1 Friday, 5 May 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.12 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.

6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honour. This is case number

8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10 Before we resume the examination-in-chief, two small technical

11 matters. First of all we discussed yesterday the -- I would say the easy

12 accessible storage of exhibits. I hope I was not over optimistic when I

13 said it should not be too difficult to get them on -- in an easy,

14 accessible way, just as the Judges -- by the way, by doing the work,

15 themselves, and within the team, got them from the judicial database where

16 they are accessible but less easy accessible compared to where we put them

17 now, just in a folder on our computers. We are still working on it to see

18 whether not the accessibility but the easy accessibility could be made

19 available to the parties as well. That's point one. I can't give you any

20 promise but it has my attention and we are looking at it. It's altogether

21 three gigabytes so we hope we can handle it but it's certainly not to be

22 done just by one CD. It's far more.

23 Second. I did understand that sometimes if a B/C/S copy fails on

24 our easy, accessible folder, Mr. Registrar is friendly enough to then

25 provide me as an annex through an e-mail that B/C/S original so that I can

1 consult it on my computer. I do understand that if he does that, he sends

2 at the same time a copy to the Defence as well. So it's just a matter of

3 opening the attachment to your e-mail that arrives at that very same

4 moment and it's available for the parties. You may understand that we are

5 trying to accommodate to the extent possible, practically possible,

6 because we would not, for example, do for the Defence or the Prosecution

7 again the work if it could not be copied right away, to take it from the

8 judicial database, copy it into a special folder, because that is

9 time-consuming and takes overtime from our staff.

10 Second issue, Mr. Krajisnik, you have provided Mr. Registrar with

11 an electronic copy of some of the documents we discussed yesterday, among

12 them the blue map, also to make it available to the Defence once the

13 formalities are fulfilled you'll receive the CD-ROM on which these

14 documents appear.

15 These are the practical matters I would like to -- not to discuss

16 but at least to announce at this very moment.

17 Mr. Stewart.

18 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I did ask for the opportunity

19 just to raise a couple of points on that area for this reason that

20 sometimes Your Honour we spend a few minutes in court but actually a great

21 deal of sometimes has to be spent out of court as the alternative in

22 communicating A with B, B with C, and so on. So sometimes it's easier to

23 deal with it when everybody is here and listening at the same time.

24 Your Honour is absolutely right about the difficulties of the JDB.

25 I'm not quite clear. I hadn't understood that the material went from the

1 JDB to the Trial Chamber. I thought it might be the other way around.

2 JUDGE ORIE: We copy it.

3 MR. STEWART: Well, yes, Your Honour. So when it goes from

4 somewhere then on to the JDB is --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, the Registry at this moment -- the

6 Registry is responsible for, I would say, filling the JDB and they are

7 doing their utmost best to have everything on the judicial database but

8 have not completed. We are thinking in terms of, for exhibits I think

9 it's 80 per cent by now or even more. So most of the exhibits are on the

10 judicial database, and once they are there we copy them in such a way to

11 our own computers that they are easy accessible. I wouldn't say that the

12 judicial database is not easy accessible but not as easy as just having

13 them in one folder under the exhibit number on your own PC, which takes me

14 approximately five seconds to get them on my screen.

15 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, the -- I think we probably all

16 appreciate that the JDB, the problem is it takes to locate a document and

17 then download it on to one's own hard disk takes a couple of minutes or so

18 per document, and if there are thousands of documents obviously that's an

19 awful lot of personnel. So that's the reason that's not practical.

20 JUDGE ORIE: In our team they do it more quickly. First of all

21 it's not thousands of documents but exhibits is approximately 11, 1200.

22 MR. STEWART: With due respect, Your Honour, it is thousands

23 because some of the exhibits themselves contain very large numbers of

24 documents. It is thousands of documents. Your Honour, with respect,

25 that's an indisputable fact.

1 JUDGE ORIE: But you copy a file, not a document.

2 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon, Your Honour. I'm sorry, I'm lost

3 here, Your Honour. The individual documents are on individual files but

4 Your Honour we are debating something futile here. It's an awful lot of

5 documents.

6 JUDGE ORIE: That work has been done and if possible it will be

7 made available to you. If not possible, unfortunately, you'll have to do

8 the same as we had to do, that is to copy it.

9 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, that's really my point,

10 Your Honour. That would, with respect that would be absurd, that we end

11 up with my team or anybody's team having to do that work all over again.

12 I entirely accept Your Honour's point that there is also no reason why

13 lots of overtime should be done to service us but Your Honour --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I asked yesterday the one's who did it

15 and said it took me several hours, yes.

16 MR. STEWART: To do what, with respect?

17 JUDGE ORIE: To do the copying.

18 MR. STEWART: Of?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Of the documents from the judicial database to their

20 own computers.

21 MR. STEWART: I don't know what to say, Your Honour. I speak to

22 my team who belong to the same human race as Your Honour's team.

23 JUDGE ORIE: We are trying to do our utmost best. You say it's a

24 problem. Okay, let's just assume that we could not achieve that. What

25 would then be your comment?

1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm trying to get -- I do have some

2 technical knowledge of this, Your Honour, but I'm trying to get, with

3 respect, just a little bit to the bottom of it. It appears that the

4 Registry, the first stage of the process, the Registry have the material

5 in some usable, accessible form, before it goes on the judicial database

6 if they put something on to the judicial database.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I can imagine that you would say we would like to see

8 to get it copied already at that early stage and see whether that can be

9 done. That's beyond at this moment my possibilities. I take it as a

10 matter of fact that if that would have been possible that we would have

11 used that facility as well. But please first discuss and see -- but let's

12 first see if we can make the easy copy. If not, then please discuss the

13 matter with the Registry whether there is a possibility to find a solution

14 there. If not, we could come back to it and see whether the Chamber could

15 further assist. But this is an area in which I feel the Chamber could not

16 be of great help because these are operations which are beyond not only

17 our control but even beyond our knowledge.

18 MR. STEWART: Well sometimes I must say, Your Honour, occasionally

19 some of the operations are beyond comprehension. But in this particular

20 instance -- I mean, that may be a limit on my own comprehension but,

21 Your Honour, the -- can I -- something that is, we suggest, within the

22 remit of the Trial Chamber by way of authority. One must perhaps bear in

23 mind the judicial database and what we are talking about now really are

24 slightly different things. The judicial database has a wider purpose and

25 enables people on one case to have material on another case. The really

1 compelling priority for this case, Your Honour, is that the Trial Chamber

2 in this case and the parties in this case should have this material as

3 quickly as possible to deal with this case over the remaining period.

4 Your Honour, one illustration of the point or one aspect of that is that

5 we have been told, for example, that we would not be given exhibits which

6 are -- where their admission is pending. Your Honour, from the point of

7 view of this case, that really isn't very practical. Given apart from

8 anything else the very rare instances where an exhibit which is pending is

9 not ultimately exhibited, there would seem no practical reason for that

10 limitation, that everything would be helpful to the parties and indeed to

11 the Trial Chamber to have at this point. So would Your Honour -- well,

12 first of all would Your Honour agree with that. If Your Honour's

13 indicated that, then no doubt because there shouldn't be a technical

14 problem. No doubt that would assist or encourage the Registry to say,

15 well, yes, that limitation can go.

16 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider the matter. I have to note, however,

17 at this moment that one of the important reasons for not admitting

18 exhibits very often, exhibits still pending, is that they are not

19 translated which, of course, could cause some problem as well. Sometimes

20 you have the B/C/S, sometimes you have the English, but we'll consider the

21 matter and --

22 MR. STEWART: It's not a problem for us, Your Honour. That's the

23 thing. It's a reason why -- of course, they shouldn't appear on the JDB

24 until everything has been sorted out and they have been admitted but after

25 all, this stuff normally comes from the parties in the first place. So

1 for us to actually have it in usable form, in the same usable form, or the

2 most usable form that anybody else has got it, which is really all we are

3 asking and we are only asking for stuff to be copied over to us. If

4 somebody in this building has material in a usable, accessible form, there

5 doesn't seem to be any earthly reason why it simply shouldn't be copied

6 over on to whatever medium, whether it's DVD or external hard drive, we

7 request.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I do not know whether they are already scanned once

9 they have not yet been admitted. That might be the reason. But as I

10 said, we will consider the matter and we'll see whether we can accommodate

11 the parties to the best of our abilities. Anything else, Mr. Stewart?

12 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, only that Mr. Haider, who has

13 been very helpful, knows that we particularly if it's at all possible to

14 put this stuff on, if it's going to be a DVD, it seems that may be

15 adequate for this material, to have it today would be of tremendous

16 assistance.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Stewart, I worked on the matter yesterday

18 late, 8.00, 9.00, with Mr. Zahar and Mr. -- it's really -- you should

19 appreciate that I immediately and intensively pay attention to it and to

20 try to resolve the matter as soon as possible. Don't push me any further.

21 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour I'm not inviting --

22 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, no I think, you, Mr. Stewart --

23 MR. STEWART: I was going to express appreciation for

24 Your Honour's work on this.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 MR. STEWART: And we have made our contribution. But I'm not

2 asking Your Honours to do the DVD copying. I'm just asking for a DVD.

3 It's five minutes, generally. I'm certainly not asking Your Honour to do

4 that. That would be insolent of me and I don't.

5 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Stewart.

6 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, may I say something? You

10 said that I had sent a CD. You told me to get a draft of the constitution

11 yesterday. I provided it on paper but also on CD, so that it can be given

12 to my Defence team and they could make copies for both you and the Office

13 of the Prosecutor because I have only one copy, one hard copy, so you have

14 that both on paper and on CD, including the two maps.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's -- and it goes through the -- and

16 whatever comes out of the detention unit has to fulfil all the formal

17 requirements but I don't think it will take much time. Mr. Registrar

18 informed me that he received it and it will be processed as usual.

19 Yes, please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I just inquire of Mr. Krajisnik --

21 Q. The CD with maps on that Your Honour referred to a few minutes

22 ago, I don't know whether Mr. Krajisnik can answer this but Mr. Krajisnik

23 gave me some time ago a CD with a number of maps on. Do you understand,

24 Mr. Krajisnik, we are talking about the same material?

25 A. We are probably talking about the same material. That's

1 yesterday's map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a map of Sarajevo, and some maps

2 taken from the book of Mr. -- Lord Owen, the Balkan Odyssey and, of

3 course, a draft of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was adopted

4 as a draft on the 28th of February. It turned out yesterday that that

5 document was necessary. I wanted you to have that CD in order to have the

6 draft.

7 Q. Well, thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.

8 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm sure we will sort all this out.

9 JUDGE ORIE: You'll receive it within one or more hours and you

10 will be able to look at what the content is. Please proceed.

11 MR. STEWART: That's very helpful, Your Honour. That's greatly

12 appreciated. Thank you.

13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to turn to -- because it relates to the

14 Cutileiro stuff that we were talking about yesterday, I'm going to turn to

15 the 8th assembly session of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina which

16 was held on the 25th of February 1992.

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that is P65, tab 93. That's the

18 document. And I've got in the usual way a B/C/S copy for Mr. Krajisnik

19 and I believe the interpreter's booth have it as well.

20 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honour.

21 MR. STEWART: Could I just swap over -- Mr. Krajisnik, may I just

22 swap the copy I've given to you with another copy because it's got an

23 additional note which is for my reference, thank you. These are the

24 copies. Oh, I think I know what Mr. Tieger is going to say.

25 MR. TIEGER: Just a reminder about the ERNs, if you could repeat

1 those, I can check those against the copy we had, as we discussed

2 yesterday.

3 MR. STEWART: Sorry, I thought Mr. Tieger had the information but

4 I'm not complaining. It's SAO 25432. That's the B/C/S. And the English

5 is -- well, it's the same, isn't it? 5434. It's a translation, 5434 to

6 5528. Is that -- that's what you're -- Mr. Tieger is after, I think.

7 MR. TIEGER: Yeah. That was the information. That's certainly

8 the correct -- the same B/C/S that I understand is in evidence. I may

9 have a different English translation, however. So I understand that the

10 English translation in evidence is 00840431 through 0506.

11 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, it's the same situation as

12 yesterday. It's not the same one that I'm working from.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Let's be alert on it.

14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I am alert to it but it was simply too

15 late to redo that work, to make that adjustment. Apologies.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go, please, it's point number -- it's

17 over on page 4 of the English. It's page 5 of the English, I beg your

18 pardon, and it's page 3 of your version. There is briefing on Lisbon

19 talks held on 21st and 22nd February 1992, do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I see that.

21 Q. This meeting was taking place, wasn't it, Mr. Krajisnik,

22 essentially between the two documents that we looked at yesterday, the two

23 different stages of Cutileiro agreement?

24 A. I think if this is the 25th of February, then it should be prior

25 to that first document that was adopted before the 18th of March. This is

1 a discussion that was endorsed in Lisbon.

2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I was just trying to place it. There were -- it

3 says here in the --

4 A. Yes. It is related to the other two documents.

5 Q. But the Lisbon talks which are referred to here on the 21st and

6 22nd of February, those talks had produced the first of those documents we

7 looked at yesterday, hadn't they?

8 A. Yes, yes. That's correct.

9 Q. And the second of those documents, of course, lay in the future at

10 this point, didn't it?

11 A. Excuse me, I'm just saying that I don't know whether this first

12 enactment was adopted at the first meeting in list been or at some other

13 meeting in Lisbon because there were several. But it was certainly in

14 Lisbon that the first document was adopted, the one that we discussed

15 yesterday. That was produced by you.

16 Q. Perhaps to avoid confusion, Mr. Krajisnik, we have seen two

17 versions of this document but it was a -- it was a running discussion,

18 wasn't it, in which there were several different versions of the document

19 from time to time, more than just the two that we've seen in court?

20 A. Yes, yes. I'm talking about the two versions that you presented

21 here yesterday. The first version that highlights the years as a

22 criterion is based on the negotiations that were held in Lisbon. So

23 you're right on that. The second version is based on the negotiations

24 that were held later, in Sarajevo.

25 MR. STEWART: Your Honour the reason I mentioned it is just for

1 example at the foot of page 7 of the English version, Mr. Karadzic, I

2 think it is, refers to second document, and I didn't want it to be

3 supposed that it's as simple as a reference to the second document there

4 being the second document that we are looking at because it is fairly

5 clear this it wasn't and Mr. Krajisnik is confirming that, Your Honours.

6 The --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are quite right, you are quite

8 right, there were several versions and -- well, any way, this has to do

9 with, how should I put this -- the first stage and it relies on the first

10 document.

11 JUDGE ORIE: None of these three judges would ever expect a March

12 document to be discussed in February. So it's -- and we have all the

13 experience that if you prepare a document, that it usually has different

14 versions so that's all obvious. Please proceed.

15 MR. STEWART:

16 Q. At page 10 of the English, Mr. Krajisnik, and it's also page 10 of

17 the Serbian, do you see a point 2 in the margin?

18 A. Yes, I see it.

19 Q. And this is still Mr. Karadzic speaking. He says, "Next -- in

20 their first document, they proposed the 1981 census, the Croats however

21 apparently asked that it be based on the 1971 census while the Muslims

22 suggested the one from 1991, so it probably will be 1981 after all. Next,

23 it was noted in the existing municipalities as well, with minor

24 adjustments which would be clearly documented, (for instance contiguous

25 villages in a Serbian or a Muslim municipality would be joined together

1 and vice versa which is what we are already doing in such a way that

2 municipalities would be ground in a corresponding constituent unit in

3 one -- in which one particular nation had a clear majority." [as read]

4 Mr. Krajisnik, when Mr. Karadzic was saying which is what we are

5 already doing, was in fact the -- a process of contiguous villages being

6 joined together already underway?

7 A. Well, when the plebiscite was carried out, certain peripheral

8 settlements, Serb settlements, also expressed their views at local level,

9 stating that they should be part of a municipality where Serbs are a

10 majority. So that would be right.

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, my question was really whether that was happening

12 anywhere in a practical sense, as opposed to a declaration of intention.

13 A. Well, it was not practically carried through but - how should I

14 put this? - people expressed their will as to what constituent unit they

15 would like to belong to. So what was envisaged here was something that

16 people locally expressed by way of their own will. It wasn't that it was

17 verified as something final. It was an ongoing process.

18 Q. Then if we carry on the next paragraph, Mr. Karadzic says, "A

19 constituent unit may consist of a number of separate parts. There means

20 that the republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina may not have

21 continuous territory. It may have several separate territories and

22 although the map we have drawn up would connect all the parts, the whole

23 of the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would leave the Muslims in five

24 to six enclaves, Croats in two to three." Mr. Krajisnik, did that reflect

25 what you alluded to yesterday afternoon, which was that each -- each of

1 the parties to these discussions was producing its own maps, its own

2 proposals which were in favour, in its own favour?

3 A. Yes, yes. You're right.

4 Q. So it wasn't -- it wasn't so much -- this is right, there wasn't

5 an insistence by the Serbs at that time on continuous territory but that

6 was your negotiating position?

7 A. Yes, you're right. But that came later. The territorial element

8 was introduced too, namely that the parties could agree on an exchange of

9 territories in order to establish continuity, especially for units to

10 consist of several parts. That's something that the Croat side insisted

11 on. They had Posavina and they had a majority in western Herzegovina so

12 it was impossible for those regions to be linked up. But we were

13 certainly ready at that point to find a solution by way of compromise, by

14 peaceful means, although it did not suit us. We would have wanted to have

15 territories that were linked up, but we still agreed to what you read out

16 just now, that this constituent Serb unit did not have to consist of a

17 single whole. That was the first stage of negotiations.

18 Q. If we go on to page 14 of the English and it's page 15 in the

19 Serbian, we find -- and it's Professor Koljevic talking now, we find a

20 paragraph beginning, "Of the major issues." Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, yes, I see it.

22 Q. Mr. Koljevic, of course, was part of the negotiating team. "Of

23 the major issues we failed to ensure the connection with the other

24 segments of the Serbian people and as we repeatedly said of the Croatian

25 people with Croatia as well, because quite naturally, in this, we have a

1 common interest. However, there are indications that that might be

2 possible too." Do you recall, Mr. Krajisnik, is that correct, that there

3 had been indications that it might be possible for you to connect up the

4 different Serb areas?

5 A. This is a major issue. Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina

6 naturally wanted to live together with Croats from Croatia. Serbs from

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to be in Yugoslavia so that

8 they would be with the rest of the Serb people. So what he's saying here

9 is that we did not get what we wanted for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain

10 in Yugoslavia. So implicitly he's saying that we made a compromise so

11 this is a major issue. Implicitly we gave up on Yugoslavia but we got

12 these other things, as Mr. Koljevic says. So my interpretation is that

13 that is it as far as this major issue is concerned. As for

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I can give an answer to your question if you're

15 interested.

16 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, yes, my next question -- well, it says, yes,

17 I am interested.

18 A. There was a series of documents, I'm now talking only about the

19 Serbian side and about the position of the Serbian side. When some sort

20 of preliminary map was drafted, was drawn, we realised that there was not

21 enough connection between Serbian territories, and since the territorial

22 principle applied, we have documents from the time when we had bilateral

23 talks with the Croatian side about certain concessions to be made to them

24 in central Bosnia, in the area of Kupres and concessions to be made to us

25 that would have the purpose of linking our two major enclaves. That was

1 in our interest. Other parties as well expressed their interests.

2 I'll just give you an example. In order to satisfy certain

3 interests, we looked at solutions from Israel, whereby some people would

4 have a passage from their territory into another territory that belonged

5 to them, passing through --

6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, one of the members of my team is suggesting that

7 you are probably going too fast for interpretation or -- and others. You

8 probably -- it's in your own interest, probably, Mr. Krajisnik, to take it

9 a bit slower.

10 A. I always criticise people who spoke fast. I thought -- well, I'll

11 try.

12 I kindly ask you to caution me about this because I really want to

13 speak properly. Thank you for telling me. If you wish, I can repeat

14 something, if there has been any omissions.

15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps just -- if you would just carry on from

16 where you were.

17 A. Well, basically, I was saying that the problem of this linking of

18 territories was less important if Bosnia was an internationally recognised

19 state, and if a constituent unit can be linked up and we could have if we

20 were to barter certain territories with the Croats or possibly with the

21 Muslims, because these were small problems. Then that is what we

22 advocated. However, it wasn't even a problem if a Croat or a Muslim

23 territory was separated, like western Bosnia, Cazinska Krajina, which is

24 impossible to be linked up. There would be freedom of movement, it would

25 be one state, so there is no reason for that not to be implemented, if

1 possible. If it is possible to have a link-up, then it would be desirable

2 because it would be better to have a single whole, if I can put it that

3 way. So we insisted that this be carried out within Bosnia-Herzegovina,

4 that our constituent unit would later be linked up. Here we said that it

5 could consist of several parts.

6 Q. How -- when Mr. Koljevic was saying there are indications that

7 might be possible, how strong had such indications been?

8 A. Here, well, there was something that was there all the time, that

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a link between Serbia and Croatia and that

10 there shouldn't be any borders there or passports. I presented an example

11 here, that Mr. Izetbegovic at the end of 1991 saying at the congress of

12 the SDA there should be no passports or borders on the Drina or the Una.

13 Croats should not feel that they are imprisoned in Bosnia or that Serbs

14 had passports on the Drina River.

15 So this process of bringing people of the same nation together was

16 later resolved by having every constituent unit given the right to

17 establish special ties with neighbouring states, and neighbouring states

18 are Serbia, or rather Yugoslavia, and Croatia. That's what Mr. Koljevic

19 said. It is important for us to have spiritual links, cultural links, and

20 the situation right now is the way it is. That is to say we stay in

21 Bosnia. I know, since he is from that field himself, that is his own line

22 of work, he always advocated these cultural ties, and also that these

23 cultural links can be a way of replacing state links, in terms of

24 Yugoslavia. He's talking about Croatia here. That's why I said this.

25 He's talking about Croats with Croatia. That is why I included this in

1 this particular line of thought that was present at the time. This was

2 ultimately verified in Dayton and there were these special relations,

3 special ties, that existed in every agreement.

4 Q. Now, a couple of paragraphs -- well, no, a bit further actually.

5 A page or so further on.

6 MR. STEWART: It's page 16 of the English, Your Honour,

7 Dr. Karadzic begins to speak again.

8 Q. Can you just find that as a reference point, please?

9 A. That's number 4.

10 Q. Well, it's actually a bit further on probably but a page or so

11 further on?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. And then I'm going to go --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger is actually on his feet.

15 MR. STEWART: Yes, I'm sorry, I didn't notice, Your Honour.

16 I'm sorry.

17 MR. TIEGER: Something very minor. First of all, with the

18 exception of pagination difference, probably arising from some format

19 issue at the beginning of the document, it appears to be precisely the

20 same document, both the English translations, word for word, but the

21 pagination issue means that I would ask Mr. Stewart to give us a little

22 time to find the corresponding reference in the copy we have.

23 MR. STEWART: Well, that's good news and a perfectly fair request,

24 Your Honour, so I'll do exactly that.

25 So we got Dr. Karadzic and then I want to go two or three pages

1 on, skipping over Dr. Karadzic's announcement that Scotland had announced

2 its secession which is news that hadn't actually got as far as England at

3 that point. On page 19 of the English, it's in -- right in the middle of

4 page 19, a paragraph, "if BH is to be independent then we have to make

5 sure there are three independent BHs." It's probably around -- around

6 page 20 in Serbian, that passage. There are references to -- there are

7 references to Broz, and we know about him [indiscernible] and so on, there

8 is a paragraph referring to 1971, 1974, do you see that?

9 A. Yes. Broz, 71, yes, I found it. It's on page 19.

10 Q. Okay. It's immediately preceding paragraph -- that very short

11 paragraph, "If BH is to be independent, then we have to make sure that

12 there are three independent BHs," Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mr. Krajisnik we

13 see all sorts of fluid terms perhaps in the course of some of these

14 discussions.

15 When Dr. Karadzic is saying there are we have to make sure there

16 are three independent Bosnia and Herzegovinas, what did you understand him

17 to mean there by three independent Bosnia and Herzegovinas. Independent

18 in what way to what degree?

19 A. I know exactly what Mr. Karadzic meant when he said this. This is

20 a speech made by a man who attended negotiations, who was in a way trying

21 to justify this new concept of ours. Now we keep talking about an

22 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina whereas we put Yugoslavia into the

23 constitution. That is why very often he inserts illogical things that are

24 receptive to the ears of that group which, all the time, like Mrs. Plavsic

25 last time when we were discussing this, keep saying, what kind of solution

1 is this? We are not in Yugoslavia.

2 At this moment, when we were discussing this, Mr. Karadzic knew

3 quite clearly and we had accepted that, that there would be only one

4 internationally recognised entity and that is Bosnia-Herzegovina. You saw

5 that he's not saying "state" but "internationally recognised entity." One

6 chair in the UN. But when he's saying this, before parliament, then he is

7 introducing quite a few political elements, quite simply in order to blunt

8 the opportunism of those who disagree with that, those who want Yugoslavia

9 or something else. I saw here that you in the West look at each and every

10 word quite literally, whereas this is politics. He didn't mean that. He

11 knew that we had accepted Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no denying that,

12 but then the MPs are listening to him so that's different. He's offering

13 sort of a carrot, something that people like to hear. You will see that

14 in the constitution that was adopted and everything else.

15 Q. And then if we go on about a page and a bit, it's page 19 of the

16 English, it's probably going to be page 20 of the -- or even 21 of the

17 Serbian. It will be on page 20 or 21, still in Mr. Karadzic's speech, he

18 says, "Take this thing in Krajina yesterday. I can bet you that Alija

19 will pay off every Krajina deputy in pure gold." Do you see that

20 paragraph?

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, it's page -- I think it's page 21,

22 almost the last full paragraph.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, you are always so

24 helpful. Thank you. Yes. I've found it.

25 MR. STEWART:

1 Q. Thank you, I'm sorry I was just giving Their Honours an

2 opportunity.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Stewart, I'm sorry, but

4 you're talking about page 19 for that last paragraph? And we are on page

5 17 in our version. In our draft, it's page 17. So it's a bit disturbing.

6 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour -- if that's -- yes, I see.

7 Mr. Tieger was asking for the opportunity to be able to find that

8 different reference. I can at the moment -- I'm afraid, Your Honour, I

9 can only give the page reference in the document that I've got. It might

10 be that when Mr. Tieger has -- if I could invite his services, if

11 Mr. Tieger has then found the reference on his, he could give it quickly

12 to Your Honours.

13 MR. TIEGER: I would be pleased to do that. I was just going to

14 suggest that.

15 MR. STEWART: That's excellent. Thank you.

16 MR. TIEGER: So the most recent reference is found at the bottom

17 of page 18 in the English.

18 MR. STEWART: Thank you.

19 Q. He says, "Take this thing in Krajina yesterday. I can bet you

20 that Alija will pay off every Krajina deputy in pure gold for what they

21 weigh just so that we leave Sarajevo and we abandon the idea that Sarajevo

22 will be the capital of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina. Banja Luka will, of

23 course, be the capital of Bosnian Krajina. The Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina

24 will have counties and regions because it is easier to share power that

25 way. They will also be responsible for development and so forth. But

1 leaving Sarajevo where there are 215.000 Serbs, including Yugoslavs, where

2 there are great riches, if we left Sarajevo, well, we should be hanged."

3 Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, as appears clearly from that

4 paragraph, well, we see it also clearly later in this document, is it fair

5 to say there was at the very least there was intense irritation among the

6 leadership, including Mr. Karadzic and you, at the proposal coming from

7 the Krajina that Banja Luka might become the capital of Serbian

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina? That's right, isn't it?

9 A. Well, irritating is perhaps not an appropriate word but I can

10 explain what this is all about. I was saying something earlier on too so

11 in case you're interested. Well, at any rate we didn't agree. I didn't

12 agree. The majority didn't agree with what had been done in Krajina at

13 that moment and Mr. Karadzic said that. I can explain what this is all

14 about.

15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik I am inviting you to do exactly that. Thank you.

16 A. The problem of rivalry between Banja Luka and Sarajevo originates

17 from the system that existed before the multi-party elections. Sarajevo

18 was favoured. There were six centres, one of them was Bihac, then Banja

19 Luka, Zenica, Tuzla, Mostar, and Sarajevo. I don't know if I missed any.

20 So Banja Luka as a centre fell in terms of economic development on

21 to the 22nd place. People from there, qualified staff, were taken to

22 Sarajevo to make their contribution to the development of Sarajevo. When

23 we remained alone, and when I say alone I mean in the assembly, that

24 animosity also carried with it certain tensions. Therefore, the deputies

25 from Krajina, in the framework of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, put

1 forward a demand saying the time has come to build the constituent unit of

2 the Serbian people. Let the capital of that constituent unit be Banja

3 Luka. And the contribution to the discussion of Mr. Karadzic and many

4 other people was that it wouldn't be fair for us not to have a part of

5 Sarajevo because there were a lot of Serbs in Sarajevo and we often made

6 comparisons with Jerusalem where two ethnic communities are intertwined

7 and keep saying that they have a claim on a part of Jerusalem, both the

8 Jews and the Palestinians.

9 So the same demand was made later, on the 25th or 26th of July, at

10 the session of the Assembly of the Serbian People during the war. People

11 of Krajina loved their town and they wanted Banja Luka for once to be a

12 capital. I'll remind you that Banja Luka in the times of the kingdom of

13 Yugoslavia was a centre of so-called Banovina, and in socialist times its

14 rating fell to the 22nd place. And Vogosca was twice less developed than

15 Banja Luka. So this regionalisation, they thought, should not only be

16 designed on the basis of political criteria but also on the basis of

17 economic criteria. They said -- so they favoured Banja Luka whereas we

18 were saying that it was not a good idea to leave Banja Luka -- to leave

19 Sarajevo, because we had a stake there and a lot of Serb population there.

20 It's not that we were against Banja Luka itself. That's what Mr. Karadzic

21 was trying to explain.

22 Q. Was that the only difference or issue there was between you and

23 the Serb leadership in the Krajina at that time?

24 A. No. That was not the only difference.

25 Q. So what was the other difference or what were the other

1 differences?

2 A. The greatest part of the Serb population in the then Bosnian

3 Krajina, that is the part of Krajina that is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there

4 were 60 or maybe 65 per cent of Serbs on that side, or maybe the division

5 was 55 versus 45 per cent, and it was quite natural, and I talked about

6 that historic moment before, that there were many attempts to create that

7 region as a sociopolitical community, to turn it into something

8 autonomous, a republic of sorts or something. Detached from the rest of

9 the Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was not a good thing

10 for Serbs, and it could have been interpreted as a tear-up of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina.

12 Maybe apart from advocating Banja Luka as a capital, there was

13 another element to this, advocating an idea that Banja Luka should be a

14 separate constituent unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's the second

15 problem.

16 And a third problem was that those two Krajinas historically

17 always strove to unite because for a long time they belonged to two

18 different states, including in the Vance plan, but the Krajina people

19 thought that they were separated and wanted to unite. And their internal

20 coherence was much stronger than the ties in the rest of the population.

21 However, by that time, we had already accepted the Vance plan and if we

22 had given in to the demands of the people from Krajina, we could have

23 opened ourselves to accusations that we were trying to destroy something

24 that we had already accepted, and it was a big problem to explain to them

25 why we couldn't do that.

1 Q. Then if we look at point 5, it's the middle of page 20 of my

2 English version, and it's page 22 in your version, Mr. Krajisnik. It's

3 almost halfway down page 22.

4 A. Yes. I've found number 5.

5 Q. Yes. And Mr. Karadzic says, "Our strategic goals are beginning to

6 materialise. The opposition in Serbia is not right. Our people here in

7 BH are also not right."

8 Are you able to say what were at that point the strategic goals as

9 they were beginning to materialise?

10 A. This is precisely an example of what I was saying a moment ago.

11 Mr. Karadzic keeps changing his rhetoric all the time, at least very

12 often. He is now replying to the opposition from Serbia who were saying

13 that somebody's betraying the Serb people, closing them in within Bosnia

14 and Herzegovina. Of course, this was a very uninformed opinion. And he

15 is saying, our strategic goal is to have authority over our own unit,

16 avoiding outvoting or minority status, and in order to make it more

17 palatable to his audience he's saying that if these internal borders are

18 thicker than the outside borders, so what? We'll strive for the internal

19 borders to be suitable.

20 When you are pushing a project which is meeting with a lot of

21 resistance, a lot of differing desires and ambitions, this sort of

22 rhetoric is understandable. He keeps trying to explain that we had to

23 look for a solution within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then he's spicing

24 it up with remarks like, we'll strife to make it thicker or thinner, et

25 cetera. He already knows that we won't be part of Yugoslavia but he dares

1 not -- he dare not say it because the people are not yet ready to accept

2 it. It's not that we were doing one thing and saying another. We were

3 trying to be realistic as politicians and to defend and promote Serb

4 interests to the greatest possible extent.

5 Q. And then two or three paragraphs below that, it's the foot of page

6 20, very foot of page 20 on my English, and it will -- you see you start

7 to speak, Mr. Krajisnik. It's the top of page 23 in your copy. Do you

8 see that? "I thank you, Dr. Karadzic and Professor Koljevic. Mr.

9 Karadzic was right when he said we would all answer to the people for our

10 actions, that is why everyone has to judge his own actions to make sure

11 that we act for the benefit of the people we represent. I thank him

12 particularly for what he did not say, what he was going to address to the

13 people -- for what he did not say. What he was going to address to the

14 people of Krajina. Because if he had said what he was going to this

15 morning, then the people of Krajina would probably know what he meant,

16 because what the people of Krajina had done was assessed as bad, I have to

17 say this in his name and Mr. Koljevic's, and it was not wise at this

18 point. That's why our decision at today's session of the assembly must be

19 wise and I propose that you have heard as introductory remarks be the main

20 item -- that what you have heard as introductory remarks be the main item

21 from the agenda. Let us have a discussion on the constitution and the

22 laws, to get over with the Thursday meeting which we intend to hold with

23 the mediation of the UN, then we will adopt the constitution and the

24 laws."

25 There is a meeting coming up, isn't there, with the EC people, in

1 particular, Mr. Cutileiro. That's what that means, doesn't it?

2 A. Yes. And his assistants.

3 Q. And then you point out 66 deputies are present. Then you say, "As

4 I was a participant in the Lisbon talks, I would like to add a few

5 remarks. Today we must discuss the first item which is crucial for the

6 Serbian people. Gentlemen, we have two options. One to fight by

7 political means, to make the most out of the present time, as a first

8 phase, or to break off the talks and go for what we have done over the

9 centuries, win our own territories by force."

10 Now in putting forth those two possibilities, Mr. Krajisnik, were

11 there -- or was there among those 66 deputies any significant faction that

12 was leaning towards the second of those options, to break off the talks

13 and win our own territories by force?

14 A. No. Nobody was in favour of war, and if you allow me I want to

15 explain what I meant by this. As a participant in the negotiations since

16 I chaired the sessions, I rarely took the floor to add to what

17 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic had to say about those negotiations and

18 their course. But whenever I felt that we were running out of arguments

19 for something that would be reasonable to accept, then I did take the

20 floor. I said a bit further up that I was supporting Karadzic and I said

21 it was a good thing he didn't tell the Krajina people about Banja Luka,

22 what he had intended to say to them. By saying that, I wanted to pressure

23 people to tell them that they should be more reasonable in their thinking,

24 and I told them that we had to choose between two options, either to

25 negotiate or to fight, fighting implying suffering. So I was warning

1 them, in fact, if we don't want to negotiate, then we have to fight, and

2 the war is something that is very bad for us. I -- Pasic and a lot of our

3 history so if you read this in Serbian it's clear, we had two options, one

4 being to negotiate and if we don't want to negotiate we are left with the

5 second option, that needs no explanation. It's self explanatory. So if

6 you put it to people like that, I was saying that we cannot negotiate

7 amongst ourselves.

8 I cannot say that this introductory discussion was accepted.

9 Nobody was against negotiations. Maybe some people said something in

10 jest, but they also didn't realise how difficult it was to negotiate.

11 They thought, "Ha, it's going to be easy to achieve what we want." They

12 didn't realise that we can only achieve something that is realistic to

13 begin with.

14 Q. If we go on, Mr. Krajisnik, then, the next speaker is

15 Mrs. Plavsic, and then after that Professor Ajdanovic speaks and he starts

16 at the top of page 26 of what you've got and towards the top of page 23 of

17 my English version. Do you see that, Mr. Krajisnik?

18 A. Yes. But it's Professor Najdanovic, the initial N is missing.

19 Q. It's missing in the original, so that's helpful to jot that in,

20 Professor Najdanovic. I'm not sure if we come across him before,

21 Mr. Krajisnik. Who was he?

22 A. Professor Najdanovic was a deputy, an MP. He was also on the

23 political council. He's an ethnic Serb and he worked as professor in the

24 medical school of the university and unfortunately he had stayed behind in

25 Sarajevo because his wife was about to give birth, and the gangs that

1 roamed around Sarajevo at the time slaughtered him. He was a wonderful,

2 very reasonable man.

3 Excuse me, Mr. Stewart, I reviewed what I said yesterday, and I

4 made a slip of the tongue yesterday, saying that the head of our

5 delegation in bilateral negotiations was Mr. Koljevic. But it was in fact

6 Mr. Karadzic. I just remembered it this moment. It wasn't Mr. Koljevic

7 who headed our delegation in our talks with the Muslims and the Croats but

8 Mr. Karadzic.

9 Q. Yes. Well it's helpful, Mr. Krajisnik, always, to have that

10 tidied up. Thank you.

11 So where Professor Najdanovic is speaking there a third paragraph,

12 he says, "I would like to say that the Lisbon agreement was a great

13 successes of our representatives. There agreement remains to be fine

14 tuned and this will be our chance for modifications to improve our

15 positions. I would not tie our present position on these negotiations to

16 our strategic goal. We must not find ourselves in a dilemma similar to

17 the Babic-Milosevic situation. We all knew that many of Babic's

18 objections were justified and yet we did not support him but Milosevic.

19 Why? Because at the time only certain things are feasible. Europe and

20 America are insisting that the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina must not be

21 changed. Failing to understand that would be political -- unpolitical and

22 unwise. However, getting Europe to agree to our sovereignty, even if only

23 within the BH borders is important enough and it's up to us what we will

24 do with the sovereignty."

25 So he is referring there to the underlying -- well, no, I'll put

1 it entirely neutrally. What is he referring to there as our strategic

2 goal?

3 A. Well, late Mr. Najdanovic explained it. The strategic goal,

4 namely that the Serb people have sovereignty over themselves without being

5 outvoted and in the position of a minority ruled by somebody else, was the

6 basis. So if we get a constituent unit with some sort of limited

7 sovereignty, because there are joint institutions envisaged, he says that

8 that's fine because it's within a reasonable framework, considering that

9 Europe and the United States are advocating unchangeable borders, and

10 that's an example of our work in Lisbon and our negotiations. So you have

11 certain target units within which you can move. Our strategic goal was

12 equality with the other ethnic communities and power to rule our people,

13 meaning that we didn't want to be outvoted. We didn't want our lands to

14 be neglected. I am -- I don't know what the other two sides were

15 thinking, what their rationale was, but I'm explaining the rationale of

16 the Serb side. So this round of negotiations in Lisbon was a great

17 success, and that's what he was referring to.

18 Q. And then he continues, about two -- well, it's just two paragraphs

19 further on. He says, "In further negotiations ..." Top of page 24 of my

20 English version and it's the top of page 27 in -- on your don't,

21 Mr. Krajisnik. "In further negotiations, whether the issue is dual

22 citizenship or multiple passports, we must not go below a certain minimum.

23 That minimum is uninterrupted ties, spiritual, economic, geographic with

24 the other Serbian lands, above all with our mother country. It is my

25 personal belief that this federal BiH will not be able to avoid the

1 destiny of the federal Yugoslavia. Let us ensure that it is federal to

2 the same degree that Yugoslavia was federal after 1974. To me this is a

3 provisional stage, a transitional state, pending the final parting of

4 ways."

5 He's -- Mr. Krajisnik, do you understand him to be saying there,

6 "let's do this because my prediction is that Bosnia will break up anyway

7 in future in the same way that Yugoslavia is breaking up now"? Is that a

8 summary of what he's saying?

9 A. Yes. He said that -- look at what he said just before that. This

10 reference was made so that the previous thing would be more palatable.

11 But that was not the point. The point was that a success was achieved in

12 Lisbon and we should accept that and we shouldn't be afraid of the future

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina because we would have our own sovereignty and that's a

14 great success.

15 Q. Then it's at the foot of the English, page 24, the English version

16 that I have, and then it's fairly near the top of page 28 in your version,

17 Mr. Krajisnik. He says, "First" -- it's a very short paragraph, it's a

18 single line, something or other, says, "First the issue of Serbian access

19 to the sea." Do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I found it.

21 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, without going into it at this point but we

22 know that the Serbian access to the sea emerged as number 6 of the

23 strategic goals that were published eventually in the Official Gazette and

24 were discussed later on, on the 12th of May at the Banja Luka assembly

25 session. At this point, in February 1992, was the issue of Serbian access

1 to the sea a matter that had been under discussion among the Bosnian Serb

2 leadership?

3 A. The answer is yes, but not only within the Serbian leadership. We

4 talked to the Croatian side. I don't know whether it was at this stage,

5 but we talked also to late President Tudjman, and it was clearly stated,

6 he said it, it was not natural for Serbs to be able to see the sea and not

7 have any access to it. And an agreement was made in Dayton, I can give

8 you that example, it was signed, although it wasn't signed in Paris, where

9 a triple barter of territories was supposed to be made so that we would

10 have access to the sea in Prevlaka peninsula. But the second option was

11 that Bosnia did have access to the sea at Neum, and we were saying that if

12 Bosnia had access to the sea, then it was natural that each constituent

13 unit should have part of that access. How? That was another matter.

14 Let me just add this. Croatia, the Croatian state, was

15 interested, had a stake in a narrow belt just above Dubrovnik, and if we

16 had access to the sea at Prevlaka then that would solve the problems of

17 Serbia and Montenegro and Yugoslavia as well. That principle that we

18 should have access to the sea as a constituent unit was never in dispute,

19 although it required negotiations with Croatia and with the other two

20 sides. And all that is documented.

21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I understand there is some excellent

22 and helpful communication going on from Mr. Haider up into cyberspace and

23 back down to Mr. Mujanovic. We do appreciate that very much.

24 Your Honour, I'm looking at the clock. Would that be a convenient

25 point for Your Honours?

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would give me one second with

2 Mr. Haider.

3 Mr. Krajisnik, you asked whether we could provide you with a DVD

4 of the early part of the 25th of April session. It has been prepared and

5 Mr. Haider will hand it out to you now so that it's available to you.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I already

7 commended Mr. Haider for being the best.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I'll not tell Ms. Philpott. We will adjourn until

9 11.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

13 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at Professor Najdanovic's

15 contribution and he's talking about access to the sea, and after that

16 reference, he makes a reference to TV programmes. Do you see, I'm not

17 going to read this paragraph, it's just for the reference point. Do you

18 see a paragraph beginning, "So far from TV programmes"? Do you see that?

19 A. Yes, I see that.

20 Q. And the last sentence of that same paragraph, he says, "Our goal

21 has to be access to the sea where Serbs come closest to it, which is

22 Serbian Herzegovina." And then it has brackets, a deputy, "We have

23 already done that, Professor." Applauded by several deputies. What did

24 that mean, Mr. Krajisnik? Was it just some humorous intervention? In

25 what sense had it already been done?

1 A. I don't know what this deputy meant. Unless he was alluding to

2 the war that was being waged around Dubrovnik. However, this is not

3 serious. It is wrong to make jokes of that kind, and has nothing to do

4 with our standpoint. I assume that that was it because otherwise there is

5 no answer.

6 Q. After that intervention by a deputy, Professor Najdanovic

7 continues, "What we must do as of today is to communicate to the Serbian

8 people that it must be prepared for territorial changes, for relocation of

9 populations, the familiar tune of betrayal of the Serbian people is easily

10 invoked these days. Regardless of pain, the global goals of the nation

11 must take priority. We must be ready to give some krags [phoen] in

12 Krajina for other krags, only this time from Metkovic to Dubrovnik and

13 this means gaining access to the sea."

14 First, Mr. Krajisnik, did you understand Professor Najdanovic's

15 reference to being prepared for territorial changes, for relocation of

16 populations, to relate to matters wider than the matter of access to the

17 sea?

18 A. Well, this is his personal point of view. First of all, let me

19 talk about access to the sea. This is a megalomaniac claim, that we

20 should give a strip of land alongside the border between Croatia and

21 western Bosnia, that is to say Cazinska Krajina with Livna [phoen].

22 That's why he was referring to these krags, in order to have more access

23 to the sea. That was not realistic. But he said that, well, as a manner

24 of speaking. As for relocating the population, perhaps he thought that if

25 we were changing some parts with Croatia, that then people from Croatia

1 with which Serbs were at war, if I can put it that way, well, would lead

2 to a relocation of population in that part of territory that would be

3 exchanged. So this is exchanging Bosnia-Herzegovinian territories which

4 would belong to the Serb constituent unit with the Croatian state that had

5 already been recognised. That's what he meant, that there would be these

6 relocations because by then Serbs were already fleeing from the Croat part

7 to the Serb areas. So as far as I can tell, that is what Mr. Najdanovic

8 had in mind here because access to the sea is being referred to as the

9 central issue, and that is what he's talking about.

10 Q. Did -- in relation either to access to the sea or broader issues

11 of changes to the map, I'll put it that way, changes to the map of Bosnia

12 and Herzegovina, did the Bosnian Serb leadership at this time discuss the

13 need to communicate to the Serbian people that there might be a need for

14 relocation of populations?

15 A. Well, I said what Mr. Karadzic was saying in case there were a

16 war, but possibly somebody gave a free interpretation along those lines.

17 But what is referred to here is a political solution, where it didn't

18 cross anybody's mind to have any kind of intentional relocations of the

19 population.

20 I have to highlight something. The late president of Croatia,

21 Tudjman, was being quoted as saying that there should be humane

22 relocations of the population. I don't know whether he said that or not

23 but it was ascribed to him at any rate. So perhaps that would be that

24 idea, freely interpreted, but I'm saying that the policy of the Serb side

25 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the political negotiations carried out, did not

1 advocate relocations of the population at all. What was advocated was the

2 establishment of constituent units where somebody would be a minority,

3 somebody would be a majority. Where we were in the majority that would be

4 a Serbian unit and we would govern ourselves, and, of course, the others

5 would be there in the other territory. Now, whether somebody would do

6 something through his own free will is a different matter. I am confident

7 that there are no official statements to that effect. Well, perhaps at a

8 regional level somebody said something but our policy in negotiations and

9 in agreements as you will see was invariably that even if somebody left

10 after the war had broken out, that they had to go back to their homes.

11 This was at the very beginning of the war.

12 Q. And then if we go on, Mr. Krajisnik, it's page 28 of my English

13 version, and it's at page 32 of your version of this document, we have got

14 towards the end of a reasonably long contribution by a Mr. Vojnovic, and

15 Mr. Vojnovic was who? He was presumably a deputy. Where was he from?

16 I beg your pardon. I'm so sorry, it isn't Mr. Vojnovic, it's

17 Mr. Miskin. We have come across him.

18 It's against the number 8 in your margin. There is a paragraph

19 beginning, "Briefly on borders," do you see that?

20 A. Yes, I see that.

21 Q. "Briefly on borders, regional borders must be drawn up on the

22 basis of the decision of citizens of each village, municipality and region

23 as to where they want to live, although this is a complex job it can be

24 done quite successfully."

25 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I would -- you -- you would agree it was a

1 complex job?

2 A. Yes. A complex job, because throughout the negotiations, it was

3 only the borders or rather the maps that were a problem that could not be

4 solved. All the rest was easy to solve. Well, easy; easier.

5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I would like you to look at some maps now, please.

6 Could you be given -- it was D7B, I think it was. That was the map which

7 you said was attached to Cutileiro agreement.

8 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I wonder if in the first place we

9 could have P211. Perhaps we could have P211 up on the ELMO or however we

10 get it on to the screen. I'm not sure how practical that is. Perhaps we

11 should do it the other way around, then. It's simply too big, I think, to

12 be -- thank you. Yes. I remember we had it yesterday so there must be

13 some way of doing it. My thanks to the Prosecution for that.

14 Q. I want you to have another map as well, Mr. Krajisnik. We are

15 going to have to look at three maps, as best we can, alongside each other,

16 and this one is the one that we glanced at yesterday, really, P293, which

17 was in P68, tab 2.

18 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I'm entirely in Your Honours' hands as

19 to whether at some point Your Honours would have it more convenient to

20 have a different map up on the ELMO and precisely how we look at them but

21 we have got three maps.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I leave it to you what should be on the ELMO.

23 MR. STEWART: Yes well, I'll do it in the first place,

24 Your Honour, but I'm certainly inviting Your Honours to make any request

25 that would help you.

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you have a shopping bag with a file. Was that --

2 you were just checking something, were you?

3 A. I didn't get anything out. I just wanted to see a similar map but

4 please go ahead.

5 Q. That's fine, Mr. Krajisnik. We can see you didn't in the end get

6 anything out. Right.

7 Mr. Krajisnik, you've got this map, P293, have you, in front of

8 you?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Yes. Now, first of all, what do you understand this map to be?

11 A. I'm sorry, is this the map that you're referring to, Mr. Stewart?

12 Q. Can I just double check that it is? I feel sure it is but I just

13 want to be 100 per cent sure. Yes, it is, indeed. Yes, first of all,

14 what do you understand that map to be?

15 A. This is an ethnic map, similar to the other map but it was just

16 subdivided into even smaller parts. One municipality here is divided into

17 settlements. You see this map, the one that you can see now, that was the

18 basis for Cutileiro's map, especially -- I beg your pardon. Here, where

19 Prijedor is, if you look at that part, and if you compare it to the map

20 that you saw a few moments ago, everything is half green because the

21 municipality is 51 per cent, whereas here, if you look at the local

22 communes and the villages, then you see that the micro-division is

23 different from that of the entire municipality. This was a basis for our

24 map, the Serb map, and for Cutileiro's map and all other maps that were

25 presented as a proposal to the European Community for them in turn to give

1 their proposal. That's why I said that throughout all negotiations this

2 map was the subject of the debate that took place - not Mr. Okun's map, if

3 I can call it that - because what Mr. Miskin was saying could not be

4 applied in that case.

5 You can see here that there are certain imaginary lines that were

6 later drawn into the maps of the entities. Cutileiro's map. So please

7 whether we discuss this in the future it would be a good thing for you to

8 compare both maps. You can compare this map to the Cutileiro map. You

9 will see how similar it is because it was this micro-plan. And the

10 imaginary line which was later drawn between the entities, it said here

11 that these small villages could opt for one entity or the other. So that

12 was the basis when the maps were actually being drawn.

13 Q. One point, I just want to clarify with you, Mr. Krajisnik, this

14 the map P293, it's the -- the more complicated map, its ethnic structure

15 of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the first results of

16 1991 census, and although it's very tiny letters and probably younger eyes

17 than mine could confirm, in the very bottom right-hand corner of this

18 document, it says, "Publisher, faculty of geography, Belgrade," and as

19 best I can do, 1992. If we can have general agreement it says 1992, I

20 would feel reassured. That's what younger eyes say as well,

21 Mr. Krajisnik.

22 The -- we were here in February March 1992. Do you actually know

23 whether this particular map was available to you at the time of these

24 Cutileiro talks in February and March 1992?

25 A. I'm surprised that this is 1992 because we had it from the very

1 outset. We had this map from the very outset from the beginning of the

2 negotiations. So it should date back to at least January 1992. But --

3 JUDGE ORIE: I stop everyone there. Publishing in 1992 doesn't

4 mean that it did not exist before. I would say publishing is totally

5 different from --

6 MR. STEWART: I was going to put that.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Great.

8 JUDGE ORIE: It's a detail. Mr. Krajisnik said it was the basis

9 on which he works. Of course I do not know -- is this to be contested,

10 Mr. Harmon? No? Then let's proceed.

11 MR. STEWART: I'm certainly happy to proceed on the basis one

12 would suppose that the people involved probably had some priority over the

13 general public in obtaining such material.

14 Q. So Mr. Krajisnik, you had this map. The -- for example, let's

15 take an example. That large swathe of what I'll call Croat territory in

16 the southwest of Bosnia, you -- we can all see and understand what I mean,

17 and you understand what I mean, Mr. Krajisnik, do you, if I use that --

18 that term and you're pointing to it?

19 A. Yes, that part, yes.

20 Q. Exactly that. Towards the north and in the centre is a small

21 piece, relatively small, of course, a relatively small piece of land or

22 territory which is marked as a -- Serb absolute ethnic majority. Do you

23 see that?

24 A. You're probably referring to this, right?

25 Q. Actually, no, I'm not. I'm going down south -- yes, you're nearly

1 there. No, further down the page, to the south, a little bit further,

2 Mr. Krajisnik, a couple of centimetres further. You're nearly there.

3 It's just to the right of where you've got the pointer there. It's a

4 smaller piece of territory than what you were pointing to a moment ago.

5 Do you see that? It's a little blob of --

6 A. Yes, yes. I see that.

7 Q. And in fact immediately above that is a very similar-sized piece

8 of territory which is marked as Muslim absolute majority, isn't it? It's

9 immediately to the north. It's a similar size and shape, really. Do you

10 see?

11 A. Yes, yes. It cannot be seen very well here but, yes, I see it,

12 yes.

13 Q. In fact, there is a finely little piece of relatively --

14 relatively tiny little piece of Muslim-marked territory just to the

15 southwest or west-southwest of that blue marked piece of territory. Do

16 you also see that?

17 A. The colours cannot be seen properly here, but I assume that it's

18 sort of left to this, right? On the screen you cannot really tell.

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the colours are terribly difficult to see on the

20 screen. You probably will need to glance over at the paper.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I think I [Previous interpretation continues]... if

23 I may do that, Your Honour. I can give Mr. Krajisnik an additional copy

24 of this map so that he's got it at his elbow because the colours are

25 naturally more distinct on the paper.

1 JUDGE ORIE: If we take the Serb area --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

3 JUDGE ORIE: -- as the centre of the clock it would be

4 approximately between 7 and 8.00, what you referred to; is that correct,

5 Mr. --

6 MR. STEWART: Absolutely, Your Honour, yes, it would. Well, yes,

7 6 minutes past 8 or something, Your Honour is right.

8 Q. So we got that, Mr. Krajisnik.

9 A. Yes, yes. Yes, it can be seen much better here.

10 Q. Is it -- would it be correct to say as a starting point that --

11 but please say straight away if it isn't correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that in

12 this complex job that might be faced of drawing up borders and so on, that

13 this pieces of territory like this would be among the most difficult to

14 deal with?

15 A. Well, you're right, but such small parts would actually stay

16 within Croatian territory because they were not along the imaginary

17 inter-entity ethnic line. We could not resolve it the same way we could

18 in other places. We could not put the Muslim ones into the Muslim entity

19 the Serb ones into the Serb entity, because they were within Croatian

20 territory in depth. How should I put this? They are not very big. They

21 would remain as a minority within the Croat entity. I think. I assume

22 that that's the way it is.

23 Q. If I put something to you, Mr. Krajisnik, again, as see whether

24 you agree with this, that perhaps paradoxically I put it to you that the

25 most difficult to deal with, your answer suggests that in a paradoxical

1 way they were the easiest to deal with because it was really clear that no

2 major adjustment was feasible in relation to pieces of territory like

3 that?

4 A. Yes, you're right. That was the most difficult thing to solve.

5 When I said it was the easiest, I meant it's simply impossible to solve.

6 It remains unsolved or solved in an unfair way. It was a situation that

7 was imposed on us. But you are right in saying that these little units

8 were the most difficult to place within their mother entity. They would

9 remain within another entity, and you can see from Cutileiro's map that

10 they remained within the Croat entity.

11 Q. And the -- what was -- it was perhaps early days, Mr. Krajisnik,

12 but within the Bosnian Serb leadership, at the time you were discussing

13 these matters at the Cutileiro talks, what was your thinking about what

14 would happen to, for example, the Serb population in that relatively small

15 area of Serb majority land that we have just been considering?

16 A. I'll tell you what happened but there is a statement of mine from

17 that time. What I'm going to say now is also written somewhere. There

18 would have been reciprocity. They would remain as a minority within that

19 entity because it's not possible for every village, if you have three

20 entities, it's not possible for every village, every local commune, to

21 become part of their own entity, and you can find one of my statements

22 made to the media to the effect that these Herzegovinas, eastern and

23 western, would have reciprocity between them and there would be protection

24 of the fundamental human rights for the Croats who remain in the eastern

25 part of Herzegovina and we expect the same of them with regard to Serbs

1 who remain within their entity. And when I say human rights, I mean in

2 particular those very sensitive ethnic rights, and that was the primary

3 consideration, even more important than economic and other considerations

4 that are -- that normally come first in every day life.

5 And when I say that this -- when this Cutileiro map was drawn, it

6 went without saying, it was implied that most Muslims should be within the

7 Muslim entity, most Croats within the Croat entity, et cetera but a

8 certain number would remain within the entities of another ethnic

9 community as a minority. That was implied. We were not looking to draw

10 borders of new states. We were looking for an internal transformation.

11 And you will find in Mr. Cutileiro's map that this belongs to the Croat

12 entity.

13 Q. And was -- was it first of all among the Bosnian Serb negotiators

14 in those talks, was it your expectation that if Cutileiro plan was agreed

15 and did come to be implemented, that the population, the Serb population

16 of a place such as that that we just identified, would stay where they

17 were?

18 A. I'm sorry but I'll have to refer to another statement of mine that

19 I made on the 12th of May where I put it in a crude way, saying that I

20 know that my home place will remain within Muslimania but please let's

21 have most Serbs the majority of Serbs within the Serb unit. All

22 participants from the negotiations from the Serb side were aware that a

23 certain number of Serbs will have to remain within other entities. And

24 the same would be true of smaller numbers of Muslims and Croats.

25 We have figures. In 1992, in what is Republika Srpska today, the

1 Muslims were 23 per cent, 17 and 5 per cent were Croats. Whereas in

2 today's federation, the percentage of Serbs was 36 per cent. Those are --

3 or those were the facts. You can't do anything with it. That's the way

4 we were laid out, and that was not a problem. Today's figures from 2000,

5 and I can give you the documents and the information prepared both in

6 English and in Serbian by the authorities, of course, they would be a

7 minority. We realised that. And I have to say, Mr. Stewart, when we

8 talked at our assembly sessions, there were people who came from Zenica,

9 let's say, or some other areas that had been within the Muslim entity for

10 a long time, they said, "What's going to become much us? We made our

11 decision at the plebiscite and we have to stay with them." And there were

12 some inadequate remarks made, but the real crux of the matter is what I

13 just said. It's impossible for everyone to end up within their own

14 entity. Nor was it ever our objective, ours or Mr. Cutileiro's because it

15 was impossible.

16 Q. But was your -- this -- these pieces of land we have been talking

17 to, it seems pretty clear from the map that they were in Tomislavgrad.

18 That can be relatively easily seen. The -- was it your expectation that

19 either the whole or very near to the whole of the Serb residents in that

20 Serb-majority piece of land we were looking at would in fact choose to

21 stay living where they were after implementation if it should happen of

22 Cutileiro plan?

23 A. I have to add to this, to correct what Mr. Miskin said,

24 Mr. Cutileiro's plan envisaged that people should their intentions as

25 divided by that interethnic line. It was not envisaged that people would

1 declare where they wanted to live in those places deep into the territory

2 of an entity. That would have been unreasonable. But you will find it in

3 the principles that where this inter-entity line was drawn, then such

4 settlements would have to choose which side they would go to. And that

5 would be an expression of their political will. It would have been

6 illogical to apply the same to some areas that are deep into the territory

7 of one entity.

8 But to answer your question, as regards larger territories such as

9 around Prijedor, we even thought about enclaves that would have a certain

10 degree of autonomy, and that would be subject to negotiation because it's

11 not the same thing as a small village. Those were larger enclaves that

12 would have some cultural or other rights within that constituent unit. We

13 tried to satisfy the largest number of people in each of the three ethnic

14 communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We -- I remember this bit of the

15 discussion where we discussed an enclave and it was envisaged in

16 Cutileiro's plan that this enclave would be half Croat, half Muslim.

17 Q. We will come that in a moment, Mr. Krajisnik. The question which

18 arises out of what you've said is this: I'm not asking you now about what

19 the Serb population, for example, of that piece of land in Tomislavgrad

20 might have been asked to declare at any point. I'm asking what your

21 expectation was, as to what the -- what the individual families and

22 residents would actually do if this plan was implemented broadly, as seen

23 on this map and under discussion. What did you expect they would actually

24 do, the people that lived there? Would they stay? Would they go?

25 A. We expected that everybody would remain where they were, but

1 individuals might decide to move to another entity. We expected that too.

2 We expected also some people who had already left to return. That's the

3 natural course of things. After the Second World War, people went to

4 Vojvodina and Slavonia and later came back home. So that possibility

5 wasn't ruled out. But we reckoned that everybody would stay in their

6 homes and would be given maximum protection so that they had no reason to

7 go. I told you about that statement I made at the time, saying that we

8 believed the Croats would take care of such minority populations in their

9 area as we would take care of their minorities in our entity. That's a

10 statement I made just before the war broke out. But our expectation was

11 that the largest number of people would remain where they were with the

12 exception of a small percentage of people who would leave, who would move.

13 Q. Can I go to another piece of land? And the most convenient

14 starting point on this one is to look at the Cutileiro map, to identify

15 what I'm talking about. So if you could have that, we would be able to

16 see this clearly enough on the screen. Do you see towards the top -- well

17 it was towards the top of the screen it's just -- it's okay, it can stay

18 where it is. Thank you, Madam Usher. Towards the top of the screen, it's

19 about two-thirds of the way across. It's yes perhaps if you -- if you

20 point, Mr. Krajisnik, yes come down a bit, I'm talking about that little

21 blob of land which is Serb, marked Serb, coming down into -- it's a --

22 it's a -- that's it, that's it, we got it?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. Now, that is shown on Cutileiro map as Serb territory, isn't it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And it's in the middle of -- well, it's not in the middle, it's

2 within a much larger area of predominantly Muslim territory, as marked,

3 isn't it?

4 A. This isn't drawn here as it was in the map, but as suggested by

5 Mr. Cutileiro. There is about the area of Ozren, and maybe it would be

6 worthwhile to explain this issue, because that's a good example of the

7 misunderstandings and disagreements that we inherited from the previous

8 system. I can show you on the first map where it was.

9 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik --

10 A. You will see that it's larger.

11 Q. As far as the topic for discussion is concerned, you and I are I

12 think going along the same lines here. If you -- if you then look at

13 the -- P293, the complicated map, the one you've got in front of you --

14 A. Mr. Stewart says it's complicated and it's my favourite one. I

15 don't know why he calls it complicated.

16 Q. If it's complicated, it's not necessarily bad, Mr. Krajisnik. If

17 it's your favourite map, it's your favourite map.

18 A. Yes, yes, sorry.

19 This is this part here.

20 Q. That's -- well, you've anticipated my question that identifies

21 that and it's -- well, do you know off the cuff, Mr. Krajisnik, which

22 municipality or municipalities it is within or straddles? We can work it

23 out but you might just know immediately.

24 A. In this area, after the war there was the Serb Municipality of

25 Petrova. Around 100.000 Serbs lived there and then it was divided into

1 five or six municipalities, this area, Sedrenik, Modrica, Doboj. I think

2 Zepce. I think Lukavac as well, and in all those municipalities, Serbs

3 were in the minority. And that was stigmatised as a Chetnik area and the

4 Partizans during the war discriminated against this area. And we used to

5 tell the negotiators, look at the size of this territory, they called it

6 mountains.

7 JUDGE ORIE: In the beginning of your answer, you referred to the

8 war. Did you refer to the Second World War or --

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the Second World War. Thank

10 you, Your Honour.

11 MR. STEWART:

12 Q. Sorry, Mr. Krajisnik.

13 A. You see, that's an example. And then, Mr. Cutileiro turned it

14 into a smaller territory on his map because, and we later talked about it,

15 he told us swap this with the Muslim segment up there on Cutileiro's plan

16 and you will have linked up the eastern and the western part. Also,

17 vis-a-vis the Croats, you see this blue area near Kupres, there was

18 supposed to be a swap - it was discussed at one assembly session - against

19 Croat areas in the corridor that we discussed. That was the subject of

20 our talks in Graz. It was a geographical principal subject to agreement

21 between the parties. If that was impossible to achieve then everything

22 would remain as it was.

23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm -- you're -- going to invite you to stay

24 perhaps a little bit more slowly with my questions. You're jumping ahead

25 and spreading around the map on matters with which you're familiar but I'd

1 like to take it in bite-sized chunks, if I may.

2 Staying with this piece of territory which we identified that Serb

3 territory marked on the map, it appears to be at least just to the west of

4 Srebrenica; is that right?

5 A. Srebrenik.

6 Q. Srebrenik, I'm sorry. [Previous interpretation continues] ...

7 old eyes. The -- and Your Honours will -- can see this conveniently on

8 211. The bigger map. It's where, of course, we have the municipalities

9 more clearly marked, if one looks closely enough. The -- now, looking

10 at - you don't like complicated map as the label - P293 the one with all

11 the smaller bits of territory, P293, looking at that map, we can see very

12 clearly that blue-marked area which -- yes, you're just putting the

13 pointer on there. And Mr. Krajisnik, do you agree, and it's very apparent

14 but I'll draw attention to it, that when we look at 211, we can see, can't

15 we, that this is, if you like, a classic example of Serb majority

16 territory in fact included entirely within municipalities where it's

17 actually the Muslims who are in the majority in those municipalities?

18 A. Yes. This is a good example from which you can see that there are

19 several municipalities to each of these areas and you don't see any blue

20 colour, unlike in the previous map. This area was divided into five or

21 six municipalities. That's why this first complicated map is more

22 precise, if you want to know what is located where in order to discuss.

23 The same applies to Sarajevo and other places that were the subject of

24 discussions.

25 Q. [Microphone not activated] ... going to bug us a little is the

1 different colours on different maps. The -- on the bigger map, 211, the

2 municipality map, blue is for Croats. On the P293, blue is for Serbs so

3 we got to be a bit careful about colours, Mr. Krajisnik, otherwise it gets

4 pretty complicated.

5 A. But here the Croats stole the blue from us.

6 Q. The -- it's clearly the blob of land, if I can call it that, on

7 the Cutileiro map that we have been talking about here is, as you

8 mentioned a few minutes ago, it's distinctly smaller than the area of blue

9 land on P293, within which it was contained, isn't it?

10 A. Yes. It's smaller, just like the other parts here that are not

11 Serb are smaller. If you look at it, you will see that Mr. Cutileiro had

12 a plan that he was going to use in giving us direction when we were

13 identifying territories. You're right.

14 Q. Yes, we'll come to those other bits of land?

15 JUDGE ORIE: But your question was [indiscernible].

16 Mr. Stewart, could you ever have managed that Mr. Krajisnik would

17 have said no, it's larger, it's bigger, and do you really think that this

18 Court looking at this map, looking at those two features you've just drawn

19 our attention to, that we would ever accept any owns other than it would

20 be smaller?

21 MR. STEWART: No, Your Honour, that's not really the point.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Nevertheless we spent 50 lines on that.

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it's not really the point of my

24 question, and Your Honour --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, then if --

1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I believe, knows perfectly well that

2 sometimes a question which Your Honour wishes to characterise as a stupid

3 question in fact has its point.

4 JUDGE ORIE: If you would have included in the question that it --

5 this smaller portion and whatever you would like to draw our attention to

6 it would have been sufficient. Please proceed.

7 MR. STEWART:

8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you indicated that -- I believe you did a few

9 minutes ago -- that it was at Mr. Cutileiro's initiative that there was a

10 reduction of that area of land to what we see on Cutileiro map. Was that

11 right?

12 A. Yes. It is more precise, this idea of Mr. Darwin, late

13 Mr. Darwin, who was on the team of Mr. Cutileiro. He drew this map.

14 Q. But is that right that the -- the instigation of the reduction of

15 that area, that emanated from Cutileiro team rather than from the parties,

16 did it?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Was -- was it a part of your thinking, the Bosnian Serb

19 negotiators, that if you ended up with that smaller bit of land, that that

20 would give the Serbs within that slightly wider area the opportunity, if

21 you like, to withdraw into the core of that land, into what was provided

22 by the Cutileiro map?

23 A. No. Our position was that we should, whenever we can, ensure --

24 specifically with reference to this area, they wanted so badly to have

25 their municipality, we were going to suggest that they should have an

1 enclave within the federation, something similar to what others would have

2 in our territory, because that is a very particular, very peculiar area,

3 to which we were committed because those people suffered injustice for a

4 long, long time. And they would have stayed up there. It's sort of

5 plateau.

6 Q. What was -- was it -- however, was it of special importance to you

7 as the Bosnian Serb negotiators, that at least some part of that blue area

8 of land that we see on P293 should become Serb territory?

9 A. I said, as far as this territory was concerned, that it would be a

10 subject for debate. We were interested in all the following talks as

11 well, that this area remain within Republika Srpska, if I can put it that

12 way. We were interested in that. Now, what would actually come through

13 specifically, whether there would have been any exchanges, I cannot say,

14 because this didn't happen in actual fact. Perhaps a different solution

15 would have been found but I'm telling you what the aim was or what the

16 plan was.

17 Q. Now, the -- apart from that, that particular piece of land that

18 we've just been looking at, the only gap in the contiguity of Republika

19 Srpska is the gap in the northeast, isn't it?

20 A. Yes. You mean this part here?

21 Q. I do, indeed. Was that -- I called it a gap. It's as convenient

22 a word as any. Was that gap the subject of specific discussion during the

23 course of the Cutileiro talks?

24 A. Yes. There were discussions, and in one stage, that is to say in

25 the second stage, when we saw this map, we wanted to find a solution, so

1 that that constituent unit of ours would be linked up, if I can put it

2 that way. I can tell you about all the combinations that were there to

3 link this up, if we only talked to the Croats or if we involved the Muslim

4 side too.

5 Q. When the agreement was reached -- I'm avoiding the word signed or

6 concluded, Mr. Krajisnik, we already know that it was a little up in the

7 air. But when the agreement was reached with this map annexed to it, how

8 happy or unhappy were you, the Bosnian Serbs, with the result as seen on

9 this map?

10 A. I would just like to ask kindly for a small correction. For us,

11 this meant carrying out a deal: Recognise Bosnia, it will be transformed,

12 give up Yugoslavia. Afterwards, regardless of whether somebody signed

13 something or not, once we accepted Bosnia, for us it was an agreement, a

14 final thing.

15 And now, when you say whether we were happy or not, it's not only

16 three or four negotiators that are making decisions. We democratically

17 put this to the assembly and there was a wide discussion, there were many

18 objections. If we were to discuss these objections and to rely on them,

19 there would be a mixed feeling because expectations were higher.

20 Everybody looked at things at a local level. If I can talk about the

21 negotiators, once we had crossed the Rubicon and said that Bosnia was a

22 state, through talks we saw that it wasn't easy for the other side either.

23 So we had nevertheless a dose of satisfaction thinking well it's not bad

24 and if it's not bad it's good. But it wasn't that we were elated. Or

25 happy. Quite simply we said, if this is a solution, it's better for us to

1 accept that and to put a stop to the crisis rather than embark on some

2 kind of adventure, heaven forbid that a war break out. The negotiators

3 wanted this to be accepted, and the assembly later adopted that.

4 Q. If -- bearing in mind what you said in that answer, Mr. Krajisnik,

5 if you had been asked at that time, when this map came to be annexed to

6 the Cutileiro agreement, for your top three preferred improvements to this

7 map for the Bosnian Serbs, what would they have been? I don't --

8 obviously, Mr. Krajisnik, we are not talking about colour the whole map

9 blue for Serbs. You understand we are not talking about something as

10 extreme as that. We are talking about your top three proposals that would

11 have at least been within a sensible range to discuss across the table.

12 A. I didn't explain the agreement we reached with the Croats so

13 perhaps this answer will be insufficiently clear. My wish was for us to

14 find a solution for that corridor in Posavina. That is one thing.

15 Secondly --

16 Q. Use the pointer, Mr. Krajisnik, for that, please.

17 JUDGE ORIE: I think where the Posavina corridor is supposed to be

18 is perfectly clear. Please proceed.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The Posavina corridor, to

20 carry out a transformation of Sarajevo in the future, that it should now

21 be under the UN. And thirdly, I don't know if I'll be able to show it

22 here, I beg your pardon. You see this here, this is Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina's outlet to the sea, that is Neum, we wanted to have access to

24 the sea either there or here, above Dubrovnik, a belt of land that should

25 be given to the Croat side so that they would have access to the sea in

1 this area where Prevlaka is and the border with Montenegro. To my mind,

2 those were the three things that could have been resolved easiest of all.

3 Two things were already there, almost. It's only the Posavina

4 corridor that required further efforts. As for linking up territories

5 along the Drina, the wish was to have some territories exchanged there in

6 order to link up this corridor which we called our strategic objective but

7 at that moment it wasn't the most important thing for me. The most

8 important were the three that I just mentioned.

9 MR. STEWART:

10 Q. You said important for you. Did that reflect the importance for

11 the negotiating team as a group or were there some differences?

12 A. Well, well, there is a map that we had proposed. It's a bit

13 different from this map. Roughly, well, other negotiators too, I think --

14 well, deputies as well, put that corridor to the forefront, linking up the

15 eastern and the western parts, that is to say linking up Krajina and

16 Semberija. That was the most important. You see here, Sarajevo was

17 treated separately, and it would have been under the UN. See, down here.

18 So this is the Muslim part, the Croat part and the Serb part respectively,

19 whereas Sarajevo is separate. That's this part here. It would have

20 remained temporarily under the UN and then resolved later. That was also

21 in the proposal of the Serb side. We agreed on that and we drew that.

22 The Muslim side did not draw that but they put it into their own entity.

23 All of Sarajevo.

24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what I was -- what I was getting at was this. You

25 agree in negotiations among, say, three teams, there are often going to be

1 some pre-negotiations among the individual teams about what position

2 should be adopted and so on. I'm simply asking whether the preferences

3 that you had expressed as your own, whether there was any significant

4 private difference of view and preferences within the team of you,

5 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic.

6 A. I think we were united. Maybe there were minor negligible

7 differences between us but on principle, we were completely united on

8 this.

9 Q. And the proposals in relation to the two pieces of land marked on

10 the Cutileiro map within that very large swathe of Serb-marked territory

11 in the northwest. So further up but right up in the northwest, that very,

12 very large swathe -- or relatively very, very large, those two pieces of

13 land there, one of which is marked Croat territory, the one to the east

14 and the other partly Croat and partly Muslim, did those proposals present

15 significant difficulties for you, the Bosnian Serb negotiating team?

16 A. No. Simply speaking, the intermediaries, that is the European

17 Community, roughly identified where various ethnic areas lay, and they

18 said if somebody wants to change something, it can only be done through

19 bilateral agreements amongst you, about enclaves, et cetera. We didn't go

20 for it because it required agreement and they too had certain demands.

21 They were going to say what their priorities were. We were going to

22 identify our priorities and then we were going to look for a solution.

23 You have to -- it's much easier to work on the basis of a proposal than to

24 put forward your demands without any underlying paper.

25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can we go back to the -- just put the maps on one

1 side for the moment, please. Go back to the 8th assembly session? I want

2 to go to page 47 of my version of the English. It should be page 59 in

3 your version in your own language.

4 A. Is that number 12?

5 Q. Yes, it is. And it's Mr. Karadzic speaking again. He says -- do

6 you see there is a reference to Mr. Jaksic in the middle of that

7 paragraph?

8 A. Yes, I see it.

9 Q. So he says, "Some of -- in that sentence, some of those people are

10 not even party members and the case -- as in the case of" --

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] This is page 46?

12 MR. STEWART: Page 46, it seems, in Your Honours' copy.

13 Q. The reference to -- yes, Mr. Jaksic, "for instance, so let us not

14 give him the licence to undermine our strategic commitment and objectives

15 or to question our tactics. We are not changing our strategy. It remains

16 the same. One state for Serbia or a federation of states and we will

17 adjust the tactics to the conditions set down by Europe and we will seize

18 at any opportunity that Europe presents us with or any concessions it

19 makes and that's what we will do too."

20 So is it again right, Mr. Krajisnik, that what Mr. Karadzic is

21 saying there is not -- is not exactly fitting what you and he and

22 Mr. Koljevic are prepared to discuss and consider in the course of the

23 Cutileiro talks?

24 A. Mr. Dusko Jaksic was the director of the economic institute, the

25 institute of economy, and I think he's still in Banja Luka today. He made

1 a feasibility study for the autonomous region of Krajina and he worked

2 on - how shall I put it? - the rounding off of the Krajina territory. You

3 can also find it in the press, that he came out with this feasibility

4 study when the Autonomous Region of Krajina was included. He didn't offer

5 other Serb areas because he thought that SAO Krajina should also be linked

6 up, the SAO Krajina from Croatia.

7 I don't know precisely what the underlying reason for this is but

8 the old theory cropped up recurrently. We have Cutileiro negotiations, we

9 have the Serb unit, and some people were going back to some superseded

10 stages of regionalisation. That objection was frequently made against us,

11 that we were talking about Krajina as a federal unit of Yugoslavia.

12 Karadzic is saying here, however, we are not letting go of our strategic

13 goals, and if Europe hands us something, we will take it. But we cannot

14 look to satisfy those of our wishes which are unrealistic. Whereas this

15 man, Jaksic took a regional view of things. He wasn't thinking broadly

16 enough. So Karadzic criticised him for that. It didn't have any serious

17 consequences, although we were trying to put a stop to any talk to --

18 about regionalisation, et cetera, and we had discussions and tried to

19 persuade people and deputies from Krajina.

20 There was one discussion between Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Jaksic

21 dealing precisely with this topic. It was produced here, where

22 Mr. Koljevic was trying to explain to him that this idea was not good,

23 that the other version was better, et cetera.

24 Q. Can we turn on, please, to contribution of Mr. Zekic, which will

25 be after point 14? It will be about a page or a bit more than a page

1 after that.

2 A. I have number 14, but -- that's Mr. Kupresanin speaking, as far as

3 I can see.

4 Q. Just before Mr. Kupresanin. It's -- not sure the speakers are

5 clearly identified in your copy at this point, Mr. Krajisnik.

6 A. Yes, yes

7 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Zekic's excerpt. We found it.

8 MR. STEWART: Sorry.

9 Q. In your version, Mr. Krajisnik, it's in the middle of page 74,

10 there is a sentence that says ...

11 A. No. I think the page is 73.

12 MR. STEWART: Excuse me one moment, Your Honours.

13 [Defence counsel confer]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Zekic starts speaking at the bottom of page 72

15 and continues on page --

16 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. It's the middle

17 paragraph on page 73.

18 Q. He says, "I think that no agreement ..." There is no number

19 against it. "I think that no agreement will be reached on Thursday." Do

20 you see that?

21 A. Yes. I've found it.

22 Q. Yes, he says, "I think that no agreement will be reached on

23 Thursday. For our part we would accept it but the Muslims won't. They

24 won't. They would accept it only on condition that we make further

25 concessions but we have no reason to do so. We have no reason to preserve

1 any kind of a Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we can do nothing else, we can

2 totally destroy and shatter it, and that is our task because if our state,

3 Yugoslavia, was destroyed, we shall destroy this Bosnia with all the means

4 available. Applause." Well, my question is really this, Mr. Krajisnik.

5 Was that at the time -- was that as belligerent as it appears in the text?

6 A. No. It didn't sound belligerent, because we knew Mr. Zekic.

7 Mr. Zekic was - how should I put this? - a man who would get cross easily

8 and he was very brave. That's the way he behaved too. He went to

9 Srebrenica on his own and he was killed from an ambush, as an MP. So he

10 is putting this in epic terms. He is saying, "Why do we need Bosnia if we

11 lost Yugoslavia?" On the one hand, he is undermining what we had said

12 before and on the other hand he's saying the Muslims are not going to

13 accept that. We would have accepted it. So he's mixing apples and

14 oranges.

15 Now, what he's saying we shall destroy, shatter. You can see what

16 the atmosphere was like after the referendum of the Muslims and after they

17 opted for an independent Bosnia, and now he is saying, Are you being

18 realistic? The Muslims are not going to accept that, because they have

19 already chosen the direction they want to take. There were others who

20 made statements to that effect too. You will see the next speaker after

21 him, Kupresanin. I don't know who he said but that is the way these

22 people speak, in epic terms, and then they are applauded and then the

23 chairman has to try to calm things down and channel things into a

24 realistic discussion. Their type of discussion is more popular than

25 people who say, wait a minute, we have to do things differently. But it's

1 not realistic. It's realistic conclusions that are ultimately drawn, not

2 the kind that Mr. Zekic proposed.

3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can you find the bottom paragraph on page 74 of

4 your -- sorry, it's 71. There has been a hitch with the scanning. It's

5 71 of your document. But it's out -- it may be immediately before page

6 75. It may have got out of order?

7 JUDGE ORIE: It was out of order but it could just be put in the

8 right place because the page is missing there, 71.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 MR. STEWART:

11 Q. It's the paragraph starting, "I suggest that Karadzic, Koljevic,

12 and Krajisnik," which is on page 57 of my English version. Do you see

13 that? "I suggest that Karadzic, Koljevic, and Krajisnik." Do you see

14 that?

15 A. Page 71? Yes.

16 Q. And it's --

17 A. Yes. It's number 14, where number 14 is.

18 JUDGE ORIE: English page 56 for us.

19 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. It appears to be Mr. Kalinic speaking, and he says, I'd suggest

21 that Karadzic, Koljevic, and Krajisnik merely initial the documents the

22 gentlemen agree on, if it's suitable for us. If we agree, we can verify

23 the document at this assembly on Friday. This means that we extend our

24 full confidence to our negotiators but the document cannot be approved

25 without our participation, and Mr. Cutileiro should be told that they are

1 only negotiators on behalf of the Serbian Assembly and that the Serbian

2 Assembly alone can approve the signing (applause). Was that the attitude

3 that you expected the assembly to adopt?

4 A. Well, we expected that, and that was our intention, that the

5 negotiations be supported. Mr. Kalinic is being helpful here in saying,

6 well, he is not saying, maybe I made a mistake. Maybe the translation is

7 a bit wrong because it's sort of a free interpretation by the translator.

8 He doesn't say "only." "The authority given to us is only to initial a

9 document not to adopt it. And then the assembly will adopt the document."

10 That is what is written here. So, of course, well, the majority was in

11 favour of that so there was applause here too. Like in other places. So

12 we would be authorised to initial it possibly but then the assembly would

13 discuss this, adopt it, ratify it and so on.

14 Q. But it didn't surprise you that this was the position that the

15 assembly adopted in relation to your authority?

16 A. No, no. No. It didn't surprise me because we couldn't do

17 anything and we didn't want to do anything and we were not authorised to

18 accept something without the assembly giving their approval. We wanted

19 things to be as legitimate as possible. Ultimately none of us -- the

20 negotiators had the right to do things apart from the assembly and we kept

21 going back to the assembly.

22 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm looking at the clock.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This would be a suitable moment for a break.

24 We'll have a break until ten minutes to 1.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

1 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

3 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you speak at this same assembly meeting that we are

5 looking at, at page 77, which is page 62 in the English version I'm

6 looking at. Can you find that, Mr. Krajisnik? It's margin number 16.

7 A. Yes.

8 MR. TIEGER: Page 61.

9 MR. STEWART:

10 Q. You comment and I'm not going to go into that again. You comment

11 on what Mr. Kupresanin has said. I won't go through that in detail. It's

12 the point we considered earlier. Then you say about five paragraphs

13 on, "I'm sorry but if you say quotes if Banja Luka is not the capital of

14 Serbian Krajina." [as read] Do you see that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "If Banja Luka is not the captain of Serbian Krajina, it doesn't

17 become that. I can say here irrespective of who is present, that the

18 capital of the Serbian people can be one city and one city alone,

19 Belgrade. This attempt to impose Banja Luka, you can put it forward and

20 embellish it but I want to tell you gentlemen that individuals who are not

21 part of your ethnic group nor are they members of Serbian Democratic

22 Party, have the main word in Krajina. I say this before God and the

23 people here, whether you like it or not, and what is happening in Krajina

24 is the division of the Serbian people which they have no right to provoke

25 in Krajina."

1 I want to read together with this, Mr. Krajisnik, the very last

2 paragraph of this particular contribution of yours, before Mr. -- you hand

3 over the floor to Mr. Kupresanin. So if you just turn to the very end of

4 that speech, you say, "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian

5 people in a single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia

6 and Herzegovina and have it become part of the Serbian empire. I wouldn't

7 have a clear conscience to approve the words of anyone here from this

8 position and place. I have to say what I've said."

9 Did any concept of Serbian empire with Belgrade as its capital

10 form part of the policy of the SDS leadership at this point in time?

11 A. No, no. I'll explain what I meant by this. This is a defence

12 mechanism against the conclusion adopted by the Autonomous Region of

13 Krajina. I said that Belgrade was a centre, meaning a spiritual centre

14 for the Serbian people. If I had said Sarajevo, they would have replied

15 that it was a Muslim town. So it couldn't be the Serbian centre.

16 The issue was whether we were going to choose Banja Luka or

17 Sarajevo as the capital of our constituent unit. As for the empire, it's

18 obvious that I borrowed their style of speech, trying to answer in the

19 same vein and discourage them for what they thought was imperative for the

20 Autonomous Region of Krajina and Mr. Vojo Kupresanin later explained what

21 it was all about. The conclusions of the Autonomous Region of Krajina

22 were very dangerous indeed, something like an ultimatum.

23 Q. Then if we just go back a few paragraphs in that same speech,

24 about one, two, three, four, five paragraphs, you say, "Gentlemen" -- it's

25 four, I think, "Gentlemen, we want to remain in a single state." Do you

1 see that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Gentlemen we want to remain in a single state together with

4 Serbia, Montenegro, the independent Autonomous Region of Krajina, now the

5 Krajina state, and the rest. We just need to agree on the method to

6 achieve this. If we don't want to do this by certain methods, let us put

7 a stop to it. You know what our profession has always been, to wage war."

8 Was there a point that you were trying to get across to the

9 deputies by that particular remark?

10 A. This is very easy to understand in the Serbian language. I

11 replied to those who were against the results achieved in the

12 negotiations, within the framework of the Lisbon Conference of the time,

13 and I told them if you don't want to pursue this method, if you want a

14 state for Krajina instead, then let's put a full stop to this and see what

15 the alternative is. The alternative is war. And I meant the people of

16 Krajina whose historic vocation was to be soldiers, because they were

17 defenders of the border, and I was saying practically are we now supposed

18 to go back and do something that we all know would end in very bad

19 consequences? And they were all taken aback because my tone was very

20 different to my usual tone. I borrowed their tone and I borrowed their

21 rhetoric.

22 Maybe in your language it sounds like we have two options, one is

23 peace the other is war. I am suggesting a different way of looking at it.

24 I wasn't calling on anybody to make war. I was saying that we should work

25 for peace, whereas war is something that requires no work. Anybody can do

1 that. Anybody can understand what is written here in the original.

2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we -- there are, as there have been

3 with previous -- there are a number of intercepts relating to the period

4 which comes up to the end of February 1992, which is where we are now.

5 In the usual way, Your Honour, may I invite Mr. Josse to deal with

6 those with Mr. Krajisnik?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse?

8 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse: [Continued]

9 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I think the bundle are with Mr. Haider.

10 Could one be given to the witness, please? My learned friends in the

11 Prosecution have one.

12 The first intercept in this bundle is one that we -- Mr. Krajisnik

13 and Mr. Karadzic. It's dated the 26th of December 1991. Your Honours, by

14 our records, this has two exhibit numbers, it's part of P154, part of 389

15 as well. It was played at page 8079 to 8088 of the transcript. I don't

16 intend to have it replayed. On the first page, we see a reference to the

17 fact that Mr. Krajisnik says that he was down in Novi Grad until late.

18 Q. And that's what I want to ask you about initially, Mr. Krajisnik.

19 Why had you gone there on the 26th of December?

20 A. Perhaps -- I visited Novi Grad perhaps a few times. That's the

21 municipality where I used to reside. I was on the initiative board of the

22 Serbian Democratic Party there a month before the elections, and in a way

23 I had some private reasons for going there too. I don't know whether it

24 was a private reason that took me there this time, but that private reason

25 that I had later turned into a business reason. President of that

1 municipality, Mr. Ismet Cengic, testified here. I asked him to receive me

2 and to help me about legalising the status of my house. He did so and he

3 helped me, but I also attended the Municipal Board of the SDS of Novi

4 Grad. Or maybe they invited me, I'm not sure any more. And after I left,

5 some disagreements occurred between the two factions that I told you about

6 when I spoke about the first time I went there and was appointed to the

7 initiative board of the SDS in that municipality. So I know I went there

8 concerning some business that had to do with my house, but maybe I also

9 attended the board, and upon my return, maybe I reported about the

10 situation from that original board in that town, from which I became a

11 candidate of the SDS party.

12 Q. A little further down, there is a reference by you to that man,

13 Unkovic, contributed a lot to that but there were others there as well.

14 What are you alluding to when you mention Mr. Unkovic?

15 A. Mr. Unkovic, you remember I spoke about him earlier, he was a

16 candidate number 1 for a MP from our municipality and I was candidate

17 number 2. I think he took over from me later. Either as president of the

18 Municipal Board or maybe that inner circle. On one occasion, when they

19 were making some staffing decisions I suggested to Mr. Karadzic to correct

20 this injustice and to appoint him minister for culture. But that was

21 rejected. They rejected it. I wanted him to have a posting of that sort

22 because I felt guilty because in the end I got the appointment although he

23 had been number 1. He belonged to one group and those who were opposed

24 were on -- in the other group, and I was trying to say that he was not

25 alone in causing that conflict. There were others too on the Municipal

1 Board who contributed.

2 Q. The second part of this intercept is really a description by

3 Mr. Karadzic to you of negotiations that he is involved in. In the

4 English, towards the top of page 3, he introduces the subject by saying,

5 helpfully, "On another topic, there is a small disappointment you will

6 understand me. It appears that Milosevic, he went today to Macedonia. It

7 seems that he immediate a step in the direction of Izetbegovic-Gligorov

8 platform." What can you tell the Trial Chamber about that, Mr. Krajisnik?

9 A. At one point in the negotiations between presidents of republics,

10 an initiative was plead by late Mr. Izetbegovic from Bosnia, therefore,

11 and the president of Macedonia, Gligorov, and it was called platform

12 Izetbegovic-Gligorov. It envisaged a solution whereby the republics, the

13 former republics, would be linked doubly. Bosnia would have closer ties,

14 formal ties, federal ties, whereas Macedonia and Slovenia would have

15 looser, confederal ties, and that's what Mr. Karadzic is referring to,

16 namely that late president Milosevic had come closer to that option and

17 was -- or appeared ready to accept it, and he later did accept it in

18 Sarajevo. However, it was ultimately rejected by Tudjman.

19 Q. I'm going to read you back in English a little bit of what you've

20 just said and ask you if you can confirm whether it's right. If reads in

21 English, "Bosnia would have closer ties, formal ties, federal ties,

22 whereas Macedonia and Slavonia [as read] would have looser confederal ties

23 and that's what Mr. Karadzic is referring to." Did you just say that?

24 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, but the read back should have said Slovenia

25 and not Slavonia and that may be a source of some confusion for

1 Mr. Krajisnik.

2 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

4 MR. JOSSE:

5 Q. Do he need me to read that again, Mr. Krajisnik?

6 A. No. I understand. Maybe it's a slip of the tongue but what I

7 said was that Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina would have firmer ties,

8 whereas Slovenia and Croatia would have confederal ties, looser ties.

9 That's what I meant. Maybe I made a slip of the tongue. I don't think I

10 did actually.

11 Q. I don't think it was a slip of the tongue. That's why I asked you

12 the question. Thank you.

13 I'd like to move on, please, to the next intercept in the bundle.

14 That is one on New Years' Day 1992 between you and Mr. Karadzic again. It

15 bears four numbers by our record, 64, 67, 292, and 403. Again according

16 to our research it's been played in full twice to the Chamber, once on the

17 24th of February 2004 at 1529, where it wasn't transcribed, Your Honour,

18 and again at 8325 where it was transcribed, initially in the evidence of

19 Mr. Treanor and then in the evidence of Mr. Bijelica. I'm not going to

20 invite it to be played for a third time. I would like to take you to

21 quite a long passage, page 4 at the very bottom in English. Again, I'll

22 read it slowly and I'm sure you'll find the place when the translator

23 picks it up. And Karadzic says, "She shouldn't have, fuck her. Fuck her,

24 I was just reading this Izetbegovic interview.

25 Krajisnik: Yeah, what's it like."

1 A. Could I please just find it? Could you just wait for a second?

2 0530? Just a moment, please, yes. Yes. I found the page. Please go

3 ahead.

4 Q. I'll go on. "Karadzic: Well he's crazy, man. He is directly

5 irritating the Serbs.

6 Krajisnik: Yeah?

7 Karadzic: He was like, if we are all the same, this and that and

8 a sovereign and independent Bosnia, now he's talking openly of a sovereign

9 and independent Bosnia. Does he want someone to destroy Sarajevo?

10 Krajisnik: Yeah.

11 Karadzic: Fuck, he's really crazy. He now openly talks of a

12 sovereign and independent Bosnia.

13 Krajisnik: Yeah.

14 Karadzic: You know that.

15 Krajisnik: Yeah.

16 Karadzic: It was until recently -- fuck him we will release our

17 tigers and let them do their job.

18 Krajisnik: Yeah, can you imagine this impertinence.

19 Karadzic: Fuck. I -- we've been calming the Serb people for a

20 year because of his foolishness. What can I do? I will not be calming

21 anyone anymore, nor can I.

22 Krajisnik: Nobody says we don't want -- this isn't an

23 independent, that's not a state. He says it's a -- sovereign so it's

24 equal in the talks. Now he says independent. Fucking they really are

25 crazy. Europe is crazy too if they think this can be so. Man, this is

1 impossible, this. I don't think there is a man who could turn the

2 situation around and now make it so."

3 I'll stop there if I may. This is clearly a reference to

4 something Mr. Izetbegovic has said. What was it?

5 A. Well, there was an interview here that was there as a document of

6 Mr. Izetbegovic. I think it was his New Years' interview, and that is the

7 occasion. In our discussions about declarations and memorandums, the

8 response coming from the other side was we don't want an independent

9 Bosnia without the approval of all. We just want Bosnia to be sovereign,

10 like all the rest, equitable. It is sovereign because that's what the

11 constitution says. It's a sovereign republic but within Yugoslavia. Now,

12 in that article, he says we want independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, preparing

13 for the referendum and so on. Now, this is Mr. Karadzic's anger, and he

14 is using various unrealistic words here, that he's going to release some

15 radical elements of his that he kept under control and so on. However,

16 there is one thing that is true and realistic in what Mr. Karadzic says.

17 All the time the Serbs were being persuaded to go for negotiations to find

18 an agreement, a solution, that there would be no unilateral solutions and

19 that the Muslim side would not ask for independence because that is

20 dangerous, without agreeing on what a transformed Bosnia would be like.

21 Please, there is a statement made by Mr. Karadzic on the 17th of January.

22 He says, "No division, not a -- not a division but a transformation of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina." So after our declaration on the Serb republic of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said we want transformation not a division. That

25 is a consequence of that interview, as far as I can remember, that

1 interview given by Mr. Izetbegovic. It was the first time that he used

2 the word independence, not sovereignty.

3 Q. Any idea what Mr. Karadzic is referring to when he says, "We will

4 release our tigers and let them do their job"?

5 A. He meant nothing. It's just an expression of powerlessness.

6 "Release our tigers." There are no tigers. It's something that -- well,

7 in our part of the world, if you say something like if you don't bring me

8 that notebook tomorrow, I'll kill you. It's sort of rhetorical. Then

9 also there is this saying he's asleep as if he were slaughtered or

10 something like that. And he meant I'm not going to keep my people that

11 way any longer, let them do what they want. There are no tigers. Wars

12 are different but this is the 1st of January. He's speaking out of fear

13 because he knows what it means. That's what my view is. That's why I

14 kept trying to pacify things. In a way I tried to calm his terrible

15 dissatisfaction down, his terrible dissatisfaction over Mr. Izetbegovic's

16 interview. And I agreed with him because it was not a good interview and

17 at that time it was not a fair interview on the part of the late

18 Mr. Izetbegovic.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] In this interview, in this

20 intercept, later Mr. Karadzic is saying in English, "No way to release

21 us. People, we should hold them back." So what exactly does this mean

22 for you?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that's what he meant.

24 At the assembly, and at all gatherings we kept saying that there would be

25 no war, that we would reach agreement and so on. You saw those previous

1 sessions, how much persuasion there was there to channel things towards a

2 solution as sought by the European Community, and now he said well we are

3 just going to let go and let everybody do whatever they want and then they

4 will see. So it's a sign of powerlessness well not of powerlessness but

5 of anger. It's not that he can release anybody or anything. He can't

6 even talk them into doing something serious. This is rhetorical. This is

7 a rhetoric that is readily understood in our parts. Well, rhetoric that

8 is perhaps not understandable in other parts of the world but it's

9 understandable in our parts, that you say something in anger that is not

10 exactly very balanced.

11 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know to what extent there might have been

12 confusion of what I read on the transcript because it does not reflect the

13 text you read, since the text says, Karadzic, Radovan saying, "No way, we

14 need to release those people. We shouldn't hold them back," whereas the

15 transcript now reads, we should hold them back. But the portion of the

16 intercepted telephone conversation says, "they -- we should not hold them

17 back." Please proceed.

18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. I've understood that, of

19 course, it's rhetoric when you say "We will release our tigers." [In

20 English] "And let them do their job." [Interpretation] But a bit later, I

21 found an expression that was more explicit, we need to release those

22 people, we should not hold them back. So excuse me if I may continue.

23 So, as a reader, when I read this, it seems as if Mr. Karadzic

24 wanted to say that there were people who were ready to really go right at

25 it, that it wouldn't be possible to always hold them back, you know, in

1 front of provocation, and you're not interpreting it in the same way as I

2 am, right?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am sorry. I cannot see this or

4 what is this, impertinence? I can't find what you read out just now.

5 Perhaps the interpreters can help me.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I think we'll find it.

7 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I found it now, yes.

9 No, no. This is the meaning of what I said. I said that we don't

10 have to release them. It's not that we have to approve that. No way.

11 They are going to do that on their own, like it or not. What I was trying

12 to say was, well, he said we are going to release them. We will let them

13 or whatever. I was saying, well, you don't have to let them. They

14 will -- well, they will do it spontaneously on their own. There will be

15 chaos. So this is an answer from me. And then he continues and

16 says, "Well, you cannot stop them any longer." So he's giving me an

17 answer, not preventing something, stopping someone from doing something.

18 He is saying as if he could stop someone from doing something, and then

19 I'm saying, no way, what does this mean? Well, I appreciate -- this is

20 something that was not defined properly because this answer doesn't make

21 any sense when we read all of it, but, well, in that sense, it follows

22 what Karadzic said, "No way, what does that mean, really? I appreciate

23 the nation, you," meaning the Muslims, "Yugoslavs, you know, they started

24 something and they have some idea as well, but I put this mildly. They

25 want me to help them in the parliament so they can get the status of a

1 constituent people." This is something that has nothing to do with the

2 previous thing that was said. Probably some party of Yugoslavs asked for

3 something in the parliament but that has nothing to do with the first

4 thing that Mr. Karadzic was saying. Somehow -- well, that's what's

5 written here.

6 MR. JOSSE: There may be one small translation issue that's been

7 brought to my attention.

8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, on your page, 0322-0531, could you read the very

9 first two lines of that page, which is a comment from Mr. Karadzic. Read

10 it slowly so that it can be translated again.

11 A. "No way. We have to let people -- we don't or we should not fuck

12 around with them." Well, the style is not very good either, if those are

13 the two lines you meant.

14 Q. Yes.

15 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour it was brought to my attention that in the

16 present translation, the use of the word "those" is inaccurate.

17 JUDGE ORIE: So we have even more differences now because on paper

18 it reads, "No way, we need to release those people," whereas it now says,

19 "We have to let people," and then "We shouldn't hold them back. Now has

20 become -- we don't or we should not fuck around with them," which is not

21 exactly the same. Could I ask CLSS to verify the translation specifically

22 on these two lines, because the language as translated on paper now is

23 more suggestive than the language as translated now orally. I see some of

24 the -- one of the interpreters raising his hand or -- no. Could we --

25 perhaps, Mr. Registrar, you could try to be in touch with CLSS to have

1 this verified; very specifically, these two lines.

2 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

3 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik in fact I was going to move on to the next intercept

5 in this mini bundle. That is one on an unspecified date in January

6 between yourself and Mr. Karadzic. It's -- it bears two numbers, it's

7 been played at 1554 of the transcript, but not transcribed, again during

8 the evidence of Mr. Treanor. And on the first page, we see that you are

9 asking about the position on the referendum. You then discuss that

10 further with Mr. Karadzic, and you say, on page 3 in the English, and I'll

11 read this slowly again whilst the place is found, "Listen, what I had in

12 mind, I think we have to say publicly we consider this referendum, it's a

13 referendum.

14 Karadzic: National?

15 Krajisnik: Yes, of Muslims.

16 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. There was a reference to page 3 in the

17 English. We went to the next intercept sequentially in the materials

18 provided. That contains 2 pages of English translation so perhaps an ERN

19 will be necessary to point us towards the right document.

20 MR. JOSSE: Yes, the ERN in translation is 02079370, 02079371 -- I

21 look at it I can see that there is going to be a problem because it says

22 draft translation. I suspect that there is a revised translation for the

23 actual exhibit and I'm afraid I don't have that. Is that the difficulty?

24 I don't know whether my learned friend can assist.

25 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, I'm reasonably confident I have the

1 translation that was actually exhibited. I'm happy to provide it to the

2 Registrar to pass it along so that we can move forward.

3 MR. JOSSE: Am I getting that?

4 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps put it on the ELMO and then have it enlarged

5 such that everyone can read it, and it would here be on -- just trying to

6 find the relevant portion.

7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --

8 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact I was looking for -- it's at 10,

9 the press conference, yes, in the one it's in numbers and the other it's

10 in -- written out. For you, Mr. Krajisnik in the B/C/S version it's

11 two-thirds down on page 1, I think it is.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

13 MR. JOSSE: I'll read on, if I may. In fact, perhaps the usher

14 could pull --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could it be zoomed in a little bit?

16 MR. JOSSE: I was going to say scrolled up, in fact, because with

17 it in front of us -- the other way, please.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it should not be scrolled up too much, I would

19 say, because you started on the line -- well, which is now in the middle

20 of the page.

21 MR. JOSSE: I know I did, Your Honour, but since it's there I'm

22 not going to read those few lines out because iz the next substantive

23 answer for Mr. Krajisnik -- over the page, please, Madam Usher -- that I

24 would like to direct Mr. Krajisnik to in reality. There it is. It's

25 this. "Where they didn't help us we have no reasons to help them but we

1 won't hinder it. In any case, we'll greet it. It would be good to say.

2 As for the official organs, they are not obliged to do because this was

3 brought by one unofficial meeting and not official. Yes, yes, and we

4 won't give up ourselves. Up by that date certain things will become

5 crystallised and that conditions set by the HDZ will be fulfilled, that we

6 will with such an agreed standpoint in that case probably when all those

7 things are resolved, it won't be disputable even for Serbs to get out, you

8 know."

9 What are you saying about the referendum, Mr. Krajisnik?

10 A. First of all, a small correction. What is it says here is "we are

11 holding on," but logically, it would be "we hope," not [B/C/S spoken] but

12 [B/C/S spoken], that things will be crystallised by that date. So it is

13 not [B/C/S spoken] but [B/C/S spoken]. It's rather similar.

14 JUDGE ORIE: The provisional translation seems to be clearer on

15 that matter than the final one, but ... Okay.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Actually, this was probably after

17 the 25th of January, the 27th of January 1992, a conversation taking place

18 then, when the Muslim and the Croat sides -- or rather, there was a

19 meeting of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I actually persuaded

20 the MPs of the Serb Democratic Party or rather our club that they go and

21 attend this joint session. That is to say on the 27th. I think it was

22 the 27th of January.

23 Then a big, profound debate took place there. It's a historic

24 session, if I can call it that, and we were so close to a solution there

25 that the Muslim side even agreed. And there is a video clip here where

1 Mr. Cengic and Mr. Karadzic are at the rostrum together and at the last

2 moment, actually, the late Mr. Izetbegovic cancelled this so this idea

3 went down the drain. Then we, the Serb side, vetoed this and we provided

4 these 20 signatures and asked this to be referred to the Council for

5 National Security. That is why this is irregular. When I say this, we

6 are saying that this is a plebiscite or a referendum of two peoples, not

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina for us, so what I'm saying here is that we should not

8 hinder them, we should welcome this if we look at it that way and if they

9 helped us in any way when we had a plebiscite they should be helped too.

10 Our official organs are not duty bound to help, in our view, but they

11 should not hinder it either. And Mr. Karadzic agrees with that. The

12 referendum of the Muslims and Croats is something that we thought we

13 should not hinder but that an official statement should be made.

14 You have a letter from Mr. Radojko from Petrovac he's the one who

15 signed it asking for instructions and that is why we were duty bound to

16 make some kind of statement. Mr. Karadzic is saying here, "I will say

17 that at the press conference" and I'm saying if by some date conditions

18 have been met perhaps we will go for a referendum too, which was a

19 sensitive issue. So that was the meaning, that we should not hinder this

20 referendum. Because they did not hinder our plebiscite either when we

21 held it.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, I don't know whether this was your last

23 question already on the matter but since I have a to announce a few

24 procedural matters as well with the indulgence of the technicians and the

25 interpreters, I would rather then invite you to do that next week.

1 MR. JOSSE: Of course. Could I just say this? I would invite the

2 Chamber to allow Mr. Krajisnik to take this mini bundle away with him?

3 Even though he was notified yesterday of these intercepts, there seems no

4 reason why he can't have that bundle.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Any objection?

6 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Krajisnik, you may take the bundle with you

8 and further read it over the weekend.

9 MR. TIEGER: Let me just confirm my understanding that the bundle

10 we are talking about is the listing --

11 JUDGE ORIE: The intercept bundle, I take it, just intercepts.

12 MR. JOSSE: The intercept bundle that he has in front of him.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 Then the Chamber would like to address a few matters. First, the

15 claim would like to deal with a few matters related to items in evidence

16 or to be tendered by the parties. With respect to P529, tab 408, the

17 parties agreed to modify the translation of an intercept dated the 20th of

18 June 1992. The portion reads, and I quote, "Well, I'm chasing those pigs

19 up there, these Muslims that left these pigs behind. Two to three days

20 I've been doing that."

21 The words "these Muslims" should deleted and replaced with "those

22 Bosniaks (or Bosniak family)".

23 The claim requests the Registrar to modify and initial the

24 translation accordingly with a reference to today's transcript.

25 The claim would also like the OTP to tender immediately the

1 translations for P1077, P1079, P1081, and P1082, and P1084. But since

2 Mr. Registrar showed me just before we entered into court a bundle of

3 documents, I take it that most of it, of the list I just gave, is covered

4 by what has just been submitted by the Prosecution.

5 Mr. Harmon?

6 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour, with the exception of 1081. Let me

7 explain the situation with 1081. 1080 was an interview with Mr. Poplasen.

8 1080 was in B/C/S, it was then translated into English. That became

9 Exhibit 1080.1. The identical interview in English was 1081. We have not

10 translated 1081 because it's the identical interview that is found in

11 1080.1.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it, Mr Josse, that --

13 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Mr. Harmon had previously explained that to me.

14 I, of course, would like to look at the translation that have just been

15 tendered.

16 JUDGE ORIE: You've got until next Tuesday to raise any

17 objections, if that -- is that enough.

18 MR. JOSSE: That's fine. That is enough so long as they are given

19 to me this afternoon, please.

20 JUDGE ORIE: So then that leaves 1077, 79, 82, and 84 are

21 submitted and you have for these exhibits as well one week from today to

22 raise any objections as we usually give you, to these translations,

23 failing which all of these items I just mentioned to the exclusion of the

24 one, 1081, will be automatically admitted into evidence. And then you'll

25 get for 1081 a week as well, Mr. Josse.

1 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Then with respect to 1092 and 1092A, which is a

3 Tanjug news report and video clip, on the 21st of March the Chamber asked

4 the OTP to submit the video, the English transcript and the B/C/S

5 transcript by the 5th of April. The Chamber requests the Prosecution to

6 tender these items at the first opportunity. The Defence will then have

7 one week to object. In the absence of any objection the items will be

8 admitted into evidence without further action by the Chamber.

9 MR. HARMON: We have those, Your Honour. Trying to locate those

10 and if not --

11 JUDGE ORIE: You'll provide them to the Registrar and to Mr. Josse

12 this afternoon --

13 MR. HARMON: We'll file them.

14 JUDGE ORIE: -- that they are now tendered.

15 We were informed that items P851, P853, P854, were not properly

16 identified on the exhibits list. Moreover, the corresponding B/C/S

17 transcripts have not been provided. The Chamber requests the Registrar to

18 modify the titles of the exhibits on the list to better reflect their

19 content. Also the Chamber notes that since the translation of exhibits

20 into B/C/S from one -- into B/C/S from one of the official languages of

21 the Tribunal is for the benefit much the Defence, there is no need to have

22 a B/C/S translation if the Defence does not request one and that's for

23 P-exhibits or does not arrange for one to be made and that, of course,

24 would apply for Defence exhibits.

25 The Chamber further requests the Prosecution to file as soon as

1 possible the photographic material on the destruction of buildings in 1992

2 and the exemplars of contracts related to the forced surrender of

3 property. There must be plenty of photographs or film frames shot in 1992

4 on which the effects of the armed conflict were captured.

5 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, that project is sitting on my desk, at

6 least the preliminary project is sitting on my desk. This is a -- the

7 situation that arises. We can identify destruction that took place in

8 1992. The photographs, however, were taken subsequent to 1992. The Court

9 order says it requires us to produce photographs taken in 1992. So we can

10 tie destruction that occurred in 1992 through witnesses' testimony. We

11 can cite to the testimony. But often times we weren't on the scene and

12 didn't have access to the scene when the destruction occurred or shortly

13 even after the destruction occurred. So a lot of our pictures are taken

14 in 2000, 2002, maybe 1998.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you could discuss the matter with the

16 Defence, whether the Defence would have any doubt as to whether the

17 destruction was caused in 1992. I'm not talking about reason or the

18 causes of destruction. We are just images to get a better impression and

19 even though the pictures may have been taken at a later stage. And then

20 we would like to receive it as soon as possible.

21 Then I -- that should not refrain you from presenting the

22 contracts, Mr. Harmon. And I know how it is. If there is a project on

23 your desk you would like to get it off it as soon as possible.

24 Then with respect to item D139, the missing compact disk was

25 tendered on the 27th of April and the item is therefore admitted into

1 evidence now.

2 With respect to item D146, the English translation was tendered on

3 the 26th of April and the item is therefore admitted into evidence.

4 All of the items tendered during the examination of Witness

5 Bijelica were admitted by the decision of the 24th of April. However, two

6 of these exhibits, namely D162 G and D163 still lack English translations.

7 In addition, the Defence has not yet submitted the compact disk of D161, a

8 video which was played in court. These three exhibits are therefore only

9 provisionally admitted. The Defence is requested to provide the compact

10 disk of item D161, as soon as possible, and to submit the missing English

11 translation, translations related to items used during the examination and

12 Mr. Bijelica within two weeks. These items will be admitted without more

13 upon receipt of the required translations and the compact disk.

14 The Chamber finally reminds the Defence that the deadline for

15 objections by the Defence to the Nielsen source material submitted on the

16 25th of April by the OTP expires on the 9th of May. This concludes the

17 Chamber's orders.

18 MR. JOSSE: Could I just -- Your Honour, since it got a

19 reference, I with Mr. Zahar's permission handed to Mr. Krajisnik earlier

20 an unmarked copy of P853.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. To say that I immediately would know what P853

22 is.

23 MR. JOSSE: It's an interview with Mr. Krajisnik.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then at least now the OTP is informed about

25 it.

1 Then I wish everyone a good weekend. We adjourn until next

2 Monday, but not, Mr. Krajisnik, until after I've instructed you not to

3 speak with anyone about the testimony given or still to be given.

4 Adjournment until next Monday, Mr. Registrar, we are sitting, I

5 think in the afternoon or is that a mistake.

6 THE REGISTRAR: In the afternoon, Your Honours, in Courtroom II.

7 JUDGE ORIE: That will be quarter past 2, same courtroom.

8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.01 p.m.,

9 to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th day of May,

10 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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