1 Tuesday, 11 February 2014
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Yes, Mr. Harvey.
7 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.
8 May I introduce Natalia Silva, who is from Spain and is studying
9 law at the University of Utrecht for her masters degree.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 There are a couple of matters that the Chamber wishes to deal
12 with before we continue with the evidence.
13 First, on the 6th of February, in order to provide sufficient
14 notice, the Chamber informed the parties via e-mail that it had decided
15 to exclude paragraphs 3 to 35 of the proposed Rule 92 ter statement for
16 Gojko Klickovic's statement, who is scheduled to testify today. Having
17 reviewed the statement, the Chamber found that these paragraphs pertained
18 exclusively to Bosanska Krupa, a municipality withdrawn from the
20 The Chamber allowed the remainder of the statement which
21 pertained to the witness's background and to character evidence of the
22 accused to be presented pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
23 Second, on the same day, the Chamber ordered that the accused's
24 filing entitled, "Statement of General Mladic," and filed on the same day
25 be temporarily reclassified as confidential.
1 The Chamber will now rule on the permanent status of this filing.
2 Having heard the parties' submissions, the Chamber is still of
3 the view that this filing directly infringes upon a Chamber's order and
4 serves absolutely no purpose before this Chamber. Accordingly, the
5 Chamber instructs the Registry to expunge the filing from the filing
6 records of this case, replace it with a certificate referring to this
7 order by the Chamber, and place the filing in the confidential case
8 correspondence folder. The Prosecution's motion to strike the accused's
9 6th of February filing, filed on 7th of February, 2014, is therefore
11 I would add, Mr. Robinson, that the Chamber has heard your
12 reasons for submitting this filing but wants to make it very clear that
13 it will not tolerate the public record of this case being used for
14 anything other than the interests of justice. This filing clearly did
15 not fit into this category.
16 That's that. We'll bring in the next witness.
17 THE ACCUSED: Excellencies, good morning. May I say something
18 for the record?
19 JUDGE KWON: If it is related to this ruling, I won't allow it,
20 Mr. Karadzic. Otherwise, please proceed.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It would relate to the first ruling
23 but not challenging the ruling.
24 I just wanted to say that the Prosecution accused me not of
25 something that I did but things that were done by the system and they are
1 proving that, using only a few municipalities as a sample. So those
2 municipalities that have been excluded --
3 JUDGE KWON: I think the Chamber has been very consistent on this
4 issue, and you may consult with Mr. Robinson.
5 Good morning, Mr. Rasevic.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, sir.
7 JUDGE KWON: Would you make the solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: MITAR RASEVIC
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 JUDGE KWON: And make yourself comfortable.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Before you commence your evidence,
17 Mr. Rasevic, I must draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence
18 that we have here at the international Tribunal. That is Rule 90(E).
19 Under this rule, you may object to answering any question from
20 Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from the Judges, if you believe
21 that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence.
22 In this context, "incriminate" means saying something to might
23 amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying
24 something that might provide evidence that you might have committed a
25 criminal offence. However, should you think that an answer might
1 incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I
2 must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer
3 the question; but, in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your
4 testimony compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any
5 case that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the
6 offence of giving false testimony.
7 Do you understand that, Mr. Rasevic?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that, sir.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies, good
12 morning to all.
13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Rasevic.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. Let us pause, please, both you and I. Let us speak slowly so
17 that every word would be recorded in the transcript.
18 Mr. Rasevic, have you given a statement to my Defence team?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D9667 in
22 e-court. Could that please be shown to the witness.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you see that statement on the screen before you?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed the statement?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the last page please be shown
4 to the witness.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Is that your signature?
7 A. Yes, it is my signature. And we also see the date when I signed
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether this statement faithfully
10 reflects what you said, or is there anything that you'd like to correct?
11 A. For the most part, it faithfully conveyed what I said.
12 Q. If I were to ask you the same things today, if I were to put the
13 same questions to you today as were those that had been put to you then,
14 would your answers basically be the same as those contained in this
16 A. Basically they would be the same.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
19 statement on the basis of Rule 92 ter, Excellencies.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objections, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours.
22 I'm just wondering about what the witness meant when he said "for
23 the most part." I was just wondering what then is not correct.
24 JUDGE KWON: That's fair enough. Mr. Karadzic, if you could
25 clarify it with the witness, please.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, when you said "for the most part, yes," is a fact,
4 is something substantial misrepresented in the statement?
5 A. When I said "for the most part," I meant that certainly some
6 points should -- some points would require broader explanations but I
7 accept this statement as it is. What is written there is part of what I
8 know and part of what I said.
9 Q. I don't know whether the transcript says "essence." In addition
10 to these broader explanations, is there anything else that you would like
11 to change in this statement?
12 A. Nothing else.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would this do, Excellencies?
14 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise you have no objection Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, thank you, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4307, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Now, I'm go to read out in the English language a brief summary
21 of Mr. Mitar Rasevic's statement.
22 [In English] Mitar Rasevic was the chief of security in the
23 KP Dom in Foca before and after the outbreak of the war.
24 Before the war, the KP Dom was a prison for the treatment of
25 alcoholics, drug addicts, and tuberculosis prisoners. The KP Dom was an
1 organ of the state administration and Mitar Rasevic was in charge of the
2 guards and their conduct. If the guards were in violation of orders or
3 misconduct, their actions were reported and appropriate punishments
5 A few days before war broke out, he noticed that a number of the
6 prisoners were released but did not return which was carried out on the
7 order of the warden. Further, at roughly the same time, a large number
8 of convicts escaped. At the outbreak of war, a new warden was appointed
9 by the Crisis Staff. The army then commanded the KP Dom from the
10 beginning of the war. Mitar Rasevic was not invited to any meetings with
11 military or civilian authorities, and he had no personal knowledge of
12 paramilitary units in the KP Dom.
13 Mitar Rasevic was aware that the prisoner capacity in the prison
14 had been exceeded at the beginning of the war; however, bunk-beds were
15 installed as quickly as possible to alleviate this issue. Further, when
16 the heating broke, attempts were made to repair it and cauldrons were
17 heated to make bathing possible and the kitchen was reorganised to allow
18 the cooking to continue.
19 No distinction was made between prisoners of war and convicts.
20 Despite the food shortages, a minimum number of meals was endeavoured to
21 be provided.
22 The KP Dom has an arrangement with the hospital in Foca and a
23 doctor would visit twice or three times a week. The prisoners would also
24 be taken to the hospital if necessary and a nurse was present at the
25 KP Dom at all times.
1 Mitar Rasevic visited the prisoners in solitary confinement daily
2 and spoke to them personally, ensuring that they were not being
3 mistreated; the prisoners confirmed that they were not. If a prisoner
4 had been in solitary confinement for an extended period, Mitar Rasevic
5 would ask that their case be re-examined.
6 As Mitar Rasevic was unable to attend meetings at which the
7 running of the KP Dom was discussed, he was frequently provided with
8 orders which he had no input to, he was ordered to transport prisoners,
9 or prepare them to be handed over for the military police. Mitar Rasevic
10 did not have any input into the creation of these lists; he merely read
11 them out.
12 Never during his employment at the KP Dom was he present or aware
13 of any prisoners being beaten or mistreated, and no prisoners ever
14 complained to him about being mistreated. On the infrequent occasio he
15 saw a guard mistreating a prisoner in an interrogation, he would ask for
16 the interrogation to be stopped and the guard's conduct was reported.
17 Further, an order was created by the warden that prohibited
18 interrogations after 20 -- 8.00 in the evening as the guards did not feel
19 that investigating the prisoners in the evening was the proper thing to
20 do. There were also no mass interrogations after July or August 1992.
21 The lists of people to be interrogated were sent from the army and the
22 guards in the KP Dom fulfilled their orders.
23 Mitar Rasevic was not aware of any prisoners being killed during
24 an interrogation. The only deaths in the KP Dom were by natural causes
25 or suicide. Mitar Rasevic never saw or was aware of any bodies being
1 moved from the KP Dom, and he never saw traces of blood in the square or
2 on the walls of the KP Dom.
3 He never noticed large numbers of prisoners going missing during
4 the day or night. The only prisoners taken away were with the army's
5 authorisation. When he conducted night inspections, he saw that
6 everything was okay and that the guards were in their positions.
7 And that is the short summary.
8 Now I would like to pose several questions to Mr. Rasevic.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, how did the KP Dom function? On which basis? Did
11 you have any rules of your own?
12 A. Well, the KP Dom functioned as an institution before the war,
13 during the war, after the war, and it is certainly functioning now too,
14 on the basis of the Law on Criminal Sanctions as established by the
15 government. The rules on internal organisation and on the job
16 descriptions within the KP Dom were passed by the warden of the KP Dom,
17 and on the basis of that document, further rulings were elaborated for
18 guards duty, for instance, because each and every post had its specific
20 In 1992, when the war broke out, we applied, we continued to
21 apply this very same Law on Criminal Sanctions, and the same rules on
22 internal organisation, just like before the war.
23 Q. Thank you very much. I would just like that ask you kindly to
24 speak a bit slower.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D09672; could that please be shown
1 to the witness.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you tell us what this is that we see before us now? It is in
4 Cyrillic. Unfortunately, the translation hasn't been completed yet.
5 A. The rules on the internal organisation of the KP Dom Foca,
6 August 1992.
7 Q. Thank you. Had anything been changed in relation to the previous
8 legal provisions that were contained in such rules?
9 A. As far as these rules are concerned, nothing was changed. It was
10 simply copied, and work was done on that basis.
11 Q. Thank you. In your statement, there is a reference to prisoners
12 and detainees. Did anything change in terms of the organisation of life
13 in that sense?
14 A. Well, it is only natural that the category of military prisoners
15 of war was something new that we had to deal with once the war started.
16 However, as far as the implementation of these rules is concerned, they
17 were treated the same way as all other persons were treated; persons who
18 were imprisoned, detained at the KP Dom Foca, regardless of ethnicity,
19 regardless of the type of crime for which they had been detained.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 9 in this
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. It already disappeared.
23 But for the record, what is this KP Dom an abbreviation of?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KP Dom is abbreviated for
25 "kazneno-popravni Dom," which is a correctional penal facility. Only the
1 noun has changed in the meantime. At that time, it was called KP Dom.
2 JUDGE KWON: So "kazneno-popravni" means "correctional facility"?
3 Thank you.
4 Please continue.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, may I be of
6 assistance [In English] "kazneno," punish -- punishing -- I mean in
7 accordance with punishment; and "popravni" means correction to
8 rehabilitate and return the convict to the society.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could you please tell us what is regulated on this basis; and
12 what you were out of all of this? Actually, can you read out loud what
13 number 1 says and what number 2 says.
14 A. Number 1 is the head of the guards service. That was me at the
15 time. That's what it was called. There is a full job description there,
16 containing all the tasks of this head of the guard service.
17 As for number 2, that was called the supervisor of the guards.
18 This is a kind of komandir. There were four such persons. They were in
19 charge of working with the guards. They were in charge of internal
20 security, external security. So they were sort of deputies of mine.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we move on to the next page
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Just tell us, please, 3, 4, 5, what does that mean?
1 A. Three is guard, there's a description of that; then 4 is the head
2 of the service for re-education; and 5 are the instructors within that
3 service for rehabilitation, counselors.
4 Q. Thank you. Would you briefly tell us what number 6 is and what
5 number 8 is?
6 A. Again, that is within that service, that was the education of
7 persons who were detained and cultural and educational activities. There
8 was even a secondary school before the war.
9 Then number 7 is the department for criminal sanctions and for
10 keeping records for such persons, so these were the persons who were in
11 charge of documentation; and then number 8 within this educational
12 department, there is a person who was in charge of providing employment,
13 work to the person who were serving their sentences.
14 Q. What does this employment mean? Ah, I see, yes, you already
15 referred to that.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 13 in
17 e-court now.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what these services are that are
20 referred to here?
21 A. The KP Dom also treated alcoholics, drug addicts. It had a
22 separate section, a medical section, if I may call it that. Before the
23 war, a general practicer, a doctor, was employed on a full-time basis.
24 We had a dental technician. We had two medical technicians. This is
25 under 11, 12, and 13. And then item 14 is a special service, legal
1 affairs service. This is something else.
2 Q. Thank you. And the rest refers to internal organisation and
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Mr. Rasevic, thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
7 document for identification purposes before -- until a full translation
8 is provided.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark for identification cover page and pages 9
10 to 13.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4308, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I think it needs to be 8.
14 Starting at page 8. Not 9. Eight.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes. Thank you.
16 Yes, I referred to the e-court page 9 which is page 8 in hard
17 copy. Yes. Pages from 9 to 13 in e-court.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, I see that you had a kitchen. Meals were provided.
21 Are you able to tell us anything about the provision of food when the war
22 broke out. How were the inmates fed and did you have sufficient
23 quantities of food? Were there any shortages or was food denied; and on
24 what basis?
25 A. Well, let me tell you right away. When I came back to KP Dom in
1 mid-May sometime, what I found was that the KP Dom was in ruins pretty
2 much. It was destroyed. And this destruction began at the beginning of
3 the war, when I was still there. The worst thing about it was the boiler
4 room which was actually the key installation, if I may put it that way.
5 It ran on coal. It was pretty much damaged because of shelling. The
6 coal, the burning of the coal provided the steam and that was the basis
7 for the kitchen. That's what the kitchen ran on. The pipes were broken,
8 and without major repairs it actually could not operate. In such a
9 situation we had to make do.
10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, thank you. We do not need to go into all the things
11 already said in the statement. I'm just interested in quantities and how
12 you obtained the necessary quantities.
13 In the statement, you said that the number of inmates rose. How
14 did you deal with that?
15 A. Since the number of prisoners rose, we asked for help from the
16 army. We asked them to supply us with a certain quantity of foodstuffs
17 because they were under the control of the army. So the army was obliged
18 to do this. We also had a farm that belonged to the KP Dom or -- and
19 that's where we also got some of our supplies. It was difficult but we
20 did manage to at least provide minimal quantities of food.
21 Q. Thank you. Was food denied? Was there any discrimination; and,
22 if so, on what basis? On what grounds was this done?
23 A. No. As for the KP Dom services, I can say with full
24 responsibility that there was no discrimination whatsoever. This wasn't
25 even technically feasible. Food was cooked in an improvised cauldron
1 which we received from the army, and everything was put into this
2 cauldron. And it was not possible to separate food for different
3 categories. And I state this with certainty.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness 0 --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please ask -- be asked to
6 repeat the number.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the number.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D09670.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you recognise the document? Can you see what it's about? And
11 can you read to us to whom it was addressed and what it -- it is
13 A. This is it a document of the 21st of October, 1992. It's
14 addressed to the Foca Red Cross. And it's a request for packages to be
15 issued to captured and detained persons as far as -- within auxiliary
16 assistance programme to prisoners and inmates. Persons located in this
17 facility require 130 packages of assistance for the imprisoned and
18 convicted persons.
19 Q. Is this 100 or 130 packages?
20 A. 130.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
22 tender this document.
23 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4309, Your Honours.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness see 1D09671.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. This is dated the 5th of March, 1993. Could you please
5 explain -- could you tell us something about it? It's addressed to the
6 Foca military barracks. And it says, "Based on the contract on leasing
7 KP Dom facilities for detained persons," and there are captured Muslim
8 and Serb individuals already in the Dom. Could you please tell us more
9 about this document. What did this mean?
10 A. When I returned to KP Dom in mid-May, the warden said that he had
11 signed a contract with military post in Foca, the military command there,
12 to place captured person and all soldiers who commit any kind of
13 violation to KP Dom in Foca, that the contract specifies that they would
14 take care of food and also the conditions of the accommodation of those
15 individuals. I saw that contract for the first time during my own court
16 proceedings. It was kept by the warden.
17 Based on this, from March 1993, probably the warden asked the
18 military post to provide certain quantities of food in order to feed that
19 category of persons.
20 I also would like to add that we requested on a daily basis
21 things. We even sold furniture around Montenegro in order to buy
22 foodstuffs for those funds in order to provide a reasonable amount of
23 food for everyone. This was a problem that we were struggling with. We
24 were looking for a way. Often we did not have understanding for our
25 problem, but we did do our utmost to provide those people, regardless of
1 who they were, to provide optimal conditions for them while they were
2 staying in the KP Dom.
3 Q. Thank you. If you allow me, I'm going to read it. This is a
4 request for beans, 200 kilograms; rice, 200 kilograms; potatoes,
5 200 kilograms; cooking oil, and so on and so forth. Is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
8 document, please.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4310, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And how did the army respond? Did they deliberately keep the
14 food, meaning that they had the food but did not provide it?
15 What is your experience on this matter, as far as the KP Dom is
17 A. Well, I did not get the impression that they did not provide it
18 deliberately. Quite the contrary. They would intervene in certain
19 cases. The army had problems with feeding their own troops at the front.
20 This is a problem that can get very complicated easily. It's very
21 difficult to satisfy everybody when there is a shortage.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D09669.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. If you allow me, the receipts stamp says that it's the
25 18th of September, 1993.
1 Could you please tell us what this komanda TG Foca is and what
2 they have to do with you?
3 A. The tactical group command in Foca, as I said, was in charge of
4 prisoners of war and soldiers who had committed some sort of crime or
6 I said earlier that the army increasingly had problems with
7 supplying the army at the front. This was particularly pronounced, and
8 we also felt this at the KP Dom, once Serbia imposed sanctions. Then we
9 were not able to sell anything or buy anything from Serbia.
10 The deputy commander, Colonel Milan Maljkovic, from what I can
11 see, issued an order that quantities of food for military units be
12 reduced due to food shortages. I think this is what it's about in the
13 briefest possible way.
14 Q. What is the title of the document?
15 A. Reduction of the portions of food articles.
16 Q. Thank you. Can we look at 2: Those are going home to spend the
17 night are not allowed to receive food rations; is that correct?
18 A. Yes. Because some soldiers would eat at home and now this is
19 something that the army banned.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document as a MFI
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4311.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Just one more question and one more document during the
3 Mr. Rasevic, did you ever have an opportunity to find out
4 anything about preparations for war and anything about the question of
5 establishing illegal units? Do you have any knowledge about that? And
6 is that knowledge something that is confirmed in practice?
7 A. Well, I can say this: I worked in an institution that was a
8 multi-ethnic one, and I must say that - and I'm proud of that - I must
9 say that there were no pronounced multi-ethnic conflicts among the
10 officials of KP Dom, and, in particular, in my service. Tensions in Foca
11 already began in 1992 with the well-known Focatrans affair. This is a
12 transport company. During my own trial, I learned, based on an interview
13 from a SDA functionary in Foca who said in this interview which was given
14 either before or after -- during or after the war, boasted that as early
15 as 1992, in Ustikolina, which was part of the Foca municipality, he
16 formed an armed unit numbering 100 men, which was under the command of
17 Cavrk who died. That's what he said.
18 Q. Thank you. Did I understand you correctly: Was this in 1992 or
20 A. It was in 1990. I'm sorry if I said 1992.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness --
23 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness talk about his own trial in his
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he did,
1 Your Excellency, in paragraph 2.
2 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. Thank you.
3 Please proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown 1D09668,
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Sir, are you able to tell the Trial Chamber what this publication
8 is, "Oslobodjenje"?
9 A. This is a newspaper that was published in Sarajevo even before
10 the war. During the war, it was also published, I don't know where.
11 It's a newspaper where this interview appeared.
12 Q. Is it the leading newspaper in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was
13 considered and still is probably an official newspaper?
14 A. Yes, it was --
15 JUDGE KWON: That's a very leading question.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, actually, since -- [Overlapping
17 speakers] ... since quite some time now he is leading. Witness speaks of
18 1992 and then he says is it not that you speak of 1990. That was already
19 when I wanted to jump up but it was too late. And now it continues like
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can you tell us the name of the person who gave this interview?
23 A. It is Halid Cengic. He was a high-ranking personality in the SDA
24 party, in Foca.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us see the following page.
2 Can we enlarge the central part.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. I'll read out what it says. It's a -- under the subheading, line
5 20, and it says:
6 "But as early as the 2nd of August, 1990, he established an
7 illegal unit at Ustikolina. The 18th," or is it 180, I can't see well,
8 "of them swore on the Qur'an that in the name of Allah they would fight
9 for the defence and the religion of Bosnia and the Bosniak people."
10 Did you know that and how did this tally with your information
11 about their organisations even before the war?
12 A. It is possible that I misspoke when I said 1992 because,
13 actually, the year was 1990.
14 Q. Thank you. How did this reflect on the relations in Foca before
15 the war?
16 A. Even then their relations were not so good in the Foca
17 municipality. The very fact that the establishment of two transport
18 companies began, one where there were only Muslims, and the other where
19 there were only Serbs - both as staff and as issuers of the services -
20 we, at the KP Dom were able, until the beginning of the war, maintain --
21 to maintain good relations and to avoid any effect of all that on us, the
22 KP Dom, because although this institution was very interesting to the
23 ethnic parties.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 I would like to tender this document offered for identification.
1 It will be good if we could have it entirely translated because it speaks
2 about the roots of the conflict in Foca?
3 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we have a basis to admit this one
4 through this witness. All he commented upon was a year.
5 Please move on to another topic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Your Excellencies. But
7 for the record, the witness said that they were aware of this and that in
8 spite of all that, they were able to preserve good relations at the
9 KP Dom. But if you don't want it, all right.
10 No more questions at this point, Your Excellencies.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Rasevic.
16 A. All right --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Good morning.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
19 Q. Mr. Rasevic, until recently you served a seven-years prison term
20 for your participation in the events in the KP Dom Foca; right?
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
22 Q. And your colleague, Mr. Todovic, the assistant warden in the
23 KP Dom, was convicted in the same trial as you to a person term of
24 12 years and six months; right?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. And Mr. Krnojelac, the warden of the KP Dom, was convicted in a
2 trial before this Tribunal to a prisoner term of 15 years. You are aware
3 of this; right?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Let me quote from the appeals judgement of the 6th of November,
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honours, it is 65 ter 25870,
8 page 29 in the English and page 31 in the B/C/S.
9 Q. And referring to the treatment of the non-Serb detainees in the
10 KP Dom, the judgement states and refers to:
11 "A gross and flagrant denial of fundamental rights of the
12 individuals in violation of international law such as the right to life,
13 liberty, and security, the right not to be subjected to torture or to
14 human or degrading treatment, on the grounds of membership in a group of
15 people or a community of a different ethnicity and religion."
16 Mr. Rasevic, that sums up the findings of, in your trial in
17 Bosnia, on the treatment for the non-Serb detainees in the KP Dom. And
18 you do not deny the truth of that, do you?
19 A. I will always deny that this was done by members of the guards
20 service. I got no information from prisoners that they had been
21 maltreated by the professional guards of Foca KP Dom.
22 As for the conduct of others during the interrogation, during
23 interrogations, I had no information about it. Maybe they didn't dare
24 report it, or they thought that I was unable to do anything about it. At
25 any rate, I cannot comment that.
1 But I can make comments with regard to the service I was the head
2 of; namely, that I had no information to the effect that they were doing
3 that in an organised and systematic manner.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page please be admitted.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, since it has been put to the
6 witness, I don't see any reason why it should be admitted.
7 JUDGE KWON: Can we do without it, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff? The
8 Chamber has a general reservation about receiving the judgement of other
9 chamber or the other court.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I thought the reservation related to the
11 judgements from this Tribunal but not from the other tribunals, but -- or
12 other courts, but I have no problem. I have cited it, so I have no
13 problem. Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, I also want to refer to a -- the appeals
17 judgement related to page 32 and in the English, in page 34 in the B/C/S,
18 because it states in this part of -- of the appeals judgement that your
19 sentence of originally eight years and six months was reduced to seven
20 years because of your attempts to alleviate the suffering of the
21 detainees, coupled with your sincere remorse.
22 Mr. Rasevic, do you still feel this sincere remorse of what
23 happened to the non-Serbs in the KP Dom?
24 A. If the Trial Chamber allows me to explain a little, to clarify.
25 Throughout my professional career, I was a true professional.
1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, our time is very limited, so I think your answer
2 could actually be a yes or no, and we come to more details later on
4 A. Let me tell you, even today, I am truly sorry for everything that
5 happened to those people later and what I learned about that. As a human
6 being, I will always feel remorse.
7 Q. You were interviewed as a suspect by the investigators of the
8 Office of the Prosecutor in September and October 2004 here in The Hague.
9 Do you remember this?
10 A. I mostly do. But it was a long time ago.
11 Q. And let me just cite something that you said then.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have 65 ter 25867 on the
13 screen, page 249.
14 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, we only have it in English language so you
15 cannot read it in your own language. But I'll read slowly:
16 "But I will tell you one thing, I felt a great deal of compassion
17 to the people who were imprisoned there. And it was very difficult for
18 me to see my former teacher, my neighbours, and friends with whom I
19 celebrated almost every new year being held there. And there was nothing
20 I could do to help them except to sneak some items to them in secret.
21 "I deeply and sincerely regret the fate that befell all of these
22 people that you mentioned."
23 And a few lines further down you say:
24 "And I will personally apologise to these people to their faces."
25 And then further down a little bit, it says:
1 "And I strongly oppose all the evil that was done to these people
2 and I condemn all of those who did that to them. And I think that these
3 people need to be punished because that is the only way that we can put
4 an end to this evil."
5 Mr. Rasevic, when you speak of those people that need to be
6 punished for the evil done to the non-Serbs in the KP Dom, were you
7 referring to the Crisis Staff and the military command who decided about
8 arrests, detention, and interrogations?
9 A. Don't put things that way. I think that those people really
10 should be punished who assumed the right to do what they did. I don't
11 know whether it was the Crisis Staff who did it. I know that those
12 people were brought in based on a document that the military post
13 forwarded to the KP Dom, but who the people were who gave the orders and
14 later misused some -- somebody's order, these people should be punished.
15 I'm not an investigator, so I cannot go into that. But I think that not
16 only here but in any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina all people who assumed
17 the right to take somebody's life without a trial should be held
18 responsible, no matter whether it happened in Foca, Sarajevo, Travnik, or
20 That's my general position.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page please be
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit this page.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6655, Your Honours.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in your statement to the Defence, in paragraph 2,
2 you mentioned in the last sentence that you were never -- that you were
3 not a member of the new parties because you did -- because you did not
4 agree with the nationalist platforms of these parties.
5 Mr. Rasevic, it was when these nationalist parties were
6 established that conflicts and ethnic strife started; right?
7 A. Well, I don't know. I won't call them nationalist parties. They
8 were ethnic parties. Whether they later became nationalist that's for
9 somebody else to assess. But I wasn't there. I'm still a -- I still
10 feel a kind of nostalgia for Yugoslavia, and I don't think that will
11 change ever.
12 Q. You yourself stated that you did not agree with the nationalist
13 platforms. That's why I asked you.
14 Anyway, Mr. Rasevic, before the outbreak of the conflict,
15 Dr. Mandic, a medical doctor, one of the SDS leaders in Foca, approached
16 you and wanted you to side with the Serbs and help them to get hold of
17 the armoury arsenal of the KP Dom; correct?
18 A. I don't know where you got that information. There was a
19 conversation, and I happened to be at the hospital. He didn't say that
20 the weapons should be given to the Serbs. Maybe I made a mistake. He
21 said, Don't let the Muslims get hold of these weapons. And I was against
22 both the Serbs and the Muslims getting hold of those weapons.
23 We were probably the only ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina who
24 destroyed their weapons. That's what we did at the KP Dom. Everybody
25 was arming themselves, but we destroyed over 60.000 pieces of ammunition
1 to prevent both the Serbs and the Muslims to get hold of them. We didn't
3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you testified in your Defence case on the
4 11th of December, 2007, before the State Court in Bosnia and we will now
5 look at one page.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866 on the
7 screen. And page 9, please, in the English and page 10 in the B/C/S. In
8 the English it's at the end of the page, and in the B/C/S it's on -- on
9 the top of the page.
10 Q. And I quote:
11 "One man saw me there. That man at that time was one of the Serb
12 leaders, and he was -- he has seen -- he was seen as a leader -- a Serb
13 leader during the Focatrans affair as well."
14 And a few lines down:
15 "He asked me, Are you going take your side? And I was thinking,
16 Take what side, in what sentence? And he told me, You cannot be on
17 neither side. What do you think you are going to do with the armoury
18 arsenal or with the armoury storage place?"
19 Next page in the English, please, the B/C/S remains:
20 "And I told him, I'm doing my job. There is no need for me take
21 any sides. And what are you saying about the armoury arsenal, the
22 weapons storage? And he told me, All you have to do is to appoint the
23 guards as we tell you and we'll barge in and take over the armoury
25 But then you said:
1 "And I left and went to see the warden and told him about this."
2 Mr. Rasevic, that is what you said then, and that's correct what
3 you said then; right?
4 A. I would repeat the same even now. Nobody could exert influence
5 on me that would have a bearing on the manner how I went about my work.
6 Q. And this Serb leader was Dr. Mandic, whom you know as a doctor
7 from the Foca hospital; right?
8 A. To tell you the truth, this is the first time I hear that he was
9 a sort of leader in the SDS. I really didn't know that he was a person
10 of importance in their ranks.
11 I can kind of doubt that, really, but I really don't know. I
12 cannot comment.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then we need to have, again, the -- we have
14 to move to page 14 in the English and page 14 in the B/C/S. It's both in
15 the middle of the page.
16 Q. And your Defence counsel, Mr. Prodanovic asked you:
17 "Before I put your next question, when you talk about the SDS
18 leader who was trying to exert influence on you, can you tell us his
20 And your answer is:
21 It's Dr. Mandic. He worked in the hospital."
22 That's what you said then. You speak, and you did so before,
23 speak of the Serb leader; correct?
24 A. Yes. That question was phrased by the lawyer. And I replied
25 that it was Dr. Mandic whom I ran into at the hospital. It wasn't
1 because I knew him and went there to see him.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can these three pages just
3 discussed please be admitted.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6656, Your Honours.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. And after the clashes started and the KP Dom was hit by a rocket,
8 as it was in the middle between the two sides, together with Mr. Tesovic
9 you transferred about 96 non-Serb convicts via Montenegro to the Tuzla
10 prison so that they would be safe, right, that's what happened?
11 A. Yes. It was our assessment that if we save those people, and
12 they were all ethnic Muslims, Croats, and Albanians, 98 of them, and we
13 did that in agreement with the BH authorities.
14 Q. And on your way, you stopped at the Velecevo female prison and
15 you stayed there for a while; correct?
16 A. Yes. For the first three or four days of the war, I was with the
17 convicts from Foca KP Dom. There was also Alija Berber, the deputy
18 warden, and some 40-odd guards of different ethnicities.
19 Q. Let me stop you. I'm just talking now about what -- some events
20 in Velecevo female prison and we don't need any more details. My
21 question was only that you stayed there and it's correct; right?
22 A. Yes, it's right.
23 Q. And at that time you say you saw military men with rank insignia
24 at the Velecevo female prison. It was sort of a command post; right?
25 A. I think that at that time it wasn't a command post, because there
1 were still female convicts in that prison. We arrived there with a total
2 of 125 convicts.
3 Suddenly, on the following day, some soldiers turned up, but I
4 didn't know who they were or what they were. They seemed very
6 Q. And on that occasion, while you were in Velecevo you encountered
7 one of your Muslim colleagues from the KP Dom who told you that he was
8 captured and that you and Mr. Tesovic tried to get him released.
9 You remember that?
10 A. Yes, I remember. He was a colleague from work, a dentist. We
11 were able to convince those people to let them go and they did. But
12 later on, he was arrested.
13 Q. And when you say "those people," you convinced those people, that
14 includes Mr. Velibor Ostojic, who was also at Velecevo at that time;
16 A. Yes. We also spoke to him. He immediately tried to -- but he
17 had problems persuading the soldiers. They were from outside somewhere.
18 I know that he had a hard time persuading them. My impression was that
19 he didn't have the power to take that decision himself. The beginning of
20 the war was a very difficult time.
21 Q. Because of your activities to help the non-Serbs convicts out and
22 not siding with Dr. Mandic and the like, Mr. Radojica Tesovic, the
23 warden, was replaced by Mr. Krnojelac; correct?
24 A. When I arrived in mid-May, I returned from Serbia where I handed
25 over the prisoners, I went back to my work at the KP Dom, and I learned
1 that Milorad Krnojelac was appointed warden. He said that it was a
2 Crisis Staff that appointed him. Only later, some eight months or so
3 later, the minister of justice confirmed that appointment because, until
4 that time, we had no contact with them, the ministry.
5 Q. And you yourself, when returning, experienced harassment and
6 threats and you felt unsafe in your position in the KP Dom; correct?
7 A. Well, you know how it goes. I felt threats, verbal taunting, why
8 I had protected those convicts of a different ethnicity and taken them to
9 Tuzla. They would surely fight us as soon as tomorrow. But those were
10 only verbal threats. They never became physical. And they were issued
11 by individuals. There were individuals who had already lost someone in
12 the war. And then they would say, You treat them so well and I lost two
13 or three family members, and the like. But nobody from the local
14 authorities ever summoned me to tell me anything that could be described
15 as a threat. Those were all individual problems, and you know, at the
16 beginning, it was difficult to control some individuals.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867.
18 Q. And you have, again, the statement you gave to the ICTY,
19 page 184. And you say here:
20 "There was an anathema around me. I was in their black box. I
21 was something like a small Serb or a Serb with a small s. And all I did
22 I did secretly on the sly from my own guards."
23 Mr. Rasevic, you feared your own guards as you did not -- as you
24 did not know who was siding with the SDS policies; correct?
25 A. Well, of course. You know what? People change very quickly in
1 war time. But that did not keep me from doing my job professionally and
2 to show, by way of an example, how this should be done. Some of these
3 guards tried to behave a bit more radically, and in this way I tried to
4 show them that they shouldn't behave that way, and therefore the
5 situation became better and better in terms of the work carried out by
6 the guards, and so on.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page be admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll add this page to the Exhibit P6655.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the Krnojelac Trial Chamber in its judgement of
11 15 March 2002 and I refer here to paragraph 118 on -- on page 50 -- 54 in
12 both pages [sic]. This Trial Chamber found that the non-Serb males from
13 Foca were imprisoned indiscriminately in the KP Dom with no consideration
14 of age, state of health, or civilian status, and that there were many
15 elderly persons among the detained and there was a substantial group of
16 ill, wounded, physically handicapped, and mentally disturbed persons
17 among the detained men; that's correct, right?
18 A. I would not fully agree with that. I can explain why I don't
19 think that is quite correct.
20 Q. [Microphone not activated] Sorry. There were many elderly
21 persons among the detained, were there not?
22 A. I really don't know whether there were that many elderly people
23 over the age of 65. I did not have any documents in terms of how old or
24 how young people were. But it is certain that there were no detainees
25 younger than 18 at the KP Dom. Whether there were people of 65 and
1 above, I don't think so. I didn't have that impression. I don't know
2 whether that was the case in the beginning, until mid-May; but after
3 that, certainly not.
4 Q. And you knew quite number of the non-Serb detainees. Your
5 doctors, your own teacher, your own professor, and even your own
6 colleagues, and you knew that they were civilians and they were not
7 captured during fighting on front lines; right?
8 A. Let me tell you straight away: It is not for us to assess
9 whether somebody is a civilian or not, that's not within our job
10 description, and whether somebody had been detained rightly or wrongly.
11 Any person in the -- who was brought to the KP -- no person who was
12 brought to the KP Dom, regardless of ethnic background, did not come
13 there without any documents. Then these documents that --
14 Q. Mr. Rasevic, that's in your statement that was admitted in
15 writing. You do not need to repeat this. I just asking you as a person
16 who knew -- sorry.
17 A. [No interpretation]
18 Q. Yeah --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not understand the
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they had done
22 anything. Those who brought them in knew that. I really don't know --
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. Can you repeated the sentence, please, the last bit. The
2 interpreters couldn't understand.
3 A. I don't know whether they had do anything, whether they had
4 committed a crime. That is what those who detained them knew, or rather,
5 they were supposed to know. Now my subjective opinion is something quite
6 different. I had that before the war vis-a-vis certain convicts as well,
7 but that does not change the status.
8 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in documentation by the Crisis Staff, or later the
9 military command, there was this standard terminology that or that person
10 was captured in war operations, but you knew it's not correct; right?
11 A. I don't see how I could have known. How could I know? When
12 there is war in town and around, how could I know whether that was or was
13 not the case?
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866 on the
16 Q. And it's again your testimony in Bosnia, page 32 in the middle,
17 and then going into 33 in the English. And in the B/C/S, it's 30, the
18 lower part going into page 31.
19 You discuss here with your Defence counsel a certificate of the
20 Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality Foca for Hasan Pilav captured by
21 Serb units. And it's a document from the 26th of April, 1992. Captured
22 in war operations, and so on and so forth.
23 And then asked, you say:
24 "Yes, I knew Hasan Pilav and his wife.
25 "So" --
1 And your Defence counsel asked you:
2 "So was he captured in combat operations?"
3 And you say, "No."
4 So this is only a form which says war operations, yes, but
5 Hasan Pilav, this specific person was not captured in the combat
7 And your Defence counsel asked you:
8 "So this is only a standard form which would be used to
10 And your answer is:
12 Mr. Rasevic, you knew that it was a pretext for at least the
13 persons you knew -- of whom you knew they were not captured in combat;
15 A. First of all, this document has to do with the
16 26th of April, 1992, when I was in Serbia. I knew Hasan Pilav and his
17 wife. The lawyer was showing a document of the Crisis Staff, and he
18 said, as he defended me, that we, from the KP Dom, were not the ones who
19 made decisions. This is a document from April, and I came from Serbia to
20 the KP Dom only in mid-May. It was the army or the Crisis Staff that
21 issued the document, and nobody could enter the KP Dom or leave the
22 KP Dom without such a document. That was the essence of the question --
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. The end of the sentence, can you repeat it?
2 A. That was just an introduction. That was evidence provided by us,
3 how somebody was brought to the KP Dom and how people were taken out of
4 the KP Dom. It was certainly not we who were authorised in that sense.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page please be
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this to Exhibit P6656.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we have another page of that same
9 testimony. Page 44 in the English, in the middle, and page 41, bottom,
10 in the B/C/S and going over into page 42.
11 Q. There is another document that you discussed in your testimony in
12 Bosnia, and you basically read it out. And it is a telegram by the
13 command of the Herzegovina Corps, dated 14th of January, 1993, with a
14 note of urgent sent to the Command of the Tactical Group Foca, pursuant
15 to the decision of the command of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska, the
16 following persons should be released from the KP Dom; namely,
17 Nazif Cengic, Hilmo Cengic, and Fehim Cengic. On 15th January, 1992,
18 they should be transferred. They will be transported the border of
19 Yugoslavia and released. The command shall be informed about after the
20 execution of this order. And signed by General-Major Radovan Grubac.
21 Mr. Rasevic, these Cengics were very old persons; right? They
22 were far beyond 70; correct?
23 A. Well, I don't know. I -- well, they were not old, not all of
24 them. One person was elderly and one person was very young. And I don't
25 see what -- I mean, this is just proof that it was the military command
1 that decided who would be detained and who would be released. And that
2 is what I still assert in general terms. That's how it functioned.
3 There was no other way.
4 Q. And this exchange was decided by the very top level of the VRS;
6 A. Well, I cannot give any comment on that. I mean, the document is
7 self-explanatory, as far as I can see here, the command of the
8 Herzegovina Corps. I don't see what the top leadership of the RS has to
9 do with this. Whether they decided on that, that is not something that I
10 can confirm.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can this -- sorry. Can this page please
12 be admitted.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add that page.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I missed something, but I
16 did not notice an exchange there. It seems to be a unilateral release.
17 Could that please be explained to me? Who was exchanged for who
18 or what? If somebody could explain --
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think he could clarify this basically
21 in -- in the examination -- in the re-examination.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
23 Shall we take a break, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And I also have to
25 foreshadow that -- as I already mentioned -- as we already mentioned in
1 the -- in the -- in filing from Friday, for -- the time for
2 cross-examination, the statement has been added to substantially, so I
3 may need perhaps a bit longer but I will only address it when it really
4 arises. Just to foreshadow that this may be coming at some point in
6 JUDGE KWON: We thought one and a half hours would be sufficient,
7 but we'll see how it evolves.
8 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at three
9 past 11.00.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, the Chamber has looked at the
13 revision of the statement again, and the Chamber is of the view that an
14 additional half an hour would do.
15 Would that be sufficient?
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think so, yes.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
19 Can we please have 65 ter 25880 on the screen.
20 Q. And as it is coming up, it is a -- a cable of Colonel Marko Kovac
21 of the 31st of August, 1992, to the Trebinje Information Centre. The
22 Foca Tactical group was part of the VRS Herzegovina Corps headquartered
23 in Trebinje; right? That's the chain of command, Mr. Rasevic?
24 A. Well, I'm not very knowledgeable as far as military matters are
25 concerned, but I cannot know what this means. I think it belonged to the
1 Herzegovina corps.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have the second page in the -- in the
3 English -- in the English.
4 Q. And if we look at point 5 of this cable, there was a reference
5 that in course of the 30th of August 1992:
6 "We released from prison a total of 55 elderly, unfit Muslim
8 "And on 31st August, we released 30 [sic] women and children to
9 keep a visiting commission from discovering them and as an alibi."
10 Mr. Rasevic, this 55 elderly unfit Muslim males, that relates to
11 KP Dom non-Serb detainees; right? That's a transport to Montenegro, you
13 A. Yes, I remember these 55. As for the 40 women and children, they
14 were never at the KP Dom. I claim that with full responsibility.
15 Q. They were in the partisan sports hall; right?
16 A. That I don't know.
17 Q. And this release, was it related to the ICRC visit that was
18 basically coming to the KP Dom; do you recall?
19 A. I really don't know about that because nobody was duty-bound to
20 inform me. It probably had to do with something, but I don't know what
21 it had to do with. I cannot comment upon things that I don't know.
22 Q. In paragraph 35 of your statement, you state that no prisoner was
23 ever killed in the KP Dom. Mr. Rasevic, your regular working hours were
24 until the -- 1500 in the afternoon. That's at least what you say in
25 paragraph 25; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You were not present during night-time with a few exceptions;
4 A. Yes. When there was a regular check of whether the guards were
6 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you cannot honestly claim that no prisoner was ever
7 killed in KP Dom. The best you can claim is that nobody was killed in
8 your presence; is that not right?
9 A. I can claim with a great deal of responsibility that on the
10 premises of the KP Dom, as far as I know, nobody was ever killed.
11 Outside the KP Dom, I cannot say. I don't know. But in the KP Dom, that
12 somebody was killed there, I never heard of any such thing. Even during
13 my trial in Sarajevo, that had not been established.
14 Q. The Krnojelac Trial Chamber established in this regard - and I
15 refer here to 65 ter 25868, pages 132 to 138 in the English, and 120 to
16 124 in the B/C/S - and I just summarise a few things.
17 Paragraph 33, they find that in the month of June and July 1992,
18 KP Dom guards went to the rooms of the detainees after the roll-call and
19 called out from a list the names of individuals to accompany them for
21 The persons called out were taken from their rooms to the metal
22 gate at the entrance of the administration building. One by one or in
23 small groups, they were called into the ground floor room of that
24 building. They were taken into one of the rooms, left and right side of
25 the staircase. They were often beaten. The beating lasted well into the
1 evening and sounds of beatings and screams of victims could be heard by
2 other detainees.
3 And in paragraph 334, they refer to when the beating stopped.
4 Victims were sometimes taken to an isolation cell. In other instances,
5 sounds of pistol shots were heard and then the sound of a vehicle with a
6 faulty pipe was heard starting in front of the KP Dom. It was a
7 Zastava KD belonging to the pool of the KP Dom and the reflection of the
8 headlights of the vehicle could be seen by witnesses travelling along the
9 Drina ridge.
10 Mr. Rasevic, do you deny the truth of that?
11 A. First of all, when a guard receives a list of persons that are to
12 be interrogated by a person, he was only able to take these persons out
13 of the room and to hand them over to the interrogators. That was the
14 only role of the guard. The guard would then return back to his
15 workplace. I claim with full responsibility that in the KP Dom, at least
16 to the best of my acknowledge, and I'm sure that I would have found out
17 in some way -- I'm saying that nobody was ever killed on the premises of
18 the KP Dom. Now whether there was mistreatment during the interviews,
19 during the interrogation by investigator, members of the military, that I
20 cannot say. But on the basis of the knowledge that I have to this day,
21 there were no killings committed in the KP Dom.
22 As for outside the KP Dom, that is something different.
23 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the Trial Chamber in your own trial, in Bosnia - and
24 I'll refer here to 65 ter 25871, page 9 -- page 9 and page 2 and 3 in the
25 English and page 3 in the B/C/S - they found the very same pattern of
1 events of killing.
2 Do you claim that the witnesses in both these trials did not tell
3 the truth?
4 A. I'm telling you I tried to slow that down. Unfortunately, I did
5 not management but I'm telling you how it functioned, and I'm telling you
6 what my knowledge was. Witnesses could not really see all of that ...
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 17, the witness says -- it
10 says here "slow down" and the word is actually "challenge" or "deny."
11 Because, in Serbian, they are very similar: "Usperim,"[phoen] "osperim."
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
14 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in your interview with the investigators to the
15 ICTY, you yourself stated that the witnesses told the truth, did you not?
16 A. Yes, as far as my attitude to them was concerned. I've already
17 stated they testified very correctly. Finally, out of the 38 witnesses
18 of the prosecution of the BH, 36 spoke very favourably about me, but as
19 for certain things, I think that they exaggerated.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25868 on the
21 screen. That's in English. And the B/C/S is pages 124 to 126. And so
22 138 in the English; and 124 in the B/C/S. It's actually paragraph 1 --
23 paragraph 339. 339 -- that's in English it should be on page 138. 138.
24 But it's paragraph 339 on page 138.
25 JUDGE KWON: Page 120. Oh, no, it's in B/C/S.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In B/C/S it's basically starting. In B/C/S
2 we have the first -- in the very bottom. But the English is ... but I
3 can -- actually it would be easier for the interpreters, though, but I
4 can read the English --
5 JUDGE KWON: It will be coming very soon.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yeah.
7 JUDGE KWON: 137. E-court page 137.
8 E-court page 137 in English.
9 Why do we move the B/C/S, which was correct?
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
11 Q. But I can actually read the names. It's about the names. This
12 Trial Chamber -- the Krnojelac Trial Chamber established the -- the --
13 that 25 victims were killed in the manner that I just described. And in
14 the -- in your own trial --
15 JUDGE KWON: What's the paragraph number?
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 339.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The next page, 138.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. It starts -- and now we have the --
19 lost the B/C/S. Yeah, that's ...
20 Q. You see under --
21 JUDGE KWON: Next page for the B/C/S.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: B/C/S, you see first the name, Alija Altoka,
23 and then on the next page in the B/C/S you see more names, and all
24 together it's also more names on the next page in both languages.
25 Q. Mr. Rasevic, these names should be very familiar to you because
1 in your own trial, in Bosnia, the trial chamber actually came up with the
2 very same names. And I would only want to address one more, and that's
3 the person number -- it was mentioned number 25, and that is Kemal Tulek.
4 Kemal Tulek was your former guard; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you notice that after one such night he was gone, he
8 A. Yes. When I came to work in the morning, they told me that
9 members of the military security took Kemal Tulek away - because all the
10 guards knew him, that's why they told me - that he was taken out for
11 integration, he and I think two or three other persons. So they took him
12 out of the KP Dom. The papers were all properly signed. What happened
13 to him later, I don't know. I think that he is on this list of missing
14 persons or something like that. But that night he was not interrogated
15 at the KP Dom. He was taken away before 2000 hours.
16 Q. You were not there on that day; right? So you cannot really
17 claim that?
18 A. I can just claim that he was not killed at the KP Dom. I can
19 claim that because the guards and the duty officer told me that, that he
20 and two or three other prisoners were taken out of the KP Dom. Now
21 whether somebody abused that later, I cannot say because I don't know.
22 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in paragraph 30 of your statement, you claim that
23 the detainees did not have a view outside the KP Dom because the
24 administration building obstructed the view.
25 Mr. Rasevic, the building in which the detainees were kept
1 were -- had more floors than the administration building and, thus, the
2 detainees in the top rooms could look over the administration building
3 and see part of the iron bridge over the Drina; correct?
4 A. Yes. They could just see the top of the bridge, the iron bridge,
5 not the bottom. And they could see a house on the opposite bank of the
6 Drina that was a little taller. They couldn't see the road or the actual
7 bottom part of the bridge, lower part.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25946 on the
9 screen. And that is a sketch of the KP Dom. And ... yes.
10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there is your signature on top of this next to the
11 24th of September, 2004; right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So the -- certain markings on there are made by you. And my only
14 question is: The room 11, you have indicated room 11 on the building A
15 with windows onto the building B and also windows facing the
16 administration building; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this sketch be admitted, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Where is building 11?
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Room 11. There is a marker -- a little
21 arrow next to the tree. The little tree next to building A, you see
22 number 11. Yes. That's where it is. And that indicates room 11.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mm-hm.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
25 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, room 11 had four -- four separate rooms and
1 also a little main hall and those kind of things; right?
2 A. Yes. It was a collective, as we called it. It had four sleeping
3 areas, washing area, toilet.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
6 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6657, Your Honours.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have Exhibit P03353 on the
8 screen. And this is a set of photos. And we only need to look at the
9 fifth photo.
10 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Rasevic, you recall that a team of
11 investigators visited the KP Dom in summer 1996, and you were among those
12 KP Dom staff members showing them around, and they made photos; correct?
13 A. Yes. I was with them in 1996, I think it was.
14 Q. Yes. And where this little arrow, yellow arrow is, that's the
15 start of the iron bridge over the Drina; correct?
16 A. That is the top part of the iron construction. You cannot see
17 the actual road. You can only see a small section of it.
18 Q. And this photo would be the view of the detainees, that the
19 detainees had from the top floor of the building where they were housed;
21 A. Yes. But I remember when the investigators were there, military
22 prisoners of war were never placed in this small room from where the
23 photograph was taken. It was a few of them. And they were separate from
24 the rest of the inmates. And this is also something that I told the
25 investigators at the time.
1 Q. In paragraph 30 of your statement, you claim it was physically
2 absolutely impossible for the detainees to see the rooms where
3 interrogations took place.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have P3569, page 4, on the
5 screen. Page 4. Yeah.
6 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the little -- the -- the circle with number 2
7 indicates where room 11 was; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The investigators measured the distance between the building and
10 the administration building, and they measured it as being 10.2 metres
11 and 11. -- up to 11.75 metres.
12 Would you agree with this?
13 A. I never measured it; but, yes, I believe that is so.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have the next page.
15 Q. And here these yellow arrows also show where room 11 was, facing
16 the admin building; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And in the picture below, there is the infamous metal door that
19 all the witnesses spoke about; correct?
20 A. They're not infamous. It's the main entrance to the KP Dom. I
21 don't know why they would be termed as "infamous."
22 This is the only way to come in and out of the facility.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have 65 ter 11289C on the
25 Q. Mr. Rasevic, if you look at the lower photo, that is what the
1 investigators found was the view of the detainees from room 11 had on
2 part of the administration building in which, according to their
3 testimony, night-time interrogations took place. Agree?
4 A. I don't know exactly where they were interrogated.
5 Night interrogations were forbidden at the insistence of the
6 military authorities at the end of May or June because inmates could not
7 be taken out and guards would not enter the premises of the prisoners and
8 inmates after 2000 hours. This is what was set down in the rules --
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last sentence.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
11 Q. Can you please repeat the last sentence, please. Interpreter
12 didn't hear it.
13 A. Well, if you understood me. Already by the end of the June, at
14 the insistence of the KP Dom administration, there was request to the
15 army to stop interrogating persons after 2000 hours in the premises of
16 the KP Dom, nor could they be taken out of the KP Dom because this was
17 something that was regulated by our internal rules. I believe that these
18 were premises that were used for interrogations, among other premises
19 that were used for the same purpose.
20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, could that be a mistake that you said June? Could
21 it be July, end of July? Even August?
22 A. No, no, it wasn't early August. Definitely. Possibly it could
23 have been early July or mid-July. I cannot really remember that anymore.
24 It's been a long time since -- after all.
25 Q. And if we look at the next page, that's basically -- it's
1 basically the same -- it's the same window, same room, same view, but
2 there is -- actually some panes were put there to reflect the situation
3 at that time; correct?
4 A. Yes. Since glass was broken because of shooting, we had to
5 improvise something. We didn't have any glass to replace the panes. So
6 this is the sort of protection that was put up.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this exhibit please be
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit P6658.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
11 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you are aware that many of the non-Serb detainees
12 disappeared in so-called exchanges; correct?
13 A. Yes. I learned that after the war, unfortunately. At the time
14 when people were being taken away, I thought all of that was regular.
15 And I thought that there was permission given for them to be taken out of
16 the KP Dom and that's how it was done. In some cases, that was pursuant
17 to permission, but, in other cases, unfortunately, it was not.
18 Q. And in the -- the Krnojelac Trial Chamber, and I refer here to
19 page -- paragraphs 479, 4 -- and 480, this -- this -- that Trial Chamber
20 found that in nine such exchanges, between August 1992 to March 1993,
21 between 181 to 223 detainees were taken from the KP Dom and disappeared.
22 That is basically consistent what your -- the trial chamber in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina also found, that approximately 200 people disappeared;
25 A. I couldn't determine the exact number, but that a large number of
1 people were taken out under the pretext of exchanges or being released,
2 that is true. Some people were also exchanged, but all of this is in the
3 records that were maintained by the military.
4 Q. In paragraph 20 of your statement, you describe the food
5 situation in the KP Dom and you state that:
6 "We never made a distinction between the prisoners of war and the
7 convicts, so the food was cooked in the same cauldron for everyone."
8 And today you gave even more details to this effect.
9 Let me put to you what the Krnojelac Trial Chamber found in
10 relation to this. And that's paragraph 442, and they say:
11 "While the Trial Chamber is satisfied that there were certain
12 restrictions on the quantity and the quality of the food available during
13 the conflict, it finds that the food available was not distributed
14 equally among the detainees. Serbs received more food and of better
15 quality than that given to the non-Serbs. Serbs were allowed second
16 helpings at meals and weight loss was negligible during the period of
17 their detention..."
18 And that -- Mr. Rasevic, that was the situation, at least in the
19 year 1992 and until the -- the ICRC came in 1993; correct?
20 A. First of all, the situation in 1992 was bad for all convicts, as
21 far as food was concerned, and technically it was impossible. Food was
22 cooked in one cauldron. The cauldron was not divided inside into Serb
23 and Muslim sections. The food was the same for everyone. I state that
24 with full responsibility. We did not differentiate when we were
25 distributing food. Everybody had the possibility of receiving visits and
1 having extra food brought in, cigarettes, and so on. This is something
2 that happened. But as for prisoners of war, military prisoners of war,
3 there was nobody who would be able to do that for them. But as for the
4 cauldron, until we fixed the boiler and had enough steam, all the food
5 was cooked in one cauldron that was sent by the army. And finally, one
6 of the men who was distributing food was a Muslim. He was also there
7 distributing food with some other Serbs. I don't know if somebody
8 perhaps received more or less in a portion. I mean, there was always
9 something like that going on.
10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you yourself tried to help and asked the warden to
11 have the leftovers provided to the non-Serb detainees, the leftovers from
12 the Serbs; right? Because they ate later after the Muslims; right?
13 A. No, not quite. That depended on the daily schedule set by the
14 warden. He would set the times when food would be distributed. I did
15 ask that food be distributed, extra food, that some of it would be set
16 aside for Serbs who would be eating later and that the surplus would be
17 distributed to the military prisoners of war. I did get permission for
18 this and this was actually done. As for whether this was enough or not,
19 I really cannot say. I think it probably wasn't. I mean, it would be
20 nonsense to say that it was good quality food, but it was food, and it
21 was the only thing that was possible at the time, in terms of quantity
22 and quality.
23 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in paragraph 25 of your statement, you claim that
24 you have never been present while any of the detainees were beaten or
1 A. No, I was never present in such a situation.
2 Q. Let me refer you to an incident that involved the detainee
3 Salko Mandzo, nicknamed Kelta. He was beaten by a dozen military
4 policemen and cut with a knife during the interrogation because they
5 thought he would be a person close to one of the Muslim leaders Saja;
7 A. Yes, I just happened to be passing by on my way back from the
8 farm, and I could see that they were interrogating somebody. I asked the
9 duty officer. They said they were interrogating Kelta and I kind of
10 stopped and I was saying, What are you asking Kelta? And then one of the
11 interrogators said, We're checking whether he has anything to do with
12 Saja. And I said, What Saja? He is just a miserable person. He
13 couldn't get to Saja. And then they stopped beating hum. It's true I
14 went to -- up to him. I greeted him. He was bleeding. I gave him a
15 handkerchief to wipe the blood off. And I took him back to the compound.
16 He is still alive today. They said that, We have to call the boss. It
17 seems that we have the wrong man. It's not the one that we were looking
19 So I had the fortune by just coincidental intervention to save a
21 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, you were also present when Ekrem Sekovic, after
22 a successful -- unsuccessful attempt to escape on the 8th of July, 1993,
23 was brought back to the KP Dom and he was severely beaten by Borilo after
24 his return; right?
25 A. Well, first let me say that it was "Ekrem Zekovic," not
1 "Sekovic." He escaped from KP Dom and there was a search organised for
2 him, and probably while they were searching for him, I wasn't there. I
3 spoke with Zekovic later. However, he told me that he was beaten, abused
4 by members of the military security. They wanted him to admit who gave
5 him the clothes that he had on when he escaped. I was actually the one
6 who gave him the clothes. He did not want to admit that. He said to me
7 then, They can kill me, but I'm not going to tell on you. He did not
8 ever tell me that any of the guards had beaten him. He told me that he
9 was interrogated for a few days. I did suggest to him that he should
10 admit that and he said, No, I'm not going to do it. Let it be like this.
11 I talked to Zekovic to this day and we sometimes do talk about
13 Q. Yes, and Mr. Zekovic, while he was in the isolation cell, he
14 continued to be abused, mistreated; correct?
15 A. I came after ten days or so from the coast. I went to the
16 seaside and then I went to see him and I spoke with him. And that's all
17 that he told me, that he was beaten. He didn't tell me when or anything
18 like that. And he came out of the solitary confinement cell very quickly
19 after that.
20 Q. And the food rations for the non-Serb detainees were half for
21 quite some time, also as a collective punishment; right?
22 A. I don't know about that. Really, I don't know whether this was
23 done. I cannot comment on that because I was away for those ten days. I
24 don't know if there was any punishment undertaken during that ten-day
25 period, and if it was, then that was really not all right.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, can I ask for an explanation?
2 Does the Prosecutor believe -- does the -- is the Prosecution thinking
3 about those ten days, in particular, or in a general period?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I was actually only referring to the events
5 surrounding Mr. Zekovic, and that's described also in paragraph 233 of
6 the Krnojelac judgement. But we have no time to go into more details to
7 this effect.
8 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there is one additional point that I would like to
9 discuss with you.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, do I have enough time? It will
11 take another, let's say --
12 JUDGE KWON: I think your time will be up around -- at the end of
13 this session. You have about 40 minutes.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh. That's good to know. That's good to
15 know, because I was running through my script. Then I can actually
16 discuss something else with you, of which I was afraid I had no time.
17 Can we please have 65 ter 25927 on the screen.
18 Q. And as it is coming up, it is another document from
19 Commander Kovac from the 20 -- 27th of October, 1993. The -- the date is
20 a little bit difficult to see from -- from this -- in the B/C/S version,
21 but the stamp on the next page, the stamp from the office -- the other
22 office, then you can see it's the 27th.
23 Here, we have this document listing 55 persons, and if you look
24 at the first paragraphs, Mr. Kovac refers to these captured persons as
25 Turks. Turks. Captured Turks. That was the term that the military
1 would sometimes use - right? - "captured Turks"; correct?
2 A. I think that this would be something that would happen rarely
3 with military officers. I don't see why this term would be used,
4 "Turtci," [phoen] "Turks." I don't see why they would use such a term.
5 Q. When we look at the list of people, Mr. Rasevic, we see from the
6 year of birth of quite some of them that they are already 50 years of
7 age - correct? - when you look at those born in 1940, 1941. It's quite a
8 number of elderly people here.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we briefly move into private
10 session, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 [Private session]
4 [Open session]
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And number 19, that is the --
6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, sorry.
8 Q. And if we look at number 19, that's -- Salko Mandzo listed here,
9 is that the one that you saved from being beaten further?
10 A. Yes.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this please -- can this exhibit please
12 be admitted.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: It receives exhibit P6659, Your Honours.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. Mr. --
17 JUDGE KWON: Can you go back to private session briefly.
18 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
9 Q. Mr. Rasevic, this list of detainees from October 1993 contains
10 only 51 names but, at that time, there were more non-Serbs detained in
11 the KP Dom; right?
12 A. Yes. I don't know why that information was requested for an
13 exchange or release or whatever, but, yes, there were more. The
14 Red Cross had been there before and registered them.
15 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there are only 51 listed here in this list because
16 quite a number of detainees were hidden from the Red Cross so that they
17 were not registered as KP Dom detainees; isn't that correct?
18 A. I don't know if they were hidden. But people would be at work
19 when the Red Cross came to visit because they only gave us half an hour's
20 notice. So I'm not sure how the army handled that. But it is certain
21 that there were more prisoners. And I believe that eventually they were
22 all exchanged.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 24, the witness said, "I
1 don't know that they were hidden." And it was interpreted as,
2 [In English] "I don't know if they were hidden." Not if they had been.
3 JUDGE KWON: I don't see much difference, but thank you.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867, page 229 on
5 the screen.
6 Q. And that's your statement to the ICTY investigators.
7 And -- 229. And there, I ask:
8 "Now that you mentioned the ICRC, you were involved in hiding
9 detainees from the ICRC, were you not?"
10 And you say:
11 "No. The prisoners were hidden from them, that's true. People
12 would come from the military security prior to the visit, and I think
13 this happened once or twice."
14 Mr. Rasevic, that's what you said.
15 A. Yes. I still stand by that. It means that the army came and
16 took people away. Whether they were hiding them or whatever they were
17 doing, I don't know. But we, from the KP Dom, did not do that. We were
18 not involved. Finally, all those people were later again registered and
19 exchanged, but what methods were applied and what exactly they did, I
20 still fail to understand.
21 Q. Mr. Rasevic, some were never registered, and those not registered
22 were particularly at risk because they could disappear without leaving
23 any trace in the lists of the ICRC or anywhere; isn't that correct?
24 A. You know what I think, but that's my personal opinion and without
25 any firm foundation, that there were some prisoners of war who were
1 interrogated and processed. And there was another group who were never
2 interrogated. They were set aside for exchanges against Serb prisoners
3 from other prisons. And I believe that other group, that was not
4 registered, was there only for that purpose, only for exchange, because
5 allegedly the other side had the same practice.
6 Q. And one of those was Dr. Aziz Torlak, a medical doctor. Do you
7 remember him being in the KP Dom?
8 A. Yes, he was there.
9 Q. And he was not registered because he was always hidden when the
10 ICRC came; do you remember?
11 A. I cannot say because the army came with a list and took some
12 people away. He may have been, but I'm -- or, rather, that list was not
13 really available to me.
14 Q. Dr. Aziz Torlak was taken away in summer 1993 for allegedly the
15 need for a battalion of the VRS and he disappeared and he's dead;
17 A. I know that he was taken away. I was told that he was taken away
18 to be exchanged. Unfortunately, during my trial, I found out that the --
19 the exchange never came about. Why not, what happened? No idea.
20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you say in paragraph 13 of your statement that you
21 started to work in the KP Dom in mid-May 1992.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25931 on the
24 Q. And we have a decision of the Warden Krnojelac of 27 April, 1992,
25 appointing you to this position; correct?
1 A. Yes. But let me explain. On the 27th, I was in Serbia. I only
2 returned after the 1st of May. I know that for sure. And where did this
3 date come from? I don't know. It was probably due to some
4 administrative reasons, but that doesn't change the essence of my work
5 and my information.
6 Q. Mr. Rasevic -- sorry. You mentioned your frequent visits to the
7 isolation cells. When you did that, you saw injured -- injuries on the
8 detainees -- looked up there; right?
9 A. It was my duty and my task to always visit people in isolation
10 cells, and I did see injured people. And I asked whether the injuries
11 had been inflicted by any of my guards, but the answer was, No, this has
12 nothing to do with your guards. And that was all in terms of
14 Q. You asked him only about the guards and they said, No, it were
15 not the guards. But they also told you that it were the military police
16 that beat them up; right?
17 A. I don't remember that I engaged in such a conversation with them.
18 I would often ask them if they had medical problems. If they said yes, I
19 would refer them to the nurse for him to take subsequent steps.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866.
21 Q. And it's your testimony in front of the Court, the State Court in
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we need now page 114 in the English, and
24 107 in the B/C/S -- or 108 in the B/C/S. 114. 114 in the -- in the --
25 in the English. 114. And, in the B/C/S, it is 108.
1 Q. And you speak here with the prosecutor about the solitary cells
2 and what you saw. And then the prosecutor asks:
3 "Does it mean that sometimes when you were visiting solitary
4 cells and when you were visiting rooms, did you ever see a prisoner with
6 And you say:
7 "Well, yes, there were some bruises on the prisoners that I would
8 spot ..."
9 "Did you enquire? Did you ask them why? How come that they have
10 those injuries?"
11 And your answer is:
12 "My exclusive question was, Did my guards beat you up? Did they
13 do it to you? And the prisoners would tell me, No, the military police
14 officers and the military security officers did that to me."
15 So that's what you said; right?
16 A. Possible. Clearly, somebody must have beaten them. If it wasn't
17 my guards, then it would have been the military police or the military
18 security. That is quite possible. I probably said that, and I stand by
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page please be admitted,
21 Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this to Exhibit P6656.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
24 Q. Mr. Rasevic, when you heard that these interrogators from the
25 military police, military security, when they beat up the non-Serb
1 detainees, you did not do anything about that? Not writing a report or
2 restrict access to them? You didn't do anything?
3 A. Let me first tell you. Those people had their own superiors.
4 Secondly, I would report all -- everything that I noticed to my
5 warden. But it wasn't actually in writing. I went to see him and told
6 him. And, after that, he must have intervened with the military command
7 because the military was responsible for the interrogation of those
8 people at the KP Dom, not we. I only insisted that my guards should not
9 do that, and I was greatly successful in that.
10 Q. [Microphone not activated]
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. Mr. Rasevic, one of your main duties and the duties of your
14 guards under your command was providing the security for all inmates;
16 A. Yes, and that's what they did.
17 Q. That means, if you get aware of persons from outside beating up
18 the detainees you were providing security for, did you not have to stop
20 A. Oh, please. When a guard hands over the facilities for
21 interrogating prisoners of war to the military, the guard did not have
22 the right to enter subsequently and be present at the interrogation. If
23 we noticed injuries, he would inform the warden -- and the warden, the
24 command. And our responsibility ended there. And if anybody needed
25 medical assistance, they would get it.
1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, I want to go back -- and that would be basically my
2 last point. I want to go back to the judgement of the Krnojelac case,
3 paragraph 339 that we looked at before, where we looked at the 25 names
4 of victims that were killed. As this Trial Chamber found -- and this
5 Trial Chamber also found that guards were involved in this night-time
6 interrogations that left people dead. And the guards listed are
7 Milenko Burilo, Zoran Matovic, Milovan Vukovic, Dragomir Obrenovic,
8 Radovan Vukovic, Slavoko Koroman, Dragan Zelenovic, Vlatko Pljevaljcic
9 and Predrag Stefanovic.
10 None of these guards were of disciplined or reported to or
11 investigated for their conduct; right?
12 A. Please. First of all, some of them are not guards of mine at
13 all, Zelenovic, Koroman, who were -- left for the front immediately
14 after, and so on. They weren't there at all.
15 Secondly, I always asked each prisoner, even when I noticed
16 injuries on their bodies, whether any of my guards had been involved in
17 that, and they would always reply, No. And how, based on what, am I
18 supposed to have found out? If anybody was involved, they are
19 responsible for that themselves, and they should be held liable. Even
20 before the war, convicts sometimes would not report physical violence and
21 it would be learned of only subsequently. Whether it was for fear or for
22 any other reason, I don't know. But they said that my guards had not
23 taken part in that, that my guards had nothing to do with it.
24 And then how could I have launched an investigation? Eventually
25 most of them said that most of my guards were very fair to them. If in
1 any individuals did their own thing behind my back, well, that I cannot
3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, my last question refers to what you said, again, in
4 your statement to the ICTY.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867 on the
6 screen. And it's page 197 on the bottom and goes over into 198.
7 Q. You say, speaking about your knowledge:
8 "I was shocked to read -- to read what I read," referring to the
9 statements of the people in the Krnojelac case and in the State Court,
10 "they hid it from me. They must have gone to great lengths to hide it
11 from me because if I had known for a second and I understand that those
12 Muslims, that they didn't tell me anything even if I -- if in response to
13 my direct questions, if when I asked them, if they had any problems if
14 anything was wrong, because they must have been afraid of talking. They
15 must have been afraid of further revenge."
16 So you were fully aware that the detainees would never say
17 anything about the guards because they would fear an immediate violent
18 response; right?
19 A. Let me tell you, I thought that some people, some prisoners who
20 were at the KP Dom, could trust me fully, and so they were in a position
21 to tell me. Because we had known each other from before.
22 Let me tell you also that among them there were military
23 prisoners of war who ratted on the military security in order to get some
24 benefits. But probably they were more afraid of each other than of the
25 guards and their revenge. Once -- not once did they tell me that my
1 guards had anything to do that -- do -- do with that.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour can this page be admitted?
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes we'll add these pages to Exhibit P6655.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No further questions, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
6 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies. Thank you.
8 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
9 Q. [Interpretation], Mr. Rasevic, I'll start with the most recent
10 thing on page 63, lines 13 through 15. It was read out, as you said, and
11 I'm going to read out in English:
12 [In English] "If I had known for a second and I understand that
13 those Muslims, that they didn't tell me anything even if I -- if, in
14 response to my direct question, if, when I asked them, if they had any
15 problems if anything was wrong because they must have been afraid of
16 talking, they must have been afraid of further revenges."
17 [Interpretation] Can you tell us if you knew for a fact that they
18 were hiding something or is it the way you stated it here?
19 A. I asked people of whom I expected to tell me the truth, and
20 people who thought -- would trust me. And their answer was always that
21 it wasn't the case, that my guards hadn't participated in that.
22 Q. Thank you. On page 50 food was discussed. Did Muslim prisoners
23 of war or convicts -- or, rather, were they forced to eat pork?
24 A. No. The Serbs didn't get any pork either because we didn't have
25 enough of it.
1 We didn't get such -- we weren't getting such supplies. So
2 nobody was forced to do so and I believe that they would have eaten it if
3 there had been any. If you take into consideration the situation with
4 regard to food, nobody would have asked questions.
5 Q. Thank you. Where were the families of the Serbian detainees at
6 the time; and where were those of the Muslim detainees? Who was in a
7 position to bring food?
8 A. I am glad you asked this question.
9 Until mid-June, both Muslims -- Muslim prisoners and the others
10 got regular portions. Until 1500 hours, there were columns standing
11 there, waiting. When the Muslims left Foca there was no one left to
12 bring food, possibly some friends occasionally. On the other hand, the
13 Serbs were still there and they were in a position to -- to supply food.
14 However, the Muslim prisoners got regular visits all the way until maybe
15 late June, until the time when the Muslims left Foca.
16 Q. Thank you. Line 11 then, it seems to have been interpreted
17 regular portions, did you have regular portions or regular visits?
18 A. You mean in that last case?
19 Q. Until mid-June.
20 A. Regular visits.
21 Q. Thank you. Can you remember when the Red Cross visited the
22 KP Dom for the first time?
23 A. I think it would have been around May 1993. But don't nail me on
25 Q. Thank you. Then document 25880 -- 25880, the telegram of
1 Mr. Kovac of August -- the 31st of August, actually, mentions a
2 commission that was announced. Did our domestic authorities, the
3 Ministry of Justice, the government, have any control, or did they
4 inspect your prison?
5 A. In 1992, all the way until 1993, we were totally isolated, in
6 terms of traffic and everything. So the answer is no, they didn't come.
7 They couldn't. They would have had to travel through Serbia and
8 Montenegro, which a very long journey. At any rate, I never noticed
10 Q. D466 is a cabinet decision dated 9 August 1992 about the
11 establishment of a commission to inspect collection centres and
12 prisoners. Did Mr. Kovac mention the announced visit of the Red Cross in
13 August 1992, according to what you know now, what you've just said?
14 A. I really don't know. I was in no position to communicate with --
15 if you mean Colonel Kovac. He was the military commander and he mostly
16 communicated with the prison warden. Whether he announced anything to
17 him, I don't know.
18 Q. Thank you. Those elements from the military that you have
19 mentioned, were they under full control? Were they fully disciplined?
20 Could one say that they were acting as a disciplined army?
21 A. You know something? When a war begins, one system breaks down
22 and another isn't established yet. And then there are groups who -- that
23 roam about, and for a time, at least a month or so, they were difficult
24 to control. They were coming in from all over the place, Serbia,
25 Montenegro. It was very difficult to cope with them. It was only the
1 army that was in a -- that had the ability to control them. We were
2 preventing several attempts by paramilitary formations to enter the
3 KP Dom. You think it was easy? No, sir. But we were able to do it.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 24866, please.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. This is a report following the inspection of the public security
7 stations of Foca, Cajnice, Rudo, but we're not interested in that. But
8 Foca is on page 1. It says here that the -- they were unable to find the
9 court and the prosecutor's office. The names of the persons were known
10 but they had left.
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot find where the accused
12 is reading from.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you -- could you indicate from
14 where you are reading.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph -- ah, the
16 second-but-last paragraph from the bottom. No, actually, in English, it
17 must be on the following page. In Serbia, it's the last-but-one,
18 starting with the words [B/C/S spoken].
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I don't really understand to
20 which particular part of my cross-examination these police statistics
21 could refer. I did not address these kinds of matters.
22 JUDGE KWON: Hmm. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please turn back one page in the
25 Excellencies, here the witness said that his guards were fair,
1 but that in the army there were some elements that were in a position to
2 act differently. This document shows that such elements disarmed the
3 police, the regular police, and beat them up and maltreated them. This
4 is what I want to show so that we -- so we'll see that the last sentence
5 states that it was ordered to document war crimes.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I reply?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I'll ask you. I'll ask you. Can you see this last but one
9 paragraph where it says:
10 "Police was disarmed and mistreated ..."
11 How does that tally with your experience of some elements who
12 were not only mistreating Muslims but also Serbs and even the police?
13 A. My wife also worked at the MUP, so I know about that. I know
14 that they mistreated them. They disarmed all the MUP employees and threw
15 them out, and this went on for several days, I think. And I also said
16 that they tried to attack us at the KP Dom, too, but we somehow managed
17 to fend them off.
18 So these were people who took power into their own hands. Now
19 what was their aim? Looting, all sorts of things. Can you imagine in a
20 town like that where there is no electricity, where we were blocked, we
21 didn't have electricity for two or three months, it was very hard to keep
22 them under any kind of control, and I believe that this is what this
23 report pertains to.
24 Q. Thank you. You said that they took power into their own hands.
25 I think that that should be interpreted differently, not this way that it
1 has been interpreted.
2 What was the attitude of the authorities in relation to
3 mistreatment --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I still think that this has
7 nothing to do whatsoever with the cross-examination. The
8 cross-examination was focussing on the events within the KP Dom and about
9 a pattern of official access to detainees and what happened during
10 interrogation. It had nothing to do with the -- what was happening
11 between the Serbs outside in Foca.
12 JUDGE KWON: Is it not related to the pattern of military police
13 abusing their powers?
14 I will consult my colleagues.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll allow the accused to continue.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. What was the attitude of the authorities in relation to these
19 people who took power into their own hands? I don't like that
20 interpretation. I would prefer alienated from the power.
21 So what was the attitude of the authorities towards these things
22 that happened that caused trouble for you as well in terms of the
24 A. As far as I know, the authorities tried to resolve this problem,
25 and they did manage to do it within a few days with the assistance of the
1 military command and active-duty police officers. So after a few days,
2 the situation returned to normal, more or less.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
5 document into evidence.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will admit this.
7 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4312, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it was your intentional decision
9 not to tender 65 ter 25880, which included facts from Foca?
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, actually, I intended to tender all the
11 exhibits that I pulled up.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 Mr. Karadzic also dealt with it.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, no objection, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: We will admit that as Prosecution exhibit.
16 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6660, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, shall we continue after a break?
18 THE ACCUSED: No, no. I'll finish before -- before the break,
19 Excellency. Only two questions.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, then please continue.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Rasevic, was the sports hall a
24 A. As far as I know, that was some kind of a reception centre from
25 which people were transported to wherever they wanted to go. Muslims, in
1 the direction of Montenegro, they could not go in any other direction,
2 and then further on towards Macedonia, and so on.
3 Q. Thank you. It was also mentioned that you confirmed that one
4 detainee did not take part in the armed rebellion. Did the army only
5 capture those who were caught with a rifle in their hands on the
6 separation line, or were there other crimes committed against the
7 military for which they could arrest people and bring them in?
8 A. You know, not a single military POW could have been brought in
9 without an accompanying document from the military. So that document
10 would say that such a person is being brought into custody because of the
11 commission of a war crime. Where? We don't know. Some people were
12 arrested in combat. Others were arrested in town. Then whether they
13 committed certain incriminations somewhere, we don't know, but that is
14 what the documents would say.
15 Q. Thank you. Last question. You said that in Velecevo there were
16 some soldiers who were not from Foca. What was the army then that was
17 official in Foca and that was officially present in Foca?
18 A. You know that's the beginning of the war. These were
19 self-organised people. They organised themselves until the
20 Army of Republika Srpska was re-established. Now these people who came,
21 my feeling was that they had come somewhere from Serbia. Who they were,
22 I think that even in -- they didn't even belong to an organised army in
23 Foca. Quite simply, they entered. It was a porous border. They were
24 very aggressive. By the way they spoke, I cam to the conclusion that
25 they were not from Foca because they did not speak Ijkavian.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Rasevic. I have no further questions.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Rasevic, what did you mean when you said they
4 didn't speak Ijkavian? Ijkavian?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They did not speak Ijkavian. Let
6 me be clear. They did not speak the language that is spoken in our area,
7 in Bosnia. Ekavian is spoken in Serbia and in parts of Montenegro, so on
8 that basis I concluded that they were not from our region.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Rasevic. On behalf of the
11 Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
12 Now you are free to go.
13 You may be excused.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon. You are the
15 first judge who presided over my hearing. Thank you. It's a pleasure to
16 see you. I wish you good health and lots of luck, Mr. Karadzic.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: Good afternoon, Your Honours, and thank you.
20 Just before the break, I just wanted to indicate that with regard to the
21 next witness, and the Rule 90(E) warning, last week we had indicated that
22 he does not need a warning. That was before the additions to the
23 statement. In light of the new topics, I will be going into areas where
24 I think a warning would be appropriate. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, it's noted.
1 Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
2 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at
19 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.36 p.m.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
24 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
25 WITNESS: GOJKO KLICKOVIC
1 [Witness answered through interpreter]
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Klickovic. Please be seated and make
3 yourself comfortable.
4 Yes, before you commence your evidence, Mr. Klickovic, that -- I
5 must draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here
6 at the international Tribunal. That is, Rule 90(E). Under this rule,
7 you may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the
8 Prosecutor, or even from the Judges, if you believe that your answer
9 might incriminate you in a criminal offence.
10 In this context, "incriminate" means saying something that might
11 amount to admission of guilt for a criminal offence, or saying something
12 that might provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal
13 offence. However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you
14 and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you
15 know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the
16 question. But, in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your
17 testimony compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any
18 case that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the
19 offence of giving false testimony.
20 Do you understand that, Mr. Klickovic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Klickovic.
2 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
3 Q. Let us please speak slowly. Let us pause between our questions
4 and answers so that it would all be recorded in the transcript.
5 Have you provided my Defence team with a statement?
6 A. Yes, that's correct, I gave a statement.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
9 1D9687. Could we please have that in e-court.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Do you see the first page of that statement of yours?
12 A. I do.
13 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?
14 A. Yes, I read it and I signed it.
15 Q. Thank you. Please do not be confused by the fact that many
16 paragraphs were taken out of your statement. The reason is the fact that
17 your municipality is not in my indictment so the participants in these
18 proceedings, the Chamber and the Prosecutor, were not interested in that
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could the witness now be shown
21 the last page so that he could identify his signature.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Is that your signature?
24 A. Yes, that is my signature.
25 Q. Thank you. Taking this into account, namely, that these
1 paragraphs were taken out of your statement, what remains in your
2 statement, does that faithfully reflect what you said to the Defence
4 A. No. Everything that remained in the statement is correct.
5 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in
6 this courtroom as were those that were put to you when you took -- when
7 you gave this statement, would your answers basically be the same?
8 A. Yes. The answers would -- well, perhaps not exactly identical in
9 terms of sequence of words and thoughts, but in form they would be the
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
13 statement into evidence according to Rule 92 ter.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objections, Ms. Gustafson?
15 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, Your Honours. Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4313, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Now I'm going to read out in the English language a summary of
21 Mr. Gojko Klickovic's statement and then I'm going to put a few more
22 questions. I'm going to deal with that live.
23 [In English] Gojko Klickovic served as the chairman of the
24 Executive Committee of the Municipal Assembly of Bosanska Krupa between
25 December 1991. After that, he was appointed it's the president of
1 Crisis Staff of Bosanska Krupa, and when the war broke out, he became
2 president of the War Presidency of the municipality. He served two terms
3 as a prime minister of the Republika Srpska. In December 1997 -- in
4 December 2007, the office of the BH prosecutor charged Mr. Klickovic with
5 participation in a joint criminal enterprise, crimes against humanity,
6 and war crimes. He was later acquitted of all allegations in both first
7 instance and the appeals judgement.
8 Mr. Klickovic was present at the session of the Main Board of the
9 SDS in Sarajevo when the manual was distributed and that became known as
10 the Variant A and B. This manual had no binding character and everything
11 in it was in accordance with the applicable laws.
12 Mr. Gojko Klickovic states that nobody ever advocated the
13 creation of an ethnically pure Serbian state on the territory of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 In July 1996, as prime minister, he was asked to ensure that
16 President Karadzic complies with the agreement that Karadzic himself had
17 reached with Holbrooke. He was told that President Karadzic had been
18 promised by Holbrooke that he would not be prosecuted in The Hague if he
19 steps down.
20 Dr. Karadzic was a real democratic leader. He did not easily
21 resort to issuing orders as instruments of power, and all his orders and
22 decisions were in keeping with the laws and regulations, states
23 Mr. Klickovic. His main objective was to fight for people, for life, for
24 peace, and stability in every situation.
25 And that is short summary. Now I would like to pose several
1 questions to Mr. Klickovic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Klickovic, I would like to put a few questions to you.
4 As member of the Main Board, not an official in your
5 municipality, could you now tell the Trial Chamber how come this
6 happened? How come you got interested in the SDS and how come you took
7 part in its creation?
8 A. I will say that I was on the Main Board of the SDS from
9 July 1991. Actually, have been until this day. That is to say, that I
10 have been a member of the SDS throughout. So from the very outset, when
11 the party was founded in 1990, I was an active member, because I was
12 attracted by the programme of the Serbian Democratic Party. Its
13 intention was basically to preserve the Socialist Federal Republic of
14 Yugoslavia and to preserve the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 within Yugoslavia.
16 How do I put this? For me, that was guarantee that the Serb
17 people would remain in a single state. It was a guarantee for me that
18 peace would be preserved in that way and it was easier to do that in a
19 big powerful Yugoslavia rather than in some small partially states that
20 were already being heralded, because things started getting quite heated
21 from 1989 onwards, and it became obvious that this creation of the West
22 was now being dismantled by the West itself.
23 The programme of the SDS, the way I saw it, was at first the
24 programme of the Serbian Democratic Party from Croatia. That was the
25 programme of the party that was led by Dr. Raskovic, a kind man, a
1 psychologist, a doctor, a humanist. And this programme established the
2 basic principles, and I was attracted by these basic principles because
3 when I first started working, my job was in the -- then League of
4 Communists of Yugoslavia, in the municipal committee of Bosanska Krupa,
5 and this idea that was contained in that political organisation and
6 party, it was quite simply accepted in this new programme of the future
7 Serbian Democratic Party that also just wanted to preserve Yugoslavia and
8 to spare those areas of a new war. Any kind of separation without the
9 consent of others in the former Yugoslavia would have led to war.
10 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that in 1989 things started getting
11 heated, as you said.
12 What did you mean by that? And did you have any insight in terms
13 of what was going on in Yugoslavia or at least in your own neighbourhood?
14 A. Well, as an official in the League of Communists, beforehand, and
15 also as a person who was a scholar, I certainly was familiar with the
16 situation in the former Yugoslavia and especially things became totally
17 clear to me after the 11th Congress, when, in fact, it became obvious
18 that Yugoslavia would be dissolved.
19 The very fact that the League of Communists was separated into
20 different republics and this federalisation meant that Yugoslavia was on
21 the path of conflict and that, as such, Yugoslavia would not stay on
22 because the retrograde forces, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia, not
23 only in 1989 but before that, in 1987 and 1988, they showed their true
25 Let me just say something else. If we look at 1987, what
1 happened in May, when the doctrine and strategy of All People's Defence
2 was being adopted, or rather, of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, it
3 became obvious already then that there were states within a state. That
4 is to say, there is Slovenia in Yugoslavia, there is Croatia in
5 Yugoslavia, and also Macedonia was sort of inclined towards that too. It
6 already became obvious that the west and different services were working
7 on the breakup of Yugoslavia. Not to speak about resistance vis-a-vis
8 the state institutions of Yugoslavia. That meant the defence of the
9 area, especially the secretariat of the interior and the army. So that
10 is where it first became evident that Yugoslavia would be broken up.
11 As for these individual phenomenon, we can speak about this at
12 great length. Already in 1988 and 1990 there were quite a few of them.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us briefly about the organisational and
14 election activity of the SDS in your region, what its intonation was and
15 how you would assess it?
16 A. I have to say that that region or, rather, this area of the
17 then-Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina approached election
18 activities in a rather tolerant manner on the eve of the first
19 multi-party elections in this area, probably because of the agreements
20 that had been reached at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, between the
21 HDZ, the SDA, and later on, the SDS too. I'm saying "later the SDS"
22 because the SDS was the last one to be organised as such, and you
23 yourself witnessed the fact that Alija Izetbegovic already in July 1990
24 warned the Serbs, saying, What are you waiting for? Why don't you get
25 organised too. It is time for us to move onto democracy, a multi-party
1 system, and so on.
2 As for this area, there was good co-operation in this period
3 between the SDA -- actually, Muslims were the majority population in our
4 area, but there were also Croats and the HDZ and also another party, the
5 SDP, the Socialist Alliance, and so on.
6 So there were others, but the key forces were the Party for
7 Democratic Action and the Serb Democratic Party that were rather
8 fair-minded, and they also attended each other's rallies. Perhaps I
9 could even say that they helped each other organise their respective
10 infrastructures because both parties wanted to prepare these first
11 multi-party elections in the best possible way so that these forces of
12 Communism, or rather, socialism could be overcome. All of that was
13 rather -- pretty good, if I can put it that way. The relations were
14 based on tolerance and understanding.
15 I think that it was the month of October 1991 when at this rally
16 in Velika Kladusa, there was that mass gathering and that showed that,
17 after all, the SDA would work together with the HDZ and other Croat
18 parties that had already been organised, not only in Croatia but also in
19 the area of Herceg-Bosna, in our areas where there was a Croat
20 population, because they tied together the two flags, and they said that
21 they would move together towards victory. That is to say, that in the
22 future government, in the future parliament, in the future institutions
23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would function together and that they would
24 try through outvoting to resolve all problems.
25 All right. I will slow down.
1 Q. Thank you. I believe that you gave an answer to my next
2 question - what the basis for the coalition was - but I see that
3 basically you have answered that question.
4 When did tensions arise? When was there a deterioration in
5 relations when the new government started functioning, the one that
6 replaced the regime and the system as such?
7 A. Already in 1991; that is to say, as soon as this joint government
8 was established together, these joint authorities and we all participated
9 in that, on the basis of the outcome of the election. Already during the
10 first four months, there were some disagreements. Parties that had a
11 full majority and that were dominant in the executive and in parliament,
12 they wanted to establish in the administration as well the same kind of
13 relations. If one looks at the population in these areas, I will give a
14 specific answer.
15 Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, and other municipalities in the
16 surrounding area, they had a minority. They participated in all of this
17 with less than one-third, that is to say, that the other side could
18 outvote them, and they could do whatever they wanted to do.
19 The first such misunderstanding happened when there was a
20 rationalisation of the staff in these structures. It was supposed to be
21 brought in line with the population structure, which meant that a lot of
22 Serb employees would be dismissed. Of course, this led to tensions and
23 also problems in the assembly and the Executive Board and other organs of
24 government. This was certainly how other problems surfaced too.
25 The next problem that appeared and that was present all the time
1 was the attitude towards the institution of the Yugoslav People's Army.
2 We know that in 1991 there was this resolution, or perhaps we can say it
3 was a declaration. The Assembly of the Serb people made it known that
4 Serbs would respond to JNA call-up. That is to say, they would serve in
5 the armed forces because Yugoslavia officially existed all the way up
6 until midnight on the 25th of April when the new "zabljak" constitution
7 was adopted and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established on
8 that basis. We thought, as legalists, that for as long as Yugoslavia
9 existed and for as long as there were regulations in force that we had to
10 abide by these regulations. And certainly, as for the institution of the
11 armed forces, we saw that institution as a protection and safety for the
12 Serb people because we knew that the Serb people were living in different
13 places that were not interconnected, all the way from Slovenia to
15 So we struggled for the survival of these federal institutions,
16 and we wanted to give our full contribution to the work of these
18 The Serbs served in the JNA. They were deployed in the structure
19 of the armed forces, and they regularly responded to call-up. This kind
20 of response meant being dismissed from work, being jobless, and it led to
21 problems and torture in that area. Once they would return from the
22 reserve force and from the territories of Croatia where we were deployed
23 to serve in the armed forces of Yugoslavia, there were unpleasant things
24 that happened in the area of Bihac, Krupac, Petrovac, Sanski Most,
25 Novi Grad because these people were being singled out, labelled,
1 threatened, from different sides. They were being told that they should
2 not respond to the call-up, that they should not serve in the JNA. As
3 opposed to others, we did that, and this was this other conflict that
4 clearly showed that it would not be possible to continue that way for a
5 long time with this kind of structure of government.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us -- actually, you said that
7 young Serbs served in the military. Where were young men, Muslims and
8 Croats, from your area, and did you have any information about their
9 military organisation and arming?
10 A. Since the municipality of Bosanska Krupa and, later on, the Serb
11 municipality of Bosanska Krupa is along the border with Croatia, we knew
12 full well what was going on in the surrounding area, and we were aware of
13 everything that was going on in that area. We responded to this call-up.
14 Others did not. We went to serve in the forces of the Socialist Federal
15 Republic of Yugoslavia, the legal force, but the other members of the
16 armed force - I'm referring to Bosniaks, rather, Muslims at the time -
17 they, within their territorial units and units in local communes,
18 compiled lists, conducted training, decided who their commanders would be
19 along party lines and on the basis of party discipline. That is to say,
20 that they ask not respond. They didn't want to talk about going into the
21 armed force that they were a member of because they all had military
22 cards of the former Yugoslav People's Army. They were all deployed in
23 various units. They had their own assignments; but, according to the
24 orders issued by the party, the SDA, they stayed at home. They -- they
25 went over weekends to conduct exercises organised by the Patriotic
1 League, the Green Berets, and so on. But, at any rate, these were units
2 of at the time that could not fit into any law or legal provision that
3 had to do with All People's Defence in Yugoslavia. That is to say, that
4 these were units that acted outside the system but under the auspices of
5 powerful political parties because the SDA was certainly the most
6 powerful political party in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 So these were these first problems, and that was when there was a
8 hint of the problems that were yet to happen.
9 Q. Can we now go back to domestic politics now.
10 Can you tell the Trial Chamber, in view of your long mandate at
11 the top of the Serbian Democratic Party, who and how was the policy of
12 the Serbian Democratic Party set and what was the role of the Assembly,
13 the Main Board, the Executive Board and the president in the party during
14 the time that you were in the leadership?
15 A. I can say the real truth and the essence regarding the way we
16 worked because I was a member of the Assembly of the Serbian Democratic
17 Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was a member of the Main Board. For
18 a while, I was in the Executive Board, and also, for a while, I was the
19 director of the directorate of the Serbian Democratic Party so that I can
20 say --
21 JUDGE KWON: Could you speak very slowly, please.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Can you please repeat what you said after saying: "I was a
24 member of the Assembly of the Serbian Democratic Party," and then
25 everything else. Slowly.
1 A. I was a member of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina. I was a member of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic
3 Party. I was, for a brief period, a member of the Executive Board of the
4 Serbian Democratic Party. For a while, I was the director of the
5 directorate of the Serbian Democratic Party. Now I am still a member of
6 the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party.
7 So I really am in a position to reply to this question
8 definitively as to how and in what manner it worked and functioned from
9 the top, all the way down: From the Assembly, down to the SDS
10 Local Board. In essence --
11 Q. Well, now, can you tell us what the role of the Assembly was?
12 Who set policy, who changed the policy, who implemented the policy of the
13 Serbian Democratic Party?
14 A. I was just about to say that the democratic principle was the
15 basis on which the programme goals were established, as well as the main
16 tasks of the Serbian Democratic Party. Everything that was adopted was
17 done exclusively and only in the Assembly, by the Assembly, which was
18 convened once a year, and, if there was any need, it could be convened
19 twice or even more often. However, in practice, it was convened once a
20 year. This would be when the report would be submitted, as well as when
21 the programme would be set for the following year for the Executive Board
22 of the Assembly, for the president. The Main Board, in the meantime,
23 would also convene but rarely, perhaps twice a year, only to analyse what
24 had been done or implemented of the conclusions from the annual assembly
1 When the programme was being prepared, or any other conclusion, a
2 broad number of people took part in this process who were not necessarily
3 members of the party. Certain institutions also took part, academic
4 institutions, writers' associations, and they would help to prepare
5 certain programme tasks because the programme of the Serbian Democratic
6 Party was more of a people's programme, a source programme, the goal of
7 which was to maintain or preserve peace in that area, to try to preserve
8 Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its goal was also to maintain
9 good relations in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was Yugoslavia
10 in -- in -- in a small scale. And it was the only party that propagated
11 idealogical reconciliation in that area.
12 People divided amongst themselves, and this was present among the
13 Serbs and among other nations as well. Serbs had Communist and
14 anarchists, so the idea of the programme was to erase these ideological
15 differences and to establish relations of tolerance, full respect,
16 regardless of anybody's views. The methodology and the way the Serbian
17 Democratic Party operated in these organs was really so tolerant that all
18 the actors, all the participants, could discuss for however long they
19 wanted if they had something new to present. There was no restriction,
20 no obstruction, in this, and I also think that at that time nobody was
21 excluded from the Serbian Democratic Party because they had a different
22 opinion, except for one person who was a bit more radical and who
23 deviated from the party concept.
24 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell us this: You mentioned that you
25 were present when the instructions known as instruction A and B was
1 distributed. Are you able to tell the Trial Chamber on what basis did
2 the Serbian people and the Serbian Democratic Party opt in favour of...
3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to repeat the
4 last part of his question.
5 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last part question -- your
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This procedure of regionalisation, regionalisation, was there any
9 legal or constitutional basis for this process?
10 A. I have to say that this is a very broad question, and I'm going
11 to attempt to answer just in bullet notes because this is actually a
12 whole set of questions. I would like to be clear and precise, and I
13 don't want to take up too much time when I do this.
14 Let's me start from regionalisation. We know that
15 regionalisation was also set by the Law on the Territorial and Functional
16 Organisation in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
17 the constitution. Some matters were regulated by amendments from 1976,
18 1989 and 1990. It is correct that only the names or titles were changed,
19 or the headings, depending on the political situation and the
20 circumstances at that particular point in time in a specific area.
21 Here's an example. The Autonomous Region of the Krajina. That
22 was a regional -- or it was an association of the municipalities of the
23 Banja Luka region which rested on the same principles as the Autonomous
24 Region of Banja Luka or the Association of Municipalities of Bihac to
25 which we belonged. In the first stage, it was organised also in keeping
1 with the current laws and the constitution of the Socialist Republic of
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Other than giving political connotations to these regions, there
4 is nothing of particular importance there. They were dealing with the
5 same questions, the same problems; but, again, I say this depended on the
6 situation and the moment in time in which that particular community was
7 acting. And it is correct that later there was regionalisation along
8 national lines or ethnicity so that we had this regionalisation, which
9 means that the Croats organised the HAO, the Muslims organised MAO, and
10 the Serbs organised SAO, but all of that was the same, with the same goal
11 to resolve some problems faster and in a more organised way, and in case
12 of any kind of danger or endangerment to resolve the security factor more
14 Therefore, this was completely founded in the constitution and
15 the law. As far as the creation of these regional communities is
16 concerned, which later became autonomous regions, and this was something
17 that was valid for Serb, Muslims, Croats, and Bosniaks. That would be a
18 part of the answer.
19 As for the second part, the instructions that really -- this is
20 something that I have to say. This instruction was the basis for action
21 and for the work of the prosecutor's office. Unfortunately, in my own
22 proceedings, I asked the prosecutors 30-odd times why they do not say
23 which law of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the law
24 of the defence of the republic or the constitution I violated and why I
25 was brought to the -- before the court. What was it that I did that was
1 counter to the laws that were then in effect?
2 This is a document probably that has been misused and that will
3 be studied for a long time in legal history. Because, in itself, it
4 meanings nothing. As far as I'm concerned, as a member of the Main Board
5 and as an official at the local level, it meant nothing to me. And I did
6 not even take it at the Holiday Inn conference room when it was
7 distributed. I think that it was distributed upon your insistence. You
8 said, Distribute it, for God's sake, and everybody can read it for
9 themselves and then they can see what they want to do then. In itself,
10 the document has no legal force. I didn't even deal with it, but it was
11 just out of party discipline that I looked to see what was actually
12 written there. The instruction that was drafted was drafted, in my
13 opinion, for the purpose of establishing, I would say, a -- a code of
14 behaviour in the field, in complex situations because we already, at that
15 time, in 1991, had a pretty complex situation in the area of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina, which was dictated by an even more complex and worse
17 situation in Croatia. And I believe that the document really did receive
18 a lot of publicity, negative publicity, and it was considered as the
19 bearer of all evil in that area. When you look into it in more detail,
20 the document was formed and is based in the constitution of the Federal
21 Republic of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 from 1974, also based in -- on the Law of All People's Defence of the
23 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1982, based on the Law on
24 All People's Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from
25 1984 and 1987, and also in the strategy and the doctrine of the armed
1 forces which was published on the 25th of May, 1987, in the Law on
2 Yugoslav People's Army from 1985, in the Law on Armed Forces from 1985,
3 in certain provisions of the republican Executive Council of the
4 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the election result of the
5 party elections, in the plebiscite of the Serbian people held in 1991,
6 and recommendations of the Assembly of the Serbian People of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 11th of December, 1991.
8 Q. Thank you. Thank you.
9 A. I'm not finished yet.
10 Q. Well, I would like to ask you to be a bit more brief.
11 A. I will try to cut it short.
12 Every word from those instructions could be found in some of
13 those 250-odd articles of these laws that I have referred to. I worked
14 on some of those regulations. I know that, and that is why I assert that
15 the document is completely irrelevant in order to establish war crimes.
16 According to the document, there should have been no war crimes at all.
17 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation.
18 Are you able to tell us -- you mentioned the recommendations of
19 the 11th of December. Where you thinking of the recommendation on the
20 formation of Serbian municipalities, Serbian municipalities assembly --
21 municipal assemblies where there were conditions for such a thing?
22 A. Yes. And these were recommendations from a joint session of the
23 Assembly in which all three peoples took part, and it was stated there
24 that regionalisation should not be used in a negative way, in order to
25 raise interethnic tensions. We needed to wait a little for the joint
1 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to adopt the regulations and to
2 regulate this and then the -- the -- the process of regionalisation
3 should proceed. And these recommendations from the 11th of
4 December actually preceded the drafting of these instructions, which
5 somebody later called Variant A and B.
6 It's not a variant. It's just something that depends on the
7 situation where these regulations were supposed to be applied. So these
8 recommendations practically initiated the political organisation of
9 behaviour in the field in order to prevent conflicts.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you -- may I just ask you
11 something? I don't have LiveNote if something is not. I am afraid. Are
12 the booths working?
13 JUDGE KWON: While it is working on the common drive, it does not
14 work on the personal one.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. It's good that
16 it's working somewhere at least.
17 Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I wanted to ask you this: When did you adopt this decision in
20 your municipality?
21 Actually, in the question, there are some errors. The question
22 is wrong in lines 6 on page 91; 7, onwards, these are assemblies of the
23 Serbian people in these municipalities.
24 When did you decide in your municipality to form the Assembly of
25 the Serbian People?
1 A. This decision on the formation of Assembly of the Serbian
2 Municipality of Bosanska Krupa was taken in December -- actually -- 1991.
3 It was supposed to have been taken in June 1991. But listening to you,
4 actually, we kept postponing this in the hope that we would repair
5 relations because the discussion on the formation of the Serbian
6 municipality of Bosanska Krupa, in accordance with the Law on Referendum
7 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1975 was
8 implemented in the course of the summer, and we prepared -- and we
9 prepared to round off our municipality and inform all the political
10 factors about it from the SDA in the Bosanska Krupa municipality. This
11 would be the SDA at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, up to the president
12 of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic and yourself, as well as all of our
13 Presidency members.
14 Therefore, we could have done this much earlier, but we expected
15 that at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina a solution would be found so that
16 we would not have to do this in a moment that was full of tensions, that
17 was tense, i.e., not to form the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa,
18 which, in the institutional sense, was already completed, but we made it
19 official in December. We formed our organs and set off with working in a
20 normal way without trying to initiate any conflicts with our parts in the
22 This is about the municipality. We accepted this as some kind of
23 necessary resolution -- solution.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the question.
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. You said that you began in June and took the decision in
3 October and completed it in the 11th of December; is that correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Because the dates were not recorded. That is, in June or July,
6 you began; and October you took the decision; and the process ended on
7 the 11th of December.
8 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... just a second.
9 Please speak slowly, both of you.
10 Please continue. Can you answer the question?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's be clear about the dates.
12 The public discussion about the economic justification for the
13 establishment of the municipality had been over by June 1991. We got the
14 mandate to establish the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa.
15 In October of the same year, we decided to do that after the
16 continued conflicts within the authorities with the SDA.
17 On the 11th of December, 1991, we officially constituted the
18 Assembly and all of its bodies.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. If that was done before the instruction dated
21 19 December, based on what was it done?
22 A. The instruction of the 19th of December was something that we
23 didn't need at all. Because we had laws and regulations of the Socialist
24 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina that were in force, and they provided for -- for the
1 organisation of assemblies according to certain procedure and so on.
2 So we proceeded in accordance with the Law on Referendum and the
3 Law on Territorial Organisation, and we also submitted an application to
4 the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to give us
5 approval. They never did. But they never refused us either. Other
6 municipalities, such as Brod, Modrica, and others were singled out and
7 criticised for such activities. We acted in accordance with laws and
8 regulations in force and that was in line with the programme of the
9 Serbian Democratic Party, which was fully legalist.
10 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, what kind of connections do
11 you have with Pale? And what kind of connections existed between your
12 neighbouring municipalities in Pale? How did you work in your
13 municipalities, you and your colleagues from the Main Board?
14 A. Well, let me tell you, the Serbian municipality of Bosanska
15 Krupa, the Serbian municipality of Bihac, then Bosanski Novi, we had very
16 bad communication because there were problems with the telecom, and it's
17 generally known why, we could only communicate with you at Pale through
18 the delegates and the club of representatives of the Serbian Democratic
19 Party, which you favoured. And you always said that there was no need
20 to -- to double these activities because the delegates and the Assembly
21 were elected representatives of the Serbian people.
22 Therefore, meetings of the Main Board often didn't take place.
23 There would have been a doubling of functions, there would have been
24 costs for travel, and instructions, if required, could be brought by
1 At any rate, I and my co-workers at the municipality didn't have
2 a great need to consult anyone because we knew the programme of the
3 party, and we knew the laws and regulations, and we adhered to them. The
4 instruction or any other document of imperative character were not
5 binding. We didn't see it as such. There were only there in case
6 anything unforeseen should happen on the ground.
7 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what you know about the preservation
8 of peace and legality and law and order, as well as combatting of crimes
9 in your municipality and neighbouring ones, with respect to the
10 participation of the Main Board and the authorities.
11 You may remember who was number one at Mrkonjic Grad or Prnjavor
12 or Laktasi, how the line of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic
13 Party functioned in these municipalities and others?
14 A. I remember almost each member of the Main Board by municipality,
15 but I can answer generally that the members of the Main Board, where they
16 exerted the most influence in those municipalities the inter-ethnic
17 relations were best. I was a member of the Main Board at Bosanska Krupa;
18 At Novi Grad, it was Mr. Pasic; At Sanski Most, Mr. Brkes; at Petrovac,
19 Mr. Novakovic --
20 Q. Slow down, please.
21 A. At Petrovac, it was Mr. Novakovic; at Gradiska, Mr. Ivastanin; at
22 Srbac, Kupresanin, Milincic, and so on. There were all people who were
23 first-day members of the SDS, and they knew the basic principles upon
24 which the SDS was built. And, in that sense, we weren't faced with many
25 negative things or a negative attitude towards Bosniaks or Croats.
1 Tolerance was present very long. Actually, until the SD --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please start over.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Klickovic, if you could repeat your answer from
4 where you referred to tolerance.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was speaking about the members
6 whom I listed.
7 We really paid great attention to tolerance, and we cared about
8 good relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and we didn't allow
9 any negative events, because that was also our task in the field that we
10 had got before the conflict. We knew that this was the condition to
11 mitigate the conflict. We expected that Europe, the west, would resolve
12 the problem, and that there would be no conflict. We never expected a
13 war to break out, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And I think that
14 wherever we were in positions of responsibility, we, from the SDS, human
15 resources were well protected, and people were able to go to safer
17 For example, at Novi Grad, during conflicts, there were also
18 some -- there was also some influence from outside, and JNA units were
19 moving. The Muslim population was offered temporary shelter at
20 Banja Luka or Doboj, but I know from my daily contacts that many left for
21 third countries or other countries that used to be part of former
23 At Mrkonjic, we -- there was Luka Culic, a member of the
24 Main Board. They were faced with great problems. They had to protect
25 churches and other buildings from -- even from Serbs who did not agree
1 with them.
2 At Bosanska Krupa, where I was, when there was combat along the
3 Una river where there are mostly Muslim-populated places, we had to act
4 to preserve the lives of those people, and we were successful.
5 Q. Thank you. Now very briefly, you mentioned the rifts in the
6 Serbian people, divisions into left and right Serbs. Were the divisions
7 among the Muslims? And were there any entities with which you had good
9 A. Yes. I have also mentioned the rifts among the Serbs. And it
10 also applies to other peoples. This is probably inherent to the Balkans.
11 In our region, there was a division into the supporters of
12 Fikret Abdic and the supporters of the SDA hard-liners, whose leader was
13 Alija Izetbegovic. We co-operated with those who supported Fikret Abdic
14 and wanted peace in the region. They wanted many things to be tackled
15 differently. But we also took every opportunity to maintain good
16 relations with Bihac, which was the -- the spearhead of the SDA
17 hard-liners. We wanted to avoid shooting and the destruction of property
18 because we knew we didn't play an important role in the resolution of the
19 global situation. We only wanted there to be as few victims as possible
20 and as little suffering because we knew that only in such a way would we
21 be able to build a sound Bosnia.
22 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, did have you information
23 about convoys passing through and did you have information about the
24 misuse of convoys for the arming of the 5th Corps?
25 A. This is a rather broad question. I need a couple of sentences to
1 answer it. But there are also -- there's also more than one segment to
3 Let me point out that the -- that international aid that came to
4 the Cazin region, which is near Bihac, we have information, including
5 documents, that instead of fuel and food, ammunition and weapons were --
6 were being transported. And this Tribunal saw these documents in other
8 I will single out two persons who were involved. Hajrudin
9 Osmanagic, commander of the District Staff of Bihac, and Sead Palic, an
10 intelligence guy from Bosanska Krupa. He was born at Ostraznica [phoen]
11 and he worked for that humanitarian aid organisation, but when we found
12 his documents we saw what was being transported, from sniper-sights,
13 through ammunition, through barrels for light weapons. In other words,
14 lethal assets.
15 That's not all. There was the Corolici [phoen] airstrip that you
16 could access by helicopter or by smaller transport planes. It was used
17 for the transportation of provisions for the 5th Corps.
18 And let me also say that JNA units also passed through the area.
19 Often individuals or small groups of soldiers or officers were stopped
20 and robbed of their weapons, ammunition, or means of transport. We have
21 specific evidence to corroborate that because the Secretariat of the
22 Interior at Bosanska Krupa, their crime investigation service, staffed by
23 Serbs, initiated about a dozen proceedings against persons who committed
24 crimes of alienation of property and so on. However, the proceedings
25 were never completed, and it is clear why. Because it was the policy of
1 SDA that decided about everything, including who would be tried and who
2 would not.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 1D8890. Could we please see it. I will show you only one
5 document, Mr. Klickovic. I will tender the rest over -- over the bar
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 At this point, I'd like to note that we've had nearly an hour of
10 detailed direct examination, much of which going well beyond the scope of
11 the witness's statement.
12 I'd like to note that we had no advance notice that this would
13 take place, no information by way of a proofing note or anything else
14 that the -- this information be elicited. No notice that this document
15 would be used in the direct examination. Obviously this makes our
16 cross-examination preparations -- hampers our cross-examination
17 preparations and our estimates, and this is the kind of notice that we're
18 entitled under Rule 65 ter, and I'd just like to ask that, in the future,
19 this not happened again, that we get the notice to which we're entitled.
20 Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume responsibility for that.
23 It's very true. But this statement has really been butchered. And I
24 wanted to point out this municipality as an example for leading Defence
25 evidence. Since that has all been cut out, I must now ask general
1 questions to elicit the information desired. If he was merely a
2 municipal dignitary, he was also a member of government, and so on. And
3 I really apologise for these documents. There is more than one. But
4 I'll show only one so that Mr. Klickovic can comment on it.
5 Could you please zoom in.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And you, Mr. Klickovic, tell us what this document is. Who is
8 sending it to who?
9 A. Even without looking at it, not only this one but a series of
10 such documents, they were considered by the court in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 where I was tried. I know very well what it says.
12 This clearly shows what kind of aid was being provided and to
13 who. We know who, at the time, was commander of the 5th Corps of the BH
14 army, Ramiz Drekovic. We know through who that went to Bihac. As I
15 said, Sead Palic was in charge of Krupa.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Klickovic, since we do not have English
17 translation, we do not know what this is about. So please tell us what
18 this document is about and then proceed to explain whatever you like.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise.
20 This document is about ammunition supplies for the 5th Corps and
21 the supply of explosive devices that the 5th Corps used for combat
23 This document is marked military secret, strictly confidential,
24 and this was a job that was done by people that I mentioned:
25 Hajrudin Osmanagic, Commander of staff, and his deputy, Hadzic.
1 At that time, they did about their work in Zagreb. They had
2 something similar to an embassy, or maybe it was an embassy department,
3 and it was all sent to the commander of the 5th Corps, Ramiz Drekovic --
4 or, rather, his command. I doubt that he as commander actually counted
6 So this document shows what was being transported instead of
7 humanitarian aid. We also had information who manned in -- border
8 crossings at the time of the -- of the international forces up there.
9 Whether they controlled what was in the tank or trunks or not, we don't
10 know. But we know that under the veil of humanitarian aid, something
11 else was being transported. We tolerated that because we let
12 humanitarian aid pass through our territory, even if it was for the
13 Muslims or the Croats. It was pursuant to the orders of Dr. Karadzic.
14 This was not the first time that, instead of food and medication,
15 ammunition, explosive devices, rocket fuel were being transported. I was
16 shown a number of such documents, and I personally made it part of
17 defence evidence at the BH Court.
18 Q. And could you please tell us through who did this happen. Who
19 transported these assets?
20 A. I don't know if I confirmed that already, but all of this was
21 done with the agreement of the UNHCR and the international sponsors,
22 meaning that those assets that were being transported did not have to be
23 their property but they had their markings and were under their control
24 and monitoring. These were assets, transport means that would cross over
25 exclusively under the supervision of international factors.
1 Q. I would like to tender this document, please, and I have no
2 further questions at this point for this witness.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
4 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI D4314, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: I take it you can start your cross-examination,
6 Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honours. Thank you.
8 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:
9 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Klickovic.
10 A. Good afternoon.
11 Q. If I could just start by clarifying the dates -- periods during
12 which you served as prime minister.
13 Is it correct that you were the prime minister of the
14 Republika Srpska between roughly May 1996 and January 1998?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. At -- in your statement, you talk about the Variant A and B
17 document, and you spoke about it at length as well this afternoon. You
18 claim that the document had no binding character and, indeed, today you
19 said "it meant nothing to me."
20 You did, in Bosanska Krupa, create a Crisis Staff pursuant to the
21 Variant A and B instructions, didn't you?
22 A. No. We formed a Crisis Staff pursuant to the Law on All People's
23 Defence of the Socialist of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Articles 98, 99, 100,
24 101, 102, 103 and 104.
25 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could have 65 ter 06700, please.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ah, it's all right now. I see that
4 it has been corrected now. That it's all right now. 100. 102. I think
5 102 is missing.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON:
8 Q. You can see, Mr. Klickovic, this is an extract from the minutes
9 of the 3rd Session of the Bosanska Krupa Serb Municipal Assembly
10 Executive Committee held on 24 December 1991 with you chairing and
11 conducting the proceedings.
12 And you can see the agenda item 3(a) is implementing the
13 instruction on establishing a Crisis Staff; and on the next page, in the
14 B/C/S, at the bottom of the page in the English, under item 3(a) it says:
15 "The chairman briefed those present on the instruction on
16 establishing SDS Crisis Staffs in BH, and, in accordance with the said
17 instruction, proposed the establishment of a Crisis Staff. This was
18 followed by establishment of the Crisis Staff of the following makeup..."
19 And then it lists the members.
20 Now, the instruction on establishing SDS Crisis Staffs in BH that
21 you referred to in this meeting is the Variant A and B instructions ;
23 A. Yes, it's correct that it says so in the minutes. But I was
24 obliged to inform everybody with any document that arrived.
25 However, the Crisis Staffs are a legal category, and there is no
1 dilemma about that. The War Presidencies are constitutional category.
2 And I did say what the basis was for this to our members. Membership in
3 the Crisis Staff is regulated by law, by Article 67 of the Law on All
4 People's Defence, which states precisely who would become a member of the
5 Crisis Staff. By virtue of their function here, they're just mentioned
6 by their names: Deputy, chairman, and so on. Only names are added, but
7 everything is regulated by laws, and there's no need for any other papers
8 or any instructions. Everything is already there. I think the deputy
9 brought it, and I was obliged to inform everybody that this instruction
10 exists, and that this will be something that will be done in all our
11 neighbouring municipalities, and we, ourselves, also had our own
12 municipality and our own, organs and we would implement it there.
13 Q. And the document says:
14 "And in accordance with the said instruction," which you've
15 agreed is the Variant A and B instruction, you proposed the establishment
16 of a Crisis Staff. This was followed by establishment of the
17 Crisis Staff.
18 Now that reflects the municipal leadership, SDS leadership
19 establishing a Crisis Staff in Bosanska Krupa pursuant to the Variant A
20 and B instructions; correct?
21 A. I don't see anywhere that it says Variant A and B. Therefore,
22 there is no Variant A and B.
23 The regulations regulated the forming of the Crisis Staffs. We
24 just used the document that arrived for information purposes only. We
25 would have done this without it as well because it's not binding.
1 Secondly, at the time the situation in our area became critical.
2 Had we needed it, we would have formed the Crisis Staff even earlier, but
3 we believed that we would overcome the situation in talks with our
4 partners in the SDA and that we would not be needing a Crisis Staff at
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this document.
7 And I'd like 65 ter 26007, please.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: It receives exhibit number P6661, Your Honours.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could have page 30 of the English and
11 page 27 of the B/C/S of this document, please.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Klickovic, the document coming up now is a part of the
13 interview you gave to the Office of the Prosecution in 2003. And I'd
14 like to direct your attention to the bottom of your page in your
15 language. It's the middle of the page in the English. Where you are
16 asked about the very document we just saw, which has the reference number
18 And you're asked: "You are familiar with this document? Do you
19 remember it?"
20 And you say: "I remember the content of the document and that,
21 so that's the -- you know, the least problem. I remember the content
22 because it was the result of the instructions."
23 And then the investigator describes the document and says: "It
24 states that the Crisis Staff is actually being set up. Do you agree with
1 And you answer: "Yes."
2 Now, again, your reference here to the instructions is a
3 reference to the Variant A and B instructions; correct?
4 A. Again, in this statement also - which was given a long time ago -
5 the Variant A and B document is not mentioned. The law does not
6 recognise Variant A and B, and that is why I never mentioned Variant A
7 and B.
8 I simply spoke about the instruction before the investigative
9 organs because I was forced to do so because they did not even want to
10 hear that there were constitutional and legal regulations on this matter.
11 I tried to explain how the instruction came about. However, no one was
12 interested. I said in the beginning that the instruction is a very
13 strange document and that somebody misused it to substantial degree.
14 Q. If we could go to the next page in both languages.
15 You said no one was interested in hearing your reasons about the
16 creation of the Crisis Staff.
17 On this page, at the top in the English, and in the middle in the
18 B/C/S, you were asked: "Right. And the reason for that creation of this
19 Crisis Staff was what?"
20 And you said: "The situation at the time in the area, the
21 instructions that came from the SDS party, and also the results of the
22 events of events that went on in the second paragraph of October."
23 You refer to the plebiscite, the memorandum on independence.
24 And then you say: "So those -- all those events resulted in
25 these instructions. Both -- they came from both the president of the
1 party and the executive body of the party."
2 Now, here, Mr. Klickovic, you were asked directly why the
3 Crisis Staff was created. You do not refer to the Law on All People's
4 Defence in any manner whatsoever. You refer to the instructions that
5 came from the president and the executive body of the party, and that is
6 a reference to the Variant A and B instructions, isn't it?
7 A. Again, I do not refer to Variant A and B.
8 And, secondly, I said that reference to any kind of rule or law
9 before any prosecutor's office meant nothing. They kept going back to
10 instructions, Variant A and B. It's correct that I said that the Crisis
11 Staff was formed because of the situation in the field and because of the
12 instructions that came from the top, in order to prevent an escalation of
13 the conflict because of certain minor things and other things that were
14 happening. Because I said that it was these instructions that were a
15 limiting factor in terms of the conflict. And if I remember correctly, I
16 said that here as well to an investigator of The Hague Tribunal, that the
17 situation in the field was such that the time of crisis had already
19 However, during a crisis, during -- Crisis Staffs are formed
20 pursuant to the relevant laws.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... we saw a moment ago that you
22 created a Crisis Staff in Bosanska Krupa on the 24th of December, 1991.
23 That is, four days after the Variant A and B instructions were issued.
24 We see here in your previous interview that you said the Crisis Staff was
25 created pursuant to instructions that came from the president and the
1 executive body of the party.
2 If you are not talking about the Variant A and B instructions,
3 what are -- instructions are you talking about?
4 A. I did not talk about Variant A and B. I do not intend to talk
5 about them, and I'm not interested about them. I'm talking about the
6 legal organ, which is based on key legal organs in force at the time.
7 The Crisis Staff is an institution which, during times of crisis, has the
8 task of restoring the original situation, or resolving a situation, if
9 the situation begins to escalate out of control.
10 Why are we talking about the 24th? I could have formed the
11 Crisis Staff on the 19th in the evening. I could have done it as soon as
12 I arrived. However, there are activities of the Crisis Staff in
13 Bosanska Krupa before the 19th. We need to find the date on when the
14 order of evacuation was issued, or the order on the transfer of
15 endangered Serb citizens from the left to the right bank. And then you
16 will see that without a Crisis Staff being named, it was actually doing
17 its work.
18 So this cannot be connected in any way to the paper that I
19 received from the party because, as I said, even today, that paper means
20 nothing to me.
21 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender these two pages of the interview.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: It receives exhibit number P6662, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot find in the Serbian
1 version what the Prosecutor said about something coming from the
2 president. There is no coming from the president in the Serbian version.
3 Perhaps we can look at the document again, both in Serbian and in
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: I see in the middle -- at line 20... my B/C/S is
7 basically non-existent. But there appears to be a line -- a reference to
8 the president of the SDS in line 21 of the B/C/S.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please ask the original to
10 be read so that the interpreter could translate it.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
12 Yes, Mr. Klickovic. Could you read out your words there so that
13 we can hear the translation.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean "GK, 16? The current
15 situation," is that what I'm supposed to read?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The current situation in that area
18 and the instructions that came from the Serbian Democratic Party as a
19 consequence of events from the second half of October, the plebiscite of
20 the Serbian people, as a reaction to the declaration of independence or,
21 rather, the initiative to the memorandum..."
22 The initiative of the memorandum had not been clarified yet.
23 And then: "Following that course of events," this activity came,
24 meaning "instructions from the party level and representatives of the SDS
25 in executive organs of the joint power."
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11, "predstavnik,"
2 "representative," was turned into "predsjednik," "president."
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
4 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I could just clarify -- this is the usual
5 situation with interviews where it is not a translation but it's two
6 transcriptions of what is happening simultaneously in two languages, so
7 sometimes the transcripts aren't verbatim.
8 I note the time, if Your Honours wish to break.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll adjourn for today and resume tomorrow at 9.00.
10 Mr. Klickovic, I'd like to advise you not to discuss about your
11 testimony with anybody else while you are giving testimony here.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
13 JUDGE KWON: Hearing is adjourned.
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
17 February, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.