1 Tuesday, 3 February 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 3.18 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Mr. Krajisnik, I again ask you whether you can hear me in a
10 language that you understand. I take it that has not been changed since
11 half an hour, but ...
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I can hear you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, this is also an invitation for you to
14 immediately address the Chamber whenever the translation would fail to
15 reach you, because the Chamber would very much like you to hear every
16 single word that will be spoken during this trial.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: May I have the appearances, Prosecution first,
20 MR. HARMON: Yes. Good afternoon again, Your Honours. My name is
21 Mark Harmon. I'm appearing with Alan Tieger and Carmela Annink-Javier,
22 who is the case manager.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.
24 For the Defence.
25 MR. STEWART: Nicholas Stewart, of the bar of England and Wales,
1 with my co-counsel on my right, Ms. Chrissa Loukas of the bar of New South
2 Wales and on my left, assisted by Ms. Tatjana Cmeric of the Belgrade bar.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
4 I would like to invite the parties that whenever the team, the
5 Prosecution and Defence is not complete, to report that to the Chamber at
6 the beginning of every hearing. Although I will not ask every day for the
7 appearances of both parties, would there be any additional member to the
8 team, the Chamber would like this member to be introduced by the parties.
9 First of all, I have to apologise for making a mistake at the end
10 of the Pre-Trial Conference earlier held this afternoon. We did not
11 return into open session when we were in private session. In order to let
12 the public know what happened, I point out that after we had heard, as the
13 last point on the agenda, some submissions in relation to the health of
14 Mr. Krajisnik, that we -- the only thing we then did is to establish that
15 neither party had anything further to submit, whereupon the Chamber has
16 adjourned until the start of the trial at a quarter past 3.00, that is,
17 this moment.
18 We are about to start a trial which might keep us together for a
19 very long period of time. That time is needed because of the complex and
20 the serious factual and legal matters the case confronts us with. If no
21 98 bis motion will be filed at the end of the Prosecution case, or if such
22 a motion would fail to be successful, the time this trial will take may
23 well be over two years. I call upon the parties to be as efficient in
24 this trial as possible, but I immediately add to that that this is not an
25 invitation not to do whatever you have to do to fulfil your difficult
1 tasks, and I'm addressing both Prosecution and Defence, to fulfil your
2 task for the full hundred per cent.
3 The experience the Chamber has gained in the pre-trial stage makes
4 us confident that the parties will perform their duties to the best of
5 their, I should say, great abilities, and also in a spirit appropriate for
6 such a trial.
7 The Chamber, although perhaps not as passive as usual in
8 common-law systems is fully aware of the assistance it needs from the
9 parties to also perform its duties and to make its determinations. After
10 these few remarks, I'd like to turn to Rule 84 and 84 bis of the Rules of
11 Procedure and Evidence.
12 Before presenting its evidence, the Prosecution and the Defence
13 may make opening statements, and the Defence may make its statement after
14 the conclusion of the case of the Prosecutor. The Chamber has understood
15 that the Defence has elected not to make its opening statement at this
16 very moment and to postpone that, I presume, until before the presentation
17 of evidence for the Defence.
18 After the opening statements, Mr. Krajisnik, after the opening
19 statement in this case, of the Prosecution, you may, if you wish to do so
20 and if the Trial Chamber would decide to allow you, make a statement,
21 under the control of the Trial Chamber, but you'll not be compelled to
22 make a solemn declaration and you'll not be examined about the contents of
23 the statement. The Chamber has also understood that you prefer not to
24 make such a statement after the opening statement of the Prosecution.
25 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I say straight away that although
1 that was the preliminary indication at 65 ter, in fact Mr. Krajisnik does
2 propose to make what will be a short statement, with the Tribunal's
3 permission. It will be a matter of just a very few minutes at the most.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, then it's good that at least I paid
5 attention to Rule 84 bis, so that it's clear now that Mr. Krajisnik would
6 like to make a short statement, and the Chamber will give its decision on
7 whether the Chamber allows Mr. Krajisnik to do so.
8 Having gone through the Rules, Mr. Harmon, the Prosecution may
9 proceed to make its opening statement.
10 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
11 [Prosecution Opening Statement]
12 MR. HARMON: Fabled Bosnia, with its rich history, diverse peoples
13 and cultures, its ambiance of tolerance and respect, lay shattered and in
14 ruins in 1992. This case will reveal how that happened.
15 This case had its origins in the process of the disintegration of
16 a state, Yugoslavia, and in the emergence of a new state, Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina. It is a case about Bosnian Serb political leaders who
18 resisted this process, insisting that their vision must prevail, and
19 preferring to cast their lot and the lives and fortunes of their peoples
20 on it rather than with the emerging new independent state.
21 As the political tide swung away from the political vision, from
22 their political vision of the state, and it became increasingly less
23 likely that they would achieve their objectives, the Bosnian Serb
24 political leaders increasingly resorted to the politics of fear, often
25 invoking old historical grudges and wrongs to incite their people to
1 violence against their neighbours.
2 Their ethnocentric form of politics became the politics of
3 separation, where the blood and the suffering of their enemies was viewed
4 as the harsh, but necessary cost of achieving their dreams of a Serbian
5 state. This is the trial of one of those political leaders,
6 Momcilo Krajisnik. The man who sits in the dock in this courtroom was a
7 politician, a shrewd and calculating man, a committed and unrepentant Serb
8 nationalist, who, along with Radovan Karadzic was one of the chief
9 policy-makers of the Bosnian Serbs, policies that ignited the war in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, policies that were implemented through massive,
11 state-sponsored crimes, the scale of which have not been seen in Europe
12 since the Second World War. These crimes fall under the rubric of ethnic
13 cleansing, a modern term for crimes that have plagued humanity for ages;
14 the killing, persecution, deportation and forcible transfer of people
15 because of their race, religion, or national origin, the razing of entire
16 villages and settlements, the destruction of religious sites.
17 The accused is a well-educated man holding a master's degree in
18 economics from the University of Sarajevo. He worked as an economist in
19 various enterprises in the former Yugoslavia and was a man who, along with
20 his friend Radovan Karadzic, entered the political arena late in life.
21 When he entered politics, he joined the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina, also known as the SDS, one of the nationalist parties
23 that emerged in the tumultuous post-Tito era in that republic. Along with
24 Radovan Karadzic, it was his hand which held firmly the levers of power
25 and authority, reflected in the significant positions he held and cemented
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 by his close relationship with Radovan Karadzic, the charismatic public
2 face of the SDS.
3 Working within the machinery of the SDS and later within the
4 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Krajisnik was vital in
5 developing and promoting ethnocentric policies that exploited fearsome
6 shadows of the past, policies that were later implemented in Bosnia to
7 cleanse non-Serbs from the territories claimed by the Serbs.
8 In November of 1990 he was elected to the Chamber of Citizens as
9 an SDS deputy from the electoral district of Sarajevo. The Chamber of
10 Citizens was one of two chambers of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic
11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 As a result of the interparty agreements that followed the
13 elections, he became the president of the assembly, and he continued in
14 that powerful position until there was a final rupture of relations
15 between the ethnic parties on the issue of Bosnian sovereignty.
16 Thereafter, the accused's leading role in the SDS was translated
17 into top leadership positions in the newly created organs of the republic
18 proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs. On their path to ethnic separation, the
19 SDS, in October of 1991, created a separate assembly of Serbian people of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the accused was appointed its president, a
21 position that he retained throughout the period of this indictment.
22 On the 2nd of June, 1992, he became a member of the expanded
23 presidency, the highest executive authority in the Serbian Republic of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina. The expanded presidency was a collective
25 decision-making body that exercised executive authority. As
1 Radovan Karadzic explained the decision making process, and I quote him:
2 "We put all ideas on the table, discussed them, and then we decide which
3 is best. We go on."
4 Along with other members of the expanded presidency,
5 Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, Nikola Koljevic, and Branko Djeric, the
6 accused decided on what was the best manner to implement his vision of an
7 ethnically separated Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through his positions and
8 influence in the SDS and the Bosnian Serb government, Momcilo Krajisnik
9 was a paramount Bosnian Serb political figure whom we allege in the
10 indictment is responsible for massive crimes committed in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina between the 1st of July, 1991 and the 30th of December, 1992.
12 The criminal charges against Krajisnik that are contained in the
13 indictment number eight: One count of genocide; one count of complicity
14 in genocide; five counts of crimes against humanity, those being
15 persecutions, extermination, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts; and
16 one count of a violation of laws or customs of war, murder. We allege
17 under each of those counts that Mr. Krajisnik is responsible both under
18 Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of our Statute, and I will discuss that later in my
20 Included in the indictment are four separate schedules, with each
21 schedule representing a type of crime, location of municipality, a date
22 where specific killings occurred, where specific killings occurred in
23 detention facilities, where specific religious sites and cultural
24 monuments were destroyed and where detention facilities were located.
25 We allege in the indictment that Mr. Krajisnik is responsible for
1 these crimes alleged in the indictment because he planned, instigated,
2 ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning or
3 preparation of those crimes.
4 Now, when I use the term "committed," I'm referring to his
5 participation. Along with other individual in a joint criminal
6 enterprise, the objective of which was the permanent removal, by force or
7 other means, of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, or other non-Serb
8 inhabitants from large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed to be Serbian,
9 through the commission of crimes. The crimes identified in the four
10 separate schedules were within the objective of the joint criminal
11 enterprise or were natural and foreseeable consequences of it.
12 As one of the members of the criminal enterprise, Krajisnik was
13 fully aware of the horrific consequences that its implementation would
14 visit on non-Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was indifferent to
16 Mr. Krajisnik did not participate in this joint criminal
17 enterprise alone. He worked closely and in concert with others to
18 achieve the objectives of the enterprise, including Radovan Karadzic,
19 Nikola Koljevic, Biljana Plavsic, Slobodan Milosevic, Arkan,
20 General Ratko Mladic, General Momir Talic, Radoslav Brdjanin and others
21 whose names you will become familiar with during the course of this trial.
22 Like Mr. Krajisnik, each member of the joint criminal enterprise
23 participated in and contributed to the criminal enterprise in different
25 Now, to fully understand the crimes that are described in the
1 indictment and the central role that Mr. Krajisnik had in the commission
2 of them, it's important to understand the major political events that led
3 to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, and the dismemberment of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, a firm understanding of the
5 Serbian Democratic Party, Mr. Krajisnik's role in it, the evolution of the
6 SDS party into a Bosnian Serb government, the nature of the Bosnian Serb
7 governmental structures, and the leadership's philosophy, goals, and
8 objectives are essential in order for you to understand this case.
9 In my opening remarks, I will touch upon the ethnocentric
10 political policies and strategic objectives of the SDS and the Bosnian
11 Serb entity. These policies and objectives, which Krajisnik was
12 instrumental in creating and implementing, were directed against non-Serbs
13 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and realised on the ground through the blunt
14 instruments of force. They tragically shaped the lives and the destinies
15 of hundreds of thousands of people in Bosnia and have brought us together
16 in this courtroom today. By now the history of the former Yugoslavia is
17 well known, but it was in that milieu that the indictment was spawned, and
18 I will therefore review with you briefly the principal political events
19 that will figure so prominently in this case.
20 Yugoslavia was a federal state composed of six republics and two
21 autonomous regions, and if you, on your monitor, by pushing the -- I'm
22 told the "computer evidence" button, there will appear before you an image
23 showing those republics.
24 Does the Defence have ...? All right.
25 In the aftermath of Marshal Tito's death and the subsequent
1 disintegration of the League of Communists, the status of these republics
2 and the continued existence of the federation represented the major issue
3 confronting Yugoslavia. In particular, the republics of Slovenia,
4 Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, there existed dynamic and powerful
5 but opposing socio-political forces that competed to achieve political
6 solutions to this problem, solutions that would result either in the
7 republics remaining within a federal structure or the republics separating
8 from the existing federal state composition and becoming independent.
9 In anticipation of the first multi-party elections in the
10 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were scheduled for the
11 18th of November, 1990, three nationalist parties emerged to challenge the
12 entrenched communist party structure or its successors. These parties
13 were: The Serbian Democratic Party, or SDS, which I've already mentioned,
14 that was the party of the Bosnian Serbs; the Party of Democratic Action,
15 or the SDA, which became the party of the Bosnian Muslims; and the
16 Croatian Democratic Party, or HDZ, which was the party of the Bosnian
18 The SDS party was founded on the 12th of July, 1990, and
19 Radovan Karadzic was elected the president of the party. Mr. Krajisnik
20 would later occupy positions on the SDS's Main Board and personnel
21 commission. Beyond the authority reflected in these and in other
22 positions which he held, which I will discuss shortly, the accused and
23 Radovan Karadzic were the paramount leaders of the party. As the Chamber
24 will learn from the evidence, they together forged policies and
25 directives. In that effort, they were guided by Slobodan Milosevic, on
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 whose counsel they relied and from whose authority they drew further
2 stature. Within Bosnia, however, it was the accused and Karadzic who
3 together framed the policies, insisted on discipline and prodded the SDS
4 towards a forcible separation of the mixed ethnic populations of Bosnia.
5 In his opening speech at the SDS founding assembly, Karadzic
6 decried what he saw as the unfavourable political position of the Serbian
7 nation and recalled the genocide to which the Serbs had been subjected
8 during the Second World War, a theme that would be repeated over time by
9 Mr. Krajisnik and other SDS leaders. By inflaming the fears and passions
10 of the Serbian population and making them susceptible to the fearsome
11 shadows of the past, they incited the people to sever violently the bonds
12 of peaceful co-existence that had existed between the diverse communities
13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to implement the policy of ethnic cleansing.
14 From its inception, the party's stated intention to protect the
15 national interests of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina included an
16 insistence on maintaining the federal character of Bosnia and Herzegovina
17 within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the unity of all
18 Serbs in a common state. That was their vision. Even before the first
19 concrete steps were taken toward ethnic separation of Bosnia, the SDS
20 warned of its categorical opposition to any effort to separate the Serbs
21 of Bosnia from their mother country, Serbia.
22 Let me return once again to the multi-party elections which I
23 mentioned moments ago. In pursuit of their shared goal of defeating the
24 Communist Party and its successors, the three parties - the SDS, the SDA,
25 and the HDZ - arrived at informal agreements to refrain from attacking one
1 another and to cooperate in the division of power if they prevailed in the
2 election. These agreements, while temporarily expedient, ignored their
3 conflicting visions for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Harmon, could you please bear in mind that
5 you are being interpreted into two languages.
6 MR. HARMON: I will slow down.
7 The results of the election were stunning. As the nationalist
8 parties defeated their opponents, winning electoral margins roughly
9 proportional to their numbers in the population itself. The SDA, the
10 Muslim party, won 86 of the total 240 seats in the assembly. The SDS, the
11 Serbs, won 72 seats, and the HDZ, the party of the Croats, won 44 seats.
12 Eight remaining parties shared the remaining 38 seats.
13 The nationalist parties then faithfully implemented their
14 interparty agreements and the SDA party of the Bosnian Muslims designated
15 the late Alija Izetbegovic to be president of the presidency; the SDS, the
16 party of the Bosnian Serbs, elected the accused, Momcilo Krajisnik, to be
17 president of the Assembly; and Jure Pelivan was named by the HDZ party,
18 the party of the Croats, to be the prime minister.
19 Now, the SDS electoral success gave rise to another powerful party
20 organ. In this newly elected assembly, the Serbian delegates formed the
21 Serbian Deputies Club, a caucus created to debate and formulate SDS
22 policies and positions to be taken in the assembly. It was this body that
23 would eventually transform itself into the first parallel Serbian
24 government organ, the Assembly of the Serbian People, with the accused as
25 its president.
1 Although the parties found common ground in their electoral
2 campaign, they did not ever reach a common position on the most crucial
3 issue that would face Bosnia and Herzegovina, its status in a
4 disintegrating Yugoslavia, and this failure would prove to be both highly
5 divisive and later fatal. In other republics of Yugoslavia, dramatic
6 events occurred that were to plant the seed of conflict in the bosom of
8 On the 25th of June, 1991, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia
9 declared independence. The next day, the JNA engaged in armed conflict in
10 Slovenia, and later, fighting erupted and intensified in Croatia. The
11 possibility that the contagion of independence would spread to Bosnia
12 greatly alarmed Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and other members of the SDS
13 leadership, and it was anathema to them.
14 Radovan Karadzic, speaking on behalf of the SDS leadership,
15 repeatedly stated, and I will use his words: "The SDS will not accept an
16 independent Croatia, or an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina."
17 He declared again and again that the SDS would not accept any
18 situation in which the Bosnian Serbs were not part of a common state with
19 other Serbs in Yugoslavia. I will quote Mr. Karadzic again: "We are now
20 openly saying what we could not -- what could not even be whispered
21 before. The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina pin all their hopes on their
22 mother country, Serbia, and will never allow a state border to separate
23 them from Serbia."
24 The Bosnian Serbs sought to preserve their union with Yugoslavia
25 through negotiations with the other political parties, while at the same
1 time taking parallel steps toward ethnic separation, beginning with the
2 creation of Serb communities of municipalities. I'll discuss Serb
3 communities and municipalities in greater detail later in my remarks.
4 They also sought to achieve their objectives in various
5 international negotiations as well, which I will not describe in detail in
6 these remarks, but those negotiations also failed. For example, on the
7 27th of August, 1991, the European Community established a conference on
8 Yugoslavia that held multiple sessions in the Hague, through the 14th of
9 August, 1992. These talks were under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington,
10 a former British foreign minister, Cyrus Vance, a former United States
11 department of state, Secretary of State, acted as the personal
12 representative of the UN Secretary-General in these discussions.
13 In its approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Community
14 sought territorial division that would create three largely autonomous
15 entities while normally preserving a central Bosnia and Herzegovina state.
16 These notions were incorporated into a statement of principles agreed on
17 the 23rd of February, 1992, which read in part that Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 would be a state composed of three constituent units, based on national
19 principles and taking into account ethnic, economic - I'm sorry - taking
20 into account economic, geographic, and other criteria. In fact each
21 constituent unit was to be dominated by a single group, Serb, Croat, or
23 Following the acceptance of these principles in Lisbon, the
24 Bosnian Serb leadership returned to Sarajevo. They were elated. However,
25 Alija Izetbegovic backed away from this agreement. At the time the
1 Bosnian Serbs were engaged in negotiations to achieve their objectives,
2 Radovan Karadzic made clear to the SDS that it would use force and was
3 prepared to use force if necessary to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs were
4 not separated from Serbia. He warned that if Bosnia was declared
5 sovereign and independent, then "all conditions for civil war would be in
7 The SDS leadership was supported in this position by
8 Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serb. Milosevic unequivocally
9 insisted that Serbs remain in one state, and he said, and I quote him: "As
10 far as the Serbian people are concerned, they want to live in one state.
11 Hence division into several states, which would separate Serbian people
12 and force them to live in separate sovereign states, is, from our point of
13 view, unacceptable. That is, let me specify: Out of the question."
14 Our evidence will show that the SDS leadership, including
15 Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and others, collaborated closely with Milosevic
16 and existing federal structures, such as the Yugoslav People's Army, the
17 JNA, and the federal police, as it prepared and eventually implemented the
18 forcible division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the removal of Bosnian
19 Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the territories claimed by the Serbs.
20 As I said earlier, while the Bosnian Serb leaders were seeking to
21 achieve their objectives through negotiations they began to prepare and
22 organise for the creation of separate Serbian territory in Bosnia. They
23 began that process by creating regional structures in autonomous regions,
24 their unstated purpose being to delineate so-called Serbian territories
25 and to establish control over large portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 The Bosnian Serb leaders also arranged, through the assistance of
2 the federal authorities, to arm the Bosnian Serb population. They created
3 secret communication systems and they issued organisational instructions
4 for the takeover of power at the municipal level.
5 Now, let me start with regionalisation. Faced with the
6 possibility of Bosnian independence, the SDS began the process of
7 separating territories. This process essentially mimicked events that
8 occurred in Croatia, where, in 1990, Croatian Serbs had declared
9 communities of municipalities which they then transformed into autonomous
10 regions. The SDS in Bosnia initiated a similar process. In April of
11 1991, when the founding assembly of the community of municipalities of the
12 Bosnian Krajina was held, the SDS claimed that this community of
13 municipalities was simply an economic and developmental link of the type
14 permitted under the Bosnian constitution, but other parties quickly
15 denounced the community of municipalities as a transparent step towards
16 the creation of Serbian-controlled territories. Those concerns were
17 realised in the economic pretext exposed in September of 1991, when the
18 community of municipalities transformed itself into the Autonomous Region
19 of Krajina, or, as I will be referring to it throughout the remainder of
20 my remarks, the ARK.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, it's not until this moment that the
22 French translation was able to translate your words, so if you would take
23 a bit more breath now and then, that will allow the translators to take
24 some breath at all.
25 MR. HARMON: Well, I apologise to the translators. They do
1 excellent work, and I'm sorry to put them through such a difficult pace. I
2 will continue and I will try to slow down.
3 The ARK regional staff, and later War Presidency, was the largest
4 and most active of the Serb autonomous regions. The ARK Crisis Staff was
5 instrumental in the implementation and advancement of SDS policies in the
6 Bosnian Krajina region. Its activities included communicating
7 republican-level SDS instructions to municipal Crisis Staff, covertly
8 supplying weapons to Serbs, ordering the termination of non-Serbs from
9 their jobs, and close coordination with Bosnian Serb forces in the
10 Krajina. The ARK Crisis Staff and the ARK War Presidency were both headed
11 by Radoslav Brdjanin, who is specifically identified in the indictment as
12 being a member of the joint criminal enterprise.
13 Now, at the same time, other autonomous regions were declared,
14 encompassing large portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And again,
15 Your Honours, I direct your attention to the monitor, and I can explain
16 what this image depicts. This image depicts the various autonomous
17 regions. The ARK Serb Autonomous Region, the Krajina is in blue, and in
18 that ARK region you'll see a number of municipalities from the indictment
19 itself. Then the additional autonomous regions are: One in pink, which
20 is the Northern Bosnian Autonomous Region; one in peach, Semberija; one in
21 green, Romanija-Birac autonomous region; and finally in yellow,
22 Herzegovina autonomous region.
23 The autonomous regions established governmental structures and
24 were shortly afterward proclaimed as part of the territory embraced by the
25 self-declared Serbian Republic. Once the autonomous regions had served
1 their purpose, and once approximately 70 per cent of the territory of
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina had been forcibly seized by the Bosnian Serb
3 forces, the Bosnian Serb leadership disbanded the autonomous regions. As
4 Karadzic would later tell the Bosnian Serb Assembly, once they had served
5 their purpose, they were ended.
6 Before that, however, they had proven an effective vehicle for the
7 dismemberment of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the attainment of control over
8 large swathes of Bosnian territory on which hundreds of thousands of
9 Muslims had lived until 1992.
10 Now, another manner in which the Bosnian Serbs began to organise
11 and prepare, and which, in particular, the way the SDS began to organise
12 for the creation and separation of the territory, was to provide arms to
13 the Serb population. In 1991, Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik and other
14 members of the Bosnian Serb leadership were concerned. The Serbs did not
15 have enough arms. I would like to play for you an intercepted
16 conversation between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik from the 23rd of
17 September, in which the topic of arms is discussed with them, and in which
18 they expressed their concern that the Serbs do not have enough arms. So
19 if we could begin that.
20 [Intercept played]
21 "Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Is it Delimustafic?
22 Radovan KARADZIC: No, no it's Izetbegovic. Izetbegovic passed a
23 decision at the Presidency that each station be formed according to its
24 own need, that is, to increase the numbers of the reserve force.
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yeah.
1 Radovan KARADZIC: Therefore, we would have to inform our people
2 in the Krajina and in the eastern ...
3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Well, yes, you know what I'd like to ask
4 you... We could reach an agreement with regard to that. Everything has
5 its, you know, black and white version always. And a smart man always
6 uses what he finds suitable for him.
7 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
8 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I would not prevent anything. On the
9 contrary, I'd say, "all right, all right, but there's you know...
10 Everything has it's..."
11 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, all right. In Serbs areas they don't
12 have enough weapons, they don't have enough weapons.
13 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: All right, but we're analysing, Radovan,
14 please. Let me tell me something, I would like to ask you something in
15 connection to that. We should weigh things well. What you said last
16 night was smart. We must always see what the means.
17 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
18 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I know what it is. As soon as we know what
19 someone wants...
20 Radovan KARADZIC: Look, there's a man from the police sitting
21 with me here who understands the situation.
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes.
23 Radovan KARADZIC: Ah, Plavsic right. Just a moment. On which
24 one? All right. All right. I'll call you in a minute.
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes. Yes.
1 Radovan KARADZIC: I'm waiting for a journalist here. Can you pop
2 down here for a while so we can sit down?
3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Where are you now?
4 Radovan KARADZIC: At the party.
5 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: When would you come?
6 Radovan KARADZIC: In about 15, 20 minutes. Can you make it?
7 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Can I come at about, say, a quarter to 3.00?
8 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes, you can.
9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: All right. I'll come at a quarter to 3.00.
10 Radovan KARADZIC: Right.
11 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Right."
12 JUDGE ORIE: On the tape they're speaking even quicker, so if
13 you'd like a little break after having heard the tape.
14 Yes, please proceed.
15 MR. HARMON: How is it possible that the arming process was
16 achieved? It was achieved through the cooperation and the assistance of
17 the Yugoslavian federal authorities whose leadership shared the goals and
18 objectives of the Bosnian Serbs. We intend to lead considerable evidence
19 about the arming effort, but let me provide you with some examples of that
20 evidence now.
21 We will tender a 20 March 1992 report of JNA
22 General Milutin Kukanjac, drafted to the JNA General Staff, in which he
23 reports having distributed to "volunteer units" 51.900 weapons. And
24 reports that the SDS had distributed 17.298 weapons to such volunteer
1 Now, these were -- these volunteer units were not part of the
2 composition of the JNA.
3 You will also hear specific evidence about a meeting that took
4 place in April of 1991 in Belgrade in the office of Mihalj Kertes, the
5 assistant to the minister of the interior, over one year prior to the
6 takeover of the Bratunac and Srebrenica municipalities. The participants
7 in that meeting were Miroslav Deronjic, a leading SDS political figure in
8 the Bratunac municipality, and Goran Zekic, who was the representative
9 from Srebrenica to the Bosnian Serb Assembly.
10 At that meeting, arrangements were made to provide arms to the
11 Bosnian Serbs of the Bratunac and Srebrenica municipalities in Eastern
13 Mihalj Kertes, as our evidence will show, was in frequent contact
14 with the Bosnian Serb leadership. During the meeting in April of 1991, he
15 said to Messrs. Deronjic and Zekic, and I quote: "That in the area of 50
16 kilometres from the Drina River, everything would be fully Serb."
17 As you will hear later in my remarks when I discuss the strategic
18 objectives of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were
19 announced by Radovan Karadzic at the Bosnian Serb Assembly 13 months
20 later, Kertes's statement to Messrs. Deronjic and Zekic virtually mirrors
21 one of the explicit strategic objectives, and I'm referring to strategic
22 objective number 3.
23 Now, the paramount role of the SDS in the arming activity and the
24 symbiotic relationship that it had with Slobodan Milosevic and the federal
25 authorities was explained in August of 1993 at the 34th session of the
1 Bosnian Serb Assembly by General Milan Gvero, the assistant commander of
2 the VRS for morale, religious, and legal affairs.
3 Let me quote what General Gvero told that Assembly, and I quote:
4 "The Serbian Democratic Party, which politically awakened and homogenised
5 the Serbian people, formulated the political and social goals in
6 organisational terms, all the important prerequisites for a successful
8 He went on to say: "The Serbian Democratic Party and the
9 established state institutions also have the most credit for the initial
10 arming of the Serbian people with small arms which was possible thanks to
11 the support and cooperativeness of numerous Serbs, officers in the JNA
12 commands on the territory of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs in
13 the interior ministry and other political institutions, and officers of
14 the army from Serbia, that is to say, the SRJ, Federal Republic of
16 Now, in their preparations, the SDS also established
17 communications network throughout the Bosnian Serb communities so that, as
18 Karadzic later explained, and again I quote him: "Information from the
19 most remote villages reaches the SDS Main Board in two hours at most."
20 According to SDS operational guidelines that were issued on the
21 15th of August, 1991, each member of the local SDS board was required to
22 "keep contact with 10 to 20 households."
23 This network was not only established to relay general information
24 but to convey orders. SDS members were obliged to carry out and respect
25 decisions of party organs.
1 Because this is a trial of a politician at the very apex of SDS
2 and later Republika Srpska power, it is worth emphasising the nature of
3 the SDS leadership's viewpoint on the adherence to and implementation of
4 its policies. During the second session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held
5 on the 21st of November, 1991, the accused issued a stern warning to the
6 SDS members. Quoting his words: "We would like to send the following
7 message to all those who falter, or are neutral, weak, or misguided, and
8 who do not feel like traitors. Today you still have time. Tomorrow it
9 will be too late."
10 Three months later, at the eighth Bosnian Serb Assembly held on
11 the 25th of February, 1992, Radovan Karadzic re-echoed the stern warning
12 of the accused. He said that once the party adopted a policy, and I quote
13 him: "Anything else is treason. Anything outside the adopted policy is
14 treason. Assisting the enemy cannot be tolerated. Giving him a way out
15 and confusing the people while being a member of that party, of the
16 Assembly, and the party organs, that cannot be. I will not allow it. I
17 will signal to the people: People, this man is a traitor."
18 Such sentiments were echoed by Radoslav Brdjanin, the head of the
19 SDS party, the head of the ARK Crisis Staff and War Presidency. Quoting
20 Mr. Brdjanin: "I am a man who abides by two principles. I obey and
21 respect those who are above me, all those who are under my command must
22 obey me."
23 The evidence will show that as the SDS moved closer to the
24 implementation of a policy of forcible division in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
25 there was heightened need for constant information that could be securely
1 and secretly transmitted. The SDS created a security system whose
2 organisation and functioning was to be strictly conspiratorial and
3 organised on a hierarchical principle. This security system created codes
4 for communication via public phones, secret designations were established
5 for other SDS municipal boards, and the SDS established a 24-hour,
6 seven-day-a-week watch service at party headquarters.
7 Let me again return to the words of General Gvero from the 34th
8 Bosnian Serb assembly session: "The SDS formulated the political and
9 social goals and prepared in organisational terms all the important
10 prerequisites for a successful struggle."
11 At the time the SDS was clandestinely preparing for the possible
12 separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and negotiating internationally in an
13 effort to separate Bosnia by agreement, the Serbian position in the
14 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly became hard and
16 At that session, at a session of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina Assembly held on the 14th of October, 1991, and presided
18 over by Mr. Krajisnik in his capacity as president of that Assembly, the
19 Assembly considered a platform on the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 in the future structure of the Yugoslav community and a memorandum letter
21 of intentions. These documents together stated that Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina would participate in the future Yugoslav state only to the
23 same extent that Croatia and Slovenia participated. You'll recall that
24 they had declared their independence.
25 Radovan Karadzic took the floor and warned in unequivocal terms
1 what would happen to the Muslims if they persisted in pursuing
2 independence. He said they might disappear because they could not defend
4 Let us listen to a portion of that speech. Again, if you turn to
5 your monitors.
6 [Audiotape played]
7 "Radovan KARADZIC: We have the constitution that will prevent
8 you from voting. Even if you brought a decision today that would be a
9 shame for Izetbegovic in The Hague because we do have a way in The Hague."
10 MR. HARMON: Lest there be any doubt what Karadzic meant by the
11 word "disappear" in his speech, our evidence will include an intercepted
12 telephone conversation between Karadzic and Gojko Dogo, the president of
13 the Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina. This conversation
14 was intercepted two days prior to the speech that you just heard. In that
15 conversation, Karadzic explains that, at best, the Muslims could hope for
16 some enclaves in Bosnia in which most of the territory would be Serb and
17 which would be a unit in a federation of the rump Yugoslavia. As he said:
18 "We could accept them creating, let's call it, a Muslim district in their
19 area within Yugoslavia." He went on to say "or several enclaves."
20 He goes on to say in that intercepted conversation that should the
21 Muslims persist in their demands, and I quote this intercept: "They will
22 disappear. That people will disappear from the face of the earth if they
23 start now. Our offer was their only chance."
24 He goes on: "They don't understand that here there will be blood
25 to the knees and that the Muslim people will disappear."
1 Now, throughout this conversation, his grim prophecy is repeated.
2 I'm going to quote him again: "They have to know that there are 20.000
3 armed Serbs around Sarajevo. They will -- they will disappear. Sarajevo
4 will be a black cauldron where 300.000 Muslims will die. They're not
5 right in the head. I don't know. Now I will have to talk to them openly.
6 'People, don't screw around. There are three, four hundred thousand
7 armed Serbs in Bosnia. What are you thinking of? Plus there's an army
8 and the hardware and everything. Do you think you can secede like
10 Later on in that same intercepted conversation, he says: "They
11 don't understand that. They will be up to their necks in blood and that
12 the Muslim people will disappear. The poor Muslims would disappear who
13 don't know where he is taking them, where he is taking the Muslims."
14 And I'll cite one more passage from that intercepted conversation,
15 this is Karadzic again: "They simply don't have any way to carry out a
16 secession. I think that this is clear to the army and clear to everyone.
17 It will be a real bloodbath. This time the army won't only use two planes
18 any more of the 500 it has; it will use 20 for each assault."
19 At this same session, where Karadzic gave this chilling speech,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, the speaker of the Assembly, closed the session in order to
21 prevent a vote from being taken on the memorandum and platform. Serb
22 deputies walked out. But before the closing of the session, Mr. Krajisnik
23 warned the non-Serb deputies, and I'll use his words: "I just want to
24 tell you: Think carefully about what will happen to you if you try to
25 adopt anything outside this assembly. I will not warn you individually.
1 You know that very well."
2 And then he concluded his remarks and the assembly closed.
3 However, Mr. Krajisnik's parliamentary manoeuvre failed.
4 Following the walkout of the Bosnian Serb deputies, the vice-president of
5 the Assembly, Mariofil Ljubic, a member of the HDZ party, reopened the
6 session, and a vote was taken on the proposed platform and memorandum.
7 Both items passed.
8 In the aftermath of the passing the declaration of sovereignty,
9 the SDS accelerated the steps to divide Bosnia. On the night of the 15th
10 of October, the SDS political council met, attended by the entire SDS
11 leadership, including Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic,
12 Nikola Koljevic. As one of the attendees, Tudor Dutina, observed, and I
13 quote: "This evening, we must shed the illusion that a form of
14 co-existence with the Muslims and the Croats can be found."
15 Three days later, the Serbian Deputies Club convened a session at
16 which the Bosnian Serb leadership emphasised that the SDS was moving
17 forward with the division of Bosnia. Karadzic announced that he would put
18 the party in a state of emergency.
19 On the 24th of October, 1991, the SDS delegates to the Socialist
20 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly met separately and established
21 the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'll refer
22 to this later as the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Mr. Krajisnik was named the
23 president of that most important body and declared at that session, among
24 other things, that the Assembly had been founded with the purpose of
25 ensuring that the Serb people would have its destiny in its own hands, and
1 he said what that meant was that the will of the Serbian people was to
2 remain "in its historical and ethnic territories, as part of a joint state
3 of Yugoslavia."
4 Karadzic also declared that this event was an historic step, and
5 he said: "This is an historic step, a step the Serbian people takes to
6 shatter the last illusions and to round our entity in such a way that it
7 would never again find itself endangered from within."
8 The same day, Karadzic told the Serbian president Milosevic what
9 would happen if the Bosnian Serbs [sic] insisted on pursuing independence.
10 That conversation was intercepted, and in that conversation, as you will
11 hear in just a moment, Karadzic says that they had prepared everything,
12 that the Bosnians would break their teeth, that there would be no way that
13 they would live together in a country with them.
14 So if we could now play that intercept. This is a portion of the
15 intercept, Your Honour.
16 [Intercept played]
17 "Radovan KARADZIC: Hello?
18 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: How is the work going?
19 Radovan KARADZIC: It's coming along slowly.
20 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: Have you arranged it with Alija to abolish
21 those decisions of his?
22 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, we gave him until 1700 hours to abolish
23 them but they won't. They will never manage to do it in time. They've
24 made so many that they can't abolish them.
25 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: All right, then. You can extend the deadline
1 if they intend to abolish them.
2 Radovan KARADZIC: No, they don't think that the Hague -- I mean
3 to abolish them. They don't mean to abolish them. They think they're
4 doing it legally but we'll respond with all means possible. We will
5 establish Yugoslavia and all the areas where we live. We have a
6 constitution. If they abolish their BiH constitution we'll rely on this
7 which is older, and I mean the federal constitution.
8 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: Yes, yes, but they're not foolish enough to
9 continue in that direction.
10 Radovan KARADZIC: No, they want The Hague, that is, Europe, to
11 give them a state in which we would be locked by international agreements.
12 We can't allow that. We have to prepare everything and we have prepared
13 everything to create a de facto situation that cannot be challenged which
14 they will break their teeth on. They simply have to break them. There's
15 no way we will live in a country with them. No.
16 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: Why don't you, I mean, have a talk with Alija
17 and tell him exactly that.
18 Radovan KARADZIC: Alija is focussed on his goal with the
19 conviction of a religious fanatic and he cannot be talked to. I would
20 like to talk to him, but that we don't touch anything of his.
21 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: Yes, yes, but why don't you tell him exactly
22 that, explain to him and put it to him nicely and then say please go
23 ahead, abolish it.
24 Radovan KARADZIC: No, no, believe me, there is no chance of that.
25 He would just waste our time. He wasted three months on the cantonisation
1 of Bosnia and then he showed up with just a ... With a paper that Tudjman
2 gave him.
3 Slobodan MILOSEVIC: Very well, then. All right."
4 MR. HARMON: You will hear that intercept in the course of this
5 trial, but in addition, Mr. Karadzic said that it was the intention of the
6 Bosnian Serbs to establish full authority over Serbian territories in
7 Bosnia, and he went on to say that Izetbegovic "will not have control over
8 65 per cent of his territory. That is our goal."
9 Now, among the decisions taken by the newly founded Serbian
10 Assembly, Bosnian Serbian Assembly, I'm sorry, was the decision to hold a
11 plebiscite on the 9th and 10th of November. And the question to be put to
12 the Serbian people was: "Do you agree with the decision that the Serbian
13 people shall stay in the joint state of Yugoslavia together with," and it
14 identifies other entities.
15 The Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People also declared, and I quote
16 relevant parts of this declaration: "That there is a conspiracy underway
17 that started a long time ago, and it is aimed at reducing the Serbian
18 people, a constituentive people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, into a national
19 minority. Because of the tragic events that the Serbian people had
20 experienced this century, particularly the genocide it was exposed to, it
21 taught the Serbian people a lesson, and we have established an assembly."
22 He went on to say and to suggest that similar events were looming over the
23 destiny of the Serb people and that the Serb people had a right, an
24 intrinsic right, to form their own state.
25 On the 9th and 10th a plebiscite was indeed held. The Serbs who
1 voted in it rejected independence and elected to stay in
2 association -- remain in the state of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serb
3 leadership would repeatedly invoke the plebiscite to legitimacise [sic]
4 further steps toward ethnic separation.
5 Your Honour, I'm unsure when we are planning to take a break.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I was just thinking about having one break, but then
7 little bit longer. I know that the tapes last for a little bit over one
8 and a half hours. So if you could continue for another 15 to 20 minutes,
9 we would then have a bit of a longer break and then continue until 7.00,
10 if necessary.
11 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
12 Now, I was discussing the clandestine efforts of the SDS to take
13 control in Bosnia, and these efforts took other forms as well. On the
14 19th of December, 1991, Bosnian Serb municipal leaders were summoned to
15 Sarajevo, where they received strictly confidential written instructions
16 outlining steps for the takeover of power at the grass-roots level. The
17 instructions which we will introduce into evidence in the course of the
18 trial, are entitled "Instructions for the organisation and activity of
19 organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary
21 They were prepared and issued by the SDS Main Board, of which the
22 accused was a prominent member. They applied to municipalities where
23 Serbs were a minority of the population and where they were a majority,
24 and they were clear and simple instructions. In municipalities where the
25 Serbs were a majority of the population, variant A, and in municipalities
1 where the Serbs were in a minority of the population, variant B, a Serbian
2 Municipal Assembly was to be formed, and preparations were to be
3 undertaken for the establishment of other municipal organs. These
4 included preparations for taking over police personnel, and facilities. In
5 both variant A and B municipalities, a crisis staff of the Serbian people
6 was to be formed which was to be responsible for activating police,
7 Territorial Defence, and civilian defence formations, as well as a variety
8 of other defence-related tasks.
9 For both variant A and variant B municipalities, the instructions
10 were broken down into two phases. In phase one, SDS leaders were
11 instructed to form crisis staffs, proclaim Serbian assemblies, and prepare
12 for the formation of municipal government bodies.
13 In the second phase, SDS leaders were to establish the new
14 municipal organs, mobilise Serb members of the police, ensure a call-up of
15 JNA reserves and Territorial Defence units, and take other steps in
16 preparation for conflict. This second phase was to be initiated by the
17 SDS president, using a secret, pre-established procedure.
18 During the course of this trial, we will present evidence to you
19 how those instructions were implemented in various municipalities.
20 Now, returning to the next significant event, on the 17th of
21 December, 1991, European Community ministers approved a procedure for
22 Yugoslavia's republics to apply for independence and created a commission,
23 later known as the Badinter Commission, to assess such applications.
24 Three days later, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 presidency voted to apply to the Badinter Commission for Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina to be recognised as an independent state.
2 Now, the very next day, the Bosnian Serb Assembly convened,
3 presided over by the accused, and it took various decisions, including a
4 decision to initiate the establishment of the Republika Srpska, and it
5 recognised the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The Assembly also issued a
6 warning to the government of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina, which stated that it would never accept, under any
8 circumstances, to be subordinated to anybody, and especially not to accept
9 the status of a minority.
10 During this session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, one of the
11 Bosnian Serb representatives, Radoslav Vukic, the head of the Banja Luka
12 SDS municipal board and member of the Main and Executive Boards, stated,
13 to applause, and I quote: "If the European Community goes on with its
14 threat to recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state, or as
15 a part of a future independent state of Croatia, or the independent state
16 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there will be another Serbian uprising and
17 there will be massive bloodshed, in which some nations that have been
18 subsequently created will disappear altogether."
19 Karadzic then gave a lengthy speech, and I quote from parts of it:
20 "We have the right and the ability to prevent anybody on the territories
21 where we conducted our referendum to secede from Yugoslavia. In all
22 territories where Serbs took part in the referendum, regardless of whether
23 they make up 5 per cent or 55 per cent of the population, they are the
24 constituent element of that town or that republic. All territories where
25 we voted in our referendum to remain within Yugoslavia must stay within
1 Yugoslavia if we so decide."
2 He went on to say: "We can accommodate everything. Everything is
3 better than civil war. Everything is better than imposing one's solutions
4 on to others. Everything is better than chaos and hell, which we can see
5 developing and evolving. We are committed not to instigate any such
6 thing. Even more, we are committed not to take part in any such thing,
7 unless it is imposed upon us in a way that it was imposed on our brothers
8 in Croatia."
9 In that speech, he goes on to say: "Apart from causing the deaths
10 of several hundred thousand people and complete destruction of several
11 hundred towns, a civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina would also result in
12 massive and rapid population movements, in other words, it would lead to
13 population homogenisation. What would be the end of it all? The end
14 result would be as it is today, separate Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim
15 areas, left impoverished by several hundred towns and several hundred
16 thousand people."
17 Finally, he says: "It seems to me that at this moment in time,
18 and the amount of mutual suspicion, we should aim for as much separation
19 as possible, and only later let life and economic reasons bring the people
20 together. We should not aim to separate 30 per cent now and leave 70 per
21 cent, as it is because the tensions that exist between us will not be
22 resolved. Everything that can exist independently should be separated."
23 On the 9th of January, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed
24 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This included, and I
25 quote: "Areas where the Serbian people are a minority because of the
1 genocide conducted against it in the Second World War."
2 On the 15th of January, 1992, the Badinter Commission reported its
3 recommendation that Bosnia and Herzegovina be required to hold a
4 referendum to determine the will of its people regarding independence.
5 On the 24th and 25th of January, in the Socialist Republic of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly, the delegates considered a resolution to
7 hold such a referendum on the 29th of February to the 1st of March, 1992.
8 The Serb delegates strenuously objected and the accused tried to close the
9 session. The SDS delegates walked out, and thereafter, a vote on whether
10 to hold the referendum was held, and it passed.
11 The next day, the Bosnian Serb Assembly announced that this
12 decision was illegal.
13 Shortly thereafter, on the 14th of February, 1992, Karadzic
14 ordered the activation of the second phase of the variant A and B
15 instructions at an expanded deputies club session. As Karadzic told the
16 media the next day, and I quote: "The Serbs have created a comprehensive
17 programme for full control of the territory where they are an ethnic
19 On the 28th of February, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted
20 the constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which
21 was later to be promulgated. On that date, the Bosnian Serb Assembly
22 passed, and the accused signed, significant legislation directing that
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina police stations on Serb-claimed territory would
24 cease to function as of the 1st of April, 1992 and would be replaced by
25 police units of the Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 On the 27th of March, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly promulgated
3 the constitution that was previously adopted. It also created a
4 government. It elected a prime minister and created a national security
5 council which acted as a de facto presidency. Momcilo Krajisnik was a
6 member of the national security council.
7 On the 31st of March, 1992, the order calling for the separation
8 of the police forces was sent out and non-Serbs who refused to wear new
9 Serb insignia and swear loyalty to the Bosnian Serb authorities were
10 dismissed from their police jobs.
11 Your Honour, I think this might be an appropriate place for a
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Harmon, although it's a bit -- I'll ask the
14 registrar: How -- and may I also ask the interpreters whether one break
15 would do if we would then continue until 7.00, at what time could we
16 restart? Because it's hardly of any use to have two breaks, I would say.
17 Would a break until a quarter past 5.00 be sufficient? And may I ask you,
18 Mr. Harmon, how much time you'd still need, approximately, to finish your
19 opening statement.
20 MR. HARMON: Well, given how slowly I am required to speak,
21 Your Honour, it's difficult to make that projection. I hope and will
22 endeavour to finish by 7.00, but I'm not entirely confident I can do that.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Looking at both technicians and interpreters, a
24 restart at a quarter past 5.00, would that be possible, and can we
25 continue up until 7.00, or would that be too long?
1 The problem always is to hear from the booth. If I'm on one
2 channel I would not hear the other booth. Could perhaps the English booth
3 give me the information needed.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, since the English booth is not
5 really working, it's up to the B/C/S and the French booth to decide if
6 it's okay to work from 5.15 until 7.00. So we leave it up to them.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So, therefore, if the other booth would tell us
8 what would be the maximum time they could continue if we would ... Thank
9 you very much. I heard from the French booth that we could continue at a
10 quarter past 5.00 and then continue until 7.00.
11 We are adjourned until a quarter past 5.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 4.44 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 5.19 p.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
15 MR. HARMON: Yes. Thank you very much, Your Honours. I ended
16 with the end of a long description on the political events that set the
17 stage for what now happens in these crimes -- in this indictment, which is
18 the crimes themselves.
19 So we ended on the events of the 31st of March, 1992, when the
20 separation of the police forces in Bosnia took place.
21 Now, as the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina became imminent,
22 Bosnian Serb forces, in conjunction with the JNA, Serbian police, and
23 Bosnian and Serbian paramilitaries started violently seizing territory
24 that would comprise the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
25 ethnically cleansing the non-Serbs from that territory, territory in which
1 they had lived for generations.
2 Our evidence will show that these violent events started in the
3 municipality of Bijeljina on the 31st of March, 1992. There, paramilitary
4 forces of the notorious paramilitary leader Arkan were particularly brutal
5 in their attacks on the civilian population. They terrorised the civilian
6 population, and those civilians bore the brunt of this savagery.
7 I would like to have the next exhibit displayed. This image,
8 which shocked the world, is a piece of evidence that we will present
9 during the course of this trial. It is an image that was taken in
10 Bijeljina, on or about the 31st of March, when Arkan's troops seized the
11 municipality, along with other Bosnian Serb forces. This image depicts
12 representatives, members of the Arkan paramilitary group.
13 Let me tell you a little bit about Arkan and what our evidence
14 will show. I've lost my image here. Could I have the image back, please?
15 Let me tell you a little bit about Arkan, who had earned a
16 reputation and a widespread reputation for his brutal efforts against the
17 Croats in Croatia. He was embraced during this time period by
18 Biljana Plavsic, a leading Bosnian Serb figure who is identified as a
19 member of the joint criminal enterprise. We will now play a very brief
20 clip, and before we play it, let me describe what it is for Your Honours.
21 This is a video clip of Mrs. Plavsic greeting Arkan in Bijeljina during
22 that period of time. It's a very quick clip. It will be played twice.
23 And if we could proceed with it.
24 [Videotape played]
25 MR. HARMON: There's no reason to translate. Could you stop it
1 right there, please? Pause. Mrs. Plavsic, a member of the joint criminal
2 enterprise, is the female who is between the two men whose backs are
3 facing you, and the paramilitary leader, Arkan, is the gentleman she is
4 kissing. So if we could now continue with this.
5 [Videotape played]
6 MR. HARMON: I'm told that's the end of the movie. We now
7 have -- okay. Then that concludes with that particular image.
8 Eight months after the events in Bijeljina, at the 22nd session of
9 the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Mrs. Plavsic revealed her role in bringing
10 Arkan to Bijeljina. I quote her: "After the statement of the president
11 of the Republic, that is, after the call to all volunteers in Serbian
12 countries and in all Orthodox countries, I have sent a letter to all
13 addresses. I will tell you: I was trying to get together all people
14 willing to fight for the Serbian cause, and then letters were sent. You
15 talk about paramilitary units and about paramilitary units. Pardon me, it
16 doesn't concern me. I was asking for men willing to fight for the Serbian
17 cause, men willing to fight on the territory of the Republika Srpska.
18 These letters were sent to the Soviet Union, they were sent to Seselj, to
19 Arkan, to Jovic."
20 As an intercepted telephone communication that we will present in
21 the course of this trial reveals, she later invited Arkan to come to
23 Now, the evidence will show that the savage events that occurred
24 in Bijeljina were repeated time and time again by Bosnian Serb and Serbian
25 forces, including paramilitary formations, in municipality after
1 municipality. In those municipalities, the permanent removal of Bosnian
2 Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and other non-Serbs was affected by murder,
3 unlawful detention, forcible transfer or deportation of non-Serbs. During
4 this trial, you will hear considerable evidence from the victims of these
5 crimes, and I will not detail that evidence now.
6 Our evidence will demonstrate beyond any doubt that the events in
7 those municipalities were not spontaneous or random events but were the
8 results of policies conceived of by the accused and other members of the
9 criminal enterprise, and implemented by forces under his control.
10 Now, on the 6th of April, the European Community recognised Bosnia
11 as an independent and sovereign state, and on that same day, the Bosnian
12 Serb Assembly declared the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
13 and Herzegovina. I would like to fast-forward to the 12th of May, five
14 weeks after this independence was declared, and I'm referring to the 12th
15 of May, 1992, to the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, presided
16 over by the accused. This was a very important Assembly session, because
17 at that session, the Bosnian Serb army was established, Ratko Mladic was
18 selected as the commander of the main staff of that army, and, as you
19 know, General Mladic is identified in the indictment as a member of the
20 joint criminal enterprise.
21 Our evidence will show that Ratko Mladic was personally selected
22 to lead the new Bosnian Serb army by the accused and by Karadzic. In a
23 speech at the 50th Bosnian Serb Assembly, Radovan Karadzic explained how
24 he and the accused made their choice, and I quote: "Gentlemen, we got the
25 officers we asked for. I asked for Mladic. General Ninkovic, then a
1 colonel, and General Perisic, had visited me before that, and I had
2 noticed Mladic's blunt statements in the newspapers. He was already in
3 Knin then. I took an interest in him, and together with Mr. Krajisnik, I
4 went to General Kukanjac's office and listened to him issuing orders and
5 commanding around Kupres and Knin. We spent countless nights in the
6 office of General Kukanjac at that time. President Krajisnik was already
7 the president of the Assembly, and I was just the president of the party.
8 I did not have any state function. We asked for Mladic and said that they
9 should set up the headquarters as they saw fit. We wouldn't interfere."
10 Now, two weeks before the VRS was formally established at the 16th
11 session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the accused participated in another
12 high-level meeting, this time with Milosevic, Karadzic, and members of the
13 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presidency, Branko Kostic,
14 Momir Bulatovic, and Borisav Jovic. The topic under discussion at that
15 meeting was the transformation of the JNA in Bosnia into the Army of the
16 Republika Srpska. According to the diary of Borisav Jovic, who was a
17 member of the SFRY presidency, let me quote this entry: "The Security
18 Council has recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. Interethnic fighting has
19 broken out there. It is being demanded that we withdraw the JNA from
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slobodan and I both expected and predicted this.
21 There remain around 90.000 JNA soldiers in that Republic, mostly of Serb
22 nationality, over whom the Serb leadership from Bosnia and Herzegovina can
23 assume political command. Karadzic agrees. Krajisnik raises a series of
24 questions: How will that military be financed? Who will pay its wages?
25 Who will provide its pensions? Et cetera. All of which are indeed
1 problems but are not critical to our discussion. There was plenty back
2 and forth about the deadline for withdrawal, and in the end, we agreed to
3 complete it within 15 days. Since it is also necessary to withdraw
4 generals who are not originally from Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was agreed
5 that General Mladic would replace General Vukovic. For us, this action
6 was very significant, but for the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was
7 even more significant. They got their own military."
8 Now, I said this particular session of the Assembly was very
9 important. There were other important decisions taken at that Assembly.
10 The presidency of the Serb Republic was also established, replacing the
11 acting presidency of Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic. The presidency
12 then consisted of Karadzic, Plavsic, and Koljevic. In addition, the
13 presidency was designated as the supreme commander of the armed forces.
14 Now, let me digress here for just a moment, because I've been
15 using terms like "expanded presidency," "acting presidency," and it's
16 very, very confusing. So let me try to clarify that, in your minds, and I
17 will do so or attempt to do so by using this next exhibit, which if it
18 could be put on the screen. And I don't see it on my screen, Ms. Javier.
19 There it is.
20 You'll see in this chart the various iterations of the presidency
21 of the Republika Srpska in 1992. You will see on the 28th of February,
22 the acting presidency that consisted of two individuals: Nikola Koljevic,
23 now deceased, Biljana Plavsic, identified as a member of the joint
24 criminal enterprise. That was replaced on the 12th of May by a
25 three-member presidency: Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, and Biljana
2 On the 2nd of June, 1992, there was an expanded presidency. This
3 consisted of five people. And you will see that one of those members of
4 the expanded presidency is the accused. That expanded presidency lasted
5 from June 2nd, 1992 until the 17th of December, 1992.
6 And finally, the presidency, with a president, Radovan Karadzic,
7 was established on the 17th of December, 1992, and there were two
9 Returning again to this very important Assembly session. At this
10 session on the 12th of May, Karadzic announced the six strategic
11 objectives of the Serbian people which had been formulated by the senior
12 Bosnian Serb leadership, including the accused. These strategic
13 objectives are quite important. They were the official expression of
14 policy developed, shaped, and promoted by the accused, and their
15 revelation to the Assembly on the 12th of May was not an epiphany. They
16 clearly had been known and understood by their Serb audience and they were
17 the culmination of the previous discussions amongst the leading members of
18 the SDS and their allies in Serbia. Indeed, let me focus your attention
19 on what Karadzic said about two months earlier at the 11th session of the
20 Bosnian Serb Assembly. He said, and I quote: "You all know our strategic
21 plans. The ultimate strategic goal must remain secret."
22 Now, Your Honours, let me have the next exhibit, please. What
23 were these strategic objectives? I have now had them placed before Your
24 Honours on the screen, and you can see these objectives were promulgated
25 on the 12th of May, signed by the president of the National Assembly, the
1 accused. And these objectives are as follows:
2 1. Establish state borders separating Serbian people from the
3 other two ethnic communities.
4 2. Set up a corridor between Semberija and Krajina.
5 3. Establish a corridor in the Drina River Valley, that is,
6 eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serb states.
7 4. Establish a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers.
8 5. Divide the city of Sarajevo into Muslim parts, Serbian parts,
9 and establish effective state authorities in both parts.
10 6. Ensure the access to the sea for the Republika Srpska.
11 Now, at that Assembly session, what did Karadzic have to say about
12 each of these objectives? I quote him: "The first goal is the separation
13 from the two national communities, separation of states."
14 Now, before explaining this objective, let's examine a map. And
15 if I could have the next exhibit placed on the computer screen. This is a
16 map, Your Honours, showing both Croatia and Bosnia. It is a map showing
17 the distribution of Serbs and the concentration of the Serb populations in
18 those two states. The legend shows you that those areas in white have the
19 fewest number of Serbs; the areas in the darkest blue have the most. Now,
20 if you notice, there is a dark line on the map, starting at the bottom,
21 running at about a 45-degree angle. Ms. Javier is pointing that out.
22 That is the border between Croatia and Bosnia. And you will see in this
23 map a considerable mixing of the populations. There are some areas where
24 it's dark blue and some areas where there's no blue.
25 Now, after examining this map, let's listen to what Mr. Karadzic
1 had to say when he defined the separation of states. He said:
2 "Separation from those who are our enemies, who have used every
3 opportunity, especially this century, to attack us, and who would continue
4 such practices if we were to stay together in the same state."
5 Now, the meaning of this objective was understood by everyone who
6 was in attendance at the Assembly session. It was an often repeated tenet
7 of the leadership's philosophy. Indeed, earlier, at an SDS Deputies' Club
8 session on the 28th of February, 1992, which was attended by the accused,
9 this is what Karadzic had to say, and I quote: "It is our goal for
10 Croatia to consolidate its territory, but it is clear to every Serb that
11 Croats and Serbs cannot live in a single state."
12 He then went on to say: "The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 is basically a conflict among peoples. Just as was the case between India
14 and Pakistan, and nothing new, it resulted in a huge resettlement of
15 people. Muslims cannot live with others. We must be clear on that. They
16 couldn't live with the Hindu, who are as peaceful as sheep. They couldn't
17 live with the Greek on Cyprus. They couldn't live in Lebanon with Arabs
18 of the same blood, language, but of a different faith. There can be no
19 discussions here. Yet they have set up the Bosnian Krajina there, and in
20 two years' time you have problems again, to separate each and every
21 village there, because they will overwhelm you with their birthrate and
22 their tricks. We cannot allow that to happen."
23 Now, I'll discuss this particular goal in greater detail in a few
24 moments, but it's important to note that by the 12th of May, when this
25 objective was formerly announced in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, it had
1 already been ruthlessly implemented in municipalities such as Bijeljina,
2 which I discussed a few minutes ago, it had been ruthlessly implemented,
3 as our evidence will show, in Brcko, in Bosanski Novi, in the municipality
4 of Foca, and in the municipality of Zvornik, among others.
5 Now, the second strategic goal -- and if we could have the image
6 on the screen, I will read what Mr. Karadzic had to say about the second
7 strategic goal, and you'll see on this image that's before you, in the
8 middle of the picture it says corridor objective 2. Let me read what
9 Mr. Karadzic meant by the second strategic goal. He said that it was a
10 corridor between Semberija and Krajina. He went on to say: "This is of
11 the utmost strategic importance for the Serbian people because it
12 integrates the Serbian countries, not only of Serbian BH, of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina, but Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbian Krajina, and
14 Serbian Krajina with Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia."
15 He further said: "That is a strategic goal which we have to
16 achieve because Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina, or the alliance
17 of Serbian states is infeasible if we do not secure that corridor."
18 So again, pointing as the moving arrow on this moving arrow
19 depicts this is the area that the strategic objective number 2 applied to.
20 As to the third strategic goal, Karadzic said: "The third
21 strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina Valley, that is,
22 the elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds. We are on
23 both sides of the Drina, and it is our strategic interest and our living
25 Now, recall, Your Honours, the evidence that I described to you
1 earlier in my remarks of a meeting that took place in April, in Belgrade,
2 between Bosnian Serb political leaders Deronjic and Zekic, 13 months
3 before, where Mr. Kertes from the Ministry of the Interior said that 50
4 miles -- 50 kilometres on the other side of the Drina would be Serb. He
5 forecast 13 months before the strategic objective number 3.
6 As to the fourth goal, Karadzic said: "The fourth strategic goal
7 is the establishment of the border on the Una and Neretva Rivers." And
8 you'll see in the upper left-hand corner of this image what that goal
9 applied to.
10 As to the fifth strategic goal, Karadzic said: "The fifth
11 strategic goal is the division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and
12 Muslim parts, and the implementation of an effective state government in
13 each of these two parts of the constitutive state."
14 He went on to say: "In addition, the fighting in Sarajevo keeps
15 fighting far away from Krajina, far away from Semberija, far away from
16 Drina, far away from all of those areas, where we could possibly have
17 conflicts with Muslims. Because the fighting around Sarajevo will decide
18 the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we suspected and said before
19 that if there was a war, it would start in Sarajevo and end in Sarajevo."
20 So you can see the strategic objective number 5 identified in the
22 And finally, and quite simply, the sixth strategic objective, he
23 said, is an exit of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the sea.
24 In that session, when Karadzic was announcing the objectives of the
25 Serbian people, he continued by saying: "We believe, we have faith in
1 God, justice, and our own strength, that we shall achieve what we have
2 planned, all the six strategic goals, of course, according to the
3 hierarchy, and that we shall finally and definitively finish the job of
4 the freedom struggle of the Serbian people. That job is not finished."
5 He went on to say: "We must also put an end to the Serbian
6 megalomania, trying to include as many of our enemies in our areas as
7 possible, especially as much territory as possible, as many hills and
8 brooks, regardless of whether they are fertile or not. It must be brought
9 to a reasonable measure in order for us to be solid and compact."
10 Later he said in that same address: "I am saying this because
11 every day we meet our brave people who took as much as they could, which
12 may bring us in danger of including in our state too many enemies who will
13 work against the state. We do not want to get our state with a huge
14 number of those who are against our state."
15 Thereafter, after this presentation by Karadzic, the strategic
16 objectives were adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, were signed by the
17 accused in his capacity as president of that Assembly, and were
18 distributed to the military and to other vital organs of the Bosnian Serb
19 Republic, and they were later published in the Official Gazette.
20 Our evidence will show that the blunt instruments of force that
21 were at the disposal of the Bosnian Serb leadership - the army, the
22 police, the paramilitaries - that are responsible for the ethnic cleansing
23 unhesitatingly adopted these objectives and instructed their subordinate
24 units about them. And I will quote from one report that we will put into
25 evidence in this case: "The strategic objectives of our war which were
1 promptly defined and set before the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska,
2 the commands and the units, served as a general guideline upon which we
3 planned the actual operations."
4 The report goes on to say: "The Main Staff of the army translated
5 the set of objectives into general and individual missions of the Army of
6 the Republika Srpska and of the individual operational and tactical
8 Now, I'd like to take you through a series of Bosnian Serb army
9 reports to show you how quickly and how thoroughly the strategic
10 objectives were implemented. And we will lead this evidence during the
11 course of the trial.
12 Nine days after Karadzic announced these strategic objectives at
13 the Assembly session, all units of the 1st Krajina Corps were informed of
14 the following. And when I say "the 1st Krajina Corps," I'm referring to
15 the Bosnian Serb army unit that operated in the area of the Krajina, the
16 ARK region. This is what all the units were informed nine days after
17 these objectives were announced in the Assembly: "The constituent Serbian
18 people who lived on around 65 per cent of the area and represent more than
19 35 per cent of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, must struggle for
20 complete separation from Muslim and Croatian peoples and form their own
21 state. Only after that will they be able to decide with whom and how they
22 will unite and associate."
23 Nineteen days after the announcement of the strategic objectives,
24 it was reported in a confidential 1st Krajina Corps report that was sent
25 to the Bosnian Serb Main Staff that Muslim conscripts in the army were
1 expressing, and I quote, "dissatisfaction with the massive destruction of
2 their towns." And it goes on to say: "This is made worse by public
3 statements made in the media by SDS Bosanska Krajina Autonomous Region
4 leaders who advocate moving and expelling all Muslims and Croats from
5 these areas."
6 The following day, 20 days after these objectives were announced,
7 the 1st Krajina Corps reported to the VRS Main Staff command. It
8 discussed the movements of Muslim and Croat populations from Banja Luka
9 region, and it said, and I quote: "Those departing will not be allowed to
11 The next day, General Momir Talic, who is identified in the
12 indictment as being a member of the joint criminal enterprise, reported to
13 the VRS Main Staff, and I quote: "The Muslim population of the area of
14 Lisnja village has been expelled." Lisnja village was in Prnjavor. You
15 will hear evidence from that municipality about the operations run by
16 General Talic.
17 On the 14th of June, 1992, General Talic reported, and I quote:
18 "The entire zone of responsibility is fully under control." He goes on
19 to report: "The most difficult situation concerns the Muslim and Croat
20 refugees in the area of autonomous region Krajina, their security and
21 provision of food. The attempt to expel them to Central Bosnia failed
22 because of transportation and their resistance to leaving their places of
24 Now, the AR -- the Autonomous Region Krajina, or ARK, contains a
25 number of the municipalities that are identified in the indictment. And
1 again, we will be presenting the testimonies of many of the victims of
2 that ethnic cleansing to Your Honours.
3 Now, was the goal enunciated in the first strategic objective
4 effective? Was the separation of the non-Serb population from
5 Serb-claimed territory effective? Startlingly so. We will present
6 evidence, including expert testimony, that the ethnic composition of
7 Bosnia changed from being a multi-ethnic mosaic of Serb, Muslim, and Croat
8 areas into an ethnically segregated Bosnia, with Serbs dominating the
9 areas they sought to conquer. The effect of the first strategic objective
10 is graphically demonstrated by the following evidence. And let me show
11 Your Honours, if I could have the next exhibit on the screen, what Bosnia
12 looked like in 1991. And this map depicts the distribution of the ethnic
13 groups -- if we could move up, I believe. Is there any more of this?
14 You'll see that in blue are the Croats, in green are the Bosniaks,
15 and the Serbs are in red, and the percentages are self-explanatory on
16 that. And this is the ethnic composition before the war in 1991.
17 Now, keeping this map in mind and on your screens, I would like to
18 use data taken from Bosnian Serb documents that we will introduce into
19 evidence in the course of this trial. These documents illustrate the
20 demographic changes in some of the municipalities in the indictment, about
21 which you will hear evidence.
22 In May of 1993, the Banja Luka security services centre of the
23 Ministry of the Interior issued a list identifying citizens who had moved
24 out of their area of responsibility. Data from eight municipalities
25 identified in the indictment are included in this particular report.
1 According to the 1991 census data for this area, approximately 187.000
2 Muslims were in those municipalities in 1991. However, according to the
3 internal Bosnian Serb document that we will present to Your Honours,
4 153.723 Muslims and 6.500 Croats had left the municipality.
5 Another report that we will present, another state security
6 service report from the municipality of Kljuc, a municipality listed in
7 the indictment and about which you will hear evidence, contains the
8 following data, and it contains data regarding the ethnic composition of
9 the municipality at the time it was sent: 18.764 Serbs, 1.445 Muslims,
10 124 Croats, and 187 others. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war
11 census, the population of Kljuc as a whole had been 50 per cent Serb, 40
12 per cent Muslim, and 1 per cent Croat.
13 Another confidential Bosnian Serb report from the internal
14 affairs, this time in Banja Luka, compared the 1991 and the 1995
15 populations under its control. In those 25 municipalities, the previous
16 Muslim population had been reduced from 252.566 to just 34.525, and the
17 number of Croats had been reduced from 96.789 to just 18.932. Of the 25
18 municipalities listed in this confidential internal Bosnian Serb document,
19 13 of the municipalities are contained in our indictment. I will just
20 extract some of the figures from some of the municipalities for purposes
21 of illustration.
22 In the Prijedor municipality, the location of the notorious
23 Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje camps, the numbers of Muslims was reduced
24 from nearly 50.000 to 3.600. In the municipality of Sanski Most, the
25 number of Muslims went from 28.285 to just 3.350. In the Kljuc
1 municipality, the number of Muslims fell from 17.714 to just over 1.200.
2 Now, these figures are extracted from internal Bosnian Serb
3 documents. We will also present reports from the United Nations High
4 Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, and a report published by UNHCR in 1994
5 contains estimates of the remarkable declines in the Muslim and Croat
6 populations in Northern Bosnia and in Eastern Bosnia from 1991. The UNHCR
7 estimated that the number of Muslims (261.003) and the Croats (40.638) in
8 Eastern Bosnia had declined to a Muslim/Croat population of about 10.000.
9 Finally, we will present the testimony of Dr. Ewa Tabeau, an
10 expert in the field of demographics, and she will present data relating to
11 the demographic changes in the 37 municipalities identified in our
12 indictment. I will not go into her statistics in my opening remarks, but
13 I will say that they confirm the dramatic demographic reconfiguration of
15 Now, if we could show the next exhibit, please. This map,
16 prepared by OHR, shows the ethnic composition in Bosnia in 1998. And
17 again, looking at the legend, you can see that the red colour represents
18 predominantly Serb areas. Now, if we could have the previous map
19 exhibited. Side by side, you have before you graphic evidence and an
20 illustration of the effects of strategic objective number 1.
21 Now, Your Honours, let me return to the indictment. And I'd like
22 to focus on each of the counts in it, and focus on the accused's liability
23 under Articles 7(1) and 7(3).
24 JUDGE ORIE: Would you allow me to, although I hesitate to
25 interrupt you, but just for the better understanding of what you just
1 presented to us. On what we see on the screen on the left map, do I take
2 it that the lightest shade of the colour, which is up to 50 per cent, that
3 could be anything between 0 and 50, still is a majority of that -- of
4 Serbs or -- well, according to the colour.
5 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I was under the -- bear with me for just
6 one moment. I would like to look at a hard copy of this, because I think
7 there's some of the legend that is missing.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that for the green and the red you
9 would have also lighter shades of that colour.
10 MR. HARMON: That is correct.
11 JUDGE ORIE: And but I was just wondering whether -- well, let's
12 say the lightest shade of blue would still be a majority. For example, 40
13 per cent.
14 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could be balanced by 50 per cent of another group.
16 So then, although true that it would be the lighter shade of blue,
17 nevertheless it would not be a majority. But may I take it that the
18 colour always represents a majority of that ethnic group?
19 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
20 JUDGE ORIE: And then, on the other hand, you do not have this
21 same distinction on the right-hand map. If you say predominantly, what
22 does that mean in percentages?
23 MR. HARMON: I don't have that data in front of me. Again, that
24 will be the subject of expert testimony before Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. HARMON: I should add, Your Honours, that on the image on the
2 left, there is some data missing from the legend, and, for example, on the
3 green lower left-hand corner, it says Bosniaks more than 66 per cent and
4 then in increasingly lighter shades of green it should say and what is
5 missing "Bosniaks 55 to 60 per cent," and the lightest shade is Bosniaks
6 up to 50 per cent. The same is true with the colour red, again decreasing
7 from dark red, more than 66 per cent Serbs, to the lightest colour, Serbs
8 up to 50 per cent.
9 So we'll present that in a better form during the course of the
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that explanation.
12 MR. HARMON: Now, the first two counts in the indictment charge
13 genocide and complicity in genocide. In six municipalities,
14 Bosanski Novi, Brcko, Kljuc, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, and Sanski Most, the
15 campaign of persecutions included or escalated to include conduct
16 committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, national,
17 ethnic, racial, or religious groups, as such.
18 In those municipalities, the killing of Bosnian Serb -- Muslims
19 and Bosnian Croats, including leading members of those communities,
20 occurred both during and after attacks on villages and towns, and in
21 detention facilities.
22 Our evidence will show that leading members of the non-Serb
23 communities were targeted, and they and other members of those communities
24 were detained in facilities under conditions of life calculated to bring
25 about their physical destruction. Those conditions included physical and
1 psychological abuse, torture, inadequate food, water, medical and hygienic
2 conditions. The detention facilities themselves in those municipalities
3 are listed in schedule C of the indictment, and they include the notorious
4 facilities of the Luka Camp in Brcko, about which you will be hearing
5 evidence immediately in this case, starting tomorrow; and the Omarska and
6 Keraterm camps in the Prijedor municipality.
7 Count 3 of the indictment charges persecutions, a crime against
8 humanity, and it describes discriminatory acts that were directed against
9 the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, and other non-Serbs in specific
10 municipalities identified in the indictment. These persecutory acts were
11 committed by Bosnian Serb political and governmental organs and by the
12 Bosnian Serb and Serbian military, police, and paramilitaries.
13 Paragraph 19 of the indictment identifies the various types of
14 persecutory acts that were directed against the victims and the specific
15 instances of those events are listed in the various schedules attached to
16 the indictment.
17 Now, in many of the municipalities identified in the indictment, a
18 pattern emerged. That pattern was that the minority, the non-Serbs, were
19 threatened, then they were disarmed by the Serb forces, and finally, they
20 fell prey to the Serb forces, often with the assistance of the JNA and
21 paramilitary formations. And through acts of murder, unlawful detention,
22 and the like, they were expelled from their homes and their communities.
23 The Muslim village of Glogova, in the municipality of Bratunac, is
24 a classic example of this type of ethnic cleansing, and we will present
25 evidence on the village of Glogova to you in this first block of days when
1 we present this case to Your Honours.
2 Now, the pervasive conduct and pattern by the Bosnian Serb
3 governmental and police and paramilitary forces and their allies, disprove
4 conclusively that these were random or spontaneous events. The acts
5 described in paragraph 19 of the indictment were, instead, the fruition of
6 a policy conceived of and promoted by the accused and others to remove
7 permanently non-Serbs from the territory claimed by the Bosnian Serbs.
8 Counts 4 to 6 charge the accused with two charges of crimes
9 against humanity and the single count of the violations of the laws or
10 customs of war. These charges describe killings of the Bosnian Muslims
11 and the Bosnian Croats and others that occurred during and after attacks
12 on their settlements, and killings that occurred while these non-Serbs
13 were unlawfully detained. The acts that support this part of the
14 indictment are found in schedules A and B, and during the course of this
15 trial, we will present evidence as to each of these acts.
16 Finally, the remaining two counts in the indictment charge the
17 accused with criminal responsibility for the forcible transfer and
18 deportation of non-Serbs from the municipalities that are identified in
19 the indictment. These charges reflect one of the desired objectives of
20 the Bosnian Serb forces.
21 Now, let me turn my attention to the criminal responsibility of
22 the accused under Article 7(1).
23 We have charged Mr. Krajisnik with criminal responsibility for the
24 crimes enumerated in the indictment because of his role in planning,
25 instigating, ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting in the
1 preparation and execution of them. Our evidence will be presented to
2 Your Honours throughout the course of the trial, and I will not detail it
3 here. But I would like to focus for a few minutes your attention on the
4 allegation that he's criminally responsible for committing the crimes in
5 the indictment because of his participation in a joint criminal
7 As I said, the word "committing" in this indictment doesn't mean
8 that Momcilo Krajisnik personally shot or beat people or that he
9 personally torched a house or that he destroyed a mosque. People at his
10 level rarely do. Others do it for them. The term "committed" in this
11 case refers exclusively to his participation in the criminal enterprise,
12 the objective of which I have said many times.
13 Now, I have earlier shown you a map reflecting the ethnic make-up
14 of Bosnia before the war, and I'd like to return to it for just a minute.
15 And if we could have it on the screen. This is the map showing the areas
16 where Bosnian Serbs lived, both in Croatia and in Bosnia, and you will see
17 again from that map it depicts the ethnic populations and their
18 concentrations in Bosnia. As you'll see at a closer look - and thank you,
19 Ms. Javier for showing us this - the darkest blue areas represent the
20 highest concentration of Serb populations, and you will see that going
21 down to the white areas where there are virtually none.
22 And it's been said oftentimes that a map of Bosnia before the war
23 showing the ethnic populations and their distribution resemble the hide of
24 a leopard. Looking at this map today in this courtroom, it's clear to us,
25 as it was clear to Mr. Krajisnik before the war, as he was a native of
1 Bosnia, when he implemented his division for a divided Bosnia, that the
2 physical separation of ethnic communities in Bosnia would not be possible.
3 People simply would not agree voluntarily to abandon their age-old hearths
4 to satisfy the political goals and objectives of the Bosnian Serbs. Yet
5 the physical separation and permanent removal of Muslims and Croats from
6 the Serbian-claimed territory was precisely a policy of the Bosnian Serb
8 Now, each member of the joint criminal enterprise contributed in
9 different ways to achieving the objectives of the enterprise, and
10 throughout this trial, you will hear evidence about the contributions of
11 Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, Biljana Plavsic, Arkan, General Talic,
12 Radoslav Brdjanin, and other members of the enterprise. I've already
13 mentioned many of the accused's contributions to the joint criminal
14 enterprise. His central role in the creation and in the implementation of
15 Bosnian Serb policies of the Bosnian Serbs, his vital role in the creation
16 of the Bosnian Serb army, one of the principal instruments used in the
17 cleansing operations; his role in the selection of Ratko Mladic as the
18 commander of the Bosnian Serb army and his role in the creation of the
19 variant A and variant B instructions.
20 We intend to present considerable evidence about his other
21 contributions to this criminal enterprise throughout this trial. But let
22 me focus for a few minutes on his crucial role in the creation of Bosnian
23 Serb policy, specifically on the strategic objectives that I've previously
25 Our evidence in this trial will show that Momcilo Krajisnik was
1 instrumental in formulating these objectives. As Karadzic said when
2 announcing this particular objective, the first objective, in all of the
3 objectives, I should say - I should correct myself - it was formulated "by
4 the presidency, the government, the Council for National Security."
5 Council for National Security, the accused was a member of that. And
6 indeed, the accused himself underscored the importance in his role in
7 formulating the objectives at the same session when they were announced.
8 I will use his words. According to Momcilo Krajisnik: "As for
9 the strategic goals, I would like to offer an explanation, since I have
10 also taken part in adopting these goals. We must make a choice regarding
11 one thing. The first goal is the most important one, and in relation to
12 all other goals, all other goals are subitems to the first one."
13 Now, our evidence that we will present during the course of this
14 trial will show that Momcilo Krajisnik was an ardent and a persistent
15 proponent of the concept of ethnic division of the Muslims and the Croats
16 at the 11th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, approximately two months
17 before the strategic objectives were formally announced, Momcilo Krajisnik
18 said, when discussing the progress of international efforts to find
19 solutions to the Yugoslav crisis, and let me quote again Mr. Krajisnik:
20 "I think the problem is that they want Bosnia and Herzegovina to
21 internationally recognised at any cost. They want it to be a state. In
22 this respect, it would be good if we could do one thing for strategic
23 reasons: If we could start implementing what we have agreed upon, the
24 ethnic division on the ground. That we start determining the territory at
25 once, and once the territory is determined, it remains to be established
1 for additional negotiations whose authorities are to function and in what
2 way. I cannot say whether this will be fair in political terms. There is
3 not much fairness in politics, after all. And yes, if it does not turn
4 out to be fair, the Serbian people will be blamed. But we cannot accept a
5 state designed in the mind of the SDA people."
6 Now, our evidence in the course of this trial will show that
7 Mr. Krajisnik persisted to hold firmly to the view that the territory of
8 the Bosnian Serbs must be clean, and we will introduce evidence to this
9 effect during this trial.
10 Now, our indictment alleges alternatively that the crimes
11 enumerated in the counts in the indictment were the natural and
12 foreseeable consequences of the execution of the joint criminal
13 enterprise, and that Momcilo Krajisnik was aware that these crimes were
14 the possible consequence of the execution of it.
15 Now, was it foreseeable that the effort to forcibly separate
16 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the homes on which they had
17 lived -- and in which they had lived for generations and for centuries,
18 would result in the types of crimes that are described in the indictment?
19 Was it foreseeable that the crimes contained in the indictment would be
20 perpetrated against non-Serbs by Bosnian Serb forces in order to achieve
21 self-contained territories? The answer again to both questions is a
22 resounding yes.
23 At the 4th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, presided over by
24 Momcilo Krajisnik, Radovan Karadzic predicted what would occur if Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina was to become independent. He predicted a civil war and
1 he predicted its consequences.
2 I quote: "Apart from causing the deaths of several hundred
3 thousand people and complete destruction of several hundred towns, a civil
4 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina would also result in massive and rapid
5 population movements; in other words, it would lead to population
7 At the 10th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, again presided
8 over by the accused, Karadzic repeated, virtually verbatim, these same
9 words. His grim prediction echoes his earlier threat on the 14th of
10 October, 1991, and we saw a film clip of Mr. Karadzic earlier threatening
11 the Muslims with the prospect of disappearing. His grim predictions are
12 reflected in the threat on the 14th of October, 1991.
13 Now, when the strategic objectives were publicly announced at the
14 Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992, the Bosnian Serb deputies
15 in attendance understood precisely their meaning.
16 Our evidence will show this to be the case. Listen to the words
17 uttered by the representative from Bosanska Krupa, Miroslav Vjestica, who
18 was also the SDS president of the municipal board from Bosanska Krupa and
19 would, in 1995, become the vice-president of the Republika Srpska
20 government in charge of internal affairs. And I should add
21 parenthetically that Bosanska Krupa is one of the municipalities about
22 which you will here evidence during the course of this trial.
23 According to Mr. Vjestica, and I quote: "I give my full consent to
24 all the strategic goals that have been proposed." He goes on to say:
25 "What have we done in the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa? I must
1 tell you -- I must remind you that there is only 24 per cent of Serbs in
2 the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa. There is 14.500 of us, and
3 there is 47.000 Muslims." He then goes on to say: "For a year and a half
4 we have been preparing for the war in the Serbian municipality of
5 Bosanska Krupa because we knew that we would be at war and it cannot be
7 He goes on further to say: "How could it happen that two-thirds
8 of the town were taken in two days of operations? Thank God we did get to
9 our borders, because that is how we envisioned them and drawn them and
10 you, people's deputies, know well that that we had said that the right
11 bank of the Una would be our border and that the right bank of the Una
12 River must be the border, after all, the natural border of the Serbian
13 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina runs from Bihac via Bosanska Krupa to
14 Bosanski Novi. That was what we claimed, and that was why we did get to
15 the right bank of the Una River."
16 Finally, he says in his speech: "On the right bank of the
17 Una River there are no more Muslims in the Serbian municipality of
18 Bosanska Krupa. All the enclaves that were there" - and he lists those
19 enclaves - "we have evacuated them so that there will be none there for
20 the duration of war operations. Will they have a place to return to? I
21 think it is unlikely after our president told us the happy news that the
22 right bank of the Una River was the border."
23 As I say, Your Honours will hear considerable evidence about what
24 happened in the municipality of Bosanska Krupa.
25 Listen to the words of Dragan Kalinic from the municipality of
1 Sarajevo, and I quote him: "We have chosen the option of war or the
2 option of negotiation. I say this with reason, and I must instantly add
3 that, knowing who our enemy is, how perfidious they are, how they cannot
4 be trusted until they are physically, militarily destroyed and crushed,
5 which of course implies eliminating their key people. I do not hesitate
6 in selecting the first option, the option of war. The fate of Serbs in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be solved in any other way but by war."
8 Our evidence will show, Your Honours, that the events on the
9 ground conclusively demonstrate that the meaning of the first strategic
10 objective was clearly understood before its formal announcement on the
11 12th of May.
12 To give you briefly some examples: In the Brcko municipality,
13 about which you'll hear evidence starting tomorrow, Bosnian Muslim and
14 Bosnian Croat civilians were rounded up and detained in the notorious
15 camp, the Luka camp. Again, before the announcement of these objectives,
16 in the Bratunac municipality, about which you'll hear evidence at this
17 session, the village of Glogova was attacked, it was torched, and its
18 entire Muslim population removed. In the Bosanski Novi municipality,
19 which is the third municipality in succession, about which you'll hear
20 evidence, not this session but the next, Bosnian Muslim civilians were
21 arrested, placed on trains, and forcibly removed from the municipality.
22 I won't go further, Your Honours, but I'd like to turn now to
23 Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal and the responsibility of
24 Momcilo Krajisnik for the crimes described in the indictment under that
25 particular article.
1 The law is clear that to be criminally responsible under 7(3), the
2 accused may either be a civilian or a military superior, and in order to
3 establish criminal liability under Article 7(3), it's incumbent on the
4 Prosecution to establish that an offence was committed, that the accused
5 exercised superior authority over the perpetrators of the offence, that he
6 knew or had reason to know that a subordinate was about to commit a crime
7 or had done so, and that he had failed to take the necessary and
8 reasonable measures to prevent the offence from occurring or from
9 punishing the perpetrators.
10 Now, the first of these elements, that the offences occurred
11 during the course of the period of the indictment, was repeatedly denied
12 by the Bosnian Serb leadership as they were occurring, and our evidence
13 will demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the contrary.
14 The second element, superior authority over the perpetrators of
15 the offence, requires that a superior/subordinate relationship must have
16 existed between the accused and the perpetrator at the relevant time. Our
17 Tribunal has defined this to mean a superior must have effective control
18 over persons committing the underlying offences, in the sense of having
19 the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these
21 The evidence that we will present during the course of this trial
22 will show Your Honours that Momcilo Krajisnik had both de facto and de
23 jure control over the perpetrators of the offences described in the
25 Turning my attention first of all to the evidence on the issue of
1 Krajisnik's effective control, the following factors may be relevant to a
2 finding by this Trial Chamber of effective control by a superior over de
3 facto subordinates. These factors, which I will quickly run through, are
4 factors that have been recognised by the jurisprudence in this
5 institution. They include, but they are not limited to: The capacity to
6 sign orders; the substance of those orders; whether the orders were acted
7 upon; the position of the accused in the overall institutional, political,
8 and military organisations; the actual tasks performed; the evidence that
9 the accused has a high political profile; the accused's overall behaviour
10 towards subordinates and his duties; the accused's use of his extant
11 authority to prevent crimes and mistreatment; the exercise of powers
12 generally attached to a military command; the submitting of reports to
13 competent authorities in order for proper measures to be taken; and
14 finally, sanctioning power.
15 These are a list of some of the elements that Your Honours can
17 Now, our evidence that we will present during the course of this
18 trial will show plainly that Momcilo Krajisnik indeed had effective
19 control over the forces that committed the crimes alleged in the
20 indictment. His position in the SDS party, including being a member of
21 the Main Board and a member of the commission for personnel, vested him
22 with vast powers and influence. In the government structures of the
23 Bosnian Serb entity, he held numerous formal positions at the apex of
24 power, including being a member of the National Security Council. This
25 wasn't merely an advisory body, but it acted as a de facto presidency and
1 exercised powers of that office during the time period when
2 Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic were the acting presidents of the
3 Bosnian Serb Republic, in other words, in the chart that I had previously
4 shown, during the time period when those two individuals at the top of the
5 chart were members of the acting presidency.
6 Later, Momcilo Krajisnik became a member of the expanded
7 presidency, a body that was the supreme commander of the army and which
8 had plenary authority over the police. He was also the speaker of the
9 Bosnian Serb Assembly, the most elevated position in that body. And he
10 was the head of War Commissions. In addition, he was often selected to
11 represent the Bosnian Serb Republic in international conferences and
13 Now, in addition to his party positions in the SDS, in addition to
14 his official government positions, he maintained a close working
15 relationship with Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic,
16 General Ratko Mladic, and other political and military figures. This will
17 be reflected in considerable evidence that we present to Your Honours
18 during the course of this trial, but I'd like to play just one example of
19 that for Your Honours. It is an intercept of a telephone conversation
20 between the accused and Ratko Mladic on the 27th of May, 1992. And,
21 Your Honours, I have instructed -- I've requested from Your Honours
22 whether or not it is necessary to have these simultaneously translated.
23 I've been informed it is not, and I've informed the booth of the position
24 of the Trial Chamber. So there will be no simultaneous translation, and
25 you will be able to listen to the words, the tone of this conversation,
1 and you'll be able to read the script without interruption.
2 So if that could be played, please.
3 [Intercept played]
4 MR. HARMON: That concludes the intercept.
5 Now, because of these official positions and his close
6 relationships with Karadzic, Mladic, and other members of the joint
7 criminal enterprise, our evidence will establish beyond a reasonable doubt
8 his effective control over the Bosnian Serb political institutions, as
9 well as the military police and associated forces that were indispensable
10 to achieving the Bosnian Serb objectives.
11 Now, earlier in my remarks I mentioned that the accused was a
12 member of the expanded presidency. His de jure authority over the
13 perpetrators of the crimes, some of the crimes identified in the
14 indictment, emanated from this position. He served in this capacity from
15 the 2nd of June until the 17th of December, 1992.
16 Now, after the constitution of the Bosnian Serb Republic was
17 promulgated, the most important executive organ through which the Bosnian
18 Serb leadership exercised its power was the office of the president of the
19 Republic. However, this position remained unoccupied until the 17th of
20 December, 1992, when Radovan Karadzic was elected to that position.
21 One of the vital powers conferred on the president by the
22 constitution was to command the army, to appoint and dismiss its officers,
23 and the evidence that we will present will show that before Karadzic
24 finally became the president on the 17th of December, 1992, interim
25 collective presidencies discharged the function of the president. In this
1 respect, one of the collective presidency members, acting on behalf of the
2 presidency, commanded the army and appointed and promoted and dismissed
4 I have to emphasise that the collective presidencies, in their
5 various iterations, were precisely that: Collective decision-making
6 bodies, and decisions were taken after consultations within the collective
7 body. Indeed, Your Honours, the accused firmly believed in the collective
8 decision-making process.
9 This is what he said: "I believe that it is normal to have
10 centralisation of authority in the war, but I would always be in favour of
11 the idea not to concentrate the power in the hands of only one man,
12 starting from myself, and then everybody else. Mr. Karadzic is not a
13 controlling man and he doesn't even want the power, but I would promote
14 that there is a consciousness in each and every one of us. Mr. Karadzic
15 feels the same way. He is in favour of leadership of Serbian people,
16 instead of its leader. Because when you have leadership, then you have
17 more common sense, more heads, so to speak, and the decisions are of much
18 better quality than they would be if they were made only by one man. In
19 order for us to be efficient, we must have unanimous decisions. We must
20 work as one. And if there's any one of us missing, a different opinion is
21 immediately created. I mean, conflict about something, that is normal.
22 That is why it's needed to have more engagement, and I would personally
23 promote the presidency and not the president, especially since they are
24 all people of great quality. They are all very patriotic, and it would be
25 a pity to eliminate some of them and leave only one to make all the
1 decisions. And honestly, the responsibility in the war is great and it is
2 necessary to share the responsibility."
3 So those were Mr. Krajisnik's views before he became a member of
4 the presidency.
5 Now, our evidence that we will present to Your Honours will show
6 that the presidency issued numerous orders, including, in some instances,
7 direct combat orders to the army. For example, in the minutes of the 12th
8 session of the presidency, they reflect that the presidency ordered the
9 Bosnian Serb army to "immediately cease all artillery and infantry
10 operations in the suburbs of Dobrinja," and further ordered that the
11 Bosnian Serb army move from offensive to defensive positions.
12 Now, what was the essence of the presidency's command authority
13 over the army? Our evidence will show that the law on the army - we'll
14 introduce the law of the army to Your Honours - emphasised that the
15 exercise of command was founded on the principle of unity of command and
16 the obligation to exercise -- to execute, I'm sorry, the decisions,
17 commands, and orders of superiors.
18 This fundamental principle was acknowledged in one of the military
19 reports that we will introduce into evidence. It says, in part: "The
20 Army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to
21 implement, resolutely and uncompromisingly, the decisions of the state and
22 political leadership of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
23 Now, similarly, the presidency had direct command over the police.
24 We'll present evidence to Your Honours to that effect.
25 Under Article 7(3), to prove criminal responsibility, it's
1 incumbent on the Office of the Prosecutor to prove that the accused knew
2 or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit crimes or
3 had done so.
4 Let me focus a bit on the evidence that Momcilo Krajisnik had
5 reason to know that his subordinates were about to or had committed
7 From the minutes of the various Bosnian Serb assemblies, over
8 which Mr. Krajisnik presided as its president, he knew that if a political
9 solution was not found on the issue of sovereignty to Bosnia, war would
10 ensue and the Serb forces would unleash the dogs of war in order to
11 achieve their overriding objectives of creating a Serb state. Throughout
12 the debates which the accused attended, the crimes in this indictment were
13 forecast repeatedly.
14 Let me take you to the 4th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
15 on the 21st of December, 1991. Listen to the words of Assemblyman Vukic:
16 "If the European Community goes on with its threat to recognise Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina as an independent state," he sets the stage, he goes on to
18 say: "There will be massive bloodshed in which nations that have been
19 subsequently created will disappear altogether."
20 That's very reminiscent of what Mr. Karadzic said in his famous
21 speech about disappearing and in his subsequent speeches about war
22 resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths, destroyed homes, and massive
23 and bloody, forcible dislocation of minorities.
24 At the 12th Assembly session, Assemblyman Kozic said, and I quote:
25 "The enemy, Ustashas and Mujahedin, has to be defeated by whatever means
1 are necessary and only after that can we negotiate."
2 Milenko Vojinovic, also known as Dr. Beli, from the Brcko
3 municipality about which you'll hear tomorrow, said at the 16th assembly
4 of the Serb Assembly on the 12th of May, in speaking about Brcko requiring
5 more forces, he said they needed those forces "for a definitive clearing
6 of the area."
7 Now, by implementing a policy to separate the Serbs from the
8 non-Serbs on the territory coveted by the Serbs, our evidence will show
9 that Momcilo Krajisnik knew that the direction he was leading the Bosnian
10 Serb people and he knew that these would lead to the commission of massive
12 One of the groups that was responsible for those crimes,
13 paramilitary groups -- I discussed earlier the events in Bijeljina, the
14 actions of Arkan, who wasn't alone. He wasn't the only paramilitary in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Momcilo Krajisnik was fully apprised of the types
16 of people who filled the ranks of the paramilitary units. He received
17 clear notice of it.
18 In a remarkably candid report prepared by the Main Staff of the
19 Bosnian Serb army, dated the 28th of July, 1992, and entitled "Report on
20 paramilitary formations in the territory of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina," and distributed to, amongst others, the president of the
22 Bosnian -- the president of the presidency, the prime minister, the VRS
23 Main Staff commander. The main characteristics of those paramilitary
24 units is described. And I have extracted certain of those descriptions
25 from that report that we will lead into evidence: "They are mainly
1 composed of individuals of low moral quality, and in many cases, of
2 persons previously prosecuted for crimes and offences, and even convicted
3 for crimes of murder, robbery, larceny, and the like. Very often, such
4 units have in their ranks pathological criminals whom the conditions of
5 war and general lawlessness have brought to the fore."
6 In another part of the report, it says: "Many formations of this
7 type display hatred of non-Serbian peoples, and one can conclude without
8 reservation that they are the genocidal element among the Serbian people."
9 The report states further: "War profiteering and looting are the
10 motive for the great majority of paramilitaries."
11 It goes on finally, in the last extract I've taken from that
12 report, reads as follows: "One feature common to all paramilitary
13 formations is that they do not take part in direct fighting with the
14 enemy. Instead, they are operating behind the lines of the regular
15 Serbian Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina army units, looting and burning
16 property and killing the innocent population, or, as our people say,
17 stealing chickens."
18 Now, this report that we will lead into evidence identifies by
19 name many of the units responsible for the predations on the non-Serb
20 civilians. You'll hear testimonies from the victims of these paramilitary
21 groups. Some of the paramilitary groups identified in this report you
22 already know. The Arkanovci, headed by Arkan. I've described for you
23 briefly some of his actions in Bijeljina. The Seseljovci, the
24 paramilitary group under the leadership of Vojislav Seselj, who is
25 currently awaiting trial in this institution. But this report also
1 identified lesser-known paramilitary groups who were involved in the
2 crimes throughout these municipalities.
3 Now, you're going to hear evidence that there were orders issued
4 to integrate these paramilitary groups into the Bosnian Serb army or
5 disband them, and indeed, many of the important paramilitary groups
6 identified in this report were incorporated into the Bosnian Serb army.
7 Momcilo Krajisnik promoted the incorporation of these elements into the
8 Bosnian Serb army.
9 Now, there are many examples that you will hear throughout this
10 trial of these paramilitary groups being incorporated into the army, but
11 let me tell you about one such group, a smaller group, a lesser-known
12 group. It hailed from the municipality of Prnjavor, which again is one of
13 the municipalities about which you will hear evidence and hear the
14 victims. The commander of that group was a man by the name of
15 Veljko Milankovic. He was a man who had been prosecuted seven times, and
16 he had been brought before the misdemeanour court 17 times. The
17 paramilitary group that he led consisted of 150 men. According to the
18 Main Staff report, Milankovic's group "is, as of recently, formally under
19 the command of the 1st Krajina Corps."
20 The report goes on to say, and I quote: "Members of this
21 detachment are involved in extensive looting." And as Your Honours know,
22 looting forms part of this indictment.
23 Now, despite direct knowledge of the ongoing illegal conduct of
24 this unit, it remained part of the corps structure, and moreover,
25 Milankovic, whose unsavoury record I've described, remained an officer in
1 that unit until his death, at which time he was later recommended for a
2 posthumous decoration.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I'm looking at the clock. It's close to
4 7.00. Could you find a suitable moment?
5 MR. HARMON: I will.
6 Now, did the presidency have clear and direct notice of
7 these -- that these elements within the army were committing these foul
8 deeds? Our evidence will show that they did. Our evidence will show that
9 perhaps a few of these units were purged, but by and large they were not.
10 Our evidence will show that perhaps a few members of these units were
11 prosecuted, but the majority were not. These unsavoury elements remained
12 in the Bosnian Serb army and the political leadership used these elements
13 to achieve their political goals.
14 And this, Your Honour, is a perfect time to break. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I've got one question for you: How much
16 time would you still need?
17 MR. HARMON: I would say no more than half an hour tomorrow
18 morning, or tomorrow afternoon.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, tomorrow in the afternoon. Then could the
20 Chamber receive a short list of all the exhibits shown to the -- which I
21 do understand that most of them will be tendered into evidence, so that we
22 can -- we at least know what the proper identification of what exactly it
23 was, whether we saw the whole, whether we saw part of certain documents,
24 so that we can keep track of that.
25 MR. HARMON: That is no problem, and tomorrow I will present that
1 to Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. If there will be a technical way
3 of -- some of the pictures we saw, of course some parts were enlarged, but
4 sometimes the whole of the picture was very difficult to see on the
5 screen. Sometimes when it was blue I even thought I was looking at a
6 Rorschach test rather than at a map. So if we could find a way of at
7 least using a full screen for these pictures, that would be nice.
8 Madam Registrar, we will sit tomorrow on from a quarter past 2.00
9 in courtroom -- in this same courtroom? Yes. Then we'll adjourn until
10 tomorrow, quarter past 2.00.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.
12 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 4th day of
13 February 2004, at 2.15 p.m.