1 Monday, 11 July 2005.
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
8 number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 We have to deal with a few procedural matters first. I, first
11 of all, would like to go into private session, but it will not take any
12 more than half a minute.
13 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We are in open session again.
5 There were some other procedural issues to be raised. One would
6 be raised either at the end or the beginning. I think it's checked on the
7 transcript what has been said by Mr. Tieger, but ...
8 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: It has been checked on the transcript. There was
10 no specification whether it would be at the beginning or at the end, so
11 therefore both parties were right or wrong.
12 Mr. Hannis.
13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 I'm sorry, I was under the impression that we were going to take
15 it up at the end of the session, but I'm happy to address it now.
16 In relation to the cross-examination of Mr. Davidovic, Your
17 Honours will recall at the time I expressed some concern about some of the
18 questions that were being put to the witness, as I -- I was uncertain of
19 what the -- the good-faith basis was for some of those very serious
20 allegations that were being made against Mr. Davidovic, calling him a
21 criminal and a liar.
22 At the time I objected and questioned the basis. I don't have
23 any objection or quarrel with the Defence statement, then, when counsel has
24 reasonable grounds to believe that it has information that impeaches an
25 adverse witness. Then counsel should ask questions about that.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you perhaps remind us, Mr. Hannis, what day
2 exactly it was.
3 MR. HANNIS: That was -- most of the questions I'm talking
4 about, Your Honour, were on --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Especially the -- the questions in cross-
6 examination on -- I think on being robbed of --
7 MS. LOUKAS: That was the 27th of June, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: The 27th of June.
9 MR. HANNIS: Yes, in particular the questions -- I've given the
10 Court a chart, I believe; I don't know if you have that. I sent an e-mail
11 to your legal officer which contained a copy. I have hard copies I can
12 hand up now, Your Honour, that has specific references. Some of the
13 questions were on the 13th, but the ones -- most in particular were on the
15 As I said, I don't have -- I don't have a quarrel with the
16 proposition that when there's a reasonable ground, that there is impeaching
17 information, then counsel should ask those questions. But it's our
18 position, Your Honour, that there's also an obligation on counsel's part to
19 exercise caution in making such serious allegation against a witness. And
20 the fact that we've got a sort of judicial immunity as advocates should not
21 be a licence to slander or engage in character assassination. Reasonable
22 grounds to believe should be an objective standard, not merely a subjective
24 We have evidence to show that several Defence counsel questions
25 are not supported and were not supported at the time that they were asked
1 by objective reasonable grounds. I've prepared --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, at least, Mr. Hannis, we do not know about
3 such support. Isn't that what you wanted to say?
4 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Because we still have to hear the Defence on the
6 matter as well.
7 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour.
8 As I've said, I've set out some of these grounds on the chart.
9 One of the questions referred to the specific question about Mr. Davidovic
10 currently having three criminal complaints against him. We were furnished
11 some documents that related to those questions, and as I've set forth in
12 the chart, Your Honour, it appears to me that it does not support that
13 implication that there were criminal complaints against him.
14 I think in the context of the question, it would reasonably be
15 understood as saying that there were actually criminal proceedings, not the
16 mere fact that a private individual had written a letter to the Prosecutor
17 complaining about somebody's conduct.
18 But one of the most troubling examples relates to Defence
19 counsel's rigorous assertions that Mr. Davidovic exploited Bosniaks during
20 the war by taking property from them. In particular, I refer to the June
21 27th transcript citation at page 15.225, beginning at line 17. The
22 question was, "Now, Mr. Davidovic, you seized all the furnishings and
23 equipment from the dental office of Dr. Edina Alabaci Hujdurovic in
24 Bijeljina, didn't you? In fact, Mr. Davidovic, after seeing you on
25 Television Bosnia giving your evidence two weeks ago, Dr. Hujdurovic, Dr.
1 Edina Alabaci Hujdurovic spoke out on local TV about you doing just that."
2 Your Honour, I hope that you have copies of the affidavits from
3 her, her husband, and her office assistant.
4 JUDGE ORIE: We have received the affidavits.
5 MR. HANNIS: Which do speak to this issue. And I believe from
6 what they say, it appears there was no basis.
7 Most troubling about that is -- is the fact that her husband
8 indicates the morning of June the 27th he received two phone calls; one
9 from an individual in Belgrade, whose phone number we have - but I don't
10 have that number in front of me, but I will furnish that to Defence counsel
11 and the Court. I think I've already sent it by e-mail to Defence counsel -
12 in which the husband was asked if it was true that his wife had appeared on
13 local TV and said that thing. He told the caller that that was not true.
14 And half an hour later he received a second phone call from a telephone
15 number which we have now checked, and our information indicates that is a
16 phone number that is associated with the case manager for the Krajisnik
17 Defence counsel. And he spoke to that individual, who he said gave the
18 name that sounded something like Radojcic, who asked if it was true that
19 his wife had gone on TV and said those things. He again told that person
20 no, that she had not said that, that her property had never been seized by
21 Mr. Davidovic nor by anyone, and that they did not want their name used or
22 spoken of in court proceedings.
23 Your Honour, for many months the Prosecution has heard Defence
24 counsel put down markers for us where it was felt that our conduct or
25 manner of proceeding was improper or out of line. Today I want to put down
1 a marker on behalf of Mr. Davidovic and any future witnesses that
2 allegations of criminal conduct and -- and perjury should not be so
3 vigorously asserted without an objective good-faith basis. We leave it to
4 Your Honours to examine the record and our submissions on this matter. We
5 believe that what appears so far raises sufficient ground for further
7 Now, that may be a matter between the Bench and the Defence team
8 outside our presence, as it may involve attorney-client communications. I
9 would merely ask that if your view -- if your review satisfies you that --
10 that due diligence was not exercised in this manner, and as you yourself,
11 Judge Orie, said at page 15.309, "It would be of concern to the Chamber
12 whenever a witness would be uncomfortable for any reason that should not
13 make him uncomfortable." We believe there was and is cause for concern
14 here, and if you so find, then steps should be taken to prevent similar
15 results in the future.
16 Now, while we cannot undo certain harm that may have been done,
17 an apology to the witness might be appropriate and would go some way, Your
18 Honour, toward helping him explain to his five-year-old grandson why he was
19 being called a criminal.
20 Now, that's all I have to submit on this matter at this time,
21 Your Honour. Thank you for your time.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
23 Ms. Loukas, I can imagine that you would like to take some time
24 before responding, but I also can imagine that, since, I take it, part of
25 the information Mr. Hannis provides to the Chamber is already known to you,
1 that you would respond immediately. I leave it to you.
2 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, firstly, of course, I indicated
3 on the day that Mr. Hannis first raised this, and Your Honour will recall
4 that I -- I made very clear that, Your Honour, I did have a reasonable
5 basis for putting the questions, firstly, and I also made the -- the point,
6 Your Honours, that as an advocate I have a duty to put the questions, and
7 if information is supplied and I don't put the questions, then Mr.
8 Krajisnik has a basis to complain about my conduct. There's a very
9 important balance here to be maintained by an advocate. And I also made
10 the point at the time, Your Honour, that these matters were raised on the
11 27th of June that, it is my obligation to put questions where there is
12 information of this nature, and it's an obligation that an advocate should
13 never shirk from, regardless of how unpopular it might make one, with the
14 Prosecution or the witness or whoever.
15 Now, Your Honour, I take it, as I had a discussion with Mr.
16 Hannis earlier today, as -- as I understood it, my conduct was not under
17 attack. If it is, I would like to know that very specifically, Your
18 Honour, because then I have to take a different course in addressing these
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't have any reason to believe
22 that Ms. Loukas wasn't told that the dentist appeared on television and
23 made that statement, but my concern is about who -- who told her that based
24 on the information that the Krajisnik Defence team was provided in those
25 two phone calls by her husband.
1 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I would like to say something
2 about this. The -- the principles are -- are really very clear. It is
3 counsel's responsibility to make a conscientious professional assessment of
4 the reliability of instructions and information given before putting
5 matters to the witness, and Ms. Loukas has assured the Court that she has
6 done that, Your Honour. And so far as that element of the matter is
7 concerned, then in my submission, that is simply -- and certainly as far as
8 I'm concerned, because this is one of those areas where as lead counsel I
9 am entitled to assert my personal position, as opposed to simply a matter
10 of submission. So that's an end of that particular point. And it appears,
11 in any case, it's an end of that particular point, as far as the
12 Prosecution is concerned because that's what Mr. Hannis has just confirmed.
13 Your Honour, what this cannot become, then, while acknowledging
14 up to a point legitimate concerns by the Prosecution that information which
15 reaches counsel should at all times be conscientiously assessed, what it
16 can't become, then, is some sort of fishing exercise by the Prosecution
17 then to start investigating beyond the specific information -- or the
18 assurance of counsel, to go behind that to then investigate what the
19 sources of information are.
20 If on this occasion - and I say "if" because it's part of the
21 responsibility of counsel not just conscientiously to assess the position
22 in advance but, of course, in the light of any such concerns, as are
23 expressed by the Prosecution here, retrospectively to assess that
24 information, so far as it might cast any light for the future. Not to
25 conduct some ex post facto inquiry into the specific information in
1 relation to this particular matter, but just to absorb any lessons or
2 information and absorb any information that we have as to reliability --
3 reliability or unreliability of sources for future reference. And that's
4 part of the learning process, and that's a matter which counsel would take
5 account of in the future. But it is not the appropriate course, in our
6 submission, to start exploring now, in light of Ms. Loukas's assurance and
7 the Prosecution's acceptance of her professional position to start going
8 into the facts here. We note the concerns. We bear those concerns in mind
9 for the future. We will at all times conscientiously exercise our
10 professional judgement in relation to such matters having regard to all the
11 information at our disposal, and that is what we undertake to the Court to
12 do for the future. But this should not become any sort of mini trial or
13 investigation in relation to these particular matters which were put to the
14 witness. They were put by Ms. Loukas in good faith. We note what's been
15 said. We will continue to do our job conscientiously for the future, and
16 we strongly submit that that is, in relation to this particular matter, an
17 end to it.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Just -- I haven't got the affidavits in front of
19 me. Again, I remember that the telephone calls were made relatively early
20 in the morning of what is the 17th or the 27th of June?
21 MR. HANNIS: The 27th, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: 27th, yes.
23 MR. HANNIS: I have an extra copy, if you want.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And -- well, I think I have it relatively clear on
25 my mind. I remember the second phone call was at 9.15, if I'm ...
1 MR. HANNIS: The first call was about 8.30 or 8.45.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The second one.
3 MR. HANNIS: And the second call half an hour after.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Just after 9.00.
5 And at what time - because I did not check that of course - at
6 what time approximately were the questions put to the witness about seizing
7 all the furnishings and equipment?
8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour --
9 JUDGE ORIE: I don't remember whether it was a morning or an
10 afternoon session.
11 MR. HANNIS: As I recall, the 27th was an afternoon session.
12 JUDGE ORIE: An afternoon session. Yes, that's just what I was
13 trying to reconstruct.
14 The Chamber will consider the matter, Mr. Stewart, but the
15 parties have responsibilities, one to the other: Parties have
16 responsibilities towards witnesses, their own witnesses, witnesses of the
17 other party. The parties have responsibilities towards the Trial Chamber,
18 and the Trial Chamber itself also has responsibilities towards the
19 witnesses, whether Defence or Prosecution witnesses. One of the matters
20 the Chamber will consider whether it needs further attention is whether it
21 needs some further analysis, assuming - and that's perhaps the first thing,
22 then, to be verified - that such telephone calls have taken place in the
23 early morning of the 27th of June. That perhaps needs some verification,
24 as well. And it needs further analysis whether, and if so, Witness
25 Davidovic was treated in an unfair way - that's one - and, second, if he
1 was, what caused this to happen; and, third, what, if the questions are
2 answered in affirmative, what should be done in order to avoid this to
3 happen again. Whether that would be something the Chamber should do,
4 whether it would be something the parties should do, that's all open. But
5 the matter, whether we will give further attention to it, we'll consider
6 that, and we'll let the parties know.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may the -- just two things. A matter
8 of information, Your Honour, so as to avoid any misunderstanding at all.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. STEWART: I do confirm that the telephone call from the
11 mobile telephone number belonging to my case manager, Mr. Karganovic, was a
12 call made by him. And we do not in the least bit shrink from that. We
13 feel -- I feel it is correct that the Trial Chamber should know that
14 absolutely unequivocally.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. STEWART: The second thing I will say is this, Your Honour:
17 And that while maintaining our position, it really ought not -- such
18 matters ought not to be the subject of some retrospective mini trial. Of
19 course, if as a result of discussions between the Prosecution and the
20 Defence in this case -- after all, it might be the other way round on
21 future occasions -- if as a result of discussions between the parties, we
22 on our side in this case were satisfied that although conscientiously put
23 at the time to the witness, in fact, on further examination it is clear
24 that the allegation conscientiously in good faith put to the witness is, in
25 fact, not correct.
1 Your Honour, we would simply withdraw it, and we would publicly
2 withdraw it. That would be the proper course to take. However, we suggest
3 that one should be careful not to open the matter up so that allegations
4 put to witnesses in good faith then became even remotely routinely the
5 matter of some -- some further inquiry. Because there is a point, where we
6 all, I hope, show proper concern for witnesses -- there is a point at which
7 such matters -- I'm not saying anything about all the allegations here --
8 are, with respect, part of the rough and tumble of coming to give evidence
9 in court.
10 But, Your Honour, certainly in relation to anything of any
11 significance at all where we are satisfied that though put in good faith it
12 did not, in fact, well-founded, Your Honour, that we would, of course,
13 unequivocally withdraw it.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
15 MS. LOUKAS: And I, of course, place it on the record, Your
16 Honour, precisely in those terms as expressed by lead counsel.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber will consider the matter to see
18 whether, and if so, what further activities should be deployed by the
20 Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: Nothing further from me, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing further for you.
23 MR. HANNIS: May I be excused?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
25 MR. STEWART: I should say thank you, Mr. Hannis. There was that
1 misunderstanding as to whether it was at the beginning or end of the day.
2 It's most helpful to me that he's agreed to come down and deal with it now,
3 Your Honour. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. He's living closer by.
5 MR. STEWART: Well, that's true. But nevertheless, it's still
6 appreciated. Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
8 Mr. Stewart.
9 MR. STEWART: Since I am here, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. STEWART: The -- no, very briefly, Your Honour, on a
12 entirely different but nevertheless important issue, I -- this is not, now,
13 to be some elaborate lengthy submission, Your Honour, but just to make the
14 position clear, in a nutshell, I said that I would consider and discuss
15 over the weekend the position generally that we are in particularly
16 relating to Mr. Krajisnik's announcement some weeks ago now that he wished
17 to represent himself and the consequential negotiations which have been
18 going on in some sorts of directions since.
19 Your Honour, the position, as we can assess it on the Defence
20 side, is this: On one particular issue, negotiations between Mr. Krajisnik
21 and the Registry do appear to have reached an impasse. I have been to see
22 Mr. Krajisnik again this morning. That is frankly my assessment. We have
23 explored that; that does appear to be everybody's assessment among those
25 Your Honour, I have in a sense, although it's unhappy to express
1 it in exactly those terms -- I do in a sense have my -- or Mr. Krajisnik
2 and I have our own negotiations. There is, of course, always an area in
3 which there's something along the lines of negotiation between client and
4 counsel on any difficult case, as I'm sure everybody would agree this one
6 On one point in particular - it may be two points. It doesn't
7 matter how one analyses it - but on one particular important point, Mr.
8 Krajisnik and I are also at an impasse. There is perhaps another point
9 where we've been at an impasse for so long that we've probably each of us
10 seized to notice it's an impasse any more, but it nevertheless is.
11 But, Your Honour, one of the matters which I have explored with
12 Mr. Krajisnik is what appears to be in some sense the logical consequence
13 or at least something closely connected logically with the Trial Chamber's
14 decision so far to allow Mr. Krajisnik to cross-examine witnesses in
15 addition to cross-examination conducted by counsel.
16 Now, not surprisingly, Mr. Krajisnik infers that the Trial
17 Chamber's position in relation to cross-examination of witnesses would
18 apply equally to examination of Defence witnesses, so that he would have
19 the right to supplement examination of Defence witnesses when counsel has
20 finished that examination.
21 But further connected with that and logically as part of the
22 same principle, the question which has been discussed between Mr. Krajisnik
23 and me - and we would at least suggest it's an intelligent question for us
24 to have discussed - is, who has the right to decide which witnesses to call
25 in the first place? Because if you don't call a witness, you can't
1 question the witness, and logically those two matters are very difficult to
2 distinguish in principle. And since the Trial Chamber's decision has
3 created and continues to create enormous difficulties between Mr. Krajisnik
4 and me in relation -- or between counsel and Mr. Krajisnik, but I must say
5 I do feel slightly at the sharp end as far as counsel is concerned on -- on
6 this issue. I don't mind. I work at the sharp end as lead counsel. But
7 we -- we have reached or failed to reach, if you like -- we have come to
8 enormous difficulties between the two of us in relation to that matter. We
9 correspondingly are now facing enormous difficulties in resolving that
10 issue. And I simply today put on the table, as one among a number of
11 matters which are still going to require careful and thorough and mature
12 exploration and consideration, what are the implications of the position
13 adopted at the moment if I and -- sorry, whatever co-counsel is with me
14 continue as assigned counsel for Mr. Krajisnik? What are the implications
15 for our conduct of the case, which is what we are supposed to have, in
16 relation to such matters as who decides which witnesses to call, who
17 decides which witnesses not to call, who decides which documents to put
18 before the Trial Chamber, who decides which documents not to put before the
19 Trial Chamber.
20 As I put the questions, Your Honours, I hope it can be seen that
21 the answers are not absolutely straightforward, and the practical
22 implications are extremely difficult. Your Honour, as a practical matter
23 right now it leads to this: It's a scheduling matter, as well, Your
24 Honour. We have Mr. Brown coming to give evidence now. And on the
25 projected time estimate from Mr. Harmon and on our assessment of time, Mr.
1 Brown is, for practical purposes, going to take up today, Tuesday, and
2 Wednesday. It looks as if his evidence is going to fit those days allowed.
3 It's not going to leave anything to spare. On the other hand, the earnest
4 hope all around is that he will be finished by close of play on Wednesday
5 because Thursday and Friday are virtually sacrosanct non-sitting for the
6 reasons the Trial Chamber has indicated, and then we have witnesses that I
7 won't name because, again, I can never remember exactly which of them are
8 protected and which aren't. But we have witnesses coming along then
9 Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, spilling quite possibly into Thursday, and then
10 another witness on Friday when the whole Prosecution case is supposed to
11 finish and, indeed, the recess starts.
12 So, Your Honour, I simply raise the practical question, since
13 it's clear that if we don't achieve the unexpected breakthrough of all
14 these negotiations falling into place and everything being resolved, which
15 I have to conscientiously inform the Trial Chamber seems a remote
16 possibility at the moment, then some substantial time is going to be
17 required to resolve these issues because, again, I'm quite confident that
18 the Trial Chamber, as everybody else, feels that everybody has to know
19 where they are, at least some useful time before we all break up on the
20 22nd of -- of July to do whatever we have to do next. If we're lucky
21 enough to go on holiday, we're lucky enough, and if we're unlucky, we
22 don't. But whatever happens, we're not sitting after that date.
23 So, Your Honour, that's the practical position, and I think I've
24 felt it was only fair to give the Trial Chamber that indication of where
25 the Defence sees that we are now.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll again carefully read your words, Mr.
2 Stewart, and we'll consider the present situation and see whether, apart
3 from being informed, the Chamber will respond to those observations or just
4 -- we'll wait and see how matters develop.
5 Meanwhile, just for the completeness of the transcript, Mr.
6 Krajisnik, you have sent a letter to the Judges in which you explain more
7 or less how you evaluate the talks you had with the representative of the
8 Registry. It took us some time to have this letter translated. Are there
9 any changes since you wrote us that letter?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I had a talk with the
11 Chamber -- or rather, with the Registry, and I think that we have exhausted
12 all the possibilities. These talks have thus been brought to a conclusion.
13 What Mr. Stewart has said are talks between the two of us, and
14 new problems keep arising. I thought that we could bring this to an end
15 and simply have done with all the problems. It's not that I don't feel
16 that Mr. Stewart is right, but I feel that a client and his counsel have to
17 cooperate closely. I don't think that I have to direct Mr. Stewart's
18 actions, but I do feel I have to be an active participant and not just an
19 observer. That's what I spoke about with Mr. Stewart this morning.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I was mainly asking whether any new developments in
21 your conversations with the Registry took place, but I do understand that
22 you have not reached a final agreement with the Registry, so therefore the
23 situation is not anything different from what you wrote to us.
24 Thank you very much, Mr. Krajisnik.
25 Mr. Harmon, are you ready to ...
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, sorry, could I just say one more
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. STEWART: It's just a small -- well, it's not a small thing,
5 Your Honour. We have Miss Tara Powers as a member of the Defence team in
6 court. It's the first time she's been in court on this case, so I wanted
7 to introduce her to the Trial Chamber and to the Prosecution. She's
8 actually -- unhappily, as often happens, she's leaving us very soon, which
9 we regret. We've been unable to persuade to her say. But she's here
10 today, anyway.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Powers, welcome in court. I think no one has
12 ever been introduced, first of all, with the words "it's not a small
13 thing." But welcome, and I hope your contribution to the Defence will be a
14 fruitful one.
15 Mr. Harmon.
16 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, our next witness will be Mr. Ewan
17 Brown, who will testify as an expert in respect of military matters
18 relating to the 1 Krajina Corps. For your information, Your Honour, I have
19 distributed four binders to the Chamber with exhibits that will be referred
20 to by Mr. Brown. I would ask the Court's permission to permit Mr. Brown to
21 keep at his side portions of the exhibits that are contained in the binders
22 that I have submitted to you, specifically his own expert report, the
23 errata sheet, the report on the army, and the transcript from the 16th
24 Session. Those are long items, lengthy items in the report, and Mr. Brown
25 has made some marks on them to indicate and quickly find passages that he
1 would like to refer to. And if the Court has -- and the counsel has no
2 objection, then I would ask that those be permitted -- Mr. Brown be
3 permitted to keep those by his side, rather than have wholly blank
4 documents -- wholly unmarked documents in front of him.
5 JUDGE ORIE: If the Defence has no objections, the Chamber has
6 no objections either.
7 MS. LOUKAS: I can indicate, Your Honour, I have no objections,
8 firstly. I would also raise two other matters, if I may, at this juncture,
9 and that is: Firstly, I'm in receipt of the errata sheet. That was, in
10 fact, only e-mailed yesterday afternoon, on Sunday, and, of course, it's a
11 report that is about to celebrate its third anniversary. So I think it's -
12 - I must place on the record that it's most unfortunate that this errata
13 sheet -- and the -- was delivered to the Defence at such a -- a late stage,
15 I've had discussions with Mr. Harmon about it, and a significant
16 proportion appear to be in the nature of typos and what have you. But a
17 number of the entries actually arise from the cross-examination of Mr.
18 Brown in the trial of Mr. Brdjanin, and they're significant matters. And
19 in those circumstances, it's -- it's surprising that it took so long to
20 correct the report.
21 That's the first matter.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MS. LOUKAS: Secondly, Your Honour, I can indicate that the
24 Defence have -- have a military expert that we would be wishing to have
25 present in court during the evidence in chief and cross-examination. I can
1 indicate that a similar application was made in respect of a Defence
2 military expert in the Brdjanin trial that was accepted, and there's quite
3 clearly a precedent for it.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 MS. LOUKAS: And I make that application, Your Honour. I place
6 that on the record, as well.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 No objection, Mr. Harmon?
9 MR. HARMON: No objection, Your Honour, as long as the expert
10 will be identified for the record.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Loukas, the request is granted.
12 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I can indicate that
13 it is a Mr. Mirko Trivic, spelled T-r-i-v-i-c. He's a retired army
14 officer, and his rank is colonel.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Loukas.
16 MR. HARMON: Just for the record, can we have the corps; did he
17 serve with the Drina Corps?
18 MS. LOUKAS: I actually don't have the specific corps noted
20 MR. HARMON: It would be helpful if we could have that
21 information, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that your concern might be, Mr.
23 Harmon, that experts who were perhaps involved in whatever activity that
24 would be covered by the indictment would not be applauded by the
1 MR. HARMON: Or other indictments, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Or other indictments.
3 At the same time, Mr. Harmon, it might not, looking at the
4 number of indictments related to all parties, it might not be easy to find
5 a military expert who is totally out of that, but let's first see what the
6 facts are.
7 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I can indicate he gave evidence to the
8 Prosecution in Brdjanin.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, then, that in the testimony in the
10 Brdjanin case he said something about his career. Is that ...?
11 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Loukas --
13 MS. LOUKAS: And I also indicate, Your Honour, of course, that
14 the -- and I will place this on the record, as well: The Defence has
15 again, as has been the case throughout the conduct of this case, had not
16 nearly enough time to prepare appropriately for a witness of this
17 significance. We have at the last moment been able to find a Defence
18 expert. He flew in on Saturday; I spent all day Sunday with him.
19 Your Honour, I -- I can indicate that there's a real question as
20 to whether we will, in fact, be in a position to commence the cross-
21 examination straight after the end of the evidence in chief. Yet again, as
22 we have been throughout, in terms of the inadequate time we have been given
23 as the Defence in preparation of this case, had to do too much with too
24 little for too long, and that, yet again --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MS. LOUKAS: -- is the case in relation to a witness of this
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's on the record, Ms. Loukas.
4 MS. LOUKAS: Sorry, Your Honour. I shouldn't have said
5 Brdjanin. It was Blagojevic.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Blagojevic.
7 I take it that you don't have that information by heart.
8 Otherwise, I think you would tell Mr. Harmon, wouldn't you?
9 MS. LOUKAS: Oh, indeed, Your Honour. He gave evidence for the
10 Prosecution in the case of Mr. Blagojevic and Mr. Jokic, and -- and there
11 it is.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Do you happen to remember what he said about where
13 he was active in the period 1992 up until --
14 MS. LOUKAS: I -- I understand, Your Honour, that it may, in
15 fact, have been the Drina Corps.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I just need to confirm that
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand.
20 Mr. Harmon, let's -- at this moment, I take it that you would
21 like further to inquire into the matter before you further respond to the
22 question. We have at this moment a very practical matter, that is, whether
23 we allow him to sit next to the Defence and hear it from this side of the
24 glass wall or whether we'd -- we would not allow him to do that when I
25 expect him to hear everything from the other side of the glass wall.
1 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, it would be inappropriate to bring him
2 in at this point in any event because I raised with the court officer
3 certain sensitivities in which I will be required to go into private
4 session briefly during the examination of Mr. Brown in respect of his
5 background. So I -- it would be inappropriate to have the witness in the
6 courtroom during that particular portion.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And apart from the private session, you take no
8 strict position?
9 MR. HARMON: At this point I take no strict position. I'm
10 making an inquiry at this very moment --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. HARMON: -- to find out about Mr. Mirko Trivic.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's, then, part of the -- Ms. Loukas, part
14 of the testimony which would be given in private session Mr. Harmon objects
15 against your expert being present during that.
16 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, Your Honour. In fact, Mr. Harmon raised this
17 issue just prior to our coming into court today, and it's just a question
18 of a portion of the curriculum vitae. It's ...
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Are we going to start with that, Mr. Harmon?
20 MR. HARMON: We are, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then I suggest that the witness will be
22 called, that he'll give his solemn declaration, that we start with the
23 testimony in private session, and that on from that moment, Ms. Loukas,
24 that your expert, with all reservations Mr. Harmon has made as to whether
25 he will object or not, will be -- can sit next to you at the Defence bench
1 for the time being.
2 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we can start in public session, and
5 then we'll go into private session.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course. I mean, the testimony, and then,
7 of course, the solemn declaration should first of all be given in public
9 Mr. Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Brown.
13 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Before you give evidence in this court, the Rules
15 of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that
16 you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The
17 text is now handed out to you by the usher. May I invite you to make that
18 solemn declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I solemnly declare that I
20 will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much.
22 Please be seated. You'll first be examined by Mr. Harmon,
23 counsel for the Prosecution.
24 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
1 Examined by Mr. Harmon:
2 Q. Mr. Brown, good afternoon.
3 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Harmon.
4 Q. Mr. Brown, since we speak the same language, I'm going to ask you
5 to pause between question and answer because of the difficulties the
6 language booth has in interpreting as quickly as we speak. So if you would
7 remember to pause between question and answer, it would be appreciated.
8 Also, Mr. Brown, I've informed the Court that you have in front
9 of you your report, the errata sheet, the army analysis, and the transcript
10 of the 16th Session where you have marked certain portions you may wish to
11 refer to. And let me inform you there's no objection to your having those
12 before you.
13 Mr. Brown, let me -- let me now begin, and I'd like you to
14 affirm the following. First of all, could you state your complete name and
15 spell your last name for the record.
16 A. My name is Ewan McGreggor Brown, that's B-r-o-w-n.
17 Q. Mr. Brown, were you born on the 15th of May, 1964? Are you a
18 British citizen? Are you currently employed as an investigator at the
19 International Criminal Court in The Hague, and have you been so employed
20 since 2005? Do you hold a bachelors degree in history from the University
21 of East Anglia, a masters degree from criminology from the University of
22 Leicester, and did you attend the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst,
23 where thereafter you were commissioned as an officer in the British army?
24 A. That's correct, yes.
25 MR. HARMON: Now, Your Honour, if we can go briefly into private
2 JUDGE ORIE: We'll turn into private session.
3 [Private session]
22 [Open session]
23 JUDGE ORIE: And, Ms. Loukas, this is the moment that your --
24 the expert you're consulting at this moment - let's put it that way - could
25 sit next to you, if you want.
1 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I'll just see that
2 procedures can be put into place in that regard.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. Mr. Brown, now, you were a military analyst in the Office of the
6 Prosecutor from 1998 to 2004; is that correct?
7 A. Yes, that is correct.
8 Q. Could you explain to the Trial Chamber the role of a military
9 analyst in the Office of the Prosecutor, what functions you performed.
10 A. There is a small, dedicated team within the Office of the
11 Prosecutor formed predominantly from ex-military officers and military
12 personnel; invariably, ex-intelligence officers are people who work in
13 military analysis. It is their job to provide analytical support to the
14 investigative teams or to the senior trial attorneys. That work invariably
15 means assisting in interpreting material, reviewing documentation, military
16 documentation, and generally giving advice in relation to military issues,
17 should they require it.
18 Q. And in the course of performing your duties in the Office of the
19 Prosecutor, did you work with materials from the JNA and from the Bosnian
20 Serb Army, the VRS?
21 A. Yes, I did.
22 Q. And did you work with those materials over the course of six
24 A. Yes, I did, amongst other things, but yes.
25 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, if I could tender Mr. Brown's resume,
1 which is found in tab 1 of the first binder that you have.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that you want to tender that under seal,
3 Mr. Harmon?
4 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And let's just see. When we go to numbering, I ...
6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, we used to give one number to the whole
8 bunch of it and then say exhibit so-and-so, tab so-and-so. But we could
9 perhaps start with the resume and give that a number under seal, then give
10 the report one number and all the tabs a similar number, but then with the
11 addition tab so-and-so.
12 MR. HARMON: That's fine.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, that would be ...?
14 THE REGISTRAR: The curriculum vitae will be Prosecution Exhibit
15 P890, under seal.
16 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
17 Q. Mr. Brown, you prepared a -- an expert report entitled "Military
18 developments in the Bosanska Krajina 1992." It is dated the 21st of July,
19 2002. Who asked you to prepare that report?
20 A. Ms. Jo Korner, who was a senior trial attorney working in the
21 Office of the Prosecutor at the time, asked me to compile the report.
22 Q. What directions were you given in respect of preparing this
24 A. Ms. Korner gave me something of -- some relatively general
25 guidance that she wanted a report produced based on -- predominantly based
1 on documentation about the military activities in the Krajina, but it was
2 very relatively general and was not necessarily detailed or specific. But
3 she wanted a report compiled based on material that we had, reviewing that
4 material on military activities and developments in the Krajina in 1992.
5 Q. And did you mainly use documentary material in preparing this
7 A. Yes. I think I -- apart from some videos, I think it's
8 exclusively documentation.
9 Q. Can you describe to the Trial Chamber what types of documents you
11 A. I prodominantly used military documentation. A large section of
12 that had been obtained as a result of search -- search and seizure tasks
13 that the Office of the Prosecutor had conducted. Most of the documents or
14 a significant percentage of the documents are military documents. I also
15 utilised some police documents. Again, many of these had been taken as a
16 result of search operations. I utilised some political documents, which I
17 predominantly utilised if they related to Defence or military issues. I
18 also used a small number, I think, of open-source documents, media articles
19 and the likes, and some videos.
20 Q. You say certain documents were the result of searches and
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. When you say that you utilised documents that had been seized by
25 the Office of the Prosecutor pursuant to searches, did that include the
1 documentation from the 1st Krajina Corps?
2 A. Yes. There was a search and seizure operation which had happened
3 actually before I had arrived to the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps, and
4 a significant section of that archive was -- was taken back here.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, in preparing this report, who selected the documents
6 that formed the basis of this report?
7 A. I did.
8 Q. Approximately how many documents did you use in the preparation
9 of this report?
10 A. I'm not actually sure of the exact number, but I know -- I think
11 there was around 900 footnotes. Not the footnotes -- not every footnote
12 relates to an individual document. There's multiple references. I think
13 there's probably around about 600 or so individual documents, maybe a
14 little less, but around that number, I think.
15 Q. What was your objective in preparing this report?
16 A. Well, my objective was to -- to look at the documentation and
17 where I could, give an analysis of, as the title suggests, military
18 developments in Bosanska Krajina in 1992 as best as I could.
19 Q. There is an index in this report. In respect of that index, can
20 you tell us whose decision it was to organise this report in this manner?
21 A. It was mine and mine alone.
22 Q. Now, what limitations, if any, does this report have, in your
24 A. Yes. There are limitations to this report, and I think I even
25 stressed some of those in the introduction. There's a limitation in
1 relation to time. It only deals predominantly with 1992; it does refer a
2 little bit to 1991. Some documents, I believe, also reference 1993, but
3 it's predominantly about 1992. So there's a limitation in relation to
5 It's limited in relation to the source of the material. It's --
6 it's documentary based. It's not relating to witness testimony or any
7 sources of information. So that is a limitation to some degree.
8 It's limited, of course, in relation to my ability to search and
9 -- and conduct analysis on -- on many, many documents that we do have in
10 the Office of the Prosecutor. I couldn't clearly footnote every single
11 issue. I couldn't put in every reference necessarily that -- of
12 documentation there. But there is a natural limitation in that respect.
13 And these -- these, I think, are some of the references -- some of the
14 limitations that I do have. And it does deal -- maybe another one is that
15 it does deal to some extent very heavily with military issues. It's not
16 about predominantly a lot of other -- the other issues that were on there
17 at the time. So these are some of the limitations to -- of the report.
18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, does Your Honour wish that at the end
19 of the examination that I tender the binders in toto, or as we go through
20 the documents?
21 JUDGE ORIE: I just had a brief discussion with Madam Registrar.
22 We would like you to tender the documents. It gets -- I did say otherwise,
23 but will get a separate number. And then a number will be assigned to -- a
24 general number will be assigned to all the exhibits attached to the report.
25 So I'd like you to tender the report, first of all, and then we'll see what
1 documents you will use -- what documents you will present to the witness.
2 And, of course, the Chamber, it would not surprise you, has similar
3 concerns, as expressed before, with large numbers of documents.
4 MR. HARMON: Well, then I would tender the report of Mr. Brown
5 at this time.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, that would be what number?
7 THE REGISTRAR: The report will be Prosecution Exhibit P891, and
8 the errata sheet, P891A.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. And could we already
10 assign a general number for the related exhibits.
11 THE REGISTRAR: The general number for the related exhibits will
12 be Prosecution Exhibit P892.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
14 MR. HARMON: Now, Your Honour, what I would like to do before I
15 get into the examination of Mr. Brown on the binders, I would be surprised
16 if Your Honours recall, but on the 13th of February, 2004 there was an
17 issue that was raised in respect of the testimony of Mr. Keronjic
18 specifically, in aren't of a diary of Petar Jankovic, and there was an
19 inquiry as to who Nikola Dencic was. And there is a reference in the diary
20 -- Your Honour asked -- Your Honour Judge Orie asked the question about who
21 was the godfather, and I undertook to come back to you at some point in
22 time with the answer, and Mr. Brown is now in a position --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. HARMON: -- to give you that answer. Again, I refer to the
25 transcript of the 13th of February, 2004.
1 Q. And, Mr. Brown, without belabouring the point, can you identify
2 Nikola Dencic and what his role was in the JNA and later in the VRS.
3 A. Yes. I -- I believe that Nikola Dencic was a JNA officer serving
4 in the JNA 17th Corps - the JNA 17th Corps was based in Tuzla - and he was
5 a staff officer working that -- in that corps. He later became, I believe
6 for a very short space of time, the first commander of the VRS East Bosnia
7 Corps, which was headquartered in Bijeljina. I don't believe he stayed in
8 that position for too long, but he was a JNA officer, and he was in the VRS
9 for a short space of time.
10 Q. Now we'll move to the testimony. And, Mr. Brown, in your expert
11 report between pages 12 and 20 there is -- you referred to the JNA, and I'd
12 like to have you address certain aspects in respect of the JNA. Are you
13 familiar, Mr. Brown, with a concept of the All People's Army?
14 A. All People's Defence?
15 Q. All People's Defence, yes.
16 A. Yes, I am.
17 Q. Can you explain to the Court briefly what that concept was.
18 A. Well, briefly, All People's Defence was a means by which
19 Yugoslavia could mobilise many aspects in the defence of the state, and the
20 JNA was a significant component of that. And the JNA was a multi- -- made
21 to be a multi- ethnic, multinational federal body engaged in the defence of
22 the Yugoslav territory. And All People's Defence was a doctrine in which
23 state and its components would be mobilised in a time of crisis in order to
24 defend the state.
25 Q. Now, I want to focus your attention, Mr. Brown, on how the JNA
1 evolved from being a -- an army that was multi-effect and defended the
2 different ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia to becoming one that
3 defended exclusively the Serb interest.
4 And if I can direct your attention first to paragraph 1.3 of
5 your report in which you say, and I quote, "In relation to the first aspect
6 in particular, elements within the JNA were already aware of the problems
7 of ethnic and party divisions in early 1992, and some evidence indicated
8 that the JNA believed that all national parties and groups were
9 contributing to the volatility."
10 Why did that concern the JNA?
11 A. Well, I -- first of all, there was the war in Croatia, which had
12 -- there had been a negotiation by the end of 1991, but that clearly had a
13 significant impact on -- on them. They were engaged there, and clearly
14 ethnic tensions and ethnic divisions there had caused significant problems.
15 But maybe more widely, I think, because ethnic divisions threatened
16 Yugoslavia and the JNA, being a Yugoslavian or federal institution,
17 probably realised that this was a -- was a threat to -- to Yugoslavia and a
18 threat to them.
19 Q. What -- in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, what policies did
20 the JNA adopt as time evolved?
21 A. I think I've articulated it in the report as something of a twin-
22 track policy. I think in the early part of 1992, as forces were being
23 withdrawn from Croatia into Bosnia, the JNA did have some references and --
24 and there were documentary evidence -- or there is documentary evidence
25 that they tried to reduce ethnic tensions in a way, presumably to try and
1 keep what was -- as much of Yugoslavia together as possible. But it's
2 clear, also, that documentary evidence, especially by the spring of 1992,
3 would seem to indicate that they themselves were aligning themselves with
4 the SDS or the Bosnian Serbs, and that there is evidence that -- that they
5 were converging and that there is also evidence that weapons were being
6 distributed from the JNA to the Bosnian Serbs. So I think there is
7 evidence of -- of a twin track of initially trying to diffuse ethnic
8 tensions because they realised the ethnic tensions were likely to endanger
9 what was left of Yugoslavia, but as the situation deteriorated, they
10 aligned themselves very much with the Bosnian Serbs.
11 Q. Now, I would like to turn to tab 4 in the binders.
12 MR. HARMON: I don't know if the witness has a copy of the
13 binders in front of him, but if he could be provided with one. I'd like
14 the first binder.
15 Q. Mr. Brown, if you could turn to tab 4.
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. HARMON: Now, Your Honour, this has a previous exhibit
18 number, and I'm prepared to read off the previous exhibit numbers, if Your
19 Honour would like, in respect of each exhibit where there is an exhibit
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you present it to the witness and just
22 mention the number. That would, for those who have to read the transcript
23 at a later stage, be very convenient.
24 MR. HARMON: This is Exhibit P51 and P51.1.
25 Q. Mr. Brown, if I can direct your attention to the exhibit in tab
1 4. This is a document classified as a military secret, and it is the
2 conclusions based on an assessment of the situation in the territory of
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, area of responsibility of the 2nd Military
4 District. This document is dated March of 1992, and at the end of the
5 document, it bears the signature of Milutin Kukanjac, Commander General.
6 Can you, first of all, identify who General Kukanjac and what
7 role he had in the 2nd Military District.
8 A. General Kukanjac was the commander of the 2nd Military District.
9 The 2nd Military District covered, to all intents and purposes, Bosnia-
10 Herzegovina. It covered a little bit of Croatia, as well, but to all
11 intents and purposes, it covered Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was the
13 Q. Now, have you had an opportunity to review -- you've reviewed
14 this document. I know that. So let me ask you: In respect of this
15 document, does this document, Mr. Brown, reflect a change in the attitude
16 of the JNA from being neutral to being one that reflects a pro-Serb stance?
17 A. Yes. I think there are a number of areas in this document that
18 would seem to highlight that. If I take you to page 3, where they discuss
19 the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular page 3 on where --
20 where it's highlighted "4" halfway down the page.
21 Q. Mr. Brown, before we get to point 4, can I direct your attention
22 to point 2 of that document, where it says, "The Serbian people has opted
23 for Yugoslavia." And in point 1 and point 3, it also discusses the
24 positions, the respective positions of the SDA and the HDZ, the two
25 political parties of the non-Serbs, and it indicates that the Serb party
1 had opted for Yugoslavia. What's the significance of that in this
3 A. I think this is another example of where I see this convergence,
4 that clearly the JNA would have opted for Yugoslavia also and that the
5 Serbian people have opted for Yugoslavia, and so there is this convergence.
6 Q. Now, if you could give us your comments on point 4, please, Mr.
8 A. Point 4 discusses a meeting that clearly had happened with Jose
9 Cutilheiro, where he seemed to want to hear, according to this document at
10 least, the truest possible version, presumably the truest possible version
11 of what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And Kukanjac writes here,
12 "The minister was briefed in great detail about the background to the
13 events, the real goals of the leaders of the nationalist parties and the
14 direction where this was heading. The position taken by the Serbian people
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reasons why it is justified were particularly
17 Again, this would seem to indicate this convergence by this
19 Q. Can we turn to the next page in the document, on page 4. It's
20 subpart C. And I would like to direct your attention to a sentence that
21 appears in the middle of that paragraph. It says, "This is quite normal
22 because the Serbian people is in all fairness under threat here yet again,
23 and accordingly we are protecting the interests of the people."
24 When the reference is "the Serbian people are under threat yet
25 again," do you know what that refers to?
1 A. It's not exactly clear whether he meant over a protracted period
2 of time or whether he was referring, say, to Croatia, as what had happened
3 in late 1991. But it's clear that, again, I would argue that this is a
4 statement that would seem to align certainly Kukanjac and the 2nd Military
5 District and the JNA with -- with the Serbs. And in this case, he makes
6 mention of the SDS leadership.
7 Q. Could you go -- let me pause.
8 Mr. Brown, could you go to the end of paragraph C.
9 A. Yes. He appears to highlight in the middle of the section that
10 there are some occurrences, and he lists them: "Criticisms of the army.
11 Emergence of Chetnik ideology. Warnings to leave them alone" - that's
12 presumably the army to leave them alone - "The assessment of some of their
13 officers." And in this regard, the commander of the 2nd Military District
14 will soon be talking to leaders of the Serbian people: Karadzic, Koljevic,
15 Plavsic, Krajisnik, and Djukic."
16 Q. What do you make from the fact that there's no reference to the
17 leaders of the HDZ talking to Kukanjac or the SDA talking to Kukanjac?
18 A. Well, he seems to be doing something in order to sort out what he
19 sees as a potential problem in that he's going to meet these leaders, and
20 he would seem to know who these leaders are. And he doesn't seem to be
21 making much of a reference in the other two preceding paragraphs, A or B,
22 necessarily that -- to dealing with them in the same way.
23 Q. Let me direct your -- let me direct your attention to paragraph
24 5. In paragraph 5 in the last sentence above subpart D, there's -- strike
1 Paragraph 5 deals with volunteer units in the 2nd Military
2 District zone. What is that referring to, Mr. Brown?
3 A. Part 5, as you say, deals with volunteers, and I think if you
4 read the section in its entirety, which goes on to the following page, page
5 5, and highlights -- where it says "some experiences," it would appear to
6 me reading that that the volunteers are those who are not JNA members, who
7 have been mobilised into the JNA, but who put themselves or volunteered
8 themselves in the district, in the -- in the districts and in the corps of
9 the district. And I think if you read the second page, or page 5, it would
10 appear that many if not most of these volunteers are Serbian volunteers.
11 And importantly in -- maybe in part F, they -- well, they talk about the
12 number of volunteers that are there. They then talk about the weapons that
13 have been distributed to these volunteers. And the JNA have given some,
14 and the SDS have given some. And I think the figure is 51.900 distributed
15 by the JNA, 17.298 by the SDS.
16 And then he -- he notes some experiences about these volunteers,
17 in that many of them don't, I think, want to leave their municipalities.
18 He talks about SDS leaders seeking weapons from the JNA and some other
19 problems in that area.
20 So I think the issue of volunteers are predominantly about
21 Serbian volunteers who are working in the -- in the whole of the district.
22 Q. So, Mr. Brown, what is your final conclusion in respect of this
23 document? What does it reflect?
24 A. I think it reflects, as I say in the report, by this date - and I
25 think the date may be around about the 19th of March, even though it says
1 "March" at the beginning - that there was this convergence and that the JNA
2 in Bosnia and the 2nd Military District were working with the Bosnian
3 Serbs, the Bosnian Serb leadership, and that they were providing weapons,
4 and that there was this convergence by this time.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, if I can direct you to paragraph 1.12 in your report;
6 that is found on page 15. In your report, you say - I quote - "By late
7 April 1992, the JNA were in a position exclusively assisting the Bosnian
8 Serbs and the SDS and any attempt at balance, if it had genuinely existed,
9 had gone."
10 Now, in April -- strike that.
11 We see the reference earlier to the arming of volunteers, but by
12 April were JNA forces, in fact, involved in combat operations supporting
13 the Bosnian Serbs?
14 A. I am aware of some instances where that happened, yes.
15 Q. Where?
16 A. I was aware or am aware of the JNA assisting in Bosanska Krupa.
17 I am aware that in Zvornik in early April 1992 there were -- there was JNA
18 support from the 17th Corps, and I think I've made some references to that
19 in the report.
20 Q. Mr. Brown, we're going to be talking at length today and in the
21 ensuing days about the 1st Krajina Corps, so I'd like to orient the Judges,
22 if I could, to the geographic area.
23 MR. HARMON: And I see that --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, what about doing that after the break?
25 MR. HARMON: I'm happy to do that, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break until quarter past 4.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 4.22 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.
5 MR. HARMON: Yes. Your Honour. Given the paucity of time and
6 the number of exhibits I have to go through, I'm going to give you a very
7 quick orientation of the are of the 1 KK, Your Honour.
8 If we could turn to tab 5 of a -- of the binder.
9 Q. Mr. Brown, if you could do the same.
10 Mr. Brown, briefly, what does this map depict?
11 A. [Microphone not activated]
12 MR. HARMON: I need you to turn your microphones on, Mr. Brown.
13 There we are.
14 A. This is a map that came from the 1st Krajina Corps archive. And
15 although it's undated, it probably comes from late 1992, and -- or shows,
16 depicts, the zone of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps in its
17 entirety. I know that it came probably from at least -- well, further on
18 than October 1992 because the area of Jajce is under 1st Krajina Corps
19 control, and that didn't happen until around about that time. Also the
20 corridor was expanded slightly. So I'd assess that this map was from at
21 least 1992. And it covers the zone of the corps and the sub-formations
22 within the corps.
23 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, if Your Honours refer to your
24 own map 527 on page 2 and Mr. Brown's report, footnotes 137 and 138.
25 Q. Mr. Brown, you can confirm -- would you confirm for me that the
1 municipalities that are wholly within the 1 KK area of responsibility on
2 the 4th of June included Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiska, Srbac,
3 Prijedor, Banja Luka, Laktasi, Prnjavor, Celinac, and Kotor Varos, and the
4 municipalities that fell partially within the area of responsibility of the
5 corps were Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Mrkonjic Grad, Sipovo, Jajce,
6 Skender Vakuf, Travnik, Teslic, Doboj, Derventa, and Bosanski Brod?
7 A. Yes, that's based on documentation that came from the Main Staff.
8 Q. All right. Now, if we could turn to the next exhibit, which is
9 tab 6. And I'm sorry to rush through the orientation so quickly, Your
10 Honours, but I've directed Your Honours to the appropriate municipalities
11 and footnote in Mr. Brown's report.
12 What I'd like to look at -- what I'd like to look at, Mr. Brown,
13 is -- it is a separate binder, a small binder, and it is the analysis of
14 combat readiness and activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in
15 1992. This is a military secret, strictly confidential. It is dated on --
16 in April of 1993.
17 Mr. Brown, is this an important military document, in your
19 A. Yes, I'd assess that it is an important military document.
20 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what this document is and how it
21 came to be created.
22 A. Your Honours, this is another document that came from the archive
23 of the 1st Krajina Corps. It's a document that's military secret, strictly
24 confidential, which I believe is the highest classification of military
25 documents in the VRS, and it's an analysis of combat -- or it's entitled
1 "Analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the Army of the
2 Republika Srpska in 1992."
3 This document is -- appears to me both a reflection back on the
4 activities of the army in 1992, an analysis of the current state of the
5 army, as the document is dated in April 1993, and also highlights the areas
6 that they need to improve in the -- in the coming period, as well as
7 indicating some of the tasks that they are to -- to conduct in the -- in
8 the coming period. So it's both a reflection on the state of the army, a
9 reflection of what the army had achieved in 1992, and also a means by which
10 they could address any weaknesses or problems and -- and also highlight the
11 tasks that were to come.
12 This type of document, I had seen one previously which was a JNA
13 document in 1991, reflecting -- sorry, early 1992 reflecting back on 1991.
14 So I can only assume that they kept up with this type of analysis, that it
15 had been a JNA procedure to look back and to conduct some kind of analysis
16 of how they were, and I believe the VRS continued with this in 1992.
17 The document is very lengthy, and it's probably one of the most
18 lengthy documents I think I saw in the archive of the 1st Krajina Corps
19 that we had. And it's very detailed, and the index indicates all the
20 various components of command and control and logistics and addresses each
21 one individually.
22 I'd also draw your attention to the section on page 4 and page
23 5, which is -- or appears to be a briefing plan with a schedule of
24 speakers, and it in itself is quite detailed. And I believe this was
25 probably a briefing either presenting this document or presenting the --
1 the main components of this document. And if you look at the -- the actual
2 briefing of who attended it, it is all the very senior military figures of
3 the VRS at the time and includes representatives from the government,
4 representatives or men to brief from Yugoslavia, and Minister of Interior,
5 I believe, also is pencilled in here on the briefing to conduct a speech.
6 So I would assume that this plan was a briefing to present this document.
7 The document itself, I believe, was compiled based on a request
8 that had gone down from the VRS Main Staff earlier, in the early part of
9 1993. I'm aware that General Talic in the 1st Krajina Corps had received
10 an order from the Main Staff to submit his own corps analysis, which he did
11 do. I'm also aware of -- I think in the 2nd Krajina Corps, which is a
12 neighbouring corps to General Talic, they had had the to do the same and I
13 think that was around February 1003. So I assume that the Main Staff
14 issued an instruction, the corps submitted the details, and then those
15 details from the various corps were formed in this compiled report, which
16 in essence was a report on the state of the army and how it -- how it had
17 worked in 1992 and the state of play in 1993.
18 Q. Was this -- was this document, Mr. Brown, both objective on one
19 hand and critical, on the other?
20 A. Yes, it is. And -- and, in fact, it -- it does draw the -- the
21 state of the army in its -- and the problems that it faced at the time, the
22 problems it still had then, some of the weaknesses in the army that needed
23 to be addressed, and although it is, obviously, on the other hand, it -- it
24 discusses their successes too. And I think it's a key document.
25 Q. Mr. Brown, I want to direct your attention in this document to
1 pages 28 to 41.
2 MR. HARMON: And while you're finding those pages -- Your
3 Honours, this has been exhibited before as P64A and P529, Hanson tab 255.
4 Q. What I want to direct your attention to, specifically, and I'd
5 like you to summarise, the role and importance of the communications system
6 and its ability -- its capabilities as assessed by the army in 1992. Can
7 you summarise those capabilities, Mr. Brown?
8 A. Yes. This section deals with communications and signals, and I -
9 - I think to some extent it's somewhat self-explanatory. They highlight
10 that they had tasks to -- in order to -- to ensure continuous and safe
11 functioning of command and reports could go up and down the chain. They
12 had to establish a communications system, and that communications system
13 had various components to it. It had a number of means by which
14 information could be transmitted within the army and to other -- outside
15 the army, as well, and they themselves assess this capability to be very
16 good and that it was able to achieve its aim of -- they say one of the
17 aims, anyway, was the prompt transmission of large quantities of
18 information from the Main Staff of the army to the Supreme Command,
19 subordinating elements, participating units and contacts with a view to the
20 swiftest possible notification and informing -- and feedback in the form of
21 directive decisions and orders.
22 And the summary that they have at the end, they do discuss that
23 there were some difficulties, but the summary that they have was that
24 communications was very -- were very good.
25 Q. And in this particular segment of the report - for example, on
1 page 33, a radio relay communications - it indicates in the second
2 paragraph on page 33 under that heading that they had radio relay
3 communications with simultaneous translation of information through 523
4 communication channels consisting of 416 telephone and 107 telegraph
5 channels. They also describe, do they not, in this report that they had
6 radio communications, wire service, courier service, and they describe the
7 encryption capabilities of the communications in the VRS?
8 A. Yes, they do. They highlight each of those sections, and they
9 also talk about -- within -- within that broad range of communications that
10 they had to assist other users outside the army, as well. But yes, those
11 were the main means that they discuss in this -- in this issue.
12 Q. Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to figure 4 on page 36.
13 A. Yes. This is -- in this section, they're talking about wire
14 services ask. That means both hardwire communications between two
15 communicators, but also they use the PTT system, which was the civilian
16 telephone line. And this particular chart outlines, as it says, the use of
17 PTT and military automatic telephone exchanges outside the army of the RS.
18 And it just lists -- so basically it was a system -- it wasn't a military
19 communications system per se, but they utilised that to communicate.
20 I'm not a communications expert particularly, but I'd imagine
21 each of the numbers here is either links to an individual line or a
22 telephone exchange or a telephone handset and a number of lines going into
23 the various formations, including the Supreme Command, Main Staff, the
24 corps, all the other units of the army, some logistic components, military
25 hospital, TV SRNA, press centres, and the warning and reporting centre.
1 And it -- it lists here the PTT lines and also the PTT from Belgrade. So
2 they used Belgrade PTT links, as well, in some cases to try and ensure
4 Q. Mr. Brown, can I direct your attention to the table that appears
5 on the next page, which is actually figure 5.
6 A. Yes. This particular section deals with encrypted and encoded
7 communications or telegraph communications, and the particular section
8 talks about the amount of written communications or encrypted telegrams
9 that were passed predominantly in the army. It also makes mention of the
10 Pale warning and reporting centre of the government. The warning and
11 reporting system, I believe, was a system that the JNA had established,
12 which was to do with national defence. I think the VRS simply utilised
13 that existing system. And there was obviously a Pale and warning and
14 reporting centre, which from this would indicate that the government was
15 utilising that system. And a number of encrypted or encoded telegrams, I
16 think two or three are highlighted here, seemed to have been established or
17 used during that period.
18 Q. Did the -- your review of this particular portion of the report
19 on the army permit you to come to a conclusion as to whether or not the
20 army had the technical means by which to communicate with the civilian
21 leadership over the -- who were above the army itself?
22 A. Well, I -- I would say from this, yes, that they had the means to
23 -- to do that. There is some indication that they had connections outside
24 the army, that they had to establish some connections outside the army, and
25 they themselves, I think, assessed that the -- that the communications
1 system in 1992 was very good.
2 Q. Mr. Brown, did you -- if you'd turn to tab -- tabs 7 and 8 of the
3 folder. If you'd look at tab 7. This is a previous exhibit. It's an
4 intercepted communication. It's a previous Prosecution exhibit, P292,
5 P389A, P389A.1 and 389B. This is a communication between Mr. Krajisnik and
6 an individual by the name of Radivoje Grkovic, and Mr. Grkovic is
7 identified on page 2 of the intercepted communication as being the
8 Nedzarici Battalion commander.
9 And if you will turn to tab 8, which is -- this is also an
10 intercepted communication between Mr. Krajisnik and an individual by the
11 name of Milan Kovic. This has been previously exhibited as 292 KID 39219,
12 and this is dated the 21st of April 1992. And it's a conversation where
13 Mr. Krajisnik is inquiring in getting a report as to the military situation
14 in Grbavica and in other parts of Sarajevo.
15 Now, does this confirm for you that the -- that the technical
16 capabilities --
17 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I'd object to leading of this nature.
18 In fact, the -- the entire prelude to the question and the nature of the
19 question are at a level of objectionable leading, in my submission.
20 MR. HARMON: Then I won't lead, Your Honour. I'll ask a
21 different -- I'll form the question differently.
22 Q. What does this suggest to you, Mr. Brown, in respect of the
23 communication capabilities permitting the senior political leadership to
24 inquire with battalion commanders and in respect of the military situation
25 on the ground?
1 A. Well, based on these two -- two transcripts, it would appear that
2 Mr. Krajisnik had an ability to speak to low-level commanders in order to
3 avail himself of the situation in the territory. It would seem -- if the -
4 - if the intercept is -- is as it said.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, let me return to the report on the army, and let me
6 direct your attention, if I can, to page 153. I'm going to read -- I'm
7 going to read to you the portion of this report on the army, page 153,
8 paragraph 4, and then I'm going to read another section to you.
9 This paragraph at 153 is a paragraph taken from the concluding
10 remarks of Dr. Radovan Karadzic on the 5th of April, 1993, in which he says
11 in paragraph 4, "The Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every
12 individual member of the Supreme Command, was informed of the objectives of
13 planned operations and concerted battles and of their results frequently in
14 great detail. This demonstrates that control and command of the Army of
15 Republika Srpska is united and that it is based upon a high degree of
16 concurrence and unity in selecting the targets of each individual operation
17 or battle and in assigning tasks to individual operational and tactical
19 Can you comment on Dr. Karadzic's remarks that I've just read.
20 A. Well, I think the remarks probably speak for themselves, and --
21 and Karadzic obviously believes that the Supreme Command was not only
22 informed but took part in the planning of operations and -- in some detail
23 and had an ability to do that. I would assume that if the communication
24 system hadn't been functioning, that the -- that would have hampered that
25 process, and he himself seems to be admitting here that -- that that was --
1 these objectives were planned operations, reports, and that was linked to
2 command and control. And from the law on the army, I know that was also a
3 function of the commander-in-chief, so it would seem to be self-evident
4 that he was briefed on operations and took an active part in that.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, let me direct you to pages 8 and 9 of this same
6 report, again dealing with the issue of communications. I want to read you
7 the paragraph -- the last paragraph on page 8, continuing over to page 9.
8 "The command. Report and command liaison links. Warning and notification
9 functions were well organised in communications plans, with appropriate
10 documents and data, were precise so that it was possible on the basis of
11 these to establish the planned communication links. With a high degree of
12 certainty, we can say that the existing communication system meets the
13 needs of command, coordination, and reporting needs at all levels from the
14 Supreme Command, the Supreme Commander, the General Staff, to the lower
16 I invite your comments, Mr. Brown, as to that paragraph I have
17 just read.
18 A. Well, it would seem to echo what Mr. Karadzic had said, and --
19 and this particular component was presumably the army's perspective and not
20 Dr. Karadzic's perspective, and -- and it seems to echo very much what they
21 said, and also replicate the issue of communications, that communications
22 were very good.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, I'd like to come back to page 153 of this report,
24 paragraph 4, and I'd like to focus your attention on the second paragraph
25 contained in paragraph 4. "The Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska
1 has performed the functions of the staff of the Supreme Command and at the
2 same time that of the superior command for operational and some joint
3 tactical formations, which presupposed the agreement of the Supreme Command
4 in respect of all tasks and objectives of the armed struggle. This
5 relationship between the command structures and the organs of government
6 and the Supreme Command made it impossible for the Main Staff to make
7 decisions absolutely on its own. Rather, every operational battle was
8 politically endorsed on the basis of the interests of the Serbian people
9 and approved by the highest authorities of Republika Srpska."
10 Mr. Brown, can I again invite your comments and observations on
11 that paragraph.
12 A. Well, I think this would indicate very much this issue of unity
13 of command and that there wasn't a division between what the military were
14 trying to do or doing and their wider political objectives of the Bosnian
15 Serbs. I think it highlights that by that comment, and I think there are
16 other documents that would -- would seem to echo that.
17 Q. When you say "unity of command," Mr. Brown, can you be more
18 precise, more explicit? What does that mean?
19 A. Well, very much that there was not a divergence here, that there
20 was -- there was a very close relationship, that the political leadership
21 in essence were -- were giving overall guidance to the military, and that
22 all decisions and operational battles were -- were politically endorsed by
24 Q. Now, I'd like to focus your attention, Mr. Brown, on essentially
25 how orders were transmitted from the highest levels down and from the
1 lowest levels of the army back up to the highest levels with -- up to the
2 political leadership.
3 And if I could first of all, Mr. Brown, ask you -- if we could
4 turn to page 159 of the army report.
5 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I have a question because
6 things -- we are moving very quickly. Could we come back to page 9,
7 please, and to the third and fourth line. [In English] "And reporting
8 needs at all levels from the Supreme Command, the Supreme Commander, the
9 General Staff, to lower levels."
10 [Interpretation] I would like to understand what "Supreme
11 Command" means and what "Supreme Commander" also means. What do these
12 words actually mean, please.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I was aware that in late 1992 the
14 Supreme Command was established, I believe, in November; although, I'd have
15 to say I defer to those who have done political analysis more. But I would
16 believe that what they're talking about here is the Supreme Command, the
17 Supreme Commander probably being Dr. Karadzic, the General Staff being the
18 Main Staff, and the lower levels being the corps and probably subordinated
19 formations of the VRS.
20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. But is there a difference
21 between the Supreme Command, on the one side, and the Supreme Commander?
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I would like to defer to someone who
23 might know more about the -- the law on the regulations and the political
24 leadership. But it may well mean here the Supreme Command is a corporate
25 body and the Supreme Commander being the president of the republic or Dr.
2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Thank you. Thank you very much.
3 MR. HARMON:
4 Q. Mr. Brown, again, using this same document, if we could turn to
5 page 159. And, first of all, very generically, can you identify the
6 various ways in which orders were conveyed in the VRS from the top, from
7 the political leadership down through the Main Staff and down through -- to
8 the lower echelons? Just identify the various ways in which that was done.
9 MS. LOUKAS: Well, just in relation to that, I think the witness
10 has quite clearly indicated even as recently as the last question that he
11 would defer to those who have done political analysis more. That's page
12 53, line 10. And it's quite clear from the beginning of his evidence in
13 chief in relation to the limitations of his evidence -- it's clear that
14 this is an analysis on military developments in the Krajina for a certain
15 year period. This witness is simply not in a position to answer the
16 question that Mr. Harmon has asked him in relation to the -- particularly
17 in relation to -- from political leadership down through the Main Staff, in
18 my submission, Your Honours.
19 MR. HARMON: And I disagree with that, Your Honour, because this
20 report indicates precisely the manners in which these orders are directed
21 down. The question is, Can you tell us the very -- identify the various
22 ways in which orders were conveyed? And I can direct Your Honours'
23 attention to paragraph 1 -- I'm sorry, page 159, specifically referencing
24 oral orders from the president of the republic as the Supreme Commander of
25 the forces did orally assign a number of tasks. So --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Let's ask the witness what he knows.
2 Do you have any -- Ms. Loukas has drawn the attention to the
3 fact that your report is in certain respects limited. Now, we are talking
4 here -- the question is dealing with, I take it, orders of a military
5 nature and suggests that it came from the political leadership, where it,
6 well, at least comes at a borderline of -- because we have heard some
7 evidence that Mr. Karadzic was the Supreme Commander, which makes him both
8 a political figure and a military figure. Are you able to answer that
9 question since it comes at the edge of what seems to be your expertise?
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I -- again, I would defer very much
11 to people who were in the political analysis sphere, but I am aware of
12 documentation that I have reviewed, including some political documents of a
13 military nature, that indicate that there were directives, that there were
14 meetings. This document indicates oral orders being assigned. I am aware
15 of meetings that occurred, and I am aware of some documentation of reports
16 that go up the chain, as well. And so I am in part aware of -- of -- of
17 meetings that occurred, minutes of meetings, schedule briefings. The 16th
18 Assembly Session, for example, is another example -- you know, Mladic was
20 JUDGE ORIE: You don't have to expand on that at this moment. I
21 do understand your answer to be that although it is about political
22 leaders, that it does not necessarily go beyond the field you studied and
23 beyond your expertise.
24 THE WITNESS: No, but I am aware of military documents that make
25 reference to this issue of the chain of command and the passage of
1 information down and up the chain.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then you may answer the question put to you.
3 Perhaps, Mr. Harmon, it would be wise to repeat it.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. Can you summarise, and then we'll explore each particular detail
6 -- Mr. Brown, can you summarise the -- the means in which orders were
7 conveyed from the Supreme Commander and political leaders to the Main
8 Staff, members of the Main Staff, and down through the lower echelons of
9 the 1st Krajina Corps and the army.
10 A. Well, this document indicates oral orders as being a means of
11 communication. I'm aware of Presidency sessions in which members of the
12 military were present, according to the minutes of the meetings. I'm aware
13 of references in this document that strategic objectives led to the
14 issuance of directives from the military, and I'm aware of a functioning
15 chain of command within the military down to the lower levels.
16 Q. Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to an intercepted radio -
17 - a telephone communication that is found in tab 10. This is P --
18 Prosecution Exhibit 67, tab 32, and also P292, KID 31423. This is an
19 intercepted radio communication, Mr. Brown, between General Mladic and Mr.
20 Momcilo Krajisnik dated the 27th of May, 1992. And if you turn to page 2
21 of this intercept, you see a conversation wherein Mr. -- General Mladic
22 says, "I'm going further as planned, and tomorrow I will stop by to get new
24 Mr. Krajisnik responds, "Excellent."
25 General Mladic says, "So we'll arrange for what we should do
2 And Mr. Krajisnik says, "All right."
3 Can I have your observations as to this particular intercept,
4 Mr. Brown.
5 A. Well, again, if the intercept transcript is -- is accurate, it
6 would seem to be that a senior member of the Bosnian Serb leadership was
7 able to speak to Ratko Mladic and -- and give him instructions, and that
8 would seem to -- seem to show that.
9 Q. I seem to be missing the English translation of tab 9.
10 Mr. Brown, does the English translation of tab 9 appear to be in
11 your binder?
12 A. Yes, it does. Is this the one on the 21st of May?
13 Q. Without having it in front of me -- it is. Actually I have the
14 B/C/S version in front of me, but I don't have the English version, so let
15 me just get the English version.
16 Now, is this -- is this, Mr. Brown, an illustration of a -- an
17 order in writing from the 1st Krajina command to other members within the
19 A. Yes. This is a -- an order that General Talic sent out on the
20 21st of May to his subordinate units in the corps, and it's -- it's an
21 order on general mobilisation. And the order starts by saying, "A decision
22 of the Serbian Republic of BH Presidency on the 20th of May has initiated
23 general mobilisation of all citizens of the Serbian Republic." And then he
24 goes on in his order to identify what that means in his corps.
25 And I'll draw your attention to point 1, which is, "To
1 immediately establish direct contact with municipal and military and
2 territorial organs on the ground, offering expert and material support for
3 the mobilisation process."
4 The end discusses issues about mobilising conscripts. If I draw
5 your attention to point 6: "Explain to conscripts on their -- as they
6 arrive the goals of our struggle, and brief them on their rights and
8 And then in paragraph 8, he states that "Until units receive
9 concrete combat tasks," presumably meaning that they're expecting some
10 combat action in the forthcoming weeks, "engage them in the following
12 And point 4: "Establish the closest possible cooperation with
13 the people and legal authorities within their zones of responsibility."
14 The -- point 11, the orders that they're "not to allow the
15 presence of any paramilitary formations or other special organisations
16 within the zone." And that these people are to be dispersed -- or
17 "disperse individual members," presumably meaning paramilitary formations
18 or special organisations, "amongst the units as volunteers. If they
19 refuse, break them up, and if necessary, destroy them."
20 And then he orders that unit commanders of units are directly
21 responsible for implementing these assignments, and this order is
22 disseminated to all the various components of his corps, that distribution
23 list of the units within his corps. And this document to me would seem to
24 indicate that there was a decision at the highest level of the Presidency
25 on the 20th of May. That was then disseminated down the chain. General
1 Talic was disseminating that down to chain to his subordinate units.
2 Q. If we could turn to page 8 of the report on the army once again,
3 Mr. Brown, and in the second paragraph in the middle of that paragraph, it
4 says, "The main documents used to regulate the utilisation of forces at
5 Main Staff level were directives." And earlier in your testimony, you
6 mentioned directives, and you also mentioned directives in your expert
7 report on page 169 of paragraph 3.27. What is a directive, Mr. Brown?
8 A. A directive is a large planning construction or -- or order that
9 deals generally with the higher level military -- military planning, and
10 these were used by the VRS throughout the war, not just in 1992. I'm aware
11 of four directives pushed out by the VRS in 1992, and there were a number
12 of other directives that were subsequently pushed out in the following
13 years, but they are, in essence, large military high-level planning orders
14 to subordinate corps.
15 Q. Mr. Brown, if we can turn to page 159 of the military report, the
16 analysis, once again. Let me read to you from the second paragraph. It
17 says, "The strategic objectives of our war which were promptly defined and
18 set before the Main Staff of the Army of the RS, the commands and units,
19 served as a general guideline upon which we planned the actual operations
20 and concerted battles. This means that objectives were set before us
21 rather than specific tasks spelled out; although, the president of the
22 republic is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the RS did orally
23 assign a number of tasks which were general and vital significance to our
24 struggle and protecting the Serbian people and its territories. The Main
25 Staff of the Army of RS translated the set of objectives and tasks into
1 general and individual missions of the Army of the RS and the individual,
2 operational, and tactical formations with the goals of every individual,
3 combat action, operation, or battle being specifically defined."
4 Can you comment on this particular passage in the army report,
5 Mr. Brown?
6 A. Well, I think that is a -- a fairly accurate reflection of -- of
7 how at the higher level these -- these goals were disseminated into the VRS
8 Main Staff, and then from the earlier quote, that they took those
9 objectives, wrote them into directives, and those directives were passed
10 down the chain to subordinate corps, and the objectives, I would argue, in
11 this reference and elsewhere relate to the objectives that were stated in
12 the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of May. And I'm aware in the two
13 directives that we have from 1992 that there are a number of references
14 that directly link -- it would appear to directly link the objectives, the
15 strategic objectives articulated at that Assembly session that are in the
16 military objectives of the VRS. And furthermore, I would argue that the
17 operational activity certainly in the area that I know reasonably well, the
18 1st Krajina Corps, the operational activity that they conducted can be
19 directly linked to those strategic objectives.
20 Q. So, Mr. Brown, if we could turn to tab 11, which has been
21 previously exhibited as P727, and also in the Brcko dossier as tab 15.
22 Is this one of the directives that you have referred to? Is
23 this ...?
24 A. Yes, this is operational directive 3, which was written in, I
25 believe, the 3rd of August, 1992.
1 Q. And generally speaking, these directives, they came from the Main
2 Staff; is that correct?
3 A. Yes. I think this one is signed by -- or it's got Mladic's
4 signature block, I believe. Yes.
5 Q. And did this objective -- did this directive, Mr. Brown, as set
6 forth on pages 4 and 5, go to the subordinate corps, including the 1st
7 Krajina Corps?
8 A. Yes, I believe it -- I'll just check the ...
9 Q. I'm referring specifically to paragraphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and
11 A. Yes. It would appear that all the various corps of the Main
12 Staff were given tasks. I'm not sure if this one actually has a
13 distribution list. And it may well be because this was on the
14 dissemination -- the dissemination means, maybe the use of telegraph or
15 whatever, but I am aware of General Talic reacting to this directive
16 because, I believe, not long afterwards, in fact, a day or so afterwards,
17 he himself wrote his own corps-level instruction. But this is an example
18 of a directive, and it does go to give various tasks to the corps within
19 the Main Staff.
20 Q. You referenced earlier, Mr. Brown, that these directives were --
21 were centred around -- or involved the strategic objectives that had been
22 announced at the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Can you direct
23 the Court's attention to references within this document dealing
24 specifically with the strategic objectives?
25 A. The strategic objectives -- well, for example, the strategic
1 objective 5, which related to Sarajevo, Karadzic announced that they were
2 to divide Sarajevo, they were to control their territory of Sarajevo, and
3 they were all to -- also to ensure that forces in Sarajevo were not going
4 to be moved to other areas that were of some importance. He also mentioned
5 at the 16th Assembly Session that they had encircled Sarajevo. And when
6 you go to the task that's given to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in this
7 directive - and there are references there - that they are to maintain this
8 blockade of -- of Sarajevo and prevent its breaking. And I would argue
9 that in order to stop forces, Muslim and Croat forces in Sarajevo from
10 going to other areas that were of importance to the Bosnian Serbs, that the
11 way to do that would be to blockade the city and make sure they didn't come
12 out. And that would seem to be one link in this directive that the task
13 being given to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps related to an objective that was
14 articulated by Karadzic at the 12th of May.
15 There are other references. I think -- I have to go through --
16 Q. Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to page 3, third
17 paragraph from the bottom, where it deals with an advance on the left bank
18 of the River Neretva.
19 A. Yes. That was another objective that Karadzic had stated. I
20 think it was Operation Strategic Goal Number 4, establish a border on the
21 Una and Neretva Rivers. And I think if you look at what the Herzegovina
22 Corps was tasked to do here, which was the corps that covered the Neretva
23 area -- Herzegovina Corps used part of the forces to prevent penetration
24 from the territory of Croatia, Western Herzegovina, and direct operations
25 of the main forces towards the Neretva River.
1 Q. Mr. Brown, can I direct your attention to paragraph 5.1, where
2 there is a reference to the Posavina and the main forces carrying out
3 offensive operations in the Posavina. Do you see that reference, under
4 "Tasks of units"?
5 A. Yes. The 1st Krajina Corps had actually already established a
6 corridor in the Posavina area, which was strategic goal number 2. They had
7 achieved that goal by early July 2002. But in this, this is August, so
8 it's a little bit later, but what they had to do was expand that corridor
9 so they could get to the river. And the Krajina Corps here was given --
10 given that task, in essence, of protecting the corridor. So I would argue
11 this is a directive which would relate back to these strategic goals as
12 articulated on the 12th of May.
13 Q. Now, what do the documentation show, Mr. Brown, in respect of a
14 directive being sent from the Main Staff to the corps level? What
15 happened, then, at the corps level?
16 A. I know that this directive, in particular directive 3, General
17 Talic issued his own corps-wide instruction. I'm aware of another example.
18 We don't have directive 1 or 2, or at least we don't when I was working
19 here with the OTP, but there are examples when a directive came out in June
20 and General Talic issued his own corps-wide instruction based on that
21 directive. And I'm aware that an operational directive 4 which followed
22 that the corps followed those directives and issued their own corps-wide
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Interpretation] Could I ask you to speak slower and
25 think of the interpreters, please.
1 MR. HARMON: Yes.
2 Q. Mr. Brown, we're going to have to pause, or I'm going to have to
3 slow down. I don't know if I can go any slower in my manner of speech.
4 But if we could turn, Mr. Brown, to tab 12. Can you identify
5 the document in tab 12.
6 A. Tab 12 was another directive. It's operational directive number
7 4., dated 19th of November, 1992.
8 Q. This is a document that comes from the Main Staff of the army to
9 the subordinate corps; is that correct?
10 A. That's correct, yes.
11 Q. Now, I -- while we were discussing the strategic objectives, Mr.
12 Brown, can you turn to page 2 of this particular document. In the middle,
13 the paragraph that starts with "Most of the tasks carried out in full, and
14 amongst the most significant we would stress the following." Can you tell
15 the Judges what this passage means.
16 A. This passage would seem to be a reflection on what they had
17 already achieved, and I think it echoes my point that the strategic
18 objectives that had been announced at the 12th of May formed -- or the
19 military worked to those objectives. And here they are highlighting where
20 they managed to achieve some successes in relation to those.
21 So, for example, the 1st Krajina Corps had preserved the
22 corridor through the Posavina. That was strategic goal number 2. 2nd
23 Krajina corp is successfully defending the north-west border of the
24 republic on the Una River; the Una River was an objective that Karadzic
25 announced at the 12th of May. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had fully
1 established command and control and prevented the lifting of the blockade
2 of Sarajevo. Again, I would argue that that links to what Karadzic had
3 said in relation to the strategic goal number 5 about Sarajevo.
4 Q. Indeed the -- number 3, the East Bosnia Corps is to preserve the
5 corridor, which was also another strategic objective; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, the East Bosnia Corps was also involved in securing the
7 corridor. It wasn't just the 1st Krajina Corps, but it was the
8 neighbouring corps of the East Bosnia Corps. So they moved from opposite
9 directions to secure the corridor, and that was achieved in July, the very
10 few days -- first few days of July 1992.
11 Q. Mr. Brown, if we turn to the next page, there's a reference at
12 the top to the following tasks from directive 3, which we have just seen,
13 not being carried out. Can you comment on that, please.
14 A. Yes. I think here they're -- although they initially said we've
15 achieved some success, they -- they haven't completely carried out the
16 tasks from number 3, directive number 3. In particular, the towns of
17 Gorazde, Gradacac, Maglaj, Bugojno, Olovo, and Orasje have not been
19 The Posavina Corridor, although it had been achieved, had not
20 been successfully widened.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If I say it in English, is it then better,
22 instead of in French, to make it clear to the interpreters that it is very
23 sorry for them, my words being described to Judge Hanoteau in the
24 transcript. But could I please ask you to really slow down. It's -- the
25 interpreters cannot follow it in that --
1 THE WITNESS: I apologise to you, Your Honour, and also to the
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mainly to the interpreters, yes.
4 THE WITNESS: And number 4, the Herzegovina Corps had failed to
5 reach the Neretva River, which, again, Karadzic had said was a strategic
7 MR. HARMON:
8 Q. Mr. Brown, I'm listening to the French interpretation, so I'm
9 going to pause until that is completed. But if -- could you turn, Mr.
10 Brown, to page 4 of this document. Again, approximately seven lines down
11 there's a reference to the left bank of the Neretva River, and there's also
12 a reference to --
13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] If you please. I'm sorry. But
14 I have a question to ask. It's going extremely fast, Mr. Harmon, right?
15 It's going very, very fast. So I'd like to be really sure that I've
16 understood everything.
17 When the witness is talking about Mr. Karadzic's decision, is it
18 a decision made by Mr. Karadzic himself or by the civilian authorities or
19 the Assembly? I'd like to really understand what is meant by "decision
20 made by Mr. Karadzic." Please.
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, maybe the word "decision" was not --
22 not the most appropriate, then. What I'm just referring to are the
23 announcements at the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of May that he made
24 in relation to what the wider strategic goals of the --
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Sorry, Mr. Witness. I'm
1 reading what's on the transcript. When I see "decision made by Mr.
2 Karadzic," is it a decision made by Karadzic himself, or is it a decision
3 that he had the Assembly enforce?
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm -- I believe that at this 16th
5 Assembly Session Radovan Karadzic announced the strategic goals, and he
6 articulated that those strategic goals had been formulated by the
7 government, the Presidency, the Council for National Security, and he
8 articulated those at that session, and that is what I'm -- I mean by that.
9 Now, who composed those bodies and what they're composed of, I think I
10 would rather defer to somebody who's involved in political analysis. But
11 what I mean is that Radovan Karadzic announced those goals and articulated
12 who had been involved in the formulation of those goals.
13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. HARMON:
15 Q. Mr. Brown, I'd like just to direct your attention again to the
16 portion at the top of page 4, where there is a reference to "reaching the
17 left bank of the Neretva," and then later in that same paragraph, "gaining
18 access to the sea." That again is another reference to the strategic
19 objectives; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. Now, if we look at the rest of this document. On that page 4, it
22 says, "The tasks of the units," and thereafter, between subparts A through
23 subparts F, found at page 6, those units he's giving the tasks to are
24 identified; correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. That includes the 1st Krajina Corps and the other corps under the
2 command of the Main Staff.
3 A. Yes, that's correct.
4 Q. If we turn to page 5 of this directive, under D, "the Drina
5 Corps," it says, "From its present positions, its main forces shall
6 persistently defend Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik and the corridor, while the
7 rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy,
8 inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, and force him to leave the
9 Bilac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas, together with the Muslim population. First
10 off are the able-bodied men and armed men to surrender, and if they refuse,
11 destroy them." That reference to "force the Muslim population to leave,"
12 does that relate to a strategic objective, Mr. Brown?
13 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I object to the question in the nature
14 of the way that Mr. Harmon has formulated. Firstly, in relation to its --
15 its leading form. And -- and secondly, Your Honour -- yes, in essence it's
16 the leading, Your Honour. I'll leave it at that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, I think Mr. Harmon has four or five
18 times asked whether portions of this document relate to certain strategic
19 goals. What's different now, and in what way exactly is it leading?
20 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Mr. Harmon reads out a portion of the
21 document --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MS. LOUKAS: -- and says, "That reference, does that relate to
24 a strategic objective?"
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, the answer can only be a yes or no.
2 That's a classic leading question, in that respect. That's the first
4 The other -- the mere fact, Your Honour, that I haven't objected
5 to a question formed in the previous in that manner does not mean that I'm
6 disentitled to objecting from this particular question, Your Honour,
7 because --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas --
9 MS. LOUKAS: We're talking about something that refers to the
10 Neretva River, the Una River.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas -- yes, Ms. Loukas, I have always
12 understood that a leading question is a question which either suggests the
13 answer to be given or a question that suggests something that has not yet
14 been established. That's, at least, in accordance with ...
15 MS. LOUKAS: It does suggest the answer. The answer is, "Yes,
16 that does relate to a strategic objective."
17 JUDGE ORIE: Or no, it does not relate to any strategic
18 objective, isn't it?
19 MS. LOUKAS: Well, we'll see what his answer is.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I mean, to say it doesn't relate to anything
21 at all, this, of course, would not be a question, which would make much
23 MS. LOUKAS: I guarantee you the answer is yes, Your Honour.
24 Let's see.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But this is unfair, Ms. Loukas.
1 MS. LOUKAS: Sorry, Your Honour?
2 JUDGE ORIE: This is unfair. You might know the answer.
3 MS. LOUKAS: No, I don't know the answer.
4 JUDGE ORIE: You don't know the answer. Okay.
5 Well, then, Mr. Harmon, you may proceed. The objection is
7 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. Mr. Brown, you can answer the question.
10 A. The answer is I do believe it does -- it does link -- it links --
11 I would argue to strategic objective number 3, which was to establish a
12 corridor in the Drina, the Drina River or the Drina Valley, and those
13 areas, Bila, Zepa, Gorazde fall within that area. And I would also argue
14 that along with other documentation and other material and -- which I've
15 included in my report, that the reference to forcing them to leave together
16 with the Muslim population is tied to strategic goal number 1, about
18 Q. Mr. Brown, let me direct your attention -- Mr. Brown, let me
19 direct your attention to tabs -- bear with me for just a minute.
20 A. Can I just possibly comment on one other aspect of this directive
21 if that's okay?
22 JUDGE ORIE: If -- I do not mind. Mr. Harmon has to use his
23 time in the best ways of ...
24 THE WITNESS: Very briefly, if I can draw your attention to page
25 6, and in relation to the use of the Air Force. It states here that, "The
1 use of aircraft can be ordered by, one, members of the Presidency of the
2 Republika Srpska/the Supreme Command; two, commander of the army of the
3 Republika Srpska; and three, Chief of the Main Staff of the army."
4 That -- I just wanted to flag that up as maybe of some
5 importance when we were discussing that earlier issue of whether leadership
6 or the political leadership or the Presidency have any relationship with
7 the military.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that clarification.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
10 MR. HARMON:
11 Q. Now, finally in respect of this document, because I'm going to
12 refer to the number in the next two exhibits, directive 4 at the top left-
13 hand corner bears the number 02/5, and can -- I turn -- direct your
14 attention to tabs 13 and 13.1. Mr. Brown, can you tell the Court what the
15 exhibits found under tabs 13 and 13.1 are. Let me just -- I'm sorry. I
16 have the wrong number. 13.1 -- I'm sorry, I have the wrong number. 13.1,
17 Mr. Brown, and 14. What are those documents?
18 A. 13.1 is a Drina Corps command document entitled "Decision for
19 further activities," and it comes shortly after directive 4.
20 Q. Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to paragraph 1 in both of
21 those exhibits, 13.1 and 14, please. Do you see a reflection in the first
22 paragraph of those respective documents to directive 4?
23 A. Yes, I do. And the reference to forcing the Muslim population to
24 leave the area is similar to that found in the quoted document, which is
25 directive 4.
1 Q. Now, in summary, are documents 13.1 and the document in 14, both
2 of these documents are issued by Commander Colonel Milenko Zivanovic. Who
3 was he?
4 A. At the time he was the Drina Corps commander.
5 Q. And are both these documents that I've just referred to orders
6 that flow from the commander of the Drina Corps to subordinate units within
7 the Drina Corps? If I look and I direct your attention in paragraph -- in
8 document 13.1, this is directed to the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade
9 command, and in document 14 directed to the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
11 A. Yes. These are two subordinate units of the Drina Corps.
12 Q. So this -- these are military orders.
13 A. Yes, and I think if you take the documents together, they show a
14 functioning chain of command.
15 Q. Can I -- in both of -- both of these tabs, 13.1 and the document
16 in 14, can we turn to -- we'll just take 13.1 to page 4, under the portion
17 of "Morale and psychological preparations." That's found at subpart C. It
18 says, "Prior to starting any activities, members of the unit are to be
19 informed about the significant aim of the activity. It is to be pointed
20 out that the achieving of the goals of the Serb people, that is, the
21 creation of the Serb state in these areas, depends on the outcome of small
22 actions and on the outcome of the entire operation."
23 Can you comment on that, Mr. Brown?
24 A. Well, I think it's of some -- some note that they reference the
25 goals and that this is being passed down to the lowest formation of the
1 army; these are not issues that are kept at a high level. And the -- the
2 fact that they're talking about small actions as having an important -- an
3 importance is -- is of some note. It, again, re-emphasises to me that the
4 strategic goals and the goals articulated were important; they were related
5 and ended up with military action on the ground, and they were disseminated
6 down through the military chain to the lowest level. This is a brigade
8 Q. Mr. Brown, I'd like you to quickly look at the documents that are
9 found in tabs 15 through 19, that all reference a number, 2-126, dated the
10 24th of November, 1992. If you'd look at each of those documents and tell
11 the Judges what these documents are.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, for me, also, sometimes it goes a bit
13 too quick. I would like to take the witness back to 13.1 and 14, if you
14 would not mind.
15 MR. HARMON: Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: You said, "Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown,
17 to paragraph 1 in both of those exhibits. Do you see a reflection in the
18 first paragraph of those respective documents relating to directive 4?"
19 And the answer of the witness was, "Yes, I do. And the reference of
20 forcing the Muslim population to leave the area is similar to that found in
21 the quoted document, which is directive 4."
22 Paragraph 1 is rather lengthy, so I would like to invite the
23 witness to tell me exactly where in paragraph 1 - and let's start with 13.1
24 - where it says that -- "forcing the Muslim population to leave the area."
25 Could you please -- because it's two pages, so I have not found it yet.
1 THE WITNESS: Paragraph 1, when I say it's similar -- paragraph
2 1 --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 THE WITNESS: -- states, "Wear the enemy out, break it up or
5 force it to surrender, and force the Muslim population" --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: -- to leave the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica,
8 and Gorazde."
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I found it. Most of the lines were about
10 enemies, but here it's clearly the population. Yes.
11 And in 14, yes, it's the same: "Force the Muslim population" --
12 I found it. Thank you very much.
13 THE WITNESS: There's --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. It's clear now.
15 MR. HARMON:
16 Q. Mr. Brown, I was asking you to identify what the documents are
17 that are contained in tabs 15 through 19.
18 A. These would appear, at face value, to be receipts for that Drina
19 Corps instruction, the Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade command and a number
20 of other receipts.
21 Q. So this is a reflection of the orders going from the top, from
22 the directive, to the corps command, down to the brigade command, and down
23 to the lower units; is that correct?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, if we could turn to tab 20, a document that is
1 dated January 23rd, 1993, signed by the commander of the corps -- the Drina
2 Corps, Colonel Milenko Zivanovic. And this is an operation -- a combat
3 order, so -- and it's an order directed to the commands of all corps units.
4 And if I could direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to the top of
5 page 8. It is a continuation from the -- the morale and psychological
6 preparation, and it says, "Transport to other areas must be provided for
7 the civilian population of the enemy, and those who accept the authority of
8 the Republika Srpska are to be disarmed and returned to their homes."
9 So when there's a reference in this to transport to other areas
10 the civilian population, can you comment on that, Mr. Brown?
11 A. I would imagine here what they're talking about is moving them to
12 areas outside of the places that they were -- they were living.
13 MR. HARMON: Okay. Now, Your Honour, as a contextual document,
14 since directive 4 dealt with the Drina Corps in the area of Zepa and
15 Cerska, I have included for Your Honours the report from Mr. Mazowiecki
16 dated the 5th of May, 1993. Yes, tab -- it's found in tab 21, and it
17 outlines in part -- or describes in part the operation General -- General
18 Zivanovic and the Drina Corps were involved in. Not all parts are
19 relevant, but there are selected paragraphs in here that are relevant.
20 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, we will move on, and I'm interested in having you
21 generally describe, based on the documentation that you've seen, and how it
22 was that the army reported to the highest civilian structures in the
23 Republika Srpska. How did they do that?
24 A. From the Krajina Corps documents that I've reviewed, there was a
25 very detailed reporting chain that ran from brigade level, low-level units
1 of the corps, to the corps command. General Talic issued instructions that
2 brigades were to report twice a day. I know that there were notebooks and
3 documents at the corps command in which references were made to brigade
4 activity. The 1st Krajina Corps itself was ordered to send combat reports,
5 regular combat reports, and in the documents that I reviewed in 1992, the
6 1st Krajina Corps generally sent two reports a day, sometimes three, and
7 infrequently one. I don't remember of one day in 1992 that the 5th Corps,
8 when it was the 5th Corps/1st Krajina Corps did not send a daily combat
9 report to its superior formation. Those regular combat reports were all
10 structured in the same way, covering enemy activity, situation on the
11 territory, logistic issues, manning issues, and any special problems that
12 had arisen. Those daily combat reports, when the 1st Krajina Corps was
13 established, went to the VRS Main Staff. And as I say, they generally went
14 two and sometimes -- or very frequently twice -- three times.
15 There were occasionally special reports that they sent up to the
16 Main Staff; I saw a small -- a small number of those. I saw some
17 documentary evidence that related to briefings that the corps commanders
18 had to give. I know of one example in documentary evidence that was a
19 briefing to the senior political leadership that the corps commanders had
20 to give in, I believe, early June 1992. There were requests for maps
21 occasionally. And those were some of the ways that I know that the reports
22 went from the ground through the corps up to the Main Staff.
23 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, do we take a break at --
24 JUDGE ORIE: We do take a break at --
25 MR. HARMON: 5.45.
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- approximately this time. We'll have a break for
2 20 minutes and resume at five minutes past 6.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 6.16 p.m.
5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Harmon, there would be a
7 possibility to sit tomorrow and the day after tomorrow in the morning. I
8 also am aware that that sometimes creates problems as far as visiting Mr.
9 Krajisnik is concerned. Therefore, I inquire with the parties whether that
10 would be something they would support or object.
11 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, I can indicate it's something I
12 would not support.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I think that's a sufficient reason to
14 remain in the afternoon.
15 Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
16 MR. HARMON:
17 Q. Mr. Brown, what I'd be interested in hearing from you is what
18 your -- what the documents that you reviewed showed as to how the army,
19 either at the corps level or at the Main Staff level, communicated to the
20 civilian structures, the Presidency and the political leaders above them.
21 A. I am aware of some documentary evidence that would highlight some
22 of the methods in which they were able to communicate to the senior --
23 senior political leadership. If we -- or if I draw your attention to the
24 report on the army in 1993, there are a number of references in that
25 document that would indicate that there was a good communication between
1 the -- the army and the senior political leadership.
2 Page -- page 9, which we have already seen before, "With a high
3 degree of certainty we can say that the existing communications system
4 meets the needs of command, coordination, and reporting needs at all levels
5 from Supreme Command, Supreme Commander, and General Staff." We've seen
6 that before.
7 Page 13, the fourth bullet down, under the general heading of
8 "Control and command functions," "which have been implemented through the
9 establishment and maintenance of permanent and mutually beneficial
10 cooperation with the authorities, the SDS, the Serbian Orthodox Church at
11 all levels."
12 Page 29, we've seen before, which was the issue of
13 communications and the signals units, and they were set the task of the
14 prompt transmission of large quantities of information from the Main Staff
15 of the army to the Supreme Command, subordinated elements, and so on. And
16 they later on say that they -- they had judged that they had been able to
17 meet those tasks and that the corps' signal system and communication was
18 very good.
19 Page 153, we've seen that -- that one before, as well, I think,
20 from Dr. Karadzic, who himself articulated that "The Supreme Command as a
21 whole, as well as every individual member of the Supreme Command, were
22 informed of the objectives of planned operations, concerted battles, and
23 their results frequently in great detail." So this document would seem to
24 highlight that there -- there was a -- a relationship between the military
25 -- that both the military are saying that it functioned, Dr. Karadzic said
1 that it functioned.
2 But I am aware of other documentation, some documentation that
3 would indicate meetings, the Presidency session, minutes which discussed
4 military or defence-related issues, the briefing of members of that --
5 those -- those sessions by military officers. And so there are -- there is
6 other documentation in it that would seem to echo what was said in 1993.
7 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I have selected a number of
8 Presidency session minutes that Mr. Brown has reviewed. Those are found in
9 tabs 22 through 36 of the binders. They -- it splits between binder 1 and
10 binder 2. I shall not go through all of those items, but I'd like to
11 direct Mr. Brown's attention to three of those session minutes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And you present the other as contextual exhibits,
14 MR. HARMON: They're already in evidence, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: They're already in evidence. Yes, yes.
16 MR. HARMON: So it's not a problem.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I've forgotten to check on the list. Yes.
18 MR. HARMON:
19 Q. If I could, Mr. Brown, in the first binder, if we could start
20 with tab 24 of the first binder in front of you --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas.
22 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, Your Honour. I just want to indicate to the
23 Court in relation to the documents that Mr. Harmon's referring to -- and
24 when one looks at the exhibit list associated with these binders, I can
25 indicate that I first became aware of these political exhibits when I got
1 this list when I came into court today.
2 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, if I may respond. I'm not sure when
3 that list was sent to Ms. Loukas. These exhibits I'm referring to are old
4 exhibits. They have been the subject of examination and cross-examination
5 in Mr. Treanor's evidence. These are documents that I believe Ms. Loukas
6 has in front of her at the very moment we're talking. These documents are
7 not a mystery.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, that's not the only criterion, whether
9 it's a mystery or not. Is it material used in the footnotes in the report?
10 Could we perhaps ask the witness the minutes of the Presidency sessions.
11 Are they footnoted material?
12 THE WITNESS: I believe they're not in the report, Your Honour.
13 I'd have to check again. Maybe --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 THE WITNESS: -- at the very end they could have been, but I'm
16 not sure if they are. I don't think they are.
17 MR. HARMON: However, Your Honour there, is reference to direct
18 communication and information to the higher-ups in and throughout the
19 report of the army, in Mr. Brown's report.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Nevertheless, it's to be preferred, Mr.
21 Harmon, that if you want to -- I mean, the material is of such a volume by
22 now that -- if it were only for Ms. Loukas to find the material and bring
23 it with her -- and I'm not saying this because that's, of course, not the
24 main issue because we could present it on the ELMO. But for preparation
25 purpose, it's good if these lists -- I mean, just looking at this list,
1 whether it bears a date or not ...
2 Well, let's see what happens, but it's clear that this is not
3 the best way to do it. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, perhaps I'm -- may I ask you another
6 question: Do I understand from your present position that you would live
7 not too far away from this Tribunal?
8 THE WITNESS: You're very correct, Your Honour; I don't live too
9 far away.
10 JUDGE ORIE: That at least, Ms. Loukas, if it would finally
11 cause you major problems, would make a decision when needed to recall the
12 witness on this material easier than it would be if he would live in --
13 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed, Your Honour. But I can -- I just very
14 briefly want to indicate for the record that, of course, my preparation was
15 based on the report.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MS. LOUKAS: It's based on -- and, of course, I went through all
18 the documents and footnotes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but Ms. Loukas, I think I've been clear enough
20 until now.
21 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. Mr. Brown, if we could turn to the 24th -- tab 24. And I'm going
25 to refer to two other tabs, and then I'm going to ask you some questions.
1 This 5th Session of the Presidency was held on the 10th of June, indicates
2 that members of -- that the following members were present: Dr. Karadzic,
3 Dr. Plavsic, Dr. Koljevic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Branko Djeric. And it
4 says, "At the beginning of the session, the Presidency reviewed information
5 received during the night on the situation at the front and reports of the
6 international public foreign press?"
7 And if we turn to tab 32 - that's found in the second binder -
8 the beginning of the second binder. Mr. Brown, this is the -- this is --
9 these are the minutes of the 21st Session of the Presidency. They were
10 held on the 2nd of August, 1992, and it says at the top that the session
11 was attended by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Dr. Miljana, as printed, Plavsic, Dr.
12 Nikola Koljevic, Lieutenant Ratko Mladic, and it also refers to Mr.
13 Krajisnik as being present, although not in the top paragraph. In item 1 -
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, if you would look at the original,
16 perhaps that might ...
17 MR. HARMON: I do not have the original, unfortunately, in front
18 of me in this binder.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, from what I see, it's tab 32 on the original.
20 If I look at the names at the top, it's Radovan Karadzic, Miljana - so that
21 means that it's the same document with the same mistake - Dr. Nikola
22 Koljevic, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, and then comes Ratko Mladic and Tolimir.
23 MR. HARMON: All right. Well, thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: So I invite the parties to correct this obvious
25 mistake. Ms. Loukas, I take it that you agree with that.
1 MS. LOUKAS: Well, yes, absolutely, Your Honour. I've checked
2 the B/C/S version myself, and it's quite apparent.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. If we turn to item 2 on the second page, Mr. Brown, it says, "On
6 the basis of the condition and assessment of the political situation
7 presented, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic briefed those present on the
8 assessment of the military situation in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9 describing the situation in each combat sector, the necessary tasks, and
10 the connection between ensuring material potentials and financial resources
11 and the necessity of adopting the decision on general mobilisation."
12 At the end of that paragraph, it also discusses that the
13 president of the republic should issue an order, a proclamation on general
15 And the final one of these minutes I'd like to refer you to is
16 found in tab 35.1. This has previously been exhibited as P64. This is the
17 22nd Session of the Presidency held on the 31st of August, 1992. The
18 Presidency session -- the session was attended by the following members of
19 the Presidency: Dr. Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Dr. Biljana
20 Plavsic, Dr. Branko Djeric, and Dr. Nikola Koljevic and Dr. -- I'm sorry,
21 Deputy Prime Minister Milan Trbojevic." If we go to the bottom of page 1
22 of the English translation, it says, "During the session of the Presidency,
23 representatives of the army of the Serbian Republic, Colonel General Ratko
24 Mladic and Major General Milan Gvero arrived. Generals briefed the
25 Presidency in detail on military and strategic questions, state and
1 position of military units, their equipment, and other questions, such as
2 the need for the relocation of the Main Staff and highest authority organs
3 to more suitable places."
4 Can you comment, Mr. Brown, on these minutes and the other
5 minutes that you have seen in respect of the communications?
6 A. I think they are on face value somewhat self-evident in that or
7 self-explanatory that the senior military leadership are briefing the
8 Presidency, sometimes in -- in significant detail, and -- and that would
9 seem to echo some of the comments from the army report in 1993.
10 Q. Can we turn to tab 38, please, Mr. Brown. 38 is a 9 June 1992
11 report from the command of the 1st Krajina Corps. It is sent to the
12 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina army Main Staff and to the
13 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency. So this document --
14 what is this document, Mr. Brown? Explain this to the Judges.
15 A. This document, which I do reference in the report, is a document
16 -- in summary, there had been a meeting of the Autonomous Region of Krajina
17 at which the issue of Muslims and Croats who were serving in the army, and
18 in particular, I think, the 1st Krajina Corps, had come up at a -- at a
19 meeting of the -- the ARK Crisis Staff. And there had been a -- an
20 ultimatum issued that these Muslims and Croats, 67 I think are highlighted
21 here, should be removed or they say they would take over control of the
22 armed forces; "they" presumably meaning the local ARK leadership.
23 This report comes from the 1st Krajina Corps, and it's signed by
24 Colonel Milutin Vukelic, who is the assistant commander for morale; he was
25 a staff officer under General Talic, the corps commander. And he's
1 reporting to the Presidency and to the Main Staff about this meeting, and
2 he says that the -- "We consider the demand is justified, but it's
3 impossible to find adequate professional replacements." So although he
4 agrees with the sentiment, there is some implication if 67 officers are
5 presumably going to have to be removed from the 1st Krajina Corps.
6 So he sends this document up on the 9th and asks for, you know,
7 a solution to the -- to the problem. On the same day, I think this
8 document, if I remember rightly, was sent sometime in the afternoon. Yes,
9 I think it's sent in the afternoon. I believe on the same day, the Main
10 Staff, Ratko Mladic, sent an order down sending all officers of non-Serb --
11 or Muslims and Croats, sent them to Belgrade, where their status would be
12 resolved, and in essence that meant that Muslims and Croats who were in the
13 1st Krajina Corps were then removed. But it's of interest that this issue,
14 which clearly was of some significance to the 1st Krajina Corps, is also
15 sent to the Presidency, presumably signifying it's -- it's an important
16 issue. And it also highlights that the corps had a capability of
17 disseminating a report to the Presidency, again highlighting maybe the
18 communication issue that we've talked about in the VRS Main Staff report
19 that it was a functioning communications system.
20 And in this case, the response from the Main Staff was very
21 quick, and -- and I think it was on the very same day that the response was
22 that these non-Serbs were to be sent to Belgrade and their status resolved.
23 Again, indicating that not only was the communication up the chain quick
24 but that the communication and the response back down the chain was pretty
25 quick, as well, on issues of -- of some importance, presumably, to the
2 Q. Can we return to tab 37.1, Mr. Brown. And staying with the topic
3 of keeping the political leadership of the Republika Srpska informed by the
4 army itself, can you discuss this document, which is dated the 1st of June,
5 which is entitled "A meeting of the corps commanders," and it is signed by
6 the Chief of Staff, General -- Major General Milan Milovanovic. Can you
7 tell us what this document is.
8 A. Yes. This is a document which is sent to the corps from the Main
9 Staff indicating that "Pursuant to a decision of the Presidency and the
10 Main Staff of the army, a meeting of the political leadership of the
11 republic and the military commanders was to be held in Pale on the 3rd of
12 June." And this instruction orders -- this is an order actually -- orders
13 that the corps commanders and the commanders of the Air Force and air
14 defence were to attend that meeting and to prepare a briefing, which
15 included a map indicating troop dispositions within the corps, state of
16 affairs, composition, manpower, disposition, enemy intentions, proposals
17 for further activities, and problems. So it's not only the current state
18 but -- but the difficulties that the corps had and also suggestions for
19 further activities. And each corps commander was to last -- was to give a
20 briefing to that effect, and it goes to all the corps.
21 This -- this document indicates that the briefing was to be on
22 the 3rd of June. There's another Krajina Corps document, dated the 9th of
23 June, which makes direct reference to a directive which the corps had
24 received from the Main Staff and which they themselves were following or --
25 or carrying out. Now, I haven't seen that directive but they clearly had
1 got a directive round about maybe the 8th, 7th or 8th, or maybe even on the
2 9th of June. And it is possible, and I only suggest here, that what you
3 have is the Main Staff ordering the corps or the corps commanders to attend
4 a briefing pursuant to a decision of the Presidency and the Main Staff,
5 i.e., the senior political leadership, the senior military leadership, at
6 which they themselves were to brief in some detail. And then a few days
7 later there's a reference to a directive which came out, and that the 1st
8 Krajina Corps followed that directive. And I know they followed the
9 directive because we have General Talic's corps-wide instructions on the
10 9th and 10th of June.
11 So it may well be a pattern that what there was a request to --
12 to the corps, a briefing in -- on the 3rd of June, and potentially what
13 fell from that briefing was a directive a few days later, and what fell
14 from that directive was combat operations that the corps conducted --
15 certainly the 1st Krajina Corps conducted.
16 Q. Mr. Brown, can we turn to tab 40, please. Again, on the issue of
17 meetings between the military and the political leadership. This is a
18 document that is dated the 12th of September, 1992. It is to the command
19 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Can you tell the Judges what this document
20 is about, very briefly.
21 A. Yes. This is a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document disseminated, I
22 believe, to the subordinate units of that corps, which highlights that
23 there was a meeting that had happened on the 6th of September, 1992, in
24 Jahorina, attended by the SRK command, brigade commanders, presidents of
25 Municipal Assemblies, chief of municipal recruiting officers, members of
1 the Main Staff, and members of the government and Presidency of the Serbian
3 Now, I believe that this, although the SRK is not necessarily my
4 area of expertise, I believe this came around the time that General Galic
5 took control of the SRK. I think he -- he had arrived in or around that
6 time period. So, clearly, the change of command of the SRK would have been
7 some -- of some significance, and it may well have been that one of the
8 reasons why this briefing had happened was because of this important change
9 of command in the corps. But it makes reference to a meeting that happened
10 in Jahorina on the 6th, and it discussed the issue of tasks. In essence,
11 we received tasks from the conference, so we received tasks from the -- the
12 conference on military and political matters with all those individuals.
13 And General Galic outlines what those tasks are. And they're -- they're
14 quite lengthy and quite detailed.
15 Q. Mr. Brown -- Mr. Brown, we won't go, I don't think, any further
16 with this document unless there's another important feature you want to
17 point out to the Judges.
18 A. Maybe the only issue I would highlight reflects back to this
19 issue of the strategic goals of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, which by then
20 was to maintain a blockade. And -- and the tasks are given, which seem to
21 indicate, you know, they're to continue with decisive defence. So not
22 necessarily going on a defensive position but they're holding the territory
23 that they already had. Maybe that that could link back to this issue of
24 the strategic goals and keeping the blockade maintained in Sarajevo.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you know that the Judges are always a
1 bit behind. Could I take the witness back to tab 35.1.
2 At the end of that document, after the briefing by the Generals
3 Mladic and Gvero, it reads, "All details were discussed, but they were not
4 put on the record because of their level of confidentiality." Is that
5 language you have found at other occasions, as well?
6 THE WITNESS: I cannot remember that language being used, Your
7 Honour. I noticed it was also in the previous Presidency, where Mladic
8 briefed, but the details were not put in into the minutes. It's -- it's
9 not something that I remember in other -- in other documents.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Was the situation at that time such that
11 information on what happened militarily was very sensitive -- I mean, I do
12 understand that military operational information is always sensitive, but
13 was there any reason to assume that it was specifically sensitive at that
15 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't like to make any projections on that,
16 Your Honour. I'm not sure why.
17 JUDGE ORIE: If you don't know, no problem.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
19 MR. HARMON:
20 Q. In respect of what the Judge -- Judge Orie, has just asked, I
21 would refer you, Mr. Brown, to page 45, I believe of this army report,
22 paragraph 2.1.1, which is the attitude of the international community to
23 the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and the war in the territory of the
24 former BH. And it -- this paragraph says that the -- "The situation in the
25 former Yugoslavia in the fullest expression of which was the civil ethnic
1 religious war in the territory of the former BH was the focus of media
2 attention and diplomatic and political activities," and it goes on.
3 And then further down in the paragraph, that same paragraph, it
4 says, "The Serbian people, who were subjected to inconceivable
5 demonisation, the unscrupulous information and propaganda war in almost all
6 of the powerful states of the world, in particular the orchestrated
7 planting of lies about alleged massacres of civilians, the bombardment of
8 civilian facilities, POW camps, ethnic cleansing, the raping of women, and
9 other media fabrication served to project a distorted picture of the
10 national interests of the Serbian people and the alleged indisputable
11 responsibility of the Serbs for all the horrors of the war in the territory
12 of the former BH. International public opinion was largely turned against
13 the Serbs."
14 Now, Mr. Brown, you stated in your report - I believe it is in
15 paragraph 2.248, which is at 154 of your report - that the international
16 press, "who appeared to be generally as anti-Serb and particularly singled
17 out for criticism."
18 Mr. Brown, was the army, based on your review of the documents,
19 sensitive, in the period of August, September, and earlier, to the
20 criticisms it was receiving by the international media?
21 A. Yes. And -- and I would say in some documents it's not just that
22 -- necessarily that time, but there is this undercurrent that -- that there
23 was -- the international press were -- were misreporting. But in terms of
24 August, in particular in relation to camps, I know of one document in
25 particular from the Krajina Corps which they specifically point to the
1 criticisms of the international press about the existence of what they call
2 concentration camps and the negative impact that that is having. So yes,
3 they were. And it's clear, I think, from the Krajina Corps, certainly, the
4 documents there, that the military were acutely aware of -- of the media
5 reporting and, in fact, established their own press centre. Well, in fact,
6 the VRS established press centres throughout the area of responsibility,
7 but the Krajina Corps had its press centre in which it was both providing
8 information which they say could counter that and -- and presumably also
9 making them aware of what the international media were doing.
10 Q. Can we turn your attention, Mr. Brown, to tab 41 on that very
11 topic. Mr. Brown, this is a previous Prosecution exhibit, Prosecution 583,
12 Trbojevic, tab 58. If I could direct your attention. This is a 6th August
13 1992 document from the 1st Krajina Corps command, Department of -- for
14 Intelligence and Security Affairs, and it is signed by Chief Colonel Stevan
15 Bogojevic, and it says "the 5th Corps Command," which obviously in August
16 was no longer in existence, was it, Mr. Brown?
17 A. No. I'm assuming they were just required to keep the stamps and
18 used the stamp --
19 Q. Can you --
20 A. To the security of the corps.
21 Q. Can you comment on this document, and particularly the --
22 A. Well, this was -- yeah, this was the document I referred to. And
23 they realised there were a lot of people in Manjaca that don't deserve to
24 be there, don't deserve to be treated as prisoners of war, don't have
25 weapons, didn't participate in combat, they were not in uniform, and in
1 order to free up space, they're asking the Prijedor police to -- to, in
2 essence, review these -- these prisoners. And it highlights at the end the
3 -- "As you know, we have recently been attacked by the European world media
4 in connection with the existence of concentration camps. So this is
5 sufficient reason to carry out this selection." And I think this comes
6 around the time that the issue of camps had arisen in the media in
7 Prijedor, around that first week -- first week in April.
8 So it seems to me that the security chief of the corps is aware
9 that many people in Manjaca, which is a camp that the 1st Krajina Corps
10 ran, didn't deserve to be treated as prisoners of war.
11 MS. LOUKAS: Just in relation to that, before we proceed, in
12 view of the fact that there's been reading from the document, and to make
13 the record clear, of course "concentration camp" appears in quotation
15 JUDGE ORIE: It does.
16 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. In the final analysis -- in your final analysis, Mr. Brown, in
19 terms of what was available to the -- the VRS from the corps level to the
20 Main Staff, the army in general, and to the political superiors, was there
21 sufficient communication equipment and infrastructures to prevent them to
22 receive information from outside in respect of what was happening in Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina as a result of their actions?
24 MS. LOUKAS: I object to that question. It's quite clear that
25 the report on which the witness was brought here to give evidence is one
1 that's very specifically delineated to a particular area and a particular
2 time frame and what have you. Now, as a result of the additional exhibit
3 list this morning, we have a more broader scope of evidence being brought
4 out from this witness, and the -- the question that's being asked there,
5 Your Honour, I would submit the witness should not be allowed to answer on
6 the basis of what he has already indicated are the limitations of the
7 report he actually produced for the Court.
8 JUDGE ORIE: What limits exactly -- of course, the witness said
9 some limitations he has drawn our attention to, but what exactly would here
10 prevent him from having any knowledge?
11 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, the report is "Military developments
12 in the Bosanska Krajina 1992."
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MS. LOUKAS: This is a more broader question about the situation
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The documents that are being examined by this
16 witness are specifically delineated in this report. The limitations of the
17 report are specifically delineated in the report, as were circumscribed by
18 the evidence he gave earlier today in his evidence in chief about the
20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, it's --
21 MS. LOUKAS: It's broadening, Your Honour; I object to it.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Ms. Loukas, of course sometimes subjects are
23 -- I mean, information you receive from -- for example, from foreign press
24 or foreign -- could relate to military matters, as well. So let's ask the
25 witness whether he thinks that the limitations he has mentioned at the
1 beginning of his testimony are such that he has difficulties in answering
2 the question, and perhaps he could also explain to us that if he thinks he
3 can answer the question, how this related, both, to his subject and why
4 it's not bothered by the limitations he expressed.
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I -- I did highlight the limitations
6 of the report, but I -- I have worked in that field for some time. I was
7 within the military analysis team looking at military documentation between
8 1998 and last year. Many of the documents I use in the report also do --
9 or a number of documents do speak to the issue of communications. The
10 combat analysis, readiness report of 1993 is a document I've looked over
11 many times. And, you know, as best I can I think I can comment on -- on
12 some of that material. Some of the documents that I have not included
13 which I've commented on, I don't think are ones that are necessarily
14 outside my -- my scope, and I believe I -- I can -- I can cover those.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you may give the comments you have in mind.
17 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat the question for me, please.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 Mr. Harmon.
20 MR. HARMON:
21 Q. Mr. Brown, what I asked you is whether the communications
22 structures and infrastructure in the Republika Srpska that was extant could
23 permit and did permit the Main Staff -- VRS army members from the Main
24 Staff, down to the corps level, and up to the Supreme Command and superior
25 civilian command to be aware of the various serious criticisms that were
1 being made against the Serbs in respect of their conduct in pursuing the
3 A. Yes, I think the communications structures were there. The
4 communications structures worked; they themselves said the communications
5 structures were very good. There are documents which seem to bear that out
6 in the passage of information up and down the chain. The Presidency
7 minutes would indicate that, at least in the one you've just shown me, that
8 the international media issue was briefed and raised. The army themselves
9 made note of concerns they had relating to the international media. And so
10 I would say yes, they -- they were able to be made aware of this issue.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
12 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. It's 7.00, and --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm just looking at the clock.
14 MR. HARMON: -- I'm prepared to conclude for the day.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll finish for the day.
16 I have one issue I'd just like briefly to address, but a very
17 minor one, I would say.
18 Ms. Loukas, the Chamber has asked questions in relation to the
19 Celinac and Teslic dossiers and wanted to know who Milos was. You remember
21 MS. LOUKAS: Oh yes, Your Honour, yes. I recall that issue.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We have considered that, and with this information,
23 the Chamber accepts these parts of the dossiers, admits them into evidence.
24 And as you know, one week after admission you always can comment on it
25 because the dossiers, of course, are not discussed with witnesses. So on
1 this issue, the decision of the Chamber is they are only now -- you
2 remember, we had additional questions?
3 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. I'm just reading it on the --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I might not be that clear at this moment.
5 Usually the Chamber receives the documentation, the dossiers; we admit them
6 into evidence, but we grant one week to the Defence to make further
7 objections or observations.
8 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed, Your Honour.
9 I would indicate, just in relation to this -- this question of
10 Milos. Your Honour will recall that I cross-examined a witness in relation
11 to a document involving that particular individual, and it -- we left it as
12 marked for identification. So at some point we'll have to tender that
13 formally now that the identity of Milos has been established.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the other one was the Chamber has asked
15 the Prosecution to clarify the relevance of tab 2 and the highlighted
16 portions of tab 5 in the Novi Grad dossier. The OTP has now clarified that
17 tab 2 was included to show the presence of the accused at a meeting,
18 because someone says that Mr. Krajisnik was at a meeting; not the meeting
19 reported on, but it's part of what is said during that meeting.
20 And the second issue to be that in respect of tab 5, that only
21 the highlighted portions of tab 5 were tendered. That means that it's
22 limited to the first four pages because as far as I can see, only in the
23 first four pages of tab 5 there appear any highlights.
24 The Chamber with these limitations admits into evidence, Ms.
25 Loukas, and, as usual, seven days for the Defence to make objections in
1 that respect.
2 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. And I would indicate
3 that at some point this week because I know there is so question of
4 finalising documentation; I also have that material in relation to 280 to
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then receive that at an appropriate
7 time. You know the week is short; it goes only to Wednesday.
8 MS. LOUKAS: Oh, indeed, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then adjourn.
10 Mr. Brown, I'd like to instruct you not to speak with anyone
11 about the testimony you have given or you're still about to give, and we'd
12 like to see you back tomorrow at quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon, same
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of
17 July, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.