1 Wednesday, 23 June 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-00-39-T, The Prosecutor versus
7 Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
9 Good afternoon to everyone. Mr. Tieger, I asked the witness to be
10 stand by. I would like to ask you, in chief until now, you've taken one
11 hour and 45 minutes. Today we could expect to have approximately four
12 hours. That would make five hours and 45 minutes. The witness was
13 scheduled for six witness. Do you intend to conclude the
14 examination-in-chief today, or... ?
15 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, two matters: Number one, I had
16 understood that the witness estimate was eight hours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: If that's so, then I should immediately --
18 MR. STEWART: That was our understanding as well, Your Honour.
19 Eight hours has been consistently what we have been given on the schedule,
20 so we agree with Mr. Tieger about that.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me just see. I thought that I saw on one
22 of the schedules six hours, but if that's wrong, then I have to withdraw
23 my question at all. If I find any six hours somewhere, I'll draw your
24 attention to that.
25 Yes. The latest schedule says time estimated: Six hours.
1 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, I can only repeat what I said
2 before. We had been operating on the understanding, as has the Defence --
3 let me also say notwithstanding that estimate, I think the Court is aware
4 that we have made considerable efforts to bring our direct examinations in
5 well under the time. That's my intention here as well, but I think I need
6 to emphasise that I understood I was operating under --
7 JUDGE ORIE: At least -- I took it from the list, which says at
8 the bottom "as of the 22nd of June," so since today it's the 23rd of June,
9 I thought this was the most recent information. If you have another --
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it's not -- well, we do have another.
11 It's that we don't have or never have seen any such document as the one
12 that Your Honour is referring to with a later date. So we --
13 JUDGE ORIE: You have eight hours on the 22nd of June, and we have
14 six hours?
15 MR. STEWART: The last one that we have is dated the 17th of May
16 2004, Krajisnik order of proof at 24th May to 9th July, and it sets eight
17 hours. And, Your Honour, when I spoke, as we often do, of course, we do
18 talk to each other, when I spoke to Mr. Tieger within the last day or so,
19 and he confirmed and said --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Let's keep it short. On the basis of the latest
21 information, I thought I should put this question to you. But now it
22 turns out that this information is, for one reason or another, is not
23 correct information, and you had something different in mind. So let's
24 just proceed then, and perhaps next time, if there's new information, and
25 that's what it learns me, please also give it to the Defence so that they
1 can already raise the issue and say this is a different number of hours so
2 you can inform the Chamber that this is a mistake.
3 Let's ask the witness to be escorted into the courtroom.
4 I asked these questions because I am looking at how to -- we lost
5 one day last week due to the loss of voice of Mr. Harmon. I'm just
6 wondering whether we could finish by not later than Friday, of course,
7 which should be possible, even within the eight-hour schedule. But I
8 would like to deal with some procedural issues as well, and therefore I
9 had in mind if this six hours would be correct, then we might take
10 tomorrow for the cross-examination, under the 60 per cent rule, which is
11 not a strict rule but kind of a level of expectation by the Chamber, but I
12 now understood that everything will take a bit more time. But if
13 possible, the Chamber would very much like, since we will not be sitting
14 for the next two weeks, to deal with the procedural issues by Friday,
15 because otherwise we will have to come back on Monday where we are
16 supposed not to sit, because, as I informed you, the Chamber agrees, under
17 close monitoring, to start with the new schedule proposed, and it would be
18 a pity if we would have to all come back on Monday to discuss this and a
19 few more procedural issues.
20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it doesn't sound as if there's an
21 enormous problem. If we assume the eight hours, I don't think
22 Mr. Tieger's been suggesting he's likely to be more than the eight hours.
23 I believe he feels reasonably comfortable about that, in which case we
24 would begin cross-examination sometime in the middle of tomorrow. And
25 Your Honour, at the moment, unless something unexpected turns up, and of
1 course it often does, but unless something unexpected turns up, it looks
2 as if we will manage to finish all these matters with some spare time for
3 the other matters within this week. So perhaps I should just sit down now
4 and let us do that.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So all the expectations are now again in the
6 same direction, and I just take it for a typing error that I read six
8 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, since it doesn't take any time while
9 the witness is being fetched, can I just say, we don't quite understand
10 what's happening if a schedule such as Your Honour has seems to reach Your
11 Honour without falling into the hands of either Mr. Tieger, who is the
12 person examining this witness, or us. Something's clearly going wrong in
13 the administration somewhere. So I don't know. But clearly it's helpful
14 both to Mr. Tieger and to me if we get these schedules updated.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. They stem from the Prosecution. And they're
16 supposed to be given to the Defence and a copy to the Chamber, and the
17 Defence could, if there's anything wrong with disclosure or translations,
18 et cetera, they can at that very moment identify what they could expect to
19 be used in court. And it's just something for proper preparation of the
20 court hearings. But I do agree if the receiving part is the only one,
21 that's the Chamber, who has knowledge of it, that's a bit odd.
22 But I see the witness is waiting. Could we, Madam Usher, ask you
23 to escort the witness into the courtroom.
24 [The witness entered court]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Okun. Good afternoon. Although
1 I take it that it would even go without saying, it's my duty to remind you
2 that you are still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the
3 beginning of your testimony.
4 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
7 Examined by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
8 Q. Good afternoon to you, Ambassador Okun.
9 A. Good afternoon.
10 Q. Ambassador, I would like to begin today with something that you
11 raised in your testimony yesterday. In response to a question about the
12 number of Muslims who would live within territories held by the Bosnian
13 Serbs, you referred to the removal of Muslims from the territory and the
14 ethnic cleansing of Muslims by the Bosnian Serb forces. First, can I ask
15 you about the sources of information that you and the Secretary Vance and
16 the other negotiators had concerning the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from
17 territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina by Bosnian Serb forces?
18 A. The first indication, and it was official and written, came from
19 the plebiscite that the Bosnian Serb Assembly ordered in November 1991.
20 This was a plebiscite of the Bosnian Serb people to decide whether to opt
21 for remaining in a Bosnian Serb entity and also Yugoslavia. And one might
22 have thought that there would just be a general plebiscite, you know, of
23 the million and a quarter or so Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
24 but it was not organised that way. It was organised opstina by opstina.
25 And a very important, significant aspect was the decision written in the
1 rules of the plebiscite that in any opstina where more than 50 per cent of
2 the Serbs voted in favour of Republika Srpska, regardless of the size of
3 the opstina, regardless of their percentage in the opstina, that opstina
4 became part of the Republika Srpska.
5 So for example, if you had an opstina that is arguendo, picture an
6 opstina that has 10.000 voting population, 5.000 Bosnian Muslims, 3.000
7 Bosnian Serbs, 2.000 Bosnian Croats; 10.000. The 3.000 Bosnian Serbs vote
8 out of 10.000. If 2.000 of them voted to remain in Republika Srpska and
9 Yugoslavia, that opstina was automatically declared part of Republika
10 Srpska, never mind that there are 7.000 others who don't want that. So
11 that was the first indication, because what was to happen of those 7.000
12 people? They weren't just going to disappear by some magic trick.
13 Then we had and noticed and saw the request for assistance,
14 "assistance" from the JNA in December 1991 to "protect" the Bosnian Serb
15 people in these places, in the plebiscitary areas, very similar to
16 Croatia. The same game was being played. That was December 1991, and
17 these were official documents.
18 In January, Republika Srpska was proclaimed. January 9, as we all
19 know. And in February, when the constitution of Republika Srpska was
20 promulgated - this is February 1992 - it stated that the areas that were
21 to comprise the territorial entity, the continuous territory, as was
22 always emphasised to us by Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and the others,
23 that the areas would constitute all of these plebiscitary areas where
24 regardless of the other numbers, a majority of Bosnian Serbs had voted to
25 remain -- to join Yugoslavia, plus - and I believe I mentioned this
1 yesterday - plus those areas where Serbs were in the minority because of
2 the World War II genocide. So this was all written and known.
3 And the question then arises, what was going to happen to the
4 other people? What about the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats,
5 because in many of these opstinas, particularly along the Drina but others
6 as well, the Bosnian Muslims in were the majority. Well, those so-called
7 crisis committees played the same game as they did - a horrible game, I
8 should say - as they did in Croatia. And this was physically known.
9 Journalists saw it. When we travelled, infrequently I may say, but when
10 we went to the areas, one could see the other populations being forcibly
11 removed. So there was no secret about this. In fact, I believe the whole
12 world knew this was happening, via television.
13 I'm sorry to have to give you such a long answer, but I think it's
14 important to know that this was already established by fiat and was not a
15 spontaneous operation.
16 Q. Were there organisations responsible for monitoring what was
17 happening in those regions, and did you receive information from such
18 organisations about what was happening on the ground?
19 A. Yes. At first, we received quite detailed information from the EC
20 Monitoring Mission, and then from the UNPROFOR troops as well.
21 Q. And as the -- after the conflict erupted in -- with more intensity
22 in April and May and June, did you receive information from such
23 organisations as the ICRC, UNHCR, and others who had representatives in
24 the region and were monitoring what was happening?
25 A. Very much so. By June, the camps were already being formed.
1 Detention centres, large-scale detention centres, particularly in -- west
2 of Banja Luka, around Prijedor; Trnopolje, a very, very big camp; the
3 Omarska camp, which was much worse, a real concentration camp. These had
4 already been formed, and there were thousands, thousands upon thousands of
5 primarily Bosnian Muslims but also Bosnian Croats, civilians - civilians;
6 men, women, and children - held in these centres. There then ensued quite
7 a lengthy and painful discussion among the humanitarian agencies with the
8 Bosnian Serb leadership about what to do with the people, because it was a
9 terrible, moral dilemma. And it's in my diary notes; you'll see
10 discussions with Madam Ogata, the head of the United Nations High
11 Commissioner for Refugees, and with the senior officials of the ICRC, the
12 International Committee of the Red Cross, because on the one hand they
13 wanted to save these people, but on the other hand, removing them from the
14 camps and taking them to Croatia, which was where most of them were going
15 - they were not going back to their homes, they were being evacuated to
16 Croatia - well, this was, as they said, collaborating in ethnic cleansing.
17 And so that posed a very painful moral dilemma for the humanitarian
18 organisations in the event they did take the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian
19 Croat civilians under their wing into Croatia.
20 Q. Ambassador, just to quickly identify one additional potential
21 source, did you and Secretary Vance and the others involved in the
22 negotiation also receive information from Tadeusz Mazowiecki?
23 A. Yes, but it confirmed what we had heard from others, yes, but he
24 was also well aware and vitally concerned with Vance in his capacity as
25 rapporteur on human rights.
1 Q. And was the information you were receiving from these various
2 sources consistent?
3 A. Yes, it was entirely consistent, I may say.
4 Q. Now, did you and Secretary Vance have occasions to let the Bosnian
5 Serb leadership, including Mr. Krajisnik, know that you were aware of
6 widespread ethnic cleansing or ongoing ethnic cleansing?
7 A. Yes, repeatedly.
8 Q. What was their response, Ambassador? Was there any meaningful
9 attempt to deny that cleansing had taken place or was ongoing?
10 A. No, they didn't deny it. The typical, indeed, the almost
11 invariable response was to point out the genocide that had been practiced
12 against the Serbs in World War II and earlier periods, or to point to
13 crimes that were allegedly being committed in -- at the present time, 1992
14 and 1993, 1991, whatever, mostly in 1992 and 1993, that were crimes
15 against them. For example, if we would raise the question of the shelling
16 of Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb leadership would normally reply, "Oh, but
17 we're only doing that to protect our own people. Sarajevo is the biggest
18 concentration camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 60.000 Serbs are being held
19 hostage by the Muslims." There was no evidence for that, but that was the
20 standard Bosnian Serb response. It was very much tu quoque; you're
22 Q. Ambassador, just to clarify the written record, you indicated that
23 the almost invariable response was to either point to genocide or World
24 War II, or to point crimes that were allegedly being committed at the
25 present time, and that thought was not completed. Did that mean crimes
1 that were being committed at the present time against Serbs by the Muslims
2 or Croats?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did you understand that response to be, in effect, an
5 acknowledgment that the Bosnian Serbs, too, were committing crimes, but to
6 point the negotiators to the fact that others were doing the same?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did the Bosnian Serb leadership, during the course of your
9 negotiations, take negotiating positions that depended upon the change in
10 demographic conditions that had been produced by the ethnic cleansing?
11 A. Most certainly. Their whole claim, for example, for the Drina
12 River valley, that is to say for the left bank of the Drina, was based on
13 ethnic cleansing. I mean, they knew it; we knew it.
14 Q. Did the members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, including
15 Mr. Krajisnik, indicate to you and Secretary Vance and the other
16 negotiators that the use of force would cease as soon as the Bosnian Serbs
17 got what they wanted?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And were they thereby indicating to you and to Secretary Vance and
20 the others that they were in control of the forces that were engaged in
21 the cleansings, running the camps, and so on?
22 A. Yes. Indeed, Dr. Karadzic said explicitly, and I've quoted him
23 actually somewhere in the diary, that he controlled - we -- I and the
24 Bosnian Serb civilian leadership - we control General Mladic, we control
25 the military. And he went on to say "You know how the soldiers are. They
1 don't like to be controlled by civilians, but we control them." He was
2 quite explicit on that point.
3 And also, we saw it in other cases. Just to give one example:
4 When the issue arose of creating a no-fly zone over Bosnia similar to the
5 no-fly zones over Iraq - this was 1992 - at one meeting between
6 Dr. Karadzic, Lord Owen, and myself, just the three of us in the room, we
7 again were insisting on the Bosnian Serbs stopping this practice, and
8 Dr. Karadzic offered to fly the planes, the war planes of the VRS, which
9 were based at Banja Luka airport, he offered to fly them to Belgrade. And
10 so we said that might be acceptable. And in our presence, he took out his
11 cell phone and called the commander, the military commander, of the Banja
12 Luka airfield and told him to remove the planes -- well, I shouldn't say
13 he told him to remove; they discussed the possibility of the planes being
14 removed, which showed - and this was in the evening, by the way - this
15 showed that the ease of communication, the rapidity of communication, the
16 fact that the communication was open between the Bosnian Serb leadership
17 and some nameless air force colonel of the VRS at the Banja Luka airport.
18 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.
19 Yesterday, you made reference to the Cutileiro plan which was
20 ongoing from at least February 1992. And I believe you also referred to
21 the 12 May 1992 statement of strategic objectives. I'd like to quickly
22 show you those documents, and then I have a question for you in connection
23 with those two.
24 MR. TIEGER: So if the ambassador could be shown both the proposed
25 Cutileiro plan with the attached map, and then the strategic objectives.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I know by now that if we're talking about
2 the Cutileiro plan, we have to carefully look at whether we have the
3 Lisbon version or the - what was the other one? - Sarajevo version. Which
4 one is on the table at this moment?
5 MR. TIEGER: Lisbon, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Lisbon. Yes.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you for that clarification.
8 Q. Ambassador, before I proceed with the specific question, let me
9 ask you a quick question about the 12 May 1992 document, the strategic
10 objectives. Although the numbers are the same, is it correct that that
11 document is not to be confused with the six political goals or war aims
12 that you described yesterday; that, while related, they are different?
13 A. That's correct. They are not meant to be nor are they identical.
14 The six principles of May 12, the strategic objectives, concern almost
15 exclusively territory. They were about land.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honour, forgive me for this clarification,
18 for amending my supposed clarification, but before anyone else notices, I
19 see that the Cutileiro plan before the witness and before the Court is
20 dated 18 March, 1992, Sarajevo.
21 JUDGE ORIE: I noticed that. And the other thing we have to do is
22 to check whether the map attached to it is the Sarajevo map or the Lisbon
23 map. But please proceed.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
25 Q. Ambassador, there has been a suggestion in this case that there's
1 a close correlation between the Cutileiro plan and the strategic
2 objectives. And I would like to know from you whether you share that
3 assessment or whether you see significant distinctions between the two.
4 A. Well, there's not a close relationship. There is a relationship
5 insofar as it discusses the three constituent peoples and would give each
6 of the three peoples, the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian
7 Serbs, would give them a juridical identity. But you can see from the map
8 that we are looking at that it does not grant territorial continuity to
9 Republika Srpska. The areas that are on this map that are entirely white
10 are the Serb areas, and they are disconnected. For example, in along the
11 Posavina. Also, one sees from the map that most of the Drina is given on
12 the correct, that's to say the census, basis of the ethnicities. And all
13 the striped areas are Muslim opstinas, from Bijeljina down almost to
14 Nevesinje, which conforms to the ethnic reality. That's the population of
15 Bosnia in 1991.
16 So that definitely does not conform with the strategic objectives.
17 And there are other points as well. The Bosnian Serb border is not pushed
18 as far as the Neretva. So there are some conformities, but by and large,
19 the Henry Darwin map, the map for Cutileiro plan which was drawn up by
20 Mr. Darwin, did not carry out these objectives.
21 Q. Did the Cutileiro plan call for the establishment of a corridor
22 linking Serbia to the Krajina, as the strategic objectives do?
23 A. Not to the best of my knowledge. One has to bear in mind that the
24 Cutileiro plan died aborning. It never was completed. This map, for
25 example, that we're looking at was discussed quite heavily but remained a
1 draft proposal unless it was definitively rejected. And the plan was
2 always a work in progress. Indeed, if you look at the last page over the
3 date Sarajevo, 18 March, the last sentence reads, and I quote from the
4 Cutileiro plan paper: "This paper is the basis of further negotiations."
5 So it was clear that this was a discussion paper. It was not a
6 complete and formal plan. It was serious, of course. But one cannot
7 really give it the same status as a formal plan proposed to the parties.
8 Q. Did the Cutileiro plan call for the physical division of Sarajevo
9 into Muslim and Serb parts, separate parts with people segregated?
10 A. I don't believe so.
11 Q. And finally, Ambassador, was the Cutileiro plan intended as a
12 proposed that would be implemented by agreement?
13 A. Oh, yes, there was no question of that. In fact, the three
14 parties did agree to this tentative document in March of 1992, and then
15 the Bosnian government withdraw its signature at the very end of March.
16 Q. And does that also represent a significant difference between the
17 strategic objectives and the Cutileiro plan?
18 A. Excuse me. I don't understand the question.
19 Q. Does the fact that the Cutileiro plan anticipated implementation
20 by agreement also reflect the significant distinction between it and the
21 strategic objectives?
22 A. I would say yes, because given the extreme nature of the demands
23 in the strategic objectives of May 12, given the fact that they were
24 claiming territory in some cases that was overwhelmingly non-Serb - along
25 the Drina, for example - that it was based on a unilateral assertion of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 Q. Ambassador, could we now turn back to some of the specific entries
3 in your diary. And I'd like to turn your attention first to a diary entry
4 of September 10th.
5 A. Excuse me, what year, please?
6 Q. 1992.
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, excuse me. It just may be worth
9 mentioning, I think we're right that the page from the Official Gazette,
10 this is a previous exhibit, of course, is P47. If that's right, if that's
11 agreed to be the number, I think it's probably helpful to put that on the
12 transcript so that subsequently when anybody is looking at the transcript
13 they know what it is we're talking about. And the other document I'm
14 afraid we don't remember immediately the number, but the other document is
15 part of a Defence exhibit. We think it's 5 or 6.
16 It seems it may be 5. We've understood Ms. Philpott to be saying
17 it is 5.
18 JUDGE ORIE: The map has a separate number. The map is D7.
19 MR. STEWART: 7, thank you, Your Honours. It's just helpful for
20 the future for all of us, I think, to have it there in the transcript in
21 the same passage.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Just to make it clear, Mr. Stewart, D5 is the
23 statement of principles, and we have another statement of principles under
24 D6. And the map, I think we switched from a more general map which was
25 first introduced, not as detailed as this one, and then -- at least the
1 detailed one is admitted under D7.
2 MR. STEWART: That's all as we understand it, Your Honour. Thank
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, it appears that we're having some
5 difficulties with the Sanction system, so I think we're going to have to
6 place this diary entry on the ELMO, the physical copy.
7 If we could have the first page of that entry placed on the ELMO,
8 that would be R0163902.
9 Q. Ambassador Okun, as indicated by your entry, this is a meeting
10 with Dr. Karadzic and Colonel Zarkovic, and the note taker. And we see on
11 that first page a map depicted. Can you explain to us what that is,
13 A. You mean page that ends in 902 from my diary journal, that map?
14 Yes. Dr. Karadzic -- I will read what I wrote: Pulls out Darwin's
15 detailed map. And that would be the map that we just discussed, the
16 Cutileiro map of March. Pulls out Darwin's detailed map, and then he had
17 an overlay showing the Serb-controlled areas. And I drew by hand, and I
18 apologise, I'm not a cartographer, I draw by hand his overlay which showed
19 the Serb-controlled areas. And basically, it's the Drina up to Semberija
20 and Bijeljina, and then the Posavina corridor, and then the -- and Western
21 Bosnia, which was Bosnian controlled, and the white area was that held by
22 the Muslims and the Croats. And basically, that's the Cazinska Krajina,
23 what came to be called during the conflict, the Bihac pocket, and Central
24 Bosnia. So this was his overlay, and he was telling us "We already
25 control this area." It was a straightforward presentation of what the
1 Bosnian Serb forces, the VRS and the irregulars, held at the time.
2 Q. If I can ask you then to turn to the two pages that are contained
3 on the ERN marked page R0163904, continuation of the notes from that
4 meeting, and the entry at the top left of that page is "CRV - about
6 A. Yes. Secretary Vance was going to ask him about the detention
7 centres, the concentration camps particularly in the western part of
8 Bosnia. And Dr. Karadzic replied, as he usually did, Sarajevo is the
9 biggest camp of all. 60.000 Serbs are held prison there, et cetera, et
10 cetera, et cetera. I mean, this was a standard response, which is why
11 after 60.000 I just wrote -- you see the three dots, meaning we've heard
12 this before and there's no need to repeat this argument. It was the
13 standard argument.
14 Then he -- Secretary Vance mentioned that we've spoken to the
15 ICRC, and Dr. Karadzic says that Trnopolje, which was one of the very
16 large and quite infamous camps, is an open camp, by which he meant that
17 people are free to enter it and leave it. That is, the displaced Bosnian
18 Muslims and Croats were free, he was saying, to enter the camp or to leave
19 the camp. In fact, that was not true.
20 Then Lord Owen says, we need to phase this out. This camp has to
21 be ended, this situation must end. And Karadzic again goes back to
22 helping the Serbs detained in camps by others. And that was true. There
23 were Bosnian Serbs being held by the others. There was no doubt of that.
24 They were held in much, much smaller number, but they were also being
25 held. So as a matter of fact, that existed, but the quantity was
1 overwhelmingly different. I mean, there was just no question about the
3 Q. On the following page of your diary, but the same ERN page
4 reference, you tell Dr. Karadzic, "You shelled Sarajevo first." What
5 prompted that remark by you, and what was Dr. Karadzic's response?
6 A. Well, Dr. Karadzic, as you see by the previous statement, the one
7 beginning "Why are sanctions tightened" he was appealing for our sympathy.
8 He did that fairly often. He would play the role of the innocent party,
9 the injured party, when we knew and he knew, and he knew that we knew, he
10 was not the innocent party. His people started this whole thing. So he's
11 complaining here. He's lamenting the fact. And he points out that the
12 Croatians, both in the Krajina and in Bosnia, are getting weapons in spite
13 of the arms embargo that had been passed by the Security Council already
14 in September 1991. And being a little tired of hearing this litany,
15 because it wasted our time, among other things, I basically was saying to
16 him, look, you know, stop this kind of talk. We all know the facts of the
17 situation. You're talking about the Croats getting arms. You're shelling
18 Sarajevo mercilessly, thousands of shells a day were falling on Sarajevo.
19 And this meeting was taking place in Sarajevo. You notice along the side
20 I write "constant firing" with arrows. You see that on the page.
21 I wrote fire. We could hear the shells falling as we were
22 conducting this meeting in Sarajevo. And here is Dr. Karadzic bemoaning
23 the fact that, you know, that other people are getting weapons. I mean,
24 this was really quite an anomalous picture. We are sitting in Sarajevo,
25 the Bosnian Serbs are shelling the city, we are being shelled. We're
1 sitting with flak jackets on, helmets, and Dr. Karadzic is complaining.
2 So I said, come on, Dr. Karadzic, we all know who shelled Sarajevo first.
3 And then his answer to that was, "They started the war" - "they" being the
4 Bosnian Muslims - "by expelling me from my apartment in Sarajevo." "They
5 started the war by expelling me from my apartment in Sarajevo." Thousands
6 of people have been by this time killed, hundreds of thousands displaced
7 from their homes, and Dr. Karadzic thinks it is a convincing argument to
8 tell the negotiators that the Muslims started the war by expelling him
9 from his apartment.
10 Q. Did you and the rest of the negotiating team obtain estimates of
11 the number of shells that were being fired into Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb
13 A. Yes, we did. Once the UN observers were there in decent number,
14 which was the summer of 1992, they kept a shell count throughout the
15 entire period. And I had actually in my office in Geneva, at the
16 conference, I had a graph on the wall that listed chronologically, day by
17 day, the shell count from the Bosnian Serb side and the return fire from
18 the Muslim side.
19 Q. Are you able to recall those numbers, Ambassador?
20 A. Yes. The Bosnian Serb shell count averaged three to five thousand
21 per day. The number of shells landing in Sarajevo area was between --
22 normally between three and five thousand per day.
23 Q. Ambassador, let me ask you to turn next to a diary entry of
24 September 17th. It is found at ERN number R0163950.
25 A. Excuse me, what date is that?
1 Q. I'm sorry. September 17th, 1992.
2 A. Yes. What page? Could you give me the page number, please.
3 Q. Yes. If you can turn first to the page which is the second page
4 of your diary entry and is located at the ERN range R0163951.
5 A. Yes, I see it.
6 Q. Now, in the middle of the page, at the left, there's an entry
7 which indicates that CRV, Secretary Vance, indicated that all must have
8 right of return, cannot support ethnic cleansing. Can you tell us about
9 that exchange and what Dr. Karadzic explained in response.
10 A. Yes, what Secretary Vance was saying, was acknowledging the fact,
11 as I mentioned a few moments ago, that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
12 Croats who had been forcibly expelled from their homes, that he was saying
13 that these people should be allowed to return to their homes. And he says
14 we cannot support ethnic cleansing.
15 Q. And is Dr. Karadzic's response indicated below?
16 A. Yes, Dr. Karadzic typically does not deny the ethnic cleansing,
17 but responds "Nor should you support the taking of ethnic hostages." What
18 I wrote was "nor ethnic hostages." People are being held in certain areas
19 against their will. He meant Serb people. Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla. So
20 his response was not to deny the ethnic cleansing, not to even discuss the
21 question of allowing the forcibly expelled Muslims and Croat population to
22 return, but rather to say that the Bosnian Serbs should be allowed to
23 leave the -- certain areas presumably so they could go to the Republika
25 Q. Now, the diary entry indicates that DLO, or Lord Owen, I take it,
1 entered the room, and according to the entry, observes that Dr. Karadzic
2 must realise that the siege of Sarajevo does you - that is the Bosnian
3 Serbs - immense harm, to which Dr. Karadzic responded, "Not a siege,
4 protecting our suburbs." Do you recall that exchange?
5 A. Yes. There it is. That's what he said. He denied that it was a
6 siege. It obviously was a siege. Serb forces surrounded the city. The
7 only way in or out of Sarajevo at this period was through Serb lines and
8 with Serb permission. Now, the Muslims did, in fact, build a tunnel near
9 the airport, so people sneaked in and out through this tunnel, but the
10 city was, in fact, besieged. It was surrounded on all sides by Bosnian
11 Serb forces who controlled ingress and egress.
12 Q. And if I can draw your attention to a couple of additional
13 entries, Ambassador. On the next page of your diary, although it's
14 located at the same ERN page, toward the bottom of that page, there's a
15 comment by Dr. Karadzic concerning the percentage of Serbs in Sarajevo,
16 and then he indicates, "I could persuade Serbs to remain if we had two
17 entities in Sarajevo. Will take time, antagonism too great."
18 A. That was the standard refrain of the Bosnian leadership; to divide
19 Sarajevo into two separate cities, you know, like East Berlin and West
20 Berlin, or Nicosia. To divide it into a Bosnian Serb section and a
21 Bosnian Muslim section.
22 Q. And consistent with that, if I could ask you to turn to the next
23 page, which is R0163952, at the diary entry on the right side of the page,
24 in the middle of that page, there's another reference to a comment by
25 Dr. Karadzic: "The communities cannot live together at present. Too much
2 A. Well, that was the position of the Bosnian Serbs throughout the
3 whole period. That the communities, the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina had
4 to be separated, that they could not live together. Now, again, it has to
5 be borne in mind that very large sections, most of Bosnia, was thoroughly
6 intermixed. This was not a physical area which, while it had 44 per cent
7 Muslim population, 31 per cent Serb, 19, 20 Croat, et cetera, that the
8 people already were living apart. They were thoroughly intermixed and --
9 but the burden of that remark, which was consistent with the Bosnian Serb
10 leadership, was that they had to be taken apart; and that, of course, is
11 what ethnic cleansing was designed to do.
12 Q. Was that the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership not only with
13 respect to Sarajevo, but with respect to the territories within Bosnia
14 that they claimed as Serbian land?
15 A. Very much so. I go back to the point you made earlier when
16 Dr. Karadzic put the overlay on Henry Darwin's map for Cutileiro. We just
17 discussed a few moments ago. He showed the entire Drina, the entire Drina
18 and as far west as the Neretva River, as Serb, whereas on the ethnic map,
19 most of that area, probably half of it anyway, were majority Muslim
20 opstinas. Well, how did that happen? I mean, how did they go from being
21 Muslim opstinas to Serb opstinas? We know how that happened: The Muslim
22 population was forced out. Or worse.
23 Q. Ambassador, you've referred to the ethnic composition or the
24 demographic composition of the area in the Drina. I'd like to have this
25 map marked as Prosecution's exhibit next in order.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, that would be?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit Number P211.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Ambassador, first let me ask you if you're familiar with this map.
6 A. Yes, I am. It's an ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would
7 say based on the 1991 census. Yes, 1991.
8 Q. And does that map assist in describing the demographic composition
9 of the Drina area and other parts of Bosnia that you were referring to
10 during your testimony?
11 A. Yes, it does. You can -- the green is Muslim. The red and pink
12 is ethnic Serb. The blue is Croat. And you see all the green. These are
13 majority Muslim opstinas: Foca, Gorazde, Rogatica, Visegrad, et cetera.
14 Srebrenica. Some names are quite well known. And these were Muslim
15 majority provinces, based on the census.
16 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask one thing. Mr. Krajisnik, I can
17 imagine that the line of sight is a bit disturbed. It's also shown on
18 your screen if you choose the "video monitor." Then you see exactly what
19 the witness is pointing at. Not at this very moment, but as soon as he
20 restarts, because you might have seen yourself at that very moment.
21 But please proceed.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm about to move away from the map in
23 my next question. So if it's helpful to refocus on the map for a moment,
24 we can ask the technician to do so.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I will do so.
1 Mr. Krajisnik, were you able to sufficiently follow the...
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I am able to follow, although
3 this is the wrong map.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it's the map that is presented to the witness
5 by the Prosecution, Mr. Krajisnik. So whether right or wrong is a
6 different matter, but we'll hear from Defence counsel if there's anything
7 wrong with the map. So there's no need to repeat the pointing done by the
8 witness. Yes. I take it that your hand sign is to be understood that you
9 do not like the witness to repeat the pointing at the map.
10 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Ambassador, you indicated that you were familiar with that map.
13 Was that a map that you had available to you during the course of your
14 efforts, negotiating efforts?
15 A. It was one of them. We had many. There are others that show the
16 same figures in different ways. The Bosnian Serb leadership preferred
17 another map which purported to show their control, as they called it,
18 their control of 65 per cent of the land. This was based on the
19 contention, which was not always incorrect, that the Bosnian Serb
20 population of Bosnia and Herzegovina tended to be more rural than urban.
21 And the Muslim and Croat was somewhat more urban. Therefore, they had
22 more farmers, and the farmers had certain land.
23 They also claimed as part of that 65 per cent control all of the
24 national parks and all of the federal Yugoslav installations for
25 themselves. That is to say, if there was a national park somewhere in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would say, well, you see, that makes it
2 Yugoslavia, and therefore it's Serb territory. And they had maps that
3 showed that, you see. But they were all based on the same statistics,
4 which were not in doubt. It's the census of 1981, which was the last
5 complete census, and the census of 1991 - the decennial censuses in
6 Yugoslavia were taken in 1981 and 1991 - the 1991 census did not differ in
7 any material way from the 1981 census. The only point was that since the
8 fighting began very shortly thereafter, the 1991 census was never
9 officialised. So if one wants to be very technical and speak of the last
10 official census, one takes the 1981 figures. But as I say, the 1991
11 figures were almost identical to the 1981 figures.
12 But this was a standard map, and there are other standard maps.
13 But some do emphasise different factors. I mean, if you have a map, for
14 example, physical map, you see much more of the geography. We had
15 economic maps. Where were the dams located? Where were the mines, that
16 sort of thing. Where was the electrical grid? So we had lots of maps,
17 and this is an accurate ethnic map of the country.
18 Q. Ambassador, let me turn for a moment to the objective of the
19 Bosnian Serb leaders to see that Sarajevo was physically divided into a
20 Serbian part and a Muslim part.
21 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour, I just wonder, if we're
22 leaving the map, there are two things: First of all, I think Madam Usher
23 probably doesn't have to stand there like a Christmas tree indefinitely
24 and could be relieved of standing there with the map, which then ties in
25 with the next suggestion: I wonder perhaps if the map could then be
1 handed to Mr. Krajisnik so that he can have an opportunity of looking at
2 it a bit more closely. Kill two birds with one stone, actually.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Do you still need the map?
4 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour. Not at the moment.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Could it temporarily be given to Mr. Krajisnik to
6 further inspect it.
7 Yes, Mr. Stewart.
8 MR. STEWART: I was also, just on a purely practical level as far
9 as the maps are concerned, we have been supplied with -- as I understand,
10 we have been supplied with this map and a number of other maps in
11 electronic form, which are coloured, and we can certainly print them off
12 in colour, and obviously we can't print them in that handy
13 slip-in-your-pocket size that we see behind us for the exhibit. But I
14 don't know, if the Prosecution do have a colour version of that and if
15 they do have access to a colour photocopier, it would seem that in
16 relation to this sort of exhibit that a simple batch of colour copies for
17 the Bench and for the Defence team and everybody else would be a
18 reasonable and practical request.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, it's a suggestion. I take it that you'll
20 reflect on it.
21 MR. TIEGER: Indeed, Your Honour. I will.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I do not expect you to immediately produce now the
23 small photocopies, but it's a suggestion which makes quite some sense.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
1 Q. Ambassador, I indicated that I wanted to return to your testimony
2 about the objective of the Bosnian Serb leaders to physically divide
3 Sarajevo into Serbian parts, a Serbian part and a Muslim part where Serbs
4 would live and Muslims would live separately. Did you become aware of
5 efforts by Bosnian Serb forces to forcibly achieve this objective during
6 this rough time period, in the summer and fall of 1992?
7 A. Yes. That's what the shelling was all about. The shelling was
8 designed to create a -- you know, a wall of fire, if you will. I don't
9 want to be melodramatic, but the shelling in effect provided a wall of
10 fire between the communities. That's what it was designed to do. The
11 shelling was directed. This was not erratic, unaimed fire. Dr. Karadzic
12 would point that out to us. He would say, for example, after we divide
13 the city, you know, it will be all right for the Muslims to live in, and
14 then he would list two or three areas. So the shelling was part and
15 parcel of the effort to divide the city.
16 Q. And more specifically, did you receive information during the
17 summer and fall of 1992 that efforts to forcibly remove, or efforts to
18 expel Muslims from portions of Sarajevo had been successful?
19 A. Intermittently, but not very much. That was not a major factor.
20 Q. To the extent that such information was received and you were
21 aware of some successful efforts to achieve the physical separation of
22 Sarajevo, was it your understanding from your discussions with the Bosnian
23 Serb leaders and from the other information you received that the shelling
24 was also a way of ensuring the preservation of that change in the
25 demographics, of ensuring that the ethnic cleansing was preserved?
1 A. Up to a point, yes. The shelling had several objectives. Why
2 does one shell a capital city? I mean, let us start with ABCs. Of
3 course, it's not only an act of war, but shelling any civilian area and
4 doing it month after month after month is very serious business, forbidden
5 by the laws of war, in fact. International humanitarian law is quite
6 clear on that.
7 So what was the purpose? Well, this was the seat of the Bosnian
8 Muslim government, so the first goal was to frighten them, to terrorise
9 them, to make them know they were surrounded; in other words, to induce a
10 feeling of hopelessness in the Bosnian Muslim government leadership. The
11 next goal, as I mentioned, was to utilise the shelling physically to
12 divide the city the way they wished it to be divided. And finally, I
13 would think that the goal was to animate the Bosnian Serb population, to
14 show them that their army was powerful, that they could do what they want,
15 even to Sarajevo.
16 Now, I can't prove that last point because they didn't say that.
17 But it's hard to imagine actually why the shelling continued throughout
18 this whole war. As Lord Owen pointed out, you, Mr. Counsel, pointed it
19 out just a moment ago, as Lord Owen said to Karadzic, this shelling does
20 you no good. It's the single thing that brings obloquy, that brings
21 disgrace, he would say, on your cause. Surely you must know that. That
22 did not matter to Bosnian Serb leadership. So they clearly must have had
23 some reason for doing it, and I've just mentioned three possibilities.
24 Q. Ambassador, I'd like to turn next to your diary entries of
25 September 18th, the following day. That entry is contained at ERN number
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 R0163960 and the subsequent pages.
2 Just a handful of entries I would like to draw your attention to,
3 Ambassador. The first one is found at the bottom of the first diary page
4 and reflects comments by Dr. Karadzic.
5 A. Yes, I see it.
6 Q. Insofar as I can, if I'm reading it correctly, it says:
7 "Recognition led to war. Will also happen in Macedonia if it is
8 recognised." Can you comment on that, please.
9 A. Yes, what he was saying is that the recognition of Bosnia as a
10 sovereign, independent country by the European Community and by the United
11 States, and then its subsequent admission to the United Nations, all of
12 which happened in the spring of 1992, that this act led to war. Now,
13 Macedonia was not recognised because of -- by the EC or the US because of
14 the problem that Greece had with the name. It was later resolved. But he
15 then goes on to say, "This will also happen in Macedonia if it's
16 recognised." War would result also in Macedonia if it were recognised,
17 because Macedonia was a very sensitive area to the Serbs. In fact, it had
18 been part of Serbia until 1946 when Tito removed Macedonia and created the
19 Republic of Macedonia. It was always, until then, called Southern Serbia.
20 So the Serbs had a great deal of interest in Macedonia and many
21 attachments to it. For example, the Serbian Orthodox church never
22 recognise the creation of the Macedonian Orthodox church. Just a point,
23 even though it's the same religion. And here we have Dr. Karadzic saying
24 that because Macedonia is so sensitive, if it's recognised, war will
1 Well, the fact of the matter is that some time later, not much
2 time later, Macedonia was recognised, and no war resulted whatsoever.
3 There was no war between Serbia and Macedonians or between the Serbs in
4 Macedonia or the JNA or anything else. It was entirely peaceful. And I
5 think one can, without exaggeration, draw the conclusion from this that
6 the war in Bosnia was not inevitable. Here is Dr. Karadzic telling us
7 that war is inevitable in Macedonia, as it turned out to be in Bosnia, and
8 that was not the case at all.
9 Q. And the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was something that
10 Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders had indicated previously
11 was a factor they could not and would not accept?
12 A. Yes, indeed. They would not accept it.
13 Q. Turning to the next page of your diary contained on the same ERN
14 page, Dr. Karadzic makes the comment, "The Muslim side will soon be
15 dominant with more than 50 per cent." Then there's a subsequent comment
16 by Dr. Koljevic: "Serbs need territorial and functional autonomy." You
17 then note that Secretary Vance asks about territorial versus political
18 autonomy. And Drs. Karadzic and Koljevic indicate that that's in the
19 context of handing back some land to Muslims. Can you explain that
20 exchange to us, please.
21 A. That entire exchange is about the question of what kind of
22 governance would there be in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this was a
23 recurring theme. And they say again, as they say repeatedly, that neither
24 the Serbs nor the Bosnian Croats would accept a unitary Bosnian state,
25 that is to say a one man, one vote state. They will not accept a state
1 based on one man, one vote. That's why they're worried that the Muslims
2 would soon, for demographic reasons, be more than 50 per cent. So they
3 say again here, we need our own state with our own territory, with our own
4 people, and our own laws. That's what they're saying.
5 Q. Ambassador, before I turn to the entries I wanted to draw your
6 attention to on the following page, I also wanted to confirm the
7 attendance at that meeting. Is it correct that that meeting was attended
8 by Dr. Karadzic, Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Buha, and Mr. Misa
9 Milosevic for the Bosnian Serbs?
10 A. Yes; Karadzic, Koljevic, Mr. Krajisnik, Aleksa Buha, and Misa
11 Milosevic. That's Misa, not to be confused with Slobodan.
12 Q. As the conversation or discussion continued, and we see it
13 reflected on the following page at R0163961, Dr. Koljevic says that they
14 need to put all the cards on the table, not get lost in mazes, nuances,
15 and subtleties. And then he goes on to describe what is acceptable or
16 unacceptable to the Bosnian Serbs. Can you explain that exchange to us,
18 A. Yes. Well, he -- after showing off his excellent English with
19 "mazes, nuances, and subtleties," he says, "Serbs will not accept the
20 internal borders" - meaning the internal borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 - "without some form of cantonisation." That is to say, without a
22 Serb-governed area, not something subject to Muslims.
23 But the Serbs are prepared to accept and prefer agreed change in
24 the internal borders to accommodate ethnic realities. Well, the phrase
25 "to accommodate ethnic realities" is a very clear, not-so-subtle reference
1 to the ethnic cleansing, because this conversation was held in September
2 1992 and by September of 1992, already hundreds of thousands of Bosnian
3 Muslims had been forcibly displaced from their homes to -- in order to
4 make Republika Srpska pure, or as pure as the Serb Army could make it.
5 And so he says, fine, sure, we'll accept changes in internal borders
6 provided they accommodate the ethnic realities. What he's doing there is
7 stating in words what Dr. Karadzic did when he put the overlay on the
8 ethnic map of Bosnia, the one I drew by hand. He's saying, "This is the
9 area controlled now by the VRS." You know, there are very few other
10 ethnicities in this area. That's the accommodation of ethnic realities.
11 So that's what he said. Fine, if you want to make this kind of -- we'll
12 accept that. We will certainly accept that, a map drawn on the situation
13 that exists now, post ethnic cleansing.
14 And then he goes on to say, and this was another standard Bosnian
15 Serb refrain: "We are not prepared to accept Tito's borders.
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina `is a pure Bolshevik creation'." And that's really
17 almost ludicrously amusing to make that statement, because in fact, the
18 borders of Bosnia are among the oldest not just in south-western Europe
19 but in all of Europe. If you look, for example, at a Habsburg map of
20 1878, the map that was used at the Congress of Berlin when Austria-Hungary
21 was given co-sovereignty with the Ottoman empire over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Until 1878, it was Turkish, but in 1878, following the Turkish defeat in
23 the Bulgarian war and the Treaty at San Stefano, Bismarck divided that
24 part of the empire between the Austrians and the Turks.
25 If you look at the map that was used, the borders haven't changed
1 hardly at all. It's a very old, established border, the ones of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were not Tito's borders.
3 So, you know, this is the kind of debating point that we heard
4 quite a lot, I must say, from the Bosnian Serb leadership. They may have
5 believed it, for all I know, but it had no validity and it bore no
6 relationship to reality.
7 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.
8 MR. TIEGER: I note the time, and I think it's an appropriate
9 moment for our recess.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I was just going to invite you to find a suitable
12 We'll adjourn until 10 minutes past 4.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I do understand that the excerpts you've
16 provided from the diaries are from a different bundle as presented
17 yesterday, that is, it is a new set, two binders which have not yet
18 received a number, I think, and which at least the Judges have not
19 received. We're not inviting you to immediately hand them over, but just
20 for purposes of the record.
21 Madam Registrar, the two new binders would have number?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit Number P212.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Are we using them later on, this --
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the binders that have just been marked
25 P212 in fact contain the diary entries we're referring to now.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, okay.
2 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honour, just to clarify, if I may, the first
3 binder contained diary entries reflecting meetings related to the
4 Conference on Yugoslavia, which lasted roughly until August of 1992,
5 although the diary entries don't go that long. These two binders that
6 have now been marked as P212 reflect entries related to the International
7 Conference on Former Yugoslavia.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. In the index, we see that they contain the
9 diaries numbers from 1 until 9, diaries described as Diary of ICFY.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Ambassador, can I ask you to turn next to your diary entries of
13 September 19th, 1992. That is reflected at page bearing ERN number
14 R0163971 and the following page.
15 A. Yes, I have it.
16 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honour, it appears that the Sanction
17 programme is, at least for now, working again and should obviate the need
18 for the ELMO at the moment.
19 Q. Ambassador Okun, this is a meeting in Geneva attended by,
20 according to the heading at the top, Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik,
21 Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, and Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Misa Milosevic. And I'd
22 like to direct your attention to a few entries. First, at the bottom of
23 the first page, there are comments by Dr. Karadzic: "We do not need war.
24 We should stop and stay where they and we are." Any comment on that,
25 Ambassador? Anything that you need to add that you haven't already
1 explained about the nature of the negotiations and the information --
2 A. I don't think so. What Dr. Karadzic was saying here reflected the
3 fact that by September of 1992, the VRS, the Bosnian Serb Army, the
4 Bosnian irregulars, had conquered and controlled about 70 per cent of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So he was saying we should stop now. Obviously,
6 it was to their advantage.
7 Q. On the next page, the second entry indicates Dr. Koljevic saying,
8 "You need to put pressure on the Muslims if you want to stop the fighting.
9 But international community has not done this." What was the pressure
10 aimed at getting the Muslims to do? What did Dr. Koljevic ask you as
11 representatives of the international community to get the Muslims to do in
12 order to stop the fighting?
13 A. Well, what he would have wished was that we, as negotiators,
14 convince the Muslims to sign a peace based on the current territorial
15 holdings, the current situation, which it goes without saying they would
16 not do that.
17 Q. Two more entries I'd like to bring your attention to: The first
18 appears immediately below the remarks to which you just referred. It's
19 Dr. Karadzic saying, or as reflected in your entry, "continuous emphasis
20 on ethnically based territorial units."
21 A. That is my gloss of what he was saying. I mean, he's not saying
22 that. He goes on and on. This is a meeting that lasted almost two hours,
23 and you notice that I've covered one hour and 25 minutes in two pages.
24 Now, if you had a transcript of that, it would probably run, I suppose, 20
25 or 30 pages. But I didn't have to write everything down because
1 Dr. Karadzic is saying what Dr. Karadzic always says, so I write
2 "continuous emphasis on ethnically based territorial units." He may have
3 spoken for 5 or 10 minutes on that subject; that is to say, we have to
4 have, you know, ethnically pure, we can't live together, they hate us, we
5 hate -- you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. This was the same old
6 story. So I just note that "continued emphasis on ethnically based
7 territorial units." But it's important to note that there is no deviation
8 in the Bosnian Serb position. Indeed, there was no deviation throughout
9 the months and months of negotiation.
10 Q. And just below that entry, it appears that Dr. Koljevic is
11 underscoring the need for physical separation and the inability, in his
12 view, of the Serbs and Muslims to live together, where he says, "War has
13 shattered trust. Communities cannot live together any more. To deny that
14 is fantasy."
15 A. Yes, this was part of the standard line. No trust. Hatred
16 between the communities. And then again, I notice in parenthesis at the
17 bottom, a lengthy expatiation on those points, again, by Koljevic and
18 Dr. Karadzic. The elaborations went on at great length.
19 Q. Was there any deviation from this position by any of the Bosnian
20 Serb leaders present?
21 A. No, not at all. They were all consistent on that, and they all
22 said the same thing. Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, Buha,
23 Lukic. Buha and Lukic were somewhat cruder in their presentations. That
24 just reflects their personalities. But the top leaders, Dr. Karadzic,
25 Mr. Krajisnik, Koljevic, were very consistent.
1 Q. Ambassador, can we turn next to the diary entry of September 24th,
2 1992, found at ERN R0163985. This appears to be a morning meeting with
3 Dr. Koljevic.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And just to assist the Court in understanding the diary entries,
6 below the entry noting Dr. Koljevic's presence, there's some initials of
7 others also present. Can you just identify who those people are because
8 their initials appear repeatedly.
9 A. CRV is Cyrus Vance. DLO is Lord Owen. HSO is me. PH is Peter
10 Hall, Ambassador Hall, Owen's deputy. MA is Martti Ahtissari, who was the
11 chairman of one of our working groups on Bosnia. And FE is Fred Eckhardt,
12 who was the spokesman for the conference. He is now the spokesman for the
13 Secretary-General of the United Nations.
14 Q. Now, in this meeting, we see the first entry by -- remarks by
15 Secretary Vance about BL. Can you explain what was the subject of that
16 meeting and what discussion ensued.
17 A. Well, if you look at the previous page, you'll see I wrote and
18 underlined "Problem, Banja Luka ethnic cleansing." We had received
19 confirmed reports of serious ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka. Now, as we
20 all know, Banja Luka's a major city. It's the second-largest city in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not that that is alone the issue, but still if it's
22 major and a major city, there's a lot of ethnic cleansing going on.
23 So the day began at 10.30 when we met with the Yugoslav
24 Ambassador, Pavicevic, who admitted, acknowledged that it was going on.
25 You see Ambassador P, "It must be stopped," meaning we must stop the
1 Bosnian Serb's ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka. This is the Yugoslav
2 Ambassador talking. "I will call Belgrade. I will speak to Cosic and
3 Milosevic. I will do everything I can."
4 So after we met with him briefly, we met with Koljevic for almost
5 an hour. And again, the principal subject was how to stop the Bosnian
6 Serb ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka. What to do about this situation?
7 And again, Koljevic does not deny it. When Vance says to him, what do you
8 hear about this? He says: "Banja Luka's under control. The problem is
9 Prijedor." Okay, so he's telling us that their ethnic cleansing in Banja
10 Luka is not so bad, it's bad in Prijedor, et cetera.
11 And Koljevic volunteers to call Karadzic, and the meeting proceeds
12 from there. As it turned out, Dr. Karadzic wished to have Secretary Vance
13 join him in Banja Luka, and Vance and Owen did go to Banja Luka. I did
14 not go with them. I had to look after the conference. Vance and Owen did
15 go to Banja Luka and were able to confirm the ethnic cleansing, but at the
16 same time, by their presence, they did succeed in temporarily slowing the
17 ethnic cleansing. They did not stop it, but their personal presence there
18 ameliorated for a bit the condition of the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian
19 Croats, who were being forcibly expelled from Banja Luka. Mosques were
20 being blown up. The Catholic churches were being destroyed. It was a
21 very serious situation.
22 Q. Now, the diary indicates that Dr. Koljevic indicated that he or
23 someone else would contact the chief of police in the area, and later on
24 on the same page the diary entry indicates Dr. Koljevic spoke to the
25 regional chief of police.
1 During discussions with the Bosnian Serb leaders about activities
2 in the municipalities, did they indicate that with respect to areas of
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina over which they claimed control, that they had
4 subordinate political and police officials there who were in charge of the
6 A. Oh, certainly yes. This is an indication. Koljevic goes out of
7 the room, comes back and says, "I've spoken to the regional chief of
8 police." That was -- there's no question of that. Just as I mentioned
9 earlier, Karadzic, in my presence, called up the colonel in charge of the
10 Yugoslav air force -- actually, at that point, I suppose the VRS air
11 force, but these were Yugoslav planes, in Banja Luka in my presence. So
12 there was no question that they had direct control of these people. That
13 was self-evident. I mean, they did have the control, and they showed it
14 frequently. And this was one case in point. He leaves the room, makes a
15 telephone call, and comes back and tells us that I - Nikola Koljevic -
16 have just spoken to the regional chief of police, and then goes on to tell
17 us another fairy tale, if you see the rest of the diary entry.
18 Q. I'll ask you about that in a moment. But one question more, and
19 that is, did the Bosnian Serb leaders appear to have any more difficulty
20 communicating with their municipal subordinates and police subordinates
21 than with the military officials in the manner you described earlier?
22 A. Not to my knowledge. I never saw any indication of that. They
23 all carried cell phones. They never said ever "We've tried to reach Dusan
24 and we couldn't find -- we couldn't speak with him." Any time they said
25 they needed to talk to somebody, they talked to that person. I mean, one
1 sees that in the diaries.
2 Q. You indicated that Dr. Koljevic returned to the meeting and went
3 on to tell you and the others another fairy tale. Can you tell us what
4 that was, please.
5 A. The phrase masquerading. One of the standard ripostes of the
6 Bosnian Serb leadership when we would tax them with the abuses and rapes
7 and expulsions being carried out by the Bosnian Serbs, they would
8 frequently say, no, the Muslims have stolen our uniforms and are
9 masquerading as Serbs in VRS uniforms. So they -- it is Muslims dressed
10 in Serb uniforms who are raping Muslim women, that sort of something. So
11 we would hear that frequently, so I write "masquerading, massacring Serbs,
12 training camps," that sort of thing. This was the standard response,
13 always to blame the other side.
14 Bear in mind, the subject was ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka. And
15 Koljevic doesn't -- never says "it's not happening. We're not doing it.
16 The press is lying. We are hearing distorted information." He never says
18 Q. Ambassador, can I next ask you to turn to a diary entry of
19 September 30th, 1992. That's found at ERN R0164015.
20 Now, Ambassador, let me direct your attention to a few entries
21 during that meeting. First, the -- your notes indicate it's a meeting
22 with Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Koljevic, and then you indicate the initials of
23 the negotiators also present.
24 At the early phase of the meeting, Lord Owen indicates that there
25 is outrage in respect of a story in the New York Times on Brcko killings
1 early in May and June, and he indicates, "Let's get on with solving this,"
2 followed by a response by Dr. Karadzic, "We're not besieging Sarajevo,"
3 and I should mention there's reference to Sarajevo earlier in Lord Owen's
5 On the following page, at ERN R0164016, Dr. Karadzic continues
6 about Sarajevo, "We have not conquered Sarajevo, could have, et cetera."
7 Then according to your notes, Lord Owen, and it says "shuts Kara up."
8 Dr. Karadzic responds: "We're the underdog. Cannot allow humanitarian
9 aid to hurt us militarily." And then you explain something about
10 Morillon's plan, UNPROFOR headquarters at Ilidza, et cetera, and
11 Dr. Karadzic says, "We cannot give up Ilidza, et cetera, our wounded have
12 died. Et cetera."
13 Ambassador Okun, any comments that might be of assistance to the
14 Court in appreciating the significance of those exchanges.
15 A. I don't think so. The discussion here referred basically to the
16 negotiators trying to accommodate Karadzic's repeated requests that
17 Bosnian Serbs who wished to leave Sarajevo be allowed to do so. You'll
18 recall he makes quite a lot of the fact that they are being held hostage,
19 constantly claiming 60.000, 70.000 Bosnian Serbs are being held hostage in
20 Sarajevo; it's the biggest concentration camp in Bosnia, et cetera, et
21 cetera. That's his common line. We've seen plenty of that. So the
22 negotiators took him up on that, and General Morillon had a plan to get
23 them out if they wanted to leave.
24 As it happened, nothing ever came of it because all of Karadzic's
25 talk about the Bosnian Serbs' desire to flee Sarajevo was just talk, and
1 when the negotiators and the UNPROFOR people on the ground offered to take
2 them out, they never did; that is to say, the Bosnian Serbs did not take
3 up the offer en masse. So this was a fruitless discussion. But it
4 indicated once more that the position taken by Karadzic and the entire
5 Bosnian Serb leadership was not, to put it charitably, was not based on a
6 fair appreciation of how to solve the problem.
7 Q. Ambassador, can we next turn to your diary entry of October 11th,
8 1992, found at ERN R0164042.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could we in one way or another expedite the
10 distribution of documents because we start walking when you are about to
11 ask questions, and then it takes us one minute or one minute and a half to
12 get everyone a copy. Could we either -- well, I leave it to your
13 imagination how to expedite the matter. Whatever is left over at the end
14 of the day will be returned to the Prosecution.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I see I'm now provided with a translation in B/C/S of
17 the last distributed entry, but the previous one was not -- there was no
18 translation. May I take it that Mr. Karadzic got one or -- pardon me,
19 Mr. Karadzic. I've heard so much about him.
20 Mr. Krajisnik, did you receive a translation of the previous
21 entry, that's the entry of September 30th? The last one distributed was
22 the October 10th, at least.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was following in English, so I
24 hadn't checked that out. But it doesn't matter. It needn't be repeated.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Please proceed then, Mr. Tieger.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Ambassador, there are just a couple of references I wanted to ask
3 you about in connection with the October 11th meeting with Dr. Karadzic.
4 There's an asterisk on the first page next to the entry "Talks with Croats
5 progressing. If so --" and "Muslims cannot fight without Croats," and
6 then if you could read for us the two words in quotation marks.
7 A. "We're near peace." It reads: "Talks with Croats progressing.
8 If so, we are near peace."
9 Q. And on the next page, it's R0164043, it would be the third page of
10 your diary entry, since two pages are reflected in each ERN range, it
11 indicates at the top of the page, again next to an asterisk: "Main
12 problem, Tito's borders. But if Serbs and Croats `are clever', exchange
13 borders voluntarily, this exchange would help."
14 Can you tell us what those remarks refer to, please.
15 A. What they refer to was the cooperation, sometimes overt, sometimes
16 covert, between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats. This
17 cooperation was at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims and occurred because
18 in some respects, but not all respects, but in some respects Bosnian Serb
19 and Bosnian Croat objectives were congruent in Bosnia. Each, for example,
20 had declared its own political entity. Republika Srpska by the Bosnian
21 Serbs; Herceg Bosna by the Bosnian Croats. Each wanted to be ruled only
22 under their own governance. Each wanted it ethnically cleansed and pure,
23 which I should note was easier for the Bosnian Croats in Herceg Bosna,
24 that is to say, in Herzegovina because Herzegovina was already 98 per cent
25 or so ethnic Croat. And the problem for the Bosnian Croats was Central
1 Bosnia where the population was a mixed one as between Bosnian Muslim and
2 Bosnian Croat. But the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats each wished to
3 carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather, to carve out of the body of Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina their own separate mini state. So there was a congruence
5 of views.
6 Now, it also happens that they were fighting each other at the
7 same time because there were areas that were in contest between the Serbs
8 and the Croats. The Neretva valley, for example. The Bosnian Serbs
9 wanted the Neretva valley. You'll recall it's one of the points in their
10 May 12, 1992, strategic objectives. They speak of it. Well, the Bosnian
11 Croats were not about to give them the Neretva valley, first, because it's
12 important economically; second, because what the Bosnian Croats consider
13 their capital, Mostar, is on the Neretva.
14 It should be noted that Mostar is still divided to this day as
15 between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. It is still divided
16 by the river, 2004. So you can see that it meant a great deal to the
17 Croats. Just as the Bosnian Serbs had and held and regarded Banja Luka as
18 their capital, so, too, the Bosnian Croats held and regarded Mostar as
19 their capital. So there were, in certain areas, cooperation,
20 collaboration, congruence as between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian
21 Croats. But they also were fighting each other for areas where they
22 didn't agree, and the Bosnian Croat Army was large because it was being
23 assisted by the regular Croatian Army which had come in to Bosnia early in
24 the conflict. It crossed over the Sava at Bosanski Brod. So the Bosnian
25 Croats were well armed and well led. And Dr. Karadzic knew that and said
1 that to us very, very frequently. And that was the situation. That's why
2 he says, "We're talking, we're making progress with the Bosnian Croats.
3 If we decide things between us, there can be peace." Well, you notice he
4 never mentions the Muslims.
5 Q. Ambassador, if I could ask you to look at a map, which is marked
7 A. Ah, yes.
8 Q. Ambassador, let me ask you if you're familiar with that map, and
9 if you could explain to us whether or not that bears on your explanation
10 about the interest in collaboration between the Serbs and the Croats.
11 A. Yes, indeed, I'm familiar with the map. Anybody who deals with
12 Yugoslavia must be familiar with this map. It is the Cvetkovic-Macek
13 agreement of 1939, the agreement between a leading Serb and a leading
14 Croat to divide what was then called the Banovina. The king had changed
15 the name to banovinas. The banovina of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's the
16 partition, the carve-up of Bosnia between the Serbs and the Croats. And
17 it was decided upon in the spring, I believe it was, of 1939 and would
18 have happened except that World War II intervened and Nazi Germany took
19 precedence everywhere in Europe.
20 In that connection, it's worth pointing out that when the puppet
21 state of Croatia joined Nazi Germany as an ally during World War II, it
22 was created by the Third Reich, the independent state of Croatia, all of
23 Bosnia was given to that puppet state. That is to say, if one looked at a
24 map of occupied Europe in 1942, 1943, 1944, according to the political
25 divisions then extant, you would have seen the independent state of
1 Croatia comprising Bosnia-Herzegovina. They took it all in 1941. Of
2 course, they lost it when the war ended.
3 So there always was a healthy, or perhaps I should say unhealthy
4 Croatian interest in dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. And this, too, was no
5 secret and is not just a matter of historical interest. When President
6 Tudjman, during the conflict, went to London at some point, about 1993 or
7 so, perhaps 1994, but while the conflict was still continuing, he was at a
8 social event, he was there to give a speech, and he drew on the back of a
9 napkin for his British hosts a map by hand of Bosnia and Herzegovina
10 divided between Serbia and Croatia. He had partitioned it in his own
12 So the Cvetkovic-Macek map is something that all of these leaders
13 have in the back of their heads. They -- you know, it's part of their
14 historical upbringing, you know, the way Americans know the civil war and
15 that sort of thing. It doesn't mean they support it. I'm not saying
16 that. But it's something that people are very aware of, and that, of
17 course, goes for the Bosnian Serb leadership and for the Croatian
18 leadership and the Muslim leadership. They all know this. So this is of
19 historical but also contemporary interest. Psychologically, it played a
20 great role in the thinking of the Bosnian Serb leadership because they
21 were always willing to make a deal with the Croatians if they could, if
22 they could.
23 Q. And is Dr. Karadzic suggesting here essentially that the Bosnian
24 Serbs and the Bosnian Croats would come to an agreement about the portions
25 of Bosnia and Herzegovina that each wanted, and then the Muslims would
1 have to accept what was left because they couldn't fight on without the
3 A. Yes, precisely that. He says it. But if the Serbs and the Croats
4 are clever and exchange borders voluntarily, this exchange would help. He
5 then drew a map. And there was no question in his mind that if this
6 happened that the Muslims would have to accept it.
7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, before I go on to the next diary entry,
8 I should have the map marked.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit Number P213.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. I should also ask you, Ambassador, is this part of a collection of
13 maps that you had with you as part of your work in the former Yugoslavia?
14 A. You mean this Cvetkovic-Macek map?
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Yes, of course.
17 Q. Ambassador, can I ask you next to turn to a diary entry of
18 November 23rd, 1992. The first page of --
19 A. Excuse me, may I find it, please.
20 Q. Sure.
21 A. November 23rd, did you say?
22 Q. Yes. I'll just indicate, for the record, the first page of that
23 meeting can be found at R0164155.
24 A. Yes, sir, I have November 23.
25 Q. Now, that is indicated as a meeting with Mr. Mitsotakis. Can you
1 explain to us quickly who he was, please.
2 A. Yes. He's the Prime Minister of Greece, Constantin Mitsotakis.
3 Q. If I can ask you to turn to what would be the fifth page of your
4 diary entry and the third ERN page at R0164157, there's an entry at the
5 top of the page which indicates Mr. Mitsotakis speaking and saying
6 "Problem is not percentage of land, Milo could live with 45 per cent.
7 Told me so." And then below that, "Hard to accept is that Milo's --"
8 A. I can read it.
9 Q. Okay. Please do so and please tell us what Mr. Mitsotakis is
10 referring to.
11 A. He was recounting to us a conversation he had had with President
12 Milosevic. As, I think, everybody knows, the Greek and Yugoslav
13 governments were very close, and it was widely felt, and not incorrectly,
14 that Greece supported in the main the Serbian position as regards the
15 former Yugoslavia.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I'd rather not interrupt you, but we have the wrong
17 page on the screen at this moment. Is it, again, Mr. Okun, we are
18 concerned about the public character of this trial, and we would like to
19 -- whoever wants to follow this trial, to understand what your words are
20 because you're now explaining a page which is a different one from what is
21 on the screen.
22 You have difficulties?
23 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, it's going to have to be displayed
24 on the ELMO.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could we then have it put on the ELMO so that --
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I say, the same observation
2 applies: The witness was clearly trying to be helpful but a few moments
3 ago when Mr. Tieger was reading something and the witness said, well, yes,
4 I can read it. The same applies; it's necessary for the particularly
5 pertinent passage to be publicly read into the record. We understand that
6 Mr. Okun was obviously being helpful, but in fact, the public character is
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 THE WITNESS: Please tell me when you want me to go ahead.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It should be put on the ELMO, ERN number last
11 four digits 4157. Let me just see whether it is.
12 Yes, we have got the right one on our screen. Please proceed.
13 THE WITNESS: As I said, Mitsotakis was recounting -- Prime
14 Minister Mitsotakis was recounting a conversation he had with President
15 Milosevic. And what he says is, "The problem is not the percentage of
16 land. Milosevic told me that he could live with 45 per cent." What he
17 meant was that if the map that eventuated from Vance Owen's work on the
18 map turned out to have the Bosnian Serbs occupying somehow 45 per cent of
19 the land, he could live with that. He could accept that.
20 But, he goes on to say, Mitsotakis, that "Milosevic says that what
21 is hard to accept is that his segment" - that is, the area given to the
22 Bosnian Serbs - "is not ethnically clean." So Milosevic -- Prime Minister
23 Mitsotakis is saying that Milosevic has told me as regards land, 45 per
24 cent, okay. But it isn't yet ethnically clean, and by inference it must
25 be ethnically clean. And then Mitsotakis says: "But we" - that is to say
1 we in the West, you negotiators, we in Greece, "we cannot admit ethnic
2 cleansing in any case. So we have a dilemma." Milosevic says we can take
3 45 per cent, the Bosnian Serbs will take 45 per cent of the land, in his
4 view - this is Milosevic - but only if it's ethnically cleansed, and we
5 can't do that for them. We can't admit it. We can't permit it. We can't
6 allow it. So we have a dilemma. That was what Prime Minister Mitsotakis
7 was saying.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. And was the position expressed by President Milosevic to
10 Mr. Mitsotakis consistent with the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership
11 as you learned during the course of the negotiations?
12 A. It was broadly consistent, but the Bosnian Serbs were tougher.
13 They were harder than President Milosevic. We see that very clearly in
14 April and May of 1993 when Milosevic sought to argue with them to sign the
15 Vance-Owen Peace Plan and they refused. This happened in my presence, in
16 front of my eyes. There are pages in the diary on just that point. And
17 then again it happened in May of 1993 when President Milosevic went to the
18 Bosnian Serb Assembly, the assembly of which Mr. Krajisnik is president,
19 and argued in favour of the Bosnian Serbs accepting and ratifying
20 Dr. Karadzic's signature to the Vance-Owen peace plan, which he had given
21 in Athens on May 2nd 1993, subject to ratification by the Bosnian Serb
22 Assembly. It has to be noted he opposed the plan and said so, as did the
23 Bosnian Serb leadership, and he signed under duress.
24 And two weeks or so later, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the
25 plan, and that was the end of it. So while their positions were roughly
1 congruent, the Bosnian Serb leadership was markedly tougher than President
3 Q. Ambassador, I'd like to draw your attention next to a diary entry
4 of January 6th, 1993, found at ERN R0164271.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, there's one point but we notice it's
6 recurrent on a lot of these diary entries which is the recent run of diary
7 entries, we've seen quite a lot of asterisks. It might be just useful to
8 clear up where they come from.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I think that it was the testimony of this witness
10 that if there were important issues, that he put an asterisk. He said --
11 he didn't use the word "asterisk" but you used the word --
12 THE WITNESS: Star.
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- star. Yes. Now I remember. That was yesterday,
14 that's what the witness testified. He used the word "star," not the word
16 MR. STEWART: "Star" and "asterisk," we would have understood
17 that, Your Honour. Just to be clear, it applies to this whole run of
18 material, because that was a very general remark made yesterday.
19 THE WITNESS: May I answer the question?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please.
21 THE WITNESS: When I heard -- for the gentleman, any time I heard
22 something across the table, as they were written as they were being
23 spoken, things that seemed to me important at the time, I would put a star
24 next to them or underline them or sometimes some other indication that
25 they were something to pay attention to. I did that at the time, and they
1 occur through the entire diary. So thousands of pages of them.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 THE WITNESS: That's what they mean. They were done at the time,
4 and they were statements that I thought at that time were significant.
5 JUDGE ORIE: That's how I understood your testimony of yesterday.
6 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Ambassador, I'd like to bring your attention to one such starred
9 entry, and it appears at the bottom right corner of the second page of
10 your diary in this entry with Mr. Milosevic speaking. And it indicates,
11 "I spoke 'briefly' to Karadzic last night. He and Krajisnik want
12 consensus rule to apply to agreement on constitution, also want
13 'federation' or 'confederation'." And then an entry below it, "Karadzic
14 and Krajisnik believe Izzie does not want peace and wants to provoke
15 foreign intervention."
16 Ambassador, can you tell us about the significance of those
18 A. Yes. This is dated January 6th. A few days earlier, the
19 Vance-Owen peace plan had been formally presented to the three parties, so
20 the negotiations now had entered a very serious formal phase with the
21 peace plan before them. The peace plan consisted of three parts. A --
22 one part with nine constitutional principles for Bosnia-Herzegovina; the
23 second part was a section on military arrangements; and third, a map. So
24 those were the three component parts of the Vance-Owen peace plan; the
25 constitutional principles, the military arrangements, and the map.
1 In the constitutional arrangements, the -- I believe it's the
2 third one said that the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it would be one
3 state, there was no Republika Srpska, that the legislation that related
4 directly to the vital interests of each of the three constituent peoples
5 would be by consensus; that is to say, if there was something that vitally
6 concerned the Bosnian Serbs or vitally concerned the Bosnian Croats or
7 Muslims, that had to be agreement by consensus.
8 But that all other legislation for Bosnia and Herzegovina would
9 not be by consensus. There was no veto. In fact, the principles say it
10 explicitly, that all other legislation and juridical rules would not be
11 veto-able. That's the exact word in the principles.
12 Well, as we've mentioned already earlier, one of the Bosnian war
13 aims, one of the Bosnian Serb war aims, one of their six war aims, was to
14 have a veto power over anything that the Bosnian central government did.
15 Anything. And here, we're being told this. Milosevic says, I spoke to
16 Dr. Karadzic, and he and Mr. Krajisnik want consensus rule to apply to
17 agreement on the constitution. In other words, on everything. On
19 They also want federation or confederation; namely, they're not
20 willing to accept a one Bosnian state. They want a Republika Srpska.
21 That was frequently the way they put it: We want a federation of states
22 or a confederation of three states, as they had in the Cutileiro plan. Or
23 two states, because by this time -- excuse me. Because later on, not at
24 this point, but after March 1993, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian
25 Croats formed a federation. It existed more on paper than in reality, but
1 there was something called the Bosnian Muslim-Bosnian Croat Federation.
2 It exists to this day. There is a boundary line under the Dayton
3 framework agreement between The Federation and Republika Srpska. So
4 that's what he's saying here: We want a federation or a confederation.
5 And they go on to say that they both, that is Dr. Karadzic and
6 Mr. Krajisnik, believe that President Izetbegovic does not want peace and
7 wants to provoke foreign intervention.
8 Q. Ambassador, did you consider it significant that President
9 Milosevic referred to Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik in explaining what
10 the Bosnian Serbs wanted?
11 A. In what way do you mean "significant"?
12 Q. Well, he refers, according to the diary entry, to Karadzic and
13 Krajisnik and not to any other Bosnian Serb leaders. Was that significant
14 to you?
15 A. Well, he was talking to the two principal leaders. But we knew
16 who the two principal leaders were, so this simply confirmed it. Yes, he
17 was talking to the two top men.
18 Q. Ambassador --
19 A. I would not have expected him to say, "I spoke with Buha or Lukic
20 or Koljevic." No, he would clearly say Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. They
21 were the leaders.
22 Q. Can I turn your attention next to a diary entry of January 11th
23 1993. For the record, that can be found at R01642 -- excuse me. I don't
24 seem to have the...
25 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, sir. Could I make a correction to what I
1 said earlier. Do I have your permission?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course.
3 THE WITNESS: When I was discussing the consensus rule in the
4 constitutional principles under the Vance-Owen Plan, I said I thought it
5 was the third point. It is, in fact, the fourth point. The rule on
6 consensus and nonconsensus is point four under the Vance-Owen principles.
7 I might just read it, it's a few words only. "Ordinary governmental
8 business is not to be veto-able by any group."
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your correction.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Ambassador.
11 I wanted to indicate the ERN number for the meeting of January
12 11th, 1993, at least the meeting in question at that date, and that is
14 Q. And Ambassador, if you have that in front of you, it indicates a
15 bilateral with the Bosnian Serbs, and for the Bosnian Serbs attended by
16 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Buha, Misa Milosevic, General Mladic, and
17 Mr. Lukic.
18 If I could draw your attention to the next page, and it is the
19 next page in the ERN range as well at last four numbers 4288, we can see
20 comments by Mr. Krajisnik.
21 MR. TIEGER: Before I proceed, I would ask that page be placed on
22 the ELMO.
23 Q. Ambassador, I'm going to read portions of those comments for the
24 reason described earlier by Mr. Stewart. That entry begins, after the
25 notation that it's Mr. Krajisnik speaking, "Welcomes our good intentions,
1 but stresses `territorial continuity' and mentions three conditions from--
2 and mentions" - and I'll ask you, actually, to interpret that word -
3 blank "conditions from Serb Assembly."
4 A. The word is "three."
5 Q. "One, Bosnia-Herzegovina be a `composite state community' (We kept
6 silent on this possible concession); i.e., that is, we must have relations
7 with other states." That's number 2 with behind it question mark. Number
8 3, "map `unimaginable'." If I could ask you to read the following.
9 A. "It is unimaginable not to have territorial continuity."
10 Q. The next entry is "Name of state very important," and then below
11 that, "'composite' must be included, also territorial continuity."
12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I don't know whether it's of any
13 significance because I'm not the witness or the maker of the diary, but
14 when Mr. Tieger read that out and said "That's number 2 with behind it
15 question mark," that's not in fact the obvious reading here because the
16 bit which he attributed to number 2 is, in fact, as one reads it, quite
17 clearly a continuation of the point under number 1. So I'll just leave it
18 there, because it may be --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could ask the witness what the question
20 mark after the 2 actually means.
21 THE WITNESS: The question mark was to myself. These are
22 indications. And I wondered why he was raising this point which we had
23 heard now endlessly and it just seemed to me he was taking up time. And
24 it is indeed a separate point. It is not -- does not flow directly from
25 number 1, and I so indicated.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for your clarification.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Well, Ambassador, I would like you, if you would, please, to
5 explain the context of these remarks and what Mr. Krajisnik was explaining
6 to you and the other negotiators.
7 A. Mr. Krajisnik was restating for the nth time the standard extreme
8 Bosnian Serb position, which I've already outlined several times; namely,
9 we must have our own state, it must have a name, we must have Republika
10 Srpska. It must have continuous territory. It must have Serbs. It must
11 have a special -- be allowed to have a special relationship with other
12 states, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. This is the standard Serb
13 complete - excuse me, extreme - position on these issues. The only thing
14 he didn't mention here was the division of Sarajevo of the six war aims.
15 He mentioned four. He doesn't mention six. He mentions four. He does
16 not mention the division of Sarajevo, which is mentioned in numerous other
17 places. He does not mention the -- in this intervention, he doesn't
18 mention the need for veto power over the central government. Those he
19 doesn't here. They're mentioned in other places. We've just seen the
20 other mention of the veto power.
21 This is a straightforward presentation of the Bosnian Serb war
22 aims. Four of the six.
23 Q. And was anything in particular understood when there was reference
24 to special relations with other states?
25 A. Well, it means Serbia, of course. That's self-evident what the
1 other states are. Sometimes they would talk about "neighbouring states."
2 Well, you know, the neighbouring state is not Uruguay; it's not the United
3 States of America; it's Serbia.
4 Q. You indicated that Mr. Krajisnik did not mention the division of
5 Sarajevo in his remarks on this occasion. Were you and the other
6 negotiators already aware of his position on that issue?
7 A. Dividing Sarajevo was probably the single item of the war aims
8 that Mr. Krajisnik emphasised more than any other. We were amply aware of
9 his views.
10 Q. Ambassador, can we turn next then to the diary entry of 15 January
11 1993. And that is found -- the first page of that is found at ERN
12 R0164301. And as indicated at the top of the page, that's a meeting
13 attended by Mr. Buha and Mr. Lukic for the Bosnian Serbs. And I'd like to
14 direct your attention in particular to two entries that are found on the
15 third ERN page at R0164303. The first of those is another asterisked item
16 found on the left side of the page, indicates that Mr. Buha is speaking,
17 and the entry is, "Corridor, we need it. Perhaps hold referendum to
19 Ambassador, what is that a reference to?
20 A. Could you tell me what you're referring to? I don't see it.
21 Q. I'm sorry. The page number in question ends with the last four
22 numbers 4303.
23 A. 303. Ah, yes, corridor. He's talking about the Posavina, the
24 road that connects Belgrade to Banja Luka via Bijeljina and Brcko. That
25 was routinely referred to as "the corridor."
1 Q. There's a reference --
2 A. Or sometimes it was called just "the Posavina." It's a road that
3 goes south of the Sava River. "Posavina" means Sava area. So it was
4 called either "Posavina" or "the corridor," and it connected the capital
5 of Serbia with the capital of the Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka. It's an
6 east-west road.
7 Q. Now, there's a reference to a referendum. And similarly, at the
8 -- in the very last entry on that same page, there's a reference by
9 Mr. Buha: "Per Karadzic, identify controversial areas and solve on basis
10 of referendum."
11 A. Well, by this time, as we've already noted, the Bosnian Serbs held
12 about 70 per cent of Bosnia. And the ethnic cleansing was almost
13 completed, so that the offer to hold a referendum clearly would have been
14 in the interests of the Bosnian Serbs since there were very few Bosnian
15 Muslims or Croats around to vote. They were in Germany or Croatia. By
16 1993, there were already 900.000, about a million, displaced persons from
17 a country that had somewhat under 4 million in 1991. There was an
18 enormous number of displaced persons. Therefore, holding a referendum in
19 areas that you've ethnically cleansed looks like a pretty good deal to the
20 cleanser. Of course, nobody was going to take the Bosnian Serbs up on
21 that argument.
22 Q. Ambassador, can we next turn to a diary entry of January 26th,
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I notice the Court is looking at the
25 clock. I didn't know exactly what time --
1 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. I'm trying to do it not
2 too demonstratively. I think a break would be fine. We will break until
3 10 minutes to 6.00, and then continue to 7.00. We adjourn until 10
4 minutes to 6.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Ambassador, just before the recess, I had directed your attention
10 to a meeting of January 26th, 1993, that can be found at ERN range
12 The last four numbers help identify those entries; 4344.
13 A. Yes, I have it. Thank you.
14 Q. Ambassador, that appears to reflect a meeting with Dr. Karadzic
15 and Mr. Krajisnik. Let me ask you first if you, Secretary Vance, and Lord
16 Owen sometimes met with the heads of the delegations during the course of
17 the talks?
18 A. Oh, yes, frequently we held bilaterals. That was a standard part
19 of the negotiating, as it is of any negotiation. One meets with them in
20 plenary, but then one meets with the parties individually.
21 Q. Were efforts sometimes made to meet with the heads of the
22 delegations, the top leaders of the delegations?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And is this particular meeting one of those?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. If I can direct your attention to the two brief entries found at
2 the bottom of the page on the right, the bottom right-hand corner, which
3 occurs after some discussion about ongoing negotiations and discussions.
4 Your diary indicates that you speak and say, "Not just 43 per cent, share
5 in a hundred per cent. Think of structures, institutions, not just
6 geography." And it indicates the response by Mr. Krajisnik: "No way."
7 Can you explain the context of those remarks and their significance,
9 A. Yes. In discussing the map of the Vance-Owen Plan, the Bosnian
10 Serbs were a majority in three provinces of the ten that were in the state
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In three of those provinces, the Bosnian Serbs
12 were in the majority. Those three provinces comprised 43 per cent of the
13 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs were occupying, as
14 we've already discussed, 70 per cent. So they had to withdraw quite
15 significantly from almost 40 per cent of the land they held. And they
16 were contending that 43 per cent wasn't enough for them.
17 I was -- and before that, you notice Dr. Karadzic saying that he
18 wants to trade Ozren, that's the Ozren mountain area south-east of Doboj
19 in North Central Bosnia, he's willing to trade that for something around
20 Prijedor. That kind of conversation was quite common when one talks about
21 geography, trades one area for another area, that sort of thing.
22 JUDGE ORIE: May I -- yes, may I just interrupt you for one
23 second. Looking at these pages, I see that on the left top corner, I find
24 a date which I read as 26th of January 1993. But on the right-hand page,
25 I see a date which appears to me to be the 23rd. Could you confirm that
1 it is the same meeting. Perhaps it's a mistake --
2 THE WITNESS: It's a mistake.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then I'm fully satisfied. I just wanted to
4 satisfy myself that there was not another date.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, obviously I was thinking of the 3, following
6 9-3, and I transposed it to follow the 2. I apologise for that. I didn't
7 notice it. But it is the 26th, as one sees, because the next page, which
8 continues, is the 26th. Yes, that is a mistake.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much.
10 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, so with that kind of discussion, 43 per cent,
12 43 per cent, you know, this endless discussion, I was saying, But you
13 don't have just 43 per cent. This is one country. The Vance-Owen Plan,
14 the constitutional principles enshrine as a constitutional principle
15 freedom of movement throughout the country, so in fact you are part of 100
16 per cent. You're not just isolated and limited to 43 per cent of the
17 country, because you live in the entire country. And that's what I was
18 saying; you share in 100 per cent of a country.
19 And then I went on to say, think of the structures and the
20 institutions in which you participate completely on an equal basis to the
21 other two parties. Don't just think in terms of geography. And
22 Mr. Krajisnik says, you know, absolutely not. No way. Impossible. We
23 don't think of it that way. So he rejected that conversation.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Ambassador, let me turn your attention then to a meeting later on
1 the same day, took place about 5.00. It can be found on ERN R0164346.
2 And it's a meeting involving Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and Mr. Buha for
3 the Bosnian Serbs; and Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Silajdzic for the Bosnian
4 Muslims in addition to the international negotiators.
5 A. And an interpreter.
6 Q. Yes. Thank you.
7 Now, as it appears from the discussion that is reflected in your
8 notes, there's an emphasis on a variety of things, including Sarajevo.
9 And I mention that in particular because I want to draw your attention to
10 an entry found on the next ERN page, 4347, at the bottom right.
11 The particular entry is a comment by Mr. Krajisnik. And your
12 notes indicate the following: "Surprised that `partners' do not accept
13 this proposal. They know perfectly well that Sarajevo was the largest
14 Serb city in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the second-largest Serb city in
15 all of old Yugoslavia."
16 Ambassador, can you explain the context of that remark, the nature
17 of the discussion at that time, and its significance, please.
18 A. Yes. This discussion was about dividing Sarajevo, one of the
19 constant themes. And we had brought the leaders of the Bosnian Muslim
20 side, namely President Izetbegovic and his foreign minister Haris
21 Silajdzic together with the two Serb leaders, Bosnian Serb leaders,
22 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, and ourselves for a face-to-face
23 discussion about the future status of Sarajevo. That was what the
24 discussion was about, as you can see amply throughout the notes.
25 And the difference of opinion was that the Bosnian Muslim side, as
1 you see, Izetbegovic saying he reiterates his position to treat Sarajevo
2 just like "any other city." That's at the beginning of the conversation
3 on page -- that ends 346 at the bottom. "Reiterates position to treat
4 Sarajevo just like any other city." And then on the next page, Lord Owen
5 is trying to find some formula to divide the city on an agreed basis, and
6 it's not working, obviously.
7 And Izetbegovic then says: "Splitting an opstina is tantamount to
8 splitting the country" because that was one of Lord Owen's suggestions to
9 the parties: Perhaps you could split the opstina, and Izetbegovic
10 disagrees. And then as you see, Lord Owen and Izetbegovic pore over the
11 map, and Karadzic intervenes to say "We'll need international guarantees,"
12 et cetera. And that was what it was all about.
13 So at the end, Mr. Krajisnik -- and this discussion went on at
14 some length, and at the end of it, I notice this is after 6.00 and the
15 discussion began at 5.00, so they had been together for one hour on this
16 single point, what to do about Sarajevo. What is the disposition of
17 Sarajevo? How is it to be governed? Et cetera, et cetera.
18 And Mr. Krajisnik says that he is surprised that the partners,
19 namely, the Bosnian Muslims, do not accept the Bosnian Serb suggestion to
20 divide the city. And then he goes on to say that they know perfectly well
21 that Sarajevo was the -- had more Serb inhabitants than any other city in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina and had more Serb residents than any -- second only to
23 Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia. So he's stressing the importance of
24 Sarajevo to the Bosnian Serbs. As I've mentioned previously, this was a
25 very important issue for Mr. Krajisnik, Sarajevo. His home city.
1 Q. Ambassador, let me ask you about the language of that entry. Do
2 you recall whether Mr. Krajisnik was indicating his view that Sarajevo
3 was, up to that time, a Serb city and a Muslim city, as opposed to a
4 single city -- single, multicultural, intermixed city?
5 A. No, I don't think so. You'd have to ask him that, but I never got
6 that impression. But he felt, along with the other Serb leader,
7 Dr. Karadzic, that Serbs would be threatened in that city, as indeed they
8 would be threatened in an independent Bosnia, unless they had their own
9 republic and unless they had their own area of Bosnia.
10 Q. Continuing with the -- that particular issue, perhaps it's useful
11 to turn your attention to an entry on January 27th, 1993. That can be
12 found at R0164352. It's a meeting beginning at 3.40 p.m., ending at 5.10
13 p.m., involving, in addition to the negotiators, Dr. Karadzic,
14 Mr. Krajisnik, and Mr. Buha.
15 A. Yes, that meeting the next day continued the discussion on the
16 question of Sarajevo, what to do about Sarajevo. And various proposals
17 were under discussion. Various formulae were raised and rejected.
18 Various maps were considered and placed aside. And Mr. Krajisnik says
19 straightforwardly, the only solution is to divide Sarajevo, which was the
20 Bosnian Serb position. The only solution is to divide Sarajevo.
21 Q. And that would mean the Muslims in one part; the Serbs in another.
22 A. Yes. And I responded to that point. And I noted that this would
23 not be acceptable, that such a separation would be completely
24 unacceptable, and I cited Berlin, Beirut, and Nicosia as examples of
25 divided cities, and that was not acceptable to the international
2 Q. Ambassador, can we next turn to your diary entry of January 29th,
3 1993. Found at ERN R0164558. Excuse me, 4358.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, this is a trilateral meeting involving the Bosnian Serbs, the
6 Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims. Is that right?
7 A. Yes, the Bosnian government. Headed, however, by Silajdzic.
8 Izetbegovic for some reason was not at this meeting, as you see.
9 Otherwise, the leaders were all there, the top leaders: Boban, Mate Boban
10 and Akmadzic for the Croats; Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. But
11 Izetbegovic was not there.
12 Q. Following that trilateral meeting, immediately afterwards you and
13 Lord Owen and Secretary Vance have a bilateral meeting with the Bosnian
14 Serbs at 4.00. Present there again are Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and
15 Mr. Buha. And if I could direct your attention to the first entries of
16 that meeting, Dr. Karadzic criticises a statement by Lord Owen --
17 criticising DLO's statement regarding Serbs, especially Geneva interview
18 Tribune. And then he goes on --
19 A. Excuse me, Counsel. He's referring to a newspaper, the Tribune
20 Geneve is a newspaper.
21 Q. And in a subsequent entry he explains his concern, and you
22 indicate in an entry next to his name, "You said we burned down villages.
23 Many more Serb villages are burned down than Croatian, Muslim," et cetera,
24 et cetera, et cetera. Is that yet another example of responding to
25 allegations of ethnic cleansing by pointing out that others are doing the
2 A. Yes, it's an example of his mendacity.
3 Q. If we turn to the subsequent page at R0164360, you indicate
4 Mr. Krajisnik speaking, and he says, according to the entry: "I'll admit
5 you tried, but you took only Muslim arguments into account. You do their
6 bidding. Let's stop fighting and settle Sarajevo. If we can stop it in
7 Sarajevo, we can end it in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Can you explain
8 the context --
9 A. Yes, that's another way of saying the same thing: Let us divide
10 Sarajevo, and if we divide Sarajevo successfully and we have the Muslims
11 on one side and the Serbs on the other, and then we would be satisfied and
12 can end the rest of the fighting. Because again, I call your attention,
13 Mr. Counsel, to the fact that at this time, the Bosnian Serb Army held 70
14 per cent of Bosnia. So the Bosnian Serbs were, on the whole, rather
15 content with the situation. The front lines were where they wanted them
16 to be. So Mr. Krajisnik is saying very politely, "If we can resolve
17 Sarajevo, and then we stop every place else, well, we've resolved the
18 problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
19 Q. Ambassador, can I direct your attention next to a diary entry
20 dated March 6th, 1993, found at R0164441.
21 And the Bosnian Serbs present at that meeting are Dr. Karadzic,
22 Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Buha, and Mr. Lukic. Let me direct your
23 attention first to the first three entries for that meeting. The first
24 indicates Dr. Karadzic speaking, and he says, "Your map is unacceptable,
25 et cetera, et cetera. Our people will never accept, et cetera." And then
1 Secretary Vance responds by saying: "You must accept and be a leader."
2 What was Secretary Vance saying to Dr. Karadzic in that exchange?
3 A. It speaks for itself, Counsel. He's telling him to accept it and
4 to lead his people to understand that it is in their interests; be a
6 Q. And then it indicates Mr. Krajisnik speaking, saying, "I'll be
7 frank: The map, unacceptable."
8 A. He reiterates for the nth time the map is unacceptable.
9 Q. After Secretary Vance had indicated to Dr. Karadzic, look, you're
10 telling me that your people won't accept, I'm telling you be a leader and
11 accept, was Mr. Krajisnik indicating, in saying "I'll be frank," his view
12 about the acceptability of the maps, irrespective of whatever "our
13 people," as Dr. Karadzic described it, felt?
14 A. He's giving his own view, but he's giving the view of the Bosnian
15 Serb parliament, his is the controlling view. That's why he says, "I'll
16 be frank." He's telling Mr. Vance, "Don't waste your breath trying to
17 convince Karadzic to accept this map. I'm telling you it's unacceptable."
18 He was quite clear on that. There was nothing dubious or ambiguous about
19 that statement.
20 Q. On the following page, but the same ERN page, there's an exchange
21 involving Mr. Buha, Lord Owen, and then Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and
22 Mr. Buha. And it indicates the following: Mr. Buha says: "Sorry to
23 correct you, but the link to Sandzak is via Visegrad." Lord Owen says,
24 "Well, then give the government Rudoo and Cajnice." And Dr. Karadzic, Mr.
25 Krajisnik, Mr. Buha all say, "Cannot. They are Serb territories." And
1 there is below that a reference in parentheses, "smiles all around on our
2 side." Can you explain the exchange, please.
3 A. Well, the only Serb territories -- Rudoo was, but Cajnice had been
4 ethnically cleansed. That's how it became a Serb territory. You just
5 have to look at the ethnographic map of Bosnia to see the prewar
6 population of Cajnice. I have one done by the United States, not by any
7 of the contending parties. I have one here I can give you, if you wish,
8 the population of the opstina of Cajnice. It's on the Drina. So we smile
9 when we hear that, yes, it's a Serb territory because it has been
10 ethnically cleansed of the Muslims. Mr. Krajisnik knows that, and we know
11 that, and he knows we know that. So this is a dialogue of the deaf. And
12 that's why we don't pursue it. But this was standard argument from the
13 Serbs. Basically, they took the position that what's ours is ours, and
14 what belongs to the other side we make ours. And there it was.
15 Q. Ambassador, I'm looking at the map we had before us before. I
16 don't have the precise marking on it, but it was the one that was mounted
17 on the --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I think it was P211, isn't it? Yes.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. I'm looking at the 1991 census figures, the demographic figures,
21 for Rudoo, Cajnice, and Visegrad.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And it indicates, as I see it here, and you can correct me if I'm
24 wrong, that Visegrad was 63 per cent Muslim, 33 per cent Serb; Rudoo was
25 71 Serb, 27 per cent Muslim; and Cajnice was 53 per cent Serb and 45 per
1 cent Muslim.
2 A. Visegrad -- yes. Yes, I see it. Thank you.
3 Q. Now, the context of this discussion appears to be issues about the
4 Muslim corridor to Sandzak and concerns about the Posavina Corridor as
5 well, if I look back at the notations in the earlier portions of the
7 A. The context of this discussion -- may I?
8 Q. Yes, please.
9 A. The context of this discussion was point made and reiterated over
10 and over again by the Bosnian Serbs that, among its other faults, one of
11 the major faults of the map of the Vance-Owen peace plan was that more
12 than 40 per cent of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not in
13 Bosnian Serb majority provinces, that they were outside of the Bosnian
14 Serb provinces. This was indeed the fact. It was done consciously by the
15 negotiators because they did not want to produce a mere replication of an
16 ethnicised Bosnia at war. They wanted one state in which the populations
17 lived amicably under international law and guarantees with freedom of
18 movement, a democratic state, altogether in one state.
19 Now, of course, they were not drawing this map on the moon.
20 People lived where people lived. So there were majorities in certain
21 areas. Herzegovina was over 90 per cent Bosnian Croat. The Cazinska
22 Krajina, the Bihac pocket as it came to be called, some opstinas there
23 were well over 90 per cent Bosnian Muslim. Velika Kladusa, for example.
24 There were provinces like Rudoo or Bijeljina that were heavily Serb. But
25 the Vance-Owen map was designed to smooth that out and to allow an
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 intermingling to the maximum degree, an intermingling of the populations.
2 Well, this was anathema to the Bosnian Serbs. And you see Buha saying
3 that, and he was perhaps the most vehement of all. He's a rather crude
4 fellow and expresses him crudely, so he speaks in that fashion.
5 And if you notice at the bottom of that page that ends 4411, Buha
6 says, "Your basic concept on the map is wrong. 50 per cent of the Serbs
7 are outside the Serb provinces." Actually, it was a little less than 50.
8 It was about 40, 45 per cent. Then he says: "You violated your own
9 principles of October 1992, re: viability and coherence of the provinces."
10 That was a false statement, that's not true. And then he says: "Provinces
11 number 4 and 6 are too small and not viable," et cetera. So that's the
13 Lord Owen responded that Buha's complaint about province number 6
14 was wide of the mark. And he says, "Province number 6 looks the way it
15 does so that you can block the Muslim corridor to the Sandzak, just the
16 way the Posavina breaks your corridor." There was a Croat-Muslim majority
17 province on the Posavina. The Vance-Owen map broke the corridor, so the
18 Serbs were very unhappy with that because that was one of their major war
19 aims, to connect Banja Luka, via Brcko and Bijeljina, to Belgrade. And
20 the Vance-Owen map did not do that. Owen was pointing out that the
21 Vance-Owen map also did not give the Bosnian Muslims their corridor to the
22 Sandzak, which is a Muslim area of Serbia. And he -- Buha then scores
23 what he thinks is a debating point by saying that the link to the Sandzak
24 is Visegrad. And that's the context of that discussion.
25 Q. So then Lord Owen says, well, if you want Visegrad, give the
1 government Rudoo and Cajnice, and the response by the Bosnian Serb
2 delegation is, We can't do that, they're Serb territories.
3 A. That's right.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, can I just mention that it was a slip
5 of the tongue by Mr. Okun in the previous answer. He referred to the page
6 ending 4411. In fact, it's 4441.
7 THE WITNESS: Oh yes. Thank you, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for your assistance.
9 THE WITNESS: My apologies.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. Further on --
12 A. If I may, Counsel, you'll notice that immediately after this
13 fruitless discussion, Dr. Karadzic changed the subject, which was not
14 unusual because he knew it was a fruitless discussion. And he says,
15 "Let's talk about other issues." And since we were in New York, he raised
16 the high cost of hotel rooms in New York. That bothered him. So you
17 know, both sides knew that this discussion, unfortunately, was
19 Q. Turning to the next page of that same meeting, Ambassador, 4442,
20 on the right-hand side of the page, you indicate Mr. Krajisnik raising two
21 questions. He says, "I have two questions `to help'. (A) Whose is
22 province number 3?" And then in parentheses, it indicates CRV, or
23 Secretary Vance, stating, "Croat, but we want balance and do not want
24 ethnicity, 'a new nation'." And all Serbs responding, "That is what we
25 don't accept." And then Dr. Karadzic saying, "Serbs wants to be Serbs;
1 Croats too."
2 A. Yes. What is the question?
3 Q. Ambassador, is that another example of the insistence that Bosnia
4 be fully segregated; Muslims in one place, Serbs in another, and Croats in
5 their spot?
6 A. Yes, very much so. Mr. Krajisnik is asking about province 3, and
7 Secretary Vance answers. And then Vance goes on to say, "We're not doing
8 this on the basis of ethnic division. This is going to be a new nation in
9 which you all live together." And they all respond: "That is what we
10 don't accept." Yes, this is an example of the need, as they saw it, for
11 division into ethnically pure areas.
12 Q. On the following page at 4443, Mr. Krajisnik indicates his final
13 question: "Since you will make no concessions to our point of view, can
14 we divide Bosnia-Herzegovina in two?" To which Secretary Vance responds,
15 "No." What did he mean by the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in two in
16 that discussion?
17 A. Well, you've seen that this discussion followed many, many hours
18 of discussions on this subject of the map. It's now March 6th, 1993. The
19 map has been formally in front of the three parties since the first week
20 of January. That's more than two months. And the discussions have been
21 steady for that period. So -- and the result is no agreement by the
22 Bosnian Serbs to the map. And Mr. Krajisnik then, because of that, wants
23 to strike sort of a simple bargain, and says, "Since you'll make no
24 concessions to our point of view," sort of how about just dividing Bosnia
25 in half? Don't have these provinces, and we won't have to worry about,
1 you know, all this. This is the Vance-Owen map, you see. Why not just
2 cut it down the middle -- not down the middle, but just divide it in half.
3 And the answer was no, we can't do that. We're not dividing the country.
4 And then Lord Owen responded in very, very stern fashion, you see.
5 "I note very tough leaders should be strong. You are cowardly. The
6 greatest superpower, the United States, will take action," et cetera, et
7 cetera. Meaning if you don't agree, the United States will make war on
8 you. Think about it. The Security Council will speak. Time is short.
9 And then he goes on to say: "I fear next time, matters will be very
10 different for you." And he's telling the Bosnian Serb leadership that
11 they must think very seriously about this peace plan because he is saying
12 to them you have to choose essentially between peace and war. But war
13 with the United States, not war with the Bosnian Muslims. And then he --
14 I note at the very end, in capital letters, underlined, "Watch out."
15 Q. Ambassador, let me turn quickly to a document --
16 A. And then Buha turns to me and says, "Everything is terrible for
18 Q. Can I ask you to turn to a diary entry of March 25th, 1993. And
19 that appears to be a trilateral meeting again. Attending for the Bosnian
20 Serbs are Dr. Karadzic, Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Lukic. If I can
21 direct your attention quickly to an entry on ERN R0164480, in the middle
22 of the page at the left, there's an entry following remarks by -- about
23 remarks from Dr. Karadzic, who says, "As `only legitimate representatives
24 of Serb people (as MB [Realtime transcript read in error "MD"] said)' we
25 insist old Bosnia and Herzegovina cease to exist and now exists as states
1 with three constituent peoples. That is the only way it can be legit."
2 And very quickly, did that continue to be the Bosnian Serb
4 A. Yes, indeed. And MB is Mate Boban. He's quoting the Bosnian
5 Croat leader on his behalf. But as I mentioned to you earlier, he and
6 Boban, that is to say, the Bosnian Serb leadership and the Bosnian Croat
7 leadership were identical in this particular aspect; namely, that
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not exist as an independent unitary state. It
9 existed only as a state composed of three constituent peoples each living
10 in their own area. We've seen the expression "composite state," "federal
11 state," "confederal state," used by all of the Bosnian Serb leaders,
12 including Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Karadzic. That's what they meant. That's
13 very clear. And he says it here again. And he cites Mate Boban, the
14 Croat leader, as agreeing with him. And that is correct; Mate Boban did
15 agree with him.
16 Q. Ambassador, can I turn your attention next to a diary entry of
17 April 21st, 1993, found at R0164518.
18 JUDGE ORIE: In between, I'd like, for the record, to state that
19 page 74, line 4, it says "MD" where it should say "MB." And since
20 reference is made to it later, I'd like to avoid confusion.
21 Yes, please proceed.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Ambassador, this reflects a meeting with Mr. Cosic. Can you tell
24 us first who Mr. Cosic is.
25 A. Dobrica Cosic was then the president of Yugoslavia, a very
1 distinguished Serb writer, the leading prose writer of Yugoslavia in that
3 Q. And on the right side of that page, adjacent to two asterisks, two
4 circled asterisks, you have a notation. And it appears to be Mr. Cosic
5 speaking, saying, "I tried but failed to convince Karadzic/Krajisnik to
6 accept your map."
7 First of all, does that entry indicate Mr. Cosic telling you and
8 Secretary Vance about the efforts he had made to persuade Dr. Karadzic and
9 Mr. Krajisnik to accept the proposal?
10 A. Yes, that's what it says.
11 Q. And does it also reflect Mr. Cosic's or President Cosic's view
12 about who the top leaders of the Bosnian Serbs were?
13 A. Yes, he mentions only the two top men. Doesn't mention Koljevic,
14 he doesn't mention Buha, nor would he ever. He knows who the leaders are.
15 Q. Can I turn I could attention next to another meeting of the same
16 day --
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we do suggest -- we understand that the
18 Prosecution have their job, and they say that Mr. Krajisnik is guilty, and
19 they're here to try to prove that, but to leave that particular remark and
20 passage in the meeting on the 21st of April 1993, supposedly on the
21 footing that it should be picked up in cross-examination, we would suggest
22 is not appropriate. The passage that Mr. Tieger put to the witness is
23 plainly incomplete, and in fairness all round, it should be completed.
24 Your Honour will see how that particular passage -- "I tried but failed to
25 convince Karadzic/Krajisnik to accept your map..." To omit the next bit
1 of that remark from this question we do suggest is inappropriate.
2 JUDGE ORIE: After the "but."
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, indeed, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please read -- Mr. Tieger, we're dealing
5 with this specific portion, so I think that you would ask the witness to
6 read the following lines as well, and then see whether there's any
7 specific comment on the following lines.
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm more than happy have the witness do
9 that, but in fairness, I have to reject the characterisation of my
10 question as inappropriate.
11 JUDGE ORIE: My problem is, since I can't read everything that
12 follows, I'm not in a position at this moment yet. I don't know whether
13 it would be wise at a later stage to respond to strong words. Let's first
14 concentrate on the matter itself. And it's on the record that you do not
15 agree with the blame put on you by Mr. Stewart.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Ambassador, if we could complete at least that portion of
18 Mr. Cosic's remarks.
19 A. Would you like me to read it?
20 Q. By all means.
21 A. "I tried but failed to convince Karadzic and Krajisnik to accept
22 your map. I tried. But I must tell you that I did not have convincing
23 arguments. I implore you to try harder."
24 Q. Does that in any way change your view that Mr. Cosic considered
25 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik the two top leaders of the Bosnian Serbs?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Can we turn next to a meeting of the same day, this one with
3 Mr. Milosevic, or President Milosevic. That's found at ERN R0164520. On
4 the right side of the page, again, next to an asterisked or starred -- or
5 star, you indicate President Milosevic saying the following: "I asked
6 Karadzic and Krajisnik what they want. `Got no concrete answer.' But
7 corridor is key." In parentheses, "Get out Serb ethnomap," end parens.
8 Then later, on the next page, which is ERN 4521, at the bottom
9 left, you record President Milosevic as saying again, "Corridor or
10 equivalent is vital. Have spent many hours with Bosnian Serbs. They are
11 fanatic on it. We do not want Greater Serbia, et cetera."
12 Ambassador, can you explain what President Milosevic is referring
13 to in those comments?
14 A. Yes. He's referring to the fact that territorial continuity, as
15 we've discussed, was a key point for the Bosnian Serb leadership; namely,
16 the territorial continuity of what they called Republika Srpska. And the
17 Vance-Owen map did not give them territorial continuity. The corridor,
18 which was the single-most important area to them -- the second-most
19 important was the Drina, the Posavina Corridor, that is to say, the road
20 from -- the road linking Belgrade through Bijeljina and Brcko to Banja
21 Luka was not in their hands. And he is saying that the corridor is the
22 key and that the corridor or its equivalent is vital, and that he had
23 spent many hours with the Bosnian Serbs, the leaders on this, and they are
24 fanatic on this point.
25 And I may say that to bring the situation up-to-date as it stands
1 today, the Bosnian Serb leadership held to that position throughout the
2 entire next years of negotiation. They insisted on it when the contact
3 group devised its map of July 1994; they insisted on it in the Dayton
4 framework agreement where Brcko, which is the narrowest point in the
5 corridor and the choke point, if you will, and it was -- it had been a
6 Muslim opstina, so the Muslims were quite obstinate about it. At the
7 Dayton framework meeting in November 1995 - the Serbs were not present,
8 the Bosnian Serbs were not present - but Milosevic insisted that it had to
9 be given to the Bosnian Serbs, and it was, under an ambiguous arrangement
10 that it would be technically under some form of international control and
11 that after one year, that is to say by 1996, it would revert to the prewar
12 situation; namely, the Bosnian Muslims. That was the agreement in the
13 Dayton framework agreement, that there would be a mediator, and Brcko, the
14 heart of the Posavina, the corridor, would then revert to Muslim or Croat
15 control. It is still held by the Bosnian Serbs in 2004. It is de facto
16 Bosnian Serb. And that's an indication of how seriously the Bosnian Serbs
17 regard the direct link from Belgrade through Brcko to Banja Luka, the
18 Posavina Corridor.
19 Excuse my lengthy answer, but that does indicate, I think, the
20 vital importance that the Bosnian Serbs ascribed and continue to ascribe
21 to their physical link with Serbia.
22 Q. Ambassador, could I ask you to turn next, please --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. May I ask you to turn next, please, to a diary entry of April
1 24th, 1993. That can be found at ERN 4531.
2 That's a meeting with Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and
3 Mr. Krajisnik. If I can direct your attention, Ambassador, to the entries
4 reflecting comments by Dr. Karadzic beginning at the bottom left page of
5 your diary and continuing on to the next page. "We have been on road,
6 cannot persuade our people to stay in province number 3 (Posavina), same
7 in Krajina and Eastern Herzegovina." And then on the next page, "Same
8 problem wherever Muslims are numerous. People say to us `either you find
9 us land or we fight to end'." And then it cites Kupres, Ozren, Donji
10 Vakuf. "A practical problem: Where are we going to put these people?"
11 Ambassador, is this another reflection of the position by the
12 Bosnian Serb leaders that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan failed sufficiently to
13 segregate the nations, failed to segregate the Muslims and the Serbs, and
14 was fatal for that reason?
15 A. Yes. It did not divide the country on an ethnic basis, as the
16 Bosnian Serbs wanted. And here, Dr. Karadzic is telling us that very
17 frankly. Now, bear in mind, this is very late in the day. It's the end
18 of April. By now, the Bosnian government had signed the plan completely.
19 That had been in March of 1993. The Bosnian Croats had already signed it
20 in January. So the only party holding out against the plan were the
21 Bosnian Serbs. And Karadzic was under pressure, naturally, and the
22 leadership was, to agree to the plan since the other two parties had and
23 end the fighting and live in peace. And he is saying here that it isn't
24 going to happen. We will not live with Muslims, he's saying. You know,
25 "people say to us," he never tells you who the people are. I suspect
1 that's Aleksa Buha, in "people." People say to us, and I quote him,
2 "Either you find us land or we fight to the end." And then he cites
3 Kupres, the Ozren valley, Donji Vakuf. Where are we going to put these
4 people? In other words, where there are lots of Bosnian Serbs who do not
5 live in a pure Bosnian Serb state. And that's that. And of course, that
6 was true. That was true. Because the Vance-Owen map was designed for a
7 multiethnic country, not a monoethnic state. And the Bosnian Serbs
8 rejected that.
9 Q. And is he indicating flatly to you that wherever there is a
10 concentration of Muslims, wherever Muslims are numerous, that arrangement
11 is not acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs?
12 A. Yes, he said so. He says the same problem exists -- I didn't
13 write exists, but that's what he probably says, same problem exists
14 wherever the Muslims are numerous. I mean, it could not be clearer what
15 he was saying. He was being very frank.
16 Q. May I ask quickly you to turn to the subsequent -- the next page,
17 at 4532. I want to bring your attention to two entries. The first is
18 found on the left side of the page in the middle, where Dr. Karadzic says
19 "We know that Kupres is vital for Croats like Posavina for us. Before
20 war, we made a deal with Boban: Kupres/Posavina."
21 And then on the next page, he asks: What if Krajina Serbs gave
22 land to Croatia for land to us in number 3?"
23 JUDGE ORIE: We are a bit confused.
24 MR. STEWART: Us, too, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You are referring to page 4332 and stated on the
1 left-hand side there's an entry with Dr. Karadzic saying something. But I
2 do not see any entry mentioning, apart from right on the top. But there
3 he does not say what you read.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it seems to be a completely different
5 meeting, completely different run of documents. Something has gone wrong
6 altogether with the numbering.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I draw your attention to the fact that on the
8 first page we see April 24th, 1993, which is a Saturday, and then the next
9 page is not Belgrade any more, but is Geneva, and is 23rd of January,
11 And the -- my colleague clearly showed me where the mistake is.
12 Judge Canivell said if you look at the last four digits of the ERN
13 numbers, you see it starts with 4531, and the next one is 4332, and then
14 it continues on the basis of 43, so we are back in time approximately
15 three months.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, first, I apologise for --
17 JUDGE ORIE: If we could perhaps look at the original.
18 MR. TIEGER: I am at the moment looking at the original, and
19 that's what I was referring to. May I suggest --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but if the original bears 4332, then we still
21 have a problem.
22 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, would it be a good idea if Mr. Tieger
23 were to sort this out overnight and we could deal with it first thing in
24 the morning?
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you would like to give him the full 12 hours or
1 more to sort --
2 MR. STEWART: It makes sense, Your Honour, because otherwise we'll
3 be doing a committee job on something which I'm sure Mr. Tieger can sort
4 out easily overnight.
5 JUDGE ORIE: It's 7.00 anyway, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, forgive me, by the way: When I said I'm
7 referring to the original, I did not intend to communicate that I had the
8 original diary.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You mean the original in the binder.
10 MR. TIEGER: That's correct.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then since it's 7.00, we'll adjourn, Mr. Okun.
12 We'll sit tomorrow in the morning. We start at 9.00. And since we know
13 now everything about the times you get up and how hard you worked over all
14 these years, we know that getting here at 9.00 should not be a major
15 problem for you. We are in a different courtroom. We are in Courtroom II
17 We'll adjourn until tomorrow. And I take it that the first thing
18 we'll hear from you is how this numbering is.
19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I speak?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course.
21 THE WITNESS: I would just like to tell the members of the Court
22 that the notes I have reproduced in front of me are continuous and go on
23 correctly. So this book, at least, is correct.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: There's no misnumbering in this particular one.
1 JUDGE ORIE: It may well be that it's just in the copies that have
2 been distributed, which is most likely, if I look at the ERN numbers. But
3 it will not be perhaps the most difficult problem we have to solve in this
4 courtroom. And we'll hear from Mr. Tieger tomorrow morning.
5 We'll adjourning until 9.00, Courtroom II.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day of June,
9 2004, at 9.00 a.m.