1 Tuesday, 3 December 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Could the witness make the solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: DRAGAN KIJAC
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Kijac. Please be seated, and make
13 yourself comfortable.
14 Before you make -- before you commence your evidence, Mr. Kijac,
15 I must draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have
16 here at the International Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E). Under this rule,
17 you may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the
18 Prosecutor or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might
19 incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate"
20 means saying something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a
21 criminal offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you
22 might have committed a criminal offence.
23 However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you
24 and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you
25 know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the
1 question. But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your
2 testimony compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any
3 case that might be laid against you for any offence save and except the
4 offence of giving false testimony.
5 Do you understand that, Mr. Kijac?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellencies.
9 Good morning, everyone.
10 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Minister. Can you hear me?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Could you please come closer to the microphone, speak
14 slowly and respond verbally to everything so that it can be recorded.
15 Have you given a statement to my Defence team?
16 A. Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up in e-court, please,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you see that statement on the screen before you?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you read and sign that statement?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could the witness be shown the last page, please, so that he can
25 identify his signature.
1 A. Yes. That's my signature.
2 Q. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have stated to my
3 Defence team?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If I were to put to you the same questions today, would your
6 answers be essentially the same?
7 A. Essentially, certainly, yes.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I tender this
10 statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter bis.
11 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection to the admission of the
12 statement, Ms. Pack?
13 MS. PACK: No, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: Shall we deal with the associated exhibits,
15 Mr. Robinson?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. There are 17 associated
17 exhibits being offered, all are on our 65 ter list except for 1D09529,
18 which we would ask be added to our 65 ter list as we decided to use it
19 after that list had been prepared.
20 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber was not able to view that document
21 because it was not uploaded on to e-court.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, it was actually sent by e-mail over the
23 weekend as part of our package of materials, but the ITSS people didn't
24 upload it yesterday.
25 JUDGE KWON: So it should be led live.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Very well.
2 JUDGE KWON: And there seems to be two translations for 1D9826.
3 Could you identify which is the correct one. Shall we upload it?
4 MR. ROBINSON: I am only seeing one translation in e-court for --
5 in my e-court.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's leave it. And 1D9834, referred to
7 in paragraph 12, the Chamber is of the view that it does not form part --
8 an inseparable or indispensable part of the statement. Further, the
9 Chamber is not satisfied with its provenance so it will not be admitted.
10 And 65 ter 18453 referred to in para 37, the Chamber will admit
11 only article 8 of the document, out of 64 pages. Otherwise, Ms. Pack, do
12 you have any objection?
13 MS. PACK: Nothing to add, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE KWON: Except 1D9529 and 1D9834, all the other associated
15 exhibits will be admitted into evidence and be assigned numbers by the
16 Registry in due course.
17 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
18 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Shall we give the exhibit number for
20 the statement at the moment.
21 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4143, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I --
24 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I should now like to
1 read a brief summary of the statement of Mr. Dragan Kijac in the English
2 language. [In English] Dragan Kijac began his career in state security
3 in 1983 when he was appointed inspector and supervisor for the republican
4 Secretariat of the Interior, State Security Service for Yugoslavia. When
5 the war broke out in 1992, Dragan Kijac was appointed chief of the
6 Sarajevo National Security Service sector of the Ministry of the Interior
7 of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He later became the
8 head of the State Security Service of Republika Srpska
9 Ministry of Interior and was serving in his capacity at the time of the
10 Srebrenica events in July 1995.
11 Dragan Kijac later served as minister for -- of the interior in
12 the Republika Srpska government and deputy prime minister. In July 1995,
13 on 12 July 1995, Dragan Kijac became aware that after the fall of
14 Srebrenica, the Army of Republika Srpska had captured Ibran Mustafic, a
15 former deputy in the BH assembly and high-ranking SDA official. He
16 ordered the chief of the Bijeljina State Security Service to take custody
17 of Mr. Mustafic and transfer him to the collection camp in Bijeljina for
18 interrogation. Mr. Mustafic was transported and interrogated by the
19 State Security Service and remains alive to this day. In the morning of
20 14th of July, 1995, Mr. Kijac travelled to Montenegro for the wedding of
21 his deputy. He returned to Pale in the evening of 18th of July. On
22 19th of July, he met with President Karadzic in Pale. The subject of the
23 meeting was likely the preparation for President Karadzic's upcoming
24 travel. Mr. Kijac did not know about the execution of prisoners from
25 Srebrenica when he met with President Karadzic. Mr. Kijac did not see
1 any report from any organ including the military intelligence service
2 which indicated that prisoners from Srebrenica had been executed.
3 Mr. Kijac never informed President Karadzic about the execution of
4 prisoners from Srebrenica, nor did President Karadzic ever give any
5 indication during their meetings that he was aware that the execution of
6 prisoners from Srebrenica had taken place.
7 Mr. Kijac believes that had President Karadzic known about such
8 crimes, he would have acted to prevent and/or punish the perpetrators.
9 And I have only one question for one document. I will not lead
10 live documents that are not admitted for the sake of saving time.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Kijac, I wanted to ask you were you with me in Krajina, in
13 Banja Luka, in August 1995?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Can you tell the Chamber what kind of relationship existed at
16 that time between the civilian authorities, including me, with the
17 commanders of our army?
18 A. Briefly, they were not good.
19 Q. Did ever information reach you that certain services acted
20 unlawfully vis-a-vis the president of the republic?
21 A. Yes. I realised that later. There were certain documents where
22 you were a target of their interest, to put it mildly.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness 1D09525?
24 We have a translation as well.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Could you tell the Chamber what kind of document is this, or what
2 is this JUDA?
3 A. This is an intelligence report produced by the military
4 intelligence service and it concerns an operative action called JUDA,
5 J-U-D-A, and it says the source is called --
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear what the source is
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Briefly, you were a target of the military intelligence services
10 interest --
11 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat as to its source? The interpreters
12 couldn't hear that.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The source is "Klej," I can see at
14 the top of the page, "Klej" written as K-l-e-j, and it says strictly
15 confidential a number and the date.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. With all your knowledge of the law, could you tell us from the
18 legal point of view, how would you qualify this treatment of the
19 president of the republic?
20 A. This is absolutely unlawful. It should never happen that a state
21 service should keep the president under surveillance. This report shows
22 that all your communications, contacts, meetings, were under surveillance
23 from dusk till dawn. This particular report covers one entire day, from
24 dawn until the night.
25 Q. Thank you. Is this the only document of its kind?
1 A. I had occasion to see three or four similar documents in my work
2 with the investigator.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
5 MS. PACK: No objection.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D4159, Your Honour.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. At this moment, I have
9 no further questions for Mr. Kijac.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
11 As you have noted, Mr. Kijac, your evidence-in-chief in this case
12 has been admitted in writing, that is through your written statement.
13 Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the
14 Office of the Prosecutor. Do you understand that?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Pack.
17 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:
19 Q. I'll start with your time as head of the DB, Mr. Kijac.
20 Paragraph 9 of your statement, you don't need to look at it, you describe
21 yourself as a professional, whose achievements in the DB were remarkable,
22 yes? Yes?
23 A. This assessment was made by my superiors, not me.
24 Q. This was a specialised service, expert in gathering information
25 and distributing it; right? That's the heart of what you did.
1 A. Well, I started working after moving to the State
2 Security Service from the Court as an operative worker, the lowest
3 category of the operative worker. That's the lowest title, inspector.
4 Q. Mr. Kijac, we don't need the detail. I'm just talking to you
5 about your time as head of the DB. I just asked you a question about the
6 DB service, expert in gathering information and distributing it, that's
7 the heart of what you did, is that right, accurate?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You reported, as head of the DB to the minister of the interior
10 and in July 1995, you reported to Kovac; right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. He was your superior, your boss, in the MUP in July 1995; right?
13 A. That's correct. He was deputy minister.
14 Q. Staying with 1995, you reported to the president directly?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You were obliged to brief him broadly on the security situation
17 in the RS, to keep the president informed; right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You reported to him in writing and orally; right?
20 A. Mainly in writing.
21 Q. Well, you met with the president in 1995, let's just -- 1995 you
22 met with him or you spoke to him on a weekly basis, that's what is
23 recorded in his diary. You'd agree with that?
24 A. It doesn't necessarily mean reporting. Reports are made in
25 writing. We can discuss written reports but the reporting was done
1 mainly in writing. If you look at the progress reports, you will see
2 that President Karadzic received, let's say, a thousand briefs per year
3 and the reports were made in writing. We were able to discuss different
4 situations verbally but the reporting was done in writing, and my service
5 would prepare all the information, make a selection and produce reports
6 to the prime minister, the president, et cetera, always in writing.
7 Q. Okay. Fine. You discussed different situations with him
8 verbally. You reported verbally, you communicated with him verbally,
9 about the situation, the security situation in the country, right, you
10 don't disagree with that?
11 A. Yes. We commented on various things that reached the president
12 in writing.
13 Q. Of course, you met with him and spoke with him on more occasions
14 than is recorded in his diary, yes?
15 A. I don't know what's recorded in the diary. I did not follow that
16 and I can't say, but we met very often, certainly four or five times per
17 month, sometimes more often.
18 Q. You personally reported as necessary to other organs of state,
19 the VRS, the president of the assembly, the prime minister; is that
21 A. No, that's not right. I was not answerable to the
22 Army of Republika Srpska.
23 Q. All the way through the war, the DB, you, shared information with
24 and received information from the VRS, you'd agree with that, wouldn't
1 A. Yes. But that doesn't mean that I was answerable to the
2 Army of Republika Srpska. It is the case that we shared information.
3 Q. Fine. You shared information with them as necessary?
4 A. Certainly, certainly.
5 JUDGE KWON: Which was necessary, Ms. Pack?
6 MS. PACK: The question was you shared information with them as
7 necessary, I'm sorry, it got left out of the -- I -- I interrupted and it
8 got left out of the transcript. I think the answer was yes.
9 Q. You nodded, yes? You have to make sure that you answer --
10 A. Yes, yes, yes.
11 Q. We will go to P05557, please. This is a report that you wrote in
12 April 1993, it's a report on the work of the DB in 1992, throughout the
13 course of 1992. We have the translation. Recognise this report; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. We will go to page 4, please, 4 in the English, 4 in the B/C/S.
16 Look at the paragraph, please, begins -- in English it begins preceding
17 from this pre-war intelligence and it goes on to talk about your
18 activities during the war. I'd just like to ask you about the last two
19 sentences. You're talking about the information that you obtained during
20 the war and you can perhaps see these two sentences I'm going to read in
21 English. This information was continuously passed on to the state and
22 military organs which based their further activities among other things
23 on it as well. It's at the bottom of the first paragraph in English.
24 The service co-operated with other organs engaged in these tasks, usually
25 military organs, exchanging daily the information that had been
1 collected. Using this they could correct and redirect the further course
2 of our interests more in keeping with current events.
3 And then you go on to describe in the following paragraph the
4 methods used to collect information, the service came by such data by
5 using different kinds of operative and operative technical resources and
6 methods, the most frequent of these were interviews with captured enemy
7 soldiers, Serbs who had been exchanged or came out of territory under
8 enemy control, and others who in various ways were in a position to come
9 by interesting data, and it goes on.
10 So that's -- accurately describes, isn't it -- doesn't it, that
11 the use of information provided by the DB to correct and redirect the
12 activities of the VRS and MUP units; right? You ensured they had
13 accurate information upon which to base their activities, yes?
14 A. I'm sorry, that part was not displayed for me here. I would like
15 to read that, although I quite understand what you're saying, but could
16 you please find that page and tell me which paragraph it is, if possible?
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
18 microphones please be switched off when the witness is speaking. We can
19 hardly hear him.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not see on page 2 which I have
21 displayed in front of me what you read out.
22 MS. PACK:
23 Q. Goes on to page 5. You can go on to page 5. At the bottom of
24 the page it's -- in the e-court it's page 4. I think we have -- going
25 over to page 5, continues to describe the methods used. So it was the
1 bottom of the preceding page you were looking at and now going on to the
2 top of this page 5, right?
3 A. And we are in page 3, and it is my understanding that you said
4 page 5, if I understood you correctly.
5 Q. Don't worry about what I'm saying to the Registrar. What I'm
6 talking about is a page within the system here. You're looking at the
7 right page, page 3, right. You were looking at pages 2 and 3 in this
8 copy here. That's what you -- what I read out --
9 A. B/C/S.
10 Q. -- right?
11 A. Yes. If it's this part here that's what we are talking about.
12 Q. Got it?
13 A. Yes, that's it.
14 Q. Do you remember my question? I'll repeat it. Information
15 provided by the DB was used to correct and redirect the activities of the
16 VRS and the MUP, MUP units you ensured, didn't you, that civilian and
17 military organs had accurate information upon which to base their
18 activities, that's right, isn't it, and that's what you say here?
19 A. Well, basically yes, but I have to point something else out.
20 What comes from the field, the military part goes to the military, and
21 the police part is redirected to the police, because we were not a
22 database to collect information for ourselves. We collected what we got
23 and sent that on to the police or the military. That is not to say that
24 our information was supposed to be corrected. Perhaps their information
25 was better and more correct than ours, but we sent that to those organs
1 so that they could correct through their own analysis the overall
2 knowledge acquired from the ground. Do you understand what I'm saying?
3 Q. I asked you about the methods used to obtain information, it's
4 the following paragraph, interviewing POWs, that was an important source,
5 wasn't it, of information for you in the DB, yes? You can say yes rather
6 than nod, please.
7 A. Partly, yes. But basic information, we got from the population
8 that were refugees. We had access to POWs only where we had an interest
9 to talk to them. POWs were under the VRS, they were never under our
10 jurisdiction, and we did not have any detention facilities. So it's only
11 where the State Security Service showed a certain interest for a
12 particular person, name and surname, they could go and ask in writing for
13 approval to speak to such persons about things that the
14 State Security Service was interested in and nothing more than that.
15 That is to say we did not have any POWs of our own. We did not have
16 wide-ranging discussions with POWs. We only asked about things that we
17 were interested in.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
19 MS. PACK: I haven't asked a question. What's the objection? To
20 the answer?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have an objection to the
22 answer. It is not correct that --
23 MS. PACK: I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
24 JUDGE KWON: No, no, you cannot object to the answer. Please
25 continue, Ms. Pack.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, not to the answer, to the
2 question. It is not correct that the question only had to do with
3 methods. There is something else stated in 11 rather than what it says
4 in 22 and 23.
5 MS. PACK: That is not an appropriate objection. It wasn't
6 raised when I asked the question and it's, in truth, an objection to the
7 answer. Entirely inappropriate.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
9 MS. PACK:
10 Q. I wasn't suggesting to you that POWs were in your jurisdiction.
11 You gave me a long answer and I think the short answer to my question
12 that POWs were an important source of information for you was yes; right?
13 A. POWs were not an important source of our information because we
14 only talked to certain individuals where the State Security Service had a
15 particular interest, so that would not be a broad spectrum. It's not
16 that you'd walk into a military prison and that you would talk to all the
17 persons there, as far as I know, from the State Security Service in
18 Bijeljina, that was a big prison, Batkovic. Our operatives, I don't know
19 whether they went there once or twice to interview people throughout the
21 MS. PACK: Let's just go to the following page, please, of this
22 document, in the English page 8 of e-court, please, and page 12 in the
23 B/C/S in e-court just to finish off.
24 Q. And you can see it's the second paragraph in the English I'm
25 going to look at, and in the B/C/S you can see it's the long paragraph.
1 So you describe in summary the data collected by the SMB, you say it's
2 distributed in a timely fashion throughout the year - I'm paraphrasing -
3 to the responsible state and military organs who used it as a basis for
4 planning direction of their activity, making evaluations, and so on:
5 "Continuous exchanges," and here I'm quoting, "of information
6 with the intelligence and security organs of the VRS were especially
7 fruitful with among other things 1.085 written reports sent to them."
8 You go on:
9 "A significant," the following sentence, "equally significant
10 attention was devoted to informing the responsible state organs."
11 You go on, and then just further down:
12 "It should be emphasised that priority is given to the timely and
13 ongoing distribution of information and practically not a single piece of
14 information ended up for internal SMB use."
15 So you are there accurately stating in your report in 1993 that
16 your priority was to obtain and distribute information, wasn't it?
17 A. Well, yes. The information that was received from the ground was
18 analysed at department level and then depending on the segments that were
19 usable, they were sent on further, if that could be my answer. So all
20 information of a military nature were ceded to the military and then it
21 says here, I think, 1.085 pieces of information. So about commanders,
22 weapons, possible axes of attack, all of that was ceded to military
23 security organs.
24 Q. Okay. We will go to July 1995, please. You talk in your
25 statement at paragraph 49 about the Bijeljina CRDB, the centre, the DB
1 centre in Bijeljina, which received information, didn't it, from the
2 Zvornik DB branch? You don't need to look at your statement to answer
3 that question.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Goran Radovic was head of the CRDB in Bijeljina; right?
6 A. Yes, 1995.
7 Q. Mile Renovica was head of the Zvornik DB branch; right?
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not understand the
10 MS. PACK:
11 Q. Could you get a little closer to the microphone and speak more
12 clearly, please.
13 A. Yes. Mile Renovica was head of the department in Zvornik.
14 Q. He had operatives working under him. They included
15 Sinisa Glogovac, Aleksandar Todorovic, Vitomir Tomic. These are all DB
16 operatives working under Renovica; right?
17 A. Yes, but these first two names that you mentioned were active
18 duty personnel in the security service; whereas the third person,
19 Mr. Tomic was a reserve person, so he was not a professional. I'm sorry.
20 Q. The others are professional DB operatives, Todorovic, Glogovac?
21 A. They were permanently employed, but if we look at the operatives
22 in Zvornik, there were seven or eight of them there. Only two of them
23 were experienced operatives, or rather, operatives before the war as
24 well. All the rest were taken in during the war in 1993, 1994, whereas
25 Sinisa Glogovac and Mile Renovica were pre-war operatives of the state
1 security, and by the same token I would say that they were trained to
2 collect information on the ground because to create a young operative
3 during the course of a single year only is quite impossible. If you take
4 into account the fact that after I got my law degree and after working in
5 the judiciary for a year and a half, I came as an intern and I could not
6 do anything for a year at the State Security Service; that is to say,
7 I was just learning the tools of the trade because that was the prevalent
8 practice at the time, that it was only after one year that I could do
9 anything on my own, independently.
10 Q. Sinisa Glogovac, your professional, was territorially responsible
11 for the Bratunac area; right?
12 A. Yes. At the time, the service had this territorial organisation
13 and although he lived in Zvornik, he covered the territory of Srebrenica,
14 or rather, the 28th Division.
15 Q. In July 1995, the reporting chain from operative to you and up
16 was working, wasn't it?
17 A. What do you mean from you and up? From operative Glogovac to me,
18 if that's what you meant? I did not quite understand you. You say from
19 you and up.
20 Q. No, I didn't. I said the reporting chain from the operative to
21 you was working, wasn't it, I'll break it down, yes?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. And you were reporting up, right, up to Kovac?
24 A. Absolutely right.
25 Q. You were distributing the information you received to Kovac, to
1 the president, to Karisik, to the VRS security organs, right, to your
2 counterpart Karisik in the Public Security Service and to the VRS
3 security organs; right?
4 A. Right. Daily information was sent to the
5 Ministry of the Interior, that is to say to Mr. Karisik and the deputy
6 minister, Mr. Kovac, while the information that had to do with the
7 military, with the Army of Republika Srpska, was sent to Mr. Tolimir.
8 Part of the information that was used from this information that came in
9 was sent to the president of the republic, to the prime minister and the
10 speaker of the assembly.
11 Q. [Microphone not activated]
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 MS. PACK:
14 Q. You sent reports, didn't you, about the Srebrenica area in July,
15 as you described to Kovac, to Karisik and so on. You were sending these
16 reports on the 11, 12, 13 July; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You've now come here today with an alibi for the 14th to the 18th
19 of July when the killings were going on. You were at a wedding in
20 Montenegro, is that what you say?
21 A. Well, that's not an alibi. That's a fact.
22 Q. On the 12th of July, DB operatives were interrogating prisoners
23 in the white house in Potocari; right?
24 A. No, according to my information. According to
25 Mr. Sinisa Glogovac's statement and Mr. Mile Renovica's statement, I had
1 an opportunity to see that. No one interviewed anyone at the "white
2 house." Only two or three interviews were conducted at the public
3 security station in Bratunac in an office, and the public security
4 station gave that office to our operatives for a few days. However,
5 there was a lot of commotion at this station after two or three
6 interviews our people gave up.
7 Q. I want to ask you about Potocari, not asking you about statements
8 from Renovica and so on. They haven't testified in this case. P0438.
9 A. No, you asked about the white house. I don't know where the
10 white house is, but there is mention of the white house in both
11 statements and it says there that no interviews were conducted, and you
12 asked me about interviews. To the best of my understanding, that's how
13 I understood the interpretation.
14 Q. I'm not asking about what you've read in other people's
15 interviews, okay? I'm asking you about Potocari, so just confine
16 yourself to what you know and we'll look at some documents. P04388,
18 A. [No interpretation]
19 Q. Okay. This is a communication, Popovic, and I'm going to ask
20 you -- it's dated the 12th of July, 1730 hours. At the top you can see
21 the time stamped at the top, if you look at page 2, please, in the
22 English and it's the bottom paragraph in B/C/S. He says, paragraph 3, we
23 are -- he's describing what's going on in Potocari, and he says: We are
24 separating men from 17 to 60 years of age and we are not transporting
25 them. We have about 70 of them so far and the security organs and the DB
1 state security are working with them. State security operatives are
2 interrogating men in the white house in Potocari, aren't they, with
3 Drina Corps security, yes?
4 A. Well, you see, first of all, I mean, as far as I can see, this is
5 a military document. I cannot speak about a military document. If I do
6 not --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters did not understand the end of the
9 Interpreter's note: We cannot understand the witness or hear
10 him. We are sorry.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kijac, could you come closer to the microphone?
12 And then speak slowly and please repeat your answer. The interpreters
13 didn't hear you.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, and do I apologise.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other
16 microphones please be switched off. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Pack, could you shut -- yes. Now, please repeat
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this is a military document
20 and I cannot speak about it. I can only say that in Potocari, we had one
21 operative, possibly two, who did not take part in what is referred to in
22 this third paragraph because physically one or two persons cannot take
23 part in that. How can one or two persons separate people? Somebody else
24 had to do that. Also I'm saying that both of them in their statements --
25 Mr. Sinisa Glogovac said that they did not conduct any interviews
1 together with the Army of Republika Srpska in relation to the POWs. That
2 they only conducted a few interviews at the public security station in
3 Bratunac and because the conditions were impossible for conducting
4 interviews they gave up on this measure.
5 JUDGE KWON: This document does not say that DB members,
6 operatives, are separating the men from the group. But they are just
7 participating. Could you read the last two sentences again, so whether
8 you agree with this report --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I can. They did not take
10 part in the interviews, as far as I know.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? May I ask? I mean, I
13 cannot find this, that this was done at the white house. This work with
14 the prisoners that has to do with the white house.
15 JUDGE KWON: That was a question from Ms. Pack. Please continue,
16 Ms. Pack.
17 MS. PACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. You say in your statement at paragraph 50 - don't need to look at
19 it - you ordered your agent in Srebrenica be found and taken to a safe
20 location. He was in Potocari, wasn't he? Your agent, DB agent? He was
21 removed from Potocari.
22 A. I don't know where he was. We had a contact in Potocari during
23 the war. I gave orders to have him found and evacuated to a safe
24 location. I really do not know, I don't have any details about that,
25 where he was found or anything like that. At any rate, the report that
1 I received was that he was transported to a safe location.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11, the witness said: I
5 don't know whether he was in Potocari, we had a contact in Srebrenica
6 during the war.
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Kijac?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I don't know where they found
9 him. During the war, we had this agent in Srebrenica.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.
11 MS. PACK:
12 Q. So you're denying that your operatives were interviewing
13 prisoners in Potocari. You don't deny, do you, that your operatives were
14 present in Potocari?
15 A. I do not deny that they were present. I mean, I don't know about
16 locations, but I'm not denying that our operatives had interviews
17 conducted at the Bratunac public security station. As far as I know, in
18 Potocari our operatives did not conduct any interview with these persons.
19 There are no documents to that effect either.
20 Q. You are aware, aren't you, that Borovcanin testified for the
21 accused here on the 7th of June that he received information from DB
22 operatives Vito Tomic and Sinisa Glogovac. You received information from
23 them on the 12th of July in Potocari?
24 A. Please, if possible, could the volume be adjusted? My hearing is
25 not very good at all. So could you please put the question to me again?
1 And I seem to be having trouble with my headphones too. They keep
2 falling off. Could you please put the question again?
3 Q. Borovcanin testified for the accused here on the 7th of June, and
4 he said that he received information from DB operatives Vito Tomic and
5 Sinisa Glogovac on the 12th of July in Potocari. What do you have to say
6 about that? You'd accept that that's what happened?
7 A. Well, I don't know whether he received that, but I can say that
8 that would have been the normal thing to do, that our operatives would
9 give information.
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's to say I would not deny
13 that. I cannot confirm that either. They are the only ones who know.
14 But I can say that operatives of the state security who operated in the
15 area were - how do I put this? - duty-bound to send this information, or
16 rather, give it on the spot to police or military organs.
17 MS. PACK:
18 Q. So you don't deny now that your operatives in Potocari were
19 gathering information, passing it on to Borovcanin?
20 A. Well, you're going back to Potocari and I'm speaking in general
21 terms. I, as the chief of the service, do not know whether an operative
22 collected information in Bratunac or in Potocari or wherever, but as far
23 as I know, they did not take part in collecting information,
24 intelligence, from persons in Potocari. They collected information and
25 I repeat once again only on one or two occasions they had these very
1 brief interviews at the public security station at Bratunac, and probably
2 that is the information that they gave to -- it doesn't matter --
3 Borovcanin or whoever was there.
4 MS. PACK: Could we see P4939, please.
5 Q. This is a document sent by you in the late evening hours on the
6 12th of July to Kovac and to Karisik. You offer detailed information on
7 the movement of the column in the first paragraph, there you can see
8 that, don't need to read it to you, and then at the bottom, still on the
9 B/C/S page 1, in the English page 1, bottom paragraph, going over to the
10 following page 2, you talk about the agreement to evacuate civilians from
11 Potocari that you say has been reached. And then you say: The
12 evacuation was suspended at night and will - going over the page in the
13 English - resume on the morning of the 13th of July. It should be noted
14 that among the people staying in Potocari, there are hardly any men fit
15 for fighting. So you are reporting there information from your
16 operatives who have been interrogating prisoners in Potocari; right?
17 A. I have to tell you again you are insisting on Potocari but I keep
18 saying that to the best of my knowledge, our men did not participate in
19 any interviews in Potocari, but at the public security station in
20 Bratunac. We are running in circles here. You're asking me the same
21 question and I believe that I have answered that question already. But I
22 can explain. According to what I know, our two operatives who were there
23 conducted interviews with three or four prisoners at the public security
24 station in Bratunac and after they saw that there were no conditions for
25 normal conducting of interviews, they suspended all interviews with
2 MS. PACK: Let's look at P04389, please. P04389.
3 Q. This is another communication from you to Kovac and Karisik.
4 This is dated the 13th of July. You report in the first paragraph on the
5 capture of a large number of Muslim soldiers, over 300 of them, in
6 ambushes. Going down that first paragraph, you talk about the movement
7 of the Muslim men and you say this is been confirmed many times in
8 interviews with prisoners. Going down, you talk about Mustafic - we will
9 get back to that later - among the prisoners. He can be a great opponent
10 of Oric and can be, with the necessary preparation, used well in the
11 media. You've spoken about that, we'll come back to it. So you report
12 that during the night of the 12th/13th of July, 1995, members of the VRS
13 and MUP managed to capture a large number of Muslim soldiers in ambushes;
14 right? You confirm information on the movement of the column many times
15 in interviews with prisoners; right?
16 A. Right.
17 Q. So you -- you're interrogating prisoners, you were tracking the
18 movement of the Muslim column, and you were reporting that information up
19 the chain, yeah?
20 A. Well, you see, this information came from the Bijeljina centre.
21 I cannot say at this point whether this was an interview or whether this
22 was indirectly obtained data from the policemen or from the soldiers who
23 participated in the action, as you keep insisting on interviews, and
24 I say that it is quite normal that every service conducts interviews with
25 POWs. But according to my knowledge, our men did not do that because we
1 only had two people, two men, there. How could two men conduct
2 interviews with 300 POWs? That is impossible. They couldn't even take
3 their basic particulars, let alone any more extensive interviews. In the
4 hills, in the woods --
5 Q. You tell us in paragraph 50 of your statement that Ibran Mustafic
6 from 12th of July -- you say you ordered Radovic to take him over and
7 transfer him to Bijeljina; right?
8 A. Yes, he was transferred to Bijeljina. I don't know whether it
9 was on the 12th or the 13th. The moment we found out, we were informed
10 at Pale, that there existed information to the effect that Ibran Mustafic
11 was among the prisoners. We agreed, i.e., I ordered to the Bijeljina
12 centre that Ibran Mustafic should be transferred to Bijeljina. As far as
13 I know, that was done. This was the chief of the Bijeljina centre with a
14 group of people was in charge of this operation, as he was taken out of a
15 group of prisoners and transferred to Bijeljina and the interview was
16 continued there in respect of the facts that we were interested in. We
17 were interested in only individuals, not prisoners of war generally, only
18 individuals, if they were of any interest to the service.
19 Q. You pulled him out of -- the DB pulled him out of the hangar
20 behind the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac on the night of the 12th/13th
21 July, right, that's where he was detained?
22 A. I don't know that, believe me, I don't know that. I don't have
23 that information. The only information that I have --
24 Q. Okay. You don't have that information. That's the evidence in
25 this case, that he was called out of the hangar behind the Vuk Karadzic
1 school and that is from P03940. He was identified by you as of
2 sufficiently high value to save; right?
3 A. Well, this is actually demeaning. This is not a fair question.
4 What do you mean save? This is not correct. Yes, we took him in order
5 to extract certain information from him that we were interested in. Save
6 from whom? What do you mean by save?
7 Q. Well, he -- he was an opponent, wasn't he, of Naser Oric? You
8 identified him as a high value prisoner. You told us that, right, yes,
10 A. Well, he was a person of security-related interest to us, that is
11 unquestionable and that is why and in view of the position that he held
12 prior to the war as a deputy, he was unquestionably of interest to the
13 service. And that is why, along those lines, so to speak, we actually
14 extracted him from wherever he was and we took him to Bijeljina in order
15 to conduct interviews with him to shed some more light on the things
16 which were happening in the area of Srebrenica in 1991 and 1992 and
17 probably statements of Mr. Ibran Mustafic exist about that, as well as
18 statements about the conduct of our operatives and statements about what
19 he had said to us, but I do not agree with the term which you used which
20 is to save. What was he saved from?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the exact reference?
22 This P3940 is a transcript, if -- where is this exactly?
23 JUDGE KWON: That was the question put by Ms. Pack. You do not
24 interrupt her question. She was putting her case to the witness and the
25 witness properly answered the question. Let's continue.
1 MS. PACK:
2 Q. What do I mean what was he saved from, Mr. Kijac? What do
3 I mean? You had it within your power, didn't you, to save those Muslim
4 men whom you considered to be useful to you, valuable to the DB. And on
5 the night of the 12th July you did so because you knew that the POWs were
6 going to be killed; right?
7 A. That is not right, Your Honours. I just answered that question.
8 We saved no one. We pursued our own interests. Our interest was to
9 extract a person which was of interest to the security service from -- on
10 a security-related basis, so there was no plan, there was no knowledge
11 about the liquidation, as you're trying to impute to me right now.
12 Q. Well, so you say, Mr. Kijac, you tell us in your statement at
13 paragraph 55 that you didn't have information until the end of the year
14 2000, when all the media began to report it. That's right? The year
15 2000, you had no information about the killings. Is that your evidence,
16 your honest evidence?
17 A. Precisely, precisely.
18 Q. And you talk about paragraph 56 you were shown some
19 communications that were sent to you personally and to the president from
20 the VRS security organs on 14, 15, 16, 17 July, you refer to those in
21 your statement paragraph 56, they are missing. You're aware of that,
22 those communications are missing?
23 A. Which paragraph did you say that was?
24 Q. Paragraph 56. You talk about some communications that are
1 A. Oh, yes, now I see. As I have already said, we exchanged
2 information with a military intelligence agency. You saw for yourself
3 that we sent daily reports to them and they sent to us, as a rule,
4 integral intelligence reports associated with a situation on the
5 battlefield. I was shown here by Mr. Karadzic's team that the 14th,
6 15th, 16th, and 17th of July, four intelligence reports were sent to the
7 DB, to me, which ostensibly do not exist.
8 Q. They are missing. Not --
9 A. I can only repeat what I've said here, so when I returned, this
10 happened at a time when I was not at Pale. So upon my return had
11 anything important been contained in those reports, my chiefs of
12 departments would have at the time imparted that information to me for my
13 consideration. Usually when I returned from a trip, and this was another
14 trip, it had to do with the wedding of my deputy, but there were other
15 trips when I went to the different regions for different meetings in the
17 Q. Didn't know anything until 2000 when the media began to report
18 it. You, head of the DB, you were aware, weren't you, of -- and you
19 followed international news media and UN reporting during the Srebrenica
20 operations, yes?
21 A. As I have said already, I didn't know anything until the year
22 2000 nor did a single paper coming to the DB which would indicate that
23 something was happening with the POWs. On the other hand, I have to
24 stress that the POW -- that POWs are not within the jurisdiction of the
25 State Security Service. It is not a sort of a supervisor --
1 Q. I'm not talking about jurisdiction. You don't need to hide
2 behind the law. I'm asking you about what you knew, okay? You don't
3 need to keep on going back to jurisdiction. Let me ask you about what
4 you knew, okay? Listen. You are aware, aren't you, that by the
5 17th of July international news media were reporting that thousands,
6 thousands, of terrified people had been deported from the enclave and
7 that men of fighting age had been taken away for screening? You were
8 aware of news reports to that effect; right?
9 A. No. It's not right. First and foremost, I do not speak English.
10 At that time we were not following the media so that we would be able to
11 know what was happening on the 17th or on the 20th. We were living at
12 Pale in a very specific milieu where often there was no electricity or no
13 water, and it's not realistic when you refer to the world media in that
14 context. What I'm saying is that we knew -- that we knew --
15 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the
18 MS. PACK:
19 Q. You, the head of the DB, weren't following the news media? Is
20 that what you're saying? Is that your evidence, your honest evidence?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You were following the international -- the reporting of
23 internationals; right? Or do you deny following UN reporting, ICRC
24 reporting, all of the other international reporting at the time in July?
25 You were aware of and followed that sort of reporting, yes?
1 A. We follow what we could follow, what we were equipped to follow.
2 We did follow the UN system of communications. For instance, the Tuzla
3 and Zagreb communication when they say that the Nordic Battalion had
4 received about 30.000 refugees, we did manage to intercept some
5 communications but you are talking about following the media. No, we
6 didn't do that. We didn't have the requisite conditions for that. We
7 did follow the activities of certain international organisations when we
8 had a technical requirements fulfilled for that to be done.
9 Q. Okay, we have moved on from the media. I'm asking you about
10 international organisations, ICRC, the UN. You followed their reporting,
12 A. No. We were not that successful, as a matter of fact. Let me
13 look at those reports. If I looked at them, perhaps I have seen them but
14 do not remember them.
15 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if the witness is following your
16 question. There seems to be a translation issue. What did you mean by
17 following the international reporting? Ms. Pack, you can put your
18 question again.
19 MS. PACK: Yes, I'm grateful, Your Honour.
20 Q. You were aware of and read international reporting, and here I'm
21 talking about UN, ICRC, the reporting of international organisations,
23 A. Let me see a report that came to the state security department.
24 Perhaps we have a misunderstanding here. If I can see one, I can tell
25 you. Perhaps I'm wrong.
1 Q. You intercepted, for example -- one example, you intercepted ICRC
2 reporting, internal reporting of the ICRC, something you did in the DB,
4 A. You must show me something. You must show me something.
5 Generally speaking, what intercepting? Is there a single interview or
6 conversation talk that you can tell me is an intercepted conversation,
7 international organisations? There is one, I'm talking about Srebrenica.
8 We intercepted a conversation between Tuzla and Zagreb. I believe it was
9 on the 13th, if I'm not mistaken.
10 Q. You can answer the question in principle, can't you? You don't
11 need to look at documents to answer the question in principle, whether
12 you, the DB -- you, as a matter of practice, one of the methods by which
13 you secured information was to obtain that information from international
14 organisations, whether through their agents, whether through intercepting
15 their communications. That was something you did; right?
16 JUDGE KWON: Could you take a look at the transcript.
17 MS. PACK: Yes, thank you.
18 Q. That is something that you did. You -- one of the means by which
19 you obtained information in the DB was to get that information from
20 international organisations, whether through communicating with their
21 employees, their operatives, whether through intercepting their
22 reporting, that is something you did to get information. You can agree
23 with that, can't you, in principle?
24 A. No, no, no. I'm not questioning what you're saying in that
25 particular segment. The service does collect intelligence and
1 information and from -- including from the foreign factor. We did
2 collect information through a network of agents and through intercepting
3 conversations, but at this point, I fail to see how do you believe that a
4 service in war conditions when there is no electricity, when there are no
5 generating sets, when there are no technical conditions, how we could
6 have done that. How could I have seen what UNPROFOR was doing or any
7 other international organisation in such conditions? You look at our
8 papers, you will very frequently see -- but that is not what you are
9 representing that to be. This is just some daily information which was
10 gathered by very successful operatives who managed to infiltrate some
11 international organisations and to obtain information which was of
12 interest to us. But intercepted conversations were very infrequent.
13 When we -- for instance, when we talk about the Bijeljina centre, the
14 centre of the state security was not there before the war, and the --
15 ipso facto, it did not have the necessary equipment to actually cover the
16 work in the bases there in Republika Srpska, if you understand me.
17 Q. You were following the news media in Serbia, weren't you? You
18 were aware of the Petrovic tape that was confiscated from studio 3 [sic]
19 shortly after it was broadcast, yes?
20 A. No, this is the first time I hear of it. I don't know who
21 Petrovic is at all.
22 Q. You weren't following the Serbian news media?
23 A. No, very seldom. We followed our own media. Actually I don't
24 know whether we had any official channels established with Serbia.
25 I mean we at Pale.
1 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
2 THE REGISTRAR: Microphone for the interpreters, please.
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection. On page 32,
5 it is line 10, where first it is stated no, and here on page 34 -- so on
6 page 34, line 7, it is stated that they didn't have necessary equipment
7 to actually cover the work in the bases there in Republika Srpska where
8 it should say it is outside Republika Srpska.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Very well. Shall we continue, Ms. Pack.
10 MS. PACK: Sorry I misspoke, it's "Studio B," not "3."
11 Q. So your evidence is -- your honest evidence today is that you
12 were not aware of the content of the Serbian news media, right, in
13 July 1995?
14 A. We do not understand each other again or perhaps you're mistaken.
15 Studio B is Belgrade studio and it can only be seen in the Belgrade area.
16 Studio B is a Belgrade TV station and it can be seen, viewed, only in the
17 Belgrade area. Your question was not properly formulated or you're
19 Q. General question: Were you following the news media in Serbia,
20 general question, answer yes or no?
21 A. No, no, no. We in Republika Srpska, to the best of my
22 recollection, we did not receive any media signals from Serbia, for a
23 while, that is, so that my -- my answer is no.
24 Q. [Overlapping speakers] newspapers?
25 A. No, no, no.
1 MS. PACK: Can we have 65 ter 13610, please?
2 Q. This is a communication from you to the president of
3 Republika Srpska, the accused, it's dated 21st of July, 1995, to the
4 president personally. Just going to deal with bits of it. Broadly
5 reports on the content of news reporting in Serbia and elsewhere in the
6 region which you apparently in your bubble in Pale were able to access at
7 the time; right? Let me just ask you to look, please, at the English
8 page 3, I'm afraid -- just get the B/C/S reference for you. It's in
9 page 2 of the B/C/S. Just look at that, shall we? Just above that
10 heading, 1, general situation, ICRC activities, just before that, you say
11 this, you say this to the president, please find attached a report by the
12 ICRC for the period between 10 and 16 July 1995. That's a report you are
13 attaching for the president from the ICRC; right? On the
14 21st of July, 1995, yes?
15 A. Probably yes, that is what it says here.
16 Q. So you got reports from the ICRC, didn't you, and you passed them
17 on to the president in July 1995; right? Yes?
18 A. Well, we misunderstand each other. Again, this is just one
19 report, we are talking about one report. We did not have all reports.
20 This is one report that was presented to the -- to the president because
21 it was captured by our measures, as it were.
22 Q. Look at what you say under paragraph 1, judging by the manner --
23 this is reporting on Belgrade media. Judging by the manner of reporting
24 by the official media, the fall of Srebrenica and, in particular, the
25 deportation of its population, seems to have happened on another planet,
1 the "Politika" does not even acknowledge the transfer of 23.000 people.
2 However, only a day before this dramatic event, the media were widely
3 publishing an interview that Milosevic gave with "Tanjug," and it goes
4 on. And on the following pages you talk about Pristina, an ethnic
5 Albanian man dying on the 4th of July at his home in Podujevo, all sorts
6 of details regarding the region, but silence about the content of that
7 ICRC report, silence about Srebrenica in this written report. You don't
8 comment on it, you don't need to, do you, because you all know what's
9 going on; right? You all know what's going on after the fall of
11 A. No, that's not right. I have to revert to the beginning again.
12 We didn't know at that time what was going on in Srebrenica. This was
13 obviously submitted by regional security centre, state security centre.
14 This is not the picture that Pale had. This could be Bijeljina because
15 they were nearer Serbia, and they had the opportunity to have the daily
16 press survey [indiscernible] Serbian signal. So this is information
17 submitted to us by the regional centre and we just took it over because
18 we did not generate information. We at the top do not generate
19 information. We just receive it. And then what we receive we translate
20 into a report of this type. So I reiterate: We did not have this
21 picture at Pale, nor did we have any reports from the Serbian media. We
22 could not follow the Serbian media. We didn't have any media from
23 Serbia. Perhaps they did come to Banja Luka, I don't know that, at this
24 point, but at Pale, I didn't receive a single written media from Serbia
25 during the war, nor was I able to follow their TV programmes.
1 Q. Not talking about Serbian Belgrade TV. I'm not asking you about
2 Belgrade TV. This is a document you signed; right? You signed this
3 document. Your signature is on the last page. Seen you've seen that;
4 right? Can we have the last page of the B/C/S?
5 A. Yes. It's not in dispute. I'm saying this is information for
6 the president. I'm not challenging any of this. When we prepare an
7 integral report for the president, it consists of a string of summaries
8 for different areas, from Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Doboj, Sarajevo,
9 Herzegovina, Trebinje, and the analytical service that receives 20 to 30
10 dispatches from the ground would prepare a brief like this. We do not
11 create briefs. I don't write them. I gather them. They send them to me
12 and then I shape them into this sort of report for the president of the
14 MS. PACK: I seek to tender this document, please.
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6538, Your Honours.
18 MS. PACK: I'm aware of the time.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will have a break for half an hour and
20 resume at 3 past 11.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Pack, please continue.
24 MS. PACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. Back to your statement, paragraph 53, you say that you know --
1 you knew that there were prisoners of war after the fall of Srebrenica,
2 and you were keeping the president informed; right?
3 A. Yes. The president and the minister of the interior. The
4 figures that were stated in our documents.
5 Q. You had operatives in Bratunac?
6 A. Yes. I had an operative who went from Zvornik to Bratunac every
7 day and returned every afternoon. He wasn't based there.
8 Q. Radovic, your subordinate, was in Bratunac when Mustafic was
9 released, wasn't he, on the 12th/13th July?
10 A. As far as I know, Mr. Radovic's chief of centre led this
12 Q. Right. So he's in Bratunac?
13 A. Yes, as far as I know, he directed the operation concerning
14 Mr. Ibran Mustafic and his transfer to Bijeljina.
15 Q. We know now, don't we, that at the very least, the very least,
16 you received that ICRC report we saw you forwarded to the president, that
17 ICRC report dealing with events in Srebrenica between 10th and 16th July,
19 A. Well, I don't know exactly which report you are referring to, but
20 if it's the one that was mentioned a moment ago, we did not have any
21 reporting from the ICRC on the 10th and 11th of July. I don't remember
22 that you showed me that it was continual reporting. It was one report,
23 as far as I was able to see, from your ...
24 Q. I'm not going to go back to the document previously. We saw the
25 report that you forwarded to the president, the ICRC report. We saw what
1 it supposedly related to. You described it as relating to the period
2 between 10 and 16 July. I'm quoting your letter to the president; right?
3 A. Yes. If that's what's written in the document, then that's
5 Q. You knew there were thousands of prisoners; right?
6 A. I wouldn't say thousands. Our documents do not refer to
7 thousands. We were referring to prisoners of war, but not in the
8 thousands. If you look at our reports from the 10th and the 11th, I
9 don't think the figure reaches even 1.000. 300 up to 500 are mentioned
10 in our reports. If you take all our reports together, you will see that
11 if you sum up all the figures, it's somewhere up to 500 prisoners of war.
12 Q. We're not looking at 10th and 11th, you are clear about that,
13 aren't you; right? It's after that?
14 A. The period after, yes.
15 Q. All right, so what you say is that you knew about up to 500
16 prisoners, 500 prisoners. That's all you knew about?
17 A. Well, I cannot say that now, but knowing how the reporting went,
18 I believe figures like 200, 300, were mentioned, up to 5 00. The figure
19 of up to 500 is circulating through our reports. Of course, I'm not
20 talking about the people who were transferred to Tuzla. I don't think
21 you mean them. There is eight and a half thousand that left in the first
22 wave and later up to the 23.000 who were taken in at the Tuzla airport by
23 the Nordic Battalion. I don't think you mean these people. They were
24 not prisoners of war; correct?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. So this is your evidence. Everyone else knows about thousands of
3 prisoners and you, head of the DB, up to 500; right?
4 A. Well, yes. That's how it turns out. I have to tell you again
5 that POWs were not in the jurisdiction of the State Security Service,
6 those were military captives, we had no access to military units, nor did
7 we have that many men in that area of Srebrenica. We had one man,
8 I emphasise one man, and he was accompanied by one young man, they formed
9 the same team and we were not able to cover such a large area because
10 people were taken prisoner --
11 Q. [Overlapping speakers] You know at the end of the war, don't you,
12 end of 1995, you know that there are only less than 200 prisoners from
13 Srebrenica at Batkovic. You know that; right?
14 A. I've read that somewhere. We were not monitoring Batkovic, so I
15 don't know how many prisoners were there, Batkovic was also not in the
16 jurisdiction of the State Security Service, but I've read somewhere that
17 there was, I don't know how large a number of prisoners in Batkovic, who
18 were later exchanged.
19 Q. You've got a list of prisoners from Batkovic from the VRS, your
20 subordinate Goran Radovic sent a communication to the VRS intelligence
21 and security organs, for the East Bosnia Corps, identifying from that
22 list persons of interest. You knew there were prisoners from Srebrenica
23 in Batkovic; right?
24 A. Yes. Yes. That number that you mentioned, we knew that
25 prisoners were in Batkovic and the military security service asked us if
1 we had any information about persons from the area of Srebrenica. And,
2 as far as I know, our service produced a document concerning the people
3 we knew something about but that's four or five people. Some people we
4 knew were somehow involved in the military operations in and around
6 Q. Knowing, as you did, the large number of prisoners captured,
7 detained, after the fall of Srebrenica, knowing as you did that less than
8 a couple of hundred made it to Batkovic, did you not wonder what had
9 happened to the others?
10 A. I am trying to explain to you that we were not monitoring where
11 the -- the army was placing its prisoners of war. We had nothing to do
12 with POWs. That letter by Mr. Radovic is a response to a request from
13 the military security service asking us to give them some information
14 about certain people who were at that time in prison but we did not know
15 how many were in prison at the time. I don't know if you understand.
16 That letter by Mr. Radovic was a response to the request made by the VRS.
17 Q. Isn't it right, Mr. Kijac, that you didn't wonder where the POWs
18 were because you knew, didn't you? You knew that they were bound,
19 blindfolded and buried in pits; right?
20 A. You are again imputing to me something that is not true.
21 Q. David Rohde, you talk about him in your statement, he's a
22 journalist who wrote for a publication called the
23 "Christian Science Monitor." He wrote an article about the executions --
24 about executions following the fall of Srebrenica in August 1995. You're
25 now aware of that, aren't you?
1 A. I don't know that he wrote a news story. I know about
2 David Rohde but I don't know about his article.
3 Q. Well you know about him because you arrested him in Zvornik
4 municipality. He was arrested by the DB, wasn't he, yes?
5 A. It's not the State Security Service that arrested him. He was
6 arrested by members of the public security station because he did not
7 have the proper papers for entering to Republika Srpska and no documents
8 allowing him to stay there. They arrested him because he was of security
9 interest, and if you go back to that report from 1992, you will see that
10 journalists and reporters were of security interest and were monitored as
11 far as we were able to monitor them. It was the public security that
12 arrested David Rohde and since he was of security interest, the matter
13 was transferred to the State Security Service.
14 MS. PACK: Can we have P05227, please.
15 Q. It's the DB, wasn't it, who initiated proceedings against David
16 Rohde; right? The charge -- you charged him, the DB charged him, and
17 then he was prosecuted, yes?
18 A. Yes, we filed a criminal complaint on the grounds of illegal
19 entry into Republika Srpska, lack of proper documents, and that was not
20 the first time. There had been journalists earlier against whom we had
21 taken measures because they were not in possession of valid documents to
22 enter Republika Srpska. They had certain documents that enabled foreign
23 journalists to be in Republika Srpska, but David Rohde did not have such
24 papers at the moment when he was arrested by the police.
25 Q. Come on, Mr. Kijac. We know he wasn't -- he wasn't in reality
1 charged and prosecuted because he didn't have proper documents, was he?
2 The real crime, the real crime, of David Rohde, his real crime, was that
3 he was finding and he was photographing the execution sites, wasn't he,
4 at Petkovci dam and Orahovac; right?
5 A. I think that everything is written in this document you have
6 shown me, so it's not correct.
7 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
8 A. All right.
9 Q. So he's arrested on the 29th of October, first paragraph, yes?
10 Second paragraph --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- you report he's got military maps on which places where crimes
13 against the Muslims had been committed were clearly marked, yes? He
14 stated that he was visiting the general localities of Krizevici, that's
15 the execution site at Orahovac, isn't it, and Djulici in Zvornik. That's
16 what he's actually saying. You find -- you talked to him, he's
17 photographing, he's got maps, that's what you're reporting here.
18 A. First of all, I would like to comment on this first sentence and
19 then the rest. The first sentence says that due to unlawful presence and
20 photographing in the area of Zvornik, he was arrested and all the later
21 that you quote is the statement of David Rohde given to the state
22 security organs, so there is no paraphrasing here other than the
23 paraphrasing of the statements made by David Rohde to the state security
24 operatives who interviewed him.
25 Q. Look, we know what crimes he was prosecuted for. We know the
1 misdemeanours with which he was charged under RS law. We have in
2 evidence P06424, the request to initiate criminal proceedings, and at
3 P06423, the detention order, signed by your Goran Radovic, your
4 subordinate. We have got all this. We've seen all this. I want to ask
5 you about what you've written here in this report, okay? So he says that
6 he discovered the precise location of a place marked on the map in the
7 Krizevici area, that's Orahovac; right? He's found evidence of crimes at
8 the sites. He's found an ID card, military ID. He's photographed the
9 items that he found. You seize all this documentation from him; right?
10 A. Well, yes. Reference is made here to what he said. He said that
11 on the instructions of some people he came to the area of Srebrenica and
12 headed for certain locations, so he was in Krizevici and found, in his
13 own words, evidence, namely, one ID and one military service book
14 belonging to people of Muslim nationality. If one ID and one military
15 service book are evidence of crimes, then I have no further comment.
16 MS. PACK: 65 ter 25255, please.
17 Q. In the spirit of co-operation, this is supposedly at a time when
18 military relations, military-civilian relations were not good, according
19 to you in your statement, the VRS Main Staff security, Beara, he writes
20 to you about Rohde, tells you, doesn't he, that people are looking for
21 him, internationals, yes? Have I accurately summarised the content of
22 this communication? Yes?
23 A. Yes, I see that I didn't sign this dispatch. I see it for the
24 first time. It was signed obviously by my deputy, and I am seeing it for
25 the first time, but there is nothing in this letter that is in dispute.
1 Q. I seek to tender that --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we looking at the same letter?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Main Staff, administration for
4 security, 3rd November, 1995, signed by Chief Colonel Ljubisa Beara. You
5 see there is no signature here in longhand. It must be the signature of
6 my deputy because at that time we were in the area of Krajina. I see
7 this letter for the first time. I suppose my people acted upon this
8 dispatch and he was prosecuted before a court of law.
9 MS. PACK:
10 Q. This followed, this followed, didn't it, your communication, your
11 communication, to the VRS security administration that we just previously
12 saw; right? This is referring to your communication. You see that?
13 It's got a number there at the top, 053368-95; right? Don't disagree
14 with that, do you? No?
15 A. I am not questioning that the previous letter was from the state
16 security department at the security administration of the VRS.
17 Q. This is a response to that; right?
18 A. No. This is not a response. It's their request. We had
19 informed them that we had taken certain measures against Mr. Rohde, and
20 perhaps Mr. Ljubisa Beara had not received our information because our
21 information was addressed to the intelligence administration, that is to
22 say Colonel Salapura; whereas Colonel Ljubisa Beara, as far as I know,
23 was head of the military security, that is to say military police, and we
24 had very little co-operation with them. We had very -- we had most of
25 the co-operation with the intelligence of administration of the VRS
1 headed by Colonel Salapura; whereas with Ljubisa Beara, who was chief of
2 the military police, we had very little co-operation. And it's possible
3 that Ljubisa Beara had not received the letter we had sent previously.
4 And then on the same day he asked for clarification.
5 Q. Do we have to spend a lot of time on this? This document refers
6 to your previous telegram, okay; right? You'd agree with that?
7 A. Apparently so. But I'm trying to explain to you that we had no
8 correspondence with the military police and the military security. We
9 had correspondence with the intelligence administration branch of the
10 military security, not with the military security proper headed by
11 Colonel Beara. It's possible that Colonel Beara had no access to the
12 previous document except that he somehow got hold of it. It's obvious
13 that this is sent to us from the military security, it's sent to the
14 state security, that's all evident. It's evident that my deputy signed
15 it and it's dated 3rd November, 1995, and nothing in the document is in
16 issue. This is the first time I see it. That's what I said.
17 MS. PACK: [Overlapping speakers] to have admitted, please.
18 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
19 MS. PACK: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6539, Your Honours.
21 MS. PACK: Just to finish.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just one question for Mr. Kijac. To be clear, do
23 you say that Mr. Beara had access to your telegram which was sent to this
24 intelligence or not?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, obviously, yes,
1 because you can see that the link is to our telegram. However, our
2 telegrams were never sent to Colonel Beara.
3 JUDGE KWON: If the answer is yes, that's fine. Let's continue,
4 Ms. Pack.
5 MS. PACK: Thank you, Your Honour. Just one last matter on
6 Rohde, P06424.
7 Q. Just very quickly so we are clear about the crimes, the
8 misdemeanours under RS law for which he was charged, for which he was
9 prosecuted, the first charge we've dealt with, this is the request to
10 initiate criminal proceedings from Goran Radovic, RDB centre chief
11 Bijeljina, your subordinate. The first charge relates to the
12 falsification of personal documents which you've spoken about. The
13 second charge on page 2 of the English, please, still on page 1 of the
14 B/C/S, is that he goes to the red mud dam in the area of the village
15 Petkovci. That's the Petkovci dam, and he takes photographs. That's the
16 second misdemeanour with which he is charged; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. We can see the evidence is identified at the following page in
19 B/C/S, same page in English, you can see the evidence against him
20 includes the photographs that he took at the time, yes?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Your interest here, you personally, in the DB, your interest
23 after the Srebrenica events, let me just go back a moment. This was the
24 one and only prosecution, wasn't it, prosecution initiated by the MUP
25 after the Srebrenica events; right? This is it?
1 A. I don't know how you mean that, the only one. I mean, if you
2 mean in terms of crime, there were probably more criminal reports. We,
3 as a service, hardly ever file criminal reports. Very seldom. We are an
4 information service. And only in certain situations that have to do with
5 the foreign factor we are the ones who possibly file criminal reports.
6 This is not the only one of the State Security Service in that period,
7 but I assume that the Ministry of the Interior had many more criminal
8 reports and that period. I don't really know what you mean. Please try
9 to explain to me what it is that you mean.
10 Q. What I mean is that in 1995, the only person who was arrested and
11 prosecuted for matters related to Srebrenica events, right, following the
12 Srebrenica events, was a journalist who was trying to find out the truth;
14 A. Yes. As far as the State Security Service is concerned, that was
15 the only case; that is to say, we worked with him because this has to do
16 with foreign national and conditions were right to file a report because
17 he was illegally staying in Republika Srpska.
18 Q. You in the DB, your interest, was only ever in repressing the
19 investigation of the mass executions, wasn't it? This is what you did.
20 You covered up Srebrenica crimes; right? You personally.
21 A. Again, you're imputing something which is wrong. I have no
23 Q. No comment because you're unsure of the answer?
24 A. Well, I think I've answered. I didn't want to take it any
25 further. That's why I said that I had no further comment.
1 Q. Let me remind you of what's going on in October/November 1995,
2 when this man was prosecuted for taking photographs of Petkovci dam.
3 Just remind you. In September/October, executed Muslim men were
4 reburied. They were shovelled from pits in Bratunac and Zvornik to other
5 pits in Bratunac and Zvornik. Roads were sealed off. This was a
6 significant logistical effort. Civilian and military assets were
7 deployed; right? You were aware of the reburials, weren't you?
8 A. I was not aware of that. The first time I came across this was
9 in Mr. Butler's report, I think in 2002.
10 Q. One person who was interviewed by the OTP described the
11 environment of Bratunac when the bodies were being shifted from pit to
12 pit. I'll read it as follows, 65 ter 25722, if anyone wants to follow,
13 but it's in English so I'll just read it. He says:
14 "There were lorries transporting bodies for hours, even children
15 along the side of the road were finding arms and legs."
16 Later he says:
17 "I didn't see it but I could smell it. I could smell the
19 A bit later he says:
20 "I know what the sketch was when I smelled it because it's very
21 characteristic, the smell of a human body which is decomposing."
22 Now, you had operatives in the area --
23 THE ACCUSED: Could we see it in e-court?
24 MS. PACK: It's pages 76, please in the English. There is no
25 B/C/S, I'm afraid. That's all I'm going to read. Just want to ask the
1 witness a question.
2 JUDGE KWON: Please go on.
3 MS. PACK:
4 Q. You'd operatives in the area, in Bratunac and Zvornik.
5 Putrefying human bodies were being shifted from pit to pit, and you're
6 seriously telling us here today that you weren't aware of this?
7 A. As far as I know, you did talk to my operatives, I will accept
8 everything that they said to you. If they said that they knew about the
9 transfer of bodies, I will accept that because I cannot deny it then.
10 However, in the statements of persons that you talked to from the Zvornik
11 department, there is no mention of transfers and there is no mention of
12 relocating these graves, on the one hand. On the other hand, you know
13 that sometime around the 11th, in one of our reports, there is mention -
14 I think it's the 11th or 12th of July - that in Srebrenica, there are
15 corpses of animals and people, and you have in this report that 40 of our
16 people, members of the police, were infected because the terrain had not
17 been sanitised. So what is being said is maybe true but I did not
18 receive a single paper stating what you said just now, especially, as far
19 as I know, not a single one of our operatives gave that kind of
20 information to you. If you have information provided by my operatives,
21 then I will say that that is possible.
22 Q. I'm not talking about that report about Srebrenica town, about
23 animals, I'm talking about -- just help me with this: How is it
24 possible, please, Mr. Kijac, how is it possible that you were not aware
25 thousands of men had gone missing, thousands of them, and then their
1 bodies were shoveled from pit to pit for everyone to see and to smell and
2 you are seriously, seriously, saying to this Court that you knew nothing
3 about this?
4 A. Well, you see, I mean, on the 25th of July, an offensive was
5 launched against the Krajina, that is to say the Grahovo and Glamoc
6 theatre of war an offensive started, and before the 1st of August I was
7 in the area of Krajina and I stayed there for almost two months. At that
8 time, our positions were also being bombed so the operatives already
9 then, you're talking about September and October, they were collecting
10 completely different information, intelligence, in terms of where the
11 enemy is going to launch offensives, what the targets of the bombing
12 aircraft are going to be, nobody thought about this. You have to look at
13 the time and conditions under which all of this was happening.
14 Q. Nobody was --
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe it was marked, but in line
18 11, it doesn't say I stayed there for about two months in the Krajina.
19 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
20 MS. PACK:
21 Q. Your president is indicted with Mladic, wasn't he, in
22 November 1995, for genocide arising out of the Srebrenica events. You
23 were aware of that, weren't you?
24 A. Possibly.
25 Q. On the 16th of January, 1996, you, by now minister, the highest,
1 most senior law enforcement official in the Republika Srpska, you order
2 the public security department in Bijeljina to provide fake IDs for eight
3 members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, didn't you?
4 A. Could I take a look at that paper?
5 Q. Do you agree or do you not agree with my question? I've asked
6 you a question, can you answer it yes or no?
7 A. Could I please take a look at that paper?
8 MS. PACK: P04491, please.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. [No interpretation]
11 Q. This is a document from --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
14 JUDGE KWON: What did you say, Mr. Kijac?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I know this paper by heart
16 but I asked to have a look at this so that I could explain to the
17 Prosecutor that this paper was sent to me by the intelligence
18 administration of the Main Staff. So the intelligence administration is
19 asking for eight passports or identity papers - it doesn't matter - for
20 their people. Since this was a normal type of communication between the
21 Main Staff and the organs of the Ministry of the Interior, I forwarded
22 that to the Ministry of the Interior to the head of public security,
23 instructing them to have passports provided to them, because, as I've
24 already said, there was always this co-operation between military and
25 state security, when their people needed to travel abroad, then, as a
1 rule, under quotation marks, false identity papers are issued to them.
2 So these papers are issued on the basis of requests put forth by them and
3 then there is documentation to that effect. At the request of the
4 Main Staff eight passports were issued, we don't know who these persons
5 were, and possibly if some day a problem occurs, then people can see
6 which organ asked the ministry for these papers. Your Honours, that was
7 standing practice since time immemorial, if I can put it that way,
8 between the Ministry of the Interior and the military service.
9 MS. PACK:
10 Q. There was co-operation, wasn't there, between the military and
11 state security when it came to covering up Srebrenica crimes; isn't that
12 right? That's when you co-operated. That's what this is.
13 A. There was excellent co-operation between military security and
14 military intelligence and the state securities service but not along the
15 lines along which you want me to give an answer. We exchanged
16 information on a daily basis that was of security interest. I know what
17 you're getting at, Srebrenica. But I'm telling you once again: From all
18 of our documents, you can see what was sent to the military and what the
19 military sent to us. Unfortunately, I cannot give a positive answer to
20 your question except for the part, what I already said, that we had good
21 co-operation, that is my estimate in terms of this exchange of security
23 Q. Help me with this. This document is talking about a group of
24 members in the 10th Sabotage Detachment who are supposedly on a list of
25 individuals who have been indicted by The Hague Tribunal; right? It's
1 talking about Erdemovic [Realtime transcript read in error "Ademovic"]
2 and seven others who were involved in executing Muslim prisoners at
3 Branjevo farm, right, and you knew that?
4 A. To this day, to this day, I don't know who these passports were
5 made for. That was not standing practice. It would not be a secret if
6 the minister of the interior knew who these passports were being issued
7 to, and these papers were being issued to persons so that they could
8 travel abroad mainly; that is to say, so that they could safely stay
9 outside the territory of Republika Srpska so they could carry out certain
10 assignments, so they would not travel with their own passports. So
11 I absolutely do not know about the organisation of the Army of
12 Republika Srpska because I left the army in 1980, as an ordinary soldier.
13 So how do I put this? I do not really know about military structure.
14 I did not even know about their 10th Sabotage Detachment. I knew the
15 Main Staff and the corps commanders, and in that segment I knew the
16 organs, the securities or intelligence organs, that is.
17 JUDGE KWON: But you agree, Mr. Kijac, that this document itself
18 refers to ten individuals that have been indicted by The Hague Tribunal?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, to this day, I don't
20 know whether these persons were accused by The Hague Tribunal. I think
21 that Mr. Salapura worded this a bit columnsily.
22 JUDGE KWON: My question is whether this document states so.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is what is written in the
24 document, Your Honour. But to this day, I -- I do not know the names of
25 these persons to this day. Now, Ms. Pack mentioned some names and
1 I really don't know about these names, and I don't know any of these
2 people personally.
3 MS. PACK:
4 Q. You were protecting them, you were shielding them from arrest,
5 weren't you? That's what you were doing.
6 A. I don't understand how you mean that, shielding them. Could you
7 please be so kind as to clarify that for me? We were protecting certain
8 persons, yes, that was the department for the protection of certain
9 officials, and that is what that part of the service did, whereas these
10 persons were not protected by the service. How could I protect persons
11 whose names I do not know?
12 Q. On April -- in April 1996, Karadzic issued an order to you and
13 other organs of state to investigate the Srebrenica events, P00164.
14 Don't need to look at it, but that's the reference. Now, at this time,
15 Erdemovic, one of the shooters at Branjevo farm, had been transferred to
16 The Hague, hadn't he? You must have been aware of that. He was --
17 JUDGE KWON: Could we have the name again.
18 MS. PACK: My apologies. The name of the document is P000.
19 JUDGE KWON: No, no, no. The name of the shooter.
20 MS. PACK: Erdemovic, Erdemovic.
21 JUDGE KWON: Erdemovic. It's noted as "Ademovic."
22 MS. PACK: It's probably my tone and my pronunciation. My
24 Q. He, Erdemovic, 10th Sabotage Detachment, Branjevo farm, he had
25 been indicted. He had been transferred to The Hague 30th of March, 1996.
1 You were aware of that. You were head of the MUP, the minister.
2 A. I learned that from the media. That was not done by the
3 minister of the interior of Republika Srpska.
4 Q. Of course you knew about it at the time; right?
5 A. Yes, it was in the media.
6 Q. You knew he was -- in the international media? You were
7 following the international media then, were you?
8 A. No. No. The Serb media.
9 Q. He was indicted, you know that, in May for his participation in
10 the executions at Branjevo military farm? You know that?
11 A. No. Individually, I don't know anything.
12 Q. You knew minister --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, it wasn't individually,
14 it was details. He said that he did not know the details.
15 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Kijac?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.
17 MS. PACK: Your Honour, I've got, I think, five or six minutes
18 left. And it may be that I'll be five or six minutes longer if I deal
19 with two more documents which I'd ask if I could.
20 JUDGE KWON: Chamber has no difficulty with it.
21 MS. PACK: Thank you very much. I'm grateful.
22 Q. You know minister of the interior that ICTY investigators are on
23 the ground in the RS in 1996 exhuming bodies and carrying out forensic
24 investigations; right? You're aware of that?
25 A. To a very small extent in 1996, as far as I know.
1 MS. PACK: Can we have P04308.
2 Q. I just want to look at some of the investigative work that was
3 being carried out in 1996 by foreign investigators in your territory in
4 the RS. So page 141 of e-court, please. This is very briefly. Forensic
5 investigations being carried out in April. You can see the date stamp
6 there, April 1996, evidence in the case supports that this is the date on
7 which this photo was taken. So there we are. And this is at Orahovac.
8 That's the evidence in this case. Orahovac, you remember, from your
9 arrest of David Rohde in October 1995; right? I'll just show you
10 another -- another photograph demonstrating the investigations being
11 carried out by ICTY investigators. There were at Petkovci. Just show
12 you briefly at page 180 in e-court. It's the dam. Remember we spoke
13 about that earlier. Date stamped April 1996. We move to 187, at
14 Petkovci, and it's 7 of e-court, digging up bones. If we go to Pilica,
15 page 242 of e-court, please. Are you looking at the pictures? You can
16 see these investigations taking place in 1996. You agree all these
17 investigations are taking place, yes?
18 A. Probably. This is the first time I see these photographs, even
19 the locations don't say a thing to me. I mean whether it's here or
20 there, I don't -- actually, I was not in the area of Srebrenica. So to
21 be quite frank, I don't know the area, so the names of these villages and
22 hamlets don't say a thing to me. This is the first time I see these
23 photographs and I can say that in that year, 1996, when these excavations
24 started, the belief was that this was sanitisation of the terrain and
25 that these were persons who were killed in fighting.
1 Q. Looking here at this picture here at page 242, August 1996 is the
2 date on that, the preceding page you can see that because there is an
3 investigator and a time stamp in Pilica dom, and that's just the wall,
4 the blood spattered wall at Pilica dom. Following page, 244, please.
5 These were the investigations that were being carried out in 1996 by ICTY
6 investigators. And then Branjevo Farm, page 255, please. This is a
7 photograph which is taken during the exhumation which took place between
8 the 10th and the 24th of September at Branjevo Farm. This is a photo
9 taken during the exhumation. It's a disturbed mass grave. You can see
10 that, can't you? There is a big pit but only about 100 bodies there
11 where those three people are standing. You can see that photograph,
12 can't you, what it depicts, yes?
13 A. I see that. I see these three men.
14 Q. And the following page, these are the bodies that remain in the
15 grave, the grave at Branjevo Farm; right?
16 A. I don't know where they are from. These are corpses, you're
17 right. I don't know at all what you're getting at. I'm not familiar
18 with these locations. When you say Branjevo to me, it's as if you told
19 me the name of a street here in The Hague. I was never in the area. So
20 I mean, I don't even know where Branjevo is, where Pilica is. I mean I
21 know by the names that that is the area of the municipality of
22 Srebrenica, but I was never there and I cannot say anything except for
23 these pictures. I see the pictures now.
24 Q. You are the head of the Ministry of the Interior. These are
25 investigations which were being conducted by the ICTY in the RS in 1996.
1 You are ordered by the president, ordered by the president, apparently,
2 to investigate Srebrenica. And you produce, let's look at it, a report
3 in September 1996, P00165. Let's look at your report. Recognise it,
4 your report? This is the MUP's investigation into Srebrenica. If we can
5 go over, I think, in the B/C/S the following two pages. It's a two-page
6 report. One paragraph devoted to the actual killings. One paragraph.
7 Look at your conclusions. Just look at the first paragraph. You say
8 that the Muslims killed each other as a chain reaction. There were
9 suicides. All of them? That was the outcome of your investigations,
10 thousands of men killed themselves, killed each other, chain reaction?
11 That was the outcome of the investigation, an investigation undertaken by
12 the minister of interior into the Srebrenica events?
13 A. I don't know what investigation you are talking about. This is a
14 report to either the assistant or the deputy minister of justice. This
15 is not an investigation. This is a report of the RDB which obtained this
16 information having conducted an interview with a person, one individual,
17 and then under a cover letter I sent it to the Ministry of Justice, which
18 at that time had started some talks with representatives of the
19 international community, i.e., representatives of the ICTY. This is
20 not -- this doesn't refer to any investigation. If you look at the
21 heading, you will see who it is addressed to.
22 Q. That's your evidence, is it, there was no investigation by the
23 MUP, no investigation by the MUP following the Srebrenica events,
24 following the Srebrenica events of crimes against the Muslim men who were
25 executed? No investigation?
1 A. I did not have any information indicating that an investigation
2 was being conducted. I stress that as the chief of the department, I had
3 no information that I had -- I had no information about the executions
4 and when I assumed the position of minister, I received no information to
5 the effect that something of the kind had happened there.
6 Q. So when the president issued an order in April 1996 --
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, can we see that again?
8 MS. PACK: P00164, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kijac, do you agree that Mr. Karadzic ordered
10 you to investigate the Srebrenica event?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Frankly speaking, I do not remember
12 this paper. Maybe I might have seen it in 2002 or 2003. I can see that
13 there are a number of addressees here and a number of institutions, and
14 that is all that I can say here.
15 JUDGE KWON: Do you agree you received this from Mr. Karadzic?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot recall that, but
17 Your Honours, we did not conduct any investigation.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
19 MS. PACK:
20 Q. You didn't conduct an investigation, you wrote this report from
21 your desk in Pale, because no one ever intended that those events be
22 investigated, did they? All you could do is write a one-paragraph -- one
23 paragraph in your cover-up report because everyone knew, everyone knew,
24 didn't they, about the killings, as they were taking place; right?
25 That's the truth.
1 A. You can say that if that were a report about investigation in
2 Srebrenica it would be addressed to President Karadzic rather than to the
3 assistant minister of justice, and it would say pursuant to your order,
4 so and so, the ministry has acted, so on and so on, has obtained this
5 information. It would not be addressed to a person of a much lower
6 ranking person than I myself was at that time.
7 Q. You didn't bother investigating Srebrenica events after this
8 order was issued by Dr. Karadzic because you knew it wasn't a serious
9 order, didn't you? It wasn't seriously intended that you investigate
10 events about which you all knew, was it?
11 A. I have to repeat, I stick to my previous answer. I have already
12 answered that question, I believe.
13 MS. PACK: No further questions.
14 JUDGE KWON: Before Mr. Karadzic re-examines you, I have some
15 questions. When asked by Ms. Pack -- when asked by Ms. Pack whether up
16 to 500 was all that you knew, you said while agreeing with that but you
17 said -- also said, "I cannot" -- I quote, "I cannot say that now." Do
18 you remember having said that?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. I remember having said
21 JUDGE KWON: As you sit there now, what do you know as to the
22 number of prisoners, the number of victims?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know what I read in Butler's 2002
24 report, that is approximately all that I know about Srebrenica. I got
25 hold of it in 2003 or 2004. Somebody gave it to me. I read a report.
1 In the meanwhile, I also perused some other documents and examined them
2 but that is a different thing altogether. But this knowledge that I have
3 is post [indiscernible] thing as it were.
4 JUDGE KWON: When did you first read Butler's report?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know it was drawn up in
6 2002, so after that year, after 2002. That is one of the versions which
7 I had occasion to see, possibly it was supplemented subsequently.
8 JUDGE KWON: Had you read Mr. Butler's report at that time, then
9 I wonder how you could say when Ms. Pack said Branjevo to you, you
10 said it sounded as if she told the name of a street here in The Hague.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because, Your Honours, I'm not
12 familiar with that terrain. I'm not talking about hindsight, about
13 things I learned subsequently. I was talking about what I knew in 1995,
14 not about what I learned after 2005. So when I'm offered this to see, I
15 have to relate to what I know about that particular period and not 2005
16 or 2010 or 2015, or perhaps we did not exactly understand each other.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
18 Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency just a couple of
20 questions. Can we have this document, P001064 on the screen again.
21 JUDGE KWON: 164.
22 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kijac, can you tell us, in principle, when
24 are documents -- when documents of this kind are sent, where do you
25 actually indicate who is in charge of executing a specific assignment?
1 A. Well, you have put it here, in certain order, as it were. The
2 protagonists, the factors who are to participate in the collection of
3 information for investigation, so if you'll allow me to say this is more
4 than anything a job for the prosecutions, for the prosecutor's office and
5 then the prosecutor's office enjoins upon other organs to undertake
6 certain measures.
7 Q. Thank you. In connection with what His Excellency the president
8 asked you, can you tell us whether you had the impression, without asking
9 you for the precise figure, how many prisoners did we have from the
10 beginning to the end of the war?
11 A. No. There is a document that I got hold of in 1996, someone
12 writing to us in connection with POWs, and we responded that we had no
13 exact data, that we only knew that there were very many POWs in Krajina,
14 in Herzegovina, in Sarajevo, et cetera. So I cannot talk about the
15 actual figures because I really don't know them, only those within whose
16 jurisdiction POWs were can talk about the figures, primarily military
17 organs. I did come across some documents preparing myself for this.
18 I found some lists, but never generally as a State Security Service, I
19 have to reiterate, we never dealt with POWs because that was strictly
20 within the ambit of the military.
21 Q. Thank you. Did you -- as a State Security Service, during the
22 war, did you come by any information to the effect that there had been
23 executions of some of these many thousands of POWs that we had in the
25 A. No. And I believe that I've already stated that, that we didn't
1 have any such information.
2 Q. Thank you. Page 56, you were asked in connection with the
3 request of the Main Staff, can you tell us when did Republika Srpska
4 adopt a law on obligatory co-operation with The Hague and was it in
5 existence at that time?
6 A. I could not give you an answer. I don't know.
7 Q. Thank you. Document -- in that document, where Beara responds to
8 you, he says in the first sentence, we found about your telegram from our
9 source, can you tell us how you interpret that?
10 A. I don't understand it in any specific way. If he indicates the
11 reference to our dispatch, that means he has read our paper, and on the
12 basis of our paper, he's communicating with us. He actually refers to
13 our paper, while stating that he receives this information from the
14 source. Obviously there was no communication within them, within the VRS
15 security services when it comes to that particular paper.
16 Q. Thank you. It follows that David Rohde was observed near the
17 dam. Can you tell us whether the dams on a river or at the dumb sites
18 were of any security related interest for Republika Srpska?
19 A. Not for Republika Srpska. That was also the case in the former
20 Yugoslavia. No one could photograph any dam or near it at any specific
21 distance. There were signs actually prohibiting access to any such
22 facility which was of security interest for the state.
23 Q. Thank you. Did you have information that there was a danger or
24 any plans for some dams along the Drina River to be demolished by the
25 Muslim army?
1 A. Yes. There were some -- there was some information about
2 sabotage groups being infiltrated into specific areas, certain areas, and
3 we sent that information to security organs in the field where we
4 thought, where we assessed such terrorist groups could actually undertake
5 such actions at that time.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can witness be shown 1D5555.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. There is no translation, so please present this document to the
10 Chamber. Can you tell us what the heading is, what unit is, what's the
11 date? You don't have to read it out aloud, just look at it. Look at
12 what Oric is proposing or requesting actually.
13 A. This is a request for a precise locations to be given, specified,
14 of the hydro power plant in Bajina Basta so that the sabotage groups of
15 Naser Oric could blow it up and prepare themselves for demolishing it.
16 They need a plan, a man who is familiar with it, and the particular spot
17 where to plant the explosives. So they are looking for an expert to
18 specify the spots at which the explosives should be laid and also a guide
19 to lead them for safe conduct of the group to the dam at Bajina Basta.
20 Q. This is the 19th of December, 1994; is that right?
21 A. Yes, this is the 19th of December, 1994, right.
22 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber what the consequences
23 downstream from that dam would have been had they managed to actually
24 blow up the dam?
25 A. They would have been disastrous, formidable, any breaking of the
1 dam or demolition of the dam would of course entail huge consequences in
2 the area which would be flooded by the waters and of course the
3 population would suffer.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. That would mean both Republika Srpska and Republic of Serbia.
6 Q. What would red mud dam demolition -- what consequences would it
7 entail, what is this red mud, if you know, the red sludge, and what would
8 the consequences be?
9 A. I don't know really.
10 Q. Thank you. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this document be marked for
12 identification, please.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know this facility, believe
14 me. As I've already said, I have never been to the area but the
15 consequence would have been terrible because, generally speaking, if you
16 demolish any dam and the waters that are released of course, destroy
17 everything on their path.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: I just wondering the point of this question. Is it
20 your case, Mr. Karadzic, that Mr. Rohde was arrested to protect this dam?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, what I'm saying is that
22 he was observed for the first time near the dam, and he was observed
23 because the people were watching, people and citizens were watching the
24 dam because it was dangerous for anyone to get near the dam. And dams --
25 that is why he was observed there. And the dams were a major concern of
1 ours at that time, of course. And incidentally, this also speaks about
2 the danger from the 28th Division, i.e. the 8th Operations Group.
3 JUDGE KWON: We will mark it for identification.
4 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI number D4160, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. During the cross-examination, you stated that not only Rohde
8 but -- and not only in 1995 but throughout the war, we had had reason to
9 inquire or to be interested in the conduct, in the behaviour, of foreign
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can we see 1D9512? Can we bring
12 that up in e-court, please?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Unfortunately, we have no translation of that either so I would
15 ask you to introduce this document to the Chamber too.
16 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the number? And whether it has been
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we have it. That's the one.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you tell us who is sending this to whom and who is this
21 gentleman, Mr. Ceranic, who is sending the document to you?
22 A. Mr. Ceranic was the chief of the State Security Service for the
23 area of Sarajevo. He is informing us hereby that the journalists of the
24 British agency Sky News are using forged certificates with the signature
25 of the president of the republic, Radovan Karadzic, enabling them to work
1 unhindered in the territory of Republika Srpska. And, generally
2 speaking, you can see in every work programme, that the
3 State Security Service was monitoring journalists as security interesting
4 persons because of the connections, contacts and information they had.
5 That's how we found out occasionally about forged IDs and we got that
6 information from our sources in journalist circles.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document to be MFI'd.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI D4161, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. You were asked how come you never wondered what became of those
13 people, those combatants, and you gave your answers, but now I would like
14 to show you 1D9513, dated 22nd July, 1995.
15 In this document, I see some information -- no, it's not the
16 right document. 1D9513. You checked out some information and marked
17 other information as unverified. Why are these designations important?
18 A. I can't see the document yet. I don't have to read the document,
19 if that's your only question.
20 Q. That's one question and then I would like to ask you about
21 paragraph 3 from the bottom.
22 A. So let me take up this one first. When we get information from
23 the ground, they indicate the source and the level of verification. The
24 information can be verified, reliable, or not. It can be in the process
25 of verification, and it may be a product of operative techniques or it
1 can be information emanating from a source we have been co-operating with
2 for a long time, and know him.
3 Q. Can you read the third paragraph from the bottom? Can you read
4 it out loud?
5 A. "According to reliable information, the RDB managed to extract
6 from the area of Srebrenica about 7.000 members of the so-called BH army,
7 3500 of which would be engaged in the Sarajevo theatre of war. The
8 government of the so-called BH is planning to place refugees from Zepa in
9 Kladanj, and those from Gorazde in Zenica and Sarajevo."
10 Q. Is that what you knew on the 22nd of July about the number of
11 soldiers, men, who got out of Srebrenica?
12 A. Yes. Through these papers, we have been following, we registered
13 that 22.000 men got out and reached the Tuzla airport where they were
14 taken in by the Nordic Battalion, and we had information that 7.000
15 combatants managed to get out in this breakthrough when the corridor was
16 opened for them, I believe on the 16th. And I have to emphasise that
17 that morning there was a skirmish between the VRS and those 7.000 men and
18 in that skirmish, within two hours, we had 22 dead and -- 12 dead and
19 more than 20 wounded.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down and take up
21 his last sentence again.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kijac, you are speaking too fast. Could you
23 repeat from your -- from where -- where you said the "12 dead and more
24 than 20 wounded"?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. So that morning there was a
1 skirmish between the army and that group of men, those 7.000 members of
2 the BH Army, who were getting out of Srebrenica. And we had 12 dead, I
3 believe, and 82 wounded, although we were on top of a hill, set in an
4 ambush with mortars and Pragas, et cetera. Then we had information that
5 out of 500 men from that group, some managed to get out to Zepa, some
6 military conscripts went to Gorazde. We had that information and we had
7 information that more than a thousand men had crossed over into the
8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Plus we had information that about 87
9 wounded from Bratunac had been transferred to the area of Tuzla. And you
10 can see all that from the correspondence at the level of the
11 State Security Service, at the headquarters, and the branch in Bijeljina,
12 through reports from the 10th, let's say, until the 20th.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Can you read out loud the last paragraph.
15 A. "Through contacts with the Muslim Commission for Exchanges, their
16 representatives asked for an exchange all for all, clearly aware of the
17 fact that there are incomparably more Muslim soldiers captured by the
18 VRS. They also insisted that there should be a contact between the two
19 chairmans of the commissions for exchange and the so-called BH."
20 Q. What is your information about the status of POWs on the
21 22nd of July?
22 A. Already on the 12th, 13th and 14th, there was talk about an
23 all-for-all exchange and Mr. Renovica, who at that time was chief of the
24 department, says in one of his statements to investigators, he says that
25 our attention is declining because there is already talk about an
1 all-for-all exchange.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are very often overlapping and do
3 not leave any pauses between questions and answers.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Pack.
5 MS. PACK: I just wanted to get in before the question was asked
6 just to say that I didn't ask any questions about this topic, about
8 JUDGE KWON: No.
9 MS. PACK: So any further questions I just wanted to stop
10 because, in my submission, it goes beyond the remit of my cross. Thank
12 JUDGE KWON: I agree, Ms. Pack.
13 Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can respond. The focus of this
15 is not the exchange. The focus is on the awareness of this witness that
16 there is a great number of prisoners, and the Prosecution was
17 insisting --
18 JUDGE KWON: You took the issue of exchange from this document.
19 I will consult my colleagues.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Pack. Please move on to
22 another topic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you tell us why is this topic discussed at the end whereas
25 the first paragraphs are about the events in Krajina? Can you explain
2 A. Of course I can. At that time, the offensive of the Croatian
3 army against Grahovo and Glamoc had already begun and we have
4 intelligence that the Croatian army is concentrating in certain areas,
5 and that the Croatian armed forces in co-ordinated action with the Muslim
6 5th Corps and the HVO would be attacking the western parts of Krajina.
7 And as far as I know, a few days after this, I left for Krajina and you
8 arrived there on the 1st of August and we both stayed there with a few
9 breaks until the end of October, I think.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document to be MFI'd.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will mark it for identification.
13 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI D4162, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Are we going to take -- shall we take a break or you
15 would like to continue now?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for
17 Mr. Kijac and I only thank him for coming.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
19 Thank you, Mr. Kijac, for your testimony. Please have a safe
20 journey back home. You are free to go.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE KWON: Before we rise for lunch break, there are a couple
24 of matters I'd like to deal with now. First, we will issue our oral
25 ruling on Vidoje Blagojevic's request for the assignment of counsel for
1 the purposes of his testimony in this case filed on the record on the
2 20th of November, 2013. The Chamber notes that the Prosecution indicated
3 via e-mail on 21st November that it did not wish to respond to this
4 request. The Chamber has considered Article 5 of the directive on the
5 assignment of counsel, which provides for the assignment of counsel to
6 three categories of individuals: Suspects, accused persons, and any
7 persons detained under the authority of the Tribunal. Blagojevic was
8 granted early release effective 31st of December, 2012, and is therefore
9 no longer covered by Article 5 of the directive. The Chamber sees no
10 exceptional circumstances warranting that the Chamber order the Registrar
11 to assign counsel to Blagojevic for the purpose of his testimony in these
12 proceedings, and the request is therefore denied.
13 Next I have a question for Mr. Karadzic.
14 On the 29th of November, 2013, the accused filed his Defence
15 submission of order of witnesses for January and February 2014 with a
16 confidential annex appending the names of 65 witnesses. This list does
17 not include your name, Mr. Karadzic. According to the Chamber's internal
18 calculations, it is expected that you should call your last witness
19 around the end of February. The Chamber was under the impression, given
20 the various representations you have made, that you would be the last
21 witness to testify in your case and that you wished to apportion a
22 significant amount of your time to that effect. Is that still the case,
23 Mr. Karadzic?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I could answer that because I was
25 the one who prepared the filing. Our calculations are that our case will
1 finish sometime in March, the beginning or middle of March, so that's why
2 we didn't include all of our witnesses on that list. This is the
3 projection of witnesses for January and February. So I think the
4 question of Dr. Karadzic testifying is still under consideration but we
5 are still reserving 16 hours for his testimony and it's anticipated that
6 he would be the last witness, but the reason he's not on that list is
7 because we believe that we will go through January and February and not
8 run out of our time.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please bear in mind that the Chamber
10 will not grant the Defence additional time for that purpose so that the
11 Defence should organise itself according to the 325 hours in total that
12 has been granted.
13 We will resume at 25 past 1.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.37 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 1.28 p.m.
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Would the witness make the solemn declaration.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
19 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: BORO TADIC
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tadic. Please make yourself
23 comfortable. Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Tadic, I must draw
24 your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at the
25 International Tribunal. That is Rule 90(E). Under this rule, you may
1 object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor or
2 even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate
3 you in a criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate" means saying
4 something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal
5 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might
6 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an
7 answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer
8 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
9 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal
10 would ensure that your testimony, compelled under such circumstances,
11 would not be used in any case that might be laid against you, for any
12 offence save and except the offence of giving false testimony.
13 Do you understand that, Mr. Tadic?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Tadic.
19 A. May God be with you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Did you give a statement to my Defence team?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting, I mean, for the interpretation. So I'm
23 asking you also to pause and enunciate your sentences slowly so that it
24 could all be reflected in the transcript.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D9528 in e-court.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you see that statement of yours before you on the screen now?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Thank you. Have you read the statement and signed it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Could the witness please be shown the last page so
7 that he could identify his signature. Is this your signature?
8 A. Yes, that is my signature.
9 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you
10 communicated to the Defence team?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in
13 this courtroom, would your answers basically be the same?
14 A. They would be the same or similar.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
17 statement according to Rule 92 ter.
18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. McKenna, do you have any objection?
19 MS. McKENNA: Your Honour, we have no objection. However, we
20 would note that many of the statements, or rather, many of the questions
21 in this statement are formulated in an extremely leading fashion; for
22 instance, questions 21, 22 and 27 contain multiple obviously leading
23 questions and also others questions invite the witness to draw
24 conclusions on legal issues. And so, in the Prosecution's submission,
25 these would go to the weight of the evidence in the statement.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will admit the statement.
2 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4163, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I'm going to read
5 out in the English language a brief summary of Mr. Boro Tadic's
6 statement. [In English] Boro Tadic was the commander of the
7 1st Battalion of the 6th Sana Infantry Brigade of the JNA and the chief
8 of the Secretariat of National Defence. In the spring of 1992, the
9 situation in BH was getting worse. In light of this, in April 1992, the
10 JNA's 6th Krajina Brigade returned to Sanski Most with the task of
11 preserving peace and preventing interethnic conflicts. The brigade
12 controlled the area and provided protection to everyone, regardless of
13 their ethnicity. However, fighting broke out and there were open attacks
14 on the army by the Muslim paramilitary forces. The Muslim paramilitary
15 forces refused to surrender their illegal weapons and attacked the army
16 and the police. Boro Tadic was directly involved in negotiations with
17 Muslims and Croats regarding the preservation of peace and resolution of
18 conflict in a peaceful way. However, Muslim extremists refused to
19 co-operate. Living conditions in the area in general were very harsh for
20 all ethnic groups. Everyone, regardless of religion or ethnicity,
21 suffered equally. Boro Tadic recalls that President Karadzic ordered
22 that he and his colleagues respect international conventions and protect
23 all citizens regardless of their nationality. The obligation to respect
24 the laws of war, especially the Geneva Conventions, and
25 Additional Protocols were stressed. Steps were taken to conduct
1 investigations into crimes against Muslims and Croats committed by the
2 members of Serb community.
3 Mr. Boro Tadic's unit in Sanski Most did not engage volunteers
4 and no one supported the paramilitaries. In March 1992, Muslims created
5 barricades to control everyone passing through their villages. They
6 killed a Serb at one of the barricades in the village of Trnovo.
7 Boro Tadic believes that between April 1990 and April 1992, the leaders
8 of the SDA and the HDZ had planned to destroy the SFRY. The Serbs tried
9 to find a solution for all ethnic groups to live together in a common
10 state. However, because of the actions of the SDA and HDZ leadership,
11 the Serbs were forced to establish bodies to defend the people's
12 interests. The Crisis Staffs were not used as a means to permanently
13 remove Bosnian Muslims or Croats from BH. There were no policies of
14 persecution, forced deportation or ethnic cleansing. Before the first
15 multi-party elections, Mr. Boro Tadic was a member of parliament of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina and was politically very active.
17 And that is all for that moment. I do not have questions for
18 Mr. Tadic.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Yes, Mr. Tadic, as you have noted, your evidence-in-chief in this
21 case has been admitted in writing, that is through your written
22 statement. Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the
23 Office of the Prosecutor. Do you understand that?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Yes, Ms. McKenna?
2 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:
4 Q. Mr. Tadic, first I would very briefly like to clarify the various
5 roles that you had. Before the war, from 1986 to 1990, you were a deputy
6 in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly; is that correct? I'm afraid you have
7 to answer --
8 A. I was in the assembly. That was the last assembly of the
9 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, before the multi-party
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tadic. May I just at the outset ask you to listen
12 to my questions carefully and answer them as concisely as possible, so
13 that's a yes-no answer where possible, and also just to remind you that
14 you will need to make a verbal response for the purposes of the record.
15 So you were a founding member of the SDS in Sanski Most in
16 August 1990; that's correct, isn't it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And we've heard that you served in the JNA and you were appointed
19 commander of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Brigade on the 3rd of November,
20 1991; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, you note in your statement that the 6th Brigade was deployed
23 back from Western Slavonia to Sanski Most in early April 1992. In
24 May 1992, you were a member of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff; isn't that
1 A. I was assistant commander for moral and religious affairs when
2 I returned from the hospital in Sarajevo, that was in April and May 1992.
3 Q. But you were also a member of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff;
5 A. Later, in the month of June, I was appointed head of department
6 in the Ministry of Defence, which is an organ of Republika Srpska, and is
7 in charge of mobilisation in the territory of municipality of
8 Sanski Most. So I attended sessions of the Executive Board only as a
9 guest, when questions from my line of work were discussed with a view to
10 co-ordinating the activities related to mobilisation, in terms of the
11 resource that is exist in the municipality.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
13 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tadic, could you come closer to the microphone.
15 Thank you.
16 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have P2614.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Tadic, this is a document issued by the Crisis Staff of
18 the Sanski Most Municipal Assembly and you'll see at subparagraph 1(a) of
19 the document, it states -- and, excuse me, the document is dated the
20 30th of May, 1992, and it states, the Crisis Staff consists of the
21 following 12 persons. Each one having a clear domain of activities. And
22 if you go down to number 5, you will see your name as secretary of the
23 People's Defence Secretariat. So it's true, isn't it, Mr. Tadic, that
24 you were, in fact, a member of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff?
25 A. At the time, war operations were underway and I was in
1 Lusci Palanka, that's where I was born and that's where I lived. So when
2 this conclusion was adopted, when the Crisis Staff was appointed,
3 I didn't even know about that at that point in time. Later on, when the
4 situation became such that I could come to work, that was sometime, say,
5 mid-June, I only attended on behalf of -- actually, we called this the
6 Executive Board, although it was the Crisis Staff. So this was a
7 transition in order to have certain things that needed to be resolved
8 properly. So this was a Crisis Staff in actual fact, but actually this
9 was a temporary body that no longer existed later on because I was not
10 appointed head of the Secretariat for National Defence because according
11 to the constitution of Republika Srpska when there were no more
12 secretariats when there was only the department of defence of Republika
13 Srpska --
14 Q. Mr. Tadic, again I'd like you to keep your answers as concise as
15 possible. But just to clarify, on the 15th of July, 1992, you were
16 appointed head of the municipal department for National Defence; that's
17 correct, isn't it?
18 A. I did not quite understand. Could you please repeat that?
19 Q. My question is: On the 15th of July, 1992, you were appointed
20 the head of the municipal department for National Defence?
21 A. Department, yes, yes.
22 Q. Now I'd like to go back a little to your first relations or your
23 earlier relations with Mr. Karadzic, you've known him since at least
24 1990; isn't that correct?
25 A. Yes. In the assembly of the republic, I spoke about the
1 situation in Yugoslavia, and that is how we met, when the
2 Serb Democratic Party was established.
3 Q. And together with him, you arranged for a gathering of the SDS in
4 September 1990 at Lusci Palanka, attended by him, Mr. Raskovic and
5 various other leaders of the SDS; that's correct, isn't it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, in response to your question number 38 you state that you
8 had no knowledge that the SDS state bodies or Karadzic spread propaganda
9 among the Bosnian Serbs and specifically you say in relation to the
10 danger that Bosnian Serbs could be victims of genocide. And you also
11 say, in your response to question number 21(f), that the Serbs tried to
12 calm the situation and prevent conflict. Now, on the 3rd of March, 1991,
13 there was an SDS rally in Banja Luka which was attended by Mr. Karadzic,
14 Ms. Plavsic, Jovan Raskovic and various others. Do you recall this
16 A. I was in hospital in Sarajevo at the time, from the 17th of March
17 until the 2nd of April. I was at the military hospital in Sarajevo.
18 Q. Do you recall hearing of this rally?
19 A. It was in the media.
20 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have 65 ter number 40516A. And I'm
21 interested in time code 1.44.11 to 1.45.04.
22 Q. Mr. Tadic I'd just like to play you a few excerpts from that
23 rally, if my colleague could switch to Sanction, please.
24 [Videotape played]
25 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The Yugoslav People's Army units
1 entered Pakrac to count dead Serbs. Ustashas took away bound Serbs under
2 their passive surveillance. Ustashas' nest has been made on the
3 bell-tower of the Orthodox church in Pakrac. Nobody knows what happened
4 to Father Savo Bosanac. It is said that he died trying to stop Ustashas
5 from entering the church. This is exactly the proof that the same
6 bestial spirituality and frantic despotism commits the same genocide as
7 it did between" --
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is there perhaps a transcript with
9 a translation? Because what is reflected in the transcript is not
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We were not interpreting,
12 we were reading from a transcript that was provided.
13 JUDGE KWON: I think there is a way you can check the transcript
14 later on at any time with the assistance of Mr. Robinson or whoever.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But in such situations, we are
16 asked to provide a transcript, and I'm just asking whether that is also
17 the duty of the other side as well.
18 JUDGE KWON: You can look at it immediately now with the e-court.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I was just wondering though --
20 I was a little bit surprised to hear that the interpreters were simply
21 reading from the transcript. I thought that they would be making their
22 best efforts to translate from what is being said with the aid of the
24 JUDGE KWON: That has been our practice, Mr. Robinson, with
25 respect to these transcripts.
1 MR. ROBINSON: I guess I was unaware of that. I always thought
2 we were providing the transcript so that the interpreters could be
3 assisted and they it would make their best interpretation from the
4 evidence that's being heard. The transcripts are admitted so there is no
5 reason to duplicate the same language in the transcript of our trial.
6 I thought that they were actually interpreting what was being said but if
7 that's not the case, that's my mistake.
8 JUDGE KWON: I found your submission surprising. It has been our
9 practice given the difficulty of interpreting the language from the video
10 or audio. Let us leave it at that. Shall we continue.
11 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. So this speaker referring to the bestial spirituality and frantic
13 despotism that commits the same genocide as it did between 1941 and 1945,
14 you'll agree that contrary to your statement, this speaker was stating
15 that the Bosnian Serbs were under threat of genocide in 1991?
16 A. In our area, in Sanski Most, no one had to talk to us about that
17 because in 1941, on the day of St. Elijah, five and a half thousand Serbs
18 were killed in Susnjari and they had been tricked to coming to Sanski
19 Most. And many, many, Serbs were taken to the Ustasha concentration camp
20 of Jasenovac and killed there.
21 Q. Mr. Tadic I'm going to interrupt you. Once again my question
22 was: Did -- was this speaker referring to the threat of genocide in
23 1991? And I believe your answer is yes; is that correct?
24 A. Yes. That is the genocide that was committed by the Ustasha
25 authorities against the Serbs, only in Jasenovac, 700.000 Serbs.
1 Q. I'd like to listen to what Mr. Karadzic said at that rally and
2 that's at time code 2.14.34 to 2.15.50.
3 [Videotape played]
4 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We are counting that today too we
5 confirmed our authority that today too we received from you instructions
6 on what to do. If we understood well, we have to do the following to
7 fight for democracy because whenever there was democracy it was good for
8 the Serb people: To fight for Yugoslavia; that is to say, for one state
9 no matter how big it would be, where we would all live, to fight to
10 accomplish political goals without violence. We will not start violence
11 but if someone else starts it, we will have to accept it. And I can also
12 tell you that Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly functions well only thanks to
13 your delegates, but if it comes to the fall of authority in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you will still have your Serb National Council which
15 will not let you be slaughtered like in 1941. Long live."
16 MS. McKENNA:
17 Q. So, Mr. Tadic, you'll agree that contrary to your statement,
18 Karadzic's reference at this rally to Serbs being slaughtered in 1941
19 would not have calmed the situation but, rather, would have made Serbs
20 more fearful.
21 A. What I recall at that time was the truth taken from under the
22 concrete, concrete, because thousands and thousands of Serbs were
23 actually placed in pits over which concrete was poured in the communist
24 era. So after so many years, the extractions of those bones of the holy
25 martyrs of Serbs, of course, sowed fear among the nation.
1 Q. Once again, I didn't ask you for an account of the history of
2 your region. I asked you whether Mr. Karadzic's statement would have
3 calmed the situation or would have made Serbs more fearful. It's
4 correct, isn't it, that it would have made Serbs more fearful?
5 A. It just made them more cautious because fear is a defensive
6 mechanism in humans. If there were no fear, if there were no pain,
7 humans couldn't live. One of those elements for the preparation of the
8 evil that was in store for us was for us to get organised in order to
9 avoid a repetition of that evil because the memories were very fresh.
10 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I'd like to tender those excerpts.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, I wonder, really, whether
13 this witness is a proper person through whom these excerpts should be
14 tendered, since he didn't attend the rally and he wasn't asked what he
15 heard about it so that he could actually comment on it other than as any
16 witness who came to this trial can be shown a video and asked to give
17 their general comment. So I don't think that there has been an adequate
18 foundation to admit it through this witness. I would also note that this
19 is a March 1991 rally and the indictment period is October 1991 where the
20 joint criminal enterprise is alleged to have begun, so it's also outside
21 the scope of the indictment.
22 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Ms. McKenna?
23 MS. McKENNA: I would, Your Honour. It was this witness's
24 evidence that the Serbs tried to calm the conflict, or rather, calm the
25 situation and prevent conflict. This video impeaches him on that point.
1 Moreover, it impeaches him on the general point that there was no
2 propaganda related to genocide.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
5 THE ACCUSED: May I ask something to be clarified?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, shall we assign the number?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6540, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: Having said that it is a propaganda related to
10 genocide, I would like to know whether the position of the Prosecution is
11 that there was no genocide in Second World War.
12 JUDGE KWON: No. Shall we continue?
13 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Tadic, I'd like to turn to the statements of the local SDS in
15 Sanski Most on this topic.
16 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have P3640.
17 JUDGE KWON: E-court, please.
18 MS. McKENNA: Thank you.
19 Q. You'll see that this is a bulletin issued by the Sanski Most
20 Crisis Staff published on St. Peter's day 1992. St. Peter's day is in
21 July; is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And the bulletin, we see, was published by the SDS information
24 and promotion centre. I'd like to direct your attention to the editors
25 in chief who are Borislav Savanovic and Dusan Praca. Can you confirm
1 that Mr. Savanovic was the president of the club of SDS deputies of
2 Sanski Most and a member of the Crisis Staff?
3 A. I didn't quite understand. Which person?
4 Q. Mr. Savanovic was president of the club of SDS deputies?
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 MS. McKENNA:
8 Q. And if we turn our attention to the associates, we see
9 Oro Nedjelko and you, Boro Tadic. Now the reference to Oro Nedjelko is a
10 reference to Nedjelko Rasula, the Crisis Staff president, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And now I'd like to look at the type of information that you and
13 your colleagues were disseminating.
14 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have English page 3 and B/C/S
15 page 3?
16 JUDGE KWON: But did you say this was published by the
17 Crisis Staff, Ms. McKenna?
18 MS. McKENNA: Yes it's published by the Sanski Most Crisis Staff.
19 JUDGE KWON: Where do we see that?
20 MS. McKENNA: Excuse me, I misspoke. It's published by the SDS
21 of Sanski Most. Thank you for the correction, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MS. McKENNA:
24 Q. And it reads: Dear brother Serbs, do you know what our
25 bloodthirsty enemies have been scheming for us? What they had in mind
1 was to gouge our eyes out and carve our insides, hack up our bodies in
2 parts, to rape women and girls in front of their beloved, to circumcise,
3 to destroy our religion, to crush us, just because we happened to be
5 And it continues on the same vein, and it says lower down on the
6 page: They have been preparing for a genocide against the Serbs but did
7 not get away with it because we saw what was coming. We warned and
8 prepared our people in time. The leaders of the SDS are resolute in
9 their undertaking to accomplish all that the Serbian people has entrusted
10 them with.
11 So my question, Mr. Tadic, is: Do you agree that this is an
12 example of the propaganda issued by you and your fellow SDS members in
13 Sanski Most to instill fear of non-Serbs in the Serb population?
14 A. When they talk about the soldiers whom they butchered in a
15 bestial way, well, as far as that is concerned, I was a witness, and
16 I actually drove home this butchered soldier, killed in this way, for him
17 to be buried there.
18 Q. Mr. Tadic [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 MS. McKENNA:
21 Q. Mr. Tadic, I'm asking you on this point about the propaganda on
22 the topic of genocide, I'm asking you whether this is an example of that
23 type of propaganda. Actually let's move to another example from this
24 article and that is, or rather, from this bulletin, and that's at English
25 page 5 and B/C/S page 4. This is an article by Mr. Rasula, and he states
1 with the -- I'm sorry, if we go to the B/C/S -- or English page 6 and
2 B/C/S page 4. Mr. Rasula states: With the coming of war and the new
3 conditions but still adhering to the goal of creating a Serbian state,
4 the work of the SDS naturally -- followed naturally into a series of
5 duties and actions which served to prepare, organise and provide the
6 Serbian people with the means of guaranteeing its safety in Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina and making it ready for a bitter battle with the other two
8 people, the Muslims, if indeed they are a people, capital letters, they
9 are not, and the Croats, who have forever carried in their genes a sick
10 pathological desire and urge to kill those better and more honest and, do
11 we need to say this, stronger than they are.
12 Mr. Tadic, this is yet another example of the propaganda issued
13 by you and your colleagues to dehumanise non-Serbs; isn't that correct?
14 A. Well, still today what Mr. Rasula is writing about is actually
15 being repeated at the Poljud stadium in Split because the entire stadium
16 actually is going out the Ustasha greeting, and this was also repeated --
17 was repeated in Zagreb at an international match where one of the players
18 was actually saluting the Ustasha salute and the entire stadium
19 responded, and this -- before the face of the entire international
20 community, and the Ustashas are doubtlessly fascists.
21 Q. Mr. Tadic, you explain in your response to question 7 in relation
22 to what you did to further the Serb authority's goal of protecting the
23 civilian population regardless of their ethnicity, and your contribution
24 was the following: You went to Muslim villages to explain to them that
25 peace should be preserved. You argued that Muslims as Islamicised Serbs
1 would succumb to the evil intentions of the West as they had done before
2 and harm Orthodox Serbs. And you told the Muslims of the original hatred
3 that they had of their own brethren who they deserted by changing their
4 religion that would turn them towards the sly and evil intentions of the
5 West. And you also state that certain extremist Muslims resisted these
6 attempts at persuasion. Mr. Tadic, you will agree that this was not a
7 particularly effective way to protect the non-Serb population of Sanski
8 Most and, in fact, you did nothing to protect them; isn't that correct?
9 A. Well, the truth is always of the essence. Whoever does not speak
10 the truth is actually telling lies. Speaking the truth -- speaking --
11 saying the truth to those people, actually they could understand by --
12 from my words by just looking at my face from which emanated love and a
13 desire for peace, they could actually have a change of heart and not do
14 what they had done in 1941, although I'm aware of the fact that only the
15 dear lord can actually make this change in their heart so that they would
16 not hate those from where that nation from which they actually converted
17 to another faith, and that is actually where this essential rift is which
18 was capitalised on by the West in order to dismember a wonderful state,
19 that of Yugoslavia, to bring the Serbs into this position in which today
20 there is practically none of them in Croatia. They have been expelled
21 from Kosovo and Metohija. And the only true shining point, the only good
22 thing in all this is Republika Srpska, which guided by the wisdom of its
23 leadership and by taking democratic measures in an opportune manner and
24 by forming the government and the democratic party it actually precluded
25 something that might have been repeated had we not been prepared. Now,
1 I ask you the question: What would have happened had the Muslims and
2 Croats had the JNA weapons that the Serbs actually had? And I have to
3 tell you that I cried when my assistant, the deputy of the commander --
4 deputy commander of the battalion, a Muslim, when he left the unit,
5 I cried because I knew that our brotherhood and unity of living together
6 was crumbling, falling apart. This is what the West abused in order to
7 fragmentise a wonderful state into a small fragment so that it could be
8 our master, that it could impose its severe, cruel economic rules of
9 exploitation like it did for centuries with its own colonies.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tadic. I'd like to come on to your point about
11 the non-Serb members in your JNA unit. In response to question 2, you
12 say that the JNA's 6th Brigade had a task of preserving peace and
13 preventing escalation of interethnic conflicts and that it controlled the
14 area and provided protection to everyone regardless of their ethnicity.
15 MS. McKENNA: Now, could we please have P3660. Thank you.
16 Q. This, Mr. Tadic, is the wartime record of the 6th Brigade written
17 by Colonel Basara, the commander. I'm interested in page 2 of the
18 English and page 3 of the B/C/S. And in paragraph 4, it states: On the
19 3rd of April, 1991, the 6th was transferred to Sanski Most municipality
20 in good order and under a veil of secrecy so that everyone was surprised.
21 Is that a correct reference or should it be to the 3rd of April 1992?
22 A. 1992.
23 Q. And it continues: After the brigade came to this area, the
24 Muslims and Croats became afraid while the Serbs heaved a sigh of relief.
25 We had to arm the Serbs quickly and quickly replenish our units, since
1 we, as JNA units, were tasked with preventing interethnic conflicts,
2 i.e., the slaughter of the Serbian people, we could not be seen to be
3 arming the Serbs in public.
4 So this is what you meant by preventing interethnic conflicts,
5 isn't it? The brigade's aim was not the protection of everyone
6 regardless of their ethnicity but, rather, its aim was the protection of
7 the Serbian people; isn't that correct?
8 A. To protect the Serbian people against the intentions of those who
9 were planning that meant, at the same time, protecting those who were
10 attempting to do that. The Serbian army ...
11 Q. Well, let's turn to your point about -- in the response to
12 question 34, you say in relation to mobilisation from 1991 and until the
13 beginning of the fighting, you say no conscripts who responded to
14 mobilisation were treated differently based on their ethnicity. Could we
15 see page 2 of the English of that and still on the same page and page 4
16 of the B/C/S. It's on the same passage. And it states, Basara states,
17 we had to resort to trickery to make it possible for us to arm Serbs
18 publicly and legally. A story was invented that the commander of the
19 1st Krajina Corps ordered that the 6th be promoted from a light to an
20 infantry brigade so that it could have up to 15 battalions and could be
21 additionally mobilised as soon as possible. To prevent Muslims and
22 Croats from joining the brigade, it was said that the brigade would be
23 going to Kupres as long as mobilisation was completed.
24 So in fact, Mr. Tadic, contrary to your statement, Muslims and
25 Croats were actively being prevented from joining your brigade; isn't
1 that correct?
2 A. This is a different period altogether. I was talking about the
3 mobilisation of the Yugoslav People's Army, the units of the
4 Yugoslav People's Army, when I was the battalion commander. That was
5 June and July 1991. By organised political activity of the SDA and the
6 HDZ, the Muslims and Croats were leaving the units, and the crying, when
7 I cried when what I referred to before, I was really deeply saddened by
8 the fact that my deputy commander was leaving me and the unit. That was
9 in September 1991. Namely, the leadership of the Muslims and Croats
10 wanted their conscripts not to do service, not to go to the
11 Yugoslav People's Army because their plan was that there should be no
12 Yugoslavia. That is why -- that is how they made the army Serbian, in
14 Q. In response to question 2, you say -- you discuss the events that
15 were happening at the end of May and you say, all this indicated that
16 Muslims and Croats illegally armed, although some responded to the 1991
17 mobilisation, they were increasingly leaving the unit. Now, it's true,
18 isn't it, that Muslims and Croats who were leaving the unit at the end of
19 May 1992 were leaving the unit because of its attacks on the Muslim
20 population in that area?
21 A. Yes, but this was not at all about Muslims and Croats leaving
22 because that was a year -- half a year before. That was in the summer
23 and autumn of 1991. They actually obeyed their own leaderships, both the
24 Muslims and the Croats, they just wouldn't and did not respond to the
25 mobilisation, to the call-up. And those who still believed in
1 Yugoslavia, a little at least, they also left and that is how the Serb
2 army was created.
3 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have P3662.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Seventeen, line 17, it is stated
7 "yes, yes, but," and what he actually said, "then." He didn't say "yes,
8 yes," "da, da," he said "tada" which is "then," at that time.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
10 MS. McKENNA:
11 Q. Mr. Tadic, this is a document dated the 31st of May, 1992. It's
12 a 1st Krajina Corps command report to the SRBiH army Main Staff. And
13 could we see page 2 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, please. And
14 I'd like to focus your attention on section 5(b) halfway through it, and
15 it states: After the actions in Kozarac, Kljuc and Sanski Most, some
16 conscripts of Muslim nationality have asked to be released from their
17 units. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the massive destruction
18 of their towns.
19 Now, it's true, isn't it, that Muslims in the Sanski Most area
20 left the JNA because of the JNA's massive destruction of their towns?
21 A. These were just several soldiers who joined this young officer
22 who was the only one who remained till the end and he was in Jasenovac
23 and then came to Sanski Most. So we are talking about just a small
24 number of soldiers, I cannot say exactly, between 10 and 20 soldiers were
25 in question.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, we will come back to the issue of the massive
2 destruction of Muslim towns. But, briefly, you stayed in -- or you refer
3 to the corridor through Posavina in your answers to questions 5 and 6.
4 This corridor was -- or the establishment of this corridor was a key
5 strategic goal for the VRS from its establishment. From the
6 establishment of the VRS, the Posavina corridor was a key strategic goal;
7 isn't that correct?
8 A. That is the essence of the evil, which in quotation marks, the
9 international community, and I say the West, actually inflicted on us.
10 It was all well thought beforehand in order to place the Serbs in a
11 disadvantaged position. That is why sanctions were imposed on Serbs,
12 that is why Serbs were bombed, that is why Serbian babies died because
13 they could not get oxygen.
14 Q. I'm sorry, but my question is, isn't it correct that it was a key
15 strategic goal of the VRS to establish the Posavina corridor?
16 A. That is what I'm saying. So those who actually created this
17 strife in Yugoslavia, those, they who planned the war, they are the ones
18 who actually charged us with the task of having to survive, to breach
19 this corridor of life in order to be able to reach food, medicaments and
20 everything which is necessary for a human being to survive.
21 Q. Mr. Tadic, do you agree that the establishment of the Posavina
22 corridor was a key strategic military goal for the VRS, yes or no?
23 A. Yes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript. That is precisely what
25 the problem is. In line 6 and 7, an entire sentence -- the witness said
1 the entire Krajina was cut off and there was no -- there is no reference
2 to that sentence. The entire Krajina was cut off.
3 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm having said that, Mr. Tadic?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But this is the intention of
5 those who actually planned to destroy our country.
6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
7 MS. McKENNA:
8 Q. Mr. Tadic I'd like to look at the operations that were conducted
9 in pursuit of that goal, and specifically the operations that the
10 6th Brigade and your battalion were involved in. Now, we've seen that
11 you arrived in Sanski Most with your unit on the 3rd of April. It's
12 correct, isn't it, that on the 19th of April, together with the TO and
13 other Serb forces, the 6th Brigade conducted an armed attack on the
14 municipality building?
15 A. Then, and I said this before, I came from the military hospital
16 in Sarajevo where I had been from 17 March until 2 April, and after
17 getting just a little bit of treatment, I was no longer a battalion
18 commander, I was assistant brigade commander for morale and religious
19 affairs. And that's why I went touring Muslim villages to tell people to
20 save peace. And later, I went --
21 Q. As assistant brigade commander for morale and religious affairs,
22 were you aware of the military operations that the 6th Brigade was
23 engaged in?
24 A. Superficially. I didn't know anything in detail because I wasn't
25 still quite well. I had just been discharged from the hospital.
1 Q. Okay, well --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript. The witness didn't say
3 "I didn't know anything in detail." He said "I didn't know in detail."
4 JUDGE KWON: I don't see any difference. Shall we continue?
5 THE ACCUSED: Concerns credibility of witness.
6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.
7 MS. McKENNA:
8 Q. Can you confirm that the 6th Brigade was involved in the attack
9 on the municipality building on the 19th of April, yes or no?
10 A. At that time, I was in Palanka and I was not au courant at all.
11 I was sick and far from there, and I was not privy to the details.
12 Q. So if I understand your answer, you're saying that you did not
13 know that on the 19th of April, your brigade was involved in an attack on
14 the municipality building; is that correct?
15 A. I heard about that later, but I did not take part in it and
16 I wasn't even informed during those few days because we were cut off. We
17 were in Palanka, that's 25 kilometres to the west. We were not in a
18 position to know the details.
19 Q. Were you also informed that the 6th Brigade was involved in the
20 take-over of power in Kljuc from the 7th to the 10th of May? Were you
21 informed of that?
22 A. I know they went to Kljuc. I know that much.
23 Q. Is that a yes, they were involved in the take-over of power in
25 A. It's the place where soldiers of the Yugoslav People's Army were
1 ambushed and killed by organised Muslim paramilitary units, and we, as
2 the only armed force, up until the recognition of Yugoslavia by that West
3 who was planning its break-up, the Muslims and Croats had been secretly
4 preparing for that, that's why they attacked convoys and columns and
5 provoked conflicts.
6 Q. Mr. Tadic, I believe the ambushes to which you're referring,
7 purported ambushes, happened at the end of May. I'm asking you about
8 incidents at the start of May. I'm asking you to confirm whether, from
9 the 7th to 10th of May, 1992, the 6th Brigade was involved in the
10 take-over of power in Kljuc.
11 A. I cannot really say that it was at that time, really not.
12 Q. Let's talk about their later activities. Can you confirm that
13 from the 25th of May to the 4th of June, the 6th Brigade was involved in
14 a comprehensive operation to mop up the terrain and disarm non-Serbs in
15 Sanski Most municipality?
16 A. I know work had been done to seize illegally owned weapons from
17 Muslims and Croats, and that went rather peacefully except that
18 occasionally incidents happened. One soldier was killed in Trnovo
19 village. I said that in my statement, at the check-point.
20 Q. Let's talk about these rather peaceful operations to which you
21 refer. The comprehensive operation to mop up the terrain - for the
22 parties' reference that's P3663 - started with a joint JNA-TO attack on
23 Mahala and the surrounding settlements on the 26th of May. Do you recall
25 A. As I was saying, I was in Palanka at the time and I still wasn't
1 well enough. I hadn't completely recovered. And the assistant for moral
2 guidance and religious affairs was not obliged to be present except on
3 the commander's orders, not at discussions of combat activities.
4 Q. While you may not have been present, did you hear, as this
5 Trial Chamber has heard, that Serb soldiers forced Mahala residents to
6 gather at a training ground and then the village was shelled by the
7 6th Brigade, businesses were blown up and house burned down selectively?
8 Did you hear of that?
9 A. All sorts of things could be heard, but I didn't take part in
10 that and I cannot talk about it.
11 Q. Well, a witness in the Brdjanin case, Mr. Besim Islamcevic places
12 you in Mahala and says that you were one of the ones going from house to
13 house in Mahala saying which ones should be burned down and which ones
15 A. No. Never in my life had that thought crossed my mind, let alone
16 that I would have done it.
17 Q. Mr. Tadic, the operation at Mahala which you have -- well, let
18 me -- let me ask you to clarify: Did you at the time hear of the
19 operation at Mahala?
20 A. I did, I did.
21 Q. And were you aware, or can you confirm, that the operation
22 involved the detention of thousands of unarmed civilians, didn't it?
23 A. I heard later that in order to protect them from combat, they
24 were placed in some sort of gym or hall.
25 Q. It's correct, isn't it, that as part of that operation, thousands
1 of unarmed civilians were detained?
2 A. I could not confirm the number. I know there was a certain
4 Q. Well, can you confirm that many civilians were killed in this
6 A. I cannot.
7 Q. Were you aware at the time -- is that -- are you saying -- is it
8 your evidence that you were unaware that civilians were killed in this
10 A. I can't recall now. I can't remember at all that I was aware of
11 it, even a few days later, that some people had been killed because I did
12 come to Sanski Most later.
13 Q. So just to clarify, what date did you come to Sanski Most on?
14 A. I can't say that. I don't know. When the situation calmed down,
15 I was not able to go to work through Gornji and Donji Kamengrad because
16 the Muslims were there and it was very risky to go to work that way
17 because at that time, that was the crossing. I was assistant commander
18 for moral guidance at the time, and about to join the
19 Secretariat for National Defence, so that was the transition period in
20 which I was not informed well enough, nor did I have firsthand knowledge
21 about it.
22 Q. And yet you're informed well enough to sit here and testify
23 before this Trial Chamber that the operations were conducted peacefully
24 when there is evidence before the Trial Chamber that this brutal
25 operation on Mahala in which your brigade was involved, involved the
1 detention of thousands of civilians and the killing of numerous unarmed
3 A. I cannot confirm that. I only know that a few soldiers were
4 killed, one of them was even slaughtered, butchered, and I personally
5 organised his funeral.
6 Q. Now, the 6th Brigade operations continued after Mahala and they
7 were involved in the attacks on the villages of Hrustovo and Vrhpolje;
8 isn't that correct?
9 A. That's when that thing happened with those soldiers. I believe
10 that was the end of May, I can't be sure.
11 Q. And in answer to question 39, you state that the 6th Brigade
12 advocated that members of the unit should be punished if they committed
13 crimes against non-Serbs. Mr. Tadic, the Trial Chamber has heard
14 evidence that, on the 31st of May, members of 6th Brigade unit entered
15 Begici, near Vrhpolje, rounded up its inhabitants, took the men to
16 Vrhpolje bridge, killing some along the way, and then at the bridge the
17 men were forced to jump off and were shot at as they did. And at least
18 28 Muslim men were killed on that day. Now, no one was ever charged for
19 this incident, were they?
20 A. I cannot confirm that.
21 Q. Well, what about an incident on the same date that involved the
22 shooting of unarmed civilians in Hrustovo where the 6th Brigade soldiers
23 were involved in the shooting of women and children who were taking
24 shelter in a garage in Hrustovo? Was anyone charged for that incident?
25 A. I cannot confirm what happened either, nor can I confirm whether
1 something had been done about it, but I know that in that specific case,
2 some Serbs, beginning with Kajtez, were prosecuted.
3 Q. Let's talk about Kajtez. There is evidence before the
4 Trial Chamber that he was taken into custody by the Banja Luka military
5 court on the 7th of December, 1992, for the killing of seven Croatian
6 villagers. And from the beginning, he and his co-accused admitted to the
7 murder, and yet their detention was suspended less than one month later,
8 on the 22nd of January, 1993 - for the parties' reference that's P3621 -
9 and the defendants stated -- or the record stated that the defendants
10 stated that they wanted to return to their unit.
11 Now, a military court releasing a confessed murderer to return to
12 his unit doesn't suggest a desire to properly bring him to justice, does
14 A. I cannot confirm that. I really don't know the truth about that.
15 Throughout that time, I was working on mobilisation and commandeering of
16 resources. I was not involved in that part of the brigade's work.
17 Q. And yet it's your position, it's your evidence before this
18 Trial Chamber, that the brigade advocated that all members of the unit
19 should be tried if they committed crimes against non-Serbs. Now, the
20 civilian authorities and the 6th Brigade leadership were aware of the
21 crimes committed against non-Serbs by Kajtez, weren't they?
22 A. While I was assistant for moral guidance and religious affairs,
23 whenever I spoke I told our troops too that every crime will have to be
24 answered for, first before God and then before people. They should be
25 concerned more for their soul than their bodies. I never supported and
1 never said anything different.
2 Q. It's your evidence, Mr. Tadic, that the brigade advocated that
3 all crimes against non-Serbs be prosecuted. I'd like to direct your
12 MS. McKENNA:
13 Q. Mr. Tadic, this is a letter of the SDS Sanski Most municipal
14 board sent to the Banja Luka military court dated the
15 10th of September, 1993, and I should say just to clarify that the
16 military court ordered detention for Mr. Kajtez again on the
17 9th of July, 1993. And this letter if we will see from the signature --
18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I'm wondering if we
19 should go into private session for a moment.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Out of an abundance of caution we will go into
21 private session.
22 [Private session] [Confidentiality partially lifted by order of Chamber]
10 MS. McKENNA: Yes, and this will be the final document for today.
11 I'm sorry.
12 Q. So if we can look at the signatures on this letter we'll see that
13 it is signed by Vlado Verkes, who was the president of the Sanski Most
14 SDS municipal board and a Crisis Staff member, and Captain Ostoja Cukov,
15 who was commander of the 4th Battalion of the 6th Krajina Brigade. If
16 you could go back to the first page, the third paragraph of this letter,
17 and this also responds to Mr. Karadzic's question, states that Kajtez was
18 a member of the 6th Krajina Brigade, he took part in the fighting in
19 Sanski Most and neighbouring municipalities in the corridor and on other
20 battlefields. It states that in carrying out combat tasks, he showed
21 exceptional courage and determination as a soldier of the
22 Army of Republika Srpska, and in -- at the conclusion of the document in
23 the next page, it states, the tragedy of the Serbian people and his
24 family in the Second World War and in this war have left visible traces
25 on Kajtez's mental state and we would like you to take this into account
1 and pass fair judgement on him.
2 So, Mr. Tadic, it's not true, is it, that the brigade advocated
3 that crimes against non-Serbs be punished? The truth is that the
4 leadership in the brigade lobbied for Kajtez, a self-confessed killer of
5 Muslims and Croats, to be treated leniently. That's the truth, isn't it?
6 A. It's enough to look at this explanation, how many members of his
7 family were killed by Ustashas. Obviously that can leave serious
8 consequences on the psyche, not that I'm justifying anything like that,
9 but because I have no direct knowledge, I can give no further comment.
10 Q. Well, in fact, contrary to your evidence, despite your claim to
11 have no direct knowledge now, contrary to your evidence and your
12 statement, Kajtez was not tried by Republika Srpska courts but was
13 released on the 14th of March, 1995. That's correct, isn't it?
14 A. [No interpretation]
15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not hear the witness.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I only know that there was a trial.
17 MS. McKENNA:
18 Q. Mr. Kajtez [sic], there was a trial in 2006 by the BiH state
19 court but you're not aware of any previous trial, are you?
20 A. I heard that he had confessed and that court proceedings had
21 started, and that's what I said in my statement. We were trying to
22 inflict as little evil on others because any evil you do unto others you
23 do unto yourself, in fact. That's how I always acted and what I always
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tadic, do you agree that Mr. Verkes and
1 Captain Cukov sent this letter to the military court?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see they did. And they tried to
3 mitigate his guilt by the mental stress caused by what had been done to
4 his nearest and dearest in World War II.
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we continue tomorrow, Ms. McKenna?
14 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tadic, we will continue tomorrow morning at
16 9.00, but I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about
17 your testimony while you are giving evidence here. Do you understand
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
20 JUDGE KWON: Hearing is adjourned.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.53 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 4th day of
23 December, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.