Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 40440

 1                           Wednesday, 26 June 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, good morning, Mr. President.  Mr. President,

 9     Colonel Beara is scheduled to testify tomorrow at 9.00 and I received an

10     e-mail from his lawyer yesterday asking that his appearance be postponed

11     until the Appeal Chamber determines the issue of whether a person whose

12     case is pending on appeal can be compelled to testify.  That's an issue

13     that's now before the Appeals Chamber in the case of General Tolimir.  So

14     we don't disagree that it's reasonable for Colonel Beara who is in the

15     same position, to have -- not be required to testify until that issue is

16     resolved.

17             So we join in the request of Mr. Beara's lawyer that his

18     appearance be postponed until that issue is decided.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Would you like to make any observations, Mr. Tieger, about this?

21             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.  We think that makes sense.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will consider the issue but in the

24     meantime we will not hear Mr. Beara's evidence tomorrow.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 40441

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

 3     morning to all.

 4                           WITNESS:  BRANKO GRUJIC [Resumed]

 5                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Grujic.

 8        A.   Good morning.

 9        Q.   The same goes for both me and you today as well, we should speak

10     slowly, clearly and pause.  Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly move into private

12     session, please?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

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22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

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Page 40442

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 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We are now in open session.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D1417, please?  I

10     don't think this is what I asked for.  I believe that that's not that

11     document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Number again?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1417.  Maybe it's 14 --

14             JUDGE KWON:  What we saw was 1D1417.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D -- I see.  Thank you.  That has

16     already been admitted.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Could you tell us what this document is, just tell us that, who

19     issued it and what does it pertain to?  Please enlarge the Serbian

20     version.

21        A.   This is the Ministry of the Interior, the service from Valjevo

22     sent this to the district public Prosecutor's office in Sabac.  This is a

23     criminal report against Dusan Vuckovic and Vojin Vuckovic.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could we go further down to see what this shorter

25     passage says?  Do you see the three lines on the bottom?

Page 40443

 1        A.   Oh, at the bottom.  Due to reasonable grounds to suspect that as

 2     co-perpetrators they committed the crime of war crime against ...

 3        Q.   Against who?

 4        A.   The civilian population.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have the next page now, please?  The last

 6     paragraph, please, where it says the Yellow Wasps, Zute Ose, and

 7     Vuckovic, Dusan as a member of that unit, what was it that they

 8     organised, torture, killing, do you see that?

 9        A.   Yes.  Precisely, that's what I said yesterday, that when I talked

10     to a particular official I actually said that.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have the next page now, please?  Do you

12     remember what you said, how many persons had they killed?

13        A.   I didn't know exactly how many.

14        Q.   Thank you.  In the last paragraph here, around the middle, it

15     says, 19 persons; is that right?

16        A.   That was established at the trial in Belgrade.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know that they had taken these steps?

18        A.   I found out only later, from the newspapers, TV, et cetera, when

19     they were brought in for the trial.

20        Q.   Thank you.  D2269, could we please take a look at that now?

21     Could you tell us briefly what this is and what it pertains to?

22        A.   This is an indictment against Dusko Vuckovic and Vojin Vuckovic,

23     two brothers.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could we now have D482?  Can you tell us what this

25     is?

Page 40444

 1        A.   This is a judgement on the basis of which they were convicted for

 2     the crimes they committed.

 3        Q.   The supreme court of Serbia actually increased the sentence on

 4     appeal because the prosecutor appealed.

 5        A.   Yes, from eight to 12.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Not going into the expeditiousness of the judiciary

 7     in the Balkans, are you on the whole satisfied with the solution that was

 8     ultimately reached through judiciary channels?

 9        A.   I believe that this is based on the justice of God, as we say.

10        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about volunteers.  Can you tell us

11     whether you knew at the time how the law regulated the question of

12     volunteers?

13        A.   I knew a little bit, as much as I could.  I think the

14     Supreme Commander, the government, or someone from Yugoslavia or Serbia,

15     I cannot tell you exactly, reached a decision to the effect that

16     volunteers are considered to be the regular army and shall be part of the

17     regular army.

18        Q.   Thank you.  On page 50 it was suggested to you the learned

19     Prosecutor spoke about volunteers, and then in her question she changed

20     that and she said that you had probably welcomed the paramilitaries.  Can

21     you tell us whether you did welcome paramilitaries or whether you

22     welcomed volunteers and what did they say when they came?  Did they say

23     they were volunteers or paramilitaries?

24        A.   For the most part they came as volunteers who came to help their

25     people, their people who were imperilled in Bosnia, in Zvornik, at the

Page 40445

 1     time.  We took them in as our very own and we sent them to the regular

 2     command of the TO and then they were deployed in certain units where

 3     there was a shortage of soldiers.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  How did they become paramilitaries?  Did all

 5     volunteers become paramilitaries and through which act did that happen?

 6        A.   No.  God forbid.  There were many of them that fought honourably

 7     and even laid down their lives in the defence of the Serb people.  They

 8     became paramilitaries when they got out of the chain of command that

 9     existed there under the command of the Territorial Defence, when they no

10     longer obeyed the command of the Territorial Defence, when they would

11     just wander about and do whatever they pleased, then they were not the

12     military any longer, then they were paramilitaries.

13        Q.   Thank you.  On page 46, you were asked about mobilisation.  You

14     explained that this was some kind of a test mobilisation that you had

15     declared on the 5th of April, 1992.  Can you remind us when it was that

16     Alija Izetbegovic declared general mobilisation for all municipalities in

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18        A.   I think that was on the 4th of April.  I'm not quite sure of the

19     date.  Alija quite simply declared that as president and

20     Supreme Commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He declared this general

21     mobilisation.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could we briefly take a look at 1D43108?

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Hasn't been released, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a minute of patience, please.

25     Thank you.  New number, 1D44050.  New number.  It seems that there is no

Page 40446

 1     translation.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can you read who it was that wrote this and can you read the

 4     title?

 5        A.   This was written by some Hasan Efendic on the

 6     17th of November, 1999, and it says development and growth of defence

 7     liberation forces from 1992 to 1995.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have page 3 in e-court, maybe it's even

 9     page 2, we'll see.  Can we have -- first, could we have the second page,

10     or no, the third one.  Yes.  Now, please take a look at this long

11     paragraph, the third one, but please just tell us this:  The Presidency

12     at the 94th session on the 3rd of April --

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   -- considered several requests for mobilisation, units in their

15     area, and then a conclusion was reached at the session held on the

16     4th of April; is that right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Last sentence?

19        A.   Which one do you mean?

20        Q.   "To carry out mobilisation ..."

21        A.   I cannot find it:

22             "To carry out mobilisation of the entire reserve police force of

23     the SRBH in compliance with previous decisions of the Presidency of the

24     government of the SRBH."

25             In my opinion it is one of a very good but belated decisions

Page 40447

 1     which means that this should have been done earlier.

 2        Q.   When they say all the municipalities, did that include Zvornik?

 3        A.   Yes.  All the municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including

 4     Zvornik.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can this be admitted for identification?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Did the witness read out something at all from this

 7     document?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, a few sentences.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I cannot find it, to carry out mobilisation of the

12     entire reserve police for the SRBH in compliance with previous decisions.

13     Is this part of this document or the witness's evidence?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.  I was reading.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was read out.  It's part of the

16     document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will mark it for identification.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Just -- of course, it can be marked.  I just want

19     to note that we may have objections based on a lack of foundation with

20     this document.  We will wait to see the translation first and make our

21     submissions in due course.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will mark it for identification.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3731.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   On page 38 of yesterday's transcript, it was suggested to you

Page 40448

 1     with relation to what you had said that you were reporting that

 2     Jovo Mijatovic as a deputy was submitting reports to the central office.

 3     Can you tell us is there any written report and can you tell us during

 4     which period was Mijatovic able to go to Pale?

 5        A.   I know that he was under blockade initially.  I don't know for

 6     how many months, but I don't remember when the road was unblocked.

 7        Q.   Were there any written reports?

 8        A.   Very rarely.  It was him who mainly communicated with the central

 9     office.

10        Q.   Thank you.  On pages 35, you were asked about the document called

11     A and B, and you heard quotations from the trial in Belgrade and it was

12     put to you that you believe that the instructions had come directly from

13     Radovan Karadzic.  Can you tell us who from Zvornik attended the meeting

14     on the 19th of December, 1992 [as interpreted], of the SDS, who attended

15     the meeting, who brought this?

16        A.   It was Jovo Mijatovic who went there.

17        Q.   You were not there?

18        A.   Well, I really don't believe.  I may have been there but I really

19     don't remember.

20        Q.   Did Mr. Mijatovic explain how he received this paper and how it

21     was adopted and how the voting was done?

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please pause between

23     questions and answers.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Grujic, could you repeat your answer?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Jovo Mijatovic said that the

Page 40449

 1     document had been given to him by the secretariat to take it to Zvornik,

 2     and he offered no explanation as to whether there was any voting on it or

 3     not.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  The accused referred to a meeting on

 7     19 December 1992, or at least that's how it came out in translation.

 8     I think it was intended to be 1991.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it's a matter of

11     translation.  I did say "1991."

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1991.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   On page 25, line 18, there is an ambiguity.  You said since this

15     unit was lined up, and then you spoke about what the Serbs undertook and

16     what was happening after the unit had been lined up.  Which unit did you

17     have in mind, because it's not clear?

18        A.   I was referring to the unit of the Patriotic League lined up on

19     this 17th of October, 1991, in the village of Godus under full combat

20     equipment and they were using nationalistic slogans that had a

21     threatening tone aimed at the Serbian people.

22        Q.   Thank you.  On page 24, there was mention of the way in which the

23     weapons were distributed to the local boards.  However, there is no such

24     thing in the Serbian original.  Was -- were the weapons distributed to

25     the party boards?

Page 40450

 1        A.   No.  As far as I know, it was distributed to individuals in each

 2     village, so that then they have a couple of weapons in order to defend

 3     themselves in the event of an attack.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Do you speak English?

 5        A.   No, I don't.  I speak a little German.

 6        Q.   During these interview, did you have your own interpreter who was

 7     controlling their interpreter?

 8        A.   No, I didn't.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  On page 23, you wanted to explain something about the

10     procurement of weapons in the Serbian version but you were interrupted

11     and then I had to do it.  Could you kindly tell us what it was that you

12     wanted to say about the weapons obtained by the Serbian side?

13        A.   I said yesterday that the Serbian side procured weapons

14     individually on the black market.  You said that even I bought a rifle

15     for myself on the black market and I said that only one batch of weapons

16     arrived with the aid of Mr. Spasojevic and that it was distributed to the

17     villages a couple of pieces each, and this is as far as the arming go.

18     At the beginning of the war, when Arkan was there already, since the army

19     didn't want to return the weapons to the TO that were kept in their

20     custody --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Grujic, the interpreters again are unable to

23     follow you.  Could you repeat from "... since the army didn't want to

24     return the weapons to the TO that were kept in their custody."  That's --

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm sorry,

Page 40451

 1     Mr. President.  Since the weapons of the TO staff was in custody of the

 2     JNA and the JNA did not want to return the weapons, then Arkan called

 3     General Savo Jankovic by phone and he nearly threatened him that if he

 4     didn't send the weapons to Zvornik, he would come over himself to take it

 5     over.  Two or three hours later Savo Jankovic sent the weapons and they

 6     arrived at the TO staff.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us this:  It was suggested to you that

 9     the Muslims of Kozluk had signed that they were leaving voluntarily but

10     these were false signatures.  When they crossed the border, were they

11     able to tell the truth?

12        A.   They were allowed to tell the truth any place, in Kozluk, in

13     Serbia, in Serbia, to the media, they thanked the authorities of Zvornik

14     for having been treated in a humane way.  They were allowed to leave

15     without any problems, that they were provided with the means of

16     transportation, et cetera.  However, later on, somebody saw an

17     opportunity of -- to qualify this voluntary departure as a forced

18     expulsion or forced relocation.  This is totally untrue.  There was no

19     forced relocation.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now Prosecution

22     Exhibit P106?  I believe we have an English translation.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Is it true that this is the Serbian commissioner for refugees and

25     they reviewed written statement of 1.822 persons from Kozluk who stated

Page 40452

 1     that they wanted to leave Yugoslavia without any pressure whatsoever and

 2     to go to West European countries, and in conclusion it says that the

 3     above given statements were given on their own behalf.  What could

 4     possibly have forced them to lie to the authorities of Serbia since there

 5     were now people from Zvornik?

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please start his answer from

 7     the beginning.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your question from the beginning?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is true.  This is not a lie at

10     all.  These people signed the statement that they were leaving

11     voluntarily and they indeed left voluntarily.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, did the Yellow Wasps ever return to

14     Zvornik?  Were they allowed to return and were they welcomed after the

15     arrest?

16        A.   As far as I know, following the arrests, some of them did return,

17     but very soon thereafter they were chased out again.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at D1418?

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you tell us what this is?

22        A.   This is a list of persons banned from entering the

23     Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24        Q.   Do you know whether this ban was complied with?

25        A.   I cannot guarantee this because I was not in a position to

Page 40453

 1     control what the police and the army were doing.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  And the last question:  You mentioned that people

 3     were called to come back.  Did this call refer to the Serbs and tell us

 4     to whom did it refer?

 5        A.   It referred to all the citizens of Zvornik who had left the

 6     territory, both the Muslims and the Serbs, to go back to their homes and

 7     to their places of work.

 8        Q.   You said that a number of people from both communities did

 9     return.  What was the position of the Muslim leadership of Zvornik

10     municipality to those people?

11        A.   The Muslim leadership of Zvornik had already fled.  They were not

12     there on the spot in order to communicate with them.  However, the people

13     returned, nobody bothered them, they were able to exercise all their

14     rights and they were treated fairly by all the organs of the municipality

15     of Zvornik, like the municipality organs and the police.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the number of

18     the document?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Please repeat the number of the document.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P01622 [as interpreted].

21     D, Defence; not P.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Take a look at this proclamation adopted on the 8th of May, 1992,

24     by the leadership of the Muslim municipality.

25        A.   This is their leadership in exile and this is a letter addressed

Page 40454

 1     to their people, calling upon them as it says in paragraph C, Muslims,

 2     rise to the arms, go to the woods or a free territory, place yourselves

 3     at the disposal of the Territorial Defence.  They even called upon the

 4     people who remained in Zvornik to go to the woods to join them and to

 5     take arms.

 6        Q.   Please read the next sentence where you stopped after

 7     "Territorial Defence of the municipality."

 8        A.   "Do not go back to the town," or, I think, "villages," but,

 9     rather --

10        Q.   No, no, it says "Do not go ..."

11        A.   I cannot read it.  Oh, yes:

12             "Do not go to work or get involved in any other business

13     activities that would give legitimacy to the occupation power."

14             That means that they are addressing all the workers and

15     administrative staff to refrain from going to work in order to deprive

16     the incumbent authorities of their authority and power.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Regarding refugees, you were asked a question and you

18     said that there were 20.000 refugee Serbs from the Federation.  Where did

19     you accommodate those people?

20        A.   Mr. President, that's a small figure.  Somebody wrote the wrong

21     number.  We had from 35.000 to 40.000 refugees pass through Zvornik from

22     the beginning until the end of the war.  In the beginning, we would put

23     them in schools.  Some families also took people in.  They would take

24     them and place them in their homes and then when there was no more room,

25     then we formed a commission which used houses abandoned by Muslim

Page 40455

 1     citizens.  Then all the property was inventoried in the house, and then a

 2     family would be allowed to use those housing facilities temporarily so

 3     that when the family would leave that accommodation, they would have to

 4     hand back everything that was originally listed as being in that flat or

 5     house.

 6        Q.   And did it happen, Mr. Grujic, that the local population

 7     unlawfully occupied housing units, and in that case what did you do?

 8        A.   There were such cases and we reacted energetically.  We would

 9     return them back to their property or home immediately.

10        Q.   And in our legal system, what is that procedure called when

11     somebody is denied the right to move in?

12        A.   Well, it's not denied in any way.  It's not your house so get

13     out.  You have your own house.  You don't need another one.  We did not

14     have any proceedings and drag them through the courts.  It was an

15     extraordinary situation, extraordinary times.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And do you see any difference between "iseliti" and

17     "proterati," "move out" and "expel"?

18        A.   Move out and return someone to their own house is one category.

19     Expel is something else.  It means to seize somebody's home and their

20     property.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D--

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the number.

23             JUDGE KWON:  To be clear, tell us how to spell those two words in

24     B/C/S, "move out" and "expel."

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You're asking me, right?  "Iseliti"

Page 40456

 1     is i-s-e-l-i-t-i; and "to expel," "proterati," is p-r-o-t-e-r-a-t-i.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could you repeat the number, 65 ter number?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D3982.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Could you please tell us what this document is that you issued,

 6     the document on the right-hand side?

 7        A.   This document is intended as instruction to free up a sports hall

 8     or a sports centre, as we called it.  We used it as a reception section.

 9     This is where we received all the refugees.  That was their first point

10     of contact.  And then after that the commission would assign them

11     accommodation depending on the number of family members.  They would be

12     placed in empty housing and they would get a temporary decision allowing

13     them to use somebody else's property.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And did there occur anywhere an unlawful change of

15     ownership in -- of property and was that property later restored to their

16     rightful owners?

17        A.   No.  Such cases did not take place, but the temporarily used

18     property, all of it, was eventually returned to their rightful owners.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Could we -- I would like to tender

20     this document, please.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No objection.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3732, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could I now have

25     P147A -- P1478, Mladic's diary, Serbian version, 252, English version,

Page 40457

 1     254.  Can we please look at the typed pages?  Well, it's possible that

 2     it's already typewritten.  Serbian 252, English 254.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Could you please tell us, we are talking about the second

 5     paragraph from the top, "We he had to evict some of the people also for

 6     the sake of our 'heroes' who fled from Kovacevici."  Could you please

 7     explain what these quotation marks indicate and what does that mean, this

 8     "Kovacevici"?

 9        A.   Could you please tell me again where?  I cannot find the place.

10        Q.   It's the left-hand side, top part of the page.

11        A.   Thank you.  Believe me, I really don't know what he meant here,

12     what he says here.

13        Q.   And how do you understand this word "heroes" in quotation marks

14     who fled from Kovacevici?

15        A.   That means deserters who fled from the front line.

16        Q.   Did you evict Muslims or your locals who were not permitted to

17     illegally occupy somebody else's property?

18        A.   Only those who had their own house.

19             JUDGE KWON:  That's a leading question.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And, in fact, I think Dr. Karadzic has to move on

21     here.  He said -- he asked him what this meant, and the witness said,

22     "... believe me, I really don't know what he meant here," and then he

23     asks a leading question looking for a particular answer.  He's asked the

24     question, the witness in a non-leading way, the witness says he doesn't

25     know.  I think he should move on.

Page 40458

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Could we look at the

 2     previous page, please?

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can you please tell us how you understood the tone and the sense

 5     of this last sentence, at the bottom, "We were the most active in

 6     evicting Muslims"?

 7        A.   Well, this is in quotation marks; is that right?

 8        Q.   How did you understand it and do you recall him speaking about

 9     it?

10        A.   Well, I don't recall him talking about it.  Perhaps I had gone

11     out for that.  I don't think that I can answer this honestly and

12     adequately, this question.

13        Q.   And they translated it, and I'm going to read it to you now.

14        A.   I believe that this is an error, erroneously written down.

15     I wasn't present.  I really cannot answer this question.

16        Q.   Does it say here, "iseljavanje," "moving out," or "proterivanje,"

17     "expel," "expulsion"?

18        A.   No.  It can be moving out at their request.  Perhaps assistance

19     was given to those people at their request to go to the territory under

20     Muslim control or to a foreign country.  If that is what he meant, then

21     it's all right.  If he meant something else, then really I don't know.

22     I couldn't say anything about it.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Perhaps this is over but Dr. Karadzic is now

Page 40459

 1     providing his own interpretations of words.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I find that his comments is fair.  It's referring to

 3     the difference between "iseliti" and "proterati."

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Right, except that he translated them himself

 5     into English.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  This passage was shown to the witness in

 7     your cross-examination.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes, Your Honour.  My concern is that

 9     Dr. Karadzic provided his own translations from B/C/S into English in the

10     question.  If he has a concern with the translation as it's written here,

11     he should go through the appropriate channels to seek a revision.  That's

12     my concern.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think the witness confirmed or agreed with

14     Mr. Karadzic's observation as to the meaning of "iseliti" and "proterati"

15     earlier on.  So on that basis I will allow Mr. Karadzic to continue that

16     question, but let's continue.  The Chamber is -- the issue is noted by

17     the Chamber.  Please carry on.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

19     Mr. Grujic, thank you.  The Defence rests.

20                           Questioned by the Court:

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Grujic, could you tell us the position you took

22     during the war?  I take it you were the president of the SDS party but

23     I just a minute ago I saw the position as the president of the temporary

24     government?

25        A.   I have to give a broader explanation.  I was the president of the

Page 40460

 1     municipal board of the SDS, but just before the war broke out, when Arkan

 2     arrived, we continued to negotiate with the Muslims about a peaceful

 3     resolution in Zvornik.  At no cost did we even consider that there would

 4     be a conflict.  That's why we continued with the negotiations.  The

 5     negotiations were conducted in the Mali Zvornik hotel.  Arkan found out

 6     about it, went to the hotel in Mali Zvornik and acted very cunningly.  He

 7     entered the room where the negotiations were underway and he beat up our

 8     Serbian negotiators, the president of the Municipal Assembly,

 9     Jovo Mijatovic, and the Executive Board president, Jovo Mijatovic

10     [as interpreted], in front of the Muslims, and he ordered them to place a

11     white flag the following morning at 7.00 a.m. on the municipal building

12     and if this does not happen, the --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear everything that he

14     said.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And then when -- I'm just coming to

16     that, I'm just coming to that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just tell us your position you took during the war.

18        A.   Yes.  That's precisely what I wanted to say.  Now, since

19     Jovo Ivanovic [as interpreted] was beaten up, he submitted his

20     resignation as president of the Executive Board at that same moment and

21     went to the factory to work.  Since then that post was empty, and it was

22     not possible to convene an assembly that would elect the Executive Board

23     president.  Then the Crisis Staff chose me to be acting president of the

24     Executive Board, so that is why I was there temporarily until the

25     assembly had the opportunity to convene and elect a new president of the

Page 40461

 1     executive -- of the municipal board and that's how I ended up carrying

 2     out that duty for a couple of months or so, until the Yellow Wasps

 3     attacked.  So I was acting president of the Executive Board for that

 4     period, and that's how that came about.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I take it that you continued to be the

 6     president of the municipal board of the SDS in 1995?

 7        A.   I was later replaced as president of the municipality and

 8     president of the municipal board.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So you were the president of the

10     municipality of Zvornik in 1995?

11        A.   Yes.  No, no, no, no.  I was actually replaced already in late

12     1994.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So what were you in 1995?

14        A.   I was the president of the municipal board for a couple of

15     months.  I continued to be at the post of the party president.  I didn't

16     have any other posts.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Neither the Prosecution nor the Defence

18     asked you a question about 1995.  So I'd like to ask you to tell us what

19     you know about the killing of prisoners who were taken to the Zvornik

20     area after the Srebrenica had been fallen.

21        A.   In 1995, I went back to my private business.  I was managing my

22     private bakery, bakery, pastry shop so I did not get involved in any kind

23     of government organ.  What I heard from citizens, these stories, I think

24     there is no point in me repeating that.  There were different stories

25     going around, none of them would really be relevant enough for me to tell

Page 40462

 1     you about them here.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.  Then unless my colleagues

 3     have a question for you, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Grujic.  On

 4     behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague

 5     to give it.  Now you're free to go.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you just permit me, please,

 7     to greet my president?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  He must have accepted your will already so that will

 9     not be allowed.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11                           [The witness withdrew]

12             JUDGE KWON:  While the next witness is being called in, the

13     Chamber is seized of the motion from the Prosecution to redact some

14     paragraphs of the next witness's statement.  Considering that some parts

15     of the paragraphs referred to in the Prosecution motion contained

16     detailed evidence about events in Doboj which is not a municipality

17     charged in the indictment, the Chamber grants the Prosecution motion in

18     part in and order to redact the paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 31 and 34,

19     and it denies the remainder of the motion; i.e. paragraphs 12, 18 and 19

20     will remain.

21                           [The witness entered court]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, sir.  Good morning, sir.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Would you make the solemn declaration, please.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

Page 40463

 1     speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

 2                           WITNESS:  MILAN NINKOVIC

 3                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Ninkovic.  Please be seated and make

 5     yourself comfortable.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Ninkovic,

 8     I must draw your attention to a certain Rule of evidence that we have

 9     here at the International Tribunal.  That is Rule 90(E).  Under this

10     Rule, you may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the

11     Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer

12     might incriminate you in a criminal offence.  In this context,

13     "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an admission of

14     guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that might provide

15     evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.

16             However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you

17     and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you

18     know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the

19     question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your

20     testimony, compelled in such circumstances, would not be used in any case

21     that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the

22     offence of giving false testimony.

23             Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Ninkovic?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

Page 40464

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3        Q.   [Interpretation]Good day, Mr. Ninkovic.

 4        A.   Good day, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   I would like us both to bear in mind that we should speak slowly

 6     and pause between questions and answers.

 7        A.   Fine.

 8        Q.   Mr. Ninkovic, did you give a statement to the Defence team?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Could we please have 1D9230 in e-court.  You see the statement

11     before you on the screen?

12        A.   Yes, the beginning.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Please just pause a bit more before you start answering.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

17     the last page so that he can identify his signature?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Is that your signature?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said

22     to the Defence team?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today,

25     would your answers basically be the same as those contained in this

Page 40465

 1     statement?

 2        A.   They would be the same.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 5     statement, Your Excellencies, according to Rule 92 ter.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We will deal with the associated exhibits

 7     separately.  Subject to that redaction on which the Chamber has just

 8     ruled, do you have any objections?

 9             MS. PACK:  No objections, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  It will be admitted.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3733, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We have presented

14     18 associated exhibits, five of which are not on our 65 ter list which we

15     would add -- ask be added since we did not have all those documents at

16     the time we interviewed this witness.  Two of those documents have now

17     been ruled out by virtue of the redaction so we are offering 16

18     associated exhibits.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I will tell the numbers of the exhibit the Chamber

20     finds some issues with.  1D9231; 1D26075; 1D26097; 1D26103, referred to

21     in para 38; 65 ter 22049, referred to in para 43; 30012, referred to in

22     paragraph 32.  The Chamber finds them either not forming a part -- an

23     indispensable and inseparable part of the statement or not relevant to

24     the case of the accused.  So in order for the Defence to tender them, it

25     should lead live as well as showing the relevance of those documents.

Page 40466

 1     Otherwise, do you have any objection to the remaining associated exhibit,

 2     Ms. Pack?

 3             MS. PACK:  No objections to the remaining associated exhibits.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  They will be admitted and be assigned exhibit number

 5     in due course by the Registrar.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read

 7     out the summary of Mr. Milan Ninkovic's statement in the English

 8     language.

 9             [In English] Milan Ninkovic is one of the founders of the SDS and

10     was the leader of the Serbs in Doboj.  He served as a deputy of the

11     National Assembly president and was -- deputy in the National Assembly

12     and was appointed deputy president of the commission for national defence

13     and control of the work of the State Security Service.  At the end of the

14     war, he became minister of defence.  At the time of the appearance of the

15     SDA and the HDZ, Serbian people in BH had no intention of becoming

16     politically active or uniting on ethnic principles because it was assumed

17     at the time that the Serbian people could express their cultural and

18     national interests through the Prosvjeta educational and cultural

19     association.  Before the founding of the SDS, there was not a single

20     political party or organisation among the Serbian people which could

21     represent its interests.

22             At the first multi-party elections in 1990, the SDS won majority

23     of the municipality -- in the municipality of Doboj, as well as the

24     region around it.  As for the national level, the SDS was involved in a

25     special struggle against majority voting or outvoting of the coalition of

Page 40467

 1     the two other peoples which was noticed as early as in 1991.  The Serbian

 2     people were waging a great and difficult fight to remain in Yugoslavia

 3     because the secessionist intentions of the Muslims and Croats were

 4     obvious.  The referendum for the independence of BH was conducted without

 5     including the Serbian population and BH was recognised on the same day as

 6     the Muslim holiday of Bajram.  In late 1991 and early 1992, the Serbian

 7     people were fighting to remain a constituent people in BH and within

 8     their ethnic entities.  This is the reason why the Serbs accepted the

 9     Cutileiro Plan which recognised them as one of the entities of BH.  The

10     Muslims on the other side, after initial accepting, rejected the plan

11     because they intended BH to be fully under Muslim control and for the

12     Serbs to be a minority with no influence.

13             Muslims started organising in paramilitary units of the

14     Patriotic League and the Green Berets even though the JNA existed at that

15     time.  Since Yugoslavia had its own armed force, the Serbs responded to

16     the mobilisation and served in that army.  The leadership of

17     Republika Srpska and the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia had constant

18     quarrels in 1993 and earlier but specifically after 1994, August 1994,

19     when all relations were suspended including even communications.  The

20     interruption of the relation proves in every way that the leadership of

21     the Republika Srpska was not an extended arm of the authorities in

22     Serbia.  Already in April 1992, Muslims and Croats set up barricades on

23     numerous roads in the municipality of Doboj.

24             MS. PACK:  My apologies for interrupting, Dr. Karadzic, but at

25     this point it may be that some of the summary relates to part of the

Page 40468

 1     statement that had been removed on Your Honour's order.  So just to

 2     highlight that as an observation.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, but, Excellency, I didn't know that it's going

 5     to be, and it is not evidence anyway.  So why it couldn't be --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  While it is not evidence there is no need for you to

 7     continue to read that part, but please pay attention to the redaction and

 8     continue.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must admit it's hard for me now

10     to be able to tell just off the cuff.  I heard a moment ago, and I didn't

11     have time to adjust things in the summary.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break now for half an hour?  Yes, we

13     will resume at 10 to 11.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17             MR. KARADZIC:  I continue in English.

18             From the beginning of the conflict until late June, early July

19     1992, the Doboj Crisis Staff did not have any contact with or receive any

20     instructions from the republican authorities in Pale, since Doboj and

21     Teslic were the only municipalities in the entire Doboj region that

22     remained under the control of Serbian forces and were completely cut off

23     from the Serbian leadership.  Established in May and June 1992, the

24     Crisis Staff was created by the municipal organs because of the imminent

25     threat of war.  Its role was to supply and assist the population and

Page 40469

 1     organise the efficient work of the municipal organs.  The Crisis Staff

 2     did not extend its powers to the police or the army and it stopped

 3     working soon after the municipality got organised.

 4             Before the signing of the Dayton Accord, Republika Srpska had a

 5     very specific military organisation.  Since the Supreme Commander had to

 6     share his power with the commander of the general headquarters, since the

 7     May 12 1992, this post was held by General Mladic because of this duality

 8     of command, the relationship between Mladic and Karadzic were unbearable.

 9     At that time, the Supreme Commander did not have any role or

10     responsibility in respect to the approving of military operations.  Its

11     only role was to discuss and resolve the army's logistical problems due

12     to the grave material and financial situation in the army itself and

13     Republika Srpska.  Dr. Karadzic was against the military operation in

14     Srebrenica and he expressed his concern during a Supreme Command meeting

15     which also attended by Milan Ninkovic, and in 1993 Karadzic strongly

16     opposed the advance of the army towards Srebrenica.

17             They also met in order to discuss the poor functioning of the

18     authorities in the municipality.  Dr. Karadzic was concerned about the

19     difficulty to establish the rule of law and to protect the personal

20     safety and property of all civilians regardless of ethnicity.

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Ninkovic, since the Trial Chamber excluded a

22     few paragraphs from the statement that have to do with Doboj for the most

23     part, I'm going to put a few questions to you, live, in relation to that.

24     Could you tell us, first, when the war started or, rather, when the

25     fighting started in Doboj and who was fighting in Northern Bosnia and

Page 40470

 1     Doboj?

 2        A.   If we look at the broader region in Posavina, Bosanski Brod,

 3     Derventa the fighting started considerably earlier, a month or two before

 4     the conflict broke out on the 3rd of May, 1992, in Doboj.  The population

 5     from these areas fled to Doboj.  The roads were blockaded, the approaches

 6     to Doboj, because Doboj is a big centre and roads lead in several

 7     directions from there.  The fighting started on the 3rd of May because of

 8     the blockade of roads because the JNA had the deadline by which it was

 9     supposed to withdraw from these territories.  That was the

10     19th of May, 1992.  Otherwise, in Doboj, there were four military

11     barracks.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, to clarify, the Chamber ordered

13     redaction of those paragraphs because it found those paragraphs not

14     relevant.  It didn't mean to tell you to lead live about those

15     paragraphs.  Mr. Robinson, I take it Mr. Karadzic understood that point.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I'm not asking

18     about those paragraphs now.  I want to establish something about the

19     broader area of Northern Bosnia where some municipalities are.  Actually,

20     Brcko and others are included in the indictment.  I want to see when the

21     fighting started and who was involved in the fighting and what the

22     influence of the civilian authorities was.  For example, I could do that

23     in this case of Doboj because out of 62 municipalities, only 20 are in

24     the indictment, and 42 municipalities are not included, although it is

25     claimed that there had been a system that it was the system that was

Page 40471

 1     spurring crimes and was involved in war in the first place.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.  But your first statement was not

 3     clear.  That was the reason for my intervention.  Please continue.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Mr. Ninkovic, so who was it who was involved in fighting in

 7     Northern Bosnia, in all these municipalities around Doboj and in Doboj

 8     itself after the 3rd of May?

 9        A.   All the fighting in Northern Bosnia, in the so-called region of

10     Posavina, was waged by the JNA led by Colonel Stublincevic for the most

11     part.  As far as I can remember, he was withdrawing, and Ugljevik was his

12     ultimate destination in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The fighting in

13     Bosanska Posavina took place in Bosanski Brod, Derventa, Odzak, Modrica,

14     Samac, and partly in Brcko.

15        Q.   Thank you.  What was the influence of the civilian authorities

16     over this fighting up until the 20th of May?

17        A.   Well, you see, the position of the JNA was that civilian

18     authorities should by no means interfere in military matters.  They just

19     asked us to take care of the wounded, also, to man the army because at

20     that time point in time, most of the members of the army came from the

21     Republic of Serbia, all its different parts, and this army was

22     withdrawing and part of the army were these young conscripts, the young

23     army as they are known.  They had no experience, they were withdrawing

24     and they had no experience in terms of warfare and defence.  The

25     objective of the army was to remove barricades.  There were barricades on

Page 40472

 1     all sides.  The de-blockade of barricades, withdrawal and handing over

 2     different towns one by one, Derventa, Brod, Odzak and others, Modrica

 3     too.  All of these refugees then went towards Doboj and found refuge in

 4     Doboj.

 5        Q.   What were the plans of the civilian authorities, the Serb

 6     authorities, in these municipalities?  How were the problems supposed to

 7     be resolved?

 8        A.   Our position, especially in Doboj, if I may say, headed by

 9     myself, was that everything should be resolved by peaceful means, for

10     several reasons.  We were a mixed community.  In my town, in Doboj, the

11     structure was as follows:  The president of the national defence counsel

12     was the president of the assembly and he was an ethnic Muslim,

13     Ahmed Alicic [phoen], also there were meetings that were often held

14     between the executive and the military and the Municipal Assembly.  We

15     tried to resolve problems altogether, but they became increasingly

16     complicated because paramilitary units were formed like the Patriotic

17     League, the HVO and the Green Berets.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to show you an intercept, an interpretation

19     that the Croatian secret service provided, and the president of the SDS

20     of Doboj, Vinkovic, Milan is referred to.  Is there a person by that

21     name?

22        A.   I don't think there are any Vinkovics in that area, in that part

23     of the republic.  I think that that probably relates to me personally.

24        Q.   Which positions did you hold in the municipality on the

25     4th of April, 1992?

Page 40473

 1        A.   The 4th of April, 1992?  I did not hold a single important

 2     position, if I can put it that way.  I was a member of parliament, and it

 3     is true that I was cut off from my superiors; in fact, by then, we were

 4     cut off from Pale, the leadership, and so on.  So, I mean, I wasn't the

 5     commander of the Crisis Staff or the president of the War Presidency,

 6     although ex officio as a member of parliament I was a member of the

 7     Crisis Staff.  However, I'm not sure, because some documents say that

 8     I was and others that I wasn't a member of the War Presidency, too.  May

 9     I say something else?  Doboj is an exception.  If we bear in mind the

10     instructions often referred to here, instructions in critical situations,

11     in crises, Variant B was supposed to be applied in Doboj, that says that

12     the president of the municipal board, and that was I, should be commander

13     of the Crisis Staff.  However, we in Doboj thought, and that is what

14     I claim to this day, that this document was not binding because this

15     document had undergone a procedure that had not actually been adopted,

16     signed or registered.  I was not commander of the Crisis Staff, as I was

17     supposed to be on the basis of those instructions.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show this on the

20     ELMO because I don't know the e-court number.  The intercepts, I mean.

21     The intercept of the Croatian secret service.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can you read this out to us.

24        A.   Inter alia, Colonel Stublincevic when speaking to the president

25     of the SDS of Doboj.

Page 40474

 1        Q.   Do others see this?  I cannot find it.

 2        A.   Vinkovic, Milan is asking this one to be more involved in

 3     organising the medical service, taking in refugees and supplying food,

 4     whereas he should be allowed to carry out this operation because now,

 5     when combat starts he has to think of units, also he is asking the same

 6     person not to send small groups of people to him but, rather, at least a

 7     company.

 8             I did not mobilise people and, I mean, I did not have such

 9     powers.  Secondly once in Podnovlje I met this Colonel Stublincevic, and

10     he was speeding things up in order to withdraw from the Posavina theatre

11     of war.  As I've already mentioned, I think that his ultimate destination

12     was Ugljevik.  And then he clashed with part of the officers there, and

13     I happened to be there, I don't know why, so I saw this quarrel and this

14     meeting simply broke down.  It almost turned into an incident.  I never

15     saw Stublincevic again, and I never sent him, I mean, any kind of groups

16     or for me to send him a company.  That makes no sense whatsoever because

17     he had the JNA with him, the army.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19        A.   Sorry, I also have to say that this Colonel Stublincevic was not

20     very well liked among the population because -- because of the withdrawal

21     of the JNA he was removing barricades, and when he would do that, and

22     when JNA units would pass there, then everything would remain the same.

23     The Muslim-Croat forces would take the roads again, as well as the

24     already-taken locations.

25        Q.   Thank you.  But what was the attitude of the SDS and the Doboj

Page 40475

 1     municipal authorities regarding the response to mobilisation?

 2        A.   Well, our position had been known from before, and that is that

 3     the Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbian people would not establish

 4     any kind of paramilitary units or anything similar to it, but they would

 5     rather abide by the then-law on the national defence and they responded

 6     to the call-up of the JNA, and were recruited into its ranks.  It is

 7     well-known that the BH territorial staff issued an order to mobilise

 8     conscripts into the Territorial Defence instead of the only legitimate

 9     armed force of the Yugoslav People's Army because just like

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was still part of Yugoslavia.

11        Q.   Now, with regard to this document, Minister, can you tell us how

12     does it fit with your experience relating to who was involved in the

13     fighting prior to the 20th of May and how much influence the civilian

14     structures had on the fighting?

15        A.   Well, when the Yugoslav People's Army and the police force who

16     were of mixed composition solved the problem of Doboj, which was a way of

17     saving the Serbian people in Eastern Bosnia because 12 municipalities

18     around Doboj had fallen into the Croatian and Muslim hands, the

19     Yugoslav People's Army found itself under blockade in Doboj.  When they

20     removed the blockade and the roadblocks, the Yugoslav People's Army and

21     the police -- actually they were not involved in any fighting.  They

22     practically just took over Doboj.  The Muslim and Croatian forces first

23     reached the ethnic borders and the army remained on these borders, thanks

24     to the policy that we pursued at the time.  We insisted that the JNA

25     should not become involved and not to interfere in any regions where

Page 40476

 1     Serbs were not living.  Doboj was divided into four municipalities on the

 2     4th of May, and they remained as such throughout the war.  And to this

 3     date, we have interethnic -- interethnicity lines and there are still

 4     four municipalities that exist in that area.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Did I understand you well when you said that the

 6     Muslims and the Croats reached the -- their own ethnic boundaries and

 7     that the same boundaries remained until the end of the war; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  That is correct.  They withdrew on the 3rd of May.  Some of

10     them remained but those who were armed and who were frightened because

11     the army was adamant and issued an ultimatum for the weapons and

12     equipment to be returned that were in the hands of the Patriotic League

13     and the Green Berets in the part of the town called Carsija, and after

14     that they withdrew, whereas the civilians who were unarmed remained

15     behind.  They withdrew and there is a bridge a kilometre or two from

16     Doboj, this is where they erected a roadblock leading to Sarajevo, Teslic

17     and so on, and they took positions on the boundaries of their villages.

18     This was followed by provocations which prompted the Serbian forces to

19     draw up this line which remained throughout the war until the signing of

20     the Dayton Accords.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this intercept be admitted for

23     identification?

24             JUDGE KWON:  We will mark it for identification.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3744, Your Honours.

Page 40477

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can you tell us now after the departure of the JNA, when was the

 4     Army of Republika Srpska established, and what was the influence of the

 5     civilian authorities on the war?

 6        A.   As I already said, the army had a limited time to withdraw, and

 7     I'm talking about the JNA, and the deadline was the 19th of May, 1992.

 8     In the meantime, on the 12th of May, at the session of the

 9     National Assembly in Banja Luka, the Army of Republika Srpska was

10     established and a number of officers and troops --

11        Q.   Excuse me, Minister, if you please give me the briefest possible

12     answers in order to save time.  So after the 12th of May and the

13     establishment of the army, tell me who was attacking and who was

14     defending in Doboj and what was the influence of the civilian

15     authorities?

16        A.   We in the civilian authorities kept insisting not to proceed

17     further on from the ethnic boundaries established in our municipality.

18     That was our position.  And the army did not launch any attacks but,

19     rather, put up a defensive existence -- resistance because the army

20     wanted to defend the refugees and everything else that was situated in

21     that area.

22        Q.   Thank you.  A minute ago you said that civilians were against the

23     crossing over.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D9231 in

25     e-court.  Thank you.

Page 40478

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you tell us what we see on this screen and who is the author

 3     of this book?

 4        A.   What I see on the screen is a book written by Colonel Lisica who

 5     later became a general, and the title is, "The Commander Without any

 6     Need."  He wrote several books and he was the commander of the Doboj

 7     operations group.  After the corridor was opened, he returned to Doboj.

 8     This commander is well-known for his conflicts with the civilian

 9     authorities, and other military structures as well.  In our opinion, this

10     commander's intention by criticising the authorities was to have martial

11     law established there.  We were against that, and we tried to rein in

12     this person and to prevent him from becoming involved in matters that

13     were governed by the law, which is to defend the territory of our

14     municipality and the general area.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the next page?

17     Actually, page 2 of the document.  Can we please zoom in.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   And would you be kind so as to read the first ten or so lines and

20     tell me whether this is consistent with what you have experienced?

21        A.   In the area of responsibility of the Doboj operations group, it

22     says that the front was about 420 kilometres long, and it was stable.

23     I can't see clearly.  He says that there were several attempts to

24     introduce radical changes on the front line in 1992 and early 1993, but

25     it did not yield any considerable military victories but only rendered

Page 40479

 1     the tactical position slightly better by occupying the village Matuzici,

 2     the destructive acting of the president of the SDS Doboj was prevented,

 3     which he tried to pursue through the people who thought the same as he

 4     did in the units of the Doboj operations group.  The propaganda in the

 5     units was --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down because we

 7     are interpreting what is being read out.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read very slowly?  We heard until, "The

 9     propaganda in the units was --"

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Propaganda in the unit was, in

11     inverted commas, save your lives, politicians will take care of it.

12     Active duty officers are communists, people who are interested only in

13     careers, et cetera, unquote.  The Colonel allegedly quoted my statement

14     because he failed in his initiative.  I particularly was against this

15     operation because Matuzici village is situated in the southern part of

16     our municipality which was divided into the Muslim and Serbian part.  By

17     occupying this municipality, we would practically encroach upon the

18     Muslim part of the territory of the municipality, which was ethnically

19     pure and we were opposed to that, and then he alleged that the army and

20     some people on the opposite side realised that this was a political goal

21     and as a result the Colonel blamed me for the failure of that offensive

22     against this populated area where about 12.000 Muslims used to live.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can these two pages be marked for identification?

24             MS. PACK:  Mr. President, just one thing to note.  This document

25     has been notified to the Prosecution but the prior document wasn't.

Page 40480

 1     I made no objection but just to observe that there wasn't any

 2     notification in relation to the last one and obviously this one hasn't

 3     been translated and is linked to one of the documents that you've

 4     excluded in your order related to paragraph 34, I think, of the witness

 5     statement.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  This was referred to in paragraph 53.

 7             MS. PACK:  That's absolutely right.  Yes, yes, Mr. President.

 8     I was just referring to the same individual who is the author of the

 9     document at paragraph 34.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will mark it for identification.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3745, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can you describe for us, by citing your personal example, the

15     attitude towards minorities, Muslims and Croats, how many of them were in

16     Doboj after delineation took place, and what was the attitude towards

17     them?  And I'm talking about official structures.

18        A.   After the division of the municipal territory into four

19     municipalities, a large number of Muslims and Croats remained in Doboj.

20     Those who were armed withdrew and crossed over to the other side.  The

21     problem was that their families, Muslim and Croat families, remained in

22     Doboj, whereas those fit for military service crossed over and joined

23     their units.  In fact, at least that's what people were saying, that they

24     were shelling Doboj from the other side because it is well-known that

25     Doboj was the town that was hit by the largest number of shells.  Even

Page 40481

 1     after the Dayton Agreement, around 110 people were killed on the streets

 2     of the town itself, and in the area more than 1500.  So our position was

 3     that everyone can remain and exercise and enjoy all their rights with

 4     regard to health care, pensions, et cetera, and as far as I know, there

 5     were no major incidents in Doboj.  If there were any, this was done by

 6     specific individuals and I think that they are being prosecuted for what

 7     they did.  I don't know if this answers your question.

 8        Q.   Can you tell me what was the attitude towards prisoners of war

 9     captured by the JNA and later by the VRS?  And from the point of view of

10     your office as a minister, what was the position of the official

11     authorities regarding prisoners of war throughout the war?

12        A.   As I already said, there were four military barracks in Doboj.

13     One or two of them were converted into camps but those were not camps in

14     the standard meaning of the word.  When 12 municipalities around Doboj

15     fell, we had an influx of some 40.000 to 60.000 refugees.  There were

16     Croats who remained there were the subjects of maltreatment by the people

17     who came from elsewhere.  So the authorities established kind of

18     reception centres to provide accommodation for those people and they used

19     the barracks for those purposes.  We also asked the

20     International Red Cross to come over and register everyone who was there.

21     Initially, they had to undertake work obligation but later on these

22     camps, and as I said these were not camps in the classic sense of the

23     word, after they were disbanded they were exchanged and went elsewhere.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Minister, I have no further questions for you at this

25     point.

Page 40482

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Mr. Ninkovic, your evidence-in-chief has

 2     been admitted as you have noted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony

 3     in its most part.  Now you will be cross-examined by the representative

 4     of the Office of the Prosecutor.  Do you understand that?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  But I don't know what it was

 6     that was omitted, but very well.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Pack.

 8             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9                           Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:

10        Q.   Mr. Ninkovic, I'd like to go through your various appointments at

11     the outset.  You were an SDS deputy in the Bosnian Serb Assembly; is that

12     correct?

13        A.   That is correct.  In the council of municipalities, the assembly

14     had the Chamber of peoples and the Chamber of municipalities.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat what he said.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Ninkovic?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I was elected as a

18     deputy in the Chamber of municipalities.  At the time, the assembly of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina had two Chambers, the Chamber of peoples and the

20     Chamber of municipalities.  Deputies for the Chamber of municipalities

21     were elected in the territory of only one municipality, and for me

22     specifically that was the territory of the municipality of Doboj.

23             MS. PACK:

24        Q.   President of the SDS municipal board in Doboj; is that correct?

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 40483

 1        Q.   Member of the Crisis Staff in Doboj during and prior to the war,

 2     yes?

 3        A.   Look, I think the Crisis Staff was formed -- I cannot remember

 4     exactly when.  It wasn't formed by the organs of the

 5     Serbian Democratic Party but by organs of the Serbian municipality of

 6     Doboj, when the municipality was divided.  I was the member of the

 7     Crisis Staff automatically because I was a deputy but I did not accept

 8     the post of commander of the Crisis Staff.

 9        Q.   You were --

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just the translation, line 14,

11     perhaps it would be better to say "ex officio," not "automatically."

12     Ex officio.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we continue?

14             MS. PACK:

15        Q.   You were employed by the Crisis Staff, right?

16        A.   How do you mean employed?  No one was --

17        Q.   You were a -- you were a member of the Crisis Staff.  You accept

18     that, yes?

19        A.   That is correct.

20        Q.   You were one of the -- or you were the accused's recommended

21     candidate for the position of minister of defence in the government of

22     Dusan Kozic; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.  This was in 1994.

24        Q.   Yes.  Can we have P01398 up on the screen?  This is minutes of

25     the RS Assembly's 44th session held on 18th of August, 1994, which you'll

Page 40484

 1     be familiar with; is that right?  You'll be familiar with that?

 2        A.   Yes.  That was the assembly session when I was elected as

 3     minister of defence of Republika Srpska.

 4        Q.   That's right.

 5             MS. PACK:  Can we go to page 47 of the English --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stay on -- the last line in English says

 7     1996.

 8             MS. PACK:  Yes, I -- that has to be an error of transcription or

 9     translation.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

11             MS. PACK:  Certainly the box further up says 18th August, 1994,

12     and if you turn over the page to page 2, again it's repeated, the date is

13     1994.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue.

15             MS. PACK:  Thank you.  If we can go please to B/C/S page 31 and

16     to the English at page 47.

17        Q.   Now I'd like to read out to you Dr. Karadzic's commendation of

18     you.  This paragraph -- you find the paragraph that begins -- it's the

19     top of the page for you in B/C/S.  In English it's the second paragraph.

20     "Of course the government should not look as I want it to look," that

21     paragraph.  I was looking about ten lines down in English to where it

22     starts, "He resolutely requested," and that's talking about Dusan Kozic,

23     have you found that in the B/C/S?

24        A.   No.  At the topic see Mr. Radovan Karadzic and then at the bottom

25     I see Mr. Kozic.

Page 40485

 1             MS. PACK:  Have you got page -- you got page -- it's 31, please,

 2     of the B/C/S.  Is that the page that's up?  My apologies, 30 --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The previous page, the previous in

 4     Serbian.

 5             MS. PACK:  It's page 32 of the B/C/S - I do apologise - in

 6     e-court.  So there we are.  That's -- the paragraph begins, "Of course

 7     the government should," and if you can go down about three or four

 8     sentences to where it starts "He resolutely requested," got that?

 9        A.   I still don't have that page.  I'm looking at page 31.

10        Q.   It's the right page.  At the top of the page it should say

11     something to the effect of course the government should not look as

12     I want it to look.  Is that right?  Is that what it says?  Yes?

13        A.   No, no.  I don't see anything.

14        Q.   Can you read from the top of the page, please?

15        A.   It is page 31.

16        Q.   Just that page, would you read it, please?

17        A.   Well, it's very small, and it's a bit too far.  Of course, the

18     government should not look as I -- it's very small, the letters are too

19     small.  The way I want it to look, and it doesn't look as I want it.  It

20     has to look the way Kozic wants it.

21        Q.   Okay, that's the right paragraph.  Thank you.  Now I'm going to

22     take up further down a couple of sentences down where it starts - it goes

23     as follows:

24             "He resolutely requested that a member of the Main Staff should

25     be the Defence Minister and that is where I was persistent, with all due

Page 40486

 1     respect, to the people from the Main Staff," and then it goes over to

 2     page 48 in the English, same page B/C/S, "to the Main Staff who were

 3     mentioned but the position of the Main Board is that it has to be a

 4     civilian because the Main Staff has a very prominent and outstanding

 5     person heading it, General Mladic.  Anyone who would become minister

 6     would have to salute General Mladic while the minister should be someone

 7     who is the master in that field."

 8             And it goes on:

 9             "I'll take it up here.  I must say that I've heard different

10     things about Ninkovic.  I've heard that in Doboj he has things under his

11     control to such an extent that we have lost some people due to that.

12     They went over to the radicals.  They say it is because Ninkovic has

13     everything under his control.  It was an argument in his favour rather

14     than one against him, because if he can control a huge municipality while

15     he is not even its president, he can influence the events.  It gave me

16     some hope that it is possible for him to introduce order in the army as

17     well."

18             Now, here is the question.  You've testified today that you

19     didn't hold a single important position in Doboj.  That was your

20     testimony, wasn't it?

21        A.   No.  I did have a position, the position of party president,

22     until March 1992, when the premises of the Serbian Democratic Party were

23     bombed and because of many barricades at the approaches to Doboj and

24     because of the general political situation.  We suspended the work of the

25     party until further notice, and because of that I did not have any more

Page 40487

 1     positions other than the one of member of the Crisis Staff.  I'm talking

 2     about 1992.  As for this here, as far as I can remember, the assembly

 3     meeting at which I was elected minister was also attended by my

 4     predecessors, ministers from the officer cadre, and their position was

 5     that they had lower ranks than that of the commander of the Main Staff,

 6     and --

 7        Q.   I'm not asking about the content of that meeting, the assembly

 8     meeting.  Please wait a moment.  I'm asking you about your position in

 9     Doboj.  Now, you testified this morning that you didn't hold a single

10     important position in Doboj.  And my question to you is:  The fact of the

11     matter is you controlled the municipality, right, during the war?

12        A.   That is not correct.  How could I control the municipality?  The

13     municipality was controlled by the Crisis Staff, headed by the commander

14     of the Crisis Staff.  The municipality was controlled by the civilian

15     structures, by the name of War Presidency, and these two institutions

16     functioned for a very short period of time, as soon as there were

17     conditions created so that the assembly, Municipal Assembly, could meet

18     and the Executive Board could meet, the Crisis Staff stopped operating.

19     I said that I was a member of the Crisis Staff, but I was not the person

20     at its head.

21        Q.   I'm not talking about who is head of the Crisis Staff.  I'm

22     talking about what Radovan Karadzic says here which is appointments or

23     not he controlled the municipality.  Is that a -- a statement that is not

24     accurate, so far as you're concerned?

25        A.   I was the president of the winning party in Doboj, and, of

Page 40488

 1     course, I dealt with the setting up of the government until the work of

 2     the party was frozen in March 1992.

 3             MS. PACK:  I'd like to go to another exhibit, please.  Can we

 4     have 65 ter 12084.

 5        Q.   You had spoken earlier about the 1991 instructions which you

 6     said, what, they weren't binding?  You didn't follow them?  What's your

 7     position?  Stop -- answer the question.

 8        A.   Yes.  What -- what question?  I didn't understand the question.

 9     I apologise.

10        Q.   My question is did you follow the 1991 instructions in Doboj.

11     Just answer the question.  Answer the question.

12        A.   We did not.  We did not because the instruction said one thing

13     and we did another thing.  If you have the instruction so that you can

14     look on the page towards the bottom of the page, the commander of the

15     Crisis Staff should be the president of the municipal board of the

16     Serbian Democratic Party and that was not the case in Doboj.

17        Q.   Just look at the article at the bottom of the page, please.  It's

18     an interview with you in "Novo Glas" dated 26th of March, 1993.  Got it?

19        A.   1993?

20        Q.   That is, isn't it, the anniversary of the setting up in Doboj of

21     the Serbian municipality, the various Serbian institutions that were set

22     up on the 26th of March, 1992; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Here you are in an article and you can see how that article is

25     headed, Milan Ninkovic, president of --

Page 40489

 1        A.   Took over.

 2        Q.   President of the SDS in Doboj and a member of parliament, we

 3     assumed historical responsibility.  And it says, on the eve of the

 4     anniversary of the formation of the Serbian municipality in Doboj, the

 5     place and role of the SDS both on the level of Republika Srpska and Doboj

 6     municipality must be recognised.  Mr. Milan Ninkovic, president of the

 7     municipal board of the SDS Doboj and a member of parliament, is the most

 8     competent person to present its evaluation.  Now if we could just turn in

 9     the English, please, to the second pain of page and I'd like you to look

10     in the B/C/S, please, at --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness have the original

12     version considerably magnified, please?

13             MS. PACK:  Yes, I'd agree.  Let me just identify the paragraph

14     which needs to be magnified for the witness.  It's the third paragraph.

15     So it's -- it's the middle paragraph -- it's a bit unfortunate actually

16     because it's -- it straddles all three columns.

17        Q.   Can you -- can you see it now, Mr. Ninkovic?

18        A.   I see it but I cannot read it.  Somebody can read it.  I don't

19     know if it's my glasses or something else.

20        Q.   Okay.  Well the first paragraph I'm not going to deal with.  So

21     we are going to the third paragraph where it starts:

22             "It is a general opinion that the SDS has successfully ended the

23     first period of work in which we gathered all the Serbs?"

24             Can you see where that starts?

25        A.   I see it, I see it.

Page 40490

 1        Q.   Perhaps you'd like to read the rest out.  Could you read it out

 2     loud, please?

 3        A.   Very well:

 4             "Back in December 1991, according to precise and strict

 5     instructions of the Main Board of the party, OOSDS Doboj formed a

 6     secretariat of the party, formed a Crisis Staff and issued a decision on

 7     the initiation of preparations for the formation of the Serbian

 8     Municipality of Doboj, constitution of its assembly and relevant organs.

 9     Through different forms of organising, the SDS tried to express the

10     political interests of the Serbian people because its representatives are

11     in the assembly, government and Presidency, and were literally pushed out

12     by outvoting and a coalition of the SDA and the HDZ representatives.

13     After the famous events in March and April 1992, the party assumed the

14     historical responsibility of organising the prevention of a new genocide.

15        Q.   So there we are.  You followed the precise and strict

16     instructions of the SDS Main Board, that is the December 1991

17     instructions, is that correct, looking at this now?

18        A.   Yes.  But there is a problem there.  The formation of Serbian

19     municipalities was a response to a different question.  If you permit me,

20     I can clarify that a little bit.  Serbs always responded to a given

21     situation.  What we would say an action -- a reaction in response to an

22     action, starting in October 1992 and then things went on from there.  The

23     Croat-Muslim coalition would make one move and we would respond to that

24     move.  That's how things proceeded.  And then when this decision was made

25     to go to a referendum on the 28th of February and the 1st of March, 1991,

Page 40491

 1     without the Serbs, our response was to form Serbian entities, autonomous

 2     provinces, Serbian municipalities, from local communes up to the largest

 3     entities, and that's how in Doboj the Serbian Municipality of Doboj was

 4     formed, and then on the other side also the Muslim municipality of Doboj,

 5     Doboj east, was formed.  And what I'm saying is --

 6        Q.   I'm asking you a question about the 1991 instructions.  Now, the

 7     question is:  Whether or not what you state here in this article in terms

 8     back in December 1991, according to the precise and strict instructions

 9     of the Main Board of the party, the OOSDS Doboj formed a secretariat,

10     formed a Crisis Staff and issued a decision on initiation of preparations

11     and so on.  Did you follow in Doboj the precise and strict instructions,

12     as is said here, that were contained in the 1991 December instructions?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be more specific, please?

14     Does the Prosecutor mean the paper known as A and B, or some other

15     instruction?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Your intervention is not appropriate.  Her question

17     is based on this article.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it is --

19             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Your objection is overruled.  Please answer the

20     question, Mr. Ninkovic.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's true that in 1991 the

22     secretariat was formed, the secretariat was formed as the inner executive

23     body of the municipal board.  That is correct.  But now, the Crisis Staff

24     was not formed in 1991.  I told you that the Crisis Staff was formed by

25     the Serbian municipality that was formed on the 26th of March, 1991.

Page 40492

 1     Actually, 1992.

 2             MS. PACK:  Break it up.  Let's break it up.  Let's break my

 3     question up.  Back in December 1991, did you follow the precise and

 4     strict instructions, the precise and strict instructions, of the SDS

 5     Main Board as you state here in the article?

 6        A.   No, we did not.  I would like to explain.  The secretariat was

 7     formed.  I don't know if the instructions envisaged the formation of

 8     secretariats.  The municipality was formed after the 28th of February and

 9     the 1st of March when independence was voted and when the referendum was

10     held among the other two peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the 26th of

11     March - on the 26th of March, I say again - the Serbian Municipality of

12     Doboj was formed because it was formed because of the inability to meet,

13     then the Crisis Staff was formed, and then, on the 26th of March, the

14     party suspended its work.  Of course, we did take part in it.  We just

15     said that we from the Serbian Democratic Party suspended our work.  We

16     cannot form a Crisis Staff.  This is something that would be done by the

17     municipalities.  The practice for the Crisis Staff was that they had

18     plans but the implementation of those plans depended on the situation on

19     the ground.

20        Q.   The instructions, we are talking about the 1991 instructions,

21     they call for a party secretariat, don't they?

22        A.   That is correct.  The secretariat is the operative body of the

23     municipal board because the municipal board had problems to meet, so that

24     everything could be regular, then the secretariat was formed, which is

25     actually a kind of executive body of the municipal board.

Page 40493

 1        Q.   The Crisis Staff in Doboj co-ordinated -- co-ordinated the

 2     military and civilian authority, didn't it, in Doboj?

 3        A.   I don't know in what sense it was standing by its army and it

 4     took care mostly of refugees.  You need to view Doboj in a special

 5     context.  As I said, 12 municipalities around Doboj fell into enemy hands

 6     and the refugees arrived, and they couldn't go anywhere from Doboj.  The

 7     entire region, which had eight or nine municipalities, only two

 8     municipalities, that of Doboj and Teslic, stayed in Serbian hands, i.e.,

 9     under Serbian rule.  So the Crisis Staff was mostly dealing with these

10     problems, trying to calm the situation down.

11        Q.   Let me just -- let me just focus -- focus your answer, I focus

12     the question.  You in the Crisis Staff made the decision to attack and

13     take over Doboj, right, and the army acted on that decision?

14        A.   That is not correct.

15        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] I'm going to ask you to look at another

16     document, please.  It's 65 ter 25274, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit the document, 12084.

18             MS. PACK:  I would be grateful, yes.  I -- I -- I would ask to

19     admit that document.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6418, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  But before we proceed further, when was it then you

22     were appointed as minister of defence, Mr. Ninkovic?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 18th of August, 1994.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But I remember Mr. Karadzic you in reading out the

25     summary, you introduced that he was appointed as minister of defence

Page 40494

 1     after the war.  Where is it -- where in the statement does it dealt it?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Towards the end.

 3             MS. PACK:  It is the case that he was reappointed to that

 4     position after the war, Mr. President, if that assists.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  If you could clarify with the witness.  So you were

 6     appointed in 1994 and continued to be the minister of defence after the

 7     war, or ...

 8             MS. PACK:

 9        Q.   I can -- can help you with the dates, Mr. Ninkovic, if it would

10     help.  You were appointed Mr. Dusan Kostic's [sic] government on

11     18th of August, 1994, then again to that position, to the position of

12     minister of defence in --

13        A.   Kozic.

14        Q.   Vojko Kazicic's [phoen] on the 17th of December, 1995, and then

15     again in 1996 to the following government in 1996.

16        A.   And then one more time in the government after that, in four

17     governments.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I --

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The government of Dusan Kozic, the

20     government of Kasagic and twice the government of Klickovic.  That's how

21     it should have been stated.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Not knowing the names of the governments, I'm not

23     sure whether the witness continued to be the minister of defence or there

24     were intervals.  Could you clarify with the witness?

25             MS. PACK:

Page 40495

 1        Q.   It's all the way through, isn't it?  You were reappointed all the

 2     way through from August 1994, then again in December 1995, then in

 3     May 1996, and again in November 1996 and that was a continual in effect

 4     reappointment over that period; is that right?

 5        A.   That's right.  Governments changed, and Minister Ninkovic

 6     remained in each and every one of the coming governments.

 7             MS. PACK:  Mr. President could we move on to the document?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             MS. PACK:  It's up now on the screen.

10        Q.   Now, here is a broadcast and I'm going to take you to a very

11     limited number of lines in this broadcast.  You can see there the title,

12     it's the record of the Serbian Radio Doboj programme broadcast on the

13     2nd of May, 1997, to mark the fifth anniversary of the forcible takeover

14     of government in the town of Doboj.  And you are amongst the guests

15     during that broadcast; correct?

16        A.   That's right.  Where does it say forcible takeover of government?

17     I cannot see that.  You must added that.

18        Q.   I haven't added anything.  If you look at the heading, please?

19        A.   Very well.  I apologise.

20        Q.   That's an article that you have confirmed [overlapping speakers]

21        A.   Yes, but I do apologise, I just don't know who wrote the heading.

22     It certainly wasn't the editor who was conducting the interview.

23        Q.   Well let's move on from the heading.  Let's go to page 2, please,

24     of the English, and in the B/C/S, please, page 2 as well.  And I want to

25     take you to Joganovic's [phoen] question which you can just see at the

Page 40496

 1     bottom towards the bottom in the B/C/S.  It says, "The army was by

 2     definition an extended hand of politics."  "When was the political

 3     decision made to take control of the town," Mr. Agoian [phoen] said

 4     referring to an earlier answer.  And then you take on the answer to this

 5     question, you say, "This must be a question for me.  It is true we were

 6     organised in this way."  I'm not going to read the whole paragraph.  Let

 7     me just take it up from about halfway -- about six lines down you said:

 8             "Because according to the instruction we received from above

 9     everyone had the right, in other words everyone had to do their job.  I

10     was in charge of Doboj municipality but I was not allowed and our

11     organisation for instance to get involved and help Maglaj municipality,"

12     and then you go on.

13             There again you're stating that you were in charge of Doboj; is

14     that accurate?  Does that accurately describe the position you held over

15     the municipality of Doboj?

16        A.   Yes.  I was in the organs of the party at republican level.  Of

17     course, as member of parliament elected by that same people, I was

18     supposed to take care of the people from that point of view.  We had

19     constant problems with the military in Doboj.  We had problems with the

20     army in Doboj then as well.  We wanted things to be resolved by peaceful

21     means but they said that they could not wait for that, that they had to

22     resolve that in a different way, in a military way.  However, when the

23     telegram arrived from Sarajevo, from the Territorial Defence, to the

24     effect that Doboj should be taken by the Patriotic League and the rest,

25     and bearing in mind that all other municipalities in that part of

Page 40497

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina had fallen, then the army decided that and we did not

 2     oppose it.

 3        Q.   You're moving on from what I directly asked you on to other

 4     matters.  What I directly asked you is whether you were in charge of

 5     Doboj and you now accept that, do you?  You accept you were in charge and

 6     in control of Doboj municipality; is that correct?

 7        A.   I don't know what sense you mean, that I was in charge.  How

 8     could I exercise control over the Crisis Staff when they have a

 9     leadership of their own?  How can I exercise control over the Serb

10     municipality when I do not head that Serb municipality and so on?  The

11     party had frozen its work and we had political influence but we did not

12     decide on anything.

13        Q.   Mr. Ninkovic, these are your words.  These are your words.

14        A.   Well, all right.  But you have to bear in mind that this is some

15     kind of an anniversary, and then for political reasons, well, you know,

16     elections are getting closer, so I allow for that possibility that I did

17     say some of that, but I'm saying what the situation was.  Do you

18     understand that?  These political speeches and political statements

19     cannot always be taken at face value.

20        Q.   Okay, let's look at a document that isn't an article.

21             MS. PACK:  I'd like to admit in evidence just the portion upon

22     which I've relied, which is as described it's at page 2 of the English.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit it as Exhibit P6419.

24             MS. PACK:  Grateful.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, may we admit the entire

Page 40498

 1     article?  There is another aspect that would be useful.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary, Mr. Karadzic may lead that part.

 3             MS. PACK:  Thank you.  Let's go to 65 ter 11270, please.

 4        Q.   You maintain in your evidence that the rights of the non-Serbian

 5     population in Doboj were maintained and upheld, is that right, during the

 6     war?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, I'm not going to go into this to show you this document.

 9     Let's move, please, in the English to page 4 and in the B/C/S to page 3.

10     Now, these are two decisions I'm going to ask you to look at.  The first

11     decision is a decision by the Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of

12     Doboj - and I'll show you the end of the document in a moment - dated the

13     24th of June, 1992, and it's addressed to the Serbian Republic of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Ministry of Justice.  You can see that.  And if

15     we just turn to page 2 of the English, you can stay where we are in the

16     B/C/S -- I mean, sorry, page 5 of the English.  Now we can see what this

17     decision is about.  It is a decision which proposes to the

18     Ministry of Justice the removal -- you can see it on your page -- the

19     removal of non-Serbs from judicial positions citing a decision of the ARK

20     Crisis Staff that only Serbs can have leading positions in state

21     institutions.  And you can see in the handwriting, you can see the names

22     of three non-Serbs identified, whose -- who are to be removed from their

23     positions and you can see handwritten relieved next to their names, can't

24     you?  And I would say -- just point you to the top of the page, you can

25     see some handwriting at the top of the page in the B/C/S and it's

Page 40499

 1     actually the preceding page 4 in the English.  It says handwritten done,

 2     yes?  And there are some Serbian prosecutors identified to replace the

 3     non-Serbs.

 4        A.   Are you asking me?

 5        Q.   Well, you can see that.  Can you -- can you just confirm that you

 6     can see the document, it's clearly there for you?  Yes?  You would have

 7     been aware of decisions of this nature?

 8        A.   Well, you see, first of all I have to correct you.  You said

 9     Crisis Staff.  The Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb

10     Municipality of Doboj, signed president.  This has nothing to do with the

11     Crisis Staff.  So this is the Serb municipality of Doboj, and if you go

12     further down, you will see it says president, and when you spoke, you

13     said that it was the Crisis Staff that had proposed this.  This is --

14        Q.   Are you trying to say you have nothing to do with this because

15     it's not the Crisis Staff, it's just the president; is that right?

16        A.   Well, no.  The Crisis Staff and the Serb municipality is not the

17     same thing.  You said the Crisis Staff proposes judges.  That's not true.

18     The organ in charge is called the Serb municipality of Doboj.

19        Q.   Show the bottom of the page in B/C/S, please, and you can see,

20     please, in the English at page 6, you see the stamp?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, while we are still here,

22     please, take a look at the translation for "predlazimo," "we wish to

23     nominate," "recommend" is one thing, "nominate" is another thing.

24     [In English] "The area of judiciary and Prosecution, we wish to

25     nominate."  [Interpretation] "To appoint," and the original says, "we

Page 40500

 1     propose."  And then of course, it is left to the minister to decide.

 2             MS. PACK:  Yes, can we -- can we -- can we please go to the last

 3     page.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the end of

 5     what Mr. Karadzic stamp.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Please do not overlap -- [overlapping speakers]

 7             MS. PACK:  [Overlapping speakers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could we zoom in to the stamp?  Just the stamp, yes.

 9             MS. PACK:

10        Q.   You can see that, can't you, that that's a stamp which has I said

11     on it the assembly of Serbian municipality of Doboj Crisis Staff, at

12     least that's how it's translated.  Can you confirm that?

13        A.   Bosnia-Herzegovina, no.  The assembly of the Serb municipality of

14     Doboj, and in very small letters, very fine print, it says

15     "Crisis Staff."  You see here it says "the Serb Republic of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina," then the "assembly of the Serb municipality of

17     Doboj," big letters, and then in the middle it says "Crisis Staff."  And

18     you see in the heading of the document, it says it's the "Serb

19     municipality of Doboj."  I don't know what the Crisis Staff had to do

20     with it because it wasn't functioning at the time.

21        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's -- let's leave that.  This is a document then

22     with a proposal for the removal of three non-Serbs from this position, a

23     recommendation for the appointment of three Serbian prosecutors.  And let

24     us, please, go to the second page in the English, and in the B/C/S,

25     please, let us go to similarly the second page.  This is a decision --

Page 40501

 1     can't see it in the English but in the B/C/S you can see it all.  It's a

 2     decision, isn't it, by which Radovan Karadzic appoints the Serbian

 3     candidates to the positions that we've spoken about, isn't it?  Do you

 4     agree?  In the English if we just look at page 3.  You can see there the

 5     signatory and the date.

 6        A.   Yes.  That can be seen, but I cannot see here in the heading on

 7     the basis of such and such article of the constitution of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, I cannot clarify that, the decision is correct, and

 9     then from the previous document you can see that the persons who were

10     proposed were accepted and they were appointed to these positions of

11     senior public attorney in Doboj, and so on and so forth, Stokic, Zoran, I

12     don't know, whatever all their names were.  You cannot really see it

13     here.  Panic Dusko, that is correct.

14        Q.   We don't need to go -- we can see the document it -- it -- it

15     identifies these same persons.

16        A.   But --

17             MS. PACK:  I'd like to have that document admitted, please.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] However, I do not see on the basis

19     of which article the president made these appointments up here, on the

20     basis of which legal documents.

21             MS. PACK:  Mr. President, may that document be admitted in

22     evidence?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will receive it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6420, Your Honours.

25             MS. PACK:

Page 40502

 1        Q.   Let's move on to 1995.  Now, you were in Western Bosnia during

 2     the Srebrenica preparations; is that right?

 3        A.   That is right.

 4        Q.   When?

 5        A.   Well, I cannot say exactly, but from time to time I came to the

 6     headquarters in Pale by helicopter and then I'd return and so on.  As for

 7     supplies, I was transferred to the western part of the front line to

 8     bring together the operation of the 11 municipalities that were

 9     undergoing a crisis, that were attacked from all sides.  It was necessary

10     to organise civilian life.  Also manning, material supplies as well.  So

11     with General Milovanovic and the Minister of Justice, I was in the

12     western part of the front when Muslim and Croat forces attacked the

13     western part of Republika Srpska.

14        Q.   I want to ask you about Srebrenica.  Now you talk in your

15     statement about a meeting you had with Radovan Karadzic, the meeting on

16     the 18th of July and also 26th of July.  Is that when you had returned

17     full time from Western Bosnia or did you just drop in for those meetings?

18        A.   Well, I assume that it just so happened that I was there.  I

19     cannot recall the subject that we discussed.  However, there is the name

20     of a particular person there, Maksim Stanisic, who was president of the

21     Executive Board, the head of the executive government of Sarajevo, and

22     there were some problems in that part of Sarajevo so that's probably what

23     we discussed.  I think that at that meeting there was no discussion

24     concerning Srebrenica.  Had that happened, I certainly would have

25     remembered it.

Page 40503

 1        Q.   When were you debriefed then about the involvement of your

 2     ministry in removing elderly men, women and children from the Srebrenica

 3     area, from Potocari?  When were you -- when were you debriefed about

 4     that?

 5        A.   I don't understand you.  What do you mean, what ministry?  It's

 6     not the ministry that carried out the removal of civilians from

 7     Srebrenica.  The ministry played a completely different role in that

 8     homeland war of ours.

 9        Q.   [Overlapping speakers]

10        A.   What does the ministry have to do with Srebrenica, except for

11     certain things that at the request of the Main Staff, certain buses and

12     trucks, et cetera, were mobilised and placed at the disposal of the Main

13     Staff.  That's the only role of the ministry in the operation that was in

14     Srebrenica.

15        Q.   When were you --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Pack, before you go further, let me put this

17     question to the witness:  Mr. Karadzic was the Supreme Commander in his

18     capacity of the president; correct?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And General Mladic was the commander of the

21     Main Staff of the VRS?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct.

23             JUDGE KWON:  And you were the member of the Supreme Command in

24     the capacity of minister of defence?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct too.

Page 40504

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Could you explain to us the relation amongst these

 2     three individuals?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have said earlier on that I was

 4     appointed in 1994 as the first civilian minister of defence because there

 5     were major problems between the civilian authorities and the military

 6     structures, because beforehand there were two ministers who were

 7     lower-ranking officers in relation to the commander of the Main Staff.

 8     When I arrived, my task was to normalise these relations between the

 9     civilian structures and the military structures.  The army was just

10     supposed to have command responsibility over the army and all the rest

11     should belong to the Ministry of Defence, in the following sense:

12     Product specific production, logistics, and many other things that we

13     often discussed, and even on an ideological and political basis, the

14     military interfered in that and we did not allow that.  I don't know if

15     I've given a full answer, but --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Put it in simple terms, would it be correct that you

17     could be regarded as superior to General Mladic?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  In a command sense, no, but as

19     for the rest, logistics, supplies and the rest, yes, the ministry was

20     responsible for that.  But the ministry in the situation of war, imminent

21     threat of war, it did not have anything to do with command, just like the

22     Supreme Command did not make decisions on any kind of operations,

23     et cetera.  It was more of an advisory body.

24             JUDGE KWON:  After the war, at some point in time, the Main Staff

25     of the VRS was transformed into a form of General Staff?  Am I correct in

Page 40505

 1     so understanding?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  In 1994, when I became

 3     minister, I intervened immediately in certain ways because foreign

 4     observers and some people from IFOR then had suggested to the minister of

 5     defence that this duality of command had to be resolved.  However, in

 6     this constellation of relations because war operations were going on, we

 7     did not change the Law on the Army or the Law on National Defence.

 8     However, in 1996, when President Karadzic handed over his duties to

 9     Mrs. Biljana Plavsic, then we decided together to make this cut in the

10     army and to change the Law on the Army and the Law on Defence.  The

11     essence of this change of the law was inter alia that instead of a

12     Main Staff, the army should be headed by a General Staff, and the

13     General Staff would be headed by the chief of General Staff, not a

14     commander, because this is a well-known organisation of the military in

15     all countries.  The Supreme Commander, along with the Supreme Command,

16     and then the chief of General Staff or perhaps it's called a different

17     name in other countries, but in Yugoslavia and in Serbia and to this day

18     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, there is this chief of General Staff.  That's

19     where we clashed, especially I with General Mladic, because he disagreed

20     with that.  However, we even joked a bit, that Tito in 1941 did not

21     recognise the king as the Supreme Commander and then he was commander

22     too, and the king was in exile in England.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So at that time, when that transformation took

24     place, could the minister of defence be regarded as the -- as a superior

25     to the Chief of Staff of the VRS?

Page 40506

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, no.  Actually, the army was

 2     in the ministry then but we had two completely separate functions.  His

 3     superior was the president of the republic as the Supreme Commander, that

 4     is to the Chief of the General Staff.  And most importantly then, we

 5     managed to get the military industry out of the control of the army and

 6     this was reflected on something different later, and then Biljana

 7     returned it to the army and then these well-known dealings with Iraq and

 8     then the replacement of the president of the republic, because Orao was

 9     within the military, not the civilian structures, and they were the ones

10     that overhauled planes for Iraq that was under international sanctions.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Given the time, shall we continue after

12     the break, Ms. Pack, if it is not inconvenient for you?

13             MS. PACK:  It is, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  We will resume at quarter past 1.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.27 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Pack, please continue.

18             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19        Q.   We touched briefly before the break on the role of the

20     Ministry of Defence in mobilising and placing at the disposal of the Main

21     Staff the buses, for the remove of the civilian population that had been

22     in Srebrenica.  So when were you made aware of the Ministry of Defence's

23     contribution to this process?

24        A.   Well, I cannot remember exactly, bearing in mind that I was in

25     the western part of Republika Srpska.  Upon arrival at the ministry, I

Page 40507

 1     had an assistant who was in charge of mobilisation, but he deferred this

 2     at a lower level of the secretariat, and then further down to ministry

 3     departments and then the departmental allocate this to various

 4     municipalities pursuant to the request of the Main Staff.  But as I said,

 5     I cannot tell you the exact time when I learned about the mobilisation of

 6     assets and this is actually standard procedure applied in the ministry.

 7     When we requisition or mobilise vehicles or similar assets we do not

 8     inquire to what purposes these assets are needed.

 9        Q.   This wasn't a standard operation, was it?  It was a huge

10     operation.  Now I'm asking you approximately, approximately when -- can

11     you recall what month, when -- when can you recall you were told about

12     this significant contribution that was made by your ministry?

13        A.   Well, look, my assistant for mobilisation of assets was in charge

14     of that and he forwarded that to lower level so that's three steps

15     downwards, and even four steps downwards from me.  Now, when was it that

16     I learned about this and when I returned, I don't know.  I heard about

17     the operation of Srebrenica in -- on TV.  We were in Drvar and that is

18     when I heard that the operation Srebrenica was successfully completed

19     military operation.  And that was all that was broadcast and carried in

20     the media.

21        Q.   Can you remember roughly when you came back, what time of year,

22     what time of year were you debriefed about your ministry's role?

23        A.   Well, I cannot -- I cannot remember when I returned from the

24     western front.  My assistant didn't need to inform me about this because

25     when they were doing other sorts of mobilisations, they had never

Page 40508

 1     informed me about that.  For example, when they were mobilising manpower,

 2     conscripts, people for work obligation, they never informed me on that as

 3     well, because as I said that was a standard procedure.

 4        Q.   Are you saying now that you weren't informed about this -- these

 5     mobilisations?

 6        A.   No.  There was no need for that.

 7        Q.   At one point you became aware, did you, that there had been a

 8     remove from the Srebrenica area, from Potocari, thousands of men,

 9     children, elderly men, women and children, in buses, some of which had

10     been mobilised by the Ministry of Defence; right?

11        A.   It was the Ministry of Defence that mobilised the buses, the

12     order signed by my assistants, I saw that for the first time during my

13     testimony before The Hague Tribunal, and it was only recently that I saw

14     these order because whenever I returned from some trip, I never wanted

15     and asked them to see every single order that were sent downwards to the

16     level of municipalities, and so on.

17        Q.   It's your evidence that the first time you heard about your

18     ministry's involvement in the mobilisation of buses was before you

19     testified here in these proceedings?  Is that your evidence?

20        A.   That is correct.  I saw these orders, four or five of them, for

21     the first time before I came to testify here because when I returned to

22     the ministry, I did not request my assistants to show me the orders that

23     they had issued.  And for your information, there are ministry

24     departments, there are secretariats, which comprise several ministries,

25     there is an assistant minister for mobilisation, and finally on the top

Page 40509

 1     of the pyramid there is the minister which means there are four levels.

 2        Q.   You learned of course that the civilian population were removed

 3     from the Srebrenica area, you learned that many years ago, you're not

 4     saying that this is something that was also newly learnt on your arrival

 5     here in The Hague?

 6        A.   That is not what I said.  I found out about this from the media

 7     during and after the operation itself, because it was shown on TV that

 8     buses and lorries were leaving for Tuzla and Kladanj and other places

 9     where the populations were being relocated to.

10             MS. PACK:  I realise my time is up.  I have no further questions

11     for this witness, thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Pack.  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any

13     re-examination?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies.

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Minister, let us start from the last question

17     and your answer to it.  It has been suggested to you, and interpreted to

18     you, that these civilians were removed, whereas you said that they were

19     relocated.  Did you have any information about them having been removed

20     in terms of forcible relocation?

21        A.   No, I didn't.

22        Q.   Thank you.  There was mention of some disagreements with the

23     army.  As for the Army of Republika Srpska as a state organ, had they

24     committed any crime that you as a minister should have known about?

25        A.   I think that the army did not commit any crimes.  I am convinced

Page 40510

 1     of that, being a member of the Supreme Command and knowing you, had we

 2     found out that the army had committed any kind of crimes, and bearing in

 3     mind the tensions that existed between the military, the Supreme Command

 4     and the civilian authorities, I am convinced, and I am sure that you

 5     would have dismissed immediately some people primarily General Mladic,

 6     the Chief of the General Staff, because we could hardly wait for

 7     something to pin on him because our option, and your option, was to try

 8     and solve everything in a peaceful manner, and we kept insisting at all

 9     meetings of the government and the assembly that the peace plan is the

10     priority and that they should only defend the reached separation lines.

11     You were always against any other kind of action and you always advocated

12     a peaceful end to the war, just like every war has to end with a peace

13     agreement.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Chamber if there -- or our crimes

15     were not the reason for the tensions with the army, what was the

16     underlying reason for these disagreements?

17        A.   I said in my statement, I don't know if that was accepted, the

18     reasons were such as the supplies for the army.  One part of the army

19     wanted to provide their own supplies.  We place under the civilian

20     control and the government control some of the facilities of the

21     military-industrial complex, then there was the issue of promotion of

22     officers, and many other things such as the system of disseminating

23     information, et cetera, et cetera.  All of these things existed until the

24     Dayton Accords, when the army became an integral part of the

25     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 40511

 1        Q.   On pages 58 and 59, you were shown document P6420, which relates

 2     to the dismissal of three individuals from the judiciary.  Those were

 3     presumably three Muslims or three non-Serbs.  Can you tell us what was

 4     the most common reason for dismissals in our country before that time,

 5     during that time, and afterwards?

 6        A.   I cannot remember exactly, but the people who used to work in

 7     those institutions did not wish to continue working there because, for

 8     example, in the judiciary, there were no trials of Muslims and Croats

 9     because they had already left.  Most of those who were tried were Serbs

10     and, of course, it is only natural that you have Serbs working in those

11     institutions.  That was a general attitude.  But later on, this slowly

12     became more balanced.  For example, in the MUP, there were many people of

13     other ethnicities and there were mixed marriages.  However, judiciary is

14     a rather sensitive area.

15        Q.   As for the remaining three municipalities of Doboj, one Croatian

16     and two Muslim ones were there any police stations and who worked there?

17        A.   Yes, there were.  Before the creation of the Serbian municipality

18     of Doboj there had already been some ideas and plans in order how to

19     divide Doboj.  When the clashes started, they divided the municipality

20     and their Crisis Staff existed before ours.  These three municipalities,

21     because the municipality of Doboj Usora is a smaller one and part of it

22     belonged to us, although it was populated by Croats; in other words, they

23     established parallel institutions as we did, and at certain periods they

24     even conducted negotiations on how to proceed.

25        Q.   In the two Muslim municipalities of Doboj were there any Serb

Page 40512

 1     policemen just like there were Muslim policemen in the Serbian

 2     municipality?

 3        A.   That was out of the question, and the situation remains the same

 4     to this date.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MS. PACK:  Objection.  Mr. President, I've not objected to the

 7     prior two questions.  I've let them go, but it may be that we are

 8     straying on to an area which is going into the specifics and details in

 9     matters in Doboj municipality which I didn't question the witness on.

10     I did -- I did question him about [overlapping speakers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  I think he's a moving on.  Let's continue.

12             MS. PACK:  Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies, with a

14     question pertained to the reasons for dismissals, that's what I wanted to

15     know.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can you tell me for how many days could one be absent from work

18     without being dismissed, and after which period a dismissal was

19     inevitable?

20        A.   Well, believe me, I really cannot remember.  It is in the domain

21     of administrative procedures, and I am not versed in that area because

22     that was something done by the lawyers.

23        Q.   Thank you.  At the time, can you tell us, if you know, if

24     I appointed any Muslims and Croats in the judiciary?

25        A.   Well, believe me, I really cannot remember.  If somebody would

Page 40513

 1     help me in order to remind me, I might be able to tell you.

 2        Q.   We have this in the evidence so I will drop it.  On page 50, you

 3     were asked about the instructions received from the party.  Were there

 4     any instructions issued by the party apart from the well known A and B

 5     variants?  Was that the only instruction, or did the party send any other

 6     instructions?

 7        A.   I don't remember, bearing in mind that the communications

 8     channels were severed, I think that this was distributed, this

 9     instruction was distributed at the Holiday Inn without any prior debate.

10     We all received it, it was handed out to each and every one of us, but it

11     was not the subject of any discussion and we just took it with us to our

12     respective grounds.

13        Q.   Before the war, did the party issue any proclamations and send

14     them out to their municipal boards before the communications were

15     severed?

16        A.   I don't know what you mean exactly.  I cannot remember.

17        Q.   Minister, in the question on page 50, it was not said precisely

18     that it was document A and B.  So I'm asking you, apart from document A

19     and B, was there any other document -- communication with the Main Board?

20        A.   Not that I can remember, on that basis.

21        Q.   I didn't mean on that basis but we shall leave this subject.

22             You said that the situation in Doboj was such that it was moving

23     towards a peaceful solution.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now have 1D9235 in

25     e-court.

Page 40514

 1             MS. PACK:  Mr. President, this hasn't been notified.  I don't

 2     know why it's being produced in re-examination.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  We are not obligated to notify documents in

 4     re-examination.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  As long as it arises from the line of cross.  But do

 6     you not notify the Prosecution at the beginning of the re-examination?  I

 7     don't know the practice.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  No, we don't.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  Shall we continue?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   This is the 29th of April, which means two or three days before

12     the events in Doboj.  Please read lines 6 and 7, which reads, "According

13     to his statement ...," can you find it?  There is the mention of 300

14     fighters and then the mention of Doboj.

15        A.   It says:

16             "According to his statement, the situation in Doboj is peaceful

17     and it is being pursued in order to achieve a peaceful option."

18             Look, we had a very specific situation.  As I said before, all

19     the other municipalities were in their hands and there was fighting in

20     Posavina, then the operation in Posavina spilled over only 11 kilometres

21     from the centre of the town in the places of Kotorsko and Orahovac, and

22     it even involved regular Croatian forces.  As a result, we held a series

23     of meetings with our adversaries at the village of Seslije in order to

24     agree not to launch any attacks on Doboj municipality because the

25     distance from the north or -- and from the south was about 50 kilometres

Page 40515

 1     so Doboj was in a kind of sandwich.  And we were pushing the JNA to go as

 2     far away from Doboj as possible but it had already been blocked on those

 3     major roads that led towards Yugoslavia?

 4        Q.   What is recorded in this intercept, is it consistent with what

 5     you know, with your experience, and was it true that actually on the

 6     29th of April, everybody was seeking a peaceful solution?

 7        A.   Yes.  Because the council for National Defence, headed by a

 8     Muslim, invited all the presidents of the municipalities, the chief of

 9     SJBs and party leaders to reach an agreement and to undertake some other

10     actions.  For example, to establish mixed military patrols, consisting of

11     the army, the Muslims and the Croats, in order to calm down the

12     situation.  This council, led by a Muslim, insisted that the Muslims

13     remove the roadblocks in Doboj in order to not to cause what they had

14     already caused earlier by keeping these roadblocks in place.  There is

15     even a written document which was actually the last warning that the

16     barricades should be removed in a peaceful way, and normal life restored.

17        Q.   Thank you, Minister.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this intercept be marked for

19     identification?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will do so.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D3746, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now have

23     P6419?  That was admitted into evidence a while ago.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Minister, who had power on the 1st of April, on the 1st of May,

Page 40516

 1     and the 1st of June in Doboj?

 2        A.   The 1st of April and the 1st of May 1992?  Yes.  Three parties

 3     had power.  In 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party won the elections in

 4     Doboj, and when it came to the division of power, we had a prerogative of

 5     choosing between two places, either the president of the municipality or

 6     the president of the Executive Committee.  Since it was up to me to

 7     decide, I reached an agreement with the Party of Democratic Action to

 8     offer them the post of the president of Municipal Assembly and that the

 9     Serbs should retain the post of the president of Executive Committee.

10     And that is what we did.  We had good co-operation, we had made

11     concessions to one another, and we were friends.

12        Q.   And who did you take that place of the president of the

13     Executive Board for?  Was it for yourself?

14        A.   No, I did not take it for myself.  I took it for a well known

15     person named Borislav Paravac who would later be the head of the

16     Crisis Staff and who was also the president of the Presidency of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton peace accords.  He was not a member

18     of the Serbian Democratic Party.  Allegedly I heard that he actually

19     joined the party in 1993.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In the 7th line what was omitted was that he was a

21     non-party person.  Could you now pay attention to this first page.

22     According to the heading, what do you think, who made the compilation of

23     this radio programme?

24        A.   I have no idea.  The Prosecution mentioned my statement.

25     However, there is also the statement here by -- of an officer of the

Page 40517

 1     Yugoslav People's Army who explained what was going on in more detail

 2     here.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And did you take over power over the Muslim and the

 4     Croat parts of the Doboj municipality?

 5        A.   No, not at all.  In the decision of the Serbian Municipality of

 6     Doboj, that is to say in the document, it says that the municipality

 7     encompasses places where there is a majority Serbian population.  No

 8     village with a majority Muslim or Croat population became part of the

 9     Serbian municipality.  Pursuant to Dayton many villages and inhabited

10     places were assigned to the municipality of Doboj, which during the war

11     were not part of the Serbian Municipality of Doboj.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Paravac mentions this council that you referred to

13     comprising Alicic and some others.  There is talk about barricades.  Can

14     we look at page 2?  And on the first page we can see -- can we see the

15     bottom, Jovanovic, who is Jovanovic?

16        A.   Security officer of the Yugoslav People's Army.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at page 2?  And Jovanovic continues.

18     At the time, on the 29th of April, when the peaceful option was embarked

19     upon -- can you please tell us, look at "Najme" [phoen].  This is the

20     15th line from the bottom --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters need time to find the text.

22             THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just wait till the interpreters could find the

24     passage.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40518

 1        Q.   "Najme smo, smo" [phoen] is at the end.  From what you can see,

 2     it's the 10th line at the end of the row.

 3        A.   I don't see that either.

 4        Q.   Actually, we received information that in Doboj and that's where

 5     that line is.  10th line from the top, barbecue barricades,

 6     "rostilj barikade."

 7        A.   At one point we received information that they were preparing a

 8     sort of barbecue barricade which was quite a jocular manner and game of

 9     the Muslim political leadership specifically [indiscernible] we received

10     information that a barbecue barricade was to be organised in the town of

11     Doboj to which people would come by vehicles from Klokotnica, Brijesnica,

12     Gracanica, Grapska, Kotorsko, and these other villages, and then these

13     other places which at some point in time the people there would bring out

14     their weapons and begin to occupy the town.

15        Q.   And did you hear when the JNA intelligence officer said that in

16     this radio programme?

17        A.   I cannot remember, but he was an intelligence officer of the JNA

18     who knew all of that and more, and they concealed many things from us,

19     that is something that is known broadly, including this.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now look at the end of this paragraph?  I'm

21     going to read it.  It says:

22             "And what Mr. Paravac said, the continuity of government was

23     established without violence."

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat his question?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.  Interpreters didn't

Page 40519

 1     hear your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   My question is:  Was there a takeover of power or was there a

 4     continuity of power, as it is stated here?

 5        A.   The government remained the same, only the information was issued

 6     that day that the berets were being disarmed and the Patriotic League,

 7     first of all, and that everybody should remain calm and that everyone

 8     should return to their work, and so on and so forth.  Nobody drove

 9     anybody out from work or anything like that.  However, within a short

10     period of time, one by one of those officials of -- from the other ethnic

11     groups would be leaving their duties, there are some who did not leave,

12     who stayed, to continued to carry on their work until the end of the war.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now please pay attention to the bottom?  If

14     we can raise and magnify this, where you speak my name, "I am a man of

15     such a nature, I never went to sit with Radovan."  Could you read a

16     little bit and just tell us whether this is true?  Could you please read

17     it out loudly?

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters kindly ask for a reference.

19             THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I think it's second or third line

21     in, Ninkovic.  Could you start reading again very slowly, Mr. Ninkovic?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Well, you can read the second sentence, "I must say."

24        A.   "I must say that our political leadership at the time was

25     constantly expressing some doubts.  I mean, I am by nature the kind of

Page 40520

 1     man, I would never go to sit with Radovan, our president, to tell him

 2     stories, to lie to him, to make promises and so on.  On the occasions

 3     when I was present at these meetings, I just said everything would be

 4     okay and all right in Doboj."

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Is it correct what you said in this interview?

 6        A.   Well, yes.  I'm not the sort of man who wails and moans and

 7     cries, and so on and so forth.  I even felt that we should resolve this

 8     in a peaceful manner, but once we split up, I did not permit the conflict

 9     to expand, as far as I was able to, but I must use this opportunity that

10     Doboj was the town who was the most heavily bombarded town in

11     Republika Srpska.  This is why we did not move those lines.  But there

12     were ambitions constantly by the other side to capture Doboj which was a

13     major problem in Dayton as well, when the decision was being made where

14     that will be and how that will look.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And because of that position of yours, were you

16     criticised by me or was that something that was to your credit; in other

17     words, you were a minister under how many presidents?  Was it just under

18     me?

19        A.   No.  When you handed over your duties to Madam Biljana Plavsic,

20     then a government, there was a change of government, and I wanted to

21     leave that government, the future government, and I did not wish to be

22     nominated because the president of the republic decided about the

23     minister of defence and minister of the interior, I think, so I asked

24     Mrs. Biljana not to nominate me to the prime minister-designate, and not

25     to suggest that I continue as minister at the Ministry of Defence;

Page 40521

 1     however, she said that the problem with the army was still not resolved

 2     and that it would be a good thing for me to stay on and that I was a

 3     reliable associate as far as she was concerned and then later she changed

 4     her mind and then presented a different story.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see, it's in English,

 7     can we look at the following page?  In the Serbian it's 4, and I

 8     believe -- and in English it should be one more.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can you please tell us, here you're talking with

11     Jorganovic [phoen]?

12        A.   Journalist.

13        Q.   Yes.  And now, can you -- this, yes, from a part of the Serbs,

14     can you retell what is there or can you read two of your answers and one

15     of his?  This one and the next two small ones.

16        A.   I think the decision was not uncovered in any elements.  He asked

17     me earlier about a large number of Serbs, Muslims and Croats, in view of

18     the fact that there were the May-day holidays, had moved out from Doboj,

19     going out on picnics, and so on, and this happened on the 3rd of May

20     which was not a workday.  Many of them did not return to Doboj, not the

21     Serbs, not the Muslims, not the Croats.  Most probably in that sense

22     I wanted to -- so I don't know.  I said they left in -- they stayed in

23     Usora, Tesanj, Maglaj, and other places which were still not caught by

24     war.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 40522

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender these three

 2     pages that we have just looked at.  Can they be added either to that one

 3     or a new number?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we add page 4 to the exhibit?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, please, and this first one,

 6     the previous one that we presented.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I think page 1 and 2 were admitted.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is so.  Then it's just 4.  We

 9     can do more.  Did not say [in English] "We can do more."  The page 4 is

10     added.

11             I'm waiting whether I can --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, that has been added, yes.

13             THE ACCUSED:  I'm waiting for you to direct me to go on.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please go on, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.  Thank

16     you, Mr. Minister, for your service as minister and thank you for your

17     testimony.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And thank you, everyone.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Ninkovic, that concludes your evidence.

20     On behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to

21     The Hague to give it.  Please have a safe journey back home.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, everyone.

23                           [The witness withdrew]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please call your next witness, Mr. Karadzic.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, the next witness is

Page 40523

 1     Mirko Trivic.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The associated exhibit for the next witness, his

 3     statement seems to be his diary, part of his diary.  I take it you are

 4     tendering only the page, i.e. page 28, that was discussed in his

 5     statement.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Ms. Pack, would it be you that will deal

 8     with this witness?

 9             MS. PACK:  Yes.  It is, yes, and I have no objection to the

10     admission.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Given that the date does not appear on this page,

12     would the parties agree that it is related to a certain date?

13             MS. PACK:  Yes, and it would perhaps be sensible to take it from

14     an earlier page.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Which is?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  12th of July, 1995.

17             JUDGE KWON:  12th of July, 1995.  Thank you.

18                           [The witness entered court]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness -- oh, yes, take your time,

20     please.  Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

22     speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

23                           WITNESS:  MIRKO TRIVIC

24                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Trivic.  Please be seated and make

Page 40524

 1     yourself comfortable.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Colonel Trivic.

 5        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   May I ask you, and you can also warn me yourself, so that we both

 7     remember to speak out our sentences slowly and that between your and my

 8     replies, we break so that we have the interpretation, and when the

 9     translation is going on, I ask you to stop and then continue when it's

10     finished so that we can continue.

11        A.   Thank you.  I will do my best to take proper part in the

12     conversation.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Colonel, sir, did you give my Defence team one

14     statement?

15        A.   Yes, I did.  I did provide a statement to your Defence team.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D9680 in e-court,

18     please?

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Could you please look at the left side of the screen?  Do you see

21     that statement there?

22        A.   Let me just change my glasses.  Yes, I see, on the left side of

23     the screen, in Serbian, the beginning of my statement.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

25        A.   Yes.  I read it and signed it, in my own hand.

Page 40525

 1        Q.   Could the witness please see the last page so that he could

 2     identify his signature?  Is this your signature?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said to the

 5     Defence team?

 6        A.   It is fully in line with what I had said.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today,

 8     would your answers basically be the same as those contained in this

 9     statement?

10        A.   Yes.  The answers would basically be the same.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

13     tender this statement in accordance with Rule 92 ter.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit the statement as well as the

15     associated exhibit.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  The statement will be Exhibit D3747 and

17     65 ter 25028 will be Exhibit D3748.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read

20     out the summary of Colonel Mirko Trivic's statement in the English

21     language.

22             [In English] Colonel Mirko Trivic served in the JNA and VRS from

23     1971 until 2002.  In 1991, he served at the land army military academy in

24     Belgrade.  He followed the war in Slovenia and Croatia through various

25     sources of information.  Military sources from the war-torn areas were

Page 40526

 1     direct participants of these areas and flooded into Belgrade garrison

 2     buildings.  Most of the sources of information about the real state of

 3     affairs in BH arrived in May 1992.  Mirko Trivic gained personal

 4     experience being engaged in a team formed by the JNA Main Staff

 5     operations administration.  Following the withdrawal of the JNA units

 6     from BH, and the return of JNA members, soldiers and officers born in BH

 7     to their land of birth, Mirko Trivic was still serving in the land force

 8     military academy of JNA in May.

 9             Mirko Trivic started at the VRS personnel organ in Han Pijesak on

10     8th of January, 1993.  The group of officers with him at the rear command

11     post received an order and task from the president of the

12     Serbian Republic of BH to form the Guards Motorised Brigade.  Units were

13     manned extra territorially by soldiers from the entire VRS -- entire

14     Republika Srpska, from all VRS corps.  The first official parade of the

15     1st Guards Motorised Brigade was on January the 19th, 1993.  It was

16     responsible for offensive task of the VRS in all operations in 1993,

17     which were carried out successfully, contributing to the improvement of

18     the strategic position of the Republika Srpska.

19             On 8th of January, 1993, a large group of active servicemen

20     arrived from Belgrade to Zvornik to man a VRS units.  Mirko Trivic and

21     his group were transferred under heavily armed escort.  VRS units were

22     unsuccessful achieving an important strategic goal in -- in 1992, which

23     was to establish a corridor in Podrinje and connect with Herzegovina.

24     I suppose it was successful.

25             In January 1993, the process of formation and development of the

Page 40527

 1     organisation and establishment of the commanding of the VRS was not yet

 2     completed.  Military units in Podrinje that were most fragmented were

 3     placed under a single command and the operation -- at the operations

 4     level.  The Manoeuvre Brigade 1st Guard Brigade was subsequently formed,

 5     except for -- except some units in the 1st Krajina Corps.  No VRS units

 6     were capable of carrying out offensive operations in an area outside

 7     their own municipality.  All other brigades were formed out of

 8     municipality Territorial Defence into Light Infantry Brigades with

 9     territorial character and were intended for the protection of their

10     municipality from well-organised Muslim military forces.  In 1991, most

11     VRS units were classified according to their combat experience as

12     Territorial Defence sent units whose engagement evolved into the practice

13     of weekend war, so-called weekend war in shifts.  All other units

14     remained fully manned after the withdrawal of JNA units from BH.  This

15     was particularly pronounced in the manning of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps

16     which counted 2500 men after the withdrawal of Yugoslav citizens.

17     Mobilisation into JNA units was carried out based on an extra territorial

18     principle.  Units mobilised as JNA units in BH up to that point were

19     suddenly under manned.  The Serb Territorial Defence was the backbone of

20     the VRS units.  The commitment of the political and military leadership

21     of Serbs in BH to the struggle for fair military and political goals and

22     the unity of Republika Srpska in BH is confirmed by the ethnic diversity

23     among officers, active officers, serving in the VRS in 1992 and their

24     motivation to participate in that struggle.  Insufficient organisation,

25     combat ability, and experience in armed combat in 1992 resulted in a

Page 40528

 1     large number of casualties among members of the Serbian army, and amongst

 2     civilians at all ages and sexes in villages with Serbs situated next to

 3     the area captured by the Muslim or Bosnian Croat forces.  Victims were

 4     killed in situations where they could not run away while working the

 5     land, et cetera.

 6             These incidents escalated in 1992 and 1993 in Bratunac and

 7     Srebrenica.  To stabilise the situation and prevents a pogrom and the

 8     drawing of the Serbian population out, the VRS carried out its first

 9     offensive operation in Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica.  Future task of VRS

10     in 1993, which ensured that from the strategic goals on current political

11     goals in the war included preventing BH Army forces from committing

12     crimes in the Zepa and Gorazde sector, liberating the corridor on the

13     Dobro Polje route and road connecting Republika Srpska stabilising

14     defence lines and preventing incidents in -- and ambushes in Serbian

15     settlements.

16             Regarding participation in military operations, in Podrinje 1993,

17     the VRS forces were never given the objective to force out the Muslim

18     population from Srebrenica.  In addition to the significant military

19     success of the VRS, the superior command did not assign a task to the

20     units to force the Muslim population from Srebrenica.  Regarding

21     preparation and participation in operation Krivaja, the brigade did not

22     hold contact lines with the Muslim forces.  And the Serbian religious

23     holiday in Vidovdan, Radovan Karadzic asked Mirko Trivic what to do --

24     what do you think about establishing a special operative command and VRS

25     task force for the enclaves in Podrinje?  Because this state of affairs

Page 40529

 1     is not good and nobody is responsible for the state of affairs in this

 2     area.  Radovan Karadzic wanted to prevent more terrorist attacks by the

 3     BH Army, even if the goal of operation Krivaja was achieved and to

 4     consolidate the VRS defence around the enclaves.  The Supreme Command did

 5     not think that the Srebrenica enclave should disappear.  As such, no plan

 6     was ever adopted to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

 7             And that would be the short summary.  At that moment, I do not

 8     have questions for Colonel Trivic.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  In the summary, Mr. Karadzic, you stated that

10     Radovan Karadzic wanted to prevent more terrorist attack by the BiH army

11     even if the goal of operation Krivaja was achieved and to consolidate the

12     VRS defence around the enclaves.  Is it coming from what paragraph?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] To be quite honest, at this moment,

14     I don't know.  I need to take a look, because I didn't actually refer to

15     paragraph numbers.

16             MS. PACK:  Perhaps I can assist.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             MS. PACK:  It's not directly from this paragraph but it's

19     paragraph 2.6.2 at page 15 of the English is a supposition by the --

20             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's coming directly from that

21     paragraph --

22             MS. PACK:  That's right [overlapping speakers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  -- and it's related to your mens rea, so to speak.

24     I would like you to deal with the witness live only that part.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40530

 1        Q.   Colonel, sir, I would like to ask you what you knew about the

 2     political objectives and positions of the Supreme Commander and the

 3     Supreme Command in relation to the outcome, military outcome, of this

 4     conflict.  What was it that we had wished for, what was it that we had

 5     advised?

 6        A.   Maybe I did not fully understand your question.  Does it pertain

 7     to my summary or my statement, or generally speaking to political

 8     objectives?  But if you allow me, I listened to the interpretation into

 9     the Serbian language of the summary that you read out and there were

10     some --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Forget about it.  Forget about the summary.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not the text.  It's just my

13     duties.  It's not the text.  It's not my statement.  Did I not work at

14     the personnel organ.  I reported to the personnel organ in Han Pijesak.

15     And secondly, in operation Krivaja, I was not serving in the guards

16     brigade.  I was serving in the 2nd Romanija Brigade.  In that summary of

17     yours, Mr. President, that was not pointed out.  And now, back to your

18     question.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Can you tell us what it was that you knew about the positions

21     that I had in relation to the war and the resolution of the crisis?

22        A.   Even before joining the Army of Republika Srpska, which came at

23     my personal request, but there was also an order transferring me to serve

24     in the Army of Republika Srpska, the positions of the Supreme Command and

25     the political and military leadership were something that I was fully

Page 40531

 1     aware of.  That is to say defence of the parts of the territory where the

 2     Serb people live in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And in keeping with that, equal

 3     participation in decision making as a constituent people in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina about the position and the functioning of that state,

 5     or at the outset in 1992 before the declaration of independence, that is

 6     to say before the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain functionally linked to some Yugoslavia,

 8     so some Yugoslavia.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all other

10     microphones please be switched off.  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Where representatives of all

12     peoples would live in an equitable state.  Since this did not happen in

13     1992, the objective of the Serb people was to participate in the

14     functioning of that state as a constituent people.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what your understanding was of my

17     position in relation to the enclaves, the eastern enclaves of Zepa and

18     Srebrenica, in view of what happened to them and around them?

19        A.   Well, yes.  It is quite clear, the situation was quite clear in

20     Podrinje in 1992, at the time, when there was a polarisation in the

21     achievement of the interests of individual peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22     Podrinje and other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Serb people

23     lived or were a majority, were cut in several parts, and it was this

24     other side that advocated a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina as internationally

25     recognised.  Podrinje was cut in several parts.  And at one point in time

Page 40532

 1     quite simply the Serb people in the area of the municipality of Bratunac

 2     was in such a position that they could not function or, rather, the state

 3     could not function and communications could not function, roads,

 4     electronic communications, so people lived there and -- actually, in part

 5     of my statement I said that in -- that on the 8th of January, 1993, our

 6     group tried to get to Han Pijesak and we had an armed escort and we

 7     weren't even taking the main roads but we took various paths via

 8     Vlasenica and that's how we arrived at Han Pijesak and some people who

 9     were supposed to get to Herzegovina were sent via Zvornik to Serbia and

10     then they arrived via Trebinje into Herzegovina.

11        Q.   Now, you mentioned that I wanted to prevent terrorist activities

12     from the enclave and consolidate the lines of the Army of

13     Republika Srpska around the enclaves.  Can you explain this to the

14     Trial Chamber, what your understanding was of that and whether that was

15     in the context of our conversation when I asked you for advice?

16        A.   Yes.  It so happened because of my position and the location

17     where the meeting took place, when Saint Vitus' Day was being

18     commemorated at Mount Romanija where I was brigade commander.  I was in

19     position to host the event in a way -- or, rather, to be the host of the

20     head of the Main Staff and you, as the Supreme Commander.  However

21     metropolitan Nikolai and other church dignitaries later on after the

22     event and after the decorations ceremony and after reminiscing about

23     struggles before 1995, a memorial room was supposed to be opened

24     dedicated to the memory of the killed soldiers from the municipality of

25     Sokolac.  As we walked towards that room I happened to be next to you,

Page 40533

 1     and you asked me about my position about that.  You asked me what

 2     I thought about that, setting up a single operative command for the area

 3     of the enclaves.  In view of the activities of sabotage groups around the

 4     villages that were around the enclaves, through the lines, check-points,

 5     observation points of the United Nations, in April and June 1995, there

 6     were several incursions of this nature, and that resulted in the decision

 7     on the order for active efforts, and although this order was already in

 8     existence, you were still thinking about how this should be done, whether

 9     this command should be established as such.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now the Prosecution may continue.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

13             Mr. Trivic, as you have noted, your evidence-in-chief in this

14     case has been admitted in its most part in writing, that is through your

15     written statement in lieu of your oral testimony.  And now you'll be

16     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.  Do

17     you understand that?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Pack.

20             MS. PACK:  Mr. President.

21                           Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:

22        Q.   Colonel Trivic, let's start with 1995.  This is when you were

23     brigade commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade; correct?

24        A.   Yes, you're right.

25        Q.   Now, you've just been speaking about a meeting which you

Page 40534

 1     apparently had with Dr. Karadzic in the last week of June 1995, is that

 2     approximately when you say it was?

 3        A.   Yes.  In my statement it is more precise than in the summary that

 4     was presented by Mr. Karadzic.  It was Sunday, not a week.  It was the

 5     Sunday after Saint Vitus' Day.  I don't know exactly what the date was,

 6     but Saint Vitus' Day is on the 28th of June, as is well known.

 7        Q.   So the 28th of June in 1995, if it fell on a Wednesday that would

 8     have been the 2nd of July, the Sunday?

 9        A.   2nd, 3rd, I don't know the exact date.

10        Q.   And that's the date upon which was issued the preparatory order

11     to which you have referred in your -- in your statement, yes?

12        A.   Yes.  That is the date when the preparatory order was issued.

13        Q.   Is the preparatory order which I'm not going to show you, you

14     have seen it on numerous occasions when you testified here.  It's P04571,

15     Your Honours.  This is the order that describes what was needed to be

16     done to prepare units for Krivaja 95; is that right?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Now, this preparatory order of course related -- was issued

19     pursuant to Directives 7, 7/1.  You remember that from your prior

20     testimony, don't you?  Yes?

21        A.   Whether it has to do with Directive 7 or 7/1, I would like to see

22     the first page of the order, if you could please display it?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Due to technical difficulties, we will pause

24     for two or three minutes.

25             Shall we test whether it's working now?  Very well.  We can

Page 40535

 1     continue.

 2             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   You wanted to see the order.  It's up on the screen.  Just please

 4     look at -- in the B/C/S, fourth paragraph down, you can see, please, it's

 5     paragraph 2, the command of the Drina Corps pursuant to operations

 6     directive number 7, and 7/1 of the Main Staff of the

 7     Army of Republika Srpska, and so on.  So that's the preparatory order.

 8     You'd accept it was issued pursuant to those two directives, yes?

 9        A.   First of all, I'd like to say that this preparatory order was

10     issued due to the reason stated under item 1.  Item 2 represents and

11     makes reference to the authority on the basis of which the corps command

12     is going to implement these activities.  Therefore, under item 1 the

13     corps command cites the reasons on the basis of which it is undertaking

14     certain activities, and then under item 2, it invokes the principle that

15     it is authorised to carry out that because the directive for that year

16     was something that pointed to active operations.

17        Q.   Colonel Trivic was that a long way of saying yes, this

18     preparatory order was issued pursuant to operations directive number 7,

19     and 7/1 as it says there at paragraph 2?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Can we go to Directive 7, it's P00838.  I'd like to remind you of

22     a paragraph you've looked at numerous times before.  It's page 10 in the

23     English, B/C/S page 15.  You of course remember testifying previously in

24     the Popovic case that the Supreme Commander is responsible for this

25     document as the signatory; right?

Page 40536

 1        A.   I'd like to listen to and to know exactly what I said.  The

 2     responsibility for every document lies with those who signed it, but he

 3     is also authorising and issuing guidelines to everybody who is involved

 4     and who is nominated in the document itself, and as far as that goes,

 5     I agree with you, I don't understand why you use the word "responsible."

 6     It is beyond doubt that the person who signs the document stands behind

 7     everything contained in that document.

 8        Q.   Thank you, could we look at page 10, please, the last -- the last

 9     sentence, please, in the bottom paragraph of the -- of the English and of

10     course in the B/C/S the equivalent, at page 15.  You're familiar with it

11     by now.  The sentence which reads:

12             "By planned and well thought out combat operations create an

13     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

14     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

15             Now, I'd like to remind you of your prior testimony in the Mladic

16     case.  You testified in the Mladic case a few weeks ago.

17             MS. PACK:  It's 65 ter 25276, please, Mr. President, and I'd like

18     to look, please, at -- have on the screen and I'll read out page 120 of

19     e-court.  1.

20        Q.   120 just has questions from the judge and -- and your -- your

21     response is in fact at page 121 of e-court if we could just turn over.

22     Just to provide you the context, the questions were about this sentence.

23     And you responded at line 20 of page 121 in e-court, you responded as

24     follows, I'll read it slowly:

25             "This sentence, Mr. President, this sentence was uttered in a

Page 40537

 1     somewhat different way as compared to the terminology that is used by

 2     forces that are preparing to topple regimes in different parts of the

 3     world.  These are sanctions, just phrased differently."

 4             And then the judge goes -- the judge says:

 5             "But is that your interpretation of the document?  Where does it

 6     come from that you say this is what was meant despite the clear language

 7     of the document?"

 8             And then you respond:

 9             "Well, I haven't received this document but I believe it is my

10     understanding of this that these different activities through combat

11     activities and through narrowing the area of the enclaves and

12     interrupting communication between the two enclaves the population should

13     have a growing awareness of them being, in a way, prisoners of their own

14     leaders and that therefore these leaders should be changed."

15             Remember that testimony in the Mladic case?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Do you stand by that evidence?  You stand by that evidence, that

18     the aim of this -- this sentence here in Directive 7, "create an

19     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

20     or life," that may be compared to the imposition by a state or states of

21     sanctions?

22        A.   I stand by what I said, but the first part of the question,

23     although we don't have it in the Serbian which I would have preferred so

24     that I can prove to you, at the beginning of my answer, I received an

25     interpretation something like a sentence uttered, et cetera.  This

Page 40538

 1     sentence had not been uttered.  This sentence defines or, rather,

 2     provides guidelines to the activities in 1993, the activities that would

 3     lead to such a situation in which the inhabitants of the enclave would

 4     undertake certain measures to participate in a way in having the regime

 5     who is doing wrongful things and therefore making the population suffer

 6     be changed and that the enclaves --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last part

 8     of his answer?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Trivic, could you repeat your last answer, the

10     last part of your answer.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that in that sense, I stand

12     by my view that the activities in 1993, not in one month or in one day

13     alone, require the change of the political leadership, whose escapades

14     were putting them, themselves, in a hopeless situation.

15        Q.   You're talking about 1995; right?  This document is dated 1995?

16        A.   Yes, I'm sorry, I said 1993.  My mistake.  It should be 1995.

17        Q.   You'd accept that these are very grave words, wouldn't you, very

18     grave words?

19        A.   I don't understand.  What do you mean?

20        Q.   These words, these words, this sentence, this aim that is

21     expressed there, it's very grave, isn't it?

22        A.   There is no objective stipulated in the directive.  The directive

23     is not a binding document.  It is a document providing guidelines for

24     certain activities.

25        Q.   Let me ask you, please, to look at your prior testimony in the

Page 40539

 1     Mladic case again, at page 138 of e-court, just like to remind you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, in line 21, the witness

 3     said that the directive does not have any objective and then he said the

 4     directive is not a binding document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             MS. PACK:  Apologies.

 7        Q.   You now have that on the screen.  The bit I wanted to read out to

 8     you was this, questions from Prosecution counsel in the Mladic case about

 9     these words.  He says:

10             "Q.  But these are amazing words.  I won't repeat them again,

11     'make life unbearable for the people.'  Certainly you would have

12     remembered those words if they had been given to you from your superiors,

13     yes or no, do you remember or not?

14             "A.  I assume I would remember.  These are very grave words but

15     let's not go into any further explanations.  I assume that if they had

16     been put that way I would have remembered, but here in this context of

17     this directive they do not have that meaning.  I explained -- I tried to

18     explain --"

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the counsel please slow down while

20     reading.  Thank you.

21             MS. PACK:

22        Q.   Let me -- let me just take it up because I've gone too fast.

23     I'll just repeat from:

24             "I assume that if they had been put that way I would have

25     remembered, but here in this context of this directive they do not have

Page 40540

 1     that meaning.  I explained -- I tried to explain, present, well, not

 2     explain, sorry, I meant I tried to present my point of view."

 3             So I've just read all of your answer.  You have identified -- you

 4     have stated there --

 5        A.   What is your question?

 6        Q.   My question is that you have stated there, haven't you, that

 7     these words are very grave, yes?  Very grave?

 8        A.   If you allow me, those were not words, that was a written

 9     document.  None of my superiors ever informed me verbally to act in that

10     way.  After all, an order that I have to act upon as well as other

11     subordinate corps commands did not receive such a task.

12             MS. PACK:  Mr. President, I note the time.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will adjourn for today and continue

14     tomorrow morning at 9.00.  As you are well aware, Mr. Trivic, please do

15     not discuss with anybody else about your testimony while you're giving

16     testimony.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.  I understand.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Hearing is adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.49 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day of June,

21                           2013, at 9.00 a.m.