Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41243

 1                           Tuesday, 16 July 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 9     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Kapetina.  Please be seated and make

11     yourself comfortable.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           WITNESS:  DRAGAN KAPETINA

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             Good morning, Mr. Harvey.

17             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  May I

18     introduce Amelia Mattis, who is from the Thomas Jefferson Law School in

19     San Diego and has been with my team since May of this year.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

22     morning to everyone.

23                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kapetina.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 41244

 1        Q.   I have to ask you to pause between our exchanges and also that we

 2     both speak slowly, and we shall thus lose less time and avoid correcting

 3     the transcript.

 4             Mr. Kapetina, I'd like to ask you if you have given a statement

 5     to my Defence team.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Can we please have 1D9168 in e-court.  Please pay attention.  We

 8     have versions in B/C/S, both versions.  Can you see the statement on the

 9     screen in?

10        A.   Yes, I do.  However, I have a correction.  There was a slight

11     error under item 11.

12        Q.   Thank you.  We'll come to that.

13        A.   All right.

14        Q.   So you have read the statement and signed it; is that correct?

15        A.   That is correct.

16        Q.   Could you please wait for the interpretation to conclude.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown the

18     last page so that he can identify his signature.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Is this your signature, Mr. Kapetina?

21        A.   Yes, that is my signature.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Everything that you told my Defence team, was that

23     faithfully reflected in the statement, and do you need to make any

24     corrections?

25        A.   Yes.  I said under item 11.

Page 41245

 1        Q.   Can we please have page 4, or it may be even 3.

 2        A.   The beginning of the sentence should not read "May" but "March."

 3     That's the only mistake.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  That has been recorded.  As for the remainder of your

 5     statement, does it truthfully reflect what you told the Defence team?

 6        A.   Yes, fully.

 7        Q.   If I were to put the same questions to you today as the ones put

 8     to you by the team, would your answers essentially be the same?

 9        A.   Yes, fully.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

12     tender this statement and the associated exhibits into evidence.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, do you have any objections?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  A few, actually, Your Honour, and a couple of

15     observations.  The -- there have been associated exhibits removed from

16     the 92 -- from the final statement that were included in the 92 ter

17     notification, so I can go through those or Dr. Karadzic can.  It's --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just pausing there.

19             Mr. Karadzic, I take it that you are tendering four items of

20     associated exhibits.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellencies, four of

22     them, and I would like them to be added to our 65 ter list.  There's a

23     fifth one which I will probably have to lead live, which is a manual

24     drafted by Mr. Kapetina for emergency situations, however it hasn't been

25     translated and I will have to discuss it with him.

Page 41246

 1             As for the others have already been admitted under either P or D.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I will express the Chamber's view first,

 3     Ms. Edgerton.

 4             Among them, Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber is of the view that two of

 5     the items not forming an indispensable and inseparable part of the

 6     statement.  They are 1D9736, referred to in paragraph 19; and 1D9738,

 7     referred to in paragraph 30.  Without them the statement can be

 8     understood without any difficulty.  So if you need to tender them, you

 9     should lead them live with the witness, as well as showing the relevance

10     of the documents.  Otherwise, do you have any objection with respect to

11     the two remaining items, Ms. Edgerton?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

13             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive the statement as well as two

14     associated exhibits.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  92 ter statement 1D9168 will be D3856.  10643

16     will be Exhibit D3857, and 30076 will be Exhibit D3858.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm going now to read a

19     summary of Mr. Dragan Kapetina's statement in English.

20             [In English] From 1985, Dragan Kapetina worked at the republic

21     secretariat for the national defence, later the ministry of defence of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In 1990, before the multi-party elections, he

23     was appointed chief republican defence inspector of the Republic of

24     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He remained in this post until the end of March

25     1992.  After May 1992, he did specialist work at the Ministry of Defence

Page 41247

 1     of Republika Srpska.  In March 1995, he was appointed secretary of the

 2     Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska.

 3             As the chief republican inspector, his duty was to oversee the

 4     implementation of the federal laws on national defence and to monitor the

 5     implementation of the republican laws.

 6             After the first multi-party elections in BH in 1990, the key

 7     posts in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned

 8     to the Muslims and Croats.  The HDZ candidate, Jerko Doko, became

 9     minister, and Kazim Begovic, a JNA colonel nominated by the SDA, became

10     his deputy.  Doko was Croat and Begovic was Muslim.  This distribution of

11     key positions in the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

12     prevented the Serbian personnel from performing their regular duties.

13     During this period, the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina

14     focused on taking over the powers of the federal organs in the sphere of

15     defence, breaking up the JNA and transforming the Territorial Defence

16     into the armed forces of the republic.  All of these activities were in

17     direct contravention with the provisions of the federal and republican

18     constitutions.

19             In May 1991, Minister of Defence Jerko Doko rejected the annual

20     inspection programme presented by Dragan Kapetina because it was not

21     reconcilable with Doko's task to break up the existing defence system.

22             Dragan Kapetina expressed his concerns about the widespread and

23     systematic violation of valid laws and drafted an official report to the

24     government and the Presidency of B and H to warn them that they were

25     exceeding their constitutional powers.  When adopting decisions on the --

Page 41248

 1     Mr. Kapetina's warnings at meetings of the government and the

 2     National Defence Council of B and H, the Serbian members were out-voted.

 3             Before the war, the Presidency of BH and the other state

 4     authorities, including the Ministry of Defence, were principally engaged

 5     in preventing Muslims and Croatian conscripts from BH from being sent to

 6     the JNA and in creating the core of the BH Army out of the

 7     Patriotic League, the Green Berets, the MUP reserve forces and

 8     Territorial Defence.

 9             Dragan Kapetina quit his job at the ministry in March 1992 and

10     returned to his village in the municipality of Hadzici exclusively for

11     security reasons.  During the stay in his village, the political council

12     of the Serbian municipality was established together with the Assembly of

13     the Serbian people in Hadzici, and he was elected vice-president of the

14     Assembly.  The proclamation of the Serbian municipality of Hadzici was a

15     measure taken to protect the Serbian people and preserve peace in the

16     area.  The newly established Assembly decided to fully respect all

17     agreements made bit three people at the republican level with a view of

18     resolving the crisis.  As for the Muslim part of Hadzici municipality,

19     the Muslim authorities took a number of tough measures against the

20     Serbian population.

21             On 30th of April, 1992, Dragan Kapetina drove his family to

22     Serbia out of fear for their safety, but his parents remained in their

23     family house, which was under the control of the Muslim authorities.  His

24     father was taken to the Silo concentration camp in Tarcin where he died

25     in November 1992 due to the dreadful conditions and torture.

Page 41249

 1             On 10th of May, 1992, Mr. Kapetina resumed his work at the

 2     Ministry of Defence in Serbian Republic of B and H in Pale.  The focus of

 3     his work was to develop two systemic laws, the Law of the Army and the

 4     Law of the Defence.  In addition he worked on sub-laws and regulations on

 5     application of the International Law of War.

 6             In July 1995, Mr. Kapetina was called to the office of

 7     Mr. Karadzic, who wanted information about the situation in Srebrenica.

 8     Mr. Karadzic appeared very angry because he could not establish

 9     communication with the commander of the Main Staff, the Chief of the Main

10     Staff, the Drina Corps, or the minister of defence, and he did not know

11     what was happening in Srebrenica.

12             And that would be short summary.  I would now like to go through

13     some documents.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Just before we do that, and I realise the summary

15     isn't evidence, Your Honour, but when Dr. Karadzic said that when

16     adopting decisions on Mr. Kapetina's warnings at meetings of the

17     government the Serbian members were out-voted, that's not the evidence of

18     Mr. Kapetina.  The evidence in paragraph 19 is that his warnings weren't

19     discussed at the meeting.  So Dr. Karadzic should be a bit careful in his

20     summaries.  Also, adding things to his summaries, for example, the ethnic

21     background of Mr. Doko and Mr. Begovic, which is not in Mr. Kapetina's

22     evidence.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 41250

 1        Q.   Can we please have 1D9736 in e-court.  [No interpretation].

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Before Mr. Kapetina answers, I'm not receiving

 3     English interpretation.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Apologies from the interpreter.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] There are so many Serbs here that

 6     I believe that all of you have learned the Serbian language by now.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the question.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, you need to repeat your question.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, can you tell us the name of the publication, the

11     date of the publication, and in ethnic terms who the author of the

12     article is?

13        A.   I can't see exactly the date.  I'd say it was September 1991.

14     Yes, 18th September 1991, and I think that the author of this article is

15     a Bosniak, Zead Dernisevic [phoen].  I think he's a Bosniak.

16        Q.   Thank you.  What can you say about this statement that there was

17     only one conscript from Livno?  Can you tell us what is reflected in this

18     article.  And then there's another reference to you, Dragan Kapetina, the

19     minister of defence, et cetera?

20        A.   Yes.  The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina was preventing

21     conscripts from going to serve in the JNA even though that was beyond the

22     powers, constitutional powers, of the constitution, and we can see here

23     that there was only one conscript from Livno, probably a Serb, his name

24     was Maljkovic, and another 87 failed to respond, and then there was my

25     written warning to the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

Page 41251

 1     government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which I cautioned the two highest

 2     government bodies that they were assuming the powers of federal organs

 3     and that they were operating beyond the powers that they have.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the next page in

 5     English.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You can see this middle paragraph in Serbian which makes

 8     reference to this five-hour meeting.  Can you tell us who the

 9     participants are, and can you tell us their ethnicity?  Can we enlarge in

10     middle column.  This sentence which starts "Inace..."  This is the last

11     paragraph.  Can you just tell us the names and tell us who they are and

12     what was the meeting about.

13        A.   Yes.  Representatives of the JNA held a meeting with members of

14     the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the promise was made that

15     the conscripts who were being sent to serve in the army would not be

16     dispatched to war zones but, rather, to trading centres that were far

17     away from the then-war zones, for example, in Croatia at the time.  And

18     here we have representatives of the 5th Army and the commanders of all

19     the corps deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Vukosavljevic, commander of the Territorial Defence,

21     Serbian, Muharem Fetahagic and Fikret Jakic?

22        A.   Muslims.

23        Q.   Commander of the Banja Luka and Tuzla Corps, and so on and so

24     forth.  And Jure Pelivan the prime minister.

25        A.   That is correct.

Page 41252

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have page 3 so that we can see what

 2     Dragan Kapetina's assessment was.  Already in September of 1991 you were

 3     issuing warnings; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, the article's been read out.  I was trying

 8     to find out what Mr. Kapetina said the meeting was about somewhere in the

 9     article, and I haven't been able to do that yet.  We have no foundation

10     with respect to the larger article itself, and I have no idea how this

11     warning -- or we have no idea how this warning, which Mr. Kapetina hasn't

12     commented on, relates to his written evidence.  So I'd say there's

13     insufficient foundation, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could ask Mr. Kapetina how this

15     meeting took place, what was the cause for convening it, and what was the

16     participation of the Ministry of Defence of BH in trying to resolve those

17     circumstances.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In that period --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Kapetina.

20             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Maybe he could ask Mr. Kapetina if he was there.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Kapetina, you heard Ms. Edgerton's

23     question.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wasn't in the meeting held at the

25     Presidency.

Page 41253

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   This exhibit relates to paragraph 19.  Mr. Kapetina, was your

 3     written paper and submission are made at the meeting, and did you have

 4     any contribution, not in physical sense, in these meetings and in these

 5     attempts to put things in order in terms of the law?

 6        A.   This meeting described by the author did not contain -- did not

 7     contain my warning.  It was held with representatives of --

 8     representatives of JNA stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, my

 9     written warning to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they

10     were breaking the laws and the constitution, was discussed at the meeting

11     of the National Defence Council chaired by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, the

12     president of the Presidency.

13             At this meeting the majority were Serbs.  However, my warning was

14     not discussed.  Instead, quite simply, the president of the Presidency

15     removed this warning from the agenda.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, I believe that this is

18     within the official remit of Mr. Kapetina and is certainly a relevant

19     one.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3859, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Before you continue, Mr. Karadzic, I forgot to ask

23     you one question -- ask one question about an associated exhibit.  That

24     is Variant A and B document, the 65 ter number of which is 10643.  I told

25     that I would admit it, but what it's point of tendering it separately,

Page 41254

 1     because we have that document in evidence.

 2             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I don't think it's necessary.

 4     I was going to suggest that we not admit that.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6                           [Defence counsel confer]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll strike it off.  Please continue,

 8     Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

10     1D9738.  It is related to paragraph 30 in the statement of Mr. Kapetina.

11     Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could you tell us, do you know this document and what is it?  The

14     date, who issued it, and what is it about?  Do you see the heading?

15        A.   Yes.  This is a brief about certain aspects of the political and

16     security situation in the area of Hadzici municipality.  I had some

17     information that is covered in this brief, and I believe the author of

18     this brief was my co-worker at the Ministry of Defence before he

19     transferred to the command of the military district, Milan Atlagic.  I

20     didn't have the entire text, but I did have some knowledge about these

21     events in Hadzici.

22        Q.   This is the end of February 1992.  That's the date of the

23     referendum, isn't it?

24        A.   It is.

25        Q.   Can we see page 2 in Serbian.  Look at the penultimate paragraph

Page 41255

 1     where certain things are underlined.  What is it about?

 2        A.   Yes.  The brief speaks about the arming drive, the distribution

 3     of light weapons, where they are stored, and that a certain Ahmet Budic,

 4     a reserve officer employed at the TAT enterprise is involved.  There are

 5     rockets, rocket launchers for the zolja.  Leaders of the Bosnia community

 6     in Hadzici were involved.  I heard information about this but not exactly

 7     what is written here.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I -- I miss again foundation, Your Honours.  We

11     don't know to what extent this information corresponds with what this

12     witness might have heard.  In fact, he said it's not exactly what's

13     written here, and he has -- no.  I think there's not been sufficient

14     comment.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can I draw your attention to paragraph 30, and could you tell us,

18     although you've said it already, who is the author, and how is he related

19     to you?  Was he in the same service?

20        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Atlagic worked at the Ministry of

21     Defence for four years in the security sector.  Then he moved to the

22     command of the military district but also -- but that was also part of

23     the Ministry of Defence.  He was my co-worker, and I received information

24     like all the other senior staff at the ministry that related to security

25     matters.  I've said before that I did not receive this brief as such, but

Page 41256

 1     I knew most of these things and Atlagic had informed me.  I didn't say

 2     otherwise.  I even had more information.  For instance, in that period

 3     the police in Hadzici seized a truck on Mount Igman full of light

 4     weaponry that was smuggled by the paramilitaries belonging to the MUP of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe, Your Excellencies, that

 7     we have now enough foundation to admit this document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will admit this.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3857, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see

11     1D9735.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, in paragraph 7 of your statement, you talk about

14     the manual for developing a contingency plan that you wrote in 1990.

15     Were you shown the paper known as Variant A and Variant B, and what can

16     you tell us about it?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Before you answer, Mr. Kapetina.

18             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  And Your Honours I'm sure are aware this is a

20     document that the Prosecution objected to.  It's a very lengthy document

21     that was used with this witness during his previous testimony in the

22     Krajisnik case some years ago and wasn't even translated at that time.

23     There's not a page of this document that's been translated.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow your objection.  So you are objecting

25     to putting this document to the witness at all?

Page 41257

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, Your Honour, because it is so large and it is

 2     untranslated.  There's simply no way for us to even begin to think of

 3     dealing with this document when we're not able to read it.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I can understand the

 6     Prosecution's position, but hopefully Dr. Karadzic will take the witness

 7     to a particular portion of this document that can be addressed and

 8     admitted if appropriate.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We'll consider whether we can admit it or not at the

10     end of the examination.

11             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see page 8 of this book.

13     That's 9.  Could we see the previous page.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, what is defined in this chapter?  This is chapter

16     1.  Could you describe to us in your own words what is said in this

17     chapter?

18        A.   First of all, I authored this manual, and as chief republic

19     inspector, it was my duty to inspect together with other inspectors

20     contingency plans, and through this manual I tried to help those who made

21     such contingency plans in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make them more easily.

22     And those who made such plans was everybody from local authorities, local

23     communes, businesses, socio-political organisations, even associations of

24     citizens.  Each one had the obligation to develop a contingency plan, and

25     I wanted this manual to facilitate their work and to teach them how to

Page 41258

 1     make these plans.  On this page I tried to define contingencies using, of

 2     course, the provisions of the Law on All People's Defence.

 3        Q.   In line 24 what is missing is that the making of these plans was

 4     their duty.  Did you say that it was their duty?

 5        A.   Yes, it was their legal obligation.  All those who made

 6     contingency plans were legally obliged to do so in keeping with the Law

 7     on All People's Defence.  Everybody had to develop a contingency plan for

 8     contingencies such as aggression, military aggression, or internal

 9     conflicts that involved the use of weapons.

10        Q.   When you said a moment ago socio-political organisations were

11     also an entity in the defence system, can you translate that into normal

12     language?  What are socio-political organisations?

13        A.   I'll try.  In the previous system it was the League of

14     Communists, The Socialist Alliance of Working People,

15     The Socialist Alliance of Youth, and in the multi-party system it was the

16     political parties.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now read out the third paragraph from the top

18     about the Law on All People's Defence.

19        A.   The Law on All People's Defence defines contingencies as follows:

20     Other contingencies for the purpose of this law are understood to mean

21     armed or other activity that directly jeopardises the independence of the

22     country, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and the established

23     social system under the constitution of SFRY.

24        Q.   So the law defines contingencies.

25        A.   Correct.

Page 41259

 1        Q.   Could we now see page 15.  So this is the manual.  What does this

 2     manual achieve?  What do entities in the defence system have to do?  Is

 3     this based on the law, and if they follow the manual, would they be

 4     complying with their legal obligations?

 5        A.   This entire segment of planning when we're talking about

 6     contingency plans envisages measures to prevent contingencies, that is

 7     preventive measures, to avoid contingencies, and then there is the

 8     repressive part aimed at eliminating contingencies once they occur.

 9             In addition to the law, there were also guidelines to eliminate

10     contingencies and the decision on the methodology for the development of

11     contingency plans.  Those were federal regulations at the level of

12     Yugoslavia, where as Bosnia-Herzegovina also had guidelines by the

13     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the development of contingency plans

14     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was one of the authors and participants in

15     the development of these guidelines.  My manual was based on the republic

16     law on the two federal regulations and one republic law on the

17     development of contingency plans.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you read out the first paragraph from section

19     3, "Preventing contingencies from occurring..."

20        A.   "... all the way up to the adoption of guidelines to eliminate

21     contingencies (19 July 1989) and the decision on the basis of a uniform

22     methodology to develop contingency plans (24 November 1989) the tasks,

23     measures, and procedures to prevent contingencies from occurring were

24     established in the plans to prevent and eliminate contingencies."

25        Q.   Thank you.  It was fast, but the interpreters managed.  Can we

Page 41260

 1     now see page 23.  The previous one.

 2             Section 3, The substance of contingency plans, these bullet

 3     points.

 4        A.   Under item 4 of the decision of the federal executive council,

 5     contingency plans shall contain an estimate of the political and security

 6     situation, i.e., assessment of the security situation.  So everybody does

 7     this evaluation at their own level.

 8             Second bullet point:  Tasks, measures, and procedures,

 9     organisation of forces and resources to eliminate contingencies in one's

10     purview.

11             And third bullet point:  Measures of readiness.

12        Q.   Can we now see page 25.  The entire page is important, but could

13     you read out the last paragraph.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Well --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Instead of asking the witness to read out which was

16     untranslated, why don't you ask the witness to -- ask the witness a

17     question directly, not in a leading way.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try, but this has not been

19     translated, and we'll see how that will reflect on the transcript.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, on this page we see some text about measures to

22     eliminate contingencies.  Can you tell us what is envisaged, which

23     obligations does the law impose in the prevention and elimination of

24     contingencies that we see in the last paragraph on this page?

25        A.   I said at the beginning that this plan has a preventative nature

Page 41261

 1     aimed at preventing contingencies from occurring, and all entities are

 2     supposed to plan measures in keeping with the law.  First of all,

 3     everybody is supposed to do their job in keeping with the constitution

 4     and the law to consistently enforce regulations, ensure co-ordination,

 5     co-operation.  Simply comply with all their obligations in keeping with

 6     the constitution and the law, which prevents the occurrence of chaos,

 7     anarchy, and other things that could jeopardise peace and stability.

 8        Q.   In the last line it says in that sense one of the possible

 9     approaches in the development of documents to eliminate contingencies,

10     what is this supposed to mean, document to eliminate contingencies?

11        A.   I had not seen this document for a long time because I didn't

12     keep a single copy for my own use.  I would need to see page 26.

13        Q.   Could the witness please be shown the next page.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, if I may before the witness goes

15     further.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm really wondering what the relevance is of the

18     very detailed evidence that we're hearing that I've had no notice of, as

19     I've indicated, regarding this document from 1990.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this document preceded

23     Variants A and B and the indictment bases many charges against me on the

24     Serbian side on that.  This is from 1990, not from 1995, because this is

25     what laid the legal foundation for what followed.  Papers A and B cannot

Page 41262

 1     be understood without this document.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you just tell us.  You see the model of this paper here.

 7     The last paragraph, "Measures established in the guidelines on measures

 8     for readiness."  Can you tell us what this is about?

 9        A.   Yes, the Presidency of Yugoslavia issued a document entitled

10     "Guidelines on Measures of Readiness," and there were three degrees

11     involved, and all the planning entities in Yugoslavia were duty-bound to

12     carry through these measures in order to prevent contingencies.  That is

13     to say so that there would not be any kind of armed intervention on other

14     intervention so that this would be nipped in the bud as I've already

15     explained, and I say here how entities are supposed to work this out on

16     the basis of a table with clear tasks.  Those who will carry them out,

17     the way in which this will be carried out, and co-operation with other

18     entities if so planned.

19             So I've just given a model, an example of how this document --

20     or, rather, how this can be done in an easier manner and how it could be

21     more user-friendly.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that from line 6 -- ah, I

23     see, that's the answer, yes.  All right.  Could we see the next page now.

24     In line 16, that's not the question.  That's part of the question.  Ah,

25     thank you.  Yes.  Now it's been corrected.

Page 41263

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 2        Q.   Could you please present item 4 to us now, the content and way

 3     plans are -- contingencies plans are elaborated at municipality level.

 4     Could you please read this out to us.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I apologise, but this evidence is

 7     not in this witness's statement.  This evidence is being presented in the

 8     context --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  When you're saying that it is not in

10     the statement, means that detail is lacking.  He referred to the manual,

11     so to speak, in para 7.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct, Your Honour.  That's the only mention,

13     only comment relating to this document in this statement.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I also noticed that Ms. Edgerton --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you put a pause.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm sorry.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Ms. Edgerton earlier stated that she had no notice

19     that this document was going to be used, but in fact it's listed as an

20     additional exhibit in our Rule 92 ter notice, and this is a partial

21     Rule 92 ter witness so items can be led live which are not detailed in

22     the statement which is what Dr. Karadzic is doing.  It's unfortunate that

23     the document is being translated and I -- is not translated and I realise

24     it puts the Prosecution at a disadvantage, but I don't think that that's

25     any bar to making whatever use of the document that can be made at this

Page 41264

 1     time, and the Prosecution can recall the witness or ask to recall the

 2     witness if later when the document is translated it finds that there were

 3     questions that it would have put and that it didn't.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  But the issue is still the use of untranslated

 5     document, which is in particular lengthy and -- yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Of course we've had notice of this document.

 7     It was one the documents I indicated that we had in -- that I had

 8     initially objected to.  It's not translated.  This is a critical issue

 9     that we should have had notice of, and this detailed evidence is not in

10     the witness's statement, and quite frankly, Your Honour, we shouldn't

11     have to apply to recall this witness because we're prejudiced for the

12     lack of translation of a document that's previously appeared before these

13     Chambers -- before this Tribunal and not yet been translated.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Could you expand further the fact that this appeared

15     before the Chamber and had not yet been translated.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I misspoke.  Not this Chamber, Your Honour.

17     Another Chamber of this Tribunal in the Krajisnik case.

18             JUDGE KWON:  It was admitted in other Chambers?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll just check the admission status in the

20     previous proceedings with Mr. Reid.  That'll just take a couple of

21     minutes, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So when it was used in the other Chamber, the

23     Prosecution should have been in the position to know about the document.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  If I could just have your indulgence while

25     Mr. Reid checks this I could respond to Your Honour.

Page 41265

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, Mr. Sladojevic has found the

 2     portion of the transcript of the Krajisnik case where this document was

 3     admitted which is admitted as D123 on page 20109, and also noted that

 4     Mr. Tieger cross-examined the witness in the Krajisnik case on this

 5     document.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  About the translation at that proceedings?  Do you

 7     have a clue?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  No.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I do.  And thank you to Mr. Sladojevic.

10             Four pages of that document were admitted which were translated.

11             JUDGE KWON:  And you didn't have the time to compare the pages

12     that were admitted in that case and those shown to the witness in this

13     case.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I didn't know that -- what pages were going to be

15     shown to the witness in this case, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So are you objecting to the last question?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  And -- pardon me, it's D123 in the Krajisnik case

18     rather than 1203, just to correct the record.  And --

19             JUDGE KWON:  So the question was how the contingency plans were

20     elaborated at municipality level.  Are you objecting to that question or

21     not, Ms. Edgerton?

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, Your Honour.  We have had no notice that this

23     detailed evidence was going to be presented today from this witness.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber agrees that Defence notice

Page 41266

 1     was not a very kind one, but in light of the para 7, the Chamber has no

 2     difficulty with continuing with this evidence.  The Chamber agrees with

 3     Mr. Robinson if necessary the Prosecution is entitled to recall this

 4     witness.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  That's fine, Your Honour.  And just to correct the

 6     record in terms of this exhibit because I don't want to be misleading.

 7     This document was assigned D123 in the Krajisnik case at transcript page

 8     20109.  It was admitted -- portions of this document, said His Honour

 9     Judge Orie, were provisionally admitted awaiting translation and further

10     specification, and that was repeated at transcript page 20110, D123 being

11     provisionally admitted.  And I was unable to be more accurate previously

12     because I didn't have the pages in front of me, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Probably you need to ask the question again, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, you told us who all the Defence entities were, and

18     you mentioned socio-political communities which means municipalities,

19     local communes, and republics in plain language.  Can you tell us what

20     the municipalities were charge of, and that is what item four deals with

21     here.

22        A.   The plan for contingencies at municipal level contains an

23     assessment of the political security situation in the municipality, then

24     tasks, measures, and procedures, organisation, forces, and resources for

25     the elimination of contingencies and measures of readiness.

Page 41267

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could we have the next page, please.  Let's not read

 2     it out.  Can you just tell us what this assessment of the political

 3     security situation in the municipality pertains to.

 4        A.   Well, this assessment mostly speaks of the situation regarding

 5     the socio-political system, the work of state organs, the functioning of

 6     the economy, economic entities then social services, education, culture,

 7     and so on.  That is to say, the overall situation with regard to

 8     political activities at the level of the municipality.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can we have page 34 now.  Can you present this

10     chapter to us:  Elaboration of plans.

11        A.   Yes, this is the content of plans with regard to state organs,

12     that is to say local government organs.  The content is the same like for

13     other planning entities.  One starts from an assessment and then each

14     organ gives an assessment within their own purview on the basis of law,

15     and then of course they take measures to prevent contingencies and

16     eliminate them once they've happened.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could Mr. Karadzic please

18     repeat his question?  It is too fast for interpretation.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 42 --

21             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters couldn't hear your question.

22     Please repeat your question.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just asked for page 42.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you tell us what this chapter 7 pertains to?

Page 41268

 1        A.   It speaks of the content and way in which these plans are

 2     elaborated at the level of local communes.

 3        Q.   To what extent -- actually, what kind of correlation is there

 4     between this and the measures that are taken at the level of the

 5     municipality and the level of the entire federal state?

 6        A.   Practically the local commune was the basic cell of the society

 7     at the time, and this plan basically pertained to measures and tasks that

 8     would be implemented by citizens directly as entities of the system

 9     within the local commune.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us where socio-political organisations

11     belong within this system?  Was this before the multi-party system was

12     introduced?

13        A.   Yes.  This manual was written before the multi-party system was

14     introduced.

15        Q.   Thank you.  What is the position and role of the ruling political

16     party in the system of All People's Defence and the system of managing

17     contingencies?

18        A.   Any political party, regardless of whether it is the ruling party

19     or a party in the opposition, was duty-bound to have its own contingency

20     plan, and these plans were mostly made at the level of the republic.  The

21     organ of that political party at republican level, that is.  However,

22     Municipal Boards and all local boards also had their own plans within

23     that plan.  So the party may have had these plans -- or, rather, did have

24     these plans along the vertical line from the republican level all the way

25     to the level of local commune.

Page 41269

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like you to remember papers A and B.  That

 2     was shown to you in the -- in the Krajisnik case; right?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Can you tell us -- or, rather, what is it that you can tell us

 5     about the foundation in law and the content of that paper?

 6        A.   Earlier on I said, and I'm saying again, that each and every

 7     party in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time and on the basis of the law and

 8     other bylaws that we refer to here, the guidelines of the

 9     Federal Executive Council and of the Presidency and so on.  So each and

10     every political party was duty-bound to elaborate its own contingency

11     plan and adapt it to its own way of political organisation from top to

12     bottom.  I think that this document that was elaborated by the SDS that

13     consists of Variant A and Variant B and two levels of readiness was done

14     in a professional and lawful manner and that this was the obligation of

15     the ruling party to have this kind of plan for this kind of situation

16     which may occur and may threaten peace and other values of the system.

17     And if there are no other questions, I can go on.  I can tell you what it

18     was that I observed in this instruction.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, Your Honour, this man was presented to us as

21     a fact witness in his statement and in his 92 ter summary, and I don't

22     think it's appropriate for Dr. Karadzic to take him in his questions

23     outside of that, to have him offer evidence as some kind of legal expert

24     of the foundation in law of the Variant A and B document which he

25     admitted that he never saw at the time, only when he was interviewed by

Page 41270

 1     the OTP in 2004.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I answer?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Should we hear it in the absence of witness,

 4     Ms. Edgerton, or would it be okay to continue?

 5             Just a second.  I'm asking Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Rather than continually interrupt the proceedings

 7     this morning, maybe it would be better and more efficient to deal with

 8     this in the absence of the witness once and for all.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             Mr. Kapetina, if you could excuse yourself for a moment.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12                           [The Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, this man was

15     inspecting how the Defence entities were operating and how they kept

16     custody of the plan.  So he was controlling the legality of all the

17     documents and enactments adopted by these organs.  So this is matter of

18     fact.  This is not a matter of expertise.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Did you ask the witness about the manual he wrote or

20     the Variant A and B in which he was not involved at all?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him about Variants A and B,

22     whether it was in line with the law, because it was his duty to supervise

23     whether the companies and other entities adopted contingency plans.  He

24     was entitled to go and to inspect the documents to review them.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Did he participate in drafting variant A and B?

Page 41271

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think so, but he recognised

 2     that as an expert work.  If I may remind you --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a -- what was he at the time?  Could you remind

 4     us again.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He was the Chief Inspector of the

 6     Ministry of Defence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He inspected the procedures

 7     of preparing for emergency situations.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to add anything, Ms. Edgerton?

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Just first in response to this last answer that

10     Dr. Karadzic has given.  In fact, the witness is not clear on what his

11     duties were at the time the Variant A and B document was issued.  He

12     talks of being marginalised by Mr. Doko in March of 1991.  He talks of

13     being put at the disposal of Mr. Simovic, and then in March or April of

14     1992, he talks about finally leaving the Ministry of Defence, but he's

15     referred to documents which at the same time show that he's carrying out

16     tasks for the Serbian Assembly.  So his actual duties are completely

17     unclear.

18             And with respect to what's gone on earlier, I do apologise, Your

19     Honour, for what -- my repeated interventions over the course of the

20     morning, and Your Honours have acknowledged some measure of deficiencies

21     in the notice that we've been given.  I've raised the question or the

22     issue of the untranslated document, but, Your Honour, I would say that

23     what we're now doing actually compounds the prejudice that we're working

24     under when it comes to dealing with the document.  Dr. Karadzic in his

25     questions are taking the situation one step further by having this

Page 41272

 1     gentleman comment as a legal expert on a document which he previously

 2     hasn't seen before, and I think that's inappropriate.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think that the question

 5     that was asked by Dr. Karadzic could be rephrased, because to ask about a

 6     foundation in law seems to invite an expert opinion which this witness is

 7     not here to give, but I think given what the role of the witness played

 8     in the drafting of this manual and in the Defence preparations, he can be

 9     asked how these Variant A and B tallies with the preparations that had

10     been made by the SFRY organs without giving any kind of expert opinions

11     just as, for example, Prime Minister Djeric could be asked on -- as a

12     Prosecution witness about things that he didn't participate in but how it

13     related to the actions of the government.  So I don't think there's

14     anything calling for an expert opinion if it's done that way.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Well, since everybody gets the chance to stand up

16     today, I guess I'll take the opportunity and simply say --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a --

18             MR TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

20             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR TIEGER:  Sorry, to be so hurried.  I have no idea offhand what

22     analogy Mr. Robinson is attempting to draw between previous occasions

23     when witnesses have been asked about events in which they didn't directly

24     participate, but in this case it is quite clear that the accused is

25     attempting to bridge a factual gap caused by what didn't happen at the

Page 41273

 1     time.  So he wants to rely on the fact that the witness could have done

 2     something that he didn't do, and indeed had the witness engaged in some

 3     kind of action at that time it would be sufficiently relevant in this

 4     context to elicit, but since that didn't happen, now the accused wants to

 5     bridge the gap by either asking for speculation about what might have

 6     happened if he did or seeking what is inevitably either an expert opinion

 7     on the legality or other aspects of a document which he didn't see at the

 8     time or by intruding on the province of the Court by drawing conclusions

 9     that fall within the Court's authority.

10             So he's already discussed a document that he participated in and

11     drafted.  We have another document before us.  The Court will be in a

12     position to make such comparisons and draw such conclusions as may be

13     appropriate.  I happen to think this is a bit of a storm in a teacup in

14     any event, but I do draw the line on trying to turn this witness into a

15     kind of expert, in particular given the deficiencies in notice provided

16     to the Prosecution to which the Court has already referred.

17             THE ACCUSED:  May I?

18             JUDGE KWON:  I do indeed see this as a storm in a teacup.  Is he

19     going to say more than what is contained in para 7, his observation about

20     Variant A and B?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, given that under

22     item 2 it is said that he was the chief inspector, I may have asked him

23     what was the purview of chief inspector.  However, since this paper,

24     Variant A and B, is hugely significant --

25             JUDGE KWON:  His evidence is that he saw that for the first time

Page 41274

 1     in July 2004, and he made observation on that document in his statement.

 2     I think that's all he can say about this document.  Why don't you just

 3     move on.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, this entire manual of

 5     his makes it impossible to understand the entire situation in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It's not based only on Variants A and B.  It is all

 7     based on the local laws and circumstances at a given time.  Variants A

 8     and B is just a small part.  But for this statement not to be too

 9     extensive, we wanted this document to be adopted in its entirety because

10     it would help the Chamber understand how things operated in terms of the

11     law.  And a comparison also can be made between Variants A and B and the

12     plans that everybody else were obliged to prepare, and as an inspector,

13     it was his duty to supervise it, and there is no better witness to

14     evaluate this paper than this witness.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Robinson, now, you did say that the question as

17     structured, it really elicited expert evidence.  Fair enough.  And you

18     mentioned the way it could have been approached.  Can you give us some

19     idea, can you give us some knowledge as to the structure of that

20     particular question you had in mind?

21             MR. ROBINSON:  What I had in mind was whether -- was how

22     Variant A and B tallied with the plans that had previously been in place

23     for the SFRY.  That's in general.  But in discussing with Dr. Karadzic,

24     he, I think, has some very specific questions that might be better put to

25     the witness than on a general level.  So perhaps he could explain some

Page 41275

 1     questions that he believes he would prefer to ask.

 2             JUDGE BAIRD:  Dr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  First of all, I would

 4     like to ask the question about the essence of his work.  Secondly, who

 5     controlled the drafting and drawing up of plans.  And thirdly, what was

 6     the role in the place of paper A and B even though he hadn't seen it

 7     before 2004, but I would like to hear his opinion about its place in the

 8     defence system that was in place in the former Yugoslavia.  What about

 9     Crisis Staff and their place and role, whether they were lawful or

10     unlawful?  To put it simply, he was the one who was monitoring the

11     lawfulness of preparations for defence.  It was up to him to evaluate

12     this whether it was exaggerated or insufficient and whether it was in

13     accordance with the law.  It was his duty from his point of view to

14     assess the lawfulness of these operations.

15             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Tieger, now that Mr. Karadzic -- Dr. Karadzic

18     has given us -- has given us an idea as to the questions he has in mind,

19     do you wish to comment on that please for us so that we have a situation

20     from both sides.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Well, as I see it, Mr. President, I understand that

22     the points that Dr. Karadzic wants to raise and the alleged basis for

23     doing so, he again cites the witness's position at the time, again notes

24     that it had nothing to do with what happened at the time because he

25     didn't in fact know about the Variant A and B document.  The alleged

Page 41276

 1     credentials he cites for this witness are exactly what a party cites when

 2     he wants to explain why someone is entitled to give an expert opinion.

 3     So again this emphasises the expert nature of what he is about to ask the

 4     witness to do.  And interestingly, again, although Dr. Karadzic keeps

 5     citing the witness's duty to do this thing, we note that he didn't do it,

 6     which seems to underscore apparently the secret nature of the Variant A

 7     and B document.  But in any event, he has not articulated a basis for

 8     doing anything other than attempting erroneously to call this witness as

 9     an expert witness to testify about that document.

10             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Given the time, the Chamber will have a break.  We

13     will resume at five past 11.00.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say just one thing?  It would

15     be better to call papers A and B by its correct title, because it speaks

16     about emergency situations.  The manual is not a legal text.  It just

17     provides guidelines and directions.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton and Mr. Tieger, the Chamber has no

22     difficulty with the question suggested by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Karadzic.

23     We will allow the question.

24             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 41277

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, can you tell us what was the main job of the chief

 3     inspector, the job that you had?

 4        A.   In a nutshell, my main job was to supervise the implementation,

 5     the constitution, and the laws pertaining to defence.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In what way did you discharge these duties?

 7        A.   I did it by means of inspection and supervision of planners,

 8     mainly the civilian structures of a society starting from state organs at

 9     the republican level, then socio-political communities, primarily

10     municipalities and districts, and I also inspected companies that were of

11     special interest for the defence of the republics and other entities in

12     compliance with the inspection plan.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us if there is suspicion that some

14     organised forces were in the course of preparing violence or rebellions

15     that can precipitate emergencies, what was the obligation of entities

16     involved in that including parties?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Their first task was to make an

19     assessment --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Put a pause.  Please wait for some time before you

21     start answering the question.

22             The same for you, Mr. Karadzic.

23             Now could you answer the question.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Their primary task was to

25     continuously monitor the situation and to assess the overall security and

Page 41278

 1     political situation in a specific municipality or organ or other planning

 2     entity and to define measures that would pre-empt the emergence of such

 3     situation or even escalation of certain processes.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.  How is this continuous monitoring being implemented

 6     in practice?  Are any new procedures being introduced or duty shifts or

 7     what?  How can you do this on a continual basis?

 8        A.   This is being done by implementing regular measures but also by

 9     reinforced measures.  You said yourself that it can take the form of

10     emergency duty shifts or establishing communication and co-operation and

11     checking up.  All these measures depended on the decision of a specific

12     planning entity.

13        Q.   Are you familiar with the notion of Crisis Staff, and what can

14     you tell the Chamber about the place of the Crisis Staffs in our system

15     of All People's Defence and civilian protection in general?

16        A.   Crisis Staffs were not regular organs.  As a rule, they were

17     formed on an ad hoc basis depending on the specific circumstances.

18     Mainly those tasks would assume the duties and powers of the regular

19     organs who are failing to carry out their constitutional and legal

20     obligations, and they continue to exist until such time when the regular

21     organs became capable of discharging their regular duties.  So as I said,

22     those were not regular organs.  Those were ad hoc organs established on a

23     case-by-case basis, and they have a mandate of implementing and using

24     their constitutional and legal powers for a limited period of time.

25        Q.   Can you tell us who made up a Crisis Staff?

Page 41279

 1        A.   Well, it depends which level we are talking about.  If it is on a

 2     local level, it depended on the specific situation.  In most cases those

 3     were members of the leadership who were already holding offices in the

 4     existing organs.  If we're talking about a municipality, a president of

 5     the municipality would be at the head of the Crisis Staff, president of

 6     the Executive Committee would be one of the members, and this would also

 7     include all those responsible for restoring law and order and suppressing

 8     any events that precipitated the crisis by virtue of their office.  This

 9     could be the chief of police, then the secretary for national defence,

10     perhaps some members of the ruling parties, and that would be the core

11     composition of a Crisis Staff, but it could include other members as

12     well.  Basically those were people who held main positions in a local

13     community.

14        Q.   Thank you.  The decisions taken by these ad hoc bodies, were they

15     evaluated under regular circumstances?  Were they being assessed,

16     adopted, or rejected, which means that the Assembly can only convene

17     after the emergency situation ceases to exist.

18        A.   Yes.  An Assembly is allowed to evaluate the operation of a

19     Crisis Staff, and it has this power.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, at least you should put a pause.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you list us situations in a which a Crisis Staff is

25     established?

Page 41280

 1        A.   For example, at the local level a Crisis Staff is being formed if

 2     regular state organs are dysfunctional.  For example, if it is impossible

 3     to convene the Assembly or if the Executive Committee is failing to carry

 4     out its duties or if any other administrative organs are not functioning.

 5     These are the circumstances that call for the establishment of a Crisis

 6     Staff, and its main duty is to make the regular organs capable of

 7     resuming their duties.  Once they achieve that, it ceases to exist.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And what about natural disasters, accidents,

 9     catastrophes other than war?  What is the procedure then?

10        A.   If we are talking natural disasters or large-scale accidents, our

11     system had civilian protection staffs that would then be activated and

12     work to deal with the situation and control the damage caused by a

13     natural disaster or other phenomenon that is a threat to life and

14     property.  In such situation a municipality can establish an operative

15     body that is supposed to oversee the situation on the ground and take

16     measures to address the consequences and control the damage caused by

17     natural disasters and other accidents.

18        Q.   Thank you.  What about continuous monitoring?  You mentioned duty

19     service.  What are the obligations of defence entities in controlling

20     transport, supplying of -- or, rather, monitoring the amount of weapons

21     in circulations controlling entry by unauthorised persons, et cetera.

22     What are their duties in terms of security?

23        A.   Considering that the defence system in the former Yugoslavia was

24     totalitarian -- or, rather, social, that is to say the entire society was

25     involved in the system, every local community was involved and had the

Page 41281

 1     obligation, as well as individuals, to monitor all developments that

 2     could threaten peace, order, as well as human lives and property and to

 3     report to the competent authorities such as the warning and alert centres

 4     and other services whose job was to prevent such threats.

 5        Q.   What are the obligations of defence entities in terms of moving

 6     population and property from threatened to safer areas?

 7        A.   That is only one measure that could be planned.  It is known as

 8     evacuation.  That means moving population and property that could be

 9     threatened by a natural disaster, an accident, incidents, or armed

10     activity.

11        Q.   If a municipality has ten local communes, five Muslim and five

12     Serb, what are its obligations and what can a legal commune legally do in

13     terms of self-organisation and defence?

14        A.   The local commune has its own plan, a contingency plan for

15     natural disasters, accidents and war.  In the case of war it would be a

16     defence plan.  In the case of natural disasters, that would be another

17     plan.

18             The local commune plans its own forces to implement these plans,

19     but for each measure it has to ask for approval from the higher

20     authority.  In such cases a higher authority authorises the enforcement

21     of contingency plans.

22        Q.   Do Defence entities have anything to do with the transport of

23     goods, smuggling, transport of technology, et cetera?  Do they have any

24     responsibility to protect citizens in those terms?

25        A.   Of course contingency plans include such measures as well, but

Page 41282

 1     these measures are enforced by the competent authorities, although local

 2     communities and citizens may report such things to the competent

 3     authorities and ask them to take steps against those who cause trouble.

 4        Q.   If there is a danger of war or armed insurgency, what are the

 5     competencies of defence entities in terms of movement of conscripts and

 6     their travel abroad.  Do they have any powers in that field?

 7        A.   Of course, if some measures contained in the plans are ordered to

 8     be implemented by the state, then restrictions may be imposed on the

 9     movement of conscripts, and they may be required to regularly report to

10     the competent authorities to report their absences and travel but when

11     the competent state body puts in place such a measure or orders the

12     implementation of that plan.

13        Q.   Where are these plans kept?  Are they submitted to you or are

14     they kept somewhere, and do you inspect the existence of such plans

15     regularly or not?

16        A.   All these plans are kept by the responsible officer in the entity

17     itself.  That is to say, person who manages a particular local body keeps

18     the plan.  If we are talking about a political party or a municipality,

19     it would be the president of the Municipal Board of that party who has

20     the plan in safekeeping, and the inspector comes to that person to

21     inspect the plan and the measures contained therein.

22        Q.   What happens if the inspector finds there is no plan?

23        A.   If the entity fails to produce the required plan when the

24     inspector comes, then he is subject to penalties under the law, and the

25     person who is the plan manager is also subject to penalties.  The person

Page 41283

 1     who was supposed to initiate the development of the plan.

 2        Q.   Did you inspect the SDS, the Serbian Democratic Party?

 3        A.   From the establishment of the Ministry of Defence after the first

 4     multi-party system, I was not allowed to inspect anything anywhere,

 5     including the SDS.  To be quite clear, I'm not the only inspector.  I am

 6     the leader of a team of inspectors from the competent state body.  I'm

 7     just man number one in the team of inspectors.

 8        Q.   If an inspection had been made and found that there was no

 9     contingency plan in the SDS, what would be the role of the inspector sent

10     by you?

11        A.   In addition to repressive measures, it's possible that we would

12     talk to the person who was supposed to develop that plan because we don't

13     only have a repressive role but also an instructing role.  We have check

14     first whether the dead-line for developing the plan was realistic and

15     reasonable and give a new dead-line.  Only if a plan was not made after

16     that second dead-line, then the entity would be subjected to fines and

17     other penalties.

18        Q.   In those places where plans do exist, what does the inspection

19     establish?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Earlier on the witness said that he

21     was not allowed to inspect anything anywhere, including the SDS.  What's

22     the basis of continuing with the witness about the potential inspection

23     vis-a-vis the political parties?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, the witness said

25     that he was prevented from doing that job illegally, that it was an

Page 41284

 1     unlawful step taken by the minister.  I was asking him what he would have

 2     done before he was prevented from doing his job, what he would have done

 3     before the minister in question took up that post.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure I'm following.

 5             Mr. Kapetina, were political parties, including the SDS, the

 6     subject of any inspection by your team?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  On what basis is a political party subjected to

 9     inspection by the government?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To give an example:  If the

11     programme of inspections envisages an inspection in the municipality,

12     then in that municipality, the inspector would visit one entity in each

13     field, in the industry, in the public industry.  They would choose also

14     one political party.  It would be a random check, not every entity, just

15     to establish the general picture in that municipality to assess the

16     situation in terms of planning and requirements.  To provide a final

17     evaluation of the whole situation in one municipality, it is necessary to

18     cover all planners, all those who have the obligation to have a

19     contingency plan.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Then I'll quote your answer, your previous answer to

21     Mr. Karadzic's question, so could you clarify what you meant.  I quote,

22     this is what Mr. Karadzic asked you:

23             "Did you inspect the SDS, the Serbian Democratic Party?"

24             Your answer:

25             "From the establishment of Ministry of Defence after the first

Page 41285

 1     multi-party system, I was not allowed to inspect anything anywhere,

 2     including the SDS."

 3             What did you mean?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I made an inspection plan for 1991

 5     that was not endorsed because the minister of defence is supposed to

 6     endorse the inspection plan.  I did the same plan for 1992.  Again, it

 7     was not endorsed.  I conducted inspections only before 1990, when there

 8     was no Ministry of Defence but the Republic Secretariat for National

 9     Defence.  So before the multi-party elections I carried out inspections

10     together with my team, but after the multi-party elections I was no

11     longer able to do that because the minister of defence prevented me by

12     refusing to sign the annual inspection plan.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Can you tell us the reasons why the new minister prevented

16     inspections from taking place?

17        A.   Since in Bosnia-Herzegovina the whole nature of the political

18     system changed from a one-party system - we moved to the multi-party

19     system - there was an urgent need to adapt the defence system to these

20     changes, to harmonise it with new nature of the social and political

21     system.  First we introduced amendments on the Law on National Defence

22     and the Law on Conscription, and we needed to develop the bylaws that

23     would allow the enforcement of the laws I just mentioned, but apart from

24     the programmed tasks, the ministry did absolutely nothing.  Its staff was

25     busy tearing apart the existing system.  They were tearing apart the JNA,

Page 41286

 1     tearing the TO apart into ethnic components, and chaos and anarchy,

 2     lawlessness were introduced into the system.  There were no instructions

 3     given to local authorities on how to act.  Basically, the ministry did

 4     not do the job that it was set up to do, although, as I said, there was

 5     an urgent need to work even harder than before because the political

 6     system had changed its nature.

 7        Q.   In line 11 you said the minister and the group of people around

 8     him.  Is that what you said, because it's not on the record?

 9        A.   Yes.  I mentioned a group of people.  Those were mainly assistant

10     ministers loyal to the minister from the ranks of the Muslim and Croat

11     communities.  Although, even some Croat individuals were not loyal to

12     him.

13        Q.   Was that position of the minister in keeping with the law?

14        A.   Certainly not.  His position and his conduct were not in keeping

15     with the law.  They were contrary to the law.

16        Q.   We have in evidence an intercept of your conversation with me.

17     Did we know each other before that conversation?  Did the SDS make the

18     keeping of your position conditional upon membership in the SDS?  Were

19     you a member of any party?

20        A.   The first multi-party elections I was a member of the SDP, which

21     was a party that was the successor of the former League of Communists,

22     and I was on the ticket for the local parliament in Hadzici, those

23     elections.

24             Before that conversation, which I believe was in July 1991, I did

25     not know you, nor did you know me.  That conversation occurred, as we can

Page 41287

 1     see, quite spontaneously, and one of the first things you asked were --

 2     was whether I had to become a member of the SDS in order to keep my job

 3     and whether I had to do as the -- whether I had to do the SDS's bidding.

 4     Nobody ever imposed any conditions on me, no one and no party.  I had

 5     worked my entire career in the local administration as a civil servant,

 6     and all I did I did in keeping with the powers given me by the law and my

 7     workplace.

 8        Q.   In line 17 it says local administration, whereas you said state

 9     administration; right?

10        A.   Yes, yes.  I worked in the state administration until 1992.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the first year.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Thank you.  Later on when you became part of the Government of

14     Republika Srpska, were any conditions imposed upon you?  Did you have to

15     join the SDS?

16        A.   No.  There were no conditions imposed on me that I had to become

17     a member of the party or that I had to carry out any kind of particular

18     party instructions.  By way of illustration, in the Ministry of Defence

19     all assistant ministers from the ethnic Serb community who were appointed

20     assistant ministers of defence were not members of the SDS:

21     Ljubisa Terzic, under-secretary, he was not a member; Dragan Markovic was

22     not either; I wasn't; and no one else was a member of the SDS.  But we

23     stayed on.  We continued to work in these jobs because we were

24     professionals and civil servants.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 41288

 1             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

 2     tender this manual which is quite instructive, and without it it is

 3     impossible to understand the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

 4     actions of various entities.  So it's either going to be the translation

 5     service or the Defence is going to make sure that all of it is translated

 6     and then maybe the Chamber will say that not all of it is needed, but I

 7     believe that this manual on action in emergency situations deserves to be

 8     part of the evidence in this case.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification for the moment

10     and see whether or not to admit it later on, Ms. Edgerton?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Perhaps only those pages that were referred to in

12     evidence, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I was thinking the Prosecution may find some other

14     relevant parts from the document, but if you say so, we'll only mark

15     those pages referred to for identification.

16             Shall we assign a number.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  It will be MFI D3860, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Had I known, I would have presented

19     more pages, but let's see.  Perhaps we'll do it in some different way,

20     bar table it.

21             Thank you, Excellencies.  For the time being I have no further

22     questions for Mr. Kapetina.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

Page 41289

 1        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, can you hear me in a language you understand?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   I'd like to start, if I -- I'd like to start your

 4     cross-examination by looking at a document you've commented about and

 5     referred to in your statement.  I'll choose P960.  And that's the

 6     Variant A and B document.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I suggest that the witness be

 8     given a hard copy of this document.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I think the witness will be able to deal with this

10     just fine, Dr. Karadzic, if I go slowly.

11             JUDGE KWON:  But witness was able to follow the document through

12     the monitor.  Let's see whether he can follow or not.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   I'd like to go over now, Mr. Kapetina, to page 4 in English of

15     this document and page 3 in your language, under the heading "First

16     level," which appears on the previous page, I guess, and instruction

17     number 4.

18             Now, the instruction in this document says:

19             "Convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the

20     municipality composed of representatives of the Serbian people in the

21     Municipal Assembly."

22             And just so you know, you found this same passage under the

23     second level of instructions in this document as well, but my question

24     for you is, Mr. Kapetina, since you seem to know something about planning

25     and have looked at this document, maybe you could identify for us the

Page 41290

 1     legal provisions, the legal or constitutional provisions that allow a

 2     political party to unilaterally create parallel Serb municipality organs?

 3        A.   First of all, I have page 2 on the monitor, and you said page 3,

 4     if I'm not mistaken, in Serbian.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I think she was referring to point 4, where it says

 6     "Convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the

 7     municipality ..."

 8             Do you see that, Mr. Kapetina?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ah, yes.  Paragraph 4, yes.

10             JUDGE KWON:  And do you remember the question?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  I do.  I would like to

12     ask you to show the last page of that document.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   I'd like to ask you to answer my question.

15        A.   Because it will contain -- because it will contain the answer

16     that I'm going to offer to you.

17        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, why don't you just give the answer?

18        A.   I shall answer instantaneously.  In this instruction these are

19     measures and tasks.  That is to say that no one ordered this.  This --

20     this was put on a menu, if you will, and for this to be correct, to show

21     that this is correct, do put the last paragraph of this document on the

22     screen for me.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I do not --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I do not understand why you should see the last

Page 41291

 1     page.  You cannot answer the question?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've answered.  This is just a

 3     measure that contains the instruction at this level, and this is on the

 4     menu for those who are supposed to carry it out.  No one ordered this

 5     measure.  No one from the Serb Democratic Party said:  "I hereby order

 6     that an Assembly of the Serb people be proclaimed," et cetera, et cetera.

 7     That's why I'm asking you for the last page because that is precisely

 8     what is written there.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The question was, Mr. Kapetina, whether it was a

10     menu, order, instruction, whatever it might have been, what's the basis

11     to unilaterally create parallels of municipalities organs.  That was the

12     question.  I assume that it was not an order at all, instruction.  Even

13     it says just suggestion.  What's the basis, that was the question.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I will -- well, now was it

15     constitutional and lawful at the level of the republican parliament to

16     out-vote the legally elected representatives of a constituent people?

17     Was that legal?  Was that constitutional and lawful?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Is that your answer, Mr. Kapetina?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this is just one of the

20     possible reactions at local level.  That is to say, when one group of

21     deputies or all the deputies of one constituent people are thrown out of

22     parliament, when you out-vote them with regard to all key questions of

23     national interest, what can you expect from that kind of legally elected

24     parliamentary group?  It cannot accept to have someone excluded from

25     political life if they had won the election and evidently they had.  So

Page 41292

 1     this is just one of the possibilities that was envisaged in the

 2     instruction, that this be done at local level, too, drawing on the

 3     experience of what happened in the republican parliament.  But I note

 4     once again that no one ordered this.  This was provided as a menu within

 5     the instruction, and that is why I'm asking you to show the last page.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I will ask Ms. Edgerton to continue.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   I'd like to go to actually a different page.  No.  Actually, it's

 9     the same page in English and the same page in B/C/S.

10             Mr. Kapetina, just look down one clause to instruction level --

11     instruction number 5, and you also find the same passage under the second

12     level of instructions.  It says in instruction 5:

13              "Carry out preparations for the establishment of municipal state

14     organs..." and it lists them, "... and prepare a list of nominees for

15     offices and duties in the said organ."

16             And then it says:

17             "Prepare the take-over of staff, buildings, and equipment of

18     security services centres and their integration with the newly

19     established organ of the interior at the seat of the centre."

20             So about this subparagraph or this instruction, I'd like to ask

21     you the same question:  Can you identify the legal and constitutional

22     provisions in place in December 1991 that allowed a political party to

23     form, mobilise, and resubordinate a separate Serbian police station and

24     police forces?

25        A.   First of all, this instruction does not say that they should be

Page 41293

 1     established, these organs.  Rather, it says that preparations should be

 2     carried out.  Do you know that a political party that is in opposition,

 3     not in government, can also form a shadow government?  They can prepare

 4     personnel for setting up a new government.  That is the right that a

 5     political party has.  One that is in opposition, not one that's in

 6     government.  So these are not documents of establishment.  These are

 7     documents referring to preparations.

 8        Q.   So, Mr. Kapetina, you can't answer either of my questions, can

 9     you?

10        A.   I've answered every one of your questions.  You can either be

11     satisfied or unsatisfied with the answers, but I keep telling you that we

12     should look at the last page of this paper, and you keep avoiding that.

13        Q.   So, Mr. Kapetina, you can't answer my questions because there

14     were no provisions in place at that time that allowed for a political

15     party to unilaterally create Serb municipality and police organs.  It's

16     quite simple, isn't it?

17        A.   That is not correct.  You are proceeding on the basis of a

18     certain perception.  For me members of parliament who were elected to the

19     republican parliament are not a political party, whereas you keep saying

20     that they are the representatives of a party.  For me, these are legally

21     elected members of parliament elected by the people.  Further on, legally

22     elected members of government, from your point of view they are members

23     of the SDS.  From my point of view, in my perception --

24             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure if the witness understood the question.

25     Shall we move on?

Page 41294

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Sure, Your Honours.

 2        Q.   In fact -- so, Mr. Kapetina, in fact you've already said you

 3     never saw this document before 2004; right?

 4        A.   That's right.

 5        Q.   You don't know what happened with this document when it was

 6     handed out.  You don't know what was said when it was disseminated;

 7     right?

 8        A.   Well, since I am in this field and that I'm professionally linked

 9     to this field, I assume what was suggested when it was distributed and

10     distributed down to those who needed --

11        Q.   I didn't ask you for assumptions.  I asked you whether or not you

12     knew.  Are you now saying that you knew about its distribution and its

13     dissemination?

14        A.   I can only assume.  I don't know.

15        Q.   That's fine then.  We'll move on then to another area.  I want to

16     ask you -- I want us to have a look at a document you discussed in your

17     evidence in chief, D3857.  So this is a document that was signed by

18     Milan Atlagic, who you said in your written evidence was an associate of

19     yours before he moved to the security unit of the 2nd Military District.

20     So I just want to know is your evidence that Milan Atlagic, who was a

21     career JNA officer, who before he took this job, head of the military

22     police for the military district, was Milan Atlagic passing you strictly

23     confidential military information in February 1992?

24        A.   Milan Atlagic worked in the sector for security of the Ministry

25     of Defence.  His immediate superior or supervisor was Colonel Bjelosevic.

Page 41295

 1     Colonel Bjelosevic was assistant minister of defence for security affairs

 2     and I was the chief republican inspector.  Milan Atlagic did not gather

 3     intelligence from the JNA.  Rather, he was in charge of security for the

 4     civilian sector and the civilian sector of society and that's the kind of

 5     information he exchanged with me.

 6        Q.   So let me stop you right there, Mr. Kapetina.  My question was is

 7     it your evidence that Atlagic was passing you strictly confidential

 8     military information, because that's what this document says on the top

 9     right-hand and top left-hand corners, was he passing you strictly

10     confidential military information in February 1992?

11        A.   In my statement I said that I had not received this information

12     in writing but that I was in a position for Milan Atlagic to provide some

13     information to me of a security nature.  Not about the JNA, rather, from

14     the ground, from local communes.

15        Q.   So your answer is yes.

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And that would be a violation of military security on his part,

18     wouldn't it?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   Let's go over to the second page of this document.  Bottom

21     left-hand corner.  This document is addressed and only copied to the

22     security organ of the 2nd Military District, the security organ of the

23     4th Corps, and the security organ of the military district command.  Your

24     name isn't there, Mr. Kapetina.

25        A.   I've already said that I had not received information in writing.

Page 41296

 1     I repeat that once again.  I did not receive this paper.  I was in a

 2     position to get certain information, security information, from the

 3     ground from Colonel Atlagic; that is to say, from municipalities in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina and from state organs and so on.  I did not say that I

 5     had received this information.

 6             And now for your information, the command of the military

 7     district that Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Atlagic worked in on the 28th of

 8     February was beforehand in the sector of military mobilisation affairs of

 9     the Ministry of Defence, and it was only later that this was transferred

10     to the command of military district.  So the law -- or, rather, the top

11     people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not in favour of this new organisation

12     that --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness start

14     answering from the last sentence.  It was too fast for interpretation.

15             JUDGE KWON:  You were speaking too fast, Mr. Kapetina --

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

17             JUDGE KWON:  -- for the interpreters to follow.  So I would like

18     you to kindly repeat from where you said about the law, "... the top

19     people in BH were not in favour...," from there.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They didn't want to accept the new

21     solutions in the amendments in the law on military obligation, that

22     carrying out military obligation in the republic should be carried out by

23     military territorial organs where this Colonel Atlagic worked.  That is

24     the command of the military district.

25             According to the previous law, this work was done by the Ministry

Page 41297

 1     of Defence and the municipal secretariats for national defence.

 2     Therefore Milan Atlagic was a colleague of mine.  Say in this period we

 3     were on the same floor in the Ministry of Defence, and we were

 4     acquaintances and colleagues, and we had the same work.

 5        Q.   I want to jump over in your statement now to a little bit of your

 6     work history in the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska.  It seems

 7     from your statement you're a pretty long-standing employee because you

 8     worked with General Subotic, General Kovacevic, Mr. Ninkovic,

 9     General Milovanovic, and it was under General Milovanovic that you also

10     severed as a deputy defence minister for a period, I think; right?

11        A.   In 1997 I was elected deputy minister of defence, and at that

12     point in time Milovanovic was not minister of defence.  It was

13     Milan Ninkovic.  I did not work in the Ministry of Defence of the

14     Government of Republika Srpska during the term of office of

15     General Manojlo Milovanovic.

16             And what you mentioned here that I worked with Subotic,

17     Kovacevic, and Ninkovic, yes.

18        Q.   And then you were military advisor to Mr. Parvas who was the Serb

19     member of the Bosnian Presidency for a period of time.

20        A.   Yes, that's right.  I was advisor for security and defence of the

21     member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Republika Srpska.

22        Q.   Until what point?

23        A.   From 2002 to 2006, that term.

24        Q.   And now you're a businessman; right?

25        A.   Well, I work in a company.  I wouldn't say that I was a

Page 41298

 1     businessman.

 2        Q.   And you're involved -- the company's work is selling arms --

 3     exporting arms and ammunition out of Bosnia and Herzegovina; right?

 4        A.   Yes.  Beforehand I worked in that company.  Yes.  That company

 5     had a licence and a certificate for exporting arms and military

 6     equipment.

 7        Q.   So clearly you were a valued member of the defence staff having

 8     been in office for so long.  You've got some long-standing experience in

 9     defence matters.  Is that fair to say?

10        A.   I think the answer is yes.

11        Q.   And in July 1995 when Mr. Ninkovic, who was your minister at the

12     time, was out on the western front, you then were the most experienced

13     official in the defence ministry.  You were the most experienced guy left

14     in office; right?

15        A.   Well, if we take into account the other assistant ministers,

16     then, yes, I was secretary of the ministry.  There were also, say, five

17     or six assistant ministers who also had experience in state

18     administration and the system of defence.

19        Q.   Okay.  I just want to get to the point in your statement now

20     where you talk about being called to Dr. Karadzic's office sometime

21     between the 5th and the 10th of July.  Now, you had -- did you have your

22     office downstairs in -- in Dr. Karadzic's building or were you in a

23     separate building where the rest of the ministry officials were housed?

24        A.   I was in a different building where the Ministry of Defence of

25     the Republika Srpska was housed, and that was in the Famos factory.  I

Page 41299

 1     was not in the same building as the president of the republic.

 2        Q.   And at that time, just to sort of set the stage for this, at that

 3     time his office was on the second floor of the building, and it was kind

 4     of down the corridor and on the left-hand side; right?

 5        A.   You mean the office of the president of the republic?

 6        Q.   I do.

 7        A.   I really don't remember.  It was possible that it was on one of

 8     the stories.  It's been a long time ago.  I really don't know remember

 9     whether it was on an upper floor or on a ground floor.

10        Q.   It doesn't really matter.  In any case, if Dr. Karadzic needed

11     you, you could be there quickly; right?

12        A.   That is right.

13        Q.   And you didn't need a formal appointment to get there either.  He

14     could just pick up the phone and call who he needed from your ministry or

15     you, and it was your job to get there as quick as you could; right?

16        A.   Right.  Of course, this was done through the secretary, not by

17     the president himself.

18        Q.   And when you go up to see him on that occasion in his office,

19     your evidence is that he knew something was going on about Srebrenica,

20     but he didn't know what; correct?

21        A.   My impression was that he had received some information but that

22     he didn't have reliable information as to what was actually happening

23     around Srebrenica.  In other words, according to the president's conduct,

24     I understood that the information that he received was not the

25     information that he got from officials of Republika Srpska but, rather,

Page 41300

 1     from members of the international community, hence he wanted someone to

 2     paint a clear picture to him regarding the situation in and around

 3     Srebrenica.

 4        Q.   All right.  Now, talking about his conduct, can you show us or at

 5     least describe in more detail exactly how Dr. Karadzic pulled his hair

 6     out, knocked over a chair, kicked and knocked over chairs and a table,

 7     and asked who the idiots were who ordered Srebrenica?  Can you show us or

 8     at least describe it more detail?

 9        A.   Well, exactly what you said in your question.  In a word, he was

10     furious for not having been informed about anything, primarily by his

11     associates, and he did exactly how I described it.  He was kicking a

12     stool, an armchair.  He was pulling his hair out.  Quite simply he

13     couldn't -- he couldn't accept not to be informed about something that

14     his associates were obliged to inform him about.  That's how I understood

15     it.

16        Q.   Well --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said he inadvertently

20     kicked.  What is this called?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A stool.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  He inadvertently kicked.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   When you pull your hair how the, that's going to cause a great

Page 41301

 1     wound, isn't it?  It's something you do with great force.  How did

 2     Dr. Karadzic do it?  I want you to show us.

 3        A.   Well, he wasn't pulling his hair out literally.  You may have

 4     noticed that during all this time here that since Mr. Karadzic has long

 5     hair he sometimes put his fingers through his hair, but according all his

 6     body language and gestures, I understood that he was infuriated for not

 7     having received the information from those who should have provided it to

 8     him.  That was my point.

 9        Q.   All right.  Let's talk a bit more about his body language.  And I

10     actually want you to look at a photograph for us.  It's P4560.  And it's

11     photograph -- it's page 1 of P4560, and it's a photograph of Dr. Karadzic

12     in his office in the Famos factory on the 13th of July, 1995.

13             So there's Dr. Karadzic in his office, and he's there,

14     Mr. Kapetina, with Srdjan Trifkovic, and there's a table in front of

15     Dr. Karadzic with a bowl of fruit on it and some flowers.  So when you

16     say Dr. Karadzic knocked over a table, was it this heavy meeting table

17     that he and Mr. Trifkovic are sitting at in his office?  What's funny

18     about that, Mr. Kapetina, because that's your evidence in your statement,

19     so I want to find out how it happened?

20        A.   I don't think that I said in my statement that he knocked the

21     table over.  Maybe a chair or a stool.  The table was never mentioned.

22     If that was included in my statement, I should have corrected it.  There

23     was no mention of any table.

24        Q.   Your statement at paragraph 43 says:

25             "This answer of mine further infuriated the president so that he

Page 41302

 1     knocked over a chair, kicked and knocked over some seats, and a table,

 2     pulled his hair out, and asked aloud, 'Who needs this right now?  Who

 3     ordered it?  Who are these idiots?'"

 4             That's what your statement says.  So did he knock over a table or

 5     not?

 6        A.   No, and that's not what I said.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance?  There is

 8     no mention of a table in the Serbian version.  Can we please see the

 9     relevant paragraph.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we take a look at para 43 of his

11     statement.

12             We have no clue other than having to ask the witness to read out

13     the first sentence of para 43.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Correct.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read the first sentence very slowly.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "This response of mine made the

17     president of the republic even more infuriated so that he overturned a

18     chair.  He kicked and turned over a suite, a chair again, he pulled his

19     hair out and asked a question out loud:  'Who needs this at this point in

20     time?  Who ordered this?  Who these are idiots?  Haven't I told you 100

21     times that the status of Srebrenica has to be resolved within the

22     framework of an overall solution for the BH and that no offensive

23     measures should be taken towards the safe haven?'"

24             So there was no mention of a table.  After such a long time I

25     cannot be sure whether the president received me in the office of the

Page 41303

 1     president of the municipality.  I think that when he asked me over, he

 2     was in the offers the president of the municipality, because looking at

 3     this picture that was not the office at all.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:

 5        Q.   So we have a problem with the English translation.  That's one

 6     thing.  And you're now adding to your statement saying that Dr. Karadzic

 7     didn't receive you in his office but in the office of the president of

 8     some municipality.  Who was that?

 9        A.   No.  In the office of the president of the National Assembly.

10        Q.   Oh.  So now Dr. Karadzic called you about Srebrenica from

11     Mr. Krajisnik's office.  Is that right?

12        A.   Roughly speaking, that would be correct.  After having seen this

13     interior and this office, I realise that that was not the office where he

14     received me.

15        Q.   So when Dr. Karadzic called you from -- was Dr. Karadzic in the

16     habit of calling you from Mr. Krajisnik's office?

17        A.   If they happened to be together in either of the office, it made

18     no difference where he would ask me to come over, but in most instances

19     he asked me to come to his office.

20        Q.   So Mr. Krajisnik would have been there then?

21        A.   Not at the time.

22        Q.   Who else was in the room, in Mr. Krajisnik's office, when

23     Dr. Karadzic called you from that location to ask you about Srebrenica?

24        A.   There was no one else.  President Karadzic and I were the only

25     people, and there were two secretaries in the adjacent office.

Page 41304

 1        Q.   So you would have had to go through the secretaries to get to

 2     Mr. Krajisnik's office.

 3        A.   Probably.  Yes, of course.

 4        Q.   Right.  Now, let's go back to the picture we had on the screen,

 5     P4560.  Page 1.

 6             All right.  Now not accepting for the moment that the meeting

 7     happened in Mr. Krajisnik's office, I just want to ask you about

 8     furniture.  When you say Dr. Karadzic kicked and knocked over chairs, was

 9     he kicking and knocking over these leather-bound office chairs that you

10     see he and Mr. Trifkovic sitting on?

11        A.   I said that he did it inadvertently because he was so agitated

12     and nervous that he was walking around the office and waving his hands,

13     so in the process he knocked over a chair.  He turned over a stool.  And

14     I wrote all this down in order to describe the state of mind that the

15     president was in.  I wanted to depict to you his state of mind at the

16     time when he asked me to come over to speak to him.

17        Q.   So we went from him being so furious that he was ripping his hair

18     out and forcibly turning over the furniture in whatever office you met

19     him in to him running his hands through his hair and inadvertently

20     knocking into furniture; right?

21        A.   I have to reiterate that one the chairs definitely was turned

22     over.  Whether this was intentionally or intentionally, but I think that

23     it doesn't affect the reason why I went there and why the president asked

24     me to come over.

25        Q.   And when Dr. Karadzic said to you or asked you who the idiots

Page 41305

 1     were who ordered Srebrenica, that must have been some kind of a trick on

 2     his part; right?

 3        A.   Well, I never talked to the president by using tricks.  At least

 4     I was convinced of that.  I only had serious talks with the president.  I

 5     never used any tricks, nor do I believe that the president ever treated

 6     me unfairly.  I am sure that all our conversations were serious, relating

 7     to the situation and to our business and our tasks, and I don't think

 8     that the president acted by using tricks.  He never treated me in that

 9     way.

10        Q.   Well, he must have been deceiving you then, Mr. Kapetina, because

11     when he spoke in public at the opening of this trial, he said:

12             "All of a sudden it turns out once all soldiers enter Srebrenica

13     that they had left Srebrenica.  That's when I ordered them to enter the

14     town, to restore peace and order.  I have a letter to that effect,

15     because General Tolimir says that's what I actually ordered?"

16             So he must have been deceiving you because it was him all along,

17     Mr. Kapetina.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I'm going to object to

19     that.  The statement and the testimony has been that somewhere between

20     the 5th and 10th of July this conversation to place, and she's now

21     referring to some event that happened later than the 10th of July.  So I

22     don't believe that it's a fair question to imply that Dr. Karadzic is

23     deceiving him based on that example.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure when you said some event that happened

25     later than the 10th of July.

Page 41306

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  The entry into Srebrenica, what she just described

 2     in her question.  Those events took place after that.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What's the date of Mr. Tolimir's report or letter?

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  I believe --

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  P2276, 9 July, 1995.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  This was a very late evening of the 9th of July.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So it's between the 5th and the 10th, so I don't see

 8     any difficulty with the question.  Why don't we continue, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   So, Mr. Kapetina, what I put to you was that Dr. Karadzic must

11     have been deceiving you, then, because in public he said he ordered them

12     to enter the town to restore peace and order, and he said he had a letter

13     to that effect because General Tolimir says that's what he actually

14     ordered.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I intervene.  Firstly, in line

16     16 the witness said that I never treated others as well in the same way.

17     Secondly, the witness should be made aware of the difference between

18     ordering and consenting.  And also in page 62 it should be explicitly

19     said which soldiers are we talking about, which soldiers entered

20     Srebrenica and which soldiers left Srebrenica.  I'm sure that this is an

21     error in the transcript.  I am sure that Ms. Edgerton spoke correctly,

22     but it seems that it was not recorded as it should.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Probably, Ms. Edgerton, you could read

24     the citation again to the witness.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Just your indulgence for a moment.  I'll

Page 41307

 1     read it again.

 2        Q.   The citation comes from transcript page 982, lines 7 to 10, and

 3     the citation is:

 4             "All --"

 5             JUDGE KWON:  That's Mr. Karadzic's opening address?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  That's correct.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   "All of a sudden, it turns out, once all soldiers enter

10     Srebrenica, that they had left Srebrenica.  That's when I ordered them to

11     enter the town to restore peace and order.  I have a letter to that

12     effect, because General Tolimir says what I actually ordered."

13             Now, Mr. Kapetina, you've had a lot of time to think of an answer

14     to this question, so can we hear it?  Was Dr. Karadzic deceiving you?

15        A.   Dr. Karadzic, or rather, the president of the republic, would

16     invite me only in a situation where the minister of defence was absent.

17     He always called me when it pertained to my purview.  Since I knew that

18     on that particular day the minister of defence was not at Pale, I believe

19     that President wasn't deceiving me.  First of all, I don't know which

20     date it was exactly.  It may have been the 5th of July, and I believe

21     that that was the sole reason why the President called me, because he

22     couldn't establish communication with the commander of the Main Staff,

23     the chief of the staff, or any responsible person on the Main Staff who

24     could give me accurate information, and that was the only reason why he

25     called me to come to his office.  He asked me if I had any information,

Page 41308

 1     not information on my own but information that I had received from either

 2     state or military organs, and that was the only reason why he asked me to

 3     come over, nothing else.

 4        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, you say you gave evidence that he asked you:

 5             "Who needs this right now?  Who ordered it?  Who are these

 6     idiots?  Didn't I tell you a hundred times that the status of Srebrenica

 7     should be dealt with within the overall solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 8     and not to take any offensive operations in relation to the safe areas?"

 9             Mr. Kapetina, either Dr. Karadzic was lying to you, or when he

10     gave his opening address which was carried in the media around the world

11     he was lying to the public.  Which is it?

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  That -- I -- that's a

13     question that falls into the category of when did you stop beating your

14     wife.  I don't think that it's an either/or.  It can be others -- other

15     explanations as well.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So now you were told about Mr. Karadzic's opening

17     speech in this trial.  Do you still stand by what you said in your

18     statement?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I fully stand by what I said in my

20     statement, and Madam Prosecutor misread my -- his statement.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.  We cannot

22     keep up the pace.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton misread what?  Could you repeat from

24     there?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The President didn't use the

Page 41309

 1     singular.  He used plural.  He said, "Didn't I say 100 times at official

 2     meetings."  He didn't say anything to me personally, because I didn't

 3     undertake any actions with regard to Srebrenica.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, if I may say, the

 5     sentence from the opening statement was misrecorded.  I didn't use the

 6     word "enter suddenly" talking about soldiers, but when soldiers left

 7     Srebrenica, this is what's creating this confusion.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  That does not make much difference.  Let's leave it.

 9             Shall we continue.

10             MS. EDGERTON:

11        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, you've just said --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes.  I was afraid that the transcript was not

13     working, but it's okay.  Please continue.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I do realise we're over time, though, Your

15     Honours.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Do you have long, some more?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I do.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we have a break?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  That's fine, thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will resume at 1.25.

21                           --- Recess taken at 12.40 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 1.28 p.m.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   And, Mr. Kapetina, just when we broke before lunch, in the

Page 41310

 1     context of talking about paragraph 43 of your statement, you told

 2     His Honour Judge Kwon that you stood by that evidence, and what I want to

 3     do now, picking up from your assertion, is I want to show you three

 4     documents, and then I'm going to ask you a question.

 5             The first document is D2097, and it's a report of the Main Staff

 6     of the Bosnian Serb Army, dated 6 July 1995.  I'm sure there's an English

 7     translation, so we'll just wait a second.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Great.  Thank you.  Could we please go over to

 9     English page 4 and B/C/S page 3, section 6(b), which says:

10             "In reference to the situation in the zone of responsibility of

11     the Drina Corps, units of the corps are at the required level of combat

12     readiness.  The forces have been prepared and grouped for active combat

13     operations towards the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa and on receiving

14     an interim report will inform you of the combat results achieved so far."

15             Now, if we could go over to page 1 of both these documents, the

16     English and the B/C/S, please.

17        Q.   You see, Mr. Kapetina, that among all the other recipients of

18     this VRS Main Staff daily combat report, the president of the Republika

19     Srpska is listed first; right?  If you see that, and then we're going to

20     leave this document and go on to the next one.

21        A.   I've seen it.  We can move on.

22        Q.   Thanks.  Now I'd like us to have a look at D02080.  It's an

23     interim combat report from General Krstic, dated 9 July 1995, to the VRS

24     Main Staff, and it says at paragraph 3 under the heading "Decision for

25     further operations."

Page 41311

 1             "Taking advantage of the success achieved, regroup the forces and

 2     carry out a vigorous and decisive attack towards Srebrenica."

 3             So you see that; right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now, I'm going to tell you what Dr. Karadzic said about this

 6     document in this trial, and that's from transcript page 27725, testimony

 7     dated 20 April 2012, and it's referring to July 1995, the same date of

 8     this document.  Dr. Karadzic said:

 9             "Do you remember that on that day it was in the evening, after

10     2220," that's 10.20 p.m., "General Krstic informed the main staff that he

11     had the opportunity of liberating Srebrenica, of entering Srebrenica, and

12     a half hour later Tolimir sent a telegram back to him with my approval?"

13             Right.  Now I want to show you the document from General Tolimir,

14     and then I'll ask you a question.  And that document from General Tolimir

15     is P2276, dated 9 July 1995, and it's an order from General Tolimir, and

16     it's copied to Dr. Karadzic for information, and it's transmitted to

17     Generals Gvero and Krstic personally, and it's about the conduct of

18     combat operations around Srebrenica, and it says:

19             "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of

20     successful combat operations around Srebrenica by units of the

21     Drina Corps and that they have achieved results which enable them to

22     occupy the very town of Srebrenica."

23             And in the second paragraph it says:

24             "The president of the republic is satisfied with the results of

25     combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the continuation

Page 41312

 1     of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica, disarming of Muslim

 2     terrorist gangs, and complete demilitarisation of the ... enclaves

 3     [sic]."

 4             So Mr. Kapetina, when Dr. Karadzic told you that he couldn't

 5     establish communication with the commander of the Main Staff or any

 6     responsible person on the Main Staff who could give accurate information,

 7     that's not true, is it, because these documents show exactly the

 8     opposite, these documents and Dr. Karadzic's own words in this trial.

 9        A.   What is the question?

10        Q.   The question is, Mr. Kapetina, that when Dr. Karadzic told you

11     that he couldn't establish communication with the commander of the

12     Main Staff or any responsible person in the Main Staff, that that wasn't

13     true, was it?

14        A.   I don't know whether it was true or not.  Maybe

15     President Karadzic invited me on the 5th of July.  You are commenting on

16     something that happened on the 6th or 9th.  Perhaps he summoned me on the

17     5th when he did the not have that information, or perhaps on the 4th.  I

18     said roughly between the 5th and the 10th.  You're acting like I remember

19     dates.  Maybe he invited me on the 5th, and then these reports followed

20     after that on the 6th and 9th.  Perhaps they came later.  I'm telling you

21     from what I know, from what I heard, and from what I was told at the

22     meeting, that he had no information from the Main Staff, that he was

23     unable to contact the defence minister.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I didn't object because the

Page 41313

 1     question was complicated and I didn't want to disturb the flow, but this

 2     is the second time today that the President has used Dr. Karadzic's

 3     non-evidentiary submissions as evidence, and I just want to point that

 4     out, and I believe that that's not correct, and I just hope that we all

 5     have the same understanding.  So when he puts a question to a witness in

 6     his capacity as self-representing accused, there is no factual assertion

 7     there that is evidence either for or against him.  Similarly when he made

 8     an opening statement, not the personal statement he made at the beginning

 9     of the Defence statement but the opening statement at the beginning of

10     the case.  That is also not factual assertions as a witness or as a

11     person so that those also cannot be used as evidence.  So I hope we all

12     agree on that.  Otherwise, it may cause us problems when we're writing

13     our briefs.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Is there anything to comment upon, Mr. Tieger?

15             MR TIEGER:  Well, yeah, there is, Mr. President, because I don't

16     agree and I think the Court is aware that we don't.  We asked for a

17     warning at the beginning of the case.  We made clear our position on

18     that.  We were told, I think, as I recall the events, that a sufficient

19     admonition or a sufficient notification of that position had been made

20     clear to the accused.  And finally, I would note that in any event, it

21     certainly is sufficient to say it is the position of the Defence or it is

22     the Defence's case that, which is certainly a basis for cross-examination

23     and impeachment by itself.  So for both those reasons I cannot agree with

24     Mr. Robinson, and that's why I rose.

25             JUDGE KWON:  But you agree that part of question or statement

Page 41314

 1     does not -- do not form part of the evidence in this case, whether --

 2     separate from whether the Prosecution can use that bit for the

 3     cross-examination of other witnesses.

 4             MR TIEGER:  You can't -- you can't unring the bell in this way,

 5     Mr. President.  I don't believe the Prosecution could use it as

 6     affirmative evidence in the kind of classical way the Court may be

 7     indicating, but to demonstrate the position of the parties, to

 8     demonstrate the position of the accused in certain instances to the

 9     extent it may be relevant in assessing the evidence, I think it's

10     certainly appropriate to use, and it can play a very significant role in

11     the case, but -- so we may -- it sounds like we don't have a

12     disagreement, but I was concerned about the -- what I would regard as an

13     attempt to ignore completely such assertions in court for all purposes,

14     and I think that would be inaccurate and unfair.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to add anything, Mr. Robinson?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue?

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, now, you're now saying that you actually weren't

21     sure of the date of this meeting, that it could have been on the 4th or

22     on the 5th or any time up to the 10th, but -- and, Mr. Kapetina, in your

23     evidence today at page 56 of the temporary transcript, you said that the

24     meeting was arranged by the secretary, and I had a look, Mr. Kapetina, at

25     Dr. Karadzic's appointment calendar for that period of time, July 1995,

Page 41315

 1     part of which you saw at paragraph 4367.  And the whole appointment

 2     calendar, for the record is P2242.

 3             Mr. Kapetina, for the period between the 1st and your meeting on

 4     the 13th of July, 1995, your name doesn't appear in Dr. Karadzic's

 5     engagement calendar.  That's because this meeting where the chairs were

 6     knocked over never happened; right?

 7        A.   That meeting happened, and I noted down exactly what transpired

 8     at that meeting.  I had a feeling that the president was calling me

 9     urgently through the secretary.  It's not the kind of appointment that

10     you note down in the appointment book or in the protocol log.  The

11     secretary made an urgent call to me and told me to see the president.

12             I told you before it's possible that this was also in the office

13     of the speaker of the Assembly.  There was no prior appointment.  It was

14     ad hoc.  What would have happened if I hadn't been in my office?  Then

15     the meeting would have never happened.

16        Q.   I have one last question before we go on to another area, a brief

17     area, and it's about the date of this meeting that you keep going back

18     and forth on, Mr. Kapetina.

19             Mr. Kapetina, the evidence in this case is that the attack on

20     Srebrenica didn't commence until 4.00 in the morning on 6 July 1995.  All

21     right?  And that's the same date as the report to Dr. Karadzic that I

22     showed you when we began this session, D2097.  So I want to come back to

23     this, Mr. Kapetina.  You keep waffling about the date, but you continue

24     to assert that Dr. Karadzic didn't have contact with the Main Staff.  Now

25     hearing the Prosecution's case and the evidence that the date of the

Page 41316

 1     attack is on the 6th of July, do you still stand by your statement?

 2        A.   I emphatically stand by what I wrote in my statement and the

 3     evidence I gave in answer to your two questions.

 4        Q.   Right.  Then I just want to go on to one final area from your

 5     testimony, and that's - your indulgence for a moment - with respect to

 6     paragraph 45 where you talk about the mobilisation by the Ministry of

 7     Defence of buses for the army.  And you said at paragraph 45 that whether

 8     the army was planning to transport its own forces to another theatre of

 9     war or for other purposes, the Ministry of Defence didn't have to know

10     this.  So I just want to ask you, Mr. Kapetina, that's not what the buses

11     your ministry was mobilising were for, was it?  You were mobilising them

12     to remove the non-Serb population from Srebrenica; right?

13        A.   I was not at the ministry when that order and that request

14     arrived from the Main Staff.  You see that the order was signed on behalf

15     of assistant Kovacevic by his employee.  I said in my statement that the

16     responsibility, regardless of the purpose for which the trucks and buses

17     were commandeered, lies with the Ministry of Defence because we are

18     duty-bound to meet the request of the Main Staff and provide the

19     resources regardless of the purpose for which the army is going to use

20     them.  That's what I said in my statement.  And if I had been at the

21     ministry, since the minister was away, I was the one who would probably

22     have signed this request for mobilisation.  But I wasn't there.  You see

23     that somebody -- not even the assistant minister signed it.  It was some

24     senior employee.

25        Q.   My question was whether you agreed that the buses were mobilised

Page 41317

 1     to remove the non-Serb population from Srebrenica.

 2        A.   No dispute.  Yes, certainly.

 3        Q.   When, actually, did you find that out?

 4        A.   Well, I found out from the media reports, television reports.

 5        Q.   When, actually, did you find that out?

 6        A.   I can't give you the exact date, but I learned that from the

 7     media reports.

 8        Q.   So the most senior official in the Ministry of Defence of

 9     Republika Srpska whose department was specifically responsible for the

10     implementation of the military request to mobilise buses to remove the

11     non-Serbs from Srebrenica, and you only found out from the news reports

12     and you don't know when.  That's your evidence?

13        A.   That's precisely my answer to your question.  And let me correct

14     you, I was not in charge of mobilisation.  It was assistant Kovacevic.

15     At that time, I was a secretary of the Ministry of Defence.  I did not

16     have a specific portfolio.  I was a secretary in the Ministry of Defence

17     in charge of regulations, statutes, bylaws, whereas there was a specific

18     portfolio called mobilisation and staffing.

19             Let me tell you about other things that I knew and didn't know

20     about.  I saw directive number 7 only yesterday.  At that time I never

21     knew such texts were drafted.

22        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, feel free to tell Dr. Karadzic those things in his

23     redirect examination of you, but my time allotted for your

24     cross-examination is up, so thank you very much.

25        A.   Thank you too.

Page 41318

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Kapetina, let's start with the last thing in

 5     the cross-examination.  Was that the first and the only mobilisation or,

 6     rather, commandeering of transport vehicles requested by the Main Staff?

 7        A.   I believe that requests for additional manpower and assets came

 8     from the army every week.  It was a continuous job at the Ministry of

 9     Defence.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we put this document on the

11     ELMO if it hasn't been uploaded.  This is 11 January 1996.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could you just read these few sentences beginning with "I hereby

14     order."

15        A.   "Immediately mobilise all motor vehicles, socially and privately

16     owned, with a capacity of over 7 tonnes.

17             "2.  All motor vehicles of the said carrying capacity must report

18     together with the drivers without delay to the Ministry of Defence of

19     Republika Srpska at the petrol station Podromanija Sokolac to the

20     dispatcher."

21        Q.   Does it say for which purpose?

22        A.   No.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

24     document to be MFI'd.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

Page 41319

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely not, Your Honour.  It's -- it's --

 2     it's -- the witness has just read the document out and absolutely nothing

 3     more.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  How does it relate to the cross-examination,

 5     Mr. Karadzic?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it was suggested that a high

 7     official of the ministry must have known for what purpose motor vehicles

 8     were mobilised in July 1995.  We see here that this was a frequent

 9     occurrence.  The witness said almost once a week.  And the purpose is not

10     indicated.  It was not the duty of the Main Staff or the ministry to

11     specify the purpose.  This follows directly from the suggestion made by

12     Ms. Edgerton.

13             The witness said -- the transcript is incorrect.

14             JUDGE KWON:  What is incorrect, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It has been corrected.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't think I suggested anything of the sort,

18     Your Honour.  All I did was to reference the witness and the Defence to

19     what the question was, which was what -- what the buses were mobilised

20     for.  I read out his own evidence at paragraph 45.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, if we look at line 4 of page 75,

22     the question she put was:

23             "Was this the first and only mobilisation or, rather,

24     commandeering of transport vehicles requested by the Main Staff?"

25             So this goes directly to that point.

Page 41320

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  That's Dr. Karadzic who said that.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber does not think this is relevant.  We'll

 4     not admit this.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Then I'm not going to

 6     show a couple of more documents that relate to the mobilisation of motor

 7     vehicles.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, do you know how many rooms there are around my

10     office and whether I always received people in the same room, that is to

11     say in my office, rather than any of the adjacent rooms?

12        A.   Of course you received people in adjacent rooms.  I don't know

13     how many there were exactly at that level, but I know there was a

14     conference room, and sometimes you would receive people in the conference

15     room too.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at D02080 in

17     e-court, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19        Q.   Can you tell us to whom is this addressed, this interim combat

20     report?  Did it reach me?

21        A.   As far as I can see, this is addressed to the Main Staff.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could you look at the passage in paragraph 2 -- item

23     2, paragraph 3, it says:

24             They ... "carried out the immediate task separating the enclaves

25     of Zepa and Srebrenica and created conditions for extending the attack

Page 41321

 1     towards Srebrenica."

 2             Were you aware of their immediate task to separate Zepa and

 3     Srebrenica, and were we entitled to do that according to the agreement on

 4     those two protected areas?

 5        A.   I did not know about any task that had to do with Srebrenica or

 6     the surrounding area.  However, as far as I know about the principles of

 7     protected areas, I think it was legitimate for the Army of Republika

 8     Srpska to have a buffer zone between these two enclaves and the UN

 9     protected areas, because it was well known in the area of Zepa, that was

10     a far bigger area, air supplies came of ammunition and weapons and so on

11     and units in both protected areas resorted to that, and I think this was

12     a legitimate activity because they were treated as two separate protected

13     areas not a single one.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know who stopped our army in 1993, stopped it

15     from entering Srebrenica, and for what reason?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Not relevant with respect to this witness.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, on the day when you saw me and when I complained

19     that I did not have any information, at that point in time did I know

20     that the 28th Division had left Srebrenica and that they would not defend

21     it?  Did I inform you about that?

22        A.   You did not inform me about anything.  You just asked me to, I

23     mean, say whether I had any information and whether I had received

24     anything from the Main Staff or the Drina Corps.  At the end you just

25     apologised to me.  I mean, because you were arrogant in the way you were

Page 41322

 1     addressing me, but it didn't really have to do with me.  It had to do

 2     with the entire situation and the people who were supposed to be doing

 3     their jobs.  That is how you had put it.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I wanted to link it

 6     up that way because the Defence position is that the assumption was that

 7     there would be heavy fighting and -- Srebrenica, I would not have given

 8     consent to enter Srebrenica, but that is the way it was.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  You have the opportunity to testify about it.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Could you please tell us -- could you please tell us, on page 53

13     you said -- it was suggested to you that military secrets were being

14     revealed to you.  Can you tell us which defence and security measures and

15     information should be concealed from the chief inspector of the minister

16     of defence on the ground?  Is it a military secret.  I mean anything that

17     comes from the ground, is that a secret for the chief inspector?

18        A.   Military secrets only have to do with JNA units and information

19     in the army, whereas in the Ministry of Defence the ministry is a

20     civilian organ, a state organ, and state secrets were the most restricted

21     secrets, highly confidential, confidential, and restricted.  And then

22     information about personnel capacity within the military, within units,

23     that was military secrets, whereas we in the state organs had state

24     secrets.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us about that example -- or, rather,

Page 41323

 1     that copy of Atlagic's report, did it stay in the archives of the

 2     ministry?  All the addressees were referred to, but such matters -- I

 3     mean, were copies left at the ministry too?

 4        A.   Well, I think there were, unless their assessment was at that

 5     point in time that it should not be sent to the ministry, but it should

 6     be in the ministry.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested that there were no legal grounds for

 8     establishing a Serb municipality, taking measures, and so on, so could we

 9     please have -- could we please have in e-court 1D9735.  Now there's an

10     MFI number, 1D1935.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  If I may, I didn't make that suggestion at all.

13     What I asked was for Mr. Kapetina to identify the specific legal and

14     constitutional provisions which permit a political party to establish

15     separate Serbian municipalities.  Which he did not.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll get to that too.

17             Page 8, please.  The page where number 8 is written.  Yes.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Now, could you please listen to this.  I'm going to read this

20     out.  This comes from the Law on National Defence, and you refer to it.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot find this

22     passage.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Where is it?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the third paragraph,

25     Excellencies.  It's the quotation within the third paragraph.  Oh, yes.

Page 41324

 1     Oh, I see, we don't have a translation here.  All right.  So then it's

 2     paragraph 3, and then quotation marks.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could Dr. Karadzic put a question rather than

 5     reading -- leading the witness by reading a document that we can't read.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question is the one that

 7     was put by Ms. Edgerton:  Where are the legal grounds for papers A and B,

 8     legal and constitutional grounds?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Why can't you ask the question without showing the

10     document to the witness?

11                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  Then I'm going to ask

13     for Variants A and B.  P5.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I think P5 is a different document.  P960.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's all the same, any number.

16     Next page, please.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please, the first sentence.  Could you take a look at the first

19     sentence.  And could we please have the next page in English.

20             Could you tell me what does this sentence stem from, and what is

21     your association in respect of regulations?  The first sentence.

22        A.   Well, this is an assertion to the effect that the constitutional

23     order of the country is under threat.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now go back to the previous document.  What is

25     envisaged in that kind of situation when the constitutional order of the

Page 41325

 1     country is under threat?

 2        A.   To declare a state of emergency and to implement plans for

 3     stopping or eliminating emergencies.

 4        Q.   1D9735, page 8, paragraph 3.  The quotation there, that is

 5     precisely what he said, but we've got it again now.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Now --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm really sorry, Your Honour, but this is not

11     matter arising from the question in cross-examination, which was whether

12     or not the witness can identify, as I said, the provisions that allow for

13     the creation of separate Serb municipal organs.  If he can, then

14     Dr. Karadzic can ask him that question and he can answer it now rather

15     than be led through documents in a way that I would submit isn't

16     permissible in redirect.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I think Dr. Karadzic could show the

19     witness a document and ask him to comment on it as to whether -- how or

20     whether it in fact shows that such a provision was in existence.  So I

21     don't think there would be anything improper if he has such documents or

22     if he knows of them to ask the witness to comment on whether or not those

23     documents confirm the existence of the right to do what they purported to

24     do under Variants A and B.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 41326

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   This is the basis for the question that Madam Edgerton put with

 4     regard to municipalities.

 5             Can you say on the basis of the constitution how are

 6     municipalities created, or, rather, what do municipalities consist of?

 7        A.   A municipality consists of local communes as basic cells of the

 8     society, and the municipality is territorial government.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Local communes, do they have the right to leave one

10     municipality and join another one or to turn themselves into a separate

11     municipality?  How are new municipalities created according to the law?

12        A.   On the basis concrete examples that happen in this period I will

13     explain this.  Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 had 109 municipalities and the

14     city of Sarajevo as a community of several municipalities, and say before

15     that, a year before that, the municipality of Pale separated itself from

16     the city and became a municipality outside the city.  So it is sufficient

17     to launch an initiative within the local Assembly and then to create,

18     say, two municipalities out of a single municipality if necessary, and

19     there can be different reasons:  Economic development, ethnic structure,

20     joining a different district or city or whatever.  There can be many

21     reasons.

22             For example, before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bijeljina was

23     supposed to be divided into two municipalities, Bijeljina and Janja, and

24     the procedure had already started, and we know that the Muslim population

25     there had already asked for a municipality of their own because that

Page 41327

 1     would guarantee faster economic development.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  You confirmed during the examination-in-chief and the

 3     cross-examination that the local commune has some authority with regard

 4     to defence.  Can you tell us on the assumption where we have a

 5     municipality with five Serb local communes and five Muslim local

 6     communes, what are the powers of the five Serb local communes if they

 7     assess that the other five municipality -- the other five local communes

 8     are threatening the constitutional order?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  This is over the top I would submit, Your Honours.

11     It's not arising out of the cross-examination.

12             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Tieger.  Just a second.

13             MR TIEGER:  Sure.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger, would you like to add anything?

16             MR. TIEGER:  I was only going to say in addition it has nothing

17     to do with the Variant A and B document which is why I presume the

18     accused didn't take the witness to the document.  So it may have been

19     obvious to the Court based on its own familiarity with it, but we've now

20     strayed beyond the terms of that particular document into some -- a new

21     area.  So it wasn't simply that it wasn't triggered by Ms. Edgerton's

22     specific question.  It wasn't even triggered by the subject matter.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  My problem is this:  The witness was not able to

25     answer your question, Ms. Edgerton, as to what the basis was with respect

Page 41328

 1     to instruction, Variant A and B, and in re-examination for the purpose of

 2     refreshing the memory or whatever, Mr. Karadzic was showing some

 3     documents, and then can you not hear what the witness would say after

 4     having taken a look at the document?  Is there --

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Just -- if I just -- I know you're asking

 6     Ms. Edgerton so I apologise, but since I was -- I was on to a particular

 7     subject matter.  That -- but not if it's no longer about A and B, which

 8     is not about the alleged legal basis for the establishment of -- by local

 9     communes of new municipalities.  It's about, as the Court is aware, some

10     of the other specific matters that -- to which the witness's attention

11     was drawn during the course of the cross-examination.  So now

12     Dr. Karadzic is using the cross-examination about the document as a basis

13     for moving into a separate area of interest to him but that did not arise

14     out of cross, pretending somehow it's related to the Variant A and B

15     document when it's not.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Actually, what -- we do not know what is cited in

17     this document.  We haven't heard about it, whether it's related to it or

18     not.

19             Mr. Kapetina, could you read out aloud what is contained in the

20     inverted commas in the sentence with the footnote number 2.  From "Pod

21     drugim."  Yes.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Read please slowly.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "According to the law on All

25     People's Defence, emergency situations are defined as follows:  'For the

Page 41329

 1     purposes of this law, other emergency situations shall denote armed or

 2     other activity directly threatening the independence of the country, its

 3     sovereignty and territorial integrity and the social order established by

 4     the constitution of the SFRY.'"

 5             That is a quotation from the Law on All People's Defence of

 6     Yugoslavia.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, can you tell us what is the relation between this

10     quotation and the quotation from A and B on item 1 that you saw at the

11     beginning?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kapetina does not know much about Variant A and

13     B document.  How can he say about the relation?  So why don't you move

14     on.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellencies, Mr. Kapetina's

16     job was to check how preparations were going on including organisations

17     such as SDS.  I'm asking him whether this was within the confines of the

18     law or outside the confines the law.  That was his job to know.  We may

19     ask him is there anything contained in this paper that is not stipulated

20     by the law?

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Move on, Mr. Karadzic, to another topic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, can you tell us is there anything in the

Page 41330

 1     regulations that gave the right to Serbian local commune to reorganise

 2     themselves or to self-organise themselves in terms of establishing their

 3     own municipalities and their own authority?

 4        A.   We have already established --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We collapse this document.

 6             And your question again, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   What the Serbian local communes undertook or the Serbian

 9     territorial units such as municipalities and local communes, was that

10     stipulated by regulations that govern emergency situations?

11        A.   Yes.  Not only Serbian local communes but --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, Dr. Karadzic keeps going outside of

14     the bounds of the cross-examination, and he's doing it again.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We're simply wasting some time.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, the

17     question was on what basis the Serb municipalities were established, and

18     I'm asking Mr. Kapetina --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just directly put the question.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   The creation of Serbian municipalities, was that possible under

22     the law and the constitution, particularly in terms of emergency

23     situations?

24        A.   In peacetime the procedure of establishing a municipality or the

25     division of municipality was regulated by the law.  Under the emergency

Page 41331

 1     circumstances, one has to act according to plans and instructions, and an

 2     instruction in my view is just part of the plan.  Tasks and measures that

 3     are contained in an instruction cannot be treated as part of the law or

 4     the constitution, because it's a plan, and it needed to be ordered to

 5     become an action, but I didn't see any such order.  That's why it says

 6     that such measures need to be specifically ordered either by the party or

 7     by the state, and the party can issue such an order only if it is

 8     endorsed by the state, and that's what it says at the end of the

 9     instruction, i.e., that none of these measures were ordered and each of

10     these measures required a separate order, and I myself never saw such an

11     order.

12        Q.   So drawing up a plan, does that imply its automatic

13     implementation?

14        A.   No, it doesn't.  It depends on a specific situation.  You might

15     draw up a plan that would never materialise.  It might just act as a

16     deterrent.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It's a waste of time.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Kapetina, you were asked about the legal foundation, the

23     constitutional foundation of certain procedures.  Can you tell us about

24     the rights of those involved in the defence when you have a destroyed

25     legal and constitutional system?  Are there any provisions stipulating

Page 41332

 1     the rights and obligations under such circumstances, whether you have the

 2     country under an occupation or in any other situation where there is no

 3     constitutional system in existence?

 4        A.   The period between January --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Same objection, Your Honour.  Same objection.

 7     Provisions stipulating rights and obligations whether you have a country

 8     under occupation.  This is far and away outside anything raised in the

 9     cross-examination.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Unless you have any further topics, I would like you

11     to conclude your re-examination, Mr. Karadzic.  It leads us nowhere.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.  My

13     understanding of disputing the issues raised in cross-examination was

14     that this witness did not confirm the legality and lawfulness of the acts

15     of the Serb side, whereas I claim the opposite and it is contained in his

16     manual as well, and with this I'm going to conclude.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

18             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Kapetina.  Thank you for your

19     coming to The Hague to give it.  You are now free to go.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you too.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Is the next witness ready, Mr. Robinson?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  It would be good if we can

24     start him since he's been waiting a long time today.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 41333

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  The next witness will be

 2     Professor Radovan M. Karadzic.

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 6     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Professor Karadzic.  Please be seated and

 8     make yourself comfortable.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

10                           WITNESS:  RADOVAN KARADZIC

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

13                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Professor.

15        A.   Good luck to you, President Karadzic.

16        Q.   Have you given a statement to my Defence team?

17        A.   Yes, I have.

18        Q.   In future, I would kindly ask you to pause before answering so

19     that everything can be recorded.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D9683 in

21     e-court.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can you see your statement on the screen in front of you?

24        A.   Yes, I can.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

Page 41334

 1        A.   Yes, I've read it, and I've signed it.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see the last page so

 3     that the witness can identify his signature.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is my signature.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect the answers

 7     that you gave to the Defence team?

 8        A.   Yes, it does faithfully reflect what I told the Defence team.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today in

10     this courtroom, would your answers essentially be the same?

11        A.   They would be the same.  Only in the interests of the truth and

12     nothing but the truth, I might make some additions in terms of additional

13     facts.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

16     statement into evidence under 92 ter Rule.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Pack?

18             MS. PACK:  No objection.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3681, Your Honours.  I apologise,

21     D3861.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it should be 3881.  Thank

24     you.

25             Now I'm going to read a summary of Mr. Radovan M. Karadzic's

Page 41335

 1     statement in English.

 2             [In English] Radovan Karadzic, son of Marko, was a teacher of

 3     literature in Capljina in the former BH until the beginning of the war

 4     when he was expelled from the place where he lived and worked.  During

 5     the period from 1990, Professor Karadzic -- until Professor Karadzic was

 6     expelled from Capljina in April 1992, he was the president of the

 7     Capljina SDS Municipal Board, president of the Serb Municipal Assembly in

 8     Capljina, president of the Capljina Crisis Staff, member of the Serb

 9     National Council for Herzegovina.  After his arrival in Pale in April

10     1992, president of the Presidency, Karadzic, appointed Professor Karadzic

11     as an advisor for internal politics and party issues.  Professor Karadzic

12     was also a member of the SDS Main Board.

13             He knows President Karadzic since he was a child, and he

14     remembers him to be exemplary in every respect.  President Karadzic was

15     among the best pupils in school and the most prominent student in his

16     generation and later an excellent doctor.  President Karadzic spent his

17     youth and a great deal of his life in Sarajevo, a Muslim-Serbian city.

18     He studied with Muslims and later he worked and lived as their neighbour.

19     Professor Karadzic never heard him saying anything that would indicate

20     intolerance towards the Muslims.

21             The SDS was envisaged to be an entirely democratic and to a great

22     extent decentralised party.  President Karadzic did not interfere in

23     personal matters.  The local SDS leaders -- leaderships were completely

24     autonomously and democratically elected in the field in local

25     communities, municipalities, and the regional level.  In party forums,

Page 41336

 1     President Karadzic insisted that decision were not made by out-voting but

 2     through finding compromises and solutions which would be supported by a

 3     great majority of the present people.

 4             One of the main issues the Republika Srpska government was facing

 5     concerned the large number of Serbian refugees from the territories under

 6     Muslim-Croatian control, their accommodation, medical treatment, and the

 7     wounded and the provisions for war hospitals and war orphans.

 8             When Alija Izetbegovic became president of BH after the first

 9     multi-party elections, some Serbs voiced reservation about him, because a

10     long time before the war he published a document entitled the

11     "Islamic Declaration."  Soon after the elections, Muslims and Croats

12     started out-voting the Serbs in the Assembly and in the government, and

13     then in all the organs of local government on the ground.

14     President Karadzic persistently tried to reach an agreement with the SDA,

15     but they rejected it with cynicism and sometimes with arrogance.

16             Izetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic agreed with President Karadzic and

17     Milosevic that the then-BH with Serbia and Montenegro, which would be

18     joined by Macedonia, were to constitute a form of federation.

19     Nevertheless, before the official announcement of the agreement on

20     television, Mr. Zulfikarpasic received a telegram fax in which the

21     Muslims expressed their opposition to any agreement with the Serbs.  It

22     came from the SDA party.  Zulfikarpasic denounced Izetbegovic for being

23     directly responsible for war in refusing this agreement.  The Muslims

24     maintained the same behaviour during all subsequent attempts to reach an

25     agreement during the war.  They violated the Cutileiro Plan and all war

Page 41337

 1     truces to which President Karadzic agreed.  They used tricks and intrigue

 2     and accused the Serbs for the incidents they were causing.

 3             As Supreme Commander of the VRS, President Karadzic clearly and

 4     publicly told the army, its soldiers and officers, and the whole Serbian

 5     people in Republika Srpska that all conventions applicable to the conduct

 6     of war must be respected.  Before the formation of the VRS, the multi --

 7     the military units of the Muslims and Croats were already formed and were

 8     involved in widespread episodes of violence against the Serbs.

 9             The position of President Karadzic about crimes against civilians

10     was clear:  Civilian are innocent and no form of force may be applied

11     against them regardless of their ethnicity or religion.  When he received

12     information about incidents involving civilians, he condemned them,

13     replaced the officers, and the direct perpetrators were processed.  He

14     even issued orders to save Muslim civilians when the conflict between

15     Muslims and Croats broke out.  On the order of President Karadzic,

16     thousands of Croat refugees were saved when they crossed over to the

17     Republika Srpska territory.  In Republika Srpska they received water,

18     food, medicine, and temporary accommodation, and then the VRS enabled

19     them to cross over to their own desired destination.

20             In the first few years of the war, the Muslims from Bileca and

21     Trebinje were voluntarily in the VRS units, and those who did not want to

22     lived undisturbed in their houses with their families.  It was only after

23     receiving secret memos and threats from Alija Izetbegovic that they were

24     persuaded to leave immediately the VRS and the territory where they lived

25     without any problems.

Page 41338

 1             On 15th of July, 1995, Professor Karadzic had a meeting with

 2     President Karadzic.  On that occasion, the liquidation of prisoners in

 3     Srebrenica was never mentioned, and Professor Karadzic had the impression

 4     that President Karadzic inform -- was informed about the unlawful

 5     killings of prisoners of war from Srebrenica.

 6             And that is a short summary, and at that moment I will not have

 7     questions for Professor Karadzic.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Professor Karadzic, as you have noted,

 9     your evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that

10     is, through your witness statement in lieu of your oral testimony, and

11     you will now be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the

12     Prosecutor, but given the time, we'll continue tomorrow morning.

13             I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about

14     your testimony while you are giving testimony here.

15             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Unless there is anything to be raised, the hearing

17     is adjourned.  We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.43 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day

20                           of July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.