1 Tuesday, 19 November 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, good morning everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, good morning, Mr. President. I'd like to
9 introduce to the Trial Chamber Rieneke Boterenbrood, who is a legal
10 intern working with our team. She is from the Netherlands. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Before we continue, there's a matter I would like to deal with.
13 In assessing the accused's motion to admit documents previously marked
14 for identification which was filed on the 7th of November, 2013, and
15 noting the Prosecution's response filed on the 18th of November, 2013,
16 the Chamber notes that the accused has not provided sufficient details
17 regarding the prior admission of five intercepts for which he requests
18 that the Chamber take judicial notice of their authenticity. Therefore,
19 as the Chamber has stated in the past, it instructs the accused, by
20 25th of November, 2013, to provide it with further information regarding
21 the prior admission of the intercepts, including the transcript
22 references or titles and date of the written decision through which they
23 were admitted.
24 Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please proceed.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to begin with something that you've
5 alluded to during your examination-in-chief, and that was your trial and
6 your conviction. Now, you were tried on charges related to and convicted
7 for your participation as a member of a joint criminal enterprise along
8 with persons such as Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic to forcibly remove
9 Muslims and Croats from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
10 35 municipalities. Correct?
11 A. Yes, yes. That's the way it was in the first judgement.
12 Q. Okay. And those municipalities included Banja Luka, Bijeljina,
13 Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Foca, Hadzici, Ilidza, Kljuc, Novi Grad,
14 Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, and
15 Visegrad, Vlasenica, Vogosca, and Zvornik? Those were among the
16 municipalities embraced by the indictment and the conviction; correct?
17 A. As I've already said, the first indictment did contain these
18 municipalities; however, in the first judgement some of them were dropped
19 and in the second judgement many more were dropped. So what stayed on
20 were the things that happened in nine municipalities.
21 Q. Well, the judgement is available for all to see. In fact, I'll
22 be providing you with a copy of it in Serbian. I think you'll see that
23 the conviction embraced more than nine municipalities, and we'll talk
24 about some of those specific municipalities during the course of this
1 Now, in assessing your responsibility, the Trial Chamber found
2 that your involvement was crucial to the commission of the crimes, and
3 that's found at paragraph 1158 of your judgement. For your benefit,
4 Mr. Krajisnik, I have a copy of the trial judgement in your language.
5 This is 65 ter 24274, which has also been uploaded in both languages.
6 And I'm referring to a finding that is reflected at paragraph 1158,
7 Mr. Krajisnik.
8 A. Well, I'm not a lawyer, but as far as I understood this, the nine
9 municipalities that remained in the conviction are Trnovo, Sokolac,
10 Bratunac, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Prnjavor, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, and
11 Krupa, and there's not a single event that occurred outside these
12 municipalities that I was convicted for in the final judgement. I'm
13 speaking to you as a former accused person, that is to say, a person who
14 was convicted; but it is possible that from a legal point of view
15 somebody may interpret this differently.
16 Q. You're welcome to turn to paragraph 1158, but I take it you will
17 confirm that the Trial Chamber found that your involvement in these
18 events was crucial to the commission of the crimes that were charged and
19 for which you were convicted?
20 A. This is the first judgement and you are right. There were many
21 municipalities in the first judgement. I, however, am speaking about the
22 final judgement in which those municipalities were dropped. I'm telling
23 you again how it is that I understand things. My participation is --
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, excuse me. Let's -- okay. You were about to
25 address your -- go ahead. Finish that thought. Sorry to interrupt.
1 A. Well, then you shouldn't have interrupted me.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I will feel free to interrupt you when you are not
3 answering the question. In this case you started off on a different
4 course, talking again about the municipalities, then you began to address
5 the question I had raised. So you may continue if you're responsive to
6 the question I've asked. Please continue, your participation?
7 A. Well, I had to give that kind of response because you made a
8 mistake. You said I was convicted for 36 municipalities.
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, please -- will you --
10 A. It was nine municipalities so I had to correct you.
11 Q. The question is -- the question is: The Trial Chamber found that
12 your involvement in the crimes was crucial to their commission? Yes or
13 no? And I directed your attention to paragraph 1158. If you're unable
14 to answer that question, we'll move on.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I think that Mr. Tieger
16 shouldn't adopt that kind of tone with the witness.
17 JUDGE KWON: You referred to municipalities. It's fair enough
18 for the witness to comment on that, but let's continue.
19 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- please try to answer the question.
20 Mr. Tieger's question about the passage in paragraph 1158 in your trial
21 judgement in which your role was said to be crucial. Would you like to
22 respond to that?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to the judgement, the
24 final judgement, my participation in the joint criminal enterprise was
25 significant and I'm not denying that.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Okay. Now, the Judges also included a special section that began
3 at paragraph 888 on your credibility as a witness or your lack of
4 credibility; correct?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. In fact, you testified from April to June 2006, for 40 days or
7 two and a half months on a four-day workweek. That was the length of
8 your testimony before the Trial Chamber; right?
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. And after watching you and hearing you for that period of time,
11 the Trial Chamber found that you were a witness of "very low
12 credibility." And that's found at paragraph 888 of your judgement;
14 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you are talking about the first-instance
15 judgement. Please, that is not what the second-instance judgement says.
16 Out of the 36 municipalities, I was convicted of nine, whereas in the
17 other ones it was not confirmed, that is to say, what the trial judgement
18 said. And that is what I had been saying all along.
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you are well aware of the fact that you were
20 convicted, whether you want to quibble about the number of municipalities
21 or not, for your participation in a joint criminal enterprise,
22 participation which you disputed for 40 days, for two and a half months
23 of court, as a result of which the Trial Chamber found that you were a
24 witness of very low credibility. And the Appeals Chamber didn't upset
25 that finding in any way. They validated the position that your claims
1 about your participation, your lack of participation in the JCE, were not
3 A. Your statement that the first-instance Chamber said that my
4 credibility was low is correct. I wish to explain to you that they also
5 said what they said about the other 28 municipalities, that my testimony
6 was correct; that's what the second-instance judgement said. And then
7 that was proven to be wrong in terms of what the first-instance judgement
8 had said.
9 Q. The Trial Chamber will look at it and I'm not going to quibble,
10 but you know very well -- and we were both there, Mr. Krajisnik, that
11 your Defence is based on the fact that you were not involved in the JCE
12 and you were ultimately convicted and the conviction was affirmed for
13 your participation in the JCE. That's the bottom line. You said you
14 didn't substantially contribute to a joint criminal enterprise and you
15 were convicted for that and you served time for that. Are you unwilling
16 to admit that to these Judges?
17 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I believe it would be useful for me to explain
18 this because your approach is wrong. I told you, I am not denying that
19 the first-instance judgement found me guilty, that my participation was
20 significant. Also, I'm not denying that I was convicted as a member of a
21 joint criminal enterprise for nine municipalities, for nine cases --
22 actually, several cases within those municipalities as a member of JCE.
23 Also, I accept the judgement because it's a final judgement; however, I
24 do not accept what happened. That is why I'm working on the review of
25 that judgement.
1 If you wish, every part of the judgement where I was found
2 guilty, I'm going to prove here before this Chamber that your indictment
3 was wrong and that the then-Trial Chamber had made a mistake. This,
4 however, are not review proceedings, and that is why I believe it would
5 be fair to know the entire truth so that a partial truth would not
6 mislead the Chamber.
7 Q. Well, we'll get to as much of the truth as we can. Let's just
8 identify just a very few of the numerous areas where the Trial Chamber
9 found that you were a witness of very low credibility. First of all,
10 they found -- well, the Trial Chamber found numerous instances, in fact
11 in excess of 20 as the judgement reflects.
12 One of those, for example, is found at paragraph 890 of your
13 judgement, where the Trial Chamber noted that you denied knowledge of
14 many facts surrounding crimes committed by the Bosnian Serb authorities
15 in 1992. And in 891 the Trial Chamber indicates that there was a large
16 body of evidence directly proving your intent and knowledge. So that's
17 one area and we'll address that more specifically during the course of
18 this examination, but that's one thing that the Trial Chamber found;
20 A. Those were the findings of the Trial Chamber, first-instance.
21 Q. And then paragraph 949 and 948 the Trial Chamber addressed in
22 part your assertions regarding your relative powerlessness and found at
23 paragraph 949 that, to the contrary, you had direct access to the levers
24 of Bosnian Serb state power. Correct, that was the finding of the
25 Trial Chamber? And I will be discussing with you during the examination
1 here some aspects related to your role in the Bosnian Serb authorities.
2 JUDGE KWON: What is your question?
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. That is -- you confirm that that was another aspect of the
5 Trial Chamber's findings with regard to your assertions and your
6 credibility in connection with those?
7 A. In order for the Prosecutor not to torment himself, the
8 Trial Chamber did find that my testimony was of low credibility. Full
9 stop. So that is what is stated by all of these paragraphs and that is
10 the first-instance judgement.
11 Q. Okay. One more before I move on to a specific example,
12 Mr. Krajisnik, that I think is illustrative. At paragraph 1037 of your
13 judgement, 1036 and 1037, the Trial Chamber focused on your testimony
14 concerning knowledge of the detention of civilians in 1992 and found that
15 contrary to your testimony, that many of the facts about detention of
16 civilians were known to you before August of 1992, that is, before the
17 time that there was an international outcry following the entry of
18 international journalists into Omarska. That's at paragraph 1037. So
19 that's another aspect of what the Trial Chamber found, specific aspect of
20 what the Trial Chamber found about your credibility concerning those
22 A. I say to this day that this is wrong. And it is correct that
23 that is what the Chamber stated.
24 Q. Okay. Now, maybe it would be useful, rather than traversing
25 through the many parts of the judgement that reflect the Trial Chamber's
1 findings about your assertions and your credibility with respect to
2 those, that we look to a particular example of your testimony in your
3 previous case. And you may or may not recall this, Mr. Krajisnik, but I
4 want to bring you back to your testimony in response to viewing the video
5 of the rally that was held in Banja Luka on the 21st of August, 1994, a
6 rally attended by you, Mr. Karadzic, and persons such as Mr. Radic,
7 Mr. Kupresanin, and Mr. Brdjanin. Now --
8 A. What was the date of the rally?
9 Q. August 21st, 1994. I'm happy to show you that rally again if you
10 need to see it and I'm happy to show you the transcript of what those
11 persons said or a copy of -- or show you what was said in your trial
12 about that. So you let me know if you need any of those things along the
13 way. But at that rally, Mr. Kupresanin and Mr. Brdjanin preceded you at
14 the podium. And Mr. Kupresanin said:
15 "There can be no Islamic state on land that has been forever
16 Serbian. There is no Muslim people and the entire world knows this.
17 There are only Serbian people in these parts."
18 And that's at -- found at P00014, English pages 5 and B/C/S
19 page 4.
20 Then Mr. Brdjanin spoke, this is something that the Trial Chamber
21 had an opportunity to see yesterday, saying:
22 "Those leftist forces which are offering us coexistence again
23 must know that it is the obligation of Serbs over the next hundred years
24 to wipe their feet from the foul non-Christians who have befouled this
25 soil of ours."
1 And then, Mr. Krajisnik, you spoke and you began by saying:
2 "Dear brothers and sisters, having heard these wonderful words by
3 my predecessors, I feel great satisfaction at being at this gathering
4 here today."
5 And that's found at P00014, English page 8 and B/C/S page 7, and
6 it was discussed during your trial at transcript page 24946.
7 Now, in response to that and upon being asked questions about
8 your praising of these predecessors' remarks, you said that you were
9 commenting only on Kupresanin's statement; that's found at 24949 of your
10 trial transcript. You recall that was your position, Mr. Krajisnik?
11 A. I cannot recall; however, I can give you my comments right now as
12 if I had never said anything before, if you're interested.
13 Q. No, I'm interested in what you said to the Trial Chamber at the
14 time, what you said the first time you were confronted with this. So I
15 would like you to confirm or I'll show the transcript that you said
16 despite the fact that you spoke about predecessors, plural, on
17 August 1st, 1994, that you told the Trial Chamber, well, you were only
18 commenting on Kupresanin's statement. That's the first thing. If you
19 want to see the transcript and I'll read the transcript to you, we can do
21 A. I believe you that that's the way it was. There's no need for
22 you to read it out to me.
23 Q. Okay. And then you said that you said those were wonderful
24 statements only "in order to gloss over a statement I didn't agree with."
25 So it was your testimony to the Trial Chamber that you didn't agree with
1 Kupresanin's statement, but you said to the crowd: Those are -- that's a
2 wonderful statement, in order to show your disagreement. That was your
4 A. That's exactly the way it was, as I put it then. Today I do not
5 agree with the negation of the Muslim nation because every person has the
6 right to declare himself the way he feels. It is a very well-known thing
7 that I do not agree with rhetoric that is not well-balanced. And it is
8 wrong to say something like that especially at a big meeting like this
9 one, a big rally like this one, things that were said by these other
11 Q. Right. And you noted that Mr. Kupresanin denied the existence of
12 the Muslims, everybody applauded, they applauded all kinds of nonsense.
13 And you said you put your words in the way you did because you couldn't
14 say: "Kupresanin, you're a criminal." So you -- that's correct, isn't
15 it? And that's what you said to the Trial Chamber in your case?
16 A. Well, the translation is probably wrong. I would never have said
17 that he was a criminal. I would prefer to say that he was wrong, that he
18 was doing things in a rather unbalanced way. So this is probably a wrong
19 interpretation. I don't agree with those Serbs who deny the right to the
20 Muslims to have a nation, even though there are facts that prove that the
21 Muslims descend from the Serbs, but if they don't want to be Serbs
22 nowadays it's their wish.
23 Q. Well, whether it was -- whether you considered it criminal or
24 radical, as I believe you modified it to -- a little bit later in your
25 testimony, the bottom line is that you were trying to explain to the
1 Court that Kupresanin said something very, very wrong that you very much
2 disagreed with. And you tried to explain your praise or your seeming
3 praise of Kupresanin by calling it a wonderful statement by saying in
4 fact you were very much against it. That was the position you took when
5 you were first confronted with this video; correct?
6 A. Well, Mr. Prosecutor, I said the same thing then. If a
7 politician tries to deny something at a public rally, it has to be in a
8 mild and moderate way and you start with the word "but" and then you get
9 to the point. This rally took place during war time. It -- of course,
10 it would be politically damaging to get into debates in such a rally. I
11 say again, I don't think that this was criminal, what he said, that the
12 Muslims were not the same as Serbs, but I thought that at the time that
13 would be politically damaging and I disagreed with that.
14 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, after you offered this explanation to your
15 Trial Chamber about the motive for your comments and what you purported
16 was your actual disagreement with Kupresanin, you were confronted with
17 the fact that that wasn't the first time that Kupresanin had raised that
18 point, that in fact he had raised that same point in the Assembly in
19 January of 1993 and that not only did you not disagree with him, but you
20 explicitly agreed with him, raised the issue on the agenda on the spot,
21 backed it, and the result was a conclusion that Muslims were not a nation
22 that was adopted at the 24th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly;
24 A. You are misinterpreting this, Mr. Prosecutor, because you
25 extracted a portion, just like last time, only one portion. It was not
1 that I was right. I'm talking about Mr. Kupresanin. I made reference to
2 Mr. Kupresanin's statement about the --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down. Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you repeat your answer and
5 please speak slowly for the benefit of the interpreters and us.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I'll repeat. I'll
7 try to repeat my answer.
8 Mr. Prosecutor is wrong and I'm sorry to say that because he is
9 entitled to criticise me, not I him. I would like Mr. Prosecutor to take
10 a look at the comment that I made on Mr. Kupresanin's answer. It wasn't
11 that I was right, but Mr. Kupresanin was right because my intention was
12 to get involved in this raging debate to the effect that Kupresanin said
13 that Muslims were not Serbs because on the day before at the Deputy Club,
14 some deputies maintained the position that the whole people has the right
15 to oppose the position of individuals. And the point is that a decision
16 was to be made, although many deputies were against it, to the effect
17 that the Muslims were not Serbs; however, that was not important, that
18 was irrelevant. And for that reason I said: All right, I am wrong.
19 You, Mr. Kupresanin, are right. The Muslims are not the Serbs. Let's
20 move on. That doesn't mean that my opinion was that Mr. Kupresanin was
21 right. If you look at the conclusions, you will not find it anywhere.
22 Just for the rhetoric purposes, I told him: Mr. Kupresanin, I concede
23 that you are right. Let's move on. That's the true meaning of my words.
24 Mr. Prosecutor, please find the place where I said: I'm wrong
25 and you, Mr. Kupresanin, are right.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, going back to the speech at the rally,
2 in order to understand the real context in which Mr. Krajisnik said --
3 let me see, "wonderful words by my predecessors," probably the Chamber
4 needs to read what followed that expression, i.e., the remaining parts of
5 Mr. Krajisnik's speech on that day. But I note the -- they are redacted.
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, they weren't -- I originally offered the
7 entirety of the video. I'm happy to do that now --
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 MR. TIEGER: -- or the entirety of Mr. Krajisnik's remarks, of
11 JUDGE KWON: So probably the Chamber needs to read the remainder
12 of Mr. Krajisnik's speech in order to understand what he meant at the
14 Do you agree? Is there any objection from the Defence?
15 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: So that will be pages 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, I don't know
17 until what part is Mr. Krajisnik's words, but I would like to -- the
18 Chamber wants to see the remainder of Mr. Krajisnik's speech on that day.
19 That said, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you say that the Prosecutor has a right to
22 criticise you, but in fact you also assumed that right at the trial and
23 also -- at your trial and also criticised Momcilo Krajisnik. So when you
24 were -- when you heard and saw the words that you spoke on that date
25 which belie what you're saying now, and let me just point out one portion
1 of what you said, you said:
2 "Let me explain why it isn't good. They want us to say we're all
3 the same. They really want to create one nation, that we're all the same
4 only of different religion. We must say that we are different" -- by the
5 way this is found in pages 24966 and 67 of your transcript.
6 "They are a group of Turkish orientation. Well, all right,
7 people, if we accept that they are some kind of group, Turkish or I don't
8 know who's, then we simply give them aces to their hands to be an
9 independent nation. They will be more than happy to claim that they are
10 of Turkish origin, the same as the Siptars developed theories that they
11 are of Iliric origin. Why, we should tell them who they really are.
12 They are unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation, that is to say a
13 nation that would like to be a nation but has no arguments for a nation."
14 And then you were asked whether or not your comments in response
15 to Mr. Kupresanin's comments in 1994, that is, whether your earlier
16 testimony at the rally was wrong because, in fact, in saying that you
17 didn't disagree with Kupresanin and didn't deny the Muslims their right
18 to be a nation, that was false because that's the position you took at
19 the Assembly almost two years earlier. And you said at page 24967:
20 "That's correct. This here is nonsense what Momcilo Krajisnik
21 was saying. It's detrimental. I have to say I never thought like this.
22 If I could distance myself from this Momcilo Krajisnik, I would."
23 Do you remember that? Do you remember talking about the -- how
24 embarrassed you were by what you called the -- that Momcilo Krajisnik and
25 how what he was saying was wrong?
1 A. As far as I can remember, that comment of mine referred to one of
2 my statements and that is that the Turks had occupied my village. Being
3 enraged, I used the word "Turks," although it may not be derogatory but
4 it might sound in this context. Without having any insight that this was
5 occasioned by this event --
6 Q. Well, let me put this in context for you. You did, in fact,
7 offer the testimony that you never used the derogatory term "Turks." And
8 then you were confronted -- that's right. And then you were confronted
9 with at least one instance, I believe two, where it was obvious that you
10 had done so, and that was another occasion on which you tried to distance
11 yourself from that Momcilo Krajisnik, that other Momcilo Krajisnik,
12 right, and that's what you were just referring to?
13 A. To my recollection, only on one occasion did I distance myself
14 from Momcilo Krajisnik and that was during the confrontation that you
15 arranged when I said that I don't remember ever using the word "Turks."
16 This is not a word in my vocabulary. Then, at the request of the
17 Presiding Judge Orie, you put to me the fact that the Turks had occupied
18 my village. It may also include the event of the 12th of May, and then I
19 as I say that without you informing me that this is about this event, I
20 said that I distanced myself from Momcilo Krajisnik. And I repeat it
21 today to this Chamber, that there is no the word "Turks" in my vocabulary
22 or any other derogatory word and everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina can
23 confirm that, not that I'm different from other people, but simply
24 because this is not fair. If you look at the entire context, you will
25 find out that this was occasioned by the confrontation that was intended
1 to confirm whether I ever used the word "Turks," and I used it only once
2 when the Muslim army occupied the village and committed heinous crimes.
3 And I said that when I was angered and that is why I used that word, but
4 I don't remember speaking about this in the context of Mr. Kupresanin.
5 Q. I'm going to quote from 24967 and --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
7 JUDGE KWON: If you are going to quote, let us upload it.
8 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the last answer it was not
10 recorded that witness said: Even though I said that in a situation when
11 my village was occupied and the crimes had been committed, I'm not happy
12 to have said that.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
14 Going back to the 1994 rally transcript, the Chamber may also
15 need Kupresanin's part in its entirety as well.
16 MR. TIEGER: Please, absolutely.
17 JUDGE KWON: And I was told that we need also the video part as
19 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Thank you, Mr. President. We'll take care of
21 JUDGE KWON: If it is short, then please go ahead.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thanks, Mr. President. It's 65 ter 25522, and we're
23 talking about page 24967. And while we're waiting, I can also mention
24 that the Assembly session that's been referenced is P921, the specific
25 sections that were referenced were found at English pages 94 through 96
1 and B/C/S 64 through 66, but obviously the Court is -- has the entirety
2 of the session in evidence.
3 Q. Again, Mr. Krajisnik, the question that you were asked was:
4 "When you talked about your comments in response to
5 Mr. Kupresanin's comments in 1994 by saying that you disagreed with him
6 and you didn't deny the Muslims their right to be a nation, that was just
7 wrong, wasn't it?
8 "A. That's correct. This here is nonsense, what
9 Momcilo Krajisnik was saying. It's detrimental. I have to say I never
10 thought like this. If I could distance myself from this
11 Momcilo Krajisnik, I would ..."
12 If you look down toward the bottom of the page, you continue:
13 "... this speech is absolutely authentic, and I'm very sorry that
14 this Momcilo Krajisnik said what he said."
15 And on the following page you said:
16 "... I know what Kupresanin said but I spoke in a very indecent
17 way because there is no reason why anybody should not be allowed to be a
18 Muslim, a Croat, a Serb, whatever they please ..."
19 So that was, indeed, another occasion on which you distanced
20 yourself from that other Momcilo Krajisnik in response to being
21 confronted with a contradiction between what you were saying in court and
22 what you had said at the time; correct?
23 A. I have to say that this is a great surprise to me. I remember
24 that I only commented this due to the event when the Muslim forces raided
25 the village and occupied it. As for this comment, it's probably related
1 to this, otherwise why would I distance myself from Momcilo Krajisnik and
2 my speech? It turns out from here that I was supporting Mr. Kupresanin
3 whilst I didn't. I don't know how this happened. I had no reason to say
4 all of this because it wasn't me who used the word "Turks," it was
5 Mr. Kupresanin. Therefore, I find it hard to understand, especially
6 since it's in English, whether I am distancing myself from Mr. Kupresanin
7 or from myself. I have no reason to distance from myself because I
8 didn't say anything inappropriate and bad in my speech.
9 Q. Well, whether you now claim you had no reason to do so,
10 Mr. Krajisnik, the transcript is clear.
11 MR. TIEGER: And I tender those pages, Mr. President --
12 JUDGE KWON: By the way, Mr. Tieger, the further parts of this
13 page shows that Mr. -- Judge Orie offered Mr. Krajisnik to take the
14 document with him to the Detention Unit so that he could have -- review
15 the document and comment upon later on. So do you know what happened
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I do, Mr. President, and would be happy to
18 tender those -- the entire -- what happened was Mr. Krajisnik took this
19 position that he is essentially taking today --
20 JUDGE KWON: Let us ask the witness first whether he remembers
21 what he did --
22 MR. TIEGER: Well --
23 JUDGE KWON: -- the result of his review of this document.
24 Do you remember that, Mr. Krajisnik?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't. I don't remember this
1 sequence of events because I didn't have any reason to distance from
2 myself in this particular instance. I could only have distanced myself
3 from Mr. Kupresanin. However, in this first instance, I had a good
4 reason for that which was prompted by the occupation of my village.
5 There is obviously some kind of confusion here. I really don't
6 understand why I would have distanced myself from the speech if I didn't
7 say anything inappropriate in it.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. I want to move on, but to resolve -- to satisfy the Court's
10 inquiry, let me ask you if you're prepared to confirm this. You came
11 back to court the next day and suggested that, having read this thing,
12 that you were just repeating other people's words. And then the
13 Trial Chamber looked to some of the previous words that were said, which
14 included Mr. Corda saying: We also know that Muslims are not a nation.
15 I would always stress that during the negotiations. They are
16 degenerates. They are no ethnic community. They are our outcasts.
17 That's at 24984. As it happened, you read out that passage to the Court
18 but left out the degenerates quote. Do you remember that?
19 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you are confusing me. You put three things to me
20 at once. One is a speech in Banja Luka, and if we are talking about my
21 apology regarding this speech, I didn't have any reason to apologise for
22 my speech. The second event was the Assembly session, where a conclusion
23 was adopted that Muslims were not a nation. And the third case was my
24 distancing from Mr. Krajisnik when I called them Turks because they
25 occupied my village. Now, I'm kindly asking you to refrain from this
1 line of questioning because this will prove that I am not a reliable
3 Now, as for Mr. Corda and the Assembly session, I only repeated
4 the words of various participants in the debate, both at the
5 Deputies Club and in the Assembly session, just to allow them to reach
6 this conclusion so that we could move on. And I didn't distance myself
7 from myself but rather from the people who reacted in that manner.
8 Q. Well, we -- I've tendered those pages to the Court. I'm going to
9 tender these pages as well. Just again to follow -- to assist the Court,
10 then you continued to say that you were just trying to put it to a vote,
11 that in any event the Assembly was not competent to make the
12 determination of whether Muslims were a nation, and that you hadn't been
13 the first to speak those words. And the Trial Chamber said the issue was
14 not -- the issue was whether you spoke the words, not whether you were
15 the first person in the Assembly to do so; and second, that no one had
16 suggested that the Assembly was competent to do what it did. And the
17 Trial Chamber said you are more or less engaging in a discussion with an
18 unknown interlocutor; that's at 24988 through 89.
19 Can you confirm that or is it preferable to actually allow the
20 Trial Chamber to see exactly what you said in your trial after you had
21 reviewed the transcript?
22 A. I know exactly what I said in the trial and what my position was
23 regarding the Assembly. If you remember, at the beginning
24 Mr. Kupresanin's speech was presented, the one held in Banja Luka. Then
25 my reaction followed prompted by the occupation of the village. Now, as
1 for the Assembly, I still maintain that there was a lengthy discussion
2 about this issue, both at the Deputies Club on the previous day and on
3 the day itself, where people said many ugly things; and I reached a
4 conclusion that this was all nonsensical. I said, without repeating
5 their words, that what they did during this whole period produced a
6 conclusion which was irrelevant. That's what I said then and I still say
7 this, and this is what is recorded -- that -- and I remember that
8 clearly. There were three things happening at the same time which
9 probably created this confusion and it affected you as well.
10 JUDGE KWON: What pages are you tendering, Mr. Tieger?
11 MR. TIEGER: The pages that I previously identified,
12 Mr. Chairman, and also 24983, where this discussion begins, to 24990.
13 JUDGE KWON: But in this 65 ter document, 25522, I don't see
14 transcript pages 24984 or 988 and 989. After page -- transcript page --
15 MR. TIEGER: I thought the -- there are obviously multiple days
16 of testimony and I don't know exactly how it was uploaded, but I thought
17 it was all uploaded under the same 65 ter number.
18 JUDGE KWON: After page -- transcript page 24980, which is
19 e-court page 1903, follows the transcript page 24992, skipping some
20 20 pages.
21 MR. TIEGER: Must be an upload glitch. We'll take care of that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Robinson?
23 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, I would like to look at it, but I don't
24 think I'll have any -- if I can look at those and get back to you.
25 JUDGE KWON: But you have no objection admitting the first two
1 pages 24967 to 8?
2 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
3 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit them and if you have objections, come
4 back to the Chamber as soon as possible. We'll admit them.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6516, Your Honours.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to turn to one more aspect of what the
8 Trial Chamber found about -- in connection with its findings about your
9 credibility. At paragraph 1005 of your judgement, the Trial Chamber
10 examined part of your claims about your -- about the relationship between
11 the leadership, the Bosnian Serb leadership, and the VRS and your claims
12 that it was only logistical, had nothing to do with military operative
13 issues, and found that this represented "another attempt by the Accused
14 to mislead the Chamber into thinking that he was a weak and
15 hierarchically isolated bureaucrat who dealt exclusively with
16 inconsequential matters of administration, such as the supply of food and
17 clothing." And the Trial Chamber found that this was "so incompatible
18 with the evidence built up against him that it forced him down paths of
19 obfuscation and incoherence."
20 So that was another finding that the Trial Chamber made about
21 your credibility in that instance related to your assertions concerning
22 your relationship with the military and military operative matters;
24 A. I would like you to ask me a specific question and then the
25 Chamber would see that. There is no reason for you to repeat the wording
1 of the judgement.
2 Q. This was a long trial, Mr. Krajisnik, as I have just indicated.
3 I'm asking you about the Trial Chamber's findings, findings which your
4 statement here to this Court -- your testimony to this Court purports to
5 dispute. So I'm asking you to confirm at the outset that that is what
6 the Trial Chamber found or I can tender that portion of the judgement if
7 you dispute it.
8 A. And what did I deny here before this Trial Chamber which is
9 contained here? I don't -- I'm not aware of anything that I denied or
10 refuted. Perhaps it's a misunderstanding and perhaps you are concluding
11 something that I don't understand. I did not deny anything that is
12 written in the judgement here. Whatever you have read, I said it's
13 correct. So I don't see what it is that I am denying what is included
15 Q. Well, let's look specifically at some of the things you testified
16 to previously as well as some of the things you said to this Court in
17 your testimony earlier.
18 First of all, in your own case in 2006 you said specifically at
19 transcript page 25619 that at the meetings with the military, they just
20 thought of the civilian authorities as logistical support and "no
21 discussion of military operative issues." So that was the position you
22 took in 2006; right?
23 A. I still claim today that the maximum percentage, let me say
24 practically all the questions, the issues requested by the army was to
25 support them logistically. All the information that we received then
1 were general and there was not a single -- or there were just some
2 indications but no information about crimes reached us. That was why I
3 explained then and I'm saying now. The army came and always raised the
4 issues about the logistics so that it would be provided so that it could
5 wage the war, and that was the purpose of the civilian authorities. The
6 information that we received at those meetings were general. Except for
7 some pieces of circumstantial evidence and criticism against the civilian
8 authorities, I never heard anything about things that I learned later at
9 this Tribunal. So this is the truthful and correct answer and this is
10 what I said then as well.
11 Q. You mentioned some meetings. You also mentioned meetings back in
12 2006, in particular a few meetings with General Mladic. You said at
13 25619 that you didn't attend many meetings, correct, that is with
14 General Mladic?
15 A. Whether General Mladic was with somebody else, but everything
16 that I learned from these materials, the meetings of the Presidency,
17 where it stated that General Mladic attended them, that's correct. There
18 were two or three briefings, that's also correct. Probably there was a
19 series of meetings that he attended but that I didn't attend, but I
20 haven't been informed about them here. If you mention specifically a
21 meeting, I will tell you whether I attended it or not.
22 Q. And as you just generally seemed to indicate, you said with
23 respect to those not many meetings with General Mladic that you attended,
24 you mentioned two Presidency sessions; that reference is found at 25736.
25 And you also mentioned two consultations with the military, one at
1 Bijeljina, one at Pale; and that reference is found at 25684. So those
2 were four meetings that you -- meetings at which General Mladic was
3 present that you referenced when you said you didn't attend many meetings
4 with General Mladic. Is that your position here before this Court today,
5 that that is roughly the number of meetings that you had at which
6 General Mladic was also in attendance?
7 A. I believe it wasn't only that meeting. There was one with
8 Mr. Carter and once I was in Crna Rijeka when Mladic was there. But the
9 meetings that you mentioned now were a subject of discussion here. I
10 said that I attended them. If you mention a different, another meeting,
11 which I did not mention, I will tell you no, I didn't because nobody
12 asked me about it. Your question is not clear to me. You probably mean
13 that other leaders were together with Mladic and not myself, which is
14 also true. Mr. Koljevic as the president of the committee that was in
15 charge of co-operation with UNPROFOR, Ms. Plavsic as well, there were
16 individual meetings that I did not attend.
17 Q. Okay. No, I was only trying to find out if your reference to not
18 many meetings and then your specific identification of two Presidency
19 meetings and two consultations generally reflected the limited number of
20 meetings that you had with General Mladic or, if following your
21 testimony, you suddenly recall dozens more.
22 A. I do not recall, Mr. Prosecutor. I said then that there were few
23 meetings that General Mladic had with the leadership that I attended and
24 that's correct. Those meetings which were christened as the meetings of
25 the expanded Presidency, I said that that's correct and that I did attend
1 them. And other individual meetings that he had with some individual
2 leaders or some other meetings that perhaps he may have attended, I did
3 not attend them. I may have attended a meeting that is not recorded
4 here, but we never discussed that, nor did anyone ever ask me: Did you
5 attend this meeting or not?
6 Q. Okay. In any event, you also explained that you knew little to
7 nothing about military matters. For example, you said you did not know
8 what goals were being implemented by the military; that's at 25595.
10 A. The army was waging the war. How was it doing it? What were the
11 specific tasks? I didn't know that. Whether they needed to take a place
12 or not, that was the competence of the army. I knew that the army had
13 two or three tasks: To protect the Serbian people, not to allow a
14 genocide to be perpetrated like in Second World War, and to stay
15 militarily on the ethnic lines which armed people had taken in the very
17 Q. You were asked whether you recall ever asking at any of these few
18 meetings you say you attended what goals were being pursued by the
19 military, and you -- your answer was at page 25619:
20 "I can't remember what I did. I don't remember having asked such
21 a question."
22 And that's also what you testified to in 2006; right?
23 A. Well, I don't remember whether that question was asked, whether I
24 said so in 2006, as it was quite a long time ago. But if that's in the
25 record, then it must be so.
1 Q. Well, I can either tender that or I guess we can address --
2 MR. TIEGER: I don't know if you want me to deal with these
3 sequentially, Mr. President. That sounds like one where we would
4 normally actually tender the quote so you could see it. But let me just
5 put that on the record and we can resolve that --
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll add these pages. But could you be more
7 specific about the pages you're tendering.
8 MR. TIEGER: Okay. It was 25619 and 25595.
9 Q. You said you didn't know about intentions to issue directives and
10 didn't ask because it wasn't your "interest or competence." Correct?
11 Now I'm talking about directives, military directives.
12 A. As an outsider I could become interested about the specific case,
13 but it wasn't within my purview. I didn't know when the directives were
14 signed or how they had been drawn up. It was simply the competence of
15 other people. I could inquire accidentally, but in principle I certainly
16 didn't deal with this nor was that within my purview or within my
18 Q. Well, when Judge Hanoteau asked you specifically whether you took
19 advantage of the presence of those military figures to ask what was going
20 on, you said:
21 "As for their intentions to issue directives, I never asked about
22 that because it wasn't my province." That's at 25703 through 04.
23 A. Perhaps we need to be clearer. Let me repeat, I wasn't informed
24 about when they did it. I didn't inquire nor was that my competence. I
25 may have asked accidentally, I do not rule that out, but it was like
1 having an outsider coming and inquiring or just attending a meeting.
2 Q. Well, I don't know what asking accidentally means, Mr. Krajisnik.
3 But I note that you said in 2006 that you never asked about that because
4 it wasn't your province. That's a correct reflection of what you stated
5 to the Court in 2006, isn't it?
6 A. I want to be precise. That's why I say it certainly wasn't my
7 competence. I didn't inquire about that. I'm saying now I may have
8 asked somebody something accidentally if I happened to attend a meeting,
9 but it was as if you had been present at the meeting rather than myself.
10 It wasn't anything so important. My attendance, my presence, was not so
11 important that anyone would brief me or report to me about anything.
12 Q. And that's similar to what you said in 2006, the latter part
13 anyway, you were asked whether the military kept the political
14 authorities apprised of operations that were about to be or that were
15 conducted, and you said:
16 "I don't remember that anybody informed me of actions like this
17 before they happened. Whether they copied such documents to somebody
18 else, I don't know."
19 That's at transcript 25608 through 09. That's what you said in
20 2006, right, in response to that inquiry?
21 A. I assert that the Main Staff had no need or obligation to send
22 information to me. It's possible that some information or report was
23 sent to me, but everything that I read, even later on, was a sort of
24 information as when a TV presenter reads something in the news, no crimes
25 or anything that would be alarming or important, especially not for this
1 Tribunal. That was why I said that I don't remember I was informed. I'm
2 convinced that they did not inform me about anything, but I cannot rule
3 out that perhaps some information may have reached me at some point.
4 Q. Well, I don't want us to get confused. I understand what you --
5 that you have taken the position that you never received any information
6 about crimes whatsoever, but you did understand that my question referred
7 not to being briefed about crimes but to being told about military
8 operations before they would happen or after they had taken place.
9 That's the question that was put to you in 2006 and that I asked you to
10 either confirm or dispute.
11 So were you answering a question about operations generally or
12 limiting yourself to information about crimes?
13 A. Receiving information from the Main Staff may have happened only
14 exceptionally, that someone would inform me about something. In
15 regularly informing me, as they were obliged to inform somebody else, I'm
16 telling you that that was not usual way that the Main Staff was organised
17 or had an obligation to do it. If there are any examples, those are
18 individual examples and the contents were benign, without any particular
19 importance. Some things I learned more from the TV than from the army.
20 Q. So it's your position that if you happened to be informed about a
21 military operation before it was to be conducted or that after it had
22 happened or while it was happening, that was only inconsequential or
24 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I'm telling you before this Trial Chamber, the
25 army was organised in such a way that they were not obliged to inform the
1 Assembly or myself about the beginning of operations or the end of
2 operations. It's possible that there were some instances when
3 information did reach me, but that was not something that the Main Staff
4 had to do, as far as I remember. And if you give me a specific example,
5 I will comment on that. There was no single information, let me not say
6 not a single piece of information, but information generally did not
7 reach me that would describe that they would take certain territory,
8 expel someone, or anything that would be considered as consequential and
9 that I should comment on now.
10 Q. All right. I'm going to probably tender this, but just to -- one
11 final thing. Mr. Krajisnik, I am not asking you whether there was a
12 de jure responsibility on the part -- whether you consider that there was
13 a de jure responsibility on the part of the VRS to inform you. I'm
14 asking you about whether, as you were asked in 2006, the political
15 authorities were apprised of operations that were about to be or were
16 conducted. And I was simply confronting you with your testimony at that
17 time, that you didn't remember that anybody informed you of actions like
18 that before they happened, but you didn't know whether they copied such
19 documents to somebody else.
20 So your recollection in 2006 was that you weren't informed about
21 actions -- military operations before they happened or after they took
22 place; right? Whether there was a response -- a de jure responsibility
23 to do so one way or another.
24 A. Yes, I then said that and I confirm it today. I only add it's
25 possible that there may have been some individual reports, but I could
1 not remember it then and I cannot remember it now, unless you present
2 such reports to me and then I may have -- I may be able to tell you why I
3 do not remember it.
4 Q. Now, in fact, in light of your assertions during your testimony
5 in your own trial that you didn't have knowledge about military matters,
6 you repeatedly suggested to the Trial Chamber that if it wanted to know
7 about such matters, they should ask Mr. Karadzic. So, for example, when
8 you were asked about an excerpt from a combat-readiness report - in this
9 case that's admitted as D325 and the particular reference is found at
10 page 159 in the English, B/C/S 138 - an excerpt that says explicitly that
11 the army carried out the objectives put to it by the political
12 leadership, you said that you didn't issue any orders and:
13 "I don't know anything about that communication. Mr. Karadzic
14 knows that."
15 That's at transcript page 21669. That's what you said in your
16 trial; right?
17 A. Mr. Karadzic had a military office and it's possible that he
18 got --
19 Q. No, Mr. Krajisnik, first --
20 A. -- such information. That's why I said --
21 Q. First things first. Did you say that? And then you can offer
22 the added information you want. That's what you said in your trial;
24 A. If that is written in the transcript and if it was not objected
25 to, then that's the way it is --
1 Q. I'm sorry --
2 A. -- I do not recall those words exactly.
3 Q. My apologies. That's what you said when you testified in the
4 Popovic case, in fact. I don't know if that helps refresh your
5 recollection that you said that.
6 A. That's what I think to this day, but I don't know if I said that
7 then. I think that to this day. That was not my line of work and no one
8 was supposed to inform me about that. That's what I think to this day.
9 Q. And similarly, in the Popovic case, you were asked about another
10 section of the combat-readiness report, and we can -- the Popovic case
11 transcript is 65 ter 25523. And you were asked about a section of the
12 combat-readiness report that says that the strategic objectives of the
13 war were promptly set and served as guide-lines and the Main Staff
14 translated them into operational and tactical formations, et cetera. And
15 then asked: So didn't the army strive to achieve the objectives put
16 before it by the political leadership? And you answered:
17 "Well," this is found at 21668, "well, I was not a supreme
18 commander. I did not write support," that's how it's written, "I cannot
19 help you. And you said to ask Gvero or other generals or "Mr. Karadzic
20 when you bring him here."
21 So again, in the Popovic case when asked about the goals put to
22 the army and about operational military issues, you suggested to the
23 Trial Chamber that they ask Mr. Karadzic; right?
24 A. You want to make me and Karadzic quarrel. Obviously that's your
25 intention. You are misinterpreting something. I wasn't speaking about
1 Mr. Karadzic as someone who was guilty of that. Mr. Karadzic was the
2 supreme commander, and he is best-placed to interpret a directive if he
3 signed it and if somebody reported to him. That is what I'm saying today
4 as well.
5 MR. TIEGER: All right. I tender those two excerpts,
6 Mr. President, from 25523.
7 JUDGE KWON: Two excerpts?
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
9 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] --
10 MR. TIEGER: 21669 and 21668.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 MR. ROBINSON: There's no objection, Mr. President. Also,
13 Mr. President, I've had a chance to look at my own copy of those pages,
14 24983 to 24990, of Mr. Krajisnik's trial, and I don't have any objection
15 to those being added.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 I note the time. Shall we take a break?
18 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: For half an hour and resume at 11.00. Just a
20 second. We'll assign a number for the Popovic transcript.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter number 25523 will be
22 Exhibit P6517.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to introduce
3 Svetlana Atanasova from Bulgaria who's joining us and she's a legal
4 intern with our team.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Just so there's no mistake. I'm not sure if -- we tendered two
9 pages from 25523. The transcript gives the impression that the entirety
10 of the document was tendered and admitted. I presume that's the relevant
11 pages, but I just note that for the record.
12 Q. Now, continuing on the subject of your knowledge of military
13 operations, Mr. Krajisnik, despite your assertions that you knew very
14 little about the planning or realisation of military operations, you
15 nevertheless claimed that there was no planning for military operations.
16 For example, as you said here to this Trial Chamber, at transcript
17 page 44302:
18 "Every ethnic unit took up its ethnic borders with slight
19 corrections. The army only corrected some things or lost some
20 territories or gave a different physiog nomy to that map."
21 It didn't conquer those territories. And as you said in your
22 testimony in 2006 at transcript page 25705 with respect to directives,
23 all of them were issued and none were carried out. It all depended on
24 developments in the field. There was not much planning in advance. It
25 would just happen that you would lose a territory or gain a territory.
1 There was no plan.
2 So the latter quote is an accurate reflection of what you told
3 the Trial Chamber in your own case in 2006, right, that there wasn't much
4 planning in advance, it just kind of happened?
5 A. Well, I assume that the military did do some planning, but the
6 civilian leadership taking part in planning some operations, I do not
7 recall any such plans and I can stand by what I said then as far as the
8 civilian authorities are concerned.
9 Q. Well, I just want you to confirm or dispute that what you said in
10 2006 that with respect to developments in the field, that is what
11 happened on the ground with the military, that:
12 "There was not much planning in advance. It would just happen
13 that you would lose a territory or gain a territory. There was no plan."
14 That's at 25705.
15 So you were saying in addition to the fact as you just mentioned
16 here, that as far as you're concerned it had nothing -- military
17 operations had nothing to do with the civilian authorities, that you also
18 took the position that you were unaware of any -- not that you were
19 unaware, that you took the position that there really wasn't any
20 particular military operation plan, events just happened according to
21 developments in the field?
22 A. I'm afraid that your question -- or perhaps the interpretation is
23 not good. I'm going to repeat what it was that I thought then and what
24 it is that I think today. Most of the territory of Republika Srpska was
25 liberated, as the Serbs put it because this was their ethnic area, during
1 the first time when the war started. After the army was established,
2 later on there were a few major operations but, for the most part, that
3 was the volume that stayed on with some minor corrections, perhaps. So
4 my answer then was with a view to the following: All the ethnic
5 communities stood at the beginning of the war at their natural ethnic
6 boundaries and throughout the war, with some minor oscillations, they did
7 not change all the way up until the end of the war, when we lost a lot of
8 our territories and when the Muslim side lost some and the Croat side
9 lost some, et cetera.
10 MR. TIEGER: I tender 25705, Mr. President -- or page 25705.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will add that. It's from the Popovic trial?
12 MR. TIEGER: This is from the Krajisnik trial.
13 JUDGE KWON: Krajisnik trial. Thank you.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. And you also said in response -- in your own trial in response to
16 a comment by the Presiding Judge that it sounded as if you were saying
17 you had no idea of where the army would end up, whether it was somewhere
18 in Bosnia or in Italy, and you said:
19 "The soldiers had only one goal, to hold the front line, and if
20 they took any action in certain areas it would depend on the situation."
21 And you said: "This was the only goal I was aware of."
22 And that's at 25619 through 25620.
23 Is that a correct -- again, you can see the transcript pages, but
24 can you confirm or do you dispute that that's what you said to the
25 Krajisnik Trial Chamber during the course of your testimony in that case?
1 A. I said that to the Trial Chamber, but just a small addition is
2 required. All three parties, all three sides, if I can put it that way,
3 there were armed people on all three sides and everybody was defending
4 their own ethnic areas where they lived or at first somebody would take a
5 bit more than they were entitled to, but these were minor corrections.
6 The task and the wish of the local population was to always take part of
7 the territory of the other side because in every part of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina there were the fellow countrymen of the people who had
9 those wishes. So it was not a wish to extend territory because everyone
10 felt that they had this right, to join their fellow countrymen who stayed
11 on the other side to their own territory. On the other hand, the Serb
12 army that constituted the armed people was to preserve the front because
13 all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a front line. That is the longest part in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina between two parties, between three parties, there was
15 a front line. So that what I said stands and I add this to that.
16 Q. And in addition, despite your claims about limited knowledge
17 about military operation, you insisted during your testimony in the
18 Krajisnik case - and as you did here - that the strategic objectives
19 annunciated at the 16th Assembly Session on May 12th by Dr. Karadzic were
20 not military tasks of the army; correct?
21 A. I absolutely asserted that and I assert that to this day.
22 Q. In fact, during the course of your testimony in the Krajisnik
23 case, you claimed that the strategic objectives were essentially putting
24 down on paper what had been said to or proposed to Cutileiro?
25 A. That's correct, but there is just this one small addition. The
1 Neretva valley was placed within our strategic objectives on the basis of
2 the talks held between the Serb delegation and the Croat delegation in
3 Graz. As for the rest, all of it is actually copied parts of the map
4 that we gave to Mr. Cutileiro before the Cutileiro Plan. As for the
5 corridor, let me just say that too, that was also the subject of talks
6 with the Croat side in Graz. I think it was on the 7th of May, if I
7 remember correctly, 1992.
8 Q. Okay. So you say that -- you said in the Krajisnik case that the
9 strategic goals were simply putting down on paper what had been put to
10 Cutileiro, but now you're explaining that strategic objective number 4 or
11 at least part of strategic objective number 4 related to the Neretva was
12 not part of the Cutileiro proposal. So the strategic objective number 4
13 was not part of the Cutileiro Plan or proposal, that's number one; right?
14 A. I said that the strategic objectives were actually our requests
15 that were put to Mr. Cutileiro. We said to Mr. Cutileiro that we wished
16 to have contiguous territory as far as the corridor is concerned. We
17 said that we needed the Neretva River Valley; however, our strategic
18 objectives followed after the talks held with the Croat side. As for
19 these two objectives, a preliminary agreement had been reached
20 specifically about the exchange of territories, about us giving
21 concessions at critical points where the Croats needed something and vice
22 versa. So there was the Cutileiro Plan, but we also reinforced and
23 spelled out in concrete terms our own requests with a lot more certainty
24 after the talks we had with the Croat side.
25 Q. So those were -- that's with respect to strategic objective
1 number 4, that's the Neretva, and strategic objective number 2, the
2 Posavina corridor; right?
3 A. Yes, you're right.
4 Q. And you also explained in your testimony in the Krajisnik case
5 that strategic goal number 6, access to the sea, was something else that
6 the Cutileiro Plan didn't embrace? That's at transcript page 24200.
7 A. Access to the sea was present in all our talks with
8 Mr. Cutileiro, the representatives of the international community, later
9 on the Croat side, and later on at conferences. Our request was for
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina to have access to the sea and if Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina were to be transformed into three ethnic entities, that we
12 should have access to the sea there. There were combinations later on as
13 well, to the effect that our right in the area of Neum would be replaced
14 through exchanges of territory in the area of Molunat and Prevlaka.
15 Q. And just to be clear on this, this discussion about exchanges of
16 territory, that took place in bilateral discussions with the Croats,
17 right, between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban?
18 A. At all conferences, later on too, of course, under the auspices
19 of the international community a proposal was worked out as to how this
20 exchange of territories would take place and this partial agreement was
21 reached in Dayton too. However, the participants in the talks forgot, if
22 I can put it that way, to insert that and that did exist. There's also a
23 map and also there is a written document as to how this would be carried
24 out. It was never a secret that there would be a triple exchange of
25 territories and it was never a secret that the Serbs should get access to
1 the sea.
2 Q. Two things. First of all, you explained repeatedly in your
3 Krajisnik testimony or you asserted in your Krajisnik testimony that the
4 exchange of territories that were contemplated was something that "we
5 agreed on in Graz," and the Graz -- that's at 25598. So you explained
6 that there was going to be -- that there was anticipated the possibility
7 of obtaining the corridor by an exchange of territories and that's what
8 was agreed on in Graz. First of all, that's what you said in your
9 Krajisnik testimony at 25598; correct?
10 A. That is correct, because the Cutileiro Plan allowed for that;
11 namely, that the parties, the negotiating parties, had the right to agree
12 on territorial changes. As for the corridor, we were supposed to give
13 part of the territory around Kupres so that the Croat parts of territory
14 that would be part of the corridor would become Serb territory.
15 Q. And Graz was a discussion between -- primarily between
16 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban, but whatever other representatives of the
17 Serbs and Croats participated, it was a discussion between the Serbs and
18 Croats; right?
19 A. In Graz there were two delegations that participated in the
20 talks. After returning from a session or conference, when this
21 conference did not end successfully, and then Mr. Cutileiro's proposal
22 was: Try to resolve problems through bilateral agreements and talks. We
23 availed ourselves of that opportunity, and then when we returned to
24 Sarajevo -- so it was not only Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban, but there were
25 two delegations that met and discussed all these questions, including
1 this exchange of territories, Serb for Croat, Croat for Serb, and that
2 was based on an agreement that had been reached beforehand in the
3 Cutileiro map. These were territories that unequivocally belonged either
4 to the Serb or the Croat side.
5 Q. The Cutileiro map, that's the map that you presented, a coloured
6 map, with the Cyrillic writing that you presented to this Court during
7 the course of your examination-in-chief by Mr. Karadzic, right? That's
8 what you're calling the Cutileiro map?
9 A. There's a document here -- actually, it's a photocopy of the
10 "Politika" daily newspaper of the 18th of March or the 17th. The Defence
11 can find it. That map is the Cutileiro map that I talked about last
12 time. It's in colour, as you said, and that is how you are going to see
13 exactly those parts of territory that we were supposed to exchange on the
14 basis of those talks.
15 Q. You -- we'll come to the Cutileiro discussions and the Cutileiro
16 map, Mr. Krajisnik. I'll stay on the subject of military operations.
17 You also explained during your Krajisnik testimony what you
18 asserted to be the meaning of the strategic objectives. So, for example,
19 you explained that strategic objective number 3 was -- which referred to
20 the Drina, was in fact the elimination of a "psychological border through
21 soft border controls." And that's found at transcript page 24158 and
22 24159. Is that right?
23 "Our goal was for the psychological border on the Drina not to be
24 there for the Serbs ..."
25 And then -- that's at 24158. And then you discussed the "soft
1 border" at 24159. Something that would be easy to cross, where you
2 wouldn't need a visa, that's also at 24158. That's what you claim
3 strategic objective number 3 was; right?
4 A. That's what I claimed and that's what I claim now, and then I
5 invoked Mr. Izetbegovic's book, his memoir, that is literally what he
6 wrote in his book, that the Serbs should not feel that they were confined
7 within boundaries, that there shouldn't be any passports and so on. You
8 will be able to find that easily in the evidence that I provided during
9 my testimony.
10 Q. Now, you participated in the formulation of the strategic
11 objectives, correct, and that's what you told the Krajisnik
12 Trial Chamber?
13 A. Well, I even said that I think that I made this proposal or
14 Mr. Karadzic, I don't know exactly which one of us, at this preparatory
15 meeting. It was either Mr. Karadzic or I that formulated that or several
16 of us, but at any rate I did take part in that.
17 Q. And you were confronted during the course of your testimony with
18 General Mladic's comments at the 16th Assembly Session, where he said he
19 also participated in the formulation of the strategic objectives. Do you
20 remember that?
21 A. Well, I suppose so but I don't know. I don't remember that
22 quotation, but I do not rule out the possibility that that was said and
23 that he was present when the strategic objectives were being formulated.
24 I don't exclude that.
25 Q. Well, he didn't -- it's not a question of his presence. I mean,
1 first of all, let's be clear on this. What you said in your Krajisnik
2 case is -- and you just affirmed right now, you think it was you who had
3 the idea: Gee, let's put down what we're saying to Cutileiro, let's put
4 it into some kind of exposition so that people will know about it. And
5 then the people who were presumably participating in the Cutileiro
6 discussions assisted in drafting the document; right? That's your
7 testimony, and it was your testimony for the Krajisnik case as well at
8 24123 through 24125.
9 A. I'm almost certain that it was I who drafted it, but I leave it
10 open that it possibly could have been Mr. Karadzic and myself. But it is
11 true that I took part in the drafting of the strategic goals.
12 Q. Okay. And so then General Mladic stood up at the 16th and said
13 that he -- he talked about setting goals that can be achieved. He said:
14 "I said this in Nevesinje before the top leadership of
15 Republika Srpska and before an even more select political leadership in
17 That's at P5956 at English page 35 and B/C/S page 26. And it was
18 raised with you at transcript page 25531. And then he said at page 36 in
19 the English, page 27 in the B/C/S:
20 "It was discussed in the most select circle of comrades whom we
21 convened the strategic goals that are of substance, which does not mean
22 that they could not be better, richer or more in keeping with our current
23 strength in the present moment."
24 So that -- that seems to be a reflection of General Mladic saying
25 that he participated in their formulation and in the discussion about
1 their formulation and how they should be said and what kind of goals were
2 appropriate. He wasn't a Cutileiro discussion expert like you, was he,
3 Mr. Krajisnik?
4 A. Mr. Mladic did not participate in the discussions with
5 Mr. Cutileiro. I'm almost certain that Mr. Mladic hadn't taken part in
6 formulating the strategic goals. What we used to call at the time the
7 Council for National Security was the body that discussed these issues,
8 and it was at this body that the strategic goals were drafted.
9 Now, as for the reference to Nevesinje, immediately before that
10 it was recorded that Mr. Mladic and Mr. Ostojic had visited Nevesinje.
11 Although we were not together, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Karadzic, and I also
12 visited Nevesinje, but we did not meet with them. We did not discuss any
13 strategic goals with the people from Herzegovina.
14 Q. And in light of the fact that the strategic objectives, according
15 to you, were strictly political, there would have been no reason for
16 General Mladic, as he said at the 16th Session, to participate in their
17 formulation, and particularly no reason if he knew nothing about the
18 Cutileiro discussions; correct?
19 A. Before going to the session, he could have familiarised himself
20 with that. It was not a secret. We took this list of objectives to the
21 session to present it to the MPs, that was to be done by Mr. Karadzic,
22 and he was to explain what our position in the negotiations was and what
23 we advocated in the negotiations.
24 Q. Right. But according to you, that had nothing to do with
25 General Mladic; that was strictly political and his job was military,
1 according to you?
2 A. I assert that it wasn't Mr. Mladic who formulated the goals. It
3 was done either by Karadzic or Krajisnik, and it was adopted by the
4 people who were present there. I do not rule out the possibility that at
5 one of the preparatory meetings Mladic was there in order to familiarise
6 himself with that, but it is highly unlikely because he was not a
7 commander at the time, he was a member of the military. He could have
8 been informed about that at some other meeting. He did not take part in
9 formulating the objectives.
10 Q. Well, in fact, during the course of your testimony in your own
11 case you were asked which members of the political leadership met with
12 General Mladic before the 12th -- before the 16th Session and before his
13 formal ascension to the top position of the VRS. And your answer was:
14 "I don't know. I don't remember that I met with him and I didn't
15 speak with him about any strategy or any goals if I did meet with him."
16 That's 25531 through 25532.
17 That's what you said during your testimony to the Krajisnik
18 Trial Chamber, Mr. Krajisnik; correct?
19 A. I have seen several documents to the effect that there was some
20 meeting, but to this date I don't remember that meeting and I would give
21 the same answer today as the one that I gave at the time.
22 Q. Okay. And your answer was: You don't remember such a meeting,
23 that's what you're saying now. But if you did meet with him, you didn't
24 speak with him about any strategy or any goals?
25 A. Well, I reiterate, it is possible that the strategic goals were
1 drafted as such, that somebody informed Mr. Mladic about them, but the
2 very drafting of the goals did not imply that we should discuss them.
3 Rather, we wanted to inform the parliament about our position in the
4 negotiations. And we definitely did not discuss the goals with him
5 because he became the military commander only later; at the time he was
7 MR. TIEGER: All right. I tender those pages, Mr. President,
8 25531 through 25532.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add those pages.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Mr. Karadzic asked you about a Milovanovic quote in an
12 interview - that's at transcript page 43302 through 03 - in which
13 Mr. Milovanovic was quoted as saying something to the effect that the
14 objectives of the war were to protect the Serbian people from destruction
15 and to stay within Yugoslavia or, alternatively, have their own state.
16 Now, those are fairly broad and I think you would agree those are not
17 exactly the articulation of a specific military objective; correct?
18 A. The exact strategic goals quoted by Mr. Milovanovic are in the
19 directive. They are different from these ones. They're only given the
20 same name. However, this confirms what you have just said.
21 Q. Well, let's take a quick look at D2149. This is a document
22 tendered by Mr. Karadzic to this Trial Chamber and it's excerpts from
23 General Milovanovic's notes on meetings with Karadzic. And this is
24 English page 27, B/C/S 18 through 19. This particular note begins that:
25 "On 25 July, the Main Staff ordered me to brief the
1 Supreme Command on the results of a recently completed second phase of
2 our offensive, Lukavac 93. Briefing of the Supreme Command took place."
3 And then it continues:
4 "With this I said the VRS had completed five of the six strategic
5 war objectives and getting RS access to the sea was the only one
6 remaining but could not be achieved by military means. Instead, this
7 should be done using political and legal means."
8 In contrast to the broad formulations that were quoted to you by
9 Mr. Karadzic during your examination-in-chief, this reflects
10 General Milovanovic's contemporaneous understanding of the military role
11 in the implementation and attainment of the six strategic objectives,
12 including access to the sea, which is strategic objective number 6, which
13 was difficult to obtain.
14 A. I don't know what Mr. Milovanovic's understanding was. You have
15 to ask him that. All I can say that the strategic goals formulated on
16 the 12th of May were the platform translated into other form of what we
17 discussed with Mr. Cutileiro. The access to the sea was a goal that was
18 most easily achievable by military means, and the army could have done
19 that because the JNA that was deployed at Prevlaka could just give this
20 space and be replaced by the Army of Republika Srpska. But obviously
21 that wasn't their goal because they preferred a political solution rather
22 than a military one, and you can glean that from the documents that you
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation of the document is
25 wrong. There are a few mistakes on this page alone.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, there's a -- I would like you to deal with
2 separately if it relates to the document we have admitted.
3 MR. TIEGER: The document, if I may add, we admitted, that
4 tendered by the accused himself.
5 Q. We also saw in that excerpt General Milovanovic talking about the
6 completion of those objectives to a large extent, as he put it there. In
7 fact, the army was actively engaged, that's the VRS, in creating a
8 factual situation that would improve the ultimate negotiations that would
9 resolve -- ultimately resolve the conflict; right? And the factual --
10 well, just answer that first.
11 A. That would have been the logic behind it, but according to this
12 logic there is sharp contrast. Since 18th of June, when Mr. Karadzic and
13 Mr. Koljevic were in London, they signed a declaration with the
14 then-foreign minister, Mr. Hurd, in which it was stated that the Serbian
15 side undertook an obligation that should a peaceful solution be reached
16 to return certain territories. Therefore, why should have been any
17 taking of the territory that would then have to be returned to a much
18 larger extent? Always, we wanted to achieve what we wanted to achieve
19 with regard to territories at the negotiating table rather than on a
21 JUDGE KWON: Date of this briefing, year is 1993, Mr. Tieger?
22 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
23 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Krajisnik, that the Bosnian Serb leadership
24 never asserted that the new reality created by the demographic changes
25 should be the basis for the -- at least part of the settlement and that
1 Serbs claimed certain territories on the basis of a so-called right that
2 came out of that new reality?
3 A. There was only one opinion. There were a variety of publicly
4 expressed opinions. Everybody wanted to be a general or a politician.
5 Even politicians used this kind of rhetoric in order to appease or to
6 alleviate certain tones. I'm telling you what our policy was and what
7 was laid down in the documents as our obligation and what was eventually
8 achieved. We had always been prepared to cede a large chunk of the
9 territory just to reach a peaceful solution.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat the last part
11 of his answer.
12 JUDGE KWON: You were too fast. Could you repeat from where you
13 said: "We had always been prepared to cede a large chunk of the
14 territory ..."
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry for speaking fast.
16 Mr. Tieger, an old acquaintance of mine, inspires me to speak fast.
17 At all times the Serbian policies and politicians were ready to
18 cede a part of territory in order to achieve a peaceful solution. This
19 policy was contained in a series of official documents. One of those
20 documents was in a map in Mr. Owen's book that I presented to this
21 Chamber, where 30 per cent of the territory that was either liberated or
22 occupied by the Serbian army that we were prepared to return. Therefore,
23 it is illogical for our army to go and conquer new territory so that we
24 must return more. The year of 1993 was the year when our army was most
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. We've seen examples of -- you spoke about everybody having an
3 opinion, everybody wanted to be a general or a politician. We've seen
4 examples of Dr. Karadzic saying that he said to the international
5 community when asked: Who gives you a right to Zvornik, which of course
6 had been the majority Muslim municipality before the conflict, we said,
7 according to him:
8 "The right which comes out of a new reality," that's at the
9 46th Session, "explain if you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims, then
10 you need a new war to expel the Serbs back to Zenica. "We requested
11 Zvornik according to this right."
12 That was addressed to you in your own trial at transcript
13 page 24932. You know that Dr. Karadzic said it. You know from your
14 participation in the 46th Assembly. You know from talking about it at
15 your own trial; correct?
16 A. That was mentioned at my trial.
17 Q. Dr. Karadzic wasn't the only one who talked about the factual
18 situation and the impact of the military results. General Mladic --
19 General Mladic said at the 34th Assembly Session that, first, the people
20 and the army have carried out most of the tasks and strategic goals set
21 to them. And then further:
22 "You have started from the most favourable position in Geneva.
23 You had the military result in your hands. You and the people and the
24 army and the forces of the MUP have created it."
25 So General Mladic took the position that the VRS established,
1 through its military operations, the most favourable position which could
2 be exploited in negotiations.
3 A. There's a big difference between what Mr. Mladic said and what
4 Mr. Karadzic said. Mr. Karadzic wanted to appease the Serbs who,
5 according to the maps, remained within the Federation. For example, in
6 Zenica and other areas as well as the central parts of Sarajevo. There
7 were many more Serbs there than in the eastern part of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said: This is the factual situation. At this
9 moment we cannot give Zvornik to the Muslims because, quite simply, the
10 Serbs will not return, they will be refugees, and that would be unjust.
11 As for Mr. Mladic, you cannot expect a general who is a
12 professional soldier who wages war, it is only to be expected that his
13 achievements and the job that he is assigned to is something that he was
14 going to praise and magnify. And the tradition is whatever you occupy
15 you can keep. But look at other excerpts from Mr. Karadzic's speeches.
16 We are ready to return some of the territories and we are ready for a
17 peaceful solution. And I say that there is a big difference between the
18 two. The one is speaking as a soldier, who is enhancing the importance
19 of his job, whereas the other is speaking as a politician who realises
20 that some people, according to the maps, had been left in the Federation.
21 This is what we discussed with people, with the international
22 community, including Mr. Owen. We told them: This is a factual
23 situation which requires new crimes or a new war in order to return the
24 Serbs from where they fled and do the same for the Muslims. Let us wait
25 for the end of the war and then everybody will have the right to return
1 to their original places of birth. And we always sustained the position
2 that upon the cessation of war operations, everybody should be given a
3 right to return from where they had come.
4 Q. So General Mladic came up with this on his own, notwithstanding
5 the comments by Dr. Karadzic reflected in the 46th Session? And the
6 Bosnian Serb leadership did not suggest to him that it would be a good
7 idea to enhance the factual situation so that the negotiations -- the
8 final negotiating position would be better for the Serbs?
9 A. Well, it is easy to establish that this is not correct. We had
10 70 per cent of territory. Should we ask for 90 per cent in order to gain
11 a better --
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, excuse me. I don't --
13 A. -- position so that we can later claim 50 per cent of the
14 territory --
15 Q. I'm not asking you to establish it by logic. To the extent you
16 were a participant in these events, I want to know if, irrespective of
17 what you claim to be the logic of the situation, whether the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership talked to General Mladic about enhancing the factual situation
19 through military operations?
20 A. No, they didn't ask for it. But of course, if you have a bigger
21 territory, you are at an advantage. But nobody aspired to occupy a
22 larger territory in order to achieve a better negotiating position.
23 Q. Now, we just saw at the 34th that General Mladic stated that the
24 army had carried out most of the tasks and the strategic goals set to
25 them. So again, there he's taking the position that he's implementing
1 goals put to him and talking to the political leadership.
2 At the 50th Assembly Session, which is P970, we see at pages 21
3 through 22 of the English and 17 through 18 of the B/C/S, General Mladic
4 in the course of a long speech talking about the military objectives, he
6 "Among other things, the basic objectives of all the mentioned
7 operations are to break and destroy as much of their forces as possible,
8 and thus impose by the force of arms the final settlement of the war on
9 the enemy and place the international community in a position of having
10 to recognise the actual situation in the field and end the war. To
11 ensure as favourable conditions as possible for the state and political
12 leaderships to conduct peace negotiations and achieve the strategic aims
13 of the war."
14 And he continued:
15 "The tasks of the war in this war" -- excuse me, "the task of the
16 army in this war stem from the known six strategic objectives adopted by
17 our Assembly which have not been carried out to the full due to the lack
18 of material and other support."
19 Now, that appears very clearly to be another reflection of
20 General Mladic's express stated position that the army was tasked with
21 implementing the strategic objectives and that it was to achieve as much
22 as possible so that the -- and enhance the actual situation in the field
23 so that the ultimate result for the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Serb
24 political negotiators would be improved.
25 It's still your position that the Bosnian Serb leadership had
1 nothing to do with this perception by General Mladic? They didn't talk
2 to him about implementing the strategic objectives, they didn't encourage
3 him to improve the factual situation through military operations; is that
4 your position?
5 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I am telling you and I'm repeating and claiming
6 that at the time when Mladic held such sizeable territory, we had
7 70 per cent of the territory. There was no reason for the civilian
8 leadership to issue tasks to the army to occupy additional territories in
9 order to improve our position. The situation was already good. As far
10 as the political leadership is concerned, they persistently maintained
11 the position that the solution had to be reached through negotiation.
12 Now, whether the factual situation was a trump card in our hands, it
13 definitely was, but it was not an imperative given to Mladic to create
14 that. He did create it and ultimately we had a better position than if
15 we had been losers, but he wasn't tasked with military operations in
16 order to achieve a better negotiating position.
17 Q. And he wasn't tasked with implementing the strategic objectives
18 and the Bosnian Serb political leadership didn't repeatedly encourage him
19 to implement the strategic objectives or repeatedly remind him about the
20 strategic objectives in the context of upcoming military operations; is
21 that your position?
22 A. The strategic objectives were a platform for the negotiations and
23 all of our people were aware of the strategic objectives and so did
24 Mladic. He certainly could contribute to the implementation of the
25 strategic objectives in his own way, but the goal of the political
1 leadership was not to take the territory and to force a solution on
2 someone. We couldn't do it and we didn't want to do it. We couldn't
3 because the international community was the mediator and we didn't want
4 to because we knew that in Bosnia, whatever kind of war there was, peace
5 had to be signed among the three sides. Without the agreement of the
6 three sides, it could not be implemented.
7 Q. And you yourself -- we looked at what Dr. Karadzic said, we
8 looked at what General Mladic said on a couple of occasions, and you
9 yourself said that the Serbian goal of a united and unique state is
10 something that had to be achieved and that you had a plan which would be
11 realised by political, military, and other means; right?
12 A. I have to say that the interpretation was quite confusing. It's
13 not a complaint against the interpreters, but I'm afraid that I might
14 make a mistake and lead you on a wrong trail.
15 One thing is this: If Mladic's goal was to achieve the strategic
16 objectives, he would have taken Sarajevo and the Neretva Valley, he would
17 have reached the sea. None of the goals that we stated, he did not
18 achieve except the corridor, I mean Mr. Mladic. Spontaneously some of
19 that was implemented. Some other areas were liberated, other than those
20 where the strategic objectives were focused.
21 Q. Well, in your own trial, Mr. Krajisnik, you were confronted with
22 your remarks at the 18th Session of -- in 1992, when you said:
23 "There is no Serb who doesn't want to live in a united and unique
24 state. It is politically impossible now but we must achieve it. We have
25 our own plan and we shall realise it by political, military, and other
1 means, depending on the situation."
2 And that was put to you at transcript page 25519 through 20 of
3 your trial, and you answered that:
4 "Well, we were at war so, of course, I had to mention war, but I
5 didn't think we had to do this by means of war."
6 And you said:
7 "It's not the factual situation that's important."
8 Correct? That was a position that you took at your own trial.
9 That's what you told the Trial Chamber there, that the factual situation
10 simply wasn't important and your mention of military means to realise the
11 plan was only because the war was in progress?
12 A. There is not a single Serb today in Republika Srpska, or rather,
13 at least 90 per cent of Serbs wanted and still want to live together with
14 Serbia. It was like that before and then and always. What is a
15 compromise is Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is today. This leadership tried
16 to pursue realistic policy that was supposed to achieve a compromise, and
17 I said correctly then it's true that the Serbs want to live with Serbia.
18 That was a wish expressed as a sort of plebiscite, but that was not
19 realistic policy. This leadership does not want to pursue unrealistic
20 policy and to oppose the will of the other two ethnic groups and the
21 international community, but wants to achieve a solution. We did realise
22 that through special connections, so it was a compromise rather than the
23 maximum that our people wanted.
24 Q. All right. Mr. Krajisnik, I asked you about the factual
25 situation and your claim that it wasn't important and that your explicit
1 reference to military means of attaining the plan was only because of the
2 happenstance that there was a war on. And in your answer you focus
3 exclusively on the goal. I'm focusing on the means of achieving that
5 So is that what you told the Trial Chamber, that the factual
6 situation wasn't important to you and the Bosnian Serb leadership?
7 A. I have to say that I do not understand the question because
8 you're quoting, its translated twice. I'll tell you what I meant and you
9 can fit it wherever you please. War, many MPs and many people believed
10 that something could be gained by war, and we said the factual situation,
11 that's the balance of powers and relations in the world, there are other
12 peoples too. We cannot achieve anything by force; we have to do it
13 through negotiations. That was our policy, nothing else.
14 MR. TIEGER: I tender 25520 and 25521.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, they will be added.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Well, in light of your comments about the role of the strategic
18 objectives, the factual situation, your knowledge of military operations,
19 I think it will be instructive to turn to a contemporaneous account,
20 contemporaneous journal, of meetings that took place between the
21 political and military leadership at that time.
22 MR. TIEGER: And I want to call up 1477. That's one of the war
23 journals that General Mladic kept between 1992 and 1995, and I want to
24 look first at a meeting that took place on the 6th of May, that was just
25 a few days before the 16th Assembly Session when the strategic objectives
1 were annunciated, and that's found at page 256, moving on to -- and 262
2 in the Serbian.
3 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, I would like the parties to
4 discuss with the Registrar to identify the correct pages that have been
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry --
7 JUDGE KWON: At the end of his testimony.
8 MR. TIEGER: Yes, of course.
9 JUDGE KWON: Not now.
10 MR. TIEGER: P1477.
11 Q. This reflects talks with Mr. Karadzic, yourself, General Adzic,
12 and so on. And we see Mr. Karadzic speaking first at what appears to be
13 quite some length, but the portion I wanted to direct your attention to
14 in particular appears toward the bottom of page 258. Incidentally, it
15 appears just after he mentions that:
16 "We were in Graz today for negotiations with the Croats."
17 And he says:
18 "It would be good to carry out the demarcation: (a) in order for
19 us to separate; (b) for us to form a corridor; (c) for the Drina not to
20 be a border; and (d) to reach the coast."
21 So in a meeting with General Mladic and General Adzic and a group
22 of generals, doctor -- along with you, Dr. Karadzic annunciates most of
23 the strategic objectives that will be fully articulated to the
24 Bosnian Serb parliament in a few days; right? And he explains to these
25 generals what at least four of those strategic objectives will be?
1 A. This is an example of Mr. Karadzic presenting our future
2 strategic objectives at this meeting. He informed them about it, so not
3 all but just one part, and that followed after the talks with the Croats,
4 as I recently testified, in Graz.
5 Q. He's explaining to the military what it would be good to do, how
6 to carry out the demarcation. That's what he's explaining to them, isn't
8 A. At the meeting with the Croats, we agreed how to carry out the
9 demarcation between us and them. We agreed on that, so it wasn't a task
10 for the military and then told to the Croats. He is presenting what we
11 agreed with the Croats, how to carry out this demarcation between the
12 Croats and us after these talks, in the corridor by an exchange of
13 territories and in the Neretva valley. We also talked about that, where
14 to draw the demarcation line between them and us, the Croats and the
16 Q. And that had nothing to do with General Mladic's remarks at the
17 34th, the 50th, and elsewhere, that the strategic objectives were set out
18 to the military and that they indeed accomplished most of them and put
19 the Bosnian Serb leadership in the best negotiating position?
20 A. But they did not achieve most of them. Sarajevo, the
21 Neretva valley, and getting out to the sea, this is what they did not
22 accomplish. But it's normal as the military representatives were at the
23 Assembly. They heard about the objectives, they were announced.
24 Everyone knew that that was our platform for negotiations. There was
25 nothing secret about that. You will remember the Popovic trial where I
1 presented the genesis of the strategic objectives, how they came into
2 being. I submitted it to you and the Tribunal, so I believe that it's
3 not difficult to find them, how the six strategic objectives came into
4 being in the first place.
5 Q. We've heard your account of how the strategic objectives came
6 into being, Mr. Krajisnik. And now we're pursuing their role in military
7 operations. The reality is that from the outset, as we see reflected
8 here, the Bosnian Serb leadership told the military what the objectives
9 were and then continued over and over again to remind the military that
10 those were the objectives in the context of upcoming or upcoming military
11 operations or military operations that had taken place?
12 A. The army did not work towards accomplishing the objectives. I've
13 told you of the six strategic objectives, they never accomplished three.
14 At the same meeting, the session, the 16th one, Mr. Karadzic said: We
15 envisage certain enclaves in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So
16 when the army could liberate territory, it did. And of course, you
17 cannot expect from soldiers not to cherish that. That was their job and
18 they would boast about it, of course, so they would say that that was
19 accomplishing goals, but they didn't accomplish them. Here,
20 specifically, these three objectives were something that they never even
21 tried to accomplish.
22 Q. Right. And your testimony is they were just boasting about goals
23 that they came to on their own initiative; it wasn't put to them by the
24 Bosnian Serb political leadership?
25 A. The six strategic objectives were read out publicly by
1 President Karadzic at the 16th Assembly. On the 9th of June, where
2 Mr. Mladic was, that was a meeting of the Presidency. And then it was
3 said that the strategic objectives should be sent to international
4 representatives, the mediators, as well as our map, and published. So
5 there was no secret about that. And of course, Mladic was aware of the
6 six strategic objectives, but I'm telling you specifically, he liberated
7 the territories he could but he wasn't taking into account the strategic
8 objectives nor were they any kind of obligation for him.
9 Q. We -- well, let's look at a meeting the next day, on May 7th, and
10 in particular, let's -- I want to remind you of your testimony in the
11 Krajisnik case, that you didn't remember meeting with General Mladic, and
12 if you did, you certainly didn't discuss any goals with him. So let's
13 turn now to page -- that's 1477 again, page 260 -- sorry, 262 in both
14 languages. This is yet another meeting with you and Dr. Karadzic and
15 General Mladic. And there -- I'm sorry, it's B/C/S page 270. Generally
16 these conform.
17 Meeting of 7 May at 1600 hours, right. At that meeting,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, you annunciated in full the strategic objectives to
19 General Mladic, to separate from the Croats and Muslims forever, to make
20 a corridor from Krajina to Serbia, to establish a link with Serbia on the
21 Drina and cut off the Muslims' link, a natural border with the Croats on
22 the Neretva, Sarajevo, and passage to the sea.
23 So for two days, you and Dr. Karadzic met with General Mladic and
24 on both days ensured that he was fully conversant with the strategic
25 objectives? And you -- correct?
1 A. Well, you have just forgotten that I said here that we do not
2 want to live alone. I'm not sure if I said that too, but here this is
3 correct -- I mean correct. I want to say that -- I want to confirm that
4 what I'm reading here is correct. Now, whether this is just what he
5 wrote, I don't know. He says that Krajisnik enumerated the strategic
6 goals and there are seven goals here, like in the near future we must --
7 I'm not sure what follows then after that. And during my testimony here
8 I said that perhaps I or Mr. Karadzic may have formulated it, but you can
9 see from what was said on the previous day was that Mr. Karadzic actually
10 listed some goals. So he may have put that it was me and it could have
11 been our joint agreement or it's possible that he attended a meeting on
12 which the strategic goals that would be prepared for the Assembly were
13 presented, and the Assembly was to be held in the next several days.
14 Q. First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, there are not seven goals listed.
15 You can see that he's got a line identifying the six goals and then he
16 moves on with an asterisk to talk about the discussion: We do not want
17 to live alone. In the near future, you are recorded as relating to him,
18 we want to establish links with the RSK. The latter point of which was a
19 continuing point of interest by the Bosnian Serb leadership, to unite
20 with the RSK.
21 In fact, Mr. Krajisnik, this entry reflects the obvious, that
22 Mr. Mladic -- that General Mladic, as he's about to assume his
23 responsibilities, is being told what his objectives are to be? And one
24 more thing -- you answer that and I'll ask you the next one.
25 A. This is not giving tasks to Mr. Mladic by telling him the goals
1 because he was not yet the commander. We didn't know when he would
2 become the commander. This is probably, though I don't know, a
3 conversation with a number of participants where the strategic objectives
4 were conceived as a platform for talks, a platform that we would advocate
5 and that would be announced to the Assembly. So these were not tasks
6 issued to General Mladic. He was still to become the commander. These
7 were talks. The talks could have been held with anyone else in this
9 Q. So it doesn't -- this could have been anybody. The fact that
10 it's General Mladic is irrelevant or coincidental. That's your position;
11 is that right?
12 A. Well, the previous meeting was held with the generals from
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Mr. Adzic, so we issued tasks to them too. They
14 had nothing to do with Mladic and the future Army of Republika Srpska.
15 I'm telling you one thing, these were the political objectives which were
16 conceived here, and Mladic could be aware of them. Why shouldn't he be
17 familiar with them? But these were not his tasks or orders issued to
19 Q. And you did not say to General Mladic on the 7th of May with
20 regard to strategic objective number 3: Our goal is to establish a
21 border control station on the Drina that will not ask for passports, but
22 will accept visas? That wasn't your articulation of strategic objective
23 number 3 on the 7th of May, was it?
24 A. Can you please bring it back, the strategic objectives, so I can
25 see how exactly the third strategic objective was formulated.
1 MR. TIEGER: Page 270, I believe, in the B/C/S and page 260 in --
2 excuse me, 262 in the English.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We always advocated that the Drina
4 should not be a border at which passports needed to be shown, and I
5 quoted what Mr. Izetbegovic himself had said. We always applied for this
6 and it was always approved by international community representatives,
7 namely, to have special and parallel relations and that exists to this
8 day. Today, you don't have to show a passport but only the personal
9 identity card. That was the goal, not to have a unification of
10 Republika Srpska and Serbia, but that the border is a soft one which can
11 easily be crossed as people do it today within the EU.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. But that's not what you said to General Mladic on the 7th of May.
14 You didn't say: We want a soft border that can be easily crossed by
15 people. You said you wanted to cut off the Muslims' link with Sandzak
16 and establish a link with Serbia on the Drina. Would a soft border,
17 Mr. Krajisnik, cut off the link with the Sandzak? It would seem to me it
18 would enhance it.
19 A. Firstly, the Drina is not the border with Sandzak. The Drina is
20 the border with Serbia proper, and Mladic could have noted this in the
21 way he wanted to. He may have included some of his own reminiscences. I
22 always advocated - I'm not sure about how that's portrayed here - as what
23 we negotiated with the Muslims in the talks with them and also with
24 international community; namely, that it should be a border where we
25 wouldn't have border posts and passports, but one that would be easy to
1 cross and go over and it exists today.
2 Q. Mr. --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, if I may help. In
4 line 12, though I see that it's noted, his "reminiscences" is what's
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
7 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, well, I can continue, Mr. President, but it
8 looks like we're --
9 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
10 It's time for another break. We'll break for 45 minutes and
11 resume at 1.15.
12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to introduce
16 to the Chamber Ms. Milica Milicevic, who was originally from Serbia but
17 grew up in the United Kingdom and is now studying here in the Netherlands
18 and working as a legal intern for our team.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Before we continue, I would like to ask -- inquire of the parties
21 about the scheduling. In the week of 9th of December, whether it would
22 cause a lot of problems if we are to sit from Tuesday to Friday instead
23 of Monday to Thursday? We are supposed to sit from 9th to 12th. I'm
24 inquiring whether it would be possible to sit from the 10th to the 13th.
25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, in the past such requests have not
1 presented any problems so we will check and get back to you very quickly.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. ROBINSON: It won't be a problem for us.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic -- I'm sorry, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Q. I'd like to turn next, Mr. Krajisnik, to some of the directives
8 that were issued before military operations. As we've heard in this
9 chamber, a directive is a high command document which addresses broad
10 issues of preparation and execution of military operations for an
11 extended period, setting out goals and tasks. And I'd like to start with
12 the first directive which was dated the 6th of June, 1992, and that's
14 Now if we turn to the second page of the English and we look
15 under the goal of the operation, that appears immediately after 4, you'll
16 see it at the bottom of your page and then continuing on into the second
17 page of B/C/S. It states:
18 "Secure parts of Sarajevo with a majority Serbian population to
19 ocistiti /mop up or cleanse/ the wider area of Sarajevo airport and
20 ocistiti its wider area of remaining groups and of individuals belonging
21 to the enemy ..." et cetera.
22 And if we turn to the item after item (D), we see that the
23 directive provides:
24 "In the first stage, in duration of 3 to 4 days, use offensive
25 actions to ocistiti the wider sector around Sarajevo airport (Dobrinja,
1 Butmir, Sokolovic, Kolonija, Mojmilo, Zlatiste), deblock the
2 communication," et cetera, "Sarajevo-Trnovo and group forces to open the
3 corridor between Semberija and Bosnian Krajina."
4 And again immediately below:
5 "In the second stage, in duration of 4 to 6 days, create the
6 corridor between Semberija and Bosnian Krajina, reject enemy forces away
7 from the communications, and in the period to come, extend the corridor
8 permanently providing secure traffic communication in it."
9 And again, Mr. Krajisnik, we see here the term "ocistiti" and in
10 English the two possible translations for that, depending on the context
11 in which it appears, are provided and this Court has heard evidence -
12 that's found at 14572 through 14575 - that the term sometimes appears in
13 a military context referring to the mopping up of the terrain, a military
14 term for the final stages of the operation, or may refer to a cleansing
15 which may in context mean the removal of the population. So it's in this
16 document in the English translation left with both possibilities and the
17 original word in Serbian is inserted.
18 But with respect to the items I identified for you, do we see
19 here in the first directive and in the fairly early stage of the VRS's
20 involvement in the conflict a reflection of two of the strategic
21 objective and an attempt to produce a factual situation which can support
22 various demands during negotiations?
23 A. I'm not a military expert so it's hard for me to interpret this.
24 Anything that I would interpret would be arbitrary and certainly not of a
25 very high quality. What I can say now as a lay person is the following.
1 I can say that at the time our ethnic areas were split up, disjointed,
2 and it is certain that the actual situation on the ground made it
3 necessary to link certain things up. It says here ethnic areas around
4 Sarajevo where Serbs were the prevalent population. Also, it has to do
5 with this linking up by way of communication. I could not say that this
6 is linked to the strategic objectives or this strategic objective. Quite
7 simply, the situation was such that it made it necessary to link areas up
8 in the eastern part.
9 As for this reference to the corridor, you know that -- here in
10 the documents you see that the entire western part of Krajina was
11 isolated because of humanitarian aid, that was a particular problem. And
12 to this day there is a monument to 12 babies that died due to a lack of
13 oxygen, and there was a lot of pressure then to open this humanitarian
14 corridor towards the western part of Republika Srpska, which was done
16 So I don't see anything unusual here in this military document,
17 and I as a layman again, I could not link this up to ethnic cleansing.
18 It is actually the military that is mopping up and it says here "enemy,"
19 and the enemy is the enemy soldiers on the other side.
20 Q. Those actions that were reflected in the directive were the
21 result of meetings with the Bosnian Serb political leadership, including
22 yourself; correct?
23 A. Well, if this is the 6th of June, as far as I can remember, the
24 first meeting of the expanded Presidency was on the 9th of June, that is
25 to say, it was later. I don't know whether there was a meeting before
1 that, say an informal meeting, unrecorded. But as far as I can remember,
2 the first meeting with Mr. Mladic was on the 9th of June, that is to say,
3 three days before this directive was issued.
4 Q. Take a look at P1478, page 92, a meeting held on the
5 5th of June, 1992, involving General Mladic, yourself, Koljevic, Plavsic,
6 and Djeric.
7 A. I can't see the date here. Can you tell me where the date is,
9 Q. This is a meeting that took place at 1600 hours, so the date is
10 reflected at an earlier portion of the document and is 5 June. If you
11 wish to scroll back, we can do so; if you take my word for it, we can do
12 so. Also on the very next page we see the entry of 6th of June and
13 you'll see that in a moment. So you'll see that it moves from 1600 hours
14 on this date to the 6th of June on the very next entry.
15 And General Mladic writes down "demands" as after -- that arise
16 from his meeting with the political leadership.
17 "To liberate the road going through Zlatiste;
18 "To occupy the border in the city and to reinforce it;
19 "The issue of our objective in Sarajevo. Sarajevo has to be
20 resolved politically while acting quietly inch by inch" --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 Next page, please.
23 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. We move to the next page.
24 Q. And "ocistiti," mop up or cleanse, "Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja,
25 and Sokolovic Kolonija, and in the town of Hrasno in the direction of
1 Mojmilo hill."
2 Here, Mr. Krajisnik, we see the demand, as it says here, arising
3 from the meeting of the state and political leadership, and in particular
4 you and Dr. Karadzic, to do precisely what is reflected in the -- in
5 directive 1 on June 6th; correct?
6 A. Well, this exactly is confirmation that it has to do with
7 communication, I mean this talk. I didn't know that there would be a
8 directive afterwards, I certainly didn't know, but I do not exclude the
9 possibility of this meeting being held and this being discussed. I don't
10 remember exactly whether the meeting was a meeting of the Presidency or
11 some other meeting, but I do not rule out the possibility of such
12 problems being discussed because it says here "Sarajevo has to be
13 resolved by political means," but of course; Zlatiste, where the road had
14 been cut off; also at the airport where they're firing at those who are
15 bringing in humanitarian aid; and then Trnovo, all of this is discussion
16 about communication. It is only natural that a directive would follow
17 after certain talks. I don't remember this being said. I don't see
18 anything strange here and I allow for the possibility of this kind of
19 meeting having been held.
20 Q. We'll check the transcript, but perhaps I misunderstood you
21 earlier when you were telling this Chamber over and over again that the
22 operations of the VRS had nothing to do with the political leadership.
23 So now I understand from you that it's natural that specific military
24 operations and military directives would arise immediately in the
25 aftermath of the meeting with the political leadership and based on what
1 the political leadership said about what needed to happen.
2 A. Well, I don't understand what it is that is not understandable.
3 I'll try to explain, and if that is not in accordance with what I had
4 said, then you have the possibility of saying that I haven't been
5 consistent. I said --
6 Q. What I want to know from you is specifically now whether or not
7 it's your position that military operations were the result of meetings
8 with and instructions from the Bosnian Serb political leadership?
9 A. Well, Mr. Prosecutor, you want to get an answer through this play
10 of words. I am telling you that if you get that, that is wrong, and I'll
11 try to explain things if something is unclear to you. I said that there
12 were very few meetings with the military, and for the most part what was
13 discussed was logistics. There was information, certain information, of
14 course, and we discussed certain problems too, but that was not
15 obligatory in terms of issuing orders to the military. From the ground
16 there were certain requests, certain wishes, but it wasn't demands of the
17 civilian authorities. The planning of the military was autonomous and
18 nobody had to tell them what to do and how to resolve things because they
19 would see the situation on the ground specifically here.
20 If this conversation did take place, and I assume that it did
21 take place, it is only natural that we had this discussion with Mladic
22 about the problems related to Sarajevo, for example, this and that and
23 the other thing is a problem, and then after that what he's going to do
24 and whether he's going to do it. That was not a request. That was
25 simply a discussion about problems that have to do with the situation on
1 the ground. If it is not clear from this, then you can put additional
2 questions to me and I can give you an answer. This is a meeting that did
3 not have to be a pretext for the directive. It could have been so but it
4 was not obligatory for the military. There's going to be another
5 meeting, say, there was a meeting on the 9th of June, and I don't know
6 whether there was a directive that followed.
7 Q. Let's look at a meeting that took place the next day, June 6th.
8 There we see consultations on the military and political situation,
9 that's the date of the issuance of the directive. Item 4 is:
10 "The political and military doctrine for upcoming war
12 And Dr. Karadzic speaks and, as we see toward the bottom of the
13 page on 94, Dr. Karadzic "reiterated the strategic objectives with
14 comments and explanations."
15 And he ends by saying:
16 "We have to protect our territories militarily."
17 So now for the fourth time in approximately a month, that being
18 May 6th, May 7th, May 12th, and now June 6th, the Bosnian Serb political
19 leadership is emphasising the strategic objectives to General Mladic,
20 this time in the specific context of a discussion on the political and
21 military doctrine for upcoming war objectives.
22 A. This is a consultative meeting of soldiers, and it is only
23 natural that politicians were present there. Mr. Karadzic is saying what
24 the political objectives are. It is the Assembly that adopted these
25 political objectives. I don't know whether what Mr. Mladic said here is
1 correct, verbatim. He said that the army is supposed to protect our
2 territories. I don't see that he said: Let's take somebody else's
3 territories. Well, of course, what do we need an army for if it's not
4 going to protect our territories?
5 Q. So you don't see a reference to Dr. Karadzic saying: Let's take
6 somebody else's territories or let's conquer somebody else's territories?
7 That's what you're saying that this meeting is about only?
8 A. Well, I'm saying I don't know what the content is of what Mladic
9 wrote down. I know that at such consultative meetings it is a particular
10 subject matter that is discussed. It says here that we have to protect
11 our territories in a military way --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
13 microphones please be switched off.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And he says here the situation is
15 very unfavourable. You see that that's what he wrote down. I don't know
16 whether what he wrote down is correct, but I'm telling you what it is
17 that I am reading right now.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Well, let's look at who did state that what needed to happen was
20 that the army had to conquer what the Bosnian Serbs considered theirs.
21 MR. TIEGER: If we can turn to page 108, please.
22 Q. That reflects your contributions to this meeting toward the end
23 of the meeting and you say the following:
24 "The goal was to form and unite the Birac-Romanija area.
25 "To draw the borders of this area and to include: Hadzici,
1 Ilidza, Vojkovici, and Novo Sarajevo.
2 "Dobrinja, if we can take it.
3 "Those who liberated Hadzici, Vogosca ... this should be
4 defended, that will be ours.
5 "The border has to be defended and held".
6 And we turn to the next page, 108.
7 "As of tomorrow we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared
8 to defend our state ..."
9 So that's what the Bosnian Serb leadership was telling the VRS,
10 immediate -- yes, contemporaneous with the issuance of directive 6?
11 A. Everything I said then I would say today as well, all of these
12 areas are Serb areas, and I did not say that a single foot of Muslim
13 territory should be taken. I said that our territory should be
14 protected, and that is the views of the participants in a particular
15 meeting. It would be very naive to say that Momcilo Krajisnik in this
16 way gave a task, an order, to the military. I said, as a participant, I
17 said what should belong to us around Sarajevo. Our territory, to take up
18 lines and to defend it. I did not say that Bascarsija should be taken.
19 I did not say that Butmir should be taken. I did not say that the inner
20 city of Sarajevo should be taken. Rather, only that that belonged to the
21 Serb people ethnically. I followed that, that we had already charted as
22 our areas with Mr. Cutileiro on the maps there. This is not a directive,
23 this is not a proposal; this is the opinion of a participant, the Speaker
24 of the Assembly, addressing a broader forum.
25 Q. So your words were that: "As of tomorrow we have to conquer" --
1 you weren't saying to take or liberate territory that was not then being
2 held by the Bosnian Serbs, you weren't saying conquer territory already
3 had. You were saying conquer territory that was held by the Muslims, but
4 that you considered to be -- that you considered the Serbs entitled to;
6 A. That is not right. Do read this. I don't know whether that's
7 the word I uttered, but it says here exactly "our territories," "our,"
8 and they're listed too. I did not say "our Butmir." I did not say "our
9 Bascarsija." That would mean that we were aspiring for something that
10 was held by the Muslims and that was their own. The Muslim side held
11 some of our territory, so what we are alluding to is that these
12 territories should be freed because that's where Serbs are. According to
13 the maps they belonged to us and they belong to us today on the basis of
14 the Dayton Agreement, too.
15 As for the word "conquer," I don't know why that word was used.
16 Maybe he put that, if that's a military term. I may have used the word
17 "osloboditi," to liberate, but why would I say "conquer"?
18 Q. And once again we see the -- in your words, desires or wishes of
19 the Bosnian Serb leadership reflected in the directives guiding military
21 A. I would have been honoured if anyone took heed of my wishes, any
22 wishes, let's say in inverted commas. There were several participants
23 they -- and it doesn't mean that what Krajisnik said we are going to
24 incorporate in the directive and then we move on. It might have happened
25 accidentally that I mentioned something that I wouldn't say today. I
1 said that we need to liberate the Serbian areas, they need to be
2 connected and linked up, because somebody had occupied these areas. I
3 didn't say these territories had to be cleansed, but I said that they
4 needed to be liberated because they had been occupied by someone and it's
5 only logical.
6 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn next to directive 3 issued in August.
7 That's D235. And -- and perhaps before we look at that in detail, maybe
8 we can look at a couple of documents that indicate what happened between
9 directive 1 on June 6th, 1992, and the directive 3 on the 3rd of August,
10 1992. So if we could turn to directive 2 on -- which is D593 first,
11 please. And sorry to the Registrar for jumping.
12 Q. This is dated July 22nd, 1992, and it indicates in the
13 informative section of the directive at the beginning in one of the
14 two items indicated as item 1, the second of those two items:
15 "We liberated the territories we consider ours and created
16 conditions for political and military leadership of the Serbian Republic
17 of BiH, so that they could perform all activities and negotiations
18 regarding the future state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the position of
19 the stronger one in this territory."
20 Item 4:
21 "We have broken through corridors in Eastern Bosnia and
22 Bosanska Posavina and thus made possible the centuries-long aspiration of
23 the Serbian people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic of
24 Krajina to be joined with the fatherland - Serbia."
25 And item 7:
1 "We have created conditions for further progress of our army and
2 state in this territory."
3 So that document in the latter part of July 1992, directive 2,
4 reflects, first of all, the attainment of the corridors in Eastern Bosnia
5 and Bosanska Posavina, those are two of the strategic objectives that
6 were articulated to General Mladic four times before the first week -- or
7 by the first week of June; correct?
8 A. Yes, the corridor in Posavina was one of the strategic objectives
9 and the linking up of the area along the Drina was another.
10 Q. And it reflects the military's understanding that the liberation
11 of territories that we consider to be ours, that is, that the Bosnian
12 Serbs consider to be theirs, created conditions for the political and
13 military leadership so that they could perform all activities regarding
14 the future state and be in the position of the stronger one on the
15 territory; right?
16 A. Yes, I -- that is how I think that the army understood, as it is
17 written in this directive. Of course they were familiar with those
18 objectives and they interpreted them as they saw fit. Nobody told them
19 explicitly what to do. The entire nation was in favour of opening up the
20 Krajina in order to get medical supplies in, in order to prevent the
21 death of infants. It wasn't necessary to tell them anything. If anyone
22 did tell them, though, it just was consistent with the situation. It has
23 nothing to do with the objectives, which was dictated by the prevailing
25 Q. All right. I wanted to turn to directive 3 which was the
1 previous document, D00235. So now we have some understanding of what
2 happened in the interim, and we see in directive 3, first, there is a
3 general political background provided in paragraph 1, and it notes in --
4 at page 2 that the army has achieved significant results in protecting
5 the Serbian people and their centuries-old home. But let's look at the
6 objectives for the future and the tasks which are provided by
7 directive 3.
8 First of all, it seeks to keep Sarajevo firmly under blockade and
9 prevent its breaking. It, once again, mentions - this is page 3 in both
10 languages - advancing to the left bank of the river Neretva, the right
11 bank of the river Sava, and border areas of Serbian territories, capture
12 Jajce and Gorazde, take hold of dominant features and ensure the most
13 favourable possible position in the negotiations with the Croat-Muslim
14 alliance on demarcation. Now --
15 JUDGE KWON: Next page in English.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Then the document continues to make specific assignments to
18 various corps in the pursuit of these objectives.
19 Now, once again, Mr. Krajisnik, we see reflected in this
20 directive, the reference to the Neretva, the reference to the Sava, the
21 reference to liberating remaining parts of Serbian territory, reflections
22 of strategic objective number 4, strategic objective number 2, strategic
23 objective number 1, general separation, in the guiding documents for
24 military operations by the VRS; correct?
25 A. Well, first of all, it's not correct. Let me tell you why.
1 Because the strategic objectives were not made up. They rely on
2 realistic foundations to what we were entitled to, and we had the right
3 to each of these strategic objectives. So if something is realistic and
4 if none of these objectives were adopted, then the Serbian army had --
5 would have had a right to liberate the areas where the Serbs had been
6 living. I don't know how it all went on, how these directives were
7 formulated, but I can say that the six strategic objectives was a
8 political document known to everyone, including the army, and anyone was
9 free to invoke them. Everyone had the right to defend themselves. There
10 is not a single objective that aspires to grabbing somebody else's
11 territory; it was not incorporated in our objectives. We only claimed
12 what we thought we had a right to, the access to sea, the Neretva Valley
13 where the Serbs used to live and were subjected to genocide. So we
14 aspired to everything that was allowed by the Cutileiro Plan.
15 It was only natural for the army to know what the objectives were
16 and what they were supposed to do as part of their task. But it was not
17 that the leadership said: Let us do this in a military way, although we
18 don't have a right to do that, in order to gain a better negotiating
19 position. Our position was very favourable and we continued the
20 negotiations. Precisely on the 7th of August, Mr. Karadzic and
21 Mr. Koljevic signed a declaration with Mr. Hurd in London, where it said
22 that all the areas that are taken by force was something that we were
23 opposed to and each such territory had to be returned.
24 Now this is construed in a different way, that we are trying to
25 occupy territories in order to improve our political position. We were
1 constantly striving for a political solution and the policy-makers said
2 we want something that we're entitled to. The Serbs can claim
3 65 per cent of the territory, mostly rural territory, not urban
4 territory. And this was publicly made known. However, we did not
5 achieve everything because the Dayton Accords provided different
6 solutions, so it was not feasible.
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you said: "I don't know how it all went on, how
8 these directives were formulated," and then you went on to offer the long
9 explanation about strategic objectives that you just did. So in
10 connection with how this directive came about, let's look first at P3068,
11 which was a meeting of the Presidency one day before directive 3 was
12 issued. And we see that the second item on the agenda is the assessment
13 of the military situation.
14 And if we turn the page we can see that General Mladic briefed
15 those present on the assessment of the military situation in Serbian
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing the situation in each combat sector,
17 the necessary tasks, and the connection between ensuring material
18 potentials and financial resources, and the necessity of adopting a
19 decision on general mobilisation due to security considerations, and the
20 detailed nature of the information, the conclusions, and alternatives
21 adopted were not put on record. And this is another meeting with
22 General Mladic that you participated in, as we see from the notation
23 indicating who the session was attended by. Okay?
24 So this was, as it states here, a briefing on the situation in
25 each sector and what needed to be done next; correct?
1 A. Well, this is exactly what I have been saying all the time. Read
2 this item consistently. Mr. Mladic briefed the president about the
3 situation on the ground, and we all know that from TV. Then he spoke
4 about the material support that was required for the army to be capable
5 of combat, and that was the point of every meeting that I attended where
6 Mr. Mladic was present. There was not a single meeting where some
7 different issues were discussed. What they discussed was something that
8 I saw on TV as well. Of course he provided more detailed explanations
9 and he said in order for us to be able to continue our activities, and
10 every soldier is proud of what he is doing, he would say: We need
11 ammunition, we need food, we need uniforms, et cetera, et cetera. So
12 that was our activity. And although these meetings were far and few
13 between, whenever I was present this is what Mladic talked about.
14 Q. So what you all knew from TV had to not be put on the record due
15 to security considerations; that's the first thing, right? That's what
16 the record of the meeting reflects, that what you say everybody could see
17 on TV was not put on the record due to security considerations; right?
18 A. Mr. Tieger, we all served in the army. Whenever an army wants to
19 do something significant, they say: This is a military secret. This is
20 a state secret. In order to create in the minds of people who are
21 present there that they were keeping something to themselves. I never
22 heard in any of the meetings anything that could be treated as a special
23 military secret. Many people didn't know what was happening on the
24 ground during the war, and I'm telling you that that is the real truth
25 and it's wrong to see that somebody was making a mystery of the whole
1 situation. Of course, soldiers are the most important factor in war and,
2 of course, they try to give more importance to themselves, but I really
3 convinced you that I never heard anything that was top secret, that there
4 was a crime that had been committed and somebody tried to cover it up.
5 All of us who served in the army know that this is the truth. The army
6 always tries to say that there is something very important and that
7 shouldn't be disseminated among the people and that it should be
8 publicised only on a need-to-know basis.
9 Q. Let's turn to another reflection of the meeting on the
10 2nd of August and that's found at P --
11 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Krajisnik, this is not a military document,
12 is it? This is a minute from the Presidency meeting, probably kept by a
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it says here what
15 was said at that time. Maybe Mr. Mladic said: Don't put that on paper,
16 but if something important was said - and I don't remember that there was
17 anything important - wasn't important enough to be put on record. You
18 can see that there are so many things that are contained in the minutes
19 because they were more important. There were many security issues during
20 the war. This culture of security awareness did not exist too much among
21 us because it is possible that he didn't write everything down, so I
22 conclude that if he omitted to write it down, it wasn't significant
24 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Let's turn next to P1479, English pages 16 through 23 -- well, in
2 this case both languages. As a general matter, the Serbian and the
3 English will track in this document. Okay.
4 Q. This is a reflection of that same meeting, a meeting on the
5 2nd of August, 1992, with the Presidency, as reflected in
6 General Mladic's diary. We see essentially the same agenda:
7 "Briefing on the talks in London (Karadzic).
8 "Assessment of the military situation.
9 "Plan for future activities."
10 And as we continue through the document, we see a fairly lengthy
11 discussion of various aspects. We see at the end something that will
12 come up in another document. Mr. Koljevic saying:
13 "To take Sarajevo.
14 "To launch a sabotage operation," that's on page 23, "and
15 eliminate the political leadership."
16 So toward the end of this discussion on the assessment of the
17 military situation and plan for future activities, Mr. Koljevic offers
18 that contribution. And prior to that we see on page 22, let's go to
19 page 21 first, look at the bottom. After you say:
20 "We must raise the issue of our access to the sea ..."
21 Then on the next page, page 22, we see that Dr. Karadzic says:
22 "The European Community will accept the factual state of affairs,
23 and that is why we should not make a single concession in military
25 So that's another reflection --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Is it Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik?
2 MR. TIEGER: I understand the confusion, Mr. President, but you
3 see -- look immediately to the right and upwards, it looks like the
4 reference for Karadzic and in the -- as you can see in the Serbian, it's
5 less confusingly listed.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, that's another reflection of the Bosnian Serb
9 leadership saying to General Mladic exactly what he said at the
10 34th Assembly Session and the 50th Assembly Session and in any number of
11 military directives that we've seen, is that he understood the role of
12 the military in part to be obtaining a factual situation on the ground
13 that would enhance the negotiations?
14 A. Very often information from the West, from our conferences, came
15 that an agreement cannot be reached, that representatives of the
16 international community wanted certain area to be given over to another
17 ethnic community, and that created chaos because huge areas became
18 vacant. Why should any territory be conceded to another ethnic
19 community? People who liberated certain area and the political
20 leadership, which was particularly emphasised by Mr. Karadzic as the
21 president of the party, used to say that whatever we occupied, the
22 international community must acknowledge that. For example, we took
23 Gorazde, somebody said Gorazde will be given to the Muslims and people
24 just packed and left. Some of them were slaughtered. Only three or four
25 days later Mr. Karadzic signed a paper which said that we were ready to
1 make territorial concessions only with a view to reaching a political
2 solution. If he says that publicly in an international conference, then
3 the ordinary people say: Look, they're bargaining there. Why should we
4 wage war? Why should we liberate areas that are going to be given to the
5 other side anyway?
6 It is only natural that there are talks during a war with the
7 military and some other people, but these were not directives. These
8 were not orders. This was just a discussion that every civilian was
9 involved in. The army was doing its job professionally, and in view of
10 the factual situation they acted accordingly. If they can liberate
11 something, they resorted to that. As I said, they didn't take the
12 Neretva Valley, they didn't take Sarajevo. It was mentioned a hundred
13 times, but it was not a goal. They didn't take Sarajevo, but they did
14 take Jajce, though, although we said it's not going to be ours.
15 According to the maps, it should have belonged to the Muslim-Croat
17 I understand what you are trying to prove here, that is to say,
18 that the political leadership in the meetings that I attended was
19 involved in the discussions about the problems, and the only real problem
20 was the war, the people being killed, the refugees, et cetera. We
21 discussed that, but these were not orders, these were wishes. They were
22 suggestions passed on to the army that waged the war as best they could.
23 They were sometimes successful, sometimes unsuccessful. I don't say that
24 there were no directives that the Commander-in-Chief issued and he
25 co-ordinated that with his Main Staff, but I don't know anything about
1 these directives. Some things happened spontaneously and chaotically on
2 the ground. I can give you a hundred examples of things that took us by
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
5 A. -- if you look at the balance of powers in certain municipalities
6 and if you see that people native to that area took part in the action.
7 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, let's look at two more documents to see how
8 spontaneous or chaotic this directive was. So first let's look at P3069,
9 another session of the Presidency two days later on August 4th.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the previous answer it turns out
13 that -- it was omitted that there were municipal armies, and I'm talking
14 about line 8 onwards.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Okay. There we see, on the 4th, the Presidency considered the --
17 and again, this is a meeting which you attended, as we see reflected at
18 the outset of the meeting. The document also reflects that the
19 Presidency considered the situation at the front and discussed
20 undertaking certain activities at the front.
21 Now, those activities at the front meant directive 3, and that's
22 what the Presidency considered and that's, in fact, what was approved by
23 the Presidency; correct?
24 A. I don't see here that directive 3 is mentioned anywhere. Can you
25 please tell me where you can see that.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you were present at that meeting. So I'm asking
2 you when we see the reference to what the Presidency considered and
3 discussed at that meeting, that that's a reference to directive 3 and
4 that, in fact, the Presidency approved directive 3?
5 A. Well, it didn't, Mr. Tieger. I never heard that I needed to
6 adopt a directive at the Presidency. I don't remember that.
7 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn to P1479, English pages -- beginning at
8 page 24.
9 Q. And this is another entry in General Mladic's diary, this time
10 reflecting the same meeting with the Presidency that was held on the
11 4th of August -- or reflecting a meeting with the Presidency on the
12 4th of August, 1992. And as we can see at the very beginning:
13 "Directive accepted without objections, except for Koljevic who
14 requested the following:
15 "(a)," and that's the same thing he talked about on August 2nd,
16 "a sabotage operation in Sarajevo.
17 "(b) the taking of Sarajevo."
18 A. I don't remember that it was presented like this and that someone
19 mentioned the directive. Perhaps we talked about some -- the meeting was
20 held, we discussed, but that somebody said: Let us adopt a directive
21 now, I never heard something like that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the previous document. Was Mladic noted
23 as one of the participants?
24 MR. TIEGER: I don't believe he's listed as a participant in that
25 particular meeting. I will note -- could ask Mr. Krajisnik this
1 question, in fact, if I can find the particular transcript page -- no,
2 he's not listed as attending that particular meeting. So I -- I will
3 note that -- and I'll find the reference and ask Mr. Krajisnik about it,
4 that he made a point in his previous testimony of noting that not every
5 participant in the meeting was always listed on the Presidency session
7 Q. I'd like to turn next, Mr. Krajisnik, to directive 4 and that's
8 dated November 19th, 1992. That's P00976. And I'd like to look at that
9 before turning your attention to some other meetings.
10 Now, if we look at page 2 in both languages, we can see, among
11 other things, that the 1st Krajina Corps has preserved and expanded the
12 borders of Republika Srpska. It also indicates at item 6 that the
13 Drina Corps was formed. It indicates, on the third page in English, the
14 tasks from directive 3 that have not yet been carried out; that is, that
15 the towns of Gorazde, Gradacac, Maglaj, Bugojno, Olovo, and Orasje have
16 not been liberated. It indicates that the Posavina corridor has not been
17 substantially widened. Enemy groups in the wider area of Gorazde, Zepa,
18 Srebrenica, and Cerska have not been totally routed.
19 "The Herzegovina Corps has failed to reach the left bank of
20 Neretva river and secure access ..."
21 Looking down on the paragraph below that, in item 4 we again see
22 the instruction to:
23 "Create conditions for the state leadership of Republika Srpska
24 to participate equally in resolving the Crisis Staff in the former BH
25 with other international factors."
1 So just in this brief review of those portions of directive 4, we
2 again see reflections of the focus on the Posavina corridor, the
3 Neretva River, access to the sea, among others, that is, numbers of the
4 strategic objectives; right?
5 A. What's mentioned here is a number of towns, Orasje, Bugojno, and
6 so on. None of these towns are included in the strategic objectives. It
7 was simply that the army, depending on the terrain -- the army included
8 it in the directive. And the three strategic objectives that you
9 mentioned, the corridor, Sarajevo, and coming out to sea and Neretva,
10 those were the political goals that we were entitled to and they were
11 familiar to anyone. And of course the army mentions them too. I don't
12 see anything strange in that, but none of them were accomplished. The
13 corridor was but it was not expanded. It remained 3 kilometres
14 throughout this time.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, didn't the Bosnian Serb leadership prior to the
16 issuance of this directive - and by the Bosnian Serb leadership, in
17 particular I mean Dr. Karadzic and you - remind General Mladic and the
18 VRS of the strategic objectives?
19 A. If we -- I apologise. May I? May I answer?
20 Q. And of course, by that I mean in the context of discussions about
21 upcoming military operations.
22 A. It's quite possible that in some conversation the strategic
23 objectives were mentioned, at a meeting or at a parliament session,
24 because they were generally known. Those were the political objectives
25 that were an obligation for all the people because we would accomplish
1 that politically if we talked and negotiated and so on. The army at the
2 local level, as everyone else, had its own wish to liberate a part of the
3 territory where other members of our people lived and no one could deny
4 them that if they had enough power. But the political goal and objective
5 was not to take other people's territories but only those spaces where
6 ethnic Serbs lived. So it's possible that it may have been mentioned,
7 but it wasn't an order or a threat to the effect that if you don't do
8 that, there will be sanctions against you; or if you fail to do it as a
9 soldier, you will not accomplish the strategic objectives. That's simply
10 not correct.
11 Q. I'm not talking about some incidental or peripheral mention of
12 the strategic objectives. I'm talking about focusing on the need to
13 apply military resources to the political -- to the strategic objectives
14 and, indeed, let's say to certain strategic objectives as opposed to
15 others. That's what the Bosnian Serb leadership did, isn't it?
16 A. 100 times there was discussion about the need to come out to the
17 Neretva or to the sea or that we should get a part of Sarajevo, but that
18 was a political objective that we mentioned in negotiations. No one
19 said: Let us take all of Sarajevo. Let us take -- or where are the
20 borders of Neretva or let us take all of Neum, no. What we once
21 presented at international community negotiations is what was mentioned
22 after that. It is completely normal that we said wherever it was: Look,
23 those are the strategic objectives. It is not Gradacac or Tuzla, which
24 are not ours, but those are the strategic objectives where the Serbs live
25 and where the international mediators have an understanding about this
1 whenever we had negotiations and contacts with them. And that's the
2 whole truth. And the army was supposed to hold the lines reached, which
3 the local units had liberated because we didn't have the solutions. If
4 we did, we would have applied immediately the map we had where we were
5 supposed to return 30 per cent of territory. You have documents about
6 that. I cannot tell you this on top of my head.
7 Q. Okay.
8 MR. TIEGER: If we can go to item 5(d) of this directive, that's
9 the third-to-the-last page in Serbian and the fifth page in the English.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you just scroll down a bit,
11 please, because I don't see anything.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. It's the paragraph that begins with "Drinski Korpus ..."
14 A. If someone could read it out because I really can't read what's
15 written here.
16 THE ACCUSED: Not right page in Serbian.
17 MR. TIEGER: I'm told that there is a better or more readable
18 version of this attached to the same document --
19 JUDGE KWON: Let's see the correct page first.
20 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: I'm told if we go to the back of the -- the
22 third-to-last page of this entire document, it contains a more readable
23 version in Serbian of the portion in question. You can see it here, it's
24 not that hard to read, but I'm told it's better to -- there you go.
25 Thank you.
1 Q. Now, that particular section of directive 4 reads as follows:
2 "The Drina Corps: From its present positions, its main forces
3 are to defend with utmost persistence Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik, and
4 the corridor, while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region
5 are to exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on them,
6 and force them to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas with the
7 Muslim population ..."
8 Now, that's a criminal order, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?
9 A. You asked me such a question during my trial, and by your
10 suggestion, I confirmed this when reading this. However, later on I
11 talked with the author of this directive, Mr. Miletic, who said that he
12 didn't know how such an error could have crept on him. I don't think
13 that it's decent for me to interpret somebody's thoughts. There are
14 people here who can interpret what they wrote. I have seen a hundred
15 times that when something is written, perhaps one single word which would
16 allow a different interpretation may have been omitted. So I cannot
17 confirm what I said once when you suggested to me whether this is
18 correct, yes. If someone said that somebody should be cleansed from a
19 territory, I would say that it is criminal, but I'm not sure if this is
20 correct. You should ask Mr. Miletic or whoever else wrote this in the
21 directive. He didn't tell me that it was criminal, but he told me he
22 wondered that it was formulated as this. He told me in the DU while I
23 was there, and I asked him because I commented on this very vehemently
24 when this was presented to me, just like now, by Mr. Tieger.
25 Q. Well, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, I didn't present that to you,
1 Judge Orie did. And what happened at pages 25605 to 25607 is that you
2 read this portion of directive 4 and then you started explaining, as you
3 were discussing the directive, that you were deeply against ethnic
4 cleansing. And so Judge Orie asked you:
5 "Well, do you consider this to be an order for ethnic cleansing?"
6 To which you said:
7 "Absolutely, yes."
8 So your characterisation of, your interpretation of, your
9 understanding of this directive was not at my suggestion. It was based
10 on a question of the Judge, prompted by your assertions regarding ethnic
11 cleansing. And that's the truth of what happened, isn't it?
12 A. I'm sorry if I blame you and you are not to blame because it
13 turns out that in my case you are only to blame, I mean the Prosecutors.
14 I'm sorry if Judge Orie did that. But anyway, my answer would be the
15 same. I'm sorry that now I have to object against him.
16 I was interpreting what I see written here, and later I talked
17 with Mr. Miletic and I saw that I really took it on myself to interpret
18 something where I was not right because I took it at face value. And I
19 could see this happen in many other instances where you suggested
20 something, probably it was just an extract, and then the one who provided
21 an answer gave a wrong one because the person was not qualified enough to
22 interpret something. What he meant by "cleanse" or not, the one who
23 really wrote it should interpret it. It's really indecent for me to say
24 literally that it is so, and I did say that previously in my own case, I
25 did say: Yes, you are right there.
1 Q. Directive 4, and in particular the portions of directive 4,
2 including this instruction to the Drina Corps, didn't come out of the
3 blue to General Mladic. It came after he was repeatedly reminded by the
4 Bosnian Serb leadership of the need to separate from Muslims, of the risk
5 that Muslims might otherwise become a majority, and of the insistence
6 that clearing the Drina area was the most important task. That's the
7 case, isn't it?
8 A. Mr. Mladic never received a request from us to ethnically cleanse
9 the Drina and this area, that's not correct. And you can see how many
10 public statements of Mr. Karadzic you have here and other leaders, to the
11 effect that they oppose ethnic cleansing. And in every agreement we took
12 on us the obligation that everyone should return to their homes. And
13 since the 27th of March, before the war, Mr. Karadzic was saying: We
14 allow for enclaves to exist in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
15 the Muslim enclaves, and our policy - I'm telling you what our policy
16 was - it was to establish our own Republika Srpska. And according to the
17 Cutileiro Plan, it meant an internal demarcation within
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to form three ethnic constitutive units.
19 Q. I know you want to talk about what was publicly said. Right now
20 I'm interested in what was said to General Mladic in meetings that
21 weren't available to the public. So I asked you if it wasn't the case
22 that General Mladic was reminded of the need to separate from Muslims,
23 the risk that Muslims might otherwise become a majority if that
24 separation didn't take place, and of the -- and reminded and indeed of
25 the Bosnian Serb political leadership's position that clearing the Drina
1 area was the most important or among the most important of upcoming
2 tasks, not what was said to the public.
3 A. I understand this question as several questions. I will try to
4 answer as I have understood it. Ethnic cleansing was not our policy. No
5 one ever issued Mladic the task to ethnically cleanse Eastern Bosnia.
6 Secondly, as for separation, separation was one of the main principles of
7 the Cutileiro Plan and all other plans, in order to form constituent
8 units. That was normal. And thirdly, in each plan there was an
9 obligation for all parties, all sides, including the Serbian one, with
10 regard to refugees who had left their areas, that they are to be able to
11 return, and we all opposed the idea that territories taken by force could
12 be a final solution in any plan nor would we acknowledge that. You will
13 find it in the platform dated at 22nd of April, 1992, issued by
14 Mr. Karadzic and on many other occasions it was stated publicly.
15 What is secret, as you said? I really don't know if there was a
16 meeting. I want to be precise. A secret meeting at which someone said:
17 Let us now expel these people from such and such an area. I don't know.
18 You've seen how many telephone conversations were recorded. It should
19 have been mentioned in some telephone conversation if it was unlawful
20 that Momcilo Krajisnik or Radovan Karadzic said: Let's expel somebody,
21 or somebody may have been angry because we are temperamental, we are such
22 people, but you cannot find it anywhere. So this would be my answer to
23 your long question.
24 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn to P01479, page 131.
25 Q. I want to look at two of the meetings which preceded the issuance
1 of directive 4.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 19 what is missing: [In
5 English] But you cannot find it anywhere to be part of policy.
6 [No interpretation].
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. This is a military political consultation meeting held on the
10 2nd of September, 1992, with a briefing by the commanders of the corps,
11 various corps. And as we go through the document, page 132, we see
12 the -- one of the corps commanders talking about weaponry, a briefing by
13 the 2nd Krajina Corps on page 134; the Eastern Bosnia Corps on 135; the
14 Herzegovina Corps on 136. And beginning on page 140, you speak. And
15 first you express a concern with criticism of the SDS, what you call the
16 movement which brought people together. And then you go on at page 143
17 to explain:
18 "Our aim is to divide with the Muslims. If the Muslims were to
19 capitulate, we would remain with them. If they remained with us, they
20 would soon be the majority."
21 And then on the next page, once again, you remind the military
22 figures, the VRS, the corps commanders in this case and General Mladic,
23 of the strategic aims:
24 Number 1, "dividing with the Croats and Muslims."
25 Number 2, "the corridor."
1 Number 3, "Sarajevo divided."
2 Number 4, and these are now out of order, "Serbs in the Drina
4 "5, border on the Neretva and exit to the sea."
5 So once again in the context of a military meeting at which the
6 corps commanders were explaining the situation in their sectors, you took
7 it upon yourself to again remind them of the strategic objectives;
9 A. Mr. Prosecutor, it would be good if that were so because I recall
10 that we didn't need to go to take Tuzla, Gradacac or Bugojno or
11 territories --
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, sorry, I don't want the explanation why you would
13 or wouldn't have, according to you. I want to know if you dispute this
14 entry and say you didn't describe the strategic -- annunciate the
15 strategic objectives to the military on September 2nd, or if you confirm
16 that you did?
17 A. I don't know, but I believe I did. I don't know that now, but I
18 believe I did. And I don't think it's anything bad nor did I divulge a
19 secret. Everyone knew that because the strategic objectives were public,
20 public knowledge. Each soldier knew it because it was publicly announced
21 and given to the international community, those objectives. I don't see
22 why I wouldn't say: Those are the objectives, don't do the other things.
23 They wanted to take the towns which were not ours. Those were the
24 objectives and not this other thing. Republika Srpska, it needs to be
25 divided, the corridor, these were all the objectives that we had a right
1 to, so I don't see why I wouldn't say that at a meeting.
2 MR. TIEGER: Turning quickly to 65 ter 06305, English pages 37
3 through 41 and B/C/S 33 through 37. This is an extract of the war diary
4 from General Simic from August 1992 to December 1995. And his entry for
5 the same date. If we could continue through the document. Next page,
6 please. Sorry, if we could see the -- I know it's difficult to show
7 both, but the entirety of the page in English.
8 Q. There we see reflections of the same information reflected in
9 General Mladic's diary. Your expression of concern about criticism of
10 the SDS and your defence of the SDS, and then your annunciation of the
11 strategic goals. So at this meeting with the military on September 2nd,
12 Mr. Krajisnik, it's clear that, once again, the Bosnian Serb leadership,
13 this time through you, reminded the military of the goals?
14 A. I'm really trying to understand your question. The strategic
15 objectives were used a hundred times during the war because that was a
16 public document, our political platform for negotiations with foreigners.
17 And on this occasion I know precisely there was a heated discussion
18 between the civilians, the civilian leadership, so to speak, and the
19 army, where they criticised the Serbian Democratic Party and local
20 municipal authorities and they had a hundred objectives and complaints
21 against the civilians. And they requested that some -- their plans about
22 the division of Bosnia down the valley of Usora River should be applied,
23 like half of Bosnia would be Serbian and half Croatian, and Tuzla should
24 belong to Serbs. And then we said: Look, wait, the strategic objectives
25 that we have are that all three sides have the right to this Bosnia.
1 Bosnia is not only Serbian. And the army wanted -- it says here the
2 alliance of communist movement for Yugoslavia. These were the communists
3 who idealised the situation and wanted to establish a new Yugoslavia
4 which was completely unrealistic.
5 So whatever I said was I recall their megalomaniac objectives so
6 this would be put into perspective and that they would pursue the policy,
7 which they didn't want to. Instead they were criticising the policy and
8 believed that the army should resolve everything in the way that it saw
9 fit. That was the objective, rather than the objective was: Gentlemen,
10 here are the war objectives, go into the war and take the Muslim
11 territories. Each strategic objective was our right. To what in
12 accordance to the agreement with Cutileiro and everybody else, we --
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you don't need to explain each time. I want to
14 turn to a meeting of November 8th, this is yet another meeting that took
15 place before the issuance of directive 4.
16 MR. TIEGER: That's found at P1481 beginning at page 141.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. Tieger, are you minded to tender that
18 portion --
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, thank you, Mr. Robinson.
20 MR. ROBINSON: We don't object to pages 37 through 40 which is
21 that particular meeting.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6518, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: Did General Simic testify in this case?
25 MR. TIEGER: No.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, he died. We would
2 have liked to apply 92 quater but we didn't ask for that.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is a meeting of the 8th of November with the
5 corps commanders, and as we can see, the various corps commanders
6 submitted their reports first. So it's a very exacting military
7 briefing. First General Talic, the commander of the 1 KK; then
8 Colonel Boric, the commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps; Colonel Lisica,
9 commander of the Doboj Operations Group; Colonel Simic, commander of the
10 Eastern Bosnia Corps; Colonel Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps,
11 and so on. And at page 145, Dr. Karadzic states that:
12 "The army and our courageous officers contributed enormously to
13 the results that we have achieved to date."
14 We notice -- next page, he notes at page 146 that there is some
15 political concern about operations. The West finds the fall of towns
16 frightening, but then notes:
17 "Maybe it would be good if we solved:
18 "The issue of the Drina."
19 And then you speak, Mr. Krajisnik, and you say:
20 "I admire the military successes.
21 "It is very dangerous to seize their territories.
22 "The Drina and the Neretva ..."
23 And then you state that:
24 "We," meaning the Bosnian Serbs, the political and military
25 authorities, "have a disproportionate engagement of the army in relation
1 to the strategic objectives."
2 And as it notes in the other page, you state:
3 "We have not achieved:
4 "The Neretva, the sea, and the Podrinje area."
5 But note that:
6 "We have achieved:
7 "The corridor and separation with the Muslims."
8 And you continue that:
9 "The most pressing thing is to mop up Orasje and then to solve
10 the problem of the Podrinje area and the Neretva River Valley as soon as
12 "The Muslims must not stay with us and they should not be given
13 any kind of autonomy.
14 "The most important objective is the task assigned to
15 Zivanovic - the ciscenje of the Drina.
16 "The most important task is separation from the Muslims."
17 A. Can you just go back to the page before that, the previous page,
18 and then could we go back to this one. Please, just the Serbian version.
19 This is a confirmation of what I said a moment ago.
20 "It is very dangerous to take their territories."
21 And then I said the Drina and the Neretva, it's probably our
22 strategic objective. I'm saying that:
23 "We have this disproportionate engagement of the army in relation
24 to the strategic objectives."
25 Can we now go back to the previous page, or rather, the next
2 Here also:
3 "Separation with the Muslims," all right.
4 "The most important objective is," I saw that somewhere, is to
5 end the war as far as I can remember. It says so somewhere. Ah, yes,
6 "we must bring the war to an end." That is probably what the situation
7 was. It is not written there. Soldiers presented different proposals
8 and I mentioned some; that is to say, Tuzla should be in
9 Republika Srpska. You saw a moment ago Gradacac, Bugojno, and so on. I
10 said there: Gentlemen, there are political objectives. You cannot take
11 something that is our policy and ours. The war should be brought to an
12 end as soon as possible. It was not my opinion; it was the opinion of
13 the political leadership.
14 And what is mentioned here, separation, all the time, separation
15 is the establishment of our own constituent unit. And our objective was
16 the following: If we could not remain in Yugoslavia, if somebody kicked
17 us out, then we reached this compromise with the international community.
18 You will get your constituent unit within Bosnia-Herzegovina. And
19 national homogenisation should be applied or, rather, the ethnic key to
20 establish your constituent unit. So that is the basic objective, a
21 replacement for Yugoslavia. We lost our state and got our constituent
22 unit. That's what I'm highlighting here.
23 I don't know how he interpreted this and how he refers to it, but
24 I recognise that those are exactly the traces, or rather, the paths as
25 set by the political leadership in the war, to reach peace as soon as
1 possible even by conceding territory, but not by taking the territory of
3 The large territory that was liberated by our army, and that is
4 5 or 6 per cent more than we had, according to the land register, that
5 created problems during the negotiations. That's a problem when you have
6 too much territory, you cannot chart a proper map, you cannot reach
7 agreement, and you don't know which territory should be returned.
8 Everybody at local level wants to have other territories returned, not
9 theirs, so that was a disadvantage for us rather than an advantage. Of
10 course it's not an advantage to have a very small territory like at the
11 very end, but 70 per cent of the territory was a problem for us. It had
12 to be reduced to 49 per cent and that is difficult.
13 Q. And so in order to reduce the territory, according to you, you
14 said: Here's what we've achieved so far, the corridor, that was achieved
15 by the military, right, Operation Corridor? That was a military
16 achievement, wasn't it?
17 A. I've already said that we had agreed with the Croats on how this
18 could be resolved politically. Of course, when it is not possible to
19 resolve it politically and people were dying there because there was a
20 humanitarian disaster, then the military made a corridor there, very
21 small, 3 kilometres, no more, so that a truck could pass through. Didn't
22 take Orasje, didn't take Gradacac, didn't take a larger territory,
23 although they did leave part of Serb territory on their side. So this
24 was a humanitarian necessity, the army had to take that. There didn't
25 have to be a task involved. If 12 babies died at a maternity ward, of
1 course people felt: Yes, we should all break through this corridor so
2 that we could have humanitarian aid provided. Also, the Neretva, we did
3 not manage to achieve that. Our army was on the Neretva river when the
4 JNA was there, when they were leaving. But, quite simply, they withdrew
5 from an area that was ours.
6 Q. Three of the strategic objectives that hadn't been achieved by
7 that date were the Neretva, access to the sea, and the Podrinje area.
8 You pointed out the disproportionate allocation of military resources to
9 the overall strategic objectives and said: Right now the most important
10 task -- the most important objective is the task assigned to Zivanovic,
11 the commander of the Drina Corps, and that is the "ciscenje" of the
12 Drina, and that objective was reflected in directive 4 which was issued
13 on November 19th. That's what happened.
14 A. My participation in the discussion had nothing to do with the
15 directive. I did not know what kind of directive had been made and I did
16 not quote these directives. I just said at that meeting -- I remember
17 that meeting very well. The situation was tense at that meeting between
18 the civilian and the military representatives. They had different ideas
19 of their own as to what should be done. I was just trying to channel
20 things and to say what our political objective was, and the objective was
21 not to cleanse the Drina. Of course, there were a lot of hostilities
22 there and a lot of blood was shed on both sides. So I was just saying
23 what the strategic was and that was the corridor.
24 You saw our map, corridor, contiguous territory, and the enclaves
25 should remain in the eastern part of Republika Srpska, of course, in the
1 western part, Serb ethnic territory should remain. So we did lose that
2 afterwards, so we ultimately, in the final solution, got things that did
3 not involve a majority Serb population and we lost others that -- where
4 Serbs were not the majority population, but that was not our objective
5 throughout the war.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These last lines, it seems that we
9 lost what was ours and we got what was ours. The witness said that we
10 lost something that had been purely Serb and we got something where the
11 Serbs were not a majority.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
13 Shall we continue tomorrow, Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: Of course, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: Hearing is adjourned.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day of
18 November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.