131212IT

Page 45014

1 and was not aware of any plan to commit crimes in connection with these

2 combat activities. He had no contact with President Radovan Karadzic,

3 and President Karadzic did not issue any orders to him or his brigade.

4 Colonel Blagojevic was unaware of any plan to execute prisoners from

5 Srebrenica. He states that the claim of Momir Nikolic that on the

6 evening of 12th of July, 1995, Nikolic informed Colonel Blagojevic of the

7 plan to execute prisoners is a lie. Colonel Blagojevic did not see

8 Momir Nikolic on the evening of 12th of July. During the Srebrenica

9 operation, combat activities, Momir Nikolic did not report to

10 Colonel Blagojevic but acted under the direction of the Main Staff's

11 security organs presents at the terrain.

12 [Interpretation] At this moment, I have no questions for

13 Colonel Blagojevic.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

15 Mr. Blagojevic, as you have noted, your evidence-in-chief in this

16 case has been admitted in writing, that is through your written

17 statement, in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will be

18 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor. Do

19 you understand that?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. McCloskey, please proceed.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,

23 Your Honours, Dr. Karadzic, everyone.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

25 Q. Colonel, it's been sometime. Can you acknowledge that you were

Page 45015

1 convicted in this court under what was at the time known as count 3,

2 murder as a crime against humanity; count 4, murder as a violation of the

3 laws or customs of war; and count 5, persecutions as a crime against

4 humanity; and count 6, inhumane acts which was defined as forcible

5 transfer? Do you acknowledge your convictions for those crimes?

6 A. I was unfortunately convicted in that trial but it was an unfair

7 trial. It was an unfair process, for the following reasons: My right to

8 defence was jeopardised. I did not have a defence in that trial. Also,

9 during the proceedings, my elementary, my fundamental, right to a fair

10 trial was violated. I'll give you just one example out of a series of

11 examples that one would need to have a legal training for, is that I was

12 not able to testify. My right to testify in my defence was violated. As

13 I understand it, it could be incomprehensible to the Court but that's

14 what happened to me. Perhaps later, if I have an opportunity, I can give

15 you a short overview of how it impacted on the way I'm serving my

16 sentence. If you have time, you will give me an opportunity to tell you

17 about this.

18 Q. Excuse me, Colonel. Colonel, it's your duty in this

19 Trial Chamber to answer my questions. And you're always able to explain

20 your answers. As you know, Dr. Karadzic will be able to ask you

21 questions as well which may go to some of the areas that you're concerned

22 with, but right now you need to answer my questions, okay?

23 JUDGE KWON: And also please bear in mind it is a serious

24 criminal trial against Mr. Karadzic.

25 Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

Page 45016

1 MR. McCLOSKEY:

2 Q. Now, in paragraph 6 --

3 A. Let me just complete my answer. You did ask me a question.

4 JUDGE KWON: I think you answered the question, but if you'd like

5 to add anything, please be brief, Mr. Blagojevic.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will be brief, but for my answer

7 to be complete on the previous question, I just wanted to say that it was

8 a kind of joint criminal enterprise by the Prosecution and the so-called

9 defence which resulted in my conviction, and now I've answered.

10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

11 Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

12 MR. McCLOSKEY:

13 Q. So you were the victim here, Colonel?

14 A. Unfortunately, yes.

15 Q. In paragraph 6 of your statement you, in fact, say that it was

16 Mr. Butler's report that violated your most basic right, and you referred

17 to this, and the Trial Chamber -- and the Judges of the Chamber. And you

18 say, and I quote:

19 "Unfortunately this practice of torture and revanchism continued

20 while I was serving my sentence."

21 So I just wanted to add that that completes your answer to my

22 question, I take it?

23 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload the statement? I'm not sure I have

24 the most recent version. Is it paragraph 6, Mr. McCloskey?

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, I hope I have the -- I know there was

Page 45017

1 versions being passed around. It's under the section "would you like to

2 add anything else," the one that I had.

3 JUDGE KWON: I don't see such a paragraph in the statement. Can

4 we upload it.

5 MR. ROBINSON: I think Mr. McCloskey may be working from a

6 different version. The final statement was distributed to all of the

7 parties after the proofing and that paragraph was deleted, or that

8 language was deleted from paragraph 6.

9 JUDGE KWON: So this is the difficulty Mr. Tieger is confronting

10 every day.

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: I see that. Well, I think we've got this in the

12 record, and I'll go on, if that's all right.

13 JUDGE KWON: Please go on.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY:

15 Q. Sir, do you feel that the -- do you acknowledge crimes were

16 committed in Srebrenica but that they were committed by individuals and

17 uncontrolled groups?

18 A. On this issue, I can tell you this: Speaking of crimes,

19 especially murder, I condemn every crime, especially killing, and

20 particularly of vulnerable, unprotected victims such as women and

21 children, or any person who does not represent a danger. My view is that

22 the people who committed that, which is a violation of the law, should be

23 prosecuted and punished. As far as Srebrenica is concerned, what really

24 happened, I cannot be the judge of that. I can only speak about my unit,

25 which was fully under my command, for which I was fully responsible and

Page 45018

1 for all of its acts, as its commander. For all other cases, which went

2 beyond my command, I cannot talk about them. I cannot say what crimes

3 were committed, when, where, by whom. We may know more when this

4 Tribunal provides a certain picture.

5 Q. Do you believe the Srebrenica crimes were committed by

6 individuals and uncontrolled groups? Do you stand by those words?

7 A. It's a possibility. It's a possibility. Very probably. Because

8 at that time, it was possible in that chaos for such groups and such

9 individuals to act.

10 Q. Do you think it's really possible that over 7.000 men and boys

11 could be rounded up, detained, transported, summarily executed, and

12 buried in a matter of four days, 13, 14, 15, 16 July, could that really

13 have been done by individuals and uncontrolled groups? You're a military

14 man. Come on. Give us some truth.

15 A. Yes, I'm an officer. I can tell you that considering that I had

16 no knowledge about these things beyond the tasks given to my brigade, and

17 which I endeavoured to carry out as best I could, abiding by the

18 regulations that prevailed at the time over the army, I cannot be the

19 judge of what happened outside of that. I cannot say whether something

20 is possible or not. I have certain experience here, and I can tell you

21 with what I know that what I thought was impossible did actually happen,

22 so it is possible. It is not possible to make an efficient judgement or

23 reason effectively without -- on the basis of speculation.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes?

Page 45019

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 6, 5 and 6, the witness said

2 that: What I thought was impossible turned out to be possible, rather

3 than proved to be possible.

4 JUDGE KWON: I think it's reflected in the transcript correctly.

5 Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY:

7 Q. Colonel, roughly how many Muslim men and boys were detained in

8 and around Bratunac on the 12th and 13th of July?

9 A. How do you mean how many? You mean a number?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. You're asking me?

12 Q. Yes, this Court knows that your headquarters is right in Bratunac

13 town. They know how small it is. They know all the schools where the

14 prisoners were staying. They know a lot. And so I'm asking you: You

15 were there, you had a front-row desk, how many?

16 A. I did not know that and I did not have an overview of the

17 situation, did not have insight, and I just want to add to what I've said

18 before. You would know better about these things if you had a military

19 expert regarding the place and role of my brigade. The fact that there

20 wasn't one leaves room for speculation. Of the so-called defence,

21 I won't even speak.

22 Q. All right, Colonel, let's go on. Let's go on. Let's go over

23 what you may have known throughout some of the relevant time periods of

24 this indictment that are related to Srebrenica which was the culmination

25 of it. You've told us you started your career at the beginning of the

Page 45020

1 war in the VRS, is that correct, in the spring of 1992?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And what unit and where were you located in the spring of 1992?

4 April, May, June?

5 A. Not April, May. Starting with 15 May 1992, that's the date when

6 I reported to the command of the East Bosnia Corps.

7 Q. What town?

8 A. I think it was Ugljevik. That was the command post of the corps.

9 Q. And what job were you given?

10 A. At that time, I was perhaps not so much occupied with a specific

11 task but I was part of the operative section of the command.

12 Q. And did you become commander of the Zvornik Brigade of the

13 East Bosnia Corps?

14 A. The corps command tasked me with trying to form the

15 Zvornik Brigade as an organised unit, and I was there for perhaps two and

16 a half months. That's perhaps from the end of May until, I don't know

17 which exact date in July. I cannot tell you exactly.

18 Q. So if you were in the operations of East Bosnia Corps beginning

19 in May in Ugljevik near -- not far from Zvornik and then you were trying

20 to organise the Zvornik Brigade for the next couple of months, you were

21 very present and on the ground during those days when Arkan and others

22 arrived in the area, weren't you?

23 A. That's not true.

24 Q. When did you go -- you said you started at the Drina Corps when

25 it was formed. You agree with me that it was formed November 1st, 1992?

Page 45021

1 A. Maybe. I don't have the exact date. That information must be

2 somewhere but I would need to be reminded.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we have 65 ter 25558.

4 Q. You can see under paragraph 1 of this order from the Main Staff,

5 it's in the name of Ratko Mladic on the next page, talks about forming

6 the Drina Corps from parts of the East Bosnia Corps, the

7 Sarajevo Romanija, Herzegovina Corps from 1 November 1992. Does that

8 help refresh your recollection?

9 A. Yes, I see that in the first paragraph. I see what's written.

10 It doesn't particularly concern me.

11 Q. You've got to answer the question, Colonel. Does that refresh

12 your recollection as to when the Drina Corps was started?

13 A. Yes. I'm saying I see that on the screen here, but to me it's

14 just a piece of information. I don't know what else to tell you.

15 Q. So if you started at the Drina Corps the same time it started,

16 you would have been working at the Drina Corps in November 1992?

17 A. No, no. In November 1992 I was not in the Drina Corps.

18 Q. So when were you at the Drina Corps? Your statement said you

19 started at the Drina Corps when it started.

20 A. It could have been in February or perhaps the beginning of March

21 the following year. That is 1993. February, end February, or earlier

22 March, I can't say exactly.

23 Q. All right.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this document into evidence.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

Page 45022

1 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6566, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. McCloskey, the Chamber will rise just for a

3 minute.

4 --- Break taken at 9.55 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 9.56 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: For the remainder of this session and next session,

7 we will -- we will be sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.

8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I have to say this is the first

9 time in the entire trial, I believe, that Judge Baird has not been with

10 us. I don't recall any other time that he's been absent. We appreciate

11 all the efforts he makes.

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And can we have Exhibit 65 ter 25789 on the

14 board.

15 Q. And, Colonel, this is a document we got from the Drina Corps

16 archives that is something you'll be familiar with. It's a list of the

17 duty officers for the Drina Corps, and it's for March - we can see that

18 in the Serbian - 1993. And if you go midway down, go past

19 Major Nedjo Blagojevic, down a bit farther, and you'll see a

20 V Blagojevic. It looks like lieutenant-colonel. Does that help you

21 remember that you were, in fact, in the Drina Corps acting in -- well,

22 you were on the duty officer roster in March 1993, like you'd remembered?

23 A. Yes, that's what I said. I agree. Whether it was the end of

24 February or the beginning of March, but I've answered this.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this into evidence.

Page 45023

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY:

3 Q. It's just to back you up, Colonel.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit P6567.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY:

6 Q. What was your job? We see "referent," referred to operations

7 section. Can you tell us what position you held? You were a

8 lieutenant-colonel. So in March of 1993, what was your assignment, what

9 was your position in the Drina Corps?

10 A. I was an operations officer in the operations organ, in the

11 command of the Drina Corps responsible for certain tasks at the command.

12 Q. What kind of tasks?

13 A. I could name a few of them now; for example, preparing certain

14 documents, reports, keeping certain records, duty service, participating

15 in the making of the working map, and as required, getting involved in

16 certain tasks according to the plan handed down by the command.

17 I cannot tell you exactly. It depended on the situation on the

18 ground and at the command. But my activities were mostly within the

19 framework I described.

20 Q. And when you got orders from your commander that were to go, be

21 sent out to the brigade, did you sometimes help draft those orders and

22 write them up so that they would go to the brigade in a proper format?

23 A. Yes. I took part in such situations at all, generally speaking.

24 I was one of the desk officers. There were a number of desk officers

25 assisting the chief of operations, and it all depended on what role he

Page 45024

1 would give me. It depended on his decision. I never had a specific

2 role.

3 Q. Who was the chief of operations and training in March of 1993?

4 Your direct boss?

5 A. Yes, I have to remember now. At least two or three changed but

6 I think I won't make a mistake if I say that at first, when I started, it

7 was Colonel, at the time, and later on he was deputy commander in the

8 Sarajevo Corps, Milosevic. He was a colonel at the time, I think, but --

9 Q. Would that be Dragomir Milosevic, who later on commanded the

10 Sarajevo Romanija Corps?

11 A. I think Dragomir, yes, that's right, yes. Yes, yes, yes. That's

12 who I mean. But I think that after that, Lazic came. Now what was his

13 first name, Milan? Was he a colonel? I cannot tell you exactly. Maybe

14 Milenko, right, right.

15 Q. Now, in 1993, those first months that you were there, March,

16 April, May, tell us how many people, how many officers, were actually in

17 the operations unit of the Drina Corps? We know you had a commander and

18 we know you, you call yourself a desk officer or we hear as a referent or

19 admin officer, who else? What other officers were part of the operations

20 unit?

21 A. Well, I cannot tell you precisely right now, a military expert

22 would have to do that for you and then you'd have a clear picture. Now,

23 for me to try to get bits and pieces out of my head, what was there, what

24 happened, I'd need a longer period of time to prepare but there were

25 several officers who were in this operations organ. How do I put this?

Page 45025

1 This is always a very strong organ within the command and the actual

2 personnel changed. They would have other tasks, these officers, in the

3 command, and so on. However, the intention was for as few as possible of

4 them to stay on in the command. This were several of them, about ten, I

5 don't know really.

6 Q. Was Jocic one of them?

7 A. Jocic? I don't remember that last name.

8 Q. All right. You can't name one person, one other officer, that

9 you shared your wartime offices with?

10 A. No, sorry. Sorry. All right. All right. You said "Jocic" but

11 I think it was "Jocic," Colonel Jocic, not "Jocic," "Jocic."

12 Q. Besides him, what other officers can you name?

13 A. The command [Realtime transcript read in error "commander"] of

14 the Drina Corps?

15 Q. No, I wanted the operations branch. But let's go on, if you

16 can't tell me any.

17 THE ACCUSED: Sorry, sorry, it was question in line 20, in the

18 command, do you mean in the command of the Drina Corps?

19 MR. McCLOSKEY:

20 Q. Unless you know any other officers in the operations branch,

21 besides Jocic, you can't name anyone else of your wartime colleagues in

22 the operations? Colonel, our records indicate you were understaffed and

23 you had very few; is that right?

24 A. Yes, that's right. There were always very few people or there

25 were not enough.

Page 45026

1 Q. All right. I want to show you a map graphic. It's

2 Exhibit 65 ter 03205. It was something that the Office of the Prosecutor

3 drew up, you may remember it from your trial.

4 A. [No interpretation]

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the

6 witness.

7 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Blagojevic.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean what I said just now?

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please. The interpreters didn't hear your

10 answer.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said, you mean unfair trial?

12 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY:

14 Q. All right. Colonel, this is just meant to give us some idea of

15 the Drina Corps zone of responsibility which is in yellow. You don't

16 need to really even read the English. And then we see the enclaves of

17 Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, and this is for the time period 1995, and

18 does that roughly fit your recollection as to the Muslim-held areas of

19 the enclave in the Drina Corps in 1995?

20 A. 1995?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Well, maybe over here in my view, the factual situation on the

23 ground was that these enclaves, Srebrenica and Zepa in a way, were linked

24 up. Otherwise, that's it. The picture is all right.

25 Q. All right.

Page 45027

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would offer that into evidence.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will receive it.

3 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6568, Your Honours.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, that's all -- I didn't realise it's

5 already an Exhibit P04941, page 6 of e-court.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY:

8 Q. Now, Colonel, I just put this up here to get -- get that view of

9 the Drina Corps in our heads, but now I want to go back to our

10 chronology, back to 1993. By 1993, you would know that there was much

11 larger areas of Muslim-held territory in the area of the Drina Corps;

12 correct?

13 A. Yes. The area was larger.

14 Q. All right. Let's go to a VRS map, Exhibit 65 ter 25786. And

15 this is a map that we obtained from the Drina Corps. It's a VRS map.

16 And hopefully our memories will allow us to see that this is the same

17 basic shape as the map graphic that I had shown, and while it's not

18 overly clear, up in the left corner we can see that there are dates up

19 there, January 1, 1993, looks like 28 February 1993. Can you just for

20 us, can you just read the Cyrillic up in the left-hand corner so we just

21 know what this says?

22 A. Upper left-hand corner?

23 Q. Yes, please.

24 A. "Work map of the staff. That's the work map of the staff,

25 command of the Drina Corps. Beginning the 1st of the 1st, 1993. The

Page 45028

1 1st of January, 1993, and 28th of February, 1993."

2 Q. Now if we could go back out a little bit, please, so we can see

3 these blue areas. Now, you did say you took part in the working maps and

4 while this is for the period just ending before you got there, can you

5 tell us, these areas outlined in blue, is it the areas -- are those areas

6 that were still held by the Muslim forces in 1993?

7 A. Well, quite possibly. This does correspond to the factual

8 situation on the ground. I cannot strictly say yes now. But possibly it

9 would correspond to the factual situation on the ground at the time.

10 Q. And there were also thousands of Muslim civilians living in

11 villages and towns within the areas outlined in blue, weren't there?

12 A. Well, there were civilians living there but I cannot give you any

13 relevant figures as to how many. But there were armed formations too, at

14 any rate, and --

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the

16 sentence.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY:

18 Q. They didn't hear your end of the sentence. Could you say it over

19 again?

20 A. I'm saying that there were armed formations too, and then that

21 can also be linked to the population.

22 Q. Yes. And as the Drina Corps, it was their job, specifically the

23 operations job, to know information for map drawing, for report writing,

24 for order passing, to know about the armed formations; correct?

25 A. Part of it is correct, but most of it is not exactly correct.

Page 45029

1 Because it's not only the operations organ that takes part in the work of

2 the command, many other organs do too and then all information is

3 completed and then the final product is the final document.

4 Q. And correct. So as well as the armed formations, was it

5 important for the command to be aware of the civilians, their numbers and

6 their locations?

7 A. Well, probably for some structures in the command. Now, I cannot

8 give you a strict answer to that question that you put.

9 Q. For you, in operations, was it important to know where the

10 civilians were and their rough numbers, especially as you have said they

11 are associated with the armed groups?

12 A. For me as an operations officer, it was important to know where

13 the possible enemy objectives were, and that is to say units, and their

14 combat resources. That was the danger for the army that I belonged to

15 primarily. And that was the criterion for my involvement in that work

16 primarily.

17 Q. Where, if anywhere --

18 JUDGE MORRISON: Sorry, Mr. McCloskey. Can I just clarify one

19 thing with the witness?

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Please.

21 JUDGE MORRISON: Were these maps intended to be strategic maps or

22 tactical maps? Both?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, yes, yes. The corps is an

24 operative level of command so these maps were made at that level. They

25 can be operative tactical ones too. However, they are not tactical, but

Page 45030

1 at an operative level, yes.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY:

3 Q. And, Colonel, I want to just ask you about where civilians fit

4 in. You told me your main concern was -- the main threat was from the

5 armed forces. Where, if anywhere, did the numbers and locations of

6 civilians fit into your work?

7 A. Look, I have to repeat part of my answer again. Danger for me as

8 an officer in the unit that I belonged to are the armed forces of the

9 enemy, not the civilians. I'm just saying that. The armed units and

10 their combat resources, their equipment. If I knew that, then I was

11 okay.

12 Q. So you could -- once you knew that and you knew that threat and

13 you could recommend commanders to take out that threat, that's what

14 you -- that was part of your job?

15 A. I could give a recommendation to the head of the operations

16 organ.

17 Q. So it may be naive of me but shouldn't you know where civilians

18 are before you attack the -- what you believe are the armed forces?

19 A. I can tell you that civilians are an important thing to know

20 about, but probably these civilians, due to their personal assessments

21 with regard to their safety and security, et cetera, were at a certain

22 distance away from these armed units, for different reasons. So the

23 other side probably took care of that too. However, my knowledge of the

24 deployment of the armed formations of the enemy is my primary task, and

25 I, as an officer, cannot assume that there, where the armed forces are,

Page 45031

1 or, for example, where an enemy nest was observed, from where a

2 machine-gun was operating or another bigger, say, artillery piece --

3 I mean, if the enemy were to bring a number of civilians to keep them

4 there in their immediate vicinity, no, that is unnatural, impossible,

5 illogical. They have to be at a safe distance. I, as a member of the

6 other side, took up positions and I aim at enemy targets. That's what

7 I was taught at school. I cannot present any different kind of science

8 now.

9 Q. All right, Colonel. I think you'll agree with me that we see

10 this blue on this map and that by organised operations of the VRS, from

11 the period where you were at the Drina Corps, and a bit before, engaged

12 in these Muslim forces and defeated them to the point where the enclaves

13 were created and the Muslims were restricted to the area of the map we

14 just saw from 1995. Can you agree with me on that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And so, you'll also agree with me, I think, that there are no

17 more civilians left in these other areas, all the civilians were either

18 in the enclaves or over in the rest of the BiH territory, Muslim

19 civilians, that is; correct?

20 A. Well, possibly. But I cannot claim with certainty where they

21 went or where they -- I mean, or if somebody stayed on. I cannot claim

22 anything to you with certainty, but in principle that would be it. It

23 could be that way.

24 Q. Colonel, there were no civilians left in the area of

25 Eastern Bosnia of the RS except in those enclaves. You know that.

Page 45032

1 A. Well, now that I hear it from you, probably it's correct.

2 Q. Okay. Let me show you a segment of a report of a UN rapporteur

3 named Mazowiecki, who described the civilian flight during this combat

4 that we've just spoke of.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we go to Exhibit 65 ter 01219A? And I --

6 JUDGE KWON: Did you mean to tender this?

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I did. Thank you, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE KWON: Do we need to put it up? Marked for identification

9 pending English translation?

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I can get some basic translations for the

11 heading so that it's more useful.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will do so.

13 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 25786 gets MFI P6568, Your Honours.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY:

15 Q. Now, Colonel, I just want to briefly look at this front page, and

16 it will not be my intention to offer this document into evidence.

17 I think you have a shortened version of something similar. But I do want

18 to ask you about some of its conclusions. We can see this -- who this is

19 from, Mr. Mazowiecki, and it's first chapter is titled: "Ethnic

20 cleansing of the eastern enclaves." And it gives the various places,

21 Cerska, Konjevic Polje, Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa, and I'm sure you'll

22 agree with me that those are the areas that were included in the blue

23 marks, in part, that we just saw on the previous map. And if we can now

24 go to the conclusion page, it should be page 18 in the English and

25 page 19 in the B/C/S, and I'm concerned with paragraph 87, in part, which

Page 45033

1 says:

2 "Massive and repeated violations of the Geneva Conventions of

3 1949 were perpetrated in recent combat in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 These were cleared out by Serb forces in Cerska, Konjevic Polje and

5 Srebrenica, and attacking and ambushing civilians attempting to flee

6 their encirclement in attacking the villages themselves, in refusing to

7 allow humanitarian aid to enter, in refusing to allow the evacuation of

8 the wounded, in attempting to link the above issues to the independent

9 question of freedom of movement for the Serbs in Tuzla."

10 This document is dated May 1993. Also, if you look briefly at

11 the next paragraph, it talks about violations of the Geneva Conventions

12 of the other side by attempting to use these same civilians as human

13 shields. So this report is giving a two-sided approach.

14 Now, you are at the -- as you've told us, since March, are at the

15 operations unit of the Drina Corps. Can you confirm that you received

16 information of these violations of the Geneva Conventions against the

17 civilians populations in these areas?

18 A. Not particularly, no. I don't remember.

19 Q. You don't remember? So it's possible it happened, you just

20 forgotten?

21 A. No, no. Quite simply I don't remember. If I don't remember

22 something, that means that this information was not there, to the best of

23 my recollection.

24 Q. Were you aware of the RS or VRS policy to force the Muslim

25 populations in these areas out of these areas?

Page 45034

1 A. I was not aware of such policy.

2 Q. Wasn't this part of the orders of the Drina Corps, to take --

3 force the Muslims -- the Muslim population, out of these areas?

4 A. Show it to me, please.

5 Q. You've seen it before, Colonel. But --

6 A. Yes. But this is an important matter, an important phrase.

7 Q. Before I show it to you, tell us what you remember about the

8 policy of your army, independent of any document. Let's forget about

9 documents for a while. What's in your memory? Remember getting a highly

10 illegal order to force Muslim population out of the area?

11 A. What order are you talking about?

12 Q. I'm talking about your memory. Do you remember any such order?

13 A. Illegal? Unlawful?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. No, none.

16 Q. All right. Let's go to P02085. And as you will see as this

17 comes up, this is from the command of the Drina Corps, dated

18 24 November 1992, just before you arrive, and of course would have been

19 applicable for the time period you're there. You will see that it's --

20 if you go to the third page in the B/C/S, it's in the name of your

21 commander, Milenko Zivanovic. And it's the position of the Prosecution

22 that this is directly related to Directive 4, which is P00976 under the

23 name of Ratko Mladic, but I won't take the time. You may recall that

24 document. And I would call your attention to this document, which came

25 out of your command with a strictly confidential number 2-126. Perhaps

Page 45035

1 you recall that the number 2 was the operative branch numbers; correct?

2 JUDGE KWON: First page.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY:

4 Q. Excuse me, the first page.

5 A. Yes, this is the second page.

6 Q. Okay. Sorry. There is the first page and we see the strictly

7 confidential number 2-126. The numbers 2 at this point in time reflected

8 they were from the operations branch; is that right?

9 A. It's possible. I can't be sure about all the numbers, but it is

10 possible that documents of this kind come or were prepared in the

11 operations branch, yes.

12 Q. And we see in paragraph 1, General Zivanovic is telling the

13 Zvornik Brigade and personally to the commander or Chief of Staff: Using

14 the main forces and equipment and active combat operations, inflict the

15 highest possible losses on the enemy, exhaust them, break them up or

16 force them to surrender. Nothing wrong with that, is there? That's what

17 you do in war sometimes?

18 A. Yes, that's how it could be. I can't tell you. I'm not familiar

19 with the document, but there you go. This is just to say something.

20 Q. This is a serious trial, Colonel. Don't just say something to

21 say something. You've been called by Dr. Karadzic, especially on this

22 question. What about the next part: And force the Muslim local

23 population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde?

24 That is criminal on its face, isn't it?

25 A. Mr. Prosecutor, a while ago, you had General Zivanovic here. Why

Page 45036

1 didn't you clarify that issue with him? Why are you clarifying this

2 issue with me? How can I tell you what was in his head, whether he had a

3 criminal mind or not.

4 Q. Colonel, take some responsibility. Take some responsibility.

5 Answer the question. You were the commander of the Bratunac Brigade.

6 You know what responsibility is. Answer the question. Is that criminal?

7 A. Please don't shout. I would ask you in the kindest possible way,

8 don't shout. It has pierced my ears. I don't know about the others.

9 I'm repeating. You had this man here. He could speak about other

10 situations. He could tell you where things led and not ask me who --

11 I was in a totally different position.

12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Blagojevic, Mr. McCloskey is not asking what

13 Mr. Zivanovic had in mind. When you read this, do you agree that this

14 sentence on its face illegal or criminal? That's the question from

15 Mr. McCloskey.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is how it may be

17 understood, but I did not know what the commander's intentions were.

18 I only knew what my task was, and I was the one who implemented the task

19 and based my decisions on that. And now as to why somebody wrote this,

20 it may have depended on the sequence of events. However, as I am looking

21 at the document, I can't tell you whether there was a criminal intent

22 behind it or not. It would show any -- a lack of any responsibility on

23 my behalf.

24 JUDGE KWON: Back to you, Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY:

Page 45037

1 Q. Was it the practice of the Drina Corps in this operation to force

2 the Muslim civilian population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa,

3 Srebrenica and Gorazde, as ordered by General Zivanovic?

4 A. On reflection, you have now made a link between Cerska, Zepa and

5 Srebrenica, and the -- there was a time difference between the three.

6 And those events did not have the same outcome -- or rather, the outcome

7 of anything was not the result of operations that happened at different

8 periods of time.

9 Q. Colonel, please answer my question. Did the Drina Corps Brigade,

10 did the Zvornik Brigade follow General Zivanovic's order here?

11 A. As part of those forces, it seems that they did, they were part

12 of the corps forces.

13 Q. I agree. Okay. Let's go to 1995 now. Just want to show you one

14 document to help us get a feel for your office in 1995. You were still

15 in the operations and training branch of the Drina Corps in 1995;

16 correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's see 65 ter 04243.

20 MR. ROBINSON: While that's coming up, Mr. President, were you

21 minded to take a break this morning?

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if it is convenient.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Of course, please. I'm sorry, I'm a little

24 confused on the break timing. Thank you for --

25 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for half an hour and resume at

Page 45038

1 10 past 11.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 11.11 a.m.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Colonel, in looking at my outline I noticed I needed to come back

7 to your convictions that I went over to clarify something, and that would

8 be that, I'm sure you'll agree to me, that the convictions I mentioned

9 for murder and persecutions were specifically related to the killings in

10 and around the Vuk Karadzic school and did not -- you were acquitted on

11 the broader charges on the overall murder operation and joint criminal

12 enterprise; is that correct?

13 A. Essentially, if you look at the judgement, you could conclude

14 that, but as to the events themselves, it's not true.

15 Q. I understand. All right. We have gotten into 1995 now in our

16 chronology and I'd like to show you a document, Exhibit 65 ter 04243, to

17 help set the scene for us. In March of 1995, you're still working as an

18 operations officer in the operations branch of the Drina Corps; correct?

19 A. Yes, in March 1995, I was still in the operations organ of the

20 command of the Drina Corps.

21 Q. And we see this document that comes out of the Drina Corps

22 command security department, interestingly under the name of

23 Milenko Lazic, who is the chief of ONO, and that is operations and

24 training branch; correct?

25 A. Yes. As far as I remember, he was in that position at that time.

Page 45039

1 Q. As I think you mentioned earlier, he was one of your bosses, so

2 at that time it's Milenko Lazic. And we see the only other persons aside

3 from Lazic and yourself from the operations unit that's on this document

4 is Colonel Predrag Jocic. Is that the person we were talking about

5 before?

6 A. Yes. I heard you say "Jocic." That confused me a bit. But

7 Jocic, when you say Jocic, I remember now, it could have been

8 Colonel Jocic.

9 Q. All right. And while the Trial Chamber has heard a bit about

10 this operation Spreca, this document speaks for itself. You were

11 obviously involved in some -- the documents relating to this operation,

12 and I won't go any further than that. Is this a true and correct

13 document, as far as you're concerned? Is that your signature there?

14 A. This could not possibly be my signature. I don't know what it

15 is. Look at it. There is no V, no B, nor anything that looks like these

16 letters. This is unlike any variant of my signature. No way. The first

17 letter here is P. Somewhere in the middle there is an M. It could be --

18 I don't know even if it's in Cyrillic or Latin letters, whether it's a P

19 or "ch" in the middle. It's impossible that I wrote this.

20 Q. But you were familiar with the documents related to the Spreca

21 operation? Again, which I'm not going to get into.

22 A. Okay, if you could put to me some basic document to remind me,

23 it's difficult to say anything on the basis of this. There is just the

24 word "Spreca." It's a code name. That's how you recognise documents.

25 I would need to see at least one basic document to remind myself of what

Page 45040

1 it was about. This reminds me of nothing in particular.

2 Q. Does it help at least remind you that your chief, Milenko Lazic,

3 was the chief in March 1995, as it's signed here?

4 A. Possibly, possibly. I don't question that. Does it say

5 operative, chief of operations? Yes.

6 Q. All right.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this into evidence, then.

8 JUDGE KWON: Could you remind me what "Spreca" means in B/C/S?

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't remember.

10 JUDGE KWON: Probably we need the assistance of the interpreters.

11 THE ACCUSED: Spreca, if I may help, is a name of a river that

12 goes towards Doboj.

13 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Blagojevic?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. My association is also with

15 the river which exists somewhere in that area.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6569, Your Honours.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.

19 Q. Now, in this early period of 1995, January, February, March, had

20 the policy and practice of the Drina Corps towards the enemy that

21 remained in the Drina Corps zone of responsibility, that is the

22 28th Division inside Srebrenica, and the Zepa Division inside Zepa and

23 the Gorazde Muslim forces, did -- as far as you knew from inside the

24 operations office, did your command have the same regard to the civilians

25 inside those enclaves as they did to the civilians inside the blue

Page 45041

1 perimeters that we saw on the map from 1993? Had anything changed from

2 Directive 4 and the document we read?

3 A. If I can speak about the Drina Corps as a whole, the attitude of

4 the Drina Corps towards those enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, was

5 conditioned by the activities, military activities, emanating from those

6 enclaves, or the rest of the front line which could have been connected

7 with what was going on in the enclaves. It is my personal conviction

8 that, as far as the civilians in the enclaves were concerned, the

9 officers, at least I, did not have any attitude other than the normal

10 attitude towards civilians, in view of the existing situation of course.

11 We have to bear in mind there was a state of war. And in my experience

12 as an operative officer, the treatment of civilians by the command was

13 conditioned exclusively by the activities emanating from those enclaves,

14 the military activities from the enclaves, or perhaps the broader area

15 and the front lines there.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 2, page 37, there was a whole

19 subclause that is missing. It says: The attitude towards civilians in

20 view of the existing situation, of course. And the subclause that is

21 missing is: Leave them to live in peace. Let them live in peace.

22 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Blagojevic?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said concerning civilians, let

24 them live in peace, in the conditions, in the circumstances that exist,

25 as dictated by the regulations, the international community, et cetera,

Page 45042

1 but the civilians do not represent a danger.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Colonel Blagojevic

3 speak into the microphone, please.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Blagojevic, for the benefit of the interpreters,

5 could you come closer to the microphone?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It's not a problem.

7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

9 Q. In that question, I appeared to have heard you say something

10 about the view of the civilians would be connected in some way to the --

11 to the Muslim army. Let me ask you this question, and maybe your answer

12 can clarify it, and I'm sure you'll agree with me that March, April, May,

13 June and even July, the 28th Division of the Bosnian army ran raids out

14 of the enclave against the demilitarise agreement, killed Serb soldiers,

15 attacked Serb villages, as part of a policy to tie down Serbian troops

16 from the Sarajevo front.

17 Now, given that was going on, all the way up to and into July, in

18 that context, you, as an operations officer, would you feel that your

19 army would be justified in taking down that army that's illegally coming

20 out of the enclave and removing the civilian population? In that context

21 that I described to you, would you feel justified in that context for

22 your army removing the civilian population, that is with the

23 28th Division?

24 A. If I understood you correctly, if I understood the question, it

25 refers to removing the population, the civilians.

Page 45043

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. No. I don't think that would be all right. I don't think that

3 that would be a reason for my unit or the organ that I belonged to to do

4 that, but I do think that because of the activities of the 28th Division

5 out of the enclave against soldiers, civilians, et cetera, on the other

6 side of that front line, in the depth, would justify activities of the

7 Serbian army.

8 THE ACCUSED: I'm not sure that there is an understanding between

9 Mr. McCloskey and the witness is full concerning the -- translation,

10 translation.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't follow you. You have an issue

12 with respect to translation?

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sounded to me like we agreed with each other and

14 we were right on the same page.

15 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue? If necessary, you can take up in

16 your re-examination. Shall we continue, Mr. McCloskey.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

18 Q. So, Colonel, as I -- I take it that despite the context that

19 I described that you agree with, it would still be improper militarily to

20 remove the civilians. Let's go to another document, P03040, of the

21 Drina Corps to see if we can look into the orders and the policies of the

22 Drina Corps where you were working on March 20th, 1995. And we can see

23 that this document dated 20 March 1995 is from the command of the

24 Drina Corps. It is to all the Drina Corps brigades and units, and it's

25 entitled, "Operative number 7."

Page 45044

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Your Honours, I won't go into it, but it's

2 the position of the Prosecution that this document is related to the

3 well-known Directive 7 that came out in the name of Dr. Karadzic. And if

4 we could go to the last page of the document, which should be 21 in the

5 English and I have it as 10 in the B/C/S, just so we can see who it comes

6 out under, we can see that -- 20 in the -- should be 20 -- well, you've

7 got it.

8 Q. We see that it came out under the name of the command -- the

9 known commander, Milenko Zivanovic, and that it was drafted by

10 Colonel Milenko Lazic, who we know at the time was the chief of

11 operations. So we just saw you, Lazic and Jocic together. So this is a

12 document that was created and drafted while you were in that office with

13 these guys; right?

14 A. I do not remember that particular circumstance, to be honest.

15 Q. Okay. Let's go to page 6 in the English and -- sorry, it's under

16 the tasks of the Drina Corps in the B/C/S and I did not catch the B/C/S

17 part of it. But it's -- we go to paragraph -- yes, you've got 2, the

18 tasks of the Drina Corps, and you'll see it's down in -- not down far

19 below paragraph 2, and it's the now very recognisable words that after

20 issuing orders regarding various forces, Zivanovic says, drafted by

21 Lazic: While in the direction of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves complete

22 physical separation of Srebrenica and Zepa should be carried out as soon

23 as possible preventing even communication between individuals in the two

24 enclaves. By planned and well thought-out combat operations create an

25 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of survival or life

Page 45045

1 for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa. And this is directed towards

2 the inhabitants of the Srebrenica and Zepa, is it not?

3 A. You can conclude that from this text. I don't see what else.

4 Q. And I'm sure you recall this phrase from Dr. Karadzic's

5 Directive 7, can you tell us whose decision it was who repeat this phrase

6 from Dr. Karadzic's directive into Milenko Zivanovic's now order, taking

7 it for directive to order?

8 A. Maybe this will make you angry again but you should have asked

9 the general, Zivanovic.

10 Q. Well, don't worry, Colonel, I'm not angry. We are not angry.

11 Can you answer the question?

12 A. My answer is you should have put that question to

13 General Zivanovic. I don't know.

14 Q. Would General Zivanovic have any discretion when he receives a

15 legal order from President Karadzic, when passing on that order to his

16 subordinate commanders?

17 A. Well, General Zivanovic signed this document, if I'm not

18 mistaken.

19 Q. Can you answer the question?

20 A. I am answering your questions. I'm saying this because

21 General Zivanovic signed this document. Maybe this is an important

22 question to which he could give an important answer.

23 Q. All right. Let's go on. You became the commander of the

24 Bratunac Brigade on May 25th, 1995; correct?

25 A. Correct.

Page 45046

1 Q. And let's go to a document about that, 65 ter 02082. And we now

2 see a regular combat report dated 25 May, looks like it goes out sometime

3 at 4.30 something on the 25th, in your name. When a document like this,

4 a combat report goes out in your name, are you responsible for it?

5 A. Yes. Now, it's a combat report coming out of the brigade,

6 basically it's approved, or rather, signed by the brigade commander or

7 somebody standing in for him, if he's absent, but I don't see the

8 signature of any other person here. However, the situation is a bit more

9 complicated. But it's my document. What else can I say? Because it's

10 possible sometimes that something is left out.

11 Q. And we can see here that this reflects that you took over duties

12 at 1000 hours. But I wanted to ask you, the first part says: Our forces

13 did not open fire towards the demilitarised zone. And were you informed

14 of when your forces shelled the demilitarised zone with mortar fire or

15 artillery fire, as it appears in this document?

16 A. Not only that, that's something the commander should have issued

17 orders for, it's a serious job, serious business, or somebody from the

18 superior command, if they happened to be there.

19 Q. Absolutely. All right.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document in evidence.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will receive it.

22 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6570, Your Honours.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY:

24 Q. And, Colonel, I would think you would recall the communication

25 and report that the -- a commander of the Bratunac Brigade from

Page 45047

1 July 1994, Mr. Ognjenovic, communicated to his troops. And to refresh

2 your recollection about it, it comes from P04075. It's 4 July 1994, from

3 the command of the Bratunac Brigade, in the name of Ognjenovic. And on

4 page 3 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S, he says: We must continue

5 to arm, train and discipline and prepare the RS army for the execution of

6 this crucial task, the expulsion of Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave.

7 There will be no retreat when it comes to the Srebrenica enclave. We

8 must advance. The enemy's life has to be made unbearable and their

9 temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the enclave

10 en masse as soon as possible realising that they cannot survive there.

11 Ognjenovic sent this out right after meeting with General Mladic.

12 Did you do anything to countermand this communication, this report to the

13 Bratunac Brigade troops, when you took over command?

14 A. This document did not concern me at all. I didn't have it. I

15 don't know what to tell you about it. It was one year before,

16 approximately.

17 Q. Colonel, this document was found in the archives of the -- the

18 VRS records. I believe we got this from the Bratunac Brigade. It's our

19 position this is an illegal order. Are you saying that an illegal order

20 to expel the Muslims from Srebrenica done by a former commander would not

21 be your business?

22 A. I apologise. You're saying that I claim that this is an illegal

23 order?

24 Q. It's the Prosecution's position that it's an illegal order.

25 A. Please be specific, Mr. Prosecutor. I'm not a historian. I'm a

Page 45048

1 commander. I'm an officer. I got there, I was informed about the

2 situation in the brigade, and I continued working as the commander in

3 that brigade. I was not interested in history and what happened a year

4 or two years ago. There was no time for that. Now, when the situation

5 is calm, we can study history, because what happened at the time is

6 already part of the history so we can study that now.

7 Q. Let's go to 65 ter 04274. We are still on your first day at the

8 Bratunac Brigade, 25 May. This is from the Drina Corps command, from

9 Zivanovic, as you'll see, and it's to all the brigades of the Drina Corps

10 and other units, and it's not exactly clear what time it goes out but

11 I think if we look at some of the other documents we may get that idea.

12 And we see here that it is informing all these units that NATO had

13 carried out an attack at Jahorinski Potok, which were weapons warehouses,

14 as you know, near Pale.

15 And it tells all the brigades, in relation to this, and in order

16 to take urgent measures to raise combat readiness of the PVO system to

17 the highest level in order to take measures of the anti-aircraft

18 protection and to protect the men, I order, and we can read paragraph 1

19 including the raising of the units of the highest level of combat

20 readiness and the opening of fire shall be regulated by the Drina Corps

21 through the Grabovica signals table. So did you, on this, your first day

22 of command, get this order to -- informing you of the NATO bombing of

23 that date, against your army, telling you to get ready to open fire?

24 A. Judging by the date, it seems that I should have received it and

25 it was only normal for me to have received it because it is addressed to

Page 45049

1 the Bratunac Brigade.

2 Q. All right.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd offer this into evidence.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6571, Your Honours.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could now go to P04076.

7 Q. And, Colonel, you'll see this is an interim combat report under

8 your name, and this one we can see was at least delivered at 2110 hours

9 on the 25th of May. It's to the commander of the Drina Corps, and I'll

10 skip down to paragraph 3 briefly because under this you say that: We

11 have taken steps in accordance with your order strictly confidential

12 number 08/8-60 of 25 May.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And that, Your Honours, for the record, I should

14 have pointed out was the previous order we just saw from the Drina Corps.

15 Q. So you, by 2110 hours, have acknowledged receiving that previous

16 order and have taken steps in accordance with it. You also say that in

17 accordance with an oral order from Colonel Lazic, is that the same

18 Colonel Lazic, your former boss, the chief of operations and training of

19 the Drina Corps?

20 A. Yes. I believe that that's him.

21 Q. We fired at -- two shells from 105-millimetre howitzers, a total

22 of four shells, on the town of Srebrenica at 1907 hours. Artillery

23 observers at Pribicevac reported two shells fired near the Domovija

24 feature. That's the Domovija hotel in the centre of Srebrenica town?

25 A. It's possible. If my memory serves me well, the Domovija Hotel

Page 45050

1 is in the centre. Srebrenica is not a big place.

2 Q. And the other two shells, they don't know where they went, were

3 not observed?

4 A. I don't know. I can't see here.

5 Q. Look at the first paragraph.

6 A. [In English] Ah, first. [Interpretation] Yes, now I can see it.

7 That's what I read, yes.

8 Q. So, do you take responsibility for firing these howitzer shells

9 on the Srebrenica enclave?

10 A. Partly, yes.

11 Q. What do you mean "partly"?

12 A. Because of what you read, pursuant to the oral order of

13 Colonel Lazic. He was there. He represented the superior

14 command.

15 Q. Yes. He shares responsibility from the Drina Corps, as did

16 anyone that may have issued orders from the Main Staff, as is anyone from

17 the Presidency that may also have issued such an order; correct?

18 A. It's not about sharing. It's about assuming responsibility. He

19 assumes responsibility because he was there and he issued that order to

20 me.

21 Q. Okay. Good point.

22 A. It was not my decision. It was an implementation of an immediate

23 order. There is no two ways about it. It's very clear in military terms.

24 Q. Yes. Let's go to Exhibit 65 ter 25799. Did you authorise any

25 mortar shells to be fired at the enclave that day?

Page 45051

1 A. No.

2 Q. Are you aware of anyone --

3 A. I don't remember. I don't remember. I don't remember. I don't

4 think so. Actually, I'm convinced that I didn't.

5 Q. You didn't. Okay. Would anybody else have fired mortar shells

6 on the Srebrenica enclave on that day outside your command?

7 A. There were several units around Srebrenica. There were at least

8 two other units on permanent positions. I don't know if anybody else was

9 there in addition to them. I don't know.

10 Q. All right. Looking at this document, this is from the

11 28th Division, and this says at 1900 hours, which is, as we just saw,

12 within a few minutes of the time you fired your howitzer shells, that

13 two -- the Muslim army thinks that two 82-millimetre mortar shells fell

14 near a primary school and killed one child and wounded another. You

15 probably remember the ten-year-old, Jasna Gabeljic, who died that day?

16 You're -- you know these things better than others. Can an 82-millimetre

17 mortar shell get mixed up or be --

18 A. [Previous translation continues]... something, something.

19 Q. -- confused with a 105-millimetre howitzer shell when it lands?

20 A. Mr. Prosecutor, let's clarify some things. I'm confused on some

21 things, and I will ask you to repeat about those 82-millimetre mortar

22 shells. Where were they? Can you take things one at a time, please.

23 Q. It's a very simple document, Colonel.

24 JUDGE MORRISON: Colonel, perhaps we can put it very simply --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely, yes.

Page 45052

1 JUDGE MORRISON: What the Prosecution is asking is whether or not

2 somebody on the ground could mistake the impact of a

3 105-millimetre artillery shell with the impact of an 82-millimetre mortar

4 shell, in terms of identifying exactly what the weapon was that caused

5 the explosion. That's the question you've been asked. Would it be

6 possible to confuse the two?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm try to answer your

8 question; however, I'm focusing on the document. I believe that this is

9 not about Srebrenica but about the local commune of Suceska, and those

10 are two entirely different geographical terms. I believe the distance

11 between the two is 20 to 30 kilometres, and it is possible that mortar

12 fire was opened there, but that has nothing to do with fire opened from a

13 105-millimetre howitzer. This is not even in the same sector. These are

14 two different locations with a distance of some 20 kilometres between

15 them.

16 JUDGE KWON: Did you read this report, Mr. Blagojevic? Could you

17 read it out? And then I'll ask you.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've not seen it before.

19 JUDGE KWON: Let us know if you have done your reading.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm done reading. The doctor was

21 in Srebrenica and the children were in Suceska local commune, as far as I

22 can understand.

23 JUDGE KWON: So this refers to two places that were shelled,

24 Srebrenica and Suceska.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, yes.

Page 45053

1 MR. McCLOSKEY:

2 Q. And we know that they are right next to each other, just a few

3 kilometres away. I think you've already said that. So can you go back

4 to His Honour's question: Can one mistake a howitzer impact with the

5 particular mortar impact we see here?

6 A. It is possible, but those who know would not be easily mistaken

7 on that. However, confusion is possible.

8 Q. As you'll recall, your unit lost track of two of your howitzer

9 shells. They saw two land downtown Srebrenica and lost track of two at

10 around the same time. So very likely, if not a certainty, that your two

11 howitzer shells landed on Jasna Gabeljic, isn't it?

12 A. It's not likely at all. It's just a speculation. And I would

13 not go there. Artillery is more sophisticated than that.

14 Q. Okay. Well, perhaps someone else fired at the same time.

15 Let's --

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer, I believe, that into evidence.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

18 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6572, Your Honours.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Now I'd like to go to 65 ter 25746.

20 Q. And, Colonel, were you aware that shortly after 7.00 the same day

21 that you fired upon this inhabited enclave with your howitzer, somebody

22 else fired on downtown Tuzla and killed more than 66 young people

23 gathered in the square? Surely you recall that.

24 A. No. I had no information whatsoever about that at the time.

25 Q. Let's go to -- we see this UNPROFOR report, let's go to the next

Page 45054

1 page in the English, it should be B/C/S page 1.

2 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I'm going to object to

3 any questions about the details of this shelling. As you may recall

4 during the Defence case, our expert prepared a report concerning this

5 shelling which you excluded, and, as a result, we weren't able to produce

6 any evidence about that. So I don't think it's fair for the Prosecution

7 to go further than the fact that shells fell on Tuzla.

8 JUDGE KWON: This shelling, what did you mean by this shelling on

9 Tuzla?

10 MR. ROBINSON: On the 25th of May, 1995, there was a shelling

11 incident in the Old Town of Tuzla which is not charged in the indictment

12 and which was the subject of detailed analysis by our ballistics expert.

13 And having read that, you excluded and redacted that analysis, and we

14 weren't able to present any evidence as to who may have fired that shell

15 or the circumstances of it. So it's our position that it would be unfair

16 for the Prosecution now to be able to elicit evidence about that.

17 JUDGE KWON: Could the Chamber hear from the Prosecution?

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. The Defence has chosen

19 specifically to, of course, call Colonel Blagojevic, who, as the

20 Prosecution's position is, that on his first day, he took part in a

21 co-ordinated effort with the rest -- many other VRS units, at -- shelled

22 all the safe areas except for Zepa. This goes to his involvement in

23 these events, his knowledge of these events. This is a lead-up to the

24 attack on Srebrenica. You've seen the document about making life

25 unbearable. That is part of this historical context. When they call a

Page 45055

1 man like this to defend the president, they open the door to his conduct

2 that's relevant to the charged crimes, and especially joint conduct that

3 you will see from later documents are occurring at the same time at a

4 larger level.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE MORRISON: Mr. Robinson, isn't there a distinction between

7 the technical aspects of the shelling in question and what this witness

8 may or may not have known about them? The fact of the shelling.

9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I agree. And I was trying to make that

10 distinction myself, but the document here is the former, so that's what

11 I was trying to avoid.

12 JUDGE KWON: We will allow the question.

13 Please continue, Mr. McCloskey.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we go to the next page in the English, should

15 be the next page in the B/C/S as well.

16 Q. And again we see this conclusion here, that as a sequel to air

17 strikes administered by NATO, at the Pale ammo dump - it's our position

18 that's the dump referred to in the VRS document we just saw - the BSA

19 resorted to massive retaliatory shelling against Tuzla town and TAB which

20 is considered deliberate targeting of the UN and the Tuzla safe area.

21 The shelling commenced at 1910 hours, simultaneously at TAV and Tuzla

22 safe area. Total of 31 impacts were recorded, up till 2100 hours. Out

23 of these 13 impacted in and around - I won't go into all of that - one of

24 them hit the old part of Tuzla city centre, a place where young people

25 flock together, and, as a consequence, 66 people were massacred to death

Page 45056

1 and 170 were wounded, amongst them 31 were critically injured.

2 You know now, don't you, historically that a shell landed in the

3 Tuzla centre killing at least 66 people and more at the same time you

4 fired your shells; correct?

5 A. I don't know about that, where which shell fell in that area that

6 you are referring to, but I would like to add something to what you said.

7 I would like one to be precise. This is an oral order in the presence of

8 Colonel Lazic and that preceded the firing of the

9 105-millimetre howitzer. That should be borne in mind.

10 Q. All right. But do you agree that over -- that at least 66 young

11 people were killed by that shell that evening? That's a Bosnian

12 historical fact?

13 A. I don't know of that case at the time.

14 Q. It's not my question. You know it shortly thereafter or now,

15 don't you, to be true?

16 A. Well, I hear that from you now, but at the time I was not

17 informed and I did not know that somebody was carrying out any kind of

18 operation or causing casualties on some side. I don't know about that.

19 Q. All right. Mr. President, I would offer just the first two pages

20 of this, just to show you the time of this report and this incident. I

21 don't think anyone is going to be contesting this incident in that

22 respect, and the issue as to precisely who did it is secondary to my

23 question, as I think you can tell.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

25 MR. ROBINSON: It's been read out, Mr. President. So I don't

Page 45057

1 think there is a need for the document.

2 JUDGE KWON: We tend to agree with it.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, the 66 people deserve more than a

4 reading out. This may be the only record, and I would like it to be in

5 the record.

6 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President --

7 JUDGE MORRISON: But it is in the record, Mr. McCloskey. It's in

8 the trial record, together with the timings and your observations of

9 this.

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: If you're happy that my reading is just as good

11 as the document, I have no problem with that.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will not admit this.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY:

14 Q. All right. Colonel, let's now go to 65 ter 19281. This is

15 another May 25th document from Mr. Akashi to Kofi Annan. And in it notes

16 just in the first paragraph, that: After the air strike of 25 May 1995,

17 all the safe areas, less Zepa, have been shelled and the Bosnian Serbs

18 have fired heavy weapons from five weapons collection points around

19 Sarajevo. I won't go on and read the rest. So did you become familiar

20 in the days and months after this that, in fact, the day that you fired

21 your shell on -- your shells on Srebrenica, that the other safe areas had

22 also been fired upon in --

23 A. No. I didn't know.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would offer this document into evidence.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive this.

Page 45058

1 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6573, Your Honours.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, I note that my time is up.

3 I do have probably 30 more minutes. Do I not intend to rehash the events

4 of Srebrenica, but I do want to finish up this particular area of

5 questioning and some Srebrenica events, if I could.

6 JUDGE KWON: Usually we do not limit -- usually be lenient, but

7 today we have -- really pressed with time. General Tolimir is going to

8 appear today, according to our subpoena decision which specifically

9 indicated today is the day he should appear. And I'm not sure how much

10 time Mr. Karadzic would need for his redirect.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, General Tolimir is here, as is

12 his legal adviser. I would suggest we just suspend the examination of

13 Colonel Blagojevic and call General Tolimir. I think we will be able to

14 conclude him by 12.30 and then we will be a little more relaxed for time

15 for the rest of the day.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think that's a very good idea. I appreciate

17 that.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Blagojevic, do you follow? Do you understand

19 what we just discussed?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. It is clear to me.

21 JUDGE KWON: How much time would we need to prepare the setting,

22 change the setting?

23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

24 JUDGE KWON: We will rise just for three or five minutes.

25 --- Break taken at 12.10 p.m.

Page 45059

1 [The witness stands down]

2 [The witness entered court]

3 --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.

4 JUDGE KWON: For the record, we are now in full Bench.

5 Good afternoon, General Tolimir.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. President.

7 Thank you.

8 JUDGE KWON: Will you make the solemn declaration, please.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

10 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Thank you.

11 WITNESS: ZDRAVKO TOLIMIR

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General. Please be seated and make

14 yourself comfortable.

15 Would the counsel assisting Mr. Tolimir introduce himself for the

16 record, please.

17 MR. GAJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm Aleksandar Gajic,

18 and I'm legal adviser to Zdravko Tolimir.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Professor Gajic.

20 Mr. Tolimir, as you may know well about this, before you commence

21 your evidence, I must draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence

22 that we have here at the International Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E).

23 Under this rule, you may object to answering any question from

24 Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor or even from the Judges if you believe that

25 your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this

Page 45060

1 context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an

2 admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that might

3 provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.

4 However, should you think that your answer might incriminate you and as a

5 consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that

6 the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question. But in

7 that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony, compelled

8 under such circumstances, would not be used in any case that might be

9 laid against you for any offence, save and except the offence of giving

10 false testimony.

11 Do you understand that, sir?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

13 I understand that.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

16 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

17 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General Tolimir.

18 A. May God be with you, Mr. President.

19 Q. God be with us. But I'm asking you to kindly pause between my

20 questions and your answers as well. In order to avoid any confusion from

21 triple interpretation, because my notes are in English, with your

22 permission and with an apology that is due, I'm going to put questions to

23 you in English and I hope that the interpretation will be accurate.

24 [In English] Can you tell us what positions you held during your

25 military career?

Page 45061

1 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your question? The first part of

2 your question was overlapped with the translation.

3 MR. KARADZIC:

4 Q. Can you tell us what positions you held during your military

5 career?

6 A. Thank you, Mr. President. I started my military career in 1971

7 after I completed the military academy. First of all, I was a squad

8 leader or a platoon leader in Slovenia during manoeuvres. This was a

9 military exercise in the then-army. Then I was reassigned to Skoplje.

10 From Skoplje, I was deployed in Titov Veles. I stayed in Titov Veles

11 until 1975. And I commanded a platoon, a company, a squad, and so on,

12 different basic units, if you will.

13 In 1984, I was sent to the school centre of the

14 Yugoslav People's Army in Pancevo for a course for security officers.

15 After that one-year course, I was returned to Titov Veles yet again, and

16 then practically carried out these duties that I had been taught; namely

17 security organ in that regiment, 212th Regiment, where I served in

18 Titov Veles. After that, I was assigned to the duties of security organ

19 for practical training in the military naval district and I was a desk

20 officer there at the security organs until 1980 something, 1986 maybe.

21 And then I was appointed assistant head of that counter-intelligence

22 group. That was a group that was involved in intelligence and

23 counter-intelligence, counter-intelligence of foreign forces and armies

24 against the Yugoslav People's Army. Then I was sent to the high military

25 and political school, I think that was sometime in 1980. The school went

Page 45062

1 on for two years. We graduated from that school, and after I graduated,

2 I was returned yet again to this unit where I had been before that, in

3 the military naval district. I assumed the same duties. After that,

4 I was sent to a course sometime in 1986, a foreign language course.

5 I studied Russian there officially. And sort of, by the bye, I learned

6 English, sort of optionally. After I completed that course, I was

7 returned to the duties that I had before that in Split and at the

8 military naval district. After that, I carried out those duties again,

9 the deputy head of this military naval district. Thank you.

10 After that, I was sent to another garrison, Knin, where I was

11 appointed head of the security organ. Then after Knin, I was sent to the

12 war college in 1991. That's when the war was going on in Croatia. Then

13 they returned us from that war college. We all had to go back to our

14 units because the war had started. After that, I was seconded to the

15 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of the Serb Krajina, until, say,

16 March of 1992. After March 1992, I was assigned to some duty there in

17 that organ, at the time that was a transition period for the military,

18 for civilian structures and everything in the Republic of the

19 Serb Krajina. After that, after the 12th, around the 20th of May, 1992,

20 I was assigned to the 9th military district. That was the Sarajevo

21 military district. Actually, yes, yes, that was it. The 9th military

22 district in Sarajevo. And after that, I was assigned -- well, when they

23 asked whether we would go to Yugoslavia or whether we would -- I stayed

24 in Republika Srpska then because I was born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that's

25 where I completed elementary school and high school, in Glamoc. That is

Page 45063

1 roughly what I can say, sort of off the cuff. If I skipped something,

2 you can ask me, if you're interested in something.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you, General, sir. Can you tell us.

4 [In English] What was your position in the VRS in July 1995?

5 A. Thank you, Mr. President. My position in July 1995 was assistant

6 commander for intelligence and security affairs. Thank you.

7 Q. Did you ever inform me, either orally or in writing, that

8 prisoners from Srebrenica would be, were being, or had been executed?

9 A. Mr. President, as far as Srebrenica is concerned, the only time

10 I spoke to you was on the 9th of July, 1995. I believe that it was on

11 the 9th. And then I shared with you the information that was received by

12 the Main Staff and that was that the Army of Republika Srpska was coming

13 to Srebrenica. There were no prisoners at the time. And then you said

14 that if they could take Srebrenica, they should. I drafted a document to

15 that effect and I sent it to the units and to the Main Staff for their

16 information. I told them that you ordered that they should be mindful of

17 the civilians, UNPROFOR and prisoners of war. However, at that time

18 there were no prisoners of war. And that was my last contact and

19 conversation with you regarding Srebrenica and the situation there.

20 Later on, I was deployed -- I was appointed assistant commander

21 in Zepa, which is 20 kilometres away from Srebrenica. There are no

22 communications between the two. And I did not communicate with you again

23 because I was not in a position to know anything about those events, so

24 I can't say anything about the ensuing events, because when we spoke

25 there were no prisoners and I could not inform you about something I

Page 45064

1 didn't know or see. Thank you.

2 Q. Thank you. The Exhibit P2989 is the log of the republic

3 communications centre in Pale for July 1995. It shows that reports --

4 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload it?

5 THE ACCUSED:

6 Q. It shows that reports were received --

7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, just a second. Just a second,

8 Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED:

10 Q. So I believe we would need 14th, 15th and 16th and 17th of July.

11 JUDGE KWON: What page should we go?

12 THE ACCUSED: I'm not able to tell right now.

13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I'm looking for that, Mr. President. We have

14 intended that this only be -- this reference be for the parties, but if

15 we could look through the document, if I could look through it for a

16 minute, I think page 5 will be the first one.

17 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if Mr. Tolimir could follow without

18 seeing these notations or record.

19 MR. ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. President. If we could just direct

20 General Tolimir's attention to page 5 and counting up from the bottom,

21 there is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and that shows an entry that we are interested in

22 as well as the two underneath that.

23 JUDGE KWON: General, do you understand what this document is

24 about?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I can see here

Page 45065

1 where it says the Main Staff.

2 THE INTERPRETER: The witness is too far from the microphone.

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tolimir, could you speak to the microphone, if

4 you could, yes.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. On

6 line 5, I can see where it reads the Main Staff of the

7 Army of Republika Srpska, and in brackets, OB. This is an abbreviation

8 standing for security organ. The document is sent to the president.

9 This is a piece of intelligence. At that time, I, not me but my organ,

10 sent to as many as 20 different addresses. You will find those addresses

11 in the document. And a document of this kind will contain all kinds of

12 intelligence on what was going on in the world and that concerned

13 Republika Srpska. Thank you, Mr. President.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED:

17 Q. So I will continue in English. It shows that reports were

18 received from the VRS security and intelligence organ and transmitted to

19 the president, Ministry of Defence, and the state security of the

20 Ministry of Interior of those dates, for 13, 14, 15, 16, 17th of July.

21 These reports cannot be located now. Did any of them contain any

22 information about the execution of prisoners from Srebrenica?

23 A. Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I don't know what those

24 reports contained because those reports were drafted by the security

25 organ, which was at the command post at that time, and I was in Zepa;

Page 45066

1 thus, I don't know. If I were to see the original of those documents

2 I could see who signed it, who processed it, at what time it was

3 dispatched and to whom. These are the addresses, the 20 addresses that

4 I mentioned, to which such documents were customarily sent. This should

5 also include the minister of foreign affairs, who participated in

6 international negotiations. I don't know what those documents contained,

7 because I didn't author them. I was in Zepa. If the Presidency doesn't

8 have this document, then you should refer to one of the 20 addresses to

9 which the document was sent, the 1st Corps, the 2nd Corps, the 3rd Corps,

10 and so forth. The Prosecutor could have found that document in any of

11 those addresses. We ourselves could not do it. And thank you,

12 Mr. President, this is as much as I can say about the matter.

13 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you, General.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At this moment, I have no further

15 questions for General Tolimir.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Thank you, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE KWON: Bear with us a moment.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

21 Mr. Tolimir, you will be cross-examined by the representative of

22 the Office of the Prosecutor, but in the meantime, there is a scheduling

23 issue. We haven't concluded the cross-examination of Mr. Blagojevic. So

24 we'll ask you to excuse yourself --

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry.

Page 45067

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: But Mr. Tieger and I have had a chance to discuss

3 this and this very basic information. We don't really feel a need to

4 cross-examine on this situation given the entire context, unless

5 Your Honours would like me to, based on this information. I -- we,

6 Mr. Tieger, is satisfied that we've had enough.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you, Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Tieger.

9 General Tolimir, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber

10 I would like to thank you. You may be excused.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I would

12 like to thank everybody present, Mr. McCloskey, President Karadzic, the

13 entire staff, and the interpreters. And may these proceedings finish as

14 God wishes and not as I wish and may God's peace be with you. Thank you.

15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Gajic, as well.

16 [The witness withdrew]

17 JUDGE KWON: Can we bring in Mr. Blagojevic again?

18 THE ACCUSED: How about --

19 JUDGE KWON: I'm carried away. Thank you. We will break for

20 45 minutes and resume at 1.25.

21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I just want to remind

22 everyone we do have to finish Colonel Blagojevic today because his

23 counsel is not available after today. But now we have what should be

24 plenty of time, but let's not get carried away either.

25 JUDGE KWON: We have to bear in mind that there is a

Page 45076

1 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not much, your Excellencies. I

3 have some but not much.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel, on page 53 you were asked -- or perhaps

8 a bit further down, you were asked about the decision to open fire and

9 you said it was up to the person who made the decision. Can you tell us

10 who made decisions for a unit under attack to respond, and does a unit

11 under attack wait for approval from the president or anyone else to open

12 fire in return?

13 A. Concerning that situation, as I imagine it, I can tell you very

14 simply. If a unit is attacked, it has to respond with all possible means

15 to save itself and its men. So the decision in that case is made

16 immediately in that situation by the commander of the unit under attack.

17 Q. Thank you. It was suggested on page 53 and it was read out to

18 you that in a UN telegram, it said that Serbs shelled Muslim enclaves

19 after NATO air strikes. So on that day, on the 25th of May, and later

20 on, on the 25th of June, were there any actions launched from the

21 enclaves against Serb territories?

22 A. By that date, there had been very important military activities

23 that were creating a serious military situation, and raids were run out

24 of the enclave against villages outside the enclave and there were

25 ambushes set. I can tell you of at least two or three cases, there was

Page 45077

1 one village which was in the area of the neighbouring Milici Brigade and

2 the second ambush with numerous fatalities was just between the left

3 flank of my brigade and my left neighbour, which was the

4 Skelani Battalion, and in that ambush one van was ambushed and a lot of

5 men were killed. There were also a lot of sabotage actions, and it was

6 typical. Those contact mines were set. The contact mines can easily be

7 moved and when you step on them, or when a vehicle runs over them, they

8 are activated. I had numerous such cases.

9 Q. Where did those sabotage men come from, these terrorists?

10 A. I mentioned those places, and those troops were identified very

11 close to Srebrenica enclave so my conclusion was, and it was only logical

12 to conclude, that they came from Srebrenica.

13 Q. On page 45, it was suggested to you that you had fired four

14 shells on Lazic's order and that they landed on the town of Srebrenica.

15 Did you fire them on the town of Srebrenica? Were there any legitimate

16 military targets in the town of Srebrenica?

17 A. Well, you see, I answered that question just a while ago. As for

18 that action that was carried out, I was safe in that action because I was

19 in the presence of the officer from the superior command, from the corps

20 command, who was in touch with the observers. Those were artillery

21 observers who were deployed in the vicinity in order to observe military

22 targets that may have posed an immediate threat to our troops, and he's

23 the one who requested the opening of fire so the only thing that I can

24 see is that the target was a military target, that it could have been a

25 command post, and that's why action was ordered by that officer.

Page 45078

1 Q. I don't know whether the interpreters understood when you said

2 the "Domovija." What is Domovija?

3 A. Domovija. I believe that before the war, Domovija was a hotel.

4 Q. Thank you. It says in document P6570 that the objective was to

5 expel Muslims. Does that imply Muslim civilians or Muslim armed

6 formations?

7 A. It is my deep conviction, as an officer and as participant of the

8 events that took place at the time, that the main objective was to

9 subjugate the enemy. And as for the civilians, according to all the

10 conventions and laws regulating the matter, they should have been treated

11 differently, without any force and the application of force. I can't say

12 anything about the decisions made by the enemy with regard to their own

13 civilians, whether they took the civilians with them. It would be

14 speculation if I said anything. However, my position with regard to the

15 military actions, they should target only the military elements, i.e.,

16 the military formations of the enemy side.

17 Q. Thank you. When -- pursuant to the provisions of the

18 international rule of war, is it inadmissible to make the life of the

19 enemy unbearable? Is it allowed or not allowed?

20 A. I repeat: When you say the enemy, you imply a military force.

21 And it is absolutely allowed. However, I would like to refer again to

22 the innocent part of the population which does not pose a direct threat.

23 This is obviously out of the question and this is my position. That was

24 my position at the time, and that's the rule that I complied with in my

25 command of the unit. And that's why I said at the beginning that I would

Page 45079

1 sincerely hope that the Trial Chamber will allow me to say something

2 else.

3 Q. We are on my time, so I can give you that time.

4 A. You mean I can say something else? I'll try and be very concise

5 and brief and up to the point. I don't want to go over the same ground

6 again. What was the problem in all that? I have to say this: I did not

7 have defence. I was on my own in this courtroom. I suffered for a year

8 and a half. I did not -- I was not allowed to say anything. I did say a

9 couple of things when I could no longer sit still because I was going

10 crazy. I was not -- I didn't dare say anything because I thought that

11 everything would turn against me, and it was turned against me. But my

12 conscience is clear. Things were done unbeknownst to me. And the

13 joint criminal enterprise that was so portrayed by the Prosecutor, was

14 supported by the so-called lawyer who was in charge of my defence,

15 although he wasn't. I'm sorry, I become very excited when I speak about

16 this. If -- things continued when I was in prison, in Trondheim, in

17 Norway. There I received some illegal decisions which resulted from the

18 violation of the national criminal code. I'm here to fight that. So

19 far, my fight has been futile, but it hasn't stopped. On one occasion,

20 in the evening, although they know that my eyesight is impaired and

21 I can't use my right eye, they tried to give me a tablet which was very,

22 very small, black but very small. Luckily enough I spotted that tablet

23 among --

24 JUDGE KWON: This goes well beyond the scope of re-examination.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I didn't know what the

Page 45080

1 Colonel would be telling us, although I understand that his emotions are

2 running high. I will continue with my questions.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Here on page 39, you heard the term "removal of civilians." In

5 our language, what connotations does the term "removal" have? How did

6 you understand the term "removal of civilians"?

7 A. As a human being, I can understand that this means to help them

8 to move out or to be resettled. That's how I can understand this.

9 However, I'm telling you if one starts -- started wondering how that term

10 came about and what caused it, then I can't be absolutely certain because

11 the enemy side may have had a lot of influence in that. One has to see

12 what the decisive influence is from one case to the next.

13 Q. How could the enemy side have influenced all that?

14 A. In my view, it could have influenced the situation by imposing

15 ideas and pursuing different policies, but that has nothing to do with

16 the military principles and the decisions made by officers. It is other

17 people who do that. It does not pertain to my manner of commanding.

18 Q. How does our own national legislation regulate obligations

19 towards one's own civilians and the enemy's civilians in the area of

20 combat activities? What is an enemy -- what is a military force

21 duty-bound to do when it encounters civilians on its path?

22 A. My position arises from what I learned about the rules and

23 regulations that I was duty-bound to comply with. And that means that we

24 were duty-bound to protect civilians.

25 Q. How?

Page 45081

1 A. It depended on the situation. If nothing else was possible, if

2 you didn't have other means, and I mean if you didn't have food or

3 medicines or anything like that, then at least you had to move those

4 civilians from the area where there was combat going on.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. I'm asking this

7 because -- in order to check whether there is a transition issue.

8 Mr. Blagojevic, you said a minute ago - let me find it: The removal of

9 population means something to help the population to move out or to be

10 resettled. Do you remember having answered so?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I meant was that they should

12 be protected, that they should be moved from such places where they could

13 become collateral damage, where they could be hit. This is what I meant.

14 So if that was within my purview, if that was something that I had to

15 decide on, that would have been my position, to move them somewhere safe.

16 JUDGE KWON: On page 74, line 20, Mr. Karadzic, when you asked

17 Mr. Blagojevic about the term "removal of civilians," what verb did you

18 use in B/C/S for "removal"?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, in the

20 cross-examination, the term removal was translated as "uklanjanje" or

21 "ukloniti." In our language, this term has a lot of connotations. That

22 may also mean to kill the enemy. This is the term that I used,

23 "ukloniti."

24 JUDGE KWON: Is that term identical to the one that was used in

25 Drina Corps document, i.e. Exhibit P3040? Drina Corps order,

Page 45082

1 operation number 7. So this could be answered either by the parties.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. "Ukloniti" was not used in

3 that document. It was something else, "take out," "move out," but the

4 word "resettle" was also not used because resettlement implies permanence

5 to move people somewhere forever.

6 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I'll leave it at that. Please continue,

7 Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. You were asked on page 33 whether the Drina Corps implemented

11 Directive 4. Did you have any information as to what the Main Staff had

12 in mind about whether Directive 4 had been implemented or not? If not,

13 just say so. Did you know what the position of the Main Staff was with

14 regard to the implementation of Directive 4?

15 A. I do not have an insight into that so I cannot answer your

16 question.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

18 65 ter 09219.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, just to answer your question

21 regarding the Drina Corps document, P3040, that's entitled, "Operative

22 number 7," it's that language that you'll recall: By planned and well

23 thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation with no

24 hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants. So it's not

25 talking specifically about removal. That would be the -- Directive 4

Page 45083

1 goes more into that.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Do you see the document?

5 A. Yes. Combat order, operational number 5, I can see it.

6 Q. Could you please read the first sentence, or rather, the first

7 paragraph.

8 A. "Since the Drina Corps forces did not execute their task from

9 Directive 4, the enemy switched to counter- offensive in the eastern part

10 of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and succeeded in

11 inflicting large losses on the units of the Drina Corps in Glogova

12 mountain, in the general area of Bratunac, Skelani and Rudo. The attack

13 against Visegrad is ongoing."

14 Q. Thank you. Can you also read the last paragraph?

15 A. "The civilian population should not be destroyed. It should

16 rather be allowed to move to other areas, or if they accept the authority

17 of Republika Srpska, they should be disarmed and the Serbian civilian

18 authority should be established."

19 JUDGE KWON: Next page, please.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And the Serbian version as well, we

21 need the next page.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. And can you now look at paragraph 4? Usually this paragraph is a

24 decision and after Srebrenica, Skelani, can you read to the end?

25 A. "In co-operation with the forces of the Drina Corps, break and

Page 45084

1 destroy the enemy forces in the general area of Srebrenica. Liberate the

2 Sase and Kunjaci mines and cut off the green transversal in the general

3 area of Srebrenica, and then in co-ordinated action with the Drina Corps

4 forces, embark on the gradual destruction of the enemy in the general

5 area of Zepa and Cerska.

6 Q. Does this imply the destruction of Muslim civilians? Is there a

7 single officer, or was there a single officer in the

8 Army of Republika Srpska who could construe this as an order to destroy

9 Muslim civilians?

10 A. No, I don't see this as a destruction of Muslim civilians. This

11 is combat and trying to defeat the enemy force under arms.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document in

14 evidence.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: No objection.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4190, Your Honours.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no time to deal

19 with the document that Mr. McCloskey mentioned, 03040. It has been

20 admitted, so we will eventually come to it.

21 MR KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Could you -- you were asked on pages 15 and 16 whether you knew

23 about what was going on in the town of Srebrenica itself. Where were you

24 during the night, actually, from the afternoon of the 12th until the

25 morning of the 13th?

Page 45085

1 A. The afternoon of the 12th until the 13th in the morning, that is

2 the first day after I returned to the command of the brigade. And after

3 that work-day I went to the Fontana Hotel, quite simply to refresh

4 myself, to get some rest and to renew my capacity to work.

5 Q. Did you receive information from someone in terms of what was

6 going on in town, or did you tour the town itself that night?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Thank you. Were you well informed about what was going on and

9 about the neighbours along the line where your brigade was? I mean, not

10 your own brigade but the neighbouring ones. Actually, the situation on

11 the front.

12 A. I think that I was informed to a necessary degree so that I could

13 command my unit in the way that I considered to be optimal at that point

14 in time.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

16 65 ter 02105. It's on the next page. It's handwritten.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Actually, is this your handwriting, or did you dictate this to

19 someone?

20 A. Well, what can I -- well, I see it now.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can go back to the first page in

22 Serbian so that the witness can see this typed up on a teleprinter.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Possibly somebody was typing this

24 up at the operative organ. I don't know. I'm not 100 per cent sure

25 because of this signature. It's illegible so I cannot quite decipher it

Page 45086

1 with certainty. Can you change this? Can I see the other part that was

2 written?

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You mean the next page?

5 A. That's right. Is there a signature here, down here? Well, that

6 is what confuses me. I do not see that that is my signature.

7 Q. Thank you. What is this document about, regardless of whether

8 it's one of your co-workers or you? Why is it important to know where

9 your forces are on the left flank?

10 A. Well, it is important because of linking up with the neighbour to

11 have a certain link, I mean contact, I mean for the control of that

12 mutual link-up.

13 Q. Thank you. When the learned Mr. McCloskey said to you, do you

14 agree, do you accept, that 7.000 men and boys were executed in

15 Srebrenica, according to what you know now, what you learned

16 subsequently, in Srebrenica itself, and in the territory of the

17 municipality of Srebrenica, was there an execution there? I'm not asking

18 you what you knew then. Did you hear later where that happened?

19 A. I didn't know then. I don't know now. I know nothing. Maybe

20 you find that incredible but you asked me about the territory of

21 Srebrenica.

22 Q. Yes the municipality of Srebrenica, the town of Srebrenica.

23 A. I don't know a thing, I really do not.

24 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions, sir, Colonel, thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I tender this document.