130725ED

Page 41962

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

2 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue, Mr. Nicholls?

3 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes. Good morning, Your Honours. Thank you.

4 WITNESS: DRAGOMIR KESEROVIC [Resumed]

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 Cross-examination by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]

7 Q. Good morning, Mr. Keserovic.

8 A. Good morning.

9 Q. All right. When we left off yesterday we were talking about

10 Sanski Most and we were talking about evidence that in Mr. Brown's report

11 goes toward your conclusion which you stated in page 26, I'll just remind

12 everybody, in your critique of Mr. Brown, that the conclusion of this

13 paragraph, which was Ewan Brown's paragraph 2.35, undoubtedly suggests

14 that the target of military operations in Sanski Most were residential

15 areas, i.e., civilians and not Muslim and Croat armed formations.

16 And you said basically something similar yesterday at 41952 --

17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

18 Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have not been receiving

20 interpretation.

21 JUDGE KWON: Did you -- do you hear me now?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear the gentleman but no

23 interpretation.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: I'll try --

25 JUDGE KWON: But do you hear me now in the language you

Page 41963

1 understand? No.

2 How about now? Do you hear me in Serbian? If we could check the

3 connection of the headphone.

4 Do you hear me, sir, now? Let's check whether it works now? No.

5 General, I hope you can hear me now?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, now I can.

7 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

8 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.

9 Q. Good morning again, General. I'll start again.

10 A. Good morning, sir.

11 Q. When we left off yesterday, we were starting to talk about

12 operations in Sanski Most, and I'd begun in connection with page 26 in

13 English of your report, where you critique -- criticise Mr. Brown for

14 finding that the target of military operations in Sanski Most were

15 residential areas, i.e., civilians and not Muslim and Croat armed

16 formations. And you said something similar yesterday at 41952, where you

17 said:

18 "I didn't find a single order, a single document where the

19 6th Sana Brigade would be asked to disarm only Muslims and Croats,

20 rather, that brigade is ordered to collect the weapons illegally owned by

21 the population, irrespective of their ethnicity."

22 And later on at the bottom of the page you said:

23 "That brigade was tasked with preventing inter-ethnic conflicts

24 and with disarming those who had illegal weapons."

25 So that's what we're -- topic we're continuing on today.

Page 41964

1 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P03313, please.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, now I don't have the

3 transcript of the trial on the desktop.

4 MR. NICHOLLS:

5 Q. Do you understand English?

6 A. Not really.

7 Q. Well, while this is coming up, again P03313, this is a document

8 I'm sure you've seen, it's cited in Mr. Brown's report at footnotes 322

9 and 389. It's the combat task of disarmament written by

10 TO Commander Anicic and you're familiar with this document; correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And this document starts off saying that in some parts of the

13 municipality with a Muslim and Croat population the Green Berets were

14 inserted, et cetera.

15 And it talks about in paragraph 2:

16 "In co-ordination with the units of the 6th Brigade, complete

17 control of the territory in order to ensure stable functioning of the

18 government and to create conditions for unobstructed life and work."

19 And then number 3:

20 "The 6th Brigade, in co-ordinated action with the TO, is

21 undertaking combat operations in the Sanski Most municipality area in

22 order to disarm enemy forces ..."

23 And if we go to the next page in the English, this document isn't

24 dated, but it states:

25 "Stand by for attack at 5 a.m. on 26 May ..."

Page 41965

1 And then you see in paragraph 5 and 6 at the very beginning that

2 it orders defence of Serbian neighbourhoods. So you would say that this

3 document supports you, your thesis, correct, because it talks about

4 disarming the enemy formations?

5 A. Just a technical correction here. It was not the Serbian

6 Territorial Defence. It was the staff of the Territorial Defence without

7 any affiliation, either Serbian or anybody else's. However, since it

8 were -- acted in a co-ordinated action with the 6th Brigade, we can say

9 that it was probably a unit of the TO staff and that most of its members

10 were Serb fighters. This is an order issued by the commander of the

11 staff of Territorial Defence which originated from the situation in

12 Sanski Most, and the fact that in that area there were significant Muslim

13 and Croatian forces that were very active. Since that area was far

14 beyond the front lines that had been established in the territory of the

15 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb forces did not have a

16 choice. Since they launched operations they had to face them and engage

17 them and neutralise those forces deep in their territory.

18 Q. Right. So the shorter answer would have been yes, that it

19 supports your thesis?

20 A. We can say that, yes, it supports the thesis that it was part of

21 the process to disarm Muslim and Croatian forces.

22 Q. Yeah, and according to you, it would also be to disarm Serbs who

23 illegally own weapons; correct? Because you said that's -- yesterday you

24 said that that was the task, to disarm everybody, regardless of

25 ethnicity?

Page 41966

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you consider this a legitimate military order?

3 A. Of course, I believe that this is a legitimate military order.

4 Irrespective of how it looks, the factual situation in that area at that

5 time was that there was a territory, there was a population, there were

6 authorities, and the authorities had to have control over that territory.

7 Q. All right. Let's move on now and look at some entries in diaries

8 of members of the Crisis Staff that preceded this order, where they talk

9 about the disarmament operation.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have 65 ter 23069, please.

11 Q. And, sir, what's coming up is the diary of a member of the

12 Sanski Most Crisis Staff named Dr. Nenad Davidovic.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have page 11 in the English and Serbian

14 quickly just to establish a date.

15 Q. All right. So there we can see we're on 21st of May, 1992.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go ahead two pages, please, to page 13 in

17 both languages.

18 Q. There we've got "meeting." This Crisis Staff member's notes.

19 "1. Disarm the population."

20 2 -- second point:

21 "Not necessary to seize weapons if they own a valid permit.

22 "Perform inspection ...

23 "Seize all weapons by hook or by crook ..."

24 A little further down:

25 "Everyone resisting Serbian authorities will be expelled together

Page 41967

1 with their families."

2 Number 2 -- after that, sorry:

3 "All extremists will be expelled from the municipality, while the

4 authorities guarantee safety to all loyal citizens.

5 "Disarming on Sunday."

6 So this member of the ARK Crisis Staff is expressly referring to

7 expelling families; correct?

8 A. He's referring to expelling extremists, and he adds to that

9 "their families." Extremists, those who are not loyal, who have weapons

10 without permission, and who do not comply with the authorities.

11 Q. Right. Now, very briefly, do you agree with me that the SOS in

12 Sanski Most, the Serbian defence forces, that that was a paramilitary

13 organisation of criminals?

14 A. I cannot accept such qualification. In order to assert something

15 like that, one would have to have a list of those individuals, i.e., of

16 those units and personal data for each and every member. We would have

17 to know what they did in order to be able to say that they were

18 organisations of criminals. In general terms, the Serbian defence forces

19 appeared during a very brief period of time in the territory of Bosnian

20 Krajina --

21 Q. Okay. I think I've -- I don't want to cut you off, but I do have

22 limited time and I think you've answered the question. And maybe if we

23 have time, I'll show you a list of the SOS members later.

24 Do you have any doubt that in this meeting the Crisis Staff

25 member Davidovic is referring to expelling the families, Muslim and Croat

Page 41968

1 families, who are considered extremists, not Serbs?

2 A. I don't know whether he said that or perhaps it is just a note of

3 something that somebody else said at that meeting. I'm not sure that he

4 himself said that. He was in charge of the minutes of the meeting, so it

5 may have been said by somebody else. It is about the resettling of

6 extremists and their families. He uses the word "moving extremists and

7 their families." I agree with that.

8 Q. Okay. And my question was: Do you have any doubt that what is

9 being referred to in this meeting is the families of Muslims and Croats

10 who are considered extremists, not Serbs?

11 A. It is not specified. We can't find this in the document. The

12 only thing that I can read here is those who resist Serbian authorities.

13 We can assume that those were Muslims and Croats.

14 Q. Let's go on to page 15 of --

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honours, may I tender that page? It's

16 not in evidence.

17 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. We don't believe that

18 the witness has been able to confirm the accuracy of this. We also

19 dispute the provenance and reliability of it. So when someone's private

20 diary is being offered, we think that they ought to be here to testify

21 before you for the truth or for the substance of the information

22 contained in it.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, other pages of this diary have been

24 admitted, so the provenance of the overall document has already been

25 established for the sake of admission. The witness is testifying about

Page 41969

1 what is going on in Sanski Most. He was not at this meeting but he has

2 been able to comment on it through his knowledge, through his report of

3 what happened in that Sanski Most and is able to say from reading this

4 that he assumes that it is about people who resisted the authorities,

5 meaning Muslims and Croats. So I think it's completely fair and I intend

6 to show another page of this document and ask the witness about it. It

7 fits with his report and testimony that only -- or he says that only

8 armed formations were targeted.

9 And the witness has also explained that Davidovic, he

10 understands, was the note-taker.

11 JUDGE KWON: Part of this was admitted through 490,

12 Witness KDZ490.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes. The other -- if I go to the next document as

14 well, the next page, perhaps we wait, I will show you how it is

15 corroborated by other documents which are in evidence that are beyond

16 dispute.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: In light of the fact that part of this diary has

19 already been admitted, the Chamber has no difficulty with adding this

20 page to the exhibit.

21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 If I could go on now to page 15 in both languages. This page has

23 been admitted.

24 Q. Here we see:

25 "Crisis Staff Meeting."

Page 41970

1 It's undated, but if we look at the conclusions, number 3 there

2 is:

3 "Protection of important buildings in Sanski Most - Colonel

4 Basara and Anicic (waterworks, silo ...)" et cetera.

5 And you may remember when we looked at the Crisis Staff decision

6 of the 21st of May meeting, which was P02613, yesterday, that

7 Crisis Staff decision appointed Basara in charge of protecting important

8 buildings including the silo. So this should be, again looking at the

9 earlier dates we looked at, Dr. Davidovic's notes of the 21st of May

10 meeting of the Crisis Staff. And if you look down we see:

11 "Colonel Basara - decree - calling them to hand in their

12 weapons ..."

13 So this refers to the disarmament operation which was referred to

14 in the decision. Then we have the note:

15 "Expelled from these areas forever."

16 So this is the 21st of May meeting, it talks about protection of

17 the silos, it talks about Basara and Anicic to put the plan of

18 disarmament in place, ensuring peace in Sanski Most, that's what the

19 21st decision says, but this one, when they're meeting, what they don't

20 write in their decision is there's a discussion about people being

21 expelled from these areas forever; right?

22 That's where a meeting where Basara, the 6th Krajina Brigade

23 commander, is present.

24 A. The key issue in my findings regarding those events, in reference

25 to the notes that were kept by the said person, is probably the

Page 41971

1 discussion at the meeting of the Crisis Staff. However, I never doubted

2 any of the documents in my findings, either in terms of the authors or

3 their contents. What I analysed, however, was the fact that the policy

4 of the authorities and the army was not to expel the population from

5 Sanski Most, because they explicitly ordered that protection should be

6 offered to all the loyal population irrespective of their ethnicity.

7 This is the main message regarding my attitude towards the situation in

8 Sanski Most. There are people who may have said that extremists should

9 be expelled, there's no doubt about that. There may have been inhumane

10 or hostile attitude towards some people; however, what I analysed, what

11 my expert analysis was about, was that that was not the official policy

12 of the Serbian authorities and its army and police --

13 Q. Okay --

14 A. -- in Bosnian Krajina --

15 Q. Okay. Let me stop you there. You keep repeating that and I

16 understand that. But what you said and what you criticised Mr. Brown for

17 was saying that Muslim and civilian population was targeted by the VRS,

18 not just armed formations. And what I'm trying to show you is what is

19 said behind the scenes, at the Crisis Staff before that order you

20 consider legitimate came out.

21 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to page 18, please.

22 Q. Crisis Staff meeting, 25th of May, just before the disarmament

23 combat starts.

24 "Protection of important buildings ..." we saw that before,

25 Davidovic has noted "done."

Page 41972

1 "Organise two prisons ..."

2 Persons to be arrested.

3 "Do not arrest with weapons.

4 "Civilians for exchange ..."

5 So the day before the combat operation starts, this member of the

6 Crisis Staff has listed:

7 "Do not arrest with weapons.

8 "Civilians for exchange ..."

9 "Do no arrest with weapons," that means during the combat

10 operation, if they come across somebody who's armed, don't take them

11 prisoner, don't arrest them; right?

12 A. The objective of any combat operation is the destruction of the

13 enemy and that is quite legitimate. I cannot really tell what he meant

14 here, but what I wish to say is that all those who are in the territory,

15 under the control of the Serbian authorities, had the choice to hand-over

16 their weapons and live peacefully. They opted for combat or fighting and

17 that's when the actions occurred.

18 Q. Okay.

19 "Civilians for exchange."

20 Very quickly, from what you know as a military expert, during the

21 combat operations after 25th of May, in Sanski Most, were large numbers

22 of civilians captured and held prisoner and then later exchanged? Muslim

23 and Croat civilians I'm speaking of.

24 A. Procedures were conducted here of detaining a number of persons

25 for whom it was subsequently established that they did not put up armed

Page 41973

1 resistance to the army in that disarmament operation and they were

2 subsequently, for the most part, released. And the policy was for the

3 civilians to be released. When we talk about this item, civilians for

4 exchange, at that time already there was strong pressure and the desire

5 on the part of the Serbs to leave from areas under the control of Muslims

6 and Croats to areas under Serb control. So there are other documents

7 that attest to this. So what was left is for the civilians, Muslims and

8 Croats, to be exchanged, for civilians, Serbs who were in territory under

9 the control of Muslims and Croats. So in that sense, when you compare

10 that and when you use this factual analysis, then you come to the point

11 of why this is here, the civilians for exchange. But those who wanted to

12 stay, who were loyal, there was no pressure at all exerted on them.

13 Q. All right. Let's go to another document about this same meeting.

14 MR. NICHOLLS: P03635. Now, if I could have English page 33,

15 Serbian page 25. I read out the wrong number I think. P03329. Sorry.

16 Q. And while this is coming up, this is the diary of the president

17 of the Crisis Staff, Nedeljko Rasula. Did you know him at all in a

18 personal capacity? If you could answer that quickly.

19 A. I had the opportunity to meet Nedeljko Rasula.

20 Q. When?

21 A. In 1992/1993. I knew him during the war.

22 Q. When in 1992?

23 A. Perhaps - I cannot be precise - but I think that perhaps it was

24 sometime in the autumn of 1992 that I had the opportunity to meet him

25 first.

Page 41974

1 Q. And where? In Sanski Most or somewhere else?

2 A. No, no, not in Sanski Most. I think that it was during a meeting

3 which was held in Bijeljina at that time, in the autumn. I cannot recall

4 the details now. That was the first time I saw him.

5 Q. All right. Okay. These are his notes of the same meeting,

6 25th of May, 1992 --

7 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, if we can go back one page in the English.

8 Q. And you'll notice that they match Dr. Davidovic's, number 1, the

9 same:

10 "Information on security of important features."

11 Number 3:

12 "The disarmament plan and its beginning."

13 Number 4:

14 "... arrest of leaders ..."

15 I want you to look at item 3:

16 "Tuesday at 6.00 to 7.00 the operation begins.

17 "The fighting will not stop until they surrender.

18 "... no prisoners if armed.

19 "Captured civilians to be used for exchanges."

20 So he's written down a little bit more in detail than

21 Dr. Davidovic did --

22 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the next page.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, Your Honour, yes, next page. My copy's

24 different.

25 JUDGE KWON: In English.

Page 41975

1 MR. NICHOLLS: It's at the top of the page.

2 Q. Now:

3 "No prisoners if armed."

4 That means take no prisoners if armed; right?

5 A. What he really meant by that I really cannot tell now, but I

6 assume that that could have been that. However, we don't know who is

7 saying this in order to be able to subject that to any kind of particular

8 analysis because the Crisis Staff is not the one that can set combat

9 rules for army units.

10 Q. No. Well, in that case let's please go to, very quickly, the

11 meeting of 24 May --

12 MR. NICHOLLS: If we could go to same document, English page 31,

13 Serbian page 25. Should be the 24th of May meeting. Yes.

14 Q. I wasn't going to show this, but since you brought it up, the

15 24th of May, Crisis Staff meeting:

16 "Colonel Basara proposed a strike at the strongest point."

17 Next entry in item 3:

18 "Colonel Anicic suggested Bojancic, Demisevci ..." and then some

19 other places.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: If we can go to the next page in English.

21 "Colonel Basara will prepare an operation against Demisevci

22 evening. The proposal was not accepted. It was decided that it should

23 be take place on Tuesday."

24 Q. Although Colonel Basara is under the command of General Talic,

25 these decisions on where to attack and when are being taken in

Page 41976

1 consultation with the Crisis Staff members; correct?

2 A. Undoubtedly for some reason, the Crisis Staff here

3 suggested - and Colonel Basara probably accepted or gave up the -- or

4 abandoned the previously planned action - we cannot really tell exactly

5 how this process proceeded of co-ordinating. But I think in the

6 continuation it says that it's possible that it's just being postponed

7 from the evening to the morning or similar time, as it says here --

8 Q. Okay. My point --

9 A. -- it should be done.

10 Q. My point is that these decisions are being taken in consultation

11 with the Crisis Staff, the military decisions; right?

12 A. No, military decisions -- or rather, the Crisis Staff does not

13 make military decisions. The Crisis Staff monitors the situation, notes

14 problems, and seeks to resolve them. If it's a matter of disarmament,

15 that would be something that would be delegated to an army representative

16 or a commander of a unit --

17 Q. Let -- let --

18 A. -- so in that sense they did co-ordinate --

19 Q. All right. Let me just stop you because that's what I said was

20 consultation, not that the Crisis Staff ordered.

21 Let's go back to where we were on the 25th of May, please.

22 MR. NICHOLLS: And could we go to the next page in the English.

23 Q. Okay:

24 "Captured civilians to be used for exchange."

25 That's unambiguously talking about taking -- capturing civilians

Page 41977

1 and using them; correct? So Muslims civilians are going to be captured

2 and used for exchanges; right?

3 A. There is no suggestion here of civilians being captured, but it

4 would happen that, in an area, you could not make a selection of those

5 who were being -- who were giving themselves up, especially if we're

6 talking about the male population. So you could not immediately carry

7 out a triage and then in such cases it would happen that civilians would

8 be captured. This did happen, but if this did happen, then they would be

9 used for an exchange. I don't see anyone here saying that civilians

10 should be captured. For that reason, they wouldn't have to go into

11 combat in order to capture civilians. They could assemble civilians from

12 any settlement where they were loyal to the authorities and then exchange

13 them. All of this applied to combat and understandably sometimes there

14 would be an error and then a civilian would be brought in or captured.

15 Q. Right. I don't want to belabour the point, but this doesn't say

16 captured civilians to be released back to their homes. It doesn't say

17 triage to be performed to make sure that captured civilians are not held

18 unjustly. It says:

19 "Captured civilians to be used ..."

20 A. This diary by Mr. Rasula is his notes, something that he drafted,

21 where he noted things that he thought were of importance. This was

22 not -- these are not notes from Crisis Staff meetings where we could see

23 what was really said in the full sense of the word. I will just continue

24 and where it says no capture with weapons and then it also says battles

25 should continue until surrender. So these interpretations are

Page 41978

1 conflicting. How can you say these two things and understand them? It's

2 a question of how Rasula was taking his notes. So when there is combat,

3 it's normal to assume that there were those captured, but at the bottom

4 it says "no." So this would need to be analysed more carefully so that

5 we would see the official document that was the result of the content of

6 those meetings.

7 Q. Well, that's my point exactly, sir, that the official document

8 which we looked at, the Grmec order written by the TO commander, does not

9 say "capture civilians for exchange," does not say "take no prisoners if

10 armed." But that's what was discussed in meetings of the Crisis Staff in

11 which Anicic and Basara were members. These are notes of a Crisis Staff

12 meeting. So you can't just rely on the official version because it's

13 unusual for an official document, an official order, to contain orders to

14 commit crimes.

15 A. I agree with that, that official orders usually do not contain

16 paragraphs that would lead to crimes being committed, but in the same way

17 we cannot accept that it was an official policy that somebody at some

18 meeting made some comment or said something. Only what is stated in an

19 official document in keeping with professional rules is something we

20 could consider to be correct and official conduct. That there were

21 official talks is -- that's something you could conclude on the basis of

22 this, but that was not accepted and only documents would indicate what

23 the actual position was of the authorities and of the army on certain

24 issues.

25 Q. All right. Well, we'll see that very soon. Let's go to the next

Page 41979

1 page of the Serbian, staying where we are on the English, please, to the

2 26th of May Crisis Staff meeting. Did you know Major Veljko Brajic of

3 the 1 KK?

4 A. I did. I knew Major Veljko Brajic. I met him in 1994. He was

5 the commander of the Doboj Brigade.

6 Q. Yeah, that was later. Here he is in 26 of May, 1992, speaking at

7 the Crisis Staff meeting. We see he talked about himself, his

8 personality, gave a kind of background. He said, at least according to

9 Rasula's notes, something along the lines of to establish a Serbian state

10 in which the rule of law will apply. SDS decisions are not heeded here.

11 Go down a bit.

12 "In future work, we must make sure:

13 "(a) that prisoners of war are to be taken over from the MUP,

14 held overnight, and the most extreme among them isolated and punished so

15 as not to walk on this earth ..."

16 Now, that's not something you're ever going to see written in an

17 order, is it, punish people so that they are not able to walk on the

18 earth, but that's what Rasula wrote down that he said in this meeting.

19 So you have to look beyond the official documents to see what the real

20 intentions are, don't you?

21 A. Well, this part, that they would not walk this earth, that's

22 something that I would understand more in a symbolic light because anyone

23 who's against the country and against those authorities, that's something

24 that maybe he meant because that contradicts what he said at the top, to

25 establish a Serbian state with rule of law. If you establish a state

Page 41980

1 where the rule of law applies, you cannot then stop somebody from walking

2 this earth. This is something that cannot be conceived and it's not

3 something that can actually be implemented. So these are indicators that

4 you could not really evaluate to say something like that, it's beyond any

5 criteria. I really cannot tell what he wanted to say by this.

6 Q. Well, I don't know what you mean by "can't be implemented,"

7 because after the disarmament operation there were Muslim individuals

8 taken prisoner and beaten to death in Sanski Most; right?

9 A. There were incidents where the outcome was death. There were

10 individuals who took justice into their own hands and I'm not denying

11 that, I never did. What I do deny is the existence of a plan for

12 somebody to be beaten up, for prisoners of war to be mistreated,

13 punished. The existence of such an intention, but there were such

14 instances, yes.

15 Q. All right.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: And just quickly, could we go down to item (f) in

17 the English. We need to go to the next page. Serbian page 26.

18 And just very quickly here, we see that something else that

19 Major Brajic said was that:

20 "The announcements on Radio Sana are not censored.

21 I just want to now go to P00725, look at one of these radio

22 broadcasts. This is a radio broadcast of 27 May 1992 in Sanski Most.

23 Q. It's a transcript, I'm not going to play the tape, sir.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to e-court 5, English; Serbian,

25 page 4.

Page 41981

1 Your Honours, while it's coming up I'll say that P00135 and

2 P00122, it's the evidence provided by Faik Biscevic in this case, that he

3 was one of the speakers on this tape on that date and authenticated it.

4 Sorry, B/C/S -- Serbian page 9.

5 Q. So this was after -- the day after the meeting we just saw, the

6 Crisis Staff meeting, the 26th of May, in which the 1 KK major said the

7 extremists to be treated not to walk the earth. I want you to look at

8 the female voice which should be at the top of your page.

9 "We call upon the inhabitants of Pobrijezje to bring all their

10 weapons and military equipment to the crossroads at the check-point by

11 1800 hours. If not, at exactly 1810 hours we will begin to shell the

12 village. If the order is not complied with, we will not bear moral or

13 material responsibility for the consequences of the shelling."

14 And then we see "male voice, Faik Biscevic." And you're familiar

15 with the Biscevic family, aren't you, of Sanski Most?

16 A. I did hear of that family. We don't know each other, but I did

17 hear that that was an old Muslim family in Sanski Most which was

18 influential and had -- was a prominent family at the time.

19 Q. Yeah. Let's look at what Faik Biscevic said on this tape.

20 "That all Muslims and Croats unconditionally hand over all the

21 weapons they possess legally and illegally and that they surrender to the

22 Serbian army and government because this is a Serbian town. To avoid the

23 soldiers having to use force to locate and seize weapons, it would be

24 better to hand over the weapons voluntarily, otherwise Sana will continue

25 to be destroyed until final capitulation. That is why we call upon the

Page 41982

1 citizens of Sana, Muslims and Croats, to hand over their weapons straight

2 away, which would be better for them to have their town continue to be

3 destroyed ..."

4 Now, when Faik Biscevic made that statement, he'd been brought

5 there by soldiers of the 1 KK. He was forced to read that statement. He

6 was a prisoner. He had guns pointed at him. I'm putting it to you that

7 statement tells us exactly what was going on; right? Muslims and Croats

8 and - Muslims and Croats only - are ordered to turn over all weapons,

9 legal or illegally held; right?

10 A. This is a transcript of what was broadcast on Radio Sana of

11 Sanski Most. It was read out. I cannot say whether Faik did this under

12 duress. One cannot see whether he had a gun pointed at him. Now,

13 speaking about the destruction of the town of Sanski Most, the town

14 itself was not destroyed otherwise traces of that would have been

15 visible. In 1993 I had an opportunity to pass through Sanski Most and I

16 didn't see any major consequences of destruction --

17 Q. Let me stop you. Let me stop you. What about Mahala?

18 A. Mahala was a significantly destroyed stronghold where houses were

19 indeed devastated.

20 Q. Okay. Well, this is after -- just after the operation we saw,

21 Grmec 92, signed by the TO commander, was put in place. You said you

22 didn't see anything in that operation that would suggest it was

23 illegitimate. But what's being broadcast is for all the Muslim and Croat

24 inhabitants only to turn over their weapons or their towns like Mahala

25 will continue to be destroyed; right?

Page 41983

1 A. In the order I did not see that any facilities were ordered to be

2 destroyed unless they are being used for operations or if they were

3 turned into strongholds. Reference here is made to the destruction of

4 the town which definitely cannot be true because most of the inhabitants

5 of the town were Serbs. Indiscriminate destruction of the town was

6 impossible. No one would have had such an idea.

7 Q. I'm not going back to the order, but it said to defend Serb

8 neighbourhoods. Nobody is saying that Serb neighbourhoods were targeted

9 by the 1 KK.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: Let's go to page 7 in English, Serbian page 11.

11 Q. And just under where it says "command of the Serbian armed

12 forces," we see the female voice:

13 "... all the struggle and retaliation will be in vain, you're not

14 capable of standing up to the forces of the Army of the Serbian Republic

15 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the statement of the Serbian armed forces

16 command states. It adds, your resistance will force us to destroy and

17 devastate your villages, which means that you will not be able to live

18 with us in these territories. If you want to go on living in these

19 territories, accept co-operation, hand over all the weapons and military

20 equipment and surrender to the Serbian authorities all the extremists who

21 force you to fight. As long as one of you has a weapon, you risk the

22 destruction of your houses and families ..."

23 That is exactly how the disarmament went in Sanski Most, isn't

24 it?

25 A. Those who had accepted to be disarmed and did so, in the zone of

Page 41984

1 the 1st Corps and in Sanski Most as well, were not exposed either to

2 attacks or forcible disarmament. However, those who put up resistance

3 and attacked the army certainly were subjected to disarmament with the

4 use of military force and that there were casualties. So they had two

5 choices: Either to surrender the weapon and wait for a solution.

6 Q. Right. And what this says is that if the Serb armed forces -- if

7 the VRS believes that not all weapons have been surrendered by the

8 dead-line, they will shell the towns, the Muslim neighbourhoods; correct?

9 A. That's what it reads, but one knows very well what an ultimatum

10 is. It is not an invention of the Serbian army, of the Serbian

11 authority. In 1999, Serbia was given an ultimatum which it rejected and

12 was subsequently attacked. This is a means which is generally accepted

13 internationally but also in civil wars. Ultimatums are issued to the

14 opposing side in order to avoid resorting to a different and more

15 difficult solution for everybody involved. So one can abide by the

16 ultimatum or not. They chose not to do it. They exposed themselves to

17 operation, they became a legitimate military target. They were carrying

18 out operations in this territory and one must always keep in mind that we

19 are not speaking about the front line; we are speaking about the

20 territory deep behind the front lines.

21 Q. Right. And we saw here that the call was to Muslim inhabitants,

22 civilians, to surrender their legally and illegally owned weapons under

23 threat of shelling. So are you considering that -- are you saying that's

24 a legitimate ultimatum. If civilians keep some hunting rifles, the way

25 the VRS can disarm them is by shelling their village?

Page 41985

1 A. There are emergency situations, and for that reason there are

2 Crisis Staff in which it is possible that personal weapons for personal

3 defence can be confiscated from citizens if the authorities deem that to

4 be necessary. So if someone had something in possession, the authority

5 had a right for them to be surrendered against a receipt and then to be

6 returned to them once the conditions are in place. So we are not talking

7 about something which was either legal or illegal. The situation was

8 difficult, there were daily incidents in which the army or the police

9 were attacked, and quite simply, the Serb forces were compelled to resort

10 to forcible confiscation. But they were called up to submit and

11 surrender that voluntarily and thus avoid such consequences. The

12 destruction was not an outcome of the intention, but rather, an outcome

13 of rejecting to accept certain authority in a certain area. And I'm not

14 being specific about who I'm talking to.

15 Q. Okay. And yesterday you claimed that the disarmament operations

16 were -- were ethnically neutral, that they were not aimed at just Muslims

17 and Croats, but at everybody equally. There's nothing in anything we've

18 seen, these Crisis Staff notes, in the broadcast, there is no hint

19 anywhere that Serbs also must turn in their weapons. It's expressly

20 directed at Muslims and Croats. Do you still say the 1 KK disarmed

21 Sanski Most equally?

22 A. I'm saying definitely that they equally treated everyone in

23 Sanski Most who were possessing weapons illegally and for whom they knew

24 that they had illegal weapons. We didn't see any documents, or rather,

25 there were no available documents about the Serbs being in possession of

Page 41986

1 these arms. But as far as the corps is concerned, when they issued their

2 orders they never discriminate against any ethnic community. Rather,

3 they said: Collect all illegal weapons from the population. And quite

4 often they would use the phrase "irrespective of their ethnicity." This

5 is what I spoke about.

6 Now, how many Serbs were in illegal possession of fire-arms is a

7 subject of another analysis.

8 Q. Okay. Well, during the break, if you have time, if you don't

9 mind, I'd like you to look -- or point me to the 1 KK documents that say

10 disarm, irrespective of ethnicity. If you can show me those because I

11 must have missed them.

12 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I go to P03928, please. This is footnoted

13 in Mr. Brown's report at footnotes 340 and 452. And I want to look at

14 who was taken prisoner.

15 Q. You talked about the difficulties in performing triage and

16 sorting out who is who. This is from the 15th of June. It's a MUP

17 report from the chief in Sanski Most, Vrucinic, report on the process of

18 disarming paramilitary formations in the Sanski Most SJB. And it begins:

19 "Serbian army units and commands (six brigades), TO units, and

20 SJB have for some time been disarming paramilitary Muslim and Croatian

21 formations in the Sanski Most municipal area.

22 "The action of peaceful disarming and surrendering of weapons was

23 carried out in the period between 10 May and 25 May 1992. During

24 that ... the Muslim and Croatian population handed over only hunting

25 weapons and other legally owned weapons, but illegally obtained military

Page 41987

1 weapons were not surrendered, and were concealed (buried) on instructions

2 from above.

3 "On 25 May 1992, this 'disarming' was followed by a military

4 action (attack) against the down-town neighbourhood of Mahala, which

5 resulted in the capture of 2.000 civilians, but no significant amount of

6 weapons have been found because they had been concealed earlier ..."

7 Now, first, we agree Mahala was a Muslim neighbourhood, right,

8 and you already said it suffered significant destruction; right.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Nothing here talks about disarming Serbs or Serb paramilitaries,

11 does it? That's a yes or no question, I think.

12 A. No, it doesn't. There's no mention of Serbs here.

13 Q. So this operation which we were looking at, this is after the

14 notes and the tape, 2.000 civilians captured. Is that -- sorry, capture

15 2.000 civilians. Do you still doubt that those diary entries which said

16 capture civilians for exchange meant exactly what they said?

17 A. When analysing this document, I made a comparison with another

18 document which says - I think it's a military report - which says that of

19 the 800 or 900 captives, there were 400 long-barrelled weapons found with

20 them. And this is a significant amount of weapons. I'm not aware of any

21 operation carried out by the army where the police acted as a service for

22 taking in the captives and where the seized weapons were stocked. I

23 don't know what the commander, or rather, what kind of information the

24 police had since the police was not itself involved in this operation, or

25 rather, was not leading this operation. But if you look at other

Page 41988

1 documents as well, we can find that they did indeed find certain amount

2 of weapons --

3 Q. Okay. I'm going to stop --

4 A. -- in my analysis, I wanted to know why 12 people were killed --

5 Q. I'm going to stop you because the question was if you -- do you

6 still doubt that those diary entries which said capture civilians for

7 exchange meant exactly what they said? That was the question, not how

8 many weapons were found.

9 A. I stand by what I said, that this was not an official policy of

10 the Serbian authorities and that it's not contained in any of the

11 documents issued by either the army or the civilian authorities.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that it was not

13 correctly noted "capture civilians for exchange," instead it should read

14 "captured civilians be exchanged."

15 MR. NICHOLLS:

16 Q. Okay. Last time I'm going to ask you this question. Do you

17 still doubt - you haven't answered it - that when we saw "captured

18 civilians for exchange," that that meant what it said, capture civilians

19 and use them to be exchanged?

20 A. I have no doubts that that is what is written, but I have doubts

21 that that was the actual intention and that it was implemented. I have

22 never seen any documents that would confirm that. The notes does not

23 give me enough ground to confirm yes, this is how it was going to be

24 done.

25 Q. All right. Let's look at another document.

Page 41989

1 MR. NICHOLLS: P02639, please.

2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

3 But you agree with Mr. Karadzic's intervention that the passage

4 in the diary said "captured civilians to be used for exchange"?

5 MR. NICHOLLS: I --

6 JUDGE KWON: Can we upload that document. Whether it said to

7 capture civilians to be used -- to use for exchange or to be used for

8 exchange.

9 MR. NICHOLLS: That should be P03329.

10 JUDGE KWON: 24th of May.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: It's actually 25th of May, Your Honour. Should be

12 English e-court 33, Serbian 25. Yes, it says: "Captured civilians to be

13 used for exchange." Thank you.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P02639 [Realtime transcript read in

16 error "P02369"], please.

17 Q. This is cited in Mr. Brown's report, sir, at 171 and 460. It's a

18 conclusion -- that's not the right -- 02639.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Could you repeat the number, Mr. Nicholls.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: I think the transcript is wrong, although I --

21 02639 is what I said. That's right in the Serbian.

22 Q. You've seen this document before, right, sir?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. All right. This is the 4th of June, Crisis Staff conclusions in

25 Sanski Most. Mirko Vrucinic, the chief of police; Nedeljko Rasula,

Page 41990

1 president of the Crisis Staff; Nedjo Anicic, TO commander, "shall be in

2 charge of resolving issues of prisoners and their categorisation and

3 deportation to Manjaca."

4 "1 ... politicians.

5 "2 ... nationalist extremists.

6 "3 ... people unwelcome in Sanski Most municipality ...

7 "In view of this, have a talk with Colonel Stevilovic from the

8 1 KK."

9 The first question: Colonel Stevilovic is the security chief,

10 right, at that time?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. One category I don't see here is combatants, another one I don't

13 see is war criminals. In your view is it legitimate to deport

14 politicians and people unwelcome to Manjaca?

15 A. I believe that prisoners, regardless of for which category of

16 population they come, all of those about whom, according to international

17 conventions, one can say that they have the status of a prisoner of war,

18 and it was my view that all those who were captured took part in combat

19 or were related and involved in these operations in a certain way and

20 that thus they can be afforded the status of prisoners of war. Now, as

21 for this categorisation, saying that someone is a politician, that

22 someone was an extremist, or that they were undesirable as a result of

23 their conduct is an additional scheme of qualifications for which I found

24 no grounds in the documents I reviewed.

25 Now, back to the question of prisoners, I believe that all those

Page 41991

1 who were taken prisoners should enjoy the status of prisoners of war.

2 As for this, this was done on a different basis and by applying

3 different criteria and this document doesn't show why they decided to

4 divide them into these categories in this way.

5 Q. Well, you're aware - and we'll get to them later - that there

6 were complaints from Manjaca camp that many, many prisoners were being

7 brought there who hadn't been involved in armed rebellions, who hadn't

8 resisted the Serb authorities, who had simply been rounded up, who were

9 simply civilians, and who were taken to Manjaca; right?

10 A. I'm aware of that. There were reports about that coming from the

11 camp and these reports exist. It is true that at times civilians were

12 held as well in this kind of prisoner centres.

13 Q. Yeah. And that would be people who Rasula, Anicic, and Vrucinic

14 decided were unwelcome in Sanski Most; right?

15 A. I assume -- I mean, I don't assume, but at that time there was a

16 decision that after being held temporarily, all prisoners of war would be

17 transported to the POW camp Manjaca. That was the only POW camp in the

18 area. All the others were remand centres, interrogation centres, or

19 holding centres. So the municipality and the brigade did not have any

20 resources to set up a camp there, so they sent everybody from Sanski Most

21 to Manjaca. Obviously there were errors made in the process that certain

22 civilians happened to find themselves in the Manjaca camp.

23 Q. Okay. We just read a document from the MUP that said they had

24 2.000 civilians captured, and I'd forgot to follow-up -- ask you a

25 follow-up question where you said you didn't know about the police being

Page 41992

1 involved in civilians. You know as an expert in this case, don't you,

2 that people captured -- Muslims captured in Sanski Most during the

3 disarmament operation were held in the MUP station there, don't you?

4 A. I know about that. I think it's either the matter of translation

5 or misunderstanding. I did not say that MUP was not involved. What I

6 said was that it was not the police who spear-headed the operation of

7 disarmament of paramilitary formations, or rather, those who possessed

8 illegal weapons. So they did not lead those actions, but I added that

9 the police premises were sometimes used to bring in those who were taken

10 prisoners and these premises were under the MUP control.

11 Q. Right. And --

12 MR. NICHOLLS: Actually, this would be a good time, Your Honour,

13 if we going to break at 10.30.

14 JUDGE KWON: At the outset of the hearing today I meant to ask

15 Mr. Tieger when we would expect or we could see the response of the

16 Prosecution to the accused's motion for suspension.

17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, I actually intended to raise

18 that on my own when we resumed at the break, but we are trying our best

19 to expedite a response and get it back to you by close of business Friday

20 or some point on late Friday. Again, if that -- I'm certain we'll be

21 able to get it in obviously before Monday, but our intention at this

22 point is to push hard to try to get it to the Court by Friday so that we

23 can -- if the Court intends to have a hearing, as I understand it does,

24 we can do so early in the following week.

25 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber appreciates the effort very much. Thank

Page 41993

1 you.

2 We'll resume at 11.00.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

6 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. Okay. In 1992 when you were in the 1 KK, you were chief of

8 security for the 1st Armoured Brigade, right, you told us that before?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Let me read you part of your Mladic testimony when you testified

11 here last month in that case, and just to orient you, this is concerning

12 your trip to Nova Kasaba and Bratunac on the 17th of July, 1995, when you

13 met and spoke with Zoran Malinic at Nova Kasaba. And he told you that on

14 the 12th/13th of July they had taken 2500 civilians and soldiers

15 prisoner. And you later testified about returning to the Main Staff

16 where you were meant to report. And Judge Moloto asked you a question.

17 This is at T 12890 in that case, and it was 18 June 2013.

18 Judge Moloto:

19 "Now, are you able to explain to us why you probably did not

20 highlight that civilians were present," speaking about those captured in

21 Nova Kasaba, "if you knew that keeping civilians as POWs is not

22 permissible according to the law?

23 "A. Well, as I conveyed that and the way in which I conveyed

24 that, I really cannot recall now. And why I did not highlight it then

25 and the form I put it in, I really have no recollection of that.

Page 42005

1 A. I really cannot say. I cannot tell.

2 Q. Okay. Well, we'll look at the document again that Mr. Karadzic

3 used on direct with you, which showed that this man was taken out of

4 Manjaca camp and you said, again at T 04994 [sic], regarding that

5 process:

6 "This was preceded by an order of the security chief of the 1 KK

7 and I was one of its members at the time and we went there, made this

8 arrangement, and this person was eventually released from the camp."

9 This is Edin Biscevic, who were talking about a little while ago

10 - his brother Nedim - was taken away on July 7th from Manjaca camp and

11 never seen again. His brother -- until this point his brother Haris was

12 taken away and never seen again. Now, this is the Biscevic family you

13 talked about. When you came to get him, did you know that his twin

14 brother had been given up by the camp and put back on the truck by the

15 people who brought those corpses to the camp?

16 A. No. No. As far as I can remember, I didn't see Nedim Biscevic

17 then. We were in the camp as a commission. I think we signed a

18 document, according to which the order of the 1st Corps chief of security

19 was being implemented and Edin Biscevic was being released from the camp.

20 And that was done then, that is what we confirmed. I don't even know if

21 I went to the actual camp out of the administration building to see

22 Nedim Biscevic. I confirmed the document and its authenticity, that I

23 was in the commission that was implementing the order by the chief of

24 security for that person to be released from the camp.

25 Q. And this is that same person, right, Nedim Biscevic from

Page 42006

1 Sanski Most?

2 A. If we could see the document again, then I think -- yes, if it

3 says "Nedim," then that's probably that. I said that I didn't recognise

4 the face.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Let's bring up D03843, please. 3843 -- D, it's D,

6 sorry, it's Mr. Karadzic's exhibit.

7 Q. That's the document, right, Nedim Biscevic, son of Faik, so it's

8 the same person; right?

9 A. Yes, probably.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, I tender 25371.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Keserovic?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The date here is the 17th of June.

14 I don't know whether that refers to the date of the document, but at the

15 top it should state "August" or this is something else. I don't want

16 there to be any confusion. It should be the 26th of August, 1992.

17 JUDGE KWON: Handwritten thing is in 2002.

18 MR. NICHOLLS:

19 Q. Yeah, if you look at the top left, Mr. Keserovic, it says

20 "August 1992, 26th August.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I don't see the point of

23 admitting the article and the substance of it. The witness hasn't been

24 able to confirm anything about this 2007 article, other than it's the

25 same person. So I don't -- unless they just want to admit the photograph

Page 42007

1 without the text, I don't see any basis for admitting the article.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, he's also confirmed it's the same person and

3 that it's part of the same family that he knew of in Sanski Most. He

4 didn't know that this person's -- that Nedim Biscevic's twin brother had

5 been taken away and killed, but he was able to comment that this article

6 concerns the same person that he took out of the camp. They're both sons

7 of Faik Biscevic.

8 MR. ROBINSON: But that can't open the door to everything that

9 the person later says just because it's the same person.

10 JUDGE KWON: So how is that article relevant to the Prosecution

11 case? Are you tendering it for the credibility issue or ...?

12 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm tendering it to show that it's corroborative

13 of the testimony in the case which is in the case by the father who is

14 now deceased, Faik Biscevic, and it links the two brothers, the

15 two -- twins. And the witness has corroborated the fact that this man

16 was in Manjaca camp, which is what the article is about.

17 JUDGE KWON: So Faik Biscevic, who appeared in the radio

18 broadcast transcript?

19 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes, he's this man's father.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE KWON: We have a basis to admit it. We'll assign a number

22 for that.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6466, Your Honours.

24 MR. NICHOLLS:

25 Q. Okay. Very quickly, again your testimony was that you were one

Page 42008

1 of the members of this commission. We can see that on D03843. It was

2 preceded by an order of the security chief, and that Vojo Kupresanin,

3 president of the ARK Assembly, is the person who took over this prisoner,

4 signed the document. Tell me how this worked. Why is a prisoner from

5 Manjaca camp being taken over, with your involvement, by the president of

6 the ARK Assembly?

7 A. Here in the document it is not written, but the president of the

8 ARK Assembly appeared - as far as I can remember - and it was said that

9 he had the permission of President Karadzic or someone from the top

10 Serbian leadership for that person to be released from the camp. In view

11 of the fact that these were persons who were members of the army, this

12 had to be co-ordinated with the security chief from the corps command who

13 was Stevan Bogojevic at the time. So he issued an oral order for that

14 person to be handed over to Mr. Kupresanin, and this is that record that

15 the -- that Kupresanin took that person from the camp and took that

16 person out of the camp. So I want to specify that I wasn't the one who

17 took the person out of the camp because this is what was suggested to me

18 in the interpretation.

19 Q. Okay. And what did Vojo Kupresanin do with this former prisoner?

20 Was he kept a prisoner, taken somewhere else and imprisoned again, or was

21 he released? What happened?

22 A. According to my recollection, I think that he was released then

23 and that he was not taken to any other camp or prison later. I don't

24 know where he went afterwards --

25 Q. Okay. So I take it he wasn't a dangerous Green Beret killer or

Page 42009

1 he wouldn't have just been released, right? He wasn't a war criminal,

2 this dentist?

3 A. Perhaps that was the reason that the authorities released him

4 from the prisoner of war camp.

5 Q. So let me just get it straight and then we'll move on. This man

6 is arrested in Sanski Most, this dentist, during the disarmament

7 operation. He's brought to Sanski Most on 7 July. His two brothers are

8 murdered. And he's not released until the end of August 1992? Why does

9 it take that long to release him if he's not a criminal?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have a reference

11 where it was established that he did not take part in preparations for

12 fighting or --

13 JUDGE KWON: That's not a --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- aided the fighting in some other

15 way.

16 JUDGE KWON: That's not a proper intervention.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But Mr. Nicholls --

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is taking that as an established

20 matter.

21 JUDGE KWON: He asked the witness -- he asked the question. It's

22 fair enough to continue.

23 MR. NICHOLLS:

24 Q. Why does it take that long to release him if he shouldn't be

25 there?

Page 42010

1 A. The procedure of reception and release of prisoners of war is set

2 down. When this person was brought to the POW camp, together with the

3 accompanying documentation, the list where his name was, was taken in and

4 treated and considered as a prisoner of war by the camp administration.

5 As for the period when certain categories of persons are identified as

6 persons who should not be held any longer until the time they are

7 released, that period is a relative thing because there are many

8 questions that are posed there. At that time, it was simply not possible

9 to take out Nedim Biscevic and say: You are free, you can go wherever

10 you want. He wouldn't have had anywhere to go, so you had to create

11 preconditions for some official organ, some humanitarian organisation or

12 some other subject that had the possibility of unrestricted movement and

13 passage to take that person together with the proper documentation. So

14 it's really a relative thing as to how long it took for all of these

15 conditions to be created.

16 I would just like to add, there were others -- there were other

17 categories - we have documents - other categories of persons who, because

18 there was no longer any need for them to remain at the camp, were

19 released. Some of them went abroad for medical treatment --

20 Q. Okay. Let me stop you --

21 A. -- religious officials were also released --

22 Q. Let me stop you because we're going to talk about releases and

23 then you can explain. This doesn't give any category of why he's

24 released, does it? Yes or no? It just says he's released.

25 A. But he was a prisoner of war of that status. It does not say why

Page 42011

1 he was released. It doesn't say that here, but you can see that he was

2 released and that a representative of the government and the responsible

3 command of the 1st Corps were also involved in the process.

4 Q. Yeah. And what you said just a moment ago was he wouldn't have

5 anywhere to go. He couldn't just go home to Sanski Most, could he, even

6 if he was found to have been an improperly imprisoned civilian? Because

7 they'd taken out -- they deported to Manjaca everybody unwelcome in

8 Sanski Most.

9 A. That is oversimplifying things --

10 Q. Sorry, you said he would have nowhere to go --

11 A. -- if you put it in that way --

12 Q. You said he would have nowhere to go.

13 A. Yes. He didn't have anywhere to go. Manjaca is far away, not

14 too far away, but it's far away from Sanski Most. There was no means for

15 him to go or any place to go without the proper transport means. Public

16 transport --

17 Q. Okay, sorry, let me stop you --

18 A. -- was not functioning and there were no communications for him

19 to be able to call anyone --

20 Q. I see what you're saying. You didn't say there was no bus, you

21 didn't say he couldn't call a cab, you didn't say he couldn't hitchhike.

22 You said he wouldn't have had anywhere to go.

23 A. Had he been released without this procedure, he wouldn't know

24 where to go and he wouldn't have anywhere to go. He could have just

25 stayed in front of the camp. It was just that sort of situation.

Page 42012

1 Q. Okay. At page 93 of your report you state that:

2 "The fact that cases of unlawfulness which did occur were

3 isolated cases committed by individuals acting on their own and without

4 orders, such cases, as was the murder of Omer Filipovic, were

5 investigated and documented. Today the perpetrators are still serving

6 their prison sentences which were handed down by the Serb court and

7 prosecutors."

8 Now, you don't say "military court" there, you say "Serb court,"

9 and that's because the murderers of Omer Filipovic weren't tried in the

10 Banja Luka military court, were they?

11 A. I think that the final verdict was handed down a little bit

12 later. I don't know which court it was that actually handed down the

13 sentence. I would need to look at that. I cannot remember.

14 Q. Well, let me help you, it's the district court in Banja Luka,

15 criminal case number K5/06, accused Zeljko Bulatovic, et cetera, et al.,

16 and it was in 2006.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. And you said:

19 "The fact that in some cases even camp wardens -- even the camp

20 warden was unable to control ordinary guards but such cases were

21 eventually rectified through disciplinary and criminal sanctions against

22 the offenders."

23 So again, are you crediting the 1 KK preventing crime,

24 disciplining offenders, prosecuting the guilty for a conviction in 2006

25 in a civilian court, over ten years after the war ended?

Page 42013

1 A. I am not saying that the proceedings in 2006 were conducted

2 thanks to the 1st Krajina Corps because it ceased to exist much earlier.

3 What I am saying is that problems did exist, they were identified, and

4 the camp administration did report to the corps command of those problems

5 and the corps command in turn reacted and issued orders that measures be

6 taken in respect of those who were behaving wilfully and committing the

7 atrocities and crimes and misdemeanours.

8 Q. Okay. Okay. You'd been to Manjaca camp. You were in the 1 KK

9 in 1992. You tell me the name of one camp guard, one person working at

10 the camp who was prosecuted in a military court during the period of the

11 war, one.

12 A. I am not -- I don't know. I was there for a short period of

13 time. I was at the Manjaca camp briefly, but -- and I was at the

14 1st Krajina Corps only until the 14th of September, with a break when I

15 was on sick leave for over one month because I was wounded --

16 Q. Okay. So you don't know. That's the answer.

17 A. -- I don't know. I don't know.

18 Q. Okay. You testified in the State Court in BiH, right, in

19 April 2012?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that was about camps run by the ABiH in which Serbs were kept

22 in terrible conditions; right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And in that case - and I'm referring to 65 ter 25408, e-court

25 pages 135 to 136 - you were asked by Defence counsel about how as an

Page 42014

1 expert in that case you came to your findings. And you were asked:

2 "Well, this claim of yours, expert, requires analysis. How did

3 you determine that POWs were physically and mentally ill-treated? What

4 proof do you have in that regard?"

5 "You had said it was done by guards at the detention centres.

6 How did you determine that, Mr. Keserovic, you included that in your

7 report?"

8 Your answer was:

9 "Yes, I relied on the statements of the POWs."

10 "Q. Thank you. How did you determine that other soldiers came

11 to the detention centre and ill-treated the POWs? How did you determine

12 that?

13 "A. The same, based on documents in the case file.

14 "Q. Did you use other types of evidence or did you rely on

15 statements of POWs?

16 "A. Well, for the most part I relied on the statements of POWs."

17 So that in that case was a legitimate way for you to determine

18 conditions in the camp and how prisoners were treated when you were

19 talking in the state court about a camp run by the ABiH. In your report

20 I don't see any reliance whatsoever on statements by prisoners in Manjaca

21 camp; right? You didn't include that in your analysis for this Court

22 here?

23 A. All the documents that were used by Mr. Brown and that I received

24 from Mr. Karadzic's Defence, I included in this report or in these

25 findings. I did not deny the bad, I can even say insufferable,

Page 42015

1 unbearable conditions at the Manjaca camp. The only thing that I

2 disputed was that this was the product of the intention of the camp

3 command, the 1st Krajina Corps command, or of the authorities to keep

4 people in such conditions. Therefore, I do not dispute that the

5 conditions were difficult, that there were insufficient quantities of

6 food, that there was a shortage of water and so on. But it was the best

7 possible that could be provided at the camp at the time in those

8 conditions --

9 Q. Exactly. I'm not talking about conditions. That's where I

10 started. I'm not talking about the water-supply. I'm talking about

11 prisoners being savagely beaten. I can move on quickly if you'll say to

12 me you don't dispute that prisoners in Manjaca were beaten -- terribly

13 beaten by the guards there?

14 A. There were cases when prisoners were beaten, but that was not a

15 rule and it was not permitted. I saw reports and statements about these

16 cases when people were beaten. I'm not disputing that.

17 Q. All right. I'll move on more quickly.

18 MR. NICHOLLS: Let me just quickly go to P02972, please. I'm

19 skipping ahead.

20 Q. Now, to save some time I'm not going to go through the documents,

21 but you'll just agree with me that, just like Sanski Most, prisoners were

22 brought to Manjaca from Kljuc municipality as well; correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. All right. Let's look at what was going on in Kljuc. This is

25 the Serbian Republic Ministry of the Interior Banja Luka Security

Page 42016

1 Services Centre Kljuc.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, P02972. I keep giving you the wrong

3 numbers today. It is actually the right number.

4 Q. This is the 28th of September, 1992. Now, that's pretty late

5 after things started in May. This is a strictly confidential official

6 secret. It's the report on criminal offences committed in the

7 municipality since the armed rebellion broke out on 27 May 1992. So this

8 is a report on the situation from the end of May to the end of September.

9 Take a time to look at it, because I want to go through it in a bit of

10 detail. It starts off talking about how:

11 "On 27 May 1992, Muslim extremists caused an armed rebellion,"

12 which resulted in three members of the Serbian army and police being

13 killed and 30 members wounded.

14 Then it goes on to say there have been 36 murders, 106 torchings

15 and explosions, and 92 aggravated thefts and thefts.

16 The next paragraph is what I want you to focus on.

17 "These are officially reported indicators that do not reflect the

18 actual situation because a large number of offences were not reported due

19 to fear, the absence of an injured party, et cetera. In the first days

20 of the war, this Organisational Unit independently established more than

21 140 break-ins, mostly on the premises of the territory of Kljuc and

22 Sanica.

23 "The start of war activities was characterised by break-ins of

24 business premises and illegal entry into Muslim apartments by military

25 persons. Then came a process of provoking fear and pressuring persons of

Page 42017

1 Muslim nationality to move out by burning their houses, throwing

2 explosive devices, firing Zoljas, /hand-held rocket-launchers/, and

3 infantry weapons at apartment buildings.

4 "In fact, it was commonplace to set fire to an entire hamlet of

5 some 20 houses ... in a single night ..."

6 This is the same period as the documents we were looking at and

7 the tape for Sanski Most. The police here are reporting, aren't they,

8 that there was a process by which the military are pressuring the Muslims

9 to leave; right?

10 A. Well, I don't think that it was the army who was exerting

11 pressure on the Muslims to leave. Here we have a summary report or

12 information about criminal offences committed in the area of Kljuc

13 municipality covering the period of about 40 -- four months. And in

14 those four months, which were actually crucial months where significant

15 events took place, this information is probably correct.

16 When I looked at this document and evaluated it, I reached a

17 conclusion that the incidents, or rather, offences had undoubtedly been

18 committed, but that the majority of them -- it says here "military,"

19 which means member of the army because according to the law, military

20 personnel refers only to commissioned officers that have ranks, but in

21 this particular instance they probably referred to all members of the

22 military. As I said, a large majority of these incidents in which people

23 were victimised and where there were torching and looting was probably a

24 reaction to numerous incidents committed by Muslims and Croats during or

25 around this period, or rather, by the 27th of May or thereabouts.

Page 42018

1 Military columns were attacked, police were attacked, there were

2 instances of capture. So there were a lot of casualties --

3 Q. Stop, let me --

4 A. -- this information that over the four months the number of the

5 killed --

6 Q. Yeah, this talks about casualties and the rebellion of -- three

7 members of the Serbian army and police were killed and 30 wounded.

8 A. Quite simply, this information is not correct. More members of

9 the army than three were killed. Seven members were killed in a single

10 incident. They were passing by unarmed in a column and they came across

11 an ambush and that is where they were killed.

12 Q. All right. I'm going to skip over the part about the serious

13 crimes, the murders, the killing with hammers, et cetera. Go to the next

14 page in the English, where it does say at the top - and I think we need

15 to go to the next page in the witness's version as well - it does say

16 that:

17 "Recently, there have been actions of revenge in reaction to

18 soldiers being killed at the front. As a result, five people were killed

19 in their homes in Sanica."

20 But I want you to look at this part:

21 "Through operative work, information has been obtained that the

22 perpetrators are persons in uniform, that is, military persons who do not

23 fall under the jurisdiction of the SJB. However, due to war conditions,

24 the military security organs have only seldom discovered perpetrators and

25 they sanction such crimes by sending them to the front line. These

Page 42019

1 crimes are being reported to the station, which simply does not know how

2 to deal with them."

3 Now, that's exactly right, isn't it? The Court's seen

4 documentation here that instead of prosecuting members of the army who

5 committed crimes, they were released from custody and sent to the front.

6 Right?

7 A. Yes, there were such cases, and one of the measures was to

8 dispatch them to the front line.

9 Q. All right. Let me look at another document with you quickly.

10 And this goes to your --

11 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours ...

12 [Prosecution counsel confer]

13 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I think I have about ten minutes of

14 the three and a half hours I'd planned. I'm going to ask you for some

15 more time. The reasons I would give are, first of all, that

16 Mr. Karadzic, when you made your assessment, Mr. Karadzic had listed one

17 hour for the witness and used 4.5 hours on direct. And the second reason

18 is there is a brief period where the witness will recall he went down to

19 Nova Kasaba and Bratunac on 17 July 1995 at the order of General Mladic

20 and I'd like to ask him a couple questions about that as well.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll allow you to proceed.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. I'll try --

24 JUDGE KWON: About the schedule, then, we'll not hear Mr. Savcic

25 this week?

Page 42020

1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I think the -- given the

2 length of the re-direct examination and the fact that we have to start

3 with another witness on Monday, there wouldn't be much point in calling

4 him.

5 JUDGE KWON: So what would the schedule -- witness schedule be

6 like for next week? Djuric and Kos has a specific date, Monday and

7 Tuesday?

8 MR. ROBINSON: Well -- yes. Djuric will testify first thing

9 Monday morning and then General Savcic will testify right after him.

10 Then we will probably have the videolink on Tuesday --

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 MR. ROBINSON: -- which may have to interrupt General Savcic's

13 testimony. And when that's over, either General Savcic will finish or

14 then Kos will resume and then we have two other witnesses for the week.

15 JUDGE KWON: What's the name of the videolink testimony witness?

16 MR. ROBINSON: Kljajic, Cedomir Kljajic.

17 JUDGE KWON: He was fixed for Tuesday?

18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

20 Please continue.

21 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.

22 Q. Now, again, trying to move quickly, I'm going to move to the

23 issue of the moving out of the population and real property, apartments,

24 et cetera. That's at Brown's report primarily at pages 110 to 122,

25 paragraphs 2.134 to 2.163; and your report at pages 48 to 49,

Page 42021

1 paragraph 25. And you stated on your direct at 40959, that Mr. Brown

2 made an error of law in terms of the laws that were in force in Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina at that time and he put an equation mark between

4 ownership and tenancy rights which is not the same, far from it. And

5 then you talked about socially owned flats where the flats were owned by

6 companies, et cetera. And you ended up saying in this section:

7 "As a result in his report he says that upon departure of the

8 Croats and Muslims, their flats were confiscated and given to be used by

9 someone else. This was simply something that was stemming from the law

10 in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time."

11 And you give an example in your report at page 49 of the English,

12 where you analyse document P03642.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: If I could have that up, please.

14 Q. Now, in your report - and this is cited as footnote 51 in your

15 report - you quote into your report:

16 "Decision on the criteria for the possibility of departure from

17 the Kljuc municipality" --

18 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry. P03462, I apologise. P03462.

19 Q. And then you quote the beginning of Article 2:

20 "Permanent departure from the territory of the municipality shall

21 be allowed to persons who have exchanged their real property, houses, and

22 land or privately owned apartments with persons from areas to which they

23 are moving."

24 That's all you quote from the document. And then you say:

25 "It is evident from this document that permanent removal was

Page 42022

1 possible only if people leaving had exchanged their property ..."

2 Let's look at the whole document. This is the 30th of July,

3 1992, the War Presidency of Kljuc municipality adopted the following

4 decision. Article 1, which you didn't include, people may move out,

5 "declaring that they are moving permanently from the territory of Kljuc

6 municipality, shall be permitted to leave the territory voluntarily."

7 And then we see Article 2 which you quoted the parts about

8 exchange. And then there's a part you left out.

9 "The exchange of real estate must be carried out in advance of,

10 or at the latest, three months after moving out; otherwise, any real

11 estate shall be taken over by Kljuc Municipality."

12 And another part you left out:

13 "Persons who place their real estate at the disposal of Kljuc

14 Municipality shall also be permitted to move away permanently from Kljuc

15 Municipality."

16 So when you say it's evident from this document that permanent

17 removal was possible only if people leaving had exchanged their property,

18 that's just not correct on the face of the document, is it?

19 A. Well, further on it is correctly stated that they are not obliged

20 to do the exchange if they leave a written document stating that they

21 place their property to the municipality for disposal. So they had to

22 resolve the issue of their private ownership in a way. That was the

23 intention behind it.

24 Q. [Microphone not activated]

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

Page 42023

1 MR. NICHOLLS:

2 Q. That may have been your intention, but it's not what your report

3 says. What your report says:

4 "It is evident from this document that permanent removal was

5 possible only if people leaving had exchanged their property ..."

6 And that's not true. You just said it's not true. People will

7 be allowed to leave permanently - this is Kljuc where we just saw how

8 whole hamlets were torched in one night - if they leave their property to

9 the municipality; right?

10 A. It was possible, just as is stated in Article 2, either through

11 exchange or by leaving it at disposal. Should they fail to do either,

12 within three months the property would be inventoried and would

13 definitely be placed at the disposal of the municipality.

14 Q. Okay. You just said "either"; your report says "only." You were

15 trying to make it look in your report as though the only way people would

16 leave permanently was if there was a consensual exchange and that's not

17 true, is it? If a person can't exchange their property, Kljuc takes it.

18 A. Well, that was the procedure. The local commune, or rather, the

19 municipality is the one who disposes of the entire stock of real property

20 in its area.

21 Q. Yeah, and that has nothing to do with socially owned housing and

22 apartments which you tried to portray this as earlier, because Article 3

23 talks about socially owned apartments in a separate category; right?

24 A. Yes, yes.

25 Q. All right. Let me show a couple other documents to you. P03517.

Page 42024

1 This is dated 21st September 1992, back to Sanski Most.

2 "Ana Stojic is hereby permitted to move permanently out of

3 Sanski Most municipal area towards Novska - Croatia ... with the

4 following members."

5 Did you know that Grgo Stojic survived an execution in Skrljevica

6 in Sanski Most?

7 A. No.

8 Q. You didn't know that he was shot by Danilusko Kajtez, who was a

9 member of the SOS and the 6th Krajina Brigade, shot at -- with two other

10 accomplices?

11 A. I don't know people who were victims by name, but I do know about

12 Danilusko Kajtez who committed crimes and I know that he was tried for

13 that.

14 Q. Yeah, after the war?

15 A. Well, I'm not sure whether it was after the war. I think that he

16 was arrested immediately after these events took place.

17 Q. Well, I'm not going to go through the whole Kajtez story with

18 you; there's evidence on that.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P06439.

20 Q. This is from Novi, similar, 9 July, regarding the statement of

21 the person present about his property for the purpose of permanently

22 leaving the municipality. Persons present, person concerned. And the

23 statement is:

24 "I have no fixed assets in my name in the Municipality of

25 Bosanski Novi and I am leaving the municipality of Bosanski Novi

Page 42025

1 permanently."

2 Did you know that Midho Alic saw his brother murdered and he was

3 detained at the Bosanski Novi stadium?

4 A. No, I don't know who this Alic person is, honestly.

5 Q. For people like Grgo Stojic and Midho Alic who have been the

6 victims of crimes, would you consider their leaving under these

7 circumstances voluntary, regardless of what these certificates say?

8 A. Well, I already said - and I'm stating that in my report - that

9 the state of general insecurity and the general conditions were the

10 strongest factor that contributed to the process of moving out. Had

11 everything been all right and well, I'm sure that wouldn't have happened.

12 Q. Sorry, back to Manjaca for just a couple questions. In your

13 report, you're critical in your paragraph 52 of Ewan Brown's report. At

14 2.132, Mr. Brown said:

15 "It would appear that the military made no attempt to let those

16 prisoners," from Manjaca, "go back to their homes. Furthermore, the

17 destruction and fear created by the Serb army, police, and authorities

18 would probably have made it impossible for them to go home, even if they

19 had wanted to. As a result, all the prisoners were escorted out of the

20 territory under intense pressure."

21 And you say there are no grounds for such a conclusion and that

22 his paragraphs are full of contradictions.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P03723, please. Which has to be

24 confidential, Your Honours, I'm sorry, for the same reasons which we've

25 discussed and this may need to be decided later, but if we could use the

Page 42032

1 Main Staff; right? You said that in Mladic last month.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And you came from the western part of the theatre - you said that

4 in Mladic last month - right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you could talk about what they said later, but that evening

7 you saw General Miletic there in the operations room; right?

8 A. I'm not sure and that's what I stated. I'm not sure whether I

9 saw General Miletic that evening or the evening after, whether I saw him

10 on the evening when I arrived at the Main Staff or the evening after

11 that. This still remains a question which I cannot answer, i.e., I

12 cannot confirm with certainty that it was either on the 16th, in the

13 evening, or the 17th in the evening. All I know is that it was indeed in

14 the evening.

15 Q. Right. And also same thing, you saw General Tolimir there? Your

16 response would be the same but you saw General Tolimir as well; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And General Mladic?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P04588, please.

21 Q. You've seen this document before lots of times; right?

22 A. Many times.

23 Q. Yes. It's from General Mladic, it's his order; right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. It's dated 17 July 1995; right?

Page 42033

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It's to the Drina Corps command for information, to the

3 Zvornik Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, and the

4 67th Communications Regiment; right?

5 A. On one occasion - I don't know whether it was in the Mladic

6 case - we analysed the telegram in detail, to see who it was sent to. I

7 believe that it was sent for the information of the Drina Corps, that it

8 is possible, and that the other units received it directly. We did not

9 get to the bottom of the thing as to who received it only for their

10 information and who had to receive it to act on it.

11 Q. Thank you. My question is: That's who we see on the top, the

12 units it's directed to; right?

13 A. Yes, those units.

14 Q. And it's headed:

15 "Integration of operations to crush lagging Muslim forces.

16 "Order," right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. At paragraph 1:

19 "Send three officers (Colonels Nedjo Trkulja, Milovan Stankovic,

20 and Bogdan Sladojevic) from the Main Staff ... to the command of the

21 Zvornik Brigade to assist in the joining of the VRS and MUP interior

22 forces -- MUP forces, the planning and co-ordination of combat operations

23 to block, crush and destroy lagging Muslim forces in the wider areas of

24 Kamenica and Cerska."

25 Now, Colonels Trkulja, Stankovic and Sladojevic indeed went down

Page 42034

1 to Zvornik, didn't they, on the basis of this order?

2 A. I don't know whether they left; however, the documents that I

3 have seen in the meantime indicate that that was indeed the case. So we

4 can confirm that they did go.

5 Q. All right. And let's look at paragraph 2 -- 3, excuse me.

6 "As of 17 July, the forces of the 1st blpbr, the 1st mlpbr, the

7 67th pv /military police/ battalion, 65th Motorised Protection Regiment,

8 and MUP forces engaged in the wider areas of Bratunac, Milici, and

9 Drinjaca will comb the territory in the zone of

10 Bratunac-Drinjaca-Milici-Besici village with the aim of discovering and

11 destroying lagging Muslim groups. I hereby appoint Lieutenant-Colonel

12 Keserovic, the officer for military police in the General Staff VRS

13 security administration, as the commander of all the aforementioned

14 forces during the conduct of the aforementioned task. The dead-line for

15 the completion of this task shall be 19 July 1995, at 20 hours ..."

16 And I'll talk about it a bit more, but this order, the written

17 order puts you in command of those forces, combined forces, for this

18 sweep operation; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And we can see that this was received by Milici on the 18th;

21 right?

22 A. Yes, judging by the stamp at the bottom of the page, that would

23 be the case.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: And P05097, please.

25 Q. Another document I want to show you quickly. Now, you've seen

Page 42035

1 this order from the commander of the special police, Goran Saric before

2 as well; correct?

3 A. I was shown this document in one of the cases in which I

4 testified, perhaps even in the Mladic case.

5 Q. So the answer's yes, you've seen it before?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. All right. And this order from 17 July - I won't read out the

8 distribution list - says to:

9 "Urgently form a combat group the size of a battalion in the

10 Kravica-Konjevic Polje sector ..."

11 It lists the units:

12 "Doboj special police detachment, two companies from," it says

13 "the seminar on Jahorina, two PJP companies in order to search the

14 terrain in the Pobudje sector in the course of today, 17 July 1995, and

15 fully mop-up the right side of the Milici-Drinjaca road, before

16 regrouping the search for Cerska."

17 Now, you testified last month in the Mladic case that this MUP

18 order by Goran Saric covers the same area and territory as

19 General Mladic's order which lists you as commander, right, same area?

20 A. Yes. It is even the same time-frame.

21 Q. Yeah. And it puts Borovcanin as commander for these combat

22 groups; right ?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, General Mladic also, when you met him, gave you this same

25 order orally, didn't he, before this written order was drafted?

Page 42036

1 Basically the same order. You testified to that last month as well?

2 A. Yes. Maybe not all of the elements, but he told me verbally and

3 he told me that General Miletic would follow-up with a written order.

4 Q. Right. And let me just read part of your testimony to you, this

5 is from last month when you testified in the Mladic trial, this is at

6 T 12841:

7 "Q. If you could tell us what unit you were supposed to be

8 commanding according to what General Mladic told you?"

9 And you said:

10 "If I remember well, there were parts of different units of the

11 Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, the Communications Regiment, the

12 Engineering Regiment of the 5th Corps, part of the military police

13 battalion of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment, parts of -- or,

14 rather, some units of the MUP, parts of the special brigade, and parts of

15 the special and regular police units as well as engineering battalion of

16 the Drina Corps."

17 That testimony was truthful, right, that's what you remember the

18 units Mladic telling you were going to be involved in this operation?

19 A. I mentioned these units based on the document, this one and some

20 other documents that showed which of the units participated in the

21 action, i.e., which were deployed in the area. I'm not sure that

22 General Mladic gave me all of their names. He said that he would be in

23 charge of scouring the terrain and that he would unify all of the units

24 in the area, and that the operation would take place on the right bank of

25 the Drinjaca and on the road leading from Milici to Konjevic Polje.

Page 42037

1 Q. All right. Well, let me just -- I won't read your answer again

2 but let me read the question again you gave that answer to.

3 "Q. If you could tell us what unit you were supposed to be

4 commanding according to what General Mladic told you?"

5 And you testified later, if it helps you, that what Mladic told

6 you corresponded to the written order.

7 A. Yes, yes. I stick by that answer. Those were the units. There

8 were no others.

9 Q. Right. Now, you claim you did not carry out this order because

10 this written order we see was orally amended. Just please answer yes or

11 no, and then I'll go over what you said about it.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What you said was:

14 "I tried immediately to tell General Mladic, the commander of the

15 Main Staff" -- I'm sorry this is at T 12846 in the Mladic testimony,

16 "commander of the Main Staff, that as far as I was concerned this was a

17 militarily unacceptable assignment and that there were many reasons why I

18 should not execute it. It's true that General Mladic, in the way that he

19 usually does, said, "Never mind, Miletic will explain everything." He

20 turned and left the room. Then General Tolimir appeared or maybe he was

21 already there. And then with General Tolimir and General Miletic, I

22 tried to clarify this new situation that I found myself in. And as my

23 superior officer, I asked General Tolimir to try to see if he could get a

24 correction or a change of this order from General Mladic which, as I

25 said, as far as I was concerned was militarily unacceptable."

Page 42038

1 Do you stand by that testimony last month?

2 A. Yes. I didn't say that I shouldn't or that I mustn't. I said

3 that I didn't have to or I couldn't. I'm not sure that I said that I

4 mustn't.

5 Q. All right. Let me read out your explanation about what happened

6 next. This is at T 12848.

7 "Q. So now what happens? You complained to Mladic, Tolimir gets

8 involved, it's still the evening of that -- let's call it your first

9 night there. What happens?

10 "A. General Mladic left and then after the conversation

11 General Tolimir followed him out. He told me there that he would try and

12 see what he could do about this. After a certain period of time, perhaps

13 a couple of hours, General Tolimir returned and told me that

14 General Mladic agreed that I should not take over command of those units

15 but that I should go to the area where the operation was being carried

16 out the following day, go to Colonel Blagojevic, gather information about

17 what was being done and how it was being done and report about it when I

18 came back."

19 Do you stand by that testimony?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And then you were asked this question:

22 "So if you weren't going to be commanding these forces, who were

23 you told that the Main Staff was commanding these forces? Clearly you

24 must have had to report to them, I would guess. Is that right? Who got

25 saddled with this job?

Page 42039

1 "A. The job was not given to anyone. Again, Colonel Blagojevic

2 continued with his assignment. I really don't know if somebody else

3 later took over the assignment, but Blagojevic was the one who began to

4 implement the task and he continued with it."

5 So you stand by that, the job was not given to anyone else?

6 A. According to what I know, nobody was given that assignment. On

7 that day, Blagojevic continued to work on the implementation of that

8 task, at least when I was there in his office.

9 Q. Okay. And then Judge Orie questioned you about this at T 12853

10 last month and said:

11 "So therefore, what do I understand, that the order or the

12 assignment was given to you was, let me say it friendly, totally idiotic.

13 Is that more or less what you're telling me? I mean, you don't get the

14 means, you don't have the troops, you have nothing, and someone asked you

15 to do a job. That is pretty strange, isn't it?"

16 And your answer:

17 "That's how it was."

18 Do you stand by that?

19 A. Yes. That was my reply as to how the task was given to me and

20 why I found it unacceptable.

21 Q. Yeah. And you are not able to show us, and neither is anybody

22 else, another written order from General Mladic or anybody else saying

23 that Blagojevic or another person is commanding those units; right?

24 A. There is an order which precedes this one, where that assignment

25 was given to Colonel Blagojevic and he was the one who was in charge.

Page 42040

1 That document was shown to me during my testimony. I don't know whether

2 it was issued on the 14th or the 15th of July. I'm not sure.

3 Q. Yeah, I'm talking about anything after the 17 July order we just

4 looked at that puts you in charge.

5 A. I'm only aware of this order and what was shown to me with regard

6 to the MUP units.

7 Q. Right. So this order gets sent out to the Milici units. We can

8 see that. And there's no written order sent out to tell them that it's

9 actually wrong, that you're not in command, so they don't know who's

10 commanding and co-ordinating the sweep, right? There's nothing written

11 sent to them?

12 A. How they were informed about that as to how to proceed and how to

13 implement their tasks and whether they were informed about that in the

14 first place, I don't know.

15 Q. Okay. And here's what you said your new job was after this oral

16 amendment of the order. You said:

17 "I should not take over command of those units but that I should

18 go to the area where the operation was being carried out the following

19 day, go to Colonel Blagojevic, gather information about what was being

20 done and how it was being done and report about it when I came back."

21 You stand by that, that was your new assignment; right?

22 A. Yes, that was one part of that new assignment.

23 Q. To go the area where these operations were taking place, observe,

24 do nothing, command no one, and then report back?

25 A. No. I said it precisely. It was to go to see Colonel Blagojevic

Page 42041

1 and get informed what was going on, not to go to the area where the

2 operations were taking place and to observe what was going on myself.

3 Q. Isn't Colonel -- isn't Blagojevic perfectly capable of reporting

4 what's going on through the normal chain of command which works every

5 single day in the Drina Corps, whereby he reports to his Drina Corps

6 commander, General Krstic, and then they report to the Main Staff?

7 A. Yes, he could and I suppose that's how things functioned.

8 Q. Mm-hmm. And then the day after receiving this order, the next

9 morning you went down to the area and you saw Zoran Malinic at

10 Nova Kasaba at the side of the road; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And just to remind us, Zoran Malinic is commander of the Military

13 Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Unit; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. He's under the command of Milomir Savcic; right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, I'll just go through this very quickly. Malinic told you at

18 that time that on the 12th or 13th July -- well, strike that.

19 Let me -- let me just read out what you testified that he said to

20 you when you were testifying here last month in the Mladic case. This is

21 at T 12863.

22 "Q. Did he tell you about any prisoners on earlier days?

23 "A. He did. He said that at the stadium in Nova Kasaba in his

24 assessment there were between 2.000 and 3.000 -- or, I think he said 2500

25 captured and disarmed Muslims -- actually, fighters and civilians from

Page 42042

1 Srebrenica who had been coming along the road between Kasaba and

2 Konjevic Polje.

3 "Q. And did he tell you anything about what he was doing with

4 those prisoners.

5 "A. Yes. He said that he had organised a process of

6 registering -- of making lists of those prisoners. He also said that at

7 some point in time he was interrupted when the commander of the

8 Main Staff, General Mladic, came along. He stopped with his vehicle near

9 the football-pitch, he assembled the prisoners and addressed them."

10 Do you stand by that testimony?

11 A. Yes. This is according to my best recollection of what I heard

12 and what I remember from that time. This is something that I said for

13 the first time to Jean Rene Ruez, and this question is always present.

14 And I think that is what I remember, what I could remember, what I told

15 Jean Rene Ruez in 2000.

16 Q. And at T 12865 --

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls, were the interpreters provided with

18 the transcript?

19 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour, but it is in e-court, we can

20 bring it up.

21 JUDGE KWON: Please be slow. I think they will be benefitted --

22 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.

23 JUDGE KWON: -- by having that.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour, for the reminder. This is

25 from T 12865.

Page 42043

1 Q. You were asked to confirm that and you were read back part of

2 your Tolimir testimony, speaking of Zoran Malinic.

3 "'He told me that his initial assignment was to register them,

4 which he had started doing, he had started registering them, but he had

5 to stop doing that because General Mladic told him to stop.'

6 "Do you stand by that testimony you gave under oath?"

7 Your answer was:

8 "Yes."

9 Do you still stand by it today?

10 A. Yes, I think that that is that testimony and I think that that is

11 what I said, or rather, I stand by the statements I gave each time.

12 Q. All right. Now, at some point after that on this trip you go to

13 Bratunac; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And you testified to this in Mladic at 12873 last month, and you

16 were with Colonel Jankovic from the Main Staff at this point.

17 "In addition to that, at one moment we stopped at the public

18 security station in Bratunac. I don't know exactly why but Jankovic had

19 some commitment there. I already said that at that public security

20 station I came across Ljubisa Borovcanin, who was there in the field."

21 Do you stand by that testimony, you ran into Borovcanin at the

22 police station?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And then you were asked at the same page:

25 "And was he involved in this sweep operation?"

Page 42044

1 And you answered:

2 "Yes. I learned that units of the MUP, especially members of the

3 special brigade, were carrying out the task of searching the terrain

4 within the area of this operation."

5 Do you stand by that testimony?

6 A. Yes, I stand by that.

7 Q. Okay --

8 A. -- that I found that out.

9 Q. So the written order that we saw from General Mladic put you in

10 charge on the VRS side of this sweep operation. The written order by

11 Goran Saric, the commander of the special police that we saw put

12 Borovcanin in charge of the MUP units in the sweep operation, both signed

13 on the 17th -- both issued for the 17th. And your testimony that you

14 coincidentally happened to run into Borovcanin in Bratunac?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. All right. Let me show you an intercept.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: P05389. Sorry, a better one is P05390 [Realtime

18 transcript read in error "P05380"]. This is from the 17th of July at

19 11.15 a.m. It's 90 I said, I believe, Your Honours. 05390.

20 Q. All right, this is the 17th of July, we can see it on the

21 print-out on the other version. We see a little further down:

22 "Y: Has Keserovic set out already?

23 "X: We came across him on our way here and he hasn't arrived

24 here yet.

25 "Well, he must have gone first forward over there to

Page 42045

1 Momir Nikolic.

2 "Uh-huh.

3 "Let me tell you I just spoke a little while ago to General

4 Miletic.

5 "Okay.

6 "He told me that Keserovic also has to come up here to solve

7 these issues.

8 "Yes ..."

9 And then it talks a bit more about Salapura and Kovac speaking

10 about a shift arriving.

11 Now, General Miletic has a nickname -- sometimes used Mico,

12 right, on the Main Staff?

13 A. I don't know.

14 Q. You don't know that? This intercept 17 July shows that

15 somebody's expecting you to come and resolve some issues, doesn't it, in

16 the area apparently around Bratunac since it refers to Momir Nikolic.

17 A. First of all, I did not go to Momir Nikolic, but I stopped to

18 speak with Malinic. Malinic was the first in the rank of the units. I

19 also went to Blagojevic. I did not -- I did not even know Momir Nikolic,

20 so -- and I did not go to him. I went to Blagojevic and they were in the

21 same unit, that's true.

22 Q. Now, let me read you back another question and answer from the

23 Mladic case from last month, 12969. And it was in relation to an ICRC

24 dispatch about missing people.

25 "Q. Were you aware of it on the 17th of July as well, all the

Page 42046

1 missing men from Srebrenica referred to here?

2 "A. No. The day that I was in Bratunac I didn't know anything

3 about it."

4 You stand by that answer?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Let me tell you about a little bit of the testimony in this case.

7 This is the testimony of Dusan Janc, 28 March 2012, T 27043 to 27045. On

8 cross-examination by Mr. Karadzic, he explained how he determined that

9 the Cerska executions took place, he says, sometimes later than the

10 13th of July. I would say around 17 July. And he explained that that

11 was because four individuals who were noted as being alive after the

12 13th were found in the Cerska primary grave.

13 And let me read out to you now something else from your Mladic

14 testimony at 12982.

15 "Q. Okay, General. Let me just get right to the point, that the

16 indictment in this case has charged that sweep operation on the

17 17th captured over a hundred people and that they were summarily executed

18 and buried in the Cerska valley. Had you been in command of those forces

19 that did that sweep operation, would you bear any responsibility for the

20 deaths of people captured in that?"

21 And your answer was:

22 "Certainly, it would be the responsibility of the operations

23 commander, the person who carried out the executions."

24 You stand by that statement; right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 42047

1 Q. Let me show you one more document, P05152. This is a dispatch

2 from the Zvornik CJB, from the chief of that centre, Dragomir Vasic. And

3 he says:

4 "The RS MUP, /special police detachment/, and PJP /special police

5 unit/ combed the terrain on the right of the Milici-Drinjaca road,

6 including features behind Cerska and Udrc in order to liquidate the

7 remnants of infiltrated groups from Srebrenica. The action was completed

8 very successfully."

9 So, sir, you have to say that the order putting you in charge of

10 the military -- the VRS in the sweep operation was orally amended, don't

11 you, because you agree that the commander of that operation ought to be

12 liable for those executions?

13 A. I don't understand the question.

14 Q. The question is: You have to say that written order was orally

15 amended even though there's no written amendment and no other evidence in

16 writing that it was amended, because you've already agreed that whoever

17 was in charge of the VRS in that operation would be responsible for those

18 executions? You said:

19 "Certainly, it would be the responsibility of the operations

20 commander and the person who carried out the executions."

21 A. I stand by the view that the commander is responsible for those

22 who did carry out the executions, but there's no reason that I have to

23 say it. It's simply how it is.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: Nothing further at this time, Your Honour.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Pursuant to

Page 42048

1 Rule 90(H)(ii), I would request that the Chamber order the Prosecution to

2 put their case to the witness on this subject. I think they're required

3 to do that.

4 First of all, is it their case that the executions in Cerska took

5 place on the 17th of July, not the 13th, as they previously alleged? And

6 secondly, is it their case that General Keserovic is responsible for that

7 crime? I think that has to be put to him.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nicholls.

9 MR. NICHOLLS: Yeah, the first thing I would say is hearing from

10 this Defence team about the obligation to put your case is almost

11 laughably incredible. They never put their case. Mr. Robinson stood up

12 the other day when he was asked to put his case about whether they were

13 executions in Branjevo and said: We reserve the right to take any

14 position at any time, basically.

15 Second, if I go back to his question, the -- this is not the

16 first time that we've talked about the executions in Cerska being likely

17 later. They are listed as on or about the 13th, something like that, in

18 the indictment. We made it clear in our pre-trial brief at

19 paragraph 241, it says there:

20 "At some point between 13 and 17 July ..."

21 So yes, the evidence -- there is evidence to support that these

22 were done -- these executions took place on the 17th, and that came out

23 of Mr. Janc during Mr. Karadzic's cross.

24 And our case on Mr. Keserovic is just what I've put, that this

25 document assigns him as commander and that we haven't seen -- that that

Page 42049

1 is the evidence, that document assigns him as commander of these units.

2 He's given his explanation that it was orally amended.

3 MR. ROBINSON: I think General Keserovic should be given the

4 chance to comment on that case if he believes there's something he would

5 like to add.

6 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, that's fine. I thought I did give him that

7 option with my last questions where I said this is the explanation that

8 you've given and you've got to give because of the written order, but he

9 can add anything he likes, of course.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, I think I -- the witness has answered

11 sufficiently, but if you'd like to add anything, Mr. Keserovic, you may

12 do so.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I just want to say that

14 really as far as the events in the Cerska valley are concerned, I don't

15 know anything about that. I was never there myself nor do I know of

16 this, so that I don't know that this happened. I saw some documents here

17 and I know that graves were found in the Cerska valley, but I don't know

18 what the events were and what the connection is there either.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 Mr. Karadzic, you have re-examination?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

22 [Defence counsel confer]

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir ...

Page 42050

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue. But before I forget, the --

3 those documents put under seal, we'll leave it as they are -- as it is.

4 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, sir, during the cross-examination you emphasised that

7 you do not dispute the existence of crimes but that the focus of your

8 attention was on the position of the authorities in relation to the

9 events, to the occurrences; is that your position?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 916,

13 please.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. The special focus of the cross-examination were to municipalities

16 Kljuc, Sanski Most, and then a little bit of Kotor Varos as well, so I

17 just would like us to see what we have there.

18 Can you please tell us what is it -- this thing here,

19 Crisis Staff -- command of the defence of Kljuc and the Crisis Staff,

20 what is it warning about?

21 A. They are warning about an end to the incidents, namely, attacks

22 on the army and the police in Kljuc because in that case there would be a

23 response to those incidents.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this, please?

Page 42051

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. And how does this fit into what you know about whether the

3 authorities were giving an opportunity for a peaceful resolution?

4 A. Yes, I did emphasise that and continue to emphasise that there

5 were first calls to a peaceful solution, then disarmament, surrendering

6 of weapons, that an opportunity was given for all disagreements to be

7 resolved in future, at some future time, through political negotiations,

8 namely, that there was a chance for the conflict not to occur at all.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this, please?

11 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3898, Your Honours.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 867 now, please.

15 And can we zoom in on the Serbian version, please.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Sir, General, this is a meeting of the War Presidency of Kljuc on

18 the 7th of August. So could you please look at paragraph 1 and could you

19 please look at these three bullet points:

20 "All institutions ... should take an active role ..."

21 What is the War Presidency asking for here?

22 A. For all structures on -- in the area of the municipality, the

23 command of the 17th Light Infantry Brigade, public security station, and

24 the SDS should take an active role in preventing the destruction and

25 demolition of family houses, that security organs and the military police

Page 42052

1 should become active in arresting individuals and taking appropriate

2 measures, that the Serbian Democratic Party should try to appeal to the

3 people to stop hostilities in the municipality and to try to pull out

4 heavy weapons to the brigade warehouse.

5 Q. Thank you. And what sort of hostilities were there in the

6 territory of the municipality, between who?

7 A. The hostilities in the Kljuc municipality were between the

8 paramilitary formations, or rather, armed formations of the Muslims,

9 dominantly, and to a part also of Croatian ones, and Serbian units and

10 the police.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3899, Your Honours.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. When we're on this subject, could we look at the document shown

17 to you by Mr. Nicholls from Kljuc also, that is P02972.

18 Can you please tell us how this Vinko Kondic as chief of the

19 public security station is treating these killings, or rather, these

20 acts? How does he qualify these crimes?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 2, please.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. What does it state here, second paragraph, line 4:

24 "Monstrous occurrences and monstrous crimes took place, such as

25 the killing of four Muslim persons ..." and so on and so forth.

Page 42053

1 How does this fit into your position that there were crimes and

2 what was the attitude of the authorities and how does this chief of

3 police qualify that?

4 A. He qualifies this in the way that it actually happened. He's

5 submitting a report about the events and is not concealing anything.

6 He's reporting here that these events did occur without any intention of

7 glossing over anything or concealing anything in the municipality. And

8 he's probably aware that this should not and ought not to have happened

9 and measures are being taken in order to resolve these problems.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: In all fairness, given that answer and the

12 question, how is the chief of public security station treating these

13 crimes, the second-to-last paragraph should be put to the witness, where

14 the police chief says exactly how he's treating these crimes.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, can you please look at the penultimate paragraph and to

17 tell us if this paragraph reflects an intention to suspend prosecution?

18 A. No, it doesn't. It is only describing the reasons that were

19 valid at the time for not filing criminal reports.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 862.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Please take a look at this. It's a document produced by the

24 municipality which states, or rather, whereby it is banned to use and to

25 dispose of private and socially owned property. Now, can you tell me

Page 42054

1 what is the difference between disposing of or possessing and --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Karadzic please repeat the last part of

3 his question.

4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

5 Interpreters were not able to hear your question in full. Could

6 you repeat your last sentence.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. My first question was: Is there a difference between disposing

9 of and possessing something? And my second question was whether if

10 someone is still in situ, hadn't moved out, do the authorities have the

11 right to confiscate or commandeer property for waging the war?

12 A. Temporary disposal is temporary, as it says, and it is in force

13 for as long as there is a need for that. Ownership of property is

14 something that is of a permanent nature.

15 Your second question relating to the possibility for both private

16 assets and socially owned assets being commandeered, according to the

17 Law on Defence, it is provided that both movable and immovable assets can

18 be mobilised or commandeered for waging a war or more specifically for

19 defence purposes.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have the next page.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. This is a news bulletin for Radio Kljuc. Look at the last

24 paragraph and can you tell us what kind of report they received from the

25 civil defence staff and the Red Cross.

Page 42055

1 A. Here, problems relating to convoys of those people who were

2 moving out are described here. These people were moving into different

3 areas; however, they failed to reach an agreement probably about an

4 unhindered passage and the reception of these people in different areas,

5 most likely different countries, and the Red Cross and the civilian

6 defence staff were involved in this entire procedure.

7 Q. Thank you. Was this a story that was broadcast on the radio

8 indicative of a postponement, and does that indicate that there was

9 forcible expulsion in question?

10 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ...

11 MR. NICHOLLS: Leading.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 And please put a pause before you start answering the question.

14 Your answer always overlaps with the interpretation of Mr. Karadzic's

15 words in interpretation.

16 Will you reformulate your question.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do so. Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you know what arrangements were made and how these convoys

20 were organised? According to what you know, were there any forcible

21 expulsions?

22 A. According to the documents accessible to me, it was permanently

23 highlight that no pressure should be exerted or any forcible moving out

24 of any individual who wanted to leave the area. The relocation was

25 carried out in the following way: Those who were interested in leaving

Page 42056

1 had to report, and upon a number of individuals were compiled in a list,

2 then a convoy would be arranged to take them to the destination that they

3 were interested in going to.

4 Q. Thank you. Can we just clarify this, were they physically

5 gathered or did you mean lists?

6 A. No, they were not gathered physically. Most often they would

7 report to the Red Cross or an office that was in charge of these issues,

8 where they would be listed. Once the conditions were in place for

9 relocation, they would be notified, and that is how their relocation was

10 organised.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, in this particular document what are they being

12 notified of?

13 A. In this document they're being notified of the fact that they

14 would not set off at 9.00, as originally planned, because not all the

15 agreements had been reached with regard to their departure.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3900, Your Honours.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we briefly have a look at

21 P3448.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. This is a Prosecution exhibit in evidence which is helpful to all

24 concerned. Can you tell us how does this statement or public

25 announcement fit to what you just explained to us?

Page 42057

1 A. Well, this is the way how the departure of citizens who wanted to

2 move out was put into practice, and then in paragraph 3 it is stipulated

3 that the civilian protection should be in charge of this implementation.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 790.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Can you tell us, on the 5th of May, what was the Kljuc

8 municipality Crisis Staff appealing? Can you please just summarise these

9 four bullet points that we see in the document?

10 A. This is an appeal to all citizens in the municipality to preserve

11 the public order and peace, not to jeopardise the safety and security of

12 individuals and their property, to familiarise themselves with an order

13 on disarmament that had been issued prior to this. They're also

14 appealing to all the companies to maintain their operation, otherwise,

15 according to law, work obligation would have to be imposed. And at the

16 same time, children are called upon to continue attending school. So

17 they're persistently trying to maintain a so-called normal daily life and

18 work in the municipality.

19 Q. Thank you. In item 1 it says all citizens are called upon. Does

20 that mean that there are any exceptions whatsoever?

21 A. No.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Can you tell us what this document is about and to whom it

25 refers?

Page 42058

1 A. This refers to all citizens who are not members of legitimate

2 military forces to turn in weapons to the public security station by a

3 determined dead-line.

4 Q. Thank you. Are Serbs exempt from this?

5 A. No, nobody is exempt. This is about all citizens.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3901, Your Honours.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Let us just devote some attention to Sanski Most.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we please have

13 65 ter 20382. But let's stick to a chronological order and instead have

14 65 ter 18922. It seems that we still haven't received a translation.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Can you tell us what this document represents and can you please

17 read the first and the penultimate bullet point?

18 A. This is a report about the engagement of the municipal civilian

19 defence staff. In the first paragraph it says that after war operations

20 in the area of town, the staff became involved in the evacuation of the

21 population who did not take part in putting up resistance in other parts

22 of the town.

23 Q. Thank you. Can you please read the penultimate one.

24 A. A convoy was set up in order to deliver goods for the population

25 of our municipality.

Page 42059

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

2 And can the next one be admitted under the same number because this

3 document relates to the period up to October 1992.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be marked for

6 identification?

7 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, all he's done so far is what Mr. Robinson

8 criticised me for right at the beginning, which is read out two parts of

9 it. I don't think there was a question.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question is always one

11 and the same. Since we know that he studied Mr. Brown's findings and

12 documents, how does this document fit with his findings as opposed to

13 those of Mr. Brown, taking into account that the population who was not

14 taking part in the resistance was moving from one part of the town to

15 another.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: Sorry, again, that was extremely leading. I know

17 he was trying to explain, but -- I'm a little tired but reading the

18 transcript all the witness has said is this first part says this and this

19 other part says this. And I thought he was just reading it out. I can't

20 tell if he was reading it verbatim because I can't read it, but that's

21 what appeared to be happening. I have no problem with him asking some

22 more questions about the document. I don't think it's admissible yet --

23 or marked for identification --

24 JUDGE KWON: About the first question and answer, what document

25 is this about, this is report of something -- but I take it you have some

Page 42060

1 further questions, Mr. Karadzic?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, can this evacuation of the population not taking part in

5 combat from one part of town to another be qualified as a criminal

6 offence? And according to our Law on Defence, how is this kind of

7 operation carried out by the civilian protection defined?

8 A. It cannot be qualified as a crime under the Law on Defence. It

9 is an obligation to have a population be moved from a war-torn zone to an

10 area where there are no such operation for security reasons. And this

11 document demonstrates the efforts made by this organ, specifically the

12 civilian protection and other organs to whom they are answerable for

13 their work, to create conditions for ensuring protection for the

14 population.

15 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us if Mahala is in the town and whether

16 there was any civilian population in Mahala and were there any

17 paramilitary formations there, according to your knowledge?

18 A. Mahala is a suburb, an area, that is part of the municipality,

19 and at the time of these events it was a stronghold of armed Muslim

20 forces that did not want to hand-over weapons and who opened fire in the

21 attempt to -- by the Serbian forces to enter, in order to disarm them, or

22 rather, to collect those weapons.

23 Q. Thank you. And do you know what happened to the population from

24 Mahala in the fighting --

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 42061

1 MR. NICHOLLS: The witness said:

2 "... it was a stronghold of armed Muslim forces that did not want

3 to hand-over weapons and who opened fire in the attempt by the Serbian

4 forces to enter, in order to disarm them ... or to collect those weapons.

5 Since the witness is not testifying as a fact witness, can

6 Mr. Karadzic or the witness give me a cite to the document that says that

7 in Mahala fire was opened on the Serb units when they came to try to

8 collect weapons.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, General, can you answer the question? Or can

10 you help us?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Was that your personal experience or did you find that in the

13 documents that you analysed?

14 A. So, I didn't take part in this personally, but I read that or I

15 saw that, rather, in the documents, thus I did not take part in these

16 events.

17 JUDGE KWON: But did you cite it in your report, General?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure that I referred to

19 this paragraph. I would need to check, I would need to look at it.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you. I would just ask for the General to

21 check so he can point me to the document which supports that statement.

22 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue in the meantime?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. But Mr. Nicholls suggested

24 that the civilians in Mahala were the target of the action. That's why I

25 asked.

Page 42062

1 Can we tender this document, please?

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

3 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3902, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE KWON: Are we going to conclude Mr. Keserovic's evidence or

5 not? We have to continue next week now?

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have to continue next week.

7 Should we continue or should we finish for today?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we have seven minutes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Can I now ask to see 65 ter -- actually, 1D30 in e-court. I'm

11 sorry, 1D31, please. Page 6 in the Serbian. The cover page is the same

12 but we would need to look at page 6 in the Serbian of 1D31.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, sir, did you see this is a book by two Muslim authors

15 from Sanski Most. We looked at this before.

16 A. Yes, I did have the opportunity to see this book.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] English page 2, please.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Could you please look, did you have the opportunity to see this

20 book before?

21 A. Yes, I did have the opportunity. I did see it before.

22 Q. Could you please look at the second paragraph, it's the second

23 paragraph from the bottom in English. Could you please tell us in which

24 villages and suburbs were these preparations formed, these armed

25 preparations?

Page 42063

1 A. These are Vrhpolje, Trnovo, Hrustovo, Sehovci, Kamengrad, and

2 then of the city or the suburban areas, that would be Mahala and Muhici.

3 Q. And then it says that this made the preparations more difficult.

4 Were the civilians in Mahala the target and do you know where they were

5 transferred to during the fighting? Did you find in the documents where

6 they were transferred to during the fighting?

7 A. They were transferred, but I'm not quite sure to which

8 neighbourhood or settlement they were transferred, but they were

9 transferred.

10 Q. Thank you. Can you please link up -- actually, do you remember

11 that ultimatum? What was it that the civilians were asked and what were

12 these armed ones asked to do?

13 A. The civilians were asked to respect law and order and not to

14 contribute in any way to the growing problems of any kind and the armed

15 ones were asked to surrender their weapons.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at the previous page

18 in the Serbian, please, and I believe in the English as well.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Among these people who were preparing the rebellion and the

21 fighting, can you find any names that we mentioned today or any names

22 that you were asked about by Mr. Nicholls?

23 A. Yes, I can see the name Faik Biscevic here.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this, please?