130717ED

Page 41367

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please be seated and make yourself comfortable.

2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

3 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Radinovic.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. I have to ask you and even more keep reminding myself that we

7 both make pauses between questions and answers and to speak slowly so

8 that everything can be recorded in the transcript. General, can you

9 please tell us the place and the time when you were born and your

10 father's name for the record.

11 A. My father's name is Dusan. I was born in the village of Grbavci

12 near Podgorica in Montenegro.

13 Q. Thank you. Even though we have your CV, could you kindly tell us

14 briefly about -- your educational background?

15 A. I finished elementary and secondary school in my native area,

16 that is to say elementary school in my village and secondary school in

17 Podgorica. After that I finished military academy of the land army

18 engineer corps in 19 --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the year.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I finished the command staff school

21 in 1972 and school of defence in 1970. I --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.

23 JUDGE KWON: General Radinovic, you are speaking too fast so that

24 the interpreters were not able to catch up with your answer. Shall we

25 begin from here. Mr. Karadzic asked you when you were born, but I don't

Page 41368

1 think we heard that.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't say that because I didn't

3 hear that question. I was born on the 11th of September, 1939.

4 JUDGE KWON: And could you tell us when you finished the military

5 academy of the land army, engineer corps?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1959.

7 JUDGE KWON: And could you repeat your answer from there, your

8 career after your graduation from that academy, very slowly?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that I enumerated the

10 military schools that I finished. I finished the command staff academy

11 in 1972 and the national defence school or the war school as it used to

12 be called in 1978. In addition to the highest military schools, I also

13 graduated from civilian schools. After the secondary school, I graduated

14 from the faculty of political sciences, sociology or precisely political

15 sociology, and I have a PhD in military science research.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us briefly, and slowly, something about

18 your career, which positions you held, and the duties that you

19 discharged?

20 A. After finishing the military academy for the land army, I

21 discharged all the basic lower-level duties such as platoon commander,

22 company commander, chief of engineer corps at the brigade level, and

23 deputy commander of an engineers battalion. It all lasted until 1970

24 when I enrolled in the command staff academy. After I finished the

25 command staff academy and the MA in the political sciences. I worked at

Page 41369

1 the centre of sociological and psychological research of the Yugoslav

2 People's Army, and after that I taught methodology of scientific

3 research. After that I became a researcher at the centre for strategic

4 studies for the General Staff, and in 1982 I became chief of the

5 operations department at the operations administration of the

6 General Staff that dealt with combat-readiness and development of land

7 army. In 1986 I became the chair of the strategy department, the School

8 of National Defence, and in 1990 I was the head of the institute of

9 strategic research of the General Staff. In 1992 I became assistant

10 minister for strategy of defence, and after that I retired in 1993 with

11 the rank of lieutenant-general. Since 1996 I was an associate professor

12 and from 1994 I had the position of an advisor.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Can you just tell us if you received any

14 commendations, awards, decorations; and if you did, which ones?

15 A. Of course I received commendations and citations and decorations,

16 although I don't remember some of them. I do remember an award that I

17 was given in 1984 for my scientific work in the JNA. This is called the

18 22nd December Award, which was the day of the Yugoslav People's Army, and

19 that was an occasion for conferring these awards.

20 In 1992 I received an award for publishing work in the paper of

21 the JNA, for the paper entitled: "Changes in the Word and the Need to

22 Upgrade the Defence Concept of the Country."

23 Q. Thank you, General.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D21046 in

25 e-court.

Page 41370

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, can you please look at these two pages and tell us

3 whether this CV is consistent with the facts?

4 A. This is in English. I would prefer to have it in Serbian, it

5 will make it easier for me.

6 Q. Very well. We'll find it after the break and show it to you.

7 Let us continue. General, did you testify before this Tribunal;

8 and if you did, in which cases?

9 A. Yes, I testified on several occasions before this Tribunal,

10 notably in the Krstic case, Galic case, Ojdanic case, and at the very

11 beginning I testified in the Foca/Kunarac case, but I testified only to

12 the general circumstances, not about the empirical situation.

13 Q. Thank you. In domestic courts did you have any role whatsoever?

14 A. I appeared several times before the court -- State Court of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a military expert. That was in seven or eight

16 cases relating to Vlasenica events, Kalinovik events, the case the deputy

17 commander of the Zvornik Brigade and the commander of the military police

18 of Zvornik Brigade, et cetera.

19 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us briefly in this particular case what

20 did the Defence team ask of you and how did they set the terms of

21 reference that you accepted as a basis for writing an expert report?

22 A. I was asked to provide an analysis of control authority of

23 Dr. Radovan Karadzic in his capacity of the head of state, i.e., the

24 commander of chief of the army.

25 Q. Thank you. What kind of material and which sources did you have

Page 41371

1 available and what was it that you relied mostly upon?

2 A. I had numerous documents and material available. The most

3 important ones that provided most credibility regarding sources was

4 something that I called primary documents, that pertained to the

5 documents in the real time, that is to say the contemporaneous documents.

6 Those were operational documents produced by the conflicting parties such

7 as commands, orders, situation maps, et cetera. I also had available the

8 so-called secondary sources such as studies provided by other authors

9 pertaining to the events and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is also

10 important material because I mainly relied on the authors that I believed

11 to be competent with regard to the specific subject and who enjoy a good

12 reputation in the public. In addition to that, I had access to

13 transcripts from some trials which were also pertinent and relevant for

14 the subject. I also studied some expert reports provided by expert

15 witnesses who testified here and that would be it.

16 Of course, incorporated in all of this was certain expert

17 knowledge that I have in this area and my ability to collect relevant

18 while studying and fulfilling the terms of reference given to me by the

19 Defence team.

20 Q. General, did you have sufficient insight into strategic documents

21 of the warring parties and whose documents were the most readily

22 accessible to you?

23 A. I had in my hand strategic documents of the Serbian side; in

24 other words, it consisted of everything that could be relevant in order

25 for me to answer some questions. Unfortunately, I did not have strategic

Page 41372

1 documents of other warring parties. I did have tactical documents such

2 as orders and commands that were helpful to a certain extent in

3 reconstructing the conduct of the opposing side, but I didn't have

4 strategic documents, such as documents issued by the Supreme Command,

5 their supreme staffs, or other documents on the basis of which one could

6 describe the conduct of the other side which was very much important in

7 terms of providing response from the Serbian side and in my analysing the

8 control authority of President Radovan Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I'm looking at the

10 clock. Is it the time for a break?

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for half an hour and resume

12 at 11.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

15 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, sir, you submitted to the Defence your expert report;

19 correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we call up in e-court

23 1D25181, to have it on the screen ready while we continue.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I hope the Trial Chamber will allow you to have your report

Page 41373

1 before you in hard copy so that we can refer to a few paragraphs now and

2 then.

3 Is this the first page of your report?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you. In some paragraphs of this report from 40 through 43

6 you refer to certain expert reports done for the OTP. Could you tell us

7 in a few words what is your main conclusion or objection to these

8 reports? Did you agree with them; and if not, why not?

9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

10 Are they not part of the paragraphs the Chamber ordered to be

11 redacted?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Possibly. I have to look --

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm still not used to --

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, maybe I can be of assistance --

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we ordered paragraph 39 to 46.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And you also ordered --

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, there are several paragraphs.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 39, yes, 39 -- you spoke -- exactly, it's

20 exactly these.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. Then I withdraw the

22 question.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, the Chamber has found that certain paragraphs in your

25 report are not necessary and I ask you to keep that in mind and I will

Page 41374

1 try to steer away from questions related to them.

2 A. I heard today in the witness room that the Chamber has done this,

3 and of course I acknowledge it. But I was not able to check it and

4 compare with my report, so I'm afraid to inadvertently make a mistake.

5 If I refer to these paragraphs in my answer, I ask for your understanding

6 in advance.

7 Q. I believe the Trial Chamber will caution us.

8 Could you tell us whether the Yugoslav doctrine and practice in

9 the area of defence is similar to the same systems in other countries and

10 whether one can understand the mechanism that starts operating in the

11 defence system. What is similar and what is different?

12 A. Yugoslavia's defence system - and I'm now talking about the

13 SFRY - was particular in every aspect compared to defence systems of

14 other countries; namely, in the area of defence and security other

15 countries relied primarily on the appropriate state institutions, the

16 army, the police, security organs, et cetera, and other entities of

17 course, whereas in the Yugoslav system defence was based on the so-called

18 armed population. It is a deeply socialised system. When numerous

19 entities were involved in its organisation and implementation beginning

20 with citizens, working people, companies, sociopolitical communities,

21 which means local communes, municipalities, regions, republics, up to the

22 Federation, all that was included in an overarching defence effort. So

23 practically the boundary between the citizen and the member of the armed

24 forces, that is to say soldier, was erased. It was the constitutional

25 right and obligation of every citizen to get involved in the defence

Page 41375

1 effort without waiting for an order from above. This is very

2 idiosyncratic and it is very difficult to compare it to other systems.

3 Whether that was good or not is a different issue.

4 Q. So conclusions based on analogies, would they be sufficient to

5 describe to the Trial Chamber the peculiarities of the system?

6 A. I don't think they would. It would be very difficult to do by

7 using analogy.

8 Q. Thank you. In that sense what did you conclude? What kind of

9 war was it in Bosnia-Herzegovina? We're not talking now about the whole

10 of Yugoslavia, we're talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina --

11 A. Based on all --

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour --

13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It would be very helpful if Mr. Karadzic

17 would always tell us to which paragraph he refers because I seem to

18 recall that the Trial Chamber excluded a section where it was exactly

19 about the character of the war and that it was a civil war and so on and

20 so forth. I think that was also excluded. So it would be very helpful

21 to know which paragraph is it relating to.

22 JUDGE KWON: Indeed.

23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was just about to cite the

25 testimony of another general from the United Nations who was a witness

Page 41376

1 for the Prosecution and I wanted to ask General Radinovic about his

2 conclusions in that respect, about the nature of the conflict. I don't

3 think you excluded that because everything hangs upon that.

4 JUDGE KWON: We'll see. Please continue then, but is this part

5 not dealt with in his expert report?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it is. I wanted him to

7 present it. I want during the direct examination to enable

8 General Radinovic to present his report orally for the sake of the public

9 and for a clear record.

10 JUDGE KWON: But it's easier for us to follow if we have the

11 reference number to the paragraphs in his report.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will try to find the

13 references.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, we have heard General Razek from Egypt testify here,

16 that's pages 5585 and 5589. In his evidence in the first part of his

17 testimony he said that neighbourhoods waged war against other

18 neighbourhoods, speaking mostly of Sarajevo. And on page 5589, he said

19 that civilians fought civilians and they found themselves in the

20 cross-fire between the warring parties. What would be your conclusion on

21 this matter? Who was involved in the conflict and how did that reflect

22 on command and control?

23 A. I came to the same conclusion --

24 JUDGE KWON: Before continuing.

25 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

Page 41377

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I see already a pattern

2 emerging again. Before a question is asked, there is put something that

3 a previous witness had said on this particular point. I think that is

4 clearly leading.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Well, yes, indeed, he could have asked the

6 nature of the war first and then asking his comment on other witness's

7 evidence. But we heard the answer already.

8 Do you have any observation, Mr. Robinson?

9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think it depends on the

10 question that's asked, if something is put to him for his comment without

11 any suggestion that it should be agreed to or disagreed with, and I don't

12 think it's leading, and I think it's a proper way to elicit a comment

13 from an expert on evidence that's in the record.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. In chapter 3 beginning with page 31 and onwards, you deal with

19 the emergence of the Army of Republika Srpska, its structure, and the

20 organisation and its system of command and control. Could you tell us

21 whether you made an analysis and drew comparative conclusions as to how

22 the armed forces of the warring parties came into being, on the basis of

23 which doctrine, from which personnel, and what are their mutual

24 connections?

25 A. All the three armies of the three warring parties came into being

Page 41378

1 in a way from the basic concept of the defence system of the former

2 Yugoslavia. All the three armies took over the legacy of the armed

3 people concept, wherein the army draws its personnel from the locality

4 where they live and operate. And thus, the war had a territorial

5 character. All the three armies took over the doctrine of people's war

6 from the former Yugoslavia, and that's where the similarities lie.

7 The main command cadre came from the Yugoslav People's Army,

8 educated in the military schools of our formerly common state. And

9 because of that, even if they had wanted to, they could not distance

10 themselves from the residual features of that army and that strategy.

11 But there are other similarities as well. Both the Croat and the Muslim

12 side in the war acquired their armies by establishing paramilitaries from

13 the political parties, that is, the military wings of those political

14 parties, military organisations came into being. On the Muslim side

15 those were the Green Berets and the Patriotic League who started setting

16 up much earlier than the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and the Croat

17 side did the same, through the Croatian Defence Council, that is to say

18 the military wing of the Croatian ruling party HDZ. And of course, parts

19 of the disintegrated Territorial Defence also joined these armies. The

20 TO disintegrated as the state itself disintegrated. Only the Serb side

21 did not establish its army by organising paramilitaries. Instead, it

22 formed its army from the remnants of the JNA which was pulling out of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and those who did not want to withdraw to pull out of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina stayed because they were born there and they wanted to

25 stay there. They considered Bosnia their homeland and they thought it

Page 41379

1 was their patriotic duty to remain in the ranks of the Army of

2 Republika Srpska.

3 In addition to them, there were members of the disintegrated TO

4 which belonged to the Serb community. Also, all those armed groups that

5 were set up in the process of self-organising of the people following the

6 concept and the doctrine of All People's Defence that we referred to in

7 previous questions. And the army came into being after the Assembly in

8 Banja Luka passed a decision to establish the army, whereas the other

9 sides just renamed their paramilitaries into armies.

10 Q. Thank you, General, sir. In Chapter 4 from page 37 onwards you

11 deal with the strategic level of command and control in the Army of

12 Republika Srpska, and that is primarily in view of the role of

13 Radovan Karadzic, or rather, the civilian head of state and army. Can

14 you tell us what your conclusion was there and what you base those

15 conclusions on and whether this differs from some of the customary models

16 and whether all of that was within the framework of the law or not?

17 A. Well, the answer could be both yes and no. First of all, there

18 are three levels in the organisation of command and control, and that is

19 customary in all armies: Strategic, operational, and tactical. The

20 strategic level involves the head of state, the supreme commander, and

21 the Main Staff of the army. The operational level is commands of corps

22 and tactical level are brigades, regiments, these lower levels. As for

23 the strategic level, there is an unusual, specific characteristic in view

24 of all the armies that I studied, including the former Yugoslavia, namely

25 in the decision on the establishment of the army on the 12th of May,

Page 41380

1 1992, at a session in Banja Luka, the Assembly appointed General Mladic

2 as commander of the Main Staff. I highlight that, commander of the

3 Main Staff, which is quite unusual. A staff has a chief, not a

4 commander. It's not a command so that it would have a commander. In

5 that way, it actually changed, disrupted, the basic role and the basic

6 character of that organ, and that is professional. These are

7 professional organs for the preparation of the military. So these are

8 professional and staff activities, not command, so training, equipping,

9 organising, arming, and staff in terms of planning its use in combat.

10 However, by appointing a commander of the Main Staff, the Assembly from a

11 substantive point of view disrupted the principle of singleness of

12 command. So there was a dualism involved and that is in -- and that is

13 opposed to principles of military command. Why that was done? Was it

14 done because of the personality involved or did they want to emphasise

15 that role or is this some kind of distrust vis-a-vis the political

16 leadership? I really cannot say. I don't have a crystal ball. But that

17 is what led to this low-level conflict between the two leaderships

18 throughout the war and at times it even resulted in disobedience to the

19 civilian head of the army and state, and there are documents to that

20 effect.

21 The Assembly, what they did, in your decision on the

22 establishment of the military on the 16th of June, 1992, you repeated

23 that and you authorised the commander of the Main Staff and the

24 Main Staff for operational command. And in that way practically you

25 conveyed the command and combat use of the army to the Main Staff. That

Page 41381

1 can be done that way. The supreme commander is authorised to convey

2 certain powers, but that should not be done fully because in that way he

3 ties his own hands. When he's supposed to intervene, when he's supposed

4 to ask for corrections, then he is not obeyed. So in that way actually

5 the principle of singleness of command and subordination were violated.

6 These are my observations, and of course we could discuss this at great

7 length and in great detail.

8 Q. Thank you. What remained in the hands of the president after

9 powers were delegated in terms of operative and tactical command? At

10 what level and in what way could the head of state act?

11 A. The head of state kept important powers in terms of strategic

12 command and control by defining military organisation, by defining

13 strategy, then also dividing the theatre of war into areas of

14 responsibility on the basis of that. The strategic grouping of the army

15 in terms of various directions - colloquially, this is called warfare -

16 that is to say, defining the basic principles of military strategy,

17 determining the type of military organisation at its deployment and

18 grouping, and also the basic strategic task of the army and also

19 supervision over that, namely, that the army is used in a legitimate way

20 in accordance with the defined principle for that strategy. The basic

21 characteristics of the strategy were taken over from the strategy and

22 doctrine of the JNA.

23 Q. Thank you. By way of an example can you tell us then when you

24 said that -- that there is lack of compliance with the decisions of the

25 supreme commander because of this dichotomy, can you tell us whether

Page 41382

1 local cease-fires are part of strategic command and whether general

2 cease-fires are part of strategic command? Did the army have the right

3 to not implement certain things that were not strategic, following their

4 own logic, if you will?

5 A. If I understand your question at all, which is rather general, at

6 a tactical level the army does have the right to take measures that had

7 not been ordered to it, but it goes without saying that, for example, a

8 tactical position belongs to that; that is to say, moving, changing,

9 deployment in order to have a better overview of the situation to avoid

10 any kind of risks and so on. However, even at a local level an army is

11 not supposed to violate a cease-fire if it had been signed at local

12 level.

13 Q. Thank you. Is the army duty-bound to carry out an order if that

14 order threatens the safety and security of the unit involved and its

15 members? Does the army have some possibility of deciding differently or

16 asking for different orders?

17 A. The army has the possibility of reacting. If it is an order that

18 does not involve a crime, then it is duty-bound to carry out that order.

19 However, before that it is supposed to warn about the consequences of

20 carrying out that order. However, if the officer insists on it being

21 carried out, it will be carried out and the consequences will be there.

22 However, the army is not allowed to carry out orders that would violate

23 the laws and customs of war or that would involve a crime. It is

24 duty-bound not to carry it out and to inform the order-issuing authority

25 about that. And in spite of the existence of such an order, it is not

Page 41383

1 supposed to carry out that kind of order.

2 Q. In the documents that were made available to you, could you find

3 any proof of officers of the Army of Republika Srpska being in a position

4 to assess what is a violation of the laws and customs of war, to assess

5 what can and what cannot be carried out?

6 A. They were trained to assess that. In principle, they could.

7 Now, whether that was possible in each and every specific example, in a

8 situation when fronts are mixed up and when positions are mixed up, it is

9 a very difficult question and it is very hard to answer. I think that

10 there were cases when they could not assess whether that was abided by or

11 not, but in principle, yes, they could.

12 Q. Thank you. When you say "trained," where was it that they were

13 trained to recognise that?

14 A. In military schools before the crisis, or rather, before the war

15 in the former Yugoslavia, in all areas special training had been

16 organised in this field that is called international humanitarian law.

17 Seminars were held, manuals were printed and handed out even to each and

18 every soldier. While the JNA was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, members of the

19 JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina had this distributed to them. Now, whether

20 this was continued in all the other armies afterwards, I don't know, but

21 I know that in the Army of Republika Srpska this was continued.

22 Q. Thank you. Analysing the role of the president of the republic,

23 did you see for yourself, were you assured, that the president had issued

24 the necessary documents in terms of respecting international humanitarian

25 law and laws and customs of war, conventions?

Page 41384

1 A. Yes, I came across a countless number of orders of yours of that

2 kind, and I think that there were even too many of them.

3 Percentage-wise, most of the documents that you personally issued

4 pertained to that subject matter, over 80 per cent.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, the answer was already given,

7 but I think the question was not proper because what the -- what

8 Mr. Karadzic asked the witness to do is give a legal evaluation whether

9 the -- Mr. Karadzic did all necessary. I think it is -- in an aspect it

10 is leading and at the same time basically overstepping the borders of the

11 witness expertise. It's for the Trial Chamber to decide whether Karadzic

12 did everything necessary.

13 JUDGE KWON: I didn't hear everything, but still he said that

14 necessary documents.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I understood the combination of: Were you

16 assured that the president has issued the necessary documents in terms of

17 respecting international humanitarian laws and customs of war. I thought

18 this -- this combination basically was what I was referring to.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE KWON: Well, given that witness has already answered, shall

21 we continue.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, sir, a moment ago you mentioned a percentage, 80

25 per cent, of all the documents pertained to this subject matter of

Page 41385

1 cautioning and -- well, behaviour in accordance with the law.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D9079, could I please have that

3 called up in e-court. I believe that that's not it, 1D9079. Now it's

4 right in the transcript. I don't think that we have a translation yet --

5 oh, we do. There is a translation, is there.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I object against the use of this document,

9 and I can argue and tell you the reasons why I want to object even

10 against the use of this document.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.

13 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to discuss it in the presence of the

14 witness?

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is no reason to -- him not hearing us.

18 The Prosecution opposes the use of this particular document for

19 two reasons. First of all, it's the late notification of this very

20 complex document. In its filing for Defence witnesses for July 2013, the

21 Defence notified the Prosecution that it would only use the expert report

22 of Witness Radinovic. Only yesterday afternoon the Defence notified the

23 Prosecution that it would use a 13-page chart - and that is what the

24 document is - listing 142 documents, if I counted it correctly, claiming

25 that they belong in certain categories. The Defence thus violated point

Page 41386

1 2(F) of the Trial Chamber's order on the procedure of the conduct of

2 trial of 8 October and it's the so-called 48-hours' rule. Usually the

3 Prosecution helps and is supportive and accepts late disclosures and late

4 notifications, but here we have to deal with a huge chart listing all

5 sorts of documents, and therefore I will have to say the use of this

6 document in court would be unfair to the Prosecution. That's my first

7 point.

8 My second point is the value and the purpose of the document.

9 According to the same ruling, in the same paragraph, the Defence needs to

10 first apply for leave to add a document not in its 65 ter exhibit list to

11 be able to use it in e-court. And here is the question of relevance. As

12 I said, the chart contains 142 documents of various alleged categories.

13 The chart does not reflect how any of these documents relate to the

14 report, such as whether the documents are mentioned in the report or

15 whether they in any way relate to certain topics in the report.

16 In fact, a quick review of the document yesterday evening and a

17 comparison with the footnotes showed that only five of the documents

18 listed are, in fact, cited in the report.

19 There is also no way to establish from the description of the

20 documents in their chart whether any relate to the excluded portions of

21 the report. Furthermore, only 44 documents contained in the chart are,

22 in fact, in evidence before this Court, so that the Trial Chamber and the

23 Prosecution have no way to verify the accuracy of the categorisation of

24 the documents listed in the chart. And as this categorisation of the

25 documents is made in this chart, the chart may, in fact, be incorrect.

Page 41387

1 Not -- and also I wish to mention that 47 of the documents are

2 untranslated, so we have no way of checking what the document is really

3 about.

4 Finally, if the expert witness would now in this testimony draw

5 any conclusions based on the chart, they would be unfounded and one would

6 not be able to check the relevance. Therefore, the Prosecution disputes

7 the relevance of the chart for the testimony and that is basically what I

8 wanted to say.

9 I do not think that at this point in time I also need to make

10 further arguments related to tendering the document because that's a

11 different topic and I'm not even sure whether the Defence wants to tender

12 it.

13 JUDGE KWON: Who is going to respond?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can do it. Well, here it is. We

15 believe that this classification that General Radinovic was kind enough

16 to prepare and which we obtained during proofing would be helpful to the

17 Chamber as a kind of tool per se. It is not a proof, but it is a kind of

18 tool for the Chamber to understand my communication with the army which

19 is the subject of this expert report.

20 Therefore, I believe that the Chamber [as interpreted] themselves

21 often did not abide by the dead-lines and we took a benevolent view of

22 that. I don't think that it will be harmful to have this document

23 presented to the Chamber.

24 As for the other documents, we hope that during the trial through

25 other testimonies or perhaps through bar table all these documents would

Page 41388

1 be properly presented to the Chamber. If necessary, the General may come

2 for additional cross-examination. I'm sure that he would oblige.

3 We tolerated all the dead-lines that were missed by the

4 Prosecution, not the Chamber. It was erroneously recorded in the

5 transcript.

6 JUDGE KWON: The difficulty is this: If these cited documents,

7 147, had been cited and referenced in his expert report and this document

8 is going to be used as a kind of aide-memoire, that would be okay. But

9 if it was -- only five of them are referenced in his report and just

10 thrown in in this way, it's another way of tendering another expert

11 report.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, Your Excellency, I think that

13 the witnesses dealing with the description of the role of a head of state

14 in command, and for that purpose he prepared a structure of written

15 communications between the head of state and the army. In general

16 terms he --

17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Sorry to interrupt you, but do you

18 agree with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's observation that only five of these

19 documents were indeed referred to in his expert report?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that there is much more

21 and I believe that we are going to offer all these documents in due

22 course, but I believe that there are many more than that. The table

23 itself corroborates the conclusions reached by the expert about the

24 nature of the role of the president of the republic in terms of command.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour ...

Page 41389

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff --

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, I have to correct

4 myself. I thought you were asking me whether only five were admitted.

5 More than that was admitted, more than 40, and our intention is to tender

6 all of them.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I just wanted to confirm that we have

9 checked the -- and we arrived with -- at the number of five documents

10 that we found. And I said already before, 44 document are, in fact,

11 before this Trial Chamber. But as the Presiding Judge correctly noted,

12 this document is basically an amendment to the report that is in front of

13 us. If he has now during the proofing reviewed additional documents not

14 mentioned before and obviously not even seen by him before, if he has now

15 reviewed additional materials, it's an addition -- this chart reflects an

16 addendum to his report and that cannot be handed in less than 48 hours --

17 in fact, less than 24 hours.

18 JUDGE BAIRD: Dr. Karadzic, what can you say about

19 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's point, that 44 documents, 44 documents, contained in

20 the chart are not in evidence before the Court -- are in evidence before

21 the Court, just 44?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, during his work,

23 the expert saw all these documents. So far either we or the Prosecution

24 managed to tender 44 documents relating to my communication with the

25 Main Staff. However, the expert - and that was our wish - should provide

Page 41390

1 and paint a total picture of my role vis-a-vis the army and that is

2 impossible to achieve without all the documents. And during the

3 remaining part of the trial, we intend to tender each and every document

4 that I sent to the army. So far we jointly - the Prosecution and our

5 team - tendered into evidence 44 documents and there is about a hundred

6 more of them that we intend to tender. What we were interested at this

7 point was that within this general picture the expert should tell us how

8 many orders to refrain from fighting for providing humanitarian aid, how

9 many combat orders and other similar orders were issued which will be of

10 assistance for the Trial Chamber to perceive what the role of the head of

11 state was in the command structure.

12 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.

13 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, just hypothetically I'm asking

14 you, in lieu of using this document in a lump-sum way, what would you say

15 if the accused were to deal with each and every document separately,

16 i.e., 147 documents?

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, you yourself have ruled in the

18 order on procedures already how additional documents and documents

19 accompanying a report, how they should be dealt with. And I do recall

20 that it is basically that not all accompanying documentation should be

21 tendered but rather the report as such, and certain documents that are in

22 addition should then be discussed in court. And I indeed think that this

23 should be done here.

24 If the -- if Mr. Karadzic wants to rely on some of the documents,

25 and in particular on the categorisation of these documents, what they

Page 41391

1 mean for command responsibility, they should be discussed during the

2 cross-examination -- during the examination-in-chief here in court. That

3 is what the Prosecution did with its own experts and it should be done

4 here in the same way. And we are -- as I said, we are dealing with

5 almost a hundred documents in addition to the ones that are already

6 tendered and that are actually dealt with in the footnotes of the expert

7 report.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the Chamber agrees with

10 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's observation: It's tantamount to the amendment of or

11 the addition to his expert report. In order to tender this document, you

12 need to produce another separate expert report. So the Chamber will not

13 allow you to use this document.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then we can remove it.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, in item 6 of Chapter 3 you speak about documents of

17 strategic command with particular highlight on directives as command

18 documents. Can you tell us briefly this part of your report and what it

19 contains? I believe that it starts on page 50 or 52 in English.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For that purpose can we please have

21 1D25181.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By referring to the manuals for

23 command and control, what I did here was to highlight the types and

24 groups of command documents are contained therein, in order to come to

25 the topic of directives which are actually documents issued by the

Page 41392

1 Supreme Command or the head of state, more precisely.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us what is a directive in terms

4 of its nature and its purpose?

5 A. That's a document of the most general nature in terms of command.

6 It contained basic guide-lines, it identifies the objectives, and it

7 defines the forces and the resources that should be used in its

8 execution. However, a directive is not an executive document. Based on

9 a directive, those who are responsible need to prepare operational

10 documents that would implement the doctrine, that means draw up plans or

11 orders, et cetera. If it is the Main Staff in question, then it has to

12 issue its own directive. So it is the document of most general nature

13 that does not have an executive power, only lays down some general

14 guide-lines.

15 Q. Can you tell us if each and every directive is implemented in the

16 course of period that was envisaged and what does it depend upon whether

17 it's going to be implemented or not?

18 A. Since a directive covers a long period of time and since

19 circumstances are changeable within such a period of time, in most cases

20 the majority of things contained therein are not put into practice. So

21 in that case, a directive has to be amended usually by operational

22 documents such as command and orders.

23 Q. Thank you. If there was something that was included in a

24 directive, intentionally or unintentionally, that would constitute a

25 violation of international laws of war and other laws and conventions,

Page 41393

1 what is the procedure relating to the implementation if such features are

2 found in this general document?

3 A. The procedure applied is identical to the one when you asked me

4 about the orders that constitute a crime. Anything contained in a

5 directive which is in contravention of the provisions of the

6 international laws of war, humanitarian law, and the rules of war must

7 not be carried out. And in preparing operational documents, all of such

8 features have to be discounted and dismissed. So nothing that is

9 contrary to the adopted international rules can be implemented regardless

10 of who issued the directive.

11 Q. Can you tell me how many directives I issued -- actually, how

12 many of them I signed and what was your conclusion as to how they were

13 generated?

14 A. As far as I know, there was a total of nine directives that were

15 issued. You yourself signed directives 6 and 7, that is to say two. The

16 remaining directives were signed by the commander of the Main Staff.

17 Therefore, when you look at a ratio of the total of the directives, one

18 can see who had a decisive role in the operational command over the army,

19 which means that in this instance the Main Staff overruled the role of

20 the head of state.

21 Now, how directives are generated? They are generated whenever

22 there is the necessary infrastructure for their preparation, that means

23 that they are generated at the Main Staff. As far as I know, you did not

24 have proper staff around you capable of preparing directives. Any

25 directive can show that because it demands professional knowledge and

Page 41394

1 professional personnel. It requires knowledge that is called in general

2 terms military science. That's how the organisation was set up. It

3 would have been better if that were -- had not been the case, but the

4 fact is that you did not have staff who were skilled enough to deal with

5 these matters. As far as I know, the directives were being prepared at

6 the Main Staff where they had enough personnel and enough information in

7 order to deal with these matters. Now, how it came about that you signed

8 some of them, I'm not able to say.

9 From the substance of each of these directives, it is very easy

10 to conclude, even for a layman, that they could not have been produced in

11 your immediate surroundings, by your entourage.

12 Q. The people who draft the directives before they are signed, they

13 do this on the basis of what, which materials and whose materials?

14 A. In the methodology of developing directives, there are three

15 methods. One is producing a directive through team-work, that is the

16 complete method when there is enough time and enough knowledge of the

17 situation and there is a long-term effort including numerous

18 consultations with various departments. The second method is the

19 shortened version. And the third one is without any consultation at all.

20 It is produced then by the same organ who signs it. That happens very

21 rarely.

22 Most often directives are produced on the basis of proposals made

23 by various organs, such as security, logistics, training, morale,

24 information. In other words, commands of various corps make their own

25 proposals for their own employment in the coming period. And then, there

Page 41395

1 is an operative organ at the Main Staff who drafts the directive, putting

2 all the elements in their right places with a certain amount of revision

3 and editing, and then this operative organ submits it for signature.

4 Q. Your word was here interpreted as "drafting." Is there any

5 difference between what you meant and the word "draft"?

6 A. I said somebody composes, actually, the directive from various

7 elements. It's not the same as "draft." The operative officer at the

8 Main Staff cannot cover with equal knowledge all the areas involved, he

9 cannot be completely versed with security and logistics and all the other

10 departments. He can only put together contributions from various

11 departments and from them make the draft directive.

12 Q. In view of the latest technologies, can this draft be made by

13 simple copy/paste of various proposals from different services?

14 A. Nowadays, yes. But at the time when these directives were made,

15 I don't think that was possible.

16 Q. Thank you. When you said that in the operationalisation of

17 general enactments, things that are prohibited are not implemented. Can

18 you tell us what you concluded about the directives that I signed? Were

19 there any changes in the treatment of these documents?

20 A. There is a great difference between Directive 7 and 7/1. 7/1 is

21 the operationalisation of Directive 7. There are differences in the use

22 of units in the scope of tasks given, the number of tasks and scope of

23 tasks is considerably reduced in 7/1. And furthermore, Directive 7/1

24 does not contain the sentence that exists in number 7, so during

25 operationalisation, it was noted that a prohibited act was involved so

Page 41396

1 that was omitted.

2 Q. In Chapter 4 there are three items where you deal with strategic

3 goals of Republika Srpska and within that there is an analysis of the

4 justification of strategic goals in the control authority over the army

5 and the use of armed force in the achievement of these goals. What are

6 your findings on this matter? What was the strategy? And then we will

7 move to Chapter 5 which deals with military strategy.

8 A. In this section I dealt with the topic called "Strategic Goals of

9 Republika Srpska." Strategic goals are covered in the record, that is,

10 transcripts of the session in Banja Luka of 12 May 1992, the session

11 where the decision was passed to form the army. At this gathering, you

12 spoke about the strategic goals that Republika Srpska needs to achieve in

13 that conflict that had begun in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I presented my

14 understanding of your speech, what those objectives were, how they were

15 formulated, how they were pursued, how they were achieved and whether

16 they were achieved. I had to -- I would have now to speak about it in

17 general terms unless you mention specific goals.

18 Q. In paragraphs 144 and 146 you indicate that the war broke out in

19 the middle of the negotiating process. You did not phrase it exactly the

20 same way, but that's what it means. How did the activation of the armed

21 component reflect on the negotiation process between the negotiators who

22 thereby began warring parties, did it have an impact?

23 A. It had an important impact. In your strategic goals you spoke,

24 even before the conflict, even before the war -- and, by the way, every

25 party to these events had its own strategic goals and voiced them. As

Page 41397

1 long as there is no war, it is implied that strategic goals are pursued

2 through peaceful means. At that time when these goals are pursued by

3 peaceful means and political means, political dialogue, debate,

4 elections, some issues are completely irrelevant. For instance, the

5 territorial issue is not of crucial importance; however, when war begins

6 then the territorial issue comes to the fore. Why? Because if the war

7 had already broken out, a necessary precondition is to ensure territorial

8 integrity so that forces could manoeuvre from one part of the front line

9 to another and be engaged in those places where they are the most

10 necessary militarily.

11 So when war breaks out, the territorial issue becomes the

12 foremost issue. But as long as goals are pursued by peaceful political

13 means, the territorial issue is irrelevant. And as far as I was able to

14 see, in your speech and in all the interviews and various public

15 appearances, you always emphasised that.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, General, sir, we come to the issue of military

17 strategy of the Army of Republika Srpska, the type of strategy that was

18 used. Can you tell us about your findings and would you describe it,

19 please, on the basis of all the documents and everything you know about

20 the VRS. What was its choice of strategy and why?

21 A. I dealt with the issue in my report only because the formulation,

22 the choice, and adoption of a certain strategy is the prerogative of the

23 head of state, that is to say the supreme commander. Judging by all its

24 characteristics, the strategy of the VRS was defensive, a defensive

25 strategy formulated as such and operationalised in such a way as to only

Page 41398

1 be able to defend the territory and the people of Republika Srpska. It

2 is absolutely inadequate for any military option because the grouping of

3 forces, their deployment, organisation, the assets in their possession

4 were completely useless for the so-called strategic offensive. The

5 Supreme Command did not have under its control appropriate military

6 forces for manifesting its influence. It only had control over military

7 corps, which is a typical feature of a defensive strategy. To use a

8 figure of speech, I used to say: You cannot win a war with that strategy

9 but you can defend what you set as your own strategic goals. So it was

10 exclusively about defence, never offensive action. And I think it is not

11 only unfounded but ridiculous to say that the VRS was an aggressive force

12 because they had absolutely no resources to commit aggression -- I mean

13 aggression in the military sense, not the legal sense.

14 Q. In the light of what you just said, did you make any conclusions

15 about the strategic goals, especially in terms of territory, of all the

16 three warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What was the aspiration and

17 the plan of each one of them?

18 A. The Serb and Croat sides to the conflict wanted to preserve and

19 to defend what they considered as their own ethnic territory. It is

20 debatable whether that was justified or not to consider their ethnic

21 territory in that way, but that's what they believed and they defended

22 what they believed to be their ethnic territory, whereas the Muslim side

23 had as its own strategic goal to preserve the integral, the entire,

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that could not be done without defeating

25 militarily the other two sides.

Page 41399

1 Q. How did that impact on the Muslim choice of military strategy?

2 A. It was by definition offensive, but in terms of means and

3 resources, their strategy was too ambitious for the resources they had.

4 So they kept trying to involve the foreign factor to wage war on their

5 side which eventually happened.

6 Q. When you said that with a strategy like that no war can be won,

7 can you tell us what would have been the outcome of such a war and what

8 would be the role of the president of the republic in terms of victory,

9 defeat, goals, et cetera?

10 A. Many times in various transcripts of consultations, sessions,

11 meetings, et cetera, I saw that it was not the goal of the Serb side to

12 win but to defend itself own people and its own territory and its own

13 identity, not to defeat the other side.

14 Q. Did the Army of Republika Srpska, in view of its defensive

15 strategy, face the danger of failing to achieve these goals of losing?

16 A. Yes. The Muslim side pursued an offensive strategy but they

17 didn't have enough strength and resources to achieve that. If it had

18 have them, then it would have defeated Republika Srpska and the Serbian

19 side would have lost.

20 Q. Thank you. What can you tell us about the choice of methods and

21 forms of combat in Republika Srpska?

22 A. In that way you were completely dissimilar to the military

23 strategy of the JNA. The military strategy of the JNA in tactical terms

24 was offensive, whereas in the VRS it was absolutely defensive. That

25 means that the forces were deployed in one line with no depth or a very

Page 41400

1 shallow depth, very easy to break through, and frontal armed combat, no

2 manoeuvres, no infiltrations behind enemy lines, deep behind enemy lines,

3 but it was all about defending lines, face-to-face. That is called the

4 linear strategy, the soldier who lives where the front line is, who was

5 born there, does not leave the line. That's why the war in Bosnia was

6 mostly static with very few, very minor shifts of front lines.

7 Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask you to present warfare in Sarajevo to

8 us, what you included in your report. Tell us, did you publish some

9 books? I forgot to ask you about that at the very beginning. Within

10 that framework, did you publish anything about Sarajevo?

11 A. Yes, I did, a book about the Sarajevo theatre of war.

12 Q. Are there any other publications of yours?

13 A. Yes, the methods of warfare, the new world order, and politics of

14 defence, possibilities of regional defence, causes and characteristics

15 and consequences of the military aggression of NATO against the

16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Also a countless number of articles, I

17 never counted all these articles, I had them published in various

18 periodicals. Also I edited many books and so on and so forth.

19 Q. Thank you. Could you briefly present to the Trial Chamber the

20 part of your report that has to do with Sarajevo. What was the theatre

21 of Sarajevo? Who turned it into a theatre of war and what were the

22 characteristics of that theatre?

23 A. I'm afraid it might be too extensive. When I say the Sarajevo

24 theatre of war, I looked at the so-called narrower and broader aspects,

25 all the way up to Bjelasnica and Igman, the wider one, and to the east

Page 41401

1 all the way to Jahorina and then north to Visoko, then Nisici plateau, to

2 the west Ilijas. So in the broadest sense, that would be the Sarajevo

3 theatre. In a narrower sense, that is the urban area of Sarajevo along

4 with Vogosca, Ilijas, Rajlovac, Ilidza, Dobrinja, all the way to

5 Trebevic. So that's in the narrower sense, and the most narrow of all

6 would be the urban area of Sarajevo between Mojmilo, Hum, Zuc, Olici and

7 Bresce Brdo, so the so-called valley. That would be the narrowest sense.

8 Now, what is important to note in this respect? Sarajevo was

9 multiethnic --

10 Q. I beg your pardon.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In e-court could we please have

12 2.2, 2.2, actions in the Sarajevo theatre.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. I do apologise, General, please go on.

15 A. Since in Sarajevo there were Serbs and Muslims and Croats, of

16 course, who were all living there, when the crisis broke out then these

17 ethnic boundaries were simply taken. And then later ethnic armies came

18 to these boundaries and that is how the Sarajevo theatre of war came into

19 being; that is to say, throughout the crisis except for the movement to

20 Otes, and that is the -- south of the urban area and that was in favour

21 of the Serb side. And then on the north from Hum to Brijesce Brdo - that

22 is to say Hum, Zuc, Brijesce Brdo, Orlic - to the advantage of the Muslim

23 side and to the disadvantage of the Serb side, there were no movements.

24 So those were the only movements. It was quite static. It was like a

25 frozen conflict from a dynamic point of view.

Page 41402

1 As for the Serb warring party, it was the units of the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that held the positions there on the Muslim side

3 in Sarajevo. There were forces of the 1st Corps of the Army of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina that on the 18th of August when it was established had

5 15 brigades, as appointed by a decision of Mr. Izetbegovic, president of

6 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say that is the first

7 time this corps is mentioned, on the 18th of August. And there was the

8 so-called Vikici Brigade of the Special Police with quite a few groups,

9 armed groups that belonged to different individuals there. Some were

10 also part of the criminal setting there which later became evident in

11 various show-downs, Caco, Cele, doctor, some doctor.

12 According to Muslim documents that are certainly reliable, the

13 total number of people under arms in the urban part of Sarajevo was

14 between 50- and 70.000, 50.000 and 70.000, that is. In such a small

15 area, that is a very dense armed force. In such a small area, it would

16 be very difficult to deploy so many soldiers without infringing upon

17 civilian facilities and the civilian population.

18 Q. What kind of structure accompanied these 50- to 70.000 soldiers

19 in the inner city?

20 A. Units from corps, battalions, brigades, all the way to companies,

21 so they all have to have their own logistics, their staffs, their

22 equipment, their positions, that is to say where they were deployed. All

23 of that had to be in town in the city itself, either in free areas in

24 town or in buildings, schools, kindergartens, markets, market areas,

25 administration buildings, that is to say without any restriction and

Page 41403

1 without restraint. Civilian facilities were used en masse for military

2 purposes, so the boundary between the civilian and the military was

3 completed deleted.

4 Q. Thank you. In line 16, Brijesce Brdo, Hum, Zuc, and Orlic were

5 moved to the disadvantage of the Muslims, but the witness said that these

6 movements worked to the advantage of the Muslims.

7 A. No. These -- these areas fell into Muslim hands in December

8 1992.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see the time. I leave it to you,

10 Excellencies, to decide.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume

12 at quarter past 1.00.

13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

15 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, sir, can you tell us whether you established what the

19 objectives were of the corps that were facing each other in the Sarajevo

20 theatre of war; that is to say, the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

22 A. You mean in global terms?

23 Q. Locally, Sarajevo.

24 A. The 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had as its

25 main objective to keep the entire city under its control and to

Page 41404

1 deblockade the city; that is to say, to break through the front line with

2 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and to link up with their forces in Igman and

3 to reach the Romanija plateau. From there, the situation would be far

4 more favourable in operational terms for military activities. The task,

5 or rather, the objective of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was to keep those

6 forces under this blockade and not to allow them to break through to the

7 free operational area in the Romanija plateau, and from there they would

8 go to the Drina River valley and in that way the war would practically be

9 lost for the Serbian side.

10 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us how these elements affected the

11 choice of strategy for both corps? Were the strategies identical or

12 different; and if so, how did they differ?

13 A. Well, by definition, objectives are of decisive importance for

14 choosing the strategy. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had its key objective

15 to keep under blockade the forces of the 1st Corps and, by definition, it

16 opted for a defensive concept, that is to say, they defended their lines.

17 As opposed to that, the 1st Corps, in order to attain its global

18 objective, that is to say to break through to the free operational area,

19 they always opted for offensive activities. And now the fact that they

20 did not have enough strength to do that is a different matter, but they

21 always wanted to do that.

22 Q. Thank you. These strategies, were they justified from a military

23 point of view and were they legal and legitimate?

24 A. From a military point of view, these strategies were legal and

25 legitimate for both sides.

Page 41405

1 Q. Does that mean that the plan and the strategy of the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to keep the forces of the 1st Corps under

3 blockade is quite legal and legitimate?

4 A. In accordance with principles of military doctrine, this is quite

5 legal and legitimate, to blockade forces.

6 Q. Thank you. Who made up those two corps from a military point of

7 view?

8 A. For the most part, it was local forces, or rather, the local

9 population that had either been mobilised in the Territorial Defence or

10 were in some military units from before. Basically, these were locals,

11 and I think that most of them actually knew one another as a matter of

12 fact.

13 Q. Thank you. Did this affect the overall picture of warfare in

14 terms of whether there were some professional forces there or forces that

15 had arrived from elsewhere or ... ?

16 A. Well, of course it's different. We have already talked about the

17 selection of activity. Had these been forces that had come from

18 elsewhere, they certainly would have taken more radical action to change

19 the front line. However, these were forces that were from this local

20 area and they chose their way of behaviour accordingly. Since they came

21 to these ethnic boundaries, the question was: Who had what perception?

22 The 1st Corps certainly perceived this as all of Bosnia being their

23 territory, whereas the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had this other vision,

24 that this was a separation line between ethnic territories.

25 Q. Thank you. How would you then characterise the positions around

Page 41406

1 Sarajevo, especially in view of this qualification, namely, that it's

2 being called a siege?

3 A. From a military point of view, and that's the one that I'm only

4 interested in practically, this is a blockade of military forces in the

5 true sense of the word. But they cannot be blockaded outside an area.

6 So if forces are blockaded, then the area has to be too. So this was a

7 blockade of the forces of the 1st Corps, or rather, of the other side,

8 those who were based in Sarajevo; it wasn't only the 1st Corps, there was

9 also the special brigade of the police.

10 Q. According to the documents that you obtained, did you reach a

11 conclusion as to whether the Muslim side had an alternative to this

12 blockade and deblockade? Could the situation be resolved in a different

13 way in Sarajevo?

14 A. Yes, in a completely different way. First of all, there didn't

15 have to be a conflict in the first place. Government could have been

16 organised on the basis of majority rule, where ethnic communities were a

17 majority. In particular municipalities, the government could have been

18 organised accordingly. And then also an open city could have been

19 declared; that is to say, demilitarisation and UN mechanisms could have

20 run the city and that way there wouldn't have been any conflicts and

21 there wouldn't have been any casualties, not even military casualties let

22 alone civilian ones.

23 Q. Thank you. Do you know what my position was in terms of

24 demilitarisation and allowing the UN to run Sarajevo?

25 A. You advocated demilitarisation, the demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

Page 41407

1 Q. I would like to ask you, in view of what is claimed in the

2 indictment, namely, that Sarajevo was under siege and that the population

3 was being terrorised and that that was the objective, did you find

4 anywhere in documents or reports, did you find any proof for that kind of

5 allegation?

6 A. For blockade of military forces, yes, because I wasn't actually

7 counting so I don't want to exaggerate, but in most military documents,

8 coming from both sides that is, the forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

9 pointed out this task of preventing deblockade, that is to say preventing

10 the departure of military forces from Sarajevo. In the documents of the

11 units of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, almost always

12 there was a reference to the need to deblockade Sarajevo, to leave the

13 city, and to link up with the forces that were attacking from Central

14 Bosnia, or rather, at Mount Igman.

15 Q. Thank you. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the forces in the

16 city itself and the forces on the outside, on the external line, what was

17 actually the situation in terms of numbers between these two armed

18 forces?

19 A. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had a maximum of 22.000 people,

20 between 18- and 22.000, so say roughly around 20.000. And the 1st Corps

21 of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had over 50.000. So it was at least

22 2:1 in favour of the forces of the 1st Corps of the Army of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we were to take other factors into account too,

24 like combat equipment and so on, then there would be a balance. It would

25 not be to the detriment of the Serb side to such a degree, but at any

Page 41408

1 rate they outnumbered the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and that was the main

2 handicap for the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that the situation was such in

3 Sarajevo and vis-a-vis the 1st Corps.

4 Q. And what is the situation if taking into account that the

5 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was also fighting against the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th

6 Corps on the other side externally?

7 A. It is far more unfavourable when you take that into account

8 because the thrust of their activity was towards the outside.

9 Q. Thank you. Did you find any proof that the Serbian army, i.e.,

10 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, attacked the city in order to terrorise

11 civilians?

12 A. I didn't find any such proof in any of the documents. It does

13 not necessarily have to be explicitly articulated, but having studied the

14 entire context of the situation I did not come to that conclusion. Now,

15 what was that indication that led me to this conclusion? There were long

16 periods without any activity. Further on there were cease-fires that

17 lasted for a certain period of time which were not characterised by any

18 activities. Had it been the case of terrorised civilians, I don't think

19 that there would be an observance of such long periods without any

20 activities.

21 There's another fact that can speak in favour of my claim that

22 this was not a matter of terrorising the civilian population. I don't

23 know how many places of worship are in Sarajevo, but I'm sure there are

24 quite a few of them. The simplest way to terrorise civilians is to do

25 that while they are attending these places of worship. As far as I know,

Page 41409

1 there were no such incidents which convinced me that this was not the

2 issue of terrorising civilians but rather the issue of casualties that

3 were caused by various --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please move closer to the

5 microphone. Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: I already sensed the speeding up of both

7 interlocutors, and please put a pause between the questions and answers.

8 And, General Radinovic, if you could come closer to the

9 microphone. Yes.

10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Let me just see if you have finished your answer. You said

15 "caused by various circumstances." Is that what you said?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you. Have you established that there were periods when the

18 Serbian side opened fire unilaterally, when there was no exchange of fire

19 but rather unilateral fire coming from the Serbian side with the aim of

20 obtaining any goal, in particular the terrorising of civilians?

21 A. No, I haven't come across such situations.

22 Q. So from which parts of Sarajevo did fire come from and where was

23 it aimed?

24 A. The fire was coming from the centre of the city and fire was

25 returned from the edges of the city.

Page 41410

1 Q. Thank you. You said that Sarajevo was rather densely

2 militarised. In your opinion, in view of the General Staff and then the

3 staff of the 1st Corps, the staff of the 12th Division, and staffs of

4 these 15 brigades, battalions, and companies, how many stationary

5 legitimate military targets were in the city of Sarajevo, and I'm talking

6 about military targets?

7 A. I made some kind of analysis and some kind of calculations;

8 however, these kind of calculations can never be accurate. There is

9 always a margin of error. If you take that an average legitimate

10 military target according to the doctrine would be a squad occupying a

11 certain position - but a legitimate target can also be a piece of an

12 artillery or a command post; for example, communications stations and

13 posts - so if I put this -- all this together, I reached a figure that

14 there were 2.200 legitimate military targets in the city of Sarajevo.

15 Q. Thank you. Did you come across any document that I sent to the

16 army, that is to say the Main Staff or the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

17 ordering an aggressive conduct of the army against the city of Sarajevo

18 or containing any unlawful elements or ordering unlawful conduct and the

19 use of unnecessary force?

20 A. I haven't come across any such document. On the contrary, I saw

21 documents in which you ordered them to demonstrate restraint and ban on

22 attacking the airport, UNPROFOR, and the city itself.

23 Q. Thank you. Here we had an opportunity to see several reports by

24 UNMOs. Did you have an opportunity to become familiarised with these

25 kind of reports?

Page 41411

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. According to what you have reviewed, can you tell us if the UNMOs

3 in terms of their numbers and in terms of having five observation posts,

4 11 of them were with Muslims in the city, were they able to provide

5 accurate reports in terms of whether fire was justified or lawful?

6 A. I am fully convinced and I wrote this down that the UNMOs with

7 such a low number of observation posts were not able to establish the

8 accurate situation, especially since they didn't know where certain

9 elements of the combat disposition of the 1st Corps were located.

10 Q. Thank you. We had an opportunity to see that foreign journalists

11 decided that fire was coming from the Serbs because it was coming from

12 the surrounding hills. Can you tell us what was the disposition of

13 forces with regard to the dominant features around Sarajevo facing the

14 inner circle?

15 A. The closest features are Mojmilo; Brijesce Brdo; Orlic; Zuc; Hum;

16 Colina Kapa, Velika and Mala. So these are the features that make a

17 circle around or a ring around the city proper. All of these features,

18 with the exception of Trebevic which is above Colina Kapa and

19 Radare [phoen] which is to the north of Sarajevo were held by the

20 1st Corps of the BH Army. So it is absolutely untrue that the forces of

21 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps held these elevated points above the city and

22 used them to open uncontrolled fire at the city. For example, Igman was

23 held exclusively by the 1st Corps of BH Army, which controlled virtually

24 and effectively the city itself; and from Zuc you could also control

25 Mojmilo. And all these positions were held by the BH army.

Page 41412

1 Q. Thank you. When you spoke about stationary military targets, was

2 the manoeuvring space, the room for rotations and supplies, a legitimate

3 military target?

4 A. Yes, they are. All military movements, including convoys

5 bringing supplies, the reinforcements, the personnel who's going to take

6 over the lines, et cetera, the command, all of these are legitimate

7 military targets.

8 Q. So what is necessary for a conclusion that fire was random and

9 undiscriminating? What is necessary to conclude that a shell, for

10 instance, was unjustified?

11 A. First of all, there should be no military forces at the place

12 where the shell impacted. It would be necessary for there to have been

13 no military movements in that area, to make it a legitimate target. It

14 would be necessary to carry out an expert investigation on site to

15 determine who fired, what he was aiming at, et cetera. We don't have

16 that, unfortunately. We only have evidence of fire, and when we

17 registered that in a certain locality where the shell impacted there were

18 no military forces, but we don't know about the period before that.

19 Q. In addition to military personnel, was it possible to also remove

20 firing positions so that at one moment they are there and at another

21 there are none? Was that a tactic the 1st Corps of the BH Army used in

22 Sarajevo?

23 A. The 1st Corps of the BH Army in Sarajevo used all the tactics

24 that is normally employed in the so-called urban warfare, that means that

25 manoeuvring was very intense inside the town. They would mount weapons

Page 41413

1 on a trailer or a cart or a car, fire, and move it, so the target is lost

2 and the opposite side returns fire. And then it seems as if they were

3 firing at random, at no particular target.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, since a few minutes I start

6 wondering whether the witness is testifying here as an expert based on

7 documents or whether he's testifying here now as an eye-witness, as an

8 investigator looking at certain incidents in detail. Now, I'm really

9 surprised and I was wondering whether what he is now talking about with

10 Mr. Karadzic is, in fact, his expertise, in particular in light of

11 paragraph 20 of his expert report, where he explicitly says that those

12 kind of details are a matter of a expert report of a different kind. It

13 would be separate reports that would deal with these kind of incidents.

14 I get the impression that we are now leaving the expert report but going

15 into a field of eye-witness knowledge or hearsay knowledge even. I don't

16 know whether it's still document related and expert view evidence.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, would you like to respond to this?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gladly. I believe that

19 Dr. Radinovic has dealt with the features of the Sarajevo theatre of war

20 in his report. I cannot give you the reference to a particular chapter,

21 but for instance 306, paragraph 306 speaks about Zuc, Grdonj, Velika,

22 Colina Kapa, Mala Colina Kapa, various hills, Grdonj, then in paragraph

23 36 he speaks about sniping which I haven't reached yet. I believe in one

24 paragraph he also speaks about undiscriminating random fire and

25 disproportionate responses. So the Sarajevo theatre of war is the

Page 41414

1 subject of these paragraphs. Beginning with page 105, 106, and onwards.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Maybe I can be more specific. He said, for

4 instance, to establish -- I'm looking here at page 74, line 7 started

5 when he starts to speak about how to establish a legitimate target he

6 says:

7 "It would be necessary to carry out an expert investigation on

8 site to determine who fired, what he was aiming at," et cetera.

9 And he says:

10 "We don't have that, unfortunately. We only have evidence of

11 fire, and when we registered that in a certain locality where the shell

12 impacted there were no military forces, but we don't know about the

13 period before that."

14 I mean, that is eye-witness evidence. It's not something that

15 arrives from the expert -- from the report that he did. And he himself

16 said in paragraph 20 that this would be a different report. And there is

17 also -- there is also this reference:

18 "They would mount weapons on a trailer or a cart or a car, fire

19 and move it so the target is lost and the opposite side returns fire."

20 That's again more what an eye-witness on the ground would be able

21 to testify to and we did have these witnesses, in fact, in court.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I wouldn't agree. Paragraphs

23 290 and onwards deal with exchanges of fire. They deal with -- 298

24 speaks about observers, 299 about observers and their reports. The

25 monitoring reports underlie a great part of the indictment. The General

Page 41415

1 was not an eye-witness. I just asked him what he established on the

2 basis of documents. I always put questions based on documents.

3 JUDGE KWON: But answering such answers as cited by

4 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff without referencing any document sounds as if he were

5 testifying as part of investigation -- as a capacity of investigator or

6 eye-witness, et cetera. I tend to agree with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's

7 observation.

8 Shall we continue, Mr. Karadzic?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, sir, in paragraph 300 you wrote about the

12 proportionality of fire from mortars and material. Could we see in

13 e-court one document that you cite in footnote 190, that's 1D9092. While

14 we wait for that, could you tell us what is the foundation for your

15 conclusions about proportional or unproportional fire? Is it the number

16 of shells on either side or the attainment of a target or something else?

17 A. In the military doctrine, at least as far as I was able to study

18 it, and I also created it in part, there are no empiric criteria based on

19 which we could determine whether fire was proportionate or not. So

20 whenever somebody claims that fire was disproportionate, it is a

21 judgement call, it is a value judgement. It is not objective. There is

22 no criterion that would determine or prescribe how many shells need to be

23 fired in order for fire to be disproportionate. Why? Because one cannot

24 envisage or foresee all the circumstances on the front line that would

25 factor into such a decision. So what remains is just a value judgement,

Page 41416

1 that a target should not be subjected to unnecessary devastation but to

2 respond in such a way as to repel the threat.

3 The only thing that exists and that works for mortar 92- and

4 120-millimetres, there are a certain number of shells that need to be

5 fired in order to neutralise the target in a certain percentage. For

6 82-millimetre mortars, that percentage is between 15 to 25 per cent or 50

7 per cent neutralisation. There is a certain number of shells linked to

8 that. For the 120-millimetre mortar, there is a prescribed number of

9 shells necessary to achieve 50 per cent neutralisation of the target.

10 But even that should be taken with a grain of salt because it depends on

11 the condition of the target on what terrain it lies. There are norms

12 that follow from experience and from regulations, but I'm not sure that

13 this would be the correct experimental result that would apply to all

14 possible circumstances on the front line, on the battleground. When we

15 make a negative call that fire was disproportionate, we are not dealing

16 with exact facts but with value judgements.

17 Q. Could you tell us, what is this document before us?

18 A. That is the rule for the 82-millimetre mortar.

19 Q. What does it stipulate?

20 A. It stipulates how that weapon should be used, how it should be

21 handled, operated, what kind of fire is achieved, how it is charged, the

22 body of knowledge necessary to use the weapon efficiently.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 268, paragraph

24 432. In e-court that would be --

25 JUDGE KWON: We have it.

Page 41417

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, we have it.

2 JUDGE KWON: Page 11.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Can you tell us what this paragraph is about?

5 A. You mean 432? Neutralising personnel and firing assets outside

6 of cover using a mortar squad and platoon.

7 Q. So what is considered to proportionate? How many shells are

8 allowed to be fired? How many is it possible to fire? First of all,

9 would a mortar be used for that purpose in urban areas, to neutralise

10 personnel and their own mortars, for instance?

11 A. Yes, that's what it's used for and it's a very good weapon to use

12 for that purpose because it has a downward trajectory, so even targets

13 covered by tall buildings could be hit.

14 Q. And what does the next paragraph deal with?

15 A. Neutralising personnel and weapons behind cover requires --

16 Q. It is combined.

17 A. Yes. It talks about systematic fire, that means sustained fire

18 over a period of time that is necessary to destroy a target. That's the

19 method. And fire strikes are a concentration of fire at certain

20 intervals necessary to destroy the target.

21 Q. This is with the aim of destruction. And what about sustained

22 fire, what is its purpose?

23 A. Its purpose is only to prevent fire against one's own forces. It

24 keeps the weapon or personnel in fear, disabling them from opening fire.

25 Q. And how many shells are prescribed? Is there a prescribed number

Page 41418

1 of shells to shut up that weapon, so to speak?

2 A. There is no prescribed number, but it's legitimate activity on

3 the condition, of course, that it doesn't threaten civilians, that

4 civilians are relocated.

5 Q. Knowing from the documents the circumstances that prevailed in

6 Sarajevo, what was the responsibility of the warring parties for each

7 other's civilians and did there exist responsibility to one's own

8 civilians and what kind?

9 A. There was responsibility to civilians on all sides. A military

10 commander is duty-bound to evacuate civilian population from the zone of

11 combat, where they could be in physical danger. So they have to remove

12 civilians. As for the civilians of the opposite side, the military

13 commander must not make them a military target if the disposition of the

14 enemy forces allows him to do so. That means he may not target civilians

15 that are physically separated from enemy forces.

16 Q. What would be the role of the enemy commander, that is to say the

17 command of enemy forces, relative to their own civilians? For instance,

18 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps has certain obligations. Are they

19 unconditional or is it also the obligation of the other side to enable

20 civilians to be spared?

21 A. The military commander has the duty to make it impossible to

22 abuse or misuse the civilian population for military purposes. That

23 means that civilian buildings may not be used for military purposes if

24 they want them to be excluded, not to be a military target. However, if

25 a civilian building is used to house a firing position, armed personnel,

Page 41419

1 et cetera, from that moment on that building becomes a legitimate

2 military target and they cannot reckon with being spared from fire from

3 the other side. So each commander has the obligation to refrain from

4 using civilian buildings for military purposes if that is possible. The

5 question is: Was it possible under the given circumstances?

6 Q. We've heard General Dzambasovic, I'm sorry I'm not able to

7 produce a reference, the page number, saying that the -- there was so

8 little room that they could not move their weapons and assets far away

9 enough from civilians. What would you say?

10 A. I believe him. I would also say it was impossible. With such a

11 concentration of military forces in such a small space, it was impossible

12 not to use civilian buildings for military purposes.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document to be

15 MFI'd pending translation? It's also mentioned in the report. That

16 would, in fact, be paragraphs from 415 through 437.

17 There's reference in footnote 190.

18 JUDGE KWON: We only saw page 268 and the next page in terms of

19 paragraph -- paragraphs 432, 433.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellency, it is

21 possible for us to look at all of it, but these few paragraphs are useful

22 for the Chamber. We don't need to go through each and every one of them

23 because they all speak about similar subjects only under different

24 circumstances, and we also have tables with the usual bursts of fire.

25 However, if you wish me to do so, I can go through each and every item,

Page 41420

1 but I think that once it is translated it is going to be of assistance to

2 the Trial Chamber.

3 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The only problem that I see is that I can't

5 read it. That's a problem. I do not really see how these other pages

6 are related to the one that we have talked about, for instance, the

7 tables. Are these firing tables and how many shells need to be fired to

8 neutralise a target? These kind of things, then I would say it's related

9 and we would -- should admit it -- at least marked for identification.

10 But I cannot really say that. Perhaps Mr. Karadzic should address a few

11 more paragraphs and see how it is related.

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

13 Following our practice we'll admit e-court pages 1 to 3 and 11.

14 We'll mark it for identification.

15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3862.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 262.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, under 417, the bold section speaks about insufficient

19 accuracy for group firing and the effects on the use of mortars. Can you

20 tell us, is that also a factor that affects the number of mortars?

21 A. Of course it does. First of all, it depends on the number of

22 approved ammunition because for every activity a certain amount of

23 ammunition has to be approved in a combat kit. There is a special combat

24 kit for every piece of artillery. Here it says that since mortars are

25 weapons that use indirect fire rather than direct fire, their degree of

Page 41421

1 precision is very low which needs and necessitates a correction of fire

2 in order to reduce the consumption of ammunition to the best possible

3 level.

4 Q. In paragraph 420 it says independent mortar squad,

5 82-millimetres, carries out group firing by targeting isolated firing

6 points, groups of marksmen --

7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't manage to translate

8 everything before the next page was ...

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Can you tell us about some -- the following paragraph in terms of

11 the size of the space that is targeted by 82-millimetre mortars?

12 A. These are 120 to 150 square metres --

13 JUDGE KWON: Could you start over again. Please put a pause.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. But please forgive

15 me. I simply get carried away by the question.

16 An 82-millimetre mortar platoon targets the area 100 times 250

17 metres, and then below you can see that these targets are firing squad

18 and defence, firing platoon in attack, and based on the data available I

19 reached the figure of 2200 legitimate targets in Sarajevo and this is the

20 basis that I used for computing it.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Thank you. As for 421, you already explained what the systematic

23 fire is and what the combination of firing --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between

25 questions and answers. Thank you.

Page 41422

1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters even didn't finish

2 your question, Mr. Karadzic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. Mainly they managed to

4 finish the combination of two, which means systematic fire and the

5 combination thereof. The General said "concentrated" and that's how I

6 would like to have it interpreted.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. What are firing strikes and what is a systematic fire? You said

9 "concentrated fire"?

10 A. Fire strikes means that several weapons are engaging the same

11 target at the same time, which means that it's a concentrated fire

12 targeting one and the same target.

13 Q. We heard testimony here of a foreign observer. I asked him how

14 he knew that it was random fire and he replied by saying, "Well, if it's

15 concentrated fire, it's not random; but when you have isolated fire, it's

16 not random fire."

17 What would you say to that?

18 A. I wouldn't agree with that.

19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

20 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to have the reference.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Regretfully, I'm not able to give

23 you the reference now. I can do it through re-direct.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. 423 speaks about systematic fire and 424 speaks about the

Page 41423

1 combination. When is this method applied, the combination?

2 A. It is being applied when you have to sustain the regime of fire

3 which keeps the enemy constantly in fear of being exposed to strikes.

4 Occasionally you can combine it with the devastating strike which adds to

5 the seriousness of the activity.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

8 [Microphone not activated]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. In paragraph 425, what does it specify? Can you tell us

12 something about it?

13 A. These are different types of fire applied by fire platoons for

14 neutralisation, destruction, and blinding. So these are the different

15 types of fire. Artillerymen know that better. I'm not an artilleryman

16 myself. So it's not exactly my speciality, but as a military officer I

17 know this.

18 Q. In terms of types of fire and without being aware of the

19 objective or purpose, actually, can one conclude that a particular fire

20 is non-selective or unprofessional?

21 A. No, not on that basis.

22 Q. Thank you. Can you focus on these tables now? Can you tell us

23 what they prescribe?

24 A. They prescribe what I already referred to, how many projectiles

25 have to be fired in order to reach a degree of neutralisation, degree of

Page 41424

1 neutralisation of the objective 15 to 25 per cent, 15 then number of

2 shells per company, 24, how many projectiles are fired at personnel.

3 Q. I see. The one down here, 15 to 25, 12 shells per hectare, what

4 does that mean? Does it mean that it is customary that in order to

5 neutralise an objective, an average of 12 shells have to be fired?

6 A. Yes, but in order to neutralise only 15 to 25 per cent.

7 Q. What about 40 to 50 per cent?

8 A. 50 to 40 per cent, 48, that would be the number of shells per

9 hectare.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could these pages please be added

12 to the number that we had?

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. While it's -- it would not be that critical,

14 could you take a look at footnote 190. The second item in that footnote

15 refers to a 120-millimetre mortar rules which was allegedly published by

16 the JNA General Staff, but the year was noted as 2001, if you could take

17 a look. Probably the General can assist us since it is his report.

18 In the meantime, let us continue.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellency, that is

20 precisely why I called up only this rule that was published in 1982. I

21 didn't even make an effort to find this one from 2001.

22 A. I took both into account.

23 JUDGE KWON: My question is now a JNA -- yes, how could JNA

24 publish this in 2001? Whether JNA existed in 2001?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's not the JNA,

Page 41425

1 it's the VJ, the Army of Yugoslavia.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe it's wrong in the

3 translation. In the original it says "VJ."

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. In the English version it said "JNA," yes.

5 Please continue.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, sir, in paragraphs 300 onwards you dealt with the use of

8 snipers in the Sarajevo theatre of war. What is your conclusion in

9 relation to the use of snipers and what is being asserted in respect of

10 that use of fire?

11 A. If I were to try to answer this question more succinctly, and

12 it's a rather broad question, this is what I would say: I dealt with

13 sniping here as part of the content of combat activities. Sniping is a

14 legitimate military activity, legitimate. Snipers and sniping were used

15 by both sides. However, the 1st Corps of the BH Army had a significant

16 advantage in relation to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as far as that part

17 of military power was concerned. Why? Because they had more favourable

18 positions for sniping; that is to say, they were on elevations around the

19 city, then also within the city, built-up areas, high-rises that were

20 often used for sniping. Also, the 1st Corps had a larger number of

21 snipers as such, because when the war started the factory Zrak, which did

22 manufacture this optical equipment for snipers for this kind of

23 weaponry -- well, all of this was distributed to units of the 1st Corps

24 of the BH. Then the 1st Corps of the BH Army had 12.7-millimetre snipers

25 from the very beginning of the war, whereas the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

Page 41426

1 got this weaponry only in 1994. And - which is even more important - the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not have any sniper units. I mean in all the

3 documents that I managed to study -- well, it was only in one document of

4 the Ilijas Brigade that I came across this information, that they had a

5 unit consisting of nine sharpshooters. Not in any other unit of the

6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did I find that.

7 As for the units of the 1st Corps of the BH Army, I came across

8 lots of information to the effect that each brigade had a sniper unit of

9 their own.

10 Q. "Unit" is the interpretation that was unit here in -- on this

11 page. Would that be "platoon"?

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The word is "squad."

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Three squads make up a platoon.

14 Now, these nine men, that unit, they comprised a squad.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Now it has been corrected and I thank the interpreters for that.

17 Can you tell us where this Ilijas Brigade was oriented, this brigade that

18 had that squad of sharpshooters, were they facing the city or were they

19 facing the external area?

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not manage to

21 follow the answer because we were still interpreting the question.

22 JUDGE KWON: Could you kindly repeat your answer.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I answered questions related

24 to the Sarajevo theatre of war, I referred to Ilijas and that's the place

25 where this brigade is from. I placed it in this broader aspect of the

Page 41427

1 Sarajevo theatre of war, that is to say outside the urban areas. That is

2 a settlement that is about 10 kilometres out of town. So this brigade

3 with that squad was not oriented towards town.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Thank you. General, sir, finally, can you tell us what it was

6 that you concluded about command responsibility and the role and

7 participation of the president of the republic in active military combat

8 in relation to Srebrenica and after Srebrenica? Your Chapter 2.3 deals

9 with that.

10 A. Yes. I looked at Operation Krivaja 95 in the context of your

11 powers in terms of control, and as far as launching the operation is

12 concerned and its development and its outcome, you did not have direct

13 responsibility; that is, exclusively within the responsibility of the

14 Main Staff, or rather, the command of the Drina Corps. You did receive

15 reports about how the operation developed. However, as for direct

16 involvement in this operation except for the 9th when you agreed that

17 they entered town, I did not come across a single document that directly

18 pertained to that operation.

19 Q. Thank you. Is that strange? What is the role otherwise at

20 strategic level of command in operative and tactical actions?

21 A. This is nothing strange. Because operative command was under the

22 Main Staff, you did not deal with that. Otherwise, an operation at that

23 level is exclusively under the corps commander and he seeks the approval

24 of the commander of the Main Staff, not the approval of yourself;

25 however, since this was not a strategic operation, that's why this was

Page 41428

1 not indispensable. And secondly, you would have interfered only if the

2 forces had been used in an illegal way and for illegitimate objectives.

3 Since that had not been the case, you did not interfere. From the

4 reports you did not have any indications --

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the

6 sentence. Could the witness please speak into the microphone. Thank

7 you.

8 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence. From the

9 report, you did not have any indications. From there, Mr. Radinovic.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

11 In the reports that you received from the ground, from the

12 Main Staff, there were no reasons -- there were no reasons for you to

13 intervene or for you to issue any kind of corrective orders.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Your report also deals with legitimacy of military

16 operations since these two zones had not been demilitarised. What is the

17 obligation of the parties involved in demilitarisation if one of the

18 parties violates it, not to say constantly violates the main provisions

19 of the agreement? Were we duty-bound to continue to consider those zones

20 to be demilitarised if they had not been demilitarised?

21 A. You did not have the obligation to behave towards these zones as

22 demilitarised zones if they had not been demilitarised and they indeed

23 had not been. The obligation of the other side was to demilitarise them

24 in accordance with the agreement reached in May 1993.

25 Q. Thank you. Did you familiarise yourself with documents from

Page 41429

1 April 1993 when the counter-offensive of the Army of Republika Srpska

2 towards Srebrenica was stopped?

3 A. Yes. When the Army of Republika Srpska intended to enter

4 Srebrenica in April of 1993, they were stopped on your explicit orders,

5 not to enter. As a matter of fact, you even did not want investigations

6 to be carried out in this very heated atmosphere so that no mistakes

7 would be made.

8 Q. Thank you. Did you notice in this preparatory order vis-a-vis

9 Srebrenica what was the actual task involved? What were the intentions

10 involved, and when was there a change in the plan?

11 A. The preparatory order for carrying out Krivaja 95 was issued on

12 the 2nd of July, 1995, and the order for carrying it out was issued on

13 the 4th, that is to say within two days. As regards the objective of

14 that operation there is no significant difference. The objective was the

15 physical separation of the enclaves, the physical separation of the

16 enclaves; controlling the area between the enclaves in order to prevent

17 misusing that area by the 28th Division so that they could not operate

18 against the civilians there, the Serb civilians. And the reports of the

19 28th Division from the 28th and 30th of June show that they are reporting

20 to the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, saying that they had sabotage groups there and

21 that they killed 40 Chetniks. Others say that there were even 70 of

22 them, and they say that they seized lots of weapons and cattle.

23 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us how this happened, or rather, more

24 specifically --

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 41430

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just want to clarify

2 something here on the record, page 91, lines 7 and 8 and 9. I'm just

3 wondering whether there was a mistake in translation or whether the

4 General misspoke because it says here 2nd of July and 4th of July. Is

5 that a translation error? Did you misspeak, General? It should be the

6 same date.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it is a mistake because

8 it's the 2nd of July, but there are some brigade ones from the 4th of

9 July, so then perhaps there may have been some confusion there.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are two documents. One is

11 the preparatory order and the other one is the order --

12 JUDGE KWON: The question is about the date of those two

13 documents.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The preparatory order was

15 certainly on the 2nd, and the order -- now, this moment I cannot say. I

16 think it was on the 2nd of July, but the operation started on the 6th, or

17 rather, the 7th.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. How did you assess my consent, or rather, agreement to changing

21 the plan in view of the reports that conditions had been created for the

22 army to enter? Was this justified from a military point of view and did

23 that have anything to do with the situation in Srebrenica itself and the

24 departure of the 28th Division, or rather, their readiness to leave?

25 A. There is yet another example which demonstrate what your role was

Page 41431

1 and how it was understood by military commanders. For as long as the

2 course of the operation was aiming at separating the enclaves, which was

3 the principal and primary objective defined in the relevant order, there

4 was no need to ask for your approval. Once a need arose for the army to

5 enter the town which profoundly changed the situation, then your approval

6 was required. And they did seek your approval to enter the town. Since

7 the town was starting to be vacated, there was a possibility of an army

8 resistance and possibility of disturbing the balance and some undesirable

9 occurrences, and therefore you gave your approval for them to enter the

10 town but you explicitly said that protection must be provided for the

11 civilians --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please finish the sentence. We

13 couldn't hear what he said.

14 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In response to this question I

16 underlined the fact that entering the town constituted a substantial

17 change of the objectives of the operation which required an approval from

18 the Commander-in-Chief, and he did give his approval to the command who

19 was in charge of the operation and he conveyed this consent through

20 General Tolimir to the forward command post of the Drina Corps. In other

21 words, the Commander-in-Chief gave his approval for them to enter the

22 town but that they must observe the rules of international law with

23 regard to the civilian population.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. In the consent that I gave, was there any reference made to

Page 41432

1 prisoners of war?

2 A. Yes. It was said that everybody who took part in combat should

3 be afforded the status of prisoners of war.

4 Q. Thank you. Based on the documents, were you able to see how the

5 capturing of prisoners took place throughout the conflict and whether

6 this procedure of capturing was carried out in accordance with the law

7 of -- customary law? I'm talking in general.

8 A. Generally speaking, this involved capturing troops who were in

9 the process of breaking through, and column was acting against forces

10 that were setting ambushes along the route of their breakthrough.

11 Therefore, it was completely legitimate to act against them, including to

12 capture those who were in the column and engaged in certain activities.

13 Q. Thank you. Have you concluded that there was something unusual

14 or illicit or alarming in the process of taking prisoners and gathering

15 them at one point, transporting them, or putting them up at a certain

16 location? Was anything done that would be either alarming or unusual?

17 A. I did not detect anything in the documents that would cause alarm

18 and that would require your intervention.

19 Q. Thank you. During the war we had a witness who said that there

20 were over 20.000 prisoners. Did you come across any document that speaks

21 about illegal executions and about my role in particular in that respect

22 during the war? And then we'll move on to Srebrenica.

23 A. No, I didn't.

24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour.

Page 41433

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Mr. Karadzic should by now know that he has

3 to give a reference when he claims that a certain witness said something,

4 and I find it a bit unfair that he doesn't do it. It's not so helpful

5 for us to get it in the re-direct. We need to have the reference now.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I withdraw this

7 information.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, in the documents or in any other way, did you manage to

10 find out what kind of orders I issued and what my role was in the events

11 that followed the liberation of Srebrenica, particularly with regard to

12 prisoners of war?

13 A. On the 11th of July when the Army of Republika Srpska entered

14 Srebrenica, you appointed a civilian commissioner by issuing an order to

15 that respect and you also ordered a police station to be set up in order

16 to carry out control. You prohibited any form of unlawful treatment of

17 civilians. You insisted on those who were engaged in fighting against

18 the VRS to be given the status of prisoners of war, and you expressed,

19 generally speaking, an acceptable attitude towards civilians. At the

20 time when you issued these documents, you were obviously expecting the

21 civilians to remain in Srebrenica.

22 Q. Thank you. According to what you have studied, can you accept

23 the assertion that the population in question was forcibly deported from

24 Srebrenica against their own will and with the use of force? I'm talking

25 about military actions that were taken, do they indicate that this

Page 41434

1 constituted a forcible relocation? What was your conclusion --

2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

3 Yes, please continue.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not find any piece of

5 information that would indicate that any actions were taken that would

6 justify this assertion that this was a forcible expulsion. I primarily

7 referred to an array of information and facts that are contained in

8 documents. I'm referring to a document dated the 9th of July, whereby

9 the civilian authorities of Srebrenica asked the leadership of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Srebrenica population to be moved out of

11 Srebrenica because the 28th Division was not defending the town.

12 Furthermore, I also have in mind the statement given by General Nicolai,

13 the UNPROFOR commander, which he gave in 1996 and in this statement he

14 said that he had ordered the commander of the DutchBat,

15 Colonel Karremans, at the meeting with General Mladic on the evening of

16 the 11th, that he requested him, or rather, the army to allow the

17 population to leave the territory under the control of the BH army.

18 Also, I had in mind the first sentence uttered by Mr. Mladic at

19 the meeting with Karremans in Bratunac. He said, "What do you want?"

20 Which means that this was not his initiative but rather the initiative of

21 the United Nations whose representative was Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.

22 So all this information is something that convinced me that this was not

23 a forcible expulsion but that it was, rather, based on expressed will.

24 But what was this will and desire based upon? As a rule, when an

25 army leaves an area, the civilian population follows in their suit and

Page 41435

1 they join the army. This is a rule that pertains to every conflict,

2 particularly civil wars, because the population wants to go to the same

3 territory where their army is going. However, this decision was not made

4 by the VRS but rather by UNPROFOR in agreement with the civilian

5 authorities of Srebrenica.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Thank you. Did you find a single document purported to say that

8 I ordered illegal actions to be taken against the prisoners of war in

9 Srebrenica?

10 A. No, I didn't find any such information. In the two orders that

11 we spoke about, you explicitly said that they must be treated in a lawful

12 manner.

13 Q. Did you find any document in which I was informed by anyone about

14 unlawful treatment of prisoners, specifically the executions of prisoners

15 of war?

16 A. I did not find a single document of the kind. There was not even

17 an indication that would point to that direction, especially not from

18 you.

19 Q. I hope you can remember and you had an opportunity to see in the

20 document, that in the media and in various documents there were stories

21 about executions of men and boys. Was there any reference made to them

22 being prisoners of war?

23 A. The media mainly reported about executions of men and boys, but

24 it was never emphasised that those were prisoners of war. I know that

25 not even prisoners of war can be executed because that's a crime as well.

Page 41436

1 But the way in which the prisoners of war are treated in comparison to

2 civilians is definitely a different one.

3 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us which localities were mentioned as

4 execution sites?

5 A. The first mass execution took place in Kravica on the

6 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road.

7 Q. I'm sorry, I was referring to what the media were reporting with

8 regard to the locations that should have attracted our attention.

9 A. There was mention that the executions took place in Srebrenica;

10 that was not the case.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please now have 1D21046

13 which is the General's CV so that he can authenticate it for the benefit

14 of the Chamber.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. While we are waiting, General, can you tell me what kind of

17 school you finished in 1996 -- 1968?

18 A. In 1968 I finished a school for additional training of --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer

20 slowly. Thank you.

21 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer slowly this time.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1968 I finished the school for

23 upgrading skill of artillery officers. All academies had advanced

24 training which were attended between the military academy and the command

25 staff academy in this interim and that is when I finished this course.

Page 41437

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you. Can you please look at the left part of the screen.

3 We translated your CV and please tell us whether it's correct and then we

4 shall tender it into evidence.

5 A. The first part, basic education, it's not post-secondary school.

6 Q. It is correct in English, it should read "high school," not

7 "post-secondary school."

8 Once you have finished with page 1, let's move to page 2.

9 A. This section, military posts, I was deputy of the commander --

10 Q. Which line?

11 A. Third from the top of "military duties." That means that chief

12 of department for military doctrine and army development.

13 Q. Thank you. This has been recorded.

14 A. I was the chief for strategy and administration, not of strategic

15 and administrative.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 A. I wasn't a sergeant in 1952 but rather in 1962.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Lieutenant.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the next page.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Is this correct?

22 A. No, this second line, no, that wasn't me.

23 Q. "Expert at the federal ministry for education"?

24 A. No, no, not me.

25 Q. All right. Should anything else be corrected?

Page 41438

1 A. Published literature, it's not military bibliography,

2 "Vojna Bibliografija." It is the bibliography of the periodical called

3 "Vojno Delo."

4 Q. All right. So this is reflected in the transcript now.

5 A. There is something that needs to be corrected.

6 Q. Where is that? Concept of battles in the range? You mean in the

7 area.

8 A. Yes. The rest is correct.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender into evidence the

11 curriculum vitae of the witness? And then the entire report as well.

12 JUDGE KWON: Could we see the first page?

13 General, what does an SCG mean in terms of nationality?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't seen that.

15 JUDGE KWON: It says: "Srbija i Crna gora." What does that

16 mean?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, then when we were doing this,

18 that was probably the name of the state. After the SFRY, Yugoslavia

19 turned into the FRY, and then the SCG, Serbia-Montenegro, so that was the

20 last name of this state of Serbia and Montenegro.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 Any objection, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit them both.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the CV 65 ter 1D21046 will be