Page 10615
1 Monday, 29th November, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.42 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning Your Honours,
6 case number IT-95-14/2-T. The Prosecutor versus Dario
7 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, as you will see, Judge
9 Robinson is not with us this morning. That is due to
10 the illness of his wife. It's not certain when he will
11 be back. We therefore propose, and I hope the parties
12 have had notice of this, to proceed by way of
13 deposition evidence this week.
14 MR. NICE: We have had notice. I'm sure
15 everybody is added in the sympathies they would like to
16 express to Judge Robinson, and via him to his wife. We
17 have started the process of drafting either a written
18 application to cover all witnesses this week, or it may
19 be a written application to cover the first witness,
20 and thereafter to prepare further applications for
21 other witnesses, so that evidence may, if possible, be
22 taken by deposition.
23 Ms. Verhaag has just gone to get the printed
24 version of either the first or the compendious
25 application, and she'll be back in Court with it in a
Page 10616
1 second.
2 JUDGE MAY: As far as the first witness is
3 concerned, is there any objection?
4 MR. SAYERS: From the Kordic Defence there is
5 no objection, Mr. President, and I have informed the
6 legal officer that we will be preparing a written
7 consent along the lines of the previous ones, which
8 will be filed in Court today.
9 JUDGE MAY: As far as other witnesses are
10 concerned, do different considerations apply?
11 MR. SAYERS: For the witnesses that are
12 scheduled for this week, as I understand it,
13 Mr. President, I do not believe any other different
14 considerations would apply. I see no reason why,
15 speaking from the Kordic Defence anyway, why the
16 witnesses should not proceed by way of deposition.
17 MR. KOVACIC: Cerkez Defence does not object
18 and we have no problem to hear all the witnesses
19 scheduled for this week in a form of deposition, except
20 that I'm afraid that we might have a problem with
21 Witness Brix Andersen. Indeed, we are planning to
22 raise some objections, and perhaps that is the problem
23 which should be dealt with by the Chamber. And if you
24 wish, Your Honours, I could tell you why do we object
25 to this witness.
Page 10617
1 JUDGE MAY: Well, I wonder if the simplest
2 course would not be to deal with the first witness, who
3 I understand is here, and make an order in relation to
4 that witness, and then we consider the position later
5 about any other witnesses there may be.
6 I'll just ask the legal officer if there are
7 any difficulties about that.
8 Very well, we'll have the first witness.
9 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the draft has been
10 proceeded in respect of all proceedings for this week.
11 It needs a slight tidying up of text by one word, but
12 that can be dealt with very swiftly. I've been given
13 advance notice by Mr. Kovacic of the nature of his
14 objection in respect of Brix Andersen, and I think that
15 we can accommodate the discussion about those
16 objections under the overall umbrella of a compendious
17 application. I don't think there is a problem.
18 So, yes, may the first witness come in.
19 MR. SAYERS: While the witness is coming in,
20 Mr. President, there are two short matters that we
21 would like to raise after the witness has testified.
22 They shouldn't take more than 30 seconds total, at the
23 end of the proceedings.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 [The witness entered court]
Page 10618
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the
2 declaration.
3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
4 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
5 truth.
6 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat,
7 Mr. Verhoeven.
8 WITNESS: JOHAN VERHOEVEN
9 MR. NICE: I trust that the Chamber has not
10 only --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice.
12 MR. NICE: I trust that the Chamber has not
13 only the summary of Mr. Verhoeven's evidence, but also
14 has or can have provided to it a small bundle of
15 exhibits.
16 Examined by Mr. Nice:
17 Q. Indeed, if one could be left with the
18 witness, that could speed matters.
19 From time to time the witness will need to
20 refer to a map, and although recently we have found
21 maps of some detail and use in particular
22 circumstances, I think probably the witness will be as
23 happy as any with map 2612,2. And if again there is no
24 objection, I'll make mine available, although it has
25 some highlights on it, but the highlights tend to be
Page 10619
1 rather more useful than unhelpful.
2 Mr. Verhoeven, are you a professional soldier
3 in the Belgian army, and have been such since 1976,
4 presently head of either what's called the logistics or
5 the infrastructure department of that army, with the
6 rank of commander, being based in Germany?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. An ECMM monitor from mid-July until October
9 of 1993. Following earlier assignments, did you, after
10 three weeks, become leader of team V1, whose area of
11 concern or responsibility was from Travnik in the north
12 through Guca Gora, Busovaca and Vitez, or the other way
13 around?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Did you have a notebook which you used for
16 certain purposes in the course of your duties, making,
17 I think, short notes rather than, perhaps, full notes?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. At the time that you made your statement to
20 ICTY investigators, did you have that notebook to hand
21 and did you refer to it for matters of detail?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Has the notebook since then been lost or
24 mislaid?
25 A. That's correct.
Page 10620
1 Q. So that for certain matters of detail not
2 referred to in contemporaneous daily reports, have you
3 had to look at your statement made to investigators,
4 but on the basis that that was itself prepared from
5 earlier contemporaneous notes of your own?
6 A. Yes.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, if you could help me
8 with one thing. Guca Gora. I don't seem to have it.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. Can you find this Guca Gora on this map.
11 You'll know how to mark it. What happens, if you leave
12 it on the -- there it is. Thank you very much.
13 A. [indicates]
14 Q. Did the Chamber see it?
15 JUDGE MAY: Point to it once more.
16 MR. NICE: And perhaps he could have the
17 pointer, unless its been mislaid.
18 Q. Just due west of Zenica, northwest of Vitez,
19 northeast by east of Travnik?
20 JUDGE MAY: Guca Gora?
21 MR. NICE: Guca Gora, yes.
22 Q. I am not going to trouble you with this map,
23 Mr. Verhoeven, but have you this morning seen a map
24 which marks out in a bold black line the shape of the
25 pocket under HVO control marked as July 1993?
Page 10621
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And although there may be some differences in
3 the details of the perimeter shown on that map, does
4 its general shape --
5 A. General shape, yes.
6 Q. -- accord with your recollection of your area
7 of responsibility?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The map to which I am referring is the
10 front-line map that's been provided to the Chamber, or
11 one of them, and it's going to be the subject of
12 evidence later.
13 Mr. Verhoeven, one of the problems, and I've
14 probably already aggravated the problem, is that
15 because we speak in English, we may not make suitable
16 allowance for the interpreters. So I will try and hear
17 when the French translation is finished, and there will
18 be gaps between questions and answers to accommodate
19 that.
20 Did you, on the 31st of July of 1993, meet
21 the defendant Mario Cerkez?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you now have a recollection of where you
24 met him, or are you driven to an assumption about where
25 you met him?
Page 10622
1 A. If my memories are well, I met him in the
2 place where he had his office.
3 Q. Which was in which town?
4 A. In Vitez.
5 Q. The topic of the discussion and its
6 resolution, please?
7 A. What date did you say?
8 Q. It's the 31st of July, and this may be a
9 matter for which there isn't a report, but which you
10 will be able to refer to your memory first, because it
11 was covered in your witness statement.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can you tell us, what was the subject of the
14 exchange?
15 It's not going to be in those documents
16 there, because we don't have a report for it.
17 A. Can I have back the --
18 Q. The witness statement?
19 A. Yes. Because there are so many dates and so
20 many --
21 Q. Yes.
22 MR. NICE: With the Court's leave, and in the
23 absence of objection, in light of the way the earlier
24 statement was founded on then-contemporaneous
25 documents, may he, so far as necessary, refer to that
Page 10623
1 for assistance?
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. As I've said before, it
3 shouldn't be a test of memory.
4 MR. NICE: It's been highlighted, but it
5 hasn't, I think, been otherwise marked -- sorry, that
6 one has been. I'll take mine out.
7 Q. At the foot of the first page, meeting of the
8 31st of July, please.
9 A. Okay.
10 Q. What happened on that meeting, please?
11 A. As we did usually, we went to -- as we did
12 usually, we went to -- to see the local commanders and
13 the local authorities. And on that day I met with
14 Mr. Cerkez in Vitez, and we discussed about problems,
15 as we usually did, of exchanges of prisoners, how the
16 prisoners were treated, and those matters. And in that
17 meeting, I was told that three boys were held by the
18 BiH in Kruscica.
19 Q. At that meeting, did Mr. Cerkez want an
20 exchange of visitors on a particular basis?
21 A. Yes, all by all exchanges.
22 Q. That's all prisoners from one side to be
23 exchanged for all for the other, and he also --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- drew to your attention --
Page 10624
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- to these three boys?
3 Very well. I will return to paragraph 4 of
4 the summary at the end of the evidence. We come to the
5 18th of August, which again is not subject to a report,
6 but is on the second page of your statement, if you
7 need to refer to it.
8 Did you receive information from the imam
9 from Busovaca, or about the imam from Busovaca, that he
10 was not free to move around?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you meet him?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. How did you appear, in a word?
15 A. He was unhappy, and he was frightened.
16 Q. You were allowed to talk to him in private,
17 but --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- was there any apparent supervision or
20 monitoring of your meetings?
21 A. Not directly, no.
22 Q. But indirectly?
23 A. There were HVO soldiers in the
24 neighbourhood. They were looking, but they didn't
25 interfere.
Page 10625
1 Q. Did he explain to you what, in his judgement,
2 was the desire of the Muslim population of Busovaca?
3 A. They wanted to leave.
4 Q. Were they allowed to?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Paragraph 6 of the summary: On the 21st of
7 August of 1993 -- and I'll lead unless anybody
8 indicates to me that I shouldn't -- did you pursue a
9 claim by the HVO in Busovaca that Mujahedin fought
10 alongside the BiH, and that they had proof of this,
11 with a foreign soldier?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. And you interviewed the person concerned, who
14 appeared to be a Syrian student claiming to have been
15 in Yugoslavia since 1982 and having been mobilised?
16 A. That's what he told.
17 Q. On the 26th of August, did you meet Franjo
18 Kristo, Busovaca's police chief, and did he express
19 himself in strong terms? And, perhaps, turning only to
20 your notes if you need to, tell the Judges what he
21 expressed about Muslims.
22 A. He didn't think that it was possible that
23 those two sorts of people, Muslims and Croats, could
24 live together as equal partners.
25 Q. And in what terms did he describe the
Page 10626
1 Muslims?
2 A. He said Muslims could eventually live
3 together with the Croats in the new state of -- in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but then as sort of immigrants,
5 just like in other countries, where someone who comes
6 into that country has no right to vote.
7 Q. Yes. Did he use any terms of abuse about
8 them?
9 A. Can you repeat this?
10 Q. Did he use any bad language or bad names
11 about them?
12 A. Yeah, he called them barbarians or
13 something.
14 Q. Paragraph 8: On the 27th of August, did the
15 HVO cut off water supply to the BiH side in Travnik,
16 and did you speak to the HVO president in Travnik about
17 this?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. His explanation was?
20 A. What do you mean by this question?
21 Q. Well, what was his reaction to your raising
22 this issue with him? What did he say was the
23 possibility of turning the water back on?
24 A. He couldn't decide that -- he couldn't decide
25 this on his level.
Page 10627
1 Q. And to what level did he have to refer before
2 he could allow the Muslims in Travnik to have water?
3 A. To Mr. Valenta.
4 Q. How did that strike you as a reaction?
5 A. I found it a little bit strange, because it
6 was a local matter, and I knew Mr. Valenta as
7 vice-president. I found it a little bit strange that
8 it had to go until this high level.
9 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, one matter of
10 detail: Looking at the statement that was
11 contemporaneously -- or the statement that was taken by
12 the investigators of Commandant Verhoeven, it looks
13 like the water-supply issue that we're talking about
14 deals with Novi Travnik and not Travnik. I wonder if
15 the Prosecution might just clear that up, because I
16 think it's a little unclear.
17 MR. NICE: Thank you.
18 Q. Would you like to resolve that issue, please,
19 Mr. Verhoeven? Are we talking about Travnik, or Novi
20 Travnik?
21 A. Novi Travnik.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 The first document, not actually covered on
24 the summary, but fits in to the account, is
25 Exhibit 1185,2, for the 28th of August. Is this one of
Page 10628
1 a number of daily reports prepared by you?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Under the heading "Political Situation," and
4 following a meeting with Kresimir Garic, chief of the
5 civilian police in Vitez, do we find an entry halfway
6 down the page where he was expressing the view that --
7 on the right-hand side of the page -- joint living
8 could be possible in other areas, but not Vitez or
9 Busovaca?
10 Going on to say that joint cooperation or a
11 certain form of cooperation could be possible, but that
12 he was convinced this was a religious war to prevent
13 Muslim domination, and he said he saw the beginning of
14 conflict as caused by Muslim refugees who tried to push
15 the Croats out.
16 And then on the second sheet, over the next
17 page. Were you stopped in Busovaca by an old,
18 desperate Muslim woman who claimed that she had been on
19 four occasions expelled from her home; they last had
20 been living with another Muslim family who now had
21 found a Croat side on the other side to exchange with.
22 And you then make this comment, "that it happens that
23 exchanges of houses through the front lines were being
24 made sometimes with the payment of money to soldiers."
25 And then under assessment, paragraph 8, you
Page 10629
1 make further reference to this by using the word
2 "black," black exchange. Was that something you
3 thought you encountered from time to time, black
4 exchange, exchange for money?
5 A. What I meant with black exchanges -- what I
6 meant, that they were not official.
7 Q. And sometimes for money?
8 A. That's what people who were involved, who
9 wanted to pass has told me.
10 Q. Paragraph 9 of the summary. The next
11 document in the bundle, 1186,2. Did you on the 30th of
12 August of 1993 meet the military chief of Busovaca,
13 Zarko Milic, who complained of the influx of Croat
14 refugees as a cause of difficulties?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. We can see this in the first paragraph of
17 your report. Was there talk there of black exchanges,
18 and did he express concern about increasing criminality
19 caused by the influx of refugees?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Let me turn to the second sheet of this daily
22 report. Can you just deal with what happened at the
23 checkpoint between Vitez and Kruscica. I think you
24 were not allowed to pass without written permission.
25 A. That's correct.
Page 10630
1 Q. The person operating the checkpoint insisted
2 on your getting permission from whom?
3 A. From Mr. Cerkez.
4 Q. Was Colonel Blaskic referred to?
5 A. Yes, but the man at the checkpoint didn't
6 agree with the permission of Mr. Blaskic.
7 Q. Which you had? Did you have the permission
8 of Mr. Blaskic?
9 A. Do you mean a written permission?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. I don't remember. I don't think so.
12 Q. So it's a question that they would not have
13 been happy with a consent of Blaskic; they required one
14 from Cerkez?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And if we read on in the entry in your daily
17 report, you were warned that the road to Kruscica was
18 unsafe because they expected an attack on Vitez from
19 that area, and while you were at that checkpoint there
20 was shooting nearby, and there was indeed nervousness
21 in the headquarters, and you noticed the large number
22 of soldiers on the streets of Vitez. Is that correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. On the map will you just remind the Chamber
25 where or approximately where this checkpoint was, so
Page 10631
1 that we can just see it.
2 Is the point of your find -- if you leave the
3 map on the ELMO, then we can all see it on the screen.
4 If you use the pointer, that will help. It may be that
5 the map can be a little bit more focused, but it's not
6 the best of maps.
7 A. Here's Kruscica [indicates].
8 Q. Thank you very much. Did you also refer
9 directly to Mr. Cerkez that day, as your report
10 suggests?
11 A. How you mean that question?
12 Q. Well, if you read the next part of that
13 paragraph, it begins "Mr. Cerkez told him that." You
14 must interpret that for us.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. To whom did Mr. Cerkez say this?
17 A. To me.
18 Q. Read the entry to yourself and then explain
19 it to us, if you would be so good.
20 A. "Mr. Cerkez told me that if BiH should
21 attack, everything, what had happened until now, would
22 have been just a game. HVO was ready to use all their
23 resources, including these which they have not used
24 until now."
25 Q. Thank you. As your first witness statement,
Page 10632
1 built on your then contemporaneous and available notes
2 revealed, and this isn't in the summary, but should be,
3 did you on the 1st of September have a meeting with,
4 amongst other people, your superior, Philip Watkins,
5 and Ambassador Thebault?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Who else was present at that meeting?
8 A. Mr. Kordic and a man called Kostroman.
9 Q. How long or short was the meeting?
10 A. It was long.
11 Q. Do you have any present recollection of the
12 detail of what passed in that meeting?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Indeed, has it not been possible for you to
15 see and not been possible for the Prosecution to show
16 you any document that deals with that meeting?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Apart from this occasion, did you see Kordic
19 on any other occasions, or try to see him?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Nevertheless, did you hear things about him
22 and about the personalities in the Lasva Valley during
23 your tour of operation?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you have any clear understanding of any
Page 10633
1 separation of civilian and military authority?
2 A. Do you mean in general?
3 Q. In general, and so far as individuals are
4 concerned in particular.
5 A. Yes. We tried to locate the functions of the
6 different authorities we met.
7 Q. Was it ever possible to do that with
8 precision?
9 A. This was not always possible.
10 Q. I'll return to this paragraph for further
11 comment at the end of your evidence. But just before I
12 do move on, did you see Valenta once or more than once?
13 A. I saw him more than once.
14 Q. Were you able to make any comparison between
15 the appearances or trappings of authority or power
16 associated with Valenta, on the one hand, and with
17 Kordic on the other?
18 A. Not really proof, just it was -- it was for
19 me easier to go to get to Valenta as to Mr. Kordic.
20 Mr. Kordic was -- I had the feeling on a higher level
21 as Mr. Valenta.
22 Q. Because?
23 A. Because it was on my level easier to go to
24 Mr. Valenta, that's one; and second, I had the
25 impression that Mr. Kordic was better surrounded, more
Page 10634
1 protected.
2 Q. By what sort of procedures or what sort of
3 people?
4 A. By soldiers, bodyguards.
5 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 11. On the 3rd of
6 September did you learn that the three Croat boys, whom
7 you mentioned earlier, had been exchanged for three
8 sick Muslim prisoners who had been held by the HVO in
9 Vitez?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, those three Croat boys had been held by
12 the BiH. Did you see them in captivity?
13 A. Yes, I visit them.
14 Q. What did their conditions of detention appear
15 to be?
16 A. Normal, as far as boys who are kept in
17 captivity can be. But they were not maltreated.
18 Q. The 8th of September next. Reference to the
19 map, if necessary. Remind the Chamber of the area.
20 Was there an attack in the area of the region of Stari
21 Bila on the 8th of September?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And was there a strategic significance in
24 that area, and was the attack successful in pushing the
25 BiH line back to a degree, but can you now -- if that
Page 10635
1 be correct, can you explain it on the map, please.
2 A. Yes. I'll put it back. This is the Bila
3 feature [indicates]. The front line at this moment
4 were very narrow to the road, and it was for Croat, HVO
5 people, very dangerous to use the road because of
6 sniper activities by BiH. After the attack, the road
7 was clear.
8 Q. Thank you. Give me a minute. There is a
9 paperwork problem.
10 Now, I have raced ahead of the paperwork. My
11 mistake entirely. But can we just correct things by
12 going back to the documents that should be before you.
13 The next one in the pile should be 1187,1, and it is --
14 and that's daily report for the 31st of August, the
15 second sheet of which requires just very brief
16 consideration, where I should have asked you to deal
17 with the full paragraph that deals with your being
18 stopped at the HVO checkpoint between Vitez and
19 Kruscica, not being allowed to pass. And at the end of
20 the same paragraph you say that, "It's likely that the
21 HVO doesn't want any NGO or ECMM to pass, because of
22 supplies delivered to Kruscica without result in the
23 water and the prisoner's case."
24 Does that mean without resolution of the
25 problem of the water and prisoner case?
Page 10636
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And this was more or less confirmed by the
3 liaison officer of the HVO, who stated that the command
4 of the operational zone, Blaskic, had some problems
5 with the responsible brigade commander, Mr. Cerkez?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. If we turn to the next document
8 in the bundle, it should be 1195,2, for the 4th of
9 September. And although it's not touched on in the
10 summary, I think you draw to our attention on the
11 second sheet, again, in the first complete paragraph,
12 the position on the checkpoints between Zenica and the
13 Busovaca junction, where the situation was getting
14 worse, where people were having to wait for days, or
15 some days. And you say this: "The problem should be
16 that the BiH want some important people out of
17 Busovaca, which the HVO refuses. They were prepared to
18 let unimportant Muslims pass without problems."
19 Is that accurate?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. We turn to the 8th of September, the
22 supporting document is now a milinfosum which is
23 numbered Z1196. Halfway down the entry for Vitez, on
24 the first sheet, you may find what supports your
25 evidence, but was there an attack on the 8th of
Page 10637
1 September by the HVO in the region of Stari Bila?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. An area previously held, strategic,
4 overlooking the road, and then that was what was pushed
5 back?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. So we can turn to the 9th of
8 September, which is now dependent on your -- not
9 dependent on, but refers to your daily report.
10 Did you have a meeting on the 9th of
11 September, Document 1198,2, with Zoran Maric, the mayor
12 of Busovaca, he again talking of civilians on the road
13 from Zenica to Busovaca, and black exchange that took
14 place in that area, he complaining that those exchanges
15 were illegal and should be stopped? And at the foot of
16 the first page of this document, we see he said that
17 the civilian police of Busovaca had received order to
18 stop Croats at the checkpoint and protect [sic] them
19 coming to Busovaca.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you saw some 60 people waiting to go to
22 Busovaca, I think?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Perhaps interesting to note, over the page,
25 as your assessment in relation to the Bila feature of
Page 10638
1 which you have already told us -- perhaps not the Bila
2 feature, but the high ground which dominates the
3 BiH-held area of responsibility of Sadovace, Bukve, and
4 Brdo -- that they can't allow a threat and will be
5 forced to gain back to the Bila feature, but you hope
6 not?
7 A. I said I hope I am not in BritBat -- in
8 BritBat at that moment, because I was there at the
9 first attack.
10 Q. The 20th of September -- I beg your pardon;
11 before we come to that, we must look briefly at the
12 daily report for the 12th of September, which is not
13 covered in the summary, but there's something I think
14 you want to draw to our attention there. That's
15 Document 1199,1.
16 We can see -- do you have that one there? It
17 may be because I've got two copies. Here's one coming
18 your way.
19 MR. NICE: I trust the Chamber has Z1199,1.
20 Q. We see, under "Political Situation," your
21 account that there were no more than 40 Muslims left in
22 Busovaca because they went to Zenica by the unofficial
23 exchanges which you had been reporting on over the
24 previous weeks?
25 MR. SAYERS: If I could just register a brief
Page 10639
1 objection to the phraseology of that question, Your
2 Honour: It appears that this report is summarising a
3 conclusion that someone else has said, rather than what
4 the witness has said.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
6 MR. NICE:
7 Q. Can you deal with that, please,
8 Mr. Verhoeven?
9 A. Yes, I was told that there are no more than
10 40 Muslims --
11 Q. Well, you were told, but --
12 A. -- left in Busovaca.
13 Q. -- first of all, by whom were you told?
14 A. By the imam.
15 Q. In your experience, what measure of contact
16 did he have with Muslim occupants of Busovaca, and how
17 reliable was he up and until then as a narrator, as a
18 provider of information?
19 A. He was allowed to get visits from other
20 Muslims at his home.
21 Q. How reliable or unreliable had you found him
22 to be, if you had been able to assess his reliability?
23 A. I think he spoke the truth.
24 Q. Thank you. In the middle of the same page,
25 you make reference to the number of people at
Page 10640
1 Checkpoint Olimpik decreasing. You saw more Muslims on
2 the other side waiting to pass. If you can remember,
3 and by reference to the map, and using the pointer,
4 tell us about where Checkpoint Olimpik was. If you
5 can't recall at this remove of time --
6 A. No, I can't.
7 Q. Very well. Paragraph 14, 10th of September,
8 the daily report Z1207,1: Did you on that day have a
9 meeting, as we can see, with Darko Gelic, the HVO
10 liaison officer for Blaskic?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What was said by way of threat or promise
13 about the explosive factory?
14 A. HVO would not allow BiH to get to the
15 explosive factory; they rather would blow them -- blow
16 him up.
17 Q. Was there an identifiable risk to civilians
18 in blowing it up?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Was that risk drawn to their attention?
21 A. They said the Croat people would fight until
22 the end and would take their destiny, accept their
23 destiny.
24 Q. Thank you. The next document is the daily
25 report for the 21st of September, Z1210,1, and again,
Page 10641
1 under your assessment, the same point is dealt with:
2 They have decided to blow up the explosive factory in
3 Vitez if the BiH continue with their aim of taking the
4 factory. Both parties are aware of the consequences.
5 It seems that the military advantage of holding it is
6 the crucial factor.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. 22nd of September, paragraph 15, document
9 Z1211,1: Did you on this day, the 22nd of September,
10 meet Valenta, discuss the Geneva maps, and did he
11 assert that there was no Croat municipality which had a
12 Muslim majority, although there were many Muslim
13 municipalities in which there was a Croat majority?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And he said, after dealing with access to the
16 sea, he explained that the water and electricity
17 problems were easily solvable, but he claimed the
18 Muslims did not want to cooperate, and so he was
19 prepared to do the same thing?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And then, over the page, we can see he
22 emphasised the humanitarian difficulties facing the
23 Croats in the coming winter.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If we then go to the next document, the 23rd
Page 10642
1 of September, although it's not in the summary, just
2 one point you want to draw to our attention on what is
3 document Z1212,1. Where under your assessment you say
4 that the battle of Vitez has reached its top and will
5 go on for a few days, and that if the water and
6 electricity problems for Novi Travnik and Novi Bila is
7 not solved, the HVO will execute its threat and cut
8 water and electricity for Zenica and Sarajevo.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Paragraph 16 of the summary, the 27th of
11 October, document 1217,1. Did you again meet Zoran
12 Maric, as the first paragraph of your daily report
13 reveals?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Did you ask him in particular about the
16 burning of a mosque?
17 A. Can you please repeat the question?
18 Q. About the burning of a mosque.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. It's in the first paragraph. Did you ask him
21 about that?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. SAYERS: Let me just register one
24 objection to the relevance of this line of questioning,
25 Mr. President. The burning of the mosque in September
Page 10643
1 of 1993 is not an item charged in the parts of the
2 indictment addressed to the damage and destruction of
3 religious institutions. So we don't believe that --
4 JUDGE MAY: Because it's not in the
5 indictment, doesn't mean it's not within the parameters
6 of what's relevant.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. I think you asked him if he met the imam to
9 discuss the situation of the Muslims, and he said he'd
10 do this after an investigation into the burning of the
11 mosque. Correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Your comment, arising from this, was that in
14 reality the imam is considered more a hostage than a
15 conversation partner. Is there anything you want to
16 add to the comment in explanation of that?
17 A. Well, the Major didn't speak with the imam.
18 When I asked him, he denied it. He didn't want to go
19 to the imam, and the imam was not able to move. So for
20 me and my comment, I meant that he was hold there,
21 perhaps for later exchange against the Croats.
22 Q. And, as a matter of fact, did you ever get a
23 report on the burning of the mosque?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Paragraph 17 of the summary. Did you on that
Page 10644
1 day or about that day, the 27th of September, receive a
2 letter from Blaskic dealing with planned prisoner
3 exchange of persons from Travnik held by the BiH
4 against Muslims held by the HVO, Stari Vitez for Vitez?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. On the 1st of October did you learn that the
7 new chief of the civilian police in Busovaca was Drago
8 Ljubos? Don't worry about the documents. This comes
9 from your statement, so it came from your notebook.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Yes?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. On the 2nd of October did you with two ECMM
14 cars go to Vitez to pick up a family that was supposed
15 to be exchanged, having been subject to an agreement
16 with Blaskic some days before?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Briefly, what happened so far as some HVO
19 soldiers in uniform were concerned?
20 A. They started shooting.
21 Q. What sort of uniform were they in?
22 A. Black uniforms.
23 Q. Did you leave the area and go to Blaskic to
24 complain?
25 A. Yes.
Page 10645
1 Q. Who else was present at that meeting?
2 A. Mr. Gelic, the HVO liaison officer,
3 Mr. Blaskic, Mr. Cerkez, and some military police.
4 Q. If we turn to the next document, it may be
5 the next document, but one in the bundle, it will be
6 1229. Is this a special report of that incident
7 prepared by you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. We've already summarised the effect of it.
10 And going through things chronologically, but with an
11 eye to that document, on the 4th of October did Ljubos,
12 the new police chief, receive a visit from you; he
13 maintaining that he was doing all he could to protect
14 the Muslim population, and giving an explanation for
15 the burning of the mosque?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What was that explanation?
18 A. He said that most likely the mosque was being
19 hit by a shell.
20 Q. Did you check that out?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. By visiting the area?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Were you able to find any evidence to support
25 the suggestion that the mosque had been hit by a shell?
Page 10646
1 A. No. I have seen no sign of damage from a
2 shell.
3 Q. On the 5th of October, did you visit Zoran
4 Maric again? This comes from your notes as set out in
5 your first statement.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did he speak of presence at the second
8 session of the government, as it was described, of
9 Herceg-Bosnia in Neum?
10 A. Yes. He told me he just came back from it.
11 Q. Did he say anything about the purpose of that
12 government session, if government it was?
13 A. Can you explain your question?
14 Q. Yes. Did he say what was discussed at the
15 session in Neum? And it may be you'll want to look to
16 your --
17 A. One moment. They discussed several matters.
18 They discussed the creation of the republic; they
19 discussed problems of human rights and so on.
20 Q. Did he say anything --
21 A. That is what he told me.
22 Q. Did he say anything about his ability or
23 inability to help the Muslims in Busovaca or anything
24 about linkage of their problems with other problems?
25 A. No. Those problems were linked with other
Page 10647
1 problems, that's correct.
2 Q. Which ones did he say the position of the
3 Busovaca Muslims were linked to? Can you recall?
4 A. Yes. Yes. The problem of the Muslims in
5 Busovaca was linked with the problems of the Croats in
6 Travnik and Zenica.
7 Q. Next document, the last of its type, is Z1235
8 dated October the 6th. A letter from Colonel Blaskic,
9 responding to your letter of the 2nd of October, which
10 dealt with what had happened to you. It expresses in
11 the first paragraph dismay and shock. In the second
12 paragraph it says he started an investigation, and said
13 that the act of violence had been done by Slaven
14 Kraljevic and Goran Medjugorac, to try and stop her
15 leaving Vitez, in reference to a love affair and
16 reference to drink. Saying he was -- he, Blaskic, was
17 responsible for the violence done, although it came as
18 a result of an emotional state, and saying that the
19 matter had been handed over to a military court.
20 Did you hear any more about that inquiry
21 after that?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Paragraph 22 of the summary. Helicopters.
24 What, if anything, did you hear or see of helicopters?
25 A. I heard talking about helicopters and one
Page 10648
1 time I have seen one. It was a transporter helicopter.
2 Q. Could you decide for which side it was
3 working?
4 A. I think while it was in HVO territory, that
5 it was HVO helicopter.
6 Q. Did it have markings associating it with any
7 particular party?
8 A. No.
9 Q. At the time you were in the area, we've heard
10 already of one participant going to meetings of the
11 parliament at Neum. Were you aware of others going
12 there?
13 A. Yes. I think Mr. Valenta was there.
14 Q. Would it have been possible for Mr. Valenta
15 or the other man to reach these parliamentary sessions
16 by road?
17 A. I don't think so, because of the checkpoints
18 on the front lines.
19 Q. And of course, just to remind the judges, the
20 drawing that you've said that described the position
21 that you saw is a contained envelope around Vitez and
22 Busovaca, and stops short of Kiseljak and Neum?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Finally, back to paragraph 4 of the summary,
25 as I said I would. The one outstanding document in the
Page 10649
1 list, your handwritten list, Z1218. Described in
2 paragraph 4 as a contemporaneous listing. In fact, you
3 prepared this document when?
4 A. The document, I handed it over to the man who
5 was after me, to make for him his work a little bit
6 easier.
7 Q. And we see under Busovaca the first name is
8 the name Dario Kordic, vice-president of the republic
9 of Herceg-Bosnia. Correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. We see in the last name on this part of the
12 list, you needn't read the name out, but we can see the
13 name of the imam, and in brackets you've put the word?
14 A. "Kept."
15 Q. Meaning?
16 A. He was under -- he should stay at home in his
17 house.
18 Q. After Kacuni you deal with Vitez. Valenta
19 first, vice-president of the republic; and then Blaskic
20 and other names?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Then over the page, the commander of the
23 Viteska Brigade, Dario Kordic.
24 Thank you very much. Please wait there, you
25 may be asked further questions.
Page 10650
1 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. And good morning,
3 Mr. Verhoeven. My name is Steven Sayers and I
4 represent Dario Kordic.
5 Just one initial question. If you take a
6 look at the transcript, the commander of the Viteska
7 Brigade is identified as Dario Kordic on page 35, line
8 14. Just take a look at the TV screen. Did you mean
9 to say Mario Cerkez?
10 A. You mean -- I don't get your question.
11 JUDGE MAY: It's a mistake, Mr. Sayers. We
12 needn't waste any time with it. We can see from the
13 document that the name should be Mario Cerkez.
14 MR. SAYERS: I think that's correct,
15 Mr. President. Thank you.
16 Q. Just a few questions for you, commandant. I
17 take it that you have been a professional soldier for
18 the last 23 years?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. With the Belgian army, correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You were in Central Bosnia performing
23 functions as an European community monitor mission
24 monitor from July the 25th of 1993, correct?
25 A. From July to October, yes.
Page 10651
1 Q. And I believe that you left on October the
2 12th of 1993?
3 A. It's possible, yes.
4 Q. So it would be fair to say that you were in
5 the area for three months. And that three-month tour
6 that you spent in Central Bosnia was a standard length
7 of time for monitors basically to spend in their tours
8 with the European Community Monitoring Mission, wasn't
9 it?
10 A. At that moment it wasn't. I spent a little
11 more time as normally, because I was -- at the first
12 time I was reserve. Someone had to be replaced, so I
13 went earlier as normally was planned.
14 It was at that moment, I think, nine weeks or
15 something for one normal tour.
16 Q. All right. So you are saying that the normal
17 length of time for a monitor to spend in Central Bosnia
18 at this time was nine weeks?
19 A. About that, I think.
20 Q. That's fine. Now, commandant, you do not
21 speak Croatian yourself, do you?
22 A. No, I don't.
23 Q. Accordingly, obviously, you had to use
24 interpreters in order to be able to conduct
25 conversations with the people about whom you've
Page 10652
1 testified today; correct?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Commandant, as you prepared to take up your
4 duties in Central Bosnia, you first travelled I believe
5 to Zagreb, the capital of Croatia; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And I believe that you received a briefing on
8 the situation that you would likely encounter in
9 Central Bosnia at that time?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. How long did the briefing last, sir?
12 A. Two days, two or three days.
13 Q. How much of the briefing was devoted to
14 Central Bosnia, as opposed to the Balkans generally?
15 A. There was not so much.
16 Q. Did you, yourself, actually do any reading or
17 undertake any additional studies to help you understand
18 the historical, ethnic, military, and political
19 situation that you would encounter when you actually
20 arrived in Central Bosnia, sir?
21 A. I -- I did not have the time to make some
22 special analyses or studies, if that is what you mean.
23 Q. And who actually gave you the briefing, sir,
24 if you can remember?
25 A. It was the operational officer in Zagreb, and
Page 10653
1 then, of course, the ambassador, and the operational
2 officer in Zenica, and my superior, Mr. Watkins.
3 Q. All right. Would you agree that the ECMM at
4 this time in 1993, during your tour of duty, was manned
5 principally by military officers who had been assembled
6 from various European and other nations, and they were
7 assigned to perform as monitors for the nine weeks that
8 you've just identified?
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
10 Q. As I understand it, sir, the headquarters of
11 the ECMM was in Zagreb?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And just so that it's clear, I believe that
14 there are separate regional headquarters, if you like,
15 called regional centres, one of which was in Zenica?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And were you actually based in Zenica,
18 primarily, as you travelled around Central Bosnia?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Would it be fair to say that the city of
21 Zenica, while you were there, was a city of some --
22 what, 150.000; something in that area?
23 A. That's possible. It's a big city.
24 Q. And there's no question that the city was
25 exclusively under the control of Muslim political and
Page 10654
1 military forces at the time that you were there; would
2 that be fair to say?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In fact, sir, I believe that there were no
5 military units from the HVO located in Zenica when you
6 arrived on the ground on July the 25th of 1993?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Did you understand that the HVO military
9 units in Zenica had actually been defeated in the April
10 1993 fighting, just a few months before you arrived?
11 A. You mean if I knew it?
12 Q. Yes. Did you understand that that was the
13 case? Or don't you know?
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. That's fine.
16 Within the regional centre organisations,
17 sir, of the ECMM, would it also be fair to say that
18 there were various coordination centres that reported
19 to the regional centres as well?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And in the Zenica area, the principal
22 coordination centre, if you like, that coordinated your
23 activities, would have been located in Travnik at all
24 times; correct?
25 A. The CC, yes.
Page 10655
1 JUDGE MAY: Is that a convenient moment?
2 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn for
4 half an hour.
5 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
8 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Commandant, as we were examining the
10 structure of the ECMM, we had talked about regional
11 centres and coordination centres, and I believe on the
12 ground, at the most fundamental level, you had a number
13 of teams of two monitors with a driver and an
14 interpreter, and they in turn prepared daily reports
15 that were submitted to the coordination centre;
16 correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And then the coordination centre presumably,
19 sir, sent the reports or collated the reports, prepared
20 summaries, and sent them to the regional centre in
21 Zenica?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. In Zenica the same process occurred;
24 summaries of those reports were prepared and submitted
25 up the line to the headquarters in Zagreb?
Page 10656
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. All right. And you were one of the monitors
3 on Team V2, was it?
4 A. Victor 1.
5 Q. Victor 1. The usual practice was to have an
6 incoming monitor basically taken around and introduced
7 to people by someone who had actually performed as a
8 monitor for some period of time; is that correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And who was the monitor who introduced you
11 around, Commandant?
12 A. This was a Norwegian. The first name was
13 Stefan. I don't remember the last name.
14 Q. Very well. Now, your duties as a monitor
15 consisted principally of speaking with people on both
16 sides of the conflict to obtain information on the
17 military, civilian, and humanitarian front; correct?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. And also to respond to any particular
20 requests for information that you received from either
21 the regional centre or the coordination centre; is that
22 right?
23 A. That's right.
24 Q. Now, after being in Central Bosnia for three
25 weeks, you were deemed to be sufficiently knowledgeable
Page 10657
1 and experienced to head up your own monitor team, V1;
2 correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And I believe that you worked with a Greek
5 army officer by the name of Mr. Bekos?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Would you agree that one of the principal
8 problems that confronted you as a monitor was the huge
9 number of refugees that had come into Central Bosnia
10 who had been forced out of their homes during the civil
11 war in 1992 and 1993?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And, in fact, I believe, sir, that you saw
14 one good example of the sheer magnitude of this problem
15 in the town of Busovaca itself, as you've previously
16 described?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You talked about a meeting that you had on
19 August the 30th with the chief of military police,
20 Mr. Zarko Milic, in Busovaca, and you were shown an
21 exhibit -- I believe it was a daily report that you had
22 prepared yourself -- which was marked as Exhibit
23 Z1186,2. Now, Mr. Milic did tell you that he was the
24 chief of military police in that town; correct?
25 A. Yes.
Page 10658
1 Q. Do you recall the identity of the chief of
2 military police in Vitez, sir? Was that Pasko
3 Ljubicic?
4 A. I'm sorry, I don't remember the names. I --
5 I should look at my list.
6 Q. It's true that the chief of military police
7 in Busovaca, the Mr. Milic that you've identified,
8 informed you that the huge influx of refugees into the
9 town were causing a large number of problems; isn't
10 that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. He emphasised to you that the task of the
13 military police was to try to protect the remaining
14 Muslim citizens in Busovaca; is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. But that this was difficult to do because of
17 the large number of displaced, dispossessed, angry
18 Croat refugees; right?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. You saw that yourself in the town?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. He also emphasised to you that this was the
23 general policy of the HVO, to try to protect the Muslim
24 minority in Busovaca; right?
25 A. Yes.
Page 10659
1 Q. And I believe he actually showed you a
2 written order from his commander, Colonel Blaskic,
3 which actually ordered this policy to be put into force
4 in Busovaca; correct?
5 A. He showed me a written order, but I -- I
6 can't remember if the order was signed, by whom the
7 order was signed.
8 Q. All right. There is no question, though,
9 sir, that the military police came under the authority,
10 the jurisdiction of the Central Bosnia operative zone
11 commander Colonel Blaskic, is there?
12 A. As I saw there, [Realtime transcript read in
13 error "as a soldier"] it would be normal.
14 Q. Right. Just a few questions, sir, on the --
15 A. I didn't say "as I saw there." I said "as a
16 soldier." I could mean that it was so, that the
17 military police comes under --
18 Q. Right. You were saying that the transcript
19 says "as I saw there," and really what you were saying
20 was "as a soldier," and you were describing the normal
21 chain of command?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Let me ask you a few questions, commandant,
24 on the subject of the so-called black exchanges that
25 you talked about. These so-called black exchanges
Page 10660
1 involved unofficial or illegal attempts of civilians on
2 both sides to cross the front lines, Muslims from Croat
3 controlled areas into Muslim controlled areas, and
4 Croats from Muslim --
5 A. Muslim controlled area to Croat --
6 Q. Right. Let me just make sure that I got it
7 correct on the record. Muslims from Croat controlled
8 areas, trying to get into Muslim controlled areas, and
9 Croats from Muslim controlled areas trying it get into
10 Croat controlled areas; correct?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And it's true that your information was that
13 these elicit exchanges were strictly forbidden by the
14 authorities on both sides, both the Muslim authorities
15 and the HVO authorities; correct?
16 A. That's what they said, yes.
17 Q. But these exchanges were going on nonetheless
18 through a variety of means, weren't they?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In fact, sir, in one of these occasions on
21 September the 4th you noted in your statement that
22 Muslim authorities were refusing to let civilians
23 across the front lines, Croat civilians that is, to
24 pass into HVO controlled territory; correct?
25 A. Did you say the 3rd of September?
Page 10661
1 Q. The 4th of September, I believe it was. It's
2 on page 5 of your statement, actually. And you say
3 that you saw civilians on the road between Zenica and
4 Busovaca, the situation was getting worse.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Some had been there for as long as three days
7 and they couldn't return to their homes because other
8 people had taken them over already.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. But despite that, they were still not allowed
11 by the Muslim forces to leave Muslim controlled
12 territory; correct?
13 A. Yes, it's correct.
14 Q. You made some reference during your testimony
15 to the water supply problems in Novi Travnik. It's
16 true that both sides were using utility interruptions,
17 utility such as water and electricity, as one of their
18 tools during this war; isn't that correct, sir?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. There was one incident, it's on August the
21 22nd, I believe, following a meeting that you had had
22 with Mr. Darko Gelic, in which he complained that the
23 Red Cross was illegally moving three persons from Stari
24 Vitez without prior clearance from the HVO
25 authorities. Do you remember that?
Page 10662
1 A. Yes, that's what he said.
2 Q. And these people, these three sick Muslims
3 from Stari Vitez, were actually part of a Red Cross
4 contingent that was stopped at a HVO checkpoint, and
5 then the ill Muslims were taken to the field hospital
6 in Vitez for treatment; correct?
7 A. That's what he said, yes.
8 Q. And it was these sick people that were
9 eventually exchanged for the three young boys that
10 you've talked about, I take it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, you had, and I think you've related this
13 to the Court, sir, several meetings with
14 representatives of the civilian government in Busovaca,
15 most notably with Mr. Zoran Maric, throughout your
16 tour; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you find it was easy to gain access to
19 Mr. Maric to discuss local issues or problems that you
20 wanted to discuss with him?
21 A. What do you mean with easy?
22 Q. If the question is unclear, that's my fault,
23 not yours. Did you ever encounter any problems in
24 gaining access to see Mr. Maric?
25 A. I received no problems, no.
Page 10663
1 Q. And you discussed a number of issues with him
2 such as, for example, the black exchanges about which
3 we've talked, and Mr. Maric confirmed to you that the
4 civilian exchanges were completely illegal; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. He told you that he, in fact, had ordered
7 them stopped, didn't he?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And one of the problems caused by these
10 incoming Croat refugees and one of the reasons that
11 he'd ordered this practice stopped was because Croat
12 refugees who came into Busovaca were trying to push
13 Muslims living in that town out of their houses;
14 correct?
15 A. That's what he said, yes.
16 Q. And he told you that the Busovaca police
17 authorities had received orders to stop Croat civilians
18 at checkpoints in order to prevent them from coming
19 into Busovaca, didn't he, sir?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And wouldn't you agree that this problem of
22 civilians wanting to pass from territory controlled by
23 one ethnic group into another was an extremely delicate
24 problem in view of all the allegations of ethnic
25 cleansing that were flying around in Central Bosnia in
Page 10664
1 1993?
2 A. Yes, it's a very delicate problem. Yes.
3 Q. You made a reference, sir, to the fact that
4 Mr. Maric and you had a meeting, I believe it was on
5 October the 5th of 1993, following Mr. Maric's return
6 from a session of the government of the republic of --
7 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia in Neum. Do you
8 remember that?
9 JUDGE MAY: If you've got the document,
10 perhaps you could refer to it for the witness.
11 MR. SAYERS:
12 Q. I think it appears, commandant, on page 8,
13 the second paragraph.
14 A. Yes. He said to me he had just returned from
15 Neum.
16 Q. All right. And did you understand that he
17 was a delegate in the House of Representatives of the
18 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia?
19 A. I didn't know his right function, but while
20 he was there, I mean, he had something to say.
21 Q. Would it be fair to say, commandant, that you
22 never had the opportunity to discuss Mr. Maric's
23 function within the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosnia
24 with him at any time?
25 A. That's correct, yes.
Page 10665
1 Q. All right. Now, it's also true that you had
2 many meetings with Mr. Valenta in Vitez during the
3 three months of your tour of duty; correct?
4 A. That depends on what you mean with "many."
5 A few. I had a few.
6 Q. All right.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Was it your understanding, sir, that he was a
9 vice-president of the HVO?
10 A. Yes, that's what he said and that's how he
11 was known at the ECMM level.
12 Q. Do you know how many other vice-presidents of
13 that organisation there were in 1993, and who they
14 were?
15 A. I have knowledge of two, Mr. Valenta and
16 Mr. Kordic. I don't know if there were more.
17 Q. Let me suggest to you, sir, that Mr. Kordic
18 was not, in fact, ever a vice-president of the HVO; he
19 was actually a vice-president of a body called the
20 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna. Did you know
21 that?
22 A. He was -- I just put in the information I
23 had. You could say it's not that way, okay.
24 Q. Did you ever receive information, sir, that
25 the President of the HVO was actually Dr. Jadranko
Page 10666
1 Prlic?
2 A. The name doesn't mean anything to me.
3 Q. Did you know that Mr. Valenta, sir, was
4 actually a representative of the Croat side at the
5 talks held in Geneva in the summer of 1993 that
6 immediately preceded the formulation of the
7 Stoltenberg-Owen plan?
8 A. I don't know if he was in Geneva.
9 Q. If I suggested to you that Mr. Valenta was
10 actually the representative of the Croat side for
11 Central Bosnia, would that jog your memory, or does
12 that not have a familiar ring to it at all to you?
13 A. I -- I know, and I knew, that Mr. Valenta had
14 a superior function for the Croats in Central Bosnia.
15 But his -- how far his power was, I can't tell you.
16 Q. Commandant, I don't want to put you on the
17 spot, but would it be fair to say that you really did
18 not know what functions Mr. Valenta actually had within
19 the political institutions of the Croats in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina generally and in Central Bosnia
21 specifically?
22 A. If you mean a precise job description, I
23 can't give, that's correct.
24 Q. And the same is true with Mr. Kordic, whom
25 you met only once throughout your tour, I take it?
Page 10667
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. In fact, you have no recollection of that
3 meeting with Mr. Kordic on September the 1st at all?
4 JUDGE MAY: The witness said that, so there
5 is --
6 MR. SAYERS: Very well, sir.
7 JUDGE MAY: -- no need to repeat it.
8 MR. SAYERS:
9 Q. You made a reference in your statements to
10 the fact that your immediate superior, Philip Watkins,
11 actually prepared a special report on the results of
12 that meeting on September the 1st, 1993. Have you ever
13 seen a copy of that special report?
14 A. No, I don't think so. No.
15 Q. Just a few final questions on Mr. Valenta.
16 You actually had a discussion with him relating to
17 ongoing talks in Geneva and the issue of maps and so
18 forth, didn't you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And he told you that he was prepared to begin
21 peace negotiations with the Muslim side and to resolve
22 issues such as the interruption of water and power
23 supplies, but that he was prepared only to initiate
24 those discussions at a high level; isn't that right?
25 A. Yes, correct.
Page 10668
1 Q. And I don't mean to trap you, sir. I think
2 you recorded that on your statement at page 6, under
3 the chronological entry for September the 22nd; is that
4 right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. All right. And you've already stated that
7 you summarised your discussions with him in your daily
8 report of that date, and that's already been made an
9 exhibit, so that doesn't need to detain us.
10 Throughout your tour, sir, there isn't any
11 doubt that Colonel Blaskic was, in fact, the
12 operational zone commander of all HVO armed forces in
13 the Vitez/Busovaca pocket, is there?
14 A. That's how he was known at the ECMM, yes.
15 Q. But I believe, sir --
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 MR. SAYERS:
18 Q. I believe, sir, that you only, yourself, met
19 Colonel Blaskic a total of three times during your tour
20 in Central Bosnia, and that your principal dealings
21 were with his liaison officer?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. Now, Vitez, would it be fair to say, was a
24 fairly dangerous place to find yourself or to be
25 walking around in the summer of 1993, sir?
Page 10669
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. In one of your meetings with Mr. Gelic -- I
3 believe it was on August the 18th, 1993, one of your
4 first meetings -- he told you that one of the tactics
5 that the Muslim forces were using was to be wearing HVO
6 uniforms during an attack; correct?
7 A. That's what he told, yes.
8 Q. And that in a subsequent meeting with him, on
9 September the 23rd, he gave you an update on the
10 military situation, and as you were talking, three
11 shells landed just a few metres away from you; correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. A few questions in connection, sir, with the
14 SPS or Vitezit factory, the explosives factory that was
15 located just to the northwest of Vitez. There is no
16 question that that was an important strategic objective
17 for both sides, for the HVO to retain control of it and
18 for the Muslim forces to capture the factory; isn't
19 that correct?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. In fact, you record in your August the 31st,
22 1993, report, Z1187,1, that it is clear to you that the
23 ABiH is looking hungrily towards the explosives
24 factory, and they demonstrated that attitude throughout
25 your tour in Central Bosnia; isn't that true,
Page 10670
1 Commandant?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And to prevent that, Mr. Gelic told you that
4 the Croat side would be prepared to explode the 100
5 tonnes of ammunition and explosives that were contained
6 in the factory, if necessary; correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. A fairly desperate move, I think you'll
9 agree, sir?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. But that never actually occurred, did it?
12 A. Not when I was there.
13 Q. One other question about shelling, sir: I
14 believe that you were present at the Nova Bila hospital
15 on September the 11th of 1993, just one day after it
16 had been shelled by 120-millimetre rounds, one of which
17 only landed two metres away from the hospital; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that explosion basically blew out all of
20 the windows and resulted in several casualties, people
21 inside the hospital; correct?
22 A. I was told that there had been casualties,
23 yes.
24 Q. And this ad hoc hospital, sir, was actually
25 operating out of a church which had big red crosses
Page 10671
1 placed outside it; correct?
2 A. It was a church, or it had been a church,
3 yes.
4 Q. And did you, yourself, see any of the
5 red crosses placed outside of the church to alert
6 people it was a medical [Realtime transcript read in
7 error "military"] facility?
8 A. I can't remember that, if it was red cross
9 signed or not.
10 Q. Sir, you described one conversation that you
11 had had with a gentleman named Franjo Kristo, the
12 predecessor of Mr. Drago Ljubos as the chief of
13 civilian police.
14 A. Can you tell me when it was?
15 Q. Yes.
16 I believe it's the bottom of page 3 of your statement.
17 While you are locating that, let me correct an error on
18 the record. Line 15 on page 56 it says "military
19 facility." I think the question was "medical
20 facility."
21 But the question that I want to raise with
22 you, commandant, is the comments that were made to you
23 by Mr. Kristo relating to Muslims, it's not unusual in
24 times of war, so far as you are aware, to talk in
25 disparaging terms about the enemy, is it?
Page 10672
1 JUDGE MAY: I don't think that's a helpful
2 question. We know that from our own experience.
3 MR. SAYERS: Let me move on.
4 Q. In connection with the mosque fire, sir, that
5 occurred, I believe, on September the 27th, 1993, you
6 have told us that Mr. Maric informed you that there
7 would be an investigation into that fire; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. But he stressed to you that there were
10 numerous Croatian refugees in the town and that it was
11 actually difficult to control the criminal elements
12 within the new refugees, didn't he?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. And so you visited the chief of civilian
15 police in Busovaca, Mr. Drago Ljubos, and he actually
16 told you that this incident was, in fact, being
17 investigated; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And he also stressed to you that the civilian
20 police had taken all necessary measures to protect the
21 Muslim minority in Busovaca; did he not?
22 A. Yes, that's what he said. Yes.
23 Q. And so that was the same message as you were
24 given a few months earlier by the chief of military
25 police, Mr. Milic; correct?
Page 10673
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. All right. Turning to one other incident,
3 sir, the incident involving the two soldiers that shot
4 at you.
5 A. Uh-huh.
6 Q. You actually noted contemporaneously on
7 October the 2nd that these -- this incident was caused
8 because one of the soldiers was actually in love with
9 one of the people that was being moved out of Vitez
10 municipality, and he wanted to stop that; right?
11 A. That's what was told.
12 Q. And the written report that you received, or
13 the written letter that you received from Colonel
14 Blaskic a few days later, confirmed what you, in fact,
15 had written in your report; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. I had referred earlier, sir, to the Croatian
18 Republic of Herceg-Bosnia. Let me just ask you, were
19 you at all familiar with the ongoing negotiations and
20 the European community was holding with representatives
21 of the Serbs, Croats and Muslims that ultimately
22 resulted in the Stoltenberg-Owen plan for the
23 governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. I knew there was negotiations going on, but I
25 can't tell you who was participating and who had the
Page 10674
1 power to speak for his party.
2 Q. That's fine. Let me suggest to you that one
3 of the -- that the principal document that emerged from
4 the Stoltenberg-Owen plan was called a constitutional
5 agreement of the union of republics of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, and that it actually envisaged three
7 constituent republics: One to be a Muslim republic;
8 one to be a Croat; and one to be a Serb republic. Does
9 that ring a bell of familiarity to you?
10 A. Yes. Yes.
11 Q. And were you aware that the Croats actually
12 founded a Croat republic of -- a Croatian Republic of
13 Herceg-Bosnia on August the 28th, 1993, shortly after
14 the final version of the Stoltenberg-Owen plan was
15 drafted?
16 A. I know, and I remember it was founded, but I
17 don't remember the exact date.
18 Q. The founding document was actually signed by
19 a gentleman by the name of Perica Jukic. Do you know
20 who that gentleman is or have you never met him?
21 A. No.
22 Q. You don't recognise the name?
23 A. No.
24 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that you
25 yourself never discovered what Mr. Kordic's position or
Page 10675
1 post in this new republic was, if any?
2 A. That's correct, yes.
3 Q. One of the -- I just have a few final
4 questions, sir.
5 One of the subjects that you covered was a
6 visit to Busovaca on August the 21st of 1993, where you
7 were introduced to a so-called Mujahedin soldier, a
8 Syrian, by the name of Kemal Muhamed Mustafa. Is it my
9 understanding that this gentlemen told you he had been
10 a student since 1982?
11 A. That's what he told, yes.
12 Q. And he mentioned to you that he had been
13 mobilised. Mobilised by whom, sir?
14 A. By the Muslim forces.
15 Q. You were actually informed by the ABiH forces
16 themselves on September the 4th of 1993, and I think
17 you can find it on page 5 of your statement to refresh
18 your memory, but you were told that the ABiH was in the
19 process of putting together a new Muslim brigade in the
20 Zenica area, and that this would be placed under the
21 command of General Dzemal Merdan; correct?
22 A. Yes. Correct.
23 Q. All right. Just a few questions on the
24 subject of helicopters. Let me suggest to you, sir,
25 that Mr. Valenta and Mr. Maric were actually flown down
Page 10676
1 to Neum in United Nations helicopters, having travelled
2 to Kiseljak under the guard of warriors, and that they
3 flew from Kiseljak to Neum. Does that ring a bell, or
4 don't you have any knowledge on that subject?
5 A. This can be possible, yes.
6 Q. You yourself, sir, never saw any Croatian
7 army troops in Central Bosnia at any time during your
8 three-month tour, did you?
9 A. What do you mean, Croatian army troops?
10 Q. Good question. I mean troops from the army
11 of the Republic of Croatia as opposed to troops from
12 the Croat forces in Central Bosnia, the HVO.
13 A. No.
14 Q. And here are the final questions that I've
15 got for you, commandant. Wouldn't you agree that you
16 encountered an extremely complicated situation when you
17 arrived in Central Bosnia, politically, militarily and
18 ethnically?
19 A. Yes, that's correct.
20 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, and this is
21 no -- certainly no criticism of you or your ECMM
22 colleagues, but would it be fair to say that you found
23 the military, political and ethnic situation often
24 confused and confusing?
25 A. I would say in the same way as the rest of
Page 10677
1 the world.
2 Q. You mean that as far as you are aware, the
3 rest of the world found it confused and confusing too?
4 A. That's what I think, yes.
5 Q. Would you say, commandant, that it took you
6 three months just to come to grips with a basic
7 understanding of what was confronting you?
8 A. Yes, as I told before, it's very delicate,
9 and it was very difficult to understand. There are
10 several reasons. But my mission was to speak with
11 people and to report.
12 Q. And, commandant, I'm sure that you did your
13 job as well as you could, you discharged your duty
14 conscientiously and effectively. But it's fair to say
15 that you left after this three-month period only to be
16 replaced by other monitors who had to go through the
17 same learning process that you had just gone through --
18 JUDGE MAY: That's a matter for comment, I
19 think. Anything else, because we need to finish this
20 witness today.
21 MR. SAYERS: Just one question,
22 Mr. President.
23 Q. Commandant, did you find it frustrating to be
24 shipped out of the area just as you learned enough to
25 start understanding this situation in which you found
Page 10678
1 yourself?
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. No need to answer that
3 question. No need to answer that. It's a personal
4 matter. It's not going to help us, what the witness
5 may or may not have felt. Yes.
6 MR. SAYERS: Very well, Mr. President, that
7 concludes my questions. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic.
9 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Cross-examined by Mr. Kovacic:
11 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Verhoeven, my name is
12 Bozidar Kovacic. I am a lawyer from Zagreb. With my
13 colleague Goran Mikulicic, I represent Mr. Mario
14 Cerkez. I shall speak in Croatian and should also like
15 to ask you to make a pause before answering so that the
16 interpreters can finish their interpretation. Of
17 course, if I am not clear enough in asking my
18 questions, please do tell me so.
19 And let us then resume where my learned
20 friend Sayers left off. When you came to Bosnia, from
21 the point of view of military positions, rather the
22 strategic advantage, was it obvious that in the Vitez
23 area in the Lasva Valley the HVO was at a disadvantage
24 as against the Bosnian -- the BiH Army?
25 A. As a soldier, yes.
Page 10679
1 Q. And I believe you will also agree with me
2 that it was an enclave and that, militarily speaking,
3 the important position, sir, that is positions in the
4 hills above the roads and around the roads, were held
5 by Muslim forces; is that correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Thank you. In the beginning of your
8 testimony today you said that you met Cerkez for the
9 first time on the 31st of July '93, that you believed
10 it was in his office and that you discussed the
11 exchange of prisoners.
12 And in point of fact, Cerkez proposed, and I
13 should say he insisted on an exchange on the basis of
14 an all-for-all principle. Do you remember that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And on the basis of the briefing, because you
17 were new to the area, did you learn in those briefings
18 that some people were swapped for some people, and that
19 this was the first time that Cerkez insisted on all for
20 all?
21 A. What is "swapped"? I don't understand.
22 Q. Exchanged. Swapped, exchanged.
23 Well, evidently a misunderstanding. In the
24 exchanges of prisoners until that time, specific
25 individuals were exchanged, and this was the first time
Page 10680
1 that Cerkez proposed to exchange all for all; that is,
2 all prisoners kept by one side for all prisoners kept
3 by the other side?
4 A. I don't know if it was the first time; just
5 at that meeting, Mr. Cerkez told -- he wanted an
6 exchange, all for all. I don't know if it was the
7 first time.
8 Q. All right. And with some exceptions, which
9 you mentioned in relation to those three boys, those
10 prisoners were, in point of fact, prisoners of war;
11 that is, individuals captured during fighting. Is that
12 correct?
13 A. As I was told, the boys were not involved
14 with fighting when they were kept. I was told they
15 were working on the field, and they were kept.
16 Q. And in relation to the same incident -- that
17 is, the capture of those boys -- did you hear that an
18 elderly man who was working in the field with them was
19 killed on that same occasion?
20 A. I don't remember that detail.
21 Q. That is quite possible, but did you have an
22 opportunity to hear, because you received information
23 about those boys and visited them -- no, let me
24 rephrase this: Did you talk to those boys directly
25 when you visited them in Kruscica?
Page 10681
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And did one of them complain that he was used
3 for trench digging, or rather that he was tied with a
4 rope to a tree as he was digging a trench?
5 A. I don't think he told this to me, no.
6 Q. Did you have an interpreter with you when you
7 visited those boys in Kruscica?
8 A. Yes, we were always with interpreters.
9 Q. I'm not quite sure I understood how your work
10 was organised, and I should like to clarify certain
11 points. In the area the boundaries of which are
12 roughly Zenica, Guca Gora, Travnik, Novi Travnik,
13 Kruscica, Busovaca, and then back to Travnik, in that
14 area, were there two or three ECMM teams?
15 A. There was one team. It was Victor 1. But we
16 had another team, and that was the humanitarian team,
17 who covered the other areas of the -- the field teams,
18 let's say.
19 Q. Mr. Verhoeven, that is an area -- if you go
20 up as far as Guca Gora, and you also went there, this
21 is an area of some 300 kilometres square, to round it
22 off, so surely you couldn't know what happened on a
23 daily basis over such a wide area?
24 A. That's for sure. It was impossible in one
25 day to do all the area. There were some places where I
Page 10682
1 had never been.
2 Q. Thank you. And let us not waste time with
3 maps. I believe you can confirm to me that Kruscica is
4 to the south of Vitez. It is beyond dispute, isn't it?
5 A. Yes, it is.
6 Q. And as you crossed the line there, could we
7 agree that immediately before Kruscica, if you use that
8 road from the main road southward, that that was the
9 demarcation line, the line separating the HVO from the
10 BH army?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And it is natural for the HVO soldiers, as
13 you are coming from their territory to go into
14 Kruscica, it is natural for them to control all the
15 persons passing there; isn't that so?
16 A. There were agreements that ECMM members who
17 were visibly in their cars, dressed in white, with
18 white cars, could pass.
19 Q. True. And on such occasions, you would come
20 to such a checkpoint, and the army had to establish
21 your identity, isn't it, in order to let you pass to
22 the other side?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Now I should like to ask you, because you
25 still have with you the document Z1186,2, it is an ECMM
Page 10683
1 daily report of the 27th [as interpreted] of
2 August, '93. Would you please look at page 2 and this
3 passage at the top of the page.
4 You told us already that at this checkpoint,
5 before Kruscica, that you had no authorisations issued
6 by Blaskic in writing, and that is true, isn't it?
7 A. I should first correct you, sir; it's not a
8 daily report of the 27th of August but of 30 August.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's mistake.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I did say 30th of August. The interpreter's
12 mistake. I am referring to the 30th of August.
13 A. So about your question, sir, that's correct.
14 Q. And on that occasion, the soldiers who were
15 at that demarcation line were members of a brigade, and
16 they asked for permission from their commander; that
17 is, the person directly superior to them. Is that
18 true?
19 A. I can tell you -- I can't tell you. So I
20 can't tell you if those soldiers belonged to which
21 brigade or -- of course, they were not wearing all the
22 same uniforms; they had no signs.
23 Q. Very well. But be that as it may, according
24 to this information, it transpires that you asked for
25 permission from Cerkez, and that you were told on that
Page 10684
1 occasion that he would have given it to you anyway, but
2 the only question that was raised was the question of
3 your safety, because they believed that an offensive
4 action might take place at any moment; is that true?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Does it mean anything to you when I say --
7 when I try to remind you that, in fact, a very forceful
8 offensive of the BH army in that area, not far from
9 Kruscica, started that day? It was near a village
10 called Bobasi. Does this jog your memory? They are
11 not mentioned in the report.
12 A. By memory, I can't remember.
13 Q. Very well. Thank you. And since we are
14 looking at this document, under Item 8, we here have an
15 ECMM assessment, and it talks about different currents
16 within the BH army, if I may call it that. This refers
17 to strangers and to local Muslims. Did you, before
18 that or after that, come across that particular
19 problem; that is, foreigners who were called
20 hardliners, and local Muslims whose approach was
21 different in relation to the HVO?
22 A. Yes. This problem was even also said by some
23 Muslim commanders.
24 Q. Thank you. On that occasion, and I believe
25 it was roughly at the same time, you said that Cerkez
Page 10685
1 expected an attack of the BH army, and that everything
2 that had happened until then had been a game?
3 I am referring to the end of August 1993, so
4 that period of time. Is it true that after that
5 forceful BiH army offensive ensued and that the war
6 became a much more -- a much graver, a much more
7 serious affair than at the time when you arrived in the
8 territory?
9 A. I don't know if -- because I wasn't there, if
10 it was worse or not before. But it's true that both
11 sides tried to get the over hand on the Lasva Valley.
12 Q. But I think that you will agree in connection
13 with what we said at the outset that the BiH Army had
14 the initiative and that it had better strategic
15 positions as compared to the HVO in the Lasva Valley?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Did you know that at that time the BiH Army
18 had 10 to 12.000 soldiers who were permanently
19 stationed in this zone, in this operative zone in the
20 Lasva Valley?
21 A. I can't tell you how many it were, but it's
22 obviously, when you look at the map.
23 Q. Which map are you referring to? Do you have
24 a map with the actual strength of the forces concerned
25 marked on that map? We haven't got that kind of a
Page 10686
1 map.
2 A. That's not what I meant. I meant when you
3 look at the enclave from the Croat community. That's
4 what I meant.
5 Q. Could you please take a look at your report
6 for the 31st of August 1993. It is Z1187,1. On page 2
7 there is a section above the words listed under number
8 4, above "humanitarian activity." There is a comment
9 of yours here saying that Blaskic had certain problems
10 with Mario Cerkez, the commander of the brigade. Was
11 this specifically stated to you? Was it because he
12 could not keep the front line and thus carry out his
13 assignment during the BiH Army offensive? Is that the
14 problem, or was it perhaps something else?
15 A. This was told to me by the liaison officer of
16 the HVO, and if my memories are well, it was a problem
17 of communication between those two men.
18 Q. You are not in a position to state this more
19 specifically, except that you can say a problem of
20 communication?
21 A. This is what the liaison officer told to me.
22 I have never seen both men arguing or having a fight,
23 if it is that what you mean.
24 Q. Very well. Thank you. In this same report,
25 a few lines up in this same paragraph, again reference
Page 10687
1 is made to Kruscica and the checkpoint, and it also
2 says that the local commander said that it was too
3 dangerous to go towards Kruscica because of sniper
4 activity or, rather, that he could not de-mine the road
5 because of sniper activity coming from the Bosnian
6 side. Do you remember these events?
7 A. Yes, I remember. Yes.
8 Q. So it is correct that there was sniper
9 activity from the other side? Do you agree with that?
10 A. Do you mean if I have been shot at at the
11 moment when I was at the checkpoint or what do you
12 mean, sir?
13 Q. No, I am not referring to you personally, but
14 you saw at that checkpoint that while you were talking
15 the BiH Army was firing up from the hills.
16 A. Yes, it happened. Yes.
17 Q. It happened. All right. And finally -- no,
18 I am sorry. I apologise. I am going to leave that.
19 Mr. Verhoeven, tell me, please, did you ever
20 see or hear about Cerkez appearing in any other place
21 except for Vitez or the immediate vicinity of Vitez,
22 like Busovaca, Novi Travnik or any other place in
23 Central Bosnia?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Let us be quite clear on this. To the best
Page 10688
1 of your knowledge, at the time when you were there,
2 Cerkez was a local commander in the municipality of
3 Vitez?
4 A. That is the way I knew it, yes.
5 Q. Thank you. In your report dated the 20th of
6 September 1993, number Z1207,1, once again there is
7 information about Kruscica and information to the
8 effect that over 100 shells had been fired in the zone
9 of Vitez; and that the HVO took part of the area that
10 it had lost in Kruscica, the front line in Kruscica or,
11 rather, that it had remained the same after all. And
12 then a bit lower -- I mean, we don't really have to
13 read all of this, mention is made -- I'm sorry. It is
14 said that 50 civilians were wounded and 12 killed; that
15 soldiers are not included in this figure; and that the
16 HVO does not have information concerning the exact
17 number as far as military casualties are concerned.
18 Not to mention all the other information that we have,
19 but based on this picture, do we agree that during
20 those days, that is to say around the 20th of
21 September, the BiH Army obviously was on the offensive,
22 as far as Vitez is concerned, and was obviously
23 predominant in this situation when such a large number
24 of civilians even got killed, and the military part of
25 the HVO doesn't even know it's own number of casualties
Page 10689
1 exactly. So is that a correct picture?
2 MR. NICE: I observe, that's a very long
3 question, almost impossible --
4 JUDGE MAY: Incomprehensible. What is the
5 point?
6 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I can rephrase it. The question is: Isn't
8 it clear, on the basis of this information, that the
9 dominant force was the BiH Army; that it had military
10 initiative totally, and that is why there was such a
11 large number of civilian casualties and the number of
12 military casualties is not even known? Do you agree
13 with that assessment?
14 A. First of all, when you speak about the number
15 of casualties, these are informations given by the HVO
16 liaison officer, as I put in my report. He said about
17 the shelling, about 20 rounds in 10 minutes. That is
18 what I saw. So the number of casualties, I can't -- I
19 couldn't control this. This is what was told by the
20 liaison officer of the HVO.
21 Now, the second part of your question, that
22 the BiH Army was in a better position at that moment,
23 that is correct.
24 Q. If I understood you correctly, your
25 interlocutor from the HVO told you that while these
Page 10690
1 events were actually taking place; is that right? This
2 was up-to-date information? He was not talking about
3 weeks, previous weeks, he was talking about the present
4 day? It was a question of yesterday, today, tomorrow,
5 so it was very up-to-date, is that right? And that was
6 Darko Gelic, if I am not mistaken?
7 A. That's correct. He talked about the 19th of
8 September, early in the morning, as I put it in my
9 statement.
10 Q. If I am not mistaken, until then Darko Gelic
11 was always as good as his word; whatever he told you
12 proved to be true and correct? Is that right?
13 A. It is difficult to find proofs on matters of
14 wounded and killed people, so reported what they said,
15 and so we did on both sides. Like in all wars, I think
16 that every part will, perhaps, give a little bit more
17 of own casualties to be able to complain.
18 Q. Yes. That is quite understandable. However,
19 tell me, you communicated quite often with Darko Gelic,
20 didn't you? Not only you personally, but your other
21 colleagues as well, and you believed him to be a
22 credible person; is that correct?
23 A. Let me put it this way, that I haven't been
24 able to really prove that he was not credible or that
25 he lied.
Page 10691
1 Q. Thank you very much. As for the threat that
2 you heard about, the HVO threat, that they would blow
3 up the explosives factory, because they had no other
4 way out, could you please look at your document, your
5 report from the 27th of September. That is 1217,1.
6 The last two lines on page 1. Could you
7 please have a look at them. It has to do with your
8 conversation with Mr. Beba, who was deputy commander of
9 the BiH Army in Travnik. And he assured you that this
10 threat was a mere bluff; that the explosives factory
11 would be blown up. Is that correct?
12 A. I don't remember the exact words, but as I
13 wrote it down at that very moment, he will have said
14 it, yes.
15 Q. Can you recall today what your own assessment
16 was, whether it was a bluff, or did the HVO really want
17 to do that?
18 JUDGE MAY: If you don't know, just say you
19 don't know.
20 A. This is a -- this is a very difficult -- I
21 know I was very worried at that moment, and I spoke to
22 several people. It was a second time said by -- I
23 don't get the name any more -- that they would do it.
24 I can't tell you if it was a bluff or not.
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
Page 10692
1 Q. I would also like to draw your attention to
2 your report dated the 23rd of September, 1993. That is
3 number 1212,1.
4 You mentioned this during your earlier
5 testimony, that shells fell near the place where you
6 were talking to Gelic, but this was a sequel to the
7 offensive that had started a few days earlier and that
8 was also taken note of in your reports. Do you agree
9 with that?
10 A. Yes, yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Just two or three questions more
12 related to the incident when your vehicle was shot at
13 and when you went to complain to Blaskic. That was an
14 ad hoc meeting, wasn't it? You came there and you
15 asked for a meeting; is that right?
16 A. It was not really a predated meeting. The
17 car was broke down; we just managed to get to the -- to
18 Vitez headquarters, and I immediately -- I exist -- no,
19 I assist -- assist? How you call?
20 MR. KOVACIC: You insist?
21 A. I insist, correct, yeah. I insist --
22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic -- I'm sorry to
23 interrupt, Mr. Verhoeven.
24 Look, we've got to terminate very quickly.
25 Is there any other point -- I think we have the point
Page 10693
1 about the meeting. Is there any point you want to
2 make, or are we going to have to go into tomorrow?
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] In relation to
4 this, I only have one more question left, which is
5 going to take half a minute. And after that, I do have
6 a few more questions; not very many, but I believe I
7 have about ten minutes left, or so, those that were not
8 touched upon in the previous cross-examination.
9 In relation to this particular event, only
10 one more question.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic,
13 we really didn't understand -- you want these minutes
14 for what reason?
15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I have only one
16 more question on the subject that we've been discussing
17 so far, so I need only ten more seconds for that. And
18 then after that, I have a few other questions. One is
19 rather closely related to Cerkez; one is related to the
20 area of Vitez, in a narrower sense.
21 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic,
22 we'll give you five more minutes to finish with this
23 witness. You've got to arrange it so that you can
24 finish in five minutes, because this witness mustn't
25 come back tomorrow for five minutes. Finish what you
Page 10694
1 have to do, please, in the next five minutes; otherwise
2 we are going to put an end to it and ask Mr. Nice to
3 end his examination as well, because we've got a
4 hearing for another case this afternoon. Please finish
5 within the next five minutes.
6 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I am really
7 going to do away with everything which I believe is not
8 absolutely essential.
9 Q. Mr. Verhoeven, what we discussed was on the
10 2nd of October, of 1993, that incident. Correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And actually, Cerkez just happened to be
13 there, because your conversation with Blaskic took
14 place in front of the hotel?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And he did not take part in the conversation;
17 is that right?
18 A. This, I don't remember any more, who said
19 what. I was just shut out.
20 Q. In connection with that, you received a
21 letter from Blaskic which we saw; did you ever find out
22 anything about this, which units the persons mentioned
23 in that letter belonged to?
24 A. No.
25 Q. You don't know that at least this first
Page 10695
1 person, Medjugorac, was a member of the Vitezovi?
2 JUDGE MAY: He said he did not know. If he
3 did not know, he didn't. There's no point going on.
4 Now, are there any other questions?
5 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I do
6 apologise.
7 Q. This list of names that you produced, Z1218,
8 I would just like to draw your attention to the last
9 name on the first page, under number 3, Vitez HVO. I'm
10 not sure I can read this well. That is the chief of
11 the civilian police; is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Did you have an opportunity of meeting this
14 person?
15 A. I don't remember.
16 Q. And this section entitled "Vitez," that is to
17 say, persons from Vitez, Cerkez is mentioned last, and
18 it says here, "Commander of the Viteska Brigade." Is
19 that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. On the HVO side, a woman is also mentioned,
22 Evica Saric; and according to this description, she is
23 chairman of the commission for prisoners of war?
24 A. That's the way she was presented.
25 Q. Was she a civilian, or a member of the
Page 10696
1 military segment of the HVO? How was she introduced?
2 A. She was introduced as president of the
3 commission of the prisoners of war. But it was at that
4 moment very difficult to know if someone was a soldier
5 or someone was a civilian, because civilians were
6 carrying arms and soldiers, armed soldiers, were
7 carrying civilian clothes.
8 Q. Very well. Just one more question in
9 relation to the no-fly zone. You will agree that at
10 that time in Bosnia there was a no-fly zone; there was
11 a total ban on flights. Is that correct?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Every side had to announce each and every
14 flight and receive permission for it; is that right?
15 A. Yes, because it was a no-fly zone.
16 Q. And these permits were issued by UNPROFOR; is
17 that right?
18 A. I don't know.
19 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic,
20 please ask your question. Ask your last question.
21 What is this about? What is the question?
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. It stems from that that every flight had to
24 be announced to UNPROFOR; otherwise, it would have been
25 a free target. Any unit could shoot down such a plane,
Page 10697
1 was entitled to do that. Is that right?
2 A. I know it was a no-fly zone, but I don't know
3 how the procedures were to get permission for flight.
4 I didn't belong to UNPROFOR.
5 Q. My last, final question related to this.
6 UNPROFOR gave permission for medical flights; is that
7 right?
8 JUDGE MAY: He is not a member of UNPROFOR.
9 Concentrate, please, on asking relevant questions which
10 the witness can answer.
11 Now, have you any other questions?
12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I thought that
13 it was reasonable to expect that this witness and his
14 people could have had such information, but of course
15 I'm not going to go into that now.
16 Q. Just one more thing: The waterworks in the
17 area of Vitez, did you ever go to the water station
18 above Kruscica?
19 A. Yes, I was.
20 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic,
21 I think that the cross-examination is now complete --
22 I'm speaking for my colleague here -- as you were told
23 you were given five minutes; it's now been ten
24 minutes. In addition, the question has nothing to do
25 with the direct examination.
Page 10698
1 I think we can now give Mr. Nice the floor if
2 he has anything he wants to add.
3 MR. NICE: Three questions capable of yes/no
4 answers.
5 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
6 Q. Did the helicopter you saw bear United
7 Nations insignia?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did anyone, including the Bosnians you were
10 speaking to, but did anyone ever talk of the United
11 Nations flying people to their parliament in Neum?
12 A. No.
13 Q. When you visited the three boys in prison,
14 detained, rather, did you visit them alone, or with
15 anyone else? If so, whom?
16 A. The entire team, I think there were, but they
17 didn't get into the place where the boys were. They
18 stayed outside, the guardians.
19 Q. So the team would include Watkins and others,
20 would it?
21 A. No, I should have to look at the testimony,
22 who was with me, because I did not drive all the time
23 with Bekos or Watkins. It changed, also; the team
24 was --
25 Q. Then we'll find the team. There is one last
Page 10699
1 question. You were asked questions about the nature of
2 the chain of command and comparing it with ordinary
3 military forces. Were you ever actually given detailed
4 information, of the nature of who commanded whom, like
5 who commanded the military police, or did you have to
6 try and work this out for yourself?
7 A. I did have to work it out myself by
8 questioning people.
9 MR. NICE: That's all.
10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Verhoeven, thank you for
11 coming to the International Tribunal to give your
12 evidence. It is now concluded and you are free to go.
13 Let me add this. That although Mr. Kovacic
14 has received most of the criticism today for the amount
15 of time that's been taken out, it would be more just if
16 it was spread equally between all the parties.
17 I would ask everybody to concentrate on
18 deciding what is relevant and trying to cut out this
19 enormous amount of detail which is taking up time, is
20 inconveniencing witnesses and inconveniencing the Trial
21 Chamber. And that applies to all sides, not just to
22 Mr. Kovacic.
23 Yes, tomorrow morning, 9.30.
24 --- Whereupon hearing adjourned at
25 1.14 p.m. to be reconvened on Tuesday,
Page 10700
1 the 30th day of November, 1999.
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