1 Wednesday, 20 November 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Good morning, Mr. President. I'd like to
9 introduce to the Chamber Joaquim Gaye, who is from France and is working
10 as an intern during this term in our office. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue.
12 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Just one quick matter.
14 The Court has raised a scheduling possibility concerning the week of the
15 9th through the 13th. As it turns out, I'm the one who has a previous
16 commitment. I should have remembered it at the time with -- actually,
17 with the ICC. So that would present a problem for me. Let me say
18 quickly that if it's a matter of my being present versus a member of the
19 Bench, then by all means I'll make whatever arrangements are necessary
20 and we should not -- we shouldn't sit pursuant to 15 bis unnecessarily.
21 But if it's simply another matter that doesn't implicate someone's
22 presence, then I would of course prefer to be here all four days. So I
23 leave it to the Court with that information, I'm otherwise previously
24 committed on Friday, but I don't believe I have a witness at that time so
25 my absence can be dealt with.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Your kindness is very much appreciated. We'll sit
3 from 10th to 13th in that week. Please continue.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
5 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
6 [Witness answered through interpreter]
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when we adjourned we were discussing the meeting
9 of November 8th, 1992, that's P1481, and if we could turn to page 147.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think we have some technical difficulties. Shall
11 we take a short break. Five minutes.
12 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
13 --- Break taken at 9.05 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 9.11 a.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: I hope it is okay now.
16 MR. TIEGER: Then we should begin by again calling up P1481 at
17 page 147.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we discussed before we adjourned the portion of
19 this discussion that related to the "ciscenje" of the Drina, but you
20 mentioned at that meeting two pressing tasks, not only "ciscenje" of the
21 Drina but that the -- also stated that the most pressing thing is to
22 "ociste" Orasje. Now, you mentioned Orasje once or twice here in this
23 court in passing, but the subject of Orasje also came up during your
24 trial, correct, and your testimony?
25 A. I suppose so.
1 Q. Well, first of all, for the -- Orasje was a municipality in
2 northern Bosnia that was about 80 per cent non-Serb, that is, it was a
3 vastly majority non-Serb municipality; correct?
4 MR. TIEGER: If we could call up 65 ter 00242Q.
5 Q. That's a reflection of the demographics of Orasje with vast
6 predominance of Croats and Serbs comprising about 19 per cent or so of
7 the population; right?
8 A. I suppose that is true. I don't know the exact figures, but
9 Orasje was mostly populated by the Croats.
10 Q. And the context in which Orasje came up in your trial was in
11 connection with questions regarding what you had said in a broadcast
12 where you were standing in front of an ethnic map.
13 MR. TIEGER: And if we could have -- I tender the 65 ter 00242Q,
14 the census, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
16 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6519, Your Honours.
17 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
18 Q. So in your trial there were -- there was a point at which you
19 were asked questions about what you had said in connection with an ethnic
20 map, and we can -- that video is in evidence in this case and I'd like to
21 show you a quick still of that, 65 ter 25658.
22 All right. Now, that's a still taken from what is in evidence in
23 this case and what was shown in your case, P797, which begins with you
25 "We are standing in front of an ethnic map of former
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina with marked borders of the territory that is
2 presently possessed by the Bosnian Serb army. I can only say that what
3 was being said, that we are possessing the territories ethnically
4 populated by the other national communities, that is not true, as can be
5 seen on the ethnic man of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we can cover with
6 a transparent sheet on which the territories are exactly marked which is
7 possessed by our army, that those are in fact areas that belong to our
9 Now, the Presiding Judge asked you some questions at that point
10 and he noted that at one -- and now we're referring to transcript
11 pages 25645 and 25646 in your case. He noted that you had said that,
12 although this vast horseshoe area represented in the blue/green
13 represented the areas possessed by your army, the areas that you said
14 were in fact areas that belonged to our people, that there was a smaller
15 area that's not yet held by our forces. I mean, it's not liberated yet,
16 that is Orasje. And the Judge asked you to point to Orasje. And you
18 "Oh, Orasje is Croatian. There's no problem there. That wasn't
19 the correct statement on my part."
20 You said Orasje was Croatian along the Sava River and "you're
21 quite right, we didn't have the right to Orasje." That's what you told
22 Judge Orie. And you [sic] said:
23 "Yes, but you said: It still has to be liberated."
24 And you said:
25 "Yes, I did."
1 You pointed out -- and you said:
2 "But I wasn't right there. I wasn't right on that score."
3 Now, first of all, that's a correct summary, is it not, of the
4 exchange that took place in your trial between you and Judge Orie in
5 connection with this ethnic map and the issue of Orasje?
6 A. First of all, you have raised a complex issue regarding the map,
7 but I will come to the map later. I suppose and I believe that it is
8 true that this exchange took place as you described, but it was a similar
9 exchange to the one that I mentioned last time --
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
11 A. -- when I presented to you --
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
13 A. Please, excuse me, sorry. You posed a complex question to me.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, the question was rather
15 complex. Let him continue. Let's see what he's up to.
16 Please continue, Mr. Krajisnik.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, I have to object.
18 Mr. Tieger wants to achieve a goal by posing wrong questions without
19 going into details --
20 JUDGE KWON: No, no, no, no. That's not correct observation.
21 He's entitled to put his case. He's entitled to put any questions.
22 Please try to answer the question and we'll give you an opportunity to
23 explain further, if necessary. The question was mainly about Orasje,
24 your position --
25 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, if I may, Mr. President. The question
1 was simply whether or not that's what he said under oath when he
2 testified previously. So that part is fairly simple.
3 JUDGE KWON: He confirmed that and he wanted to explain.
4 MR. TIEGER: I understand that, but I just wanted to clarify --
5 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're right. You're right. I
7 said that I don't doubt that the record is correct. I don't remember all
8 the details, though, but I do remember the map. This is a complex issue
9 and every answer that I give would be incomplete unless I give you a
10 thorough explanation. That was the only comment that I wanted to make.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Okay. Now, that explanation --
13 JUDGE KWON: So you confirm that it is your mistake to refer to
14 Orasje as a smaller area to be liberated?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't my mistake. I rather
16 gave a wrong answer. I don't know to date whether this is correct, what
17 is stated in Mr. Mladic's diary. I didn't say that Orasje needs to be
18 liberated and that I'm showing on the map that Orasje should belong to
19 the Croats, and I never entertained an opinion that the Serbian army
20 should take hold of the area, that according to our maps and the plan and
21 the agreement with the Croatian side should belong to the Croatian
22 side --
23 JUDGE KWON: No, no, your comment about Orasje was broadcast in
24 TV Pale. You see, this is a -- you see yourself in front of map, that's
25 a video -- part of the video conveying your statement. In that statement
1 you are said to have commented that Orasje should be liberated.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I would kindly ask the part of
3 the statement to be read out, the one that accompanies this video.
4 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we play that.
5 MR. TIEGER: Sure. Of course.
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether the interpreters have the
7 transcript --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would be the best approach.
9 JUDGE KWON: It's only one-page document.
10 MR. TIEGER: P797.
11 JUDGE KWON: Or we can print it out.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The booths don't have the transcript.
13 MR. TIEGER: I can give them a hard copy if you want to run it up
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be coming. The Registry could print it
16 out in a minute.
17 Mr. Krajisnik, are you happy to read this transcript or would you
18 like to hear the sound -- the video?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that it would be enough
20 for me to read the transcript.
21 JUDGE KWON: One moment.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Well, you can see it -- you can see the word "Orasje" on line 32,
24 if that's of assistance.
25 A. I can answer now.
1 Q. All right. You said it in the video; correct?
2 A. In this video I would like to explain what I meant regarding
3 Orasje. I'll start with this part that deals with the proximity of
4 Orasje. The territory of Republika Srpska is actually represented by the
5 border along the Una river, the Sava River, with a smaller area that is
6 not yet under our forces. I mean, it is not liberated yet, that is
7 Orasje. That is the border of Semberija, et cetera. Then further on,
8 it's the territory of Semberija, territory of Ozren, and territory of
9 eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. We presented as our territory to the
10 Croatian community in Graz, and so on and so forth.
11 Namely, one can see here -- perhaps it's just a problem of
12 comprehension. I'm saying that we are looking at the border that was
13 being held by our forces, so maybe it was not the happiest way of
14 formulating the phrase to liberate Orasje. What I meant was that Orasje
15 was there in the part where our forces were not on the Sava, but I made
16 reference to the talks that we had with the Croats in Graz when we said
17 that, generally speaking, there should be a corridor and that by exchange
18 of territories we could have part of Posavina populated by Croats. This
19 is not an invitation nor a claim to Croatian territories. This is rather
20 an implicit indication that we did discuss Semberija and Posavina with
21 the Croats in Graz, and, now, when I'm showing the map, I say that our
22 goal is the Sava, whereas at present we are still not holding the
23 territory or the part of territory with Orasje in it. This should never
24 be interpreted in that way. Maybe it was not put in a correct way,
25 meaning that we should occupy it militarily. I was just pointing to the
1 map and to the fact that there is a place called Orasje there that was
2 not under the control of our forces.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you said in this broadcast, referring to areas
4 that had been taken by and were held by the VRS, that this is what was
5 possessed with one exception, Orasje, that had not yet been liberated.
6 You pressed on November 8th for the VRS to "ociste" Orasje, and you
7 continued -- you and Dr. Karadzic continued to press for the duration of
8 the war for the VRS to take Orasje, which had not been successfully taken
9 and were still doing so in 1995; correct?
10 A. Well, for sure the army tried to reach the Sava River. In the
11 end that was the military plan that one should not have enemy forces
12 behind one's back when we're talking about the corridor. But this is
13 already a stage of the war when large territories, Serbian territories,
14 fell under somebody else's command and then it was normal that everybody
15 at the local level tried to expand the territories of their own ethnic
16 community. But that was not what you say, that it was an instruction.
17 I'm just going to remind you of your own conversation. You mentioned
18 that last time we did brief Mr. Adzic on the 6th and 7th of May and
19 Mr. Mladic as well, this is what you said, discussing the strategic
20 goals. Then the JNA held Neretva and an exit to the sea, and what
21 happened? Just a few days later the Yugoslav army withdrew. The local
22 army --
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, stop. We're still talking about Orasje. You've
24 just said -- apparently the answer to my question is no. You didn't
25 continue to press for the VRS to take Orasje, but that locals may have
1 done so.
2 MR. TIEGER: So I'd like to turn to P1473, at English page 130
3 through 131 and B/C/S 132 to 133 --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just wanted to be more precise,
6 please. This is not what I said. I need to make a slight correction.
7 What I said at the end of the war when the territories began to be
8 captured outside of what we had talked about it and agreed with the
9 Croats in Graz, then a large number of the territories belonging to the
10 other ethnic community were in question. And then of course, as far as
11 Orasje is concerned, the army wanted to clear that area, to capture it
12 militarily, so as not to have soldiers behind their backs in relation to
13 the corridor. So these are all these situations in which the war was
14 waged. I didn't say that there were conversations where Orasje should be
15 taken. It was simply a question of securing the corridor, and then again
16 in talks these things would be resolved politically and not through the
17 military situation on the ground.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. The document in front of us now, P1473, at page 130, reflects a
20 meeting between General Mladic and President Milosevic, General Perisic,
21 and General Gvero. As we can see at the beginning, President Milosevic
22 states that he received Mr. Karadzic and you, Mr. Krajisnik, the day
23 earlier. They said bad things about you and also attacked Gvero.
24 Milosevic notes:
25 "It is my impression that Krajisnik is normal but stupid.
1 Karadzic is overburdened with history, he's not normal. They live in a
2 kind of historic fantasy world ..."
3 He goes on to say -- to claim that:
4 "There is no military solution for the crisis in Yugoslavia ...,"
5 pressing for a political solution.
6 And then observes:
7 "They," still referring to you and Mr. Karadzic, "say that they
8 should seize Orasje."
9 And he says:
10 "You cannot keep 70 per cent of the territory."
11 If we move to the next page, he then discusses what he wants to
12 present in connection with the negotiations, and then continues toward
13 the bottom of the page. There was clearly a discussion about those
14 negotiations with you and Mr. Karadzic. And then he says:
15 "Moma," apparently referring to you, "wrote it down, but we'll
16 see what they will do. They are carried away by the idea of seizing
18 "I don't think Radovan will accept; he is a bad student of
19 history and he's in some sort of poetic fervour."
20 Now, that, Mr. Krajisnik, is a reflection of your continuing
21 focus on Orasje which began in 1992, was reflected in the broadcast that
22 we saw, in the meeting of 8 November, in directive 4, and now continuing
23 on into 1995.
24 A. First of all, the map does not date from 1992. If you can see,
25 you can see that in the eastern part there were no enclaves which did
1 exist. This is probably a map from 1995 or 1994. Secondly --
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, excuse me --
3 A. -- I don't know now --
4 Q. Do you acknowledge in your own case, and I'll find the reference,
5 but maybe you can confirm, if you -- if you remember, that you
6 acknowledge that map as from 1992 or 1993?
7 A. The map is not from 1992.
8 Q. The map and the broadcast. I'll find you the reference and then
9 you can continue.
10 A. Could you please find my written objection to you where I said
11 that this is not a map from 1992. If you look at the map, you'll see
12 that there were no enclaves on it, no Srebrenica, no Zepa, and they did
13 exist -- they didn't exist in 1992. In negotiations with the
14 international community is where the map comes from, not the map that
15 we're talking about. If you look, you will see.
16 JUDGE KWON: Well, let's come to 1995, May, about this entry. Do
17 you have any observation on this?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can see here that there is a
19 misunderstanding between Mr. Milosevic and myself and Mr. Karadzic and
20 where he's using quite inappropriate language. This was at the time when
21 the Contact Group plan was on the agenda. As for Orasje, I am not ruling
22 out the possibility that at that time in 1995, when all the values were
23 turned upside down, where force was on the agenda, where some of our
24 territories were taken, the primary thing was for the army in Orasje not
25 to have enemies behind their back in a very narrow corridor. I'm not
1 ruling out that this was something that we discussed, but that was
2 definitely never our policy right from the beginning to the end of the
4 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn quickly to page -- to 65 ter 25522
5 at page 25645.
6 Q. That's part of the discussion that you and Judge Orie were having
7 about this video and about your assertion that there's a smaller area not
8 yet held by our forces, it's not yet liberated yet, that is Orasje. And
9 you say:
10 "I think the map was a 1993 map or whenever. Perhaps it was
11 1992. Not quite sure ..."
12 That was your testimony in the context of the very discussion
13 about this map with Judge Orie that I raised --
14 JUDGE KWON: Where is it?
15 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry. 25645, lines 6 through 7.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, sir, even if I had
17 said that, I kindly ask you to look at the map. There is no Srebrenica
18 or Zepa on the map, so that means that it could not date from 1992, 1993,
19 or 1994, but only from 1995 and not even that. The map is a proposal to
20 the international community how to create a tripartite Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina. If you look at it, you will see that it could not have been
22 a map from 1992 or 1993 or 1994. Even if I had said that, I made a
23 mistake. I was talking about the map that we had presented to the
24 international community, I know that precisely, as a proposal. Of course
25 the line of separation is there also, our front line.
1 MR. TIEGER: All right. I tender the --
2 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the next page as well.
3 We'll admit these two pages.
4 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
5 JUDGE KWON: We'll add it to Exhibit P6516.
6 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
7 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, your explanation that that map must be 1995
8 because it doesn't show Srebrenica, Zepa, or Gorazde, how does that make
9 sense? Did you have Gorazde in 1995?
10 A. No, no. I said the map cannot date from 1992, 1993, or 1994. It
11 can date from 1995. I'm saying that the map that I was talking about is
12 the map indicating the line that was held by our forces, marking our
13 front line. It could not have been the actual, real map from 1992
14 because none of the enclaves are there that existed at the time. So the
15 map could not be from 1992, 1993, or 1994. It could possibly be from
16 1995, but this is a map that we put forward as a proposal to the
17 international community. It's two maps, one is like a transparent film
18 on top of it, the actual map, and then the lines of division that are on
19 the transparency.
20 Q. Oh, I see, that was your proposal to the international community,
21 that that horseshoe represented the portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 that you considered was Serbian and that you considered the
23 international community should bestow on the Bosnian Serbs?
24 A. This map was a proposal at one of the conferences. There are a
25 number of press conferences where the same map appears. In Belgrade,
1 Mr. Karadzic also interpreted this map as our proposal to be discussed at
2 one of the conferences. As to whether it's a realistic one or not,
3 that's a different matter, but it's a map dating from that period.
4 Q. All right. So two mistakes in this broadcast, number one, the
5 reference to Orasje -- or in your testimony, number one, the reference to
6 Orasje; and number two, the reference to the fact that this map dates
7 from 1992 and 1993. Any other mistakes in your testimony to Judge Orie
8 regarding this broadcast that you need to bring to our attention?
9 A. You put five questions at the same time. I was clear. That map
10 that I was explaining was a map that we gave to the international
11 community, it was our proposal. Secondly, when I explained that, I said:
12 Look, we are not holding all the territories that we -- that belong to us
13 except for Orasje. I did mention the strategic goal -- well, I don't
14 know if there were any other mistakes or errors. If you ask me, then I
15 will be able to tell you. But I was never for capturing the territory of
16 the other -- of another ethnic community that could not belong to us when
17 the final division is decided on.
18 Q. All right. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you may -- you and your forces
19 may not have been able to take Orasje during the course of the conflict,
20 but as --
21 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to interrupt you. Do we not have the date
22 of that broadcast?
23 MR. TIEGER: No, it had to be contextually dated, Mr. President.
24 It was dated by a witness or two, but before Mr. Krajisnik testified; and
25 then it was dated by him. But the date does not appear on the broadcast
2 JUDGE KWON: So the date appearing on the English translation as
3 1992 is not a correct one?
4 MR. TIEGER: Well, it's not a reflection of the specified date on
5 the broadcast itself, no. But it was a reflection of the aggregation of
6 testimony in the previous case and aggregation of testimony largely in
7 this case.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
9 [Prosecution counsel confer]
10 MR. TIEGER: And I might also add, and I'll check on that, it was
11 part of materials that we received and -- so I also imagine that when it
12 was originally dated in that manner it was related to the other portions
13 of the broadcast that were provided.
14 JUDGE KWON: But the year does not appear in the B/C/S version, I
15 just note that.
16 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
17 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. As I said, Mr. Krajisnik, your forces may not have been able to
20 take Orasje, but as we know from the evidence in this case and as we can
21 see from this horseshoe map and from what you stated, that there were
22 many other places that were populated primarily by non-Serbs which were
23 taken. For example, if we look at the right side of that horseshoe,
24 among the municipalities included there is Foca, which you'll agree was a
25 predominantly Muslim -- was a Muslim-majority municipality prior to the
1 conflict; correct?
2 A. Foca was divided at the beginning of the war. If you want to say
3 who the majority was, well there was almost an equal number of Serbs and
4 Muslims. In the elections even a Serbian deputy from that municipality
5 won. So the number of Muslims was practically equal to that of the
6 Serbs, perhaps a percentage or two larger, but then part of the
7 municipality was allocated to the Muslims.
8 Q. Well, we've received evidence in this case, including through
9 statements made by Petko Cancar at the Assembly in front of you, that
10 by -- that not that long after the conflict began that Foca had become
11 almost an entirely Serbian municipality; that is, I think as Cancar said,
12 you'd have trouble finding any Muslims within the territory of Foca which
13 was geographically among the largest municipalities in Bosnia. I'd like
14 to look at what you said when you went to Foca after the conflict began
15 and after the municipality no longer had -- not only no longer had a
16 Muslim majority, but had few Muslims at all.
17 MR. TIEGER: And that's P06204. I'd like to play that. And the
18 date of this broadcast is 21 May 1994.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Brothers and sisters, high priests,
21 president of Srbinje Municipal Assembly, members of the Assembly, dear
22 Professor Kilibarda, dear people of Srbinje, it is a great pleasure to be
23 among you after two and a half years. Today you are not as you were
24 before. Now I see a true Serbian town, and you proudly bear your true
25 Serbian name. You are the example to every Serb because all that was
1 coming from this town you've managed to eliminate. You've prevented it
2 from happening. From this town, from this community, the hardest things
3 were aimed at the Serbian people by the then-leaders of the
4 Serbian-Muslim organisation, the SDA. Then, Mr. Izetbegovic ..."
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The video stopped. I don't know
6 what happened.
7 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think this is enough for
9 what you would like to ask me, so I don't think there is a problem.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Okay. Fine. Was that you preparing the people of Foca for the
12 return of the Muslim population after the conflict ended?
13 A. Well, this is a barbed and spiteful question a little bit,
14 Mr. Prosecutor, because I was giving a political speech here and I can
15 explain every single thing. Of course today I would speak differently,
16 but then it was war and I tried to choose carefully every word; and I can
17 interpret each of those words, if you're interested.
18 Q. We have that in evidence. I want to move on to what you said
19 about the document known as Variant A and B, that is, the instructions of
20 December 19th, 1991. Now, here in this trial you said in response to
21 questions about -- from Dr. Karadzic that everything you say now is --
22 was also reflected in what you testified to in your own trial. And this
23 appears here at 43201. You minimise the importance of the document. You
24 said you didn't know when it was distributed and that was essentially it.
25 What you said in your own case, and I'll ask you to confirm, is also that
1 you don't remember the document being distributed, you didn't get the
2 document at the time, if you had received that document you would have
3 just put it away because you never found it was important, you never
4 heard from any locality that they had implemented it, and you discussed
5 how groundless and unnecessary it was; correct?
6 A. It's all correct, except for this part that I had never heard of
7 it. Perhaps that's an omission. I'm sure I did hear of it, but today I
8 did feel that it was superfluous. Perhaps as far as the municipalities
9 are concerned, the concern is there and I think it was not implemented in
10 a number of municipalities, at least 50 or 60 per cent of them, and I
11 think there could have been a recommendation for each municipality
12 without the document A and B. The document A and B is quite illogical
13 and difficult to implement had anyone wished to implement it. As for me
14 not knowing when it was distributed, that is correct. I do not have any
15 recollection on anybody distributing it in my presence. I really was not
16 aware of anybody distributing the A and B document in my presence.
17 Q. All right. Now, in connection with the Variant A and B document,
18 Dr. Karadzic asked you at transcript page 43207 the following leading
20 "Two days before that, on the 19th of December, did you attend
21 the plenary session of the Serbian Democratic Party?"
22 And you said:
23 "I believe so.
24 "Q. You've already discussed this. Was there any debate about
25 papers A and B, debate and decision?
1 "A. No."
2 Then -- now, the fact is that the plenary that took place before
3 the Assembly session on the 21st of December didn't take place on the
4 19th, it took place on the 20th. And let me show you two documents to
5 indicate that. First, if we could look at P5792, an intercepted
6 telephone conversation between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Novakovic on the
7 19th of December. Here on the first page we see Dr. Karadzic talking to
8 Novakovic and saying about some others:
9 "They can go fuck themselves. I'll introduce ... this Friday
10 I'll introduce a second-degree state of emergency and I'll teach everyone
11 who fucks around a fuckin' lesson."
12 Novakovic says:
13 "Is that so?"
15 "Yes, yes ... they were here from ... this region and they'll let
16 you know about who needs to come. It's our Assembly session here on
18 So Saturday was the 21st, Friday was the 20th, and that was the
19 date on which the plenary was held. And, secondly, I would like you to
20 look at a portion of the Grkovic diary --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, excuse me. Can we
22 finish this first. This piling up of documents is improper.
23 MR. TIEGER: Fine.
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, does that refresh your recollection now in
25 contrast to your response to Dr. Karadzic's leading question that the
1 plenary was held on the 20th and not the 19th?
2 A. I believe that Mr. Karadzic was wrong. The plenary was not on
3 the 20th, but the Deputies Club was held together with representatives or
4 deputies from the SDS. We had a meeting with representatives of the SDS,
5 deputies from the board. And so I probably wasn't present when this was
6 distributed because I was doing this other thing. So when the -- this
7 was being distributed, it's possible that I was in another office.
8 Q. And just to confirm that recollection, if we could look at
9 65 ter 08201 at English pages 58 through 59 and B/C/S 64. Just showing
10 you the entry for the 19th, to orient, use the diary. If we could -- so
11 we see here the entries for the 19th -- we show -- yeah, thank you. And
12 then if we could turn to the next page, the 20th. And there we see the
13 listing for the meeting of the Main Board and the Deputies Club, so the
14 SDS representatives and the deputies as you referred to earlier. So
15 again, that's a reflection of the fact that the large meeting which
16 preceded the Assembly session, that is, the 4th Assembly Session on the
17 21st, took place on the 20th and not the 19th, as Dr. Karadzic suggested
18 to you in his question during your examination-in-chief?
19 A. I think that you're right. On the 20th, it had been scheduled
20 for the 19th, as you saw on that paper a moment ago, at 12.00 at that,
21 but it was held on the 20th. I think that you're right. I think it was
22 on the 20th just before the session of the Assembly.
23 MR. TIEGER: And I tender that portion of the diary.
24 JUDGE KWON: Whose diary is this?
25 MR. TIEGER: This is Mr. Grkovic, his diary. This was -- a
1 portion of this was tendered by Dr. Karadzic earlier and during the --
2 when he tendered that, he mentioned that Mr. Grkovic was "my chef de
3 cabinet in the Serbian Democratic Party." So this is the diary of
4 Mr. Karadzic's chef de cabinet at the time.
5 JUDGE KWON: Shall we include page 2 of this document?
6 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think it would be
8 appropriate to admit this entire document, 08201. This -- we've admitted
9 Dr. Karadzic's agenda for 1995. It's been useful. It's been referred to
10 different times. I think it would be useful also to have this admitted
11 in its entirety for the same reason.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: I don't have any objection, Mr. President.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it in its entirety.
16 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6520, Your Honours.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the reason I asked for this date to be
19 clarified is that there was a -- there's a telephone conversation between
20 Dr. Karadzic and yourself that's in evidence, that's P2550, which refers
21 to what happened at the previous day. So it was important to know what
22 happened that previous day.
23 MR. TIGER: And if we could call up P2550 --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger. Part of that diary was
25 admitted already as evidence in our case?
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. That would be D215 and it's
2 discussed -- its admission or tendering was discussed at transcript pages
3 2713 through 14.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then why don't we admit it in its
5 entirety as D215 instead of producing --
6 MR. TIEGER: I understand.
7 JUDGE KWON: -- another exhibit number. Yes, we'll strike out
8 the P number, 6520.
9 MR. TIEGER: Although I suspect for clarity there will have to be
10 some -- I imagine the Registry can take care of that, some way to
11 identify where in the diary the portion that was being discussed and
12 tendered at 215 can be found so that there is no confusion about that,
13 but that shouldn't be very difficult.
14 JUDGE KWON: The Registry will make sure to leave some reference
15 to that.
16 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
17 P2550, please.
18 Q. A conversation between you, Mr. Karadzic -- Mr. Krajisnik and
19 Mr. Karadzic on the 21st.
20 A. Please.
21 Q. And if we could turn to page 3, we see that there is a discussion
22 about -- or a reference to Mr. Cizmovic. And Dr. Karadzic says:
23 "You know what, who will implement what we issued last night?"
24 And you say:
25 "This Council of Ministers."
1 He says:
2 "But they can't run from municipality to municipality."
3 You say:
5 And he says:
6 "They cannot run from municipality to municipality and say, Do
7 this, do that or that."
8 You say:
9 "He won't run either."
10 And Dr. Karadzic says:
11 "But he must run."
12 Now, that reference of Cizmovic running from municipality to
13 municipality and implementing what we issued last night is a reference to
14 the Variant A and B document and to Cizmovic's role in attempting to
15 ensure that the municipalities move forward on its implementation;
17 A. That's not it. You can find an answer here in the next
18 paragraph, if you take a look at that. You see where you read this and
19 then later on it says:
20 "Yes, but do you see what he is doing? But all right. It is not
21 important. Well, you know, we put it in, you know, like an article.
22 Then we down sized it, right."
23 Mr. Cizmovic became chairman of the Council of Ministers and he
24 was supposed to synchronise the members of the council that were supposed
25 to pursue policy -- no, not policy, many decisions that were reached by
1 the Assembly. So this is an answer -- this comment of mine is an answer
2 to your question about Mr. Cizmovic as a member of the
3 ministerial council who was supposed synchronise the implementation of
4 the decisions on the ground.
5 Q. Mr. Cizmovic, as you stated in your testimony in the Krajisnik --
6 in your own case was a "confidant" of Mr. Karadzic and "he kept him
7 informed"; right? That's what you testified to in your case?
8 A. Well, I was a bit nasty there because Cizmovic is a Montenegrin
9 like Mr. Karadzic, so perhaps I made a bit of a joke in terms of the
10 confidence involved. He had no particular importance. Maybe he did
11 inform Karadzic about certain things, but I would not say that he was a
12 man of particular confidence.
13 MR. TIEGER: I tender 25053, Mr. President, where those
14 references are made.
15 Q. You also testified --
16 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry.
17 JUDGE KWON: Can we looked at the page --
18 MR. TIEGER: Sure. We can call it up.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, I have difficulty admitting the page we didn't
21 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 25522, lines 20 through 21 at page 25053.
22 JUDGE KWON: But before we move to that transcript, do you agree
23 the -- it is the Variant A and -- document that you were talking about
24 with Mr. Karadzic and you in this intercept?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely not.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 25522 I think is being called up. And the
3 page as mentioned is 25053, lines 20 through 21. Can we scroll up,
4 please. Well, it seems to be miscited here. One moment. Well, I'll
5 return to that in a moment. Sorry, it's missed by one page, 25054 and
6 the lines are the same.
7 Q. "Mr. Cizmovic was a Montenegrin and so was Mr. Karadzic, and he
8 was a confidant of Mr. Karadzic and he kept him informed ..."
9 That was your testimony in 2006.
10 A. Yes, and the continuation is very important and I explain why.
11 It was this sort of nasty observation of mine, not really malicious or
12 anything like that. I was alluding to the fact that most of them were
13 Montenegrin. It's not that Cizmovic was that important. You will see
14 from all these documents that he had no role, no particular role. He was
15 co-ordinator of the Council of Ministers at first, or something like that
16 as far as I can remember, but afterwards he was simply lost.
17 Q. Well, in keeping with that theme, you also stated in your
18 testimony - and we'll be able to see the extent to which Mr. Cizmovic
19 kept Mr. Karadzic informed - but you also said there were hundreds of
20 representatives of Mr. Karadzic like that, meaning like Mr. Cizmovic,
21 whom he sent into the field. And that's at 25070, lines 4 through 8.
22 That was also your testimony?
23 A. Because of poor communication, because of different kinds of
24 misinformation, because of different kinds of fear in terms of what was
25 going on in the field, Mr. Karadzic kept trying to receive the right kind
1 of information so that he could take certain measures, and that could be
2 seen from his different statements when he alluded to certain information
3 that he was receiving from the ground. And one of them was Mr. Cizmovic.
4 It wasn't a countless number, but it was a large number of people who
5 were similar to Cizmovic.
6 Q. Okay. And the way you phrased it in 2006 is:
7 "There were hundreds of representatives of Mr. Karadzic like that
8 whom he sent into the field ..."; correct?
9 A. Well, all right. I exaggerated a bit. It's not hundreds, but it
10 was certainly a large number, a few of them.
11 MR. TIEGER: Can I tender both those pages then, Mr. President,
12 25053 [sic] and 25070.
13 JUDGE KWON: The second page that we are looking at, how do you
14 know this is a reference to Cizmovic?
15 MR. TIEGER: Because -- if you want to see the previous page to
16 contextualise it, I'm happy with that, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we look at the previous page.
18 Yes, we'll admit these -- we'll add these three pages to the
20 MR. TIEGER: And I misspoke. I said 25053, when of course we
21 identified it correctly as 25054.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Okay. As long as we're on the subject of Mr. Cizmovic, can we
25 turn next to P2551. This is a telephone conversation between
1 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cizmovic in the same day as the --
2 JUDGE KWON: Just one question to you --
3 MR. TIEGER: Yes --
4 JUDGE KWON: For you, Mr. Tieger. Do you agree that the topic
5 Mr. Karadzic and Krajisnik talked about through that intercept was not
6 related to Variant A and B document?
7 MR. TIEGER: Of course not, Mr. President. My -- my -- I --
8 I -- I put to this witness that it was exactly about Variant A and B, and
9 I'm going to take him through a number of subsequent documents which
10 will, in our submission, make that point completely clear.
11 JUDGE KWON: So your case is that that -- what they issued last
12 night was the Variant A and B document?
13 MR. TIEGER: That's why I focused on the distinction between the
14 19th and the 20th, that what happened the previous day, on the 20 --
15 the -- was -- the plenary session where this was distributed was the 20th
16 rather than the 19th, as the leading question seemed to indicate.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then I would like the witness to expand
18 on the reason why he said: Absolutely no.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I read this sentence
20 where I said we appointed Cizmovic -- we brought him to a low level, we
21 determined what his authority would be. Read that sentence. Cizmovic
22 was chosen to be co-ordinator of the Council of Ministers, to co-ordinate
23 their work from the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the decisions
24 that would be made by the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
25 supposed to be carried out by the Council of Ministers, and Mr. Cizmovic
1 was supposed to co-ordinate that. Mr. Tieger can call up hundreds of
2 pieces of evidence, but I'm saying that that document was not discussed
3 in my presence at that plenary or at the Assembly. Maybe it was
4 distributed but it wasn't discussed. The topic was completely different.
5 It had to do with the work of the Council of Ministers.
6 JUDGE KWON: Can we upload the intercept, P2550, I remember it
7 was page 3. Could you -- so Mr. Karadzic is saying:
8 "You know what, who will implement what we issued last night?
9 This Council of Ministers ..."
10 So what was it what they issued last night?
11 THE WITNESS: Well, different decisions, different requests.
12 This, on the 21st -- the Assembly was held on the 21st and the
13 Deputies Club, the Deputies Club was on the 20th, together with the
14 representatives where we discussed different ideas, different decisions,
15 a lot of that. And then on the following day, the Assembly, and that's
16 where it was carried through. I'm saying here the Council of Ministers
17 is supposed to implement these decisions, and after that I say that
18 Cizmovic got this duty and you will find in documents that he was
19 co-ordinator of the Council of Ministers. We are not mentioning
20 Variants A and B.
21 JUDGE KWON: Back to you, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. We're -- I don't know if
23 255 -- get back to 2551, conversation between Mr. Karadzic and
24 Mr. Cizmovic, the same date as the intercept we looked at just now. If
25 we could turn to English page 2 and move on to 3 as we discuss it, and
1 B/C/S page 2.
2 Q. Dr. Karadzic tells Cizmovic:
3 "The most important thing now in this very moment is that those
4 papers those ..."
5 And Cizmovic interjects:
6 "To the realisation."
8 "Right, right."
12 "That is the most important."
13 Cizmovic again interjects:
14 "The most important would be if ..."
15 And Karadzic says:
16 "You have a full authorisation to visit all our municipalities,
17 including even those where there is no ... and all those there who are
19 Now, on that same date, this is Cizmovic and Karadzic talking,
20 and those papers that Karadzic is talking about is a reference to
21 Variant A and B which had been recently distributed and needed to be
23 A. It is a thankless job for me to try to interpret Mr. Karadzic,
24 but I'll try, although that is not proper. In the Serbian language it
25 says: The most important thing at this moment is those papers. If he
1 meant A and B, he would have said: That paper. But there were several
2 decisions, suggestions, here. A lot of things had to be implemented.
3 Just take the agenda of the Assembly on the 21st of November, and that
4 was the previous day, the Deputies Club. Really, when Mr. Karadzic
5 testifies, he can explain this to you, but this is how I interpret it. I
6 don't know, they could have agreed on papers A and B, but I know that
7 this A and B paper in my presence was not officially discussed at this
8 Deputies Club. Maybe it was distributed, probably it was distributed,
9 because I see that many witnesses said that it was distributed. I was
10 not present and I don't know how that happened.
11 Q. Well, let's take a look at 2596, a telephone conversation between
12 Dr. Karadzic and Miroslav on the 7th of January, 1992. If we could turn
13 to English page 7, B/C/S page 8. Dr. Karadzic says in response to
14 Miroslav saying:
15 "This is not a time for science, right?"
16 Mr. Karadzic says:
17 "No, it's not a time for science. It is time to take over real
18 functions, real functions ... this, this and this real function and
19 chop-chop ... and there isn't any ... in the sense of that paper ... I
20 don't know ... that paper of ours ... level one - level two."
21 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, that discussion is another reflection of
22 Dr. Karadzic's continuing focus on the need to implement Variant A and B
23 on the ground, that is, the document referring to level one and level
24 two; right? That was a big part of his focus at the beginning of 1992.
25 A. You should ask Mr. Karadzic about that. I assure you, and I
1 would like to point out, in my presence Variant A and B was not
2 discussed, we did not take any positions regarding that, and whatever
3 people said they could have spoken about that, but A and B Variant was
4 not carried through. Perhaps in 10 or 20 municipalities out of a hundred
5 or 50 or whatever the number was, however many there were. Mr. Karadzic
6 can explain this to you. Maybe he did speak about Variants A and B,
7 level one, level two, but this document did not constitute any kind of
8 important document. It was not any kind of evidence in terms of our
9 pursuit of policy. It was unnecessary, if you want my view. Not
10 unnecessary from the point of view of fear. People had the right to
11 express their fear, but as far as the functioning of the municipalities
12 is concerned, it was completely unnecessary.
13 MR. TIEGER: P2552, English page 7, B/C/S page 8, please.
14 Q. Telephone conversation between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cizmovic on
15 the 16th of January, 1992. Here discussing, as we see from the earlier
16 part of the intercept, what's been going on -- what results Cizmovic is
17 achieving in the field. As we see, he discusses with Dr. Karadzic:
18 "I've talked to Bijeljina, they're prepared for full
19 co-operation, it's the same case with northern Bosnia."
20 And then he says at the bottom of page 1 -- page 7 of the
22 "To what extent are they prepared to implement the first level of
23 the instructions? What are the problems? What do they need help with?
24 So that I am even prepared to form a sort of team with your help ..."
25 So this is a reflection of what Cizmovic was running from
1 municipality to municipality to implement, that is, the first level of
2 the instructions. It's crystal clear from this intercept, isn't it?
3 A. No, Mr. Prosecutor. This is an example for you. Bijeljina, what
4 was Mr. Cizmovic looking for over there? Serbs are an absolute
5 authority. They do not need Variants A or B. Why would they establish a
6 municipality? They have 100 per cent authority there. He went there to
7 implement other decisions, I think, of the Council of Ministers. Or the
8 man may have had some other reason. Perhaps he misunderstood his role.
9 In Bijeljina he had no reason to go there to carry out Variants A and B
10 because it was 100 per cent Serb.
11 Q. Do you know of any other document containing instructions divided
12 in different levels or reference to -- or even non-written instructions
13 to -- that were split up on different levels? You don't, do you?
14 Variant A and B is the only one in existence at that time. And that's
15 exactly what you told Judge Orie when he asked you that same question.
16 A. I am not disputing the existence of Variants A and B as
17 documents. Large number of witnesses confirmed that it had been
18 distributed and I believe them. All I'm saying is that this document is
19 completely insignificant. Even if it was implemented, it was implemented
20 only partially. There may have been two or three parallel activities.
21 One of them was maybe a peripheral one, including Variants A and B, and
22 the rest were essential Assembly decisions that had to be implemented.
23 So Mr. Cizmovic maybe made a confusion there and I'm telling you
24 that Variants A and B were irrelevant for what you're interested. It may
25 have been relevant with regard to fear, and the soldiers rightfully
1 pointed that out in view of the experience from World War II, and I only
2 learned about this paper during my trial.
3 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break for half an hour. We'll
4 resume at 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to introduce
9 Lili Dobreva from Bulgaria, who's working as a legal intern for our
10 Defence team. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to look at a few documents in connection
14 with your testimony to this Court that Variant A and B was irrelevant,
15 that's at 33, 7, that you only learned about it at your trial, also on
16 page 33 of our discussion today, and that it was never discussed in your
17 presence, that's at page 31. So I'd like to turn first to the Assembly
18 session -- the 6th Assembly Session held on the 25th and the
19 26th of January, and that's at - let me just find the reference - P1349,
20 English page 12 and B/C/S page 25.
21 Now, as we're waiting for that to come up, Mr. Krajisnik,
22 recalling the date of this session, the 26th of January, 1992, can you
23 confirm your testimony in your case that this was a special and
24 extraordinary session called to consider what should be done in the face
25 of what you term the unconstitutional decisions by the Bosnian Assembly
1 on the referendum of independence which had occurred the previous day?
2 A. Yes, that was an extraordinary session related to the BH Assembly
3 session that was to be held.
4 Q. And the topic of discussion at that Assembly, what people were
5 talking about as you acknowledged during your own testimony, was what to
6 do in response to that; right?
7 A. Yes, the main task was to persuade the deputies to attend the
8 joint session of BH Assembly where the referendum was to be discussed.
9 Q. Well, the deputies were talking about other things; for example,
10 Mr. Vjestica at page 12 of the English and page 25 of the B/C/S talked
11 about "setting up our own state" and the immense duties they faced in
12 that regard and how there must be a great deal of hard work and
13 discipline and that an operative plan should be drawn up to define tasks
14 and dead-lines. If we could turn back, you can see -- the next previous
15 page you can see who the speaker is.
16 Okay, so you can see Mr. Vjestica talking, and he begins by
17 saying this is a time where protracted speeches -- not a time for
18 protracted speeches and a time to move forward.
19 If we turn to the next page. Next page, please. We can see him
20 talking about setting up dead-lines, the need for discipline, and the
21 need to execute operative plan and so on. And as you acknowledged in
22 your own testimony, the discussion about what to do in response became
23 pretty concrete pretty early; right?
24 A. Well, I don't know about later, but what Mr. Vjestica is saying
25 here is clear to me. He is underlying that we are constantly and
1 unsuccessfully trying to reach a democratic agreement with the other
2 side. He expressed his concern about the situation in his area where
3 there were lots of Muslim soldiers and paramilitary forces that had been
4 established in Western Bosnia.
5 Q. "The operative plan should also be drawn up to define tasks
6 precisely, those charged with executing them and the dead-lines for their
8 He did say that at the 6th Session; right? You can see it right
10 And then Mr. Cizmovic spoke shortly thereafter, that's at page 14
11 of the English, and e-court page 29 in the B/C/S. And in the context of
12 this concrete discussion about the steps that should be taken in response
13 to this unconstitutional decision, as you put it, Mr. Cizmovic said at
14 this extraordinary session -- to solve the problem he proposed:
15 " ... an urgent operationalisation and a declaration on the
16 establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the instructions of 19 December
18 1991 should be carried out."
19 Now, that is a clear reference to the Variant A and B document.
20 In fact, it's a reference to the document in terms of its very title;
22 A. Yes, he is making reference to the document of the
23 19th of December, probably Variants A and B. But, you see, he says here
24 that a decision to declare the republic of the Serbian people, and on
25 9th of January we already did that. We proclaimed our own republic. So
1 if you have your republic, then any discussion about Variants A and B
2 becomes superfluous and irrelevant. I don't know what reason he had to
3 make reference to this document. Perhaps you should ask him that.
4 Q. Okay. So do I understand that you're now modifying your
5 testimony to the Court a few moments ago, that this was never discussed
6 in your presence; and now you want to say: Well, it was discussed in my
7 presence but it's an irrelevant document, so why does it matter?
8 A. I totally did not accept that because I didn't see that as
9 important. My concern was hard to persuade the deputies to attend the
10 next day's session of the BH Assembly. That is why it was irrelevant to
11 me. I didn't pay attention which date he mentioned, 19th of December or
12 any date in 2005 or whatever. What I'm saying that there was no
13 discussion. He may have mentioned it, as he probably did, but you can
14 see that nobody continued with the discussion about this. It was only
15 Mr. Cizmovic who mentioned this specific date, although this date could
16 be quite meaningless, it didn't mean anything to me; therefore, it
17 escaped my memory. And you can see further on in the minutes that there
18 was no further efforts to the 19th of December. I suppose so, maybe
19 somebody else did, though, but I don't know. So this document was
20 totally not on the agenda of the Assembly of the Serbian People.
21 Somebody may have mentioned it, I'm not ruling out that possibility
23 Q. Well, why don't we turn to the very next time this group got
24 together, which is the 14th February extended Session of the Main
25 Executive Boards and Deputies Club which is P00012.
1 A. I know that Mr. Karadzic mentioned level two, but this didn't
2 mean anything either. It may have been some instruction or whatever, but
3 that was not discussed by the Serbian Assembly nor was it implemented in
4 the way that you are trying to portray. And I know what you are trying
5 to do.
6 Q. Yes, what I'm trying to do is present in the course of this
7 examination the contemporaneous documents reflecting exactly what was
8 discussed and how it was discussed. You say here:
9 "I know that Mr. Karadzic mentioned level two ..."
10 Well, the fact of the matter is Mr. Karadzic referred to the
11 Variant A and B document four times in the course of his presentation and
12 concluded with the fact that that's why we called you here today, to
13 intensify, to introduce "the second level and to intensify the
14 functioning of the government at any cost and every single millimetre of
15 our territory."
16 So it wasn't simply mentioning it, it was emphasising it and
17 moving it up from level one to level two; correct?
18 A. No, Mr. Tieger. I didn't say that I knew that he spoke about
19 this. I don't remember. I do know that this was presented as evidence
20 in my trial and we commented on it as well as other witnesses did, and I
21 can assert that as official authorities nor did the Serbian Assembly take
22 any position on that. It was only a document produced by people who were
23 concerned and that was implemented somewhere. I don't know what kind of
24 document that was, whether it was complete or not. Why somebody's trying
25 to portray this document as something that was the product of a
1 conspiracy. Can you please find me any Municipal Assembly or five
2 Municipal Assemblies that have implemented what is contained in
3 Variants A and B. I assure you that not even the municipalities with
4 absolute Muslim majority did not -- did implement that. You heard that
5 the Crisis Staff came into being two years later. Variants A and B were
6 not implemented as they did -- it was not a secret document. It did not
7 bear any relevance. It was totally immaterial.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. I'm going to move on to a couple of other documents, but let
11 me --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was not recorded in the
15 transcript that Mr. Krajisnik said that the document was benign,
17 JUDGE KWON: Do you --
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If somebody gave it to me today I
19 would say: All right. I would read it and I wouldn't see any --
20 anything bad about it.
21 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that you said so?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. I confirm that, that it
23 was a benign document.
24 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. You also -- I'm going to go to the issue of what
2 Municipal Assemblies did or didn't do, also in the context of your claim
3 that no one discussed it in your presence. But I also noted in your
4 testimony earlier you said you would have known about municipal
5 Crisis Staffs if there were any, but you didn't.
6 A. I'm sorry. I didn't understand your question.
7 Q. Did I misunderstand you when you said earlier that you didn't
8 know about the establishment of municipal Crisis Staffs in the period of
9 time before the conflict, that is, between December 19 and April 1992?
10 Or did you know about that?
11 A. Well, of course I knew that Crisis Staffs existed, but that was
12 not - how shall I put it? - a planned action. It might have occurred
13 spontaneously. I was working in a company and if the workers rebel they
14 immediately set up a Crisis Staff. Crisis Staff were not a customary way
15 to do things in the former system. I know that there were Crisis Staffs
16 when barricades were erected. I knew about the Crisis Staff of
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. And I'm talking about municipal Crisis Staffs, not Crisis Staffs
21 in random companies. Didn't you say to this Court you would have known
22 about municipal Crisis Staffs if there were any, but you didn't? And now
23 you're saying you did know about Crisis Staffs. Did you know about
24 municipal Crisis Staffs?
25 A. Please, do not put words into my mouth. I said that I knew about
1 the Crisis Staff relating to the barricades and at the level of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I said it was possible that Crisis Staffs did
3 exist - I don't remember - but that was not a plan. There was no
4 agreement to do that. It happened spontaneously. There was no directive
5 issued by the SDS to set up Crisis Staffs. That is what I know.
6 Q. And --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 21, page 39, it was
10 erroneously written "Crisis Staffs were not a customary way," whereas it
11 should be "were a non-customary way." The witness said, "They were not a
12 non-customary way of solving problems."
13 MR. TIEGER: I have to say that is one of the least helpful
14 clarifications I've ever heard. Maybe the witness better be asked. I'm
15 not sure what Dr. Karadzic is saying.
16 JUDGE KWON: I'm -- I understood that -- it's better to ask the
17 witness. Do you remember the question -- do you follow the issue? What
18 was it that you said? Could you repeat what you said, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The setting up of Crisis Staffs in
20 the former system was not an unusual way to operate, so it was quite
21 normal to set them up.
22 JUDGE KWON: Crisis Staffs were not a non-customary way to do
23 things. Yes.
24 So you agree with Mr. Karadzic's intervention?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
1 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Can we turn to P01403, page 347 in the English,
3 page 304 in the B/C/S.
4 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the document, Mr. Tieger
5 and Mr. Robinson, when I discussed the rescheduling of the sitting in the
6 week of 9th of December, I didn't realise that there's no courtroom
7 available on Friday, 13th of December, due to the Appeals Chamber's
8 hearing as well as Mladic hearing. So we'll go back to the original
9 sitting plan, Monday to Thursday.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Good fortune for Mr. Tieger.
11 JUDGE KWON: But in any event, I thank the parties for their
13 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Here's what Dr. Karadzic said looking back on what happened in
16 1991 and 1992:
17 [As read] "Please remember how we used to work before the war.
18 Everything was as clear as day in the municipalities where we were
19 majority and in those where we were minority. Do you remember the
20 Instruction A and Instruction B? We had Crisis Staffs and it was clear
21 that they were the authority. They could make mistakes but they were
22 still the authority. The people were not left without the authority
23 because there was a Crisis Staff."
24 So when Dr. Karadzic was calling upon everybody in the Assembly
25 to remember how it was in 1991 and 1992, were you the only person in the
1 room who didn't know that?
2 A. You're really trying to insult me and that's not fair, but I will
3 give you an answer. It is possible that Karadzic said that, but quite
4 simply when somebody was delivering a speech I'm not paying attention to
5 some information that at that point I thought were irrelevant and maybe I
6 wasn't listening carefully. I suppose that this is what he said, and if
7 Mr. Karadzic knew that the A and B Variant documents were distributed, he
8 probably mentioned that. But I assure you that I never saw in practice
9 whether it was distributed or implemented. That's what I said. I never
10 disputed that someone may have received this document. The point is that
11 this document did not produce any significant effects, definitely not.
12 We're not talking about whether a municipality did receive it. It might
13 have received it.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Previous translation continues]...
15 MR. TIEGER: Let's look at --
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am trying to find where this
18 refers to the year 1991 in this text, and I can't do -- find it. So
19 could Mr. Tieger please say specifically whether he's speaking about the
20 period before April 1992 or after April 1992.
21 JUDGE KWON: I don't think Mr. Tieger was quoting from this
22 document when he referred to 1991 and 1992.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Even worse.
24 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
25 JUDGE KWON: We can continue.
1 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
2 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
3 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn to P975 very quickly.
4 Q. You were asking about what the municipalities did or didn't do,
5 posing the rhetorical question: Show me a municipality that acted on
6 this. So here at P975, we see that Ilidza formed the
7 Serbian Municipal Assembly "in accordance with the given instructions of
8 the Serbian Democratic Party of BiH Main Board ...," and it provides the
9 specific number, 079 "of 19 December 1991 ..."
10 And if we can scroll down and then turn to the next page, please.
11 This document was signed and it was forwarded personally to you.
12 A. I suppose so.
13 Q. One more document, Mr. Krajisnik. If we could turn to P1377,
14 English page 148 and B/C/S page 127 through 28, another document bearing
15 on your claim that Variant A and B was irrelevant, that you only learned
16 about it during your trial, and that it was never discussed in your
18 This is a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the 33rd Session
19 in 1993, and here we see the president of the Jajce municipality
20 speaking. And here's what he relates. First he notes:
21 "If we go back a little and recall the material which came from
22 the Main Board for work in the field, there was Variant A and B.
23 Variant A was for municipalities where the Serbs were a majority,
24 Variant B for municipalities in which they were not, like Jajce ...
25 then, pursuant to those guide-lines we formed a Municipal Assembly and
1 later formed municipal organs of government. All that was done before
2 the war ... on the 27th of January 1992 ...," and he explains some of the
3 things they did.
4 So, first of all, that's a reflection of the discussion in front
5 of you and the other representatives about the existence and
6 implementation of Variant A and B, wasn't it?
7 A. There was no deputy in the municipality of Jajce or Ilidza.
8 There was no Council of Citizens, and perhaps people did act pursuant to
9 the document they received at that time. But when a discussion is being
10 held, I wasn't really paying attention whether somebody mentioned some
11 documents or not or if something could be linked with something else
12 that would be important for me to answer right now. You see --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Krajisnik please repeat what he's
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You are speaking too fast,
16 Mr. Krajisnik.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Forgive me, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: You have to repeat from where you said you were not
19 really paying attention.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that in the municipality of
21 Jajce there was no deputy from that place in the Assembly, and perhaps
22 they, pursuant according to Variant A and B that they received at the
23 time which -- when the plenary together with the Deputies Club was in
24 operation. I also mentioned the previous document. I said this decision
25 about forming the municipality of Ilidza, perhaps it reached the
1 secretary. It wasn't given to me. He registered it. Important to me
2 was that the decision was made, if it was important, and problem solved.
3 And now, had I known that I would have to reply about that here, I would
4 have read each decision and then there would be a decision A and B. I
5 would say: What is that? And then I would make an inquiry. I mean, it
6 wouldn't have occurred to me then or today. It could have been formed by
7 one or the other SDS president pursuant to a recommendation of the
8 Assembly without any problems at all, without any Variant A and B. He
9 had the Assembly document on the formation and he could have sent it to
10 me. Why would he need Variant A and B?
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. So it's your testimony to this Trial Chamber, Mr. Krajisnik, that
13 you weren't paying attention when the president of Jajce municipality
15 [As read] "When according to instructions we were to form the
16 Serbian municipality of Jajce on the orders of Dr. Karadzic and yourself,
17 I conducted talks with all the Assemblymen in the joint Assembly who were
18 Serbs and a single one agreed to join the joint, i.e., the Serbian
19 municipality of the Serbian municipality of Jajce ... all the others
20 refused. As we had no one to augment, the presidents of the local boards
21 became members ex-officio. At a gathering in Sarajevo, I asked
22 Dr. Karadzic and you what I should do in that event and we agreed that
23 the presidents of the local boards should join by virtue of their office,
24 as had been agreed ..."
25 So when the president of Jajce municipality outlined the
1 background of the Variant A and B document, talked about the
2 implementation that they were able to achieve, identified their attempt
3 to further implement it and the obstacles they encountered based on the
4 orders of you and Dr. Karadzic as he said explicitly, and then related
5 and recalled how he went to you and Dr. Karadzic for counselling, you
6 weren't paying any attention to this?
7 A. He could have talked to me. I don't recall that now. He
8 probably did talk to me. I have no reason as president of the Assembly
9 to tell him: Take Variant A and B, when he has the recommendation.
10 Here's the recommendation, take it from the Assembly if you need to do
11 that. Why would I need once we adopted the recommendation, why would we
12 take Variant A and B before the Assembly? We could have done that,
13 adopted it before the Assembly. But the recommendations were adopted
14 before the Variant A and B, so the president of the Jajce municipality
15 could have received an answer from me: Here's the recommendation, take
16 it and constitute. Only pursuant to the -- only the recommendation is
17 relevant in the formation. The A and B Variant is not relevant. It's an
18 instruction, it's an expression of concern, but the only valid document
19 was the recommendation. This other was not something that was adopted by
20 the Assembly.
21 Q. I'm going to move on to a different topic. At transcript
22 page 43340 of your testimony here in your examination-in-chief, you
23 describe the taking of UN personnel as hostages as "a desperate attempt
24 on the part of our army to prevent further air-strikes."
25 So once again, you point to the army as being responsible for
1 actions and not the political leadership. But the fact of the matter,
2 Mr. Krajisnik, is that the political leadership, as always, was behind
3 this, and in that regard I'd like to look at P5607. This is a transcript
4 of an intercepted telephone conversation of the 30th of May, 1995,
5 involving Todor Dutina, yourself, and Dr. Karadzic. And if we turn to
6 the third page, first you can -- well, maybe first I'll take you through
7 it quickly. You see Dutina talking to Milenko Karisik, another early
8 participant. You are put on the phone at the top of page 3 in the
9 English. Dutina asks you:
10 "Let me tell you, Momo, that things aren't bad at all. Just take
11 care. Is Radovan somewhere near?"
12 You say: "He isn't. He's there."
13 Then a few lines later you say:
14 "Wait until I switch a call to Karadzic so we all can hear. Is
15 that fine?"
16 Karadzic comes on the phone on page 5.
17 You say to him:
18 "Radovan, here is Todor; speak up Todor; now Radovan is also
19 listening ..."
20 Dutina expresses some concerns about confusion that may result
21 from an issue related to the involvement of a French intermediary.
22 Dutina says:
23 "Nobody should ... let me tell you, Radovan, we made a move and
24 now we should wait for a move of the other side."
25 Karadzic says:
1 "Fine, their move was to send a negotiator that left
3 And Dutina says, as we turn the page in the English:
4 "That's the way it should be."
5 And then you say:
6 "And please, what did Jovanovic say?"
7 Seeking clarification, Dutina says:
8 "That an intermediary from France is being expected, et cetera."
9 That was the issue that Dutina expressed some concern about.
10 Karadzic says:
11 "Intermediary in what? In the release of the hostages?"
12 Dutina says:
13 "They are not interested in anything else, you have to know
15 Karadzic says:
16 "We are not interested in letting them go as much as they are
17 interested in us letting them go."
19 "Let me tell you, they should be kept until final solution."
21 "That's our decision, that's out of the question, there is no
23 And Dutina goes on to say well, people are a bit confused.
24 Karadzic explains that the contact was irrelevant --
25 THE ACCUSED: Could we have Serbian page displayed relevant.
1 Thank you.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
3 Q. Karadzic explains that that was irrelevant. Dutina tries to say:
4 "Look, they know what you eat."
5 And you say:
6 "Don't frighten us. It's not true that they know."
7 Dutina says:
8 "I'm not frightening you."
9 And you say:
10 "Well, they just pretend to know."
11 And then you say:
12 "If they did know, then why didn't they know that we would do
14 JUDGE KWON: Next page for English.
15 MR. TIEGER: That's on page 7 of the English, correct.
16 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, this wasn't about some desperate action by the
17 army. This is about an event that was planned and implemented -- planned
18 by and implemented at the behest of the political leadership, as we've
19 seen in other instances. And that's exactly what's being referred to
21 A. First of all, you were reading the intercept from here and there,
22 so I couldn't put together all of the parts, but I will try to comment.
23 Mr. Todor Dutina, whom I recall -- who I recall was absent at the time
24 and by nature he's a man prone to panic. And he called us to talk to us
25 and you saw how he said that foreigners knew what we were having for
1 lunch, so this was exaggeration and that was the tone of the
2 conversation. I repeat now that I don't know all the particulars
3 precisely, but they can be found in the evidence here. For us, for me,
4 the arrest of those soldiers -- actually, detaining the soldiers and
5 showing that publicly on television was a desperate attempt to prevent
6 further bombing, and what it says here, they could have known, the
7 military and the political leadership warned several times in relation to
8 their threats that they would bomb us, that they would consider that to
9 be as NATO's interference as one of the sides in the conflict. I
10 believe, I'm not sure now, that the initiative and the whole
11 implementation was carried out by the army. Perhaps this can be seen
12 from the evidence. If there's any evidence or an order by Mr. Karadzic,
13 in that case I'll withdraw this assertion of mine. But my impression at
14 the time was that this was a desperate attempt by the army, this is how
15 the people understood it as well, in order to thwart bombing. Why would
16 you want to do that publicly? Nobody wanted to harm those soldiers. You
17 saw that when those three airmen were captured who had parachuted down,
18 the local population accepted them as their very own. Our people don't
19 have anything against the soldiers or the people, but they are against
20 the policy that prompted those people to come and bomb us.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it may have been the military that put their hands
22 on the hostages and seized them and scattered them to various places
23 around the territory of RS where they were placed, but it was the
24 political leadership, you and Dr. Karadzic, who were full square behind
25 that from the beginning, indeed even before it happened, as reflected in
1 this intercept. This intercept reflects full backing for everything
2 that's going on and reflects the fact that it was anticipated beforehand.
3 A. Could you please tell me the date of this intercept.
4 Q. May 30th, 1995, as I mentioned at the outset.
5 A. 30th of May, 1995, is a period of major dissent or a split
6 between the civilian authorities - I'm not going to talk about personal
7 relationships - but it was personally a matter between Mladic and
8 Karadzic. I don't believe that this was a -- had this been an initiative
9 of Mr. Karadzic that Mr. Mladic would have implemented it. If this had
10 been taken as a desperate attempt to thwart further bombing, we would not
11 have taken this -- we would not -- we would have only done that on this
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Krajisnik please repeat what he's
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, please speak slowly. No, just a
16 second. You have to repeat from when you talked about desperate attempt.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise deeply to the
18 Trial Chamber and to others.
19 Mr. Tieger inspires me to speak fast because a number of times I
20 have told him that this was a desperate move, and that is how I
21 understood it. And now I repeat, in 1995, May 1995, it's practically the
22 end of the war and there was a split between the military and the
23 civilian authorities. If there is any document indicating that Karadzic
24 ordered the arrest of hostages, as you say, then that document could
25 provide an answer to your question. All it could have said, if there was
1 such an order - but I don't think there is, I'm not aware of it - he
2 could have said: Let that be a matter of thwarting further bombings
3 because we had warned several times as well as the army, both
4 Mr. Karadzic and those who talked with representatives of the
5 international community, if -- if NATO interferes with -- if it bombs our
6 positions, then it will become a party to the conflict because it will
7 place itself at the side of our enemies. I know that there was such
8 warnings given, but I repeat: I understood this as a desperate move in
9 order to prevent further bombing because the bombing was awful. There
10 was a lot of panic, destruction of military, civilian, and communications
11 facilities in Republika Srpska at the time.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, throughout the process of the hostage-taking, you
14 continued to express your endorsement for it, support for it, involvement
15 in it, responsibility for it, and to stress your awareness of the great
16 leverage that the hostages gave you, that is, that they were a kind of
17 ace up your sleeve, and that you wouldn't be giving up that advantage
18 easily. You wouldn't sell these hostages cheap. That was your position
19 during this entire period of time, wasn't it?
20 A. You put five questions at the same time, but I will answer.
21 Correct, but -- because I believed that this would be a way to prevent
22 further bombardments. After a bombing like that -- my wife already also
23 was a casualty, so I know what that means. But if you refer to my
24 telephone conversations in 1992 -- not in 1995, excuse me, but bombing
25 was conducted then so I know what it is. So if you referred to telephone
1 conversations of mine with people abroad who spoke about hostages who
2 were saying: You shouldn't release them, and so on and so forth. I
3 talked with people then who were not informed about things so they could
4 have said: You're crazy, you don't know what you're doing, you're
5 advising us to do something inappropriate. I was trying to end a
6 conversation that I disagreed with. I repeat: My support was towards
7 preventing further bombing, that's how I understood it, because I saw
8 that. I felt sorry for those men. I saw that on television, but they
9 also showed the destruction throughout Republika Srpska. All I prayed
10 for was for the bombing to stop, and that was my position.
11 Q. Okay. One point of clarification. You were trying to say there,
12 it didn't come across clearly, that your earlier testimony and your brief
13 reference here to your wife's death had nothing to do with the bombing in
14 1995, that that happened in 1992? I know you mentioned your wife's death
15 twice now in the context of a discussion about the hostage-taking and the
16 NATO bombing, but you were conflating two periods of time.
17 Unfortunately, your wife died in 1992; correct? So I just want to
18 clarify that.
19 A. My wife was killed in 1992 and I said here I know what bombing
20 means when bombs start falling, and bombs were dropping on Pale at that
21 time. So there's an incredible amount of fear and it's a problem and you
22 want that to stop immediately.
23 Q. Well, let's look at a couple of the intercepts that you alluded
24 to in your answer. First if we can turn to 65 ter 328 -- 32 -- let's
25 turn to P2271 first, please.
1 So this is a conversation on the 3rd of June, 1995, between you
2 and Mr. Vinkovic, who states at page 1:
3 "Look here, as you predicted and as you said, the West would
4 unite because they will be angry about what you've done."
5 And you say:
6 "I know."
7 And then he goes on in his response to say:
8 "However, now they are pointing their finger at who is to blame
9 for such a situation. If you hold on for a while in this gambit, you'll
10 see how they are disintegrating. That's why one begins to put pressure
11 on families ...," et cetera.
12 And he says:
13 "I think that this played a great role because they have stated
14 and are openly writing and saying that they cannot do anything" --
15 A. Could you please move it to the next page. I don't see that
17 Q. I think that was in the bottom part of the page we were just
18 looking at, Mr. Krajisnik, where Vinkovic begins "mej djutim." If we can
19 turn back, I think that's where I was reading from. You see down there
20 at the bottom?
21 A. I see it, yes. I apologise.
22 Q. "I think that this played a great role because they have stated
23 and are openly writing and saying that they cannot do anything to you as
24 long as you're holding hostages. They can't make a single normal plan
25 that they'll follow because every plan they want to follow implies the
1 use of military force and they cannot do that because they'll endanger
2 the lives of those hostages -- of these hostages. Therefore, the
3 hostages are of vital importance to you regardless of what anyone else
4 may be telling you."
5 And you say:
6 "My dear man, we let some go and we captured some others."
7 Then if we continue on to the next page, that's toward the bottom
8 of the page, same thing in English, please. Vinkovic says:
9 "But look, hold on to the hostages. That's a fantastic card!
10 Don't ever forget that Saddam got destroyed when he released the
12 And you say:
13 "Yes, yes. We're doing that. We have an excellent method. We
14 always have an ace up our sleeve."
15 And then Vinkovic says, and I think that continues on to the next
16 page in your language:
17 "The hostages are the cheapest anti-aircraft protection, better
18 than a missile because they never miss."
19 So that's one of the telephone conversations that you alluded to
20 in your previous answer, Mr. Krajisnik; right?
21 A. Well, it would be very good to continue with the text and then
22 you would see that I replied to his assertions with a joke.
23 Q. By saying:
24 "We've got the support of the greatest power in the world"?
25 A. Yes, yes, please continue and then you will see exactly which
1 power I meant.
2 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I -- I am finished pointing out those
3 portions of the intercept that I wanted to bring to your attention and to
4 the Court's attention, but if you want to --
5 JUDGE KWON: Let us see. Let us see [overlapping speakers]...
6 MR. TIEGER: No, no, Mr. President. He is -- I'm sorry. But I'm
7 happy to let Mr. Krajisnik do that, but he's asking me to pursue the
8 intercept. I'm just turning it back to him.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, next page, please.
10 Now, tell us what you wanted to say, Mr. Krajisnik.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I deeply respect, value Mr. Tieger,
12 but he's a specialist in reading an excerpt of the text and then he would
13 like a response to something else that is also important -- without
14 submitting something else that is also important. I said to my
15 collocutor: We have the greatest power in the world. He said: Whom?
16 And I said: You. And then I said: The diaspora that is supporting us.
17 I wanted to bring the conversation to a more relaxed tone. I did not
18 wish to disrespect the person at the other end of the line. So when you
19 read it, you can see that, and this is important. If you would like a
20 true response, you need to read the whole text. I don't remember the
21 entire conversation. Actually, I'd never read it until I'd spent some
22 time here in prison.
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if I'm following you. How is the issue
24 of support from diaspora related to this hostages issue, Mr. Krajisnik?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our entire conversation was a
1 conversation with a person from the Serbian diaspora, and he kept giving
2 this advice in terms of radical moves: Don't let them go, and so on and
3 so forth. I did not agree with that, we are no power. And then in order
4 to lighten things up, I said: We have the support of the greatest power
5 in the world, God and you and the diaspora. And I wanted to say by that
6 that what he was saying was not realistic. I did not want to offend him
7 by saying: What are you telling us? What you're saying is nebulous. So
8 anyway, this is one of the conversations I had with people from the
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
11 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 32818, please.
13 Q. This is a conversation between you and Petar Makara on
14 June 2nd, 1995. Mr. Makara begins by expressing concern that the
15 hostages will be handed over prematurely, which he considers a kind of
16 treason. He states to you, this is in the second big block:
17 "Your only hope and guarantee is that you will be able to keep
18 the hostages. There is no way they will sacrifice so many people" --
19 JUDGE KWON: What page are we on?
20 MR. TIEGER: That's the first page, Mr. President, second block
21 of the first page:
22 "There is no way they will sacrifice so many people which you
23 already hold."
24 Q. He says that to Milena, your secretary, and then you get on the
25 line, and on the second page he continues in the same vein. You say to
2 "... we are not" -- this is the second block on this page, 2.
3 "... we are not crazy to release them. Let them be scared, what
4 intervention groups of theirs and others, those are stories for little
6 THE ACCUSED: Should we --
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. And then you continue and you can read the entirety --
9 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure we are on the correct page in B/C/S.
10 MR. TIEGER: I think we should go back a page.
11 Q. Okay, and you'll see it here:
12 "... we are not crazy to release them. Let them be scared, what
13 intervention groups of theirs and others, those are stories for little
15 You say:
16 "We are unable to gather them. Here already for two days we are
17 collecting them, and not that we could find them, that is all scattered."
18 Makara wanted to convey and then tried a couple of times, he
20 "To convey the message that it is very important, that you are
21 already uniting with RSK ... and the Serbs are already mixed there with
22 Knin, and so you could capture many of those from the West, which would
23 be twice as important."
24 If you continue on to the next page in B/C/S and English. After
25 speaking briefly about Western Slavonia, you say:
1 "Here, the two of us understand each other even when we are not
2 talking openly. Please, tell my namesake, he has to make sure that all
3 those goods have to be sold expensively. It is selling, don't be ..."
4 And Makara says:
5 "Let me tell you this, in the Falkland islands the British lost
6 255 men. They won't let themselves lose 255 men over Bosnia which isn't
8 And you say:
9 "Not because of Bosnia."
10 He goes on to talk about the relations with America and how the
11 politicians in the West only care about winning elections, rather than
12 the number of people killed. And then after you speak saying you hope he
13 understands you, he says:
14 "I believe, exactly that I wanted to tell you, if you know,"
15 which at least as it's written, "a lot of hostages, the way the West has
16 been working for the Muslims, they will shift and work for you."
17 And you say:
18 "Fine, we need those people. Believe me, we are very pleased,
19 very pleased, because there are many things we have achieved and which we
20 have mentioned ..."
21 And then if we turn to the last page, please.
22 You are concluding the conversation:
23 "Please say hello to my namesake and please know that this is a
24 great thing, although they are telling us that this is stupid. This is a
25 great finished match, and now our partners who had to give in can fidget
1 as much as they want, but they have to pay. This is a payment ..."
2 And then Makara says -- goes on to talk about taking an enclave:
3 "... any one, because any one you take would make a precedent and
4 it is clear to the entire world that the UN is useless and that it is
5 time to withdraw. There has been some talk about this already."
6 And you say:
7 "... we shall look into some of the plans, it is being worked
8 on ...," and then you mention a small problem you can't discuss on the
10 Mr. Krajisnik, that's another reflection of your support, as you
11 mentioned, for the retention of the hostages and another reflection of
12 the conversations with people in the diaspora about the hostage-taking,
13 conversations that you alluded to in your previous answer?
14 A. It would be a good thing if you were to go back to the previous
15 telephone conversation where there is mention of Mr. Makara, and then you
16 will see what this Novakovic thinks about Makara and then it will all be
17 clear to you why this kind of conversation took place. He says that he's
18 crazy, or words to that effect. You can go back to that other intercept
19 and you'll see. He's a good man, but he's an idealist, and he has these
20 "idee fixe." My answer is the same. When I talked to people from the
21 diaspora, I didn't want to offend them, I tried as much as I could to
22 speak in riddles in order to satisfy him, but not to openly agree with
23 him. You see, over there Mr. Makara is an old man. He called very
24 often. He was worried. He offered advice, of course unrealistic advice
25 that we disagreed with. I repeat, the hostages were our trump card, if I
1 can put it that way, and that's what it says here, in order to avert the
2 danger of bombing our positions. The intention was not to kill people,
3 but to prevent terrible things that were happening in our area then. So
4 go back and see what this other Momcilo said about Makara.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6520, Your Honours.
8 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 32822, please.
9 Q. And this is a conversation roughly a couple of weeks later on
10 June 15th, 1995, again between you and Makara.
11 JUDGE KWON: Just for reference, if you could remind us of the
12 exhibit number where Makara was referred to, as indicated by
13 Mr. Krajisnik?
14 MR. TIEGER: P -- I believe Mr. Krajisnik was referring to P2271,
15 which was the intercept that preceded this one.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please go --
17 MR. TIEGER: I --
18 JUDGE KWON: We don't have to go back to that intercept at the
19 moment --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With Mr. Novakovic, the telephone
21 conversation with Mr. Novakovic.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you. If necessary, Mr. Karadzic
23 will deal with it in his re-examination.
24 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, just so there's no confusion, P2271 is a
25 conversation between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Vinkovic. The only
1 conversation with Mr. Novakovic that I recall is the one that we --
2 between --
3 THE WITNESS: And me.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Momcilo I think it's Ninkovic, you're
7 right. I know his first name is Momcilo.
8 Q. All right. We're now at 65 ter 32822 --
9 JUDGE KWON: You didn't put that question, but it's evident that,
10 Mr. Krajisnik, you agree that it was your conversation with Makara that
11 we just admitted?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
14 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: We're at 65 ter 32822.
16 Q. Again, this is a conversation on the 15th of June, 1995, between
17 you and Makara. And it begins by him talking about an attack. You
18 continue talking about -- you move on fairly quickly to the issue
19 Mr. Makara had raised before, that's in the middle of the page:
20 "We still think you made a mistake, letting those hostages go."
21 You say:
22 "Mr. Makara, let me tell you ... it was the biggest deal and
23 quite a lucrative one. I am not saying we could have gotten more out of
24 it, but it would have been useless having the UNPROFOR personnel and
25 not having ..."
1 And then I'll give you a moment to familiarise yourself with the
2 rest of it. Again Makara emphasises that an enclave should be taken,
3 just to make clear that UNPROFOR doesn't mean anything over there. And
4 if we could turn to the end of the intercept. I will go slowly so you
5 can see the text.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, I need the previous page in English,
7 please. Thanks. And you can go to the second page in the Serbian.
8 Q. You can conclude the conversation by assuring him:
9 "Believe me, this is the best deal. All the rest would ...
10 these hostages would have simply spoiled if we had kept them without
11 being able to sell them properly. We are very pleased."
12 So, Mr. Krajisnik, that's another one of the conversations
13 between you and people in the diaspora that you referred to in your
14 previous answers; right?
15 A. Yes. This is the best example of him advocating a very radical
16 view, that the hostages should be kept to the very end. Our army
17 released the hostages -- they were not hostages, actually. They were
18 soldiers that had been taken prisoner. And then, indeed, the Serb
19 positions were bombed again and that's why we lost lots of territory.
20 Makara is right here, although he's not a very bright man or a very wise
21 one, he was right from his point of view. But politically, we could not
22 have kept the hostages. I mean, I keep saying "hostages," and that's
23 your terminology. We could not have kept these soldiers longer. The
24 decision was made, Mr. Mladic agreed on that, he released the hostages,
25 and I think that that was all right.
1 MR. TIEGER: I would tender 65 ter 32822.
2 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6521, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: And again, you confirm that interlocutor here is --
5 one of the interlocutors was you, Mr. Krajisnik, in this intercept?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, as far as I can see, I am.
7 JUDGE KWON: You confirm that this conversation took place? That
8 was my question.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember that conversation.
10 There were many. I assume it is, but I cannot be sure that that is that
11 conversation, that it's the same one. Maybe it is.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit it.
13 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, at page 43325 you said during your
17 "The army that was in Sarajevo very often, very often provoked
18 our army. They would hit them in order to elicit a response, if I can
19 put it that way. That was based on a political decision -- I mean the
20 Muslim and Croat side, or rather, the Muslim side in this situation.
21 They wanted to represent Sarajevo as a victim and to represent us, our
22 army, as an aggressor, people who were attacking in order to take a
24 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you cast this as responses from the Serb
25 army, but, in fact, these -- and so again you're focusing on the actions
1 of the army rather than any actions of the political leadership. But
2 it's true, is it not, that the political leadership also urged and
3 co-ordinated retaliation against Muslim positions and the Muslim
4 population in the form of --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A reference, please.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm asking a question. I don't need a --
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Reference --
8 JUDGE KWON: No, I think Mr. Tieger is putting the Prosecution's
9 case to the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just interested in this part,
11 the population, where it was that we asked for the civilian population to
12 be targeted.
13 MR. TIEGER: It's too bad that Mr. Karadzic feels that -- now he
14 feels that, again, Mr. Krajisnik can't answer my questions. Before he
15 thought he couldn't answer his questions unless he was leading. It's a
16 question, the witness can answer it, and then we can move on.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 But for clarity, why don't you put your question again, which was
20 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
21 Q. The testimony you gave at 43325, Mr. Krajisnik, addresses
22 responses - and that was in the context of discussions about the shelling
23 of Sarajevo - responses by the army. So I'm asking you whether or not it
24 isn't true that the political leadership got involved in the issue of
25 responding or retaliating against the Muslims in the form of shelling?
1 A. Since there are two questions here, I'm going to answer both of
2 them. The first question, at the time I had information to the effect
3 that our army was responding to the provocations coming from the other
4 side. Now, after having had a look at numerous documents from my case,
5 I'm absolutely sure of that. At that time, I wasn't that sure. As for
6 the civilian authorities supporting this, I know what evidence you're
7 referring to and what a protected witness said. That witness lied and
8 I've already said that here. No one ever supported the bombing of
9 Sarajevo, on the contrary. As a matter of fact, there were decisions to
10 the effect that bombing was impermissible. I think that on the
11 10th of June this kind of decision was taken by the expanded Presidency
12 to stop the bombing, although it had been provoked. So I know what
13 you're referring to, but that witness was lying.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Well, it's interesting that you say that, because what I'm
17 actually referring to, Mr. Krajisnik, is something that you said. And I
18 want to turn to P5653 --
19 MR. ROBINSON: But before he does that, it would be good to
20 clarify the matter of the transcript.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11, it doesn't say that the
23 witness said, "At the time I was not sure, but I listened to them." But
24 I listened to them. I listened to what the army was saying. That is not
25 included. It can be listened to again and you will see.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, do you confirm having said so?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's continue.
4 MR. TIEGER: If we could call up P56 --
5 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break now?
6 MR. TIEGER: Sure.
7 JUDGE KWON: All right. We'll have a break for 45 minutes and
8 we'll resume at 10 past 1.00.
9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: Would that be too much if I ask for a bit shorter
11 break? I would like to finish today. I'm interested in having tomorrow
13 JUDGE KWON: By the way, how much longer do you have, Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: I thought I was going to use most of -- I expected
15 to finish by the end of today, Mr. President, which I thought would
16 pretty much exhaust my time. But I thought I would be using -- I had
17 actually advised Mr. Robinson yesterday that I might finish early, but it
18 doesn't -- I can check in the break --
19 JUDGE KWON: By the way, if we have break right now, would we not
20 have difficulty with going until 3.00? I have to consult the Registrar,
21 in terms of tape.
22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
23 JUDGE KWON: Does it mean that you need more than two sessions
24 tomorrow, Mr. Karadzic, for your re-examination?
25 THE ACCUSED: No, Excellency. I think I would finish in an hour,
1 but tomorrow is my great holiday, St. Michael, the Archangel.
2 JUDGE KWON: No, that's been already taken care of. We'll be
3 sitting until 12.30 tomorrow so we have plenty of time.
4 We'll resume at 1.10.
5 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.24 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 1.14 p.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to introduce
9 Laura Luka [phoen] from Romania who is a legal intern with our Defence
10 team and joining us this session.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Mr. Robinson, if Mr. Tieger would conclude his cross-examination
13 today and if Mr. Karadzic will spend only an hour for his re-direct
14 tomorrow, do we have the next witness available?
15 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President. The next witness was scheduled
16 to be Dr. Stakic, but he's not available because his counsel wasn't able
17 to come at this particular point. So we don't have any other witnesses
18 for tomorrow.
19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure it is a proper use of time, but we'll
20 see how it evolves.
21 Shall we continue, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. And just before we adjourned, we had just been about to call up
24 P5683 [sic]. This is a telephone conversation, Mr. Krajisnik, between
25 you and Mr. Motika on the 17th of June, 1995. And as we can see on the
1 first page, make sure you get the -- 56 -- maybe I misspoke. 5653,
2 please. I apparently said "5683." 5653. I'm sorry.
3 Okay, as we see on the first page, there is a call from your
4 office. They get ahold of Motika. He's put through to you. That
5 happens on page 2, both languages. Then you tell him:
6 "I'm interested ... err ... about that very big thing, you
8 And he says:
10 And you say:
11 "That thing we didn't use before ..."
12 And he says:
14 And you say:
15 "Do you have any of that wheat?"
16 And he says:
17 "Well, there is a little."
18 And you say:
19 "A little?"
20 And he says:
22 And you say:
23 "You know what I know."
24 And he says:
25 "I do. There isn't ... an engine."
1 And you say:
2 "Oh, no, not that?"
3 He says:
6 "More than that. We -- you know, the one that's going -- that
7 brought in a man from Serbia, remember?"
8 And then finally Motika says:
9 "Look, this is a secure line. You can say it. That -- that."
10 Motika says then on page 3 of your language.
11 You say:
12 "Ah, it's secure."
13 So then you go on:
14 "Well, I'm interested in these 'Oganj,' 'Orkan' and the rest."
15 And Motika says:
16 "There's nothing with the Orkan and we adjusted the entire Oganj
17 to 250."
18 And he explains that again:
19 "The entire Oganj has gone to 250."
20 And he says it once more. And he said:
21 "Tell me, is there -- that in Serbia?"
22 He says:
23 "Well, they have it now in Krusik and they may have it in Prva --
24 and they have it in 'Prva Iskra,' ... perhaps we could request it from
1 He wants to know if there are any connections so it can be
2 purchases. He says he has those connections. You say:
3 "Go ahead. Can you arrange for us to set that up? We can
4 try ... down there Visoko ... some retaliation should be done."
5 Motika says:
6 "Well, yeah, we're preparing that right now."
7 You say:
8 "Preparing it?"
9 He says:
11 You say:
12 "Go on, prepare it. I've said about that, that if there's
13 anything if it's possible ... do you have an idea for us to use this
14 opportunity because it's very important to retaliate."
15 Motika says:
16 "I propose that it be done in the town."
17 And you say -- now continue on page 4 of your language you say:
18 "Yes, yes."
19 Motika says:
20 "Here in the town."
21 You say:
23 And he says:
24 "Directly in the town."
25 And you say:
1 "Yes, yes, but it's necessary down there."
2 And he says:
3 "Both down there and here."
4 Your response:
5 "Yes, yes, just go ahead. We'll agree about everything but it's
6 very important down there, where there was a big attack."
7 And it continues on to the next page.
8 Now, this -- these references we see here to 250, no engine, and
9 so forth, this Chamber has received a great deal of evidence about
10 air-bombs which indicates that this discussion, focussing on the use of
11 Oganjs, 250s which are the size of the air-bombs to which Oganj rockets
12 were attacked, no engines, and so forth, reflects that this discussion is
13 about air-bombs; correct?
14 A. I really don't know and I cannot establish any connection with
15 air-bombs. I'm not versed in this kind of technical matters. Oganj and
16 other names are completely dissociated from air-bombs and I'm hearing
17 this from you.
18 Q. Well, if you and Motika weren't talking about the use of FAB-250
19 air-bombs to which Oganjs were affixed as propellants, what were you --
20 what kind of weaponry were you talking about?
21 A. I told you that I'm not a technically minded person when it comes
22 to weapons. Oganj is something completely different, it's a rocket and
23 has nothing to do with air-bomb. That's what I know as a layperson. I
24 did not discuss air-bombs. I was discussing a particular case and I know
25 what it was all about.
1 Q. [Microphone not activated]
2 You're discussing with Motika your interest in rockets; right?
3 A. Well, it's a long barrel, that's what it's called, Oganj. It's
4 probably called Oganj and that was the weapon that I was talking about.
5 Q. Whatever weaponry you're talking about and -- first of all, you
6 acknowledge that Motika was talking about 250s, he's explaining that the
7 Oganjs had gone for the 250s. That's what he told you contemporaneously?
8 A. I still don't know what this 250 means. I heard it from them,
9 that Oganj was a barrel-shaped means that was produced in Travnik and
10 that it was very efficient in combat. This is what I heard from them as
11 an ordinary person and this is what I heard on the ground.
12 Q. Okay. So you're not disputing that Motika is talking about the
13 transformation of the supply of Oganj rockets to the 250s for the use --
14 for use as air-bombs. You're just saying you don't know what he meant?
15 A. I'm disputing that I still don't know what it means. You think
16 that I was discussing Oganj. I wasn't discussing air-bombs. I am not an
17 expert in that. I know what I asked for, what I was talking about. I
18 wasn't talking about air-bombs. If it was him who raised the issue of
19 air-bombs, then so be it. I am not versed in these technical matters,
20 otherwise I would have been able to give you an explanation.
21 Q. So in this conversation, according to you, are you talking about
22 retaliation through the use of air-bombs, Oganjs, or some other weaponry
24 A. I know that there was a ferocious attack from Visoko at Ilijas at
25 the time. Since this is a neighbouring municipality, they came in panic
1 asking for help to stop the attack because there were lots of civilian
2 casualties, the Serbs. I asked Motika if anything more powerful can be
3 used in order to deter the attack because there was another attack in the
4 pipeline as a last-ditch attempt on the part of the Muslim policy to, as
5 they put it, expel the Serbs totally and to lift the blockade of Sarajevo
6 but also of Central Bosnia as well.
7 Q. Okay. What were you referring to when you said "do you have any
8 of that wheat" in the early part of discussion before Motika told you
9 that the line was secure?
10 A. Well, I thought that wheat referred to shells for launchers or
11 mines. It is closely connected but it's disassociated.
12 Q. And how routinely do you claim you and Motika were in contact
13 about issues related to weaponry systems? You'll agree that this is
14 obviously not the first time you spoke to him about such a matter?
15 A. That was the area from where I came and Motika worked in a
16 factory close to Serbian Sarajevo, which is my native place. I cannot
17 say I contacted with him often, but we did speak to each other on a
18 number of occasions. It was a private relationship and the local
19 population was constantly asking for assistance and I had no other
20 recourse than to ask someone else for help.
21 Q. That's the same explanation you gave during your trial about your
22 repeated contacts with military figures. You insisted repeatedly that it
23 was purely for a matter of a kind of private inquiry from an interested
24 citizen, even though the contemporaneous conversations captured in the
25 intercepts reflected that you were intervening in matters for the purpose
1 of getting action taken on the ground, either to relieve people who were
2 under combat pressure or to determine what had happened in response to
3 actions taken by Bosnian Serb forces. Do you remember that? Do you
4 remember that? Remember the whole series of intercepts with you and
5 Garic and others, where you're inquiring about what's going on. I need
6 to know. Following up on those calls, and you tried to dismiss them as
7 simply your private, curious inquiry.
8 A. I wouldn't call it curiosity. It was a necessity. I was a
9 deputy from the Serbian Sarajevo or Sarajevo, and during the war that was
10 a Serb-controlled territory. A large number of politicians, including
11 members of my family, tried privately through me to gain assistance and
12 protection because they were under threat. And most definitely,
13 privately and for their own reasons, I was even sometimes criticised of
14 being -- intervening on behalf of Sarajevo. On several times I pleaded
15 with the army in order to improve the situation, in order to protect the
16 population. But the sole reason for that was because I hail from that
17 area. Although I was a political functionary at the republican level, I
18 never displayed such a level of interest for Banja Luka, for example, and
19 perhaps I should have.
20 Q. I want to turn, in the interests of time, to some things you
21 spent a great deal of time with on your examination-in-chief, and that
22 was the Cutileiro Plan. I think it's fair to say you emphasised that not
23 only in your examination-in-chief but also your cross-examination. And
24 you attempted -- you asserted that the Bosnian Serbs had been assured or
25 promised by the European community that they would get their own entity
1 and that the European representative prepared a map which the strategic
2 objectives simply followed, and that was your explanation for any number
3 of things that we looked at that the Bosnian Serbs did; right?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Well, the reality, Mr. Krajisnik, is that although negotiations
6 were conducted under the auspices of the European community, nothing was
7 promised to the Bosnian Serbs, as we can see reflected in P952, which is
8 a letter in June from Mr. Cutileiro to Mr. Karadzic. And if we could
9 call that up, please. As we can see, this is dated the
10 12th of June, 1992, and in the third paragraph --
11 A. It would be beneficial if there is a translation so that I can
12 follow and subsequently to be precise.
13 Q. Well, I'll get you to the third paragraph in a minute, if I can,
14 through a synopsis. If the Defence feels like it's not sufficient to
15 contextualise the comment in the third paragraph, they can make that
17 So the first paragraph thanks Mr. Karadzic for his letter of the
18 5th of June, points to a comment by Lord Carrington that the only way to
19 peace in Bosnia is through negotiation. A political settlement is
20 essential. And that's been emphasised in a UN Resolution. Carrington
21 went on to say:
22 "'... there is absolutely no question of the Conference, or for
23 that matter the international community, endorsing a policy of
24 'fait accompli.' Territorial claims which have been pursued by force are
25 totally unacceptable.'"
1 Now, me stop there, since you asked to read it. There, that's a
2 reference to what the Bosnian Serbs were doing, that is, going on the
3 offensive to liberate, conquer, seize, or control territory; right?
4 A. I don't think that this refers to Serbs specifically. This is a
5 general statement. We accepted --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Can Mr. Krajisnik please repeat his answer.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, could you repeat your answer.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first paragraph which speaks
9 about the territories taken by force, that coincided with our position
10 and we agreed to that. There is even a document signed by Mr. Karadzic
11 that this is exactly our view and that we accepted that and that was
12 incorporated in nearly all the agreements.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. The second paragraph refers to Cutileiro's intention to reconvene
15 the talks as soon as the questions of the airport, free passage of
16 humanitarian relief, and Serbian artillery around Sarajevo are resolved
17 through the mediation of UNPROFOR. And he urges Mr. Karadzic to do
18 everything in his power to facilitate a satisfactory solution.
19 Now we get to the third paragraph where Cutileiro says:
20 "Let me add one thing ... the European community has not made any
21 promises to you. What happened, as you well know, is that talks on
22 future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina among the
23 three main political parties ... under my chairmanship, were established
24 by Lord Carrington in early February. On the 18th of March, we reached
25 agreement on a set of principles. The validity of that agreement,
1 however, can only be upheld if borders and competences of the constituent
2 units be defined by negotiated consensus and not by force, and if
3 'ethnically cleansed' territories be restored to their ante-bellum
4 ethnical compositions."
5 And he concludes by saying:
6 "I'm sure you realise that it is in your interest to do
7 everything from your side to ... achieve those results."
8 And Ambassador Cutileiro testified here as a witness for
9 Dr. Karadzic. He verified that letter, and there was never a suggestion
10 in his testimony by him or by anyone else during the course of his
11 testimony that the international community promised or told the Serbs
12 that they would simply be given their own ethnic unit. So I put it to
13 you, Mr. Krajisnik, that your claim is essentially an attempt to justify
14 your military conquests of the areas that you wanted for
15 the [indiscernible] which you were unable to get by negotiations.
16 A. I will try once again to interpret what I said in this trial. I
17 said that the first information that we would be given our national
18 entity was received from Mr. Milosevic. Prior to that, there were talks
19 with Mr. Carrington and other international representatives. That what
20 Mr. Milosevic said was true was to the effect that you are going to get
21 your own entity in exchange for giving up on Yugoslavia. He confirmed
22 that to Mr. Cutileiro when he came, and at the time we had an endorsement
23 of the European community because he presented these principles exactly
24 commensurate with what we had received previously as information. This
25 is the truth. Mr. Cutileiro, that is true, never said explicitly: I am
1 guaranteeing you that you are going to get this and that except for one
2 thing, and I think that you have it in the documents.
3 On the 17th of March, in a meeting where we were, Mr. Cutileiro
4 said in response to our question: Are we going to get our constituent
5 unit? He said: Not one, you will get more than one. And we said: We
6 only want one. He then went to talk to the Muslim side and he said they
7 agreed, and you can find it in the documents. In this meeting he said:
8 You're going to get your entity. It is not a promise. This was the
9 adopted policy by the European community and that is the genuine truth.
10 Q. So notwithstanding what Mr. Cutileiro said in a contemporaneous
11 letter, that this was all about negotiations and dependent upon consensus
12 among those parties, notwithstanding what he told this Trial Chamber when
13 he came to testify 20 years later, you maintain that that's wrong and
14 that instead you were acting on the assurance by the European community
15 that you had an ethnic entity?
16 A. With all due respect for Mr. Cutileiro, what I said a minute ago
17 is true. He said on the 17th: You are going to get your national
18 entity, and the entire agreement was based on that sentence of his. The
19 Muslims and the Croats were aware of that and they set up the exactly
20 same principles. That's what he said. And there was never any doubt or
21 dispute that this promise existed, and this was verified in the
22 Dayton Agreement. Everybody was to get their own entity except for the
23 Vance-Owen Plan, where there was an attempt to deviate from the
24 originally accepted principles.
25 Q. Now, you also referred repeatedly to the so-called -- or what you
1 termed as the Cutileiro map, something that you called the Cutileiro map
2 but Mr. Cutileiro didn't nor did anybody else. Mr. Cutileiro testified
3 to the contrary, that there was a map annexed to the agreement which
4 showed the relative majority in each municipality and that that would be
5 the basis of the working group; that is, it showed the current
6 municipality structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina and it shaded in,
7 according to the ethnic group, which of the ethnic groups had an absolute
8 or a relative majority there. That map's in evidence as P782. You saw
9 it in your case. It's the one with -- drawn in with the cross-hatching
10 and the stripes. And Mr. Cutileiro further indicated that that map was a
11 preliminary map, so much so that we decided to create a Working Group, a
12 Working Group that was never created. And that's at T33965.
13 Now, that was testimony that he offered at the behest of
14 Dr. Karadzic. Mr. Cutileiro never testified about the existence or
15 creation of another map, never suggested there was another map, and
16 Dr. Karadzic never asked him about another map or suggested that one in
17 any way existed. So I submit that the map that you presented here in
18 court, that coloured map published in 1996 that's in Cyrillic, is not the
19 Cutileiro map. The only Cutileiro map is the one reflected in P782.
20 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you are not right. There is proof here - and I
21 saw it while preparing for this testimony - the "Politika" daily of
22 19th March published this map. Please find this document here and show
23 it. If it was published on the 19th of March, then it doesn't stand that
24 it does not exist. You have it in the documents; I have it on my laptop.
25 And I claim that there are two maps. Your map, which you referred to as
1 Cutileiro's one, was made by the late Mr. Darwin, and it only represented
2 which ethnic community was in majority and where.
3 Before our 12th of May Assembly in Brussels, the line on the Una
4 was drawn up for the first time, and that is why we introduced as one of
5 our strategic objectives the border on the Una. If you find this
6 document, you will see that this is true and I'm referring to the
7 "Politika" daily of the 19th of March. I hope I'm not mistaken. I think
8 this is correct.
9 MR. ROBINSON: That's Exhibit D302.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Mr. Cutileiro also confirmed an article he wrote in which he
12 stated that following the breakdown of negotiations after 18 March, the
13 Bosnian Serbs felt confirmed in their paranoid view of history and went
14 brutally on the offensive. That's found at T33953. And he accepted that
15 the control of municipalities such as Zvornik, Bratunac, Vlasenica,
16 Srebrenica, Rogatica, Visegrad, all reflected as Muslim majority in the
17 map annexed to the statement of principles, shifted as a result of the
18 conflict, that's at 33969. And that's exactly what he was referring to
19 in the letter of June 12th as well that we looked at a moment ago; isn't
20 that right?
21 A. I don't know what Mr. Cutileiro had in mind. I can say that when
22 the war started, each municipality at its local level in this all-out war
23 was in conflict. And whoever was stronger militarily was victorious in
24 such a municipality. We lost some territories but we acquired other
25 territories. That was a war among three peoples. There was no guidance.
1 There was no connection with the municipal levels. People in Sarajevo
2 were saying: We don't even know if Karadzic is alive, let alone that
3 there was someone pulling the strings from somewhere.
4 Q. Now, somewhat related to this subject was your repeated emphasis
5 that your focus on the strategic objectives, your repetition about the
6 strategic objectives, in your meetings with the military were simply a
7 reflection of the fact that it was public knowledge because, as you said,
8 it had been publicly announced and there was nothing new, everybody knew
9 that the strategic objectives were public, et cetera. And you tried to
10 do the same thing in the Popovic case. You said that the annunciation of
11 the strategic objectives at the 16th Assembly was a way of informing the
12 international community and the public at large about our positions since
13 all the meetings and sessions were public. That's found at transcript
14 21583 through 84 of the transcript in the Popovic case.
15 Can you confirm that that was your position in Popovic or do you
16 wish to see the transcript?
17 A. I have to say I wasn't really following so well what you want.
18 When I testified in the Popovic case, I believe it's reflected correctly
19 in the transcript. I didn't check but I believe that it is correct.
20 Q. Okay. And the point here, Mr. Krajisnik, is that you were saying
21 to the Judges in the Popovic case that the annunciation of the strategic
22 objectives was simply the public exposure, the public exposition of the
23 ongoing negotiations, and so it would be disseminated because all your
24 sessions were public. And then you continue to offer that same
25 explanation here, that the strategic -- that notwithstanding your
1 repeated admonitions and focus on the strategic objectives in your
2 meetings and Dr. Karadzic's meetings with the leadership of the VRS, that
3 didn't have any significance because it was somehow just your reminding
4 them that everybody knew about the negotiations. That's essentially what
5 I was pointing you to.
6 Now, first of all, the reality is that the 16th Session was not
7 an open session; it was closed. And we can look first to -- sorry.
8 MR. TIEGER: It's a P number I should have memorised by now, but
9 I see that nobody else jumped up with their own recollections. It's
11 Q. And that's a transcript of the 16th Session.
12 A. Well, you don't have to bother. It was a closed session in part.
13 I remember that. That is correct.
14 Q. Okay. Thank you. Okay. And you were reminded of that in the
15 Popovic case after you first asserted that -- and tried to explain the
16 strategic objectives as being the public dissemination of the negotiating
17 position. You were then confronted with evidence that the session was
18 indeed closed, and then you acknowledged it had been closed; correct?
19 A. Correct. The session, a part of it was closed and I can also
20 tell you why that was closed, not because of the six strategic goals but
21 because of something else.
22 Q. So you're saying -- was it closed -- okay. What part of the
23 session do you claim was closed, Mr. Krajisnik?
24 A. Well, I don't know. You can see it from the minutes. It's easy
25 to establish that. I don't know it off the top of my head, but it wasn't
1 because of the six strategic goals that had already been announced to the
2 public, to the international community. It was not a secret matter. Our
3 platform, the six strategic goals, and the map, all of that was already
4 publicly announced and I can also provide evidence of that.
5 Q. What -- where was -- who publicly announced it before the
6 16th Assembly Session, according to you? Or what document reflects the
7 public provision of the six strategic goals before the 16th Assembly?
8 A. I did not say "before." What I said was that they were discussed
9 at the 16th Session, and then on the 9th of June you can find the
10 Presidency minutes for that, where it says these goals should be sent to
11 the international community and our map, meaning the map, the map. We
12 sent it all to the international community and publish openly. And so
13 the secretary made a mistake. He was thinking of publishing it in the
14 Official Gazette, and then when he saw that he made a decision he crossed
15 it out, and then instead of a conclusion he said "decision." And then a
16 few days later when they were making a new report on the work, the new
17 secretary put that in and that is why there is that problem about the
18 subsequent publication of the strategic goals as a decision, but it had
19 already been sent to the international community. You can read the
20 minutes and you can see that's how it was.
21 THE ACCUSED: D00428.
22 JUDGE KWON: We didn't hear you because of overlapping,
23 Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document that the witness is
25 referring to is 0428.
1 MR. TIEGER: He's referring to --
2 Q. You referred explicitly to the June 9th Presidency session.
3 Okay. So, first, you said in Popovic that the session was open and so
4 was the exposure of the six strategic goals. Now -- then you said it was
5 closed. And now you say: Well, it was disseminated after the decision
6 that's reflected in the June 9th, 1992, Presidency session minutes.
7 But the fact is that the strategic goals were not published in
8 the Official Gazette until the latter part of 1993, and that happened
9 when someone came to you, according to you, and to note that there was no
10 record of the strategic goals anywhere and that something should be
11 published so that it could be reflected in the official records. And
12 that's what you said in the Popovic case.
13 A. What I said in the Popovic case is correct because while I was
14 preparing for my appeal I found documents which explain all of that.
15 Mr. President, if you like, I can provide the whole chronology of how
16 this document came about and why it was subsequently published, how it
17 was publicised, and that it was not a secret document of any kind. If
18 you permit me, I will easily explain that. At this Tribunal there are
19 all these documents that I sent to the Prosecution and to each Judge in
20 my case, and I also have it on CD and I can easily submit that to you
21 tomorrow if you wish, all of those documents.
22 JUDGE KWON: If Mr. Karadzic is interested in.
23 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. As long as we're talking about Presidency sessions, I wanted to
1 raise one other matter with you, Mr. Krajisnik. During the course of
2 your testimony in your case, you had opportunity to look at the
3 conclusions from a session of the government held on the 10th of June,
4 and that's P1092, if we could call that up. If we could turn to item 6
5 which is on page 3 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S. That reflects
6 the conclusion that the Ministry of Justice should make a report about
8 "This report should pay special attention on treatment of
9 civilian population, prisoners of war, accommodation, food, et cetera.
10 The report would be considered by the government, after which it would be
11 submitted to the Presidency of the Republic."
12 Now, you testified in your case that on the basis of this
13 document and on the basis of these conclusions, one could infer that
14 information about maltreatment of prisoners reached the government.
15 JUDGE KWON: Was that your question?
16 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
17 Q. Can you confirm that, Mr. Krajisnik? Sorry.
18 A. I apologise, I was waiting for a question. I didn't understand
19 that as a question. If it's not a problem, could you please repeat it.
20 I'm not sure I understand what the question is.
21 Q. Sure, and I'm sorry I wasn't more clearer. I just want you to
22 confirm that you testified in your case that on the basis of this
23 document, on the basis of these conclusions, one can infer that
24 information about maltreatment of prisoners reached the government?
25 A. Now, when I read it, I don't see it. But if it states so there,
1 there must be a reason that I said that. Perhaps somebody put an
2 additional question to me. We're talking about the treatment of the
3 civilian population, prisoners of war, accommodation, food, and so on and
4 so forth. So from what I can see here, you cannot see that.
5 Q. Okay. I'll read you what you said at 2441 [sic]:
6 Were you at this time," we're talking about the 10th of June,
7 "had you received or heard any concerns that prisoners of war were being
8 maltreated at the hands of Serbs in an unacceptable or inappropriate
10 You said:
11 "The answer is no. No, I am so convinced that I was never
12 informed of any such thing. Had I been informed, I certainly would have
13 intervened in order to have an analysis carried out, if I can put it that
14 way. However, on the basis of this," and you're looking at the 10 June
15 minutes at the time, "I can infer that a similar type of information
16 reached the government and then the government sent a commission of its
17 own to investigate these rumours ...," et cetera. Okay.
18 So that was the position you took in your trial, that one could
19 see from -- one could infer from this, that the government had heard
20 something about and was seeking a report specifically about how civilians
21 and prisoners of war were being treated?
22 A. Well, I wouldn't state it -- say something different today. The
23 government on the basis of this knew about the prisoners and was asking
24 for information about prisoners of war. I assume that some reports
25 reached the government, and prompted by those rumours or indicia the
1 government sought some kind of information and a report of sorts was made
2 about the treatment of persons of different ethnicities in prison.
3 Probably there was some other issues there as well which are not relevant
4 to what we are discussing right now.
5 Q. And you also explain that you didn't know -- you didn't have such
6 information or -- that the -- of the type the government had because this
7 was just something the government decided on its own independently;
8 correct? That was your testimony? First, before you explain it, if you
9 can confirm or not that that was your testimony.
10 A. I don't remember. But if you want me to explain what I said in
11 this testimony, that I can do.
12 Q. Well, you still -- do you maintain now that this was something
13 the government did on its own independently and that's why you didn't
14 have such information, because the information they had that's reflected
15 in these conclusions was something that -- and that triggered this call
16 for the Ministry of Justice to make a report was something that only the
17 government had?
18 A. My answer at that trial was that I was not informed about
19 criminals of war or war crimes, but if any rumours or indicia appeared, a
20 reaction ensued immediately. It's possible that there was some sort of
21 information and that on the basis of that the government reacted.
22 Possibly. I don't know that. I know that every time a rumour popped up
23 there would be a reaction. It's possible that Mr. Djeric was at our
24 extended meeting and that this was discussed and then it was said: Let
25 the government make a report and say whether this was true or not. That
1 would always be our action and -- reaction. And I testified to that
3 Q. Well, you just put your finger on exactly the point I was going
4 to make, and that is the following: It's not only possible that
5 Mr. Djeric was at your extended meeting; that's in fact exactly how it
6 happened, that there was a Presidency session at which Mr. Djeric was
7 tasked to do this, and that's found at P1093, page 2, that the government
8 then submit a report on prisoners with proposed measures.
9 A. Yes, that's it. That means that the meeting was there, the
10 government -- the task was issued, the government reacted, and that's it.
11 It's possible. I mean, I forgot that particular case, but it wasn't that
12 case. Maybe there were other cases, but there would always be actions to
13 investigate, establish, see what it was, and to have a report done and to
14 punish the perpetrators. That I know for sure.
15 Q. Well, I know that's the position you're taking now, now that you
16 have the range of documents in front of you. But I just want to be clear
17 on what happened in the Krajisnik case when you were testifying for the
18 first time. And then you wanted to say two things. Number one, you
19 never had any information that there was a problem with prisoners and
20 civilians being held; and number two, it may be that the government found
21 out about it but they immediately launched an inquiry, but they did all
22 that independently, on their own. That was your testimony initially,
23 right, and that's what you just confirmed a moment ago, I think, that you
24 said that first when asked?
25 A. Prosecutor, sir, then and before, I always spoke the truth the
1 way I knew it. Always when an information would turn up, the information
2 was always an assumption and the reaction would be: It's not true, but
3 let the organs investigate and get the information. That's the true. If
4 I said that I perhaps never heard of a crime, I did not. Perhaps I heard
5 about some assumptions, speculations, indicia. There was some
6 propaganda, lies on all sides during the war. So this is not something
7 that is in collision. I'm simply telling you how after a certain piece
8 of information I can round off my thought, and what I said in my trial
9 was confirmed. There was no firm news about crimes. There were some
10 indications, perhaps rumours, but never definite information. There were
11 always lies and rumours in war time. Let me give you an example. You
12 saw that on the 7th of August there was a Presidency session, and
13 Mr. Karadzic approved visits to all prisons for journalists and
14 international mediators. Had we known that there were crimes there, we
15 would not have approved it. We would have postponed that permission. It
16 was not something that was done maliciously. Simply, we said: We don't
17 have any information about crimes. You are free to go and visit any of
18 the prisoners -- any of the prisons, to all representatives of the
19 Red Cross, the international intermediaries, there were no crimes that we
20 were aware of at that time.
21 MR. TIEGER: May I tender 24438 and 24441 to the portions that I
22 referred to at length?
23 JUDGE KWON: We haven't looked at it.
24 MR. TIEGER: I know, Mr. President, but I mean, we can look at
25 them but I did recite them --
1 JUDGE KWON: We can do -- if you are tendering, I would like to
2 see them.
3 MR. TIEGER: Okay. 24441, please, of 65 ter 25522. If we look
4 at lines 11 through -- 11 and 12.
5 Q. "However, on the basis of this I can infer that a similar type of
6 information reached the government ...," et cetera.
7 And if we can turn to 24438.
8 "Can you say whether at this time, this was the 10th of June,
9 were you aware of any special concerns in relation to treatment of, first
10 of all, civilian population?"
11 And you said:
12 "This was something that the government decided on its own
13 independently because it came under its competence and authority ..."
14 MR. TIEGER: So I tender those portions, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add them to the exhibit.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. Now, at that time, June 10th, we've seen evidence -- very
18 recently, in fact, we've reviewed such evidence that by that time there
19 were thousands and thousands and thousands of prisoners being held in the
20 Krajina alone, as reflected in repeated daily combat reports of the 1 KK,
21 for example. Now, those people were rounded up at the end of
22 May/beginning of June. They continued to languish in detention
23 facilities in the Krajina and elsewhere throughout June, throughout July,
24 and it wasn't until August when the international community gained access
25 to Omarska and publicised it that any action was taken with respect to
1 those detention facilities, Mr. Krajisnik; isn't that right?
2 A. Well, I couldn't confirm your entire explanation. Perhaps it was
3 confirmed during this trial, but at that time, if we're talking about
4 that time, there was a blockade that Krajina was isolated and none of us
5 had that information. You had witnesses here, they didn't know in
6 Banja Luka what was going on in Omarska, and then a delegation went and
7 was flabbergasted to see what was going on, never mind us in Pale knowing
8 what was going on.
9 Q. On the 2nd of June Mr. Brdjanin told Mr. Karadzic personally,
10 asked him personally, for a position about prisoners. That was one day
11 after reports from the 1 KK reflect the seizing and detention of 7.000
12 people from Kozarac alone. Dr. Karadzic had access to information from
13 the military, didn't he, and information from the Krajina?
14 A. It's not in dispute that -- whether it was known on all three
15 sides that there were prisons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was
16 general knowledge. The problem was the treatment in those prisons. I
17 assert, I'm convinced that Karadzic didn't know that either. He would
18 have told me. I know definitely that I did not know it and Mr. Karadzic
19 did not know it either. Had he known, he would have informed us. Had he
20 known, he would have informed us about it. I assume so. And as for the
21 letter by Mr. Brdjanin, he probably explained what he was seeking and
22 what reply he got. I mean, I really cannot comment on that because I'm
23 not really knowledgeable about that matter.
24 Q. Well, let me focus for a moment, then, on the reliability of what
25 you explained to us you knew or didn't know. You testified in your trial
1 in 2006 that as for Koricanske Stijene, that is, the murder of more than
2 200 unarmed Bosnian Muslim men at Vlasic mountain, you never heard of it:
3 "As for Koricanske Stijene, I never heard of it ..."
4 And you said:
5 "I only heard about Koricanske Stijene in The Hague ..."
6 That's found at 24636, lines 15 and lines 1 through 2. That was
7 your testimony under oath before this institution in 2006; right?
8 A. That is correct and I explained that to you and I explained to
9 you the things that were misinterpreted by SRNA, our news agency. I can
10 explain what I said then. What I said then is correct and I claim that
11 to this day.
12 Q. Well, one of the witnesses in this case, a witness called by
13 Dr. Karadzic, was former Minister of Defence Subotic. And he testified,
14 that's found at transcript pages 40104 through 40109, that he was
15 dispatched to the Krajina following events at Koricanske Stijene and that
16 he briefed the Presidency in detail about what happened there. That is,
17 he came back from being dispatched to the Krajina, and when he reported
18 to the Presidency he told them all about Koricanske Stijene. And that's
19 reflected in P0303, a meeting of September 1st that reflects his return
20 from the Krajina, his briefing the Presidency members, and your
21 attendance at that session.
22 A. Mr. Subotic testified at my trial too, and if you take a look at
23 that, you will see that he said that when this meeting was held when he
24 was supposed to go to the Krajina when he received that information, I
25 was not present. I explained why I was not present. You will remember
1 that. On the 21st of August, I believe, my wife was seriously wounded in
2 Pale. I was with her in Belgrade at the military medical academy and she
3 died on the 23rd. All that time, while these activities were underway, I
4 was not present at that meeting. You saw the SRNA report there which is
5 wrong. When I was in Belgrade when she died, they wrote that I received
6 some delegation. That was completely false, a lie. I don't know why,
7 maybe misinterpreted seven days' difference. I was not informed then and
8 I did not know. And on the 1st of September I don't think that it was
9 then that he informed the Presidency. In my presence he did not inform
10 the Presidency about that, perhaps before that, between the 21st and the
11 1st of September, maybe at some meeting when I was not present. It took
12 seven days. I brought my wife back from Belgrade, buried her. All of
13 that happened then. So the statement I gave then is quite correct, and
14 that was confirmed by Mr. Subotic when he testified in my case, that I
15 was not present at that meeting when he spoke about what had happened
17 Q. I'm not talking about the meeting at which he was dispatched.
18 I'm talking about his report back on the situation. We also heard from
19 Mr. Aviljas, another Defence witness, who also participated in meetings
20 related to Koricanske Stijene and he said everybody in RS knew about
21 that. And he meant everybody. He didn't just mean the top leadership
22 who would be expecting to know about this stuff, he meant that this was
23 no secret. So were you the only person who didn't hear about this,
24 Mr. Krajisnik?
25 A. Mr. Tieger, I'm telling you, at that time, I'm telling you what
1 the situation was, what my situation was, and I tell you I was not
2 informed about that and I was not dealing with Koricanske Stijene. Had
3 somebody informed me -- I mean, Mr. Subotic said that he gave a task to
4 the MUP and the 1st Krajina Corps to investigate that and to punish the
5 perpetrators. Well, had that been the case, that would have been a
6 normal sequence of events; however, I did not attend that meeting and I
7 did not receive that information. I did not attend that meeting. It
8 doesn't matter. There should have been a request to punish the
9 perpetrators, to investigate and punish the perpetrators, and that's what
10 I heard from Mr. Subotic. You can check that.
11 Q. Last issue, Mr. Krajisnik, last question in fact. You told this
12 Court in response to questions from Mr. Karadzic that you believed
13 that -- or it was your impression that Mr. Holbrooke did not believe that
14 Mr. Karadzic was guilty.
15 So somehow you called upon whatever contact you had with the late
16 Mr. Holbrooke to suggest that he had formed a view of Mr. Karadzic's
17 innocence, and in that regard I'd like to call up 65 ter 25654. And in
18 an interview that took place at the time of Mr. Karadzic's arrest,
19 Mr. Holbrooke was interviewed by "Spiegel" and asked what that meant to
20 him. He said he was overjoyed. This was bringing to justice one of the
21 worst, most evil men in the world. First for his responsibility for
22 hundreds of thousands of deaths. He notes that he believed in racial
23 superiority even though Muslims and Serbs were really basically the same
24 ethnicity. And finally ends up saying he would have made a good Nazi.
25 This is a more accurate reflection, is it not, of Mr. Holbrooke's
1 view of Dr. Karadzic's guilt or innocence than the impressions you
2 offered here under oath in response to Mr. Karadzic's urging?
3 A. I want to repeat this. In my view, at that moment it was
4 irrelevant for Mr. Holbrooke whether Karadzic was guilty or not. He
5 thought that the indictment against Karadzic was an instrument for
6 implementing the Dayton Agreement, and if Karadzic were to go illegal, if
7 I can put it that way or leave all the offices held, that would have
8 meant that he would have accomplished his missions. What Mr. Holbrooke
9 said in this interview, that was not his opinion, that was not his view
10 and he never showed that in any way. Nothing would have indicated this.
11 I can just explain this in the following way: At the time when he was
12 working on the agreement, he was in power. And after that, he wasn't in
13 power. And then he was trying to justify why he had reached this
14 agreement. It's not that he reached this agreement without anybody's
15 consent. I saw him making phone calls, and he said for Mr. Karadzic the
16 Hague Tribunal is the past, and that is correct. And there is also other
17 information stating that Mrs. Albright said the same things to
18 Mrs. Plavsic. That's contained in her book too.
19 MR. TIEGER: I tender that and conclude my cross-examination,
20 Mr. President.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes --
22 JUDGE KWON: I don't see the need to admit it. The relevant part
23 was put to the witness and he answered the question.
24 MR. TIEGER: All right.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Speaker.
4 A. Good day.
5 Q. May I ask you whether you remember what the late Holbrooke said
6 about rhetoric when you were parting, when the oral part of the agreement
7 had been reached?
8 A. Mr. Holbrooke said it is very important that Mr. Karadzic does
9 not appear in public, does not make public statements, et cetera, that
10 was my understanding. And as Mr. Bildt said that he should go into the
11 basement, not be a public person.
12 Q. Did he say anything about their rhetoric in the meantime?
13 A. He said -- please, you have to understand, this is an agreement.
14 However, in public we will have to be speaking differently because this
15 would have been working against the Hague Tribunal which would not have
16 been right because it would have meant that we as a state do not support
17 the Hague Tribunal, whereas we do that publicly.
18 Q. Thank you. Let us move on with the most recent things. Can you
19 tell us, Mr. Speaker, according to the constitution, what are the powers
20 of the Assembly, what are the powers of the Presidency or the president,
21 and did you have to be informed ex officio about crimes?
22 A. Thank you, sir. Ex officio, nobody was supposed to inform me
23 about crimes, not even you. You didn't have to be informed about crimes
24 either. According to procedure, it was important to report that to
25 institutions that were in charge of that.
1 Q. Thank you. When would they have to inform me, in which case
2 would they have to inform me if they had already informed the
3 institutions concerned?
4 A. Well, it's only logical. If a certain institution were passive,
5 if it would not want to take measures, if it would refuse to take
6 measures, then those providing the information would have the right to
7 inform the prime minister, the government, even the president of the
8 republic as the highest executive body.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, in our system and I believe in other
10 systems too, where is policy created? How is policy created and how is
11 it implemented?
12 A. Top-level policy, international policy, is pursued by the
13 Presidency and the president. The Assembly passes documents and the
14 government implements policy. So if the Presidency adopts a document or
15 if a -- or if the government adopts a document, as far as the pursuit of
16 policy is concerned, that is done by the executive and by certain
18 Q. Thank you. On page 89 of today's transcript you were asked
19 what -- actually, it's from 87. It says that you said that the
20 government carried out an investigation independently. Who else could
21 have conducted an investigation in addition to the government, or rather,
22 its ministries?
23 A. By inertia I said this, because the Prosecutor was trying to say
24 that now all of us were supposed to be conducting this investigation, the
25 Speaker of the Assembly, the president of the republic, and everybody
1 else, and I said that this was autonomous, without any kind of initiative
2 or some kind of joint meeting. That is what the government did. That
3 was the task of the government. That was the task of the ministries
4 because the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior are
5 within the government. And these ministries are in charge of carrying
6 out policy, of course, through the prosecutor's office and through courts
7 of law.
8 Q. Thank you. On pages 84 onwards -- actually, before that, did you
9 attend that government session that you were asked about in relation to
10 the government's questions about the treatment of prisoners?
11 A. Well, it can be seen here that I did not attend this government
12 meeting because on that same day, perhaps in the morning, there was a
13 session, I mean this consultative session, of the
14 National Security Council. We all attended that, perhaps in the morning,
15 and then in the afternoon the government looked at these problems on its
16 own perhaps.
17 Q. Thank you. If the government is seeking information about crimes
18 from the ground, if you will, then this poor treatment of prisoners,
19 would that be part of our policy?
20 A. Certainly. That was a constant task of the ministry and of the
21 government as a whole, to bear this in mind for treatment to be correct.
22 There were even these instructions that were adopted by the government,
23 that is to say how the prison authorities would behave towards prisoners.
24 Q. Thank you. But it seems to me that I was confused when I was
25 putting my question. If prisoners were ill-treated, or rather, if that
1 was part of our policy, would the government have to ask us or the grass
3 A. Of course they would ask us. They would say: Why are you doing
4 that if that is policy? It's against the Geneva Conventions and
5 everything else. However, if somebody - how do I put this? - is pursuing
6 an erroneous policy and if there is ill-treatment and if the political
7 leadership thinks that people should be treated properly, then of course
8 they should ask people at the grass roots: Why are you doing that? And
9 then let us inform the top leadership, let us take political measures,
10 and let us have the organs in charge file criminal reports, prosecute
11 this, and so on and so forth.
12 Q. Thank you. On page 83 Mr. Tieger suggested that, as regards
13 strategic objectives, they were not discussed between the 12th of May and
14 the autumn of 1993 -- or rather, between the 12th of May and the time
15 when they were made public. You and I, did we have an interview? Were
16 we interviewed on Republika Srpska TV with the late Risto Djogo in
17 January or February 1993?
18 A. That is correct. I was reminded of this interview in these
19 materials, but before that interview I mentioned the 9th of June when we
20 publicly concluded -- I mean, these principles. The six -- actually,
21 objectives should be made public, sent to the international
22 representatives, together with a map.
23 Q. Thank you. You were asked and it was often mentioned the meaning
24 of strategic objective number 3. Do you recall on that programme? And
25 I'm referring to document that is in evidence. I'm just looking for its
1 number. How did we explain to the public in this programme the
2 significance and the meaning of the strategic objective number 3, that is
3 to say the Drina and its nature?
4 A. As far as I can recall, we did exactly as I interpreted before
5 this Tribunal. You said on that occasion that we allow for certain
6 enclaves to exist, I think that was mentioned in the Assembly, and I'm
7 talking about Muslim enclaves that would enjoy all rights. Our entire
8 policy, I'm going to repeat it once again irrespective of this, was to
9 use our resources not to have the Drina as a psychological burden on the
10 shoulders of the Serbian people. It should have been a porous border
11 without passport, without border posts, and we managed to achieve that
12 only later because all links with Serbia were subsequently allowed. No
13 passports are required. There are no border posts, and all of this was
14 done not to the detriment of either the Muslims or the Croats.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have D1934 in
17 e-court, please, both in the Serbian and in the English.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Please look at this text. Try to remember whether this was the
20 programme when the two of us were interviewed by members of the public.
21 A. I remember this interview, maybe not all the details, but I do
22 remember it. I am familiar with it.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 3 in
24 Serbian and I believe it's the same page in English.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Can you please look at this part -- I'm afraid we need the next
2 page, 3, and the time-line is 2.41. There's something wrong here.
3 That's not the right page as the one that I have. I'm sorry, I have an
4 abbreviated version, so it would be on page 28, which means that I have
5 just a few pages here in court, whereas there are many more on the
6 screen. Please look at your response where you spoke about the fourth
7 strategic objective, that is to say the Neretva valley. Can you please
8 read it out loud.
9 A. "I think that the Neretva valley was the most manipulated subject
10 and the left bank of the Neretva because lots of misinformation was
11 disseminated as if we had sold it to Herceg-Bosna, that is to say to the
12 Croats. One of our strategic goals was to have a border between eastern
13 and western Herzegovina, between these two provinces, should be the
14 Neretva river and that we would persist on that in our negotiations."
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we turn to the next page,
17 please. Page number 30 in the Serbian.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Look at the last question posed by the anchor about the border
20 between Serbia and the Republika Srpska, how it's going to work and
21 whether the world knew that there was no border between Croatia and
22 Herceg-Bosna, and so on and so forth.
23 A. Let me read it. Radovan Karadzic responded:
24 "Thus, well I think that the Muslim leadership, when they
25 requested that borders be controlled by the central government, referred
1 to the borders between Herzegovina and Croatia, as those borders don't
2 exist, where there are no restrictions, rather than to the Drina border.
3 We'll never allow, and that is one of the strategic aims we adopted at
4 the Assembly, we'll never allow the border running along Serbian
5 territories to become real, restrictive, although that was the case for a
6 while, because of the economic relationship was such that it had to be
7 imposed, but things will change. Whichever way we deal with it, Serbian
8 areas in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will enjoy great freedom of
9 economic and other communications with whomever they choose. This is in
10 accordance with the Lisbon document and other documents ..." and this is
11 where it ends.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please. We can keep the
13 English but we need the next page in the Serbian.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The Lisbon document and other
15 documents, that is in accordance with the current European trend. The
16 Germans and the French have that freedom, Alsace and Lorraine have that
17 freedom, those rights will have Serbs living on both sides of the
18 Drina ..."
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. There are quite a few more instructive things, but
21 let us go back -- well, never mind. All right, so in January or February
22 when this interview took place, did we publicly speak about the strategic
23 objectives and explained what we meant by them? Did this imply
24 unification with Serbia or what Europe has in the aftermath of the
25 Maastricht Agreement, that is to say soft borders?
1 A. I think that this is quite clear that this corresponds exactly to
2 what I said in my testimony, that we wanted a porous border without
3 border posts and customs control in the sense that is usually perceived
4 between two hostile countries. This was a true reflection of our policy
5 and this was supported by Mr. Izetbegovic. I would refer the Chamber to
6 an extract, or rather, a piece of evidence in my case which is a
7 quotation from Mr. Izetbegovic's memoirs, where he says exactly that the
8 Serbs must not feel confined, that they must not show passports on the
9 Drina, that this border must be porous, that they can freely pass across
10 it, and that no one should feel that border to be a burden.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we again have page 29 in the
13 Serbian language.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You spoke about people being upset and alarmed once they hear
16 that certain area would be given to someone else. Look at the last entry
17 of Radovan Karadzic on this page, where our enemies are spreading rumours
18 about some things being sold out, that Karadzic gave away Vogosca and
19 Ilijas which was followed by an offensive. First they softened the
20 defence and then it was followed by an offensive. Did you have that in
22 A. Yes, I did. But also another example which refers to the
23 Neretva. In the course of adopting the objective goals on
24 the [indiscernible] of May, the JNA held the Neretva river valley and the
25 access to sea; however, after one of our visits, either on the 5th or 6th
1 of May, you, I, and Mr. Koljevic were in Herzegovina. On that occasion,
2 Mr. Koljevic inadvertently and carelessly informed people over the radio
3 that we had agreed with the Croats in Graz to have the left bank of the
4 Neretva given to the Serbs and the right one to the Croats; however, that
5 the Croats did not agree with that. They wanted the dividing line to be
6 on the Titova Street --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, the interpreters didn't follow you.
9 Please start from when you referred to Titova Street. They wanted to --
10 the dividing line to be on the Titova Street, and then please continue.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise once again.
12 JUDGE KWON: Please speak slowly.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll do my best. I'm sorry.
14 Mr. Koljevic carelessly said, or rather, interpreted our agreement with
15 the Croats reached in Graz. He said that there were certain differences
16 between our position and their position in the sense that we demanded a
17 border to be on the Neretva river, whereas the Croats wanted a small belt
18 on the left bank up to Titova Street to belong to them. And he said that
19 we had to reach an agreement with Croats. On that same day, whilst we
20 were in Nevesinje where we stayed, five young Serb men were killed,
21 combatants from a unit that went on its own initiative, because this was
22 still an armed people, to liberate a Serbian village, and as a result
23 they were killed, which means that all these households were
24 extinguished. This caused an uproar among the citizens, this statement
25 of his, and immediately rumours were spread that the negotiating team was
1 selling out the river Neretva valley, that is to say that the politicians
2 from both the valley and from the top leadership were prepared to give up
3 on the Neretva and the result was that the army withdrew from that area,
4 just as the army withdrew from the Prevlaka and the seashore. And I can
5 confirm that whenever such statements or such news appeared, that
6 softened the front line and the people were manning the front line.
7 People would simply retreat from those areas, which means that we did not
8 have an advantage in terms of the size of the territory. It was, rather,
9 a burden for us so it was not easy for us to create a map if you have a
10 big territory. Only after the Dayton Accords when our territory was
11 reduced to 45 per cent, it was very easy to participate in the
12 negotiations. It is a paradox, but it is true.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. You were asked today why, or rather, with -- about
15 the promise or the offer of the international community for us to get a
16 constituent unit. Did we accept unconditionally for Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 to leave Yugoslavia? What was our condition in that regard ?
18 A. I said that in this trial as well, that a promise was made. It
19 was not a condition of ours. It was a promise made by Mr. Milosevic and
20 by others as well that we had to give up Yugoslavia in return for a
21 constituent unit in Bosnia. That was made quite clear to us, and that is
22 why before that we organised a plebiscite. We all voted for remaining in
23 Yugoslavia; however, quite simply, after that we had to change our
24 policy, our real policy. If we cannot have Yugoslavia, we shall have our
25 constituent unit within Bosnia and we shall recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 as a complex state and that was the reason why we forgot about Yugoslavia
2 and accepted Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. After we gave our agreement,
3 Montenegro decided to form a new Yugoslavia, but not before we gave our
4 consent to this.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 27 in the
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. I'd like to ask you something about a position on that page. Did
10 we strive to defeat - and I mean you yourself, among others - to defeat
11 Muslims and Croats?
12 A. I can categorically say that our policy was not to defeat Croats
13 and Muslims, even if we had been able to because our policy was
14 separation, separation meant that we wanted to have our own constituent
15 unit within Bosnia, which means internal demarcation. Why? Now,
16 Your Honours and Mr. President, let me remind you that we were out-voted
17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and due to that we could not allow for this policy
18 to continue. That's why we said: All right, you Muslims and Croats
19 don't want to remain in Yugoslavia; however, we do not trust you and we
20 do not want to remain with you in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You out-voted us
21 even before the war. One can only imagine how you're going to out-vote
22 us once we remained alone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So our policy was to
23 separate from them, not to defeat them. So let us make an arbitrary
24 assumption. Let's say that the Muslims capitulated, as well as the
25 Croats, and that Bosnia --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Krajisnik please slow down.
2 JUDGE KWON: You are speaking too fast.
3 Let us assume Muslims capitulated, start from there slowly.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'd like to explain why we
5 preferred separation. For example, if we had defeated Muslims and
6 Croats, Bosnia would have been an independent state already recognised.
7 What would happen? The same thing would happen. We would be out-voted.
8 We were in favour of Yugoslavia and the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 within Yugoslavia perhaps divided into economic regions. Once Yugoslavia
10 disappeared and once we were put under the jurisdiction of this coalition
11 that out-voted us, we said that we cannot be sure that we are not going
12 to be out-voted again in the future. And you can see that happening even
13 nowadays after the Dayton Accord. That's our situation.
14 So in response to your question, we did not want to defeat the
15 Muslims. We wanted an honest division. We wanted to have our
16 constituent unit comprising only Serbian areas. We failed to achieve
17 that. Some of our ethnic territories remained within the Muslim/Croat
18 entity, whereas other parts, that is to say parts belonging to the
19 Muslims and Croats, remained within Republika Srpska. But generally
20 speaking, the ethnic division was successfully and ultimately
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Please look at this, Djogo says -- actually, a viewer from Pale
24 says: Why doesn't Radovan Karadzic order the liberation of Sarajevo --
25 THE ACCUSED: Please, next page in English.
1 JUDGE KWON: Is this your last question in relation to this clip?
2 Otherwise we will continue tomorrow.
3 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency, but there is a complementary
4 intercept that I wanted to tender.
5 JUDGE KWON: No, no. About -- I'm asking whether to adjourn now
6 or not.
7 THE ACCUSED: Okay, we can adjourn now and I will continue
8 tomorrow from this point.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
10 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. The hearing is
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.02 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of
14 November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.