1 Tuesday, 29 October 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. I hope that everybody has
6 been re-energised for the proceedings to come. There are several matters
7 I'd like to deal with before we begin hearing the witness's evidence.
8 The Chamber will first issue its oral ruling on Tomislav Kovac's
9 request for assignment of counsel for the purposes of his testimony in
10 this case filed on the record on 23rd of October, 2013.
11 The Chamber notes that the Prosecution indicated via e-mail that
12 it did not wish to respond to this request and that the accused filed a
13 submission in support thereof on the 28th of October, 2013. The Chamber
14 has considered Article 5 of the directive on the assignment of counsel,
15 which provides for the assignment of counsel to three categories of
16 individuals: Suspects, accused persons, and any person detained under
17 the authority of the Tribunal. Although Kovac does not fall under any of
18 these three categories at the moment, given that he was interviewed by
19 the Prosecution as a suspect on several occasions between 2003 and 2010,
20 and that he was assigned counsel for the purpose of his testimony in the
21 Stanisic and Zupljanin case in 2012, the Chamber orders the Registrar, on
22 an exceptional basis, to assign counsel to Mr. Kovac and allows counsel
23 to be present in the courtroom during his testimony.
24 The Chamber will now turn to the Prosecution motion to exclude in
25 part evidence of Tomislav Kovac filed on the 21st of October, 2013, as
1 well as the Prosecution's motion for leave to reply to the accused's
2 response thereto filed on the 28th of October, 2013.
3 The Prosecution requests that paragraphs 7, 12 through 15, 19 and
4 20 of the statement of Tomislav Kovac be excluded as they are not
5 relevant to the charges in the indictment. The accused in his response,
6 filed on 28 October 2013, opposes the motion on the grounds that the
7 Prosecution was allowed to elicit evidence on historical matters. Also,
8 on the 28th of October, the accused circulated a revised version of
9 Kovac's statement. Having reviewed the submissions and the statement,
10 the Chamber is of the view that paragraphs 7, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20
11 should be excluded as they pertain to issues not relevant to the
12 indictment. However, the Chamber is of the view that paragraph 13, as it
13 appears in the revised statement, may remain as it is at least of some
14 relevance to the time frame of the indictment.
15 The Chamber therefore grants the motion in part, orders the
16 exclusion of paragraphs 7, 12, 14, 15, 19 and 20, allows the accused to
17 tender the remainder of Kovac's statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter, and
18 denies the Prosecution's request for leave to reply.
19 The Chamber will now issue an oral ruling on the Prosecution
20 motion to amend Exhibits P4771 and P7 -- strike it, P4772, filed on the
21 25th of September, 2013.
22 In the motion, the Prosecution seeks to amend the expert report
23 of Witness Dusan Janc admitted under seal as P4771, as well as the public
24 redacted version admitted as P4772, by replacing charts included in the
25 report with revised versions. The Prosecution submits that it discussed
1 the issue with the Defence on the 18th of September, 2013, and that the
2 Defence does not object to the replacement of the charts.
3 The Trial Chamber has reviewed the revised charts and in
4 accordance with its ruling of the 6th of March, 2012, concerning the
5 expert report of witness Dusan -- I'm sorry, Dean Manning, the Chamber is
6 satisfied that the revised charts shall replace the old versions and
7 instructs the Prosecution to upload them into e-court as such.
8 Next in relation to the accused's motion to admit documents
9 previously marked for identification, before a ruling on that motion, the
10 Chamber would like to inquire with the Prosecution regarding its
11 submission on the documents marked for identification as D2518.
12 I forgot the -- to mention the date of filing of the motion but
13 it was on the 5th of September, 2013.
14 The Chamber notes the Prosecution's response to the accused's
15 motion on 13th of September, 2013, wherein in objects to the admission of
16 MFI D2518 based on concerns of authenticity given that the original
17 document in B/C/S is not available. At this stage, the Chamber would
18 like to receive further submissions from the Prosecution as to its
19 reasons for being concerned about the authenticity of this document.
20 For the remainder of matters, I'd like to go into private
22 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Are there any matters to be discussed? Then we will
23 bring in the witness.
24 Yes, good morning, Mr. Harvey.
25 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Your Honours. May I, before we start,
1 then, just introduce Ms. Ellen Naughton who was been with my team since
2 June of this year. She is a graduate of Bond University in Australia
3 with a bachelor of laws and bachelor of international relations. Thank
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir.
8 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
9 JUDGE KWON: If you could take the solemn declaration, please.
10 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
11 whole truth and nothing but the truth.
12 WITNESS: JOHN ZAMETICA
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
14 comfortable. Mr. Zametica, before you commence your evidence, I must
15 draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at
16 the Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E). Under this rule, you may object to
17 answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from
18 the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate you in a
19 criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate" means saying something
20 that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or
21 saying something that might provide evidence that you might have
22 committed a criminal offence.
23 However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you
24 and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you
25 know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the
1 question. But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your
2 testimony, compelled under such circumstances, could not be used in any
3 case that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the
4 offence of giving false testimony.
5 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?
6 THE WITNESS: I do.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
9 Good morning, my learned friends. Good morning, everyone. I'm glad that
10 we are in good form, all of us, after the break.
11 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Zametica.
13 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zametica, I know that you understand both
15 languages but here we -- every word of Mr. Karadzic should be translated
16 so could you put a pause between the question and answer --
17 THE WITNESS: I will.
18 JUDGE KWON: -- which is very imperative here.
19 THE WITNESS: I understand.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Q. As your testimony will be live, I will try to ask you some
23 relevant questions in the briefest form possible, as the answers to those
24 questions could help us to understand the situation and what you had the
25 opportunity to witness and see personally.
1 Can you tell us, briefly, your first and last name, your father's
2 name, when and where you were born, and everything else that you consider
3 important about your background.
4 A. I was born in Banja Luka, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1955. The
5 name of my father was Muris. He was a Muslim. My mother, Olga, was of
6 mixed Slovak-German descent. Although I was born in Banja Luka, I didn't
7 live there very long. My mother divorced my father when I was still a
8 baby, and my mother, of course, took me with her when she returned to the
9 place where she came from, which is a Slovak village north of Belgrade in
10 the -- what was then known as the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
11 I was given the name Omer, I shall spell that out, O-m-e-r, which was a
12 Muslim name. Just like Francois is recognisably a French name or Helmut
13 is recognisably a German name, Muslim name Omer was recognisably very
14 Muslim and that was the name I was given at my birth. But I grew up in
15 this Slovak village called Padina and my mother tongue was Slovak. It
16 was not Serbian or Serbo-Croat as it was then known. I grew up in a
17 house where Slovak and German were spoken. My mother and grandmother
18 conversed exclusively in German. And I went to elementary school, a
19 Slovak elementary school, so I grew up actually among Slovaks, who were a
20 national minority in Yugoslavia living among many other national
21 minorities in that province of Vojvodina.
22 Subsequently, my mother's career took her to Belgrade and
23 I continued my elementary education in Belgrade where, of course, I had
24 to learn this new language called the Serbo-Croat language. But we only
25 stayed in Belgrade, I think, for three years because my mother's career
1 then took her to Ljubljana, the capital of the then Socialist Republic
2 Slovenia, and I had to learn yet another new language, this time Slovene,
3 which is quite different from Serbo-Croat. And I continued my elementary
4 education in Slovenia, started my secondary education there too.
5 When I was 18, this was back in 1973, my mother and I moved to
6 England for family reasons. My mother decided to remarry and she married
7 someone who at the time worked and lived in London. So I had to learn
8 yet another language, this time English. When I still lived in
9 Yugoslavia I used to go and visit my father in Sarajevo, where he lived,
10 quite frequently. So the -- what that meant was that I actually got to
11 know Yugoslavia quite well, or perhaps better than your average Yugoslav.
12 Q. [Microphone not activated].
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Could you now please also summarise for
16 us the progression of your education, by just listing the degrees you
17 were awarded, if you can?
18 A. I received my university, my higher education in England. I went
19 to several English universities. I obtained a BA in modern history and
20 politics. I obtained an MA in 20th century international history, and
21 I also obtained a Ph.D. I specialised in -- in the area of the Cold War.
22 I was very interested in the initial stages of the Cold War, and I did a
23 Ph.D. on British strategic planning, on British military planning during
24 the early stages of the Cold War, 1945-46-47. That was my main academic
25 interest, and the Ph.D. had nothing to do with Yugoslavia. So I did
1 something in mainstream British history or international history.
2 In between my MA and my Ph.D., I -- I worked for a while at an
3 English secondary school, I taught as a teacher, I taught modern British
4 history and modern European history. And subsequent to that, I served
5 during 1980-81 in the Yugoslav People's Army, as it was called. I did a
6 stint in the infantry, as an infantryman. So this was the time just
7 after Tito had died. But immediately after completing my military
8 service, I returned to England to do my Ph.D., which I completed in 1986.
9 Q. Thank you. I hope that this answer also included everything that
10 you held in terms of professional positions. Is there anything that you
11 might add about that? Before coming into the midst of our crisis, what
12 were the positions that you held? You worked in some institutes; is that
14 A. That's right. But before I started working at the International
15 Institute for Strategic Studies in London, which was, I think, back in
16 1990, I had a series of part-time jobs teaching international history,
17 Cold War. I used to teach at, for example, I used to teach for the open
18 university, I used to teach a course on nuclear weapons. I used to teach
19 international history for the department of extramural studies at the
20 University of Cambridge. I taught international history for a while
21 at -- as a tutor, as an external tutor at Wadham College, Oxford. But
22 those were not permanent appointments.
23 The institute you referred to, the International Institute for
24 Strategic Studies, offered me a post in 1990 at a time when Yugoslavia
25 began to disintegrate, and they needed someone who was an expert on the
1 Balkans. Strictly speaking, I was not an expert on the Balkans. I was
2 an expert on the Cold War. And in fact, I had published on the Cold War,
3 academic pieces, essays and articles, but I had also published an article
4 on Yugoslavia for "The Times" newspaper and they noticed that. And as a
5 result, they wanted to talk to me because they needed someone who was an
6 expert on the Balkans. Those were few and far between at the time in
7 the -- in the UK. So I was offered this job, and I took it.
8 After I completed my stint at the International Institute for
9 Strategic Studies, I worked as a research fellow at the Polytechnic of
10 Central London, which subsequently became the University of Westminster.
11 You may or may not know that all the polytechnics in the U.K. overnight
12 became universities. So -- but that was my last appointment in the UK
13 before I went to Bosnia.
14 JUDGE KWON: Before we go further, line 18 on previous page
15 should read "International Institute for Strategic Studies."
16 And, Dr. Zametica, you said a while ago that you did a stint in
17 the JNA. Could you expand on it? Was it a compulsory on your part? And
18 what was your nationality then?
19 THE WITNESS: The JNA, the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or the
20 Yugoslav People's Army, the system in Yugoslavia at the time was that you
21 had to -- if you were an able-bodied young man over 18 you had to do your
22 stint in the military. There was an exception, however, and the
23 exception pertained to those people who had residence abroad. So in my
24 case, I didn't have to serve in the JNA because I had residence abroad.
25 So it wasn't compulsory for me and it would not have been -- I would not
1 have commited an illegal action had I not joined the army or agreed to go
3 But in my case, you know, it was a personal decision. I believed
4 that it was part of a man's education to do a stint in the army, and
5 I thought, you know, a man's education is kind of incomplete if he
6 doesn't have some military experience. So even though many people
7 considered it a strange thing to do, for me to leave the UK and go to
8 Yugoslavia to do a period in the army at a time when there was a great
9 deal of speculation about the possibility of a Soviet attack on
10 Yugoslavia following Tito's death, I thought that I should nevertheless
11 do it, and I -- I don't regret doing it. So I hope I have --
12 JUDGE KWON: And I take it your nationality was then a Yugoslav?
13 THE WITNESS: Well, my -- as you know in Yugoslavia, you could
14 declare yourself Serb, Croat, Slovene, whatever, but there was a special
15 category which was allowed for those who considered themselves as
16 Yugoslavs. And in the population censuses which took place when I was
17 still living in Yugoslavia, I would always declare myself a Yugoslav.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Could you just tell us briefly what you
21 knew and to what extent about our crisis in Yugoslavia, in the 1990s,
22 before you came to Bosnia and joined the Bosnian Serb leadership?
23 A. My job at the International Institute for Strategic Studies was
24 to do -- was to prepare or write what they called an Adelphi paper.
25 Adelphi papers were short studies about 90, 100 pages long, so we are
1 talking about a booklet, which the institute publishes in relation to
2 whatever current crises are going on in the world or important
3 international issues that need to be addressed. Because Yugoslavia began
4 to find itself in a crisis in the late 1990s -- late 1980s and the
5 beginning of 1990s, that should be late 1980s, I was asked to prepare a
6 paper on the Yugoslav crisis.
7 So at the time I began my work there was still no war, but
8 obviously I had to follow the situation very closely. I was subscribed
9 to several newspapers from different parts of Yugoslavia. I went on
10 several visits in Yugoslavia in order to do research for my paper. I met
11 quite a few actors on the Yugoslav scene at the time, as well as
12 journalists, diplomats, people like that. So, yes, I -- I had to very
13 closely follow the situation, and be, as it were, at the cutting edge of
14 the research on the subject. That was expected of me. So on a daily
15 basis I followed events, yeah.
16 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Could you tell us whether you and I
17 knew each other before this crisis, whether we had any kind of personal
18 relationship? Actually, you can also tell us when we first met and how
19 our cooperation evolved before you arrived.
20 A. We certainly did not know each other before the crisis developed.
21 The one person on the Bosnian Serb side that I knew well, at the
22 beginning of the crisis, was the late Nikola Koljevic. I also met
23 Biljana Plavsic on one of my visits to Yugoslavia, to Sarajevo. But
24 I did not meet you, I believe, before sometime in 1992, and if I remember
25 correctly, we first met in Villa Bosanka in Belgrade after the war in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina had already begun, but we did have, I think, telephone
2 conversations beforehand. So we knew each other on the telephone, and
3 you probably gathered information about me from -- from Professor
4 Koljevic, maybe also from Mrs. Plavsic, I don't know, but we did -- we
5 certainly did not know each other before the crisis. And, well, I think
6 I have answered the question.
7 Q. Thank you. When did you come to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather,
8 Republika Srpska, and what was the position that you came to? What was
9 your role, what was your position, in the Bosnian Serb leadership?
10 A. I arrived in -- in Republika Srpska in, I think, October 1993.
11 When I arrived I still had no position as such, and I was not given one
12 until, I think, February 1994, when you appointed me your advisor. But
13 my advisory role, as it were, concerned the area of international
14 relations, which is where my expertise lay. In other words,
15 communicating with the international community. I was your aide in
16 matters concerning relations with international organisations, the
17 diplomatic effort that Republika Srpska was making. Of course, in all
18 this, my knowledge of the West and my knowledge of the English language
19 presumably played a role in my appointment.
20 Q. Thank you. On the whole, how were you received, by me, by the
21 leadership of the Bosnian Serbs?
22 A. Well, my problem in -- in Republika Srpska was my Muslim
23 background. I say "my problem." I didn't have a problem with my Muslim
24 background but I think some people did. Certainly, Professor Koljevic
25 did not, and certainly you did not. But I think some others may have had
1 such a problem, which is, I suppose, understandable. I think your --
2 your wife was suspicious of my background. I think your daughter, too,
3 didn't like me because of my ethnic background. But you never exhibited
4 any feelings that would indicate to me you had a problem with that. On
5 the contrary, you -- you were very open about the fact that you knew my
6 ethnic background but that was absolutely no problem for you. And I must
7 say, had I -- had I felt that you in any way disliked me on account of my
8 ethnicity, I would have left. I would not have felt comfortable. But
9 I never felt uncomfortable with you because of that. I think some people
10 in the army didn't like me because of it, or thought I was suspect
11 because of it, but I didn't pay much attention to that. I felt very
12 comfortable working with you.
13 I should perhaps add that within your own family, your wife and
14 your daughter, as I subsequently found out from you, had drawn to your
15 attention the fact that I had a Muslim background and that perhaps I was
16 not the right person to be appointed in the place where I was, but
17 I think you fought against that and I must say this is to your credit.
18 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the army and persons close to me. In
19 addition to ethnic background, were there other reasons for suspicion, in
20 terms of your British background?
21 A. [Interpretation] Well, possibly. Sorry. [In English] Maybe so
22 but I would not like to speculate on the subject. I really don't know
23 what was being said behind my back.
24 Q. Thank you. But apart from that, on the whole, did you manage to
25 get insight into what was going on? Were you part of brainstorming
1 sessions, the process of decision making, especially in terms of contacts
2 with foreigners, humanitarian issues and so on?
3 A. Given the position I held in the Presidency, I was privy to a lot
4 of information. I think I was privy to everything that was important.
5 So you always shared with me information about the international scene
6 that you had, information about the domestic scene, information about
7 relationship with Milosevic, information concerning relationships --
8 relationship with the Army of Republika Srpska. So everything that was
9 important and you knew about it, in principle I would also know about it.
10 So, yes, I was -- I was privy to a lot of information.
11 I must say I -- I did not read intelligence reports. There are
12 two kinds of intelligence reports reaching Presidency, I think, on a
13 daily basis: Military intelligence and state security intelligence. But
14 you had your special advisors for those two sectors. I think they were
15 General Subotic for military matters and Gordan Milinic for state
16 security matters, so they would read those reports.
17 Although I must say I didn't miss much, it would appear, in the
18 sense that you would sometimes share or show me intelligence reports.
19 And I remember one occasion when, I think it was in 1994, when you asked
20 me to come to your office, you asked me to sit down and you handed me a
21 report, and you asked me: "Read it, please, and tell me what you think
22 about it." And so I started reading it and it was a military
23 intelligence report signed by General Tolimir, who was the head of the
24 Bosnian Serb military intelligence, and it was quite a long report. And
25 when I finished reading it, you asked me: "Well, what do you think about
1 it?" And I said: "President, I've never read so much rubbish in my
2 life." And you laughed and said: "Yes, exactly. This is what they do.
3 They just send me lies." And you said: "You know what I think General
4 Tolimir does every morning? He gets up, drinks his coffee, reads his
5 newspapers, then takes his scissors, starts cutting the newspapers, makes
6 a collage, and then starts typing his military intelligence reports which
7 he then sends to me. And I'm never again," you said, if I remember
8 correctly, "I'm never again going to read the rubbish." And so this is
9 where it ended.
10 But I mention this episode just to illustrate the fact that what
11 you were receiving from your own people, quote unquote, did not, it would
12 appear, amount to very good intelligence.
13 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. You were asked to appear in public from
14 time to time and present the views of the leadership with regard to
15 particular matters. Were there ever any misunderstandings? Did we ever
16 have to issue denials of anything that you presented as our position? Or
17 was everything always accurate?
18 A. No. I cannot remember a single occasion when you or either
19 anyone else from the leadership, civilian leadership or even military
20 leadership of Republika Srpska ever denied anything I said in public. So
21 I cannot remember a single such occasion.
22 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Chamber whether you became aware
23 of my positions on war and peace? And to the best of your knowledge,
24 what were these positions and what were they like?
25 A. That's a rather large question you just put to me. I remember
1 one occasion when we were talking to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, when you said to
2 him -- and I cannot remember the exact date, but I do remember that you
3 said to him: "Mr. Akashi, I'm not interested in cease-fires. I'm
4 interested in a permanent peace settlement." And I quote this, these
5 words of yours, in order to illustrate what essentially your approach was
6 to the questions of war and peace.
7 Of course, you, before talking about cease-fires or permanent
8 peace settlement, there was a period when you had to -- when you were
9 negotiating with the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats about a
10 political settlement in the context when there was still peace, in other
11 words before the hostilities broke out in -- in 1991 -- sorry, in 1992 in
12 Bosnia. And of course, I was following all of this from my position in
13 London at the International Institute for -- for Strategic Studies, and
14 there were two particular episodes which stand out from that period. One
15 is -- one is the attempt to reach a political settlement in Bosnia, an
16 attempt associated with the name of Adil Zulfikarpasic. And the other
17 episode that stands out is the so-called Cutileiro Peace Plan.
18 Now, as far as I know, you did your best to reach a settlement
19 with Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic, who -- who was co-founder of the Stranka
20 Demokratske Akcije, the SDA, the Muslim party, to call it simply, the
21 Muslim party in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The other founder was, of course,
22 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. But Mr. Zulfikarpasic, whom I knew personally
23 before the war, Mr. Zulfikarpasic subsequently broke away from the SDA,
24 which he helped found, and founded his own party called the MBO, the
25 Muslimanska Bosnjacka Organizacija, but he will be remembered in history
1 for his effort to -- to ensure peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina before --
2 before what he feared, war broke out. And in order to do that he went to
3 Mr. Izetbegovic, asking him, you know, are you aware that we have -- this
4 is summer of 91 -- are you aware, he asked him, that we are about to, you
5 know, start fighting each other, with the Serbs and the Croats and so on?
6 And according to Zulfikarpasic's account, Mr. Izetbegovic authorised him
7 to go and negotiate with the Serb side about a possible -- about a
8 possible deal, settlement, with the Serbs, within some kind of
9 Yugoslavia. Although, of course, hostilities already had broken out in
10 Yugoslavia on 25th of June, 1991, with Slovenia and Croatia declaring
11 independence, but there was still, you know, Serbia, Montenegro,
12 Macedonia, and of course Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 And Mr. Zulfikarpasic thought he had Mr. Izetbegovic's backing
14 for this so he approached you and your colleagues in the Bosnian Serb
15 leadership, Mr. Koljevic, Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Krajisnik, and according to
16 his account, there was agreement between you. And he subsequently went
17 to Belgrade to see Mr. Milosevic, who also agreed with the proposals,
18 which amounted to some kind of rump Yugoslavia containing
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly Croatia. But if Croatia didn't want it,
20 it could secede.
21 Now, the interesting thing about that particular peace
22 initiative, as it were, was that it was the only one that did not propose
23 a territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you had agreed to it,
24 according to Mr. Zulfikarpasic.
25 Now, the whole thing, of course, came to nothing because
1 subsequently Mr. Izetbegovic, according to Mr. Zulfikarpasic, turned
2 around and didn't want to have anything to do with the settlement he
3 initially approved of, and so the whole thing collapsed. But it was an
4 interesting attempt to -- to reach peace, not just in Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 but -- but in the rest of Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia possibly and
6 Croatia, which went wrong. So that's why I mentioned this particular
7 Zulfikarpasic initiative because I think it's kind of been forgotten and
8 your own part in it has been forgotten. And it -- although, you know, it
9 was -- it was probably going to be difficult to implement it or to
10 completely agree on the package, it was still a better alternative
11 than -- than war. But as I said, the whole thing collapsed,
13 The other outstanding episode from the peace period, regarding
14 initiatives to reach a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course was
15 the Cutileiro Plan which you also backed and which initially
16 Mr. Izetbegovic also agreed to. I can't remember the exact dates,
17 February 1992, March 1992. This is the period we are talking about.
18 Q. Dr. Zametica, may I -- may I just try to save time? In relation
19 to what you know about Zulfikarpasic, did you actually talk to him about
20 that? Did you learn certain things from him in personal contacts?
21 A. Mr. Zulfikarpasic and I mostly talked about antiquarian books
22 because we shared a passion for collecting antiquarian books on the
23 Balkans, written mostly in French, German, English, and we were in fact
24 rivals up to a point as collectors. But his funds were infinitely
25 greater than mine. Yes, we also talked about politics. But, no,
1 regarding this particular matter, we didn't talk about. I met him
2 several times, but prior to this particular initiative which took place,
3 I think July-August 1991. Yeah, 1991, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Since Ambassador Cutileiro testified,
5 could I ask you to summarise for us what you saw for yourself, what my
6 position was with regard to peace efforts, peace plans, in which the
7 international community mediated? You took part in some of the
8 decision-making, and you probably spoke about that, presenting our
9 position to the public.
10 A. After those two peacetime peace plans, which -- which -- well, it
11 seems that I don't have enough time to talk about the Cutileiro Plan, but
12 if you say that Ambassador Cutileiro has already been a witness here,
13 that must have been already covered. So I'm not going to waste this
14 Tribunal's time talking about that, especially because I was not
15 personally involved.
16 But regarding your question now, regarding the other peace plans,
17 I think there were -- there were four more during the war, starting with
18 the Vance-Owen Plan, followed by the Owen Stoltenberg Plan, followed by
19 the Contact Group Plan, followed by in the -- in the end by the Dayton
20 Peace Plan which is the conference, the -- that ended the war in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Looking at those four plans, I think from my own
22 experience having been involved in most of them, your attitude was always
23 to gain a political settlement within Bosnia and Herzegovina that would
24 satisfy the Serb side, obviously, and I don't think there is a single
25 plan that you -- of those four that you particularly objected to.
1 I think in essence you accepted all of them.
2 You accepted even the Vance-Owen Plan. I know that because even
3 though the Bosnian Serbs as such rejected in the end the Vance-Owen Plan,
4 you personally didn't. The Serbs did but not you. You accepted it. You
5 informed the members of the Assembly of Republika Srpska at the session
6 in, I think, Bijeljina before the final rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan,
7 but did you -- that you actually wanted to accept it. This is what
8 I heard from someone who was present then. And you had in fact signed
9 the Vance-Owen Plan in Athens, if I remember correctly. I wasn't
10 personally involved with that, but this is what I understand was the
12 Certainly, you accepted the Owen Stoltenberg Plan. You also, in
13 essence, accepted the Contact Group Plan. I mean, in the end it was
14 rejected by the Bosnian Serbs, but the Contact Group Plan was really
15 problematic in its semantics rather than in its essence. And I knew that
16 you were personally in favour of it but couldn't really push it past the
17 opposition from, you know, the -- the -- some -- some, I would say,
18 vested interests on the Bosnian Serb side, maybe the -- some -- some
19 members of the Assembly who did not like the territorial aspect of it. I
20 don't think the constitution was the problem.
21 And of course, you also accepted the Dayton Peace Plan. That may
22 sound obvious but it isn't, really, because the delegation you sent to
23 Dayton, and I was a member of that delegation, it was an eight-member
24 delegation. In Dayton we, in fact, rejected the final peace plan. This
25 may or may not be well known, I don't know. I don't think it's
1 particularly well known in Republika Srpska or in Serbia or in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina for that matter.
3 What happened on the last day in Dayton, on the 21st of November,
4 1995, was that Mr. Milosevic, who had pushed us aside, and so we hardly
5 participated in the work of the Dayton conference, and of course
6 Mr. Holbrooke, who was the main actor on the -- on behalf of the
7 international community, if you like, or on behalf of the United States,
8 the two are not the same, I should add, although very often they seem to
9 be, Mr. Holbrooke was also quite happy to ignore us. So the delegation
10 of Republika Srpska did not know until the last day what had actually
11 been agreed. And on the last day, Mr. Milosevic came, accompanied by
12 Mr. Bulatovic of Montenegro and by Mr. Milan Milutinovic, the Serbian
13 Foreign Minister, and he showed us this map, and when Mr. Krajisnik, the
14 leader of our delegation in Dayton, saw the map, he went red in the face,
15 and told Mr. Milosevic that history and the Serbian people will never
16 forgive you this. And we then, the members of the delegation of
17 Republika Srpska, subsequently held a little session where each one of us
18 had to declare himself, as it were, where he stood regarding the peace
19 plan at Dayton, and we all said that we opposed it for this or that
21 And so we left Dayton without signing the Dayton Accords.
22 Milosevic had Mr. Milutinovic sign it on our behalf, as it were, but the
23 Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Dayton settlement.
24 When we arrived in Belgrade, and we travelled in the same plane
25 with Mr. Milosevic and his delegation, we dispersed, we were told that
1 next day there would be some kind of big conference in Belgrade and we
2 should hang around in Belgrade, but that night we were all arrested at
3 different locations in Belgrade. When I say "arrested," I mean to say
4 that we were all picked up by the police and sent to or driven to one of
5 the most luxurious prisons in the world, the former villa of
6 President Tito at Dobanovci, outside Belgrade. And so we were in this
7 luxury arrest place but suddenly, you know, telephone lines went dead and
8 we could not call anybody. And of course we were looking at each other
9 significantly. Nothing needed to be said. We knew we were arrested.
10 And we didn't really know whether to fear for our lives, we didn't know
11 what was going on.
12 I personally kicked up a fuss and demanded to be connected to
13 Mr. Jovica Stanisic, the head of Serbian state security, whom I vaguely
14 knew. This was initially refused, but then I insisted and I even began
15 shouting at the personnel in the villa. So finally they did connect me
16 to him by telephone and I said to Mr. Stanisic that I demanded to get out
17 because I had not seen my wife for three weeks, and wanted to be rejoined
18 with my wife. And he laughed and said: Look, I'm going to let you --
19 I'm going to let you out, but you must promise me that you will, the
20 following morning, turn up at the villa because there is going to be this
21 big meeting and we don't want anyone to be absent. So I did, and as soon
22 as I got out, I got to a telephone and telephoned you, explaining to you
23 what had happened. And I think - correct me if I'm wrong - I think
24 I told you that, you know, your life may be in danger because we really
25 didn't know what was going on.
1 But by the tone of your voice, I -- I gathered -- we spoke in
2 some kind of semi-coded language. By the tone of your voice I gathered
3 that you had, in fact, made up your mind to accept the Dayton peace
4 settlement, and in fact you did the following morning turn up at
5 Dobanovci. We were there. It was kind of an all-Serb meeting, only the
6 patriarch was missing, but everybody came. The president of Montenegro
7 was there of course, all the -- Milosevic's ministers. Thankfully his
8 wife was not there. But apart from her and the patriarch, everyone else
9 was. And I remember Mr. Milosevic pushing you into some kind of small
10 room at one stage and he probably offered you a fountain pen to sign a
11 piece of paper. Correct me if I'm wrong.
12 Anyway, to cut a long story short, you also accepted the Dayton
13 peace plan at a -- at a -- in a situation where none of your -- none of
14 the members of your delegation had in fact accepted. We had in fact
15 rejected it. Whether that was clever or not on our part, I don't know.
16 I have mixed feelings about that. But we did reject it and you did
17 accept it.
18 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. The details are really interesting but
19 I have to hurry up a little. You mentioned the opposition, the deputies,
20 and the efforts that I had to make to achieve anything. However, an
21 expert witness of the Prosecution we've heard here, Dr. Donia - for the
22 parties, it's his expert report in my case - said, for instance, that the
23 Assembly of Republika Srpska heard open debates and one could often hear
24 critique addressed to Karadzic, Mladic and others. And despite that,
25 I quote:
1 "The Assembly unanimously, or with just a few votes against,
2 passed and endorsed all the important measures proposed by the
3 leadership. There was only brief debate about proposed measures."
4 What is your view? Was it easy for me to deal with that Assembly
5 consisting of 83 people's representatives? Was it all that simple for
7 JUDGE KWON: Before -- Mr. Zametica, yes. Yes, Ms. Edgerton?
8 MS. EDGERTON: Just if Dr. Karadzic could oblige us with the
9 65 ter number and the page reference for that quote, it would be of
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately I'm not able to
12 starts up my computer here so I can't tell you that. But that's the
13 expert report of Dr. Robert Donia, the chapter on institutions, first
14 institutions and then subheading: "The Assembly of Bosnian Serbs." It's
15 at the beginning of his report.
16 JUDGE KWON: Probably you can offer the reference to the
17 Prosecution during the break. But in the meantime, shall we proceed.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Do I need to repeat the question?
21 A. No. There is no need for you to repeat the question. Whether
22 you had it easy with 83 members of the Assembly, well, the short answer
23 is no. Not at all. In fact, my impression about your place in the
24 political universe called Republika Srpska was that even though you held
25 the title of president, in my view you were a weak president, weak in the
1 sense of your power did not extend very far. My -- my firm impression,
2 and I have this impression to this -- I hold on to this view to this --
3 to this day, is that you had very little power in -- in Republika Srpska.
4 I felt that there were other, more powerful factors than you.
5 I felt that, for example, the Army of Republika Srpska was a
6 power unto itself, pursuing its own policies, domestic as well as foreign
7 policies, and being regularly insubordinate to you. I felt that you did
8 not have the control over the police. I felt that you did not have the
9 control over the Assembly members, even though they may have been the
10 members of your own party. I felt that you did not have control over
11 your own driver. I felt that you did not have control over your own
12 wife. And I felt that you certainly didn't have control over your own
13 daughter. So not that your daughter and your wife were necessarily
14 political factors, but in the case of your daughter, she did prove to be
15 something of a factor in relation to the international media. So I felt
16 were you a weak president from that point of view. You had very little
17 control over what was going on in that -- in that chaos called -- called
18 Republika Srpska in the period 1992-95.
19 I also felt that you did not have your own people in the
20 government of Republika Srpska. Where you did have some kind of
21 autonomy, that was in the field of foreign affairs, and this is where
22 I felt happy working with you because I knew that you could take
23 initiatives there, you could make some impact there, and this is what was
24 important to me. The idea was to attain a political settlement that
25 would be favourable and fair, and this is the area where -- where you
1 actually did do a lot, but not elsewhere.
2 So to go back to your original question, was it easy for you to
3 deal with those 83 Assembly members, no, it wasn't, because they were all
4 very individualistic. They all had their own local interests to defend.
5 They very often were very arrogant. They -- you know, one might call
6 them robust. But I don't know where Dr. Donia got his information from,
7 but it's clearly wrong, yeah.
8 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Another expert witness, Mr. Treanor,
9 Patrick Treanor, in his report before this Court, in the summary,
10 paragraph 15, E15, wrote as follows:
11 "The formal authorisations, the formal powers of the president in
12 extraordinary situations were rather broad and included a considerable
13 degree of control over security forces such as the army and the police,
14 as well as the local regional authorities with the mediation of wartime
15 Presidencies and commissioners. Thanks to the overwhelming majority of
16 SDS deputies in the Assembly, the Presidency effectively had control over
17 members of the government and, through the SDS, over local and regional
18 authorities as well."
19 How did you see my use of these powers in extraordinary
20 situations? You mentioned a moment ago local authorities. How did you
21 see the SDS party? Was it unanimous? Was it united? And how did you
22 view my use of these constitutional powers that were indeed broad? And
23 how did you see the relationship between central authorities and the
24 local ones?
25 A. May I ask you whether, when you said Mr. Treanor, are you
1 referring to Ian Traynor, the "Guardian" journalist?
2 Q. No. Patrick Treanor is an expert for political systems. He
3 appeared as an expert witness here for the Prosecution.
4 JUDGE KWON: Treanor spelling, T-r-e-a-n-o-r.
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you. The local factors in Republika Srpska,
6 that's -- that's a separate and very long story, but I would argue
7 that -- and this is partly my experience and partly what other people
8 told me, so partly what I saw with my own eyes and partly talking to
9 other people, ministers or local officials. Local power in
10 Republika Srpska was the only one that actually properly functioned.
11 When -- when Bosnia and Herzegovina began disintegrate and when
12 Republika Srpska began to be created, the only thing that actually
13 functioned were the old local authorities. And the people there, on the
14 Bosnian Serb side, as far as I could tell, were extremely powerful. They
15 were local chieftains, local masters of life and death. They would be
16 people who would run their municipalities and not ask many questions
17 about -- they would not ask many questions from you or from Mr. Krajisnik
18 and so on. They were -- they were very powerful people who decided on
19 practically everything in their municipalities, and they -- they felt
20 that they were the most important people in the world. They felt that if
21 they -- if their municipality falls to the Muslims, this would be the end
22 of Serbdom.
23 I think you had very little power over these individuals,
24 especially at the beginning of the war, when it was difficult to
25 communicate and everything was in chaos. I would say that the local
1 forces, as it were, in Republika Srpska, sometimes worked even against
2 you. They always certainly defended their own narrow local interest.
3 They didn't have the broader vision of the state. The state was still
4 being created. And so we must see that in that particular context.
5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Were you aware of the powers held by
6 municipalities under the previous socialist system and the degree of
7 their autonomy, especially in the area of defence? Were you familiar
8 with these vestiges of socialism and did they continue during the war in
10 A. No. I can't say that I have -- that I had -- I had expert
11 knowledge about the pre-war municipalities' responsibilities, but of
12 course, I -- I seem to remember that they had pretty wide powers,
13 especially in terms of local defence. There was a system called
14 Teritorijalna Odbrana in the old Yugoslavia, the Territorial Defence. So
15 I imagine this continued when the war broke out.
16 Q. Thank you. You've mentioned the army. Were you aware to what
17 extent I was involved in the operative and tactical levels of command
18 over the army?
19 A. I don't think you did anything of the kind. I mean, in terms of
20 operative and tactical levels of command over the army, I think you --
21 you left that to the army itself. I think you had responsibilities with
22 regard to -- to any strategic decisions, but with regard to the
23 day-to-day operative and tactical levels, I do not think you -- you were
24 particularly involved.
25 My experience is that -- is that, you know, you and I talked
1 mostly about the international situation and about the forthcoming peace
2 conference and 90 per cent of the time we would discuss such matters, and
3 I can't really remember you going on about, you know, the army should
4 have done this or that. I'm not saying you were not interested but you
5 certainly didn't -- didn't tell me anything about it. I cannot remember
6 you as someone who -- who was on a daily basis concerned with what was
7 going on in terms of a particular military operation. I remember it was,
8 you know, a low intensity war and so there weren't many days when, you
9 know, there was intense fighting somewhere. There was always some
10 sniping, some shelling, some -- some fighting, but big operations were
11 few and far between.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what my position was vis-à-vis this
13 fighting and the lulls in fighting and the sniper activity and shelling?
14 What were you able to observe as to my attitude to this belligerence and
15 the developments on the ground?
16 A. As I said, we never talked a great deal about such matters.
17 I remember you saying that sniping on the Bosnian Serb side, sniping from
18 the Bosnian Serbs was stupid, that it didn't get the Serbs any military
19 advantage, and I think you were against it. The same regards
20 irresponsible shelling or instances when there was some shelling and you
21 had disapproved of it because you just thought it senseless or
22 unnecessary. But we didn't really talk much about military matters.
23 I think you were more concerned about -- about how to attain a political
24 settlement, and this is what we talked about, rather than, you know, what
25 is going on on the battlefields. This was not -- this was not something
1 you and I talked a great deal about.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you have an idea about the position held by
3 Bosnian Serbs and myself on humanitarian issues, regarding civilians,
4 especially those of the other two warring parties --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We'll come back to this after the
6 break. But Mr. Zametica, you just mentioned that Mr. Karadzic was
7 against sniping and shelling on the ground that it would not be
8 advantageous to the Serb side. In relation to that statement, could you
9 tell us how you understood the snipings and shellings to be? What
10 shellings and what snipings did you talk about?
11 THE WITNESS: I was not referring to anything in particular.
12 I was -- I was talking about sniping and shelling in general, as
13 something disapproved of by Dr. Karadzic. I'm not sure that I understand
14 your question, when you ask me what snipings did I talk about? Did you
15 ask me about anything in particular? Or any particular event or did
16 you -- did you mean to ask me, you know, what was Mr. Karadzic's general
17 position on the subject?
18 JUDGE KWON: I will quote what you said. It's from line 13.
19 It's in answer to Mr. Karadzic's question:
20 "I remember you saying that sniping on the Bosnian Serb side,
21 sniping from the Bosnian Serbs was stupid, and that it didn't get the
22 Serbs any military advantage ..."
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's what I said, yes. Well, I stand by
24 that. This is what I remember Dr. Karadzic as saying. Of course you
25 must --
1 JUDGE KWON: But my question was whether you knew any sniping
2 incident, what sniping Dr. Karadzic was referring to at that time? And
3 you also continued to say that:
4 "The same regards irresponsible shelling or instances when there
5 was some shelling ..."
6 So what kind of irresponsible shelling you discussed at the time?
7 Could you expand on that?
8 THE WITNESS: No, I cannot expand because I was talking about a
9 conversation we had in which the subject was mentioned in general, not
10 with particular reference to any particular events of sniping or
12 JUDGE KWON: By your answer about quote/unquote irresponsible --
13 I'm sorry, irresponsible shelling, we can take it that Dr. Karadzic had
14 known some irresponsible shelling at least, at the time?
15 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know whether he knew about it but he
16 would -- I think he told me that, you know, there was some stupid
17 officers who -- who were irresponsible, but I cannot remember any names
18 or any particular event associated with that. But he was in general very
19 critical of the army, I would say that. And you know, I got used to him
20 saying, you know, that this general or this colonel is -- is not -- is
21 not someone who is responsible or -- or general things like that, but I'm
22 not referring to any particular events or any particular names. I cannot
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I note the time. Shall we continue
25 after a break? We will resume at 11.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
5 Your Honours. If I could very briefly raise one housekeeping matter in
6 connection with the pending resolution of the motions concerning either
7 safe conduct or subpoena for Mr. Kijac. I simply wanted to note that
8 irrespective one way or another of the outcome, that the parties have
9 agreed that his projected date of appearance would be the first week of
10 December and not the date previously indicated.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
12 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. Dr. Zametica, I think that before the break the question had to
15 do with what you noticed about our and especially my positions about the
16 humanitarian needs of civilians in our territory and especially that of
17 the other two warring parties. Were you in a position to notice what my
18 position was to their humanitarian needs?
19 A. I think you were very cooperative regarding the humanitarian
20 needs, the humanitarian convoys, although you often complained about the
21 attitude of the army, you even used rude language to describe their
22 behaviour. So I think you were every now and again rather frustrated
23 about the fact that the army was perhaps not as cooperative with regard
24 to the passage of humanitarian convoys as you would have liked them to
25 have been.
1 Of course, in this context, I should also mention the fact that,
2 to be fair to the Army of Republika Srpska, that they frequently detected
3 illegal activities concerning those humanitarian convoys such as
4 smuggling of arms. And perhaps they had every reason to oppose further
5 passage of such convoys if they had reason to suspect or if they actually
6 found that the humanitarian convoys were delivering goods other than
7 goods meant to cover the humanitarian needs. I mean weapons.
8 But, yeah, on the whole, I would say that you were cooperative
9 with regard to that. I think the best example of that is the fact
10 that -- I think it was in June 1992 when you agreed to the handing over
11 of Sarajevo airport to the UN and on humanitarian grounds. Thereby, you
12 gave up a military strategic advantage which the forces of Republika
13 Srpska had in holding the airport, and which perhaps almost cost you the
14 war. So that's what I would have to say in general on that subject.
15 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica. Were there any examples of incidents
16 after which certain corridors had to be closed down for commercial
17 traffic? And what was our attitude to humanitarian convoys as opposed to
18 commercial and other civilian traffic?
19 A. Well, I remember one occasion in 1995, was it April or May of
20 1995, when you actually ordered a closure of the so-called blue routes,
21 but that was in connection with the fact that, I think, two Serb girls
22 were killed by Muslim snipers and there was much public outrage regarding
23 that. I personally remember that because I saw it -- I saw the corpses
24 of those two girls shown on TV and there was indeed much outrage about
25 that. So you did react in that particular connection, I seem to
1 remember, and ordered the closure of the routes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D25093 in
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Please have a look at this announcement of yours in the media, at
7 the top of the page. Can you please tell us whether you remember this
8 and whether this corresponds to what was going on at the time?
9 A. Yes. I have no particular comment to make on that. That
10 statement -- this statement corresponds to the situation at the time --
11 I don't -- I don't seem to see a date for that particular -- is this
12 June 1994?
13 Q. [In English] July, July.
14 A. This is July 1994.
15 Q. [Interpretation] And do you see this, apart from your words, when
16 they convey what "Borba" reported about, and is that in accordance with
17 information that you had that the civilian traffic was closed rather than
18 humanitarian convoys?
19 JUDGE KWON: Before he answers the question, let's find out what
20 this is about. Mr. Zametica, do you read the first line of this
21 document, "Vecernje Novosti," 28th of July, 1994?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can see it on top of page, yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Could you tell us what it is?
24 THE WITNESS: It is a statement that I made regarding allegations
25 by the Muslim side that -- that the Serb side was blockading humanitarian
2 JUDGE KWON: What is -- what was "Vecernje Novosti"?
3 THE WITNESS: "Vecernje Novosti" is a Belgrade mass circulation
5 JUDGE KWON: So I take it this is an excerpt from that
6 "Vecernje Novosti" written by Markovic.
7 THE WITNESS: Correct.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
10 admitted, please?
11 JUDGE KWON: Are you going to deal with the next page as well?
12 Or shall we admit only this page?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only this page, and only the first
14 part, down to the next title. What Mr. Zametica said and what was
15 reported by the "Borba" daily.
16 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objections, Ms. Edgerton?
17 MS. EDGERTON: No.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will admit the first page.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3928, Your Honours.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Zametica, you recently mentioned accusations levelled against
23 the Serbs. The false accusations for something that they were not in
24 reality doing. Can you tell us what your experience was with that sort
25 of game, how we were represented in the media, and did this
1 representation correspond to what you could observe in our conduct?
2 A. That is the second very large question you have put to me
3 regarding the media. I would say that the international media on the
4 whole reported the Bosnian war in black and white terms, very -- in a
5 very partisan way, supporting the Muslim side which was portrayed as the
6 victim, and portraying the Serb side as the aggressor. That's what
7 I would say in general.
8 Few Western journalists came to Pale, few Western journalists
9 came to Grbavica which was part of Sarajevo and which was Serb-held
10 throughout the war -- throughout the war, or to Ilidza and other suburbs
11 around Sarajevo that were held by the Bosnian Serb forces. Why this was
12 so remains partly a mystery. Why did the Western media report in the way
13 they did without bothering to -- to present a more researched, a more
14 objective picture.
15 There were exceptions, of course, but on the whole I think
16 Western journalists were looking for ways in which to present this rather
17 complex conflict, with complex origins, and with very complex goings-on.
18 Remember there was not just one war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were
19 two, three, at times four wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, going on
20 concurrently. The war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims,
21 the war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, the war between
22 the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, the war between Muslims and
23 Muslims in the Western region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So I think my
24 impression was that Western journalists wanted to simplify matters. And
25 in simplifying them and looking at the same time for a sort of good guys,
1 bad guys, type of story, the Serbs were an easy target in the sense that
2 for a lot of the time, the Bosnian Serb forces, military forces, held the
3 military advantage or had the military advantage and the Bosnian Muslims
4 were seen as the losing side.
5 It did not help matters that the Bosnian Serbs were seen as an
6 extended hand of the regime in Belgrade, in Serbia, an extended hand of
7 Mr. Milosevic. You, yourself, are being portrayed to this very day, in
8 many popular accounts, and even academic accounts of the war in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the extended hand of Mr. Milosevic, which I find
10 absurd. I cannot imagine a greater enemy, repeat enemy, of the Bosnian
11 Serbs than Mr. Milosevic himself, together with his wife.
12 So the Western journalists, in portraying the war in Bosnia as a
13 kind of Serb aggression agreed between you and Mr. Milosevic, whose tool
14 you were, according to their accounts, had a good story. This was
15 swallowed, hook, line and sinker, by many people in the West. There were
16 those, of course, who remained curious or critical, but on the whole,
17 people relied in the West on what the mainstream media were telling them,
18 and day after day, there were all these horror stories.
19 I remember on quite a few occasions the Muslims were saying that
20 the Bosnian Serb forces were shelling Sarajevo airport. That's why the
21 humanitarian convoys couldn't get through, because the airport was under
22 fire from the Serbs. Whereas, in fact, humanitarian convoys were also
23 very good business for the Muslim side. We have the evidence from
24 Phillip Corwin who served on the civilian side in Sarajevo with the UN,
25 he worked for the UN, who in his diary wrote that he knew the Muslim side
1 had often shelled, deliberately shelled, Sarajevo airport in order to
2 stop the flights coming in, in order to make sure that the prices of
3 goods that they were in the business of selling to the population of
4 Sarajevo went up. So -- and the Serbs, Corwin continued, if I remember
5 correctly, the Serbs were regularly being blamed by the Western media nor
6 doing something that, in fact, the Muslims were doing in order to gain --
7 to gain financially from it.
8 So this is just one illustration of the way in which the Western
9 media were uncritically reporting events, in this case the shelling of
10 Sarajevo airport, blaming it on the Serbs, whereas in fact, as we have
11 learned from Phillip Corwin, but we knew that any way, but it's good to
12 have someone neutral say that, it was the Muslims who were responsible.
13 Q. Thank you. Just to help with the transcript, did you talk about
14 Phillip Corwin?
15 A. Phillip Corwin, C-o-r-w-i-n.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: How do you know that what Mr. Corwin wrote in his
18 book was correct?
19 THE WITNESS: Well, I read his book.
20 JUDGE KWON: Did you talk to him?
21 THE WITNESS: I did meet him, I think in 1995, several times in
22 Pale. So I was in the meetings when he too was present, but of course he
23 subsequently wrote his book, which is a combination of his diary and his
24 subsequent reflections on the events. But most of it is actually what
25 historians call primary evidence, i.e. diary material.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you, Dr. Zametica, you mentioned Karadzic and Milosevic as
4 a context. In your view, was there some sort of agreement or joint
5 enterprise or anything joint between these two political views and these
6 two political tendencies, primarily between myself and
7 President Milosevic, regardless of how much respect I have for him?
8 A. I fail to see why you should feel you have to add regardless of
9 how much you have respect for him. I think you should consider yourself
10 lucky to be still alive, because he was going for you. I think at least
11 since the Vance-Owen Plan, Mr. Milosevic was looking for ways to get rid
12 of you, either politically or even physically. And together with his
13 wife, who absolutely detested you, they were scheming to replace you with
14 someone more pliable.
15 Milosevic is often portrayed as a -- as the person who was
16 scheming the creation of something called Greater Serbia. Nothing could
17 be further from the truth. He was an unreformed communist, and all he
18 was really interested in was to stay in power and consolidate his power.
19 Serbs did not interest him. Serbs outside Serbia interested him even
20 less. I would say that in Milosevic you had a very formidable enemy
21 because he was in charge of a state which still had -- despite sanctions
22 still had considerable military and economic potential and ways and
24 As you know, following the failure of the Contact Group Plan,
25 Milosevic it was who imposed sanctions on Republika Srpska. So a state
1 that was under sanctions itself, Serbia, was imposing sanctions on
2 Republika Srpska. We were cut off from the rest of the world. I think
3 all that Milosevic was really concerned about was to, as hastily as
4 possible, sell the Serbs outside Serbia down the river in order to lift
5 the sanctions and be able to say to his people: "I have achieved this,
6 despite all the difficulties. You can have confidence in me. We are
7 going to build a great future together." He was certainly not interested
8 in creating something called Greater Serbia. You were certainly not his
9 tool. And I don't see why you should say you still have regard for that
11 Q. Thank you. If we leave Milosevic aside, did you establish that
12 there was some joint criminal enterprise on my side, that is to say, the
13 side of myself and my associates?
14 A. I believe the answer to your question is implied in my answer to
15 your previous question. So the idea --
16 Q. Thank you.
17 A. The idea of some kind of joint criminal enterprise between
18 yourself and Mr. Milosevic is absurd.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you say whether you established or whether you
20 observed that, on my part, on the part of the leadership of the Bosnian
21 Serbs, the people I worked with, whether there was any enmity or any kind
22 of inhumane position vis-à-vis Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 Muslims and Croats as such, not some of them, like a political entity.
24 Muslims and Croats as such.
25 A. Again, I believe that at least part of the answer to this
1 particular question is implied in some of my previous answers, when
2 I talked about your attitude towards me, someone who has a Muslim
3 background. I don't think you were a man driven by ethnic hatred. I
4 don't think you were a man driven by any dogma of that kind. That's
5 simply not you. People who do not know you may -- people who have
6 received a wisdom about you from newspapers or popular accounts about the
7 war probably have a very different view about you, but I knew you very
8 well, I worked very closely with you, and I don't think you had anything,
9 even approaching in you that we could call ethnic hatred or feeling of
10 ethnic superiority vis-à-vis the Muslims or the Croats, not at all. All
11 you were concerned to achieve was a lasting and fair political and
12 territorial settlement regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. Thank you. The very basis of the indictment against me, the very
14 basis of the indictment, without which there would have been no
15 indictment, contains a position to the effect that I wanted to get rid of
16 Muslims and Croats from the territories that we thought we were entitled
17 to, and entitlement to territory is not an incrimination. Did you notice
18 that I personally or the responsible part of the leadership had the
19 intention to get rid of Muslims and Croats from our areas, to expel them,
20 even going all the way up to genocide? And would you turn a blind eye to
21 that had you noticed something like that?
22 A. No. I certainly think that you had no plans, schemes, in that
23 direction at all. You were always going to be happy if Muslims and
24 Croats stayed on the territory of Republika Srpska. You appointed, as
25 far as I know, quite a few people in the judiciary system of
1 Republika Srpska who were -- who had Muslim or Croat background. You
2 appointed me as your principal aide in foreign affairs. I had a Muslim
3 background. You had, I don't want to name him now in an open session, a
4 person who was in a very sensitive position in Republika Srpska also had
5 a Muslim background. Another person I remember who was also close to you
6 had a Croat ethnic background. I mean, it doesn't make sense to call you
7 someone who -- someone who -- who was -- who was driven by ethnic hatred
8 in the light of what I know and what I experienced with you, what you
9 were telling me. You, in fact, considered the Muslims to have been
10 originally Serbs who then chose to become Muslims and you respected that.
11 That was fine by you.
12 What people in the West often failed to pay sufficient attention
13 to is the fact that, in fact, we were fighting a defensive war. It was
14 the Muslims, together with the Croats, but principally the Muslims who
15 started the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And through a series of illegal
16 actions in late 1991 and early 1992, actions that destroyed the political
17 consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina or I should say the remnants of
18 political consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The culmination of that
19 was the illegal decision to hold the referendum on independence which
20 took place in late -- end of February, beginning of March, 1992.
21 On top of that, I should add that the political group leading the
22 Muslims at the time was not Muslim nationalist. This was a group that
23 I would call Muslim internationalist, led by Alija Izetbegovic and his
24 clique. I say he was not a Muslim nationalist rather he was a Muslim
25 internationalist, he was a pan-Islamist and his ideology was Islam. His
1 politics were pan-Islamism. I'm just paraphrasing what he himself wrote
2 in his book called "The Islamic Declaration," where he also stated that
3 there can be no peace or co-existence between, on the one hand, Islam and
4 on the other hand, non-Islamic -- non-Islamic organisations or
5 non-Islamic society. And he also stated that the moment the Muslims feel
6 themselves morally and numerically strong enough, they should overthrow
7 the existing system and set up an Islamic one.
8 At the meetings, I remember the meetings, pre-election meetings
9 in October 1990, during the first free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
10 his supporters at the SDA rallies, they had banners, for example, saying,
11 "Long live Saddam Hussein."
12 What I'm trying to say is that the politics of Mr. Izetbegovic
13 who was the legally and legitimately Muslim -- elected Muslim
14 representative, elected by a very large majority of the Muslim
15 population, his politics and his plans were perceived by the Serb side as
16 really threatening and really dangerous. Even so, you had agreed, as we
17 have already said, to the Zulfikarpasic plan, to the Cutileiro Plan and
18 so on and so forth. But I mean, I think people in the West often fail to
19 pay enough attention to the threat that this man and his clique and his
20 ideology and his proclaimed aims, the way we perceived them. And I think
21 we fought a defensive war, I think we fought a just war, and I don't
22 think we have anything to be ashamed of. Except one episode - I'm sure
23 we'll come to that - and that's Srebrenica.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you just tell us, as briefly as possible,
25 whether, in addition to becoming familiar with the political papers of
1 this leadership, did you have personal contacts with this leadership that
2 followed Mr. Izetbegovic? I mean, in addition to Mr. Zulfikarpasic, who
3 left him.
4 A. Well, I knew -- I knew Professor Muhamed Filipovic but I'm not
5 sure whether he was -- he must have been together with Zulfikarpasic,
6 with Izetbegovic in SDA. But apart from those two individuals, I didn't
7 know any other prominent Muslim personalities. I knew Izetbegovic
9 Q. Thank you. I would like to move on to another topic now. Do you
10 know, do you remember, what the mandate of UNPROFOR was and what our
11 attitude was towards UNPROFOR and NATO, from the moment when they joined
12 forces and when the bombing took place? Did you know what our position
13 was, what UNPROFOR could do and what they could not and should not do?
14 A. In answer to your question, I would like to cite or rather
15 paraphrase, I can't remember exactly, but I would like to cite what
16 Cedric Thornberry - Cedric, S-e-d-r-i-c [sic], Thornberry - said in his
17 centenary lecture held at the London School of Economics in 1995.
18 Cedric Thornberry was involved with the United Nations in
19 Sarajevo in 1992, on the civilian side, a very respected personality.
20 And several years later, as I said in 1995, he held this centenary
21 lecture in which he stated, if my recollection is correct, that one of
22 the main lessons to be drawn from the experience of international
23 peacekeeping is that one must be clear that peacekeeping is peacekeeping,
24 and enforcement is enforcement, and that there can be no hybrid or
25 hybrid, I think he called it monstrous hybrid, in between. And I think
1 this is what happened in May 1995, when the United Nations, through NATO,
2 ceased to be a peacekeeper and became a war maker.
3 The essence of international peacekeeping is to -- to stay
4 neutral in a conflict. The idea is to try and keep peace, secure the
5 passage of humanitarian convoys and so on. What happened in May 1995 was
6 that this was thrown out of the window and the Serbs were bombarded. So
7 the line was crossed, the line between peacekeeping and peacemaking had
8 been crossed.
9 Our attitude was very clear. We accepted the presence of UN
10 forces on the ground, in fact we welcomed that, and when the -- when the
11 threat became clear that UN might change its role and become a factor of
12 enforcement, I remember very clearly that on several occasions we
13 informed the representatives of the UN, both military and civilian, that
14 in that event we should treat the UN as our enemy. I think the position
15 was very clear.
16 Q. Thank you. What can you say in connection with our taking
17 prisoner of UN personnel after the bombing started? What status did they
18 have, in our opinion? What was communicated to them? And how were they
20 A. The taking of UN personnel as prisoners or hostages had been
21 announced in advance, but I personally disagreed with that. I thought
22 that Republika Srpska, in 1995, was in a -- in a position of
23 international isolation that was deep enough already. We didn't need
24 further international isolation. And that any step that would lead to a
25 breakdown of our relationships with the international community or,
1 rather, with the UN in this particular case, could only worsen our
2 position. So I was against it.
3 At the same time, when the bombardment took place, feelings,
4 popular feeling, feelings were running very high on the streets, and it
5 is perhaps understandable that UN personnel on the ground were taken
6 prisoner. But I felt this was -- this was an untenable position and, in
7 fact, I remember writing a memorandum, I seldom used to write memoranda
8 but I did write a memorandum very soon after the event, which was
9 sometime after 25th of May, 1995, in which I argued for the immediate
10 release of the UN prisoners. I think you agreed with me. I was knocking
11 on an open door there. And indeed, all the prisoners were released very
12 soon, and no harm was done to them. So -- well, I hope I have answered
13 your question. I cannot remember its original phrasing.
14 Q. Did we consider them to be hostages? Or were they there in some
15 other capacity? And what was communicated to them? What was their
16 position? Were they hostages or prisoners of war?
17 A. They were treated as prisoners of war, but I think it was
18 indicated to them that, you know, this is only a very temporary situation
19 where they were going to be released very soon. I think the intention
20 was never going to -- the intention was never to keep them as prisoners.
21 Q. Thank you. Were you in a position to establish the following?
22 When we were asked to allow people to enter Gorazde or some other
23 enclaves, were you in a position to find out what the specialty of these
24 soldiers was? Were we deceived sometimes? Did some other people enter
25 those areas, people who were not actually what they said they were? I
1 have a statement of yours, a public statement that you made --
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton?
3 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, that's a pretty leading question.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I agree.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, all right. I will rephrase.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Were you following this when we allowed them to enter, and was it
8 always what it was declared to be? Were they just military observers?
9 A. I remember a episode from 1994, around Gorazde, when some of
10 those so-called military observers turned out to be FACs, forward air
11 controllers. They are the people who guide an aircraft up in the air to
12 its target on the ground. And I remember that particular -- as you say,
13 I think I did give a -- I did make a statement about it but I cannot
14 remember the details.
15 Q. Thank you. At the end of May 1995, when these prisoners were
16 taken, can you tell us whether it was envisaged or planned that these
17 prisoners of war be threatened by punishment, by death or wounding? Do
18 you know what was envisaged and do you know how they were treated
20 A. That was never said to them, as far as I know. I mean, no
21 threats were made. I think -- I think they -- those of them who were
22 subsequently interviewed by the Western media all said that they were
23 well treated.
24 Q. Thank you. A moment ago you mentioned Gorazde and you talked
25 about exaggerations at one point and misrepresentations of consequences
1 and victims.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could we have a look at 1D25089
3 in e-court? Could it be zoomed in, please? And then we would like to
4 have page 2. This is April 1994.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you remember this statement of yours about this exaggeration,
7 misrepresentation --
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually could we zoom in seriously
9 on the first part?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. You mentioned today as well that there were false reports,
12 especially about Gorazde.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton?
14 MS. EDGERTON: Could Dr. Karadzic please just keep an eye on how
15 he phrases the question because at no point in today's transcript did
16 this witness mention the word "exaggerations" and misrepresentation of
17 consequences. That makes this a leading question. All Dr. Karadzic
18 needs to do is show the witness the document.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Shall we continue?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise if it was leading.
21 Could we please see the lower part first?
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Can you tell us whether you remember this statement of yours?
24 And can you tell us what it refers to and how it fits into your overall
1 A. Well, I vaguely remember this statement I made but, I mean, you
2 don't have to take my word for it, you can read the memoirs of
3 General Sir Michael Rose who says essentially the same thing. He was the
4 UN military commander at that time.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at the upper part
6 so that we can see that?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Dr. Zametica, can you tell us whether this was an exception, and
9 how often or how rarely did this kind of thing happen, namely that a
10 false picture was portrayed to the public?
11 A. I think this matter must have been clarified in this Tribunal
12 many times over already. I mean, you only have to remind yourself of the
13 statements made by, I think he was then the Foreign Minister of Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, who at the beginning of the
15 conflict -- I was still in London admittedly, but I very closely followed
16 the events. At the beginning of the conflict he was claiming
17 200.000 Muslim dead. This was, you know, after two months of conflict.
18 In the end, the total number of casualties on all sides was somewhere
19 like 100.000. So these exaggerations on the part of the Muslims about
20 the number of their dead or wounded, such exaggerations were commonplace.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: We will admit pages 1 and 2. Any objection before
24 that, Ms. Edgerton?
25 MS. EDGERTON: No.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, pages 1 and 2.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3929, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Dr. Zametica, can you tell us about this exaggeration,
6 misrepresentation, how it affected our confidence in what we heard, what
7 was bandied about in public? Could we believe such allegations?
8 A. I'm afraid I don't understand your question. So you have to
9 rephrase it or -- I'm not -- I'm not sure what you're trying to -- to
11 Q. Can you tell us whether this affected our lack of confidence in
12 sources and allegations of this kind? Could we continue to blindly trust
13 everything that the media reported?
14 A. Well, of course not, but you were a politician, I was your
15 presidential aide. I mean, we could not blindly trust everything that
16 the media reported in any case. And particularly not in this case.
17 I mean such exaggerations, if this is what you're trying to say, such
18 exaggerations did nothing to boost our confidence in the -- in the
19 objectivity of the media, yeah.
20 Q. After I went into hiding, did we correspond occasionally? In
21 other words, were you able to receive my messages or perhaps a letter or
22 send me a letter? Especially regarding the adoption of the Law on
23 Cooperation with the Tribunal, especially until that time? Were there
24 any obstacles in that period?
25 A. Yes. We -- we did have a correspondence whilst you were a
1 fugitive. As far as I can remember, a lot of that correspondence
2 pertained to private matters concerning my family or things like that.
3 There was some political content to that, regarding the situation in
4 Republika Srpska, the wider Balkan situation. But nothing very memorable
5 about that correspondence, as far as I can remember.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up
8 65 ter 21578 in e-court? [Microphone not activated].
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need page 2 in Serbian, 3 in
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. I would like to draw your attention to the second paragraph and
14 in English it begins with the words: "You know very well what we were
15 going through." Here, in this paragraph, the subject is the same as what
16 you just said, the allegations in the media.
17 Do you remember this passage in my letter where I considered,
18 together with you, what had happened in Srebrenica? In 2001, did we know
19 more than we had in 1995? And what were our speculations, what did we
20 know exactly at that time?
21 A. You mean to ask what we knew about Srebrenica in 1995?
22 Q. First of all, what did we know about it in 2001, when I wrote
23 this letter? Did you know more than I did? And does this reflect what I
24 knew and what I thought at that time?
25 A. You always respected me. You never lied to me. I never felt
1 that you -- you were being even economical with the truth regarding
2 anything. You completely trusted me, and I completely trusted you. In
3 this kind of private correspondence, you would be as sincere with me as
4 you would be in our normal course of -- in the normal course of events.
5 So if in 2001, if this is 2001, you wrote this about Srebrenica, I have
6 no reason to believe that you were not sincere in saying that. So in
7 2001, we didn't know much more about Srebrenica than we knew in 1995.
8 JUDGE KWON: I just -- probably it's only me, but I didn't follow
9 the relation between this paragraph and Srebrenica. If you could
10 clarify, Mr. Karadzic?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, in this letter,
12 I wrote to Mr. Zametica my thoughts, my speculations, my attempts to
13 reconstruct the events on the basis of all that I had learned up to 2001.
14 That is the importance of the letter and a good part of the letter refers
15 to Srebrenica 1995. I am thinking aloud what exactly might have happened
16 and who stands behind it.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, more specifically the second
18 sentence in that paragraph is what [overlapping speakers] --
19 JUDGE KWON: How does it read?
20 MR. ROBINSON: It reads that:
21 "When you add to all this the information on the arrest of the
22 Spider Group and the role of the French intelligence service in the
23 events in Srebrenica, then it becomes crystal clear that we had nothing
24 to do with it."
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I tender this whole
3 JUDGE KWON: This includes two letters from you? Before that,
4 yes, do you have any observation or do you object, Ms. Edgerton?
5 MS. EDGERTON: Although I don't agree with Dr. Karadzic's
6 characterisation of the contents of the letter, I have no objection to
7 the whole 17 pages, two letters, being tendered.
8 JUDGE KWON: So are you tendering it in its entirety,
9 Mr. Karadzic?
10 THE ACCUSED: It could be. I have here from one to five but it
11 could be all 17.
12 JUDGE KWON: In light of the Prosecution position, we will admit
13 it in its entirety.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3930, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now we come to this point. Looking at the agendas kept by my
18 secretaries, I see that we had encounters between 10 and 14 July, on
19 several occasions, and these meetings were also attended by
20 Dr. Trifkovic, et cetera. Do you remember coming to my office on certain
21 dates in July 1995, that you met me at my office?
22 A. For God's sake we had daily contact in those -- I mean, frequent
23 daily contact during those days. I was -- I left Pale, I think, on the
24 19th of July because I had to be present at my own wedding. But until
25 that date, we were in frequent daily contact. Yes, of course I remember.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Chamber what did we know at that
2 point in time about events around Srebrenica, especially after the
3 takeover of Srebrenica? What information did we have at our disposal?
4 A. We knew that a military operation had been successfully
5 completed, the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica as a
6 military stronghold from which the Muslims were frequently staging
7 attacks. Not only on our forces but also on our civilians. That much we
8 knew. If you are asking me did we know something about a massacre that
9 took place in Srebrenica during roughly that period, then my answer is we
10 knew nothing about that. By "we," I mean the civilian side. I mean you,
11 I mean myself, I mean our close colleagues in the Presidency. We knew
12 nothing about it.
13 JUDGE KWON: Can we pause here? Just going back to the previous
14 document, which we admitted as D3930, Ms. Edgerton, is it your intention
15 to use the other part of the letter?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I haven't decided yet, Your Honour, to be
17 perfectly honest.
18 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, we are going to admit only the
19 page which was shown to the witness. Yes.
20 And, Mr. Robinson, if you could remind me, remind us whether we
21 heard ever the evidence about or in relation to Pauk or Spider Group?
22 MR. ROBINSON: I don't know if that term has been used for sure.
23 It's possible that it has been but I don't recall exactly. I think that
24 that was a designation of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, but I don't know
25 whether or not that has ever been actually testified to by a witness or
1 is contained in a document.
2 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
3 MS. EDGERTON: With respect, I don't think that's correct. But
4 I'm not able to give Your Honours any further information about it.
5 JUDGE KWON: Then I have to ask Mr. Zametica whether he remembers
6 anything about -- anything related to the arrest of Pauk or Spider Group.
7 Can you assist us, Mr. Zametica?
8 THE WITNESS: I can remember, Your Honour, I can remember reading
9 about it in the press, in the media. It was a big story. I didn't
10 follow it very closely so I'm afraid I cannot assist you in any
11 significant way. But it -- at the time I remember it was quite a big
12 story. So maybe Mr. Karadzic can elaborate on that, but I don't have the
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I will leave it at that. Shall we
15 continue, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellency, if
17 it's of any assistance, I can say that we have evidence here that the
18 10th Sabotage Detachment members were taken by the French to Africa to
19 fight, and later they were involved in attempts to kill Milosevic. But
20 the connection is that these people were members of the
21 10th Sabotage Detachment. And then, after our war, they were taken to
22 Africa to fight, and then they were -- they reappeared as the Pauk,
23 Spider Group, and arrested by the Serbian intelligence service, and
24 caught in the attempt to kill Milosevic. Some gold was involved and some
25 foreign party, foreign intelligence service.
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue? We'll leave it at that.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Dr. Zametica, as opposed to what we knew, how was all this
5 portrayed in the media? Did we have reason to trust media reports? Did
6 we run our own checks? What were we able to establish during those days
7 regarding the rumours surrounding Srebrenica? Were they true or not?
8 I mean, before you left to attend your wedding, while you were
9 there, did we check allegations published in the media and what did we
10 conclude? First of all, was there any talk at that time about execution
11 of prisoners or did it concern civilians?
12 A. I'm not sure I understand the last bit of your question. There
13 was certainly no talk about executions of prisoners. I mean -- or
14 anybody else for that matter, so, you know, I -- I can certainly say that
15 much. But I'm not sure what -- what exactly you were asking there.
16 Q. At that time, did you make a public statement or a press release
17 regarding these allegations?
18 A. Oh, yes. I -- I -- I made a statement, I believe on the
19 17th of July, 1995, with regard to the media allegations that there had
20 been mistreatment of prisoners. So, yes, I -- I denied that, and
21 I denied that on the basis of the knowledge accessible to me, and to you
22 by the way, at the time, and also on the basis of a declaration signed by
23 the representative of Muslim civil authorities in Srebrenica - I cannot
24 remember his exact name, someone called Nesim Mandzic or something like
25 that - who, on that same day, 17 July, if I remember correctly, signed a
1 declaration to the effect that the Muslim civilians from the area of
2 Srebrenica had been well treated and had been evacuated, I believe he
3 said, under the supervision of United Nations forces. There was no
4 maltreatment of them and everything had been done in accordance with an
5 agreement or -- yeah, it was an agreement of, I think, the 12th of July,
6 which the Srebrenica authorities had signed with the representatives of
7 the Bosnian Serb forces.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we pull up 65 ter 25314 in
10 e-court, please?
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. This is a report by AFP on your communique. Please look at it.
13 It says that allegations of torture, murder, rape, and deportation of
14 Muslim civilians are made repeatedly without any independent
15 verification, and then you mentioned this document signed on the
16 17th by the Muslims and the UNPROFOR. Is this what you just talked
17 about? And how does this refutation upon verification fit in with the
18 whole story of passing off misinformation?
19 A. Well, yes. That is the statement I made. I remember it. I can
20 only repeat that I made that statement on the basis of information
21 available to us at the time. I have nothing further to add.
22 Q. Please answer the second part of my question. How does this
23 reverified and reconfirmed exaggeration about the deportation and -- of
24 civilians fit in with the context of what you just said? To what extent
25 were the media to be believed?
1 A. Yes. The -- it certainly was part of my experience that the
2 Muslim side, as we have discussed already, would tend to exaggerate
3 matters regarding their casualties.
4 I remember already, at the beginning of the military operation
5 Srebrenica, Muslim media, Haris Silajdzic, I seem to remember him
6 particularly, listening to the Muslim radio, was shouting murder, was
7 shouting rape. You know, the operation was still going on. He could not
8 have known anything about what was happening. And in typical fashion, he
9 had already decided that there had been horrible things going on at the
11 So, yes, to answer your question, it was part of my experience
12 that they would, as a matter of policy, exaggerate.
13 JUDGE KWON: Let's go back to Mr. Karadzic's question. He said,
14 I quote, "reverified and reconfirmed exaggeration about the deportation."
15 Do you agree that you, the Bosnian Serbs, at the time, reverified
16 or reconfirmed the Muslim argument or the statement at the time? And if
17 yes, then how?
18 THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic was asking me
19 whether it was part of my daily experience that, to hear, to listen to
20 the Muslim side exaggerating about their casualties. I think he meant
21 that. I think the way in which this particular question put by
22 Dr. Karadzic was phrased is not -- not particularly clear, to me at
23 least. So I would need -- I would need -- I would have to ask
24 Dr. Karadzic to rephrase this question.
25 I mean, there was no question that we thought anything horrible
1 was going on. We thought everything was being done in accordance with
2 all the conventions. I remember the late Professor Koljevic telling me
3 at some stage during Operation Srebrenica, that General Mladic had told
4 him he had let in the International Red Cross into the Srebrenica area.
5 And I remember this particular episode precisely because at the time,
6 Professor Koljevic was very angry with General Mladic because he thought
7 General Mladic was taking away his job from him. Professor Koljevic was
8 in charge of the International Red Cross and such organisations. So
9 that's why I remember that particular episode. But it just illustrates
10 that if I knew and if Dr. Karadzic knew that General Mladic had let in
11 the International Red Cross into the Srebrenica area, plus this statement
12 signed by what's his name, the Muslim civilian representative in
13 Srebrenica, all of that formed a picture in our minds that everything
14 was, you know --
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's leave it there. But my question was
16 whether there is any process of reconfirmation or reverification of what
17 happened in Srebrenica. But let's leave it to Mr. Karadzic. Shall we
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Zametica?
21 THE WITNESS: Can I please have some water? Thanks.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember, Dr. Zametica, who sent us this document and at
24 whose request? How did we receive it? How did we receive this document
25 confirming that all of this was regular?
1 A. No, I cannot say that I do remember the exact circumstances about
2 the receipt of this document. You have to remind me.
3 Q. Do you remember the name Deronjic and the man's position? Was it
4 at my request that this response came or would it have been sent by the
5 Muslim authorities even if I had not requested it? Perhaps you don't
6 know the details, but do you remember that there was the Bosnian Serb
7 signature and the Muslim signature and the UNPROFOR's as well?
8 A. Oh, yes. The document dated 17 -- the Srebrenica document dated
9 the 17th of July was signed by all three sides, by the Muslim side, by
10 the Serb side, and by the UN. And the name Deronjic, I don't think I
11 ever met the man, but I remember him, I remember that name, because
12 I think he was the man you appointed at some stage during the Srebrenica
13 military operation, possibly towards the end, as -- as the Serb civilian
14 representative there.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to have this document
17 admitted. My point, Your Excellencies, was that this was a response to
18 our verifications. Dr. Zametica did not have to know that we had asked
19 Deronjic about the media reports and whether they were true.
20 JUDGE KWON: We will admit this.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D --
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Dr. Zametica, thank you very much that you came to testify
24 although you are a very busy man and thank you for your long years of
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 21578 will be
2 Exhibit D3931.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will have a break for 45 minutes,
4 after which we will hear the cross-examination by the Prosecution.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
8 But before we continue, please bear in mind, Mr. Zametica,
9 although Ms. Edgerton and you will speak the same language, please put a
10 pause for the benefit of Mr. Karadzic, who will hear in Serbo-Croat.
11 Yes, there is one matter.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. Just for the record, the
13 correct 65 ter number for Exhibit D3931 is 25314. Thank you.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, thank you, Your Honours.
15 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
16 Q. Mr. Zametica, I would like to start your cross-examination today
17 by showing you 65 ter number 25545, page 1. And, Mr. Zametica, this is a
18 copy of the e-mail that you wrote to Mr. Robinson on 28 June of this
19 year, and that e-mail was appendixed to the public motion Dr. Karadzic
20 filed on July 2nd for a subpoena for you to testify in his defence. And
21 I just want to draw your attention to paragraph 2 of this e-mail. And in
22 paragraph 2, you write that earlier that day, you were listing through a
23 pile of documents which an intern had brought you after you signed your
24 statement. And you say one of those documents flatly contradicts a
25 central claim you make in your statement, one that you sincerely believed
1 to be true when you wrote the statement, and the Prosecution would have
2 no problem ripping apart this claim.
3 So I'd like you, Mr. Zametica, to tell me the central claim you
4 made in your signed statement that you now say was flatly contradicted by
5 the document. And if you want, actually, we can have a look -- rather
6 than have you look at notes, we can have a look at your signed statement
7 in e-court.
8 MS. EDGERTON: It's 1D09616. And you can collapse the e-mail so
9 that Mr. Zametica can see his statement at greater magnification.
10 Q. We can go through this and you can identify for us the central
11 claim that was contradicted by the document. Can we do that? Can you
12 identify for us what it is?
13 A. Yes, I can. If we go down to relations with the UN, I think
14 that's how I entitled --
15 JUDGE KWON: Do we have a hard copy? It's a 17-page document,
16 I take it. Shall we print it? Oh, you have it, yes. Unless the Defence
17 has problem with it, we'll hand it over to the witness.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you. If you go to page 13 of my statement,
19 paragraph 27, near the bottom, so it's the --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm afraid, we have different
21 version. But paragraph 27 --
22 THE WITNESS: Paragraph 27, fifth line from the bottom, sentence
24 "But there had been no policy decision to that effect." This is
25 what I wrote. "But there had been no policy decision to that effect."
1 Meaning -- I meant to say, and I think it's clear from the
2 context if you read the whole paragraph, that there had been no decision
3 by the leadership of Republika Srpska to take UN personnel prisoners.
4 All right?
5 So on returning from -- as you know, I was here already in June,
6 but some other witness's testimony took much longer than expected and
7 I never testified in June. In the meantime, I was handed a small pile of
8 documents which were made available to the Defence by the Prosecution,
9 and at home, having returned from The Hague, I had a closer look at those
10 documents. One of those documents, which I don't have, unfortunately,
11 with me today, but you have it because you made it available to the
12 Defence, relates to an intercepted telephone conversation dated, I
13 believe, the 30th -- the night of 30th to 31st May 1995. It is clear
14 from that conversation, which was -- which involved several people, the
15 call was made by Todor -- Mr. Todor Dutina, who was the Republika Srpska
16 representative in Moscow. The call had been made either to Mr. Krajisnik
17 or to Dr. Karadzic, I'm not sure which, and it's not, I think, clear from
18 that document. But in that document, Mr. Krajisnik at one point says, in
19 reply to Mr. Dutina's assertion that the international community is
20 monitoring everything that the leadership of Republika Srpska is doing,
21 and knows every single move that the Republika Srpska leadership is
22 making or is about to make, in response to that assertion by Mr. Dutina,
23 Mr. Krajisnik says: "How come, then, they didn't know we were going to
24 do this?" From the context, it is clear, how come they didn't know we
25 are going to do this, how come, in other words, they didn't know that we
1 were going to take UN personnel prisoners?
2 Any reasonably capable Prosecution could conclude that there was,
3 in fact, a policy decision to the effect that UN personnel would be taken
4 prisoner, in case of aerial attacks. I didn't know about that telephone
5 conversation, but in the intercepted document, Dr. Karadzic mentions me
6 twice because he too was -- I think they put on the speakerphone so they
7 could all talk, mentions me two times, saying that "Zametica is speaking
8 on my behalf or in my name," words to that effect.
9 Now, what does all this mean? Any Prosecution could establish
10 that, in fact, either Zametica is lying or he's a fool being fooled by
11 the Republika Srpska leadership, or in any case, I turn out very badly
12 from this, and that is why I objected. It's the business and duty of the
13 Defence team to notify me of such evidence of which I was not aware when
14 I wrote this statement. I wrote it in all sincerity, and I believed that
15 there had been no decision, policy decision, to take UN personnel
16 prisoner. So I objected and protested because I thought, for God's sake,
17 this sort of thing is being discussed in court all the time, presumably,
18 and the Defence should have let me know, having read my statement, they
19 didn't write it on my behalf, I wrote it. Had they read it carefully
20 they would have come across this sentence, "but there had been no policy
21 decision to that effect," and said to me, look, this is wrong, there had
22 been a policy decision to that effect.
23 So I thought, as I wrote subsequently in this paragraph, my
24 understanding is that a group of Russian volunteers, fighting on our side
25 and stationed in Pale, had taken the initiative to start taking -- that
1 is the reason why I wrote that -- what I wrote.
2 Q. So this line, which doesn't say, "I believe there had been no
3 policy decision to that effect" but says, "There had been no policy
4 decision to that effect," is not true?
5 A. What is truth? I don't think Dr. Karadzic deliberately misled
6 me. I simply wasn't there. This was at night time. I was up in my
7 hotel on -- ten kilometres away on Mount Jahorina. There clearly,
8 according to Mr. Krajisnik, had been some kind of decision to that
9 effect. I hadn't been notified of that, but this was a fast-moving
10 situation. I -- I would normally have been notified of such things, but
11 I was sincerely unaware of that particular decision, in whatever form it
12 was taken. Whether it was spontaneously immediately after the first
13 bombs fell or whether it was subsequently, I certainly was not privy to
14 that decision and I didn't know about it.
15 Q. But the very next sentence -- now you've just said you weren't
16 there, you didn't know about it, but your very next sentence reads:
17 "Karadzic had not issued any order about taking UN personnel
19 Is that also untrue?
20 A. As far as I knew it, yes -- as far as I knew it, it was -- it was
21 true. I thought that Karadzic had not issued such orders.
22 Q. But, again, Mr. Zametica, you wrote this in absolutes. You said:
23 "Karadzic had not issued any order ..."
24 A. I just --
25 Q. And now you're qualifying what you wrote in your signed statement
1 in June.
2 A. I'm not --
3 Q. Right?
4 A. No, it's not right. I'm not qualifying anything. I just gave
5 you a very long explanation or I gave this Tribunal a very long
6 explanation of the context in which I wrote what I wrote in my statement.
7 And I repeat, at the time, I thought that there had been no policy
8 decision to that effect.
9 Having said that, and I think I mentioned this during the time
10 when Dr. Karadzic earlier today questioned me, there had been warnings,
11 so it did -- you know, this does not come as a surprise to me, that
12 intercepted document, not as a huge surprise, because there had been
13 warnings to the UN, if you bomb, there will be consequences, we will
14 treat you as an enemy. Of course, taking UN personnel prisoner would
15 have been a consequence of that.
16 Q. Now, what about this next sentence, which says your understanding
17 is that a group of Russian volunteers fighting on your side had taken the
18 initiative to start taking hostages. So is your understanding that four
19 military corps, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the 1st Krajina Corps, the
20 East Bosnia Corps, the Drina Corps - oh, actually five - and the
21 2nd Krajina Corps were all separately prompted to take UN personnel
22 hostages and place them at military targets and VRS military facilities
23 right across the areas of responsibilities of all five of them because of
24 something a group of Russian volunteers did?
25 A. That was my understanding. I was given this information about a
1 group of Russian volunteers by the then Minister of Information,
2 Mr. Miroslav Toholj. And my understanding was that when this initial
3 action of Russians taking UN personnel prisoner started in Pale, there
4 was an avalanche effect. That was my understanding.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Let's have a look at D2149 next, please. This is
6 a Defence Exhibit, not yet, a Defence Exhibit D2149 tendered by
7 Dr. Karadzic and it was offered by General Milovanovic relating to his
8 meetings with Dr. Karadzic, between May 1992 and December 1995. And I'd
9 like us to go over to page 56 in the English and page 38 in the B/C/S
11 THE WITNESS: I would --
12 MS. EDGERTON: And I'd like to --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, just a second. Yes, Mr. Zametica?
14 THE WITNESS: I would kindly request if the English version can
15 be enlarged because I can hardly read it.
16 MS. EDGERTON:
17 Q. Do you mind, then, if we collapse the Cyrillic version so you can
18 just read at least one of them clearly --
19 A. Well, for the time being I don't mind, but I certainly cannot
20 read the small letters there.
21 Q. And if at any time you want to see the Cyrillic of a --
22 A. Thank you.
23 Q. -- document or the other version, just say.
24 So here, on the entry in this diary for May 25th, 1995, on the
25 very last line, General Milovanovic says:
1 "While informing Karadzic about the start of bombardment, he,"
2 and if we go over to the next page, "he ordered me to activate last
3 year's decision of the Supreme Command on the VRS arresting everything
4 foreign in RS territory."
5 So not only was there a policy decision taken by the
6 RS leadership, your understanding of Dr. Karadzic's role in the operation
7 is actually incorrect. Dr. Karadzic ordered it, didn't he?
8 A. It is possible, yes. I cannot confirm that or deny that.
9 I think it is possible, yes.
10 Q. Well, how about if we go over to - your indulgence for a moment -
11 P2137, which is a VRS Main Staff order to the commands of the 1st and
12 2nd Krajina Corps, the air force, the anti-aircraft defence, the
13 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, all the corps, signed by
14 General Milovanovic.
15 Now, have a look at this document, Mr. Zametica. It says in
16 paragraphs 1 and 2, that the corps commands and the air force and
17 anti-aircraft defence shall, in agreement with the commanders of the
18 logistics bases, place the captured UNPROFOR staff as well as the staff
19 of other international humanitarian organisations in their AORs in the
20 areas of command posts, firing positions, and other potential targets
21 that may come under air strike.
22 And then, if you go over in the English translation to page 2,
23 paragraph 8, and also find the second-to-last paragraph in the original
24 B/C/S, you see, Mr. Zametica, that this order of the VRS Main Staff about
25 the deployment of UNPROFOR has been approved by the president of the
1 Republika Srpska.
2 Mr. Zametica, not only is it possible, that's what the evidence
3 shows. Isn't that the case?
4 A. That is what General Milovanovic says, yes.
5 Q. That's what this order shows. Isn't that the case?
6 A. No. I'm not trying to say this is impossible. All I'm saying,
7 this is what General Milovanovic was saying. There is no direct
8 connection between his document and Dr. Karadzic saying these people
9 should be tied up to, I don't know, posts and the like. It is possible.
10 I -- I have no knowledge of that and I cannot comment on it. But all I'm
11 saying is that you do not actually prove a direct connection here. This
12 is what Milovanovic says.
13 Q. So evidence that the specific order deploying UNPROFOR personnel
14 to military locations that could be the subject of NATO air strikes has
15 been approved by the president of the Republika Srpska doesn't in your
16 mind represent a direct connection?
17 A. No, it does not because -- because the army would do very often
18 things on its own regardless of Dr. Karadzic's wishes or orders or
19 instructions. As I said earlier, the army was very much on its own,
20 pursuing its own policy. I'm not saying this is impossible. All I'm
21 saying, it proves nothing.
22 MS. EDGERTON: If we could have a look at another document,
23 please. It's D1055.
24 Q. And when you call that up, if we could go over to page 5, which
25 is a statement given by you on 26 May 1995, at midnight, actually,
1 26 May 1995, in response to the air strikes. And you said there,
2 Mr. Zametica:
3 "I believe that we have demonstrated" -- you can read it halfway
4 down the page. "We have demonstrated our determination and firmness
5 through today's response," and you describe it as a restrained response,
6 and that the international community will understand that.
7 You also say:
8 "However, if that's not understood and the attacks continue, we
9 shall go further. If the international community continues with the use
10 of force, we shall respond in the same manner. We are defending
11 ourselves in our traditional territories and we will respond adequately
12 to the use of force."
13 And just to put things in context, the first air strike took
14 place at 4.20 on 25 May 1995. All the safe areas were shelled except for
15 Zepa, and the source for that is P6275 --
16 A. No, no, I'm --
17 Q. -- and -- and here you are, using language that speaks expressly
18 of unity of purpose and unity of action, Mr. Zametica. How is the army
19 doing something on their own?
20 A. If you go further up in this document, which is my statement
21 dated 26th of May, you will see that I'm sending here a signal to the
22 international community which is as follows. I'm reading now.
23 Q. We can see the document, Mr. Zametica --
24 JUDGE KWON: Let him continue.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Apologies.
1 THE WITNESS: I say that:
2 "The international community has so far demonstrated a total lack
3 of understanding. We are defending ourselves in our traditional
4 territories," and I continue further down. "We are prepared to negotiate
5 today or tomorrow, but only on the basis which would assure equal
6 treatment to us as to the other parties to this conflict."
7 So my message there -- of course, I said all these things. I'm
8 not denying it for a second. And it was a strong statement, and you must
9 understand the context in which it was made. Feelings were running very
10 high. But the most important part of this document is the one where I'm
11 sending a signal to the international community, hey, we are prepared to
13 Q. My question was about the language you used. You said, referring
14 to the -- what you described as a restrained response, you said, "We, we,
15 we," over and over. Are you saying that this was the army doing
16 something on their own?
17 A. I'm not saying that. All I'm saying is that you -- you cannot
18 demonstrate what you call unity of purpose here. There was no unity of
19 purpose. There may have been a coincidence of purpose but never
20 something as grand as what you have termed the unity of purpose. Didn't
22 Q. So are you saying now that it's a coincidence that all the safe
23 areas were shelled within hours of the first air strike? It's only a
25 A. Your question doesn't follow from my answer. I don't see the
1 logical connection.
2 Q. Maybe you could answer my question. Are you saying it's a
3 coincidence that all NATO safe areas were -- pardon me, all safe areas
4 were shelled within hours of the first NATO air strikes?
5 A. The question of coincidence does not arise here at all. I fail
6 to follow your logic.
7 Q. Was the army doing something off their own bat?
8 A. Very often that was the case. I don't know what the army was
9 doing in this particular instance.
10 Q. Then why do you use the words "we" all the way through your
11 response that's carried across the world?
12 A. Because it is logical that I say "we." What other term in the
13 English language would you have recommended me to use?
14 Q. I'll move on. The next day, after all the safe areas were
15 shelled, and you issue this threat that "we" will go further, you up the
16 ante and that -- on the 26th of May, within one hour from the second air
17 strike, you were shelling Sarajevo with 250-kilo air bombs, you blocked
18 land access to Sarajevo, you cut the water and electricity supplies off,
19 and you reacted by taking human shields. The order that Dr. Karadzic
20 gave to General Milovanovic was implemented all across the country.
21 That's what happened, isn't it, Mr. Zametica?
22 A. That is what you said happened. I'm not so sure.
23 Q. Well, you were there. Tell us.
24 A. How many human shields, if I may ask, were there out of, I don't
25 know, 300 prisoners? Because I mean -- sorry, I just need to continue.
1 What you said sounded as if, if someone didn't know about it, as if all
2 prisoners were human shields. In fact, a very small proportion of
3 prisoners were human shields. Not that I approved of it. I made my
4 opposition to the whole idea very clear earlier on. But I just wonder
5 why you are using language which suggests that all prisoners, all UN
6 prisoners, were human shields, which was demonstrably not the case.
7 Q. Mr. Zametica, I gave you the context and the sequence of events
8 and you said that you weren't so sure this is what happened. So if I'm
9 wrong, I'd like you to tell me what happened. You were there.
10 A. The fact that I was there doesn't mean that I knew everything
11 that was happening. So whatever happened there, and my knowledge about
12 those events, I have related in my statement and I have nothing further
13 to add to that.
14 Q. Well, Mr. Zametica, let's look at something else you said on
15 26 May 1995.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Let's go to 65 ter number 25339.
17 Q. It's your press statement carried by Reuters.
18 MS. EDGERTON: And perhaps we could enlarge it a little bit.
19 Q. And I'd like you to go down to the second-to-last sentence. It
21 "Zametica said that the Serbs have positioned UN troops and
22 unarmed military observers around potential targets that NATO might hit."
23 Well, Mr. Zametica, based on what you say at the time, not only
24 were you there, you knew these military observers had been deprived of
25 their weapons, deprived of their protective gear, dispersed throughout
1 Serb-held territory to compel NATO forces to stop the air strikes. And
2 In fact, you say -- if you go up and look at the second paragraph on that
3 page, you say:
4 "If it wishes to proceed, the international community as a whole
5 will have to pay a very, very heavy price."
6 And further, you say:
7 "It will not stop at that. The Serbs are determined to make a
8 point to the entire world."
9 And very -- at the very bottom of the page, you say:
10 "If the NATO alliance wishes to continue with air strikes, then
11 it will have to kill the UN troops here on the ground."
12 You were there, you knew exactly what was going on, Mr. Zametica.
13 Isn't that right?
14 A. No, that is not correct. I think I made my views on the subject
15 very clear earlier on. I personally opposed the whole policy of taking
16 UN personnel prisoner. The Reuters report which you have presented me
17 with sounds very much like -- like a made-up statement, in part at any
18 rate. It sound to me like some kind of briefing I may have given to some
19 journalists, there were plenty of journalists there at the time, but off
20 the record. I never would use terms like: "It will have to kill the UN
21 troops here on the ground."
22 I was very aware -- but that in particular sounds to me like a
23 made-up story. I was very much aware of the importance of communicating
24 with the Western media, with the Western world. I was very careful in my
25 choice of words and I would never have used words to that effect or the
1 words that are stated here. So, yes, I was there, I'm not denying that
2 I was there, but I didn't know everything that was taking place.
3 Fast-developing situation, plenty of emotion. War, you see, is
4 not a set of rational moves and countermoves. Emotion comes into it.
5 Fear comes into it. And so on. So this was one of those situations.
6 But I, despite the statement which we saw earlier on, which I'm not
7 denying I'm the author of, this sounds to me like an off-the-record
8 briefing with an additional content thrown in, of which I'm not the
9 author. I would never have used things -- terms like: "It will have to
10 kill the UN troops." That would have been a completely wrong message to
11 send to the international community.
12 I drew your attention just earlier on now to the most important
13 part of my statement of, I think, 26th of May, where I said that
14 Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate. Do you think that I was
15 unaware of the very situation -- very serious situation in which we were
16 finding ourselves? I mean, our only hope was through negotiations. Our
17 only hope was, you know, given the combined forces arranged against us,
18 which were enormous, from the international community to the Western
19 media, to Mr. Milosevic and his wife in Belgrade, to the insubordinate
20 army, to -- our only hope was to have a peace settlement as fast as
21 possible. So -- so this statement which you have presented -- this
22 press -- Reuters press report completely goes against my thinking at the
24 Q. You've just once again described the army as insubordinate, but,
25 Mr. Zametica, we've looked at a series of documents now, including
1 military documents, that show exactly the contrary, that show the army is
2 implementing a directive, an order, in fact, from Dr. Karadzic. On what
3 basis, in respect of this operation, are you claiming the army is
4 insubordinate now?
5 A. Can you show me that order by Dr. Karadzic? Not Milovanovic's
6 document, Dr. Karadzic's document. Is there one?
7 Q. We have seen the evidence from General Milovanovic's diary. If
8 you'd like, I can call it back up for you.
9 A. No. I have seen it. I asked you to give to me, to demonstrate
10 to this Tribunal Dr. Karadzic's order. Where is it?
11 Q. Mr. Zametica, I've just told you, you've already seen the
12 evidence. Now you can answer my question. On what basis, in respect of
13 this operation, are you now claiming the army is insubordinate?
14 A. The army was insubordinate all the time. It was preparing a
15 military putsch in August 1995.
16 Q. I asked you --
17 A. I can go -- I can go into detail. I mean, an army that is
18 preparing a putsch --
19 Q. Mr. Zametica, stop. I'm not asking you about August.
20 I specifically asked you about this operation.
21 A. Well, what makes you think that during this operation, the army
22 was acting as, all of a sudden, an instrument of the political leadership
23 of Republika Srpska and had become less independent than it normally was?
24 Q. Mr. Zametica, you're not answering my question, so --
25 JUDGE KWON: Let me put this. What is your evidence,
1 Mr. Zametica: Number 1, Dr. Karadzic never ordered the taking prisoners
2 of UN soldiers or, number 2, you did not know whether he issued such
3 orders or not?
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it's number 2.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Your indulgence for a moment, and I'll
7 go on to another area.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Perhaps we could admit this exhibit,
9 Mr. President.
10 MS. EDGERTON: Of course. That would make understanding
11 Mr. Zametica's answers much easier. If that could be a Prosecution
12 exhibit, please.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6474, Your Honours.
15 MS. EDGERTON:
16 Q. You've mentioned a couple of times today, both to Dr. Karadzic
17 and to your answers to me, about the memorandum you wrote advocating the
18 release of the hostages and that was because you thought there was a risk
19 of additional international isolation. Fair?
20 A. Fair enough, but that's not the whole story. I felt that taking
21 prisoner -- taking UN personnel prisoner was also morally unsustainable.
22 Q. Now, it looks like -- your indulgence for a moment.
23 Now, Dr. Koljevic, who you referred to in your signed statement a
24 couple of times, wrote about your memo in his diary actually, and
25 I assume you've read his diary. Have you?
1 A. I have read parts of his diary. It is a diary which has been
2 published, in two very large tomes. I would not like to claim that I
3 have read it from page 1 to the last page. I have read bits of it, yes.
4 Q. All right. Then you knew that Dr. Koljevic had written about
5 your memo in his diary. Right?
6 A. I cannot remember now but it's very possible, yes.
7 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like to call up 65 ter number 25569.
8 Q. Which is an excerpt from his diary, or the excerpt from his diary
9 which talks about your memo. And in the B/C/S original it's at pages 152
10 and 153.
11 And you can just tell us, Mr. Zametica, which you'd like to have
12 on the screen in front of you, the English or the B/C/S. I'd like you to
13 direct your attention to the paragraph that reads: "On that same day,
14 29 May," because that's the part that relates to your memorandum. And if
15 you can skim through that, I'm going to take you over to the next page
16 and then I'm going to ask you a question.
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we collapse the B/C/S?
18 MS. EDGERTON:
19 Q. Is that all right with you, Mr. Zametica? Shall we collapse the
21 A. Yes, please do.
22 Q. Can you tell us when we can go to the next page, Mr. Zametica?
23 A. Yes, go ahead.
24 Q. And there is going to be part of a third page after that. So let
25 us know when you've come to the bottom of this page.
1 A. Yes, please go on.
2 Q. When you talked about your memo --
3 A. Sorry, I haven't finished reading.
4 Q. Let me ask the question and you can continue reading after I ask
5 the question. When you talked about your memo, Mr. Zametica, you didn't
6 mention this next bit that Dr. Koljevic has written about in his book,
7 and it was about a proposal, your proposal, as regards the eastern
8 enclaves. Now have a read.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Mr. Zametica, what you didn't mention is that you also made a
11 proposal for an immediate fierce offensive attack against the eastern
12 enclaves at the same time as UNPROFOR members were released selectively,
13 and you pointed out that that would be the only move that would bring us
14 back to the negotiating table to ensure a complete victory in
15 Eastern Bosnia.
16 Now, you relied on Dr. Koljevic's diary on more than one occasion
17 in your signed statement. Can we also rely on Dr. Koljevic's diary in
18 his rendering of your proposal to the Bosnian Serb leadership?
19 A. To a large extent, yes.
20 Q. Great. Then I want to ask you a little bit about this fierce
21 offensive against the eastern enclaves that you recommended at the end of
22 May 1995. And what I'd like to know, Mr. Zametica, and it actually
23 relates to something you said earlier today. You told Dr. Karadzic in
24 your examination-in-chief that you didn't read the intelligence reports
25 because he had advisors who did that, and you identified them. Now, do
1 you agree, then, with the security advisor that did read those reports,
2 that the killings in Srebrenica are a myth? In fact, he used the words,
3 "a big farce." Is that your position?
4 A. Before I say what my position is, I would like to have
5 additional -- I would like to have clarification on who you're referring
6 to and what is the -- what is the citation -- who are you attributing
7 this citation to about the myth?
8 Q. I'm attributing it to Ambassador Milinic who was one of the two
9 advisors to Dr. Karadzic and he said this when he came to testify in
10 Dr. Karadzic's Defence at this Tribunal at transcript pages 39769 to 70,
11 and 39793.
12 A. I'm not responsible for what Gordan Milinic was saying, so I'm
13 not clear what you're trying to ask me. I mean, are you asking me to
14 comment on what Mr. Milinic said in his testimony? Is that what you're
15 trying to ask me?
16 Q. I'm asking you -- you said you didn't read any intelligence
17 reports and Dr. Karadzic had advisors who did. Well, one of the people
18 who read those said the killings at Srebrenica are a myth, a farce. Is
19 that your position as well?
20 A. No, it is not my position.
21 Q. Well, then, Mr. Zametica, when you talk about the crimes at
22 Srebrenica, as you did with Dr. Karadzic, you're talking about the mass
23 executions of thousands of Bosnian men and boys by the armed forces of
24 the Republika Srpska. Right?
25 A. Can you please repeat your question? I'm not following you.
1 Q. All right. So since that's not your position, I want to ask you
2 if we can agree on this. When you talk, as you did in your
3 examination-in-chief and in your written statement, actually, your signed
4 statement, about the crimes at Srebrenica, you're talking about the mass
5 execution of thousands of Bosnian men and boys by the armed forces of the
6 Republika Srpska. Right?
7 A. I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm just taking a little bit more time to
8 come to the -- to the Srebrenica section, to see what exactly I wrote.
9 I actually wrote - this is page 16, paragraph 35 - to this day, I do not
10 know who perpetrated or ordered the crimes of -- the crimes in
11 Srebrenica, but it is certain that whoever it was did a great disservice
12 to Republika Srpska. That's what I wrote.
13 Q. All right. When you talk about the crimes at Srebrenica, it's
14 correct that you're referring to the mass executions of thousands of
15 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by forces of the Republika Srpska. Right?
16 A. No. First of all --
17 Q. Tell us what you're referring to, then.
18 A. I'm referring to a massacre that took place in Srebrenica during
19 that period. That's what I'm referring to. More than that, I cannot
20 refer to because I was not there.
21 Q. Mr. Zametica, there has been -- and you would know this because
22 you seem to have been following the trials at this Tribunal rather
23 closely. There has been several trials now into the allegations related
24 to Srebrenica and there has been several findings about these executions
25 and those findings are -- are to this effect: Those findings refer to
1 7.000 -- pardon me, those findings refer to almost 7.000 Bosnian Muslim
2 men and boys executed by the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, the
3 VRS and the MUP. Is it your evidence that you're not prepared to accept
4 that as true?
5 A. No, no, I'm not saying that. Incidentally, I wonder on what
6 basis you say that I have been closely following the trial -- the trial
7 here. I don't think this follows from anything I said. But as regards
8 the massacre that took place in Srebrenica during that period that we are
9 talking about, I can only repeat what I said in my statement in
10 paragraph 35, and I shall read it to you again because you do not seem to
11 have understood my -- so if you require additional explanations, I
12 shall -- I shall be happy to try and provide them. But I repeat this
13 first sentence in paragraph 35, which is as follows: To this day I do
14 not know -- so to this day, and this was dated, I suppose in June -- to
15 this day I do not know who, repeat who, perpetrated or ordered the crimes
16 in Srebrenica, but it is certain that whoever it was did a great
17 disservice to Republika Srpska. I have nothing to add to that.
18 Q. So can we take from what you're saying that you're not prepared
19 to accept that almost 7.000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by
20 the armed forces of the Republika Srpska?
21 A. Once again, I repeat because you do not -- I don't know in which
22 language I should be talking to you, but it seems to me that either you
23 have chosen to misunderstand my English or ignore it, or perhaps if
24 I offer additional explanations -- but I think the -- the phrasing of
25 this sentence, first sentence in paragraph 35, is as clear as it can be
1 in the English language. So all I can say is that I was not in
2 Srebrenica at the time. My knowledge at the time was that nothing in
3 terms of crimes had been done in Srebrenica. That was also what I
4 believe to this day was Dr. Karadzic's information. So I was not there,
5 I do not know who, repeat who, perpetrated or ordered the crimes in
6 Srebrenica. I'm sure this Tribunal has been looking into the matter very
7 carefully and it will, I'm sure, establish the facts of the matter.
8 Q. Because you're not answering my question, I'll ask you one more
9 thing in a slightly different way and then we'll move on.
10 You refer repeatedly now, because you keep repeating something
11 you wrote in your statement, to a massacre at Srebrenica. How many
12 victims, to your knowledge, and do you believe, resulted from those
14 A. I have no knowledge of the subject. Let me just add, because
15 I see what you're driving at, let me repeat, I was not there on the spot.
16 I have no idea what happened there except that it is by now clear
17 something awful did happen. I don't know who perpetrated the crime. I
18 don't know how many people were executed. So I'm not trying to run away
19 from this subject. I'm just trying to be as clear as I can be in the
20 English language, to tell you that I have no specific knowledge of the
21 matter. I don't know how many people were executed. Even if only one
22 was executed, that would have been wrong.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, you also said today that as regards the massacre
24 at Srebrenica, and you said this at temporary transcript page 50, that we
25 didn't know any more in 2001, at the time you and Dr. Karadzic were
1 having some private correspondence while he was a fugitive from justice,
2 you didn't know any more in 2001 than was known in 1995.
3 Mr. Zametica, Radislav Krstic, the deputy commander of the
4 Drina Corps, was convicted here, at the ICTY, after a trial in the first
5 instance in August 2001 of aiding and abetting in the genocide, murder,
6 extermination, and persecutions in respect of the killing of thousands of
7 Bosnian Muslim men and boys. So how can you say we didn't know any more
8 in 2001 than we did in 1995?
9 A. If the Tribunal convicted General Krstic, did you say? It must
10 have investigated the matter very carefully, and I cannot comment on
11 that. I think what you're referring to -- this is the private letter
12 that Dr. Karadzic wrote to me in 2001. You will be aware that the
13 subject of Srebrenica is still a subject of considerable controversy, and
14 presumably what Dr. Karadzic meant to say in that letter is that
15 basically we don't know now, in 2001, much more than we knew in 1995.
16 Presumably that's what he meant but I cannot -- I cannot comment more
17 than that.
18 Q. Thank you. Your indulgence for a moment. Now, you said in
19 response to a question by Dr. Karadzic earlier today as to what
20 information we, referring to, I presume, you, he and other people, had at
21 your disposal, your response was:
22 "We knew that a military operation had been successfully
23 completed, the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica as a
24 military stronghold."
25 Mr. Zametica, this was an operation ordered by Dr. Karadzic,
1 wasn't it?
2 A. I believe it was, yes. However, I have something to add to that.
3 I think when we are talking about Srebrenica, it is important to realise
4 that there are two separate aspects to Srebrenica which most people seem
5 to be unable to distinguish between. The first aspect of Srebrenica is
6 military operation Srebrenica. The neutralising of a military
7 stronghold, Srebrenica, bristling with armed people who are jumping out
8 of it all the time, something that was commented upon by UN
9 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in contravention to the
10 demilitarisation agreement on Srebrenica. So the taking out of this
11 military threat, Srebrenica, is aspect number 1 of the subject of
13 Aspect number 2 of Srebrenica is the massacre in or at
14 Srebrenica. They are two very separate matters. Whoever did the crime,
15 it was done on the ground, repeat, on the ground, and not as a result of
16 some joint criminal enterprise. If it was, as you said, the Army of
17 Republika Srpska that did it, then it was an army out of Dr. Karadzic's
18 control. Repeat, out of Dr. Karadzic's control. I'm sure that
19 Dr. Karadzic would have sanctioned aspect 1 of Srebrenica, which is the
20 military operation. I'm equally convinced, however, that he would never
21 have sanctioned any crimes that subsequently took place in or around
23 Q. Let's look at another document. Now, you said, when I asked you,
24 that you believe that the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica
25 was ordered by Dr. Karadzic. Now, I'd like you to have a look at P4484.
1 And it's going to take us some steps to go through this. This is an
2 excerpt from a dictaphone tape containing a number of recorded
3 conversations and I want you to look at a conversation between
4 Dr. Karadzic and the Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic about the
5 attack on Srebrenica. And it's dated on or around July 1995 --
6 A. Sorry, can you repeat the date?
7 Q. 8 July, on or around 8 July 1995. Let's have a look at the
8 conversation. A third of the way down the page, Dr. Karadzic asks:
9 "Are the tits ours?"
10 A. Sorry, what does he ask?
11 Q. The English translation is: "Are the tits ours?" Referring to a
12 feature. General Zivanovic responds:
13 "They are. They're there for the first time" --
14 A. Excuse me, excuse me, can you please stop for a second? Which
15 line is this roughly in the document?
16 Q. One-third of the way down the page.
17 A. "Are the tits ours?"
18 Q. Line 15, approximately.
19 A. Sorry, can you please give me some time to read the whole
21 Q. Absolutely.
22 A. Thank you.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could we have the correct page in B/C/S,
25 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you to my colleague, Mr. Registrar.
1 Q. By the way, just regarding the translation, the English word
2 being "tits," that refers to when it says in the B/C/S - and apologies
3 for my translation --
4 A. You don't need to --
5 Q. -- it's the Tri Sise mountains.
6 A. The what mountains -- oh, the [indiscernible].
7 Q. Tri Sise, if I pronounce it correctly and I probably don't.
8 A. Actually we might need that translation because I did not
9 understand your rendering of the Serbian language there. So I'd kindly
10 request the translation. I've read this page.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Could we go over to the next page in English,
13 Q. Mr. Zametica, Dr. Karadzic, in this conversation with his
14 military commander, General Zivanovic, is getting an earful of
15 information and it's a very tactical discussion. They talk about
16 elevations being reached, prisoners being taken, and Dr. Karadzic gives
17 an order. He gives an order to attack. You would have seen in the
18 second page, two-thirds of the way down, Dr. Karadzic tell
19 General Zivanovic:
20 "All right, General, full speed ahead. Tell Krstic order to go
21 full steam."
22 Now, you said earlier this morning, or earlier today, that as far
23 as you knew, Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in operational, tactical
24 command over the army, and that's contradicted by this, and I called it
25 an intercept, I apologise, this dictaphone tape recording, isn't it?
1 A. No, it's not. I didn't say that. Please don't put words into my
2 mouth. I said by and large, or words that that effect, he did not -- he
3 did not have a great interest in tactical operational matters. That's
4 what I said. I think I was very clear earlier today. I think it can be
5 checked in the record.
6 Q. What you said was:
7 "In terms of operative and tactical levels of command over the
8 army, I think you left that to the army itself."
9 A. So I said "I think."
10 Q. "I think you had responsibilities with regard to strategic
11 decisions, but with regard to day-to-day operative and tactical levels, I
12 don't think you were particularly involved."
13 A. Precisely. He was not particularly involved. So what you said
14 earlier on just now, that this document currently on display contradicts
15 or contravenes my earlier statement, is simply untrue.
16 Q. It fits -- you're saying it fits, then, within the statement
17 you've given that I just read back to you?
18 A. It fits in within your imagination, perhaps, but it doesn't fit
19 with my statement.
20 Q. We'll move on to another document, D2090. This is a document
21 dated -- oh, pardon me.
22 JUDGE KWON: We are hearing B/C/S in English channel. I think it
23 has been corrected. Please continue.
24 MS. EDGERTON: And I said the wrong 65 ter number, it's 2080.
25 JUDGE KWON: And has your question about Sise been resolved?
1 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I think it's been ignored.
2 JUDGE KWON: It just referred to the three hilltops nearby
4 THE WITNESS: I see.
5 JUDGE KWON: "Sise," I take it, was "tits" in B/C/S.
6 THE WITNESS: Correct.
7 MS. EDGERTON: My mispronunciation, I'm told it's not a sh sound.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. So, Mr. Zametica, this is a document dated the next day,
10 9th of July, 1995, from General Krstic to the VRS --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, can we establish for
12 sure whether that date, the date of the first document, was indeed the
13 8th or not? If we are going to continue claiming that this was on the
14 next day?
15 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?
16 MS. EDGERTON: I said on or around the 8th.
17 JUDGE KWON: We do not have document -- I do not have date on
18 that document.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Not on that document, but I can -- tomorrow
20 morning, I can direct Dr. Karadzic to the evidence regarding the date of
21 this conversation.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we continue, then?
23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
24 Q. So this is a document from General Krstic to the VRS Main Staff
25 with an assessment of the situation in Srebrenica on the 9th of July --
1 A. You mean 9th of -- I see two separate dates. I'm sorry to be
2 interrupting you, but I see two separate -- 9th of July and 9th of May,
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. So I'm confused.
6 Q. There is nothing confusing about this document. This document is
7 dated in the top left-hand corner, the 9th of July, 1995. And in the
8 second paragraph, General Krstic relates the fierce attack that his units
9 have carried out along the axes of Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica-Pribojevici
10 village and so forth, and indicates that they've created conditions for
11 extending the attack toward Srebrenica. In paragraph 3, he --
12 A. Sorry to interrupt you, Madam Prosecutor.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zametica was referring to handwritten date on
14 top right corner.
15 THE WITNESS: Correct.
16 JUDGE KWON: Why don't ignore it for the moment. She may come
17 back later on if --
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour, but I wish to comment also
19 on the translation of paragraph 2. It just goes to show that sometimes
20 things can be lost in translation. In paragraph 2, there is no talk
21 about a fierce attack. There is talk about "u snaznom naletu" which
22 means a "strong push." It's not a fierce push but -- okay, it's a minor
23 detail. I'm just drawing the attention of your fine self and the
24 Tribunal that we have to be very careful regarding the language.
25 I happened accidently to stumble against the Serbian version of the
1 document, but please carry on, yes.
2 MS. EDGERTON:
3 Q. Now, paragraph 3 sets out his decision for further actions, where
4 he writes:
5 "Taking advantage of the success achieved, regroup the forces and
6 carry out a vigorous and decisive attack towards Srebrenica."
7 MS. EDGERTON: And if we scroll down to the bottom of the page,
8 in both languages, please. Sorry, you'll have to go over to the second
9 page in English for the date stamp.
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I -- sorry, I haven't even digested the first
11 page. You're already pushing me on to the second page. I think this is
12 slightly unfair.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. That's fine, Mr. Zametica. We can go back to the first page.
15 A. Thank you. Thank you so much. Just a quick comment on
16 paragraph 1, he talks about the enemy firing all their available weapons.
17 Q. Mr. Zametica, I'll give you an opportunity to comment when I ask
18 a question. I would just like to invite to you finish reading the
19 document, as you'd requested.
20 A. Thank you. Yes?
21 Q. All right.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we can go over in English to the date
23 stamp, we see that it's received on the 9th of July at 2330. If we can
24 go back over to the English page -- the first page of the English.
25 Pardon me, 2320. All right.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Zametica, General Krstic is sending this interim combat
2 report exactly where he is supposed to, up to the VRS Main Staff. So I'd
3 like us to go to another document --
4 A. Excuse me, when you say General Krstic is sending this report
5 where it should be going to, the VRS Main Staff, and the Drina Corps,
6 what exactly is the meaning of your words?
7 Q. It's a lead-up to the next question --
8 A. Oh, I see, sorry, yes.
9 Q. -- in the next document.
10 MS. EDGERTON: P2276, please.
11 Q. The very same evening that you, in your written statement, have
12 your conversation with Dr. Karadzic, General Tolimir issues an order
13 which is copied to Dr. Karadzic for information and it's delivered to the
14 Drina Corps command post, Generals Gvero and Krstic, personally.
15 Now, it relates to the conduct of combat operations around
16 Srebrenica, and it says, in paragraph 1, paragraph 2, paragraph 3, and
17 paragraph 4, that the president of the republic has been informed of the
18 combat operations, the president of the republic is satisfied with the
19 results of the combat operations, he's ordered that follow-up combat
20 operations take place, and in accordance with the order of the
21 president --
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please be more precise?
23 Where does it say that I ordered it in -- as opposed to given my
24 approval? Or consent? If the meaning is important, then let us take
25 proper care of this meaning.
1 JUDGE KWON: We have the document. So what -- please let us know
2 when you have done the reading, Mr. Zametica.
3 Just a second.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I'm sorry, but
5 I received a different interpretation than the translation.
6 JUDGE KWON: Ignore the previous question. I think Mr. Zametica
7 read the document. What is your question, Ms. Edgerton?
8 THE WITNESS: Well, I think it is clear --
9 JUDGE KWON: No, just a minute. What is your question,
10 Ms. Edgerton?
11 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Zametica, I want to go back again to your assertion that
13 Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in operational tactical command of the army,
14 and here --
15 A. Can we -- can we just pause for a second? I mean, this is the
16 second time I'm going to say this. I never said that. You say that
17 I asserted that Dr. Karadzic was never involved in operation and tactical
18 conduct of warfare. I never said anything of the kind and I repeat it
19 now. It will be on the record. I repeat it now. He was largely
20 uninterested. So I never asserted that he had not been involved in
21 operational and tactical at any time whatsoever. I never said words to
22 that effect.
23 Q. Thank you. Mr. Zametica, you've described the army as
24 insubordinate. This is an example of General Krstic sending a report
25 right up to where it's supposed to go, to the VRS Main Staff. If you
1 look at this document, it's clear that the order we just looked at, D2 --
2 or the report we just looked at, D2080, went to Karadzic. 45 minutes
3 later, and you can see by the time stamp on this document, the answer
4 comes back from Dr. Karadzic.
5 This is an example, Mr. Zametica, of the chain of command in
6 the -- the chain of command working perfectly smoothly and contradicts
7 your assertion that the army was out of control.
8 A. No. I think this is a very good example of how a clever lawyer
9 like yourself puts two and two together and makes ten. And I shall
10 elaborate on that. In this document currently on the monitor, you said
11 Karadzic ordered this and that. In paragraph 1, in paragraph 2, you
12 said, and in paragraph 3. In fact, if you actually bother to read the
13 document, he doesn't order anything in paragraph 1. He simply informed.
14 I shall read it:
15 "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of
16 successful combat operations," blah, blah, blah.
17 Second paragraph:
18 "The president of the republic is satisfied ..."
19 So being satisfied doesn't mean he's ordering anything. Being
20 informed doesn't mean he's ordering anything.
21 The only thing, in fact, he is ordering is to be found in
22 paragraph 3, and I shall read it out for you:
23 "The President of Republika Srpska ordered," repeat ordered,
24 "that in the follow-up combat operations, full protection be ensured,"
25 repeat, full protection be ensured, "to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim
1 civilian population and that they be guaranteed safety in the event of
2 their crossover to the territory of Republika Srpska."
3 And that's the only thing he ordered.
4 Q. So you agree with me, then, the chain of command is working
6 A. No, I do not. I wish that were true, but it -- it unfortunately
7 didn't work like that. Earlier today, I tried to make the point about
8 the Army of Republika Srpska being basically a force unto itself. I
9 don't know what better way of describing the state of affairs that
10 existed at the time. The chain of command that you talk about did not
11 really exist. It existed only when the Army of Republika Srpska, when it
12 suited it to obey some order or instruction by Dr. Karadzic, then it did
13 work. But otherwise, they did what they -- what they liked. They very
14 much behaved like a force unto itself. So you're trying to establish the
15 existence of a certain chain of command which was demonstrably not there.
16 Only two -- three weeks, sorry, after this date, which is 9th of July
17 here, the army is staging a silent coup d'état. What sort of chain of
18 command are you talking about?
19 JUDGE KWON: Shall we stop here?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, I was about to say. I've gone over time and
21 I apologise, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zametica, have you ever testified before a
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, in a civil case regarding tenants once in
25 Cambridge, many years ago.
1 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody
2 else about your testimony while you're testifying here.
3 THE WITNESS: I understand, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE KWON: We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. The
5 hearing is adjourned.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of
8 October, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.