1 Thursday, 18 July 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Harvey.
8 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. May I
9 introduce Eoin Murphy, who is a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, and
10 will be attending Leiden University next year doing a masters in public
11 international law. He's been with the team since February. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Please proceed.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours. Your Honour,
15 before the start of the cross-examination, I wish to note that
16 Mr. Mitchell and I, we will share the cross-examination responsibility.
17 Mr. Mitchell will address the Srebrenica portion of the expert evidence,
18 and I will deal with all other chapters of the expert report. And,
19 Your Honour, when we asked for five hours of cross-examination time, we
20 did this with the caveat that the outstanding decision of the
21 Trial Chamber on the exclusion of parts of the report may have an impact
22 on the time needed, and now that we have the decision, Mr. Mitchell and I
23 are likely to need more than five hours that we requested in the
24 beginning and that you allotted to us.
25 We're not asking the Trial Chamber to make a decision until the
1 moment it actually arrives, what we don't know, but I would like to
2 foreshadow now that we have finalised our preparation and have now -- we
3 believe that it may be more than five hours, rather in the -- in the
4 period of six hours perhaps, but even if we very judicially and even if
5 we attempt to narrow the scope of the cross as much as possible, but it
6 is more likely that we will need something like six hours.
7 We may well be requesting, therefore, some additional time in the
8 course, but we will see how it goes. I just want to foreshadow this.
9 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
12 Q. Good morning, General.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. General, we have limited time. Therefore, I would kindly ask you
15 to co-operate by giving short answers to the questions and very focused
16 on the questions as such.
17 Let me -- let me first turn to your CV that was admitted
18 yesterday, and I just have a few additional points. In your capacity in
19 relation to the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence position that you had, you
20 also participated in sessions of the Supreme Defence Council in the years
21 1992 and 1993; is that correct?
22 A. I attended several sessions of the Supreme Defence Council, but I
23 can't tell you exactly which ones. However, I was not a member. I was
24 not a member even ex officio. I was occasionally invited to provide an
1 Q. And Dr. -- General, you accompanied Prime Minister Milan Panic on
2 missions including a visit to Sarajevo in July-August 1992; is that
3 correct? Do you remember?
4 A. Yes, I remember. On that journey a US reporter, Mr. Kaplan, was
5 killed. It was in August 1992. On that mission that escort of ours was
7 Q. Dr. -- or, rather, you prefer to be called General instead of
8 doctor; right? That's my understanding.
9 A. I was primarily a soldier, a general, and I appreciate that more
10 than my doctorate but I don't mind whichever way you wish to address me.
11 Q. General, you toured the entire front lines during the event, did
12 you not?
13 A. You mean when I travelled with Prime Minister Panic?
14 Q. No. I mean in relation -- in the time period in particular in
15 Bosnia you toured the front lines not with Mr. Pantic but for other
16 reasons; correct?
17 A. Not at the time when front lines were active. Later on a study
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25278 on the
20 screen, and as it is coming up, it is an interview you gave to the "Nin"
21 magazine on the 22nd of April, 1994. You remember that you gave that
22 interview, General, but --
23 A. I gave numberless interviews.
24 Q. Now, we look at this year, and we look at the end of the very
25 first paragraph. You say here:
1 "I toured the Krajina. I was at every part of the front. I've
2 been around the whole Bosnia, talked to people and have completely
3 assured myself that this is an historic battle which the Serb people is
4 fighting for its survival. If we miss this chance, we will not get
5 another one like it ever again."
6 I understood that you went through the area during the events,
7 that means before you gave this interview; correct?
8 A. I travelled on a study trip during that crisis, especially in
9 Krajina, because there was a group that edited the magazine "Vojno Delo,"
10 was writing about Krajina, and I occasionally contributed to that
11 magazine, and we made study trips to the Republic of Serbian Krajina
12 while it existed, and on the way we also toured some front lines or parts
13 of front lines that were along the way. After I was retired in 1993, I
14 found a job at the institute for economic studies in Belgrade, and
15 working to revitalise the military industry we toured Republika Srpska,
16 and we also visited the Main Staff of the VRS. So I was able to
17 familiarise myself with the situation at front lines in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina too.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I suggest that in Serbian we
20 show the actual page. This is not that page.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It should be. Sorry, it is actually the
22 first page, and it is -- I can't read the -- no. I see --
23 THE ACCUSED: Trust me, this is interview with Oskar Kovac, who
24 is an economist.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, and it's "ekonomija."
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then we have actually uploaded the wrong --
2 the wrong document, I'm sorry. In the English it's correct, but we have
3 uploaded the wrong document. Thank you for alerting me.
4 JUDGE KWON: Shall we come back to this later on?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But I can still ask a question.
6 Q. When you -- General, when you went through Bosnia-Herzegovina on
7 these various visits, you came across devastated villages and settlements
8 in Serb-controlled areas, did you not?
9 A. Yes. Yes.
10 Q. And these devastated settlements would be Muslim or Croat
11 villages; correct?
12 A. There were also Serbian devastated villages.
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. But there were the other kind, too, Muslim and Croat.
15 Q. Yes. Thank you. And I just quoted to you something that you
16 said, and unfortunately you cannot see the Serbian right now, but what
17 you said is -- you speak of a historical chance for the Serbs that will
18 not come again. General, the historical chances for the Serbs you speak
19 about here, that was a state for all Serbs on all lands considered
20 Serbian; right? That's what the historical chance was, isn't it?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
24 JUDGE KWON: What is the basis of your objection, Mr. Karadzic?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, your suggestion to
1 return to this when we have the original, and also from our experience
2 with translations, we need to be cautious. We need to see the original
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I have actually here a hard copy that we can
5 put on the ELMO that will solve the situation because I don't know why it
6 is so difficult to upload this. Here is the article.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we have the first page. Please put the
9 first page on the ELMO, and then we will use also a few other -- other
11 Q. And, General, if you look -- if you look at the bit -- we need to
12 see the end of the first paragraph. A bit -- now we can't see anything.
13 We need to see the -- yes. So if we look at the -- you have to take away
14 the paper. We need to see the -- yes, so if we look at the -- you have
15 to take away the paper. We need to see the -- can you move the document
16 a bit up, but we move the shadow. Yes. That's -- that's it.
17 If you look at the last lines here in this first paragraph, it
19 "I've toured Krajina. I was on every part of the front. I've
20 been around the whole Bosnia, talked to people and have completely
21 assured myself that this is a historical battle which the Serb people is
22 fighting for its survival. If we miss this chance we will not get
23 another one like it ever again."
24 And my question to you was, General, the historical chance for
25 the Serbs you speak about is the state for all the Serbs on all lands
1 considered Serbian; right? That's what you meant?
2 A. No. I meant exactly what I said, for their survival. And
3 "survival" means physical existence, saving your life. And once you've
4 managed to save your life, then you see what you can do.
5 Q. And the territory that the Serbs would need for surviving, that's
6 defined by the six strategic goals, is it not?
7 A. At that time I don't think anybody knew about those strategic
8 goals except the people who discussed them. I didn't know anything about
9 the strategic goals.
10 Q. We are talking about an article of the 22nd of April, 1994. By
11 then you knew the six strategic goals, did you not?
12 A. No, I didn't know because I wasn't involved with this. I learned
13 about the strategic goals only when I started working on this case.
14 Q. By working on this case you learned that -- what the six
15 strategic goals were, and they were actually pursued by the Bosnian Serb
16 leadership and also by General Mladic as commander of the VRS Main Staff.
17 They all shared -- shared these six goals; right?
18 A. Well, I can suppose they were, but I wasn't involved in that, so
19 I don't know. I don't know that first-hand. I learned about it later.
20 Q. But by studying the documents you learned that, that they were
21 all pursuing these goals?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. The dispute between Karadzic and Mladic you referred to in
24 paragraph 6 and 101 and 113 of your report was not about these war goals,
25 was it?
1 A. No. It's not a discussion of war goals.
2 Q. The two at times had different views on whether certain
3 concessions in negotiations were advisible in relation to the military
4 strategy and the militarily -- military situation; correct? That's where
5 they had different views at times; correct?
6 A. I think the differences between them were not about that. There
7 was no conceptual difference. The difference lay in the perception of
8 the role in the system of strategic command, the decision to establish
9 the army, appointed General Mladic commander, and starting with him down
10 to the last soldier, everyone considered him the operative commander
11 whereas the president of the republic --
12 Q. Let me interrupt you. General, that is all discussed already in
13 the examination-in-chief and also very rightly explained in your report.
14 I would rather come to this a bit later. My question was very specific,
15 and you have answered this.
16 You mentioned yesterday during your testimony, and that is at
17 page 41382, line 17 to 25, that the army is supposed to warn the
18 Supreme Commander about the consequences of carrying out an order when
19 they see danger in relation to the military position. That's right, yes?
20 A. If he's the one who gave them that order. If the
21 Supreme Commander gave them that order, and that has negative
22 consequences. It would be natural to warn him. But if he didn't order
23 it and they got their order from their own command, then, no, but he
24 issued -- if he issued the order and that has negative consequences for
25 the status of the troops or the army, then, yes, they would warn him.
1 Q. And -- and --
2 THE ACCUSED: Transcript is catastrophe.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, in line 7 on page 8,
5 the witness said that all in the army considered that the supreme
6 operative commander is General Mladic, and the answer as recorded is
7 completely incorrect, incorrectly interpreted.
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't think it was incorrectly translated. And
9 next one?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The problem is only with that
11 answer. The last answer.
12 JUDGE KWON: The transcript reflects that everyone considered
13 him, being Mladic, the operative commander. I don't see any problem with
15 THE ACCUSED: Supreme operative commander.
16 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Yes.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the answer after that beginning
19 with line 17 on is not correctly recorded or interpreted.
20 "[In English] But if he didn't warn them and they got the
21 order ...," this is all -- "... the order and that has negative
22 consequence for the status of the ... army ..." senseless. Witness said
23 "if he ordered them" and not "warned them."
24 JUDGE KWON: I leave it to you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
1 Q. General, when I asked you about whether it would be the right
2 thing to do for the -- for General Mladic to -- to warn the
3 Supreme Commander that a certain order would endanger the position of the
4 army, then he would have actually had the duty to do so; right?
5 A. Yes, if he got the order from Karadzic. But if Karadzic didn't
6 give him that order, then he's not supposed to warn him. He needs to
7 correct that decision himself.
8 Q. And when the Supreme Commander decided against the warning, to
9 take it on board, then the VRS carried out the orders, correct?
10 A. I don't understand the question really.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Just leave it there.
12 JUDGE KWON: The document is now uploaded in e-court.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Yes. Thank you. I didn't see that.
14 Sorry. Yes. Now we can look at the electronic copy, because I want to
15 continue now. The English has to be -- I think the English has to be
16 slightly moved up. Yes. And the B/C/S is fine. Here in --
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you gave up your last question?
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The question was actually answered,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: He said he didn't understand the question.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, sorry. Sorry.
22 Q. General, what I meant is if the Supreme Commander Mr. Karadzic
23 had given an order and General Mladic would have advised and warned him
24 against this order and opined that it would be harmful to the army, when
25 Supreme Commander then decided that the order should be carried through
1 the VRS acted and did that. They carried through with the order, did it
3 A. It's a hypothetical question. If you told me specifically what
4 this is about, I would be able to answer, but now we can speak only in
5 general terms, in hypothetical terms, and I'll give you a hypothetical
6 answer. If Karadzic had ordered something to be done and that was not
7 contrary to the rules of warfare, then that would need to be carried out,
8 but if it's contrary to the doctrine and rules of warfare, then that must
9 not be carried out. It's not carried out regardless of the consequences,
10 personal consequences to the person who would refuse to carry it out, but
11 this is like playing hide and seek. It's all hypothetical.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 A. Let me just --
14 Q. No. Thank you very much, but we have very limited time, so I'd
15 rather want you to stop here. And as you are here as an expert,
16 hypothetical questions and hypothetical answers are actually what is
18 Here I would like you to look again at your interview, and on the
19 same page, exactly the next paragraph after the one we spoke about, here
20 you speak of the importance of Gorazde. You refer to the at least 70.000
21 people living there at the moment, the geostrategic importance for
22 installing a Muslim state in what you refer to as former
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and you speak of the exceptional significance of
24 Gorazde. That is one the most important points and it represents a
25 natural link between Sandzak and Bosnia.
1 General, Sandzak is an area in Serbia inhabited mostly by
2 Muslims; right?
3 A. Not only Serbia but Montenegro as well, because that's an area
4 between Montenegro and Serbia. It is indeed populated by Muslims, but
5 there's also a large number of Muslims and Serbs as well. To tell you
6 the truth, I can't give you the exact demographic pictures, but there are
7 entire villages and towns that are majority Serb and Montenegrin and, on
8 the other hand, others that are majority Muslim.
9 Q. And if we move one paragraph down a bit in both languages in
10 relation to the significance of Gorazde for the Serbs, what you say is:
11 "What is important for us is that the Muslims do not achieve this
12 goal, that is the so-called Green Transversal be severed. It is
13 important to us that the FRY border to what's the former
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina be as secure as possible, and it will be more secure
15 if this section of the border is in the possession of the, I hope, new
16 Serb state."
17 General, that was your view and also that of the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership; correct?
19 A. Well, that was a natural aspiration and desire. However, how
20 much realistic it was is a different question. I know that in all maps
21 that provided divisions Gorazde was never part of Republika Srpska. It
22 was always in the Muslim part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, probably due to the
23 geostrategic objectives that I mentioned here in this article.
24 Q. The elimination of the Gorazde enclave was something you found
25 reflected in the command documents, did you not?
1 A. The elimination is a natural aspiration by anyone who is engaged
2 in war and that is to control an area, but it is up to politicians to
3 decide, and in this instance the politicians decided that this would not
4 to be the case. The army wanted Gorazde to be within Republika Srpska.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the reference, please?
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm coming to this. I'm actually showing
7 the General now two orders.
8 Your Honour, we will come back to this "Nin" article. Therefore,
9 I will not ask to have it admitted right now but a bit later.
10 Can we now please have Exhibit P00854 on the screen. It is an
11 order dated 18 April 1994. And when you look at point 4 of this order,
12 it says:
13 "The president is ordering and kindly asking Hercegovina Corps
14 commander to engage all available forces from TG Visegrad and to take
15 over the part of the town on the right bank of the Drina River at any
16 costs and push the enemy forces to the left bank by the above -mentioned
17 dead-line before UNPROFOR -- before UNPROFOR forces enter the left bank,
18 the left bank part of the town."
19 General, the -- the Supreme Commander is here actively involved
20 for the same -- is he actively involved, right, on the ground?
21 A. One cannot see what his order is from this. It only says that it
22 has been ordered by him, but one cannot see the very order itself. It
23 says here he is ordering and kindly asking. They two things cannot go
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have P01645 on the screen.
1 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an order coming from the TJ
2 Visegrad command of 11th of April, 1994, regarding its participation in
3 the attack on Gorazde, and under point 7 -- can we see point 7? Yes.
4 Under point 7 is a message forwarded by General Mladic who visited the
5 zone of combat operations on the 10th of April, 1994, saying:
6 "Keep pushing energetically onwards. Pay no attention to what is
7 going on around us. The Turks must disappear from these areas."
8 General, you're aware of this document, are you not? You looked
9 at command documents, so you have seen that before; right?
10 A. I have seen a great deal of documents. At this point I can say
11 that it looks familiar but I'm not sure whether I dealt with it.
12 Q. And when you look at the two documents that we just looked at,
13 the Main Staff and the Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic, are actively
14 involved for the same military result; correct?
15 A. But I didn't see a document issued by Karadzic. Somebody's just
16 making reference and at the same time ordering and kindly asking. If I
17 were to see what Karadzic wrote, I could tell you more. The only thing I
18 can say is to comment what I see written here. So this is not about an
19 order issued by Karadzic, but, rather, one of the commanders is making a
20 reference to it and at the same time ensuring an order and kind request,
21 and this cannot go together. A commander can either order or kindly ask,
22 but not the two at the same time.
23 Q. I cannot show you this order because the Prosecution did not get
24 all the orders that Mr. Karadzic submitted during the events, but the
25 fact that the order is not here in front of us doesn't mean it doesn't
1 exist, does it?
2 A. I'm almost certain that it doesn't exist because there was no
3 need at all for Karadzic to issue any order with regard to this
4 situation, but, rather, there was a need for Karadzic to halt this
5 operation because of the outcome that he considered to be the task of the
7 Q. General, you also agree with me that orders can be issued orally;
8 correct? Then there is a paper, except for a reference in a other
9 command document?
10 A. The Supreme Commander doesn't issue verbal [Realtime transcript
11 read in error "commercial"] orders. He issues all his orders in writing,
12 and they are properly registered so that everybody knows what the Supreme
13 Commander is ordering.
14 THE ACCUSED: Line 3. Oral.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oral orders. You said "oral orders" not
16 "commercial orders"; right? Yes.
17 Can we now please go back to the "Nin" article and that was
18 65 ter 25278, and we move now to page 5 in the English. Page 5 in the
19 English and page 2 in the B/C/S.
20 Q. And, General, you speak here of the striving of the RS delegation
21 to have a state and the power leaders of the world striving to prevent
22 that by dividing Serb ethnic territory in former Bosnia-Herzegovina into
23 enclaves that were not interconnected. And you are saying this in --
24 in -- at that point in time. That point in time, General, the RS
25 territories were connected through corridors, were they not?
1 A. Yes, they were connected, but the corridor was constantly cut
2 off. During my trips I often had to travel between salvos of fire, and
3 it could easily be fired upon, and that happened very often and people
4 were killed in this corridor.
5 Q. But you also stated in your report at paragraph 10 that by the
6 time the VRS was established, the strategic goals were achieved except
7 for goal 6, the access to the sea; correct? So in May 1992, according to
8 your words -- yes.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you further also state --
11 A. But on the 30th of May --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please repeat the date again.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
14 Q. The interpreters could not follow you, so you would have to start
15 again with "But on the 30th of May," and then they lost you.
16 A. On the 30th of May, the forces of eastern group Posavina where
17 headquarters in Croatia occupied Movica -- Modrica and severed the
19 Q. But you devote an entire section of your report to the corridor
20 connecting the Krajinas and other parts of the RS and the FRY, and that
21 this operation started in May and was, in fact, successful at the end;
23 A. Yes. It was successfully accomplished in October 1992.
24 Q. And a bit -- a bit further down you state in this article:
25 "All those games," referring to the negotiations, "were
1 eliminated by the wartime victories of the Serb people and its army."
2 General, you were all in favour of achieving results on the
3 battle-field and established facts on the ground; right? That's more
4 helpful than, as you say, games during negotiations?
5 A. Either I didn't understand you correctly or maybe I didn't
6 understand the question. This is a figure of speech. When I made
7 reference to the games in negotiations, can offer you more or can offer
8 you less, when they offered less and the Serbian side was dissatisfied,
9 if they could eliminate these games through military victories then it
10 was all right. That was my view. I'm not in favour of military victory
11 as a option. I was championing a justified solution, and if you have an
12 unjustified solution you have to resolve it through a military victory.
13 Q. If we look at the last bit in this article in the English and in
14 the B/C/S you would have to look at the next column in -- on this page.
15 When journalists ask you about the cities such as Brcko and Zvornik which
16 were not predominantly Serb before the war you say the following, and now
17 I quote:
18 "The matter at hand is that it has to be acknowledged that a
19 state cannot continue to exist if it has no essential prerequisites, and
20 one of them is territorial connectedness of the entire entities populated
21 by an ethnic majority. In the final demarcation too, an injustice will
22 have certainly been done to different localities, but this can be
23 balanced out through a certain exchange of territories."
24 Giving what you said here about Brcko and Zvornik, your
25 conclusion and arguments in paragraph 103 and 204 of your report that the
1 Serbs took only the territory where they were in the majority is not
2 correct; right? It doesn't apply to Zvornik. It doesn't apply to Brcko.
3 It didn't apply to Foca either; right?
4 A. As you can see from this article, I said that there cannot be an
5 absolutely justified solution. There is no absolute justice. There will
6 always be a chunk of territory populated by another ethnic community that
7 would suffer some kind of damage, and that can be rectified in a
8 reasonable way by an exchange of territories, and you can see that I was
9 in favour of a balanced solution. That the Serbs establish their entity
10 only in the territories where they were a majority? That is true.
11 However, there were some exceptions. But the key issue was that a
12 territory must be a single and a unified one, without that there can be
13 no entity.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this article be admitted, Your Honour.
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6446, Your Honours.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
19 Q. General, to complete your CV in relation to military duties, you
20 also functioned as the president of the prisoner exchange commission for
21 the FRY in the years 1992 and 1993; is that correct?
22 A. That was not my main duty. That was something that I did
23 alongside my regular job. It was an ad hoc duty. But the answer is yes.
24 Q. As the president of the exchange commission, you were aware that
25 there were camps all over Bosnia-Herzegovina and civilians were detained
1 and used in exchanges, were you not?
2 A. That is not within the scope of my responsibility, not
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was the chairman of the commission for exchange of
4 prisoners between the JNA and Croatia.
5 Q. You received lists showing that women and children were among
6 those detained and exchanged from Bosanski Samac, did you not?
7 A. No.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25213 on the
10 Q. And as it is coming up, we have here prisoner exchange records
11 for various areas, including Bosanski Samac, submitted by a certain
12 Miroslav Tadic from July 1992. That's not here on the first page, but we
13 need to look at page 5 in the English and page 9 in the B/C/S. At page 9
14 only very briefly. And then you see -- only very briefly on the bottom,
15 on the bottom, please, in B/C/S page 9 on the bottom, and then we move
16 over to page 10 in the B/C/S.
17 Mr. Miroslav Tadic is a member of the Crisis Staff of
18 Bosanski Samac, according to this document, and sends records related to
19 a prisoner exchange for the prisoner exchange commission of the
20 Ministry of Defence in Yugoslavia speaking of hundred prisoners. And the
21 president of the commission he's sending this to, that's you; right?
22 A. To tell you the truth, I don't remember that, but we didn't have
23 any jurisdiction over Bosnia. They did exchanges on their own. My
24 commission was involved in the exchange of prisoners between the JNA and
1 Q. What it shows here is that you, General, forwarded this
2 documentation that you received from Mr. Tadic to UNPROFOR. That's what
3 it says here in this document. You remember that.
4 A. I really don't remember. It was a long time ago. I don't
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now have page 3 in the English and
7 page 5 in the B/C/S.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I point again to an error in
9 interpretations, and it says -- actually in translation which says that
10 we are forwarding this for your jurisdiction, whereas the jurisdiction
11 was that of UNPROFOR. The translation says competence.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this is not an appropriate
13 intervention. I can pick it up in his rewrite -- redirect. It is clear
14 that I simply asked him that he forwarded it to UNPROFOR, and he
15 basically says he doesn't remember that anymore.
16 JUDGE KWON: I take it Mr. Karadzic should have understood it.
17 Jurisdiction and competence does not make much difference. We can -- as
18 long as we follow the flow of the evidence. I would like you to refrain
19 from intervening. You understand I'm very -- I mean, the Chamber has
20 been very lenient as far as translation is concerned. Yes, the Chamber
21 is aware of the various issues regarding the interpretation and
22 translation, but at the same time flow of evidence is also important.
23 Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
25 Q. When you --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say just one word? The rest
2 of the answer or the continuation of an answer during cross-examination
3 can be adversely affected by errors of this nature. That's why
4 interventions are necessary.
5 JUDGE KWON: But take -- this example, the competence or
6 jurisdiction, does not make much difference, Mr. Karadzic. I'm not sure
7 if it is my English, but shall we continue.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
9 Q. What you see here and we see here is a list of the Bosanski Samac
10 commission for exchange of prisoners of war and detained civilians, and
11 it is a list of 52 women to be exchanged; correct?
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We have the -- the B/C/S has -- the lower
13 part, please, in the B/C/S.
14 Q. Now, when you look at the names, it's all women; right?
15 A. Yes. It seems to be correct.
16 Q. Yes.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we now have page 8 in the English
18 and page 13 in the B/C/S.
19 Q. And we again have a list of detained women for exchange; correct?
20 A. These are Croatian words, but I suppose that the prisoners are of
21 the Serb ethnicity.
22 Q. It says here -- don't we have page 8?
23 A. These are Croatian officers.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Don't we have page 8 in the English and page
25 13 in the B/C/S? Sorry.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All these last names are Serbian
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: What does the stamp say?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The stamp is actually -- I'm looking at the
6 lower -- the lower --
7 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please speak into the
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Radinovic, if you do not speak to the
11 microphone, the interpreters have difficulty understanding you.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a stamp that bears the
13 insignia of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina because there's a Croatian
14 flag, although it's rather blurred.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. We have to move in the -- in the B/C/S one page further. I think
17 there is obviously a mistake, because it should -- it should be a list
18 from Republika Srpska, Serbian municipality of Samac.
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, let's find out what this
20 document is about. Shall we hear the explanation of the witness about
21 page 2. There are three stamps, one of which seems to be Croatian.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
23 Q. Perhaps I can clarify something, Your Honour. This document, we
24 left it in the original version how we got it, but it is a mix of
25 documents coming from various areas, and I'm only talking about the
1 Bosanski Samac ones.
2 JUDGE KWON: But let's take a look at page 2.
3 THE ACCUSED: If I'm may, I think it falls in the framework of
4 68 Rule, and we should have had it disclosed.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this was disclosed to the
7 JUDGE KWON: Could you read out the last part. Yes, we have
8 English translation.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, but that is a document that does not
10 relate to the materials sent by Mr. Tadic from the Bosanski Samac.
11 JUDGE KWON: This 44-page document is just one document.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was how we received it, as one document,
13 but it's obviously a mix of various submissions, and the ones that we
14 were -- that I am talking about with the General is just the few pages
15 that relate to Bosanski Samac. And you can always see it by -- by the
16 stamps on that particular page. We just discussed it in relation to
17 page 3 in the English, and we discussed it in relation to page 8 in the
18 English, and now we have -- so we should look at page 8 in the English
19 and page 13 in the ...
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If this is what I have here, all of
21 these stamps are those of the HVO.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Could we then please have page 9 in the
23 English and page 15 to 16 in the B/C/S. Page 15 to 16 in the B/C/S.
24 Q. And here we have the Republika Srpska Serbian municipality of
25 Samac, commission for exchange of prisoners and detained civilians, and
1 we have here again a list of exchanges and -- so according to this
2 document at least you saw on your desk materials relating to the exchange
3 of prisoners of war and civilians and among them women; correct?
4 A. I don't know. I don't remember that. It wasn't my commission
5 that was carrying out the exchange. There was just information to the
6 effect that an exchange had taken place.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
8 speak into the microphone, and could all other microphones be switched
9 off when he's speaking. Thank you.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
11 Q. Sir, you have to move a bit closer to the microphone so that
12 the -- the interpreters can hear you better.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can these two -- these three
14 pages that we've just discussed be admitted?
15 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I would ask that only page 5 be
16 admitted because the other pages which -- hasn't been demonstrated that
17 they were forwarded to General Radinovic, so they're not relevant. All
18 he sees is that in July 1992, there's an exchange proposed for 100
19 prisoners for 100 prisoners. Whether they're women or anything else
20 isn't among the information that is provided him, and there is no
21 evidence that any of those other pages of this compilation of documents
22 were provided to him. So we would ask only that page 5 be admitted.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I disagree with this
24 interpretation, and that is actually a matter for the closing argument.
25 What I had proposed to admit is the letter from the Bosanski Samac
1 commission and then a few extra pages related to that letter of the
2 Bosanski Samac exchange commission, and whether the -- the general saw it
3 or not is then base -- is a matter of circumstance and argument rather
4 than of admission.
5 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the page where Mr. Radinovic's name
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Page 3 in the English and page 5 in the
9 MR. ROBINSON: Page 5 in the English.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Sorry. I misspoke. Thank you very
11 much. Yes. That's a letter -- that's a letter from the Bosanski Samac
12 committee, and then we have underneath the -- this forwarding of the
13 matters to UNPROFOR. So my proposal would be to admit page 5, page 3,
14 and page 9.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can we have the letter that was
16 sent to me in Serbian?
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Sorry. Yes. That is page 9. Page 9,
18 but only very -- at the very bottom, very bottom, a small reference and
19 then the next page. The next page, yes. This is the rest of this
21 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I'd also like --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not my signature. This is
23 not my signature.
24 JUDGE KWON: What was the date of the document,
25 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The date of the document is --
2 JUDGE KWON: 1996.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
4 Q. The date of the document is unclear. It's only becoming clear
5 from the Bosanski Samac lists that it's related to July and August 1992,
6 and that would be the time of the corridor 92 operation, General; right?
7 JUDGE KWON: But was he part of VJ army at the time?
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He was actually the president of the
9 prisoner exchange commission of the Ministry of Defence of the
10 Yugoslav Army. And we see here that his --
11 JUDGE KWON: Was he posted in Belgrade?
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. You were posted in Belgrade, General?
14 A. I don't know whether I was in Belgrade then or whether I was in
15 Geneva at the negotiations. I really don't know. But this is not my
16 signature. I was not there. This information of the Crisis Staff of
17 Bosanski Samac is being forwarded with a view to facilitating this
18 exchange, so that is not really within my purview.
19 JUDGE KWON: Somebody could have signed for you. Can you not see
20 "za," "for"?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it says president of the
22 commission of the Ministry of Defence of the Army of Yugoslavia for
23 exchange of prisoners didn't signed for me.
24 JUDGE KWON: But I see handwritten "for" in Serbian, "za." Shall
25 we zoom in to the stamp?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I see. It's covered by
2 the stamp. I do apologise. But obviously I was not there at the time.
3 I am not challenging that I held that position of the chairman of the
4 commission. Obviously this was not within my purview, though, and that
5 is why I'm sending this to UNPROFOR to get this done.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Chamber will admit those three pages.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I also wanted to point out that
8 page 9 and page 8 also relate to August of 1992, which is apparently not
9 the same as what is being sent to him in July of 1992.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think that's still argument.
11 It goes to weight.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6447, Your Honours.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
15 Q. General, you know that an expert has to provide truthful and
16 objective evidence and should not be biased in any way with respect to
17 the parties to the conflict in Bosnia; correct?
18 A. When I speak as an expert absolutely, but as an author I can be
19 partial, as a public figure, but not otherwise.
20 Q. An expert should not misrepresent the facts to the Judges of the
21 Tribunal even if he or she would very much resent the work of the
22 Tribunal; right?
23 A. I really do not understand the question. I am trying to be as
24 objective as I possibly can be and to the best of my ability and
1 Q. I thought the question was simple. An expert should not
2 misrepresent the facts to the Judges here, even if he or she would resent
3 the work of this Tribunal. That was a simple question.
4 JUDGE MORRISON: Actually, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it wasn't a
5 question at all. It was a statement. Do you simply want the witness to
6 agree with your statement?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I want him simply to agree that an expert
8 should not be biased against the work of this Tribunal, and I thought
9 that was a question. That's at least -- but I move on.
10 Q. General, you very much resent the work of the Tribunal, do you
12 A. I don't know why that would -- well, I have my position on
13 everything, including this, but that is my personal view, my personal
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25279A on the
17 Q. And as it is coming up, it is a speech you gave at the conference
18 on legal and political aspects of the indictment of the ICTY against
19 Dr. Vojislav Seselj held in Belgrade on the 23rd of June, 2005, and
20 Mr. Seselj had actually published this in a book. You attended this
21 conference; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And on the first page the second paragraph in English and in
24 B/C/S, the last bit, you were asked the question why Mr. Seselj was
25 arrested and -- give the answer yourself -- were it simply because Seselj
1 is a metaphor for Serb patriotism and the Serb identity. And a few lines
2 further down in the English and in the B/C/S it's on the next page, you
4 "I would just like to underline a few of my personal impressions
5 on The Hague, that is The Hague Tribunal where I was misfortunate enough
6 to have occasions to be several times trying to testify in defence of the
7 Serbian generals. So further to what I believe must -- deeply and what I
8 have learned. The Hague trouble is a powerful means of the West's
9 extended aggression against our country."
10 General, that's your view on the Tribunal; right? At least how
11 you expressed it then.
12 A. That is my view to this day.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this be -- please be
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
16 JUDGE KWON: This page?
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, this excerpt. It's actually two
18 pages --
19 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- in the B/C/S, and -- yeah. Can we now
21 please have --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We'll admit this.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6448, Your Honours.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Could we please have now 65 ter 25363A on
25 the screen.
1 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an excerpt from your book, "Lies
2 about the Sarajevo battle-field." You remember that you wrote this book,
3 right, and it was published in 2004; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. By then you had already testified in the Kunarac case and the
6 Galic case; correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can we first look at the first paragraph in the foreword of the
9 book, and you say here:
10 "Can the Serbs accept without checking being named the guilty
11 party for all the evils that have befallen these territories and these
12 people in the last decade of the 20th century."
13 And you say:
14 "I can't accept this but I don't know about the rest."
15 And a few lines further down you say:
16 "These are precisely the motives that have steered the author in
17 his ungrateful task to straighten a corrupt Drina."
18 And a few lines further down in the English and it would be the
19 next page in the B/C/S:
20 "I was simply unable to bear all the knowledge I gained of the
21 guilt of the Muslim side and the so-called international community for
22 the destructive hate and obliteration that had occurred on both sides of
23 the line of conflict on the Sarajevo battle-field."
24 That's also your view today?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can we move to the next page in the English, please. The B/C/S
2 is still the right -- the right one. And you say here:
3 "I didn't call this book the way I did because I believed the
4 Serbs are not to blame or because I believe that Sarajevo residents
5 deserved the suffering by such destructive civil war or because I wanted
6 to diminish the victims and the suffering."
7 General, you agree with me that Sarajevo's residents suffered and
8 that crimes were committed against them by the VRS? Do you agree?
9 A. I agree relatively, but it's not only the fault of the
10 Army of Republika Srpska. It's also the fault of the BH Army that
11 misused civilian buildings, civilian facilities. They did not protect
12 civilians. They provoked operations from areas where civilians were, and
13 in that way they contributed to the suffering of civilians.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated] Can we please move
15 to page 3, the last --
16 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Yes. Can we please have page 3, the
18 last bit in English and page 4, middle in B/C/S.
19 Q. Dr. Radinovic, you speak here of the partial confessions from
20 frightened and blackmailed Serbian detainees at Scheveningen, and my
21 question is: Is it your position that none the Serb accused that
22 admitted their participation in crimes here before this Tribunal did so
23 because they felt remorse? They were all blackmailed and threatened? Is
24 that your position?
25 A. Well, no, that is not my position. This is the position of an
1 author who has the right to value an act as he perceives it at that point
2 in time. At that point in time some confessions seemed like redemption
3 to me rather than true -- an act of truly repenting. So had they done
4 that, it wouldn't have -- it would have been better had they not done it
5 in the first place rather than confess and repent.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 4 in the English and
7 page 6 in the B/C/S.
8 Q. And you remember your book probably very well, and you have here
9 a discussion on the use of the term "aggressor." And you say
10 international factors but also The Hague investigators have fallen for
11 the same lie even though they should not be entitled to such bias. And a
12 few lines down you state in English and then continuing into page 4:
13 "It is also only rational to assume that witnesses were coached
14 how to testify by the Prosecutor and instructed to qualify the Serbian
15 side as the aggressor," and so on and so forth.
16 Is that your view, that the evidence collected by the ICTY
17 Prosecutor was manipulated in this way?
18 A. There certainly were manipulations. To this day I'm convinced of
19 that, because an old lady who testifies says that she was hit by a
20 sniper. How can she tell what the difference is between a sniper and an
21 ordinary bullet from a rifle? She was instructed that it was a sniper.
22 Nothing else would work, because it's not even easy for a military expert
23 to tell the difference between a sniper bullet and a bullet that was
24 fired from a regular rifle.
25 And then "aggressor forces." How could she know what aggressor
1 forces are? If you're listening to an ordinary person using language
2 like that, "aggressor forces are over there, but not over here," that has to
3 look like instrumentalisation. That is how it impressed me. And this is
4 a book that is authored by me, and it is my right to write that way, and
5 I am not equally proud of each and every part of my CV. You know, there
6 are parts of one's biography that are emotional too. Some are rational,
7 and then sometimes one exaggerates, but basically the fundamental views
8 expressed in this book I wrote all hold. We can discuss the book on
9 another occasion, not necessarily today only.
10 Q. General, for a victim of a gunshot wound, it isn't really a
11 difference being shot by a sniper rifle or by -- and a sniper of special
12 training or a marksman, a good shot; right? For the victim, it doesn't
13 make a difference; right?
14 A. Of course it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter at all for the
15 victim. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm saying that the victim
16 was instructed to say that it was the result of sniper fire. That's the
18 Q. General --
19 A. I have full compassion for that victim.
20 Q. You are -- General, you are aware that people use all sorts of
21 terminology in relation to people shooting from a far away distance;
23 A. Well, yes.
24 Q. And the ordinary person would not be able to say what in military
25 terminology and in relation to training sniper is. That means a
1 highly-trained person; right?
2 A. Well, an ordinary person cannot.
3 Q. But still they would use the term "sniper" in their everyday
4 language, would they not?
5 A. They say sniper shooters because they were instructed to say
6 that. It would be more natural if they said they were hit by a bullet,
7 not sniper.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can we have the few pages
9 admitted, please, of the book that we discussed.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit them.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6449, Your Honours.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. General --
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please, I'm sorry. I
15 was waiting for this to finish. On page 32, line 12 it says,
16 [In English] "... that I wrote adheres to all my fundamental values."
17 [Interpretation] The witness said that everything that is written is
18 based fundamentally on facts, not his fundamental values. Fundamental
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you agree with Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Radinovic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
24 Q. General, during your testimony yesterday and also in paragraph 38
25 of your report, you described the tasks you were given by the Defence,
1 and you namely stated:
2 "It was analysis of the control authority of Mr. Karadzic within
3 the system of command and control of the VRS."
4 That's your task; right?
5 A. Then that is a question of bad translation. I said that I was
6 supposed to analyse control responsibility of Radovan Karadzic in the
7 role of Supreme Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that yet again it is
10 wrong. [In English] "Leading competence" would probably be more
11 accurate. Again, it's "control responsibility."
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, we are going now into a debate
13 about what terminology was right. I think we have his expertise.
14 Q. And we see there it's about the control authority of Mr. Karadzic
15 in the VRS; right?
16 A. No. Well, that is what is written in the heading. That is the
17 title in Serbian, but I don't know how it was translated.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
19 Q. I can -- I can simply read it again. The control authority of
20 Dr. Radovan Karadzic in the strategic command system of the VRS. That
21 was the task; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And who gave you the task, any specific person?
24 A. I got that task through the lawyer, Sladojevic.
25 Q. Did you discuss the preparation of the report with the Defence
1 team during various stages the progress of the report or only in the
3 A. At that first meeting we discussed that basic task, and after a
4 while I asked to be given some time to study that task, to think about
5 it, and to propose a conceptualisation of my own of my work on that
6 report, and then I met up with Mr. Sladojevic. I cannot say exactly
7 whether it was five, six, or seven days later. We talked about this, how
8 I thought this should be done, how I perceived this task, whether that is
9 what he thought was needed, he agreed in principle, and from them onwards
10 we did not discuss this at all except for the fact that they sent me
12 Q. Did you receive all the documents that you used for your report
13 by the Defence or did you do your own research in archives and through
14 the materials from the Tribunal without their assistance?
15 A. All the documents that are attained to this case I received from
16 the Defence team, whereas some documents that I knew of and about which I
17 had my own notes that pertained to the situation around Sarajevo -- well,
18 I had some of them, I mean my notes. When I studied documents for the
19 Galic trial, then I had some notes, and then I mentioned some sources,
20 but I was absolutely certain that this existed in e-court, and I thought
21 that it would be no problem to find that, that these were documents that
22 were opted for in that trial. Which ones they were exactly I really
23 cannot say at this moment. I would have to be reminded in order to say
24 which documents these were exactly.
25 Q. Did you explain the repeated use of the word "we" and "our"
1 throughout the report? And I refer here to just a few paragraphs.
2 That's 15, 46, 64, 69. That's --
3 A. I would have to see the context. In published works, one often
4 says "we" meaning the author. That's a convention in published work. I
5 don't think it's used in other contexts. So could you tell me which --
6 Q. Yes. It says -- when I read it I thought, Who is "we." When
7 you say "we found," "we saw," I was wondering, did someone -- is -- do
8 you have co-writers in relation to the report?
9 A. No, no. It's really the convention.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I note the time. Perhaps this
11 is a point to have a break.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll resume at 3 past 11.00.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to address you on
18 one particular issue. Page 33 today at line 11 to 23, Mr. Karadzic made
19 an intervention in relation with the transcript, and you find it here and
20 it says -- it relates to the transcript reference that I wrote here to
21 "all my fundamental values." And then Mr. Karadzic said the witness said
22 that everything that is written is based fundamentally on facts, not his
23 fundamental values.
24 I have been informed by a B/C/S speaker that that is not correct,
25 that the witness had, in fact, spoken of his fundamental values and the
1 word "fact" wasn't said at all.
2 The fact that Dr. Radinovic ready agreed to this change is at
3 least a very remarkable issue, and it needs to be clarified.
4 JUDGE KWON: But why do we have to discuss it in the absence of
5 the witness?
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Because I think he should not now be tainted
7 even further. Because I wan to make two requests in relation to this.
8 The first I would like an order by the Trial Chamber to the Registrar to
9 compare the audiotape or video-tape with the transcript to verify whether
10 the intervention of Mr. Karadzic was correct or not. And I think also
11 for the rest of the -- this testimony, I would request that in case the
12 witness doesn't speak English, he could simply take off the headphones
13 and Mr. Karadzic could make his intervention in English or the witness
14 would have to leave the room, because we cannot really check immediately
15 now whether what I was told is correct or what Mr. Karadzic had said is
16 correct. So I see no other way at the moment to proceed with these --
17 these new procedures in relation to transcript interventions.
18 THE ACCUSED: May I?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is true that the witness did not
21 mention fundamental facts, but I explained that he said based on
22 fundamental values general, not his own, and I noted that it means based
23 on fundamental facts, not on his fundamental values.
24 JUDGE KWON: Then it's not an appropriate intervention on your
25 part, arguing that it's a translation issue.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. One extra word was added, "my
2 fundamental values."
3 JUDGE KWON: It will be checked, and we will come back to this
4 issue after having received the report from the CLSS.
5 I will consult my colleagues with regard to the second issue.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will rise for five minutes.
8 --- Break taken at 11.14 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 11.39 a.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. The Chamber is not restricting
11 you to raise any issue in relation to the translation, but the Chamber
12 urges you to be prudent and discreet in raising such -- making such
13 interventions. With that said, we'll continue.
14 Shall we bring in the witness.
15 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency. I will do my best. And
16 whenever it is possible I will ask not to be translated and address you
17 in English.
18 JUDGE KWON: Further, I can add this: It is improper to add your
19 comment or supplement the witness's evidence by way of intervention
20 regarding the translation. I take it you understand that.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: With regard to the portions referred to by
23 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, the Chamber still wishes to see the report from the
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: And please try your best to be able to finish in the
4 originally allotted time. Do your best, please.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
6 Q. General, do you agree with me that transparency of the expert's
7 opinion in relation to facts, methodology and sources used is of great
8 importance for the Trial Chamber?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And, General, as an expert when drawing your conclusions you
11 would consider all material, weigh the value and credibility so that your
12 report would be objective; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Would you also agree with me that the quality of your opinion is
15 only as good as the information upon which it is based?
16 A. And also it depends on how well I know the matter.
17 Q. Yes. When you came across -- first of all, did you come across
18 information that contradicted your conclusions while you researched
20 A. If I had come across documents that would be contrary to my basic
21 evidence, I would quote it.
22 Q. In -- in preparation of your earlier report in relation to
23 Sarajevo, you mention already that you had notes and that you reviewed
24 the notes. These notes included interviews of members of the VRS that
25 you yourself conducted; right? Is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And, in fact, you confirmed in the Galic case that you
3 interviewed 34 members of the VRS, including commanders and -- of the top
4 level; right?
5 A. And I turned over those notes to the Court.
6 Q. And you relied on those interviews in your Sarajevo report in the
7 Galic case, did you?
8 A. Not too much, but I took them into account.
9 Q. And you incorporated portions of the Galic report into the
10 Karadzic report; correct?
11 A. Not directly, but I did use that report, certainly.
12 Q. And did you in preparation for this report here interview any
13 members of the SRK since then?
14 A. No.
15 Q. And any other Defence witnesses?
16 A. No.
17 Q. General, you agree with me that it is important for transparency
18 to proper reference the report so that the Trial Chamber can evaluate the
19 credibility of your report or, rather, the credibility of the sources;
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. The Krstic -- you may remember the Krstic Trial Chamber in front
23 of whom you also testified discussed this with you, this particular
24 point; correct?
25 A. I don't remember, but I suppose so. That's part of the
1 discussion before any appearance before the Court, if you mean the
2 credibility of sources, et cetera.
3 Q. But despite this guidance, you state in paragraph 54 that some of
4 the author's views and arguments will often not be supported by relevant
5 references because they form an accepted part of military doctrine and
6 the doctrine of command and control. And I would like to address some
7 examples. In paragraph 78 [Realtime transcript read in error "58"] you
8 referred to the fact that before the 16th April 1992, that is the
9 decision to set up the Serb TO, Mr. Karadzic had no authority over parts
10 of the TO that were formed on the local level, and in paragraph 75 you
11 refer to village guards basically being formed in local communes for Serb
12 defence, and, General, you do not provide any reference for these acts;
13 right? There's no reference in these paragraphs.
14 A. No. That was common knowledge. I thought there was really no
15 need for a reference in that respect.
16 Q. And it was actually not -- you did not research this early period
17 because it was not really the task, included in the task, because that
18 was about the VRS; right?
19 A. It did not relate to the VRS or the direct command authority of
20 Dr. Karadzic, but in my earlier studies I got such information about the
21 existence of those armed groups, parts of the disintegrated
22 Territorial Defence, I learned that working on other cases. I knew that.
23 It was just common knowledge.
24 Q. General, you know that Mr. Karadzic as president of the SDS had
25 hierarchical structures of authority other than military chain of command
1 but de facto authority; correct?
2 A. I have no expertise in that line of work, but the SDS was the
3 strongest party. It had won the elections, and it was the ruling party.
4 It was in power. But he did not have the vertical of command, which is a
5 prerequisite for him to have command competencies. The chain of command
6 had not been established all the way until the army was established.
7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it may be minor, but in your
8 previous question, in paragraph 58 General Radinovic stated Karadzic had
9 no authority before 16th of April 1992 over the TO, but I couldn't find
10 that passage in para 58.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I must have misspoken. I'm sorry. I
12 said -- I meant to say 78. Sorry.
13 JUDGE KWON: And you said --
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I misspoke. It's in 78.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you referred to 78 with respect to the latter
16 part of your question.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: But it's all 75.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Next is 75. That's about the village guards
20 and how they were established.
21 JUDGE KWON: Where do you have the passage that Karadzic had no
22 authority over TO?
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's in paragraph 78. Before the --
24 JUDGE KWON: 78.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 78, yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: So you meant 78 --
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: -- not 58.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, not 58.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. But there's reference -- oh, yes, in the
6 latter part. Yes. Shall we continue.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you.
8 Q. In paragraph 81 of your report you explained the reasons why the
9 Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed General Mladic as commander of the VRS
10 Main Staff, and you concluded that the Assembly sought to limit
11 Karadzic's control authority over the VRS.
12 You do not provide any sources here for the reasoning in the
13 Assembly; right?
14 A. I cite the decision to establish the army from which we can see
15 that his authority is limited, because the Main Staff was appointed and
16 Mladic was appointed commander of the Main Staff, and that's how his
17 authority was directly limited. The Main Staff did not remain the
18 Main Staff organ but a command organ. By virtue of appointing Mladic
19 commander of the Main Staff, Karadzic's role in the operative command the
20 of the army was considerably limited. That was my position.
21 Q. In paragraph 105 you claim that Karadzic believed that he should
22 be on the top of the decision-making pyramid while Mladic and his
23 generals thought that Mladic was the top person in military
24 decision-making. That claim of yours is not supported any reference;
1 A. By the nature of things the head of state is also
2 Supreme Commander. At the same time, there is nobody above him in the
3 hierarchy. Those are general points that need not be corroborated by any
4 references. But when the Assembly appointed Mladic commander of the
5 Main Staff, it disputed thereby that Karadzic was at the top of that
6 pyramid. It introduced dual authority, dual powers.
7 Q. You know -- General, do you know the book of General Milovanovic,
8 "My view of the war in Bosnia in 1992 and 1995?"
9 A. No, I haven't read Milovanovic's book. I hope I will have the
11 Q. In this book - and this book is, in fact, in front of this
12 Trial Chamber as D825 - in this book at page 23 in both languages in the
13 context of his criticism of Supreme Command, establishment of
14 Supreme Command, General Milovanovic stated there could not have been no
15 reason for such a decision apart from the excessive self-assurance of the
16 inner circle of the RS political leadership convinced they could
17 completely do anything. In practice, the peace of Josi [phoen] created a
18 situation unique in the world in which the Main Staff could not be at the
19 same time the Supreme Command staff. And in that same context he
20 underlines it could be said that the Main Staff willingly obeyed the
21 command staff anxious as it was to achieve the strategic objectives of
22 the war and internal strife among Serbs. In this, we were successful.
23 General, in the view of General Milosevic, who was in fact on the
24 ground and contact -- in contact with the Supreme Commander Karadzic, the
25 authority of the Supreme Commander was not at all limitless -- limited,
1 at least as he says it. Would -- would he not know better than you?
2 A. I'll have to take some time answering this. If this is in
3 evidence, I should have received this exhibit. I don't know why I
4 didn't. It's very hard to respond to such a serious matter off-the-cuff
5 quickly, to answer your question. But if you put the direct question to
6 me whether Milovanovic knows that better than I, then the answer was no,
7 I was the one who taught Milovanovic how these things are done. I was
8 his professor. There are, of course, examples when pupils outdo their
9 teachers, and that's always nice to see, and I hope that's the case of
10 Milovanovic. However, facts are relentless. Even Milovanovic is part of
11 the group of generals who refused to obey Karadzic. So he showed,
12 indeed, that what he says there is not right. Karadzic was not fully
13 able to put his ideas into practice vis-a-vis the Main Staff.
14 In the decision to establishment the army, it is stated that the
15 Main Staff is the command of the army, not a staff organ. It was the
16 operative command of the army. And in Karadzic' decision on the
17 organisation of the army, it says the operative command over the army
18 lies in the hands of the Main Staff. That's also written in the
19 Law on the Army. There's no need for interpretation. These are explicit
21 THE INTERPRETER: The witness was speaking much too fast.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not all is recorded. The witness
24 also said that it's not that they were undisciplined, it's that they
25 understood their role in that way.
1 THE INTERPRETER: The witness added at the same time: "That's
2 also --" the witness needs to repeat this.
3 JUDGE KWON: Because of your overlap, the interpreters were not
4 able to hear your -- your words as well as Mr. Karadzic's words. Please
5 do not overlap. Please put a pause if you want to make a -- if you'd
6 like to make any comment immediately following Mr. Karadzic's comment.
7 But at this time we can continue.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
9 Q. General, in paragraph 1 of your report you conclude that the VRS
10 was effectively established on the 15 June 1992. Is it your position
11 that until this date Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic had no command and control
12 authority over the VRS?
13 A. The army was established on the 12th of May, 1992, under the
14 decision of the Assembly, and on the 15th of June, Karadzic made his
15 decision on the organisation and structure of the army, and he empowered
16 the Main Staff to command the army. That means operative command in
17 combat operations. Up to the 12th of May, he certainly did not have any
18 control authority, because the army did not exist.
19 Q. General, you yourself in the corridor operation, Corridor 92, and
20 also this morning you mentioned that the VRS, despite having this command
21 structure and paperwork, was already conducting operations in relation to
22 the corridor; correct? So de facto it was already conducting operations,
23 was it not?
24 A. Well, Operation Corridor began in early June, not before. The
25 forces that carried out Operation Corridor were in Western Slavonia, and
1 only when the United Nations established UNPROFOR they started
2 withdrawing, and from those units forces were made up for the
3 Operation Corridor. That was in the month of June.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we -- can we please have D428 on the
6 Q. And I assume you have seen this document. It is -- it are the
7 minutes of the 4th -- of the 4th session of the RS extended
8 War Presidency of 9 June 1992, and I assume you know this document
9 because you reviewed minutes; right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And we see here that Generals Mladic and Gvero and
12 Colonel Tolimir are reporting about the situation, and the
13 Supreme Commander makes decisions on military matters, and that is before
14 the date that you mentioned; right?
15 A. This is the 9th of June, and --
16 Q. You spoke about 15 of June.
17 A. -- the army was formed on the 12th of May.
18 Q. But you said it was not operational until the 15th of June
19 because there was no structure, but here we have actually the generals
20 reporting to the Supreme Commander, at that time the Presidency of which
21 Karadzic was a member, and then decisions are made. So that is before
22 the date that you put it, 15th of June; right?
23 A. You must have in mind the fact that the establishment of the army
24 is not about one document in one day. It's a process. And the army did
25 not start to be established before the 12th of May. There were armed
1 units that would later become part of the army. Until then, there was
2 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the 12th of May, the
3 Army of Republika Srpska started to be established, and this process of
4 formation was supported by the decision of the 15th of June prescribing
5 its organisation, it's structure, et cetera, et cetera. But it started
6 on the 12th of May, and normally on the 9th of June they are discussing
7 the state of army, like a cross-section of the situation as of the
8 9th of June.
9 On the 22nd of May, for instance, the 1st Krajina Corps was
11 Q. General, I was actually addressing the difficult situation on the
12 ground. Between -- after the withdrawal of the JNA combat operation took
13 place. It was the VRS that existed already, and despite the paperwork
14 not yet matching the situation de facto they conducted operations. Is
15 that not how it worked?
16 A. Before the 12 of May, no.
17 Q. I was speaking about the situation between the 12 of May and the
18 15th of June. That was -- that is the period that I'm actually
19 discussing with you.
20 A. Yes, yes.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have Exhibit D325 on the
23 Q. And as it is coming up, General, it is the analysis of the combat
24 readiness and activities of the VRS for the year 1992. Are you aware of
25 this report?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And it is an important command document, is it not?
3 A. It's not a command document. It's an analysis of the situation.
4 Based on that analysis of the situation, one discusses the good and bad
5 sides. Measures are taken to address it. It is an important planning
6 document, but not as important as it is taken to be in these processes.
7 Q. You did not refer to it at all in your footnotes; right? At
8 least I didn't find any reference.
9 A. No, I didn't. I didn't mention it in my footnotes, because it
10 doesn't address the issue of control authority of Mr. Karadzic, but I did
11 say that Mr. Karadzic may have exert influence on the situation in the
12 army concerning the combat readiness, but at various meetings or
13 workshops, et cetera. This is what I spoke about.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 7 in the English and
15 page 8 in the B/C/S.
16 Q. And paragraph -- if you look at paragraph 5 on this page, in the
17 fourth paragraph, Chief of Staff General Milovanovic writes:
18 "We carried out individual and concerted battle operations
19 according to a single design and plan entrusting SUP [indiscernible]
20 commands with details or overall missions as appropriate."
21 General, that is how all armies do it; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And implementation of decisions of the Supreme Commander down to
24 the military chain of command of the lower level, that is how it works;
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And it says here further:
3 "During the past year the Army of Republika Srpska has been under
4 a single command -- control and command structure despite the fact that
5 initially we had a large number of different armies and paramilitary
7 General, there is no mentioning of any dual or parallel systems
8 of command. It's not in here.
9 A. Here he is speaking about operational command, so there is no
10 mention of duality. They were indeed authorised to conduct operational
12 Q. There is also a reference on -- can we please move to page 69 in
13 the English and page 62 in the B/C/S. And in the fourth paragraph there
14 is a reference to what the -- in the third paragraph is a reference to
15 the Serb TO units established under the leadership of the SDS party. Do
16 you see that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that is basically also a de facto chain of command then;
19 right? So the SDS channel.
20 A. Yes, but it goes on to say as a form of self-organisation of the
21 Serbian people for the purpose of defence from -- I think it says
22 pro-fascist aspirations of the Ustasha and Muslim organisations and
23 formations. So the issue here is the people who is being self-organised.
24 Q. And in the next paragraph there is a reference to what these
25 early forces could achieve, and it says here:
1 "They failed to achieve these strategic objectives of the armed
2 struggle of the Serbian people in for former Bosnia-Herzegovina. They
3 failed to open the corridors through the Sava river valley between the
4 Krajina and the FRY or a corridor which would link Herzegovina," and so
5 on and so forth.
6 Sir, according to this document of the Main Staff of the VRS, the
7 VRS did not just inherit what the previous troops had achieved as you
8 state in your paragraph 10, is it not?
9 A. All I'm saying and claiming is that the Army of Republika Srpska
10 inherited the achievements of the JNA. It was the JNA who opened the
11 corridor that was operational until the 13th of May when the eastern
12 group of Posavina -- rather the Operational Group Posavina took
13 possession of it and cut it off. But initially the corridor was
14 established by the JNA.
15 Q. And at the bottom of the page is a reference to the withdrawal of
16 the JNA as is said here, and I quote:
17 "The pull-out of most of the combat hardware together with the
18 personnel, the FRY nationals, was prevented."
19 General, the VRS took over the hardware from the JNA and the
20 soldiers from the JNA that were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
21 A. Yes. These elements remained as members of the
22 Army of Republika Srpska.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 152 and -- first 152
24 and then 153 in English, and then page 132, 133 in the B/C/S, one after
25 the other as we move.
1 Q. And as this is coming up, these are concluding remarks of the
2 Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic, on the 5th of April, 1993, regarding the
3 previous year, and looking at paragraph 3, Mr. Karadzic refers here to
4 combat operations involving offensive and defensive operations or
5 concerted engagement of tactical units whose achievements have had
6 results of operation and even strategical significance.
7 You agree with this?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please ask for the reference.
10 Where can one confirm or find that these are actually my words, that it
11 was I who said this?
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's actually if we look at a few pages
13 further, you sign that document. You sign this particular document.
14 Concluding remarks of the Supreme Commander. It's your signature. We
15 can look at it at the end when we have dealt with the other references I
16 want to address from this part of the document.
17 Q. So, General, when you wrote in your conclusions, and I refer here
18 to conclusions -- paragraphs 13, 201, 210, 211, 214 regarding the
19 defensive character of operation, that is here, the Supreme Command,
20 Mr. Karadzic, speaking of both, offensive and defensive operations;
21 right? So your conclusions are not entirely correct, are they?
22 A. My conclusions are completely accurate. However, Mr. Karadzic
23 is not familiar with these matters and he tends to call certain things
24 operation which actually is not an operation. An operation means that it
25 involves forces involving corps and other high-ranking units, and when he
1 said operation, he probably had in mind an operation with tactical
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down. This is a
4 very complex issue.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Radinovic, when you are using technical and
6 professional language, it's very difficult for the interpreters to
7 precisely follow. Could you speak more slowly, and kindly repeat your
8 answer, please.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic used to speak about
10 offensive operations, but he did not bear in mind that this type of
11 actions and activities that he spoke about cannot be qualified as an
12 operation. In the military doctrine, forms of combat operation are
13 divided into operations, battles and struggles. The lowest --
14 lowest-ranking operations are conducted by lowest-ranking units and goes
15 on in the same manner toward higher levels. And when Mr. Karadzic spoke
16 about operations, he probably had in mind actions taken by lower-ranking
17 units. Concept of defensive strategy can be composed of a series of
18 small size tactical operations, and it basically can, despite of that
19 remain as a defensive one. These are very technical issues and I hope
20 you can follow me. I cannot make it more simple.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
22 Q. You have actually addressed this also in your report, so we don't
23 need to repeat it. Under point 4 Mr. Karadzic states that the
24 Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every individuals member of the
25 Supreme Command were informed of the objectives of planned operations and
1 concerted battles and of their results frequently in great detail.
2 So that is an important factor of the command authority -
3 right? - to be informed and involved in the planning of such matters;
5 A. Yesterday during examination-in-chief, I said that Mr. Karadzic
6 regularly received combat reports from the Main Staff briefing him about
7 the progress of activities. I did not dispute that, and it goes without
8 saying. But the point is that in the process of planning and conducting
9 operations that are not strategic by nature, the Main Staff does not
10 require an authorisation from the Supreme Commander. This is their
11 inherent authority, and they can do it independently. They only have an
12 obligation, and I mean the Main Staff, to inform him.
13 Q. Mr. Karadzic continues here to state that control and command of
14 the VRS is united and that it is based on a high degree of concurrence
15 and unity in selecting the targets of each individual operation or battle
16 and in assigning tasks to individual operation and tactical formations.
17 General, according to Mr. Karadzic there was a fully functioning command
18 and control from the Supreme Commander down to the units on the ground,
19 is it not?
20 A. Well, not from the Supreme Commander. There was no chain of
21 command from that level to the lowest ranking units.
22 Q. Let me refer you to the next -- to the next paragraph that makes
23 it even clearer. Mr. Karadzic says here the relationship between the
24 command structures and the organs of the government and the
25 Supreme Command made it impossible for the Main Staff to make decisions
1 absolutely on his own; rather, every operational battle was politically
2 endorsed on the basis of the interests of the Serbian people and approved
3 by the highest authority of Republika Srpska.
4 General, the authority of the Supreme Commander is not diminished
5 at all. He is functioning as the Supreme Commander and the army; the
6 Main Staff is functioning as it should and as it does in other armies.
7 Is that not what he's saying here?
8 A. What he says here is that the army was functioning and God forbid
9 that the army was dysfunctional. I never claimed that the army was not
10 functional. We had remarkable commanders, and we had excellent officers
11 who joined the VRS and they were fully capable of discharging their
12 duties. But in the operational sense in terms of command they were not
13 obligated to seek approval for their decisions. They planned them, they
14 carried them out and only informed the superior organ. This is what I
15 claimed. I never said that they were not doing their job properly or
16 that they did not conduct the operations in an appropriate manner. All I
17 wanted to try was to define the position and the place of
18 Radovan Karadzic in the system of the strategic command of the army, and
19 he retained his position as the highest ranking politician who is
20 ensuring the government control over the army. This was basically my
21 assertion. I never said they were doing their job badly. I never said
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have now page 154 in the
24 English and page 134 in the B/C/S, and it is again a section of this
25 combat readiness report signed by Mr. Karadzic, and what we have here is
1 the setting of tasks for the VRS; correct?
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 155 in the English
4 and 135 in the B/C/S, and then we have to turn over both.
5 Q. We find here tasks for the various course detailed, and if you
6 look at -- and you know this document, as you said, and the Judges know
7 it and the party knows it. What we find here in this part of the combat
8 readiness report are tasks that are in line with the six strategic
9 objectives; right? Except for -- at least for the first five; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. [Microphone not activated]
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have P1388 displayed on the
15 Q. It's also mentioned in your -- sorry, no. That's a mistake.
16 Sorry, ignore that. As it is coming up, it is the 39th RS Assembly
17 session on the 24th and 25th of March, 1994, and you reviewed this
18 document in preparation of your report?
19 A. Yes.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 84 in the English,
21 and it is 68 in the B/C/S so that we can see that Mr. Karadzic is
22 speaking. It is the lowest in the B/C/S, in the B/C/S.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have Mr. Karadzic's
24 contribution in the B/C/S.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can you then -- can we -- 68. Is that 68 in
1 the B/C/S? Next page in both, please. Next page in both languages. And
2 we -- at the bottom in English. We look at the bottom in English, and in
3 the middle in the B/C/S. And Mr. Karadzic is saying here: I report to
4 you and to the people, commanders report to me, the commander of the
5 General Staff, GS, commanders of corps and brigades. And I established a
6 Supreme Command so that I do not make decisions by myself. I did not
7 establish it to use it as a cover. I'm the one who signs, who decides,
8 and I will be responsible for each decision.
9 That's reflecting effective control, does it not?
10 A. I'm not denying that Karadzic had control over the army. All I'm
11 disputing that he had operational control over the army. This is what I
12 keep insisting on. The operational command over the army was within the
13 jurisdiction of the Main Staff.
14 Q. But I just read to you that Mr. Karadzic himself says that
15 commanders of corps and brigades report to him. That's for -- much below
16 the General Staff; right?
17 A. Corps commanders, well, so far when reviewing the documents I
18 never saw any report submitted to him by a corps. His reports came from
19 the Main Staff, and that's the standard procedure. Although it is
20 possible that it pertains to a significant situation, a corps or even a
21 lower unit may send a report to him, but this is out of the ordinary.
22 This happens only in exceptional circumstances, and I myself never came
23 across such a report.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was omitted from the transcript
2 that lower-ranking units may send reports provided it is requested by the
3 Supreme Command, and this is under the concept of exceptional
5 JUDGE KWON: Do you agree having said so?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
7 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, shall we take a break?
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will resume at 1.20.
10 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour. Can we please have
14 P3039 on the screen.
15 Q. And, General, as it is coming up, it is directive number 6, a
16 document you are familiar with and that Mr. Karadzic signs as
17 Supreme Commander on the 11th of November, 1993; correct? Do you
18 remember that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And yesterday you -- during the testimony you highlighted the
21 fact that the Chief of Staff drafted the directive that Mr. Karadzic
22 signed. That is standard procedure, is it not, that someone in the
23 Main Staff drafts directives for these command documents?
24 A. I said the chief of operational administration, not the
25 Chief of Staff.
1 Q. And the -- this drafting is not only done for Mr. Karadzic. It
2 was also done for General Mladic; right? He did not draft his directives
3 that he signed either; right?
4 A. Well, most probably it's correct.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can, please, the word "drafting" be
6 translated differently to the witness, not by using the word "writing."
7 JUDGE KWON: But in light of the answer, he must have understood
8 it. Shall we continue.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Can we please have page 15 in the
10 English and the last page in the B/C/S.
11 Q. Reference is made under command and control to two command posts,
12 including the one for the Supreme Commander in Pale. So in relation to
13 this directive, there are two command posts with the Supreme Commander
14 commanding the operation from Pale and the Main Staff executing whatever
15 he decides in Han Pijesak; correct?
16 A. Well, I don't see any reference to an operation being executed by
17 a Supreme Commander. A directive is a document of general nature.
18 Q. You also made a point of the fact that the two -- the two that
19 they are not together in one command post would show that Mladic has more
20 authority or basically is the one running the army. I'm just puzzled
21 about this, because isn't it right that during wartime any corps
22 locations of government bodies and commands should be avoided for safety
23 and security reasons? Is that not the typical situation?
24 A. This is not a typical situation. What we have here is the fact
25 that the Supreme Commander is separated from the Main Staff command. In
1 all armies across the world the staff organ and the commander are always
2 at the same location because the staff organ provides support to the
3 Supreme Commander in the process of preparing decisions. This is not the
4 case here. In other words, it means that the Supreme Commander never
5 prepared himself to draft decisions. Rather, it was done by the
6 Main Staff.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4, to work on operational
10 decisions. Not to draft but to take or make operational decisions.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
13 Q. Just a bit further down under point (a) is a reference to
14 reporting giving the exact dates. That is a regular practice; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you have no evidence to the contrary or documentation to the
17 contrary it didn't happen with the Supreme Commander Mr. Karadzic; right?
18 A. But you have point (a) that I mean works in favour of my
19 assertion. The decisions of corps commanders are to be submitted to the
20 commander of the VRS Main Staff for approval seven days before a planned
21 operation. You see that in point (a)?
22 Q. Yes, but that is the normal practice, is it not, that the chain
23 of command is -- his chain of command has different levels of
25 A. Approval is requested from the person who was supposed to grant
1 it. Obviously in this situation it is the Main Staff, not the
2 Supreme Commander, and that is why corps commanders are duty-bound when
3 they're carrying out operations to submit their plans for approval to the
4 commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, not the Supreme Commander. I've
5 been trying all the time to make that difference. I'm not saying that
6 the Supreme Commander does not have any control and that he should not
7 have any control and that he's not receiving information about what the
8 army is doing, no, of course not. But operational command is in the
9 hands of the Main Staff.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
11 be asked to speak slower, thank you.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. Can you please speak a bit slower for the sake of the
14 interpreters. And, General, I just noticed again you always speak about
15 control when it comes to Mr. Karadzic. But he was not just the
16 controller, he was the commander; correct?
17 A. Command and control and control is part of that function.
18 Q. General, you mentioned in paragraph 102 that there was continuing
19 disagreement between Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic and that
20 Mr. Karadzic wanted to replace Mladic as early as 1993, and there's no
21 reference for this.
22 I would -- I would ask that -- I don't think we have to actually
23 call up the -- this exhibit. You are aware -- are you aware that
24 Mr. Karadzic promoted General Mladic on the 28th of June, 1994 - and that
25 is in front of this Court as P3046 - and it is, in fact, an exceptional
1 promotion? Do you know this document?
2 A. Yes, but it's not that this disagreement was there because Mladic
3 didn't know what to do or because he was working poorly.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We could not hear the
5 first sentence.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. Can you repeat the first sentence, please.
8 A. There was no reason for him not to be promoted, because Mladic
9 was a very capable and successful commander. Disagreement was not there
10 because Mladic did things wrong. The disagreement was there because
11 Mladic, on the basis of the decision on the establishment of the army,
12 had this dualism, this dual authority within the army.
13 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 261 and 280 of your report in relation
14 to Sarajevo, you state --
15 JUDGE KWON: Can I intervene.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, please.
17 JUDGE KWON: If there was no problem of so-called dualism, the
18 operational control should have belonged to who?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Operational control was in the
20 hands of the commander of the Main Staff, but the president of the
21 republic had the authority for the army to be used in accordance with a
22 set strategic concept, that is to say to defend the territory of
23 Republika Srpska and to carry out that concept.
24 JUDGE KWON: Let me understand your observation about the dualism
25 correctly. You said since Mladic as the commander of the Main Staff or
1 commander of the VRS exercising his -- the operational control of the
2 army, it caused the problem of dualism. Am I correct in so
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: So if such dualism would not have -- had not existed
6 at all, who should exercise that operational control over the VRS, corps
7 commander or Supreme Commander?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Supreme Commander was supposed
9 to have Supreme Command and control over the army, whereas in depth at
10 all levels of decision-making others. The Main Staff was supposed to
11 carry out staff and professional work for preparation and for army use.
12 That is the definition for any staff organ, the Main Staff included; that
13 is to say professional and staff matters to prepare the army and to plan
14 its use, and these plans should be approved by the Supreme Commander.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Your Honour, I move now further to
18 Q. In paragraphs 261 and 280 of your report in relation to Sarajevo,
19 you state that civilians and civilian buildings were not deliberately
20 targeted by firing with the primary purpose of terrorising them and
21 inflicting unnecessary suffering, but such firing with strikes on
22 military targets.
23 General, you studied the indictment against Mr. Karadzic; right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And in relation to the incidents charged in the indictment, the
1 very incidents of shelling and sniping, you cannot state with any
2 certainty what the circumstances at that moment were and whether the
3 strikes were legitimate; right? That was not your expertise and the
4 task; correct?
5 A. That was not my task but that is the conclusion I reached on the
6 basis of the existence of numerous documents that I studied that show
7 that the combat elements of the 1st Corps of the Army of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina were deployed in civilian facilities.
9 Q. You know that Mr. Karadzic is charged with the shelling of a
10 waterline of civilians in Dobrinja on 12 June 1993, killing 13 people and
11 wounding 14, and that's a scheduled incident G5.
12 There's evidence before this Court that the -- the victims were
13 hit by 182-millimetre mortar round.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And that is, Your Honour, in P1437. It's
15 report at pages 8 to 9 and also in P1438.
16 Q. You cannot point us to any specific source of evidence that fire
17 was opened by the BiH forces from the immediate vicinity of this
18 waterline at that point in time prompting the VRS to fire back; right?
19 You cannot say that.
20 A. Well, I didn't deal with that specific example. I assume you
21 discussed that with that expert who provided that expertise. I just
22 assert that it was a regular phenomenon for facilities and civilians to
23 be misused for military purposes. Practically there was no need to
24 target civilian targets because all of them had been turned into military
25 facilities. That is my assertion. As for this specific case, I don't
2 Q. In relation to this particular point, I want to direct you to
3 paragraph 312 and footnote 198, and, General, in this paragraph you refer
4 to a sniper platoon stationed in the Blagoje Parovic school. And I would
5 like to have D3526 on the screen, and it is an order of the
6 1st Motorised Brigade of 2nd October 1993. And in -- it refers in
7 point 3 not, as you say in your report, the Blagoje Parovic school, it
8 refers to the former Blagoje Parovic school. In fact, this location was
9 right on the front line. Do you know?
10 A. I do. That's a civilian facility, a school, the Blagoje Parovic
11 school. That is a civilian facility.
12 Q. General, a corps blockaded in a city as you referred to with very
13 few original military installations would have to find facilities such as
14 schools, factories, and the like and turn them into military facilities;
15 right? They had no other choice.
16 A. But they didn't have to be in town. Why were they in town? Why
17 are they exposing the population to unnecessary casualties? Why don't
18 they leave town?
19 Q. I just told you that this school or, rather, former school was on
20 the front line, and isn't it logic that in the moment when the military
21 take over a building and install their units in there, it ceased to be a
22 civilian building. It's a military building, is it not?
23 A. No. It is still a civilian building, but the military is
24 misusing it and it becomes, thereby, a legitimate military target. The
25 military is not supposed to be there.
1 Q. And, General, whether a given building is military or a civilian
2 object depends on the use of this building, is it not?
3 A. No. Its primary use is that of a school, a civilian facility.
4 The fact that it became a military object is misuse.
5 Q. General, yesterday at transcript page 41421, line 19, you
6 explained your calculation of the number of military targets in Sarajevo,
7 and you arrived at the number 2.200. In paragraphs 287 to 289 of your
8 report, you arrive at the number of 2.000 legitimate military targets in
9 the city of Sarajevo; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you concluded that the whole of Sarajevo was one big military
12 target; right? That's also there.
13 A. Put in figurative terms, it is as if all of Sarajevo was a
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpret's note: Could the witness please be
16 asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
18 Q. Could you please speak closer to the microphone. It's difficult
19 for the interpreters.
20 A. It's put in figurative terms that it was all of Sarajevo. I
21 don't think that all of Sarajevo was a target, but almost. If you take
22 all of these localities all over town, it would be hard to draw that
23 without all of it being a single colour when you're colouring military
25 Q. General, your calculation that let you alive at number 2.200 as
1 you said yesterday in the transcript and 2.000 as said in the report, you
2 arrive at this figure in relation to -- on the basis of the number of
3 brigades of the 1st Corps of the Bosnian Army as the starting point;
5 A. Not only on the basis of that but also on the basis of all other
6 elements of the establishment of the 1st Corps of the BH Army and the
7 strategic deployment of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their command
8 posts, their Supreme Command post, Main Staff, workshops, military
9 production, police forces. So it's not only brigades, but the brigades
10 were the bases.
11 Q. In paragraph 51 and in footnote 151, you refer to a decision -
12 and that is 1D1192 - to show how you arrived at the figure of 15
13 brigades. Can we please have 1D1192 on the screen just to confirm. If I
14 count correctly, it's 13, not 15, in the first place, and it's only
15 formed in August 1992; right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And you do not know how many brigades were there before this
18 date; right?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot hear the witness
20 at all.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
22 Q. The interpreters could not hear you.
23 A. Before that date I don't know how many brigades were there,
24 because we don't have information about that.
25 Q. Before this Court is already a list of the 1st Corps command of
1 the 30th of April, 1993, and that's D496. You referred to this document
2 also in footnote 182, and that lists ten brigades. And there's also a
3 document from the SRK command of the 20th January 1994 - and that is
4 P5968 - and there on page 2 it speaks of 12 brigades. And we have
5 another one before this Court - that's D292 - an attack order of the
6 1st Corps of the 11th June 1995, listing nine brigades. So would you
7 agree with me that the number of brigades changed over time and was never
8 at the level of 15 brigades? Would you agree with that?
9 A. I would agree with you on the number of brigades changing and
10 that they became bigger, but the number of targets did not change
11 significantly. So that number of targets in any establishment, in any
12 unit, it can be calculated approximately. I've already said that this is
13 not exact arithmetic but it is approximate. Sometimes --
14 Q. General, looking at your Galic testimony about the number of
15 legitimate military targets --
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, that is 65 ter 25415,
17 transcript pages 20995 to 21001.
18 Q. You arrive based on such calculation at the figure of 1.500
19 targets. Do you remember that you had in the Galic case that number?
20 A. Yes.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we have -- could we please have
22 65 ter 25363A. It is actually now a P number, but I forgot which one.
23 Q. That's your book, your book on Sarajevo. And we need to have
24 page 13 in the English and page 11 in the B/C/S.
25 And here you again make such a calculation, and here you have
1 1.800 military targets. So that clearly shows that calculations based on
2 theory do not match reality; right?
3 A. No. The calculations are approximate, not exact. Let me just
4 illustrate this for you. A battery, for instance. A battery can be one
5 military objective, but it also can be 20.
6 Q. Let me stop you. I'm just wondering how can it be that in a few
7 years even actually from your report writing to giving testimony the
8 numbers change from 1.500 to 2.200. How is that possible if there's any
9 value in such a calculation?
10 A. These calculations are not there for measuring something exactly.
11 Rather, it is supposed to indicate the problem that there was a host of
12 military targets within a settlement. The calculations are approximate.
13 So the difference -- well, if we were to calculate it each and every
14 time, we could have the number change because we would pay more attention
15 to detail, to the actual establishment of a brigade. So the figures
16 would vary. But none of these figures are inaccurate, incorrect. It
17 just depends at the point of time when it was done.
18 We also had the organisational establishment of the corps after
19 Galic's term, and then there were a lot more elements for the corps and
20 the Supreme Command in Sarajevo than during Galic's service because this
21 group. Galic's term was over in August 1994.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please now have page 18 in the
23 English and 16 in the B/C/S. And on this page and the six -- the six
24 following pages, if you could scroll to them, please, Mr. Registrar, to
25 just so that it is a list of altogether 222 legitimate military targets.
1 Q. And if I understood your evidence in Galic case properly, it's
2 based on 24 military documents of the SRK and the
3 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
4 A. Yes, this is a sample of documents on the basis of which --
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
8 Q. Could you repeat the end of the sentence, please.
9 A. This is a sample of documents from the entire compilation of
10 documents in the Galic case.
11 Q. And the documents, the list is based on -- they're not all from
12 the same day; right?
13 A. No.
14 Q. So you cannot claim that these 222 targets existed throughout the
15 time period this Trial Chamber is concerned with; right?
16 A. Since documents do not bear the same date, you are right, but
17 since these brigades were always in town, then one could say that I'm
18 right too. These brigades did not change their location. They were
19 there in Sarajevo. Sometimes they were within divisions, sometimes they
20 were within groups, but they did not change their locations.
21 Q. General, if we look at the targets included, there are many
22 targets which are temporary positions like observation posts, sniper
23 positions, firing positions, machine-guns even; correct? You nod, but
24 you have to say yes so it is on the record.
25 A. Yes, yes, yes. You're right.
1 Q. And highly mobile weapons frequently changed their positions?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. That means the existence of a sniper position or moving mortars
4 on a truck at a certain location is only valid for a specific target
5 list. It would -- for a specific date and not for the entire period;
7 A. Yes, but they are going to reappear elsewhere.
8 Q. Yes, but if a sniper or a mortar moved to another location and it
9 is mentioned in another of the documents that you review, it would be
10 double counting of that one firing instrument, whatever it is, would it
11 not? You would count it, got also [indiscernible].
12 A. You would be right, only if it had to do with the organisation of
13 the establishment of a single unit. However, I'm not doing that. I am
14 working on the basis of documents of certain units. So if this sniper
15 appears in location N, then some other day it's going to reappear
16 elsewhere unless it had been destroyed. That was my logic. I don't know
17 if I'm right, but that is the only way I could see it.
18 Q. General, the question whether you are allowed to fire on a
19 military target is a question of whether at that point in time when you
20 fire that particular building is, in fact, in use for military purposes,
21 would it not be?
22 A. Yes.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated] Can we now have
24 page --
25 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. Can we now turn to page 15 in
2 English, first paragraph, and 13 in the B/C/S.
3 Q. You mentioned -- you discussed with Mr. Karadzic yesterday the
4 rules book in relation to 82-millimetre mortars, and we have already just
5 a few minutes ago discussed a certain incident involving an 80-millimetre
6 mortar. And if Mr. Karadzic needs a reference, it is at T41416.
7 In the book you explain the following: The 82-millimetre mortar
8 rule state that an enemy target can be neutralised 25 per cent. This is
9 considered the lowest acceptable militarisation rate. If one fires 24
10 shells on each target, which is 96 shells per target for an average
11 militarisation rate of 50 per cent. And for the 120-millimetre mortars
12 it would be less. And it goes into very -- in many specifics, and you
13 have already dealt with that yesterday.
14 General, do you recall that you also explained these figures in
15 the Galic trial, where you also speak about -- how many shells need to be
17 A. I don't remember any.
18 Q. But would you agree with me that firing a single round would not
19 serve any military purpose? Would you agree?
20 A. Firing one single mortar projectile does have a military purpose.
21 It's called observation fire, methodical fire that warns of danger and
22 puts the enemy on notice so he takes steps. So such a thing exists as a
23 single round of fire.
24 Q. General, the single round that hit the people in the waterline,
25 that cannot have had a military purpose. It was hitting people wanting
1 to get water; right?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this question appropriate? We
3 did not deal which this case which we challenge and no evidence has been
4 led to prove that it was indeed so.
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, first of all it is -- evidence
7 was led. We have it in P1437, his report. I've already mentioned that.
8 And also P1438, investigative file, and also I make a very particular
9 point here, and it doesn't really matter whether it was charged or
10 whether it was covered with evidence. That's in addition the fact.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the witness said he was not
12 aware of that case. He's talking in general terms about doctrines. He
13 does not know the details of the individual case.
14 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was asking about a
15 specific incident.
16 Can you answer the question, General?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know about this
18 specific incident, because I didn't analyse it, and I don't know. But
19 what was the question?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
21 Q. I was actually putting to you that the shelling was a single
22 round of a water line of civilians in Dobrinja on that particular day
23 could not have had any military purpose, firing a single round on a
24 ground of people.
25 A. I'm absolutely not sure that it was fired at a group of people.
1 It would have been fired at an active military target, missing that
2 target and hitting instead the column, the water line. Of course
3 civilians should not be targeted. If that's what you're saying. I
5 Q. Let me move to one last topic in relation to Sarajevo. Control
6 of forces. In paragraph 24 and 247 in your report, you state that the
7 Sarajevo situation is such that it is impossible for Mr. Karadzic and the
8 command officers at all levels to exercise effective control over the
9 conduct and combat operations of their subordinate units and commands.
10 General, the ability to control troops is not a geographical
11 exercise, is it?
12 A. No. It's not only defined by geography. It's defined by the
13 situation on the battle-field.
14 Q. General, the ability to control and command troops is first and
15 foremost an existing system of command and control. Would you not agree
16 to that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And the SRK had such a control system in it; right? It was a
19 professional officer, professional command system; right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. General, you also state in paragraph 17 of the report that the
22 report does not confirm any wrongdoing in relation to the Sarajevo
23 charges, but in any event, it would have been instances of insufficient
24 control of the command on the ground. That means unauthorised activities
25 of the ground troops? Is that what you mean?
1 A. Not only that, but there was no possibility of effective control
2 of the conduct of all the possible renegades on the battle-field,
3 offenders. And I could explain more if you allow me.
4 Q. At this point in time I would rather move on, because we have
5 very little time. I was just wondering about this, because as you have
6 looked at the command documents in -- in this case, we have before this
7 Trial Chamber several documents related to SRK command orders for the use
8 of air-bombs. Do you remember having seen those?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So the use of air-bombs were ordered by the SRK command and not
11 by the local ground unit or brigade or whatsoever; correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When researching the materials for your report, did you come
14 across the evidence of Witness Pyers Tucker?
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, that is P4203,
16 paragraph 37.
17 Q. Do you recall seeing something like this?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Mr. Tucker described a co-ordinated military attack on the
20 31st of October, 1992, by the VRS from the north and south of the centre
21 of Sarajevo with the apparent objective of cutting the city into an
22 eastern and western half.
23 Such an observation and such an activity would not be an activity
24 of a lower-level unit; right? It would come from the RSK command; right?
25 A. If that is so, yes.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I forgot and I just remembered.
2 I had -- I wanted to tender the additional pages from the book. I
3 just -- I just remembered it. I didn't ask for that.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add those pages.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, as you have said, we should
6 stick to the five hours. I will now hand over to Mr. Mitchell, but I
7 still have a few topics like the six strategic objectives and a few
8 matters related to incorrect citations, but I can do this if time allows
9 after Mr. Mitchell has finished.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Mitchell:
12 Q. Good afternoon, General.
13 A. Good afternoon.
14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff and Mr. Robinson, about the book.
15 I was told that we have dealt with almost 20 pages out of 23 pages, so we
16 will admit them all in its entirety.
17 MR. MITCHELL:
18 Q. General, before we get to Srebrenica, just a couple of quick
19 points about your testimony so far today. You've read the RS Law on the
20 Army, haven't you?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. MITCHELL: If we could have Exhibit P2603 in e-court, page 24
23 in English and 17 in the B/C/S.
24 Q. What you're about to see here, General, is chapter 11 of the
25 Law on the Army, which is entitled "command." Now, you talked earlier
1 today about dual authority. I just want you to take a look at
2 Article 173 there, which says:
3 "Command in the army shall be founded on principles of a unified
4 command regarding uses of forces and means, single authority, obligations
5 to enforce decisions, command and orders issued by superior officers."
6 General, it's there in black and white. The command system in
7 the VRS is based on unity of command; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If you go down to just Article 174, just below that, you've
10 talked a lot about the control authority of the president, and we see
11 your report is about control authority. Article 174 says:
12 "The president of the republic shall be commander-in-chief of the
13 army. The president of the republic shall command the army in compliance
14 with the constitution and the law."
15 Just to be very clear, the Supreme Commander commands the army;
17 A. Yes, but the Supreme Commander commands the army as the head of
18 state, not as the operational commander.
19 Q. Let's talk about Srebrenica, General. You've made a lot of
20 factual assertions in your report which aren't supported by a citation,
21 and I've just picked five examples which I want to ask you about right
22 now. If you have a look at paragraph 320 of your report. This is
23 Exhibit D3864, page 122 in the English and 140 in the B/C/S.
24 You'll see there, General, you refer to a conversation between
25 Dr. Karadzic and General Zivanovic that you say occurred on the
1 10th of July. Now, there's no citation there, but I want to show you the
2 conversation that I believe you're referring to. If we could have P4484
3 in e-court.
4 Now, General, you say this conversation took place on the
5 10th of July. The Prosecution's military expert Richard Butler testified
6 at length about this conversation and established that it occurred on the
7 8th of July. Mr. Karadzic, who is one of the participants in the
8 conversation, has also accepted in this trial that this took place on the
9 8th of July. So can we agree that that's just an error and this
10 conversation actually happened on the 8th of July? Do you accept that?
11 A. Well, obviously it's a mistake, because the conversation took
12 place before Karadzic allowed the entry into Srebrenica.
13 Q. Well, you say at paragraph 320 of your report that
14 President Karadzic during this conversation simply made inquiries without
15 making any comments or issuing any instructions or orders. Now, you talk
16 about this again at paragraph 348, and you say in the course of this
17 conversation, Karadzic does not issue any orders.
18 General, I can count at least six separate instructions or orders
19 from President Karadzic in this conversation. He says the blue guys
20 should be treated properly; that if General Zivanovic needed
21 reinforcements he should call President Karadzic via the Main Staff; to
22 have someone prepare instructions for the journalists; for
23 General Zivanovic to tell Krle - that's General Krstic - that
24 President Karadzic couldn't get to him right now, General Zivanovic
25 needed to go ahead with his own forces. And then you'll see if we go
1 over to the last page, crystal clear, an order from the president where
2 he says: "All right, General. Full speed ahead. Tell Krstic to go full
3 steam ahead."
4 General, would you agree that paragraph 320 of your report,
5 that's another mistake where you say that President Karadzic simply made
6 inquiries without any comments or issuing any instructions or orders?
7 That's a mistake; right?
8 A. No, it's not a mistake. He didn't issue a single order in terms
9 of employing the forces. He didn't say use this and that unit for this
10 and that task. Carry out a new task, capture a new goal. He assessed
11 the situation in general. There is not a single military order there
12 that implies a new use of forces, different from the current one,
13 different from what the corps commander had decided. And in that sense,
14 I believe my report is correct.
15 Q. General, your report doesn't say President Karadzic didn't issue
16 a new -- a new order relating to a new goal. It just says he didn't make
17 any comments or issue any instructions or orders. We can see he very
18 clearly does issue instructions and orders in this conversation; right?
19 A. The thing is he wasn't issuing new operational orders about the
20 use of forces here. That's the essence, not whether he talked or whether
21 he commented on the situation.
22 Q. Let's go to the second example I want to ask you about at
23 paragraph 370 of your report, and this is on page 140 in the English, 161
24 in the B/C/S. It's D3864.
25 If you can just focus on point 4 in this paragraph. Have you
1 found that, General?
2 A. Concerning vehicles. Is that it?
3 Q. Yes. And you say that the operational order of the VRS
4 Main Staff and the Drina Corps to obtain the means of transport for this
5 operation was only issued on 12 July 1995, after the last meeting in the
6 Fontana Hotel and the consent of the representatives. So just to
7 clarify, your argument is that the removal of the Muslim population
8 couldn't have been planned because the buses weren't ordered until after
9 that last Hotel Fontana meeting; is that right?
10 A. No. I'm not maintaining that the population -- in fact, the
11 evacuation couldn't have been planned because of the buses. The planning
12 of the moving out of the population could not have been carried out
13 because that was not the expected consequence of the operation that had
14 been planned on the 2nd of July, 1995. That operation was of limited
15 scope, and it could not have been expected that it would result in
16 consequences based on which it would be necessary to move out the
17 population. That was an operation geared at separating the enclaves, and
18 it wasn't possible to expect the moving out of the population.
19 Q. I understand that, General, but your report here says the
20 operational order was only issued after the last meeting at the
21 Fontana Hotel; right? That's what your report says.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MR. MITCHELL: Can we look at Exhibit P4533.
25 Q. And while that's come up, General, you'd agree that the third
1 meeting at Hotel Fontana happened at 10.00 on the 12th of July, 1995? I
2 don't think there's any dispute about that?
3 If you can just focus in on the stamp of this document which is
4 General Zivanovic's order to get buses. You can see the time there is
5 8.35 in the morning which is before the third Hotel Fontana meeting;
7 A. All right. The third meeting was planned with the idea of having
8 authorised representatives come, and there were talks with the
9 representatives of the Muslim population at previous meetings and the
10 moving out was agreed, but General Mladic insisted on authorised
11 representatives so that there shouldn't be talk later about the agreement
12 being made with unauthorised people. That's this meeting schedule at
14 At 8.35 on at that day, it was known that there would be a moving
15 out of population only approval was awaited from the authorised
16 representatives of the civilian population.
17 Q. But we can agree that paragraph 370 of your report is inaccurate
18 where it says that the orders were only issued after the third
19 Hotel Fontana meeting. We can agree that that's a mistake.
20 A. All right. Well, it relates to the 12th. It's not a mistake.
21 It's still the 12th at 8.35 or at 10.00. Those half -- those 30 minutes
22 don't make any difference in terms of the fact that I'm explaining here
23 that the evacuation could not have been planned. That hour and a half
24 doesn't mean anything.
25 Q. Let me take you to another example that I want to show you,
1 paragraph 401. This is page 150 in English. It's 173 in the B/C/S. And
2 we see you in paragraph 401 say that the testimony of foreign witnesses
3 in this case has confirmed that all those captives, they're talking about
4 prisoners captured on 12th and 13th of July regardless of when they were
5 captured were first brought to the collection point at Bratunac. That's
6 not right, is it General, that all captives were taken to Bratunac.
7 You've forgotten the men who were executed at Kravica, haven't you?
8 A. No. Well, we've said that of course those who were executed in
9 Kravica did not come to Bratunac. The collection at Bratunac does not
10 apply to the people who were executed at Kravica, because Kravica was in
11 the evening of the 13th, whereas the collection in Bratunac was in the
12 night between the 13th and the 14th.
13 Q. If we keep reading down that paragraph, we can see you say:
14 "Miroslav Deronjic reported on 13 July 1995 that 2.000 of them
15 were already gathered there."
16 Who was Deronjic reporting to, General?
17 A. To tell you the truth, I can't remember this minute, whom he was
18 reporting to, but normally he should be reporting to President Karadzic.
19 Q. You can't remember as you sit here today that Miroslav Deronjic
20 was reporting to President Karadzic about the prisoners?
21 A. I'm telling you I can't remember that specific case, but in the
22 nature of things he should be reporting to Karadzic.
23 Q. And Deronjic should be reporting to Karadzic in his role as
24 civilian commissioner of Srebrenica. That's right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. If we can look at paragraph 408, General. That's page 153 in the
2 English and 177 in the B/C/S. And here we see you say there's no
3 reliable information or tangible evidence about who decided to move the
4 prisoners of war from Bratunac to Zvornik. And then a few lines down you
5 say President Radovan Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move the prisoners to
6 the Batkovic camp. And we can see you cite to a document there, P --
7 it's actually P02994. If we can have that in e-court.
8 Have a look at the document on the screen, General, that you've
9 cited to. It doesn't say anything about moving the prisoners to Batkovic
10 camp, does it?
11 A. Batkovic camp, no, it doesn't speak about it, but the Batkovic
12 camp was a well-known place as a camp for that part of the front line,
13 and this is where the prisoners were taken.
14 Q. I understand that, General, but you've made a factual statement
15 that President Radovan Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move the prisoners to
16 the Batkovic camp, and you've cited to this document and this document
17 says nothing the sort; right?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It doesn't exist in this document,
20 but to put it simply, this is common knowledge.
21 JUDGE KWON: But is it true that you cited document as a
22 reference to your statement that Mr. Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move
23 the prisoners to Batkovic camp? Have you seen that sentence and the
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I saw it in the report, and
1 now when I'm looking at this order, I don't see that sentence there.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's exactly the point,
3 your Excellency. In footnote it is P02944.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the second
6 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters didn't follow you. Could you
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Radinovic is referring here
9 to P02944, whereas the Prosecutor called up 2994.
10 JUDGE KWON: Hmm.
11 MR. MITCHELL: That's right, Mr. President, because what he's
12 actually citing to is the order of the RS president on the establishment
13 of the SJB in Srebrenica, which is P2994. I think you'll see P2944 is
14 something completely different. It's a video. I think it's very clear
15 that this was a typo, and it was P2994 that the General was intending to
16 cite to which contains nothing about an order to go to Batkovic.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It's clear from the text General Radinovic
18 made reference to the order of Mr. Karadzic on the establishment of the
19 SJB in Srebrenica.
20 We can continue.
21 MR. MITCHELL:
22 Q. Okay. General, just one more. The fifth example I wanted you to
23 take a look at, paragraph 389. It's page 146 in English and 168 in the
25 You say in this paragraph:
1 "We know that there were a few opportunistic killings in Potocari
2 but that after some of the killings the perpetrators hid in the woods
3 which speaks volumes about their fear of the VRS officers."
4 First of all, General, who were the perpetrators that you were
5 referring to here? Can you give us a unit, a name?
6 A. No, no.
7 Q. Okay. Well, can you give us any foundation for your statement
8 that the perpetrators hid in the woods after those killings if you don't
9 even know who the perpetrators are?
10 A. No. No. During the trials before the court in Sarajevo, there's
11 been reference to this and that's why I said it, but I have no specific
12 knowledge about it.
13 Q. Let's move on. I want to ask some questions about directive 7
15 MR. MITCHELL: We can have in e-court Exhibit P838. It's page 10
16 in English and 15 in the B/C/S.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must intervene. The witness
18 should have been shown the second page of the previous document, item 4.,
19 from document P2994.
20 MR. MITCHELL: Mr. President, I think if Dr. Karadzic wants to
21 readdress that on redirect, he can.
22 Q. Now, General, you can see directive 7 in front of you on the
23 screen and you're very familiar with the language: "By planned and
24 well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of
25 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
1 inhabitants of Srebrenica." And you say at paragraph 323 of your report
2 that you don't wish to defend this sentence. The reason you don't want
3 to defend this sentence is because it's an illegal order, isn't it,
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you agree that a specific reference to no hope of further
7 survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa means it's
8 not only that those towns will be captured but the population's going to
9 be moved out as well; right?
10 A. Well, one could expect that if the measures envisaged here were
11 implemented. However, there were a number of mechanisms that could have
12 prevented it.
13 Q. Let me just read you what you said in the Krstic case on this
14 point. And the question that was put to you from the Prosecutor was:
15 "General you would agree with General Dannatt's assessment of
16 this order when he stated in respect of this particular portion of the
17 directive that we're discussing General Dannatt said I think what is
18 intended here is that Srebrenica and Zepa should be captured and I assume
19 that the reference to no hope of further survival or life for the
20 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa meant that not only were the towns to
21 be captured but the existing population shall be removed."
22 And then you were asked:
23 "So based on what you've just said you agree with that assessment
24 of this particular portion of the directive?
25 And your answer was:
2 So you agreed in the Krstic case that that language meant remove
3 the existing population; right?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. MITCHELL: Can I have in e-court 65 ter number 18970.
6 Q. You may not have seen this document before, General, so just take
7 a moment and read it.
8 A. This is the covering letter from General Milovanovic. And I've
9 seen it, yes.
10 Q. Okay. And this document means when you see General Zivanovic's
11 signature down at the bottom that the Drina Corps received directive 7;
13 A. Yes.
14 MR. MITCHELL: Can I tender that, Mr. President?
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6450, Your Honours.
18 MR. MITCHELL:
19 Q. General, in your testimony yesterday at transcript page 41393,
20 you said that if a directive contained orders that amounted to a crime,
21 all such features had to be discounted and dismissed in preparing
22 operational documents based on that directive. I just want to show you
23 one more document, Exhibit P3040, page 6 in the English and 3 in the
24 B/C/S. And you'll see just under point number 2 the same language by
25 planned and well-thought-out combat operations --
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we show the witness what document this is
3 MR. MITCHELL: Yes, Mr. President. If we can go back to the
4 front page.
5 Q. Now, you can see, General, this is an order from the Drina Corps
6 to all of its subordinate units entitled "Order for defence and active
7 combat operations, operative number 7." If we can go to the very last
8 page. Second last in English. You can see that's General Zivanovic's
9 signature, isn't it?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you can see that it's drafted by Colonel Milenko Lazic.
12 Colonel Lazic was the Drina Corps Chief of Operations and training in
13 1995, wasn't he?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If we can go back to page 6 in the English and 3 in the B/C/S.
16 You can see the language there under point 2: "By planned and
17 well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of
18 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
19 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." So the commander of the
20 Drina Corps, General Zivanovic, has taken the illegal language from
21 directive 7 and he sent it out to every single one of his subordinate
22 units; right?
23 A. Yes. I must admit that I didn't have this document. I didn't
24 have this document.
25 MR. MITCHELL: Mr. President, that might be a good place to stop.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I informed the parties by
3 e-mail earlier, but because we have subpoenaed General Andric for
4 tomorrow, we propose to interpose his testimony so that he would begin
5 his testimony at 9.00, and we would interrupt the testimony of
6 General Radinovic, and we would expect General Radinovic to continue his
7 testimony at around 1.15 tomorrow hopefully.
8 JUDGE KWON: General Radinovic, have you been informed about
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't.
11 JUDGE KWON: Given the circumstances, the Chamber will hear
12 Mr. Andric's evidence tomorrow morning and continue with your evidence
13 when his evidence is over.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I ask something? Does that
15 mean that it might happen that I am not finished tomorrow? That would be
16 very unfavourable for me if that were to happen.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, that's very likely. It depends upon
18 how much time Mr. Karadzic is going to use as his redirect and how much
19 it will take for Mr. Andric's evidence.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. It seems like it will be unlikely that he
21 would complete his evidence, General Radinovic would complete his
22 evidence tomorrow, but perhaps through the Victims and Witnesses Section
23 we can inquire and try to solve the problem. Perhaps if it's something
24 very significant with respect to General Radinovic, we can try to
25 complete his testimony and maybe General Andric can stay, but as I was
1 under the impression that -- I wasn't aware that General Radinovic had a
2 problem to stay until Monday.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. We were just going to suggest the same thing.
5 Now that General Radinovic has raised that problem it seems like it would
6 be prudent to -- to check whether or not, in fact, we can do what
7 Mr. Robinson just suggested might be done, and that is complete the
8 General's testimony and then move forward with Mr. Andric to be completed
9 on Monday once he's appeared before the Court and acknowledged that the
10 subpoena has been complied with.
11 JUDGE KWON: Shall I endorse --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Before you make a decision, may I
13 explain what my problem is? My wife is seriously ill, and I had
14 difficulty leaving her this time. If there is any possibility for me to
15 finish tomorrow, I would highly appreciate that, but if that cannot be
16 accomplished, then I'll stay. What else can I do?
17 JUDGE KWON: If General Andric's testimony could start later
18 on -- later tomorrow, I would prefer to continue General Radinovic's
19 evidence, but I will leave it to you, parties. So I will allow you to
20 contact the witness, so for that purpose, and liaise with the victim and
21 witness section. So please sort it out the best way in the interests of
22 the witnesses.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we'll do that, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. The
25 hearing is adjourned.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Friday, the 19th day
3 of July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.