Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42178

 1                           Tuesday, 30 July 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, everyone.

 6             Good morning, Mr. Kljajic.  Do you hear me in the language you

 7     understand?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good day.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             Mr. Kljajic, could you make a solemn declaration, please.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

12     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13                           WITNESS:  CEDOMIR KLJAJIC

14                           [Witness appeared via videolink]

15                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.  Please be seated and make

17     yourself comfortable.

18             Mr. Kljajic, if at any point of time you do not feel well, please

19     do not hesitate to let us know.  And there's one thing further that I'd

20     like to advise you about, that is, the rule that we have at the

21     International Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under this rule, you may

22     object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or

23     even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

24     you in a criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying

25     something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

Page 42179

 1     offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

 2     have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that an

 3     answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer

 4     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 5     compel you to answer the question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal

 6     would ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would

 7     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,

 8     save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

 9             Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

12             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good day, Excellencies.  Good day

14     to all.

15                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Kljajic.  Good day, Mr. Ram.

17        A.   Good day.

18        Q.   Good morning to you, it's morning over there where you are.

19     Mr. Kljajic, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             Can Mr. Ram show you a copy of that statement and can you tell us

23     whether that's your statement?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read that statement?

Page 42180

 1        A.   Yes, I've read it.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you

 3     communicated to my Defence team?

 4        A.   Except for some minor details, I think that 99 per cent is the

 5     way I had put it to the Defence team.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  As for these details, do you feel it is necessary to

 7     indicate them and to correct them if they are of significance and if they

 8     change the meaning?

 9        A.   Basically, they're not very significant.  It was mentioned here

10     that I worked at the crime prevention service and I actually worked at

11     the department that had to do with the tasks of the police, "milicija."

12        Q.   Which paragraph is that?  Could you please take a look.

13        A.   It's paragraph 2.  I think that it's line 6 or 7 where it says

14     that I -- only to return to the post of inspector for crime prevention.

15        Q.   And what is it supposed to read, inspector for affairs -- police

16     affairs and tasks?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Does the rest of the statement faithfully reflect

19     what you said?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Today if I were to put the same questions to you, would your

22     answers basically be the same?

23        A.   They would.  The answers would be the same.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please take a copy from Mr. Ram and could

25     you sign it before him and before us, and could you please put today's

Page 42181

 1     date there.

 2        A.   I'm done.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

 5     tender Mr. Cedomir Kljajic's statement 1D7052, that is the number it

 6     bears now, and I would like to have it admitted into evidence.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson, do you have any objections?

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  No objections.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             We'll receive it.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3917, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             Now I'm going to read out a brief summary in the English language

15     of Mr. Kljajic's statement.

16             [In English] Cedomir Kljajic worked as police inspector in

17     Sarajevo from 1987 to 1991.  He was deputy to the assistant minister of

18     police from September until October 1991 to the beginning of the war.

19     When the war broke out, he was assigned to work in Vraca, where he

20     occupied the post of under-secretary for public security.  He remained in

21     that position until August or September 1992.

22             Cedo Kljajic was aware that the first party to be founded in BH

23     was the SDA followed by the HDZ and finally SDS.  During the SDA

24     foundation assembly the Croatian and Muslim flags were tied together,

25     showing the unity of the two ethnicities.  These actions caused fear and

Page 42182

 1     concern amongst the Serbian people.  Also during this period Cedo Kljajic

 2     was aware that the people were being armed and that more than 160.000

 3     weapons entered B&H illegally.  The overwhelming majority of the weapons

 4     were obtained by Muslims and Croats.

 5             Following the multi-party elections, a coalition was created

 6     between the SDA, SDS, and HDZ and the positions in the MUP were

 7     supposedly equally divided.  On every level there were hypothetically one

 8     Muslim, one Serb, and one Croat.  However, the SDA breached this

 9     agreement and people from the MUP were replaced by others who were not

10     qualified.  Cedo Kljajic discovered that he was not being consulted about

11     changes of personnel in the MUP under his authority as he usually would

12     be, and soon after he raised this issue he himself was replaced.  New

13     positions in the MUP were created and Serbian personnel were

14     side-stepped.

15             The Muslims were not only dominant in the top positions in the

16     MUP but they also started to increase their numbers in lower positions.

17     Also, the number of reserve policemen increased.  These policemens were

18     almost exclusively Muslims and only served the interests of the SDA.

19             Mr. Cedomir Kljajic was aware that the Muslims were using the MUP

20     to obtain equipment for the SDA.  The security situation was getting

21     worse by the day and as a result of all of this there was a need to

22     divide up the BH MUP.

23             The Serbs did not want a conflict.  They knew it would result in

24     massive bloodshed and therefore the Serbs embraced the Lisbon Agreement

25     with enthusiasm and relief because they thought that a solution had been

Page 42183

 1     found to the problems.

 2             When the RS MUP was created, it had numerous problems including

 3     the lack of equipment, poor communication, lack of personnel, and the

 4     constant shelling of the base in Vrace.  Further, some parts of the RS

 5     were physically completely inaccessible.

 6             In April 1991, Radovan Karadzic told Cedo Kljajic and the two

 7     others that the SDS had received certain positions in the MUP and that

 8     they could fill them; however, it was not necessary for them to be a

 9     member of the SDS.  Karadzic asked that they work as the law requires,

10     regardless of the violations of the law by their Muslim colleagues.

11     Radovan Karadzic was adamant that the MUP must operate in accordance with

12     the legal provisions and it was necessary to have a balance in the MUP

13     between the staffs of the SDS and SDA.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, perhaps I forgot to ask you something.  In your

16     statement perhaps instead of this Sime Djodan, should it have said

17     Dalibor Brozovic, that is paragraph 3.  Do you remember, was it Dalibor

18     Brozovic or Sime Djodan?

19        A.   I really cannot remember.  I thought it was Sime Djodan.  It's

20     possible that it was Brozovic though.  I know that his statement was very

21     inflammatory.  He said that the time came, that there had to be a border

22     on the Drina, that this western bloc would exist again, and we Serbs in

23     principle would not have any place there.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And, Your Excellencies, I don't

Page 42184

 1     have any further questions for Mr. Kljajic now.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  How shall we understand paragraph 3 then?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I understood things correctly,

 4     Mr. Kljajic allows for the possibility that it wasn't Sime Djodan, that

 5     it was Dalibor Bozovic.  He's not sure about the name but he knows it was

 6     a high-ranking Croat official who spoke.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I'll leave it at that.

 8             Mr. Kljajic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this

 9     case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your written

10     statement, in lieu of your oral testimony.  And now you'll be

11     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

12             Ms. Gustafson.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14                           Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

15        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Kljajic.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   Now, it's not mentioned anywhere in your Defence statement, but

18     you were interviewed at length by the Prosecution in 2003, and that

19     statement was audio-recorded; correct?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Now, I understand from your statement that aside from one break

22     of about five months between April and September of 1991, that you worked

23     full time as a police official, first in the joint Bosnian MUP, then in

24     the RS MUP for about 18 years, from 1974 until September 1992.  That's

25     correct, isn't it?

Page 42185

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Now I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your

 3     position in the RS MUP.  You stated that you were under-secretary for the

 4     public security service, and that's at paragraph 2 of your statement.

 5     And that meant essentially that you were in charge of the public security

 6     service of the RS MUP and you were accountable for its operation directly

 7     to the minister, Mico Stanisic; correct?

 8        A.   Correct.

 9        Q.   And the public security service was responsible for, among other

10     things, threats to state security, the protection of citizens' lives and

11     personal safety, the prevention and detection of criminal offences,

12     tracking down and arresting perpetrators of criminal offences, and

13     maintaining law and order.  And that's from Article 15 of the RS Law on

14     Internal Affairs P2964.  Can you confirm that those items I listed were

15     among the responsibilities of the public security service and indeed

16     among your responsibilities as under-secretary?

17        A.   We had regulations for the interior and we were supposed to take

18     care of preserving law and order and preventing crime and also detecting

19     criminals.

20        Q.   Okay.  So for what we understand as regular police work,

21     preventing and detecting crime, arresting perpetrators, protecting

22     citizens, you were the number three person in the ministry.  The only

23     people above you were the minister and his deputy; right?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, at paragraph 4 of your statement you state that

Page 42186

 1     in the pre-war period you had information that people were being armed

 2     and that according to you the overwhelming majority of weapons were

 3     obtained by the Muslims, followed by the Croats, and the Serbs were

 4     third.  Now, the RS MUP report for the period April to December 1992

 5     describes activities of Serbian employees in the joint MUP before the

 6     war, activities which include "illegal arming of reliable active

 7     personnel and reserve employees."  That's P2761, page 7.

 8             Now, before the war you were a high-level Serb employee in the

 9     MUP, so I take it that you were aware of this illegal arming among Serb

10     police personnel; is that right?

11        A.   I think that you're wrong there.  What I said, namely, that I

12     knew that before the war about 160.000 fire-arms were illegal is a piece

13     of information that I received from the representatives of the

14     State Security Service.  It was Brane Krstic's assistant, I think it was

15     Zoranovic, I think that was his name.  And at the end of 1990 we had some

16     joint commission that went out there to the area of Mostar-Capljina

17     because there were some conflicts between the army and the civilian

18     population, and this was a Joint Commission of the Executive Council.  In

19     that commission there was a representative of the government, there was

20     this representative of the State Security Service, and I was the third

21     member of the commission.  So there was a Muslim, there was a Croat, and

22     a Serb.  This representative of the State Security Service who was a

23     Croat stated several times then that the State Security Service had

24     reliable information to the effect that in the territory of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina there were over 160.000 long-barrelled weapons that

Page 42187

 1     were in Bosnia-Herzegovina illegally.

 2             By the way, by way of a joke sort of, he also pointed out:  And

 3     these are Muslim weapons, these are the weapons of the Muslims.  And by

 4     way of a joke, he also said:  I'm not sure how much Croats have, but at

 5     any rate the Muslims managed to equip themselves well for a war.

 6        Q.   Well, let me ask you this more specific question.  In September

 7     1993, Tomo Kovac, who I assume you knew, reported that beginning in early

 8     1991 he had been organising intense arming of citizens of Serbian

 9     nationality in Ilidza.  That's P2308.  Did you know about that?

10        A.   I did not know about that.

11        Q.   Okay.  At paragraph 15 of your statement you describe a July 1991

12     meeting of the SDS Deputies Club that you attended along with

13     Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, and Vitomir Zepinic.  And in your

14     statement you say that Mico Stanisic praised you and Stanisic and Mandic

15     criticised the work of Vito Zepinic.  And you said that Dr. Karadzic

16     reacted forcefully and criticised Zepinic.  Now, I'd like to remind you

17     of some additional things you told the OTP in 2003 about this meeting and

18     ask you to confirm them.

19             First you explained that this meeting and the criticism of

20     Zepinic related to the fact that you had been recently demoted, you'd

21     been demoted to the position of commander in charge of escorting trains,

22     a position you rejected.  And that's 65 ter 24950 at pages 23 and 24.

23     Can you confirm that that's the context of your attendance at this

24     meeting?

25        A.   I don't know on which basis the meeting was called.  I know that

Page 42188

 1     in the context Mico Stanisic said that we should come to that meeting.

 2     There were many people, many SDS members, but I hardly knew anyone except

 3     for Mr. Karadzic and that some other people I knew from TV.  And some

 4     people demanded an explanation because they saw me and some other people.

 5     I believe that Slavko Draskovic was there and Kijac too.  They saw people

 6     they didn't know and they were asking:  Who are these people?  What are

 7     they doing here?  And then Mico Stanisic explained that we had come

 8     because there were some problems on the MUP, that there had been -- that

 9     I had been suddenly replaced, that the Muslims demoted me to a deputy

10     commander after five or six years of being commander of that police

11     station.  It was part of their intention to humiliate me and return me to

12     the same police station where I was, but only to the position of deputy

13     commander.  That's the lowest position for a person with a university

14     degree.

15             You probably know Sredoje Momic [as interpreted], who was

16     transferred to the Novi Grad police station in Sarajevo.  The plan was to

17     humiliate people so that they refuse the position offered to them and as

18     a consequence they'd be left without a job.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must intervene in the transcript.

20     In line 14 we see "Sredoje Momic," which is wrong.  It should be "Novic."

21     And apart from that, the witness said that he was highly educated and

22     experienced.  He was in an executive position in the State Security

23     Service, but he was transferred to a lower position which he refused.

24             As for you, Mr. Kljajic, please speak slowly so that the

25     interpreters don't have too difficult a job.

Page 42189

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kljajic, do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic has

 3     said now?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   And at this meeting, Mr. Kljajic, Dr. Karadzic not only

 9     criticised Zepinic, he slammed his hand on the table, yelled at

10     Mr. Zepinic, and told him that if he did not get you re-instated, Zepinic

11     would lose his job; right?

12        A.   Probably my memory was fresher then.  It's been ten years, after

13     all.  I don't remember all the details, but I believe that this is right.

14     If I said it at the time, yeah, I think it was so.  Mr. Karadzic must

15     have been very angry with Mr. Zepinic because things were going on at the

16     MUP and things were out of any control by the Serbs.  People were

17     replaced daily or removed daily --

18        Q.   Mr. Kljajic --

19        A.   -- people were sent to police stations in the field --

20        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, I'm going to interrupt you there because --

21        A.   -- for example --

22        Q.   Sorry to interrupt you, but my question was quite specific and

23     you were moving away from it.  If we could -- if I could just show you

24     what you said before quickly.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  It's 65 ter 24950.  It's page 25 in the English

Page 42190

 1     and page 33 in the B/C/S.

 2        Q.   And I believe the Registrar has a copy there he can show you.  In

 3     and the English, it's about a third of the way down the page, it's

 4     roughly in the same position in the B/C/S where you described

 5     Dr. Karadzic slamming his hand against the table and yelling at

 6     Vito Zepinic:  What are you doing?  And then about two-thirds of the way

 7     down the page close to the bottom in the B/C/S you said:

 8             "And then Radovan Karadzic said, 'We all demand from you that you

 9     do this.  You either do this or you'll lose your job.'"

10             Does that remind you of what Dr. Karadzic -- how Dr. Karadzic

11     reacted to Mr. Zepinic at this meeting?

12        A.   I think that during the meeting Dr. Karadzic really was angry at

13     Mr. Zepinic and that he insisted that he take steps for the situation at

14     the MUP to stabilise.  However, objectively speaking from today's vantage

15     point, Mr. Zepinic really couldn't do much because there was a

16     combination of people at the MUP starting from Alija Delimustafic,

17     Mr. Simovic, Avdo Hebib, Jusuf Pusina, the chief of communication and so

18     on, Hajdar Hodzic who --

19        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you again, but I am trying to ask very

20     specific questions and I would ask you to try to keep your answers

21     focused on those specific questions.  Can you just confirm that you told

22     the OTP in 2003 that Dr. Karadzic slammed his hand on the table at this

23     meeting, yelled at Mr. Zepinic, and told him that if he did not get you

24     re-instated that he would lose his job?

25        A.   I think that Dr. Karadzic was angry and he probably slammed his

Page 42191

 1     hand on the table once.  I don't think he -- I said he did it more than

 2     once.  And I believe that he told Zepinic that he must re-instate me.

 3        Q.   Okay.  At paragraph 8 you talk about the division of the MUP.

 4     You said that there was a need to divide the MUP and you said that this

 5     was also what the Lisbon agreement provided for.  Now, it's correct that

 6     whatever the Lisbon Agreement envisioned, it was never finalised.  You

 7     acknowledged that in 2003 and that's correct, isn't it?

 8        A.   The truth is that the Lisbon Agreement envisaged a division, and

 9     more or less all of us at the ministry started behaving in accordance

10     with it.  Although, at some point Mr. Alija Izetbegovic changed his mind

11     and gave up -- walked out from the Lisbon Agreement.

12        Q.   Okay.  And the other thing about the Lisbon Agreement is that the

13     evidence in this case indicates that the negotiations that culminated in

14     this so-called agreement commenced on 13 February 1992.  And that's

15     D2968, paragraph 5.  But senior Serb police personnel within the joint

16     MUP, including yourself, were making concrete plans to divide the MUP

17     even before this date.  That's right, isn't it?

18        A.   It wasn't only senior Serb personnel.  Everybody did it.  I can

19     mention Alija Delimustafic and there was even mention of a division of

20     buildings.  The Muslims would get the building on Bozo Kovacevica Street,

21     the Croats the one on Augusta Cerca [phoen] Street, and I think that two

22     buildings were to go to the Serbs at the school of -- at the MUP school

23     at Vrace.

24        Q.   Okay.  Could we go to -- sorry.

25        A.   And that was agreed at a collegium of the then-Minister of the

Page 42192

 1     Interior, Alija Delimustafic.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P1083, please.

 3        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, these are minutes of a meeting held in Banja Luka on

 4     the 11th of February, 1992, and it indicates in the first paragraph your

 5     presence.  Now, you did attend this meeting of Serb MUP personnel in

 6     Banja Luka; right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, I'd like to point you to a few comments that are

 9     reflected in the minutes of this meeting, and the first is in the middle

10     of page 1 in the English and near the bottom of the page in the

11     B/C/S - and these are Mico Stanisic's remarks where he says:

12             "Work has to be done by the organisation of the Serbian MUP,

13     starting from the municipal and regional levels up to the Serbian

14     ministry ..."

15             And on the next page in the B/C/S and towards the bottom in the

16     English, Nenad Radovic "notified those present that the Assembly of the

17     Serbian Republic of BH had made a decision on the establishment of the

18     Serbian MUP ..."

19             And then you're the next speaker.  And if we go to the next page

20     in the English you state:

21             "I categorically state that the SDA and the SDS cannot work in

22     the same MUP.  And if Nenad Radovic's proposal is not implemented within

23     seven days, I will resign."

24             The next speaker Andrija Bjelosevic, and this is on page 3 in the

25     B/C/S, says at the end of his comments:

Page 42193

 1             "I also support the decision to establish the Serbian MUP."

 2             Goran Zugic, the next speaker, at the end of his comments, says:

 3             "The Serbian MUP has to start work as soon as possible ..."

 4             Predrag Jesuric, the next speaker, again at the end of his

 5     comments says:

 6             " ...  the Serbian MUP should be established as soon as

 7     possible."

 8             Krsto Savic says:

 9             "We are already forming the Serbian Mostar SJB ..."

10             Now, it's clear, Mr. Kljajic, that the main topic of this meeting

11     or at least one of the topics was the creation of a separate Serb MUP;

12     right?

13        A.   I think that the topic was the situation at the MUP.  That was

14     the main topic, and one of the other topics was the establishment of the

15     Serbian MUP.  And Nenad Radovic said that the Assembly of the Serbian

16     people took that decision, and if it did we had no choice but to start

17     working on it.

18        Q.   Okay.  And --

19        A.   It's another matter that the representatives of all the

20     stations --

21             THE ACCUSED:  I would really prefer to let witness finish.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I didn't follow the --

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I had started to speak and then I realised the

24     witness was still speaking --

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I continue or should I --

Page 42194

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  -- so I stopped --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I'll leave it to you.

 3             Yes, please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

 4             If necessary, the Chamber will intervene.  Otherwise, please

 5     continue.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 7        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, if you would like to finish your answer, go ahead,

 8     please, briefly.

 9        A.   I think you interrupted me when I was about to say that at that

10     meeting the situation was analysed and all representatives of public

11     security stations and security services centres exerted great pressure on

12     us and criticised us for not doing anything at the ministry.  That we

13     were being inactive and irresponsible on that, we didn't deserve to be in

14     our positions, that we should leave those positions and make room for new

15     people to do the job as it should be done.  And I pointed out at the

16     meeting that if in the coming 10 or 15 days we really showed that we

17     weren't determined enough to do anything, that I will resign so that

18     somebody else may be able to do the job better than I.  And after some

19     time I did that.  I handed in my resignation and retired.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kljajic, if you could concentrate on answering

21     the question.  The question put to you this time was whether the topic at

22     the time was a creation of a separate Serbian MUP.  What is your answer

23     to that, Mr. Kljajic?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The answer is affirmative.  I

25     believe Nenad Radovic phrased it best.  He informed us that the Assembly

Page 42195

 1     of the Serbian People had taken that decision.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, when you were shown this document in 2003, you

 4     agreed that the officials present at this meeting were not implementing

 5     something that had been agreed with the Muslims.  That's correct, isn't

 6     it?

 7        A.   I don't remember what you're asking me about now.  I don't

 8     remember that part.

 9        Q.   Well, if we could then -- I'll just remind you.

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to page -- to 65 ter 24950, again.

11     This is page 52 of the English and page 70 in the B/C/S.

12             [Microphone not activated]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Your microphone.

14             MS. GUSTAFSON:

15        Q.   And at the bottom of page 52 in the English and towards the

16     bottom of page 70 in the B/C/S, you're asked:

17             "Mr. Kljajic, is there any reference," and then there's something

18     unintelligible, "agreement with Muslims in respect of division of MUP?"

19             And this is in the context of your discussion of this document,

20     and you say at the top of the next page in English:

21             "No, there is no reference in this document ... this is something

22     that was mentioned and discussed every day."

23             And then in the next page in the B/C/S and skipping down two

24     paragraphs in the English, SM asks you at the end of his question:

25             "Are you saying that all of these officials who got together were

Page 42196

 1     doing something that was agreed with the Muslims?"

 2             And you answer:

 3             "No."

 4             And you're asked again:

 5             "So, the proposal set out in this document was not agreed with

 6     the Muslims?"

 7             And you say:

 8             "No."

 9             Now, that's what you said in 2003, right, that the proposals at

10     this 11 February 1992 meeting were not proposals that had been agreed to

11     with the Muslim side?

12        A.   Well, you see, if you're asking me whether we had written down

13     these proposals and given it to the Muslims to work on them, my answer is

14     no.  But whether there was previous discussion at the collegium of the

15     minister of the MUP, then the answer is yes.  In other words, were these

16     proposals put on paper before we discussed them?  No, they weren't.  But

17     at any rate, there was discussion about this matter at many collegium

18     meetings at the MUP.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'd like to tender these two pages of the

20     interview, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. --

22             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

23             JUDGE KWON:  -- Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive the first page and these two

Page 42197

 1     pages.  Shall we assign a number for this?

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6468, Your Honours.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 5        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, I'd like to ask you now about the barricades in

 6     Sarajevo in early March, which you discussed in 2003, and I will ask you

 7     to please, if you -- I'm going to put a series of short propositions to

 8     you, and if you could please just affirm that it's correct if you agree

 9     that it's correct, and if there's anything that you need to add at the

10     end, you can do so.

11             So in 2003 you explained that when the blockade of Sarajevo

12     started with barricades put up by the Serbs, you were called to go

13     urgently to the MUP headquarters.  Correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And when you arrived, Momcilo Mandic, then chief of public

16     security, took you on a tour of the barricades and introduced you to the

17     people manning the barricades and told you all of their names; correct?

18        A.   Am I supposed to answer merely yes or no?

19        Q.   I'd like you to please answer yes or no if possible.  Thank you.

20        A.   I think I owe you an explanation - although you're insisting that

21     I do so at the end, because I may forget until then.  When I came to the

22     MUP, everybody was there, not only Serbs.  And this should not be

23     considered to have been that way.  Everybody was there, Serbs, Muslims,

24     Croats.  At one point we had a meeting for us to be informed of the

25     situation on the ground, and Momcilo Mandic asked me to accompany him, to

Page 42198

 1     go to the Holiday Inn.  And on our way there we saw those roadblocks and

 2     we saw some people at the check-points that he knew.

 3        Q.   In 2003 you said:

 4             "He invited me to come with him and tour these barricades.  We

 5     toured the barricades at Vrbanja bridge and Pofalici.  I have omitted to

 6     mention that when we were touring the barricades he introduced me to the

 7     people who were manning these barricades."

 8             That's what you said in 2003.  Can you confirm that that's

 9     correct?

10        A.   I think that it's a fact that he told me we were going to the

11     Holiday Inn, and on the way there we also called up those barricades if

12     we want to be fully precise and accurate.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, I'd like to tender what I just read out

14     which is page 20 of the English and page 27 and 28 of the B/C/S and add

15     that to P6468, please.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, since it's been read out in its entirety,

17     Mr. President, I don't know that that's necessary.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, Your Honour, I think if the witness doesn't

19     accept his prior statement, then the prior statement itself should be

20     admitted as evidence.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Better to have them in written evidence.  We'll add

22     them to the exhibit.

23             Shall we continue.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

25        Q.   And, Mr. Kljajic, you mentioned that Mr. Mandic was taking you to

Page 42199

 1     the Holiday Inn, and he indeed took you to the SDS headquarters at the

 2     Holiday Inn where you met with a number of people including Rajko Dukic

 3     and Nedjo Vlaski who was then a DB official.  That's page 21 of the

 4     English.  That's right, isn't it?

 5        A.   Yes.  I did not meet with him.  It was not a meeting.  They were

 6     doing their job.  We came to their office.  We simply arrived there, we

 7     sat down, and they continued doing what they had been doing before.  It

 8     was not a formal meeting.  It was not like we had arrived in order to

 9     attend a meeting that was scheduled before.

10        Q.   And what Rajko Dukic was busy doing at the time was talking on

11     two or three telephone lines, and it became clear to you that he was

12     handling everything and was the main organiser.  That's page 22.  That's

13     correct, isn't it?

14        A.   That's correct.  I realised that he was the one who was in charge

15     of that activity within the SDS, that he was the most responsible person,

16     the number one person.

17        Q.   And you observed that Rajko Dukic was informing Radovan Karadzic,

18     who was abroad at the time, on the latest developments regarding the

19     barricades; correct?

20        A.   I believe that he did talk with Mr. Karadzic on the phone and

21     that he put him in the picture, he told him about the situation.

22        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to ask you some more questions about Mr. Mandic.

23     In 2003 when you were asked about the period before the war, you compared

24     Mr. Mandic and Mr. Zepinic as follows.  You described Mr. Mandic as

25     aggressive and unscrupulous, whereas Zepinic was composed, calm, and

Page 42200

 1     decent.  That's page 19.  That's right, isn't it?

 2        A.   That was how I saw things.  It was my free estimate of the

 3     things, if you will.

 4        Q.   And you said that Mandic was very influential and acted as if he

 5     were the deputy minister instead of Zepinic.  That's page 19.  That's

 6     right, isn't it?

 7        A.   That was in keeping with his personality.  He liked to behave in

 8     that way.  I believe that in some cases he appeared to be more important

 9     than Mr. Zepinic, that he was the deputy minister and not Mr. Zepinic.

10        Q.   And in light of this behaviour of Mr. Mandic, you assessed that

11     he must have had the support of Dr. Karadzic.  That's page 20.  Can you

12     confirm that?

13        A.   At that time, that seemed to be logical, that he enjoyed more

14     support from Mr. Karadzic and the SDS, which is why he behaved in the way

15     he did.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now, after the war began you told the OTP in 2003 that you

17     arrived at the Vrace school the day after it had been taken over by the

18     special forces, and that from the moment you arrived it was clear to you

19     that Mandic was bent on illegal activities.  That's page 33.  That's

20     correct, isn't it?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And in particular, you observed that Mandic, with his associates,

23     was taking away everything that he pleased from the Vrace school with a

24     2-tonne freight vehicle, including valuable property, passports, and car

25     registration papers.  That's pages 33 to 34.  That's right, isn't it?

Page 42201

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And on one occasion Branko Djeric, the prime minister, told you

 3     that Mandic had made a gift of nine Golf vehicles to the RS government,

 4     but you knew these vehicles were stolen from the Sarajevo airport and you

 5     told Mr. Djeric that; right?  That's page 37.

 6        A.   Correct, yes.

 7        Q.   And Mr. Djeric was taken aback by what you told him and after

 8     that it appeared to you that Mr. Djeric wanted to replace Mandic but was

 9     not powerful enough; correct?

10        A.   Mr. Djeric was taken aback.  As a matter of fact, that was my

11     interpretation which was based on the information that I had collected.

12     In the meantime I've read some books and some newspaper articles, and I

13     realised that Mr. Djeric did have an intention to remove Mr. Mandic from

14     his position but he failed in doing that.

15        Q.   And you complained to Mico Stanisic about Mandic's activities,

16     and Stanisic told you he couldn't do anything about it because Krajisnik

17     had said Mandic was the best minister in the government.  That's page 32

18     and 33.  Correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And you told the OTP that Mandic and Stanisic were very close,

21     they were connected by the kum relationship, and you believed that that

22     relationship continued throughout 1992, in part because you and others

23     complained to Mr. Stanisic about Mandic's criminality but Stanisic never

24     did anything about it.  Pages 35 and 36.  Correct?

25        A.   I don't know what Mr. Stanisic did, whether he tried to do

Page 42202

 1     something.  I suppose that I concluded that based on the information that

 2     I'd had up to then.

 3        Q.   Okay.  At paragraph 11 of your statement you said that you spent

 4     roughly the first month and a half of the war in Vrace, and then you were

 5     about 15 days in Pale before you transferred to Bijeljina.  So I take it

 6     you were in Vrace from roughly early April until roughly mid-May 1992; is

 7     that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And you told the OTP in 2003 that during the time you were

10     in Vrace you went to Belgrade for ten days to visit your family.  That's

11     page 34.  Can you confirm that; and if so, did you travel back and forth

12     to Belgrade by car?

13        A.   I went to Belgrade, but I travelled by helicopter there and back.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson, line 16 in your question, you

15     referred to kum relationship between Mandic and Stanisic.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I can ask a follow-up question.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:

19        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, can you explain to the Trial Chamber what the kum

20     relationship that Mandic and Stanisic had entailed?  What does that mean?

21        A.   The kum relationship is a form of a friendly relationship.  It is

22     not a family relationship.  However, a kum is somebody's best man at his

23     wedding.  That would be the kum relationship.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And now you just mentioned travelling to Belgrade by

25     helicopter, and again in 2003 you were played an intercept, which is in

Page 42203

 1     evidence as P2227, from the 18th of April, where you were speaking with

 2     Mr. Mihajlovic, and in that intercept you said that helicopters were

 3     flying every day back and forth from the Pale or Vrace area to Belgrade.

 4     Can you confirm that helicopters were going back and forth on a daily

 5     basis?

 6        A.   Well, I can't say that.  I doubt that I ever said that they

 7     travelled every day, but they did travel from Pale to Belgrade, not from

 8     Vrace to Belgrade.  And the main purpose of those flights were to

 9     transport the wounded.  And whenever the wounded were transported, there

10     would be a place left unoccupied.  So we made the most of the opportunity

11     and we travelled on those helicopters to Belgrade.

12        Q.   Okay.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could have P2227, please.

14        Q.   I'd just like to remind you of what you said in that

15     conversation.  As you can see this is an intercept of conversation

16     between you and Pero Mihajlovic on the 18th of April.  And if we can go

17     to page 2 in the English and page 3 in the B/C/S.  And it's towards the

18     bottom of the page in both languages, and you're discussing with

19     Mr. Mihajlovic whether he will come to see you and you say:

20             "There are helicopters flying between Belgrade and here daily."

21             And Mihajlovic says:

22             "I can't reach him, damn it," talking about Mico Davidovic.

23             And you say:

24             "You should ask around.  They are operating constantly."

25             Does that remind you of what you said on the 18th of April, 1992,

Page 42204

 1     about helicopters operating -- flying between Belgrade and Pale daily or

 2     constantly?

 3        A.   Well, there was just one or perhaps two helicopters that

 4     transported the wounded from Pale to the military medical academy in

 5     Belgrade, and this is what the conversation is about.  I urged him to get

 6     on one of those helicopters and return to Pale together with the wounded.

 7     That's what I was telling him.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Again, at paragraph 12 of your statement you discuss

 9     communication problems in the MUP at the beginning of the war.  Now, in

10     2003 it was put to you that by the 20th of April, 1992, the ministry was

11     producing daily bulletins on security-related events based on information

12     received regularly from the CSBs.  And you claim that you were not aware

13     that there was communication between the CSBs and the ministry and that

14     you had never seen these daily bulletins.  And that's pages 69 and 72.

15     Is that still your claim, Mr. Kljajic, that although you were the number

16     three person in the ministry, you didn't know that there was

17     communication between the CSBs and the ministry or that the ministry

18     produced daily bulletins based on that information?

19        A.   Well, I believe that you have to understand my position and my

20     role at the time.  I was in Vrace and the Ministry of the Interior was in

21     Pale.  The communication between the centres and the ministry at Pale

22     bypassed me.  I simply did not have any insight into the type of

23     communication that they may have had, what they were doing.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 42205

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 15 the witness said that he

 2     was seconded to Vrace.  This is missing from the transcript.  Vrace was

 3     not close to Pale and this is missing from the transcript.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kljajic, do you confirm that?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 8        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, despite your claims that you don't know about

 9     communication between the CSBs and the ministry, it's correct that you

10     directly received a report from the Bijeljina CSB in mid-April when you

11     were in Vrace by telephone.  Do you remember that?

12        A.   I don't remember that.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to D1694, please.

14        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, you can see on page 1 that you introduced

15     yourself.  About six lines down, you say:

16             "This is Cedo Kljajic speaking."

17             And the respondent says:

18             "Cedo, this is Jesuric, chief from Bijeljina speaking."

19             That would be Predrag Jesuric, CSB chief in Bijeljina; correct?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Okay.  Do you remember now receiving a report on the 16th of

22     April from Mr. Jesuric reporting on the situation in the Bijeljina CSB

23     area?

24        A.   This is not a report.  Do you know what a report should look

25     like?  When you look at this conversation and when you put it on paper,

Page 42206

 1     it will fit on one single page.  Reports are more extensive.  They go

 2     over four, five, or six pages.  This is just an overview, a short

 3     conversation that you are now trying to portray as a report.  This is a

 4     simple conversation between myself and Jesuric.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Let's look a little more at this simple conversation --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. --

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  -- Gustafson, shall we take a break now?

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Certainly, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 25 minutes, but before doing

11     so we'll -- there's one thing I'd like to discuss in private session.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 42207

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 25 minutes and resume at

13     seven past 4.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 3.36 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.

16                           [The witness takes the stand via video-link]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

19             If we could go to page 3 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S

20     in this document.

21        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, I was asking you some questions about this

22     conversation between you and Mr. Jesuric on the 16th of April, 1992.  And

23     at the top of the page in both languages, Mr. Jesuric reports that

24     everything is normal in Bijeljina and the situation in Zvornik is getting

25     back to normal.  You say:

Page 42208

 1             "All right."

 2             And he says:

 3             "15.000 Muslims escaped to Serbia which means that they are not

 4     afraid of Serbs and that they have trust from Serbia to Serbia."

 5             And you ask:

 6             "Escaped to Mali Zvornik, is that right?"

 7             And Jesuric says:

 8             "Yes."

 9             And you say:

10             "To Serbia.  Escaped to Serbia.  All right."

11             Now, you would agree that a report that 15.000 Muslims have

12     escaped Zvornik.  That's a pretty alarming piece of information; right?

13        A.   I don't know what you mean when you say this.  He shared that

14     with us as a piece of information.

15        Q.   And you as under-secretary for public security responsible for

16     protecting lives and safety of citizens, maintaining law and order, and

17     detecting possible criminal offences, you didn't find this piece of

18     information, that 15.000 Muslims had escaped Zvornik, to cause you any

19     concern?

20        A.   Look, objectively speaking I believe that this is blown out of

21     proportion, this figure of 15.000 people who fled at one moment.  There

22     may have been a couple thousand who fled, and you know that operations

23     were going on there.  There was war going on.  And it is only normal that

24     under such circumstances people leave, that they flee the war.  I don't

25     see anything out of the ordinary here if people decided to cross the

Page 42209

 1     river to go to Serbia to save themselves from the war.

 2        Q.   Well, it doesn't say they decided.  It says they escaped.  And

 3     you said:

 4             "It is only normal that under such circumstances," referring to

 5     operations, "people leave."

 6             But, Mr. Kljajic, you didn't ask Mr. Jesuric what caused these

 7     people to leave.  You didn't -- you didn't know whether they were leaving

 8     due to combat, whether they were being forced out, what had happened to

 9     these people, why 15.000 people of only one ethnicity had left the

10     municipality in a short period of time.  You didn't ask any of those

11     questions, did you?

12        A.   I did not ask any of those questions because at the time you

13     could hear on the radio and watch on TV that there was combat going on

14     there.  It was a logical conclusion that that was the reason.  I believe

15     that a certain number of Serbs also escaped; however, that moment he

16     didn't speak about Serbs who had fled the combat area.  It is only normal

17     to people to flee from an area of combat operations.  I don't know what

18     you think I could do as an under-secretary who was in Vrace to save those

19     people, to provide them with safety in an area of combat operations.  Do

20     you really think that one person could do something, especially in view

21     of the fact that I didn't have power in my hands?  I was an individual

22     who worked in Vrace.  I didn't have a single man under my control or my

23     command.  So are you saying that I should have gone there as an

24     individual and that I should have stopped those people?  That I should

25     have them:  People, stop, you have to stay?

Page 42210

 1        Q.   So let me get this straight, Mr. Kljajic:  As someone with 18

 2     years service as a professional police official who was the

 3     under-secretary for public security, you get a report from the CSB chief

 4     in Bijeljina that 15.000 Muslims have left Zvornik and your professional

 5     decision is to assume that they're fleeing due to combat and you see no

 6     need as a professional to ask Mr. Jesuric any follow-up questions about

 7     these people; is that correct?

 8        A.   Look, read the report through and you will see that at the end

 9     Jesuric tells me that he will send the report to Pale.  Whatever the two

10     of us discussed, he would forward to the Ministry of the Interior.  And

11     that was just a piece of extra information.  And what do you think that I

12     should have done at that moment?  I would love you to tell me what I was

13     supposed to do as a professional.  The only thing I could do was to

14     acknowledge that.  I didn't have any effective power, any possibility to

15     prevent war operations.  I could only acknowledge that information as

16     such.

17        Q.   Okay.  You mentioned that there were operations in Zvornik at

18     this time, and you knew that Arkan was involved, didn't you?  You told

19     the OTP in 2003 that it was well-known that Arkan had operations in

20     Bijeljina, Brcko, and Zvornik; and after that, he carried out extensive

21     looting and took as much as he could for himself.  That's page 137.

22     That's right, isn't it?

23        A.   I received that kind of information.  I was not there.  I

24     received that information from other people and I interpreted it in the

25     way I did.

Page 42211

 1        Q.   Okay.  At paragraph 16 of your statement you describe a meeting

 2     you attended in Belgrade in May of 1992 about a month after the conflict

 3     began, attended by the chiefs of CSBs, RS MUP officials, and

 4     Dr. Karadzic.  Now, in 2003 you told the OTP that you thought

 5     Mr. Krajisnik was there as well, that's page 68.  That's correct, isn't

 6     it?

 7        A.   Yes, I remember that meeting.  I said that I thought that meeting

 8     had taken place and that he had been there, but I can't remember that

 9     clearly.

10        Q.   And I assume that Mr. Stanisic, the minister, was there as well,

11     Mico Stanisic?

12        A.   Yes, he was there.

13        Q.   Okay.  And you said in your statement, Defence statement, that

14     Dr. Karadzic informed those present about the general situation and

15     issues.  I take it from that that Dr. Karadzic was better informed than

16     the MUP leadership about the situation; is that right?

17        A.   Well, he spoke in general terms, and what he told us is

18     everything that we could see on TV.  That information was publicly

19     available.  He told us that war operations had started, that there were

20     dead and wounded, that we had to take that into account, and he told us

21     that on our side we had to remain as professional as possible, that we

22     had to implement laws and regulations that applied to the work of the

23     Ministry of the Interior.

24        Q.   You said he told you that there were dead and wounded.  Did he

25     tell you any more details than that about who was dead and wounded?  Did

Page 42212

 1     he tell you who, where, or when?

 2        A.   I really don't remember that he shared any detail with us.  He

 3     told us that we should comply with the Geneva Conventions, the Law on

 4     War, and that the Ministry of the Interior had to act within the

 5     framework of the Law on the Interior and our rules and regulations.

 6        Q.   And did Dr. Karadzic ask Mr. Stanisic or any of the other police

 7     officials there for any specific information or reports or ask for any

 8     information to be gathered and reported back to him?

 9        A.   I don't remember that he asked anyone for anything like that.

10        Q.   Okay.  At paragraph 10 of your statement you said that you never

11     heard from any of your colleagues in the MUP or other members of the

12     civilian and military authorities that Muslims or Croats should be

13     expelled.  But you did know at the time that, in the summer of 1992 in

14     particular, that the Republika Srpska authorities were capturing large

15     numbers of Muslims and detaining them in terrible conditions in makeshift

16     camps guarded by MUP officials.  You knew that, didn't you?

17        A.   Never really did anyone speak about that kind of thing in front

18     of me; I can assert that.  No officials within the Ministry of the

19     Interior or political representatives or military representatives, no one

20     ever spoke of any kind of expulsion of Muslims or Croats.  As for these

21     camps, I just knew of this one camp, I think it was at Manjaca, the one

22     that Mr. Zupljanin spoke about and he said the conditions were rather bad

23     there and that something would have to be done.  So roughly the

24     conclusion was that the best solution was to carry out an exchange of

25     prisoners, Serb and Croat prisoners, all for all.

Page 42213

 1        Q.   When did Mr. Zupljanin tell you that the conditions in Manjaca

 2     were rather bad?

 3        A.   Well, you see, he just said that there was this camp there that

 4     had been established and the conditions were not exactly adequate and

 5     that actually this is a burden for the MUP, that he wanted that to be

 6     resolved as soon as possible, and that was the conclusion, that this

 7     should be resolved by having exchange all for all.  So that the Muslims

 8     would release all of our prisoners and we would release all of their

 9     prisoners, and that would be the only right and rapid solution.  They

10     were a problem for us.  What to do with these people?  There was always

11     the possibility of some abuse on the part of individuals who could have

12     abused these people in some way.  So it was really in no one's interests.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Could I have D477, please.

14        Q.   And while that's coming up, Mr. Kljajic, my question was when

15     Mr. Zupljanin told you about poor conditions in Manjaca.  Can you

16     remember that?

17        A.   I think that at this meeting he said a few sentences, that the

18     conditions were not good and that this question should be resolved

19     urgently by way of an exchange, all for all.  All the prisoners held by

20     the Serbs for all the prisoners held by the Muslims and that that would

21     be the only solution.

22        Q.   Sorry, I'm -- I think I misspoke.  I think it should be D447.  I

23     apologise.

24             THE ACCUSED:  But this is nice document, anyway.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 42214

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, this is a summary of a meeting of senior MUP

 2     officials from the 11th of July, 1992.  And if we go to page 2 you can

 3     see that it indicates that you, among others, are present.  Now, you

 4     attended this meeting; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to page 7 of the English and

 7     page 8 in the B/C/S in e-court, and it's actually page 5 in the original

 8     numbering of the document in B/C/S for the Registrar's benefit.  And it's

 9     the second paragraph in B/C/S and it's in the middle in the English.

10        Q.   And Mr. Zupljanin is speaking and he says:

11             "The army and Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies are requesting

12     that as many Muslims as possible are gathered and they are leaving these

13     undefined camps up to the internal affairs organs.  Conditions in these

14     camps are bad.  There is no food.  Some individuals do not observe

15     international norms ...," et cetera.

16             And do you remember Mr. Zupljanin describing multiple camps in

17     which as many Muslims as possible were being gathered and detained and

18     these camps were left to be secured by MUP officials?

19        A.   I think that Mr. Zupljanin said that in the context of our

20     obligations on the basis of the law and that it was in that context that

21     this discussion took place at that meeting and it was stated that organs

22     of the interior cannot in any way be the ones in charge of camps that

23     were set up by the military.  If the military set them up, then they

24     should provide security there too.  From the point of view of the Law on

25     the Interior, and that was one of the conclusions, it was unacceptable

Page 42215

 1     for us to deal with improvised camps.  Because if we are to give our

 2     people there to secure these camps, then we would not have enough people

 3     for preserving public law and order in the territory that is under the

 4     control of the authorities.

 5        Q.   And that was Mr. Zupljanin's concern, right, that there were too

 6     many -- that the police were too busy securing these improvised

 7     collection facilities to be -- and they weren't able to carry out their

 8     regular police duties; right?

 9        A.   Well, Mr. Zupljanin made these comments orally.  I think that

10     this report or whatever it was that he wrote, he contributed that to the

11     transcript or the minutes and we did not hear all of it perhaps.  Truth

12     to tell, he did say there that he thought that that was not the best way,

13     how the organs of the interior should be involved, and he expressed his

14     fear that some members of the police may overstep their authority, abuse

15     these people who are in the camp.  And he was afraid of that.  He said

16     that he thought that we had to resolve the matter, namely, that the army

17     should take over these camps again and that we should deal with our own

18     work.

19        Q.   And earlier you mentioned that Mr. Zupljanin had discussed

20     Manjaca, but it's clear this isn't just about Manjaca, right, he refers

21     to undefined camps being left up to the internal affairs organs and that

22     these collection centres, plural, are not adequate.  This isn't just

23     about Manjaca.  This is a widespread phenomenon; right?

24        A.   Well, I've already said to you that Mr. Zupljanin provided this

25     information in writing too.  Here he spoke - it was an oral statement and

Page 42216

 1     it was about Manjaca.  Now, 21 years ago whether he mentioned some other

 2     camps, I cannot remember now.

 3        Q.   Well, you have expressed quite some recollections about this

 4     meeting and these comments in particular by Mr. Zupljanin.  Do you

 5     remember that in 2003, ten years ago, when you were asked about these

 6     comments you said that you didn't remember whether these camps existed or

 7     if they were discussed as a problem at this meeting?  Do you remember

 8     that ten years ago you basically said you had no recollection of these


10        A.   It is possible that I said it at that moment.  I don't know why I

11     said that.  In the meantime I got quite a bit of information through the

12     media, on the internet, read different books.  It is possible that in

13     that context, I mean now, I am putting this together, things that I did

14     not remember at that moment.

15        Q.   Okay.  If we could just go quickly to 65 ter 24950 at page 160 in

16     the English and, in fact, there's no B/C/S transcript for this portion of

17     the interview.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And for the benefit of the Registrar in Canada,

19     the page numbers are in the upper right-hand corner, the consecutive page

20     numbers.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kljajic, do you understand English and read

22     English?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

Page 42217

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Kljajic, you've said you don't understand English so

 2     I'll read the relevant passages to you where you're being asked about

 3     this document we just looked at and this comment from Mr. Zupljanin in

 4     particular.  And you're -- it says -- you're asked:

 5             "This meeting took place on the 11th of July 1992.  Can you

 6     confirm that as ... July 1992 you had knowledge of these camps?"

 7             And you say:

 8             " ... you have to believe me, I really don't remember.  I can't

 9     recollect any of these things, it's a long paragraph, you see, I don't

10     remember any of these details."

11             And you're asked:

12             "Do you recall what the Crisis Staffs and the Army ...," and then

13     there's something inaudible, "persons and left them in camps?"

14             And you say:

15             "I cannot remember that, because I was not there, in the field, I

16     was specifically at Vraca and these activities took part on the ground,

17     somewhere in the area of Banja Luka."

18             And you're asked:

19             "Can you confirm that these camps were left under the

20     jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?"

21             And you say:

22             "I can see that from these minutes, from what I said here in the

23     minutes, but I really don't remember that these camps existed and that we

24     discussed them as some sort of problem."

25             You're asked:

Page 42218

 1             "Do you remember that the conditions in the camps were poor?"

 2             And you say:

 3             "I never toured a single camp and I can't confirm that the

 4     conditions were either bad or good."

 5             And you're asked:

 6             "Did you consider that the involvement of the police in the

 7     management of these camps was a serious issue?"

 8             And you answer:

 9             "I don't remember that."

10             So, Mr. Kljajic, you can that -- can you confirm that in 2003,

11     ten years ago, you stated that you basically had no recollection of these

12     comments at this meeting, in contrast to what you've testified to today?

13        A.   Yes.  Well, I'm telling you, in order to clarify this thing that

14     you wish to know about, in the meantime I received a lot of information.

15     I looked at a lot of clips on YouTube, I read different books, articles,

16     and probably in the meantime my knowledge about all of that was

17     completed.

18        Q.   Okay.  Well, you've given evidence about what Mr. Zupljanin said

19     at this meeting and what he meant at this meeting.  So is it your

20     testimony that your evidence about what Mr. Zupljanin said and meant at

21     this meeting is influenced by what you've seen on YouTube or read in

22     books and articles?

23        A.   Well, look, Mr. Zupljanin at that moment - as I've already

24     said - attached his report and I never had an opportunity of seeing it

25     before it was presented to me in The Hague.  I never saw it.  We were at

Page 42219

 1     that meeting.  Mr. Zupljanin spoke briefly and I really do not recall.  I

 2     really cannot recall all the details of everything he said then.

 3     Obviously in that report he wrote about that, as is stated here in this

 4     document of yours.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Your Honours, my time I think is up in the next

 7     five minutes.  I need to deal with two brief topics, so I would ask, if I

 8     could, for an extra 10 to 15 minutes.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please proceed.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, I'd like to ask you to confirm some information you

13     gave to the OTP about Predrag Jesuric, the Bijeljina CSB chief, that you

14     gained from your time when you were based in Bijeljina.  You told the OTP

15     that one of the paramilitary units in Bijeljina, Mauzer's Panthers were

16     essentially operating under Predrag Jesuric.  You said that Jesuric was

17     the brains and Mauzer was the executive power behind him.  That's page

18     82.  That's right, isn't it?

19        A.   That is the information that I had.  That's true that I stated

20     that.  That's the information that I had.

21        Q.   Okay.  And at one point due to complaints about Jesuric's work,

22     you spoke to Mico Stanisic to try to get Jesuric transferred out of

23     Bijeljina.  That's page 138.  That's correct; right?

24        A.   Well, I asked Mico Stanisic several times to get Jesuric out of

25     Bijeljina because I thought that he was this factor of disruption in

Page 42220

 1     Bijeljina, that he disrupted relations in Bijeljina.

 2        Q.   And you later learned that Jesuric had spoken to Mico Stanisic

 3     and had convinced Stanisic to allow Jesuric to remain in Bijeljina and

 4     part of that convincing exercise was Jesuric promising to give Stanisic

 5     an Audi and a BMW; correct?

 6        A.   That is the same information that I learned of indirectly,

 7     through my co-workers.

 8        Q.   And then you spoke to Mico Stanisic and he told you that he'd

 9     spoken to Jesuric and that Jesuric could stay in Bijeljina, and Stanisic

10     asked you to bring him the two cars that Jesuric had promised him, a

11     request that you refused to carry out.  That's page 139.  Correct?

12        A.   Well, if I stated that then it is certainly correct.  Now I no

13     longer remember that, it's been another ten years since then.

14        Q.   If we could go to page 139 of the English and page 153 of the

15     B/C/S of your interview.  And this is at the top of the page in English

16     and in the middle of the B/C/S, and here you explain that Mr. Pantic, who

17     was the SJB chief, told you that Jesuric had told him that he -- Jesuric

18     had convinced Stanisic that he could remain in Bijeljina and promised to

19     give him the two cars.  And then you say that you had a conversation with

20     Mico Stanisic and he told you that he'd talked to Jesuric and that there

21     was no need for Jesuric to go to the MUP headquarters, that everything

22     would be okay in Bijeljina.  And you say:

23             " ... and then he asked me to bring to the ministries two cars

24     that were then in Bijeljina and to transport them to the ministry and to

25     give him, the ministry, the keys for the cars which I naturally never

Page 42221

 1     carried out."

 2             Does that remind you of your conversation with Mr. Stanisic when

 3     he asked you to bring him the two cars that Jesuric had promised?

 4        A.   Well, this has not reminded me, absolutely not, but I believe

 5     that what was stated then is true.

 6        Q.   Okay.  I have one last document I'd like to show you and it's

 7     not -- there's no hard copy there in Canada, so I'm going to ask the

 8     usher to please put it on the ELMO so that you can see it across the

 9     videolink --

10             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether it's possible because ELMO is

11     being used for the --

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I spoke to the AV people before court and they

13     told me that it would be so.  We can try it out and --

14             JUDGE KWON:  We'll sort it out.

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I will check it out.

17                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

18             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that it would be possible but we could

19     not see the witness.  Let's proceed.

20             Mr. Kljajic, can you confirm that you can see the document?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 42222











11  Pages 42222-42226 redacted.















Page 42227

 1   (redacted)

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Your Honours, I would like to tender the document

 3     I had on the ELMO, although it needs some parts of it to be translated

 4     from the B/C/S.  So if it could be MFI'd.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it and mark it for identification.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6469 marked for identification,

 8     Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very briefly.  Only a couple of

11     questions, Your Excellency.

12                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Kljajic, you mentioned that you stated

14     something because at that time you had such information.  Was such

15     information checked and were -- was it proved true or was it part of a

16     blackening campaign --

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Before the witness answers, I have no idea what

18     Dr. Karadzic is referring to here.  You stated something because at that

19     time you had such information, I think the question needs to be more

20     specific.  I can't follow.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I think he mentioned he checked something, but could

22     you repeat your question.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll go question by

24     question.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42228

 1        Q.   Can you tell us the exact position or job title of Mr. Jesuric?

 2        A.   Mr. Jesuric was chief of the Bijeljina SUP at the beginning of

 3     the war.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D1436.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Was he in that position long -- oh, you cannot see this.  But

 8     then I'll read it out to you.  It's a report about an audit or as it says

 9     here an inspection conducted on situation found at SJB Bijeljina.  And on

10     page 4 -- actually, page 5 it says:

11             "Their demands according to our information have to do with the

12     removal -- unconditional removal of chief Predrag Jesuric ..." and so on.

13             Was he chief of the crime enforcement service at any time?

14        A.   When I and Mico Stanisic came to Bijeljina, he was chief of crime

15     enforcement, whereas Aco - I can't remember his last name - was the SUP

16     chief.

17        Q.   Is the name Pantic?

18        A.   Yes, that's the name, Pantic.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P2881, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   I'll read it out because you cannot see it -- or can you?  Do you

23     have it there?

24        A.   I have a report here.  I don't know if this is it.  It's dated 26

25     June to 25 July 1992.

Page 42229

 1        Q.   Yes, that's it.  I'll read out the second part of the sentence in

 2     paragraph 1.

 3             "Certain personnel changes occurred in the department for -- of

 4     prevention and detection of crimes ..."

 5             And then we'll go to the next page, the third paragraph from the

 6     bottom, which mentions Arkan's men.  It says here:

 7             "89 pistols and three hunting rifles were illegally registered

 8     with the Bijeljina SJB with the knowledge of the then-Chief

 9     Predrag Jesuric and the general affairs department head ..."

10             Based on all this, was he removed?

11        A.   I don't know what the reason for that rotation was.  I know that

12     Predrag Jesuric was SUP chief before the war and when Mico Stanisic and I

13     went there, it may have been in May or early June, he was chief of crime

14     enforcement, whereas Aco Pantic, whom he appointed as SUP chief, was SUP

15     chief.  There was this rotation, but if he was removed because of that I

16     don't know.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Today on page 42 of the transcript which you probably

18     cannot see, you mentioned that there were demands for Jesuric to be

19     removed.  Was this case involving Jesuric an exception or not and what

20     was the attitude of the MUP toward shortcomings in the work of their own

21     officials?

22        A.   I believe that the RS MUP made efforts to function in accordance

23     with the law and the regulations.  Whoever did not was basically exposed

24     to disciplinary sanctions, just as in peace time.  We didn't replace

25     people ad hoc as if there was a war on.  We tried to follow the regular

Page 42230

 1     procedure.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  What was the position of the organs, that is, the

 3     Serbian authorities, before the war and the authorities of the RS when

 4     the war started and it began functioning?  Did you receive support from

 5     them or were you obstructed?

 6        A.   No one obstructed us on that.  On the contrary, we always enjoyed

 7     support.  In all contacts with you, you always insisted that we work in

 8     accordance with the law and the regulations, nothing else.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  On page 32 of today's transcript you were asked what

10     you as chief of public security whose task it is to preserve law and

11     order, what you did in areas of combat activity, what were you able to do

12     there?

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, that wasn't the question.  I mean, that was

14     a total mis-characterisation of what I had said.  If he wants to ask the

15     question, I don't have an objection, but without the

16     mis-characterisation.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Could you rephrase your question, Mr. Karadzic,

18     based upon the actual transcript.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.  I will.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   You were asked about the number of Muslims who were crossing to

22     Serbia from municipalities along the border.  What were you able to do?

23     Did those people go to Serbia because of disruptions in public law and

24     order or for some other reason?

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, that's a totally leading way of asking the

Page 42231

 1     question.  Just ask it in an open-ended way.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   What was the reason why those people went there and what did your

 6     service -- what means of intervention did your service have at its

 7     disposal?

 8        A.   First of all, we must know that at that time communication

 9     between us and SJBs out there were very bad, barely existing.  All we

10     could do was send Telex messages but the enemy was able to listen in.

11     Whatever we sent out by Telex or received by Telex was also read by the

12     enemy.  The same applies to phone lines, and you can see that from

13     intercepts.  Everything was eavesdropped.  So we could send the

14     information to Sarajevo and Sarajevo could forward that information to

15     them at the same time.  There was no direct, dedicated phone line between

16     us and the public security stations.  And we were unable to issue any

17     orders to those public security stations, either directly or indirectly,

18     except by sending messages by courier.  And of course that took quite

19     some time.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D4447 [as interpreted]

22     again, page 20 and it's 18 in English.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please take a look at the page where that starts with the name

25     "Planojevic" or the section that starts with his name.  We got the right

Page 42232

 1     document although the number is wrong in the transcript.

 2             Before your reply, the fourth bullet point from the bottom

 3     attributed to Planojevic:

 4             " ... take measures to ensure that our members know what awaits

 5     them if they commit a crime."

 6             What was the position with regard to this?  Were efforts made to

 7     implement this?

 8        A.   I insisted several times with Planojevic that all police officers

 9     should be informed that we are to honour the law and regulations and you

10     also demanded as much from us always.  That was our duty and we acted in

11     the same way in our relations with the CSBs and SJBs.  We insisted that

12     they act in accordance with the laws and regulations.  If they failed to

13     do so, they would be criminally prosecuted, maybe not right away but at

14     some point certainly.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at this last-but-one priority and tell us

16     what the position was with regard to the ethnic affiliation of

17     perpetrators of crimes, this part that begins "our priority."

18        A.   We always insisted that crime victims are all equal and so are

19     perpetrators of crimes, so that any crime of which we learned must be

20     investigated and, if possible, an investigative magistrate and a

21     prosecutor must be involved, we must do our part of the work and all

22     documentation must be forwarded to the appropriate places so that it

23     might be used later.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now please the sentence that you uttered here, is it

25     the only thing you said then or did you say more?  Can you see it here?

Page 42233

 1        A.   Which sentence do you mean?

 2        Q.   The one under your name, Cedo Kljajic, it's underneath what

 3     Planojevic said.  It only says:

 4             "He stressed the need to document crimes as a matter of priority,

 5     so criminal reports can be filed."

 6        A.   Well, you see, those minutes were often made by people who did

 7     not record everything that was said and that was relevant.  I'm sure that

 8     this applies to these minutes as well.  I can't have said one single

 9     sentence.  I must have said a lot more.  This is just a -- one of the

10     conclusions, but the minute-taker summarised it this way.

11        Q.   Did you get this document for you to authorise what you said?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get page 5 of the same

15     document up now.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can you say what this means, summarise -- summary of discussions,

18     and can we rely on this summary as being comprehensive, complete?  It

19     says "page 2," although it's page 5 of the document.  It's 5 in e-court

20     and 2 in the hard copy.

21        A.   You know what?  In principle I can't say how accurate and

22     comprehensive this is and how much it reflects what was said at the

23     meeting.  The person who took minutes, it all depended on who he was, how

24     professional, how fast he was, and how quickly he could take notes to

25     interpret those notes later.  It was his own free will to interpret the

Page 42234

 1     words and produce the final minutes.  The minutes usually did not reflect

 2     what was actually said at the meeting.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Were meetings sometimes recorded and then

 4     transcribed?

 5        A.   I don't know that any of the meetings that I participated in were

 6     recorded and then transcribed.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  On page 17 you stated that you suffered pressure from

 8     the local police before the war broke out.  What was it that intimidated

 9     people?  What caused dissatisfaction among the local police before the

10     war broke out?

11        A.   Before the war broke out, they had a lot of objections about the

12     work of the Ministry of the Interior and a lot of complaints.  They filed

13     applications for filling up a position with certain people.  If the

14     conditions had been normal and if the Muslim side had not obstructed

15     matters, those people would have been appointed within seven to 15 days

16     pursuant to their proposals.  However, those people could not be deployed

17     for months given the way the Ministry of the Interior worked.  It

18     happened that people were removed and new people were not appointed,

19     vacancies lasted for a long time, and this primarily applied to the

20     Serbs.  They were removed from their positions and the Muslims performed

21     duties according to what they had been said by the SDA, not according to

22     the letter of the law.

23        Q.   Thank you.  On page 13 you were interrupted.  You started saying

24     that the ministry could not do much because there was a combination of

25     people and you mentioned Delimustafic and you were interrupted.  Can you

Page 42235

 1     finish that sentence?

 2        A.   In the Ministry of the Interior there was a group of people who

 3     really played like a good team.  They had received instructions from the

 4     SDA.  They obstructed everything that would arrive from the Serbian side.

 5     For example, if we were asked to intervene and to complete any of the

 6     processes with regard to the appointment of a commander, we would go to

 7     the personnel and then they would refer us to the administration for the

 8     police; from there, they would refer us to the minister of the police.

 9     Actually, we were running in circles.  They made us run in circles.

10     After a certain while and after we went from one manager to the next, we

11     realised that it was to no avail because we could not exercise our rights

12     and you could not make sure that things were done by the book.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Kljajic, could you please tell us something about

14     the ethnic distribution of positions in the MUP and other bodies before

15     the multi-party elections.  What was the purpose of such a distribution?

16        A.   Before the multi-party elections, one could say that the Serbian

17     cadre had a slight percentage more personnel in the Ministry of the

18     Interior with regard to the ethnic structure in the Republic of Bosnia

19     and Herzegovina.  However, the reason for such a representation was

20     primarily the fact that the Serbs were loyal to the Ministry of the

21     Interior.  Whenever there was a job opening, for example, for a

22     policeman, a dozen of Serbs would apply, whereas there would be only five

23     Muslims and one or none Croat.  This means that they were simply not

24     interested and this is why the Serbs had a slight prevalence, if I can

25     put it that way, they had a slight majority.

Page 42236

 1        Q.   What I meant, Mr. Kljajic, is what you were saying about

 2     managerial positions, one Serb, one Croat, one Muslim.  Did such a

 3     situation exist even before the multi-party elections?  What was the

 4     person of such a distribution?  Why was that taken into account among the

 5     managers?

 6        A.   Before the war, i.e., before the multi-party elections there was

 7     a lot attention paid to the balance among the managers in view of the

 8     ethnic structure of those managers.  It had to be one Serb, one Muslim,

 9     one Croat, and that applied to the minister, his deputy,

10     under-secretaries, and down the scale.  The same applied to the

11     assistants.  For example, if the assistant minister was a Muslim, his

12     deputy would have been a Serb or a Croat and so on and so forth.  A lot

13     of attention was paid to the ethnic composition.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I note the time.

15     I will finish within the next few minutes before the break.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, in that sense could one control the other so as to

18     prevent illegal deals along ethnic lines?

19        A.   Of course.  But there was also a lot of trust because before the

20     multi-party elections all the personnel was duty-bound to comply with the

21     laws and regulations.  After the multi-party elections, when the Muslims

22     took over the Ministry of the Interior, there wouldn't have been any

23     problems if they had continued working in the same way in compliance with

24     the law.  Problems arose when they started disobeying the law, when they

25     started disobey being the rules and regulations of the service.

Page 42237

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Kljajic, did the Serbian Democratic Party or did

 2     I impose people at any level in the police, people who had not been

 3     members of the police before that and who were not professional in

 4     discharging their duties?

 5        A.   I believe that the SDS paid most attention to appointing people

 6     who were professional and who were career police officers.  The SDA

 7     appointed people who came from other services, from other bodies, who

 8     absolutely had nothing whatsoever to do with the police and still they

 9     became highly appointed officers.

10        Q.   My last question:  Among the Serbian cadre in the MUP, who was

11     supposed to look after the good representation and distribution of

12     positions and appointments to those positions?

13        A.   By virtue of his position, this should have been the deputy

14     minister of the interior.  He was the one who should have been tasked

15     with that.

16        Q.   What's his name?

17        A.   Vitomir Zepinic.

18        Q.   Did you ever hear from me or from my closest associates anything

19     unfavourable about Muslims or Croats, especially that they should be

20     expelled or discriminated against?

21        A.   I can claim with full responsibility that I have not heard a

22     single negative word, either from you or from your associates.  Nobody

23     uttered any such thing in front of me.

24        Q.   Did any of your acquaintances or associates in the MUP inform you

25     that they heard something of the kind?

Page 42238

 1        A.   No, nobody ever told me anything like that.

 2        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.  Thank you for your effort in testifying

 3     before this Court.

 4        A.   Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Your Honours, with leave of the court I'd like to

 7     ask one further question in re-cross-examination related to the witness's

 8     statement that "we always insisted that crime victims are all equal and

 9     so are perpetrators of crimes."

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

13                           Further cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

14        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, in the document D447 you were shown some comments -

15     this is the document where Mr. Zupljanin made his remarks about camps -

16     and you were shown comments from Planojevic about investigations and you

17     said we always insisted that crime victims are all equal and so are

18     perpetrators of crimes.

19             Are you aware of anyone who was criminally investigated and

20     prosecuted in 1992 for any crime associated with the rounding up and

21     capturing of as many Muslims as possible and detaining them in undefined

22     camps without food in poor conditions?

23        A.   I've already spoken about that.  I said that we insisted that the

24     crime prevention service should collect all the information that they

25     could gather, that they should engage an investigating judge or a

Page 42239

 1     prosecutor; if they couldn't, that they should do their job and forward

 2     the information to higher instances for future criminal prosecution.  It

 3     is very difficult to speak about the time when I was still a member of

 4     the service.  It's difficult to say whether during those first several

 5     months there could be any criminal prosecution because the courts were

 6     not in place, the system didn't function.  We could not punish people on

 7     our own.  We had to have courts for that, and to have courts there had to

 8     be a procedure in place.  A prosecutor was first and he was followed by

 9     the courts.  We insisted on the professionality of the investigation,

10     that all the information --

11        Q.   Mr. Kljajic --

12        A.   -- should be collected, that statements should be taken from

13     eye-witnesses in order to complete the file and forward it for further

14     proceedings.

15        Q.   You didn't answer my question which was very simple.  Are you

16     aware of anyone who was criminally investigated and prosecuted any time

17     in 1992 or let's say 1993 as well for any crime associated with the

18     rounding up and capturing of as many Muslims as possible and detaining

19     them in camps without food and in poor conditions?

20        A.   I read about that subsequently and I saw that there were such

21     trials; however, as I already told you, in 1993 I was not a member of the

22     bodies of the interior.  I was there in 1992 up to early September and at

23     that time conditions were not in place for such trials.

24        Q.   Mr. Kljajic, can you identify anybody by name who was criminally

25     investigated and prosecuted in 1992 or 1993 for crimes associated with

Page 42240

 1     camps as I've described?  Any specific person at all?

 2        A.   Look, over the period of 21 years I've heard so much and now

 3     you're trying me to identify one person.  It's simply impossible.  You're

 4     asking me to do something impossible.  This is not a fair question.  I

 5     can't remember such cases.  You had to ask me that -- you had to alert me

 6     that you would ask me something like that.  Off the top of my head, I

 7     can't remember anybody, but I know that there was such cases, I know that

 8     there was such people.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May I?

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Do not lead the witness.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

14                      Further Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   My first question, Mr. Kljajic:  What was the attitude towards

17     the requirements -- or rather, what was the position of the MUP vis-a-vis

18     Zupljanin's request about the capturing of Muslim civilians?

19        A.   I really don't understand your question.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  The witness has given lengthy evidence on this

21     topic.  I see no need to ask this question.

22             JUDGE KWON:  This does not arise from the -- from this question.

23             Shall we conclude, given the timing?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then with regard to the additional

25     questions in cross-examination.

Page 42241

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   What happened with criminal reports and investigations that were

 3     carried out in 1992?  Do you know if they were not tried in 1992 whether

 4     they were ever put on trial, whether those criminal reports were ever

 5     used or did they become moot?  Did they just perish and vanish in thin

 6     air?

 7        A.   I know that we insisted with the system for crime prevention --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  [Overlapping speakers]

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that all the investigations

10     should be carried according to the law.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kljajic --

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what happened next and

13     what --

14             JUDGE KWON:  The witness said that he is not in the position to

15     answer specific questions.

16             Shall we stop here, Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it just be recorded that the

18     witness said it depended on the judges not on the MUP?  I believe that

19     this on record would be useful and that would bring my examination to an

20     end.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

22             Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Kljajic.  On behalf of the

23     Chamber, I'd like to thank you for that.  You may be excused.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Can I just on behalf of

25     Dr. Karadzic thank the Government of Canada for facilitating this

Page 42242

 1     videolink and the co-operation of the witness with our Defence team.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber would like to join the thanks as well.

 3             Shall we take a break?  We'll resume at 6.00.

 4                           [The witness withdrew via video-link]

 5                           --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.

 6                           [The witness entered court]

 7                           --- On resuming at 6.02 p.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

10     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11                           WITNESS:  MILOMIR SAVCIC

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Savcic.  Please be seated and make

14     yourself comfortable.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Savcic, I take it that you are well aware of

17     this, but before you commence your evidence I must draw your attention to

18     a certain rule of evidence that we have here at the

19     International Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under this rule you may

20     object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or

21     even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

22     you in a criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying

23     something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

24     offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

25     have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that an

Page 42243

 1     answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer

 2     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 3     compel you to answer the question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal

 4     would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would

 5     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,

 6     save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

 7             Do you understand that, Mr. Savcic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, General.

14        A.   Good day, Mr. President.

15        Q.   Did you provide a statement to my Defence team, of which you are

16     a part as well?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   I'm waiting for the interpretation so I'm asking you to wait as

19     well.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court

21     1D09310.  Could you please focus on the left-hand side of the screen.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you see that statement of yours before you?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

Page 42244

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the last page please be shown

 3     so that the witness could identify his signature.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is this your signature?

 6        A.   Yes, that is my signature.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said

 8     by way of an answer to the Defence?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today,

11     would your answers basically be the same?

12        A.   Yes, they would be the same.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

15     tender this statement of General Savcic's into evidence according to

16     Rule 92 ter.

17             JUDGE KWON:  How about the associated exhibits, Mr. Robinson?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We're offering eight

19     associated exhibits.  We would ask that they be added to our Rule 65 ter

20     list as we hadn't decided to use them at that time that list was filed.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have translation for 1D10086 referred to in

22     paragraph 45?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm pretty sure we do, but I'm not sure if it's in

24     e-court.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we upload it to check it.

Page 42245

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I'm told that there's no English translation or we

 3     don't have access to it.  I'm not sure it's necessary, but if necessary

 4     Mr. Karadzic should lead live about that document.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  We do have a translation, I'm looking at it right

 6     here, so it's perhaps not released.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It was -- hasn't been released.  The Chamber didn't

 9     have opportunity to examine it, so Mr. Karadzic should lead it if

10     necessary.  And we will admit it if we are satisfied as to its relevance.

11             Mr. Nicholls, do you have any objection to the statement as well

12     as seven other documents?

13             MR. NICHOLLS:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  No, I do not.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit the statement as well as the other

15     seven associated exhibits.  Shall we assign the numbers for them.  First

16     92 ter statement.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the statement D3918.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And shall we assign the numbers for the remainder.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE KWON:  In lump sum, yes, from D3919 to what number,

21     Registrar?  D3925.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  This would be D3919 through D3925, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 42246

 1             Now I'm going to read out, in the English language, a brief

 2     summary of General Savcic's statement.

 3             [In English] General Milomir Savcic was the commander of the

 4     65th Motorised Protection Regiment of the Main Staff of the Army of

 5     Republika Srpska and serves as an investigator for the Defence team of

 6     Radovan Karadzic.

 7             When the war broke out in Sarajevo, General Savcic was teaching

 8     at the JNA military school in Sarajevo.  The military school was subject

 9     to constant attacks by Bosnian Muslim forces and General Savcic remained

10     there until early June 1992 when the JNA was evacuated from the military

11     school.

12             During his command of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment,

13     General Savcic led his troops in both defensive and offensive operations.

14     In July 1992, he and his regiment participated in the arrest of the

15     Yellow Wasps paramilitary group in the Zvornik area.  They also

16     participated in other operations to arrest Serb paramilitaries in

17     Bratunac and in an operation against Brne's group in the Sarajevo area.

18             Attacks were regularly carried out by Bosnian Muslim forces from

19     the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, even after they became UN protected

20     areas.  On June the 26th, 1995, forces from Srebrenica attacked the

21     Main Staff headquarters in Crna Rijeka.  General Savcic led his troops in

22     repelling that attack.

23             The military police component of the 65th Motorised Protection

24     Regiment was headquartered in Nova Kasaba.  On July the 13th, 1995,

25     commander of the military police Major Malinic took a large number of

Page 42247

 1     prisoners of war who had surrendered in that area after the fall of

 2     Srebrenica.  Major Malinic and his men registered those prisoners during

 3     the afternoon of the 13th of July.

 4             General Savcic has reviewed a telegram bearing his name dated

 5     13th of July, 1995, transmitting proposals by General Tolimir for the

 6     handling of prisoners.  Although he does not specifically recall this

 7     telegram, General Savcic states that the procedures set forth in this

 8     telegram, such as preventing journalists from having contact with

 9     prisoners and preventing prisoners from being seen from the air, were

10     standard procedures for the handling of prisoners.

11             General Savcic states that he had no information that prisoners

12     from Srebrenica would be executed and that there is nothing from this

13     telegram that led him to believe that any prisoners would be killed.

14             That's all and I would give up this document that is not

15     translated.  I will not lead it live.  Thank you.  I do not have

16     questions -- further questions at that moment.

17             JUDGE KWON:  As you are aware, Mr. Savcic, your evidence in chief

18     in this case has been admitted in writing and you'll be cross-examined by

19     Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  One quick correction to the summary.  The

21     statement does not say that Major Malinic and his men registered those

22     prisoners.  The statement says at paragraph 55 Major Malinic started

23     making a list of the prisoners.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Nicholls:

25        Q.   You're Karadzic's chief investigator in this case?

Page 42248

 1        A.   In a way, yes, although there is no rank of chief investigator in

 2     formal terms.

 3        Q.   Well, that's what they call you in their motions, in the motion

 4     for the subpoena of Zivanovic, 26th of March, 2013, in para 5; and the

 5     motion for the subpoena for Andric, 26 April, 2013, at para 4.  They

 6     refer to you as the chief investigator.  So whether that's a formal

 7     position, that's the way the Defence views you, since they're filing that

 8     with the Court.  Right?

 9        A.   Well, basically that's it since I do the work of other

10     investigators too, one may conclude that I have that role in the team.

11        Q.   All right.  On 13th of July, 1995, as we just heard in the

12     summary, at that point you're commander of the 65th Motorised Protection

13     Regiment; right?

14        A.   Yes, the 65th Protection Regiment Motorised --

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a minor point.  In line 21

16     there is something missing:  "I do organise the work," et cetera.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:

20        Q.   And is that correct, that you organise the work of the other

21     investigators, as Mr. Karadzic just said?  We missed that in the

22     transcript.

23        A.   Yes, that is correct.

24        Q.   Okay.  So I'll ask it again.  13 July 1995, your position at that

25     time in the VRS is commander of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment;

Page 42249

 1     right?

 2        A.   That's right.

 3        Q.   And Zoran Malinic, whose name we heard in the summary, is

 4     commander of the regiment's military police platoon; correct?

 5        A.   The interpretation I received is completely incorrect.

 6     Zoran Malinic was commander of the battalion of the military police, not

 7     commander of a platoon of the military police.

 8        Q.   That may have been my error.  Thank you.  Battalion.

 9             And you are his commander, Zoran Malinic's commander?

10        A.   I was not his commander.  I was commander of the protection

11     regiment.

12        Q.   He was your direct subordinate?

13        A.   Yes, as commander of the battalion of the military police, he was

14     directly subordinated to me.

15        Q.   Okay.  And on the 13th of July, 1995, as we've heard, he was in

16     Nova Kasaba, Zoran Malinic?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   You were in Borike on that day, 13 July 1995?

19        A.   In the broader area of Borike.  I could not say that I was

20     exactly in Borike.  I think I was in the village of Sjeversko, that's

21     what it's called, but this entire area is called Borike.

22        Q.   That's what I meant, you were in the Borike area.  And so was

23     General Tolimir on that day, 13 July 1995?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, again as we heard in the summary, the unit, the battalion

Page 42250

 1     Zoran Malinic commands, took a large number of Muslim prisoners that day,

 2     13 July 1995; right?

 3        A.   That is partly correct.  Now, what is it that is not correct?  I

 4     would like to stress once again that every time one speaks in front of

 5     this Court about that unit one always speaks of the battalion of the

 6     military police.  At that point in time, on the 13th of July, in

 7     Nova Kasaba there were up to 20 men there, that is to say the

 8     quartermasters of the military police and the duty service of the

 9     military police --

10        Q.   Let me -- let --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all other

12     microphones please be switched off when the witness is speaking.  Thank

13     you.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:

15        Q.   Let me stop you right there.  I didn't ask you how many men

16     Zoran Malinic had at his disposal then, okay.  On 13 July 1995,

17     Zoran Malinic and the men he commanded, however many of them there were,

18     took a large number of Muslim prisoners; correct?

19        A.   But in your question you said "battalion of the military

20     police" --

21        Q.   [Overlapping speakers]

22        A.   -- which is a force to be reckoned with.

23        Q.   Okay.  I did not say complete battalion.  Were the men he

24     commanded at Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995, however many of them there

25     were, members of the military police battalion?

Page 42251

 1        A.   That's right.  That is correct.

 2        Q.   He and those men took a large number of prisoners that day;

 3     right?

 4        A.   That's correct too.  However, I could not say whether all of them

 5     had been taken prisoner or whether they had perhaps surrendered on their

 6     own, but both did happen.

 7        Q.   Now, you spoke with Zoran Malinic about those prisoners on that

 8     day by telephone?

 9        A.   That's right.

10        Q.   And you told him, this is from your statement at paragraph 53, to

11     secure the prisoners and to treat them in accordance with the Rules of

12     Service; correct?

13        A.   Since it had to do with that subject matter, today I cannot

14     recall exactly what I said to him.  But I assume that the conversation

15     had to be related to that and that I drew his attention to the personal

16     safety of his men and the people that had surrendered to him and the

17     people that he had taken prisoner.

18        Q.   All right.  Let me read you paragraph 53 of your statement that

19     you just swore to and said you would answer the questions the same way,

20     and you can look at your copy.

21             "I told him to call the regiment command and that a company of

22     about 30 men who were engaged on increased security of the KM

23     General Staff should be sent to the Nova Kasaba sector.  I again told him

24     that he should secure the prisoners and to treat them according to Rules

25     of Service."

Page 42252

 1             Now, do you assume you said that or is your statement true, that

 2     that is what you said?

 3        A.   It's impossible to remember after all this time each and every

 4     word that I said, but it's certain that we didn't discuss other topics

 5     but the one - the one - that had cropped up that morning and that is

 6     prisoners of war.  So what I wrote in this paragraph is probably what I

 7     said.  Now, whether it was in this form, that is another matter.

 8        Q.   Please listen to my questions and little more carefully.  I'm

 9     asking you verbatim.  Let's make this very simple.  Is paragraph 53 of

10     your statement correct?

11        A.   Paragraph 53 of my statement is correct.

12        Q.   So in that case you did tell him to secure the prisoners and

13     treat them in accordance with the Rules of Service, right, as it says in

14     paragraph 53?

15        A.   That's right.

16        Q.   And by 17th of July, 1995, four days later, virtually all of

17     those prisoners who had been in the custody of your direct subordinate,

18     who you had spoken to about how to treat them, had been murdered; right?

19        A.   What does that have to do with me and Zoran Malinic?

20        Q.   Can you answer the question, please?

21        A.   I am answering your question right now.

22        Q.   Well, they're in your custody and they're murdered four days

23     later.  I'm asking you if you accept that, that by the 17th of July the

24     vast amount of those men who were in the custody of your direct

25     subordinate were dead?

Page 42253

 1        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I accept that on that 13th of July we handed over

 2     all of those men, as we were ordered by the commander of the Main Staff,

 3     to Bratunac.  And I don't accept any more than that.  On the 17th of

 4     July, neither Zoran Malinic nor I nor any soldier from the

 5     65th Motorised Protection Regiment had nothing to do with that.  And it's

 6     not only on the 17th, it's from the 13th in the evening.  That is true.

 7        Q.   I didn't ask you after the 13th what they had to do with it.  My

 8     question is:  Do you accept that by the 17th virtually all of those men

 9     had been murdered or do you not accept that?

10        A.   On the 17th of July and for many years after that, I did not know

11     that.  And don't ask me now whether I know what happened on the 17th of

12     July and in some indirect way you are shifting responsibility for the

13     fate of these men to my men.

14             JUDGE KWON:  No --

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I really have nothing to do

16     with that and you know that full well.

17             JUDGE KWON:  No, Mr. Savcic, your answer is not acceptable.

18     Mr. Nicholls' question is whether you accept now that those, the

19     prisoners, whatever you call them, had been murdered at the time.  Do you

20     know now or do you accept it?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I know that and now I accept

22     that.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that was the question.

24             Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you.

Page 42254

 1        Q.   So in July 1995, over a thousand men who were held by

 2     Zoran Malinic, your subordinate, ended up dead in a matter of days.  When

 3     did you learn that?  You accepted it just now.  When did you learn that,

 4     that these men had been killed?  I shouldn't say "killed," "murdered."

 5        A.   After a great many years I will tell you that on the 27th of July

 6     I was sent from the area of Han Pijesak to the area of Drvar, that is

 7     over 500 kilometres away from that area.  For several months I was

 8     involved in heavy fighting on a daily basis with the Croatian army and

 9     the 5th and 7th Muslim Corps.  I stayed there all the way up until the

10     end of 1995.  In 1996 I was sent for training to the General Staff school

11     of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade.

12             And the first information and intimations of these events I

13     started learning after the statement of General Krstic that was disclosed

14     in certain media in the BH.  However, I wish to note there as well that

15     in the statement of General Krstic's the role of the protection regiment

16     in these events was presented in a completely wrong and erroneous manner,

17     so even then I did not know the real truth about these events.  And

18     practically, it was only later when I entered this procedure of giving a

19     statement I had the opportunity of seeing certain documents and of

20     finding out the truth.

21             I wish to say one more sentence here, I hope that you won't mind

22     because of the time, and it has to do with the following.  Two persons

23     were tried before this court who are friends of mine - otherwise, of

24     course they were not tried because of that, they were tried because of

25     their possible responsibility - it is Mr. Vinko Pandurevic and

Page 42255

 1     Mr. Ljubisa Borovcanin.  With these men I spent over three years with

 2     them every day.  We saw each other every day.  We had coffee together,

 3     read the newspapers together, played cards together, talked.  I did not

 4     hear a single word of -- from them that had to do with Srebrenica, and if

 5     we are going to call this the full truth or it depends to what degree it

 6     has been discovered, I practically learned of that when I started giving

 7     my own statement and when I had an opportunity of seeing certain

 8     documents.  That is the truth concerning my knowledge about what happened

 9     in Srebrenica.

10        Q.   Okay.  So the 1200-odd men or more under Malinic's control on

11     13 July, you didn't learn their fate until sometime after General Krstic

12     had been indicted; right?  I'm talking about the people who were under

13     the -- in the custody of your subordinate.

14        A.   If I understood your question correctly, it's much like your

15     previous one.  These people were under the control of the military police

16     battalion of the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment for a very short

17     time.  These -- the people were addressed at Nova Kasaba by the commander

18     of the Main Staff who said that they were going to be exchanged.  So how

19     could I have known what later on would happen to them?

20        Q.   You were -- let me move on.  You were interviewed by the OTP in

21     2005, in October, by Mr. Peter McCloskey.  Do you remember that?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Did you tell the truth in that interview to the best of your

24     ability?

25        A.   Absolutely, to the extent I was able to remember the answers to

Page 42256

 1     the questions put to me, I gave those answers.

 2        Q.   And you've testified in this Tribunal before twice in the Popovic

 3     and Tolimir cases; right?

 4        A.   Right.

 5        Q.   You testified truthfully then?

 6        A.   Absolutely truthfully.

 7        Q.   All right.  We already went over that you were commander of the

 8     65th Motorised Protection Regiment in July and that at that time your

 9     deputy was Jovo Jazic; right?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   And speaking again of Zoran Malinic, his nickname at the time --

12     well, all the time probably is Zoka; right?

13        A.   Well, basically whoever's name is Zoran is called Zoka where I'm

14     from.  So we can say -- so I can answer yes, although I don't know if

15     many people called him that.

16        Q.   Okay.  That's a slightly strange answer.  Is his nickname Zoka or

17     not?

18        A.   I'm telling you, most people by the name of Zoran are called Zoka

19     by others, but that depends on the relationship between them.  I didn't

20     call him Zoka.  I called him major captain, you know.

21        Q.   Okay.  I'm not asking what most people named Zoran are named.  In

22     your interview with Mr. McCloskey at page 6 you said:

23             "Commander of the military police battalion was Major

24     Zoran Malinic."

25             Question from Mr. Peter McCloskey:

Page 42257

 1             "And his nickname?"

 2             Answer from you:

 3             "Zoka."

 4             That was not really a nickname, Zoka.  Everybody called him Zoka,

 5     didn't they?  Zoka, Zoran.  So people called Zoran Malinic Zoka in July

 6     1995, didn't they?

 7        A.   [No interpretation]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your answer.  We didn't hear the

 9     interpretation, please.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I was not focused

11     on -- what was your question?

12             MR. NICHOLLS:

13        Q.   I just read out your answer from your interview in 2005 where you

14     confirmed that Zoran Malinic's nickname was Zoka.  I don't think it

15     should be that complicated of a question.  Is his nickname Zoka or not?

16        A.   Well, probably many people called him Zoka.  I did not.

17        Q.   Not probably.  Did people call him Zoka?  I don't want you to

18     speculate.  If your answer's different now than from your interview, let

19     me know now you don't remember what his nickname was.

20        A.   Well, there can be no other nickname given his first name.  A

21     nickname is either derived from one's first name or -- well, his first

22     name was Zoran and I don't remember anyone calling him Malina, so it must

23     have been Zoka if that's relevant or not.

24        Q.   Let me ask you this, don't worry about what's relevant and what

25     isn't:  Have you ever heard someone call Zoran Malinic Zoka or refer to

Page 42258

 1     him as Zoka ever?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And Zoran Malinic's deputy was named

 4     Aleksandar Lucic; correct?

 5        A.   You mean -- are you referring to July 1995?

 6        Q.   Yes.

 7        A.   I think so, but I was absent from the unit due to a injury almost

 8     a year, but I think so.

 9             THE ACCUSED:  Absent.  [Interpretation] Transcript line 14, it

10     should be "absent."

11             MR. NICHOLLS:

12        Q.   Just to help you remember and keep this clear, let me try to

13     refresh your recollection from your testimony in the Popovic case at

14     T15236.

15             "Are you familiar with someone by the name of Aleksandar Lucic?"

16             Your answer:

17             "Yes.  At that time he was lieutenant or captain.  I can't

18     remember exactly, and his duty was deputy commander of the military

19     police battalion."

20             So he was Malinic's deputy; right?

21        A.   Well, I told you I underwent medical treatment for almost a year.

22     Before my last injury he was company commander.  I now cannot remember

23     that he was -- that he became battalion commander in the meantime.  But

24     if I said so, it must be true.  However, off the top of my head right

25     now, I can't say whether he was company commander or anything else.

Page 42259

 1        Q.   He was the deputy of the military police battalion; right?  Not

 2     the -- he was the deputy.  That's what you said in 2007 in the Popovic

 3     case.

 4        A.   Sir, he can be deputy even if he's commander of company 1.  If --

 5     in the establishment he has no deputy or if there is no deputy due to --

 6     in the establishment.  In an infantry battalion or a mountain battalion

 7     or -- and similar unit, the commander of Company 1 can be deputy

 8     battalion commander.  So I cannot state it with any certainty, but you

 9     are free to choose the variant that suits you best.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not following, Mr. Savcic.  Does it mean that

11     your testimony in Popovic case was incorrect?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I could see that statement in

13     Serbian -- because even now, Mr. President, I'm not stating anything to

14     the contrary.  Aleksandar Lucic was an officer in the military police

15     battalion.  Before I was wounded, he was commander of the Company 1 of

16     that military police battalion.  And automatically, that same person is

17     deputy battalion commander, if there is no deputy in the establishment.

18     If after a year when I returned he was really appointed deputy commander,

19     I don't know.  But I can accept both possibilities.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:

21        Q.   Okay.  I'm not asking you to accept anything.  I'm asking you to

22     answer a question.  What you said in Popovic was about Aleksandar Lucic:

23             "His duty was deputy commander of the military police battalion."

24             I'm asking you if that's correct.  Not what his rank was, not if

25     was also a company commander.  Was his duty deputy commander as you

Page 42260

 1     testified to here last -- the first time here under oath?

 2        A.   I'm under oath even now and I don't deny that Aleksandar Lucic

 3     was a member of the military police battalion.  Maybe the question put to

 4     me then was different.  But I repeat, the commander of Company 1 can at

 5     the same time be deputy commander.  Now, don't make me say that he had

 6     been appointed by a written order and what have you.  But you can say

 7     that he was performing the duty of a deputy battalion commander.

 8        Q.   He was performing the duty of a deputy battalion commander;

 9     right?  That's what you just said.

10        A.   Well, Mr. Prosecutor, we agree.

11        Q.   Okay.  Now, in July 1995 - and I'm not saying only then - but in

12     July and in 1995, the regiment, your regiment, was highly disciplined;

13     correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could I have 65 ter 25457, please.

16        Q.   You may remember this.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Could we go to the last page so that

18     General Savcic can see who signed it.

19        Q.   And just so you know, if you didn't see the first page, this is

20     just an assessment of order and discipline in the 65th Motorised

21     Protection Regiment, that's what this is.  Is that your signature?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Is it for you?  Is there a "za" there?  I don't see a "za."  Or

24     maybe it is "za."

25        A.   No, it doesn't say "za."

Page 42261

 1        Q.   So who signed that?

 2        A.   Vojislav Sarovic signed it.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And who is he?

 4        A.   Vojislav Sarovic is chief of the training and operations organ of

 5     the regiment.

 6        Q.   All right.

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  Let's go to the first page, please, in both

 8     languages.

 9        Q.   And if you'll see that sentence up there that ends with a 4 it

10     says:

11             "The final grade for order and discipline for the year 1995 is

12     very good (4)."

13             And that's correct; right?

14        A.   Well, that's a subjective assessment.  It's an analysis of an

15     order.  The elements underlying this assessment are not mentioned here,

16     only the final grade is stated --

17        Q.   You seem to have incredibly --

18        A.   -- I can confirm it --

19        Q.   I don't want to stop you from -- you can confirm it.  Okay.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Can we go to page 2 in both languages.

21        Q.   And it's written here at the top of the page in the English - it

22     should be at the top in your language as well I believe:

23             "Even when the situation was the most difficult and people's

24     lives were in danger, nothing was done without issuing a command, which

25     is proof of exceptional training and exceptional discipline."

Page 42262

 1             Right?

 2        A.   Oh, you cannot have top-notch -- a top-notch training level after

 3     two months of training.  In peace time the training lasts three times

 4     longer, but we did whatever we could to train the soldiers as well as

 5     possible to prepare them to carry out the basic military duties in a

 6     unit.

 7        Q.   Okay --

 8        A.   I repeat that this is a subjective assessment of that officer.  I

 9     was much stricter in this respect.

10        Q.   Right.  Do you agree with that statement that I just read out to

11     you?  You already told me it was a highly disciplined unit.

12        A.   I agree with that.  There is no doubt about that.  This is the

13     only unit that absolutely carried out all tasks without complaining.

14     That's why we stayed so long on the front line.  In principle, the answer

15     is yes; however, there could be individual incidents that were not in

16     keeping with this.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  May I tender the document, Your Honours?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6470, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  While we are dealing with the admission,

22     Mr. Robinson, we admitted the 65 ter 2529 which is referred to in paras

23     57 and 61, but I take it that you are tendering only those parts, not the

24     entire JNA rules?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

Page 42263

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If you could identify those pages and liaise with

 2     the Registrar.  And also 1D9178 which was referred to in para 8, I'm not

 3     sure if that has been translated.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  I know we do have a translation for that.  Whether

 5     that is uploaded or not -- whether you can see it or not, I don't know,

 6     but we do have that.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Could you see to it that that would be uploaded as

 8     well.

 9             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             In line 19, the -- it was not recorded that the General said

12     that's why we stayed longer on the front line up until -- up to a year

13     while other units were on shifts of one month.  That was omitted.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Savcic?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's exactly what I said.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18        Q.   Okay.  Let's go back to 13 July and when you spoke with

19     Zoran Malinic on the phone from the field in the Borike area.  You said

20     in your interview that you were using an RRU1 phone from the field;

21     right?

22        A.   Yes, RRU1, that's a telephone for wireless calls.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's talk about the second call with Malinic

24     that day.  That's at para 50 of your statement.  It says:

25             "He told me that some UNPROFOR members asked for his help because

Page 42264

 1     they did not consider it was safe for them to return to their base in

 2     Potocari in view of the combat activities in Srebrenica."

 3             Right, that's what it says?

 4        A.   What's your question?

 5        Q.   The question is that's the full truth, as far as you're

 6     concerned, about why -- the interaction between DutchBat and

 7     Zoran Malinic and the military police battalion on 13 July.  DutchBat

 8     came and said to -- to Zoran Malinic and said:  We don't think it's safe

 9     for us to go back to Potocari.  Can you help us?  Is that your truthful

10     testimony about what happened that day between DutchBat and the military

11     police battalion at Nova Kasaba?

12        A.   I was informed in that way and I later learned that there were

13     three vehicles of the DutchBat with crews and that one vehicle was taken

14     away from them at Nova Kasaba and that was a signal that they should not

15     continue towards Srebrenica.  They contacted the first military unit and

16     asked for help.  That's what Major Malinic told me.

17        Q.   Okay.  Well, you're the chief investigator on this case.  Have

18     you looked over the -- you know, in learning about the case, have you

19     looked over the DutchBat statements and testimony at all?

20        A.   Well, not only their statements.  This is a large trial, I cannot

21     read all statements, but I was even able to listen to some of their

22     testimonies.

23        Q.   Okay.  Well, if you listened to the testimony, which was 92 bis

24     in this case, of Witness Egbers, which is P00331, you would know that

25     what is in your statement is not correct according to Egbers.  Mr. Egbers

Page 42265

 1     testified at T2757 that what happened at Nova Kasaba is that they were

 2     stopped, he and his DutchBat fellows, by soldiers pointing guns at them,

 3     that they took his car and drove away with all the equipment, and that he

 4     had to sit along the road with 10 or 12 others, DutchBat members, and

 5     that these other 10 or 12 members had not succeeded to go past

 6     Nova Kasaba and their cars had been taken.  And he said again --

 7             MR. NICHOLLS:  This is for friends P00331 at e-court page 35.

 8        Q.   -- that he was brought to a school nearby Nova Kasaba where they

 9     were stopped and that's where he met Major Zoran.  And he says:

10             "I always called him by his first name.  His last name was

11     Malinic."

12             And that he asked to be able to leave and Malinic said to him:

13              "Well, okay, you can go if you want to."

14             So he ordered three UN vehicles to be prepared with peacekeepers

15     and ordered them to try to leave the school and go nearby Nova Kasaba and

16     go back to Bratunac.  And then this is what he said happened:

17             "But, unfortunately, one car was coming back, two others were

18     stolen by Bosnian Serbs, and they all walked back 500 metres with just

19     one car.  So it wasn't possible for us to leave the site of the school by

20     our own means and we were not free to go."

21             And then he was asked:

22             "So what did you then decide to do?"

23             And Mr. Egbers responded -- answered:

24             "So I complained about that as well to this major and he told me

25     he had to contact Colonel Beara about this, and as soon as he is there at

Page 42266

 1     the school he would try to arrange a safe return for us to Potocari."

 2             So did you know that, that the DutchBat did not go to the 65th --

 3     to the military police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment and ask

 4     for help, that they were halted there, their equipment was stolen, and

 5     they weren't free to leave?

 6        A.   Prosecutor, even now from what you have read out, I'm not

 7     convinced that this was done by members of the military police battalion.

 8     You read out the statement of a Dutch officer.  The information I

 9     received was different, namely, that they were stopped near the school at

10     Nova Kasaba but not by military police battalion members.  That was the

11     Drina Corps zone of responsibility.  Many units were moving here or there

12     executing their tasks.  I told you a short while ago what I heard, and I

13     know that many years later Zoran Malinic spoke to me about the details,

14     that they were never stopped by force, that they had the possibility to

15     communicate with their higher command.  And only on the following day,

16     when the situation calmed down somewhat, they left, two Mercedes vehicles

17     were left at Nova Kasaba with Major Malinic.  A protocol was made about

18     that and nobody ever claimed those vehicles.

19             Soon after IFOR forces arrived and they knew that those were

20     their vehicles.  If they had had a report that anything had been stolen,

21     they would have done something about it.  I believe that one of those

22     vehicles, a Mercedes or Puch, was salvaged or had to retire together with

23     the VRS.  I don't believe that this was an accurate statement and these

24     people were not stopped by military police members but some -- with other

25     units of the VRS.

Page 42267

 1             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honour, I see the time, but I could have one

 2     question maybe.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

 4             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.

 5        Q.   So you knew that these DutchBat soldiers were stopped by, as you

 6     say, another unit of the VRS and that some of their vehicles were taken;

 7     right?

 8        A.   Upon first arriving at the school, they were in three vehicles.

 9     They wanted to stay for a short while and continue towards Srebrenica --

10        Q.   You're not answering my question.  Were they stopped by another

11     unit of the VRS and not being allowed to continue?

12        A.   I am answering your question.  They were convinced that they

13     could continue.  As soon as they were on the road again - and I believe

14     the Trial Chamber was there to see what it's like, the road is only a

15     hundred metres away from the school - they returned to the school again,

16     to Malinic.  Why did they return if he was confiscating their property or

17     anything else?  That's the information that I got.

18        Q.   Were they stopped by another VRS unit and stopped from

19     continuing?  You just said it was another unit that stopped them.  Did

20     you know before you sat down today that they were stopped by another VRS

21     unit?

22        A.   According to my information, yes, another unit from the command

23     of the Drina Corps.

24        Q.   All right.  So when we look at your statement which says on

25     paragraph 50:

Page 42268

 1             "The second time that day when we spoke, he told me that some

 2     UNPROFOR members asked for his help because they did not consider it was

 3     safe for them to return to their base in Potocari, in view of the combat

 4     activities in Srebrenica."

 5             You think that is a fair and accurate way to present the evidence

 6     to this Trial Chamber when you know they were stopped by a VRS unit from

 7     continuing?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, that's not a very fair

 9     question since that paragraph describes his conversation with

10     Major Malinic on that day, not what he knows today.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, if you only described the conversation, the

12     clear implication is that's what happened from reading this.  If we're

13     supposed to take everything he says with a grain of -- a huge grain of

14     salt that it may be completely inaccurate, that explanation of why it's

15     not accurate is left out of the statement, that's another thing.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber does not consider the question to be

18     unfair at all.  Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:

20        Q.   Can you answer the question, please.

21        A.   I don't understand why you're getting upset while you're asking

22     questions, and I really fail to understand what you're -- what you're

23     claiming I knew or did not know.

24        Q.   Listen carefully.  I'm not getting upset.  Listen carefully.

25     I'll read the question again.

Page 42269

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have your statement, Mr. Savcic, with you?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  It's paragraph 50.

 4             Yes, if you could put your question again, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 6        Q.   All right.  So when we look at your statement which says on

 7     paragraph 50:

 8             "The second time that day when we spoke he told me that some

 9     UNPROFOR members asked for his help because they did not consider it was

10     safe for them to return to their base in Potocari, in view of the combat

11     activities in Srebrenica."

12             You think that's a fair and accurate way to present the evidence

13     to this Trial Chamber when you know that these DutchBat personnel were

14     stopped by the VRS unit from continuing?

15        A.   Yes.  But after they first called at the school and tried to

16     leave, but that has nothing to do with the military police battalion but

17     some other unit and they returned to the school and stayed until the 14th

18     or whenever.  They spent the night there.

19        Q.   You don't find that misleading in any way?

20        A.   I don't understand you.  What do you mean "misleading"?  How

21     misleading ?

22             THE ACCUSED:  Transcript.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't want to interrupt, but on

25     page 88, line 23, General Savcic said, "I trust my major more than a

Page 42270

 1     lieutenant who gave unprecise testimony, unprecise evidence," after the

 2     VRS part.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Let me help you understand Mr. Nicholls' point.

 4             Take a look at paragraph 50.  In your statement you said that

 5     DutchBat members couldn't go to the Srebrenica area because they

 6     considered that it was not safe for them in view of the combat activities

 7     in Srebrenica, but you didn't tell here about the VRS another unit, be it

 8     DK or whatever else, stopping the DutchBat soldiers at the time.  So

 9     Mr. Nicholls said that that was misleading.  Do you agree?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree that I omitted to state

11     that fact; however, I did not wish to mislead anybody and I believe that

12     the way we treated UNPROFOR members is something that the protection

13     regiment can be very proud of.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll adjourn for today and continue tomorrow

15     at 9.00.

16             THE ACCUSED:  I would like to -- this correction of transcript to

17     be confirmed.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What, Mr. Karadzic?

19             THE ACCUSED:  What I said about 88 page, 23 -- line 23.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes, I didn't ask the witness.

21             But I take it you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said, Mr. Savcic?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As regards my opinion, or rather,

23     my position that I trust my major more than I do a lieutenant who didn't

24     convey a message properly, yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

Page 42271

 1             The hearing is adjourned.

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.10 p.m.,

 3                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 31st day of

 4                           July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.