1 Thursday, 24 June 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would you
6 please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Mr. Tieger, yesterday, in the afternoon, we ended by some
11 confusion. Could you tell us what the results of your research is.
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I will. It appeared that the most expeditious
13 and effective way to resolve the problem from yesterday was simply to have
14 the excerpts that would be presented to the Court correspond to the actual
15 diary entries and to the pages, the sequential pages as they appear in the
16 exhibit which has been provided broadly to the Court. So as near as I can
17 determine, it was simply that the excerpted portions presented to the
18 Court were miscopied.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. TIEGER: And they are now, as I understand it, presented to
21 the Court in proper sequence.
22 JUDGE ORIE: So we can proceed without any further confusion.
23 Then, Mr. Usher, could you please escort the witness into the courtroom.
24 [The witness entered court]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Okun.
1 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Just as I said yesterday that it would go without
3 saying that you're still bound by your solemn declaration, the same is
4 true for today.
5 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
6 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Examined by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
9 Q. Good morning, Ambassador.
10 A. Good morning.
11 Q. Ambassador, when we concluded yesterday, we were focusing on a
12 diary entries from meeting of April 24th, 1993, which begins at ERN range
13 R0164531. And I had just drawn your attention, if I recall correctly, to
14 two entries on ERN page 4532, when we discovered some problems with the
15 copying and numbering of the copies that had been provided to the Court.
16 I think that problem has been resolved, so I'd like to return your
17 attention now to that meeting and to a couple of entries from that
19 And do you have page 4532 in front of you? I'd like to note two
20 entries. One appears in the left side of the page, next to an asterisk.
21 It's Dr. Karadzic speaking, and the entry notes: "We know that Kupres is
22 vital for Croats, like Posavina for us. Before war we made a deal with
23 Boban: Kupres/Posavina."
24 And on the next page, next page of your diary but the same ERN
25 page, it reflects Dr. Karadzic speaking again. And the entry notes:
1 "What if Krajina Serbs gave land to Croatia for land to us in number 3?"
2 Can you assist us, please, with what Dr. Karadzic is speaking
3 about and what he's indicating about a deal with Boban or the proposition
4 that the Krajina Serbs give land in Croatia in exchange for land to the
5 Bosnian Serbs in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
6 A. Dr. Karadzic was, as we know, unhappy with the Vance-Owen map.
7 The Bosnian Serbs' leadership was all extremely unhappy. That has been
8 established. So there was a good deal of suggested changes, or what we
9 call in America horse-trading. And here he is suggesting a trade. But
10 the trade was - excuse me - the trade was not in this case inside Bosnia
11 necessarily. Perhaps the Krajina was the Bosnian Krajina, but maybe it
12 was the Croatian Krajina, the old Vojna Krajina. It's hard -- I suspect
13 -- it's hard to tell exactly whether he was talking about a trade inside
14 or outside, because he says "... gave land to Croatia..." So presumably,
15 you know, he's saying: Well, okay, we will give some of the western area,
16 the western area of Bosnia, to Croatia for land given to us. You see,
17 what if the Krajina Serbs gave land to Croatia to use in number 3? But
18 number 3 - excuse me - province 3 was not in the west, so here he's
19 talking about the Posavina. He's talking about the Posavina, province 3.
20 In any case, it was an impossible idea. But he is suggesting that
21 the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, would be willing to give some land to
22 Croatia in exchange for other territories they got. Not something that
23 could be accepted. And Lord Owen responds that these are separate issues
24 and goes on to say: If you can do it informally, it's your business. The
25 UNPAs, that is to say, the United Nations protected areas, are all
1 separate in history, geography, and current status. And his reference to
2 the UN protected areas clearly shows that Lord Owen took this to assume
3 that Lord Owen inferred from what Karadzic said that they were talking
4 about Croatia, because the UN protected areas were only in Croatia.
5 So here you see Karadzic suggesting a trade of land in Bosnia for
6 land in Croatia. And Lord Owen says that's impossible.
7 Q. Ambassador, let me draw your attention very quickly, in the
8 interests of time, to a couple of additional entries in that same meeting.
9 I think they reflect issues that you've already covered in detail and it
10 may well be that no comment is necessary. But if we turn to page
11 R0164533, on the left side of the page, at the very top, there's an entry
12 reflecting comments by MK, Mr. Krajisnik, which indicates: "Raises
13 Sarajevo and suggests solutions for 'inner' 'outer' area."
14 And then below that, after an indication that the map talk
15 continues, there's an entry: "RM" - Ratko Mladic - "wants entire west
16 bank of Drina (no way" - that's underscored - "colon, DLO/HSO)" that is
17 Lord Owen and yourself.
18 So do those two entries reflect again Mr. Krajisnik raising the
19 question of the -- and the demand for the division of Sarajevo and General
20 Mladic expressing the demand of the Bosnian Serb leadership for the entire
21 area of the Drina?
22 A. Yes, that's correct. Mr. Krajisnik, as we mentioned repeatedly
23 before, was intensely interested in dividing Sarajevo, and this was
24 another example of that. And following that, I see we discussed Popovo
25 Polje - that's down in the south-eastern section - and Nevesinje and
1 Sarajevo again. And General Mladic said that they wanted -- the Bosnian
2 Serbs wanted the entire bank of the Drina. We knew that, of course. I
3 mean, they said that repeatedly and their actions in the Drina, the ethnic
4 cleansing, made that clear. And we said no. Lord Owen and I said that
5 was out of the question.
6 The areas that were discussed probably most frequently, that is,
7 insisted upon by the Bosnian Serb leadership consistently, persistently,
8 were the Drina area, the west bank of the Drina, the corridor, and
9 particularly Brcko, which is the choke point in the corridor, and
10 Sarajevo. I would say among the areas, the territorial demands that they
11 focused on, and these were constant, the three that were highlighted most,
12 both in terms of the number of times we heard that and the depth of their
13 insistence were the division of Sarajevo, gaining control of the entire
14 west bank of the Drina, and Brcko, as the choke point in the corridor that
15 we've discussed, the Posavina corridor. Thank you.
16 Q. Ambassador, if I could quickly draw your attention to two
17 additional meetings. The first is a meeting of the -- again of the 24th
18 of April, 1993. That meeting begins on ERN page R0164535, and the
19 particular entry to which I want to draw your attention is contained on
20 the following page, at 4536. And that is a meeting involving yourself,
21 Lord Owen, and President Cosic and President Milosevic.
22 And again I think this is an issue you've covered in some depth
23 earlier, so no comment may be necessary, but drawing your attention to an
24 entry that appears toward the bottom right-hand portion of page 4536,
25 Mr. Milosevic says: "C and I" - which I take to mean Cosic and I - "will
1 talk this afternoon with Karadzic and Krajisnik Re Int. Presidency," and
2 there's a word I cannot confidently decipher --
3 A. The word is "consensus" and "int." is interim. Interim Presidency
4 and consensus.
5 Q. And then the passage continues: "We'll talk to K and K" -
6 Karadzic and Krajisnik - "and have by end of day a clear understanding.
7 We'll inform you. Maybe talk tomorrow."
8 Again, Ambassador, is that another reflection of the understanding
9 of President Milosevic and President Cosic regarding who the top two
10 leaders of the Bosnian Serbs were?
11 A. Yes. There was no question in their minds or ours.
12 Q. And Ambassador, if I could now draw your attention to a similar
13 entry in your diary from a meeting of April 25th, 1993, found at ERN
14 R0164553. This is a meeting which begins with President Cosic, President
15 Milosevic, President Bulatovic, which Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik
16 joined at 4.00 p.m., and the entry reads: "SM" - Slobodan Milosevic -
17 "explains in our presence to Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik,"
18 indicated by initials, "where we stand on the MOU map on the interim
20 And I only draw your attention to that as another reflection of
21 what you've previously indicated. Unless some comment is necessary, we'll
22 move on to the next item.
23 A. I would only mention, Mr. Tieger, that again we see reference to
24 the corridor at the very bottom of page R0164536. On the lower right-hand
25 side, at the bottom, President Milosevic says, yet again: "Regarding the
1 map, the key is the corridor, the Posavina corridor." And he continues to
2 say: "Please talk to Tudjman and Izetbegovic on this in province number
3 3." Because province number 3 was the mixed Croat-Muslim province that
4 bordered on the Sava River and cut the corridor from Belgrade to Banja
5 Luka. This again was the reference to that choke point at Brcko.
6 And in this connection, I might mention that before the war, the
7 opstina of Brcko had no ethnic majority. But of the three peoples who
8 lived in Brcko, the minority were the Serbs. 80 per cent of the province
9 was non-Serb -- of the population of Brcko, of Brcko opstina, in the
10 pre-war census. It was approximately 40 per cent Muslim people, 30 per
11 cent Croat people, and 20 per cent Bosnian Serbs. The exact figures are
12 39 per cent, 29, and 20. So, you see, one fifth of the province were
13 Serb. 80 per cent or so of the people living in this opstina, according
14 to the 1981 census, were non-Bosnian Serbs, were not Bosnian Serbs. They
15 were either Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Muslims. Yet the Serbs insisted
16 fiercely that this must become a Serb province - not an opstina but a
17 province - in the Republika Srpska.
18 Now, what was to happen to those other people? Because the
19 pre-war population of the opstina of Brcko was over 80.000, which meant
20 that about 60.000 or so were not Bosnian Serbs. Well, they were to be
21 ethnically cleansed, as indeed they were.
22 So that gives you an example, a clear one, of this Bosnian Serb
23 insistence, absolute demand, and here you have Milosevic saying this is
24 the key to an opstina that was not Serb. It was done, of course, for
25 strategic reasons. That we knew. Everybody knew that. But what it
1 involved was cleansing the area by force and violence of the other peoples
2 who formed 80 per cent of the populace of that Brcko opstina.
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, for the record, the reference to which
4 the ambassador referred, found at 4536, is a reference back to the meeting
5 of April 24th.
6 Q. Ambassador, I'd like now to show you a document which is shorthand
7 notes from an enlarged session of the Council for Coordinating Positions
8 on State Policy, which was held on the 21st of January of 1993. I know
9 you've had an opportunity to look at that before. I think this is a --
10 this is a copy of the document to which you previously had access.
11 MR. TIEGER: With the Court's permission and permission of the
12 Defence, which has already been indicated, I would provide this to the
13 witness for his assistance in responding to the questions.
14 Q. First of all, Ambassador, is it correct that this is a meeting
15 that took place during the course of negotiations over the Vance-Owen
16 Peace Plan?
17 A. Yes. The plan, as I mentioned earlier, was -- excuse me. The
18 plan was put before the three parties in the first week of January, and
19 this would be following on the initial discussions about the plan, which
20 took about two weeks. They're all in my diary.
21 Q. And have you had a chance to review this document and determine
22 who the participants were and what the principal subject matter discussed
24 A. Yes, I have had that opportunity.
25 Q. Can you give the Court some idea who was in attendance and what
1 principally they were discussing.
2 A. Yes. This coordinating committee meeting brought together about
3 20 or so, the top 20 political and military leadership of Yugoslavia,
4 including Serbia and Montenegro, with the Bosnian Serb leadership. These
5 are the most important decision-makers of the -- of those groups, that is
6 to say, Yugoslavia, including Serbia, Montenegro, and the Bosnian Serbs.
7 The top leadership.
8 Q. And during the course of that meeting, what issue was focused on
9 by those top leaders?
10 A. Well, they discussed the entire Vance-Owen Plan. I would say the
11 emphasis, as I recollect it from having glanced through it, was probably
12 on two questions: On the territorial issue and on the ethnic issue. But
13 all of the issues were covered, that is to say, the three aspects of the
14 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, namely, the constitutional principles, the map, and
15 the military agreements. They were all discussed quite thoroughly by the
16 coordinating group. I note that the meeting lasted hours and hours. I
17 think it's almost three hours. It begins at 5.10 p.m. and ends at 8.00,
18 so it was basically a three-hour meeting. They covered the issues quite
20 Q. May I draw your attention to a few passages --
21 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour. I wonder, might I
22 ask, is there a B/C/S version of this document?
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this document is already in evidence.
25 It was admitted during the course of Mr. Treanor's testimony, and yes,
1 there is a B/C/S transcript available.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar informs me that it's in P65,
3 tab 220. Is that ...? 220 is perhaps ...
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just say on a practical matter.
5 I had a discussion with Mr. Harmon the other day about this. Your Honour
6 may have noticed, so far as you thought about it, but it's not -- it's not
7 the Defence practice at the moment to bring every exhibit into Court every
8 day, because if we look at the volume of the Treanor material, in addition
9 to everything else we have to do, carrying all this stuff backwards and
10 forwards to and from Court just in case we should refer to a couple of
11 documents, that really would be rather onerous. So it's only that on
12 something like this we could no doubt find such material and bring it with
13 us if we had an indication. But I hope that -- Mr. Harmon didn't indicate
14 his expectation was necessarily that we should do that. Whatever has
15 happened in other cases, because this case is rather heavier on
16 documentation than many in relation to Mr. Treanor alone. So whatever the
17 practice of other Defence teams, it's not intended, Your Honour, with
18 respect, to be our practice to bring every exhibit in the case, and it's
19 obviously going to increase as the case goes on.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand, Mr. Stewart. On the other hand, but
21 I don't know whether it was finally now distributed to you that the list
22 of exhibits of the 22nd of June specifically mentions the -- I would say
23 the Treanor exhibits that were intended to be used during the examination
24 of the witness. So therefore, I do understand that you wouldn't take all
25 of the, what was it, 18 binders, but at least there is a clear indication
1 what you could expect. At least on this list. I have not consulted
2 previous lists, but --
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that would be terrific if we had that
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well --
6 MR. STEWART: That would be a very helpful solution and pointer
7 for us if we had that particular list that Your Honour is referring to,
8 but we haven't.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, that's the same -- it seems a failure to
10 properly communicate with the other party on -- especially on the 22nd of
11 June. I do not know whether on any previous list the exhibit already
12 appears. We could --
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The original is here, so we could provide it to
15 Mr. Krajisnik, but I know that Madam Registrar is always very concerned
16 about the chain of custody, but I trust --
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we entirely understand Madam
18 Registrar's position. Our case manager takes the same approach. She
19 requires an undertaking to give back to her a document, and we understand
20 the practical reasons for that.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's make sure, Mr. Tieger. The 22nd of June
22 list, of which we more or less established yesterday that it was not in
23 the hands of - I'm not saying for what reason - has it been provided then
24 or have you asked to be provided with a copy or additional copy?
25 MR. STEWART: Of that list, Your Honour?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. STEWART: Well, I've just asked a few moments ago, Your
3 Honour, for the reason that that's the first time I was aware of its
4 existence. So I don't have a practice, Your Honour, without being
5 flippant, of asking for documents the existence of which I'm unaware of.
6 That would be going rather far.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let's make sure that documents containing the --
8 well, the time estimate, six or eight hours, attached to it the exhibits
9 to be shown, that they should always be in the hands of the other party in
10 due time. That means well before the start of the examination of the
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, it appears to me that the good news here
13 is that we indeed have a procedure which is intended to cover this. Of
14 course, the bad news is that there seems to have been some kind of mix-up
15 in the course of executing that. I don't think either of us know at this
16 point precisely what happened, but that is certainly something that we can
17 address in future efforts.
18 JUDGE ORIE: And finally, the good news is that this was the last
19 time it would happen. Please proceed.
20 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, we solved the immediate practical
21 problem. Thank you very much. We will hand back that document, of
22 course, to Madam Registrar in due course. And I agree with what
23 Mr. Tieger has just said.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Ambassador, let us now return to the document itself. And I'd
1 like to draw your attention to a few comments by participants in the
2 meeting. The first of which are comments by Vladislav Jovanovic, which
3 can be found at page 19 of the document. And during the course of his
4 comments, Mr. Jovanovic states: "Therefore, the territorial link with
5 Serbia and Montenegro, in other words, with Yugoslavia, has to be ensured
6 in an undisputable way -- indisputable way which is not transitory. But,
7 what is more important is to make the territory that we get, nationally
8 homogenous as soon as possible, but not by means of ethnic cleansing and
9 so on. Ethnic cleansings are palms off/as written/. So, we should use
10 the peacetime process of the exchange of inhabitants, in other words
11 migration and immigration, which will flow. What is important is that
12 life in that future Bosnia becomes impossible and that everybody
13 understands that individually, that they rush off to their original
14 provinces. This is a strategic goal to which we should aspire and which
15 should be achieved."
16 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.
17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I understand that the interpreters -- I
18 hope the interpreters have a copy of this. Nevertheless, I will, for
19 their benefit, attempt to speak slower when referring to portions of the
21 Q. Ambassador, first, can you shed any light on what Mr. Jovanovic is
22 talking about and the extent to which it may have reflected positions
23 taken during the course of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
24 A. Jovanovic was the Yugoslav foreign minister at this period, and he
25 says, correctly, that he has not been deeply involved in the negotiations
1 with the Bosnian Serbs. That's what he means when he says, "I'm an
2 amateur on the sidelines." What he's saying here is that the ethnic
3 cleansing carried out by force and violence is hurting the Bosnian Serb
4 cause internationally, which is surely the case. He knew that. That was
5 evident. And he is therefore suggesting that the ethnic cleansing be
6 carried out in a smoother fashion, as the counsel has just read.
7 Q. Now, subsequent to Mr. Jovanovic's remarks, Dr. Karadzic speaks,
8 on page 20 of the document, and the portion to which I'd like to draw your
9 attention is contained toward the bottom of that page, where Dr. Karadzic
10 states: "I think that this which Jovanovic is talking about, has already
11 happened to a huge extent. There was fifty-fifty of us in Zvornik. The
12 number of inhabitants of Zvornik is the now same, approximately 50.000,
13 and they are all Serbs."
14 And I'd also like to draw your attention to comments by
15 Mr. Krajisnik on page 21 and 22. At the bottom of page 21, Mr. Krajisnik
16 states: "Let me start with what Mr. Jovanovic was talking about, and
17 Radovan was also talking in that direction. The problem is not 45 per
18 cent of the territory and whether it will be 55 per cent. The part they
19 now took from ethnically pure Serbian territories and gave to the others,
20 that is the biggest resource we had in our territories."
21 And there are further comments by Mr. Krajisnik contained on page
22 22, that it would be catastrophic to think about 45 per cent of territory,
23 because it is not important how big the territory is in percentage, but
24 what the quality of that territory is, and he discusses the need to
25 seriously approach the issue of maps. And then states in the middle of
1 the second-to-last paragraph on page 22: "We have to solve one part at a
2 time. Something through politics, something else through migration, and
3 some things through settlement, et cetera."
4 Ambassador, again, any comments you have that may illuminate the
5 issues being discussed by Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Jovanovic, and
6 others, and the extent to which they may have been reflected in positions
7 taken during the course of the Vance-Owen peace process?
8 A. Well, they're entirely consistent with what they expressed to us
9 at the negotiating table. They're discussing here ways to break up
10 Yugoslavia, the need for the ethnic cleansing. You've seen at the
11 beginning the first statement by Foreign Minister Jovanovic says, Don't do
12 it so brutally, just take your time about it, let it happen. Make the
13 place unlivable. Make certain areas unlivable so that the populations
14 will move "voluntarily." Then Karadzic comes back, talking about Zvornik,
15 he says, We've already ethnically cleansed Zvornik, you see. That's at
16 the bottom of page 20. He says it used to be 50/50. Actually, plurality
17 was Muslim. But anyway, Dr. Karadzic says it used to be 50/50. Now there
18 are still 50.000 people in the opstina and they're all Serb. Meaning the
19 other 50 per cent, the Muslims, have been cleansed. So that was
20 Dr. Karadzic's response to the Jovanovic point about go easy on the ethnic
21 cleansing because it's hurting you internationally.
22 And Mr. Krajisnik takes another tack. He says the issue is not
23 just the 45 per cent, because, as we mentioned yesterday, the Vance-Owen
24 map, the Serb-majority provinces constituted 43 per cent of the territory.
25 So he states it in an approximate fashion, nothing wrong with that. He
1 says the problem is not 45 per cent of the territory or whether it will be
2 55 - remember that the claim of the Bosnian Serbs was always 65 - but he's
3 complaining -- Mr. Krajisnik is, at the bottom of page 21, that the
4 quality of the land -- the resources of the territories in that 43 per
5 cent were insufficient. That made him unhappy. And he also notes that
6 they're ethnically cleansed, by the way. I think the word "pure" probably
7 in the original Serbo-Croatian was "clean" or "cleansed." "Cistiti." I
8 would assume it was "cistiti" or some variant of "cistiti". And then on
9 page 22, Mr. Krajisnik continues in the same vein, giving examples of the
10 resources that he believed were taken from the Bosnian Serbs and given to
11 the other communities. And he states it quite frankly. He says: We have
12 to think of the quality of the land we have, not just the size.
13 So for Mr. Krajisnik, the question here was both quantity, how
14 much land the Bosnian Serbs would take, and how much they would assume was
15 theirs, therefore; and also the quality of that land. And he felt that
16 they had been treated badly by the Vance-Owen Plan.
17 Q. Finally, Ambassador, let me direct your attention to comments by
18 Nikola Koljevic, and those are contained at the bottom of page 24 and the
19 top of page 25. Dr. Koljevic states: "We will have to organise huge
20 political activity in order to win people over this for this --"
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, excuse me, forgive me for interrupting,
22 but in the last answer, the witness speculated about what the original
23 Serbo-Croat, Croatian, was his phrase, said. Rather than leave this to be
24 sorted out in hours' time, it seems appropriate -- after all, the witness
25 is not, as I understand it, qualified, he's speculating that that's what
1 it might say. We can clear that up straight away, I suggest, and then
2 it's more neatly on the same passage of the transcript.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please repeat the words you expressed in
4 Serbo-Croatian. Because you referred to language they use. So it can be
5 translated to us in English. But it was in my mind that these were
6 varieties of the word "clean."
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I said I assumed that the "pure" here was
8 "cistiti" in some form. The interpreters can tell us that.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could they tell us what "cistiti" is, if I
10 pronounce it well.
11 THE INTERPRETER: "Cleanse," or "clean."
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
13 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. I didn't hear what they said, Your
14 Honour. What did they say? What was the answer?
15 JUDGE ORIE: They said -- you are on what channel at this moment?
16 Because if --
17 THE WITNESS: I'm hearing you in English.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you please check whether Mr. Okun is
19 on channel 4 or channel 0 perhaps.
20 You're now on 4. That means whenever someone speaks another
21 language it will be translated to you in English. But until now, English
22 has been the prevailing language. So they -- their translation was
23 "cleanse" or "clean."
24 THE WITNESS: So I was correct in my assumption.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you for clearing that up, Counsel.
2 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I'm not quite sure this
3 deals with the point. The witness was speculating as to what the original
4 word in Serbian or Serbo-Croat, B/C/S, what the original word was. I'm
5 suggesting we can clear up what the original word was, and then -- if we
6 simply work in English we're just going to be endlessly repeating what the
7 witness has said.
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm certainly prepared to put the
9 Serbian on the ELMO and we can check right now.
10 MR. STEWART: Yes.
11 MR. TIEGER: I believe that's what counsel is suggesting.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, it seems to be sensible to do it right now
13 rather than have two disjointed bits of transcript.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please put it on the ELMO. I misunderstood
15 your observation there.
16 MR. STEWART: Perhaps I didn't make myself sufficiently clear,
17 Your Honour.
18 MR. TIEGER: And if I may, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. TIEGER: In English, we see President Cosic saying, "Momcilo
21 Krajisnik, you are next," and in the B/C/S we see that passage: "Momcilo
22 Krajisnik izvolite," and then Mr. Krajisnik begins to speak. You can see
23 the reference to 45 and 55, as you do in the English and in the B/C/S, and
24 then you can see in the next sentence, and you may want to have the
25 language staff interpret it, but you can clearly see the words "etnicko
1 ciscenje Srpska teritorija."
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's the language originally used. Do we
3 still need to have the four words translated or is it clear enough now?
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, perhaps I had better say what I
5 understand the position to be and then we can confer. Because after all,
6 I have the big advantage of having Ms. Cmeric with me. What I'm informed
7 is that "cistiti" there, it's the equivalent, if you like, of "clean" or
8 "pure," but it is not the equivalent as a grammatically -- of "cleaned"
9 or "cleansed." In other words, it's not the verb form, it doesn't --
10 JUDGE ORIE: It's not the verb in its perfect form, but -- you
11 mean something can be clean without being cleansed just before that.
12 MR. STEWART: Well, I rather do mean that, Your Honour, because
13 that's clearly so. The thrust of the witness's evidence, I think, was
14 that the original Serbo-Croat would -- he was speculating was "cleansed"
15 or "cleaned" [Realtime transcript read in error "clean"]. Perhaps he said
16 "cleansed." It's -- well, I've made the point, Your Honour. There's
17 nothing more for me to say on this.
18 JUDGE ORIE: The point is clear. It's a matter of interpretation
19 of language, and we now have -- you've drawn our attention to the fact
20 that, at least in the view of the Defence, several interpretations are
21 possible, not exactly being the same.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Let's return, then, to the comments by Mr. Koljevic -- Dr.
25 Koljevic, please. And Ambassador, I was drawing your attention to the
1 comment by Dr. Koljevic that begins at the bottom of page 24: "We will
2 have to organise huge political activity in order to win people over for
3 this, and we will have to develop the activity of settlement
4 homogenisation while there's still time."
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm sorry. Could I -- I'm sorry to
6 interrupt again, but on the transcript, in my last observation - and this
7 would just cause confusion in future, I used the phrase -- this is at
8 9:54:50. He was speculating -- I said I think that the original
9 Serbo-Croat, what he was speculating was "cleansed" or 'clean.' Your
10 Honour, I'm pretty sure I said "cleaned." And if that remains on the
11 transcript as "clean" instead of "cleaned," that's going to utterly
12 confuse the point I was making because the whole point was to be drawing a
13 distinction between "clean" as an adjective and "cleaned" as a verb form.
14 So if that isn't corrected, that would simply make further confusion of
15 what I've said. Perhaps I could just note that.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you said "clean." Is that --
19 MR. STEWART: The point was what I said, Your Honour. Because if
20 I'm recorded as having said "clean" there, when I believe I said
21 "cleaned," it doesn't make much sense, in the end, of what I was trying
22 to say.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I fully understand. You made your point quite
24 clear now. And I -- it's off my screen now. Yes.
25 MR. STEWART: No doubt this is all crystal clear in the B/C/S
1 translation to anybody listening.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The point is perfectly clear to us at this
4 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Ambassador, I'm not going to read Dr. Koljevic's remarks again,
7 but bearing in mind the remarks that preceded it and Dr. Koljevic's
8 comments about the need to develop the activity of settlement
9 homogenisation while there's still time, can you comment, please, about
10 Dr. Koljevic's remarks in the context of that meeting and the extent to
11 which that position was reflected and positions taken by the Bosnian Serb
12 leadership during the course of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
13 A. Yes. This is also consistent. Mr. Koljevic's remarks are
14 consistent with the Bosnian-Serbs' ethnic cleansing, that is to say, the
15 desire to achieve ethnically clean provinces, as Dr. Karadzic gave the
16 example. And we have a specific example in front of us at this meeting
17 where Dr. Karadzic speaks about Zvornik, where he says it used to be
18 50/50, but now it's 100 per cent Serb. And this is what Koljevic is
19 referring to as "settlement homogenisation."
20 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. I'd like to present you now with a portion
21 of the transcript from the 34th Assembly Session of the National Assembly
22 of Republika Srpska, which was held in the latter part of 1993 over the
23 course of several days, 27th to the 29th of August, 9th and 10th of
24 September, and the 29th through the 1st of October 1993.
25 And Ambassador, in particular, I'd like to draw your attention to
1 an exchange between a delegate by the name of Rajko Kasagic and
2 Mr. Krajisnik, which appears beginning page 47 and continues on to page
3 48. And to quickly give the context, or at least to paraphrase
4 Mr. Kasagic --
5 A. Could I take a moment to read it? I'm seeing this for the first
7 Q. Yes, please.
8 A. Thank you.
9 Yes. Thank you.
10 Q. Just to set the -- I want to draw your attention to a particular
11 comment by Mr. Krajisnik, but I want to put it in appropriate context. Is
12 it correct that Mr. Kasagic raises concerns about the problem with whether
13 or not the Bosnian Serbs will get a corridor, and then suggests the
14 possibility of giving Sarajevo away, in his words, "So let's give that
15 Sarajevo away and let's charge for it as much as it is worth."
16 A. Yes, that is correct. The speaker, Rajko Kasagic, emphasises
17 strongly the importance of Brcko, that is to say, the choke point in the
18 corridor, and says, in effect, quite directly, in fact, he is suggesting a
19 trading Sarajevo, the Serb position in Sarajevo, for acquiring a firm Serb
20 position in Brcko. And Mr. Krajisnik reacts negatively to that proposal.
21 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik states in part, and that can be -- that sentence
22 can be found in approximately the middle of the paragraph that appears on
23 page 48: "Let me tell you, gentlemen: Muslims and Croats ask for their
24 municipality in Banja Luka, which we did not accept because we must have
25 that territory clean."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Is that response by Mr. Krajisnik and the position he takes in
2 response to Mr. Kasagic's remarks consistent with the positions he took
3 during the course of the Vance-Owen peace process?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. And just to clarify: Did peace discussions, peace negotiations,
6 or efforts toward a resolution of the conflict continue after the
7 rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan by the Bosnian Serb Assembly?
8 A. Yes. Other negotiators continued and other plans and maps were
9 proposed to the party. At this period, the August/September 1993 period,
10 the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was continuing,
11 under the chairmanship of Lord Owen for the EC, and Thorvald Stoltenberg,
12 who replaced Secretary Vance for the UN, and they developed other maps to
13 put before the parties, and other arrangements. This end of
14 August/September was the period when the so-called Invincible Plan was
15 being discussed, named Invincible because the parties met on a British
16 warship in the Adriatic, with the name Invincible, and so the discussions
17 and the map and the documents that came out of that meeting were referred
18 to as "the Invincible Plan" in the fall of 1993. At approximately the
19 same period, but a bit later, Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman together
20 proposed a plan which was called "the Tudjman-Milosevic Plan." And then
21 somewhat later, but beginning in 1993, the contact group, consisting of
22 the six countries that formed it, developed a map which they presented in
23 July 1994. This period, August/September 1993, focused mostly on the
24 Invincible map discussions.
25 Q. Ambassador, let me next draw your attention, if I may, and present
1 you with a portion of the 37th Session of the National Assembly of
2 Republika Srpska, held on January 10th, 1994.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Just in order to make it possible for those who will
5 later read the transcript to retrieve the documents, I'd like to invite
6 Madam Registrar to tell us under what number the exhibit we last have
7 discussed was admitted into evidence.
8 THE REGISTRAR: It was Exhibit P65, tab 221.
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this particular document falls within
10 the same general category. It's also a P65 document. However, my list,
11 although it did contain the tab number for the previous document, does not
12 contain the tab number under which this document was previously submitted.
13 But as indicated, it is a P65 document.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you -- it's a P65 document. But to ask
15 people to go through 18 binders is -- so if you could clarify that which
16 -- under which tab those minutes are to be found, that would certainly
17 assist those who have to struggle through these transcripts.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Ambassador, let me draw your attention to comments by
20 Mr. Krajisnik, which are contained on page 4 of the translation that's in
21 front of you, in the second paragraph, in which Mr. Krajisnik states:
22 "Believe me that the biggest tragedy would be if the Muslims agreed to
23 live together with us. You saw how they were squeezing in the Croats, but
24 the Croats do not want it. We would lose our state. That is the only
25 thing that I would not accept. I would accept, however, that we be
1 granted a smaller percentage of territory than we have now, provided that
2 we remain separated and that we have our own state without Muslims."
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, if I may interrupt. Again it is about
4 numbering. I see that this document starts with page 1 out of 153, then
5 page 2 out of 153, and then the next page is 1 out of 5, which is at least
6 surprising. I'm not asking you if you say this is -- if I look at the ERN
7 numbers, I -- no. There are ET numbers on top of it. And the first page
8 and the second page have the same ET numbers, which suggests that it's the
9 same document, whereas the third page and the fourth page and all the
10 remaining pages have a different number on the top, which also surprises,
11 because it seems that the top numbering is about documents and the bottom
12 is about pages. And it's really confusing. I'm not saying that it's not
13 the same document, but at least it raises some questions.
14 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I recall correctly, this matter was
15 raised during the course -- when we had documents admitted following
16 Mr. Treanor's testimony. I believe this is clearly the same exhibit. I
17 think -- and first of all, let me indicate for the record, this is P65,
18 tab 222.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. TIEGER: And as we indicated at that time, this apparent
21 discrepancy arose from the fact that portions of that particular session
22 were translated. It wasn't translated in its entirety.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If we discussed it at that time, I apologise
24 for not having this clearly in my mind, every detail of the 18 binders.
25 Well, the only thing that is at least promising is that the same
1 inconsistencies in numbering are raised consistently, then and now again.
2 Please -- yes.
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I was going to make, in slightly ironic
4 form, the same apology, because the expectation sometimes for recollection
5 of these things is beyond human ability.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Perhaps I should leave the irony to the
8 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Ambassador, having in mind the comments by Mr. Krajisnik which I
11 read out a few moments ago, can you tell us whether or not those comments
12 are consistent with the positions taken by Mr. Krajisnik and the other
13 Bosnian Serb leaders during the course of the Vance-Owen peace process
15 A. Yes. This comment from January 10, 1994 is consistent with the
16 positions taken by the Bosnian Serb leadership and Mr. Krajisnik, as the
17 -- one of the leaders during the Vance-Owen discussions, and it's also
18 consistent with the document we just looked at from January 21st, 1993,
19 particularly this remark fully consistent with the earlier ones of Dr. -
20 excuse me - Mr. Krajisnik: "I would accept, however, that we, that is,
21 the Bosnian Serbs, Republika Srpska, that we be granted a smaller
22 percentage of territory than we now have, provided that we remain
23 separated and that we have our own state without Muslims."
24 Well, that's quite consistent with everything we heard, the need
25 for the state, the ethnic purity, et cetera.
1 Q. And finally, Ambassador, I'd like you to -- or I'd like to draw
2 your attention to a video clip that has been previously shown to the
4 MR. TIEGER: That is P70, Your Honour, and the transcript, I
5 think, is P70.1 or P70.1A.
6 Now that the transcripts have all been distributed, I'd ask that
7 the video be played.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Ambassador, the video --
11 [Videotape played]
12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
13 JUDGE ORIE: We have a transcript problem at this moment,
14 Mr. Tieger, because the -- we have a written English text, but the
15 translation does not appear in the transcript. I'll deal with the matter
16 during the next break. Let's proceed at this moment. We have had this
17 problem before, and I just would like to find out how we solved it at that
18 time. But at least it's on the record now that there is a problem.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Ambassador, may I have your comments, please, on the presentation
22 by Mr. Krajisnik contained in the video.
23 A. Well, the --
24 MR. STEWART: Could I just ask, Your Honour. I'm not quite sure
25 -- again, if it was said weeks and weeks and weeks ago, I just forget,
1 whether we actually had a date for this videotape. Because the transcript
2 doesn't show one. It says 1992. I don't know whether it was identified
3 previously as being for a more specific date.
4 MR. TIEGER: We -- the question was raised. The answer is there
5 is not a specific date, but a range. But I'll be more than happy to ask
6 the ambassador if he can place -- assist us in identifying the approximate
7 date by virtue of the comments made.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Ambassador, if you can incorporate that in your remarks.
11 A. Yes. I can answer that. It's clear from the internal evidence of
12 the remarks that the map that Mr. Krajisnik was using in this video was
13 something that would have been available to him and that he says was shown
14 in Geneva between September and December. Why do I say that? Because of
15 the lay of the land, that is, how much the Serb forces had conquered, the
16 battle line that he showed on the map. That's point one.
17 The second point is he says our people offered this in Geneva.
18 And this would have been during the International Conference on the Former
19 Yugoslavia, which met in Geneva. And the fact that he doesn't mention at
20 all the Vance-Owen maps which were put down in January leads me to
21 conclude that this discussion, his graphic description of this map and
22 what it stood for and what the Bosnian Serb goals were, occurred sometime
23 between December and December [sic] 1992.
24 As to his description of the situation and the two maps, the
25 overlay and the ethnic map under it, this is consistent with the Bosnian
1 Serb position. He refers to the need to retain the Drina, the corridor,
2 the need for ethnically pure Serb, or clean, or cleansed, whichever
3 semantic word you choose. He emphasises the Sarajevo question again. But
4 the problem with his presentation is when he lifts the overlay, the
5 transparent overlay, which showed the front line, the battle lines, that
6 70 per cent of the territory held by the VRS, the Bosnian Serb army and
7 their territorials, because the map underneath that, which Mr. Krajisnik
8 says is consistent with the battle line, is by no means consistent with
9 the battle line. In fact, it's quite inconsistent. Because the territory
10 he claimed on the transparency showed the Serbs occupying the entire
11 Drina, west bank, up to the Neretva River, that huge swath along the
12 Drina. And as we all know, this area of the Drina - there were many, many
13 Muslim opstinas on the Drina: Zvornik, Visegrad, et cetera. I mean, the
14 ethnic maps are quite clear on that.
15 And on the area in the western section, the Cazinska Krajina, the
16 so-called Bihac pocket, he notes that the Una River is the border, and
17 claims that this is consistent with the ethnic situation before the war,
18 that is, before the ethnic cleansing. And that's not true. That's simply
19 not true. There were Muslim plurality opstinas east of the Una River.
20 Any ethnic map based on the census of 1981 or 1991 will show that. So
21 that his assertion that the battle lines corresponded to the ethnic
22 situation before the war is totally untrue, as a glance at the map will
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm looking at the clock, and perhaps we
25 could decide the issue of the transcript right away. But perhaps we
1 should not bother Mr. Okun with this matter.
2 Mr. Okun, we'll resume in 25 minutes. So if you could please be
3 back then again.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I mention. There was just a slip
5 of the tongue in the very last answer. The witness at some point said
6 "December to December 1992." It's quite clear from earlier in the answer
7 that he meant September to December 1992, but it's as well to correct
8 these things straight away.
9 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear to everyone. Thank you very much.
10 Mr. Usher, could you please escort Mr. Okun out of the courtroom.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I suggest that immediately after the
14 break we play the same video again. It takes three minutes. The main
15 problem is that the French transcript will not be the same as the English
16 transcript any more. Do the interpreters have the English translation of
17 the --
18 MR. TIEGER: Yes, they do, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: They have. So let's then play it immediately after
20 the break and have it translated in both the two official languages of the
22 We adjourn until 5 minutes to 11.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Okun, the Chamber has decided, for technical
2 reasons, to replay the video, but you don't have to answer the questions
3 again about it. It's just to have the English translation of the video in
4 the transcript.
5 Mr. Tieger, let's proceed with the two minutes, 51 seconds.
6 [Videotape played]
7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] [No interpretation]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Could we stop. Could we stop again. Yes. I'd like
9 the interpreters to give the translation on the English channel which will
10 result in the English text to appear in the transcript later on. Yes.
11 Could you please restart.
12 [Videotape played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Serbian people in the former Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina. Momcilo Krajisnik speaking:
15 "We are standing in front of the ethnic map of former
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with marked borders of the territory presently held by
17 the Bosnian Serb army. I can only say that what was being said, that we
18 are holding territories ethnically populated by other national
19 communities, is not true, which can be seen on the ethnic map of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina, which we see covered with a transparent sheet, where our
21 territories are exactly marked, and it is clearly seen that these are the
22 territories that belong to our people. Such a map, similar to this, as
23 far as I'm informed, was offered in Geneva and it was made clear that the
24 Serbs want that the border of our country be here, that is, the Neretva
25 River valley, and this is mostly the territory of the Bosnian Serb
1 Republic, with the proviso that we allow that certain enclaves in our
2 territory be populated by other ethnic communities. Sarajevo is a
3 separate problem. It is marked here. The city proper is marked as Muslim
4 territory, but we shall plead for demilitarisation and division between
5 the two national communities, primarily the Serb and the Muslim ones, and
6 maybe a municipality populated by Croats. The territory of the Bosnian
7 Serb Republic represents in fact the border along the River Una, the River
8 Sava, with a smaller area that is not yet under our forces. I mean it's
9 not liberated yet. That is Orasje, the area of Semberija, the territory
10 of Ozren and the territory of Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. We presented as
11 our territory to the Croatian community in Graz that our border should be
12 between our two national communities that would be the Neretva River. In
13 any case, this continuity of our territory is in one piece, so to speak,
14 and we advocate that it be one constitutive unit of the Bosnian Serb
15 Republic, and we allow the possibility that there be also constitutive
16 units of the Bosnian Croat Republic."
17 JUDGE ORIE: The beginning and the end is, as far as translation
18 is concerned, seems to be a bit different from what we see on paper. The
19 introduction what the presenter introduces is not fully translated. Is
20 there any need to have that replayed and have that -- that is that:
21 "Today, the president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik,
22 showed to our reporter," et cetera. Do we have to play that? No. I see
23 no need for that. And I noticed that at the very end, the translation was
24 a bit different orally from what we see on paper.
25 If the Defence would like to come back to that at a later stage,
1 perhaps you could compare first and see whether it's of any importance to
2 come back to that.
3 We'll then now proceed. Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Ambassador, the overlay used by Mr. Krajisnik shows a wide swath
6 of territory west of the Drina which is claimed by the Bosnian Serbs and
7 which Mr. Krajisnik says are those areas that belong to "our people."
8 Does that area shown in the overlay correspond to the pre-war demographics
9 of that area of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
10 A. In part, yes; in part, no.
11 Q. And looking at P273, the map that is to your left at this moment,
12 does that map show the composition of the Drina area where the conflict
14 A. Yes, it does.
15 Q. The areas of green are the areas of Muslim majority or plurality
16 in those opstinas?
17 A. Yes. The green are Muslim plurality or majority opstinas.
18 Q. And those are areas that were indeed ethnically populated by
19 Muslims before the war began; is that correct?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. Ambassador, unless you have any further comments on the video
22 presentation, I will conclude my questions.
23 A. I'd like to make one or two brief comments on Mr. Krajisnik's
24 television presentation. One notes at the very beginning of his
25 presentation that he states that "We are standing in front of an ethnic
1 map of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina." Well, as we've established,
2 this map probably was being shown in the period September to December of
3 1992, and at that time, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a recognised state and
4 member of the United Nations, and yet Mr. Krajisnik refers to it as the
5 "former" Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say, he negates and denies
6 the existence.
7 And this statement that "We possess territories that were
8 populated by other national communities" is not true. Well, that's an
9 inaccurate statement. We can see the ethnic map.
10 There is also -- it is also worth noting his statement about
11 Orasje, that is, the opstina at the Posavina, which he says "They have not
12 yet taken." If I could find that in the -- in his remarks. Yes. It's
13 about three quarters of the way down in the English, where he says:
14 "Territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic represents in fact the border
15 along Una River, Sava River, with smaller area that is not yet under our
16 forces, I mean it's not liberated yet." In other words, he was indicating
17 that there were a few areas yet to be conquered militarily by the Bosnian
18 Serb forces. He was quite frank about that. And again, that emphasises
19 the importance that the Bosnian Serb leaders attached to the corridor, to
20 the Posavina corridor, linking Belgrade through Brcko to Banja Luka.
21 And he emphasises the continuity of the Bosnian Serb territories
22 as then held by the Bosnian Serb armed forces.
23 So what he's doing here is comparing the six strategic objectives
24 of May 12, 1992 with the situation as actually existent at the time he was
25 looking at the map, somewhere between September and December 1992. And
1 one notices that he focuses on the principal points of the geography. And
2 he is, in effect, saying, although he does not state it explicitly: We
3 have achieved our aims, with the exception of Sarajevo. Because if you
4 compare the war aims of May 1992 with this presentation, one sees that he
5 discusses very carefully, very accurately, the war aims, the strategic
6 objectives, with the situation as it existed on that map; the Una, the
7 Neretva, the corridor, et cetera.
8 Q. Thank you, Ambassador.
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that concludes the examination-in-chief.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
11 Mr. Stewart, is the Defence ready to cross-examine the witness?
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, subject to the small physical --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The lectern is not common property, but in
15 common use between the parties.
16 Mr. Okun, you will be cross-examined by Mr. Stewart, counsel for
17 the Defence.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
19 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Cross-examined by Mr. Stewart:
21 Q. Mr. Okun --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Mr. Stewart, would you
23 kindly put your microphone on, please.
24 MR. STEWART: Just done it. Thank you. My microphone is on. Can
25 you hear me? No answer.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, we can. Thank you very much.
2 MR. STEWART: Right. Thank you.
3 Q. Mr. Okun, the -- you described how the Carrington Peace Plan for
4 the entire Yugoslavia was accepted by everybody except Serbia, and that
5 meant, another way of phrasing it, is to say everybody except
6 Mr. Milosevic.
7 A. Is that a question?
8 Q. Yes. Is that -- would that -- is that an equally fair way of
9 expressing it?
10 A. Well, I would say the Serb leadership. I don't know that one
11 would ascribe 100 per cent of that rejection to President Milosevic.
12 There were other leaders. Kontic was there. And it was the rejection by
13 the Republic of Serbia.
14 Q. And what was the nub of their objection?
15 A. Well, they didn't think it was a fair solution to the problem, the
16 position of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the fall of
17 1991 - this was the period we're discussing -- this was October 1991, to
18 be specific. The position was that Yugoslavia was one country and that
19 the declared independence of Croatia and Slovenia were illegal
20 secessionary movements. So they didn't accept that position, and they had
21 other arguments as well.
22 Q. Well, of course the position they didn't accept what had happened,
23 the Carrington Peace Plan, like every other plan looking forward, looking
24 ahead to see how it could be resolved. What do you say were the key
25 objections by the -- by Serbia to the Carrington Peace Plan?
1 A. They had many objections. I perhaps would point particularly to
2 the minority provisions in what was called chapter 2, in the second
3 section of the Carrington elements of agreement. These were detailed
4 provisions concerning the treatment of minorities in the various
5 republics, and with specific reference to the question of ethnic Serbs
6 living in Croatia, the Serb delegation to the Conference on Yugoslavia
7 felt that they were not adequately treated in the Carrington plan. And at
8 that point, it has to be noted, that Croatia had not fully accepted the
9 second chapter. So among their other objections was that they were
10 worried about the future of the Serb people in Croatia.
11 I should mention that the Serb minority in Croatia constituted
12 approximately 12 per cent of the overall population. 12 per cent of the
13 Croatian population were Serbian, Orthodox Serbs. That was probably their
14 principal objection.
15 Q. So there are two points particularly come out of that. First of
16 all, you indicated that although -- your evidence was that the peace plan
17 was in fact accepted by five of the six republics, that's subject to the
18 qualification you've just mentioned then, that Croatia didn't fully accept
19 every element of the peace plan as it was being propounded.
20 A. They accepted it. There was still some residual discussion of the
21 second chapter.
22 Q. So in a nutshell, then, at the time when Serbia made it clear that
23 they did not agree, there would still have been further ground to cover
24 and further elements to resolve?
25 A. Yes, I think that's true. Although the elements were not major in
1 terms of the conference. Lord Carrington did not regard them as in any
2 sense problems that could not be overcome. They were overcome. Croatia
3 did accept the second chapter, very shortly. So it was really more a
4 question of timing rather than overall acceptance. But Serbia never
5 accepted any aspect of the Carrington proposals.
6 Q. And the concern about the Serb minority in Croatia, it wasn't by
7 any means an irrational concern, was it?
8 A. No, not at all.
9 Q. And then you talked about the Badinter Commission, which reported
10 - do you recall this would be right - sometime in early 1992?
11 A. Yes. The Badinter Commission issued decisions throughout this
12 period, not just in January 1992. In December, for example, if I may,
13 Mr. Stewart.
14 Q. Please.
15 A. In December, for example, coming back to your earlier question of
16 the Yugoslav objections to the Carrington proposals, one of the principal
17 Yugoslav points, as I mentioned, but it needs to be reiterated because it
18 was the basis of their position, one of their principal points was that
19 Yugoslavia existed; it was a country and there was an illegal rebellion
20 against, an illegal secession against this country. So Lord Carrington
21 asked the Badinter Commission to answer that question, and in December of
22 1991, the Badinter Commission did issue an avis, a decision on
23 particularly that point. And what that commission decided was that
24 Yugoslavia at that point was in a process of dissolution, that it was not,
25 in fact, a coherent state any longer. And they said it was "dans un
1 processus de dissolution" and that decision, needless to say, did not
2 please the Yugoslav authorities. So they issued many decisions throughout
3 the conference period, not just in January, although the one in January
4 concerning recognition was a very important avis.
5 Q. And is it right the Badinter Commission recommendation was that
6 only Slovenia and Macedonia satisfied what were regarded as the
7 appropriate conditions for independence and recognition of independence?
8 A. Well, it was recognition by the EC. Yes.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. Not by the rest of the world, of course. The Badinter Commission
11 was speaking for the European Community.
12 Q. Yes. It was an EC organ, wasn't it, effectively?
13 A. Correct. Yes. So that's exactly correct, yes.
14 Q. And I think as far as Macedonia was concerned, well, Greece were
15 an issue. Greece objected --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- to the position on Macedonia.
18 A. Yes. And they had a veto on that.
19 Q. And vetoed. But it follows, doesn't it, as an obvious corollary,
20 that since only Slovenia and Macedonia satisfied conditions for
21 independence, the other republics, including, of course, Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, didn't?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. And did that relate -- well, particularly including issues such as
25 satisfactory provisions to ensure the position of minorities within the
1 republics concerned?
2 A. Not directly. What they said in the decision was that there had
3 not been an expression of will, in essence, that there needed to be some
4 more of an expression of will within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 Q. That was correct, wasn't it, in effect? Well, it was their
6 decision, but it wasn't a decision that serious commentators could
8 A. No. Well, the expectation was that, again by commentators at the
9 period, was that a referendum would probably be held in Bosnia. That was
10 the widespread expectation, in the wake of the Badinter Commission's
11 decision, and in fact that happened, the next month. A referendum was
12 held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. 1992, Your Honours, being a leap
13 year, which explains February 29. It was held on a Saturday, February
14 29th, and Sunday, March 1, 1992. And that was held expressly, although
15 implicitly, but expressly to satisfy that condition, if you will,
16 expressed by the Badinter Commission of arbitration, an expression of
18 Q. The political pressures at this stage involving, weren't they, the
19 European Community, particularly under a lot of pressure from Germany, to
20 recognise Croatia, notwithstanding what Badinter had to say about the
22 A. Oh, yes, very much so. The Germans had made that clear. In fact,
23 they had said in December that they were going to recognise Croatia by
24 Christmas of 1991, regardless of what anybody else did or said. And this
25 was opposed by other people. It was -- what Secretary Vance did, for
1 example, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, wrote to Mr. van den
2 Broek, who was then -- well, he was then the Dutch foreign minister and
3 the Dutch were holding the Presidency of the community. And in December
4 of 1991, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar
5 wrote a letter to him recommending that recognition not be granted
6 piecemeal, that it be a coordinated, coherent act. And it was precisely
7 around the issue of German -- the German desire to recognise Croatia
8 immediately. And indeed, the letter that the Secretary-General of the
9 United Nations wrote to Mr. van den Broek was answered by foreign minister
10 Genscher of Germany. Not by van den Broek but by Genscher. So you're
11 quite correct, Mr. Stewart, that the issue in December 1991, the issue of,
12 shall we say, premature recognition of the seceding republics, was an
13 issue very much in Lord Carrington's mind and very much an issue in front
14 of the Conference on Yugoslavia.
15 Q. So Mr. Genscher particularly, for Germany, he was their foreign
16 minister, Mr. Genscher pushed extremely hard, didn't he, and eventually
17 was successful in pushing the European Community on Croatia?
18 A. Well, he pushed extremely hard. The degree of his success was, I
19 think, limited, because in fact the European Community did not recognise
20 until they received the decision from Mr. Badinter and the judges on his
21 commission. And it was in connection with that chapter 2 that we
22 mentioned earlier, the second chapter on minorities in the Carrington
23 proposals of October 1991, that the issue was joined. Croatia did accept
24 and implement the minority provisions. That removed the last bar to
25 recognition of Croatia, and so the European Community did recognise. But
1 there was no question that Germany pushed very hard for the earliest
2 possible recognition of Croatia.
3 Q. And it's also true, isn't it, that Lord Carrington was not pleased
4 and not happy about that approach.
5 A. That is correct. In fact, he also wrote to Mr. van den Broek in
6 December on that point. I believe it was December 2nd, 1991, his letter
7 to van den Broek. But of course it can be checked. It's a public letter
8 in the public domain, as are the Secretary-General's letters. He wrote --
9 even before the Secretary-General wrote to van den Broek, Lord Carrington
10 wrote to van den Broek, opposing early, premature recognition of one
11 republic. And the reason why he did that, of course, was quite clear: He
12 was working on an overall settlement for all of Yugoslavia. If one
13 recognised Croatia at that point before the settlement were achieved, what
14 incentive would the Republic of Croatia have to continue negotiating? It
15 would have removed the pressure, if you will, of recognition. And that
16 was the burden of Lord Carrington's argument in his letter to Mr. van den
17 Broek of early December 1991. Yes, he opposed it.
18 Q. So the sum of the basic political realities here were these,
19 weren't they: That it was increasingly apparent that -- certainly if
20 Croatia was heading for recognition of independence, so was Slovenia.
21 That was very clear, wasn't it?
22 A. Yes, that was clear. Slovenia, indeed, was the first country to
23 declare its independence, and by this time, de facto, was independent.
24 Because, as we know, the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, went into
25 Slovenia in force in June 1991, ostensibly to protect their international
1 border with Austria, in fact to suppress the independence, but within a
2 week of fighting, they withdrew - I should say after a week of fighting,
3 they withdrew - and never went back. So that was the situation in
4 Slovenia as of the end of June 1991. So by December, Slovenia had been de
5 facto independent for six months.
6 That was not the case in Croatia, of course, where the JNA was
7 involved in heavy fighting, heavy fighting.
8 Q. Is it fair to say in a nutshell that Slovenia didn't -- it didn't
9 present the same intractable problems as Croatia and also, of course,
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina; it was, in terms of its population, in terms of
11 nationalities, it was nowhere near as difficult or complex as those
13 A. Oh, yes, that's surely the case. It's 90 -- I suppose over 90 per
14 cent Slovenian, probably over 95 per cent Slovenian in population. The
15 second group, there were some pockets. There were some Croats and
16 Italians, of course. I mean, there were many Italians in Slovenia since
17 portions of Slovenia had been in Italy. But yes, you're correct that it
18 was ethnically -- Slovenia is Slovenia.
19 Q. And the problem with Slovenia and independence was more that it
20 was -- it was the start of the very process of dissolution that the
21 Badinter Commission were referring to then in the terms that you
23 A. Well, that's part of the problem. The other issue which was very
24 important in Slovenia is the wealth of the republic. Slovenia, with a
25 population that in pre-war constituted about 8 per cent of the overall
1 population of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, the
2 pre-war population, with that 8 per cent, they produced about one quarter
3 of the gross national product of the country. So economically, it was
4 very important. But ethnically it did not present the same challenges.
5 Q. But then looking at those developments in late 1991 and early
6 1992, from the position of Serbs, and whether in Croatia or in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or indeed in Serbia, the -- Slovenia and Croatia
8 appeared to be heading quite firmly and quickly towards recognition of
9 independence. That's -- we seem to be agreed on that so far.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. It was, by the end of 1991, also already clear that
12 Mr. Izetbegovic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and his colleagues also had in mind
13 independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 A. Both Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had also declared their
15 independence before the end of 1991.
16 Q. So that from the point of view of the Bosnian Serbs, a lot of the
17 writing was on the wall as to where things were going, wasn't it? Perhaps
18 I'll be more specific: They clearly were going to find it already
19 difficult to the point of impossible in the long run to resist the
20 progress towards independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 A. Well, I think that it would have been a reasonable assumption to
22 believe that the four republics would all become independent one day, that
23 -- and receive recognition; that Croatia -- that Slovenia and Croatia
24 would be the first and that the others would follow. I think that was
25 reasonable, yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. And it's also correct, isn't it, that if that was likely to follow
2 in the way that you have acknowledged, it was very specifically something
3 that the Bosnian Serbs did not want and would not have wanted to see
5 A. Well, we know they opposed it. They vigorously and violently
6 opposed it, yes.
7 Q. So that in the negotiations -- now, the position was this, wasn't
8 it: You said the Dutch had the Presidency for the second half of 1991, of
9 the European Community. That's correct, isn't it?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And then Portugal took over from the 1st of January; is that
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And that's how Mr. Cutilheiro came into it. He was invited then
15 to take over in the way that you've described.
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And so the Serbs were --
18 A. Excuse me, Mr. Stewart. I'm seeing Mr. Cutileiro's name
19 misspelled on my monitor. There is no "H" in the middle of his name.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The transcript will be reviewed over night in order
21 to get all the names as they should be. That sometimes causes a problem.
22 Thank you very much. Please proceed.
23 THE WITNESS: It's Cutileiro, not Cutilheiro.
24 MR. STEWART: I expect Mr. Cutileiro probably suffers from being
25 one of the most misspelled people around.
1 THE WITNESS: I think that's true.
2 MR. STEWART:
3 Q. Anyway, the gentleman from Portugal, Mr. Cutileiro, he took over
4 specifically in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as you have
5 described. The Bosnian Serbs were, right from the very beginning of the
6 Cutileiro process, if I can call it that, were engaged in something in a
7 negotiation based on a fundamental point that they didn't like but, for
8 practical purposes, were being driven to accept for the purpose of those
9 negotiations, Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate state.
10 A. That's partially correct. I would not say they were being driven
11 to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina by the negotiations. Bosnia-Herzegovina was
12 about to be, as we've indicated earlier, an independent, recognised state
13 and member of the international community. So it was not the negotiations
14 that were accomplishing that. That was the decision of the international
15 community. After all, one has to be voted in to the General Assembly of
16 the United Nations. It's not automatic, you know.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. So that was the situation. But -- and that they recognised was
19 likely to happen. What they wanted was to have their own state, their own
20 entity, under the umbrella, and that they declared, even before Bosnia was
21 recognised, as we've discussed several days ago, they, already in
22 November, December, and January - that is, November and December 1991 and
23 January 1992 - they took steps to establish what they saw as the Republika
24 Srpska. I mean, they proclaimed it in existence in January. They issued
25 a constitution in February. But they understood it would be under a --
1 what they hoped would be a fictional Bosnian state, or a nominal state, so
2 weak as not to affect their interests.
3 Q. Yes. Mr. Okun, I think we can, in the light of your answer, we
4 can agree that if we take away "by the negotiations," the context was that
5 the real world, the political forces, were driving in that direction?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And the Cutileiro meetings and discussions led to the --
8 particularly to the two agreements, which were effectively in two stages
9 that we've mentioned. There was first Lisbon and then Sarajevo.
10 A. Yes. Excuse me. There were also referred to at that time "London
11 Agreements," because they met in London from time to time to accommodate
12 Lord Carrington's interest and his presence in London. So it was rather
14 Q. It was a continuing process, wasn't it?
15 A. Yes, precisely.
16 Q. But the two key documents that emerged from this, for our
17 purposes, could be regarded as the Lisbon Agreement and the Sarajevo
19 A. If you ask Cutileiro and Lord Carrington, they would say London
20 and Lisbon. And I'm sorry, but that's what they say.
21 Q. That's helpful to know what they would say if they were and were
23 A. But the essence is, I think, rather look at the documents than
24 worry about the location.
25 Q. Indeed.
1 A. Because, as you say correctly, it was a continuing process.
2 Q. And the two documents, the Lisbon Agreement, as we call it, and
3 the Sarajevo Agreement, are exhibits already in this case. We've looked
4 at them before. D5 and D6. I think it might be helpful -- they're not
5 very large documents. It might be helpful, Mr. Okun, if you could be
6 given both.
7 A. I believe I have the copy I was given previously.
8 Q. Yes. Well, that would do fine, Mr. Okun. Well, it seems it may
9 not do fine. I'd better check.
10 A. The one I have is entitled 02093996, 15-XI-00. The 11 is in
11 Roman numerals. And on the front page it says "Regards, Jose Cutileiro."
12 It was obviously given to somebody by Ambassador Cutileiro. Yes. It's
13 what I have. Thank you. I have it.
14 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr. Okun. In fact, as often happens in this case,
15 D6 and D5, D6 comes chronologically first. That's the Lisbon Agreement.
16 We think that was around 27th of February, 1992. Whether that's the exact
17 date -- it was late February, wasn't it?
18 A. Well, I was not directly involved. It would have been February
19 and March, I believe.
20 Q. And then the Sarajevo Agreement, that's D5, that actually has the
21 date 18th March 1992.
22 A. Yes. Yes. It was February, March, and, as you say, it was a
24 Q. And if we look particularly, if we take D6, that's the other
25 document to the one that you specifically referred to a moment ago, the
1 general principles -- well, independence. It starts with A. I'll try and
2 pick out the pertinent points and not grind through all the text. But
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, independence is the first section. It would,
4 after independence, be an independent state composed of three constituent
6 And then number 3, the people of the three nations, Muslims,
7 Serbs, and Croats, would realise their sovereign rights through the
8 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And then it sets out constitutional
9 principles, many of which would be widely regarded as unobjectionable, as
10 elements of a constitution. I don't think we need dwell in detail on
11 those. And then there's a provision for assembly and government.
12 And then D, the constituent units. Number 1, within Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina, three constituent units would be established, whose territory
14 would be those envisaged in part E below. And that's where I want to go
15 next, please, Mr. Okun, part E, definition of the constituent units. The
16 territory of the constituent units would be defined on the basis of the --
17 and then it's left open, 1971, 1981, or 1991 census, and the existing
18 communes, with only such small adjustments as may be clearly justified in
19 such a way that communes where one particular nation is clearly in a
20 majority are grouped together into the appropriate constituent unit. And
21 then a state may have several separate parts. If there are
22 any particular areas, difficulties of definition remain, the assistance
23 of the arbitration commission would be requested. And was that
24 Mr. Badinter's commission?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And then Sarajevo would be the capital. Now, then if we -- this
2 is, as you've confirmed, this, of course, was a continuing process. If we
3 look, then, at the Sarajevo Agreement, so it's coming just a few weeks
4 later, it's been refined, of course, as one would expect. Lots of gaps
5 have been filled and some of the choices that were left open in the first
6 draft have been made effectively by the drafters of the second document,
7 the Sarajevo Agreement. And in particular, if we look at the constituent
8 units -- I won't dwell on A, B, and C. Look at the constituent units D1,
9 within Bosnia and Herzegovina, constituent units would be established
10 which are defined in part E below. Then we get the definition: "A
11 Working Group will be established in order to define the territory of the
12 constituent units based on national principles and taking into account
13 economic, geographical, and other criteria. A map based on the national,
14 absolute, or relative majority in each municipality will be the basis of
15 work in the Working Group and will be subject only to amendments justified
16 by the above-mentioned criteria."
17 So what it's saying, do you agree, Mr. Okun, is this: It's making
18 the nationalities the dominant criteria. It's introducing economic,
19 geographical, and other criteria, whatever those might be, as subordinate
20 criteria, and it is only where some adjustment is justified, according to
21 those subordinate criteria, that there will be an amendment or an
22 interference with the main criterion of nationality?
23 A. That's basically correct.
24 Q. And --
25 A. That is my reading as well.
1 Q. Yes. And so whether -- I say nationality. We're talking about
2 the three nationalities with which we're familiar now, Muslims, Serbs, and
3 Croats, so whether one puts the label "nationality" or "ethnicity" on it,
4 that was the recognised dominant criterion for these purposes?
5 A. Yes, I think that's true.
6 Q. And then the development of this process, the Cutileiro process,
7 if I can call it that, well, it ran into the sand, didn't it?
8 A. Yes, it did.
9 Q. Ultimately. The -- and in particular, the position was this,
10 wasn't it: That Mr. Izetbegovic agreed to -- well, particularly the later
11 one is important -- agreed to the Sarajevo statement of principles, on the
12 18th of March. It says at the very end of that document "As agreed by the
13 leaders of SDA, SDS, and HDZ parties in the fifth round of talks on future
14 constitutional arrangements." But subsequently, and not very long
15 afterwards, he withdrew his support and agreement.
16 A. Yes, that's my understanding. I was not present at this. What
17 was normal for the leaders throughout the negotiations, that is, for the
18 leaders of the three parties, the Muslims, Croats, and the Serbs, was to
19 agree subject to their Assembly agreements. We've seen that with
20 Dr. Karadzic many times, and the Croats the same, although I think Boban
21 probably had more control than the other two. But it is correct to say
22 that when he returned to -- or after he returned to Sarajevo from wherever
23 this was actually physically agreed upon, that the President Izetbegovic
24 withdrew his agreement.
25 Q. But it was -- acknowledging the comment you just made about such
1 agreements being subject to approval by the relevant Assemblies, in this
2 particular case it wasn't that Mr. Izetbegovic went back and was then
3 overridden by his Assembly, it was that Mr. Izetbegovic himself changed
4 his view.
5 A. Well, I think both are true. I asked him about that. As I said,
6 I did not participate in this meeting of 18 October. But subsequently,
7 when I was with President Izetbegovic, I recall asking him, and what he
8 told me was that when he returned to Sarajevo and spoke with other leaders
9 of the Bosnian government, that they convinced him that his agreement had
10 been unwise. That's what he said.
11 Now, there were other theories. We don't know this. As far as I
12 am concerned, we don't know for sure why this happened, what you've just
13 described. I have seen in many journalistic accounts the report, which as
14 far as I know is quite unsubstantiated but it's very widespread, that the
15 American ambassador in Belgrade, Ambassador Zimmerman, convinced President
16 Izetbegovic to withdraw his signature. I asked Zimmerman about that
17 directly, and he said that was not true at all, that there was just no
18 truth to that. But it appears in journalistic accounts, and even in
19 accounts between hard covers. You know, journalists do reach for the hard
20 covers and write books quite often.
21 But in sum, I think we don't really know at this point. One could
22 ask other individuals. Izetbegovic is dead, Zimmerman is dead. I suppose
23 if one wanted to delve into this, one would wish to ask Mr. Ganic, Ejub
24 Ganic, Haris Silajdzic, people who were the acknowledged Bosnian Muslim
25 leaders. But the fact remains he changed his mind and he did withdraw his
2 Q. Well, so whatever the reasons, Mr. Okun, as you succinctly
3 describe them, or the possibilities you've described, the theories that
4 are out there in the world, the -- as you say, the fact is that
5 Mr. Izetbegovic and his colleagues in the SDA did change their minds.
6 That's an obvious fact.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And that was inevitably seen by the Bosnian Serbs as some sort of
9 a -- some sort of a betrayal.
10 A. Well, they certainly did not like it.
11 Q. Because they had, as we explored a few minutes ago, they had gone
12 into negotiations in a context which they didn't like in the first place,
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina -- they didn't, in effect, like A(1) of the
14 document, did they?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. So they were proceeding from an A(1) that they absolutely didn't
17 like to see what they could wear --
18 A. Uh-huh.
19 Q. -- in the context of --
20 A. That's correct. They felt they had given something and that the
21 other side had not reciprocated.
22 Q. So they regard Mr. Izetbegovic as having, if you like, got the
23 main -- in A(1), they regard Mr. Izetbegovic as having got the main thing
24 he was looking for.
25 A. I'm not sure they would go that far. You could ask Mr. Krajisnik
1 his views. He would know better than I. But surely they felt that they
2 had made some compromises and that he had not reciprocated by compromising
3 to the degree they felt that he should have.
4 Q. Well, certainly, even if they felt that he had come a decent way
5 to compromise when the agreement was reached in Sarajevo, once he'd
6 withdrawn it, your description would inevitably be their viewpoint,
7 wouldn't it?
8 A. Oh, yes. I mean, they had signed, the Croats had signed, and he
9 signed and withdrew.
10 Q. And is it correct, then: You've described how the ICFY, I think
11 you've usefully described it as, the ICFY, the conferences in which you
12 were involved then --
13 A. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. I grant
14 you it's a mouthful. If you can come up with a better acronym, I would be
15 welcome to hear it. But short of that, we must, I think, say
16 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, or ICFY.
17 Q. Yes. Well, I don't know whether I heard ICFY from you or somebody
18 else before, but it seems to do.
19 A. Anyway, that was the conference that began in September 1992.
20 Q. And is the -- or I think you said August, August/September is not
21 a big --
22 A. No. I said September. I said September, because that's when it
23 began. The London conference was August. I mean, again, the London
24 conference led to the international conference, but the London conference
25 had a beginning and an end in August. And the ICFY, which was established
1 by the London conference, so it is a progenitor of the international
2 conference. But as the diary makes very clear, it began in the first week
3 of September 1992, immediately following on the London conference at the
4 end of August 1992.
5 Q. And given that Mr. Izetbegovic's withdrawal of his agreement to
6 the Sarajevo Agreement, that happened very quickly, within a week or two
7 of his return after 18th of March. Well, say return, it was in Sarajevo.
8 He didn't actually return anywhere.
9 A. Yes. It happened within two weeks anyway, surely, yes.
10 Q. So by the beginning of April, because we know that April was --
11 well, euphemistically, and I put it as neutrally as I can, April was an
12 active month.
13 A. Yes, indeed it was an active month.
14 Q. Put it entirely neutrally.
15 A. It's important to bear in mind what we know, and you're quite
16 correct, April was active and I'm not going to go into it further, but it
17 was on April 6th that the European Community recognised Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina, and the United States recognised one day later. So that was
19 a very significant act because the state was -- after April 6, 7, Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina was a recognised state by the EC and the United States and
21 by most of the countries. Not every country in the world but most of the
22 rest of the world recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina after April 6 and 7.
23 Q. But without any offence to any country, most of the world that
24 mattered for these purposes had recognised.
25 A. Yes. China did not recognise for some time, but of course, you're
1 quite right; in this context, China was not as relevant as the countries
2 that did recognise.
3 Q. The -- is the position, then, that between the -- I used the
4 phrase running into the sand, but between the collapse of Carrington,
5 Cutileiro, all that had run into the sand. Between the end of March,
6 then, 1992, and the London conference towards the end of August 1992,
7 there were no overtly active diplomatic negotiations going on.
8 A. No, that's not correct. They did continue. You're quite right to
9 say they ran into the sand. They were declining in importance and
10 agreement was not being reached. But the Conference on Yugoslavia met in
11 Brussels in May. I mean the full conference. I attended it as an
12 observer for the United Nations. It's in my diary notes. And Cutileiro
13 stayed active working on the principles, the map, everything we have in
14 front of us. He remained active until June. He's written a book about
15 it, by the way. As far as I know, it's only available in Portuguese.
16 I've read it. It's called The Life and Death of Others, [Portuguese
17 phrase], and I suppose you can get it or should get it. It's his account
18 of this period, Cutileiro's book.
19 So the Conference on Yugoslavia, while it was grinding down and,
20 as you say correctly, running into the sand, in a metaphor for lack of
21 success, it did continue. It reached a very difficult moment in July,
22 because in July the British ambassador to the United Nations rather
23 unilaterally committed and got the Security Council of the United Nations
24 to commit to certain actions, and this infuriated - and I use the word
25 advisedly - the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was
1 openly extremely annoyed at the British ambassador's action. And so what
2 one was seeing as the conference was running into the sands was mad
3 feeling around, frustration that agreement had not been reached. By July,
4 Sarajevo had been under shelling for three months. The city was being
5 destroyed before their eyes. And so there was a good deal of emotion at
6 that period. And it was, I believe, that contretemps in July between the
7 British ambassador to the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the
8 United Nations that led the British government to initially think about
9 convening a conference to get the negotiations back on track, as it were,
10 and that led to the London conference which followed the next month, in
12 Q. You were there in Brussels, then, as an observer, as you say, in
13 May 1992. Who were the main players, then, at that particular meeting in
15 A. It was the usual cast of characters.
16 Q. Being?
17 A. Just read my notes. You can see for yourself. They're all
18 listed. I can't give them to you from memory, Mr. Stewart. They're all
19 in the diary. I'd be happy to consult it for you.
20 Q. Don't worry, Mr. Okun. We won't take time on that.
21 A. I mean to be cooperative, but I don't -- I mean, there were 50 or
22 60 people at the table. I can't remember, after 12 years, every
23 individual, but the main people were there.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Okun, I do not have the impression that anyone in
25 this courtroom thinks at this moment that you would not be cooperative.
1 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Mr. Okun.
2 Q. So anyway -- well, you've corrected what I put to you about the
3 lack of overt political negotiations, because it clearly wasn't a secret
4 meeting in Brussels.
5 A. No, it wasn't secret. And you are correct, Mr. Stewart, the
6 process was grinding down and clearly not achieving a solution. But that
7 was happening throughout May, June, and July.
8 Q. So you -- things got revived or took on a different form, as
9 you've described, in late August 1992 and then in September 1992, and
10 cutting not an enormously long story, but cutting it fairly short anyway
11 here, it led to the Vance-Owen plan in January 1993. Now, you said in
12 your evidence earlier in this case that the result of this process, the
13 result was that by the spring of 1993, the Bosnian Croats had completely
14 accepted the Vance-Owen plan, in fact, they had accepted it from the
15 beginning effectively, hadn't they, in Geneva?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And they were the first. The Muslim side, which was the Bosnian
18 government, effectively, had accepted the plan in March 1993. You said:
19 They had -- talking about the Muslims, the Bosnian government, as they
20 were, that they had some reservations but they were not onerous. Could
21 you just briefly indicate what their reservations were?
22 A. I don't have them to memory. They were listed after their
23 signature, so they're available.
24 Q. So they're formal reservations?
25 A. Yes, you may call them reservations. President Izetbegovic, I
1 believe, called them conditions. More or less the same thing. But they
2 were not killer amendments, as we like to say in the United States.
3 Q. Yes, I see. That clarifies it.
4 A. They did not vitiate the acceptance, but they were conditions,
5 subject to, subject to, subject to. They were listed right after his
6 signature, so they're available to the Court if you wish to read them.
7 Q. No. Well, thank you, Mr. Okun. You clarified that you mean
8 reservations in the sense of express reservations or qualifications to the
9 document itself as opposed to reluctance.
10 The -- but as far as the Bosnian Serbs were concerned, you stated
11 in your evidence earlier that by April 1993, the only side that hadn't
12 accepted the plan were the Bosnian Serbs, and there's an intensive effort,
13 and then you -- the Greek government, actually, called a conference and
14 then you said Dr. Karadzic signed for the Bosnian Serbs, subject to the
15 approval of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, consistently with something you
16 described a few minutes ago, that it was not uncommon for the people
17 concerned to make such a reservation, make it subject to that.
18 A. Yes. He signed on May 2, 1993, in Athens, and it was very clear
19 that he signed reluctantly. This was no secret. I've described in the
20 diaries that Mr. Krajisnik and Koljevic looked as though they were about
21 to weep. They were near tears after his signature. And Dr. Karadzic was
22 extremely depressed. So there was no doubt that he was signing with great
24 Q. Now, the -- Dr. Karadzic was a not constant attender in the sense
25 that he was at every single meeting, but for practical purposes we see
1 Dr. Karadzic attending so many of the meetings you had that he could be
2 regarded as a permanent presence.
3 A. I think it's fair to describe him as the principal interlocutor
4 for the Bosnian Serb side.
5 Q. The -- and he had been engaged, had he, throughout that period of
6 the summer of 1992, from when the Cutileiro plan, well, certainly began to
7 get pretty buried in the sand, through to August, when there was the
8 revival of the new form of negotiations. Dr. Karadzic remained involved,
9 did he?
10 A. I would assume so, yes. I wasn't directly involved. And as you
11 say, the negotiations became even more intermittent than they had been as
12 the effort was drawing to a close. But I think it's a fair assumption
13 that Dr. Karadzic would have been involved, yes.
14 Q. Do you have a recollection -- of course, Mr. Okun, we accept
15 completely that you don't come here armed with a total list in your head
16 of everybody that attended all these meetings. That wouldn't be humanly
17 realistic. But do you have a recollection of Mr. Krajisnik's
18 participation in the -- I call them the revived process, from August 1992
19 through to the culmination with the Vance-Owen plan?
20 A. Yes. In terms of the number of times we would meet with the top
21 Bosnian Serb leadership, the first place would be held, in quantity, by
22 Dr. Karadzic, and I suppose, although I'm just guessing here, that
23 probably we saw Koljevic at least as much or maybe a few more times than
24 we saw Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps about the same. Again, I mention what I
25 said at the very outset, that Karadzic and Koljevic both spoke excellent
1 English, and that was clearly a factor. What was also noticeable was
2 that, at the most important meetings after January of 1993, when the plan
3 was put down, I mean after all the preliminary palaver was over, at the
4 most important meetings, Mr. Krajisnik was always present, and not
5 Koljevic. And we've already noted that when President Milosevic called
6 Mr. Vance in April from Belgrade to New York to say that we have another
7 round of talks and, you know, the Greeks were involved, and could
8 Ambassador Okun come to Belgrade with lord Owen, because Mr. Vance could
9 not - that conversation is in my diary notes - that he said: I've spoken
10 to Karadzic and Krajisnik, and they are willing to do the following...
11 So I think there's no question about the importance of these three
12 gentlemen, and particularly about the duumvirate of Karadzic and
14 Q. Just jogging back for one moment in time. The meeting back in
15 December 1991, at that stage of the different diplomatic negotiations and
16 discussions, Mr. Krajisnik had not appeared at all at that stage, had he?
17 A. That's correct. Nor had Koljevic. Neither. It was in December
18 of 1991 when there was no fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia was at
19 peace in December 1991. The only fighting in Yugoslavia, except for the
20 informal fighting, but the only formal fighting was in Croatia. And it
21 was in December 1991, December 2nd, as we've already established, that
22 President Milosevic said to Secretary Vance and me, in answer to our
23 question about Bosnia: You should talk to the Bosnian Serb leaders and
24 start with Dr. Karadzic. And we went to see Dr. Karadzic that day, and
25 the meeting is recorded in the diary.
1 Q. Now, it appears, and this is simply apparent from your notes, that
2 Mr. Krajisnik was present at a meeting on the 18th of September, 1992.
3 That's a meeting -- that's what your diary shows. After that, there were
4 a number of -- there's a meeting the following day. We can -- if the 19th
5 of September, but we can take it, can we, that meetings on the 18th and
6 19th of September are in effect one meeting spread over two days?
7 A. No. I think that's an incorrect conclusion to draw. Better to
8 look at the subject matter of the meeting, Mr. Stewart. They might be the
9 same. I mean, you might want to continue it -- to regard it as a
10 continuation, but that would depend on what we discussed. If, for
11 example, in one meeting one discusses the situation in Sarajevo for a
12 couple of hours and then the next day you discuss the situation, let us
13 say the ethnic cleansing in Zvornik, those I would consider two meetings.
14 I think the subject matter really is the determinant rather than the
16 Q. Yes. Well, we can probably just all look at the notes of the
17 meeting and form a view about whether it's one or two.
18 A. It's not a major point. It's just that what counted in the
19 meetings was what we were talking about.
20 Q. Yes. Well, anyway, Mr. Krajisnik was there on the 18th and 19th
21 of September. And those -- actually, those were in Geneva. Well, that
22 meeting or those meetings, depending which it is, took place in Geneva.
23 The -- he was then -- and that was the -- would this accord with
24 your recollection: That was the first time, first time you'd ever met
25 Mr. Krajisnik, was it?
1 A. I'm not sure. I was in -- I was in Sarajevo in October 1991, when
2 the Bosnian Serbs walked out of the Bosnian Assembly physically, and I saw
3 people milling around. And it's possible we might have met then, but I
4 don't think it's relevant, because we certainly didn't exchange any views
5 of substance.
6 Q. Mr. Okun, we wouldn't need to take issue over that. If you were
7 in Sarajevo on that --
8 A. But the notes would show at what meetings Mr. Krajisnik attended,
9 and if that's the first time he's mentioned, that's the first meeting he
11 Q. Yes. Well, it certainly is. It's on your notes of these
12 meetings. It is the first time, 18th and 19th of September. And then the
13 next time -- well, there's a reference to him on the 25th of November,
14 1992, but it doesn't --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: Probably better to intervene at this time than later.
17 But if we look at the notes from March 5th, 1992, we see a reference to a
18 meeting with Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and Ms. Plavsic.
19 MR. STEWART: Well, thank you. If that's what that shows, then
20 that's what that shows.
21 Q. The -- well, in the sense, everything I put to you would be
22 adjusted then, wouldn't it, Mr. Okun, if there was a meeting on the 5th of
23 March at which you were both present, then subject to what you've said
24 about Sarajevo in October 1991, that would have been your first meeting
25 with Mr. Krajisnik?
1 A. Yes. If the diaries indicate March 5, and I'll have it in front
2 of me in a moment. Yes. In Sarajevo. I now see it. Page 104 of the
3 diary. The number that the Court has put is R0163755, on the left-hand
4 side. And this was Dr. Karadzic, a meeting with Mr. Krajisnik. Koljevic
5 was not present. But Mrs. Plavsic was, Biljana Plavsic. So this was a
6 meeting with the three.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Okun, if I may interrupt you.
8 THE WITNESS: So March would be the first meeting, apparently.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You might not know, but this Chamber knows, and
10 certainly Mr. Stewart knows, that he's under some time constraint. So if
11 he would be very much interested to hear more about that meeting, he'll
12 ask you.
13 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Subject to that -- thank you, Mr. Tieger. The next time we see
15 Mr. Krajisnik appearing at one of your recorded meetings after September
16 is the 3rd of January -- I beg your pardon, is the 4th of January, 1993.
17 So -- and it was -- of course, it was in January of 1993 that you first
18 managed to produce the plan which then was, over the course of the next
19 two or three months, was signed up eventually?
20 A. Yes. January began the most intensive and the most high-level
21 series of meetings in the peace process. Plenary sessions were held with
22 Milosevic, Cosic, Tudjman. Yes. So after January, the entire situation
23 was elevated to the highest level, and that's when Mr. Krajisnik was in
24 pretty constant attendance, at the highest level.
25 Q. Now, you said in your evidence that -- of course, before you -- or
1 in the early stages, when you first met Mr. Krajisnik, "he was known to
2 us" - I assume you mean Mr. Vance, yourself, and others in your team -
3 "known to us by name and reputation, even before we met with him, because
4 of his importance as a Bosnian Serb leader." What was known to you? Let
5 me put it this way: On the footing that you first met him in March 1992,
6 immediately before that, what was known by you about Mr. Krajisnik and his
8 A. That he was a Bosnian Serb leader, that he had been a leader in
9 the Bosnian Assembly, that Sarajevo was his home town, that he was
10 particularly interested in Sarajevo, that he was a man of substance, a man
11 of weight, a man of importance. That was known.
12 Q. And you received some sort of briefing on the people concerned?
13 A. Well, we would -- Dr. Karadzic would talk about his colleagues.
14 The others would talk about him. This was an open process.
15 Q. Yes. I wasn't implying anything sinister, I was simply asking
16 whether you also, Mr. Vance and you, whether you also, in advance of
17 meeting people, whether you received some sort of briefing on your side
18 from --
19 A. No, I don't recall that. We discussed, of course, with Lord
20 Carrington the people he had met. Naturally, we would hear his views on
21 the people he was dealing with, which were always informative, quite
22 important for us to hear from Carrington, from Cutileiro. But we never
23 received any formal briefings, no.
24 Q. Did you get some informal briefing from Mr. Cutileiro about Mr.
1 A. I don't recall that.
2 Q. From Lord Carrington?
3 A. I don't know what you mean by "informal briefing."
4 Q. I've just been talking about what you've been talking about
5 yourself a moment ago, Mr. Okun.
6 A. You used the word "briefing" and I'm asking you what you mean by
8 Q. All right. Mr. Okun, I'll take away the word "briefing" which
9 perhaps has too much formality about it. When you said "We discussed, of
10 course, with Lord Carrington the people he'd met, naturally we would hear
11 his views on the people he was dealing with, which were always
12 informative." Now, I don't know whether he ever dealt with Mr. Krajisnik
13 but did you hear anything from Lord Carrington about Mr. Krajisnik?
14 A. I don't remember that.
15 Q. So apart from what you've just told the Trial Chamber a few
16 moments ago about what you knew about Mr. Krajisnik before you first met
17 him, did you know any more than that about his position, his style, his --
18 A. Yes. Well, we knew his positions. Of course we knew his
19 positions. They're matters of public record. I mean, I know you're the
20 Defence counsel. I've never laid eyes on you before three days ago, but I
21 now know you are the Defence counsel. You know who I am. I mean, this is
22 not a matter of difficulty to know that he was the chairman of the Bosnian
23 Serb Assembly or the president. I've already stated what we knew of his
24 official positions. There was no secret about that, Mr. Stewart.
25 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you: I'm trying to understand, because I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 feel there might be some misunderstanding. From what I understand from
2 Mr. Stewart's question at this moment is that whether you got any
3 information as Mr. Krajisnik being a hesitant negotiator or someone very
4 reliable or someone who would change his mind frequently, or whatever.
5 These kind of -- is that the kind of information --
6 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I'm talking about
7 anything to do -- I think I used the word "style" as a rather loose word.
8 Q. But anything to do with his political approach, his personality,
9 his style, whether you knew any more than that, beyond -- of course you
10 knew his positions, as you've rightly acknowledged.
11 A. We knew that he was a firm advocate of the Bosnian Serb position.
12 I wouldn't go beyond that and try to overcharacterise it. We knew it was
13 he who had signed the document to the JNA, asking for JNA "help," help in
14 clearing the -- in defending the Serb people, which in effect meant
15 clearing out the other people. We knew that because that was a public act
16 and had happened already in December. So one knew certain actions. But I
17 don't want to overcharacterise or mischaracterise what we knew about
18 Mr. Krajisnik in March 1992. Of course, we got to know him much better
19 after we sat for hours talking with him at the table. That, I think, goes
20 without saying. One learns as one gets into these things.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Okun.
22 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, are we at the right point for a
23 suitable break?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we are at the right point, if this is a suitable
25 moment for you, Mr. Stewart. We will adjourn until 10 minutes to 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
4 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Mr. Okun, you talked about the relative roles of Dr. Karadzic,
6 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Koljevic, in your earlier evidence, and how
7 Mr. Koljevic played an increasingly lesser role as time went on. So is it
8 -- it may be a rather crude analysis, but is it that just as
9 Mr. Koljevic's role declined, in a reasonably balancing way,
10 Mr. Krajisnik's role increased?
11 A. Well, I don't know -- I don't know that I'd be quite that
12 schematic. All three were present, for example, in Athens, in May 1993,
13 at the ultimate act, the day that Karadzic did sign. All three were
14 there. But there were some very important meetings, really essential
15 meetings, climactic meetings, one might say, where we had as our
16 interlocutors Dr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic and Koljevic was not present.
17 I refer to the April meetings with Mr. Milosevic, that is to say the end
18 of April, 1993.
19 Q. You've already described Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik as being
20 rather different personalities. That's a fair starting point, isn't it,
21 Mr. Okun?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. The -- is it right, in Mr. Krajisnik's case, that you got nothing
24 like the ranting - and that was a word you used about Dr. Karadzic - you
25 never had any ranting of that nature from Mr. Krajisnik, did you?
1 A. No, never.
2 Q. And would you say that he was a more mentally organised,
3 to-the-point person than Dr. Karadzic?
4 A. Dr. Karadzic was a very intelligent man. When he laid out a
5 position carefully, it was done thoroughly. But his emotion frequently
6 got in the way of his presentation, and that was never the case with
7 Mr. Krajisnik. Mr. Krajisnik always maintained a serious demeanour. But
8 I don't want to say that we did not take Dr. Karadzic seriously. One had
9 to take him seriously. It's just that his mode of presentation was much
10 more emotional than Dr. Karadzic or than Mr. Koljevic, for example.
11 Everybody has his own style.
12 Q. Did Mr. Krajisnik show concern in the course of your discussions
13 for constitutional, legal, or procedural niceties?
14 A. I wouldn't say for the niceties in the sense that they can be
15 interpreted -- I'm not saying that's your interpretation, Mr. Stewart; not
16 at all, but he was not, as we say, nit-picking. He did show attention to
17 the constitutional principles, say, of the Vance-Owen plan, which were
18 very important to the Bosnian Serbs and were discussed at length and which
19 he did not like at all, and which he made clear, but I would not
20 characterise that as a nicety. Rather, it was to him, as indeed it was to
21 the plan, it was an essential component of the plan, so a disagreement
22 with the constitutional principles, let us say, on the issue of consensus
23 voting, on would the Serbs -- would the Bosnian Serbs have a veto power
24 over everything in the Bosnian Assembly? Yes, he took a strong position
25 opposing that, but it was a position of principle, not a minor negotiating
2 Q. And it was apparent, was it, as you were approaching finalisation
3 of the Vance-Owen Plan, it was apparent, was it, that it would need to be
4 carried back to the Bosnian Serb Assembly?
5 A. Well, they said so. It was not an obvious thing to us. But once
6 they said it, they said it. I must say that we regarded that position
7 that it would be taken to the Assembly as a sign that it would be
8 ultimately rejected, because we knew the position of the Bosnian Serb
9 Assembly from their previous meetings. That is to say, by May 1993, we
10 knew the position of the Bosnian Serb Assemblies. So that when
11 Dr. Karadzic said that his signature was conditional on acceptance or
12 ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly, it was a pretty safe assumption
13 that they were going to reject it. And I so indicated in my diary.
14 You'll find an entry which, if you wish, I can show you, but I shan't do
15 it unless you ask, but I can show it to you, that at the time I expected
16 it to be rejected. I wrote that entry in the diary. May I show it to
18 Q. I think it's not necessary. Thank you, Mr. Okun. Thank you for
19 the offer.
20 A. Okay. But the only reason I mention it is that it does not say "I
21 expect the plan to be rejected," but rather, I chose and quoted a line of
22 poetry that would indicate that. So that if you look at the entry, it
23 isn't immediately apparent unless you know the poem and what I'm saying.
24 But it was clear to me.
25 Q. This is your "Winter is a comin' in".
1 A. No.
2 Q. No, that's another one, that's your other line of poetry,
4 A. That's an adapted one about winter, yes. No, what I wrote was,
5 "Bred to a harder thing than triumph." That's the quote, which I'm sure
6 you know.
7 Q. Of course, Mr. Okun.
8 A. And you know --
9 Q. I'll decline to finish the whole thing off this morning, but ...
10 A. For the benefit of the Court, it is a line from a famous --
11 well-known poem by William Butler Yeats, and the title of the poem is "To
12 a friend --" this is the title: "To a friend whose work was come to
13 nothing." And after the Bosnian Serb signature and the statement, "We're
14 taking it back to the Bosnian Serb Assembly," of which Dr. Krajisnik was
15 the president, that made it abundantly clear to me that the work of the
16 Vance-Owen conference had come to nothing, and I so indicated. I mention
17 it because it was clear to us what was meant by, We will take the
18 signature back to the Assembly. It was going to be defeated there. And
19 it was. It was defeated.
20 Q. Well, I -- I think the reference to the poem should enable us to
21 identify the relevant passage, Mr. Okun, and I won't ask you to give us
22 the author of "Summer is comin' in". But the ratification by the
23 Assembly, that was, I think as you've described earlier in your evidence,
24 that was normal, expected procedure, wasn't it?
25 A. It was not at all surprising.
1 Q. Did the -- did Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik themselves
2 offer any expression of the likelihood or not of support and ratification
3 by the Bosnian Serb Assembly?
4 A. I don't recall them saying it expressly. They didn't have to say
5 it. They knew and we knew it would be defeated there.
6 Q. It was, wasn't it, if anybody was going to sell it, if that's one
7 way of putting it, if anybody was going to sell it and get it through the
8 Bosnian Serb Assembly, it was going to have to be Mr. Krajisnik, wasn't
10 A. Well, I would say that he would have been one of the most
11 important people, but President Milosevic went to the Assembly, so one
12 sees his importance. We know that. And the Greek Prime Minister, Prime
13 Minister Mitsotakis, went to the Assembly session. But Mr. Krajisnik was
14 in the chair, of course.
15 Q. Well, you turned out to be right, in effect, Mr. Okun. But at the
16 point where you were at the -- in the final stages of negotiation of the
17 Vance-Owen Plan and the question of its approval by the Bosnian Serb
18 Assembly was concerned, it was obviously valuable to have Mr. Krajisnik
19 involved in your meetings at that stage, wasn't it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And valuable in a way which had not applied in the earlier stages
22 of the discussions, during the period in the last few months of 1992, when
23 in fact he largely wasn't at the meetings?
24 A. Well, that's true up to a point. He wasn't at the very earliest
25 meeting, but he participated quite fully, again in a very important way,
1 in the September to December period, and the diaries indicate that; his
2 many interventions on Sarajevo, his discussions of the ethnic areas. That
3 was clear. And then increasingly after January 1993, he was a full
4 participant. So we knew his views. He had expressed them. He was quite
5 well known to us. By May we had seen a great deal of Mr. Krajisnik and
6 we'd seen him express his views across the table.
7 Q. When you -- you say, Mr. Okun, he participated quite fully in a
8 very important way in the September to December period. During the
9 September to December period, he was only present, according to your
10 diaries, on the 18th and 19th of September.
11 A. But they were very important interventions, Mr. Stewart. What he
12 said was very important.
13 Q. No. I beg your pardon, Mr. Okun. What I'm putting to you: He
14 was -- well, what you're saying, what he said on the 18th and 19th of
15 September was very important?
16 A. Yes. Yes, indeed.
17 Q. But otherwise, from September through to the end of December, he
18 wasn't there at all?
19 A. We knew he was informed of the situation. He appeared immediately
20 in January, when the principals met, when only the principals at the table
21 met. So that we knew that his views were very important and had to be
22 taken into account.
23 Q. How -- just on a purely practical level, how hampered did
24 Mr. Krajisnik appear to be, if at all, in his contributions to the
25 discussion by virtue of the fact that he really did not speak English?
1 A. I don't think that affected him in any material way. There was an
2 interpreter present for him, and occasionally the others who spoke
3 excellent English would whisper in his ear simultaneously as we were
4 talking. Buha would usually just whisper into his ear. So I think he had
5 a simultaneous interpretation that was really quite adequate, probably as
6 good as this Court.
7 Q. I'm sorry. Do you mean there was an actual --
8 A. Buha would be sitting next to him, and whispering in his ear, say,
9 as Mr. Vance spoke.
10 Q. Yes. I see. So there wasn't a specific interpreter with that
11 task who was present.
12 A. There was after January. Excuse me. Yes. After January, when we
13 met in plenary or in smaller session at the Palais de Nation, and that's
14 where we met, we met in UN headquarters in Geneva.
15 Q. I think some of your later notes record the presence of
16 interpreters, but at the September 18th, 19th meeting or meetings, it was
17 done, was it, by Mr. Buha?
18 A. It was done by whoever was present at the table. Buha wasn't
19 always there either, but whoever was present at the table. But to answer
20 your question, Mr. Stewart, the question, as I understand it - and please
21 correct me if I'm wrong - the question was: Was he adequately served? In
22 other words, did he understand what was being said across the table? The
23 answer to the question, did he understand what was being said across the
24 table, the answer to that question is yes.
25 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Buha actually speaks English to a serious
2 A. Yes, because I've met and discussed matters with him in English.
3 You'll see conversations with Buha and me, and those were held in English.
4 Q. In fact, Mr. Okun, my question to you really was whether
5 Mr. Krajisnik's participation, and I meant in the sense of active
6 participation, was hampered, because he doesn't appear, for example, in
7 the 18th and 19th of December -- the September, I beg your pardon, 18th,
8 19th September, 1992, there is no note made by you of his having spoken at
9 all. Now, I want to be clear. I'm not suggesting these are longish
10 meetings, I'm not suggesting the fact you don't note someone is speaking
11 means they never said a single word, but as there is no note at all in
12 your diary of Mr. Krajisnik speaking at either of those meetings, that
13 does rather suggest that he didn't make a highly significant or pertinent
14 contribution at any point.
15 A. Mr. Krajisnik is a man of few words. He spoke much less than the
16 extremely voluble Dr. Karadzic and he spoke less than the equally voluble
17 but less emotional Nikola Koljevic. They spoke more. The word count will
18 show that. He is a graver, more severe person in manner, very dignified,
19 and spoke less. It was clear that he weighed his words with care. It was
20 clear to us also that he meant what he said.
21 Q. Now, we -- some of your earlier evidence covered and spoke about
22 the six wartime goals of the Bosnian Serbs.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And we can take them one by one in shorthand. Number one, as you
25 described it, was to have their own state, Republika Srpska, juridical
1 state was the phrase you used. Now, given that I think we can -- you
2 probably would acknowledge that all sorts of difficult concepts involved
3 in there being Republika Srpska as a separate state.
4 A. What is the question?
5 Q. Well, do you agree that that itself raised various questions about
6 what that exactly meant internationally, domestically?
7 A. Well, the organisation of any state is a complex matter. But it
8 was clear and it was so stated repeatedly by all of the Bosnian Serb
9 leaders, that, as they would put it, "We will not live under Muslim rule.
10 We want to have -- be ruled by our own people." That was the shorthand of
11 it. I don't want to go into it further. I mean, you could read their
12 constitution, but that was the essence of the position, was We will have
13 our own state, we will make our own laws for our own people. That was the
14 essence of it.
15 Q. And that was, in the context in which they found themselves, that
16 was a reasonable aim to have, wasn't it?
17 A. Well, I would say that everybody else felt it was an unreasonable
19 Q. Everybody else being?
20 A. All the negotiators, and certainly the Bosnian government. But
21 the negotiators, Secretary Vance and Lord Owen did not find that a
22 reasonable aim.
23 Q. The second wartime goal was that the state - because that proceeds
24 from the first goal - the state was to have continuous territory and to be
25 contiguous with Serbia, not chopped up into patches. Once you've got the
1 first goal, the second goal is really, would you agree, it's a natural
2 follow-on from the first goal, that that's what a group such as the
3 Bosnian Serbs would be likely to seek?
4 A. They would be likely to seek it. It does not follow
5 automatically, however, on the first date. If we recall that Pakistan was
6 created, and there was a West Pakistan and an East Pakistan. And if you
7 look at Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan has a serious exclave, surrounded by
8 Turkey and Armenia. So there are examples. Before World War II, East
9 Prussia was separated from the German Republic. The famous Polish
10 corridor separated it. So it's not a complete situation. The United
11 States today, Hawaii is thousands of miles away from the continental
12 United States, but it's part of the United States. The same thing for
13 Alaska; it's a thousand miles away.
14 Q. Yes. Mr. --
15 A. So it's not -- all I'm saying, Mr. Stewart, I gathered you meant
16 it was an automatic requirement that the state be the way they wished it
17 to be, and my view is that it's not either automatic or necessary.
18 Q. Well, Mr. Okun, of course it is accepted that there are countries
19 with bits of their territory somewhere out at sea or somewhere else, even
20 on some other continent. I've only got to glance at the Bench to be
21 reminded of countries you can add to the list. But that's not what I was
22 putting to you. Even though there may be countries in that position, it's
23 nevertheless a natural follow-up from the first --
24 A. Territorial continuity. Yes. Territorial continuity is accepted,
25 I would say it is natural, yes.
1 Q. And then so far as the third goal was concerned, the way you
2 described this in your evidence was, third, to be ethnically pure Serb or
3 overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb, as they could make it. And then you added
4 on: Hence the ethnic cleansing. Well, if we leave -- it's not a small
5 topic, Mr. Okun, after all, but if we leave the "hence the ethnic
6 cleansing" on one side as your addendum, as a consequence of this, to be
7 ethnically pure Serb or overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb, as they could make
8 it, again, in the context of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9 which they didn't want, in a state in which they were in a minority, which
10 was a problem for them, as they saw it very clearly, to be as
11 overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb as they could make it was again an
12 understandable aim, was it not?
13 A. I'm afraid I have to disagree with you there, Mr. Stewart, because
14 the -- even if the aim were understandable in the abstract, the manner in
15 which it was being carried out and the areas over which it was being
16 carried out were real areas and involved the forcible expulsion and
17 removal and killing of other peoples, of Muslims and Croats. And we were
18 able to see that in the presentation of Mr. Krajisnik that was shown on
19 the video, when he showed the battle lines, the lands held by the Serbs,
20 and under it was the ethnic map. Now, we have an ethnic map here, and
21 there are plenty of ethnic maps easily available, and one sees that the
22 areas held by the Bosnian Serb army in 1972/3 -- excuse me. In 1992,
23 1993, 1994 were not congruent, in many serious respects, with the ethnic
24 composition of the country on a pre-war map. So that while one may say,
25 as a theoretical proposition, that it's nice to live in, you know, a
1 country with your own people, that was not the situation that faced the
2 Bosnian Serbs in the beginning of 1992. They made it that way, and it was
3 also Dr. -- I should say that Mr. Krajisnik says this in his presentation,
4 as we looked at it on the video. He states that this will be Serb
5 territory and that there could be some enclaves of other peoples living in
6 the territory. Well, an enclave is a very small area of one people,
7 entirely surrounded by the bigger area of another people, in the way that
8 Goa was a Portuguese enclave on the Indian continent. Those were
9 Dr. Krajisnik words, which we just saw here in the courtroom.
10 So to say, and I understand your view as a theoretical
11 proposition, that it's nice to live with your own people, but that it
12 becomes a very different matter when you have a very large area in which
13 hundreds of thousands of people are inextricably intermingled and that you
14 then go about creating, creating, this pure state through force and
15 violence and expulsion, and other acts.
16 Q. Now, I appreciate, Mr. Okun, the thrust of your evidence is that
17 the two are not separated in the way you've described it. But if we take
18 away any suggested illegal means of achieving that goal, the goal of
19 wishing your state within a state, as it's likely to be, to be as
20 overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb as they could make it is, in principle, an
21 unobjectionable goal, isn't it?
22 A. As I say, as a theory, in the abstract, one can say that. But if
23 one takes the position that words have some relationship to reality, that
24 one must base words on reality and one must base outcomes on the reality,
25 then it really was an unreasonable goal, Mr. Stewart, because it couldn't
1 come about except by forcible means. So it's one thing to state the
2 proposition as theory. You know, it's another thing to make it come to be
3 the case. And this was frequently at issue, and we have examples of it,
4 which I don't want to repeat and take the Court's time, but we've already
5 discussed and heard examples. For example, very briefly, Dr. Karadzic
6 saying there will be war in Macedonia for the same reason there is already
7 going to be war in Bosnia. Well, it didn't happen in Macedonia because
8 the Macedonian leadership didn't make it happen. Now, it did happen in
9 Bosnia because the Bosnian Serb leadership made it happen.
10 Q. The fourth aim was to -- or fourth war goal was to have a special
11 relationship with Yugoslavia or Serbia, as the case may be. That was a
12 natural aim in the circumstances, wasn't it?
13 A. I would not find that unobjection -- I would not find that
14 unnatural. It would depend, of course, on the degree of the special
15 relationship, what exactly did it constitute. But the -- many states have
16 special relationships with other states. Dual citizenship, for example,
17 extradition treaties, preferential trade relations. So there are many
18 special relationships.
19 Q. And fifthly, a topic that's come up a lot, of course, is to divide
20 Sarajevo into a Muslim and Bosnian Serb section. Now, whatever happened
21 in Sarajevo, again, in principle, Mr. Okun, if that were the only way out
22 of an intractable problem, division of Sarajevo into Muslim and Bosnian
23 Serb sections also was not fundamentally an objectionable war aim, was it?
24 A. I can't agree with you there, Mr. Stewart, because the population,
25 above all in Sarajevo, was inextricably linked. So there was no way that
1 you could separate the peoples, except by force. Nor was there any great
2 desire on the part of the people of Sarajevo to live apart. During the
3 entire war, for example, during the entire months and months, years, of
4 Bosnian Serb shelling of the city, there were many areas, indeed there
5 were individual apartment buildings where there would be a Serb family on
6 one floor and a Muslim family on the other. I was able to observe that
7 myself during our visits. I could see no inclination on the part, or very
8 little inclination, on the part of the citizenry of Sarajevo, regardless
9 of whether they were Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Serb, to be divided into
10 two cities, like East Berlin and West Berlin. But it was a constant
11 refrain from the Bosnian Serb leadership. Yes, you're quite right. It
12 was emphasised over and over again.
13 Q. And when these negotiations began in August, September 1992, did
14 Mr. Vance and you, did you have a view as to what would happen about
15 Sarajevo? What should happen? Perhaps I'll put it that way. What the
16 solution should be, as far as Sarajevo was concerned.
17 A. Well, the situation in and around Sarajevo was known. The Serb
18 population was large in the city, to be sure, much smaller than the
19 Muslim, but it was a significant population. But the surrounding
20 opstinas, the rural areas, Ilidza, for example, were Serb -- largely Serb
21 populated. We recall, for example, that Dr. Karadzic and the other
22 leaders made Pale their interim capital of the Bosnian Serb Republic
23 during the conflict. In other words, they placed their capital next to
24 Sarajevo. So it was of importance to them. But neither Mr. Vance nor I
25 had a fixed and irrevocable view of the future of Sarajevo at the
1 beginning of the negotiations, to answer your question specifically. But
2 it is also fair to say that we did not envisage, and indeed would find it
3 very hard to envisage, dividing the city a la Berlin or Nicosia.
4 Q. So what did you see -- that indicates what you didn't see as a
5 solution, what you didn't see as something that would work. What it
6 doesn't quite indicate, Mr. Okun, is how you did see it would work in the
7 long run.
8 A. Well, leave it alone. After all, the people -- this city had been
9 at peace for decades, if not centuries. It was the capital of the
10 republic. It was entirely peaceful. The Winter Olympics had been staged
11 there a decade or so earlier. It was a peaceful city. It was rather like
12 The Hague. So we saw no particular reason to disturb it any more than I
13 see any reason to reorder the population of The Hague, for example. It
14 really did not enter our minds that one would want to split a city which
15 was at peace, where its inhabitants lived peacefully.
16 Let me recall for you -- and this is relevant, Mr. Stewart. Let
17 me recall for you that when it came time for the signature of the
18 implementing accords of January 2, 1992, the cessation of hostilities that
19 ended the war in Korea [sic], discussion was held at the highest levels:
20 Where would the accord be signed? Bearing in mind it was essentially
21 agreement between Serbia and Croatia. Well, if the decision was made,
22 understandably, not to sign in Belgrade - the Croats wouldn't accept that.
23 That would not be happy news for the Croatian side. Nor would the Serbian
24 side wish to sign in Zagreb - that left, Podgorica, Skopje, and Ljubljana,
25 and Sarajevo. And the decision was: Well, let us go to Sarajevo to sign
1 it, because it is central. It's the middle, we can all get there
2 comfortably, and it's a very peaceful place. It's entirely calm. So we
3 will be able to sign in an atmosphere of tranquility. And therefore, the
4 January 2, 1993 agreement, the cessation of hostilities that ended the
5 fighting in Croatia, was signed in Sarajevo, and it was signed, I repeat,
6 precisely because Sarajevo was at peace.
7 Q. So you didn't see any problem emerging from the fact that if the
8 first goal were achieved and there was a Republika Srpska as a state
9 within a state - of course in practice, there was already for quite a long
10 time - but that Sarajevo would be placed in the other part of
12 A. As I believe I already indicated, we did not accept, never
13 accepted the concept or the -- of Republika Srpska. The Vance-Owen Plan
14 did not accept Republika Srpska. Indeed, Secretary Vance and Lord Owen
15 would not receive letters written on stationery that had as the letterhead
16 Republika Srpska. They did not accept it.
17 Q. And the sixth war aim, which was a veto power over --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
19 MR. TIEGER: Sorry to interrupt, Your Honour, but before we move
20 too much further and pass the transcript --
21 JUDGE ORIE: If it's about the date --
22 MR. TIEGER: It's actually about the substitution of the word --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Your testimony was, Mr. Okun, that the January
24 2nd of 1993 agreement, cessation of hostilities that ended the fighting in
25 Croatia was signed in Sarajevo, as you said, then a still peaceful city.
1 I may take it that you wanted to say 1992?
2 THE WITNESS: Correct. The correct date is January 2, 1992.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Then that's corrected.
4 THE WITNESS: I apologise.
5 JUDGE ORIE: No. It's -- Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. The other minor matter I had in mind was
7 a substitution, the inadvertent substitution of the word "Korea" for
8 Croatia in referring to the cessation of hostilities.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You --
10 THE WITNESS: Did I say "Korea"?
11 JUDGE ORIE: At least that's what I understood and what appears in
12 the transcript.
13 THE WITNESS: Oh, dear. How embarrassing.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Both short names, both starting with C. Okay.
15 Please proceed.
16 THE WITNESS: I have no explanation for that.
17 MR. STEWART: I thought it was an extension of this whole issue
18 which I had previously overlooked. But yes. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: Perhaps thinking of -- not to go into it, but there
20 are divided countries, you see. When one begins to think in terms of
21 divisions, I suppose Korea creeps into the subconscious. Forgive me.
22 MR. STEWART:
23 Q. Mr. Okun, and the sixth of the war goals, to have a veto power
24 over any residual powers held by the central government of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, again in the context of the other goals with the first
1 aim of having a separate Republika Srpska -- given the position the
2 Bosnian Serbs felt themselves in, this was a reasonably natural
3 concomitant, wasn't it, of the other goals?
4 A. I have to say, Mr. Stewart, that while it is possible to say that
5 it is a reasonably natural concomitant, if the original goal is invalid
6 and if it cannot happen except by force and violence, to say that
7 something is a natural concomitant does put rather a positive gloss on it.
8 If I may choose an unhappy example along your line of questioning,
9 one could say that if you agree with the Nazis that Germany should be free
10 of Jews, if you agree with that, well, then it's all right, it's a natural
11 concomitant to take them out to Poland and gas them. But, you know,
12 nobody would, I think in this courtroom, agree with that. So it's really
13 a bit misleading, and I'm sure you don't mean it to be, but it does leave
14 the impression that these actions were all logical, simple, normal courses
15 of behaviour flowing from a reasonable position. In reality, they were
16 actions taken consciously to create a new reality on the basis of force
17 and violence.
18 So I can't agree with your characterisation that this was a
19 natural concomitant, because the end result was highly unnatural, and in
20 this case, on the sixth war aim, namely, the veto power, it was
21 tantamount, indeed would have meant the non-functioning of the Bosnian
22 Republic. It would have involved the de facto disintegration of the
23 Republic if one side that does not accept the Republic then has a veto
24 power over all of the actions in the legislature, then there's no
25 Republic. And we did hear Mr. Krajisnik, in the video which was shown to
1 the Court an hour or so ago, we heard Mr. Krajisnik, in his first or
2 second sentence, referring to "the former Bosnia and Herzegovina." You
3 see, he does not accept the state. He does not accept the state of
4 Bosnia. So that to describe this action as a natural concomitant, while
5 that can pass grammatically, it involves the destruction of the state, the
6 physical destruction, and that's what the other war aims were all about,
7 and this put the final touch on the war aims.
8 Q. You said -- in your evidence, you said the other parties had war
9 aims as well. I don't want to devote a disproportionate amount of time to
10 the other parties' war aims, but in summary, how would you have described
11 the Muslim -- Bosnian Muslims' war aims in early 1992?
12 A. Their goal was to have a state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its
13 current borders, internationally recognised. They wished the state to be
14 unitary, in other words, that it should have a central government and then
15 a whole series of other institutions, but not belonging to other entities.
16 And they wished it to be a secular democratic state, based on one man, one
17 vote. The Bosnian Croats' war aims were to, first, remove, as help,
18 remove by vote in the referendum of February 29 and March 1, 1992, to vote
19 for independence. So to remove Bosnia from what was left of Yugoslavia in
20 March 1992. Second, to assist the Bosnian Muslims in fending off the
21 Bosnian Serb army and to defend the areas where Bosnian Croat people
22 lived. And third, and here they had a similarity to the Bosnian Serbs, to
23 have a special relationship with Croatia and perhaps even join Croatia at
24 some later date.
25 Q. Now, you may recall, Mr. Okun, Mr. Izetbegovic having said, and I
1 think it's a fairly well-known statement, at the end of February 1992, he
2 said: "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
3 for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would not sacrifice sovereignty."
4 Is that something that you recall?
5 A. I don't recall those exact words, but he was interested in the
6 state being sovereign, yes.
7 Q. Expressed in those terms, as -- and I am quoting, though in
8 English of course, but expressed in those terms, would you have regarded
9 that at the time as a rather warlike declaration?
10 A. I don't think one -- I would have, nor could anyone objectively
11 characterise that as a war declaration, because he had no army.
12 Q. Was it a warlike, warlike declaration?
13 A. I see, a warlike declaration. I don't know. I don't really think
14 so. I think he was expressing what any leader would say who is on the
15 verge of leading a country to independence for the first time in its
16 history, in fact, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 JUDGE ORIE: This is a very special way of reminding the Presiding
18 Judge that we are close to a quarter to 2.00, Mr. Stewart. I'll inquire
19 what caused this. Others might say it is music, but I would say it is
20 noise, rather.
21 MR. STEWART: I thought it was a commercial break.
22 JUDGE ORIE: It is effective, although I'd like it not to be
23 repeated. We are close to a quarter to 2.00.
24 I would like to have one minute with the parties to discuss a few
25 practical matters, but we are not going to bother you with that, Mr. Okun.
1 We'd like to see you back tomorrow morning, 9.00, same courtroom, and may
2 I instruct you again not to speak with anyone about your testimony,
3 whether given or still about to be given.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, to get a better impression of what our
8 day will look like tomorrow, how much time would you think you still need
9 for the cross-examination?
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I would expect to finish either within
11 or for practical purposes close to within the first session --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. STEWART: -- tomorrow.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then there might be some questions from the Bench.
15 There might be some questions in redirect. So we'll certainly find
16 tomorrow some remaining time for practical matters. I'd like to pay
17 attention tomorrow both to the -- well, as it's sometimes said, the
18 conditions or at least the monitoring of the Chamber, the plans made by
19 the parties to expose them publicly and to see what further has to be said
20 about it.
21 The second issue I'd like to raise tomorrow is the statements and
22 transcripts as far as tendering them into evidence is concerned. Because
23 they, at this moment, do not appear on our list of exhibits. And we now
24 are faced with the next problem, that the exhibits attached to them also
25 do not appear on the list of exhibits. So, therefore, I'll make
1 suggestions tomorrow how to deal with that in the near future.
2 These are the two major issues on the agenda, but if the parties
3 would like to add one, then either it could be just written down briefly
4 in one or two lines and to be presented to the Chamber this afternoon so
5 that we are aware of what the issues are. Or, if it could be said in one
6 minute, fine, but otherwise the interpreters have -- we have stolen
7 already time from them again.
8 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we don't have anything right now, and
9 I'm not aware we'll have anything, and if we do, we'll take up Your
10 Honour's invitation.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Same true for the Prosecution, I do understand,
12 Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We'll then adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, same
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Friday, the 25th day of
18 June 2004, at 9.00 a.m.