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  1. 1 Monday, 26th July, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 (The accused entered court)

    4 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

    6 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario

    7 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

    8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice?

    9 MR. NICE: The witness to be called today is

    10 one for whom protective measures in advance had been

    11 sought and obtained. He's been here over the weekend,

    12 and there is no further application for him to be

    13 protected. He's prepared to give evidence in full open

    14 session.

    15 Over the weekend, obviously, a lot of work

    16 has been done with him, and those in the Prosecution

    17 team doing that work have taken every step they can to

    18 make all material that's appropriate available to the

    19 Defence as soon as it's come into our hands in usable

    20 form. That's led to, I think, the serving of probably

    21 a couple of proofing summaries, and I hope that the

    22 Chamber now has something headed "An Amended Proofing

    23 Summary."

    24 A number of exhibits have also been produced

    25 to the Defence, I think some of them without any form

  2. 1 of translation. I'd rather get them across to them in

    2 the original B/C/S than not at all. We've been

    3 troubled to some degree over the weekend by a

    4 significant computer problem with one of the databases,

    5 or something to that effect, so that it hasn't been

    6 possible, simply, to identify or to extract all the

    7 documents that we might have wished to do.

    8 The consequence is that the production of

    9 exhibits may be a little less smooth today than I would

    10 normally want, but I'll do the best I can to keep

    11 things absolutely chronological, because my judgement

    12 is that that helps you most.

    13 JUDGE MAY: Why were the exhibits only being

    14 produced at the weekend?

    15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if a witness comes

    16 in, there is a process of proofing -- well, not over

    17 the weekend but before the weekend -- matters may arise

    18 which are of significance and which won't be known

    19 about until then. Therefore, if they are only known

    20 about then -- and this is a witness, as the Court will

    21 know, who came, I think, with a subpoena, so that the

    22 materiality of documents simply isn't known in advance,

    23 and once it is known, they have to be extracted. There

    24 is simply no other way of dealing with it.

    25 JUDGE MAY: This is not a case where he has

  3. 1 brought the exhibits?

    2 MR. NICE: Some he has brought, and they've

    3 been handed over. Other exhibits become relevant, from

    4 either his documents or from things that he tells us

    5 about; they then have to be extracted. And if the

    6 relevant part of the database is in difficulty, there's

    7 nothing we can do.

    8 But we're working as fast as we can to get

    9 everything available. I'm most concerned to ensure

    10 that material comes to you in a way that's helpful to

    11 you and not at random.

    12 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

    13 MR. NICE: Where we will be asking him to

    14 comment on -- if and where I will be asking him to

    15 comment on documents that have already been produced,

    16 I'm not intending to produce further copies of the same

    17 documents. It seems to me that that's both wasteful

    18 and probably ultimately more confusing for you. If I'm

    19 wrong about that, and you tell me, I'll adjust for

    20 future witnesses. But at the moment, if a document's

    21 been produced as a Prosecution Exhibit already, I'll

    22 refer to it.

    23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Naumovski?

    24 MR. NAUMOVSKI: (Interpretation) Thank you,

    25 Your Honours.

  4. 1 When the Chamber ruled on protective measures

    2 of these witnesses who have asked for protective

    3 measures, I was a bit confused, because I think that in

    4 that way, the Chamber has done something that is really

    5 contrary to the equality of arms. However, I believe

    6 that --

    7 JUDGE MAY: That is not so. We bore all

    8 those matters in mind when we made the order. Now, is

    9 there anything you want to raise about the --

    10 MR. NAUMOVSKI: (Interpretation) Yes, Your

    11 Honours, this was just a preliminary remark. The

    12 integrity of the witness was to be protected as much as

    13 possible, and I understand that. However, it is the

    14 second time now, as was the case with the first

    15 confidential witness, as with this one, that a whole

    16 set of protective measures is introduced, including

    17 limiting the number of Defence counsel who can ask

    18 questions, and then the witness changes his mind and

    19 decides not to seek protective measures.

    20 I think that this is not a person who

    21 actually changed their mind, because I think that he

    22 wants publicity. However, since this is happening for

    23 the second time, the Defence of Dario Kordic believes

    24 that the Prosecution has actually abused the procedural

    25 issues, because it is not -- this is not an issue of

  5. 1 protective measures -- that is, of protecting his

    2 identity -- but rather to introduce an element of

    3 surprise against the Defence, and --

    4 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Naumovski, what are you

    5 asking us to do? Because let's get on with the

    6 evidence, if we can, rather than complaining. Now,

    7 what motion or application are you making? What has

    8 happened is -- let me finish. What has happened is

    9 this witness asked for these measures; we granted

    10 them. He has changed his mind, and the position is now

    11 that he's going to give evidence in open court. Now,

    12 is there any application you want to make?

    13 MR. NAUMOVSKI: (Interpretation) Yes, I will

    14 submit our application right away, and then I have an

    15 additional one which I need to clarify. Since this

    16 witness has now become a witness who will testify in

    17 open court, and since we believe that this is an abuse

    18 of the procedure, we ask that this witness not be

    19 allowed to testify today, because we were supposed to

    20 be given the evidentiary material by 17 May.

    21 Secondly, we received an outline of this

    22 witness's testimony last week, that is, Friday. And

    23 the period from Friday to midnight last night, we

    24 received an additional 150 pages of evidentiary

    25 material. Mr. Kordic was not even able to read through

  6. 1 this material, let alone sit down with his Defence

    2 counsel and discuss the issues which this raises.

    3 So we were twice -- since we were not able to

    4 either read through this material nor discuss it with

    5 Mr. Kordic, who received it at the last moment, our

    6 request, should the Trial Chamber not grant the first

    7 request, is to allow the Defence additional time for

    8 our cross-examination. And I don't have in mind just a

    9 couple of days, because a couple of days will not be

    10 enough.

    11 JUDGE MAY: Let us see how we get on. Let

    12 the witness give his evidence in chief, and then we'll

    13 see how much of it you claim not to have had disclosed

    14 to you, and we'll review the position at the end of the

    15 evidence in chief. If you're going to ask time before

    16 you cross-examine, we will consider that application.

    17 But let us get on with the witness now.

    18 MR. NAUMOVSKI: (Interpretation) I have just

    19 one more matter to raise regarding the ruling of the

    20 Chamber regarding the six protected witnesses.

    21 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't relate to this

    22 witness, I take it. We'll hear any applications you

    23 have about other witnesses after the witness's

    24 evidence, when we're at a convenient moment during the

    25 trial.

  7. 1 MR. NAUMOVSKI: (Interpretation) Very well.

    2 Thank you.

    3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

    4 MR. KOVACIC: (Interpretation) Your Honours,

    5 I'm not going to not belabour the point. I think that

    6 one matter has not been clarified. Pursuant to the

    7 Chamber ruling of 19 March regarding classification of

    8 this witness as a special protected witness, we

    9 received a very small portion of the testimony about

    10 ten days ago, and then we received the rest of the

    11 material over the weekend, and we had nothing. For

    12 this reason, we are just simply not prepared. We're

    13 not ready to cross-examine this witness.

    14 And I have a similar request as my

    15 colleague. If we cannot -- we need to be -- we are

    16 asking either this witness not be called now, or

    17 alternatively, that we be given additional time to

    18 prepare for the cross-examination of this witness.

    19 JUDGE MAY: We'll hear the examination in

    20 chief, and then we'll decide whether time is needed for

    21 cross-examination.

    22 Yes, Mr. Nice.

    23 MR. NICE: Can I simply explain in one

    24 sentence? The witness came here, the subpoena duces

    25 tecum. There is no duty for disclosure that has not

  8. 1 been complied with. On the contrary, in accordance

    2 with my normal practice, the Defence have had a great

    3 deal more than the Rules require of me. As soon as

    4 I've known that documents might be of importance or

    5 might be of help to them, I've ordered them to be

    6 transmitted, even untranslated or whatever, so that

    7 they can consider them.

    8 JUDGE MAY: Let's have the witness.

    9 MR. NICE: Thank you. The witness is going

    10 back on Wednesday, and I'll deal with that later.

    11 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the

    12 declaration.

    13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    15 truth.

    16 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a

    17 seat. Thank you.


    19 [Witness answers through interpreter]

    20 Examined by Mr. Nice:

    21 Q. Your full name, please, sir.

    22 A. Stjepan Kljuic.

    23 Q. You were born in 1939. Are you a citizen of

    24 Bosnia and Herzegovina, your ethnicity and religion

    25 being, please?

  9. 1 A. I was a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I

    2 was born in Sarajevo. My ethnic origin is Croatian,

    3 and I'm Catholic, Roman Catholic, by religion.

    4 Q. Educated in philosophy at Zagreb and

    5 Sarajevo. We're going to deal with what happened in

    6 the early '90s, but are you presently the president of

    7 the Republican Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that

    8 being a multi-ethnic and independent party founded by

    9 you on the 5th of June, 1994?

    10 A. Yes. I studied philosophy and literature in

    11 Zagreb briefly and then in Sarajevo. For 35 years, I

    12 was a journalist and a dissident in a Communist

    13 society, and today I'm the leader of a party with a

    14 civic orientation, and I want to explain what that

    15 means. It is pro-western, secular, democratic, and I'm

    16 a member of the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    17 Q. Was the HDZ party founded on the 18th of

    18 August of 1990, with Davor Perinovic the first

    19 president and you a founding member?

    20 A. I took part in preparations for the

    21 establishment of the HDZ on 18 August 1990, but the day

    22 and night before that we had comprehensive discussions

    23 with guests from Zagreb who arrived in Sarajevo to

    24 found the Bosnian-Herzegovinian HDZ.

    25 I was a leader of a group of Sarajevo

  10. 1 intellectuals, and among the guests from Zagreb were,

    2 very briefly, Josip Manolic, president of the Croatian

    3 government, and then continuously Miljenko Zagar,

    4 general secretary of the HDZ in Zagreb; Dalibor

    5 Brozovic, a member of the academy and a high official

    6 with the HDZ; the late Gojko Susak, who at that time

    7 was on duty of Minister of Immigration with the

    8 government of Croatia, and many other guests from

    9 Zagreb who were of lesser stature.

    10 Q. In September of 1990, did Perinovic, the

    11 first president, come to be replaced? Just "Yes" or

    12 "No" to that.

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Did President Tudjman say anything to you

    15 about that before it happened?

    16 A. On my way to Germany, I passed through Zagreb

    17 on 5th and 6th September 1990, and I was taken to

    18 Dr. Tudjman on that occasion. I then learned, in a

    19 conversation with him, that Perinovic was going to be

    20 replaced, because as early as 17 August, I said that

    21 Perinovic could not be leader of the Croatian people.

    22 However, they replaced him because it was determined

    23 that he was an ethnic Serb.

    24 When I argued against Perinovic's presidency,

    25 it was not only because he was an ethnic Serb, but

  11. 1 politically speaking, he was not the right person to

    2 take the Croatian people to the first democratic

    3 elections. On WDR Radio in Germany, I learned that

    4 Perinovic was replaced and that I was named the general

    5 secretary and acting president.

    6 Q. Were you happy with your appointment taking

    7 place without democratic process or not?

    8 A. I was mostly pleased for Perinovic having

    9 been replaced, and I took this appointment as a great

    10 challenge because there was very little time left

    11 before the elections and the Croatian policy in

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to be spelled out. Today, I

    13 think that I was fortunate to have become the president

    14 of the HDZ at the time.

    15 Q. Was your position ever to be subject to

    16 election by the party?

    17 A. We copied the statute of the HDZ party in

    18 Croatia, and there it was said very clearly that the

    19 president could only be elected by the convention. But

    20 there was no time to call for a new convention because

    21 you had to bear in mind that there were only 70 days

    22 left until the elections. I insisted that my

    23 appointment be done in Sarajevo so that I would

    24 demonstrate the autonomy of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian

    25 HDZ.

  12. 1 When we won the elections in great style, I

    2 organised a convention of the HDZ, created a platform

    3 for the political activity of the Croatian people of

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and received acceptance for both my

    5 position as president and the platform for the policy

    6 by acclamation.

    7 After the elections, I became a member of the

    8 presidency based on the relative majority of votes

    9 which we received.

    10 Q. I think you can probably deal with this next

    11 question by just the answer "Yes" if the proposition is

    12 correct. Paragraph 9 of the summary. Did you win 44

    13 of the 240 seats in parliament, gaining two seats on

    14 the presidency, you and Franjo Boras; did you achieve

    15 some 23 per cent of the major governmental and state

    16 industry positions, including six ministerial and eight

    17 deputy ministerial posts, with majorities in 10

    18 municipalities where Croats were not, in fact, in a

    19 majority, those municipalities including Mostar,

    20 Derventa, Bugojno, Fojnica, Zepce, Kotor Varos, in

    21 which place, or some of which, I think, the Croat

    22 representation was only 17 per cent? Is what I've just

    23 read out to you correct?

    24 A. Yes, except that in all the municipalities

    25 where we won, the total percentage of the Croatian

  13. 1 population was 17,3. I must say that this was an

    2 exceptional result, because in the previous Communist

    3 government, the Croats were only represented by 7,4

    4 per cent in the government.

    5 Q. Can you look, please, at the first exhibit in

    6 time, which I think just precedes the elections, and I

    7 think we have bundles produced.

    8 MR. NICE: It may be that some documents will

    9 have to be fitted within this if a strict chronological

    10 sequence is to be followed. Nevertheless, I hope this

    11 will be a more convenient method than handing documents

    12 in one by one.

    13 MR. STEIN: May it please the Court, part of

    14 the problem announced by Mr. Naumovski is that these

    15 are new to us, some of them, and only in one language,

    16 not in English.

    17 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's see how we get on.

    18 MR. NICE: What I will ask of the witness,

    19 with documents that aren't in translation, is that he

    20 lays them or has them laid on the ELMO, and if he can

    21 be shown how to use the pointer. Thank you very much.

    22 He can point to the passages of the documents of which

    23 he may speak. It is, of course, important, these

    24 documents having arrived, that they are properly

    25 produced by this witness.

  14. 1 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Nice, the Rules are

    2 that documents have to be in the working languages of

    3 the Tribunal.

    4 MR. NICE: Of course, yes. I have to tell

    5 you that there is simply no available translation

    6 service over the weekends, and it's as simple as that.

    7 We can't deal with it.

    8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, but it places difficulties

    9 for everybody --

    10 MR. NICE: Of course it does, yes.

    11 JUDGE MAY: -- if documents are produced in

    12 this way.

    13 MR. NICE: I quite understand that, but this

    14 is the best that we can do. Of course, the

    15 translations are on their way. They have been or are

    16 being submitted for translation straightaway, and there

    17 are original language speakers on both sides.

    18 JUDGE MAY: Well, that may be, but the Rules

    19 provide for a way of doing these things, and what

    20 you're doing is technically applying for an exception.

    21 MR. NICE: Well, it may be, but if the

    22 witness comes with his documents under the subpoena and

    23 I cannot provide translations overnight, and I can't,

    24 then the alternatives are stark. Either the witness

    25 can't give his evidence or he can give his evidence and

  15. 1 talk about the original document, because he

    2 understands it and, of course, the defendants

    3 themselves will understand it, and whatever he says by

    4 way of -- whatever he says is the meaning of a

    5 particular passage will no doubt be susceptible to some

    6 form of verification, because we have the interpreters

    7 simultaneously translating for us in the booths, and

    8 will be further confirmed when the written documents

    9 are provided later in English and French.

    10 (Trial Chamber confers)

    11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

    12 MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour.

    13 Q. This document dated the 8th of October, 1990,

    14 just tell us, in a word or phrase, what is it?

    15 A. First of all, gentlemen, I wanted to say

    16 three things at the beginning.

    17 I have come here under subpoena, not of my

    18 own free will, and I am forced to cooperate with you by

    19 the laws of my country, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    20 Thirdly, I asked to speak in open session

    21 because what I am saying is part of my political

    22 struggle, and it is no secret. Everything I tell you

    23 today is what I have already said several times in my

    24 political speeches and interviews.

    25 This meeting took place after I was elected

  16. 1 acting president in Sarajevo on the 16th of September.

    2 All municipal and other organisations had to be brought

    3 together before the elections, and that's why we

    4 gathered in Sarajevo, so that I could get to know them

    5 and they could get to know me. For the sake of

    6 continuity of political activity, the representatives

    7 of the HDZ from Zagreb were also present.

    8 Q. I'm going to ask you to take matters

    9 shortly. Will you turn now to the third sheet of this

    10 document, where at the foot of the page we see your

    11 name. Does this document set out what you said at the

    12 meeting?

    13 A. Yes. This confirms that on the 17th of

    14 April, a day before the establishment of the Bosnian

    15 and Herzegovinian HDZ, I was present at all these

    16 discussions and wanted to help, but they did not accept

    17 what I said. And Perinovic ignored a whole group of

    18 people who were able, who were intellectuals, who had

    19 been Croatian dissidents during Communism, and without

    20 whom the party could not exist.

    21 Q. What, on this occasion, and you can take this

    22 quite shortly by looking at this sheet or turning over

    23 to the following sheet, what on this occasion did you

    24 set out of your own political position? If you want to

    25 turn over to the following sheet, Mr. Kljuic, you can.

  17. 1 JUDGE MAY: I wonder if it would be helpful

    2 if we had translated what is against the witness's

    3 name.

    4 MR. NICE: Certainly, if the interpreters are

    5 equipped with a copy in the booths, or alternatively

    6 following it on the ELMO.

    7 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Kljuic has to read it;

    8 otherwise we are not allowed to do it.

    9 MR. NICE: Would you read it, then,

    10 Mr. Kljuic, please, just read what follows "Dr. Stjepan

    11 Kljuic, Sarajevo, politicki tajnik." Can you read it

    12 out, please?

    13 A. Yes, I can. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian

    14 document as read]

    15 "He introduced himself personally and

    16 stressed that on the 17th of March, he had joined the

    17 HDZ party wishing to help the former leadership with a

    18 stronger personnel, group of people, which they did not

    19 accept. Perinovic ignored a group of people who were

    20 willing to put themselves to the disposal of the party

    21 and to work, which was then a sign that certain things

    22 were not going in the right direction, Mr. Kljuic

    23 said."

    24 And there is an error here. It is not the

    25 17th of March but the 17th of August.

  18. 1 Q. Carry on, please. It goes over to the

    2 next --

    3 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    4 read]

    5 "After that, he set out a part of the

    6 programme of the party for the future, stressing that a

    7 person can be respectable and the leader, according to

    8 what he does, and that a list of meetings would be

    9 drawn up, and that work would be coordinated from the

    10 centre. The HDZ is a global party, fighting for the

    11 interests of the Croatian people throughout the world,

    12 and certain games are of a non-party character.

    13 Political theses are to be drawn up to which everyone

    14 will have to adhere, and party discipline will have to

    15 be respected. The statutes will have to be adapted to

    16 the political norms of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    17 and Article 18 of the Statute has made everything that

    18 has happened valid. All the presidents of the steering

    19 committees are to be gathered together, and they are to

    20 agree on their work. The same mistakes must not be

    21 allowed to recur. From tomorrow, the office will be

    22 open, and there is work waiting for us, so that there

    23 is no place for mutual discord and dissatisfaction,

    24 Stjepan Kljuic said."

    25 Q. That's Exhibit 2719. Can we turn to next

  19. 1 document, please, 2720, which comes in two parts, I

    2 think. The first part is the conclusions of the

    3 presidency of the 15th of October; is that correct?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. And I think the second part, which is dated

    6 the 5th of November, is, I think, the minutes for a

    7 meeting , not the minutes, the -- well, you tell us

    8 what it is, better than I ask you. What's the second

    9 part, starting on the 5th of November, third sheet?

    10 A. This is a meeting of the presidency of the

    11 HDZ, a regular meeting during the election campaign, at

    12 which the acting president was present, all the

    13 vice-presidents, the treasurer, the administrative

    14 secretary, and some members of the municipal

    15 committees.

    16 Q. Now, you produced those documents for the

    17 time being, and I may not ask you any detailed

    18 questions about them, but one can see -- we can see

    19 that the name "Kostroman" appears. Just tell us, what

    20 was Kostroman's role in these early stages, and what

    21 was his position generally?

    22 A. First I have to say that I was duty-bound to

    23 bring with me the documents I had. This document is

    24 not important, but Ignac Kostroman was a person who was

    25 in the leadership with Perinovic, and I inherited him.

  20. 1 He was the technical secretary.

    2 Q. What were his views generally? What was his

    3 position generally?

    4 A. I can't talk about his views, because, as

    5 president, I did not pay much attention to him. But I

    6 can say that later on, he went to Herceg-Bosna and that

    7 our ways parted.

    8 Q. I go back to the amended proofing summary at

    9 paragraph 10. Did you view the HDZ BiH as an

    10 independent party, or not?

    11 A. I considered and advocated the HDZ being an

    12 independent party, but a sister party with the party in

    13 Zagreb. That is why I insisted that it should be

    14 called "the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina." There were

    15 suggestions that it should be called "the HDZ for

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Apart from this, as president, I

    17 registered the party at the high court in Sarajevo,

    18 with the stamp and signature of the president, and it

    19 was valid, as such, and was able to take part in the

    20 first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    21 Q. Why was President Tudjman of Croatia in any

    22 position to represent the party of Bosnia and

    23 Herzegovina?

    24 A. Later on, there were talks between the

    25 leaders of all the Yugoslav republics. Unfortunately,

  21. 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina was not represented by

    2 representatives of the Muslims, Serbs, and the Croats,

    3 but only by the president of the presidency,

    4 Mr. Izetbegovic. So I asked Dr. Tudjman, at these

    5 Yugoslav talks, since there was no representative of

    6 the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Croats there, that he should

    7 represent our interests.

    8 Q. Did Tudjman's view of the independence of

    9 your party coincide with your view, or did he hold a

    10 different view?

    11 A. In the end, he conceded independence for our

    12 party, but of course, we were two sister parties.

    13 Formally he recognised the independence of the party,

    14 but we were connected by all the other elements: The

    15 media, our funds, the design of our symbols, and

    16 media.

    17 Q. And as the presidency of the HDZ, how were

    18 you regarded, as a president of the local party? How

    19 was Mr. Tudjman regarded in those terms?

    20 A. Dr. Tudjman considered me the president of

    21 the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I confirmed this

    22 status, not only by leading the party, but by acquiring

    23 legitimacy because I was elected to the presidency of

    24 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And later on,

    25 at the convention in Mostar on the 23rd and 24th of

  22. 1 March, 1991, I gained overwhelming support and was

    2 elected the regular president. This convention

    3 confirmed my political platform.

    4 Q. Did people like Boban accept you as the true

    5 president of the party?

    6 A. I must say that at that time, Boban did not

    7 represent any force within the HDZ. He was one of the

    8 44 deputies in the parliament, and he is remembered by

    9 the fact that he never took the floor. In Mostar, at

    10 the convention, I gave a two-hour break, thus giving

    11 the counter-candidates a chance to consolidate. At the

    12 beginning, there were several candidates running

    13 against me, but they soon they gave up. The

    14 representatives of the municipalities from Herzegovina

    15 withdrew to a separate room, and when they took a

    16 count, they saw that they numbered only 53, and some of

    17 them were in favour of me, so that they stood no chance

    18 of getting Boban voted for.

    19 Q. You're slightly running ahead of the question

    20 I wanted an answer to. It's just that -- did Boban and

    21 people like him accept you as the true president, or

    22 did they look elsewhere for authority? You can

    23 probably deal with it at that stage quite shortly, or

    24 very shortly.

    25 A. Some of them personally did not accept me as

  23. 1 president, because in our behaviour and philosophy and

    2 world view, we represented two different worlds.

    3 Q. Thank you. Next exhibit, please, 2721.

    4 There's only one paragraph of this we want, but perhaps

    5 you'll tell us first of all what the document is. It's

    6 slightly out of chronology, because this is back in the

    7 9th of January of 1991. What is the document, please?

    8 A. Immediately after winning the elections, we

    9 had to change the strategy of work of the party. In

    10 the first stage, we focused only on the elections, but

    11 when we gained power, we had to appoint a large number

    12 of people to high positions. We had to take these

    13 positions, and most people were amateurs, with no

    14 experience in government. And then we looked for ways

    15 to take over power legally as soon as possible and to

    16 act in a legal manner.

    17 Q. Does this document set something out? It's

    18 headed "Programme," I see.

    19 A. Yes. This was a practical document with

    20 brief instructions on how we should act now, after the

    21 elections, in the first stage.

    22 Q. The second sheet, Number 6, please. If you

    23 would just read it out for us, then we'll hear in

    24 English or French what the interpreters provide.

    25 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

  24. 1 read]

    2 "Closer contact must urgently be established

    3 with the leadership in Zagreb by the overall leadership

    4 of the party in order to agree on the coordination and

    5 synchronisation of the HDZ, and meetings have to be

    6 organised to this end. The person who should execute

    7 this is the president in agreement with the

    8 leadership."

    9 May I comment on this?

    10 Q. Yes.

    11 A. You should know that at that time, in

    12 Croatia, the HDZ was already in power, and the party

    13 coordination was needed not only politically but a

    14 large number of municipalities in which we had won the

    15 elections had local connections, direct local

    16 connections with the Republic of Croatia, and many

    17 things had to be furthered.

    18 Let me just mention employment, transport,

    19 the building of joint projects such as waterworks,

    20 irrigation canals, and so on.

    21 Q. Thank you. The next series of exhibits in

    22 the Court's and my learned friends' papers are produced

    23 by the --

    24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    25 MR. NICE: The next series of exhibits in the

  25. 1 papers for the Court and for my learned friends are

    2 produced under the subpoena. Apart from identifying

    3 what they are, I don't wish to make any points through

    4 the witness in relation to them.

    5 Q. So, Mr. Kljuic, will you just look, please,

    6 at the series of documents and confirm what they are.

    7 Z2723, does that record a meeting of the

    8 presidency of the party on the 15th of January, 1991?

    9 No comment is required beyond telling me that that is

    10 correct, if it is correct.

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. 2724 --

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. -- is the 25th of January, '91, directions

    15 issued by you to municipal committees?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. 2725 is a pronouncement of the 25th of

    18 January?

    19 A. The 25th of January.

    20 Q. 25th of January, and the subject matter? The

    21 title?

    22 A. Public announcement because of the military

    23 threat against the Republic of Croatia. This is a very

    24 important document because it was published after a

    25 forged film by the Yugoslav intelligence service, the

  26. 1 KOS, about the Minister of Defence of the Republic of

    2 Croatia, General Martin Spegelj. This was produced by

    3 Belgrade propaganda, and in it, the Croats were

    4 represented as the aggressors, as those responsible for

    5 the break-up of Yugoslavia. They were represented as

    6 being very well armed, and the film was supposed to

    7 incite hatred, and not only among Serbs against the

    8 Croats, but also in all the other republics.

    9 Since the Republic of Croatia was in a really

    10 difficult situation, I appeared on television and read

    11 out this announcement, where I said that if the

    12 Republic of Croatia is attacked, we, Croats from Bosnia

    13 and Herzegovina, would stand in its defence.

    14 Q. Thank you.

    15 A. I have to say that that's what happened.

    16 When the war in Croatia started, many Croats from

    17 Bosnia and Herzegovina actively joined in the defence

    18 of the Republic of Croatia.

    19 Q. Thank you. The next document, 2726, a letter

    20 from Pero Markovic to you and to Franjo Boras. The

    21 title of the letter?

    22 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    23 read]

    24 "Report on certain events which took place

    25 last weekend in the municipality of Capljina."

  27. 1 Q. The next document, 2727, 29th of January. I

    2 think this is a record, is it, of a meeting of the

    3 presidency held on that day?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. 2728, dated the 2nd of February of 1991, a

    6 letter from an individual to you and to Ivancic. It's

    7 in the bundle, but you don't make any point out of it?

    8 A. The document is correct.

    9 Q. The next one is 2729, which is the 5th of

    10 February, 1991, the conclusions of the HDZ Mostar

    11 municipal committee.

    12 A. This is a very interesting document which

    13 speaks of the loyalty of the Mostar HDZ in Bosnia and

    14 Herzegovina. It says -- okay.

    15 Q. 2730 is a letter of Kovac, president of the

    16 municipal assembly, to you, dated the 12th of February?

    17 A. Yes, this is support to me, personally.

    18 Q. Thank you. Back to the summary at paragraph

    19 11. You've already told us something, I think, of the

    20 convention held at Mostar on the 24th and 25th of

    21 March, and I needn't ask you more about that.

    22 Of the 288 representatives, what number were

    23 from Herzegovina?

    24 A. Fifty-three.

    25 Q. In terms of proportions, how does that assist

  28. 1 us? Is there any significance in that proportion?

    2 A. It was on a par with the share of the Croat

    3 population or the Mostar Croats in the population of

    4 Bosnian Croats.

    5 Q. Was that meeting attended by people from

    6 Zagreb?

    7 A. It was.

    8 Q. Namely?

    9 A. Mr. Susak first, then Mr. Beljo, who was the

    10 HDZ secretary general of Croatia, and a number of

    11 others less prominent. But there were quite a number

    12 of people from Zagreb.

    13 Q. What was the true role of those people?

    14 A. I must say that they helped to deal with the

    15 extremists, but to tame the extremist part of the HDZ

    16 which was really unduly ambitious, and they extended

    17 their full support to me, but that was also due to the

    18 support that I enjoyed among the present

    19 representatives of the Croat people. Had I not enjoyed

    20 such support, they perhaps would have acted

    21 differently. But as it was, they simply had no choice.

    22 Q. When you speak of an extremist part of the

    23 HDZ at this time, what, if any, clearly identifiable

    24 views did the extremist part hold that the majority or

    25 remaining part of the party did not hold?

  29. 1 A. That is what I wanted to say. The Croat

    2 Democratic Union, as many other ethnic parties, was

    3 joined by quite a number of former Communists. Then

    4 the Yugoslav Intelligence Service also infiltrated its

    5 own people into it. As a result, no idea was accepted

    6 without resistance.

    7 Nonetheless, things were developing very

    8 quickly. Belgrade had a war programme, and other

    9 incidents had to be put to use. Besides, there is a

    10 certain parochial spirit in that area, that is, people

    11 who will never agree with anything, because, say, the

    12 same people who were against Perinovic subsequently

    13 turned against me, subsequently turned against Brkic.

    14 In other words, it is political destructiveness, and

    15 they could not really grasp -- they couldn't understand

    16 the historical conditions in which all this was taking

    17 place.

    18 Q. So the extremists' view was to what effect or

    19 conclusion?

    20 A. They simply wanted to foist upon us their own

    21 local policy as the party doctrine, and at the same

    22 time they never looked at what the reality was.

    23 Q. I should have asked you earlier, but I'll ask

    24 you now. What, in your experience, had been the

    25 relations between the different ethnic groups in

  30. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina generally?

    2 A. There is a tradition of tolerance amongst

    3 us. We inherited it from our parents. But this Serb

    4 fascism embodied in President Milosevic knew that they

    5 had an army which was the fourth conventional military

    6 force in Europe and believed that this would suffice to

    7 preserve the centralistic Yugoslavia. But Slovenia,

    8 Croatia and Bosnia were requesting a confederation in

    9 Yugoslavia in the early days, at an early stage, but

    10 when Milosevic refused that, he instrumentalised the

    11 media, the army, and the police to such an extent that

    12 it simply led to the resistance of non-Serb peoples.

    13 Naturally, this put an end to tolerance, as

    14 any newspaper, any television station, simply

    15 propagated -- proliferated hatred, chauvinism, racism,

    16 representing the Serbs as the only vulnerable people in

    17 the former Yugoslavia, although they were the only

    18 privileged people.

    19 At the moment when the war began in Slovenia

    20 and then in Croatia and in Bosnia, and you see it came

    21 to its end in Kosovo recently, the tolerance stopped,

    22 and now in Bosnia one has to look for people who are

    23 ready to come to grips with their hatred, and there are

    24 such people, and who are trusted also by

    25 representatives of other peoples and not only the one

  31. 1 that they come from.

    2 So there was tolerance which was tolerable,

    3 which was bearable, until 1990, even idyllic in places,

    4 but the activation of the Serb fascism brought about

    5 great evil.

    6 Q. There are three major ethnic groupings.

    7 Croats, Serbs, and Muslims would create, I think, some

    8 four bilateral relations; that is, Serb-Croat,

    9 Serb-Muslim -- sorry, three -- Muslim-Croat. Was the

    10 tolerance as between those groups similar or was there

    11 any pronounced differences? For example, how was the

    12 Muslim-Croat relationship generally?

    13 A. Yes. Well, to begin with, those relations

    14 were not always the same. During the Communist and

    15 royalist Yugoslavia, as the ruling people, the Serbs

    16 exercised more influence among the Muslims, and in

    17 consequence, during the Independent State of Croatia,

    18 that is, 1941 to 1945, the Muslims were informally in a

    19 state with Croats. The best relations in

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina were between the Croats and the

    21 Muslims, in part because they were both under equal

    22 threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

    23 Q. Thank you. Amended summary, at paragraph 12,

    24 was there the meeting on the 27th of March of 1991

    25 between Tudjman and Milosevic, of which you became

  32. 1 aware?

    2 A. Everybody talks about that meeting, but I

    3 have no proof of it. All I have is what Mr. Stipe

    4 Mesic told me, and that is that together with Jovic,

    5 who was at that time the chairman or the presidency of

    6 Yugoslavia, arranged for some meeting between Tudjman,

    7 Milosevic, Jovic and Mesic, and yet later on this

    8 version was changed, and in all likelihood only

    9 Milosevic and Tudjman met on that occasion, and Mesic

    10 being eliminated from those talks.

    11 Q. Was that meeting followed by other working

    12 group meetings of which you were aware?

    13 A. Well, you'll know, and Mr. Bilandzic affirmed

    14 that here, that there were various meetings of working

    15 groups, but I knew nothing about that because I lived

    16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and those took place in Belgrade

    17 and in Croatia. I mean we know about these matters

    18 from the writings from texts written in the territory

    19 of the former Yugoslavia.

    20 Q. Take us, then, to April 1991 and a few more

    21 documents that you can deal with quite briefly.

    22 Document 2731, on which I need seek no

    23 detailed comment, is that a record or excerpts from a

    24 meeting of --

    25 A. Yes, it is. Yes, this is a digest, an

  33. 1 excerpt.

    2 Q. It's the 4th of April of 1991.

    3 The next document --

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. -- 2732, this is a letter dated the 8th of

    6 April from Dragutin Cicak. What is the subject matter

    7 of the letter, please?

    8 A. Well, Dragutin Cicak was complaining against

    9 Dario Kordic. That was a staple practice there. They

    10 always -- there was always strife there. But as I was

    11 very busy as the president at that time, I could not

    12 really intervene very much or mediate between them, and

    13 it was of no importance for me. It was a local

    14 incident, and there were various such in various

    15 places.

    16 Q. This is the first time that you've mentioned

    17 the name "Dario Kordic". When did you first become

    18 aware of him and in what setting?

    19 A. I believe I met him at meetings with

    20 municipal representatives, because in the beginning he

    21 was vice-president of the HDZ, while Dr. Barac was the

    22 president. Subsequently, Dr. Barac went to another

    23 duty and he became the president.

    24 I interceded to have him employed as a

    25 secretary for all national defence in the municipality

  34. 1 of Busovaca, even though, in formal terms, he did not

    2 meet the terms. But he was young, and I believed that

    3 at that moment he could protect Croats and Muslims

    4 going to do their military service.

    5 As you must know, in 1990 and '91, the

    6 majority of Croats and Muslims from Bosnia were being

    7 sent to do their military service in Macedonia,

    8 Montenegro, and Serbia, and my thesis was to keep as

    9 many of them in Bosnia-Herzegovina or send them out

    10 only to Slovenia and Croatia because I thought it would

    11 be more promising to them.

    12 Q. At that stage then, did you hold any views,

    13 one way or the other, about Kordic and his views or his

    14 ambition?

    15 A. It was of no consequence, from my point of

    16 view, as from the point of view as how I understood

    17 presidential duty. I simply had no time to go into

    18 that.

    19 Q. Just staying with document 2732, if you would

    20 turn to the second sheet just to explain the document

    21 to us, the first sheet is dated the 8th of April, the

    22 second sheet is the first of two typewritten sheets

    23 from Cicak. That one is dated the 7th. What's this

    24 second document?

    25 A. This is the first document of the 7th of

  35. 1 April in which Cicak presumably addresses the municipal

    2 committee of the HDZ, and the second document he wrote

    3 was intended for me as the president of the HDZ.

    4 Q. What was Cicak like as a local politician,

    5 party worker, and so on?

    6 A. Well, his attitude was correct. It is really

    7 very difficult to say how he was in the party, because

    8 that was an area which was quite quiet and quite safe.

    9 There were no Serbs there, only Muslims and Croats were

    10 there, and I paid more attention to where incidents

    11 were likely to happen and I really did not know how

    12 each and every municipal committee worked. That is

    13 only natural, because there were 67 organisations. I

    14 could not really keep them all under my control.

    15 However, it is quite obvious that those were

    16 personal conflicts, I should say.

    17 Q. The next document is 2733. No points that I

    18 wish to make on it. Just identify it for what it is.

    19 This is dated the 16th of April, and is it excerpts of

    20 the minutes of the presidency?

    21 A. That is true, yes.

    22 Q. The next document, 2734, again I don't desire

    23 to make any points. The 24th of April, a letter from

    24 you calling the first meeting of the HDZ BH main

    25 committee; is that correct?

  36. 1 A. It is, yes.

    2 Q. The next document, 2737, is this a document

    3 dated the 29th of May of 1991, and is it minutes of the

    4 third session of the party presidency that we --

    5 A. Yes. I must have been away on a business

    6 trip somewhere, abroad perhaps.

    7 Q. In your absence, by whom was the meeting

    8 chaired? The second paragraph.

    9 A. At the first stage, Vitomir Lukic, he was my

    10 first vice-president, and after he died, Mate Boban

    11 became the first vice-president, and therefore he

    12 chaired the meeting.

    13 Q. If we turn to the fourth sheet, the last

    14 sheet of this exhibit, we see that there's a signature

    15 of Kostroman and a stamp, your name, but no signature.

    16 A. Yes, because I was not there, and they

    17 expected that I would read the record after my return

    18 and then confirm it. But Kostroman was the man who

    19 took notes and who signed it.

    20 But, sir, I mean this is not a political

    21 problem. Perhaps I had no time to read it. Had I read

    22 it, then I probably would have signed it. There is

    23 nothing disputable here.

    24 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 13 of the summary. In

    25 the course of your work on behalf of

  37. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you meet a number or possibly

    2 all of the key personalities involved in the unfolding

    3 conflict, from Milosevic and Karadzic through to Lord

    4 Owen, Stoltenberg, and others?

    5 A. Yes. There was a very broad range of them.

    6 To begin with, the presidents of all Yugoslav republics

    7 and their delegates, then of course the meetings with

    8 Karadzic and Krajisnik from the Serb side, Izetbegovic

    9 and Behman from the Muslim side, and quite a number of

    10 international intermediaries, from Lord Owen to Jacques

    11 Santer, to a number of others.

    12 Q. I would like you to deal next, please,

    13 paragraph 14 of the summary, with a meeting on the 13th

    14 of June of 1991 in Zagreb. What was the meeting?

    15 A. It was a regular meeting of representatives

    16 of HDZ of the Republic of Croatia and the HDZ of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But you need to know that the

    18 circumstances at that time were already rather

    19 aggravated because it came in the wake of the incident

    20 at Plitvice and in Borovo Selo. At that time, the war

    21 in Croatia had not yet started, but everybody was

    22 already clear that it could not be prevented.

    23 The meeting was devoted to an analysis of the

    24 political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    25 preparation of some projects in case Bosnia-Herzegovina

  38. 1 was recognised and in case Bosnia-Herzegovina was not

    2 recognised.

    3 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice,

    4 could we ask the witness, Mr. Kljuic, why was this

    5 meeting held in Zagreb rather than Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    6 MR. NICE: Answer Judge Bennouna's question,

    7 please.

    8 A. Yes. I do not think this is of any

    9 consequence, because we held meetings alternatively in

    10 Zagreb and in Sarajevo very often during official

    11 visits of President Tudjman and Mr. Susak and some

    12 other ministers who came to Sarajevo, and then we would

    13 hold our meetings in Sarajevo, and we also held our

    14 regular meetings in Zagreb. So this was one of those.

    15 MR. NICE:

    16 Q. At your meetings in Zagreb, what level of

    17 representation from the Croatian government was there?

    18 Was it always President Tudjman himself or not?

    19 A. There are different kinds of meetings. As a

    20 statesman, I would come to pay an official visit to the

    21 Republic of Croatia as, for instance, when I was a

    22 guest of the Croatian diet on the occasion of the

    23 promulgation of the new Croatian constitution. Then I

    24 would be together with the president of the

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina government, another member of the

  39. 1 HDZ, Mr. Jure Pelivan, when we discussed

    2 inter-republican relations relative to economic

    3 matters, the port of Ploce, and so on and so forth.

    4 There were also some meetings which were only

    5 party meetings. This one was, one might say, a

    6 combination of all of that, because we first assessed

    7 the political situation and the security situation in

    8 Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was followed by

    9 a discussion on the activities of the party.

    10 Q. You spoke a little earlier, in answer to the

    11 question from the Judge, of meetings that were held

    12 alternatively in Zagreb and Sarajevo, suggesting that

    13 perhaps there was one type of meeting that was held in

    14 these two locations. If there was such a type of

    15 meeting, what representation from the government of

    16 Croatia or from the party in Croatia was there at the

    17 meetings held in Zagreb?

    18 A. A large number of meetings were attended in

    19 Zagreb. The topmost echelons of the Croatian state and

    20 the HDZ were represented, so President Tudjman, Prime

    21 Minister Manolic, Mesic, and Gregoric, or prime

    22 ministers, then minister Ramljak, and a number of

    23 others, and Mr. Susak. So that as usual, usually, we

    24 had the topmost echelons of authority on the Croatian

    25 side, and on our side, in addition to myself, the prime

  40. 1 minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister for

    2 Personnel and so forth, and other dignitaries of the

    3 HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina were about, in addition

    4 to me but there were also frequently quite a host of

    5 municipal HDZ representatives.

    6 MR. NICE: I hope that clarifies the position

    7 so far as we can.

    8 Q. Returning shortly to the meeting of the 13th

    9 of June itself, was the possibility of the secession of

    10 Serbia from the republic reflected in different

    11 potential plans or different plans that might be put in

    12 place?

    13 A. It is true, yes.

    14 Q. And what particular plans were considered

    15 either at that meeting or at about that time?

    16 A. To begin with, that was a time when the

    17 presidents of all Yugoslav republics regularly met in

    18 the presence of various international representatives.

    19 The European union was looking for a formula for a new

    20 Yugoslavia, in particular, at that time, so the

    21 question of confederation or federation was at the

    22 table. Nobody spoke of the independence of individual

    23 republics.

    24 We, as the leadership of the Republic of

    25 Croatia and high dignitaries of the Republic of

  41. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina representing the Croat people,

    2 needed to consider all the versions so as not to be

    3 taken unawares by the situation. There is no doubt

    4 that I and those people who supported me always placed

    5 the security and survival of the Republic of Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina in the forefront, but there were also those

    7 who wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to be no more.

    8 When I spoke about the parochial frame of

    9 mind, I can corroborate it by saying that very many of

    10 them had never heard, let alone observed the Helsinki

    11 Act of 1975; they simply wanted to quit

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that kind of policy, which

    13 would later on take the upper hand, has inflicted

    14 horrendous damage on the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    15 on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then on the

    16 citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

    17 Q. With reference to the two-track approach, or

    18 two-track proposal, and reference to a third option,

    19 which is the outright secession of the Croatian parts

    20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "two-track" refers, just

    21 to be quite clear, to which two proposals?

    22 A. One was a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    23 the equality of the Croat people in it. That was our

    24 election platform, on the basis of which we won a

    25 landslide victory in the elections.

  42. 1 The second presumably spoke of the

    2 confederation of Yugoslavia, with individual parts of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina establishing close ties with their

    4 immediate neighbours.

    5 And the third option was, if

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not survive as a state and if it

    7 were divided, what then could Croats be given in it who

    8 were not satisfied with the status quo? As with the

    9 share of 17,3 per cent of the population, they mostly

    10 held underdeveloped and peripheral parts of the

    11 republic, and that is why the historical factor was

    12 invariably mentioned, because it is a fact that once

    13 upon a time, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina played a much

    14 more important role; but owing to two Yugoslavias, the

    15 royalist and the communist ones, they were the big

    16 victims, and a large number of people emigrated.

    17 Q. And the third option: Was that discussed at

    18 this meeting? Was it ever taken any further by you or

    19 by meetings in your presence?

    20 A. It was not mentioned openly. Only as a

    21 possibility. And I must tell you, because they knew my

    22 views they did not discuss it openly before me. But I

    23 was not invited to all the meetings.

    24 MR. NICE: I'm turning to another topic.

    25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's a convenient

  43. 1 moment.

    2 Going back to the earlier applications in

    3 relation to cross-examination, quite clearly there's a

    4 lot of material which this witness has produced --

    5 MR. NICE: Yes.

    6 JUDGE MAY: -- quite properly, under the

    7 subpoena. There's a question of the amount of time

    8 which the Defence need to assimilate it all, if it was

    9 given to them over the weekend. So the question of

    10 when it's going to be convenient to conduct a

    11 cross-examination arises.

    12 Obviously, what's got to be balanced is the

    13 preparedness of the Defence, the opportunity of which

    14 they have, the fact that these documents are not

    15 translated, as they will have to be in due course, and

    16 it may be more convenient to deal with

    17 cross-examination when that is done, as against the

    18 convenience of the witness, or the inconvenience to

    19 him, being here, as he is, under a subpoena.

    20 Now, those are all matters which have got to

    21 be balanced, if necessary, by the Court, in making a

    22 decision. But it may be sensible for the parties to

    23 try and reach a sensible arrangement, bearing in mind

    24 the convenience of the witness, as I said. To that

    25 end, of course, you may speak to him to ascertain what

  44. 1 his position is.

    2 MR. NICE: I know to some extent what his

    3 position is; I've already outlined that. He has to go

    4 back on Wednesday; there are things he has to do.

    5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

    6 MR. NICE: The documents produced, of course,

    7 may by no means all be requiring of cross-examination.

    8 They are produced at the moment because he produces

    9 them, and there's no real satisfactory way to ensure

    10 they're available other than by producing them in the

    11 way that I am dealing with it. They were made

    12 available on Friday, I think, either for the most part

    13 or all of them. I will discuss the matter with my

    14 friends over the break.

    15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you would.

    16 Very well. We'll adjourn now for half an

    17 hour.

    18 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

    19 --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m.

    20 MR. NICE: I'm on paragraph 14 of the

    21 summary.

    22 Q. Two other points, Mr. Kljujic, just to remind

    23 the Chamber, or inform them: The Helsinki provisions

    24 as to the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina were what?

    25 A. The Conference for European Security, 1975,

  45. 1 in which the U.S. and Canada also participated, said

    2 that there would be no changes in borders in Europe and

    3 that certain ethnic minorities would have guaranteed

    4 rights based on high European standards, and it was

    5 signed by President Tito of Yugoslavia. All borders

    6 were guaranteed, and we received guarantees that the

    7 European Community would recognise these borders once

    8 the new countries would be recognised, and the Helsinki

    9 document would then be signed by every new acceding

    10 nation.

    11 I later had a meeting with Jacques Santer on

    12 1st March, 1992, when he confirmed this. So the HDZ

    13 policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was for Bosnia and

    14 Herzegovina to be recognised in its AVENOJ borders;

    15 that is, the borders which it had in the Socialist

    16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

    17 Q. After the 13th of June, 1991, meeting, was

    18 there another meeting on the 20th of June in Zagreb

    19 with HDZ BiH leaders from Herzegovina, but you weren't

    20 present?

    21 A. I was not present. A meeting was held on the

    22 20th of June, but I was not even invited to that

    23 meeting.

    24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the position about

    25 documents, just before I return to producing them, is

  46. 1 that I think over the weekend, or Friday, documents

    2 were produced that it was thought the Prosecution would

    3 rely on to some extent, and not all of the documents.

    4 It seems to me that that creates a problem, or not a

    5 problem, a potential problem, with documents that are

    6 untranslated, and it's for that reason that I am simply

    7 putting in all the documents, even though we don't rely

    8 on them for any particular point, because it's only in

    9 this way that I can ensure that material that is not

    10 translated and that might assist the Defence is

    11 available to them to read. I'm not suggesting the

    12 documents have any particular significance, although

    13 they might provide a fuller record of the HDZ. That's

    14 why I'm doing it very quickly, and it won't necessarily

    15 involve time to be taken by either side, but at least

    16 the documents are then part of the library of material.

    17 MR. STEIN: I should point out that three of

    18 the 16 that we've already seen -- in other words, 13

    19 documents that have just been admitted were not

    20 delivered to us over the weekend, and as far as we can

    21 tell are brand-new.

    22 MR. NICE: That may well be the case, for the

    23 reason I've just given.

    24 Q. The next document is 2735, and again, just a

    25 "Yes," "No" answer: Is this a minute of --

  47. 1 A. Yes, it is correct, yes.

    2 THE FRENCH REPORTER: The interpreter doesn't

    3 say who speaks, so I can't understand.

    4 MR. NICE: If I am causing problems for the

    5 French writer, I apologise. If there is anything I can

    6 do to make her task easier, I will do so.

    7 Q. 2735, extracts from the minutes of the

    8 presidency for the 10th of July; is that correct?

    9 A. Yes a that is correct.

    10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if the

    11 Chamber has a view. 2738 is a document that this

    12 witness produced to us, but it's already gone in, in, I

    13 think, an identical form, as Exhibit Z7. So we can

    14 either produce it as part of the series and add to the

    15 amount of paper, but that might be more convenient, or

    16 we can simply note that it is Z7 and not produce it

    17 through this witness.

    18 JUDGE MAY: That seems to be more sensible,

    19 the latter course.

    20 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

    21 Q. Then we come to 2736, please.

    22 Tell us a little bit about this. This is the

    23 31st of July of 1991. Was there a meeting on that day?

    24 A. Yes, but I did not attend this meeting.

    25 Q. So far as you know, these are minutes of that

  48. 1 meeting, chaired, I think in your absence, by Boban?

    2 A. That is correct.

    3 Q. Turn to the second sheet, please. Can you

    4 read out the last three bullet points, as they are

    5 known, that come at the end of Tocka 1 and just before

    6 Tocka 2?

    7 A. It is recognised that the opinion of the

    8 Western Herzegovina regional HDZ community coincides

    9 with the conclusions of the Travnik Regional Community

    10 of the HDZ.

    11 Second, it is necessary to consider the

    12 possibility of regional linking in other municipalities

    13 with majority Croatian population or the communities

    14 which are territorially linked with a Croatian

    15 population, and the main board is to consider this.

    16 Also, the areas where the Croatian population is in

    17 minority and territorially is linked, and they can also

    18 link to the regional communities of the HDZ in order to

    19 have a better-organised and more unified activity.

    20 Q. Do you have any comment to make on those

    21 entries or not?

    22 A. No. That was the regular organisation of the

    23 party.

    24 Q. 2739, nothing to say about it, simply that it

    25 is a record you produced of the 1st of August, being a

  49. 1 press release of the presidency, I think.

    2 A. Yes, is it. The document is correct.

    3 Q. The next document in time, which I needn't

    4 produce because it's been dealt with as Exhibit 10 -- I

    5 beg your pardon, not through this witness. There is a

    6 document Z10 which has already been produced which

    7 deals with --

    8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    9 MR. NICE: There is a document Z10. I'm

    10 sorry. Can it go before the witness? It comes from

    11 the core bundle. That's why it's Z10.

    12 Q. This reflects a meeting held on the 6th of

    13 August, with you in the chair, and again we needn't

    14 spend time on this. Does --

    15 A. Yes, even though I left the meeting and had

    16 to take a helicopter to Sarajevo for urgent state

    17 matters, but I do accept the contents of this meeting.

    18 Q. Does this take further the plans developed in

    19 Zagreb on the 13th of June that same year?

    20 A. No. I think that this is, first of all, the

    21 instructions on what the position should be, given the

    22 situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the escalation

    23 of the war in Croatia.

    24 Q. Right. Well, that's available, produced by

    25 you. I'm wrong, it wasn't in the core documents. It

  50. 1 was one of the library documents given original

    2 numbers, and that is available if anybody wants to ask

    3 you about it.

    4 A. These are minutes from the session which was

    5 distributed to all the municipalities in Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina.

    7 Q. I'm grateful. Perhaps if you would like to

    8 turn to point 22, which we have in an English

    9 translation on this document and which you can -- I

    10 know you speak some English indeed, but if you can find

    11 it in the original. Paragraph 22 reads, in the English

    12 translation:

    13 "We remain behind the policy of independence

    14 and indivisibility of BH, but should the war start in

    15 BH by an attack by a Greater Serbia or any other

    16 aggressor on the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    17 a special plan will be applied."

    18 What plan is that; can you say?

    19 A. You see in all the documents, we supported

    20 the unity and indivisibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    21 However, in case it would not be recognised or not

    22 possible, we had to have a plan of protecting the

    23 Croatian interest in the pro-Croatian population. And

    24 it was against the plan which was called Rame or Frame,

    25 which was created by Milosevic, and it had to do with

  51. 1 Greater Serbia, which would encompass -- which would go

    2 along the lines Zadar on the Adriatic coast, Karlovac,

    3 which was 50 kilometres from Zagreb, and Petrinja, also

    4 very close to Zagreb.

    5 We discovered this plan, and I first -- had

    6 it published in the former Yugoslavia and drew

    7 attention to Milosevic's plan, because according to

    8 this plan, a large segment of the Croatian population

    9 in Bosnia-Herzegovina would find itself under the

    10 Serbian control, and we could not accept that. This is

    11 why we asked that the areas where the Croats were in

    12 the majority in this case either become independent or

    13 join the Republic of Croatia.

    14 Q. The next exhibit needn't be separately

    15 produced. It is already Exhibit 11. It is dated the

    16 13th of August. Just tell us what this document is,

    17 please, if you can. There is no point I want to make

    18 on it, so a sentence to identify what it is is all I

    19 ask.

    20 A. I believe that this is the implementation, on

    21 a regional basis, of certain conclusions reached by the

    22 main board of the HDZ BH.

    23 Q. Thank you. 2741, dated on its last sheet the

    24 17th of August, just tell us what it is. No points to

    25 make. Just tell us what it is.

  52. 1 A. This was a political platform for rescue of

    2 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    3 Q. By what individual or group?

    4 A. Primarily, against the Serbian fascism and

    5 the plan called Rame which I had mentioned.

    6 Q. We see a list of names on the fourth sheet,

    7 various people, starting with Professor Babic and other

    8 professors. Your name is not on it. Any comment on

    9 that?

    10 A. This was a meeting of Croat intellectuals who

    11 were not politically involved, except for Dr. Komisic,

    12 who was the vice-president of the Communists, and

    13 perhaps this is the cream of the crop of the Croat

    14 intellectuals of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    15 Q. Next, 2742, the 23rd of August. I think this

    16 is a list of regional communities, and we see Travnik

    17 is the first?

    18 A. Yes, that is correct.

    19 Q. Thank you. The next document, 2743, a press

    20 release dated the 26th of August of the presidency. No

    21 points to be made. I'm just producing these documents

    22 through you.

    23 A. Yes, this is correct.

    24 Q. 2744?

    25 A. This is just standard minutes, that is, a

  53. 1 summary from the presidency meeting.

    2 Q. [Previous interpretation continues]

    3 A. Yes, that is correct.

    4 Q. Then the next document is from the

    5 Prosecution's original list, Z76,1. Sorry, Z16,1. Is

    6 this a document with which you're familiar or not?

    7 A. It is the organisational chart of our party.

    8 Q. We can see that it's dated the 18th of

    9 September of 1991 two thirds of the way down the page,

    10 and can you just explain the top line, please, for us?

    11 The presidency is identified by its constituent

    12 members, hierarchy?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. We see your name as the president. Can you

    15 put it a little higher up on the ELMO, please?

    16 A. Yes, that is correct.

    17 Q. The other members are shown as Mate Boban and

    18 Vlado Santic as vice-presidents, Markesic as --

    19 A. Secretary general.

    20 Q. And then Kostroman as secretary?

    21 A. That is correct.

    22 Q. The next row signifies what?

    23 A. This is the main board, some kind of a

    24 greater council, the largest collective body in the

    25 party, and the presidents of all sizeable organisations

  54. 1 were represented here, for the most part, where the

    2 Croats were in a position of authority in local

    3 governments or where they had very significant

    4 minorities.

    5 Q. Then the bottom part of the chart underneath

    6 the date, the box with the date, what's that about?

    7 A. We had a security council for the HDZ and a

    8 crisis staff, which consisted of myself as president,

    9 Mate Boban as vice-president, and our officials who

    10 were in the government, Branko Kvesic and Bruno Stojic

    11 in the Ministry of Interior, Jerko Doko, Ministry of

    12 Defence, and some prominent persons from the different

    13 regions. We all sought to have all regions represented

    14 in it.

    15 Q. Then we see Dario Kordic's name here, bottom

    16 left-hand corner?

    17 A. Yes, he was there.

    18 Q. On this crisis staff, not as a representative

    19 of one of the municipalities on the main board?

    20 A. He was the representative of several

    21 municipalities from the Travnik region.

    22 Q. Very well. 2745, no points. 18th of

    23 September. It's the conclusions of, I think, is it the

    24 security council of HDZ BH?

    25 A. That is correct.

  55. 1 Q. Back to paragraph 16 in the summary. Was

    2 there a meeting on the 8th of October of 1991?

    3 A. Where?

    4 Q. I'm afraid I can't help you with that. Maybe

    5 the date is wrong.

    6 A. But a meeting of what body, presidency?

    7 Q. Presidency and crisis staff. Maybe we should

    8 go back to the last -- here it is.

    9 A. It's possible there was a regular routine

    10 meeting of the presidency and the crisis staff.

    11 MR. NICE: This one, I think, has not been

    12 copied. Can I lay it on the ELMO and it will be

    13 copied? It's our Exhibit Z18.

    14 Q. Take your time to look at this. This is, of

    15 course, in English, but assuming that it is a proper

    16 reflection of a document in B/C/S, it reflects a

    17 meeting on the 8th of October of the joint meeting of

    18 the presidency and the crisis staff. It sets out some

    19 conclusions. Would you turn to number 7 of the

    20 conclusions and see if you can help us with that? Is

    21 the B/C/S attached to that? Don't attach it at the

    22 moment. Just show the B/C/S number 7 on the ELMO,

    23 please. Can you put it up so that we can follow it?

    24 A. Yes. This is correct, it is correct.

    25 Q. Can you read number 7 and it will be

  56. 1 translated for us, and then we'll get it properly

    2 copied?

    3 A. "Persons appointed to state organs by the

    4 Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    5 shall continue to perform their duties conscientiously,

    6 thinking first and foremost of the interests of the

    7 Croatian people."

    8 Q. And any more?

    9 A. Do you want a comment on this?

    10 Q. Can you read the totality of number 7 first?

    11 A. "Inasmuch as the work of our representatives

    12 referred to in the above paragraph is paralysed, all

    13 our representatives in organs of authority shall

    14 withdraw therefrom, and in that case the sole

    15 legitimate representatives of the Croatian people in

    16 Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be the presidency of the

    17 BH HDZ and the BH HDZ crisis staff of the republic, as

    18 well as our municipal and intermunicipal authorities

    19 where we are in the majority.

    20 "In the event of the withdrawal of the

    21 representatives of the BH HDZ from organs of authority

    22 in the republic, a special plan in work in

    23 extraordinary circumstances shall be drafted."

    24 Q. Do you have any comment you want to make on

    25 that paragraph?

  57. 1 A. At that time, the Serbian representatives in

    2 the government were paralysing the joint work of the

    3 institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that the

    4 joint institutions were unable to run the country

    5 efficiently.

    6 In practical terms, everyone was doing what

    7 they wanted, and the intention here was to gather

    8 together all the representatives of the Croats and the

    9 party leadership so that should a new situation arise,

    10 since we had our election results, they and only they

    11 could represent the will and the interests of the

    12 Croatian people. With this, we wanted to prevent any

    13 possible misuse of the Communist Party which might, in

    14 a rump assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, try to

    15 contribute to the out-voting of Croats, since we were

    16 the smallest of all the three national parties, so that

    17 when we say that our representatives must perform their

    18 duties conscientiously, this means that they should

    19 work honestly within the republic institutions, bearing

    20 in mind the Croats, if a situation of confusion should

    21 arise.

    22 MR. NICE: Thank you. That document, Your

    23 Honour, has been produced already as Exhibit Z18

    24 through an earlier witness.

    25 Q. Paragraph 17 of the summary. Did problems

  58. 1 develop in the Travnik region, later the Travnik

    2 Regional Community?

    3 A. What kind of problems are you referring to?

    4 Q. Well, let's deal with it in another way. Did

    5 there come a time when you required Mr. Kordic to come

    6 to the party headquarters in Sarajevo?

    7 A. There were several complaints about his

    8 attitude. I did not consider this to be particularly

    9 important because in the government bodies of Bosnia

    10 and Herzegovina we had numerous problems in the

    11 Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, and

    12 I simply required discipline in the field so that we

    13 could work seriously.

    14 I think that at one moment I was very

    15 energetic in demanding absolute obedience from

    16 Mr. Kordic, because the worst thing that could have

    17 happened to us at that moment would have been if,

    18 instead of global interests, we started dealing with

    19 local conflicts of a personal kind. However, what I

    20 said then was simply in an outburst of anger. I did

    21 not really mean it seriously.

    22 Q. What you said was what, just so we have the

    23 detail? What was it you said, the detail?

    24 A. I should say?

    25 Q. Yes, please.

  59. 1 A. Well, I said I would have him arrested

    2 because he was causing problems for me.

    3 Q. Thank you. I needn't trouble with the next

    4 exhibit in the bundle, Z18,1.

    5 We can turn to the 11th of November of 1991,

    6 Mr. Kljuic. On that day, was something called the

    7 Croatian Community of Bosnia Posavina created?

    8 A. Well, you see, since the situation was very

    9 complicated, the war was raging in Croatia, many troops

    10 of the Yugoslav army arrived in Bosnia from Slovenia,

    11 from parts of Croatia, and reservists and volunteers

    12 were called in from Yugoslavia and Montenegro from

    13 Serbia.

    14 At that time, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the

    15 biggest military barracks in Europe, and we had 17

    16 Corps of the JNA which was extremely well armed in

    17 classical weapons. It was impossible from Sarajevo,

    18 because we had difficulties with telephone connections,

    19 our telephones were bugged. We had security problems,

    20 so it was impossible to have daily conversations with

    21 every municipality and every town, and it was quite

    22 normal to set up regions which would draw together a

    23 certain area, and it was much easier to communicate

    24 with their representatives then from the party.

    25 In this respect, the Posavina region was

  60. 1 established, the Central Bosnia region and Herzegovina

    2 also set up its own. But they were homogenous and

    3 compact from the very beginning.

    4 Q. You dealt with one or both, as you've spoken

    5 of the principle, but the Bosnia and Posavina was

    6 created first and then Herceg-Bosna was second?

    7 A. I think that on the 11th of November, the

    8 Posavina region was set up, the Travnik region on the

    9 14th of November, and Herceg-Bosna on the 18th. But I

    10 was not invited to any of these gatherings, nor did I

    11 attend them.

    12 Q. Indeed, what was the first you learned of the

    13 creation of these two communities?

    14 A. Well, I think they sent a fax message to the

    15 party, so it was no surprise that the Posavina and

    16 Travnik community were established.

    17 Q. Just returning briefly to your instruction to

    18 Kordic to attend your office for fear of being

    19 arrested. Did you get a response from Dario Kordic --

    20 A. I don't remember, but I think he didn't come.

    21 Q. But did he write to you, do you know? It's

    22 Exhibit 21,1.

    23 A. I don't know. If you show me the text, I

    24 might recall it.

    25 Q. 21,1, and also 25,1, please.

  61. 1 First of all, 21,1. And if there's a B/C/S

    2 version of it, can that be made available to the

    3 witness. Is there a B/C/S version attached to that?

    4 He may need to look at the B/C/S version, I think.

    5 A. That's correct.

    6 Q. Do you remember this?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Any comment to make about it? Any expression

    9 of whether your views and his coincided?

    10 A. No, I think that at that time, while I was in

    11 charge of the government policy and the central policy

    12 in Sarajevo, people in the field were slowly setting up

    13 a para-organisation because they did not like the

    14 vertical structure of things, and each of them thought

    15 that from their local perspective they could create

    16 policy. This failure to respect the documents adopted

    17 and the party leadership was soon to be expressed when

    18 there was an open confrontation between two currents in

    19 the HDZ and when many personal ambitions surfaced, so

    20 that even attempts to hold meetings together with

    21 President Tudjman were able to reconcile these two

    22 currents.

    23 Q. We'll be coming to that very shortly, but to

    24 try to keep things chronological so far as possible,

    25 could you just look, please, now, at 25,1, already

  62. 1 produced. If you follow the B/C/S, this is from Dario

    2 Kordic, or signed by him on behalf of the regional

    3 community of Herzegovina in Travnik, a reply to the

    4 proposal for a separate meeting of the Croatian

    5 regional community of Travnik. And if you would just

    6 like to remind yourself of the B/C/S original.

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Any comment on this document?

    9 A. No.

    10 Q. It speaks of a lack of coordination between

    11 the main offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Herzegovina, and

    12 Travnik and speaks of possible negative repercussions

    13 resulting from the different approach of certain

    14 people, and so on. Was there an identity of views

    15 between the local community and you, or not?

    16 A. Even if it existed formerly, many people on

    17 the ground acted differently from what was in the

    18 political programme of the HDZ and from the policy of

    19 the presidency of the HDZ. And as regards the poor

    20 level of subordination, you should know that this was

    21 the most tragic period of the war in Croatia, and it

    22 was a time when the aggression against Bosnia and

    23 Herzegovina was already beginning, when the JNA, the

    24 Yugoslav People's Army, was burning and destroying

    25 Croatian villages.

  63. 1 Q. Did either of these local communities have

    2 the structural or the constitutional right to be

    3 dictating what the presidency should be doing?

    4 A. No, they did not. They mostly dealt with

    5 local problems, and their task was to prepare the

    6 defence of the Croatian people from aggression.

    7 Let me remind you, the former Yugoslavia had

    8 two kinds of army and weapons. One kind was the

    9 official army, which was already instrumentalised by

    10 Milosevic and the Serbian fascists, and the other

    11 system was the system of All People's Defence,

    12 something that William Tell advocated his time, and it

    13 was supposed to defend local citizens in the area where

    14 they lived.

    15 However, with the exception of Slovenia, no

    16 republic was ever given those weapons. The communist

    17 authorities, before the democratic elections, gave the

    18 weapons of the All People's Defence to the Yugoslav

    19 People's Army. After that, the Yugoslav army openly

    20 armed Serb citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, and

    21 the role of the regional HDZ communities was to prepare

    22 people and mobilise people for defence as far as was

    23 possible.

    24 Q. Thank you.

    25 MR. NICE: The next document, please, is one

  64. 1 that's already been -- no, is one that has a regular

    2 exhibit number, Z30, has yet to be produced. May he

    3 have that in the original, and perhaps the original had

    4 better be placed on the ELMO, because I'm going to ask

    5 the witness to read a couple of passages from it.

    6 Q. Before we turn to the passages, just confirm,

    7 please, that this is an excerpt from the minutes of the

    8 28th of November of 1991 of the presidency.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Would you turn -- in the English version it's

    11 the second sheet; in the B/C/S, it is the second sheet

    12 and the third sheet. On the second sheet, the

    13 penultimate paragraph, the second subparagraph of

    14 paragraph (a) begins "HDZ BiH." Could you please read

    15 that out for us?

    16 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    17 read]

    18 "Conclusion from the minutes of the 14th of

    19 November 1991 that serious problems and differences of

    20 opinion have arisen in the leadership of the BH HDZ

    21 with regard to political activity and the realisation

    22 of the programmatic principles is rendered more

    23 precise, as follows. The BH HDZ is a united party

    24 operating on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    25 within the scope of the AVNOJ borders of Bosnia and

  65. 1 Herzegovina, but represents a constituent part of the

    2 Croatian Democratic Union based in Zagreb, as expressly

    3 established in the statutory provisions and the

    4 programmatic principles."

    5 Q. Can you then turn to subparagraph (c), over

    6 the page. Read that -- at least, just read the first

    7 three lines and one word.

    8 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    9 read]

    10 "The presidency of the BH HDZ unanimously

    11 adopts the decision on the establishment of the

    12 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna of 18th November,

    13 1991, which represents the freely expressed will of the

    14 Croatian people and which consists of the following

    15 municipalities."

    16 Q. They are then listed, and the last line and

    17 half of subparagraph C reads ...

    18 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    19 read]

    20 "The Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

    21 represents a political, cultural, economic, and

    22 territorial entity."

    23 Q. And if you go down, please, to subparagraph

    24 (e), and in particular the second subparagraph of that

    25 paragraph, beginning "Formirane."

  66. 1 A. Yes. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian

    2 document as read]

    3 "The established Croatian communities are

    4 independent political, cultural, economic, and

    5 territorial entities which have their own organs to

    6 represent them and act on their behalf."

    7 Q. This is a document, I think, that you

    8 signed. Did it carry your full consent and will with

    9 it?

    10 A. There was a big struggle, and a compromise

    11 was reached. They conceded that we are fighting for

    12 Bosnia and Herzegovina within the AVNOJ borders, which

    13 means for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I

    14 agreed to recognise Herceg-Bosna, but what does the

    15 expression "political organisation" mean? In the

    16 former Yugoslavia, a women's association, a trade

    17 union, a youth organisation was such an organisation.

    18 Furthermore, it says that they are to

    19 represent a region, which is completely true, because

    20 the presidency of the HDZ and the people in the

    21 government and in the presidency of Bosnia and

    22 Herzegovina were representing the republic, and at that

    23 time, no one suggested -- and it would probably not

    24 have been adopted if they had -- that they represent

    25 administrative institutions, because we had, within the

  67. 1 state, legal institutions such as municipalities, and

    2 the local governments, and various government

    3 committees, because if they had demanded something like

    4 this, it would have meant the creation of para-state

    5 institutions, which, at that time, no one would have

    6 accepted officially.

    7 So we had to mitigate the public response to

    8 this, because the Serbs and their propaganda, when they

    9 were setting up their own so-called autonomous regions,

    10 said that the creation of Herceg-Bosna was a parallel

    11 system, which was a new incentive to those who wanted

    12 to destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. By

    13 emphasising that we were still fighting for a united

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that this was a regional

    15 community with economic and cultural responsibilities,

    16 I succeeded in mitigating the public response to the

    17 creation of this community.

    18 Q. Thank you very much. The next document is

    19 2746. Nothing to say about it, just note that it is

    20 the minutes of the presidency meeting of the 17th of

    21 December.

    22 A. Yes. It's an old document, dating to 1990.

    23 Q. Now, this document we don't have in

    24 translation. Can you just tell us what it is? It

    25 appears to be dated, I think, the 22nd of December.

  68. 1 A. Ever since the HDZ was founded in Mostar, the

    2 situation has been complicated, and there were very

    3 many personal conflicts. This is one of the reports

    4 submitted by Damjan Vlasic, and it relates to the

    5 situation in Mostar, all sorts of problems and strife,

    6 and that it is impossible --

    7 Q. I'll stop you there, unless it has any

    8 bearing on the issues with which you know we are more

    9 closely concerned, and unless there is anything that

    10 you want to add that takes it away from Mostar.

    11 A. No, no, no, no. It's quite irrelevant.

    12 Q. Thank you. Summary paragraph 19, paragraph

    13 19, on the 23rd of December, was there a meeting of the

    14 Community of Herceg-Bosna's presidency, including Boban

    15 and Dario Kordic, at Tomislavgrad in Herzegovina?

    16 A. I don't know, because I was not present at

    17 that meeting. However, several days later, I heard

    18 such a meeting had taken place. I'd never been invited

    19 to that meeting.

    20 Q. What did you hear happened at it?

    21 A. No, it was -- the meeting was always

    22 mentioned, but I never learned anything about the

    23 contents of it.

    24 Q. Then the next meeting that I want you to deal

    25 with in detail is the 27th of December of 1991. Where

  69. 1 was that meeting, and who was present, and so on?

    2 A. The meeting was held in Zagreb on the

    3 official premises of the President of the Republic of

    4 Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. In addition to President

    5 Tudjman, there were also Stipe Mesic, Josip Manolic,

    6 Dalibor Brozovic, Dr. Milan Ramljak, Gojko Susak, Ante

    7 Beljo, and several other officials of the party, and

    8 the Croatian government were present on the Croatian

    9 side.

    10 On our side, there were all officials

    11 discharging individual offices in the government and

    12 presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and presidents of very

    13 many regional boards, even though I need to say that we

    14 arrived there separately and that we also left Zagreb

    15 separately, because it was on the eve of peace in

    16 Croatia; that is, on the 2nd of January, '92, peace was

    17 to be signed in Sarajevo between Croatian Serbs,

    18 UNPROFOR, and representatives of the Republic of

    19 Croatia and the Croatian army.

    20 So on the 27th, we all met in Zagreb, but it

    21 was already clear by that time that there were two

    22 factions in the HDZ and that the faction rallied around

    23 Herceg-Bosna had shown they did not comply with the

    24 adopted and agreed political programme. Among other

    25 things, they in particular wanted to disparage, to

  70. 1 belittle my person, my political activity, my political

    2 commitment, even though President Tudjman at that very

    3 meeting said that I had done a great deal for the

    4 results achieved until that particular time.

    5 Q. Now I'd like you, please, to look at three

    6 documents which we must explain to the Court.

    7 MR. NICE: First there's the largest, the

    8 fattest document, which is 2717. I think you may find

    9 it third, but just -- will you hand that to the

    10 witness, please.

    11 Q. What is this?

    12 A. These are the minutes of that meeting held on

    13 the 27th of December, 1991, in Zagreb.

    14 MR. NICE: Before I come to look at those and

    15 to deal with them in whatever method may be acceptable

    16 to the Tribunal, can I explain that you should have two

    17 other documents -- it may not be necessary to trouble

    18 the witness with these, but they'll assist the Tribunal

    19 with what I think has gone to the Defence -- I

    20 certainly hope it has -- 2717,1, if the Tribunal and my

    21 friends opposite have that, is an extract from the

    22 minutes which was served, and 2717,1A is a partial

    23 translation of some of the elements of that document, I

    24 think.

    25 So that explains, I hope, the documents, and

  71. 1 if there's anything that's wanted in more detail, I'll

    2 explain it. I don't think Mr. Kljujic need be

    3 particularly troubled with that, but that's what there

    4 is there, in case it assists.

    5 A. I think that Document 2717,1 is part of the

    6 Document 2717.

    7 Q. That's right, yes. Thank you.

    8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, given the lack of a

    9 complete translation of the minutes, and given the

    10 proper restraints on the interpreters in the booths,

    11 all that I can do is find the passages in the full

    12 minute, ask the witness to read them, and they will

    13 therefore translate them to us over the headphones.

    14 JUDGE MAY: Do you want to go beyond what's

    15 in 2717,1A?

    16 MR. NICE: I think there are one or two more

    17 passages beyond that, yes. In any event, it may be

    18 helpful to find our way around the larger document in

    19 case it becomes of significance later.

    20 Q. If you look at the larger document, let's

    21 focus on 2717, Mr. Kljujic, we see that the first four

    22 pages are page-numbered. Have it in front of you, and

    23 we'll put the appropriate pages on.

    24 We see the first page is not numbered, then

    25 the second, third, and fourth pages are numbered.

  72. 1 Thereafter, the numbering is either different or has

    2 gone. Can you just explain that? If you can't explain

    3 it, don't guess.

    4 A. I can, but it must be a technical error or

    5 something, because I did not make this document.

    6 Q. Well, now if we go, please, through the

    7 document very swiftly, but we'll just physically count

    8 pages because they aren't numbered and it's the only

    9 way to be sure we reach the right pages, but we see

    10 that on the second sheet which is numbered page 2, your

    11 name at the beginning -- I beg your pardon -- at the

    12 foot of the page, and then there's a long or fairly

    13 long extract attributed to you. Did you speak at an

    14 early stage of this meeting?

    15 A. I did, several times.

    16 Q. Now, if we then go to a page in the top

    17 left-hand corner differently numbered 7/3/JG --

    18 JUDGE MAY: Where are we finding this?

    19 MR. NICE: It's on the top left-hand corner.

    20 You can see some numbers, "7/3/JG".

    21 Q. Can you tell us, please, who was speaking at

    22 this time? If you need to check by going back a few

    23 pages, about three or four pages, do so and you'll see

    24 who was speaking.

    25 A. President Tudjman.

  73. 1 Q. Thank you. Returning to part of what he said

    2 on page 7/3/JG, would you pick it up at the middle of

    3 the page, the beginning of the paragraph "Znaci"? Read

    4 it to us, and the interpreters will interpret it for

    5 us.

    6 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    7 read]

    8 "And so on the survival of the sovereignty

    9 of Bosnia under present-day conditions is, from the

    10 Croatian point of view, such that we may not promote

    11 it. We may not even postulate it openly. We may not

    12 postulate it openly, but why not accept this offer of

    13 demarcation, since that is in the interests of the

    14 Croat people, of the Croat people here in this republic

    15 and the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for I

    16 see no reason which would be a serious-enough reason

    17 which would go against it, all the more so during the

    18 talks which I personally conducted both with

    19 Izetbegovic and with Milosevic and, moreover, one of

    20 our people in Bosnia has drawn up this proposal on such

    21 a demarcation where the Croat areas and those which you

    22 encompassed in this community of Herceg-Bosna and in the

    23 community of Croatian Sava river valley where, in case of

    24 demarcation, in addition to these two communities,

    25 Croatia would get, presumably for due political

  74. 1 reasons, both the Cazin and Bihac area, and that will

    2 be almost full satisfaction, optimal satisfaction, of

    3 Croat --" I guess it is "interests", but there is a

    4 word missing -- "national interests, not only at

    5 present but also in the future, and that then from the

    6 remaining part --" and that's the end of the

    7 quotation. It's interrupted.

    8 Q. Then the next page?

    9 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    10 read]

    11 "Then from the remaining part where mostly

    12 Muslims will stay and a part of Catholic Croats, so in

    13 other words that around Sarajevo, one can create a

    14 little state, a statelet (phoen) which would remind of

    15 that historical countrylet (phoen) of Bosnia which

    16 would then be a buffer zone between this demarcation

    17 line between Serbia and Croatia and which would, under

    18 those conditions, necessarily rely on Croatia for the

    19 major part.

    20 "International factors could be satisfied

    21 with that, as they must be counting on it quite

    22 seriously. As you have just mentioned, they are now

    23 counting also on this Serb gendarme, vis-à-vis that

    24 Muslim element, that Islamic element in the territory

    25 of Yugoslavia, whose aspiration is to found an Islamic

  75. 1 state in Europe with the support of Teheran and

    2 Tripoli."

    3 Q. That was still Tudjman speaking, was it?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Can you turn over one sheet, please, to 8/2

    6 and pick up what Boban says at the foot of the page?

    7 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    8 read]

    9 "Founding municipalities HA --" I don't know

    10 what "HA" means -- "and community Herceg-Bosna now

    11 have, according to a census, 55 per cent of Croats

    12 altogether. There are 27 per cent of Muslims, 9

    13 per cent Serbs, and the rest are others.

    14 "However, since the municipalities in

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina are along more or less the same

    16 lines as in Croatia where established, so in a way

    17 which would combine the Serb and the Muslim population

    18 in the Croatian territory, or vice versa, by cleansing

    19 the border areas which are, in fact, at the border

    20 areas of Herceg-Bosna, this creates about 65 per cent

    21 of the Croat population in Herceg-Bosna.

    22 "Excuse me, as I know the latest data in

    23 Serbia are 63 per cent."

    24 Q. The word "cleansing" was used there. Was

    25 that a regular term used in political discussion at

  76. 1 that time or not?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. What was its meaning when used in meetings of

    4 this type?

    5 A. Under the Communist regime, the

    6 municipalities with the Croat majority were often

    7 administratively abolished or subdivided so that one

    8 half would come under another municipality and the

    9 other half under a third municipality. In those

    10 expanded municipalities, the Croats would then come to

    11 be a minority. There are a series of such examples in

    12 Dobratici, between Jajce and Travnik, and Kotor Varos,

    13 the municipalities of Ravne, then the municipality of

    14 Ivanjska near Banja Luka, and so on and so forth.

    15 In 1967, those municipalities which were

    16 Croat were split up and placed, by and large, under

    17 Serb domination.

    18 Q. Thank you very much. If we go to page 16/4,

    19 it's just about a little over halfway through, this is

    20 at the foot of the page of 16/4. This is what Dario

    21 Kordic was saying, and if you can -- or a summary of

    22 what he was saying. Can you read that out, please?

    23 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    24 read]

    25 "Mr. President, distinguished participants,

  77. 1 Dario Kordic, president of the municipality board of

    2 the HDZ of Busovaca, the chairman of the Travnik

    3 Regional Community, of the Croat Democratic Community

    4 and vice-president of the Croat Community of

    5 Herceg-Bosna. I shall speak.

    6 "It is my duty and my privilege on behalf of

    7 the one which some call a disputable part about

    8 Dobratici and Jajce to Kraljeva, Sutjeska and Vares.

    9 "For six months we deliberated your idea of the

    10 13th and the 20th June in blood, and we've just --"

    11 Q. Just stop for two seconds. The Court can

    12 follow this on page 6 of the English extract, if it

    13 prefers to do it that way, rather than following it on

    14 the screen.

    15 I'm sorry to have interrupted you,

    16 Mr. Kljuic. Please pick it up again. "The 20th of June

    17 in blood," you were on.

    18 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    19 read]

    20 "I should say that the Croat spirit here in

    21 these lands of the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna and

    22 the Sava Valley, during those 40 days and notably in

    23 Bosnia, this is the proclamation of the Croat Community

    24 at Grude has strengthened more than for a year

    25 following the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  78. 1 "The Croat people in this regional/

    2 subregional community lives with the idea of the final

    3 incorporation joining with the Croatian state and is

    4 prepared to do it with all the means and Croat spirit

    5 which boils in young men.

    6 "I'm saying this because I come from the

    7 field. We visited every village in the territory of

    8 this subregional community of Herceg-Bosna.

    9 "I should say I'm sorry that many leaders

    10 from the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    11 were not with their people in these areas during

    12 Christmas holidays and seen numerous Croat standards on

    13 Croat homes in these municipalities of the Bosnian

    14 part. There were 60 to 70 flags in the

    15 municipalities. This was not noted down.

    16 "Although this is a sad Christmas because of

    17 the destruction of Croatia, this was the most Croat

    18 Christmas since the war in this part of Bosnia, and

    19 this is a fact that nobody may deny.

    20 "I should say that any option which would not

    21 mean clear demarcation of the Croat soil in the

    22 territory of Herceg-Bosna and the protection against

    23 the destruction of the Croat body, except through a

    24 clear state mechanism of the State of Croatia which

    25 would serve as a guarantor to the Herceg-Bosna Croats,

  79. 1 would be treason, whether it happens in three months or

    2 a year, yet we must believe in it.

    3 "When some gentleman said that it is not

    4 true, that it is not a reality, what our fate would be,

    5 what was said about Travnik, I do not think that in

    6 other municipalities we would have even a relative

    7 majority unless we applied this concept.

    8 "I need to point out one thing in particular,

    9 and that is that the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been

    10 throughout only a side-show of the SDA policy. It was

    11 a surrogate of the Croatian policy. When the Croat

    12 being was reborn in the latter half of 1990, at the

    13 time of the elections in November, until November of

    14 1991 when the resurrecting Croat being became a dying

    15 being and the Croat policy had no identity, it was the

    16 policy of subjects, it was passive, it was cowardly, as

    17 shown in the beginning of the dirty war in the State of

    18 Croatia and its transfer to the lands of Herceg-Bosna.

    19 The SDA leadership in these lands revealed all their

    20 honest intentions regarding a civil republic which they

    21 coloured with an unheard of Islamic fundamentalism of

    22 SDA leaders, spiced with the Congress of the Party of

    23 Democratic Action, and ovations to ambassadors of

    24 Turkey and Libya, Cengic's statement three days ago

    25 that their home is in Turkey, and the premature

  80. 1 disclosure of the dream of the Jamahirija.

    2 "We, from mixed regions, are well familiar

    3 with the sincere intentions of the leaders of the Party

    4 for Democratic Action.

    5 "I am not an advocate of false peace because

    6 it necessitates a useless waste of energy. I believe

    7 what Mr. President said. This leadership, this peak of

    8 the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their

    9 government, are incapable of concluding this agreement

    10 with Muslims and Serbs because their point of departure

    11 is that we are not more than 17,4 per cent, and they do

    12 not take as the point of departure as to who we are,

    13 what our real strength is, which is our state, and how

    14 big is our power.

    15 "I believe that this leadership cannot put

    16 to life this new platform and that in this Croat

    17 Democratic Union, that is, the implementation of this

    18 policy cannot be provided by all these same people.

    19 "I should like to say that what we used to

    20 say at these meetings with our people had been, by the

    21 Muslims, ready to move in front of us, we would have

    22 fought with them. But at this particular point in

    23 time, we have no moral obligation to them because they

    24 do not deserve that, and we do not think that either

    25 Izetbegovic or his clique will be able to pursue even

  81. 1 this Muslim policy in this territory of theirs which

    2 will remain, because they are driving the Muslim people

    3 to ruin. The Muslim people will depose them themselves

    4 because they did not provide them with the defensive

    5 mechanism, and their people will, at long last,

    6 understand that."

    7 JUDGE MAY: Is that a convenient time?

    8 MR. NICE: Certainly.

    9 JUDGE MAY: We'll finish this witness's

    10 evidence in chief, I take it, today.

    11 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. This is probably

    12 the longest passage, and there's only one sheet of the

    13 summary to go.

    14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Half past 2.00.

    15 I'm sorry. Mr. Kljuic, could you be back,

    16 please, at half past 2.00.

    17 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.









  82. 1

    2 --- On resuming at 2.35 p.m.

    3 MR. NICE:

    4 Q. We've just heard what Dario Kordic said at

    5 the meeting. By this time, what sort of a figure was

    6 he, to your knowledge? How important? How did his

    7 views fit with yours, or with others, and so on?

    8 A. He was not an important figure in the party

    9 until the time when Herceg-Bosna was established. I

    10 have to say that what I stood for and what I

    11 implemented as president was not just my personal

    12 position, but I also received full support in the

    13 elections, and then through the party, the platform

    14 adopted on the 23 and 24 March in Mostar, which was a

    15 unified and undivided Bosnia with equal representation

    16 of all, integral Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be

    17 also equal to other republics in the Former Yugoslavia.

    18 Q. Did you have any personal relationship with

    19 Kordic, good or bad? Or not?

    20 A. Not particularly good or bad. Privately we

    21 did not have much communication, only through official

    22 channels.

    23 Q. Thank you. The views he expressed at this

    24 meeting, that we've just read out, do you want to

    25 comment on those at all?

  83. 1 A. I think that this was a position that was

    2 held by a faction which was led by Boban. In other

    3 words, I don't think that he said anything different

    4 from what Boban and some others had also stated, except

    5 perhaps in some details.

    6 Q. I'll turn to things that were said by

    7 Tudjman, but there's one earlier passage that I ought

    8 to have asked you to deal with. I cut short a little

    9 too early the passage I was asking you to deal with.

    10 It's at page 8/1.

    11 In the middle of the page, "Sa toga," we've taken

    12 it to the end of the previous paragraph. Could you

    13 just read, picking up at "Sa toga," and go over to the

    14 following page?

    15 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    16 read]

    17 "From that point of view, even some kind of

    18 cantonisation with the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    19 for us it does not represent a solution which is the

    20 solution, which means the separation. So that is where

    21 the problem lies. So I believe that you have missed --

    22 that you have been implementing a policy and politics

    23 which is, on the one side, to retain sovereignty, and

    24 the surrounding areas which may have been more

    25 interested for joining and which in the end the people

  84. 1 are using to support the Croatian cause. So it seems

    2 to me that as we use this historical moment to create

    3 an independent and internationally recognised Croatia,

    4 I believe it is the time now also to use this moment to

    5 gather our Croatian national --"

    6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who is speaking here?

    7 MR. NICE: President Tudjman.

    8 Q. I'm sorry, I may have stopped you too

    9 quickly. Could you finish that sentence?

    10 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    11 read]

    12 "... which are in the borders which are as

    13 wide as possible." Now, I don't know whether this

    14 would involve 28 or 30 municipalities. I think that

    15 that is of lesser importance.

    16 Q. Staying with President Tudjman, but moving to

    17 a later part of the minute, can we go to page -- it's

    18 about three-quarters of the way through, 21/2/VM. We

    19 see a paragraph headed with the word "President," I

    20 think, and then the first paragraph I needn't trouble

    21 you with, the first major paragraph, but if you could

    22 start with "Da Bosna," please.

    23 A. Yes. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document

    24 as read]

    25 "All the history has shown that Bosnia and

  85. 1 Herzegovina is not a solution for the Croatian people.

    2 First of all, it was created by colonial conquest of an

    3 Asian power, gentlemen, let's not forget that, starting

    4 in the period between the 15th and 18th centuries, at

    5 the expense of Croatian people and the expense of

    6 Croatian territory.

    7 "All these colonial creations have collapsed

    8 both in Asia and Africa. Bosnia-Herzegovina did not

    9 exist between the two wars. Communists invented it

    10 after World War II, brought it back on stage. They

    11 even proclaimed the Muslims as a nation in order to

    12 ostensibly solve the dispute between the Croatian and

    13 Serbian peoples. Did they succeed in it? No, on the

    14 contrary. So one should not count with Bosnia and

    15 Herzegovina as something which was God-given, and

    16 something that is to remain, and not at all neglect how

    17 harmful it can be.

    18 "Croatia has been brought in an impossible

    19 situation, territorially speaking, because of the

    20 creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We cannot create

    21 an independent Croatia both administratively, let alone

    22 defensively speaking. So what are the perspectives?

    23 What is the future of the Croatian people in Bosnia and

    24 Herzegovina? I quoted -- I said that we have fallen

    25 from 24 to 17 per cent of the population. Mr. Vlasic,

  86. 1 from Travnik, has said that in Travnik the population

    2 is down to 37 from 56. Be sure, if Bosnia-Herzegovina

    3 became independent, within ten years that will assume

    4 horrible proportions, because the Muslims are counting

    5 on demographic expansion, and because of their birth

    6 rate, they are counting on 500.000 Muslims from Turkey,

    7 and so on.

    8 So the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as

    9 an independent and sovereign state, even if possible,

    10 would be at the expense of the Croatian people, and it

    11 would enable normal territorial creation of a Croatian

    12 state, and it also creates preconditions for

    13 disappearance of the Croatian peoples such as they

    14 exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. Furthermore,

    15 there is no one unified Bosnia and Herzegovina today."

    16 Q. That observation by Tudjman about the

    17 impossibility of Croatia existing in its then form and

    18 shape, is that something that he said just once or did

    19 he say it on other occasions?

    20 A. He said here, for the first time, explicitly

    21 this.

    22 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] on other

    23 occasions?

    24 A. Not in this form.

    25 Q. We move on two pages, I believe, to 22/1 LJ;

  87. 1 still Tudjman speaking. The second-to-last paragraph

    2 on the page, the paragraph beginning with the word

    3 "Iz", could you just read that paragraph for us,

    4 please?

    5 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    6 read]

    7 "For tactical reasons, we support a

    8 sovereign Bosnia as long as it exists, but there is no

    9 more sovereign Bosnia. Serbs separated themselves

    10 out. You have no more power. The Bosnian government

    11 has no authority over the Serbian areas and the Serbian

    12 parts. Not only the Serbian parts of Bosnia but all of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina is involved in the war against

    14 Croatia, its territory, and the Serbian population

    15 against Croatia, that is a fact.

    16 So what do we talk --"

    17 Q. That's all I require. Thank you very much.

    18 We turn now to some of the things that you

    19 were saying. It had been seen earlier, but can we turn

    20 to page 24/1 LJ. I think this is you speaking. I

    21 better check that it is. If you come back a couple of

    22 pages, I think you'll see that this is you speaking.

    23 Can you pick it up from the third paragraph, "Dalje"?

    24 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    25 read]

  88. 1 "Further, we consider that we had to conduct

    2 discussions, but in all these discussions, gentlemen,

    3 everybody is asking the question, 'Who is the first?

    4 Who is going to propose the partition of Bosnia?'

    5 'Let's see. You want cantonisation. Very well.'

    6 Because when we brought the Serbs to this to say, 'All

    7 right, you have initiated this, you don't want an

    8 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, so please draft a

    9 paper,' and they brought a paper with the Belgrade

    10 initiative because they have the media, and now the

    11 question is, 'Who is going to bite first?'

    12 "We were here the last time when you were

    13 here and you told us there were three options. The

    14 first one is to fight for a sovereign Bosnia as long as

    15 we can. Second, if the Serbs take control over their

    16 parts by force because it's under international

    17 control, let's have this rump Bosnia and Herzegovina in

    18 a confederation with Croatia. Then there will be a

    19 buffer zone. We will get the Muslims.

    20 "Then somebody said, and that was not very

    21 tactful, 'We will give the Muslims some kind of

    22 autonomy,' so let there be this type of

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, please."

    24 Q. And then President Tudjman asked you

    25 something or said something, namely --

  89. 1 A. Yes. It states here:

    2 [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    3 read]

    4 "Stjepan, let's be specific now. Let's not

    5 waste --"

    6 Q. And you added?

    7 A. (In English) Just one minute,

    8 please. (Interpretation) "Let's not waste time,

    9 please," and I replied, "The third option -- let me

    10 just finish, Mr. President, the third option. The

    11 third is the Muslims do not want to go with us. The

    12 Serbs want their own. Let's engage in propaganda and

    13 that it is a question of Europe versus Balkans,

    14 Belgrade, Zagreb, and then we have a chance to get the

    15 Travnik Muslims, the Bugojno Muslims, the Jajce, and

    16 then Croatia could get a block, and this is what it

    17 should be prepared."

    18 Q. All right. Now, you therefore set out the

    19 three options. I see one or two other contributions.

    20 Can you turn over to 25/2 JG, please, towards

    21 the end. At the foot of this page, you can see "Miro

    22 Lasic". Can you just read what his contribution was,

    23 or part of it?

    24 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    25 read]

  90. 1 "If we manage to create a Bosnian dinar,

    2 believe me, the Serbs will drown in their own faeces of

    3 dinar. That is, if we manage to do this, and I'm not

    4 sure that we will be.

    5 "The President replies, 'You will not

    6 succeed. It is clear that you will not succeed. You

    7 will not. I suggest that we agree on a commission

    8 which will conduct these talks and which, in that

    9 sense, will be, if you will, the leadership of the

    10 Croatian Democratic Community in Bosnia. Do you have

    11 any suggestion, Kljuic, Boban, Stanic?'"

    12 He is from Bosnia.

    13 "'Indeed, these three have to be there.

    14 Let's go on.' Then somebody interjected, 'We have to

    15 include Bihac. Bihac is very important.' And another

    16 interjection, 'As I said, as a region it remains under

    17 our control.'

    18 "Stipe Mesic then says he is suggesting that

    19 it be where things are critical, and then an

    20 interjection, 'To be a negotiator where the situation

    21 is critical.'"

    22 The President says, "Who do you suggest," and

    23 then the interjection which is unintelligible.

    24 "Is he here? Stjepan, this is not a personal

    25 question but an issue of political positions." "Could

  91. 1 you put Rajic?" "Why not put the professor from

    2 Travnik?" The president, "Well, I did not say it could

    3 not be. Go ahead."

    4 Kordic, and he joins in the discussion later,

    5 "I have the right to be here, because there are 12

    6 municipalities behind me. I am the presiding officer

    7 of that regional community."

    8 Then the president, "Very well. Kljuic,

    9 Boban, Vlado Santic, we said that Iko Stanic, Udovicic,

    10 Vlasic, and who else?" And then an interjection,

    11 "Dario Kordic from Busovaca. That's seven, Kljuic,

    12 Boban, Vlado Santic, Iko Stanic, Udovicic, Vlasic,

    13 Kordic." "Very well, that is accepted."

    14 The last two names, I just want to say, are

    15 misspelled.

    16 "Let's vote. Who is for Kljuic?"

    17 Q. That's enough of that quotation. That

    18 grouping that was created at the end included Kordic,

    19 at his own suggestion?

    20 A. No. In the end, a group was created, Kljuic,

    21 Boban, Stanic.

    22 Q. Was there another body created at the end of

    23 this meeting, an inner-leadership body?

    24 A. No, it was only said that in the future,

    25 since some of those from Herzegovina who were present

  92. 1 and questioned my leadership in the party, they asked

    2 that a commission be represented on all these events,

    3 which would also include Boban and Stanic.

    4 Q. I can take you back to the reference, if

    5 necessary, but do you remember the contribution of

    6 Perica Juric and a reference to refugees?

    7 A. I cannot recall, but I believe it's in the

    8 transcript.

    9 Q. In the course of this meeting, what, if

    10 anything, was said, to your recollection, about what

    11 would happen to the Muslims and what the consequences

    12 for them would be? I'll take you to a reference, if

    13 you want to find one, that touches the topic, but first

    14 of all your memory.

    15 A. Both factions in this meeting had their own

    16 views on the Muslims. My faction considered the

    17 Muslims an important partner in the defence of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and considering the historical

    19 friendship, they were our only political friends.

    20 Boban's side viewed the Muslims with

    21 indignation, and later it would be shown that they

    22 frequently had contacts with the Serbs, regardless of

    23 the fact that during this very period, the Serbian

    24 fascism was at its cruellest against the Croatian

    25 people, not just in Vukovar but in Dubrovnik and in

  93. 1 other parts of Croatia.

    2 Q. Thank you. We've heard something about

    3 President Tudjman's attitude towards Croatia's shape

    4 and the possibility of its survival in that shape.

    5 What, in general, if you can summarise it, was his

    6 attitude towards Croatia's borders and shape as

    7 expressed at this meeting or at other meetings?

    8 A. He said that for the first time openly, that

    9 Croatia's shape was not right and that it cannot stay

    10 that way, and that the HDZ policy, that is, the Zagreb

    11 policy, would be evidenced in Dayton when some of the

    12 best Croatian territory in Posavina was sacrificed for

    13 three municipalities that were very backward, that is,

    14 Dravar, Glamoc and Bosanski Grahovo.

    15 But let me go back to the main issue, which

    16 is that at this meeting and in the party itself, people

    17 split along the lines of those who did not believe that

    18 much in the significance of the Helsinki conference of

    19 1975 and those people who believed in the survival of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    21 On the other hand, President Tudjman stated

    22 that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a colonial creation.

    23 Bosnia is an old state with a thousand-year history,

    24 and Croats from Bosnia did not come from Croatia but

    25 are an indigenous group which arrived there in the 7th

  94. 1 century from the Carpathian, just like all the other

    2 Slavs.

    3 Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a rather

    4 rare case in Europe because it has the most stable

    5 borders within the last 400 years.

    6 Q. The positions taken by the other faction, the

    7 faction other than yours, did those positions fit with

    8 the original HDZ BH platform and the laws of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina or not, or don't you have a view?

    10 A. No. The group that I led, and these were

    11 mostly people holding high-ranking government positions

    12 and many of the local leaders from Central and Northern

    13 Bosnia, fully supported the idea of a sovereign and

    14 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    15 Q. But the other faction, what I want to know is

    16 did the other faction's position fit with or did it

    17 violate the HDZ BH platform and all the laws of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    19 A. In that period, no one was against the laws

    20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but evidently the faction

    21 led by Boban and some other people from Herzegovina,

    22 which was later joined by many others, was against what

    23 we adopted at the party convention in Mostar.

    24 Q. Was Boban acting -- and his group acting

    25 independently of Zagreb, or not? Or don't you know?

  95. 1 A. No. I know very well that they were not.

    2 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice,

    3 could you ask the witness -- in his answer, he says

    4 that it was fine that Boban did not act independently

    5 of Zagreb. Could you tell us, how does he know that,

    6 and on which information is this very clear-cut

    7 negative answer based?

    8 A. First of all, because the policy advocated by

    9 Boban was in opposition to the platform adopted at the

    10 convention. On the other hand, what Boban was saying

    11 was what many people in Zagreb wanted to hear. And

    12 finally, when we parted after this meeting, I, together

    13 with the officials I had brought with me, and you have

    14 to know that we couldn't travel by car because there

    15 was a state of war in Croatia, I arrived in Gratz, in

    16 Austria, in the government aeroplane of Bosnia and

    17 Herzegovina and went to Zagreb from there. So those

    18 two groups went their own ways after the meeting.

    19 We fled from Zagreb the following morning, in

    20 the direction of Austria, and they went out together

    21 with the officials from Zagreb that evening. Of

    22 course, not with President Tudjman.

    23 MR. NICE:

    24 Q. Can I get you to deal with one last extract

    25 on the papers? It's a reflection of the other side's

  96. 1 point of view. 20/3/JG, please -- sorry, my mistake,

    2 20/4/JG. This is from, as we can see from the previous

    3 page, Juric, middle paragraph, beginning "Mislim?

    4 A. The first, or the second?

    5 Q. The first one.

    6 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    7 read]

    8 "I think that we can truly do everything for

    9 a plan, a plan of integration, starting from good

    10 preparations for defence to the linking of

    11 institutions, the linking in the best sense of that

    12 word. At the diplomatic level, our political people in

    13 Sarajevo can go on swearing that they are in favour of

    14 a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we have said up

    15 to now."

    16 Q. Next paragraph?

    17 A. [Translation of Serbo-Croatian document as

    18 read]

    19 "I think that this sovereignty will not

    20 succeed. No one is supporting it any more. I think

    21 that Croatian policy has now at least reached the point

    22 where it has to start taking care of its own

    23 interests."

    24 Q. So you were explaining how you fled that

    25 meeting, and did you have any feelings as to how things

  97. 1 were going to develop with the different factions that

    2 now existed?

    3 A. In the last two paragraphs, it is evident

    4 that they wanted to perform a trick, and that they

    5 wanted to go on formally advocating a sovereign Bosnia

    6 and Herzegovina, but they were acting differently, and

    7 they did not in fact want it. Unlike them, I truly

    8 believed in the future of my homeland, and both as a

    9 human being and as a communist dissident, I always

    10 openly stated what I was fighting for. I, and most of

    11 the people from my faction, did not agree to saying

    12 publicly that they were in favour of Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina and secretly working against it.

    14 On the other hand, many participants in this

    15 meeting left the political scene because the retrograde

    16 ideas being advocated there were denied by the events

    17 which followed, and that is the Washington Agreement,

    18 and the peace between the Croats and the Muslims, and

    19 the Dayton Accord, according to which Bosnia and

    20 Herzegovina remained a sovereign country with its

    21 borders unchanged.

    22 Q. As you left that meeting, did you have any

    23 concerns for yourself, either your political career or

    24 your personal security?

    25 A. Well, I was a dissident during communist

  98. 1 times, and I never intended to build a political

    2 career. But when I was given the honour of leading the

    3 Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the

    4 help of my associates, I created the best possible

    5 political platform. I was concerned, because I knew

    6 many people, and besides this, I was the leader of a

    7 delegation which brought seven high-ranking officials

    8 from Bosnia and Herzegovina there, and it was my

    9 responsibility to take them back to Sarajevo. And I

    10 was successful in this.

    11 Q. On the 16th of January -- paragraph 21 of the

    12 summary -- 16th of January, 1992, did you chair a

    13 meeting of the HDZ BH presidency, and at that

    14 meeting --

    15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    16 MR. NICE: Thank you.

    17 A. It's possible, because on the 15th of

    18 January, 1992, Croatia gained its independence.

    19 MR. NICE: Exhibit Z38, please. I think it's

    20 in the pile.

    21 A. And we celebrated this event in Sarajevo.

    22 Q. You see Z38, decisions of the presidency, in

    23 English, French, and B/C/S. Number 2 of the

    24 decisions --

    25 A. Just one moment, please. Please, a Croatian

  99. 1 copy.

    2 Q. Yes, of course. Coming your way.

    3 MR. NICE: Right at the end, I think.

    4 Q. And then Item Number 2, we have an English

    5 translation which reads to this effect -- perhaps you

    6 could follow it in the original.

    7 "The HDZ of BH has asked the BH government to

    8 include immediately the Croatian dinar into the

    9 financial transactions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If

    10 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not act

    11 in this manner, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina will

    12 undertake other political measures to protect the

    13 Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina from further

    14 inflation."

    15 Can you make any comment about that?

    16 A. Yes, I can. When we saw what was happening

    17 in the former Yugoslavia, when Slovenia and Croatia

    18 were intensively preparing for independence, we in

    19 Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to protect ourselves from

    20 the Yugoslav dinar, which was arriving from Belgrade in

    21 vast quantities, with teams of smugglers who bought

    22 foreign currency from citizens and took them to

    23 Belgrade. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    24 printed banknotes, or rather designed banknotes, and

    25 had them printed in London, so that we, too, could have

  100. 1 our own currency, especially as on the 31st of

    2 December, 1991, Croatia abolished the use of the

    3 Yugoslav dinar.

    4 Unfortunately, the government of Bosnia and

    5 Herzegovina was not successful in getting these

    6 banknotes printed fast, and when the printing was

    7 completed in London, the war broke out, and these

    8 banknotes never actually reached Bosnia and

    9 Herzegovina.

    10 Q. Nothing else on that. I think the next

    11 document in the pile is Z2748. I include it simply

    12 because you have produced it. I have no comments on

    13 it. Please confirm that this is a letter from the head

    14 of HDZ BH in Mostar's municipal committee concerning an

    15 election of the supreme court -- of a supreme court

    16 justice, I think.

    17 If I've got it wrong, or if there's a

    18 material comment, please make it.

    19 A. Yes. No, no, no, please, it was our

    20 obligation to staff a large number of institutions,

    21 including the judicial system. After receiving some

    22 recommendations from Mostar, we elected Mr. Ljubomir

    23 Zovko as a justice of the constitutional court of

    24 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we believed this to be a

    25 good solution. However, the struggle between the

  101. 1 different factions in the Mostar HDZ was very fierce,

    2 and I received a letter from the president of the

    3 Mostar HDZ in which he objected to this appointment.

    4 However, I have to tell the Trial Chamber

    5 that this gentleman was later very well received by the

    6 same people who objected to his being appointed, and

    7 throughout the war, he held a high position in the

    8 judiciary of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    9 Q. Paragraph 22 of the summary: Was there a

    10 meeting on the 2nd of February, called by Drago Krpina,

    11 in Siroki Brijeg?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?

    14 A. As you can see from these documents, the

    15 polarisation of the two fractions was growing, and it

    16 could no longer be concealed from the public. I was

    17 handicapped because I had to deal with affairs of

    18 state, I had to attend meetings of the presidency, of

    19 the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inter-party

    20 discussions with the SDA and the SDS, talks with the

    21 international mediators. And while I was busy doing

    22 all this, and so were my associates, they took the

    23 opportunity to organise themselves on the ground.

    24 The fact that this meeting was held in Siroki

    25 Brijeg on the 2nd of February, 1992, and that it was

  102. 1 organised from Zagreb, was a blow to the legal

    2 leadership and to me personally. I had two plans. One

    3 was not to go, and to wait and see what they would

    4 decide. And because of the overall situation in Bosnia

    5 and Herzegovina, I would probably have been disciplined

    6 by my party.

    7 The second plan was to go there and to fight

    8 for my political views. I chose the second path. In

    9 the meantime, I received information that in Siroki

    10 Brijeg, they wanted to challenge the referendum issue,

    11 and that they were asking for it to be altered.

    12 You should know that at that time the

    13 international community, and primarily the European

    14 union, required us to apply for the recognition of the

    15 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The presidency

    16 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which I was a member,

    17 sent this application to the European union, and five

    18 out of seven members voted in favour of doing so. Only

    19 the two Serbian representatives did not support this

    20 application.

    21 Since there was no inter-ethnic consensus,

    22 the European Community insisted that a referendum

    23 should be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question

    24 was, "Are you in favour of an independent Bosnia and

    25 Herzegovina of equal citizens and peoples?"

  103. 1 At the meeting in Siroki Brijeg, a

    2 high-ranking delegation of Zagreb was present,

    3 consisting of Stipe Mesic, Perica Juric, and Vice

    4 Vukojevic, and I chaired the meeting.

    5 Q. What was the objective of the Zagreb

    6 delegation, so far as your position was concerned?

    7 A. The delegation which attended the meeting in

    8 Siroki Brijeg did not say what their aim was. On the

    9 contrary, we greeted each other warmly, as if this were

    10 some kind of routine meeting, but a few years later,

    11 Stipe Mesic told me that the task he had been given was

    12 to get me dismissed at the meeting in Siroki Brijeg.

    13 However, when he saw the support I had in the

    14 hall, he did not try to carry out this task.

    15 Q. In the event, how did the meeting end? I'm

    16 sorry, by whom had Stipe Mesic been given that

    17 particular task? I should have asked you that.

    18 A. I don't know. We can only suppose.

    19 Q. Did he tell you by whom he was given the

    20 task?

    21 A. He said that the leadership in Zagreb had

    22 asked him to do this.

    23 Q. The meeting ended with what, so far as your

    24 position was concerned?

    25 A. The meeting was interrupted. Because out of

  104. 1 the 41 members who took the floor, 39 were from

    2 Herceg-Bosna, and some of these accused me openly as a

    3 traitor of Croatian interests, as a person who,

    4 cooperating with the Muslim party, had brought the

    5 Croats into an inferior position. One of them, Jozo

    6 Maric, stood up and said that the Croatian people in

    7 Bosnia and Herzegovina refused to be ruled by the Turks

    8 for another 500 years.

    9 In the meantime, many representatives from

    10 Bosnia who lived a long way off left the meeting,

    11 saying to me, "Mr. President, we support you, but it's

    12 late, we have to get home." You should know that at

    13 that time, there were many Serbian checkpoints in

    14 Bosnia, and that the roads were unsafe.

    15 So I prepared for this meeting especially,

    16 and I decided not to eat anything at the meeting.

    17 However, later, I felt ill, and I can tell you later on

    18 what happened.

    19 Q. I think you were in hospital for some -- 20

    20 days?

    21 A. You see, when I saw that they wanted to

    22 outvote me and that they wanted to challenge the

    23 referendum as the most important document for the

    24 future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Croatian

    25 people in this country, because if the referendum was

  105. 1 not successful, Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain in

    2 Milosevic's Yugoslavia, I interrupted the meeting and

    3 told them, "Gentlemen, you can go your way, and I'll go

    4 mine."

    5 I left, although they all tried to keep me

    6 there. Mesic, too, of course. However, I am not a

    7 person who makes decisions easily, and I knew that on

    8 the basis of the statute of the HDZ of Bosnia and

    9 Herzegovina, I had paralysed the further work of the

    10 gathering. I said that I would resign, and the statute

    11 of the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that,

    12 should the president say that he is going to resign, he

    13 still remains the resigning president, and for his

    14 resignation to be either accepted or rejected, a

    15 convention has to be called. It was quite clear to me

    16 that they wanted to sabotage the referendum, and

    17 Milosevic probably was interested in Western

    18 Herzegovina and the Cazim region -- he would have given

    19 those areas to someone else because they were not

    20 territories which could be governed easily. It later

    21 became evident that this was their intention, when they

    22 meet in Livno a week later.

    23 Q. Let's pause there a moment. I'm going to

    24 come back to the constitution and the document that

    25 evidences it right at the end, for completeness, but

  106. 1 can you look now, please, at -- Livno was -- Livno,

    2 tell us about the date of that meeting, and what

    3 happened there?

    4 A. On the 9th of February, 1992, those same

    5 people met in Livno and ordered a new referendum

    6 question. Generally speaking, the idea was that Bosnia

    7 should be a tripartite community, and this was

    8 requested and submitted to the election commission, or

    9 rather referendum commission, which refused it on

    10 formal grounds as this request had arrived too late,

    11 and its authors did not meet the conditions.

    12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    13 MR. NICE:

    14 Q. Can you look, please, then, at Document 2749,

    15 which I hope is in the Court's pile. The third sheet

    16 shows that this is dated the 12th of February. Can you

    17 tell us what this document is, please.

    18 A. At the time, Lord Carrington was conducting

    19 very intensive talks, and he was to be joined by

    20 Mr. Cyrus Vance, with all the leaders of ethnic parties

    21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the end, when they were not

    22 satisfied, when they were not happy with the outcome of

    23 those meetings, they asked for each of the ethnic

    24 parties to draw up a text as a summary of their idea of

    25 the future independent state.

  107. 1 More specifically, this text is the SDA

    2 proposal. It is of great consequence, because it takes

    3 note of the request of the Croats to have a chamber of

    4 peoples in the parliament in which representatives of

    5 individual ethnic communities would have the right of

    6 veto in cases of a major national interest, rather

    7 ethnic interest. We did not have it in communism, but

    8 that was part of our programme, and I can tell you that

    9 today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that in the Federation and

    10 in Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a chamber of peoples.

    11 So we and the SDS submitted similar

    12 documents.

    13 Q. Now, that reflects what was going on on the

    14 12th of February. You, I think, were still in

    15 hospital. Did you write to President Tudjman on the

    16 14th of February?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Does a copy of that letter exist, or to tell

    19 us about it, are you dependent on memory?

    20 A. I believe there is a copy of that letter

    21 which I gave. The letter is original, and it is very

    22 important, because the eve before that I went through a

    23 crisis; that is, after 11 days of fighting for my life,

    24 I did remain alive. And as soon as I could summon

    25 enough strength to sit at a table, I did sit so and

  108. 1 wrote a letter to Mr. Tudjman, a letter in which I

    2 warned him that he had to bring pressure to bear on

    3 those -- when I say "those," then I mean those who did

    4 not abide by the political platform of the Bosnia and

    5 Herzegovina and HDZ -- and in which I also indicated

    6 that if the referendum failed, that Bosnia and

    7 Herzegovina would then remain in rump Yugoslavia, and

    8 that that would be the greatest of the disasters for

    9 the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 I also wrote that he should recognise

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he subsequently heeded to my

    12 advice, because in this manner he would at long last

    13 show that he was not the one to partition

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    15 Q. When you wrote to him, did you get any

    16 acknowledgement from him, or any reply, or anything like

    17 that?

    18 A. No. Quite the contrary. Nobody called from

    19 Zagreb while I was in the hospital. I asked

    20 [indiscernible] that [indiscernible] call me, offering

    21 me treatment in Vienna, and nobody dialled my number

    22 from Croatia.

    23 I received very many telegrams from citizens

    24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina of all ethnic origins, in which

    25 they wished me to get well soon, and then a day after I

  109. 1 sent this letter, little Perica Juric called me from

    2 Zagreb, asking me to call him. I think it was cynical

    3 on his part, but I clearly don't want to talk about my

    4 personal problems here.

    5 It was really beyond belief that the whole

    6 European press wrote that I had been poisoned, and yet

    7 from Zagreb, from my own party, from my own political

    8 partners, nobody bothered about me.

    9 Q. Thank you. Can I just backtrack a little?

    10 There is a document in the pile dealing with the

    11 meeting at Livno. It's Z45. Can the witness just see

    12 it? Although he wasn't present at the meeting, he may

    13 have seen the document and be able to confirm it.

    14 A. I cannot authenticate this document, but all

    15 I can say is that here is a standard HDZ form. And I

    16 can confirm the question from Livno, which was carried

    17 by all the newspapers and all the other media.

    18 Q. If you look at the other document, there are

    19 a couple of signatures, not terribly clear. Do you

    20 recognise them?

    21 A. I see. Secretary and initiative clerk;

    22 Boban, vice-president of the HDZ; Santic, another

    23 vice-president; Ivan Markesic, general secretary.

    24 Q. Do you recognise either of those signatures?

    25 A. I have only two, Andzelka Stojic and Ivan

  110. 1 Markesic's. I couldn't really claim that these are

    2 their signatures. You would have to ask them.

    3 I don't think there is any secret in this.

    4 The most important thing is the question was publicised

    5 and publicly printed, so that there was nothing secret

    6 about this.

    7 Q. You left hospital, and you told us about one

    8 letter you received. Did you receive a letter from

    9 Markesic on the 19th of February? I'm sorry, I --

    10 A. What is the letter about? Markesic was in

    11 Sarajevo with me, yes.

    12 Q. [Previous interpretation continues]

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. I'll just show you the letter.

    15 A. Yes. At a session in Lisbon, I was being

    16 prepared, and with the ecoutier, who was the mediator,

    17 the negotiators of the HDZ, the SDA, and the SDS were

    18 to attend that meeting.

    19 The secretary general, Ivan Markesic, after I

    20 summoned enough strength to go back to work, sent a

    21 proposal to Zagreb that I should head the delegation of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovinian HDZ.

    23 The next day, Stipe Mesic replied that

    24 allegedly I wasn't feeling all too well and the

    25 delegation should comprise Boban, Miro Lasic, Stanic,

  111. 1 and that was the delegation that went.

    2 Q. If you look at Z2754, is that the letter from

    3 Mesic that you just spoke of?

    4 A. It is.

    5 Q. Was there a meeting on the 15th of March

    6 called by Krpina in Bugojno?

    7 A. Yes, but there is a vacuum here, we've got a

    8 void here. May I explain something?

    9 Q. Yes.

    10 A. Because it is very important, you know.

    11 After I left the hospital and generally up until I left

    12 Siroki Brijeg, I had a very clear political direction,

    13 as the statute was on my side and they could not

    14 dismiss me without holding a convention. Then I went

    15 around and started promoting the referendum, and I

    16 believe that was a historic moment in Bosnia because I

    17 enjoyed absolute support of the Catholic Church, and

    18 we, the Croats, contributed to the referendum held on

    19 the 29th of February or 1st of March succeeding.

    20 I must say that the largest percentage of

    21 Croats voted for the referendum. In terms of

    22 structure, Croats had 17,3 per cent share of the

    23 population, but because the population was -- they were

    24 of older generations, so their share in the electorate

    25 was larger.

  112. 1 On the other hand, the Muslims accounted for

    2 a very large share of the population, but the

    3 population is younger, so that they were represented on

    4 the electorate with a smaller number of people.

    5 In contrast, a considerable number of Serbs

    6 also voted for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    7 Sixty-six per cent who voted for an independent

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina was seen by Jacques Santer as an

    9 excellent result, and he personally told me at a

    10 luncheon that in the western countries, less people

    11 than that turn out to vote.

    12 Even though I was very happy that we had won

    13 our independence, I yet knew that not all was formally

    14 over with the HDZ. Why is that? As the president, I

    15 believed, when I began to promote the referendum, that

    16 if I won in the referendum, then I would hold a

    17 convention of the party and remove the entire

    18 referendum stream, and if I lose in the referendum, I

    19 intended to withdraw. However, I won the referendum.

    20 The Croat people offered their whole-hearted

    21 vote for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Zagreb

    22 never permitted to hold the convention. That is why

    23 the meeting in Bugojno was organised on the 15th of

    24 March, and I was not even invited to it, to be quite

    25 honest.

  113. 1 Q. At that meeting --

    2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    3 MR. NICE:

    4 Q. At that meeting, who was elected acting

    5 president?

    6 A. Mr. Milenko Berkic was elected. Otherwise,

    7 he was a member of the last Communist government.

    8 However, it was a bypass of sorts, because he was to be

    9 dismissed and replaced by Boban.

    10 You probably want to know why couldn't they

    11 immediately bring Boban after me. Well, quite simply

    12 because I enjoyed the great trust of all citizens of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and representatives of the

    14 International Community, notably ambassadors of major

    15 states to Yugoslavia, at that time already saw that

    16 that separatist line was not good either for the Croat

    17 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina or for the State of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    19 However, in the course of the war which

    20 commenced in early April '92 in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    21 things radically changed, and sometime at some meeting

    22 in Posusje or wherever, Boban, at long last, became the

    23 wartime president of the HDZ.

    24 Q. Let's just conclude with the appointment of

    25 Boban. That happened on the 24th of October, did it?

  114. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Were you invited to be at that meeting?

    3 A. No. Had they invited me, I would have gone.

    4 Q. What, if anything, happened to you or what,

    5 if anything, was done of a formal nature about your

    6 position on that meeting or at that meeting?

    7 A. Absolutely, yes, they then decided to dismiss

    8 me from the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That

    9 decision was unlawful because I was elected ad persona,

    10 I mean, to the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

    11 is. Of all the 42 candidates for the presidency, I won

    12 the relative majority of all votes, which means that

    13 representatives of other ethnic communities had also

    14 voted for me.

    15 However, their request would have been

    16 immaterial, would have been irrelevant, had not the

    17 president of the presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, not

    18 concluded a separate contract with President Tudjman

    19 and Mate Boban. If you care to, I can briefly recount

    20 it to you, because that was an event which produced a

    21 tremendous effect on the future fate of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Yes, perhaps

    24 we could hear something about that agreement.

    25 A. Yes, yes.

  115. 1 On the 19th of December, '92, according to

    2 the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was to become

    3 its president. Namely, pursuant to our constitution, a

    4 man could not hold the office of the president for more

    5 than two years. Izetbegovic's term was expiring on the

    6 19th of December, '92.

    7 Tudjman, Zagreb, and Herceg-Bosna could not

    8 accept -- could not agree that I become the president

    9 of that state because they knew that I would very

    10 consistently pursue the policy which I had advocated

    11 from the outset. Because of that, there was a meeting

    12 in Zagreb between Tudjman and Izetbegovic in which he

    13 said that Izetbegovic should remove Kljuic and that

    14 Izetbegovic would then continue as the president of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    16 Needless to say, Izetbegovic wanted that, but

    17 Tudjman told him, "But you've agreed with me, but your

    18 real partner, your true counterpart, is Mate Boban."

    19 So Izetbegovic goes to Grude, and that was truly a

    20 sensation, because until that time Izetbegovic used

    21 always to censor or to condemn Boban's policy.

    22 I did not know about the substance of the

    23 Grude meeting, and I was to learn it only a few years

    24 later. But when Izetbegovic returned to the

    25 presidency, we met, and I laughed, "Who are you, the

  116. 1 president of this state, going to the smallest

    2 municipality to conduct negotiations," because Grude

    3 was absolutely the smallest municipality in the state.

    4 And Izetbegovic, you know, slyly said, "Well, you have

    5 to talk with everyone."

    6 But what happened? I really did not feel up

    7 to dealing politically with such a man. I mean there

    8 was HDZ and Boban, but I did not want to leave the

    9 presidency because I had fought for it personally in

    10 the elections. However, this was a procedure in which

    11 they were not requesting only my resignation, my

    12 dismissal, but also the dismissal of the prime

    13 minister, Jure Pelivan, and explicitly asking that Miro

    14 Lasic substitute for me. He had never been on the

    15 electoral list and, therefore, pursuant to our

    16 constitution, could not become the president. However,

    17 to put Izetbegovic in a situation to publicly violate

    18 the constitution or support me, I wrote a letter to the

    19 presidency and acceding my place in the presidency to

    20 Miro Lasic.

    21 At the same time, Mila Ekmescic replaced Jure

    22 Pelivan, and then when Izetbegovic accepted -- admitted

    23 Miro Lasic in the presidency, they overthrew the

    24 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because pursuant to

    25 the constitution, if I had properly resigned, then a

  117. 1 person figuring the third on the electoral list would

    2 have taken my place, and that was Ivo Komisic. But

    3 when he violated the constitution, succumbed to

    4 Tudjman's pressure, then Tudjman ordered all high

    5 officials of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to

    6 leave their offices and move either to Herceg-Bosna or

    7 to Zagreb.

    8 Thus, in the history of Bosnia, there is a

    9 disgrace that the prime minister left without saying

    10 goodbye, he did not resign, he fled from the country,

    11 and that Miro Lasic went as a member of the presidency

    12 and with him another member, Boras, and all this was

    13 done so as to represent the lawful presidency of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina as Muslim.

    15 Then when Tudjman and Izetbegovic met in

    16 Zagreb the next time, and this is what Izetbegovic told

    17 me, then Tudjman said, "Well, don't you know,

    18 Mr. Izetbegovic, that you're not the president of the

    19 state? Don't you know your own constitution? You are

    20 the president of the Muslims," that kind of policy

    21 whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be torn apart, and

    22 Izetbegovic, brought to negotiate as representatives of

    23 the Muslims only, was the most dangerous of all.

    24 Ten months later, under the pressure of the

    25 international public and the big powers, a lawful

  118. 1 presidency was reinstated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I

    2 was also on it, and it remained in power until the end

    3 of 1996.

    4 Q. The appointment of Boban, in your judgement,

    5 organised by whom?

    6 A. Well, he couldn't become the president.

    7 Well, presumably he must have had a number of people

    8 who were supporting him, but he wouldn't have been able

    9 to become the president without the support of Zagreb.

    10 Q. A few documents that I've overlooked, I

    11 think, are probably in the Court's bundle which I ought

    12 to just tidy up. If the Court has 2750 and 2751, can

    13 we just look at those, please, just for completeness.

    14 It's my oversight not to have put these in the right

    15 sequence. Also 2752, if you've got it.

    16 2750, what's that, please? It's dated the

    17 12th of February.

    18 A. This is a mix-up, a confusion which set in

    19 after the Livno issue, because people around were

    20 asking for an explanation and seeking that explanation

    21 from the general secretary.

    22 Q. 2751, another letter from the Opstina --

    23 A. Well, I think this is a humane -- a very

    24 warmly-written letter which shows that my poisoning at

    25 Siroki Brijeg was not accidental.

  119. 1 The president of the municipal government

    2 simply sends me a letter and wishes me to get well

    3 quickly and tells me not really to think too much of

    4 the events of Siroki Brijeg. He says, "Please realise

    5 that the toll passes but people stay."

    6 Q. 2752, please.

    7 A. This is my letter to President Tudjman.

    8 Q. From the hospital?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. You've given us a summary of it already.

    11 Without reading passages out loud, just check if there

    12 are no other parts of it that you want to refer to,

    13 turning the pages if you need to.

    14 A. No, I already said what was most important in

    15 the referendum, independence of Bosnia, the pressure

    16 brought on those who were supporting the referendum. I

    17 also indicated what would be the future of Bosnia if we

    18 avoided the referendum, and things like that.

    19 Q. Two other documents that have yet to be

    20 distributed, I think, 2759 and 2760. I don't think

    21 they are in the pile. Copies are coming, in enough

    22 numbers for the Court, the Defence, and the witness.

    23 2759, please. Tell us, please, what 2759

    24 is. You can see it's dated Zagreb, 1990.

    25 A. Yes. Yes, yes, yes. This is from the first

  120. 1 general Congress of the HDZ held in Zagreb in early

    2 1990 where the leadership of the Croatian HDZ was

    3 elected and later on this will lead to their election

    4 victory in the spring of the same year.

    5 Q. If you, I think, go to page -- on page 22 of

    6 this document, what is there?

    7 A. This is the general statute of the HDZ,

    8 statute of the Croatian Democratic Community in Zagreb.

    9 Q. Will you now take Document 2760. What

    10 publication is this?

    11 A. The publication is called "Bosna and

    12 Herzegovina" -- I cannot see from which paper because a

    13 number of newspapers had this type of size. It could

    14 be Zagreb, it could be --

    15 Q. On the bottom of the page, which isn't on the

    16 ELMO at the moment --

    17 A. Yes, this is the party paper of the Zagreb

    18 HDZ. The Croatian Democratic Community, as a party,

    19 issued its own paper, and this is an excerpt from that

    20 paper.

    21 Q. So if you turn to the second sheet, please,

    22 the right-hand column, the second fresh paragraph,

    23 beginning "u sedmoj", a bit higher up, please. Yes,

    24 that's the one there, in the middle of the page now.

    25 Thank you very much. Can you just read out that

  121. 1 paragraph for us, please?

    2 A. "The Congress was then addressed by Neven

    3 Jurica, Muhamed Zulic and Dalibor Brozovic. Their

    4 speeches reflected the idea that Bosnia-Hercegovina had

    5 to go to Europe, and the quickest and best way was

    6 through Croatia."

    7 Q. The next paragraph?

    8 A. In the seventh point of the agenda, the BH

    9 HDZ Statute was adopted. It was presented by Miljenko

    10 Zagar. He said that the statute was the same with the

    11 HDZ statute of the Republic of Croatia, because all of

    12 the HDZ were one single movement. In the BiH HDZ

    13 statute, the changes in article 4, 8, 43, and 72, were

    14 proposed in order to adapt to the political terminology

    15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the statute and the

    16 changes were adopted by acclamation.

    17 Q. So that apart from those clauses, the statute

    18 that we've produced as Exhibit 2759 should apply for

    19 the Bosnia-Herzegovina party as well; is that right?

    20 A. No. After I was elected president, I had to

    21 reregister the party at a superior court in Sarajevo,

    22 and among others, I changed what was there before; that

    23 is, the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina and I

    24 substituted "by HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina." So

    25 that we were registered as an independent political

  122. 1 party. And of course we continued to maintain very

    2 close relations with the HDZ in Zagreb, and I have to

    3 say that they have helped the HDZ in Bosnia and

    4 Herzegovina, and so on.

    5 Q. But apart from that important change in

    6 title, the clause is subject to what is said in the

    7 official newspaper, the clauses remain the same for

    8 both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    9 A. The concept of the party was the same.

    10 Q. Just a small matter of detail, at some stage,

    11 did President Tudjman offer you a post overseas?

    12 A. Yes, I believe that President Tudjman

    13 realised that he could not manipulate me politically,

    14 that I could not change my political views, given that

    15 I had been a dissident for so many years, that I had

    16 very clear views, and then he behaved in a gentlemanly

    17 manner, and he invited me to either come and work with

    18 him in Zagreb, or he also offered me an ambassadorship

    19 in Argentina. And the same thing happened in Bosnia.

    20 I said, "Perhaps I look like an ambassador, but I don't

    21 think that you can really get rid of me that way."

    22 Q. To be ambassador in South America, this was

    23 for which country? Ambassador for?

    24 A. Yes, to be the ambassador of the Republic of

    25 Croatia. And I said, "Mr. Tudjman, I cannot be your

  123. 1 ambassador, because I am going to be placing our own

    2 ambassadors of my own country to those countries."

    3 Q. I think, finally, paragraph 30 of the

    4 summary, I think you have a Bosnia-Herzegovinian

    5 passport, don't you? Do you have a Croatian passport?

    6 A. No, unfortunately. And today, it's a

    7 handicap. But both myself and my family have passports

    8 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because as a politician, as

    9 a person who is fighting for the equality of Croatian

    10 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, cannot hold other

    11 passports. And privately, perhaps, it would have

    12 been -- it would be much more pleasant for me to have

    13 spent the wartime as an ambassador abroad than spending

    14 it at home through the war, and -- you know, to have to

    15 sustain all the consequences of the war.

    16 But those people who were against me,

    17 especially those who harmed me so much, I harbour no

    18 ill feelings towards such people to date. Many of

    19 these people should be understood in a particular way,

    20 because in such a crucial historical moment, they were

    21 unable to reach the right decisions, and especially

    22 those younger ones became victims of a policy which was

    23 conducted from Zagreb.

    24 Q. One matter of detail I haven't dealt with is

    25 paragraph 30 of the summary, but you can deal with this

  124. 1 quite shortly. In the conflict, were there leadership

    2 meetings, including one at Graz on the 7th of February,

    3 1992?

    4 A. There were several meetings in Graz.

    5 Manolic, Karadzic, and then Boban and Karadzic, and

    6 once even Borac was there. These were all attempts to

    7 contact the Serbian side and reach an agreement with

    8 them. And I have to say that people who led

    9 Herceg-Bosna at the time, the top people, I have to

    10 say, had continuous contacts with Karadzic's people

    11 throughout the war. We watched on Serbian television

    12 when the government of Herceg-Bosna, in the middle of

    13 the war, twice officially visited, once Banja Luka and

    14 another time Herceg Novi.

    15 Q. Dario Kordic, you've spoken about the meeting

    16 which you attended and of which the minutes are

    17 available. Did you meet him personally other than at

    18 that sort of meeting?

    19 A. No, we never saw each other after

    20 27 December -- that is, after the 2nd of February, in

    21 Mostar. I was not in Bugojno. The war had started. I

    22 lived in Sarajevo. And I would just like to add that

    23 he was not part of those delegations which went to

    24 Herceg Novi and Banja Luka. If that is of any interest

    25 to you, he was not a member of those delegations.

  125. 1 Q. Yes, just back on those meetings: At the

    2 time that those meetings were going on, they were, of

    3 course, at war one with another; is that right?

    4 Meetings in Graz and so on?

    5 A. I don't know about those things, apart from

    6 the reports in the media and what Mesic told me. But

    7 the international news organisations reported when

    8 Manolic first met, and he confirmed it, too, for me.

    9 And there was a Boban/Karadzic meeting in Graz, and it

    10 was then represented as if an agreement was reached

    11 where they agreed that if there were any Croats left in

    12 Sarajevo, that Karadzic would take care of them, and if

    13 there were any Serbs in Mostar, it was Boban who was

    14 going to take care of them.

    15 But I'm talking about a development of the

    16 situation which led to three catastrophic errors

    17 regarding the Croatian population. One is against the

    18 population itself, one against Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    19 and thirdly against the Republic of Croatia, if you

    20 will.

    21 MR. NICE: The Court said that 4.15 was its

    22 time for ending today, and I think that is the last

    23 question I have to ask. If we are going over to

    24 tomorrow morning, if I could just technically keep

    25 examination-in-chief open in case there's something

  126. 1 I've omitted, I'd be grateful.

    2 JUDGE MAY: What's the position about

    3 cross-examination?

    4 MR. NICE: There's been no agreement. I've

    5 made the point to my learned friends opposite that this

    6 is no doubt a witness in relation to whom their case

    7 will have been clear for a long time. He is a central

    8 figure in the history, and the documents that have been

    9 produced -- many of them simply for completeness and

    10 because they've been brought, provided ahead of the

    11 time that they would normally get them -- may not

    12 themselves generate any specific cross-examination.

    13 But we would ask that the case continues in

    14 the normal way. This witness can be here tomorrow. As

    15 to any other days, I'm not so sure.

    16 JUDGE MAY: Have you made any inquiries?

    17 MR. NICE: Certainly, we have, yes.

    18 Can we possibly conveniently just go into

    19 private session, rather than full closed session? As

    20 we are discussing timetable matters, it would be safer,

    21 I think.

    22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. But before we do,

    23 there are some documents which were handed up which

    24 haven't been referred to. There's one, 1437, which is

    25 a newspaper report which has been translated into

  127. 1 English. I don't know if you want to rely on that at

    2 all or whether we can hand it back.

    3 MR. NICE: Can we defer all that until

    4 tomorrow morning? I'll make a final decision

    5 overnight. I've been attempting to prune documents to

    6 some extent, but nevertheless, if they're official

    7 documents, I think they're better produced by this

    8 witness.

    9 JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness will be

    10 required, in any event, will he, tomorrow?

    11 MR. NICE: Well, certainly, if -- I think he

    12 will be required. I don't know what the Defence

    13 position is, but it may be preferable if we just deal

    14 with that in private session.

    15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we'll go into private

    16 session.

    17 (Trial Chamber confers)

    18 (Private session)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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  137. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    4 4.33 p.m., to be reconvened on

    5 Tuesday, the 27th day of July, 1999,

    6 at 9.30 a.m.