Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 44079

 1                           Wednesday, 27 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours.  May I

 9     introduce Ms. Kyriaki Karnezi from Greece, who's been with our team since

10     the beginning of September.  She has graduated from the

11     University of Groningen with a master's in international criminal law.

12     Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, please continue.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you very much, Mr. President.

15                           WITNESS:  NIKOLA ERCEG [Resumed]

16                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

17                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]

18        Q.   Mr. Erceg, when we adjourned yesterday we had been looking at

19     paragraphs 22 and 34 of your statement concerning your assertions that

20     the ARK and the ARK institutions were formed due to the impossibility of

21     communications with Pale.  And we had looked at the date of establishment

22     of the ARK, but this morning I'd like to turn to the claims you make

23     about the communication problem.  Now, in paragraph 22 you state that the

24     ARK was formed because "all communication lines were severed."

25             In paragraph 29 you essentially repeat that assertion saying


Page 44080

 1     there was a "total breakdown of telephone lines, all forms of

 2     communication."  You say that "all the communication lines with us had

 3     been severed."

 4             Now, with respect to this total breakdown of communication that

 5     you allege, you also acknowledge in paragraph 4 that in some mysterious

 6     way the instructions on establishing Crisis Staff, that is, the Djeric

 7     instructions of approximately April 26 somehow made it through this

 8     impenetrable barrier, right, you acknowledge that the Djeric instructions

 9     were received?

10        A.   Yes, as far as I can remember I had them, but I'm not sure when.

11     I don't know if it was those first few days when it arrived in

12     Banja Luka.  I imagine it was within two or three days.

13        Q.   Okay.  And that appears to be the sole "exception" to the receipt

14     of documents from Pale mentioned in your statement, at least mentioned

15     explicitly.  Now, in fact, there was another document received from Pale

16     just a couple of days later and that is 1D09858, an enactment of yours

17     reflects the receipt of an order from the Ministry of Defence.  Let's

18     take a quick look at that document.  Okay, and that's dated the

19     29th of April, 1992.

20        A.   This was sent to Mr. Radic, the president of the

21     Municipal Assembly of Banja Luka.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now -- and it refers to a document received from the

23     republic-level authorities and refers to action that should be taken in

24     response to that; correct?

25        A.   Yes.


Page 44081

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, the reason this document is not acknowledged in your

 2     statement as yet another exception to this total breakdown that you claim

 3     existed is because it was mentioned, in fact, in one of your drafts but

 4     then it was deleted from the final version of your statement that was

 5     submitted to this Trial Chamber.  In other words, even though you were

 6     expressly aware of this document, it was removed from your statement so

 7     that this Trial Chamber would not be aware of yet another document that

 8     was received from Pale during that period?

 9        A.   No, I cannot be aware or unaware of this document because I'd

10     never seen it.  It was not sent to me personally or to the institution

11     that I was in.  It was sent to the president of the Municipal Assembly of

12     Banja Luka, not the president of the Executive Council of the AR Krajina.

13     That's why I'm not aware of this document.  I don't remember anything,

14     any of this.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Can we have 1D09853, please.

16             JUDGE KWON:  But do we know who signed this document?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Well, if we wait for just a moment, Mr. President --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MR. TIEGER:  -- I think we'll at least have part of that answer

20     and then we can pursue it further.

21             JUDGE KWON:  But it was sent to the president of

22     Municipal Assembly, but was -- by who was it sent?

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   Mr. Erceg, I believe that's a question for you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  It was sent by the Executive Council, wasn't it?


Page 44082

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Do you see the heading of the document?

 3             THE ACCUSED:  Exactly, Excellency.  Thank you.  It doesn't

 4     originate from Sarajevo at all --

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  If you could read the heading, it says:

 7             "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 8             "Autonomous Region of Krajina.

 9             "Executive Council.

10             "Banja Luka."

11             We can collapse the English for the moment for the benefit of

12     the -- and can you show him the signature part.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Yes, yes, that's

14     correct, now I see that it passed through the institution of the

15     Executive Council of the AR Krajina.  It was probably just transmission

16     there, sending this document to the municipalities.  I'm not sure.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not your signature?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not.  Just a moment,

19     please.  It is typewritten.  It says "Nikola Erceg," but it's somebody

20     else's signature.  Probably I didn't even know about this document,

21     somebody else forwarded it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24        Q.   And we were -- we have been in the process of calling up 1D09853.

25     And if we could turn to portion where we'd find paragraph 37.  Okay.


Page 44083

 1             This document is one of the previous drafts prepared by you and

 2     the Karadzic team, and it says:

 3             "I have been shown document 1D9858," that's the document we just

 4     looked at.  "This enactment of mine relies on an order of the

 5     Ministry of Defence which was one of the rare enactments of that kind to

 6     arrive in the ARK from Pale, but I do not remember how ..."

 7             So you looked at this document before, you acknowledged that it

 8     reflected the receipt of --

 9        A.   [Overlapping speakers] --

10        Q.   I'm sorry, the answer is yes?

11        A.   Yes, yes, yes, now I see that it is being confirmed that I had

12     the document, but I didn't know at that moment, it's just when I read

13     this.

14        Q.   All right.  So whose idea was it to take this paragraph out of

15     your statement, a statement which alleged that there was a total

16     breakdown in communications, notwithstanding the fact that this document

17     got through?

18        A.   I had no way of knowing.

19        Q.   All right.  Let's take a look at another of the documents that

20     somehow appeared in the ARK despite your claims of this impenetrable

21     barrier.  And I'd like to look first at P2824, English and B/C/S pages 4.

22             This is an extract from the telegram log-book of the republic

23     communications centre, and if we look at the bottom of the page in both

24     languages we see a reference to a telegram from the republic-level

25     authorities to the autonomous districts, including Banja Luka, which


Page 44084

 1     refers to the dissociation from the participation of Pejanovic and

 2     Kecmanovic in the BH Presidency.  And the date is -- of this telegram is

 3     June 5th, 1992.  Now, just to orient the Trial Chamber, Pejanovic and

 4     Kecmanovic were the two Serb representatives who had garnered the most

 5     votes in the 1990 elections behind Plavsic and Koljevic, and then assumed

 6     the positions of Plavsic and Koljevic when they left the

 7     Bosnian Presidency; correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And the dissociation being referred to here was a kind of

10     symbolic dissociation; right?  It wasn't -- it wasn't any concrete -- it

11     wouldn't have any concrete effect on Pejanovic or Kecmanovic.  It was

12     just the political or propaganda position to be taken by the Bosnian Serb

13     authorities in relation to the service of Pejanovic and Kecmanovic on the

14     Bosnian Presidency?

15        A.   I haven't seen this document, but the reasoning was as you had

16     set it forth.

17             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could look next at 65 ter 01558.

18        Q.   This is a public announcement dated the 6th of June signed by

19     Vojo Kupresanin, the president of the ARK Assembly, expressing on behalf

20     of the Serbian people of Krajina the renunciation of Kecmanovic and

21     Pejanovic.  It refers to them as traitors and degenerates, and in

22     conformity with the telegram sent the previous day dissociates itself

23     from any decision these two might sign.

24             So, Mr. Erceg, this public announcement by Kupresanin is clearly

25     a response to the instructions sent from the republic level just the


Page 44085

 1     previous day in respect of this propaganda effort; right?

 2        A.   It can be put that way in terms of the time when this happened,

 3     but Nenad Kecmanovic and Mirko Pejanovic cannot be equated in any way,

 4     but it is certain that that's the way it was in the public domain at the

 5     time.  By the way, may I say that this is the first time I see this press

 6     release.  I hadn't seen it before in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender that, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  How about the witness -- 1D9858?

10             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, sorry, absolutely.  Please.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it first.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6531, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And this one as well.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 01558 will be Exhibit P6532.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Now, Mr. Erceg, apart from the documents we've just looked at and

17     others, you were aware that there was a military communications system;

18     right?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And as you explained in your interview in 2001, you believed that

21     guide-lines from Pale were forwarded using the military communications

22     system and also the messenger service; isn't that right?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   In paragraph 26 you state that you think that relations between

25     Brdjanin and the SDS leadership were good for a time, but then -- but


Page 44086

 1     relations change and so much so that at one point Brdjanin left the SDS,

 2     et cetera.  Just to clarify that, what you said back in July 2001 was

 3     that the relationship between Brdjanin and the SDS leadership must have

 4     been good not for a time but at the time; that is, at the time that was

 5     being discussed in the interview which is basically the time of the

 6     outbreak of the war?

 7        A.   Well, I know there were oscillations, I mean in respecting

 8     certain things, if I can put it this way.  The institution of the

 9     president of the republic included, so that goes for Brdjanin and for the

10     rest.  So there were oscillations, yes, vis-a-vis everyone, not only

11     Brdjanin.

12        Q.   Yeah, no, I appreciate that as a general matter, but that's a --

13     that's a bit vague and tends to obscure the actual fact.  Brdjanin's

14     problems with leaving the SDS didn't occur until years later; right?

15     That's when he left the SDS, not in May of 1992, first of all.

16        A.   I don't know about these dates.  I hear these dates from you and

17     I have no idea what these dates mean.  For me what matters is the very

18     essence.  All of us had our views regarding the president, including

19     Mr. Brdjanin, and then he formed his party.  I don't know why.  I don't

20     know whether it was because he quarrelled with President Karadzic.  But I

21     know there were tensions, tense situations, between practically all the

22     MPs and the president.  That is logical and only natural.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Can we have --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.


Page 44087

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, this is a

 2     misinterpretation.  The witness said there was argumentation, discussion,

 3     quarrels, something -- or struggle of views, maybe that would be the

 4     right word.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Struggle of views.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not views, as was interpreted.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Can we have 1D09896, please, page 25.

 9        Q.   Okay.  If we look at the top third of the page, you were asked

10     about the sort of relationship that Mr. Brdjanin had with the republic

11     level.  You said, and here the interpreter speaks in the third person in

12     interpreting your answer:

13             "Each of us has ... had a different approach to things, of

14     course, but he cannot say what was the relationship between Brdjanin and

15     the republic SDS, but it must have been good at the time ..."

16             Then you go on to describe that at some point he formed his own

17     party.  Toward the bottom of the page the question is asked again:

18             "Sorry, maybe my question was not clear, but a moment ago you

19     said Brdjanin had a good relationship with politicians at the republic

20     level?

21             "A.  Yes, there's no question about that.  He did have good

22     relations.

23             "Q.  With whom, in particular?

24             "A.  It's a personal question.  How can he say now," referring to

25     you in your answer, "his co-operation with SDS president, with the


Page 44088

 1     Assembly members, it was a very good relationship.  How close they were,

 2     he cannot tell you anything about that, but it was obvious he could feel

 3     it, that there was the common goal that they all shared which brought

 4     them all together."

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see it on the screen.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   And then you confirm --

 8             MR. TIEGER:  If we can scroll down, please.

 9        Q.   And then if we turn the page, we can see the reference to the

10     common goal they all shared which brought them all together, and then the

11     confirmation by you that when you referred to the SDS president, you were

12     referring to Mr. Karadzic.

13             Now, that's what you said in 2001 about Mr. Brdjanin's

14     relationship with the SDS leadership, and in particular Mr. Karadzic,

15     that it was good at the time, a very good relationship, it was obvious,

16     and you could feel that the common goal they all shared brought them

17     together; correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Now, in approximately page 11 of your statement, you deal with a

20     number of matters under the heading of powers of the ARK with respect to

21     the republican organs.  And that means the powers of the

22     Autonomous Region of Krajina with respect to

23     the Republika Srpska republic organs; right?

24        A.   Yes, yes.

25        Q.   And in paragraph 58 you refer to an extract from the 15th


Page 44089

 1     ARK Assembly Session held on the 4th of March, 1992, reflecting a

 2     decision to form ARK public funds, that's a reference to D04094.  And in

 3     the same paragraph you refer to the fact that:

 4             "We leaders of the ARK took it upon ourselves to do that and

 5     under normal circumstances these areas would have been regulated at the

 6     level of the republic."

 7             Similarly, in paragraph 59, you cite a report from the session of

 8     the ARK Assembly on the same day, which you say confirms the decision to

 9     establish a CSB for the region of Bosanska Krajina from part of the

10     republican MUP, and thus transfer the authority of the republican MUP to

11     the CSB, the Security Services Centre, in Banja Luka.

12             Now, Mr. Erceg, these events occurred at a time when the joint

13     government still existed, when there was -- when there was still a

14     Bosnian government in which the full coalition served, that is, SDA

15     representatives, HDZ representatives, SDS representatives; right?  The

16     conflict had not yet occurred and the government was still in existence?

17        A.   No.  The government did exist, but that was not our government.

18        Q.   But the impact of decentralising the funds from the SDK and

19     having them controlled by the Krajina and the impact of removing

20     authority from the republican MUP was on the Bosnian government, on the

21     joint government that existed at that time.  It was removal of authority

22     from them; right?

23        A.   No.  The setting up of the funds and financial institution and

24     the setting up of the SDK is the result of the fact that we didn't have

25     communication with our central government at Pale.  This is not about the


Page 44090

 1     government in Sarajevo.  Everything I'm saying in this sense is due to

 2     the fact that there was no communication between the AR Krajina and the

 3     government at Pale, the government of the Serbian people, that is.  Why

 4     are you talking about the government in Sarajevo?  It was war time, you

 5     know.

 6        Q.   Are you asserting that the war had broken out by the beginning of

 7     March, 1994 [sic], and that there was an RS government in -- and

 8     political structure established in Pale at the beginning of March 1992?

 9        A.   When it comes to war, I believe that the war started when

10     Izetbegovic said that there should be sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

11     but now you have to talk about nuances.  What is the war?  The fact that

12     the state can no longer exist or that there is a front line?  It's a very

13     relative thing.  The beginning of a war is a very relative thing.  How

14     things developed is one matter, but we had to cope with all those

15     situations.

16        Q.   Mr. Erceg, nothing relative about it, and I'm not talking -- I'm

17     not asking you for an ideological dissertation.  I asked you whether the

18     joint government still existed at the beginning of March 1992, something

19     I thought you confirmed before.  You referred to the government, the RS

20     government in Pale.  So I asked you whether you were stating to this

21     Court that you, that is, your testimony, that Mr. Karadzic and the

22     Bosnian Serb authorities had moved to Pale and set up their structures by

23     the beginning of March 1992?

24        A.   I can't tell you when that was, whether that was in March or

25     April, I'm not sure, but it did happen.  The most important thing here is


Page 44091

 1     that it did happen.  It doesn't really matter when that happened.  It's

 2     of a lesser importance.

 3        Q.   Well, Mr. Erceg, it matters in terms of the purpose and effect of

 4     the actions which you pointed out in your statement because if the joint

 5     government still existed then they had the effect of destabilising and

 6     undermining the joint government.  So let me put to you this proposition

 7     that we've addressed in this Court before and this Court has received

 8     evidence on.  The purpose of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and other

 9     autonomous -- and other regions was to resist the movement by Muslims and

10     Croats toward a sovereign and independent Bosnia and, in effect, to

11     destroy the joint government, to destroy the Bosnian government.  And

12     that's what -- correct or not?  You knew that.

13        A.   This is not correct.  It was not to destroy the Bosnian

14     government.  It was for us to survive, so this was not about the

15     destruction of the government.  Why?  However, so much time later, of

16     course I have forgotten a lot of things.  What I said ten years ago was

17     obviously more accurate than what I'm saying now.  Obviously what I said

18     in those interviews would be more accurate because in the meantime I have

19     forgotten a lot of things.  I can't say how sure I am about some of the

20     details that I myself shared with the investigators because of course

21     time is important and time matters, doesn't it?

22        Q.   Among other things, this Court has received the following

23     evidence:  That at the 20th Assembly Session in August or September 1992,

24     Mr. Kupresanin said:

25             "Last year we built up the region and made it strong with a clear


Page 44092

 1     purpose and goal.  The task of the region of Krajina was to destroy

 2     Alija's state."

 3             That's D456, page 70 in the English, page 76 in the B/C/S.

 4             Mr. Mijatovic said at the same session at page 68 in the English,

 5     page 75 of the B/C/S:

 6             "At a time when we had to destroy a unitary Bosnia, the SAO

 7     regions and districts were politically and territorially the best

 8     solution."

 9             And at the 36th Assembly Session, P1083, at English page 11,

10     B/C/S 13, Mr. Krajisnik confirmed that:

11             "The establishment of the autonomous districts was a response to

12     the centralisation of power in the hands of the Muslim/Croat coalition."

13             And further explained that once they fulfilled their functions,

14     they were abolished by amendments to the constitution.

15             So does this refresh your memory in any way that the purpose of

16     the Autonomous Region of Krajina and the other regions and districts was,

17     in effect, to destroy the Bosnian state and prevent the possibility of a

18     sovereign and independent Bosnia?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, can we -- objection.  Why

20     my learned friend Mr. Tieger does not repeat the following wording:

21     Alija's state, not the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We are not supposed

22     to redefine the gist of the matter through one's questions.

23             MR. TIEGER:  This is --

24             JUDGE KWON:  No.  I think Mr. Tieger read out the quotes and he

25     put his question.


Page 44093

 1             MR. TIEGER:

 2        Q.   Mr. Erceg, you were about to answer the question.  Can you do

 3     that or do you need to have me repeat the last line --

 4        A.   You should repeat the question.

 5        Q.   Yeah, well, I mean I take it I don't have to repeat everything I

 6     just read to you; if I do, I will.  But I asked you if this refreshes

 7     your memory in any way that the purpose of the ARK, the

 8     Autonomous Region of Krajina, and the other regions and districts was, in

 9     effect, to destroy the Bosnian state and prevent the possibility of a

10     sovereign and independent Bosnia?

11        A.   Of course there was such reasoning.  I did not hear Kupresanin

12     say that, but I was present when Mr. Krajisnik said what he did.  Of

13     course I cannot claim that he used those exact words, but I can affirm

14     that those things were discussed.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I seem to be getting some odd --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Is your mike --

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, I think the interpreters had some additional

18     mike on.  I just wanted to -- okay, that seems to be corrected.

19        Q.   Mr. Erceg, at paragraph 85 you assert that notwithstanding the

20     general nature of the hierarchy to which you refer in other part of your

21     statement, that Sanski Most acted "completely autonomously," you say a

22     completely autonomous decision with reference to a 4 June 1992 order from

23     the Sanski Most Crisis Staff to the Territorial Defence staff on

24     disarming paramilitary formations in Sanski Most.  And you say it's

25     completely autonomous because the Sanski Most Crisis Staff held its own


Page 44094

 1     meeting and adopted its own decision and issued an order to its own

 2     municipal TO.  So setting aside the question of autonomy within that

 3     limited realm, the reality, Mr. Erceg, is that this decision actually

 4     reflected the hierarchy, beginning with republican level and going down

 5     to the municipalities via the intermediate level of the ARK, and in

 6     particular with respect to this issue of disarming - isn't that right? -

 7     that there was a republican level decision on taking all necessary

 8     measures that the ARK acted in response to that in issuing its order to

 9     disarm paramilitary formations and then Sanski Most implemented that

10     order in its municipality?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Similarly in paragraph 82, you cite 1D9822, which is

13     conclusions from Prijedor showing -- which you assert show the high

14     degree of independence from the ARK.  And in that connection I wanted

15     just to look quickly at whether Prijedor implemented ARK decisions after

16     that time.  So if we could look quickly at P2740.  That's a 22 June 1992

17     ARK Crisis Staff decision or it -- that reflects both the decision of the

18     ARK Crisis Staff, prohibiting non-Serbs from many kinds of employment

19     which -- and we see that on page 1 and 2, the ARK decision signed by

20     Mr. Brdjanin.  And then at page 3 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S

21     we're able to see the president of the Prijedor Crisis Staff, Mr. Stakic,

22     forwarding the ARK Crisis Staff order for implementation.  And then if we

23     could look at P2637, which is dated the 1st of July, a little over a week

24     later.  And also the -- I will note -- I don't think we have to return to

25     the previous document, but the ARK Crisis Staff order was numbered


Page 44095

 1     03-53/92.  All right.  Page 1 refers to the Crisis Staff document we saw

 2     a moment ago which was dated the 23rd of June, 1992, that was the page we

 3     saw before.  And if we turn to the last entry on page 2 of both

 4     languages, we can see a reflection of the confirmation that the ARK

 5     Crisis Staff order which was forwarded by Dr. Stakic for implementation

 6     was, in fact, implemented.

 7             Now, clearly, Mr. Erceg, that implementation comes after the date

 8     of the document that you cite showing Prijedor's alleged independence.

 9     This is a reflection of the fact that Prijedor continued to implement ARK

10     Crisis Staff orders; right?

11        A.   It depended on the case.  Some decisions from AR Krajina towards

12     the Crisis Staff were implemented.  Some couldn't be implemented and for

13     others there was no will to implement them.  I don't know what happened.

14     I know that there was disobedience among the municipalities and among the

15     Crisis Staffs in respect of the Crisis Staff of AR Krajina.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On lines 3 and 4 there is an error.

19     The witness said that those were the decisions of the Crisis Staff and

20     not the Executive Council of the AR Krajina, and as we read in the

21     transcript one would conclude that it's the other way around.  The

22     witness said:  These are not things that were issued by the

23     Executive Council of Krajina but by the Crisis Staff.

24             JUDGE KWON:  The question was not about Executive Council at all.

25             Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Erceg?


Page 44096

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure what I'm supposed to

 2     say.  What do you mean?  Do you want me to confirm that I didn't say --

 3     if you're asking me to confirm what I have just said, what I said a

 4     couple of minutes ago, then, yes, I can confirm that.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What you said is:  Some decisions were implemented

 6     and some were not.  That was your answer in a nutshell.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 9             Shall we continue.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I would like to once

11     again make a point that I've made before about the nature of Mr. Tieger's

12     questions to the witness.  The last question was so complicated with

13     multiple documents, and then asked the last -- the question was:  Right?

14     So right to what?  He made a number of assertions in that question.  So

15     this is not a good way to get accurate information, and I've suggested

16     before that when he has one document is to just ask:  Is this an example

17     of ...?  And then put the proposition, then get a clear answer.  In this

18     case he got the answer that it depends on the case.  So by putting

19     multiple propositions in a single question, we're not advancing the trial

20     at all in my opinion.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, would you like to respond?

22             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  I've actually met with

23     Mr. Robinson on this and I've been reasonably receptive to suggestions

24     where I thought they were well-founded.  In this case I don't think it's

25     appropriate.  That sequence of events could not usefully have been broken


Page 44097

 1     down if it came to one point, and the question was -- I asked exactly

 2     what he suggested I should have asked which is very concrete:  Was this a

 3     reflection of the implementation after the date of the document that he

 4     pointed to as a reflection of non-implementation.  So it couldn't have

 5     been simpler and the witness was able to answer it easily.  And I think

 6     now Mr. Robinson is introducing a problem where none exists.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I see a point of putting to the witness less

 8     documents at one time.  Think about that.  If you put several questions,

 9     it may be complicating the witness in answering the question.  We'll be

10     better off with less documents.

11             MR. TIEGER:  And that, if I may, so I won't belabour this, but I

12     discussed that with Mr. Robinson, I understood his point in that

13     respect -- in that regard, and I am more than happy to follow that as

14     scrupulously as possible.  In this case it seemed to me that the sequence

15     was not difficult to follow, that the documents were related, and the

16     proof of that is the fact that I think the witness was easily able to

17     follow it.  But I do have it in mind as a general proposition.  I think

18     here it was unfair -- that was an unfair comment.  But at this point I

19     think we can move on.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let's continue.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   Mr. Erceg, you cannot point me to a single document or single

23     instance where the Prijedor Crisis Staff, or any other Crisis Staff for

24     that matter, refused to follow or implement ARK Crisis Staff decisions

25     about, for example, dismissals, can you?


Page 44098

 1        A.   At this moment, obviously not.  I don't have such documents.

 2     Whether there were any, yes, I suppose that there were.

 3        Q.   And you are well aware of the fact that the ARK policy on

 4     dismissals was, in fact, implemented in the municipalities and many, many

 5     non-Serbs were dismissed.  And in fact, by the end of 1992 virtually all

 6     non-Serbs had been terminated from employment.  You know that; right?

 7        A.   No.  This is not about the ARK but about the Crisis Staff of the

 8     ARK.  Please be precise.  There were dismissals, yes, but it is not true

 9     that everybody was dismissed.  It is also true that Serbs were dismissed

10     as well.  We insisted on the reciprocity and that is also correct.  It

11     was a dynamic situation which cannot be described in just one word.  You

12     have to have some very exact data.  I don't know whether there are such

13     data available.  There were indeed dismissals and those dismissals

14     included Serbs in every municipality, and I repeat that we insisted on

15     reciprocity; i.e., if we heard that somebody was dismissed in a

16     municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, obviously there were reactions to

17     that.  It is only human, I suppose.  But there were no decisions that

18     were -- that said that those things should be done.  Obviously there were

19     some wrong-doings in the process, but that was true of both sides across

20     the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is what you

21     have to understand.

22        Q.   At paragraph 91, Mr. Erceg, you state that you were present at

23     meetings of the ARK Crisis Staff when the existence of Omarska and

24     Keraterm was mentioned.  And you indicate that these were raised by

25     municipality officials at these meetings who wanted to discuss how to


Page 44099

 1     "logistically provide" and how to "finance the whole project."

 2             Now, we've heard testimony from -- we've heard that

 3     Mr. Kupresanin, for example, stated in 2001 that he knew about events

 4     within 15 to 20 days after they happened and knew about Omarska within

 5     15 days of its formation.  So how -- how quickly after the establishment

 6     of Omarska and Keraterm do you say that these discussions about how to

 7     finance the whole project took place in the ARK Crisis Staff?

 8        A.   I cannot say when that was.  I'm not aware of the dates.  I don't

 9     know under what circumstances they were set up; however, when a crisis

10     occurred - and I'm referring to a logistics crisis - I suppose that it

11     was then that the matter was sent for our consideration.  I really don't

12     have a clue about the dates when that happened and how much time lapsed

13     between the day when they were founded and our intervention.  I really

14     can't say anything about that.

15        Q.   Okay.  And you refer to discussions, so there was clearly more

16     than one.  How many such discussions were held about Omarska and

17     Keraterm?

18        A.   Those discussions were part of broader considerations concerning

19     the incarceration of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Croatia, and in

20     our midst.  Of course those were discussions.  It was said that it

21     happened, that the process is underway, and that that process should be

22     fought in every possible way to prevent those things from happening.

23        Q.   So do I understand you correctly that the discussion of Omarska

24     and Keraterm where non-Serbs were held was part of the discussion about

25     how to deter or respond to the detention of Serbs elsewhere?


Page 44100

 1        A.   No, I can't say that that was the point of our discussions.  That

 2     happened which opened the door to a process that was very hard to

 3     control, and that's why I assume that the reasoning was that if those

 4     things were difficult to control or stop, at least we should ease the

 5     situation and we should try and minimise the impact of that situation and

 6     minimise the numbers.

 7        Q.   And part of the discussion was that in -- that the number of

 8     prisoners -- in other words, there were so many prisoners that it was

 9     straining the resources of the municipalities to deal with the -- what

10     you called the whole project.  That was part of the discussion; right?

11        A.   I don't believe that the magnitude of that situation was the main

12     preoccupation, that it was the main topic of discussions, no way.

13     However, resources had to be provided, there's no doubt about that.  It

14     was at the time when goods were -- became more and more scarce and we had

15     to be rational.  And when it came to being rational with food and other

16     bare necessities, we also had to take into account the resources that

17     were necessary to provide food for prisoners, of course.  Food was

18     becoming scarce and we had to be careful about all of the provisions,

19     including the food.  We had to make sure it was sent where it was needed

20     and when it was needed.

21        Q.   I'm just about out of time, Mr. Erceg, so I'm going to deal with

22     one more subject and that appears at paragraph 95 --

23             MR. TIEGER:  And, Mr. President, I don't know exactly my time,

24     but I can just deal with that one subject.  I think I'm nearly at the

25     end, but I don't think I'm over yet.


Page 44101

 1        Q.   At paragraph 95 you discuss the issue of expulsions, insisting

 2     there was no policy to expel or persecute non-Serbs.  Now, in your -- in

 3     2002 during your interview you were asked about the testimony in the

 4     Brdjanin case of a man named Amir Dzonlic, who testified that he came to

 5     you seeking help for non-Serbs who had been crammed into seven cars --

 6     railroad cars meant for livestock and who were dying of thirst in the

 7     summer heat.  He said that he came to you for assistance but that you

 8     said those people were in transit and that you were not competent to

 9     help.  And you stated in your interview that you didn't recall that

10     discussion but that if someone had -- felt that if someone had come to

11     you with such a request, you would have felt bound to help.  You recall

12     that -- or do you recall that part of your interview, sir?

13        A.   Amir Dzonlic, as far as I remember, is a man who lived in my own

14     entrance-way and it's not true that he ever addressed me.  I know that I

15     saved some people after I met them literally in passing and I would have

16     accommodated him too, if he had ever addressed me, but he didn't and I

17     don't know what he's talking about.

18        Q.   Well, in 2002, sir, I think you said you didn't recall that.  But

19     we'll leave it for the moment.  Because you -- it is fair to say,

20     however, that you were aware that non-Serbs were leaving the ARK in great

21     numbers, weren't you?  You were aware of that?

22        A.   I can only confirm what I said before.  I don't recall Amir

23     because he didn't address me.  How can I remember something that didn't

24     happen?  That is a very important thing and it would have remained etched

25     in my memory, but he didn't address me.  We never had any contact.


Page 44102

 1        Q.   But my last question was:  You were aware, were you not, that

 2     non-Serbs were leaving the area, the Autonomous Region of Krajina, in

 3     great numbers, weren't you?

 4        A.   Well, of course people were leaving.  As far as I know, there was

 5     no coercion involved.  It was their own desire to leave, but you have to

 6     understand, talking about Banja Luka, for instance, these people were in

 7     transit so you could have gained the impression that Banja Luka is

 8     expelling people which wasn't true.  In a large percentage, people were

 9     leaving of their own free will.

10        Q.   No coercion?  So were you completely oblivious, unaware, of the

11     repeated statements of Mr. Brdjanin in one form or another that Muslims

12     had to go?

13        A.   Look, of course in war anything can happen.  There was some

14     coercion in some cases but there was no official policy of coercion.

15     Nobody ever said:  We have to expel people.  But individual cases

16     happened even without a war, let alone in war time.  Of course, I'm not

17     saying that these things never happened.  Individual cases did.

18        Q.   Well, I'm sure that's a truism that no one would dispute that

19     there were individual cases.  The question is:  How many individual cases

20     and for what reason.  I asked you and you didn't answer.  Were you

21     completely unaware of the repeated statements of the president of the

22     Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, public statements, some

23     in very ugly forms, that Muslims had to go?

24        A.   What can I do about that?  He did make those statements.  That's

25     done and over with.  I personally was against it.  But, again I have to


Page 44103

 1     say there were forced expulsions but not in the measure people talk

 2     about.  I think it was Brdjanin's personal interest because he couldn't

 3     do it through the Crisis Staff because no official decision had been made

 4     to that effect, that he personally was involved in these things is a

 5     different matter.

 6        Q.   Were you aware of the devastation of Muslim villages by the VRS

 7     and Bosnian Serb forces?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Not at all?

10        A.   Why would I have to know that?  If I had heard anything about it,

11     I could have believed the story or not.  From my personal experience, I

12     saw only Kozarac, every house destroyed.  And after a while, as the war

13     went on, one couldn't come even near the front line, so you couldn't know

14     what was going on.  And by nature, I'm a pacifist and I didn't want to

15     see these things.  If I had the opportunity, I would have avoided it.

16     When I travelled to Prijedor, I saw that village - what's the name?  The

17     one I mentioned now? - Kozarac.  But I know from stories that things were

18     devastated, one, another, then another.  I know it only from stories.  I

19     didn't see it.

20        Q.   And you knew that the VRS was implementing the strategic

21     objectives in the area of the Autonomous Region of Krajina; right?

22        A.   I don't know what the strategic objectives of the army were, not

23     at all.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Well, can we look at 1D9896, e-court pages 70 --

25     e-court page 78.


Page 44104

 1        Q.   There we see a discussing about the strategic objectives:

 2             "When did you first hear the reference to them?"

 3             We see at the beginning of the page.  Well, that's in the

 4     previous page.  If we can turn to the previous page just to see the

 5     beginning of that discussion.

 6             At the top of the page we see:

 7             "When did you first hear reference to these strategic goals?

 8             "At about that time that was during the preparation of the

 9     Assembly.

10             "Do you recall who actually spoke about them?

11             "President of the republic, the assembly president, some of the

12     deputies who actually made the speech.

13             "Were they referring" --

14             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure the witness can read English, so --

15             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  I'll be more -- I'll recite that more slowly

16     and carefully.

17             And let me turn to the next page then.

18        Q.   You were asked:

19             "Did you hear a lot of discussion about these goals among the

20     members of the SDS after the 12th May meeting?"

21             You said:

22             "Discussing it, it's beside the point.  This was a strategic goal

23     that was determined and adopted at the session and now we had to -- we

24     were about to implement.  But it's totally irrelevant whether discussions

25     about the strategic goals.  There's no doubt, yes, of course, we talked


Page 44105

 1     about it, but it was."

 2             And then you go on to say:

 3             "It was a task, it was the army who was sort of, more required to

 4     fulfil these tasks, because the civilian structures, the political

 5     structures failed in their attempts to stay within one joint, within one

 6     state of Yugoslavia.  And there was only one alternative to having

 7     military structures trying to achieve what the Serbian people wanted.

 8     What can civilian, what could civilian authorities do when you have to do

 9     was to join two territories that were physically separated.  This could

10     have been achieved only through a military operation because at that time

11     we have already had war."

12             That's what you explained in 2001; correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I have, I think, exhausted my time and that

16     concludes my examination.  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Before I turn to Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Robinson, with respect to the

19     associated exhibit you raised at the end of last -- yesterday's session,

20     the Chamber has reviewed the English translation and is satisfied with

21     its relevance and the nature of -- indispensable and inseparable part of

22     the statement, so it will be admitted.

23             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, before he does that,

25     first maybe is the exhibit number to be given now?


Page 44106

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D4109, Your Honours.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  And before Dr. Karadzic begins his re-examination,

 3     I just wanted to put something on the record, and that is that on the

 4     14th of November of this year you told us that we should only tender

 5     associated exhibits which form an indispensable part of the statement and

 6     that we -- which are significant to our case, and you asked us to be more

 7     vigilant and take more robust care in tendering exhibits.  And when you

 8     did that, I took it upon myself to tell my team that I would examine

 9     every statement and make sure that the exhibits that are included in

10     those statements are, in fact, meeting your criteria.  And the first

11     statement that I took up was Mr. Erceg's, and I eliminated nine documents

12     from that statement which I believed were not necessarily significant to

13     the case or indispensable to the statement.  And one of those documents

14     was 1D9858, which was the subject of Mr. Tieger's question to the

15     witness.  So I just wanted to put that on the record in case Mr. Tieger

16     wanted to ask any further questions of the witness.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

18             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

20     Your Excellencies.  Good morning, everyone.

21                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Erceg.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   Let us be mindful of the breaks between question and answer, as

25     always when we speak the same language.  On page 25 today you were asked


Page 44107

 1     if you had heard about any Muslim or Croat villages, or rather, some

 2     villages, I believe Muslim and Croat ones were meant, that were

 3     devastated.  Did you hear about any Muslim or Croat villages that

 4     remained intact?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have any information about what it depended

 7     on?

 8        A.   On our position on the war and our desire to avoid war at all

 9     costs.

10        Q.   Thank you.  On page 24 you were asked about Brdjanin and how he

11     said that Muslims and Croats had to leave.  Did you ever hear him

12     personally speak like that?

13        A.   Occasionally in informal conversation.

14        Q.   On page 13 of today's LiveNote a quotation was made of

15     Mr. Kupresanin, saying that Alija's state had to be destroyed.  What did

16     we understand by this term, "Alija's state"?

17        A.   It's a very broad concept.  Alija's state was a centralised state

18     within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Its objective was to dominate

19     over everyone else.

20        Q.   What was the ideological basis of what we call Alija's state?

21        A.   The ideological underlying concept of that state was undoubtedly

22     the Islamic Declaration.

23        Q.   Can you tell us how long do the demands of Krajina and other

24     regions for the decentralisation of funding date back, that is, the

25     demand that funding not be centralised, that it flow back to regions?


Page 44108

 1        A.   Do you mean the former Bosnia-Herzegovina or the government of

 2     Republika Srpska?

 3        Q.   How long had such demands been heard in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 4        A.   Well, these demands were always heard.  I personally am in favour

 5     of decentralisation.  It's a normal process which is always on the table.

 6     It's an issue which is always on the table in every country, but in

 7     socialism it couldn't be discussed much.  With the introduction of the

 8     democratic system, of course some thinking went along those lines but of

 9     course within an appropriate framework.

10        Q.   Thank you.  So if there had been no war, would you have gone on

11     insisting on the decentralisation of funding?

12        A.   I personally would have.

13        Q.   On page 10 of today's LiveNote, it was read back to you and you

14     confirmed that there was a common goal that held all those aforementioned

15     people together.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber what that common goal

16     was?

17        A.   Living in the rump Yugoslavia as a socio-political system; the

18     other goal was to avoid war wherever possible; the third goal was to

19     continue living as our own lords and masters on our own land.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now see P6531.  It was

21     admitted a moment ago.  Could we zoom in on the stamp.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I'm a little confused.  There's nothing in the middle of the

24     stamp, it doesn't even say "Republika Srpska," just the Republic of

25     Bosnia or perhaps the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,


Page 44109

 1     Autonomous Region of Krajina.  Are you familiar with this stamp?  Could

 2     it have existed at that time?

 3        A.   No, no.  I'm not familiar with this.  I don't recognise it.  But

 4     I see my typewritten signature.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom out now.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   I'm also confused by this passage which says:

 9             "Please find attached the order of the commander of the

10     National Defence ..."

11             Did the Territorial Defence have a commander?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   We also see a reference number 03, that number appears very often

14     on various documents.  What does that number mean?

15        A.   In the protocol, I have no idea.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see now P6532.  Can we make

17     this larger.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   We see the number again, 03.

20        A.   Then it must be the Assembly.  It's a document of the Assembly of

21     the ARK.

22        Q.   Oh, I see.  Thank you.

23        A.   Because you see the connection 03 and Vojo Kupresanin signed.

24        Q.   But here we see the Executive Council and again 03.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in on the stamp.


Page 44110

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   How come there is no coat of arms and there is no

 3     Serbian Republic of BH?

 4        A.   It says the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

 5        Q.   Is everything clear to you about these stamps?

 6        A.   No, there should be something in the middle, an emblem,

 7     something.  I'm not sure.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Yesterday on transcript page 88, document 05415 was

 9     shown.  It was signed by Mr. Dukic.  Can you remember which position he

10     occupied?

11        A.   I can't remember.  I know he was in Sarajevo, but I can't recall.

12        Q.   Thank you.  To the best of your knowledge did Crisis Staffs exist

13     within the party?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Thank you.  If I tell you Mr. Dukic was president of the

16     Executive Board of the party, would he have been in a position to send

17     dispatches like the one we've seen to state authorities?

18        A.   I don't think so.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Okay, that's a leading question, it's speculative,

20     and it's basically a useless exchange.  But -- so I'll leave it at that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. Erceg, can you explain to the best of your knowledge the

25     difference between the Muslims and Croats who remained in our towns and


Page 44111

 1     cities throughout Krajina all the time on the one hand and those who

 2     left, who didn't dare to stay?

 3        A.   I don't know which difference you mean, you mean loyal versus

 4     disloyal?

 5        Q.   Yes, why were some able to stay and others weren't?

 6        A.   Well, some of course were able to say if they wanted to go on

 7     living there peacefully within the limits of the situation, and those who

 8     wanted more than was their due.  And of course there were those who

 9     wanted something different; that is to say a Muslim who wanted to join

10     the Muslim army and a Croat who wanted to join the Croatian army.  At

11     certain times there were even large waves of these departures, convoys

12     were organised, but again, only if they wished to leave.

13        Q.   And speaking of pressure, who exerted pressure, those who wanted

14     to leave or the authorities on them?

15        A.   The authorities did not exert any pressure.  In a very large

16     percentage of cases, it was their own wish to leave.

17        Q.   And my last question:  Did you know what my position was

18     regarding forcible transfers?

19        A.   You never insisted on that.  You never said any such thing

20     publicly.  I suppose you wanted first to avoid war and once war started

21     you wanted it waged in a dignified way, if I can put it that way, without

22     perpetrating any evil.  That's how I experienced it.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Erceg.  Thank you for making the effort to come

24     here.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,


Page 44112

 1     Your Excellencies.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Erceg.  On

 3     behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to

 4     The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber go into private session briefly.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8                           [Private session]

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10   (redacted)

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17   (redacted)

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19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.


Page 44113

 1             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00 in closed

 2     session.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

 4                           [Closed session]

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Page 44114

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Page 44124

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 8             Shall we rise for some five or ten minutes?  Five minutes.  We'll

 9     rise for five minutes.

10                           --- Break taken at 11.24 a.m.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12                           --- On resuming at 11.40 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

15     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16                           WITNESS:  MILORAD SAJIC

17                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Sajic.  Please make yourself

19     comfortable.

20             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

21                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Sajic.  Could you please tell

23     us your rank which I would like to use in our further communication.

24        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.  My name is Milorad Sajic.  I am a

25     teacher of defence and reserve lieutenant-colonel.


Page 44125

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Lieutenant-Colonel, we have to speak slowly and we

 2     have to pause between my questions and your answers.  Did you provide my

 3     Defence team a statement?

 4        A.   Yes, I did provide a statement to your Defence team and I signed

 5     it.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D9531 in

 8     e-court.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you see that statement on the screen in front of you?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you read the statement and did you sign it?

13        A.   Yes, I read it and I signed it.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

16     the last page to identify his signature.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Is this your signature?

19        A.   Yes, it is.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement accurately reflect what you said

21     to my Defence team?

22        A.   Yes, it accurately reflects my words.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today in

24     the courtroom, the same ones you were asked by my Defence team members,

25     would your answers be the same in essence?


Page 44126

 1        A.   Yes, they would be the same.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this statement

 4     into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Is the Defence also tendering associated exhibits?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We had listed three

 7     associated exhibits; however, one has since been admitted, that's 0941

 8     now admitted as -- excuse me, 09421 now admitted as D4051.  And we're

 9     tendering the other two.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection, Ms. Gustafson?

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Good morning, Your Honours.  No objection.

12             JUDGE KWON:  They will be all admitted into evidence.

13             Shall we assign the numbers for them.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  The 92 ter statement 1D9531

15     will be Exhibit D4114.  65 ter number 1D9850 will be Exhibit D4115.  And

16     1D9851 will be Exhibit D4116.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Please proceed.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm now going to read a

20     short summary of Lieutenant-Colonel's statement in English.

21             [In English] In 1991 Milorad Sajic was appointed commander of the

22     Territorial Defence in the Banja Luka municipality, and during the spring

23     and summer of 1992 Mr. Milorad Sajic was a secretary of the regional

24     secretariat of national defence, for which position he was not either

25     nominated or recommended by the Serbian Democratic Party.  He has never


Page 44127

 1     been a member of the same.  Mr. Sajic became a member of the

 2     ARK Crisis Staff in 1992 and the member of the Army of Republika Srpska.

 3     In 1992, after -- in 2000, I suppose -- so after the war he was

 4     demobilised.

 5             In March 1992, Milorad Sajic took the position of a commander of

 6     Banja Luka Territorial Defence, appointed at this position by the

 7     Municipal Assembly on a proposal of the president of the

 8     Municipal Assembly and based on the opinion issued by the commander of

 9     the republican Territorial Defence.  The direct superior of Milorad Sajic

10     at this -- at the time was the commander of the district

11     Territorial Defence staff in Banja Luka, and his superior on the other

12     district -- on the other hand was a commander of the republican

13     Territorial Defence staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

14     General Drago Vukosavljevic.  Milorad Sajic was also a member of the

15     National Defence Council of municipality of Banja Luka.  As a secretary

16     of the Autonomous Region of Krajina National Defence, Milorad Sajic was

17     carrying out the orders of the Ministry of Defence of the

18     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  At the time Nikola Erceg,

19     the president of the Executive Council of the Krajina region, was his

20     superior as well as Minister of Defence, General Subotic.

21             The Yugoslav People's Army reserve forces were recruited from the

22     Autonomous Region of Krajina in 1991 and they were involved in the combat

23     operations in Croatia.  As a result of the situation created by the

24     outbreak of the war, high number of Serbian refugees started fleeing to

25     Krajina and the region experienced lack of capacity to solve the


Page 44128

 1     thus-created problem.  Weapon distribution was enacted in 1991 and 1992

 2     after mobilisation took place.  In early April 1992 there was a blockade

 3     of Banja Luka by the Serbian Defence Forces, SOS.  The issue was

 4     discussed on a meeting convened with the presence of Radic, Zupljanin,

 5     and Tutus, aiming at the peaceful resolution.  There was no existence of

 6     a strategic goal to expel Muslims and Croats from the territory of

 7     Republika Srpska.  On 12th of May, 1992, the Army of Republika Srpska

 8     underwent a reorganisation and the Territorial Defence became a part of

 9     it.  The same process was observed in June 1992 when no special

10     Serbian Territorial Defence was formed, but instead the

11     Territorial Defence units were reorganised into infantry brigades.

12             Following the outbreak of the war, there was a lack of means of

13     communication experienced between the Autonomous Region of Krajina and

14     Pale, and the situation remained the same up until June 1992 when a

15     corridor was forced and communications between Pale and Banja Luka were

16     restored.

17             The war situation necessitated the formation of a Crisis Staff

18     which was headed by Mr. Radic.  Milorad Sajic never held the office of

19     vice-president of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

20     Mr. Sajic was present on several meetings of the Crisis Staff chaired by

21     Brdjanin.  No penalties used to be imposed in case of non-attendance of

22     the -- there was no actual voting mechanism as regards to the

23     decision-making process within the Crisis Staff.  For certain period of

24     time there were regular meetings and reports were prepared accordingly

25     which were supposed to be forwarded to Radovan Karadzic.  Although


Page 44129

 1     Milorad Sajic was not aware of the set-up or location of camps or

 2     collection centres, on one of the meetings of the Crisis Staff

 3     representatives from Prijedor had raised the issue concerning shortage of

 4     food and clothing supplies.  Milorad Sajic claims that the Crisis Staff

 5     of the Autonomous Region of Krajina was not in capacity to issue orders

 6     to General Talic or to Mr. Zupljanin and was not in control of the

 7     Banja Luka district Territorial Defence staff.  The region of Banja Luka

 8     had formed its own Crisis Staff, which was later renamed the War Staff.

 9             Milorad Sajic never met Radovan Karadzic in person.  A delegation

10     to Pale was planned in May 1992 including himself, Kupresanin, Erceg, and

11     Zupljanin, which was however not realised.

12             And that is a short summary and at that moment I do not have

13     questions for Mr. Sajic.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Mr. Sajic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this case

16     has been admitted in writing, that is, through your written witness

17     statement in lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you will be cross-examined

18     by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.  Do you understand

19     that?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23                           Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

24        Q.   And good morning, Mr. Sajic.

25        A.   Good morning.


Page 44130

 1        Q.   Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 12 of your statement you assert that

 2     between the outbreak of war and the time -- and late June when the

 3     corridor was created there were "no links to Pale."

 4             Nevertheless, you acknowledge that you received General Subotic's

 5     mobilisation order of the 16th of April, 1992, which is in evidence in

 6     this case as P2412.  Now, Mr. Sajic, the fact that you received this

 7     order from General Subotic implies that your claim that there were no

 8     links to Pale at this time is not true.  There had to be links in order

 9     for you to receive this mobilisation order from General Subotic; right?

10        A.   The mobilisation order from General Subotic, I believe that I

11     received it after the corridor was broken on the 16th of June and my

12     order was on the 4th of May.  It could have arrived from the

13     communication centres of municipalities.  I really can't remember how I

14     received it.  I did not communicate with Subotic at all.  I could not get

15     in touch with him.

16        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you just said that you received General Subotic's

17     order after the corridor was broken and then you say:

18             "And my order was on the 4th of May ..."

19             Your order of the 4th of May, which is in evidence as P2818, and

20     which you refer to in your statement, states:

21             "Pursuant to decision of the Ministry of National Defence of the

22     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, number 192 of

23     16 April 1992 ..."

24             And goes on from there.  So it is crystal clear that by the

25     4th of May, 1992, when you implemented General Subotic's order, you had


Page 44131

 1     received it; right?

 2        A.   No, not fully.  I could have received the order a day or two

 3     before I issued my own order.  If I had received it on the 17 or

 4     18 April, I would have issued mine immediately thereafter.  So the links

 5     that existed before the corridor was broken through was not really

 6     functioning in my view because that order required from me to urgently

 7     issue my own order and convey the message of the previous order to all

 8     the municipalities.  However, I only received that order 20 days later.

 9        Q.   Mr. Sajic, the Chamber's received evidence from the person who

10     actually transmitted General Subotic's order to Banja Luka, and he

11     explained that it was sent by teleprinter, using the teleprinter

12     connection between Pale and Banja Luka.  And that's Mr. Vukovic's

13     evidence at P2794, pages 20 to 21.  Were you aware that there was a

14     teleprinter connection operating between Pale and Banja Luka at this

15     time?

16        A.   That was the only connection that I deemed usable, the

17     teleprinter in the centre for information and communication.

18        Q.   Okay.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Could we have P2821, please.

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, this is an 18 June 1992 document from the

21     Ministry of Defence in Pale sent to the other ministries and it says

22     that:

23             "The communications centre at Pale can send telegrams to the

24     Serbian Autonomous Region of Bosanska Krajina and to other Serbian

25     autonomous regions ..."


Page 44132

 1             Now, you just said that the only connection that you deemed

 2     usable was the teleprinter.  Were you aware of the telegram link that

 3     existed between Pale and Banja Luka before the corridor was broken?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   And you had helicopters available to you in Banja Luka that you

 6     could use to travel outside of the ARK; right?

 7        A.   No, not me.

 8        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 47 of your statement you described

 9     travelling to Knin by helicopter in mid-May.  Does that remind you of the

10     availability of helicopters at this time to travel outside of the ARK?

11        A.   There was a helicopter, but I didn't use it.  I could not use it.

12     I'm talking about myself.  The helicopter, however, did fly to Knin.

13        Q.   And you were in it; correct?

14        A.   Yes, yes.

15        Q.   Okay.  That's clear now.

16             Moving on, Mr. Sajic.  At paragraph 55 of your statement you said

17     that some municipalities did not accept the decisions of the ARK

18     Crisis Staff and they did not implement the conclusions that we adopted.

19     And you then go on to give the example of Banja Luka resisting the ARK

20     Crisis Staff.  Now, when you testified previously in the Brdjanin case,

21     you explained that you could, in fact, only speak about Banja Luka in

22     this regard and you didn't know the extent to which other municipalities

23     in the ARK accepted ARK Crisis Staff conclusions.  That's correct, isn't

24     it?

25        A.   Yes.


Page 44133

 1        Q.   At paragraph 68 of your statement you comment on adjudicated fact

 2     number 555 which regards restrictions on movement imposed on Muslims and

 3     Croats in the ARK, and your evidence is:

 4             "Restrictions on free movement were aimed at all citizens

 5     regardless of their nationality."

 6             Are you aware, Mr. Sajic, that on the 23rd of July, 1992, the

 7     Celinac War Presidency issued a decision on the status of the non-Serb

 8     population in Celinac and that decision, among other things, forbid

 9     non-Serbs from "moving around Celinac town between 1600 and 0600 hours,"

10     forbid them from "lingering in the street, catering facilities and other

11     public places," and forbid them from travelling outside their settlements

12     without permission from the authorities.  That's P2638.  Were you aware

13     of that decision?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   So would it be fair to say that with the possible exception of

16     Banja Luka, you don't really know in any detail what kinds of

17     restrictions were placed on the movement of non-Serbs in ARK

18     municipalities?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   I'd like to come back to your 4th of May mobilisation order, and

21     that order in addition to mobilising the TO, pursuant to

22     General Subotic's order, also imposed a curfew and called for the

23     disarming of paramilitary formations and individuals who illegally

24     possessed weapons.

25             Now, when you testified previously in the Brdjanin case, you


Page 44134

 1     confirmed that the disarmament provision and the curfew provision were

 2     based on your own assessment of the situation on the ground.  That's

 3     correct, isn't it?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And you also confirmed that these additions were consistent with

 6     General Subotic's order which instructs recipients to take all necessary

 7     measures based on the specific situation in their territories.  That's

 8     right, isn't it?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   You also confirmed previously in your prior testimony that your

11     mobilisation order of the 4th of May was mandatory.  That's right, isn't

12     it?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And when you testified previously you were read out the following

15     passage from Miroslav Vjestica's speech at the 16th Assembly Session,

16     which is P956, page 21, where he said:

17             "As for Bosanski Novi, let me tell you that I was there

18     yesterday.  Bosanski Novi is sealed off.  An ultimatum has been issued

19     and a dead-line set for the Muslims to surrender their weapons.  Some of

20     them did, some did not.  Yesterday there was shooting.  What will happen

21     today?  I believe they will surrender.  The same is going on in

22     Sanski Most.  I think the Muslims will soon be disarmed there too."

23             And in your previous testimony you confirmed that Mr. Vjestica

24     was talking about the results in Bosanski Novi of the 11th of May

25     disarmament dead-line prescribed in your 4th of May order.  That's


Page 44135

 1     correct, isn't it?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to P3928 now, please.

 4        Q.   Mr. Sajic, this is a Sanski Most SJB report of the

 5     15th of June, 1992, on the process of disarming paramilitary formations

 6     in Sanski Most.  And you can see in the first paragraph it states that

 7     the army, TO, and SJB have for some time been disarming paramilitary

 8     Muslim and Croatian formations in the Sanski Most area.

 9             And it says that peaceful disarming and surrendering of Muslims

10     was carried out between 10th and 25th of May.  During that period, the

11     Muslim and Croatian population handed over only hunting weapons and other

12     legally owned weapons, but illegally obtained military weapons were not

13     surrendered.

14             And then in the third paragraph it states that:

15             "On the 25th of May ... the 'disarming' was followed by a

16     military action (attack) against ... Mahala, where ... 2.000 civilians

17     were captured but no significant amounts of weapons were found."

18             Now, this document reflects the implementation of the disarmament

19     aspect of your 4th of May order in Sanski Most, does it not?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Now, in paragraph 65 of your statement you talk about adjudicated

22     fact number 538 which states that the ARK Crisis Staff disarmament

23     demands were selectively enforced against non-Serbs.  And you stated that

24     you disagreed with this fact.  You stated that:

25             "Illegal weaponry was demanded from all regardless of ethnicity."


Page 44136

 1             Mr. Sajic, Mr. Vjestica's Assembly speech that I read to you a

 2     few moments ago and this Sanski Most SJB document refer exclusively to

 3     disarming Muslims and Croats.  And it's true, is it not, that the ARK

 4     disarmament process was, at least for the most part, selectively enforced

 5     against non-Serbs, isn't it?

 6        A.   I can give you my comment, but I stand behind my statement that

 7     illegal arming implies that an individual who doesn't belong to any unit

 8     owns a weapon.  This applied to all ethnicities, even Serbs.  Serbs also

 9     had illegal weapons.  He took it from the army, refused to join his unit,

10     and gave the weapon to his brother or cousin.  Now, how it was applied in

11     different territories, that's a different matter.  But that demand was

12     made of everyone.  Now, how Vjestica put it in practice is something

13     different.  I cannot tell you about every municipality individually.  The

14     way it happened, it happened.  But illegal possession of weapons is

15     illegal possession of weapons.  That demand was made of everyone, whether

16     it was applied differently in Celinac than somewhere else, that's

17     something different.  And still, even after this drive, a lot of weapons

18     remained hidden in houses as an illegal possession.  But the requirement

19     was made of everyone equally.  I cannot give you the kind of answer you

20     seem to expect like it was more on this side than another side.

21        Q.   Well, let me remind you of your prior testimony on this point.

22     And this is from page 98 of 1D09818.  And you were asked -- you were

23     actually referred back to your previous OTP interview.  You were asked:

24             "I'd like to go back to your interview for a minute.  During your

25     interview with us, you talked honestly about who was disarmed.  You were


Page 44137

 1     asked, talking about the order on mobilisation and disarmament:

 2             "'But the effect was this, wasn't it, that it was only the

 3     Muslims and Croats who were having their weapons removed from them.'"

 4             Your answer:

 5             "Mainly, you cannot say that it was a hundred per cent like that,

 6     but this statement can stand."

 7             And then you were asked:

 8             "And you were telling the truth, weren't you, sir?"

 9             And your answer was:

10             "Yes."

11             And that's correct, isn't it, Mr. Sajic?  It may not be

12     100 per cent the case, but for the most part it was Muslims and Croats

13     who were disarmed pursuant to your order in the ARK; right?

14        A.   I have to repeat what I stated before on three different

15     occasions.  I'm not deviating from my earlier statements.  It was

16     required of everyone, regardless of ethnicity, to give up their illegally

17     owned weapons.  It's quite logical the way you draw conclusions, but I

18     don't know which percentages you are thinking about.  If there were more

19     Serbs who were incorporated into units, it's quite logical that less

20     weapons were taken away from Serbs.  It's logical that more weapons were

21     taken away from Muslims and Croats because they had received their

22     weapons not from the army but from the HDZ and the SDA.  I'm not

23     retracting on my statement that more weapons were taken from Muslims and

24     Croats, and that is a question to which you cannot answer yes or no.  You

25     have to give an explanation.


Page 44138

 1        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you are emphasising that this was an order to disarm

 2     people from illegally possessed weapons, but it's true, is it not, that

 3     this disarmament order was also used to disarm Muslims and Croats of

 4     legally possessed weapons and you even knew of a case where a Muslim

 5     friend of yours had his legal weapon taken away.  That's right, isn't it?

 6        A.   I gave an example of this man called Islam.  He did not get his

 7     weapon from a unit.  He worked as a professional on the staff while I was

 8     working there.  These are individual cases where legal weapons were taken

 9     away from somebody; I'm not denying that.  But the order was to seize

10     weapons in illegal possession, weapons that were not obtained from a unit

11     or from people who refused to join the unit, whereas they had taken a

12     gun.  So if anybody abandons their unit, any unit, there were units which

13     incorporated Muslims and Croats as well, there were even units that

14     were -- that comprised entirely of Muslims so if he took the weapon and

15     was not in the unit, that weapon was supposed to be taken away from the

16     man.

17        Q.   Mr. Sajic, I'd like to move to something else now.  You said at

18     paragraph 49 of your statement that Pale had deep reservations about the

19     existence of the ARK and all its organs.  And you said Pale's influence

20     on Krajina was non-existent.

21             You also explained at paragraph 22 that you were never an SDS

22     member and, in fact, SDS members referred to you as a commie.  The

23     Trial Chamber has received a lot of evidence about the relationship

24     between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Brdjanin, in particular evidence of meetings

25     and phone calls between the two of them.  Now, I take it you are not


Page 44139

 1     familiar with the details of their contacts such as when they spoke, what

 2     they spoke about, or the nature of their relationship; is that right?

 3        A.   I was not privy to all the conversations between Mr. Brdjanin and

 4     Mr. Karadzic.

 5        Q.   Were you privy to any conversations between Mr. Brdjanin and

 6     Dr. Karadzic?

 7        A.   No.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay, if we could go to 65 ter 05513, please.

 9        Q.   Mr. Sajic, this is a Banja Luka CSB dispatch of the

10     22nd of June, 1992.  And it states that the ARK Crisis Staff has adopted

11     the following decision which we give to you in full and then it repeats

12     that ARK Crisis Staff decision from a 22nd June, 1992, meeting.  And if

13     you look at just under Roman numeral I of that decision, it says that:

14             "All executive posts ... posts involving a likely flow of

15     information, posts involving the protection of public property, that is,

16     all posts of importance to the functioning of the economy may only be

17     held by personnel of Serbian nationality."

18             And on page 2 under Roman numeral II it states that:

19             "The dead-line for implementing ... this decision ... is the

20     26th of June 1992 ..."

21             And then after the decision the -- is repeated, the CSB chief,

22     Mr. Zupljanin, gives instructions for its implementation in the C -- in

23     the SJBs.

24             Now, it's clear that compliance with this decision would require

25     dismissing any Muslims or Croats holding the types of posts described in


Page 44140

 1     the decision; right?

 2        A.   That's what the decision says; however, in practice it wasn't

 3     like that, it didn't have to be like that.  In the public security centre

 4     there were Muslims and Croats, in the same centre where Zupljanin worked.

 5     In my own staff, there were Muslims and Croats on the staff.  So I

 6     repeat, when you read all these decisions issued by the Crisis Staff, you

 7     can never be sure whether it was really done.  If it was done to some

 8     extent, to what extent.  In some cases none of it was ever put in

 9     practice.

10        Q.   Okay.  Well, at paragraph 41 you said you did not believe that

11     Brdjanin personally called for the dismissal of Muslims and Croats, but

12     this document shows that through his position as ARK Crisis Staff

13     president he did exactly that, called for the dismissal of Muslims and

14     Croats; right?

15        A.   From the documents it appears so.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us be precise.  Is this about

17     dismissal or about replacement of people in executive posts?

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  First of all, I'm not clear on that distinction.

19     Secondly, I asked the witness that this would --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Now -- I would tender that document, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6533, Your Honours.


Page 44141

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 2        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, a moment ago you said:

 3             "In my own staff there were Muslims and Croats on the staff."

 4             You're talking about the Banja Luka TO staff; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And then after paragraph 11 of your statement you discuss

 7     how the TO was reorganised into the 1 KK and the TO thereby ceased to

 8     exist; right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And it's right that after the 1 KK was formed, Muslim and Croat

11     officers were purged from the 1 KK; right?

12        A.   What do you mean "purged"?  I don't understand the question.

13        Q.   Well, maybe it will make it easier if I read from your prior

14     testimony, and this is at page 151 of 1D09818.  You were asked:

15             "Now, you know, don't you, that in fact ultimately not right on

16     this date," and the date in your reference is 9th of June, 1992, "but

17     soon thereafter officers of Muslim and Croat nationality were purged from

18     the 1 KK; correct?"

19             And you answered:

20             "I'm not trying to deny that, but I do not know the exact date

21     when these officers were purged or who exactly was purged.  I don't know

22     the date, whether it was on the same day or not.  I can see this order by

23     Mladic and it looks quite clear to me."

24             And then you're asked:

25             "I'm not asking you for the day.  I just wanted your confirmation


Page 44142

 1     that that, in fact, occurred, that these men of Muslim and Croat

 2     nationality were, in fact, purged from the 1 KK ranks; correct?  Don't

 3     worry about the exact day."

 4             And your answer was:

 5             "Yes."

 6             And that's correct, isn't it?

 7        A.   It's true that I made that statement, but you cannot read that

 8     statement as saying that the corps was purged of all the Muslims and

 9     Croats.  But when I was giving my statement, I said that many of them --

10     in fact, several of them started and ended the war being members of the

11     1st Krajina Corps.  When I talked about this subject, I meant primarily

12     active-duty officers.  There was, for instance, one colonel, I can't

13     remember the name now -- I meant active-duty officers.  The reserve force

14     was composed of people who were born there, natives of these areas, who

15     stayed to defend their homes, members who -- of the former

16     Territorial Defence which was renamed a brigade and they remained as

17     members of the brigade.  I cannot say that they didn't stay there until

18     the end of the war.  We cannot generalise like this.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I would like to tender what I just read out, if

20     Your Honours would like to see it, it's page 151 and 152.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, shall we take a look?

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Of 65 ter 1D09818.  It's the bottom of page 151

23     and the top of 152.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see that document that this

25     passage in the transcript refers to?


Page 44143

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 2             Can we take a look at the next page.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could this be shown in Serbian?

 4     This is in English.

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And, Your Honours, the 9th of June document

 6     that's being discussed here is in evidence at P5429.  If Dr. Karadzic

 7     wants to raise it in re-direct, he's free to.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive these two pages.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6534, Your Honours.

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:

11        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, a few moments ago when I showed you the CSB

12     dispatch repeating the ARK Crisis Staff decision, stating that only Serbs

13     could hold certain types of posts you said:

14             "So I repeat, when you read all these decisions issued by the

15     Crisis Staff, you can never be sure whether it was really done."

16             And then you said:

17             "In some cases, none of it was ever put into practice."

18             Back in 2001 when you were interviewed by the Prosecution, you

19     were asked whether in 1992 Muslims and Croats were dismissed in

20     Banja Luka.  You said:

21             "Mainly, yes, I agree to a large extent."

22             And that's true, isn't it, Mr. Sajic?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   You also --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, under this number I get


Page 44144

 1     something else, P05429, it must be a different number.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'll get the reference.

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, you also told the OTP in 2001 that most

 4     properties that were destroyed in 1991 and 1992 in Banja Luka belonged to

 5     Muslims and Croats, and that's correct, isn't it?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 34 of your statement you said you

 8     attended five or six ARK Crisis Staff meetings and that General Talic

 9     only attended the first Crisis Staff meeting that you attended.  But in

10     addition to General Talic's presence, General Vujinovic, the assistant

11     commander of the 1 KK for civilian affairs, attended several

12     ARK Crisis Staff meetings on behalf of the corps.  That's right, isn't

13     it?

14        A.   Say, that's General -- in fact, Colonel Vujinovic, who was in

15     charge of civilian affairs.  That's literally nothing to the corps

16     commander.  He just gave his formal ascent.  He was not a general.  He

17     was supposed to be promoted into general, but the active-duty officers

18     did not agree.

19        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Sajic, it's your evidence that the assistant commander

20     for civilian affairs is nothing to the corps commander?  Is that what

21     you're saying?

22        A.   A person of very little import in the corps command.  There were

23     many more important people in the command of the corps, and he never

24     replaces the commander.

25        Q.   But -- Colonel Vujinovic did attend several ARK Crisis Staff


Page 44145

 1     meetings on behalf of the corps and he reported on those meetings to his

 2     command.  That's what you said before and that's right, isn't it?

 3        A.   Well, he should have reported.  He was supposed to report.  I

 4     don't know.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It may be okay, but I wonder

 8     whether he -- in line 8:  He never replaced the commander.  Should it be

 9     he never deputised the commander.

10             JUDGE KWON:  We understood it in that meaning.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:

12        Q.   Mr. Sajic, just so we're clear, Colonel Vujinovic did attend

13     several ARK Crisis Staff meetings on behalf of the corps, didn't he?

14        A.   Well, yes, he's from the corps.  He didn't have any kind of

15     authority.  He just attended.  Please understand me.  It is one thing to

16     attend on behalf of the commander and to make decisions on behalf of the

17     commander and it's a different thing just to be present.  He could not

18     replace the corps commander.  He did not have the authority to deputise

19     for him.  It is only Kilecevic [phoen] who had that kind of authority.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Do Your Honours wish to break now?  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

23     1.20.

24                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.


Page 44146

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 50 of your statement you describe

 4     regular Monday meetings of the Crisis Staff attended by municipal --

 5     municipality presidents where reports were supposed to be provided to

 6     Dr. Karadzic.  And then at paragraphs 56 and 58 you describe one of those

 7     meetings in more detail, it's a meeting attended by representatives from

 8     Prijedor and there was a discussion of camps.  Now, was it Mr. Stakic,

 9     Mr. Drljaca, and Mr. Kuruzovic who attended that particular meeting as

10     the Prijedor representatives?

11        A.   I don't know what you're asking.  They did not submit their

12     report to Karadzic?

13        Q.   Well, I was just reading from your statement.  My question is:

14     At the ARK Crisis Staff meeting where there was a discussion of camps

15     and, in fact, an argument between the Prijedor representatives and

16     Mr. Radic, a meeting you describe, was it Mr. Stakic, Mr. Drljaca, and

17     Mr. Kuruzovic who attended from Prijedor?

18        A.   Yes, I gave that -- well, yes, yes.

19        Q.   And Mr. Brdjanin chaired that particular meeting; is that right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Now, at paragraph 58 of your statement you said that the Prijedor

22     representative reported that there was a shortage of food and clothing in

23     these camps and they didn't have sufficient accommodation for these

24     people.  And you characterise this as "the usual problems facing

25     collection centres at the time when there was a high concentration of


Page 44147

 1     people in a small space."

 2             I take it from this that it was clear to you and everyone else at

 3     this meeting that large numbers of non-Serbs were being held in

 4     collection centres in the ARK; is that right?

 5        A.   I don't know how many there were there.  I was not at these

 6     collection centres, as I said in my statement; however, there was this

 7     problem that I refer to in paragraph 58.  The problem was even more

 8     pronounced because the population and even the military to a large degree

 9     did not have enough food because there were other refugees coming from

10     other areas.  So the capacity of the Krajina was increased compared to

11     the pre-war period.

12        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you didn't really answer my question.  At paragraph 58

13     you talked about "the usual problems facing collection centres at the

14     time when there was a high concentration of people in a small space."

15             Now, I put it to you that the only way that remark makes any

16     sense is if it was clear to you and those at the meeting that there were

17     large numbers of people being held in collection centres in the ARK at

18     this time.

19        A.   I can say yes, a large number is an abstract concept, it is not

20     any particular figure, but yes.

21        Q.   And it was also clear that these people were non-Serbs; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   I have one question about the SOS blockade in early April in

24     Banja Luka that you talk about in your statement and it's just to have

25     you confirm something you said before in 2001 to the OTP.  And in 2001


Page 44148

 1     you said -- you referred to a general -- sorry, a negative outpouring of

 2     feelings towards Muslims and Croats by the SOS.  That's correct, isn't

 3     it, there was a negative outpouring of feelings towards Muslims and

 4     Croats by the SOS?

 5        A.   I don't know that that's exactly what I had stated.  Negative

 6     outpouring of feelings -- there were negative outpourings regarding

 7     things that happened in Sijekovac and many other places, negative

 8     outpouring because of the poor status of the army and so on and so forth.

 9     I don't remember saying that it was done because of the Muslims and

10     Croats, that that was the only reason.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to 65 ter 25672, page 47 of the

12     English and page 63 in the B/C/S, please.

13        Q.   This is a page from your -- the transcript of your tape recorded

14     interview with the Prosecution in 2001, and near the top in the English

15     about a third of the way down in the B/C/S you were asked:

16             "You did not approve of the SOS and its activities; correct?"

17             And you answer:

18             "In my opinion, they were needless just like in September 1993."

19             And you're asked:

20             "Now surely you remember that one of the demands made by the SOS

21     to the senior SDS leadership and military leadership in Banja Luka was

22     that all Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka should be dismissed from their

23     jobs?"

24             And your answer was:

25             "I don't know whether it was in that form presented, but one


Page 44149

 1     could say that there was this negative outpour of feelings towards that

 2     part of the population."

 3             And you're asked:

 4             "By the SOS?"

 5             And you say:

 6             "Yes."

 7             Now, in 2001 you told the Prosecution that the SOS had a negative

 8     view or negative feelings towards Muslims and Croats; right?

 9        A.   I'm reading this here now.  I don't know whether it was in such

10     form, but - but again - one could say that the outpouring was -- I mean

11     negative towards that -- anyone I guess.  I don't understand this really.

12     So negative outpouring, yes, since that's what happened in town, under

13     the blockade, et cetera, but it wasn't only against the Muslims and

14     Croats but against the Serbs too.  I'll give you an example.  The

15     president of the Executive Board of Banja Luka, he was not allowed to

16     enter his office.  So the SOS did things that were not supposed to be

17     done, not only against Muslims and Croats.  And I already said that in my

18     statement that that was not supposed to be done and that that did not

19     enjoy any support on my part, and it also had to do with some Serbs,

20     especially those criminals who would snatch earrings or chains or things

21     like that.  The SOS did not only go after Muslims and Croats.  It was an

22     unnecessary trouble for everyone in Banja Luka for three or four days.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I tender this page, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6535, Your Honours.


Page 44150

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 2        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic at --

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could have P956 now, page 20 in the English

 4     and page 17 in the B/C/S.

 5        Q.   While that's coming up, Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 54 you said that

 6     neither the republican leadership nor the strategic objectives presented

 7     at the RS Assembly ever had the goal of expelling Muslims or Croats from

 8     the territory of the RS.  Now, you attended the 16th Assembly Session in

 9     Banja Luka when Dr. Karadzic presented those goals; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Now, if you look at the document in front of you, this is

12     transcript from that session that you attended, and this is Mr. Vjestica

13     speaking shortly after Dr. Karadzic described those goals.  And this is

14     at the bottom of the English page and it is about a third of the way down

15     for you, Mr. Sajic, in the B/C/S.  And Mr. Vjestica says:

16             " ... on the right bank of the Una river there are no more

17     Muslims in the Serbian municipality of Bosanka Krupa.  All the enclaves

18     that were there, Rapusa, Veliki Vrbovik, Ostroznica, Babic,

19     Muslim Jasenica and Zavir, we have evacuated them so that there will be

20     none there for the duration of the war operations.  Will they have a

21     place to return to?  I think it is unlikely after our President told us

22     the happy news that the right bank of the Una is the border" --

23             THE ACCUSED:  The problem is that the interpreter can't find the

24     relevant paragraph and I suppose the witness too.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.


Page 44151

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  It's about 16 lines down from the top of the page

 2     where it begins, roughly a third of the way.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show him the previous page to let him know

 4     this is what Mr. Vjestica said.

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Certainly.

 6        Q.   You see Mr. Vjestica's name about two-thirds of the way down,

 7     Mr. Sajic?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go back to the previous page, i.e., the

 9     next page?

10             So if you could read out again, Ms. Gustafson.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I will.  And, as I said, this is, I think,

12     16 lines from the top in the B/C/S.  Mr. Vjestica says:

13             "On the right bank of the Una river there are no more Muslims in

14     the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa.  All the enclaves that were

15     there, Rapusa, Veliki Vrbovik, Ostroznica, Babic, Muslim Jasenica and

16     Zavir, we have evacuated them so that there will be none there for the

17     duration of the war operations.  Will they have a place to return to?  I

18     think it is unlikely after our President told us the happy news that the

19     right bank of the Una is the border ..."

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, in your statement you said the strategic

21     objectives did not have the goal of expelling Muslims and Croats from the

22     RS.  But Mr. Vjestica here at the 16th Session is saying essentially the

23     opposite, isn't he, that the permanent removal of Muslims from

24     territories defined by the strategic objectives is consistent with those

25     objectives?


Page 44152

 1        A.   Am I supposed to comment on that?

 2        Q.   Yes, it was a question.  I'm asking you to confirm that what

 3     Mr. Vjestica said at this session, at which you were present, was that

 4     the permanent removal of Muslims from territories defined by the

 5     strategic objectives is consistent with those objectives?

 6        A.   I was present at the Assembly on the 12th of May up until I think

 7     Mladic spoke, and I have already stated that I did not attend the entire

 8     Assembly session.  And finally, I wasn't even acquainted with these

 9     strategic objectives, but Vjestica often spoke about something but that

10     doesn't mean that those were the objectives.  He said, conditionally

11     speaking, that he had cleansed whatever of Muslims and that it's a good

12     thing that the president said that the border would be there.  The

13     president himself could not say where the border would be; it depended on

14     military operations and ultimately on the Dayton Agreement.  So I cannot

15     accept that, that the leadership reached such agreement that there would

16     be an ethnically cleansed Republika Srpska.  That is my feeling, that is

17     my conviction, throughout the war and ever since.  That is my feeling and

18     not only mine, also of many other people.  So in the statement that I

19     gave here, the republic leadership, et cetera, I believe did not have as

20     a strategic objective any kind of cleansing.  That would be my comment.

21        Q.   Firstly, Mr. Sajic, you talked about borders and you said:

22             "The president himself could not say where the border would

23     be ..."

24             Have you forgotten at this session strategic objective 4, as

25     announced by Dr. Karadzic, was the establishment of a border on the Una


Page 44153

 1     and Neretva rivers?

 2        A.   I repeat -- I mean, I didn't listen to all of it with regard to

 3     these strategic objectives, but an objective to have a border somewhere

 4     does not mean ethnic cleansing to my mind.

 5        Q.   Well, you've confirmed that that was nevertheless what

 6     Mr. Vjestica was talking about.  So if that was, as you say, a wrong

 7     interpretation by Mr. Vjestica about what the strategic objectives meant,

 8     then you would expect someone from the leadership, Dr. Karadzic or

 9     somebody else, to correct Mr. Vjestica so that the deputies aren't left

10     with the misimpression that the strategic objectives are about ethnic

11     cleansing, wouldn't you?

12        A.   I repeat, I don't know whether I listened to Vjestica at all on

13     the 12th of May, 1992, I did not stay the entire Assembly session.

14     That's why I cannot accept that I heard Vjestica, and even if I listened

15     to all of this, it wouldn't mean that somebody accepted that.  Vjestica

16     is just Vjestica, just an individual.  Even if it were an important

17     office-holder, it cannot just -- well, that would be my answer.  I cannot

18     say a priori yes to something that I did not even listen to, and I repeat

19     once again quite sincerely:  The people did not have such objectives.

20     The people did not think that there was any objective of cleansing the

21     other peoples there.  I assure you of that.  I am from that area, the AR

22     Krajina.

23        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to P3656, please.  This is the -- a report on the

24     current political and security situation dated the 1st of June, 1992, by

25     the 1 KK, and I'd like to direct your attention to the third paragraph of


Page 44154

 1     this document, approximately halfway through the paragraph it states:

 2             "A portion of the Muslim and Croatian population is moving out,

 3     and the Region of Bosnian Krajina has issued a decision to facilitate

 4     such departures, providing that the Serbs -- that Serbs from

 5     Central Bosnia and places with predominantly Muslim and Croatian

 6     populations were also allowed to move out.  Those departing will not be

 7     allowed to return."

 8             Now, you just said that the people did not have the objective of

 9     ethnic cleansing and you say:

10             "I assure you of that.  I am from the area of the AR Krajina."

11             Now, the decision of the ARK authorities described in this

12     document, that Muslims and Croats who are moving out will not be allowed

13     to return, reflects the implementation of the first strategic goal in the

14     Krajina, doesn't it?

15        A.   Could you please show me this entire document to the end?  This

16     is the first report on the current political and security situation.

17     Could I just have a look at this document up to the end.

18        Q.   Certainly.  It's three and a half pages, if you'd like to scan

19     through it.

20        A.   All right.

21        Q.   Can we turn to the next page now, Mr. Sajic?

22        A.   I haven't seen all of it -- well, yes, yes.

23        Q.   You're welcome to look at it, Mr. Sajic, but I can reassure you

24     that nothing else in this document refers back to the passage I read out

25     to you.


Page 44155

 1        A.   And finally the signature, please.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to the last page, please.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excellent.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 5        Q.   Mr. Sajic, should I repeat the question for you?  I will.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Now, the decision of the ARK authorities that Muslims and Croats

 8     who were moving out will not be allowed to return, that's described in

 9     this document, reflects the implementation of the first strategic goal in

10     the Krajina, doesn't it?

11        A.   I don't see that decision here.  I see a document that the

12     assistant commander for morale, Colonel Vukelic, is sending as a report,

13     I don't know whether it was sent to Talic or the Main Staff, and he's

14     presenting his view.  I have to see a document where a body of the AR

15     Krajina, that would be the Executive Council -- well, you keep saying

16     "Crisis Staff," but I think that it's only for the Executive Council to

17     say that, that that kind of decision was made -- I mean, there has to be

18     a decision and this primarily referred to Serbs.  If they were leaving,

19     they were proclaimed to be traitors of their people and they were

20     prohibited from returning ever.  Now, Vukelic is commenting upon some

21     decision as assistant commander for morale who just --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the end of

23     the sentence.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He is commenting upon this just as

25     if I heard -- I mean, it's not meritorious, believe me.


Page 44156

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 2        Q.   Mr. Sajic, can you -- the interpreters didn't catch what you said

 3     after:

 4             "... Vukelic is commenting on some decision as assistant

 5     commander for morale ..."

 6             Can you please complete that sentence?

 7        A.   This is the opinion of Mr. Vukelic as the assistant commander for

 8     morale.  In this document I don't see -- well, he is saying that the

 9     authorities of the Krajina made a decision.  Which authorities is he

10     referring to?  What does he mean?  Often in assessments, in reports,

11     between the military and civilian authorities there would be a

12     divergence; namely, both the civilian and military authorities were

13     accusing each other.  They were not opposing sides, but they kept

14     accusing one another and they kept making poor assessment of each other

15     so military personnel criticised civilian authorities and then the

16     civilian authorities criticised military personnel.  This happened at the

17     level of the Krajina, and I personally think that this happened even

18     further up at higher levels.  That is why I cannot accept this statement.

19     To that I would like to add the following:  I was against any kind of

20     moving out until the corridor was established.  As far as I can see, this

21     is the 1st of July, is it?  What is the date here?  I do not see the

22     date.  Could I have the first page once again, please.  The 1st of June,

23     yes.  And he is submitting information to his commander, and the

24     commander lives in that area.

25        Q.   Mr. Sajic, I'd like to remind you of what you said previously


Page 44157

 1     when you were shown this document, and that's at 65 ter 1D09818 at

 2     page 167.

 3        A.   Where is that?

 4        Q.   It's coming up on your screen and it's in English only so I will

 5     read it to you.

 6        A.   Okay.  Very well.

 7        Q.   And there was a rather lengthy discussion about this document and

 8     ultimately the Judge asked you:

 9             "The question is doesn't it make sense that the decision in

10     Bosnian Krajina that Muslims and Croats who leave are not going to be

11     allowed to return because strategic goal number 1 is not to be in the

12     same state as Muslims and Croats.  This is the question.

13             "In other words, you are being asked to confirm that the decision

14     of the ARK Crisis Staff that those who leave will not be allowed to

15     return fits in the first strategic point mentioned or outlined by

16     Krajisnik according to that report."

17             And I just mention that there is a mistaken reference to

18     Dr. Karadzic at the 16th Session.

19             And you answered:

20             "To leave room for those who will be coming from elsewhere, the

21     Serbs coming from other parts.  In that sense, yes."

22             And then you're asked:

23             "Right.  In the sense that Bosnian Muslims and Croats who leave

24     will not be allowed to return, period, and you're saying the rationale

25     behind that is to allow Serbs to move in; right?"


Page 44158

 1             And you answer:

 2             "It is linked up in the text.  In the statements, it is all

 3     linked up.  Yes."

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Where is Karadzic mentioned here,

 5     please, can you tell me?  The Prosecutor said that those were my words or

 6     that those words are in relation to what I said.  Line 24, line 25, she

 7     says that it has to do with my own words.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  What Ms. Gustafson said is "Krajisnik" is mistakenly

 9     referred to by -- who?

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  They were referring back to the --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  -- announcement of the strategic goals at the

13     16th Session, and by counsel and then by the Judge it was mistakenly

14     attributed to Krajisnik --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it should read "outlined by Karadzic," that's

16     what you meant?

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes.  And it refers back to the 16th Session,

18     that's all.

19        Q.   Mr. Sajic, that's what you said before when you were shown this

20     document, that the decision that Muslims and Croats who move out will not

21     be allowed to return was consistent with the strategic objectives and the

22     rationale was to allow Serbs to move in; right?

23        A.   I don't quite get it.  One thing is what I said during the

24     Brdjanin case and the other thing is what you're asking me now.  I don't

25     even know whether I ever saw this ARK document on a ban on return, that


Page 44159

 1     decision was never shown me.  That's one thing.  Second of all, I'm not

 2     denying what I said as a witness against Brdjo.  However, the question is

 3     now put in a different context.  If you were to ask me whether the moving

 4     out of Muslims was carried out or -- in an organised manner, I would say

 5     no.  If you ask me the same question in a different way, I would say yes.

 6     This is a very vague question, so I can't say either yes or no.  I would

 7     have to provide a lengthy explanation to tell you which part merits a yes

 8     answer and which part merits a no answer.  You have to be more precise,

 9     and only then will I be able to give you a good-quality answer;

10     otherwise, I can't do that.

11        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, you just -- you took issue with my question,

12     claiming that I was referring to something different and that you'd never

13     been shown this 1 KK document before.  And if we could just go back to

14     page 157 of this transcript where this line of questioning includes

15     reference, specific reference, to this document.  Two-thirds of the way

16     down --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.  Objection.  It is not

18     correct that the witness said that this document was never shown to him.

19     He said that the decision that Vukelic is talking about was never shown

20     to him.  This is not the way to interrogate and examine a witness.

21     Einstein himself would be confused by this manner of questioning.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.  I'll ask it this way then.

23        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you don't deny that what I just read you from the

24     transcript was a question based on the same 1 KK document that I just

25     showed you, right, do you?


Page 44160

 1        A.   I'm not sure that I looked at that document properly.  I'm now

 2     reading the document in detail and I'm telling you that I did not peruse

 3     it in detail at the time.  This document doesn't mean anything in the

 4     sense of the decision on moving out.  This is just Mr. Vukelic's opinion.

 5     I don't want to be harsh on him, but he was often -- let me not go there.

 6     Second of all, he was not in a positions where he would have been able to

 7     provide such qualifications, and I underline once again that the

 8     animosities often existed between the active military personnel, i.e.,

 9     military authorities, and civilians.  This is a tendentious type of

10     writing in my view.  On the 1st of June, on the 1st of June, that is,

11     what was still valid, and I claim that, that we were staying in the

12     territory of Krajina.  And now on to Banja Luka, that we were staying

13     together, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, and that we would share the common

14     lot because the corridor was closed.  You, I'm sure, are aware of that

15     case of the 12 babies who died.  So this was on the 1st of June.  I

16     personally was against the moving out of the Muslims and Croats.

17     Irrespective of how this was conveyed to me, I couldn't accept that.  I

18     would not have been able to accept that.  I was not even aware of the

19     date.  I want us to discuss this document well and sincerely.  This is

20     not a credible document for the Trial Chamber.  He writes about the

21     status of morale --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness is speaking too fast.  It's

23     impossible to interpret.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Interpreters -- Mr. -- just a second --

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please understand me.


Page 44161

 1             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters were not able to follow you because

 2     you spoke too fast.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Shall I repeat?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  If you could repeat from where you said he wrote

 5     about the status of morale.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Vukelic wrote about morale,

 7     about morale in the army, and when describing the state of morale in the

 8     army when he spoke about high level of morale, he was explaining what was

 9     going on in various theatres of war which should have been done by

10     operative organs.  I'm not talking about his relationship with

11     Commander Talic.  However, Mr. Vukelic, and I underline, was not

12     authorised to give his assessments.  And this is just an assessment, this

13     is not a decision, this is not evidence, this is just his opinion about

14     the moving out of Muslims and Croats.  And I would like to try and

15     convince you that at that time in the months of May and June could have

16     used some channels to move out of Krajina.  But the general position

17     across Krajina was that we should share the common lot and the

18     breakthrough of the corridor happened on the 28th of June.  That's when

19     the territory of the -- the territory of the ARK with Serbia and the

20     territory of Serbia were linked.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:

22        Q.   Thank you.  I think you've now had ample opportunity to comment

23     on this document and you're now moving away from my question.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'd like to tender these two pages of the

25     transcript, page 167 and 168.


Page 44162

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 2             Have you admitted this part of transcript?  I don't --

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No, but if it could be added to P6534 which is

 4     another passage.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  65 -- oh, yes, these pages will be added to that

 6     exhibit.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 8        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, in paragraph 67 [sic] of your statement, you

 9     discuss an ARK delegation visit to Omarska and Mr. Radic's negative

10     impressions of what he saw, that he subsequently conveyed to you.  Just

11     to be clear, Mr. Radic told you that as they approached Omarska camp the

12     detainees were forced to raise three fingers in the air and sing songs

13     about Greater Serbia and this is what made Radic very uncomfortable;

14     right?

15        A.   They were not forced to do that.  They just did it and this is

16     the difference.  I can confirm what I said, but I cannot say that

17     somebody approached them and told them to raise their hands.  As they

18     approached them, they would raise three fingers and sing songs about

19     Serbia.  They did it spontaneously.  I don't know whether somebody from

20     the camp threw stones at them and ordered them to lift their three

21     fingers.  They were not forced.  Nobody forced them.  If somebody used

22     that term, they did it of their own will.  But, yes, they did raise three

23     fingers and they did sing songs about Serbia and, yes, I did hear that

24     from Radic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.


Page 44163

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 14, the paragraph should be

 3     "57" and not "67," as it is currently recorded.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 5        Q.   Mr. Sajic, do you honestly believe that a group of Muslim and

 6     Croat detainees would spontaneously begin singing songs about

 7     Greater Serbia and raise three fingers in the air and you honestly

 8     believe that that would make Mr. Radic uncomfortable?  It's quite obvious

 9     from the context that this was something that detainees were required to

10     do; right?

11        A.   He didn't tell me anything about people being forced to do that.

12     He said as they approached the camp that they raised three fingers in the

13     air and sang, and he didn't tell me that somebody asked them to do that.

14     He was a war orphan, as I already explained, and that's what made the

15     situation difficult for him.  He never told me that somebody whipped them

16     and forced them to lift those three fingers.  He never said that.

17        Q.   And just to be clear --

18        A.   The fact is that they did raise three fingers and the fact is

19     that they did sing those songs.

20        Q.   And the significance of the raising of the three fingers is that

21     that's a traditional Serb salute, isn't it?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And, Mr. --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm not following you.  You said --

25     you said they were not forced to do so; correct?  You said:


Page 44164

 1             "They were not forced.  Nobody forced them."

 2             Is it your evidence.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said that Radic told

 4     me they had raised three fingers and sang songs and that I never said

 5     that he had told me that those people were coerced into doing that.  In

 6     other words, he never told me.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We're talking about words being

 9     added to what I said.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I can understand, but today's transcript just a

11     minute ago it is noted as this.  You said:

12             "They were not forced.  Nobody forced them."

13             If -- do you still stand by that evidence?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, I did not say that.  I said

15     that I don't know whether they were coerced.  I didn't say that they did

16     it of their own will or that they didn't do it of their own will.  I can

17     repeat.  I wasn't there.  I don't know.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Sajic, at paragraph 42 of your statement you discuss

21     Mr. Brdjanin's statements to the media about Muslims and Croats.  Now,

22     this paragraph doesn't 100 per cent reflect what you said before so I'd

23     just like to confirm a few things that you said previously about this.

24     First, you learned from other Serbs in Banja Luka that Mr. Brdjanin had

25     said in the media that only a thousand Muslims would be allowed to stay


Page 44165

 1     in Banja Luka and they would be elderly people who'd be put to work

 2     cleaning the streets.  That's correct, isn't it?

 3        A.   You think that I said that to -- during the Brdjanin case or that

 4     I said that to the investigator?  What do you have in mind?

 5        Q.   I'm just asking you if it's true, Mr. Sajic, that you heard from

 6     other Serbs that Mr. Brdjanin said in the media that only a thousand

 7     Muslims would be allowed to stay in Banja Luka and those would be elderly

 8     people who'd be put to work cleaning the streets?

 9        A.   And where did I state that?

10        Q.   If you deny it, we can go to your prior testimony.  Do you deny

11     that this is true?

12        A.   Where?  In what part?  Well, I can't remember.  The only truth

13     that I know is that Brdjanin often spoke things that were not correct,

14     that his mouth ran away with him.  I could have heard from other people.

15     I'm not saying that I didn't.  I'm not denying that, but in what context,

16     I don't know, but, very well, we can go on.

17        Q.   I think it's a simple question but let's go to 65 ter --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One sentence is completely missing.

21     The witness said:  I never heard him say that.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Could we go to 65 ter 1D09818, page 102 --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this please be checked?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Well, it doesn't matter.  We are coming to this

25     transcript.  Let's continue.


Page 44166

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 2        Q.   About two-thirds of the way down you were asked:

 3             "I want to ask you a little bit about some of the things

 4     Mr. Brdjanin said when he was president of the ARK Crisis Staff, and

 5     perhaps just before he became president as well.  One of the things you

 6     were asked about in this interview that you remembered was hearing from

 7     other Serbs that Mr. Brdjanin had said in the media - doesn't say whether

 8     it's TV or radio - that only a thousand Muslims will be allowed to stay

 9     in Banja Luka and that those thousand Muslims will be comprised," so the

10     next page, "of elderly people who will be put to cleaning the streets.

11             "Now, do you remember hearing about that from Serbs in

12     Banja Luka, that they had heard Mr. Brdjanin say that in the media, as

13     you state in the interview?

14             "A.  Yes."

15             Now, that's what you said when you testified before and that's

16     the truth; right, Mr. Sajic?

17        A.   I don't have that translation before me of that part of my

18     testimony.  Everything I have is in English.

19        Q.   There is no B/C/S.  That's why I read it to you verbatim.  That's

20     what you said when you testified before and that's the truth; right,

21     Mr. Sajic?

22        A.   Let me tell you, let me answer, I did not hear any such nonsense

23     from Brdjanin, any -- no such nonsense did I hear from him.  I could have

24     heard from other people and say yes to that question.  So let my answer

25     to your question be yes.  But do you understand me, I personally never


Page 44167

 1     heard any such nonsense from him and he really did say a lot of things.

 2        Q.   If we could go to the next page of the transcript in the middle

 3     of the page you're also asked:

 4             "You can confirm to me, can't you, that Mr. Brdjanin made these

 5     types of speeches in the media?

 6             "A.  Yes."

 7             So you also confirmed in your prior testimony that the more

 8     general point that Mr. Brdjanin made these types of derogatory speeches

 9     in the media; correct?

10        A.   I can confirm that Brdjo did deliver such speeches in the media.

11     I said that when I was here, I don't know when.  And now about the

12     thousand Muslims who would be allowed to stay to clean the streets, and

13     you have just read it out again, I did not hear that stupid statement,

14     but I may have heard it from other people.  If I had heard it, that

15     figure would have stuck.  He did say a lot of stupid things.  I'm being

16     serious.  Him and Vukic said a lot of things, and I said that on day one

17     when I provided my statement.  So I may have heard it from other people,

18     not from Brdjanin, but he did used to say a lot of stupid things; I can

19     confirm that.

20        Q.   And you have confirmed that these kinds of speeches about Muslims

21     and Croats would put fear into the minds of Muslims and Croats who heard

22     them and that they did, in fact, frighten the Muslim and Croat

23     population; that's right too, isn't it?

24        A.   The first sign of instance -- insecurity among Muslims and Croats

25     in Banja Luka was when an influx of refugees came from Croatia, those


Page 44168

 1     Serbs who came from Sijekovac and all those developments after the events

 2     of April and May including Dobrovoljacka Street and

 3     Cazinska [phoen] Street.  And after that they obviously started feeling

 4     insecure and that's what they started saying.

 5        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you didn't answer --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED:  Line 6, witness said:  From Sijekovac where the

 9     Serbs have been slaughtered.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:

12        Q.   Mr. Sajic, you didn't answer my question.  I'll just read out

13     what you said in your prior testimony which is on this same very page and

14     the lawyer is referring back to your OTP interview.  He's quoting from

15     it.  And the question is:

16             "And you were then asked:  'These sorts of words would put fear

17     into the minds of Muslims or Croat who were listening to them, wouldn't

18     they?'  And your answer was:  'Of course.'"

19             And then in your testimony you said:

20             "Yes."

21             And then you were asked:

22             "Then you were asked whether the point of this, of these

23     speeches, was to frighten Muslims and Croats into leaving."

24             And you said:

25             "Well, I don't know whether that was the idea, but certainly they


Page 44169

 1     were afraid."

 2             So again you're confirming that these speeches frightened the

 3     Bosniak and Croat populations.  And your answer in your testimony you

 4     said yes.  That's true and that's what you said; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I have nothing further.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only three or four questions.

11             I would like to call up 5469 which is Mladic's reply to

12     Colonel Rankovic.

13                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Would you please tell us, Lieutenant-Colonel,

15     what is the meaning of the words:  Send people to the Army of the Federal

16     Republic of Yugoslavia to deal with their status in service.  When is

17     somebody put on stand-by; i.e., when are they referred to the

18     Army of Yugoslavia?

19        A.   On the screen I don't have anything.  I don't have a translation

20     or anything.

21        Q.   Let me read this for you.  It says Muslim and Croat officers -

22     and this is a reply to a telegram - should immediately be sent on

23     vacation.  Start the procedure for them to be referred to the

24     Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to deal with their

25     status and service.  What is this?  Is this their demotion or what?


Page 44170

 1        A.   In practical terms this implies the following:  All the officers

 2     in the Army of Republika Srpska, the current Serbian Republic of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the army of the so-called Army of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia came from the JNA.  The

 5     status of the JNA was kept by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia composed

 6     of Serbia and Montenegro.  So those officers had to be returned.  For

 7     example, somebody is in their work-place and then they are reassigned

 8     back to their old work-place.  This was not people being dismissed.  This

 9     was sending them to Belgrade where they would be given a new job.  This

10     is the proper interpretation of the order sent to the 1st Krajina Corps.

11     I believe that there was the 33rd Regiment which actually kept those

12     officers on their ledger and paid them.  Those Croatian and Muslim

13     officers received salaries, but they were never active members of that

14     unit.  I don't know if you're happy with my answer.

15        Q.   Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel.

16        A.   So this is not about people being chased out from that unit.

17     This is about sending them on vacation and on reassigning them.  This was

18     a common principle in the former JNA.  For example, you serve in one

19     region and then you are sent to serve in another region, you're

20     transferred.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can the witness please be

23     shown P6533.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Something has remained unexplained about this document.  It has


Page 44171

 1     been suggested that people were dismissed, that they were demoted.  Let's

 2     look at page 2 in this document.

 3             Below number III I'll read out to you how Zupljanin interprets

 4     this.  He says:

 5             "However, employees may not be dismissed or removed from posts

 6     without the knowledge of the CSB as has happened in some stations.

 7     Instead, appropriate solutions must be found for their reassignment to

 8     duties and work which are not in contravention of item I of the

 9     decision ..."

10             Lieutenant-Colonel, does a change in a senior post mean dismissal

11     from work according to this document?

12        A.   This is staffing policy.  I think it was even called at that time

13     the levelling of cadres.  For instance, if a new party comes into power

14     in a multi-party state, this ruling party assigns its own people to

15     senior posts.  It doesn't mean that the person who occupied it before

16     lost their job.  If people are dismissed unlawfully they can always sue

17     and they will win the case, but this is not about dismissal.  This is

18     about transferring people to some other job for which they are qualified

19     and have adequate education.  And Zupljanin is perfectly right here, and

20     indeed things were not done as Brdjanin would have wanted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  What -- have you exhausted your questions about

22     this, Mr. Karadzic?  Otherwise, please continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, concerning the document I

24     want to know if replacing somebody from a senior post means

25     simultaneously dismissal?


Page 44172

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  On page 54, line 16, you were asked about document

 4     P2638 concerning the restrictions of the rights of some Muslims in

 5     Celinac.  Did you understand that this was a reference to non-Serb

 6     population or Muslims in general as opposed to certain individuals?  How

 7     did you understand it?

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  The witness said he didn't know anything about

 9     the decision at all, so asking him to clarify details about it doesn't

10     make any sense to me.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             Shall we move on, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

14             Could the parties please read the document about some people who

15     were not detained, only their movement was restricted allegedly for their

16     safety --

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Now these are just submissions.

18             JUDGE KWON:  You can raise it in your closing argument.  Let's

19     continue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   On page 65 it was put to you that the property of most Muslims

23     and Croats, or rather, mostly Muslim and Croat property was destroyed or

24     devastated.  Tell me, what was the attitude of the authorities in

25     Banja Luka and Krajina to the destruction of property?  Was -- were the


Page 44173

 1     authorities involved and how did they treat this?

 2        A.   I can only repeat my comment from before concerning the

 3     destruction of property.  In that wretched war, what happened was that

 4     there were criminals of both Muslim, Serb, and Croat ethnicity and they

 5     got along very well between themselves.  They would come, loot, get away.

 6     They got along well.  I gave you an example of the Latas municipality

 7     where a Croat sold abandoned Croat houses to some Serb; however, the

 8     municipal authorities of Krajina were all against the destruction of

 9     property.  And of course the most vulnerable population -- in fact, the

10     most vulnerable property was the property of Muslims and Croats because

11     people had weapons.  There was always somebody who had been in a unit

12     that had been issued a weapon and they would use it for that purpose, but

13     the authorities were against any destruction of property.

14        Q.   On page 57 it was suggested that based on the order that had been

15     forwarded to you, a number of civilians had been captured in

16     Sanski Most -- in fact, the order was forwarded my you.  Did your order

17     imply any arrests of civilians?

18        A.   No, never.  My order and my decision governed the seizure of

19     illegally owned weapons and the disarming of paramilitary units belonging

20     to any ethnic community, illegal weapons not arrest of civilians.

21        Q.   And the last question.  Pages 51 and 52 you mentioned

22     intelligence communications centre in municipalities.  Which means of

23     communication did these centres have and since what time have they been

24     in existence in municipalities?

25        A.   In the former Yugoslavia there were republic and municipal


Page 44174

 1     centres of warning and information.  That's what they were called.  They

 2     were formed at the level of municipalities and there was duty service and

 3     there -- at the level of regions, Zenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and

 4     some others, and I have to mention that my region, the ARK, basically

 5     coincides with this and at the level of Belgrade.  These were centres for

 6     warning and alerting and information.  They were used in peace time and

 7     in war time, as they had been during our civil war.  They were used to

 8     warn and alert people to natural disasters and all sorts of accidents and

 9     emergencies.  They were established and operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina in

10     the 1990s.  If somebody had pulled out this centre from Sarajevo to Pale,

11     they could have managed the territory of Banja Luka, et cetera.  I think

12     I sent my decision through that centre.  I'm not sure now.

13        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber where were the main hubs of that

14     type of communication, in which places and under whose control?

15        A.   The main hubs were in Banja Luka, Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, and

16     Mostar.  They were under the control of the Ministry of Defence, that is

17     to say the secretariat for National Defence, the so-called military

18     departments.

19        Q.   And out of those six how many were under Serb control when the

20     war began?

21        A.   Only Banja LukaBanja Luka is the regional centre, but every

22     municipality had its own.

23        Q.   To what extent were these centres dependent on electricity and

24     other amenities?

25        A.   They still depend on their power supply and the power supply in


Page 44175

 1     the time we're discussing was very fractious.  There were power cuts and

 2     then power generators using electricity would be used, but it was a great

 3     problem to maintain this centre.

 4        Q.   Thank you very much, Lieutenant-Colonel, Mr. Sajic.  Thank you

 5     for coming.  Thank you for the effort you made to testify.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,

 7     Your Excellencies.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Then that concludes your evidence, Mr. Sajic, in this case.  On

10     behalf of the Chamber I would like to thank you for your coming to

11     The Hague to give it.  You are now free to go.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Is the next witness ready, Mr. Robinson?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Before we begin with the next witness, I just

19     wanted to raise something with Your Honours that Mr. Tieger has discussed

20     with Mr. Robinson.  And it is, Your Honours, that I'll be asking and time

21     may be on my side, but I'll be asking for the cross-examination of this

22     witness to go over until tomorrow morning.  Given that he finished his

23     testimony as a Prosecution witness in the Mladic case only yesterday

24     morning, it's simply a situation where a few more hours will ensure that

25     I'm effectively prepared to officially deal with the cross-examination.


Page 44176

 1             JUDGE KWON:  And I think you have an issue with his previous

 2     interview?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Indeed.  And in a submission that we filed last

 4     week, I foreshadowed that argument.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But to save time, the Chamber is of the view it will

 6     admit those pages referred to in the transcript.  So I would like the

 7     parties to identify those page numbers.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  I think Mr. Robinson will find those in the table

 9     of concordance that was attached to our submission, and I should just ask

10     that he have someone double-check those page numbers given my

11     difficulties with numbering sometimes.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, sir.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would you make the solemn declaration, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

17     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18                           WITNESS:  MILENKO TODOROVIC

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Todorovic, please be seated and make

21     yourself comfortable.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

25                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:


Page 44177

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Todorovic.

 2        A.   Good afternoon.

 3        Q.   Could we please make a short pause between questions and answers

 4     so that everything is properly recorded.  Did you testify in the case

 5     against General Tolimir?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we call up transcript 1D9173.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   To the best of your recollection, did you tell the truth there

10     and do you still stand by everything you said?

11        A.   Yes, I told the truth.  I have nothing to change or add to that

12     evidence.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this

15     transcript pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you have no objection to the admission of

17     this transcript?

18             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4124, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, shall we deal with the associated exhibits

22     except for the -- his previous interview, which I discussed with the

23     parties.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  There are 15 associated

25     exhibits, two of them a translation was not provided to the Chamber in a


Page 44178

 1     timely fashion and we apologise for that.  We would ask that those two,

 2     if you could possibly consider them this evening and make a decision

 3     tomorrow, and those are 1D29064 and 24780B, and that B is for the two

 4     pages that were actually admitted in the Tolimir case.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Further, with respect to 1D9454 referred to in

 6     transcript page 13030, the Chamber is of the view it is not relevant to

 7     this case.  And 1D09458 referred to in transcript pages from 13140 to

 8     13143, witness stated he never saw this document and he was not in the

 9     IBK at the time; and further, this document was not even tendered in

10     Tolimir case.  1D5459, the Chamber is of the view that this does not form

11     an indispensable and inseparable part.  65 ter 23604, likewise, this

12     document does not form an indispensable and inseparable part; the witness

13     does not sufficiently comment upon it.  Also, the same applies to 23606

14     and I wonder whether the Prosecution has any other objection than the

15     items that I referred to.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  No, nothing additional.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit the remaining part of the associated

18     exhibits tendered, and if the Defence is minded to tender those

19     documents, it should lead live as well as showing the relevance of the

20     document.

21             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, excuse me, Mr. President.  We won't be

23     leading any of those live, but I would like to ask your permission and

24     Dr. Karadzic's permission, we had an error and the state -- in the

25     summary which was distributed is not actually the correct summary to be


Page 44179

 1     read with this witness.  So if you don't mind, I would like to be able to

 2     read a short summary that we do have.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We have no difficulty with it.  Please go ahead.

 4             The exhibit numbers of these associated exhibits will be assigned

 5     and distributed to the parties in due course by the Registry.

 6             Please continue, Mr. Robinson.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, and we haven't distributed this text so

 8     I'm going to read slowly.

 9             Milenko Todorovic completed military high school in 1966,

10     specialising in artillery.  He received his first commissioned rank of

11     second lieutenant in 1971.  Beginning in November 1993, Milenko Todorovic

12     was chief of the intelligence and security organ in the East Bosnia Corps

13     of the VRS.  He retired from the army with the rank of colonel.  At the

14     time of his retirement, he was chief of the security department of the

15     3rd Corps command of the VRS in Bijeljina.  In mid-November 1993,

16     Mr. Todorovic entered a temporary assignment as chief of intelligence and

17     security of the command of the East Bosnia Corps headquartered in

18     Bijeljina.

19             After the fall of Srebrenica, Milenko Todorovic testified that a

20     telegram came from the Main Staff that the East Bosnia Corps command

21     should be engaged and should prepare accommodation at the Batkovici

22     collection centre for an additional 1.000 to 1200 new detainees.

23     Milenko Todorovic believes that the task of finding accommodation for the

24     additional detainees came from General Tolimir.  The expected 1.000 to

25     1200 prisoners never arrived at the camp and Milenko Todorovic was


Page 44180

 1     informed by General Tolimir that the idea was abandoned and to drop all

 2     further preparations for that task.  Although he is not certain,

 3     Milenko Todorovic believes that at least 24 hours and perhaps two to

 4     three days passed between him receiving the task and his phone call with

 5     General Tolimir indicating the task had been abandoned.

 6             And that's the end of the summary.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have further questions?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies, just one.

 9             I would like to call up D2243.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Todorovic, let me ask you about one circumstance.  In your

12     document dated 15 April 1992, which we can see before us, in paragraph 3,

13     somewhere in the middle it says:

14             "The largest number of enemy soldiers are soon exchanged ..."

15             And so on and so forth.  I'd like to ask you this:  Can you tell

16     the Trial Chamber which levels had --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second.

18             Did you say this is his document?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe so.  The document

20     was signed -- no, no, this is Popovic.  But there is also another

21     document by Todorovic.  Can we see the following page.  Within this

22     document there is another document that was referred by Mr. Todorovic.

23     Can we look at page 4 in Serbian.  Go on, continue.

24             It's 65 ter 25603.  I have this document before me, 25603.  This

25     is the document that was forwarded by Mr. Todorovic --


Page 44181

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this was one of your associated exhibits.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to ask

 3     Mr. Todorovic --

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Todorovic, at what levels could people be exchanged?  How

 6     quickly could people be exchanged at the level of lower units and how

 7     could that be done at the level of the republican commission?  What was

 8     the time that was needed to exchange people?

 9        A.   Let me answer in the following way:  At the level of the

10     East Bosnia Corps command there was a commission for the exchange of

11     prisoners of war if they had enjoyed the status as combatants of the BiH.

12     Exchanges took place at the moment when there were prisoners to be

13     exchanged at the mutual proposal of the two parties.  And the 2nd Corps

14     of the BiH army had its headquarters in Tuzla and our East Bosnia Corps

15     would talk.  There was a routine in place, they would agree on a meeting

16     at which they would discuss a possible exchange with the mediation of

17     representatives of the International Red Cross which was compulsory.

18     There was also a state commission for exchanges of prisoners who enjoyed

19     different kinds of statuses.  I wouldn't know much about that commission

20     and I can't share many details with you, but I know that it existed.

21        Q.   Thank you.  At the brigade level, at the level of lower units,

22     did it ever happen that there were ad hoc exchanges on the same day when

23     people were taken prisoner, if that was possible?

24        A.   [No interpretation]

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to come


Page 44182

 1     closer to the microphone --

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know that.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you come closer to the microphone,

 4     Mr. Todorovic.  Thank you.

 5             If you could repeat your answer.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not aware of any such example

 7     of exchange.  I'm not saying that there were irresponsible people out

 8     there who may have done that.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now let's look at line 4 where it says that people

11     were soon exchanged.  What does that mean in time-frame terms?  What does

12     it mean when it says "soon"?

13        A.   "Soon" or "quickly" means a couple of days to -- ten days to a

14     fortnight at the longest.

15        Q.   And those who may have committed crimes or were suspected of

16     having committed crimes as combatants, how were they treated?  Were they

17     earmarked for quick exchanges, as it were?

18        A.   In Batkovici camp, as far as I know, we did not have anybody of

19     whom we had learned that they had been involved in the commission of

20     serious crimes.  None of those people in Batkovici was ever processed

21     before being exchanged.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Todorovic.  That would be all for the time being.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             I take it, you concluded your evidence in the Mladic case as a

25     Prosecution witness?


Page 44183

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  In that case, your previous testimony was tendered

 3     as a -- in lieu of your oral testimony.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already said that I have

 5     nothing to add to my previous evidence.  I wouldn't change anything

 6     because I said the truth and only the truth and nothing else.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, did you lead the witness in the Mladic

 8     case?

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  No, I did not, but his previous -- portions of his

10     previous testimony and the interview were tendered as his 92 ter evidence

11     in the Mladic case.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             So your testimony in chief in this case has been admitted in

14     writing, i.e., through your testimony in the Tolimir case.  And now

15     you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

16     Office of the Prosecutor.  Do you understand that, sir?

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to start?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  In fact, it's not a cross-examination that's

20     easily sort of compartmentalised or boxed up, Your Honour.  And if I may,

21     I would prefer to start, with your leave of course, tomorrow morning to

22     conclude as quickly as possible.

23             JUDGE KWON:  That's fair enough.

24             So, Mr. Todorovic, we'll adjourn for today and continue tomorrow

25     morning.  I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about


Page 44184

 1     your testimony.

 2             But before we adjourn, Mr. Robinson, I would like to hear the

 3     witness schedule for this week.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, I was going to rise to

 5     indicate that tomorrow after we conclude the testimony of this witness,

 6     we have one further witness this week.  However, he is not able to --

 7     well, the 48 hours between his proofing, which occurred last night, and

 8     the beginning of his testimony wouldn't take place until Friday morning.

 9     So we're not in a position to ask that he be cross-examined until Friday

10     morning.  He's a detained witness and he was only able to arrive on the

11     day before yesterday.

12             JUDGE KWON:  What witness, Dobrijevic?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  He's coming for next week.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Was he not moved up?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  He was moved up from two weeks in advance until

16     next week.  We're taking steps to bring additional witnesses in the

17     upcoming weeks because when we received the Prosecution's

18     cross-examination estimates for December, we realised that we need more

19     witnesses in those additional weeks.  So we're taking steps to bring

20     additional witnesses.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any observation to make, Mr. Tieger?

22             MR. TIEGER:  No, nothing in particular, Mr. President, except to

23     note with respect to the witness whose cross-examination on Friday was

24     discussed, it's not only a matter of a technical -- the technical timing

25     of the 48 hours, but in this case the previous statement was expanded


Page 44185

 1     from 33 pages to 45 pages at what we consider the 11th hour plus creating

 2     a variety of problems which we may raise with the Court when -- on

 3     Friday.  But -- so it's not simply a matter of the 48 hours but

 4     additional issues as well.  So -- but -- with respect to the rest of the

 5     submission, no, I don't have anything else.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             The hearing is adjourned.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.55 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of

10                           November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.

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