140217ED

Page 47184

1 MS. EDGERTON: I don't mean to interrupt you. If I could just

2 have your indulgence for a moment, but I think there was a revision to

3 the --

4 JUDGE KWON: All right.

5 MS. EDGERTON: -- 90(E) notification that we provided you with

6 that was sent by Mr. Reid earlier in the week. Yes, Mr. Reid advises me

7 there was a revised notification sent last Friday.

8 JUDGE KWON: Probably it didn't reach me or I just missed it.

9 Thank you. Very well.

10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,

12 Your Excellency. Good morning, everyone.

13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.

15 A. Good morning.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we call up in e-court,

17 please, 1D49080 without broadcasting it.

18 [In English] Not to broadcast.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Witness, may I ask you to tell us, is your real name and surname

21 below this number?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it under seal.

Page 47185

1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4372 under seal, Your Honours.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Witness, have you given a statement to my Defence team?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you. I see you observe a pause, as you should, and I thank

6 you for it.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness 1D2321 in

8 e-court. 1D23231 without broadcasting.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Do you see before you on the screen the first page of your

11 statement? Certain passages in which the Trial Chamber was not

12 interested have been redacted. I believe this is the redacted version.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Well, it's not, actually, not on the one that I

14 see.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we did make the redactions, Mr. President,

17 but perhaps they didn't make it into e-court, but they have been made and

18 I think the statement that was distributed shows the redactions in hard

19 copy.

20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we continue on that basis,

21 Ms. Edgerton? Yes.

22 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Have you read and signed this statement?

Page 47186

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the last page.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And in the bottom of this page there's also your signature. Is

6 this your signature?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have said to the

9 Defence team?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you. If I were to put to you the same questions here in

12 the courtroom today, would your answers be essentially the same?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this statement under

16 92 ter.

17 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

18 MS. EDGERTON: No.

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, are you tendering only the

20 confidential version or are you tendering also redacted version -- public

21 redacted version?

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I think we can tender a public

23 redacted version.

24 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

25 Shall we admit them.

Page 47187

1 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 65 ter number 1D23231 will be

2 Exhibit D4373 under seal, and the public redacted version will be

3 Exhibit D4374.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 I will now read out in English a short summary of the -- of this

7 witness's statement.

8 [In English] Witness KW586 was a member of a unit of the Bosnian

9 army called Biseri. The task of the unit was to protect the Presidency,

10 its members, and their families. During his shifts, KW586 was constantly

11 with President Izetbegovic and he was present during many of the secret

12 meetings held in the basement of the National Bank. These meetings were

13 attended by military and political leaders as well as by Izetbegovic's

14 son, Bakir; Izetbegovic's son-in-law, Jasmin; and Reis-ul-ulema Ceric,

15 who had the biggest influence on the president because he was a believer

16 and he held the Reis-ul-ulema in deep respect.

17 From the first meeting he attended as a security guard, KW586

18 heard that the goal of President Izetbegovic and the other leaders was to

19 get the international community militarily involved in BH on the Bosnian

20 side. To achieve this goal, they decided to apply the tactic of causing

21 the mass suffering of the Bosnian population and of engaging in

22 provocations in order to cause the shelling of buildings such as

23 hospitals and the like. They agreed to provoke the Serbs who had a lot

24 of artillery on positions around Sarajevo, so they would engage in

25 shelling which in turn would be used against them before the

Page 47188

1 international community. Whenever shelling was provoked in the places

2 where civilians would be hurt, the TV crews and journalists would be

3 close by.

4 Furthermore, smaller units were to make incursions into

5 Serbian-populated areas, where they would attack the civilian population

6 in order to get a reaction from the Serbian forces. This strategy

7 involved the engagement of units of the local commanders with a criminal

8 past such as Juka Prazina, Caco, Celo Bajramovic, and others. These men

9 were supposed to do as much dirty work in Sarajevo against the Serbs as

10 possible before the regular units with a joint command were formed so

11 that their actions would be qualified as crime and revenge and

12 President Izetbegovic could not be held responsible.

13 The truce agreed between the Muslims and the Croats just before

14 the Washington Agreement was a condition for a large quantity of weapons

15 intended for the Muslims and located in Split on the Adriatic coast, to

16 cross Herceg-Bosna on trucks and get to Sarajevo. In addition to the

17 weapons transported from Croatia to Bosnia with trailer-trucks, weapons

18 were also normally packed into food and clothing which was supplied as

19 humanitarian aid.

20 In the spring of 1994, President Izetbegovic and

21 Reis-ul-ulema Ceric met Naser Oric in order to remind him of the

22 importance of provoking the international intervention in BH. They

23 suggested Oric to organise smaller combat groups which would leave the

24 safe area without the knowledge of the UNPROFOR and engage in combat

25 actions against civilians in Serbian-populated communities as to provoke

Page 47189

1 the Serbian forces into retaliating and shelling the safe areas. The

2 victims were not important. As Reis-ul-ulema Ceric often repeated: They

3 are dying for a just cause and on the part of the Lord.

4 Soon after KW586 heard this conversation, news started arriving

5 that the Srebrenica had been shelled by the Serbian forces. In some of

6 those cases there was even talk that Muslim forces had shelled parts of

7 Srebrenica to point the finger at the Serbs. The implementation of the

8 agreed tactic to constantly provoke the other side and have the

9 international community blame the Serbs included the staging of incidents

10 before or during the visits of international officials.

11 As for the first Markale incident, Witness KW586 personally heard

12 President Izetbegovic, Reis-ul-ulema Ceric, and others present in the

13 bank talking what could have happened if a shell were to fall on Markale

14 because the market was full of people. Two or three days after this

15 meeting a shell impacted at the Markale market.

16 And that is short summary. Now I would like to pose several

17 questions to the witness.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown without

20 broadcasting 1D8841.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Witness, could you tell us what we have before us?

23 A. This is an official ID, probably mine, I don't know. The police

24 of BH, the official ID of the BH police.

25 Q. You mean the secretariat for internal affairs?

Page 47190

1 A. Yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please, without

3 broadcasting.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Help us with this, please.

6 A. Yes, this is my name and surname and my photo on the ID.

7 Q. Is it sometimes renewed or its validity extended?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal.

11 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

12 MS. EDGERTON: No.

13 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15 JUDGE KWON: Do we need the translation? Yes, we'll mark it for

16 identification under seal.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4375 under seal, Your Honours.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Could the witness be shown 1D8842 without broadcasting.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And what is this?

22 A. That's my accreditation to the company for the protection of the

23 Presidency. This was issued to members of my unit attached to the

24 Presidency.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the reverse of this

Page 47191

1 ID. The next page.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. This is the flip side of the ID?

4 A. Yes, and that is the coat of arms of the police.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal to be

6 MFI'd pending translation.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

8 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D4376 under seal, Your Honours.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D8840 is the next document I would

10 like to show the witness. No broadcast.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Witness, tell us what this document is.

13 A. This is an ID of the American humanitarian organisation where I

14 went to get fuel, food, and supplies for our unit. This ID was given to

15 several members of our unit.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is a translation, the text above corresponds to the text

19 below in our language?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document under seal.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4377 under seal, Your Honours.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 47192

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Witness, can you tell us from when until when were you a member

3 of this protection unit, unit for the protection of the Presidency and

4 the members of the Presidency and their families?

5 A. Two years, from April or May 1992 until May 1994.

6 Q. Thank you. Until when did President Izetbegovic use the shelter

7 at the bank?

8 A. As far as I know, the whole period I was there he was also at the

9 bank. I didn't notice that he was moved during my tenure.

10 Q. Thank you. We have received a document from the Presidency --

11 sorry, from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina which says he used the

12 bank premises until June 1993. Which information is correct, what you

13 have just told us or what is written in this letter?

14 A. As far as I know, he was not moved as long as I was there.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 1D8845.

16 No broadcast until I say something can be broadcast.

17 THE REGISTRAR: It's not released, Mr. Karadzic.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. While we're waiting, can you tell us, Witness, after the war did

21 you suffer any health problems; and if so, what kind?

22 A. I had a stroke in the year 2000 or perhaps 2001.

23 Q. Were there any consequences; and if so, what kind?

24 A. I have this tremor still in my hand and in one foot, but no other

25 consequences.

Page 47193

1 Q. Thank you.

2 The ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we don't have this in e-court,

3 could this document be placed on the ELMO?

4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

5 We have it in e-court now.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. I will now read out to you, it says, pertaining to your request

9 for assistance - please do not broadcast this - I will read it out in

10 English so it can be interpreted to you.

11 [In English] The witness "is a qualified driver. During

12 20th of May, 1992 - 12th of May, 1994" this witness "was a member of the

13 Protection of People and Objects ... of the Interior Ministry of the

14 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the basis of the decision made by

15 the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of," with

16 this date, witness "was a reserve policeman of the Protection of People

17 and Objects Sector - Police Unit for the Protection of People and Objects

18 and he was a sergeant beginning with 1st September, 1993 ..."

19 [No interpretation]

20 [In English] "... a member of the Fifth Police Department in the

21 Interior Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning

22 with the 12th of May, 1994.

23 "Finally" this witness "was a member of the unit 'Biseri'

24 throughout the war in B and H, and the unit was responsible for the

25 protection of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Page 47206

1 pretty important story about a conspiracy that could have affected -- if

2 it broke could have affected the conduct of parts of the rest of the war.

3 And it could have affected your stay in Germany, and you never told this

4 story to the authorities in Germany, did you?

5 A. I never discussed the war with anyone in Germany, not with the

6 authorities, not with the civilians.

7 Q. Well, the story you're giving us today is kind of like the

8 ultimate conspiracy about the war involving everybody from the political

9 leadership to the military leadership to the media. If what you say is

10 true, that story could have stopped more people from dying in Sarajevo,

11 it could have stopped more people from dying in Srebrenica, and you

12 didn't think it was important enough to tell as soon as you landed in

13 Germany?

14 A. Well, no. It's always this question of to be or not to be. At

15 first I did not consider that I should say anything at all because it was

16 the same on both sides, and they were doing what they were doing while we

17 were doing what we were doing. And I thought there was a balance to it

18 all. But when I saw after the war that the same gang is ruling Sarajevo

19 just as it did during the war, although the war had ended, while other

20 people are being held accountable for what they had done, then I saw

21 there was no balance in it after all. If one who is liable is held to

22 account, then another one should be held to account as well. And when I

23 saw that injustice, then I changed my mind. And even then, it's very

24 difficult to say things against your own people. I wouldn't wish it upon

25 anyone, but sometimes you have to do it.

Page 47207

1 Q. If it could have saved lives of your own people, wouldn't it have

2 been worth saying 20 years ago when you first landed in Europe?

3 A. I just told you. Whether it is right or not, I don't know, but

4 at that time I was still not certain that I should do it. I wasn't even

5 thinking of doing it. I wasn't even thinking of whether I should. It

6 was all fresh in my head and my only thought was to get away from it, to

7 find shelter with my family, to get as far away as I could from the war.

8 I didn't think about it at all. And at that time the Hague Tribunal

9 still did not exist anyway, so it didn't occur to me to do anything

10 further with that story. I just didn't think about it. I simply wanted

11 to find some peace of mind, to get some rest from all of that, to find my

12 own spiritual peace and then to get better physically, to recover my

13 weight. I wasn't thinking really, if you can understand, whether what

14 was right and what was not, not during those years. And only later when

15 I saw that some people are being judged for crimes that they hadn't done

16 while others were not being judged for crimes they were responsible for,

17 then -- then it came back.

18 Q. Well, a month or two after you got to Germany, you left for

19 Belgium; that's what you told us Saturday, right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you lived there for five years, four and a half or five

22 years, not even 200 kilometres away from this Tribunal, and you never

23 told the Belgian authorities this great conspiracy story, did you?

24 A. No, no, no. But I'm telling you now. At that moment -- well,

25 I've already told you, I was just looking at my own personal interest, to

Page 47208

1 get some rest, to come to. You can condemn me all you want, but it never

2 really crossed my mind.

3 Q. And --

4 A. But, but, there is this other reason, what I said just now, let

5 everybody be responsible. That's my opinion. Nobody was accused then.

6 These judgements came later. Everybody should be responsible for

7 everything; Mr. Karadzic too. If he's guilty for anything, let him be

8 held accountable, but don't make him guilty for the things he didn't do.

9 That's it. As for these years, I never thought of testifying, saying

10 things. And then when these judgements were being passed, then I sort of

11 thought about it. I saw that over all of those 20 years that gang is

12 still in power over there, no one can touch them. So that led to it too,

13 but that came only later --

14 Q. Well --

15 A. -- it wasn't at first.

16 Q. Well, so if what you're saying is true, you weren't thinking

17 clearly - because that's what you said - for the whole five years you

18 were in Belgium --

19 A. No, no, no, no. No, it's not that I wasn't thinking. I wasn't

20 thinking about war, The Hague. I just wanted to distance myself from all

21 of that, to be as far away from it as I could.

22 Q. And sacrifice the people that you left behind when you fled

23 Sarajevo; that's what you did, right?

24 A. Well, I guess you have to say that. I couldn't have changed

25 anything, just like anybody else. But anyway, if that's what you're

Page 47209

1 saying then ...

2 Q. So two months after you left Germany there were people on the

3 ground here in The Hague at this Tribunal. The whole time you were

4 living in Belgium, we were operating. And you would have seen that

5 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, while you were living in Belgium, were

6 indicted for killing and terrorising civilians in Sarajevo, by shelling

7 and sniping, and for the killings in Srebrenica, and you just stayed

8 there; right?

9 A. Yes, just stayed there.

10 Q. You didn't think this story was important enough to get on the

11 train for an hour and a half and come speak to an investigator here, did

12 you?

13 A. First of all, I'm saying now I did not follow the news very much,

14 either this way or that way. So it wasn't that I was informed about

15 The Hague -- well, even if I had been informed, during that first time I

16 wasn't really interested in that until these wrong judgements started

17 coming in. Well, then, I saw that one was being held accountable but not

18 the other one, and in my view both should be held accountable but I saw

19 that only later when I came to Bosnia that none of those bandits of ours

20 are being held accountable and others are. Well, call it what you will.

21 While I was in Belgium, it never crossed my mind that I should go and say

22 something to someone. I just tried to forget all of that. It was only

23 when I returned to Sarajevo and when I saw that those same people that

24 were looting, that had a free hand then, it is only then that I felt this

25 revolt again. Now, whatever you say to that, however you may interpret

Page 47210

1 this, that's the way it was. But in Belgium, it never crossed by mind.

2 Q. Well, when you went back to Sarajevo, as you told us on Saturday,

3 in 1999, these people who you mention in your statement - I'll give you

4 two examples - Sefer Halilovic, he was put on trial in this Tribunal in

5 2005 and you didn't come forward. Naser Oric, who you talk about a lot

6 in your statement, was put on trial in 2006 and you had a story that

7 could have changed the course of his trial and you didn't come forward.

8 That's because, Mr. Witness, you were only thinking about yourself, just

9 like you're only thinking about yourself in coming forward now after

10 20 years. That's really what's going on, isn't it?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Well, then you --

13 A. I don't know how come. Thank you. That's not the way it is. In

14 order to understand all of that, you have to live in Bosnia for a while.

15 Roughly around 2000 I wanted to come here for the first time, and I said

16 that to some people, that I intended to make a statement against that

17 scum over there. And then, as we talked, quite a lot of people agreed

18 with that but very few would come and dare testify. The main reason is

19 that they all have their families there, they have children, and nobody

20 dares because they know that there would be a lot of retaliation. I --

21 Q. Mr. Witness, I'm not asking about other people; I'm asking about

22 you. You didn't come forward -- Mr. Witness, you have protective

23 measures. Please, let's try and not talk over one another. You didn't

24 come forward to testify in the trial of Naser Oric because you're making

25 this up.

Page 47211

1 A. No way, no. You can interpret that any which way you want,

2 whether I'm right or wrong, but what I said is the truth. And if you

3 allow me, I will continue saying what I tried to say a moment ago. I

4 wanted to come here roughly in 2000, and as I talked to all these other

5 people who were not interested, they all agreed that there's been an

6 injustice but nobody dares testify. I hope that after my testimony

7 perhaps one or two more people will come and there will be some purpose

8 in all of this, otherwise nobody can get rid of that gang over there. I

9 did want to come in 2000 and I confided (redacted)

10 (redacted) I said that I would testify. He said that to them. The

11 very next day, the very next day around the apartment there were jeeps,

12 there were threats: What are you doing, you ape? What are you doing,

13 playing with your life? Where do you think you're going, you fool?

14 Things like that. And this was going round and round.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The name in lines 9 and 10, could

16 that be redacted?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 MS. EDGERTON:

19 Q. Mr. Witness, you can't even get your story straight between

20 Saturday and today. On Saturday you told my colleague who was

21 interviewing you exactly this same story, but you said it happened in

22 2012 and not in 2000.

23 A. Obviously you misunderstood all of that. I know exactly what it

24 was that I said, and I spoke about the first time, about that which is

25 now. As for the rest, the story that coincides with 2012, I know exactly

Page 47212

1 what I said. I wanted in 2001 to testify, but they prevented me from

2 doing so. And then came that stroke, and that's why I couldn't

3 afterwards. But once I recovered from this stoke and when I saw that I

4 could -- and you see that it's a bit hard for me to walk even now. Again

5 I spoke up. And that's why this testimony of mine did not arrive on time

6 for Oric and Halilovic, that's the only reason. I know full well what it

7 was that I said because that's the way it is.

8 Q. On Saturday we didn't ask you about 2000 or 2001; we were asking

9 you about Halilovic and Oric in 2006. And you said on Saturday that you

10 told this great story only in 2012 to your one cousin, so you told one

11 person, and you thought that he must have told someone because

12 immediately afterwards jeeps showed up. And then I asked you, I asked

13 you, who he told, and you had absolutely no idea. You can't tell me who

14 he told, you can't told me where he spoke to them, you can't tell me even

15 if he told someone because it never happened, Mr. Witness; isn't that

16 right?

17 A. That's not right. You've twisted it. Perhaps I misunderstood

18 you there, but I know what I'm saying now and that is the way it is. It

19 did happen. That is contained in my statement, and you did not allow me

20 to say a bit more. When I wanted to tell you more on Saturday, you just

21 said: Okay, okay, let's move on and so on and so forth.

22 Q. Then tell us who your cousin told.

23 A. Who he told? How could I know? I just know that this gang is

24 very well organised and that very quickly they got these yes men of

25 theirs, probably somebody who's in cahoots with the people that I'm

Page 47213

1 testifying about. Only a day before that there weren't any jeeps and the

2 very next day there were jeeps and threats, and I hadn't told anyone but

3 him.

4 Q. You know, Mr. Witness, since the 1990s this Tribunal has had an

5 office in Sarajevo open to the public in a protected facility. The

6 people in our office in Sarajevo include staff who have specific witness

7 protection skills and training, and you never in all the 13 years you

8 were living in Bosnia showed up with this huge conspiracy story; right?

9 You never went to them?

10 A. I never did, never did. Should I comment upon that or ... ?

11 Q. I want to go to another thing -- another area that we talked

12 about on Saturday. You confirmed on Saturday, didn't you, that you were

13 not one of President Izetbegovic's body-guards; right?

14 A. Well, this word, "body-guard," that would be wrong. I was just a

15 guard, an escort -- well, "body-guard," wow.

16 Q. And the president, he had a lot of meetings, didn't he, meetings

17 that you wouldn't have known about; right ?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That's because you weren't with him all the time; right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you know that if he was really concerned about information

22 leaking out about something sensitive, he would have closed-door meetings

23 that nobody could overhear. You know that, don't you?

24 A. That's not right.

25 Q. Well, well --

Page 47214

1 A. That room --

2 Q. -- Mr. Witness, you know that because you talked about a meeting

3 like that in your statement. That's what the president did. If he

4 didn't want -- if he was discussing highly sensitive information, he

5 would have closed-door meetings, just like the one you talked about that

6 he had with President Tudjman.

7 A. Tudjman never came to that room in the bank. Tudjman was at the

8 Presidency, and that's completely different. You're confusing things.

9 In this room where Izetbegovic lived, in the basement of the bank, there

10 were these persons who were mentioned here that came, starting with the

11 Reis and Bakir and Sefer Talijan. The meeting with Tudjman was an

12 official visit. However, they within the Presidency had their meeting

13 somewhere up there at the Presidency. This has nothing to do with this

14 thing over here. There's nothing for me to say there. Whereas over here

15 in the basement of the bank, well that is where they decided what they

16 decided. Whether they hid that from me, no. I guess they trusted me or

17 whatever.

18 Q. Let's get --

19 A. But I could hear every word. Tudjman has nothing to do with this

20 whole story. He was just mentioned because of the weapons. Later when

21 that meeting was held with him -- well, seven days later, those weapons

22 were released from Split -- well, that's the only context for Tudjman.

23 Q. We'll leave that conspiracy aside and get back to my question.

24 You would agree, would you, that the president would have closed-door

25 meetings where he didn't want to have anybody overhear; right?

Page 47215

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you wouldn't describe yourself as a close confidant of

3 Sefer Halilovic, would you? You weren't Sefer Halilovic's closest friend

4 or in his inner circle, were you?

5 A. God forbid.

6 Q. The same with Ismet Dahic, you weren't a close confidant of

7 Ismet Dahic?

8 A. No.

9 Q. And the same goes, doesn't it, for Avdo Hebib, Stjepan Kljuic,

10 Mustafa Hajrulahovic, even Reis-ul-ulema Ceric, Bakir, Izetbegovic? You

11 are not a close confidant of any of those people and you weren't at the

12 time, were you?

13 A. Well, I was nothing with them. I hadn't known these people from

14 before. Quite simply, I was carrying out my duties and it so happened

15 that in the course of my work I would be close to the president. As for

16 this man, I can only say the best and even later, and you can see that

17 from my statement. I think even -- since he's a religious man, had

18 somebody asked him -- I think he would have repeated that here too, but

19 there you go. I was no friend of theirs. I hadn't known anyone from

20 before. I mean, we weren't friends or enemies. Quite simply, I was on

21 this guard duty 3 or 4 metres away from them, and as far as I know the

22 late President Alija was always very nice to me. He'd bring me a cup of

23 tea and sometimes we'd even exchange a word or two, in a friendly way

24 really. (redacted) so probably

25 that's why I had that duty too. It wasn't for Sefer or anybody else, it

Page 47216

1 was just Ari Slupovac [phoen] as commander of the president's guard and

2 the Presidency. He's the only one who would decide who would go where.

3 No one could interfere with that, Sefer or this person or that person.

4 Q. And you would agree with me that an explicit instruction to

5 Naser Oric to attack Serb civilians to provoke the Serbs into shelling a

6 safe area and Sefer Halilovic openly saying that he had fired a shell at

7 the market-place and was going to do so again would be incredibly

8 damaging to the interests of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

9 wouldn't it? If that came out, that would be incredibly damaging. It

10 would turn world opinion against them, wouldn't it?

11 A. That requires a broader explanation. Will you allow me?

12 Alija Izetbegovic was convinced that he could not win this war

13 because he had a lot of men but less weapons. And the point was always

14 to somehow provoke an international intervention in this or that way,

15 according to the motto: All's fair in war. That's what was aimed at, to

16 cause an international intervention even at the cost of one's own

17 victims. The first time we expected international intervention,

18 President Mitterrand of France came and nothing happened. There was no

19 intervention. Then after that there would be a few casualties here, a

20 few casualties there, but it was never even remotely enough for the

21 international community to intervene.

22 Now, on the basis of all of that, because these two towns were --

23 well, Srebrenica was a protected area and Gorazde was a protected area,

24 and then there's Sarajevo. They were the ones that the media wrote about

25 the most, abroad as well. And also according to that thing, everything

Page 47217

1 goes in war, just win the battle, I know when the Reis said that, well I

2 saw that. Daily we're losing 50 to 70 people and no use, whereas this

3 way if we managed to provoke an international intervention they will all

4 go to paradise, they will all be martyrs on God's path. Those are his

5 words. So that was the point of all of that, to provoke an international

6 intervention and that could be done only through the protected areas. In

7 Gorazde they didn't succeed in that because they didn't have a man they

8 trusted there who would obey them the way Oric did.

9 Q. You haven't answered my question --

10 A. Let me finish.

11 Q. No. My question was: If this news, if your story had leaked

12 out, that would have been incredibly damaging and turned world opinion

13 against the Bosnian people, yes or no?

14 A. Probably. If that is just -- if -- well, if it's possible to

15 answer just that way -- well, yes, yes, that would be right.

16 Q. So -- but your evidence -- and it would be pretty basic to have

17 these conversations actually behind closed doors, just like the president

18 did with President Tudjman; right?

19 A. Again, I'm saying Tudjman is a completely different story and the

20 president had a meeting, a real meeting, with Tudjman in a real building,

21 the building of the Presidency of BH, where these decisions were made;

22 whereas these other meetings were held in the basement of the bank - do

23 you understand that? - where Alija lived temporarily because over there

24 his apartment had been shelled. And those decisions that were made at

25 the Presidency had nothing to do with these decisions taken at the bank.

Page 47218

1 It's just that some chosen people came to the bank. When Oric came, he

2 never stopped at the Presidency building, never. I remember three times

3 when he was there and once I brought him by car from Dobrinja to the

4 runway, to the Holiday Inn, and over there he never went to the

5 Presidency building but he always came to meetings at the bank. I want

6 to tell you to make a distinction between the two, and over here, it was

7 only these six or seven men who came to the bank, at first Kljuic. After

8 that he didn't come, when he realised what was going on there he said: I

9 don't want anything to do with that, whereas those people came non-stop.

10 Do you understand that? Where can you have a greater conspiracy than the

11 bank basement? There was no journalists there, secretaries, no one, just

12 six or seven men talking.

13 Q. And you; right?

14 A. And I.

15 Q. And your evidence -- and your evidence is that they discussed

16 these plans that could turn world opinion against them over and over and

17 over again in front of you; right?

18 A. If that's what you say, that's the way it is. I don't know what

19 could turn out, but there you go.

20 Q. And you're the first one to come forward with this story that

21 they discussed, not behind closed doors, you're the first one to come

22 forward with this story in 20 years; right?

23 A. I don't know whether I'm the first one or which one I am. I just

24 know that that's the way it is.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I note it's actually past the break.

Page 47219

1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue after a break?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me just add one more thing.

3 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue after the break.

4 We'll resume at five past 11.00.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

9 Q. Mr. Witness, I want to talk about some of these shelling

10 provocations you described in your statement, your written evidence. And

11 you said, with respect to those incidents:

12 "The agreement was that whenever shelling like this was provoked

13 in the places where civilians would be hurt, TV crews and journalists

14 would be close by."

15 So as I understand that, it's your position that these incidents

16 were all pre-planned in arrangements with TV journalists; that's your

17 evidence, right?

18 A. No. The journalists didn't know anything about it. Our people

19 just made sure that they would be close by when an incident would happen

20 so they could report in time, and since Sarajevo was encircled it was

21 never far away from the Presidency to the Dvor, to Kosevo, to all these

22 addresses, and the journalists were always at the ready to go there. Of

23 course the journalists had nothing to do with it. They just wrote about

24 what they saw, and our people served them up what they should see.

25 Q. Well, do you mean you? You've just said:

Page 47220

1 "Our people made sure they would be close by when an incident

2 would happen ..."

3 How would you know if you weren't a part of it?

4 A. I could neither decide anything nor was I able to -- I was just

5 close by when somebody discussed it.

6 Q. Well, then how do you know that your people made sure that

7 journalists would be close by when an incident would happen? Tell me

8 what they did to make sure that happened?

9 A. First of all, I don't know what they did later because I wasn't

10 there after. I only know when they talked amongst themselves how to take

11 care of the journalists, and generally speaking, Avdo Hebib took care of

12 journalists while he was there. That was his assignment, to enable all

13 the journalists to go whenever they wanted to, that access not be denied

14 to them. But, first of all, our people were supposed to clean things up

15 so the journalists shouldn't see what they shouldn't see, the military

16 hospital and all the other things.

17 Q. Oh. But --

18 A. -- the buildings of all the institutions, but not for a moment

19 did I say that journalists were pre-advised or involved in it.

20 Q. So this arrangement, this agreement that you're talking about, if

21 it's true, that would involve, I would say probably at a minimum, some

22 senior police officials, some senior military officials, probably some

23 brigade officials, probably some traffic cops from different parts of the

24 city of Sarajevo, probably the crew who was driving the truck that the

25 weapon was launched on and the crew that fired it, and you're the first

Page 47221

1 one from inside Sarajevo to come out and talk about this; right?

2 A. All these who were enumerated probably should have known, but all

3 these people were just executing orders without asking why. You

4 understand? I don't know about what came after. I only know what I saw

5 and heard at these meetings. What happened later at the execution stage

6 I was not able to know because I wasn't there. I could only know when

7 they said: Oh, this job was well done or that job was well done. And I

8 know who was in charge of what. A moment ago you said Sefer Halilovic

9 fired that shell; Sefer Halilovic didn't, the Italian did, Mustafa

10 Hajrulahovic, on the orders of Sefer Halilovic and those others in the

11 basement. That's the small error you made.

12 Q. Oh, so now when you talk about Markale I, you've pulled

13 General Hajrulahovic into the story. Were you there? Because that's the

14 only reason you would know about any order that General Hajrulahovic

15 might have given. Did you see him give the order?

16 A. When we were in the building of the Presidency and when the

17 planning was done for that, then Alija told Sefer: This and that needs

18 to be done. Sefer turned towards the Italian and said: No problem, the

19 Italian will take care of it. That's the sentence.

20 Q. Right --

21 A. And similarly, when the first attempt was made - there were two

22 attempts - the first attempt with that shell ended in the shell landing

23 on a roof near the market. The same thing was said: No problem, we'll

24 repeat it. We just have to wait for the same conditions to meet, for the

25 same group of UNPROFOR to be near. That's how I know it was the Italian,

Page 47222

1 not Sefer.

2 Q. Right. So let's leave the media conspiracy and let's go on and

3 talk about the Markale conspiracy.

4 A. No, no, no, no. No, there was no media conspiracy, no media

5 conspiracy at all. The media just covered and broadcast what we served

6 them, and I include myself in that army.

7 Q. Let's talk about Markale I. You're saying that the shell that

8 fell on the market-place in Sarajevo in February 1994 was fired - because

9 this is how I read your evidence - it was fired from Bosnian army

10 positions under Mrkovici by Mustafa Hajrulahovic at the order of

11 Sefer Halilovic and with the knowledge of an entire UNPROFOR team; right?

12 A. No, no. No, I did not mention the UNPROFOR in that context.

13 That UNPROFOR team was chosen perhaps because they were less attentive in

14 listening for the shells or because they were drunk. I don't know why

15 they were chosen by our people. But after that one visit of the UNPROFOR

16 our people knew who and what they were. There was no UNPROFOR

17 conspiracy. I don't know why they needed that particular team, by that,

18 that crew of people who were counting the shells. For the rest, you are

19 correct, everything apart from the UNPROFOR.

20 Q. Well, you said in your statement why they needed that UNPROFOR

21 team. You said that they had some kind of agreements with them that they

22 wouldn't register the firing of missiles from our positions, so UNPROFOR

23 was part of the conspiracy you're alleging in your own words?

24 A. I never said that, and if it's written somewhere then it needs to

25 be corrected. I never said that the UNPROFOR was part of the conspiracy;

Page 47223

1 UNPROFOR wasn't. It's just that one crew, I don't know whether they were

2 a bit careless or less attentive, but nobody ever said that UNPROFOR was

3 part of the conspiracy.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have the witness's statement in his own

5 language so he could have a look at that sentence that he seems to be

6 having trouble with.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I look at it?

8 JUDGE KWON: Of course, by all means, but shall we upload it.

9 MS. EDGERTON: And it's at paragraph 8, B/C/S page 10.

10 THE ACCUSED: Not to broadcast. Not to broadcast, please.

11 JUDGE KWON: No.

12 Last page in both versions.

13 MS. EDGERTON:

14 Q. And in your language, it's --

15 JUDGE KWON: Page 10 --

16 MS. EDGERTON:

17 Q. I think it's about seven lines up from the bottom. And it says,

18 and I quote:

19 "They had some kind of agreements with them," referring to

20 UNPROFOR," that they would not register the firing of missiles from our

21 positions."

22 A. Yes, but the crew of the UNPROFOR, not the whole UNPROFOR. And

23 these two or three men could be drunk, they could be inattentive, they

24 could be whatever, not the whole UNPROFOR but just one team. The way you

25 put it, it sounds like the whole UNPROFOR conspired against the Serbs.

Page 47224

1 It was just one crew, two or three men. I don't know how many there are

2 in one crew.

3 Q. So this third or fourth conspiracy that you're alleging would

4 involve Halilovic, Hajrulahovic, at least one subordinate officer, a

5 mortar crew, police who would make sure that no one who was living in the

6 area saw what was going on, or civilians in Sedrenik who were living just

7 hundreds of metres from where you say this shell should have been fired,

8 and the UNPROFOR team; right? That's who would have been involved in

9 this scenario that you're putting to us today.

10 A. Mrkovici village was chosen because it was known from before that

11 there were mortar positions there, and it was important to occupy a

12 couple of positions covering certain axes. And since the separation

13 lines were very close, it's very difficult to decide whether a missile

14 targeted a place here or 2- or 300 metres away. And for the inhabitants

15 of Sedrenik --

16 Q. This scenario potentially involves the conspiracy of dozens of

17 people from all walks of life, right, the scenario that you're putting to

18 us today; right?

19 A. Wait a minute. Let me explain this scenario and then we'll see

20 how we go on. You can't just ask me to say yes or no. Will you let me

21 explain?

22 Q. You explain what you want.

23 A. The direction of Mrkovici village was chosen because a number of

24 times during the war shelling came from that side. The distance between

25 separation lines was very small so it's very difficult to decide whether

Page 47225

1 it was fired from Mrkovici or not in the direction of Markale. And I

2 believe the inhabitants of Sedrenik didn't pay attention at all. What

3 they cared about was that the shell didn't fall on them because there

4 were shells non-stop falling, so they are certainly not part of the

5 conspiracy. As for the rest, I can only tell you what they discussed at

6 their meetings. I did not go out into the field and check any further.

7 I know that it was agreed when they talked amongst themselves that

8 Mrkovici village would be chosen. It would be good because there had

9 been firing at the city from that village before and because they knew

10 there were mortars there.

11 Q. Mr. Witness --

12 A. And whether those others down there were part of the

13 conspiracy -- no, they didn't have to know what was going on.

14 Q. Mr. Witness, this account, just like most of your statement and

15 every single conspiracy you allege, is pure fiction because you would

16 know that at the time you said these discussions were going on,

17 Sefer Halilovic wasn't even in the army. He had been ostracised months

18 before. He had been dismissed from the army at the time this was going

19 on. You made it up, just like every other conspiracy you've alleged to

20 try and get yourself a better deal with the people who are protecting you

21 now. That's what's going on, isn't it?

22 A. No, no, regardless of how you want to present it. I know that

23 with time you will get that other information. And I'm sure you already

24 know a lot that would make you believe what I'm saying. I said that

25 Halilovic was ostracised because of certain things he did vis-a-vis the

Page 47229

1 schedule. That's generally true. I was considering the possibility of a

2 slight adjustment. I'll communicate with him by e-mail.

3 JUDGE KWON: And I forgot to mention and put on the record that

4 the Chamber conveyed the -- its order to redact certain parts of the

5 previous witness's statement via e-mail. I just wanted to confirm it,

6 but I forgot that.

7 MR. ROBINSON: And also, Mr. President, the upcoming witness's

8 testimony you have ordered the redaction of paragraphs 3 through 11,

9 which we've done.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

11 [The witness entered court]

12 JUDGE KWON: Could the witness make the solemn declaration.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15 WITNESS: VLADIMIR GLAMOCIC

16 [Witness answered through interpreter]

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Glamocic. Please be seated and make

18 yourself comfortable. I take it that you understand my words in your

19 language that you understand?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

23 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Glamocic.

25 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

Page 47230

1 Q. Let us please wait for the interpretation to finish and you will

2 be able to observe that on your screen. Have you given a statement to my

3 Defence team?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown 1D08850.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Is this the first page of your statement that you see on the

9 screen? Do not be confused by the fact that some of the paragraphs have

10 been struck off. It's because the Chamber did not feel that they were

11 relevant. Is this the first page of your statement?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the last page be shown so that

17 the witness may identify his signature.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Is this your signature?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully convey your words.

22 For your information, the paragraphs 3 up to and including paragraph 11

23 have been excluded from your statement. Does this statement faithfully

24 reflect your words?

25 A. Yes.

Page 47231

1 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you about the same things and put

2 the same questions to you, would your answers be essentially the same?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender the statement

6 into evidence under Rule 92 ter.

7 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. File?

8 MR. FILE: Good morning, Your Honours. No objection.

9 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4379, Your Honours.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read out in

12 English a short summary of the statement of Mr. Vladimir Glamocic.

13 [In English] Vladimir Glamocic was elected chairman of the

14 Executive Committee of the Knezevo Municipal Assembly, Skender Vakuf

15 known as early -- in 1991. He held this position until 1993 when he went

16 to work at the directorate of roads of the Republika Srpska.

17 In 1990, Serbs made up about 70 per cent of the population of

18 Knezevo municipality --

19 MR. FILE: Pardon the interruption --

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MR. FILE: -- Your Honour.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 MR. FILE: I believe that Dr. Karadzic would save time as well by

24 skipping the second and third paragraphs of the 65 ter summary which were

25 excluded from the statement.

Page 47232

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic would appreciate it.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I kept the old one.

3 [In English] From the beginning of the conflict in Slovenia and

4 later in Croatia and BH, civilian and military convoys were often

5 travelled through the territory of Knezevo municipality. No one ever

6 notified the local government when the convoys would pass and where the

7 people in it were from. From the beginning of this term the -- of office

8 of the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Knezevo municipality,

9 Mr. Glamocic tried to establish good relations with the neighbouring

10 municipalities of Travnik and Jajce mainly inhabited by Muslims and

11 Croats and succeeded in it to a significant degree. The municipal

12 authorities in these municipalities were headed by the elected

13 representatives of Croats and Muslim population. The municipal leaders

14 of Knezevo enjoyed the full support of President Karadzic in terms of

15 maintaining good relations with the neighbouring municipalities.

16 President Karadzic phoned Mr. Glamocic in the early hours of

17 23rd of August, 1992, after being informed of the incident that occurred

18 at the Koricanske Stijene on the 21st of August. On the same day

19 Mr. Glamocic went out to the scene with the chief of the civilian

20 protection and the VRS in order to investigate the situation and take

21 measures.

22 Since during the war members of the civilian protection were

23 mostly older men unfit for military service, the municipality did not

24 have either the human or financial resources to deal with the problem of

25 pulling out the dead bodies and burying them. That is why the president

Page 47233

1 of the municipality Assembly got in contact with the authorities of the

2 ARK in order to find a solution at the regional level, while Mr. Glamocic

3 was responsible for mobilising the forces of the municipality.

4 Mr. Glamocic participated in a meeting held at the Banja Luka

5 Security Service Centre, CSB, and chaired by Minister of Defence,

6 General Subotic. The meeting was dedicated to the solving of the problem

7 at Koricanske Stijene because Knezevo municipality was unable to solve it

8 alone. During the meeting, the president of Prijedor municipality,

9 Mr. Stakic, pointed out that the conflict created a state of absolute

10 mistrust and the civilian authorities were unable to guarantee the full

11 safety of all citizens. For the reason -- for this reason they had

12 approved requests for relocation of some parts of BH inhabitants abroad,

13 wherever people asked to go.

14 During the meeting, it was agreed to put Prijedor municipality in

15 charge of the clearing up of the terrain because it was known that the

16 perpetrators of the crime were from its territory. It was also concluded

17 that the bodies should be identified at the scene and that the cause of

18 death should be determined for each person. Furthermore, representatives

19 of the prosecutor's office and the police were to investigate the event.

20 The work of clearing up started on 4th of September, but were suspended

21 when the crane used for lifting up posthumous remains broke down.

22 Mr. Glamocic is not aware that anyone, either before, during, or

23 after the meeting in Banja Luka, influenced the municipal authorities of

24 Knezevo to hide anything in connection with the incident. On the

25 contrary, everyone condemned the crime and demanded the punishment of the

Page 47234

1 perpetrators. When the meeting finished, all the participants visited

2 Knezevo and Koricanske Stijene. On that occasion, the commander of the

3 22nd Infantry Brigade of the VRS refused to receive the delegation from

4 Banja Luka since the VRS did not accept or recognise Subotic as a

5 minister of the defence. As a result, the relationship between the local

6 civilian authorities and the command of the 22nd Infantry Brigade of the

7 1st Krajina Corps was rather poor.

8 And that is short summary, and at that moment I do not have

9 additional questions for Mr. Glamocic.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Glamocic, as you have noted your evidence

11 in chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your

12 written witness statement in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will

13 be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

14 Yes, Mr. File, please proceed.

15 MR. FILE: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Cross-examination by Mr. File:

17 Q. Mr. Glamocic, you first learned about the Koricanske Stijene

18 massacre from Radovan Karadzic; right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. He called you at 4.00 in the morning on the 23rd of August;

21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So this phone call took place approximately two days after the

24 massacre which had happened on the 21st of August; right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 47235

1 Q. You immediately went to see the president of the

2 Knezevo Municipal Assembly, Milan Komljenovic; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you told him that Radovan Karadzic had just called you about

5 the incident at Koricanske Stijene; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, Mr. Komljenovic testified here in this case and he gave a

8 statement or he said the following, and that's P3768 at page 3:

9 "Three or four months ago Vlado Glamocic admitted to me the

10 following story which I heard for the first time. On the night of the

11 massacre, Glamocic received an enraged telephone call from

12 Radovan Karadzic demanding answers about the massacre and who was

13 responsible for it ..."

14 Now, Mr. Komljenovic's comment was made in December of 2009, so

15 his evidence is that you related this story about the Karadzic phone call

16 to him sometime in mid-2009. So my question to you is: Is it possible

17 that your recollection regarding when you first told Mr. Komljenovic

18 about the call from Karadzic is faulty and that you actually told him in

19 2009, not when you first saw him after the massacre around the

20 23rd of August, 1992?

21 A. No. It was for that reason that I visited Milan Komljenovic who

22 resided in a village between 12 and 15 kilometres halfway from Banja Luka

23 to Knezevo. On that same morning I told him that the president had

24 called me and asked me about the incident at Koricanske Stijene. At this

25 point he told me that on the previous day he was in the Prijedor

Page 47236

1 municipality and the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly and that he discussed

2 the incident at Koricanske Stijene with some people. This is definitely

3 how it happened and the reason why I went to see Mr. Komljenovic was that

4 I had received that call from Mr. Karadzic.

5 Q. You gave a sworn statement to the BiH prosecutor in 2008 in

6 connection with the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of the

7 massacre; correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And did you tell the whole truth in that statement?

10 A. I did.

11 MR. FILE: Could we see 65 ter number 22096, please.

12 Q. Mr. Glamocic, does this look familiar to you as a copy of that

13 sworn statement that you gave?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. FILE: Could we look at English page 4 and B/C/S page 3,

16 please.

17 Q. We're going to look at the middle of the first paragraph in both

18 the English and the B/C/S. Here you'll see that you say:

19 "I think it was around 22/23 of August when I came back to

20 Knezevo and when I learnt from Milan Komljenovic that on the location of

21 Koricanske Stijene the Prijedor police, who escorted this convoy, singled

22 out a certain number of men from the convoy and killed them on that

23 spot ..."

24 So in 2008 in your sworn statement to the BiH prosecutor, you

25 didn't mention anything about receiving an angry phone call from the

Page 47237

1 president in the middle of the night, but rather that you learned of the

2 massacre from Mr. Komljenovic himself; correct?

3 A. Yes. But nobody had asked me whether Mr. Karadzic had called. I

4 learnt about the incident at Koricanske Stijene from Milan Komljenovic.

5 I don't know if Mr. Karadzic knew about everything that had happened at

6 Koricanske Stijene, but he was probably familiar with the events. After

7 my visit to the home of Milan Komljenovic, I heard from him what had

8 happened and who had done it and what he had done on the previous day to

9 attend the scene and to have these people buried.

10 MR. FILE: I would tender that document, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit that page.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6672, Your Honours.

13 THE ACCUSED: Transcript.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 2 at page 55, the witness

16 said: I learnt about the course of events at Koricanske Stijene from

17 Milan Komljenovic, not about the incident, but about the course of the

18 event.

19 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Glamocic?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 MR. FILE:

23 Q. Okay. As of 23 August 1992, when you spoke to Mr. Komljenovic,

24 you had learned that the perpetrators of the Koricanske Stijene massacre

25 were members of the Prijedor police; correct?

Page 47238

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, I want to turn your attention to a meeting. I didn't see it

3 mentioned in your statement, but before you attended the large meeting on

4 the 30th of August, 1992, that was chaired by Bogdan Subotic, you

5 attended an earlier meeting around the 24th of August in

6 Stojan Zupljanin's office in the Banja Luka CSB; correct?

7 A. No. Milan Komljenovic attended the meeting, that particular one.

8 I attended only one meeting which was chaired by Mr. Subotic.

9 Q. Okay. Both Mr. Komljenovic and Nenad Krejic discussed this first

10 meeting in the evidence that they've given here, and both of them say

11 that you were there as well. That is, for the record, Komljenovic's

12 amalgamated statement which is P3768, pages 2 to 3, paragraph 4; and

13 transcript 20914 to 15 in his testimony. And for Nenad Krejic it's

14 P3760, e-court pages 21 to 23, which is his testimony from the Stanisic

15 and Zupljanin case.

16 Now, I just want to focus on a couple of details from

17 Nenad Krejic's testimony, just to see if that might jog your memory about

18 this meeting. He specifically mentions you being there, and then he says

19 that you and Komljenovic nearly had a physical fight with Simo Drljaca

20 over the issue of who would be responsible for removing the bodies,

21 that's at page 23 of his testimony. Do you recall that?

22 A. We did experience conflicts in communication with the

23 municipality of Prijedor, in particular with Simo and Stakic, but I

24 recall our conflicts and misunderstandings happening at this meeting

25 chaired by Mr. Subotic. And this had a bearing on our visit to

Page 47239

1 Koricanske Stijene and all the other things that Simo Drljaca did

2 together with his people at Koricanske Stijene.

3 Q. Mr. --

4 A. I don't remember this meeting. As for the other meeting that was

5 chaired by Mr. Subotic, I kept notes for the part of the -- for a part of

6 the meeting and conclusions were formulated by Mr. Komljenovic and we

7 used the same notebook for that.

8 Q. Okay. We'll get to that meeting in just a minute. Nenad Krejic

9 also said at the same page that Drljaca and Stakic admitted that the

10 Prijedor police had committed this crime and that Drljaca was bragging

11 about it. Do you recall ever hearing something to that effect?

12 A. Well, I don't believe that he was bragging about it. It was not

13 a thing to brag about. What Simo insisted on and opposed our suggestion

14 and demand that they clear out the terrain and that they remove the

15 bodies, so they opposed this idea because the Knezevo municipality didn't

16 have either the human or material resources to do the job. Simo Drljaca

17 would at times attack our people from the civilian protection,

18 Mr. Barisic, who was the chief, with some very strong language.

19 Q. Okay. At paragraph 32 of your statement you say:

20 "During my encounters with Drljaca, I gained an impression that

21 he was furious because this crime had happened ..."

22 But isn't it possible that Drljaca was angry instead that your

23 municipality was not willing to clean up the site of the massacre?

24 A. Well, first of all, I think Drljaca was angry with the

25 perpetrators of the crime. He was, second of all, probably angry because

Page 47240

1 we weren't able to do the job and this was our unambiguous position as

2 was of the command of the 22nd Brigade as well as the population of the

3 Knezevo municipality in general. I don't believe that Simo was angry at

4 us, but rather I think he was angry with the perpetrators of the crime.

5 Q. Okay. Let's move on to the 30th of August, 1992, meeting that

6 was chaired by Subotic. One of the conclusions of that meeting you say

7 in your statement at paragraph 28 is:

8 "It was agreed to put Prijedor municipality in charge of the

9 clearing up of the terrain because it was known that the perpetrators of

10 the crime were from its territory."

11 Now, that is understating what was known at the time, right,

12 because everybody in that meeting knew that it wasn't just that the

13 perpetrators were from the territory of Prijedor, they were members of

14 the Prijedor police; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, another conclusion of this meeting is at paragraph 28 of

17 your statement. You say:

18 "It was also concluded that the bodies should be identified at

19 the scene. Pathologists engaged to determine the exact cause of death

20 for each person ..."

21 And then at paragraph 33 of your statement you say:

22 "As far as I know, a crane was set up on the road and it was to

23 be used to lift up posthumous remains ..."

24 Now, I'm going to show you a video that will last for just over

25 3 minutes and I'm going to ask you a few questions about it.

Page 47241

1 MR. FILE: This is going to be 65 ter 40573D which is time-code

2 55.30 to 58.48.

3 [Video-clip played]

4 MR. FILE:

5 Q. Now, this video depicts Koricanske Stijene; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And in this video you can see the recovery of three bodies using

8 the crane that you described in your statement. Now, you would agree

9 that this does not look like people who are under instructions to

10 preserve bodies for a pathologist to examine them for the cause of death

11 or for them to be identified; right? This looks more like disposing of

12 garbage, doesn't it?

13 A. Yes.

14 MR. FILE: Your Honour, I would tender that video.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6673, Your Honours.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, may I just make a

18 comment? It's an ugly sight. Your question that this looks more like

19 disposing of garbage, you have to understand that the terrain is

20 extremely difficult. There was just this narrow path from the access

21 road from where this crane was operating, and also the depth from which

22 the bodies were being taken out.

23 MR. FILE:

24 Q. I'm going to move on to another topic. In your statement at

25 paragraph 30 you describe how the commander of the 22nd Infantry Brigade,

Page 47242

1 Lieutenant-Colonel Bosko Peulic, who was the local VRS commander, refused

2 to receive the delegation from Banja Luka in the brigade because the VRS

3 did not accept or recognise Bogdan Subotic as minister of defence.

4 And then in paragraph 31 you describe how:

5 "The relationship between the local civilian authorities and the

6 command of the 22nd pbr of the 1st Krajina Corps of the VRS was rather

7 poor as a result of the poor relationship between the brigade commander

8 and the civilian authorities ..."

9 You go on to describe how the brigade commander Peulic was

10 difficult to work with. And then you say:

11 "In addition to these disagreements, there were purely

12 ideological matters which were, in my opinion, none of his business."

13 MR. FILE: I'd like to bring up 65 ter 26025, please.

14 I'm just going to show you three small portions of testimony that

15 Colonel Peulic --

16 JUDGE KWON: I think I would like you to speak more slowly.

17 MR. FILE: Yes, Your Honour.

18 Q. I'm going to show you three small portions of testimony that

19 Colonel Peulic gave in one of the BiH court trials of perpetrators of the

20 Koricanske Stijene massacre, and then I'm going to ask you a question

21 about it.

22 MR. FILE: If we could have English page 14 and B/C/S page 20.

23 Q. We're going to focus on the middle of the English page and the

24 top of the B/C/S page. Here you'll see a question from the Prosecutor to

25 Mr. Peulic:

Page 47243

1 "Did you receive such an order," he's referring to the minister

2 of defence, Subotic, "for clearing up from the Minister, as a military

3 insubordination?"

4 And Peulic answers:

5 "No, no, I think that I promptly let him know, I didn't on

6 principle honour such orders ever, especially not when such a difficult

7 matter was at issue. I knew that any order which represents a crime

8 pursuant to the Rules of Service in the JNA, a commander and indeed any

9 serviceman can refuse such an order, namely, an order which represents a

10 crime. Participation in such a serious matter would mean my

11 co-perpetration in a crime and so on and consequently it fell on stoney

12 ground with me ..."

13 The next passage I want to show you is on the next page in both

14 versions. In the middle of both pages.

15 Here he's describing -- the prosecutor's asking about a meeting

16 that Peulic attended that took place in the Alumina factory approximately

17 three days after the massacre. He says it was attended by you as well as

18 Komljenovic, Stakic, and Drljaca. And the witness says:

19 "Well, the meeting set off in a somewhat non-parliamentary

20 manner, as I'd call it. It began with an exchange of information about

21 what should be done and so on. Suddenly this other stouter man

22 Simo Drljaca banged his fist on the table and said: 'We did our part and

23 what did you do?'"

24 And if we can continue on to the top of the B/C/S page 22. When

25 he's asked what he understood this to mean, he said: Well, that he

Page 47244

1 meant: Well, we killed them, you clear it up.

2 First of all, do you remember that meeting?

3 A. I do.

4 Q. And do you remember it roughly as Mr. Peulic described it?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. FILE: If we can just go to English page 24, B/C/S page 35.

7 We're going to focus on the lower half of both pages.

8 Q. This part of the testimony refers to a telegram that Peulic had

9 sent on the night of the massacre, 21st August, 1992, to the 1 KK command

10 intelligence security department. That telegram is in our case in

11 evidence as Exhibit D2040. You'll see the judge asks:

12 "Do you agree that you wrote what it says in there that night

13 that genocide had been done?"

14 The witness says:

15 "That's it."

16 The judge says:

17 "All right."

18 And then the counsel asks:

19 "Mr. Peulic, what I would like to know is, at that -- at that at

20 that moment, I don't know what your function in the army was, did you

21 know what the word 'genocide' meant?"

22 And if we go to the top of page 36 in the B/C/S.

23 Peulic answers:

24 "I did."

25 Then he's asked:

Page 47245

1 "You knew what it meant?"

2 He answers:

3 "Yes."

4 And then he's asked:

5 "And you found that it was genocide?"

6 And he answers:

7 "I still do."

8 So my question to you is: Do you think that it's possible that

9 Colonel Peulic may have proven difficult to work with and may have had

10 what you call ideological differences with civilian authorities because

11 he thought this was a case of genocide and he felt he was being pressured

12 to participate in some form of cover-up and he wanted to have nothing to

13 do with it?

14 A. No, this statement of mine did not pertain only to the problem of

15 Koricanske Stijene when I spoke about this difficult co-operation with

16 the army, it had to do with the number of persons involved. At the time

17 the economy was functioning and the army was asking for a lot of

18 resources, material, technical. Mr. Peulic attended a meeting with us in

19 Banja Luka and the conclusion of that meeting was that we should all go

20 to the location of Koricanske Stijene. All of the attendees from the

21 meeting went to Koricanske Stijene. It was agreed that in the meantime

22 we should meet at the command of the 22nd Brigade that was commanded by

23 Peulic. Peulic didn't want to wait for us at the command of the

24 22nd Brigade. We organised that meeting at a different location, at the

25 command of the light brigade. It is correct that Peulic didn't want to

Page 47246

1 hear of any participation of the military in the sanitisation of the

2 terrain, or rather, recovering the corpses, things that the army would

3 deal with in that situation. He knew who the perpetrators were. So he

4 did not dream of using the assets that the army had available. I want to

5 say that the area of Koricanske Stijene did not belong to the

6 municipality of Knezevo. The area of Koricanske Stijene belonged to the

7 municipality of Travnik, so this was a war zone of this 22nd Brigade.

8 And we, as the civilian authorities, when we would go to the command of

9 that brigade, we would have to be announced to the command of that

10 brigade. So it was a war zone. This territory did not belong to the

11 municipality of Knezevo.

12 Q. Okay. The last topic I'd like to explore with you relates to

13 paragraph 33 of your statement. You say:

14 "At one point when the crane was working an ambulance

15 transporting wounded people came up but could not get past the crane.

16 While the crane was being removed from the road, it broke down, and

17 despite all the efforts it could not be repaired. As a result, work on

18 the removal of posthumous remains was suspended ..."

19 And then that's the conclusion of your witness statement. But it

20 seems like an odd point to end the story in your statement because there

21 were frequent complaints of the smell and possible water contamination -

22 you acknowledge that in paragraph 21 of your statement - animals and

23 birds were depositing human remains on the roof-tops of nearby residents

24 of Koricani village - that's in P3760 at page 39 - the situation in this

25 area was intolerable and it was imperative to make this problem go away.

Page 47247

1 So what happened to the bodies afterwards? They weren't just left out

2 there to continue decomposing; correct?

3 A. As far as I know, the civilian protection department of the

4 municipality of Knezevo buried four mortal remains that were identified

5 and that was done in accordance with the conclusions of the CSB

6 Banja Luka.

7 Q. Right. But there were 150 to 200 bodies out there, so what

8 happened to those?

9 A. I don't have the exact information on this. All I know is what

10 was written in the press in "Nezavisne Novine" from Banja Luka. Because

11 with regard to all of these activities it was the investigating judge who

12 was in charge as well as the prosecutor and the crime inspector from the

13 CSB, and with Simo Drljaca they were in charge of these activities.

14 Q. As chairman of the executive committee of the Municipal Assembly,

15 the IO SO, by law you were the commander of the civilian protection, or

16 CZ, in the municipality; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you were able to give orders and instructions to the chief of

19 the civilian protection of Knezevo municipality?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So this is a horrific mass crime as well as a potential public

22 health crisis in the municipality where you're the chairman of the

23 Executive Committee. The police from another municipality have caused it

24 and now they are tasked with cleaning it up. My question is: Under

25 those circumstances, don't you just want to make sure they're doing their

Page 47248

1 job properly? All you had to do was to tell Barisic, the head of the CZ,

2 to go over there and see what they're doing and report back to you;

3 right?

4 A. Barisic was at Koricanske Stijene with the civilian protection

5 unit several times. He did not have enough manpower. He did not have

6 enough material resources and he was not able to do anything more

7 meaningful than what he had done. He always had a problem with

8 Simo Drljaca. As a matter of fact, he was even chasing them away from

9 the scene. The civilian protection of Knezevo was supposed to provide

10 accommodation for the people from Prijedor. We did that at the school in

11 Limeni [phoen] and that is our only obligation in addition to the

12 obligation from the Banja Luka meeting, namely that the civilian

13 protection from the municipality of Knezevo should dig graves and bury

14 all the persons who are identified.

15 Q. According to Komljenovic, some of your civilian protection people

16 were always present on the site during the clean-up operation, that's in

17 P3768 at e-court page 11. He says that the Prijedor team had brought

18 some equipment from the Prijedor mines, tried to do the job, the crane

19 broke down, they couldn't do the job. Then he says: Those are the

20 things that we heard indirectly about what had been going on up there

21 because even some of our own people from civilian protection were always

22 present there, so to some extent we were able to see what was going on.

23 So regardless of whether civilian protection had difficulty

24 working with Drljaca or had limited responsibilities there, you still had

25 a source of information for what was going to happen to these bodies;

Page 47249

1 right?

2 A. Barisic could convey only what he knew.

3 Q. In your statement at paragraph 29 - this is my last

4 question - you said:

5 "I'm not aware that anyone, either before, during, or after the

6 meeting in Banja Luka, influenced the municipal authorities of Knezevo to

7 hide anything in connection with the incident. On the contrary, everyone

8 was repulsed and condemned this crime and demanded that those responsible

9 be punished."

10 But if that was really true, if everybody was repulsed by this,

11 if everybody condemned the crime and wanted to assure accountability, if

12 nobody wanted to hide anything, don't you think that at a bare minimum

13 there should have been public information about where the bodies had been

14 buried for the families of all these victims?

15 We found out about the location of the burial site in 2009 from a

16 perpetrator in a confession. We shouldn't have had to wait that long;

17 right?

18 A. Well, the media did inform the public. That was in two articles

19 in "Nezavisne Novine." There was no wish from any side, least of all

20 from the executive authorities of the municipality of Knezevo, to hide

21 the crime.

22 Q. But we're talking about the burial site -- the mass burial site

23 with more than a hundred bodies, that information never came out until

24 2009; correct?

25 A. I don't know.