1 Monday, 8 May 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

7 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you allow me to respond, I would say good

9 afternoon, Mr. Registrar, but it's good that you're still morning fresh.

10 There are two minor matters which I would just like to raise for a

11 second. We asked Mr. Krajisnik -- I think it was last Friday but I'm not

12 sure about that, to read the first two lines on what was his page

13 0322-1 -- 0531. Yes.

14 The transcript now reflects exactly what I said, but that might

15 create some confusion. So I repeat the number: 0322-0531. Yes.

16 Since there was a problem with the translation, the Chamber asked

17 the CLSS to verify the translation of this document on which this page

18 appears, and then specifically on these two lines. CLSS has, however, a

19 problem there because the original translation is not theirs. It seems to

20 be an OTP-produced translation. Therefore, they suggested to have the

21 whole of the document freshly translated, which might take considerable

22 time. I tend to invite CLSS to translate specifically, so not commenting

23 on the existing translation, but to freshly translate the two lines and

24 invite the Defence to identify any further translation issue that might

25 appear in this document, because to have seven pages translated since we

1 found -- we identified one translation problem in two lines, it takes a

2 lot of resources. Therefore I would first prefer to have verification,

3 whether the remainder of the translation causes any real problem, that is

4 any problem apart from some variety in language that could always be there

5 but whether it would be prejudicial to the Defence. Perhaps if

6 Mr. Sladojevic could perhaps have a look at it. But before doing so, I'd

7 like to see whether there is any submission to be made in this respect

8 from the parties as briefly as possible.

9 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, we consider that Your Honour's

10 suggestion is far and away the most sensible way of proceeding.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

12 MR. TIEGER: We agree.

13 JUDGE ORIE: And that saves us six pages and approximately 35

14 lines to be translated. Then we'll do it this way. Mr. Registrar, you --

15 would you please present to CLSS the two lines and one line prior to that,

16 one line after that, to be retranslated freshly and then we, I take it

17 that we hear within a week from the Defence if there is any further need

18 to have the remainder of the document to be translated.

19 That's one issue. Then there is a second issue I would like to

20 briefly raise. I was informed, Mr. Krajisnik, that a floppy disk which

21 comes from you went, I don't know for what reasons, went to the OTP, is

22 now sent back to the Defence and there was a personal matter on it and

23 therefore you would like to receive it back from the Defence. Is that a

24 correct understanding?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just take a minute of your

1 time? During my arrest, the SFOR took certain documentation from me,

2 including one floppy disk, the graduation paper of my son, and at the

3 request of the Defence team, the OTP returned that floppy disk to my

4 Defence team. I am unable to contact them right now and they have still

5 not found a way to give me that file, nor are they able to open it. So I

6 am sort of left without a choice and I have to request your assistance in

7 having that returned to me. Maybe you can take a few minutes to find out

8 what it is about and I'm sure the Office of the Prosecutor knows.

9 MR. JOSSE: Well, I know about this, Your Honour, at least I know

10 what Mr. Krajisnik is talking about. Shortly before he gave evidence, the

11 Prosecution disclosed various arrest documents, or documents relating to

12 Mr. Krajisnik's arrest, to us. That included an old-fashioned floppy

13 disk.

14 JUDGE ORIE: The big one, the real floppy one, or is it a 3 and a

15 half inch?

16 MR. JOSSE: Small but not one that's capable of going into a CD

17 reader. And frankly we were unable to open it. The extent to which we

18 made efforts to open it I can't tell the Court. At some juncture I had

19 made an arrangement with Mr. Krajisnik that he would open it in my

20 presence. Due to an oversight on my part, that proved impossible; frankly

21 I forgot it at the relevant meeting. He thought he would be able to open

22 it on the equipment he had available to him at the detention unit. So

23 that hasn't happened. We are still in possession of it; it's actually in

24 this building. Probably we should open it first of all, but I suspect

25 Mr. Harmon knows what's in it, not now, I appreciate he doesn't know now,

1 but I suspect someone in the OTP will know what's on it. Perhaps I could

2 speak to them at the next break and we could then revert to this subject.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Opening you mean to open by what programme so

4 the file doesn't open and is not visible on your screen? Is that --

5 MR. JOSSE: That's right. We've been unable to physically open it

6 in that sense, correct.

7 JUDGE ORIE: And do I understand that you -- you identified on

8 that floppy disk which document it was?

9 MR. JOSSE: No. But Mr. Krajisnik --

10 JUDGE ORIE: He knows?

11 MR. JOSSE: He inferred that it must be a particular file, which

12 he said to me, I'm sure he won't mind me saying this, included work done

13 by his son six years ago when he was arrested. Whether that's right, we

14 can't say until it's been opened but that is what Mr. Krajisnik thought

15 was on the disk. Whether there is anything else on the disk, I have no

16 idea, I'm afraid.

17 JUDGE ORIE: It has been returned to the Defence. I'm looking to

18 you, Mr. Harmon. Is there any hesitation to just return the floppy disk

19 to Mr. Krajisnik? Because I do understand that if it's returned to the

20 Defence that the Prosecution would have no problem in -- and it is -- has

21 the same content as six years ago, I take it.

22 MR. HARMON: I take it does, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because it has been in your hands for all this

24 time. Would, under those circumstances, would there be any major problem

25 just to return the floppy disk Mr. Krajisnik?

1 MR. JOSSE: None at all. That could be done this afternoon, I'm

2 pretty sure, I'm fairly confident.

3 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore, I will --

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber has no difficulties that you would

6 return the floppy disk, of course, within all the security settings as

7 defined by the Registrar to return it to Mr. Krajisnik.

8 MR. JOSSE: If Mr. Krajisnik feels there is anything on the disk

9 which is important to his evidence, then I would invite him to bring that

10 to our attention in some way.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And, of course, first seek leave from the

12 Bench --

13 MR. JOSSE: Of course.

14 JUDGE ORIE: -- to further discuss the matter.

15 MR. JOSSE: That was assumed in the remark I just made.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I just remind Mr. Krajisnik of this rule.

17 So therefore, both matters are resolved now. We'll now continue,

18 but not until after I have reminded you, Mr. Krajisnik, as you know, I

19 always do, all witnesses, that you are still bound by the solemn

20 declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony.

21 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart or Mr. Josse, whoever it is, you may

24 proceed.

25 Examination by Mr. Josse: [Continued]

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you have the bundle of intercepts that you were

2 permitted to take with you to the detention unit this weekend? I see that

3 you do.

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. We had got to number 3 on this mini list. I'd now like to turn to

6 number 4, which is an intercept again between yourself and Mr. Karadzic,

7 sometime in January of 1992. As far as --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Is that one which has no exhibit number.

9 MR. JOSSE: As far as our records indicate that is the position so

10 could I ask for a number, please.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D187, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

14 MR. JOSSE:

15 Q. I don't intend to play this, Mr. Krajisnik. At the beginning of

16 the conversation, we see that you say --

17 A. Just a second, please. There are several intercepts from January.

18 Which one of them?

19 Q. It's the --

20 JUDGE ORIE: You said it was number 4.

21 MR. JOSSE:

22 Q. -- fourth one in your bundle and --

23 A. Yes, yes, it's all right.

24 Q. And we see at the top of the intercept that you say that you've

25 been called by Vojo Kupresanin. You go on and say it would be good if

1 someone went there, but swearing it would be good if someone could now,

2 you know, explain this about the finances, they want the whole Krajina,

3 stop paying tomorrow.

4 What's this about, please?

5 A. When I read this intercept, I wrote a note that reads, "I don't

6 know what this is about." However, having thought about it and analysed

7 it a bit, I can now recall that in January at one point, the Autonomous

8 Region of Krajina wished on its own initiative to stop its contributions

9 and payments towards the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, into the budget

10 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And there is reference here to the

11 opinion that that shouldn't be done unilaterally and there is a reference

12 to the conversation between me, Mr. Karadzic, and the president of the

13 Autonomous Region of Krajina, Mr. Kupresanin.

14 Q. So what was your view on the matter?

15 A. Whenever we were talking finance, the position was always that we

16 should decentralise the budget and that the existing centralisation, the

17 one in Sarajevo, should be decentralised as much as possible and funds

18 returned to the regions. But this specific conversation was about a

19 unilateral decision and we were against doing it that way. We wanted

20 instead to reach a solution through negotiations, and there were some

21 negotiations in January, and we thought it was possible because the

22 Muslims and Croats were also in favour of that solution, and we were about

23 to finalise this deal. This concerned funds for health care, old age

24 pensions, et cetera, and all the other funds that were regulated and

25 collected at the level of the republic.

1 Q. And what was your concern as to what might happen to the ARK

2 finances if they took this course? To put it another way did you fear

3 there might be some retaliation from the republic government?

4 A. What was at stake were economic interests. As in every state, the

5 centre, Sarajevo, was a large economic centre, and when revenues are high,

6 contributions are also high, and we were saying -- we were discussing in

7 this conversation whether it would -- whether it pays off to make

8 contributions, to continue making contributions, whether what they

9 received offsets their contributions or they should withdraw their

10 contributions subject to a tripartite consent because any unilateral

11 position and we who defended Serb interests knew this perfectly well,

12 would damage the negotiating positions of the Serbs because the other side

13 would tell us, "You are doing something that we hadn't agreed about,"

14 whereas we always kept saying, "We are reacting to your unilateral moves

15 because you started violating our earlier agreements."

16 Q. I'd like now, please, to turn to the next intercept in the bundle.

17 Same two protagonists. This was sometime in February of 1992. It has

18 been exhibited as part of 64 A and 154.

19 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I understand it's never been played.

20 Again I don't intend to play it now. I'm not in fact sure whether it's

21 been referred to previously in the transcript.

22 Q. Could we turn in the English to the second page, please, and at

23 the top of the page. I'll read it slowly, Mr. Krajisnik, whilst the place

24 is found. You say, "I had to give them a boost, not to make silly moves

25 like Brdjanin and Kupresanin and then I first did that and then I made an

1 agreement for them to translate that and thirdly the constitutional

2 committee to prepare it. Alija called me."

3 "Yes," says Karadzic.

4 You say, "Is it true that you're going to proclaim the

5 constitution on Friday? It is confusing. You didn't tell him Friday but

6 tomorrow."

7 What are you saying there?

8 A. Two issues are discussed here. I'll start with the second one.

9 When he asks me, "Did you convene the proclamation of the constitution for

10 Friday? Did you schedule it for Friday?", I, in reply, convey the

11 discussion I had with Mr. Izetbegovic and I tell him that it's scheduled

12 for the next day, the 26th, on the 25th February, I don't know when this

13 conversation took place. Whereas this first passage, where Mr. Brdjanin

14 and Mr. Kupresanin are mentioned is something else. We were following the

15 unconstitutional moves plead by the other sides and we reacted to them.

16 However, there was great concern in the Krajina and especially on the part

17 of Mr. Brdjanin and Mr. Kupresanin, who kept saying that we, our side, is

18 constantly making some moves which are dictated in a way by the other

19 side, whereas they are following their ambition to create an independent

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina at an accelerated tempo. We agreed to a transformation

21 along the lines of decentralisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina but not to a

22 unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. You saw our draft constitution that we made

23 where we specified that this constitution that we were about to adopt was

24 going to be an integral part of the outcome of negotiations on

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So our policy was to keep the negotiations going, to

1 keep this as a link, whereas the people from Krajina thought that ours was

2 an exercise in futility, that they were following their objective of an

3 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina along a different track and

4 unfortunately they turned out to be right later because they got their

5 independence and we did not get the transformation as agreed. However at

6 this point I was trying to persuade them to refrain from unilateral moves

7 and I was trying to boost their morale and appease their concerns. When I

8 read this through I recalled that time. It came back.

9 Q. I'd like to move on to the next document, please.

10 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, could I make an observation about the

11 next document? This is part of P154, though I don't have it in front of

12 me, I think on the exhibit list this still appears as being under seal.

13 It shouldn't be. I've had some correspondence with Mr. Zahar on the

14 subject and he confirmed that it should not be under seal.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we check that first.

16 MR. TIEGER: I followed that correspondence as well. That's

17 consistent with my understanding, too.

18 JUDGE ORIE: It's not in my recollection any more but having been

19 informed that P154 is one of the documents tendered through the late

20 Mr. Babic, I think we gave a -- kind of a general order on that so that

21 would then be public and it should be indicated on the list that it is a

22 public document.

23 MR. JOSSE: If I could assist, that's from 152 through to 156

24 inclusive.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. You may proceed in public session now

1 with 154 and we'll verify where things went wrong.

2 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. Your Honour, again, according to our

3 researches, the intercept that I'm about to refer to has never been

4 alluded to in any way at all in court. It's simply part of the Babic

5 intercept collection.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 MR. JOSSE:

8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to take you to the bottom of the first page

9 in the English. This is a conversation again between you and Mr. Karadzic

10 sometime in February of 1992. And Karadzic says, "I see they've removed

11 Babic there."

12 Krajisnik: "Well, I must tell you that they did the right thing."

13 Karadzic: "Did the right thing, huh?"

14 Krajisnik: "He can go fuck himself."

15 Karadzic: "Right. One man who insists he can go fuck himself."

16 Krajisnik: "There is no fucking way. I don't know what I would

17 do. For a long timing I thought about whether we made a mistake but you

18 have to be a rational Serb."

19 Karadzic: "No. It's unbelievable that he values himself so much

20 and he thinks he's more important than everything else. But he has to

21 stand before the assembly and say to the people that we have a situation

22 which is so" -- I'm afraid in the English it's not clear what that is. I

23 think I'll ask you to read that in a moment back, and you decide and I'll

24 do what you say.

25 Could you read, Mr. Krajisnik, that answer from Mr. Karadzic into

1 the record and so it can be translated again?

2 A. "Well, no, it's incredible that he sees himself that way and he

3 believes himself to be more important than anything. He has to come out

4 before the assembly so that P ... and say, people, we have a situation

5 here. And the situation is such and such. And I will do as you decide."

6 Q. Thank you. And your response to that was, "Right."

7 A. What you are interested with these dots, it was supposed to

8 be "people." It was simply swallowed and the speech is a bit incoherent,

9 but it's clear what Mr. Karadzic was saying. He is overestimating

10 himself. What he should do is to come out in front of the assembly,

11 explain the situation to them, and let them decide.

12 Q. Why are you and Mr. Karadzic happy that Mr. Babic has been

13 removed?

14 A. It's not that we were happy. You can even see from my answer that

15 we weren't. But we did support that move. If I may, I would like to

16 remind Their Honours, when I was examined by Mr. Stewart about the meeting

17 in Belgrade at which the Vance plan was supposed to be adopted, the entire

18 meeting was ready to accept the plan and only Mr. Babic, late Mr. Babic,

19 and his government, were against it. And the next day, when we were

20 supposed to resume, he simply didn't show up. And an entire group of

21 participants not from Republika Srpska went to attend an assembly meeting

22 of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, to Glina, I believe, to replace

23 Mr. Babic.

24 Regarding the Vance plan, we were saying in this conversation that

25 he needed to be rational, and I even questioned my own judgement, whether

1 I was right, whether we were right, when we gave unreserved support to the

2 Republic of Serbian Krajina, although not personally to Babic, and this

3 ties in with the discussion that followed at the meeting of the Assembly

4 of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

5 Q. Thank you. And the next interpret, please. This is a

6 conversation between you and Mr. Koljevic held sometime in February of

7 1992, part of P389. Again, I don't think it's ever been played or perhaps

8 referred to. A few lines down, after the introductions, Mr. Koljevic

9 says, "Horrible. I'd been in a real Ustasha nest in Slavonski Brod. Not

10 even Tudjman controls it." What's that a reference to, please?

11 A. There was a conflict in Bosanski Brod, that is to say on the

12 Bosnian side. The other side is Slavonski Brod. And a delegation of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Ejub Ganic, they

14 arrived in Bosanski Brod and established contact with Slavonski Brod which

15 is across the Sava River. Because traffic had been stopped, interrupted,

16 between Bosanski Brod and Slavonski Brod. And now, Mr. Koljevic here says

17 that he saw various units over there that weren't even being controlled by

18 the centre from Zagreb, and he had in mind the late Tudjman, and he's

19 looking at it from his point of view and he said I was in a real Ustasha

20 nest and what he had in mind was probably the people that had this

21 insignia and reminded him of World War II. So he says here that they

22 attacked Ejub Ganic and Bosnian politics, that they attacked him to a

23 lesser extent, but that that was the reason for the conflict, and which

24 had a negative repercussion later on, if you remember the Sijepovac

25 [phoen] case where Mrs. Plavsic went and somebody -- somebody else to

1 represent the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a delegation. And

2 Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Ganic were there in the name of the

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency before the war, not on the part of the

4 Muslim side or representing the Serb side.

5 Q. A few lines further on, you say, "Do you see, they went to the

6 council and I have to go to a meeting up, then I'll go to the one down in

7 what's its name, I have in Rajlovac some meeting in connection with this

8 one municipality." Before I ask you a question about that, Mr. Krajisnik,

9 could we look at the next intercept in the bundle, please, which has two

10 numbers, it's also part of P389 but it's also P1135, would be relatively

11 fresh in all of our memories because my learned friends for the

12 Prosecution cross-examined Mr. Krsman about this particular intercept.

13 It's a conversation again in February of 1992 between yourself and Mr.

14 Karadzic. And near the top of the page, you say, "He's not -- he's gone

15 down to Reljevo, so down there people, I'm right, is an idea, I have one,

16 big territory, they want to establish Rajlovac municipality as it used to

17 be, you know. You go on and say that's a big territory so then people

18 want you to sit down with them, I stayed until late last night and I had

19 to go to the constitutional commission so I asked Milos to go. I can't,

20 that's Milos Savic."

21 So there are two references to Rajlovac, one in the conversation

22 with Mr. Koljevic, the other in the reference to Mr. Karadzic. Do they

23 have anything in common and what are they about, please?

24 A. It would be a good idea if the interpreters had the original

25 because I'm looking at the original and they are doing their best, but the

1 sense here is quite different when it goes from Serbian into English and

2 back from English into Serbian. So it would be a good idea if the

3 interpreters had the original Serbian text and I'll tell you the mistake

4 here.

5 MR. JOSSE: My observation on that, Your Honour, is this

6 illustrates a problem which I came across in going through these with

7 Mr. Krajisnik, is more than probably any other area of translation, these

8 intercepts are particularly difficult to translate for obvious reasons.

9 And this illustrates the point rather well.

10 JUDGE ORIE: I do agree with you that it's not an easy task to do.

11 At the same time we'll have to do our utmost best and I think it's

12 certainly is of great value that these mistakes are now identified so that

13 the Chamber will not be misled by them.

14 MR. JOSSE: Absolutely.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Apart from having the original in front of the

16 interpreters, Mr. Krajisnik, if there was a specific line you had in mind,

17 you could perhaps slowly read that and see whether the -- and could you

18 then please indicate to us exactly where you start reading so that the

19 translation can be verified by the interpreters?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the second conversation, I heard

21 the interpreter say something different. I'll read it out and tell you

22 what I heard. I'm just going to read out three lines and it's Krajisnik

23 speaking, the M. 02079380 is the number. And it's Krajisnik speaking,

24 the M: "So knackered you cannot imagine."

25 "Ah," Radovan, that is, "so, resting or what?" He can't say

1 "resting." He probably said, "You're resting." So he should have said,

2 "Are you resting," not just "resting." Then, three, the third person is

3 M again: "No. I had," where it says "he's not," and "he's gone," third

4 person singular, whereas it should be "I," first person singular. And I'm

5 going back to reading now. "No, I had -- went down there to Reljevo, and

6 down there people -- I'm right." And then there is a question

7 mark; "because there is an idea, there is a big territory, they want to

8 establish a municipality, Rajlovac municipality, the kind that it used to

9 be, you know."

10 So here the problem is that I say, "I went to Reljevo and the

11 people told me that they wished to establish a municipality." I'm not

12 speaking about a third person. So it's not "he." And Karadzic asks me

13 whether I'm resting, not "Is he resting, he's resting." He's asking me.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for reading it again to us. If you just

15 allow me a minute, I have not found it, but -- and I want to reread the --

16 what Mr. Krajisnik just read to us. We are in number 8, Mr. Josse?

17 MR. JOSSE: We are in number 8, correct, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then exactly on what page are we?

19 MR. JOSSE: In the English, we are in the first page.

20 JUDGE ORIE: First page, yes.

21 MR. JOSSE: And obviously the same in the B/C/S.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see it just at the top, yes. I will now

24 re-read what I see on the transcript at this moment. Yes. The question

25 now is how to resolve it.

1 Mr. Krajisnik, if you read the original, do you find that it's not

2 transcribed properly? Is it a translation problem or is it a

3 transcription problem? If it's a translation problem, then we would

4 invite to have these couple of lines be translated anew and then invite

5 the Defence to identify any other matter, any other translation problem

6 they would find in this document. If, however, it is -- if the original

7 is transcribed wrongly, then, of course, we should take different action.

8 Could you tell us whether the -- we call it B/C/S and you call it

9 Serbian -- whether that's properly transcribed, especially on the issues

10 you just raised.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Apart from the fact that it's a

12 little unwieldy, and hasn't been interpreted in a fluent way, perhaps it's

13 like that in the original, but the sense in the original is not wrong.

14 But when I listened to it, I don't know how it was interpreted into

15 English, I didn't listen, but I was afraid that it might not be translated

16 correctly.

17 JUDGE ORIE: What we'll then do is we'll do it on the same basis

18 that we did it before, unless I hear any objection by the parties, that is

19 that the first five boxes -- because that covers the problem, I would say,

20 Mr. Josse, the first five boxes will be translated anew and that the

21 Defence is invited to draw our attention to any other translation problem

22 involved.

23 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

24 MR. JOSSE:

25 Q. So Mr. Krajisnik, I showed you this passage and the one in the

1 previous intercept, where there is a reference to you having a meeting in

2 Rajlovac. First question is: Is this one and the same meeting being

3 referred to or are they different meetings?

4 A. It's the same meeting. It's just that a broader concept of

5 Rajlovac, if I can put it that way, was used, and a precise location,

6 Reljevo, but that's a region. Rajlovac is a region, Reljevo is a village.

7 Q. Are you able to be more specific as to when this meeting took

8 place? When in February 1992?

9 A. Perhaps if I think back and analyse the situation I might be able

10 to tell you, but unfortunately off the cuff I can't. I didn't focus on

11 that too much. But I do know that I did attend the meeting.

12 Q. And what was the meeting about and what was your role there?

13 A. Your Honours, you will recall that the president of the Novi Grad

14 municipality testified here, Mr. Ismet Cengic, and he mentioned that there

15 was an initiate on the part of people from Rajlovac to give the local

16 community in June 1991, pursuant to standard procedure, or rather to give

17 them a municipality and the municipal assembly discussed the situation.

18 The local commune did not receive the go ahead and I talked to people

19 privately and I always told Mr. Cengic at the time or rather I made him a

20 promise that I would help them find a compromise solution, because it's my

21 local commune, it's the village I lived in, and those deputies didn't do

22 anything to make it possible to establish, following recommendations from

23 the assembly, their own municipality, the Serbian municipality, and

24 Rajlovac, after World War II, was indeed a municipality. And then I said

25 that they had invited me to attend the meeting, in February, I was their

1 deputy, I was from that place, myself, and then I expressed what their

2 demands were. They wanted a municipality, and a referendum had already

3 been called. It was common knowledge that things were not going through

4 as they should be. So now we have a request from them to establish a

5 municipality. And Mr. Cengic did read out some facts and figures, some

6 information, and I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that had I

7 had any knowledge about Variant A or B, it would have been presented to

8 the people where I lived for them to be able to compile in January,

9 December, and not in February when I went at their request to see what

10 they actually wanted. And later on, the Rajlovac municipality was indeed

11 established. It existed during the war. It was in existence throughout

12 the war.

13 So the meaning of this is that we called, that is to say deputies

14 and citizens, called for this and the meeting was convened and everybody

15 wanted to ask a question, and so I stayed there for a long time and

16 discussed all this. It's just 500 metres from my house, Zabrdje Reljevo.

17 I went to Reljevo to talk to Mr. Koljevic from Zabrdje, that is I went to

18 Sarajevo where he had come to from Slavonski Brod.

19 Q. And the reference to Milos Savic going to the constitutional

20 commission is what?

21 A. You asked me a question but I've forgotten. Milos Savic was the

22 deputy secretary of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The deputy of

23 Mr. Avdo Campara, on the Serb side. At one time he was president of the

24 Novi Grad municipality. And I was supposed to go to the constitutional

25 commission. Now, whether the constitutional commission of Republika

1 Srpska or Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to convene, I don't know. I was

2 a member of both. But I asked him to replace me, to take my place in that

3 constitutional commission because I had to go to this other meeting where

4 I'd been invited, the meeting in Reljevo. Mr. Milos Savic, he died since

5 then, but he was the secretary of the Serbian assembly, later on, and

6 throughout the war as well.

7 You will recall the telephone conversation when I asked Mr. Mandic

8 to release his family because his brother and sister-in-law from Bolje

9 [phoen] Potok was supposed to be liberated and Mr. Mandic took it upon

10 himself to see that that was done. So that's what this is about.

11 Q. Thank you. The penultimate intercept of this bundle, please,

12 which is one between yourself and Mrs. Karadzic initially, and then about

13 halfway through the conversation Mr. Karadzic takes over. Also in

14 February of 1992.

15 MR. JOSSE: It needs a number, please.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D188, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

18 MR. JOSSE:

19 Q. At the beginning of the conversation, Mrs. Karadzic says to

20 you, "Not yet but Branko Simic from Capljina has just called. The

21 Capljina garrison has been blocked since last night." What is that a

22 reference to?

23 A. Thank you for asking me that. There was a misunderstanding here.

24 Capljina is in Croatia n the Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

25 belongs to the Federation today. I'm sure the Presiding Judge will recall

1 when I asked my lawyer a question and said that Capljina was in Croatia

2 because a witness said that the Serbs had expelled Croats and (redacted)

3 (redacted) was a mistake.

4 He was wrongly informed by the media in Sarajevo.

5 What this is about is that there was a garrison in Capljina, a

6 garrison of the Yugoslav People's Army, and the HOS units -- first of all,

7 they were extremist forces, Croatian extremist forces, they had blocked

8 the Capljina garrison and later on the whole of Capljina was controlled by

9 the HVO throughout the war. The Serbs had left the area.

10 And for purposes of illustration, if I might just be allowed to

11 digress, the son of a Presidency member was killed on the occasion of the

12 Yugoslav state Presidency in that blockade.

13 And now to get back to the question that counsel has just asked

14 me, what happened, blockades started being set up around garrisons like

15 they were in Croatia, and this began in the Croatian parts of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina first, and the reference to Branko Simic is this. He's

17 the late Branko Simic. He was vice-president of the Serbian Assembly and

18 he was a deputy of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and he was the

19 president of the commission for the control of National Defence, and he

20 had come from Mostar where he lived. He phoned up Mrs. Karadzic to inform

21 Mr. Karadzic that the garrison had been blocked in Capljina. So that is a

22 useful piece of information for you to be able to see that this was a --

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted) It was the reverse. So this is by way of assistance to the

1 Trial Chamber to be able to understand this in context.

2 And there is some more important things here that I can say about

3 Mr. Karadzic's visit, if you're interested in hearing it, Mr. Josse.

4 Q. Mr. Karadzic's visit to what are you referring to?

5 A. Well, there was a secret visit, in fact. Mr. Karadzic met with

6 the Croatian side. I think it was in western Herzegovina because

7 Mr. Karadzic had good relations, was on good terms, with the late

8 Mr. Boban, who led the HDZ, and he had a meeting with him. He crossed

9 from the Serb side to the Croatian side and had a meeting somewhere around

10 Mostar, and when he refers to Branko Simic, who was a deputy, later on, he

11 expressed his dissatisfaction as to why he did not know about this secret

12 meeting, that someone should have informed him. It was a bilateral talk

13 in order to find a solution to the situation, and mild pressure was

14 brought to bear on the Muslim side to try and dovetail their agreements

15 and not to refuse a compromise. I learned about this visit later on. I

16 didn't know at the time. I didn't know when Mr. Karadzic actually went

17 there.

18 Q. I'd like to move on with the intercept, please. Just over the

19 page in the English, you're still talking to Mrs. Karadzic, she has in

20 fact indicated that her husband is returning home at that moment. You

21 say, "You know what Cengic said today. Cengic said it was very

22 interesting. Cengic said" --

23 Mrs. Karadzic, "Just a second, please, the right time."

24 You say, "Really."

25 Mrs. Karadzic: "Yes, and just a moment. But just let me finish.

1 You should just finish about what Cengic said."

2 And you say, "Well, no, Cengic said, and he didn't feel right

3 about not being in the negotiating team. He says he said to Alija, 'Why

4 are you putting a man of conflicts there when he managed to cause an

5 argument between me and the Muslims rather than the Serbs and the

6 Muslims?'"

7 What is that about, Mr. Krajisnik?

8 A. As I have already said, there were negotiating teams of the three

9 parties. Mr. Cengic --

10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

11 MR. JOSSE: I think I know what the problem is, Your Honour, it

12 won't occur again.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

14 MR. JOSSE:

15 Q. Yes, go on, please, Mr. Krajisnik.

16 A. May I continue?

17 Q. Yes, please. Please do.

18 A. The three sides had their negotiating teams and these were all set

19 up by the head of the teams, Karadzic, Kljuic, and Izetbegovic. And now

20 here, Mr. Cengic, and this is Muhamed Cengic, I assume, yes, it is, he was

21 the vice-president of the SDA, and he had high repute in the party. And

22 Mr. Izetbegovic, the late Izetbegovic, didn't put him on the team as a

23 member. Now, it was considered a great honour and then there was a little

24 rivalry between the members of the team, and those who weren't on the

25 team, so as far as I know, this was an individual who was characterised by

1 Mr. Cengic as being one prone to conflict, and he says he managed to cause

2 a rift between us and the Muslims. I think this is related to

3 Mr. Mahmutcehajic and it refers to him. And Mr. Cengic says this because

4 there is a certain amount of jealousy there because he wasn't on the team

5 himself. And a little fact, too: Because that's how things were, and he

6 says, well, he had fairly good relations other wise with the Serb side.

7 Mr. Cengic did, I mean, that he thought he would be more useful on the

8 team rather than the person appointed by Mr. Izetbegovic.

9 Q. Mr. Karadzic arrives home. He then takes over the conversation

10 with you and very soon he says, "This is not assembly business. This was

11 more party business." What does he mean by that?

12 A. Well, I'm joking a bit here, why no one knew where he was. So I

13 sort of criticised him for that. Whereas he's presenting a fact and he

14 says that it wasn't assembly business but party business, because in our

15 party you had a differentiation between party business and the rest, and

16 Mr. Karadzic, as I said, met with the president of the HDZ at the time,

17 Mr. Boban, and so - how shall I put this? - he identifies this because you

18 always strove -- well, he even referred to it in psychiatric terms and

19 said that we were on -- like on a football team. There is the management

20 board and those who know the business best work in the state organs just

21 like football players playing on a team. So that's why he says this was

22 not assembly business. It was more party business.

23 Q. Turn if we may to the last intercept of this bundle. It's one

24 between you and Mr. Karadzic on the 2nd of March of 1992. It needs a

25 number?

1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D189, Your Honours.

2 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I would like this one to be played and

3 the Prosecution have kindly agreed to oblige in that regard. But again,

4 if it goes wrong, it's my responsibility not theirs.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please play the transcript -- the intercept.

6 [Intercept played]

7 "I'll come within half an hour to the corps command."

8 "It's live telephone connection into the programme. Wait a

9 moment. Hello, uncle Momo, please wait just a little. He's still

10 talking."

11 M: Oh, really?

12 XW: JuTel.

13 M: Excuse me.

14 XW: I'm talking to them mere. Just a moment.

15 R. Yes.

16 M: What's up?

17 R: Were you watching JuTel? You weren't?

18 M: No I wasn't.

19 R: Well, I was talking directly to Izetbegovic. That started a

20 secret mobilisation.

21 M: A secret mobilisation?

22 R: At all points, they are attacking everywhere.

23 M: How?

24 R: Well, they are attacking our settlements in an organised

25 fashion and so on.

1 M: Did you say that? They are attacking Pale?

2 R: Excuse me?

3 M: Did you say that they are attacking Pale?

4 R: Well, yes. I received the information from up there. They

5 are -- there are wounded, they can't get through.

6 M: Really?

7 R: Yes, yes.

8 M: Where is that?

9 R: Just a moment, Momo. Toso Domazet [phoen]. On JuTel, right,

10 the police are distributing weapons to Muslims, of course. Of course.

11 Well, I'm going to the corps headquarters now and we'll see what. Thank

12 you very much. All the best.

13 M: Hold on. You have that information. Maybe it's not -- there

14 is a lot of misinformation.

15 R: Look here. There is misinformation but we also have some

16 pretty accurate information. There isn't a single Muslim settlement in

17 which they haven't started.

18 M: That's the thing. They are getting organised and putting up

19 barricades but there is no place that -- I don't know. There is a lot of

20 misinformation.

21 R: There are wounded. There are wounded.

22 M: There are wounded even in Zabrdje but that's not true, you

23 know. It's only people talking, you know.

24 R: Yes.

25 M: Spreading misinformation.

1 R: No, no. I'm getting information from people. There are

2 people with gut wounds, leg wounds and --

3 M: You know.

4 R: Excuse me?

5 M: Where did you get that from?

6 R: From Pale.

7 M: From Pale?

8 R: They are calling from Pale.

9 M: And where is -- do you know, is anything going on in the city?

10 R: Well, they are attacking in the city. That is approaching

11 Vojkovici and these Grlica and Vojkovici settlements, they kidnapped a

12 director of, what's it called, Famos and so on. I'm going to the corps

13 headquarters with Kukanjac and Izetbegovic now.

14 M: Yes, good.

15 R: Oh, we received that memo from Cutileiro.

16 M: Yes. What does it say?

17 R: In which he says that the talks will continue on the 7th and

18 8th in Brussels.

19 M: On the 7th and 8th in Brussels?

20 R: Yes. Talks about geography and competences. There is no

21 going back.

22 M: Oh, please call and tell me what happened there.

23 R: All right.

24 M: I'll be home. But now down there in Reljevo, you know.

25 R: All right.

1 M: In about half an hour.

2 R: All right. Bye.

3 M: Bye."

4 MR. JOSSE:

5 Q. What is going on in the intercept that we've just heard,

6 Mr. Krajisnik?

7 A. Well, this is a very chaotic, confused conversation, and it would

8 be really useful to understand it, to get to the bottom of it. First of

9 all, Mr. Karadzic was on the phone with JuTel, and that was a television

10 station for Yugoslavia. It created for itself the image of an independent

11 station, although they weren't, really. There was a crisis going on. A

12 member of a wedding party was killed in Bascarsija in Sarajevo. I think

13 the father of the bride was killed. And now Mr. Karadzic and --

14 Mr. Karadzic and.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the name of the other

16 person.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Were talking through JuTel about the

18 possibility of going to see Mr. -- sorry, General Kukanjac in the corps

19 headquarters, to try to see whether the army can restore some order.

20 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreter missed the second name you mentioned.

21 You said and now Mr. Karadzic and --

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic was talking to late

23 Mr. Izetbegovic through JuTel.

24 That was the beginning of that conversation.

25 And they had agreed to go to the second military district to see

1 Kukanjac. And then continues the conversation between Mr. Karadzic and

2 me, in which he informs me about what he knows about attacks on Serb

3 areas, the number of the wounded and so on. And at one point I tell him

4 there is a lot of misinformation circulating. We need to distinguish

5 between what is true and what isn't. And I quote to him the example of my

6 village, Zabrdje, because the current information circulating is that

7 there are people wounded there, and I tell him I know that there aren't

8 any. And he tells me, all right, but there are conflicts in other places,

9 clashes and skirmishes. The overall atmosphere is one of mistrust and

10 disinformation being deliberately put out to mislead the other side.

11 That's the focus of our conversation and I am asking him to pass on the

12 information that he gets when he goes to the 2nd Military District because

13 I am also very concerned. There were some barricades put up at that time

14 and there were some conflicts, but nothing was so dramatic as it seemed at

15 this point.

16 It was mostly fear that was feeding the frenzy. And at one point,

17 Mr. Karadzic told me that he had heard Serbs were attacking Sarajevo as we

18 talked, which was wrong. Disinformation was circulating in abundance.

19 MR. JOSSE:

20 Q. For those of us who were only able to listen to this intercept in

21 translation, how would you assess the tone of Mr. Karadzic's voice as he

22 was speaking to you on this occasion?

23 A. I don't know how the people who listened in to this conversation

24 managed to transcribe it. It must have been very difficult. It's not

25 exactly authentic. There are many interjections. Mr. Karadzic was

1 anxious and panic-stricken because he was afraid that war had broken out.

2 He had heard a lot of bad news. I suppose, and I heard later, from JuTel

3 television, that Mr. Izetbegovic was also saying to him, "Your men are

4 coming on from Pale." That was in the conversation they had through

5 JuTel. It was played on TV the other day, and I even saw that

6 conversation.

7 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I've now got a few minutes of questions

8 about the shooting at the wedding and the barricades that Mr. Krajisnik

9 has just referred to. I'm in the Court's hands as to whether to deal with

10 that now or immediately after the break. Mr. Stewart will then take over

11 after that.

12 JUDGE ORIE: If you could do it within the next seven minutes I'd

13 like you to do it now. If not, then we'll have a break first.

14 MR. JOSSE: I'll try.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

16 MR. JOSSE:

17 Q. I want to ask you about the shooting at the wedding that this

18 Chamber has heard a fair bit about, and you have just mentioned. When you

19 receive news of this shooting, what was your reaction, Mr. Krajisnik?

20 A. Mr. Josse and I watched footage of an interview during the

21 proofing. It is not authentic. It's done by a journalist from Great

22 Britain. We were in the delegation, Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha

23 and myself, attending a meeting somewhere abroad. Geneva or Brussels.

24 And that day, we had arrived in Belgrade because we always took the plane

25 from Belgrade, either to Geneva or to Brussels, and in Belgrade we got a

1 report that somebody was killed at his son's wedding. He was killed by a

2 member of the Patriotic League, a man who is on trial as we speak. The

3 Prosecutor in Sarajevo, a Serb, qualified this as not an ethnic incident

4 but as a crime.

5 Q. Go on. But a little slower please.

6 A. Thank you. This entire activity in Sarajevo is being led by

7 people who are in Sarajevo, Mr. Dukic and Mrs. Plavsic, and there are

8 discussions in the Presidency because both sides had put up barricades,

9 first Serbs and then Muslims. And then it had to be dealt with, various

10 demands were put forward. So we had a conversation with them from

11 Belgrade. When I say "we," I mean Mr. Karadzic spoke on our behalf trying

12 to get as much information as possible. And what was wrong in that

13 interview is this: When I say "we," I use this word "we" all the time but

14 I didn't actually invite anybody to participate with me because we were

15 unable to do anything at a distance, any way. I have a couple of things

16 to say about that interview but I'll wait until we get to it.

17 For both the Serb and the Muslim side, and I'm talking about

18 politics now, it was a very unfavourable incident. It was certainly done

19 by an individual who was a greater Muslim than late Alija Izetbegovic, and

20 maybe his group of extremists, but to us, it was a terrible shock because

21 nothing like that had ever happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such

22 disrespect for national emblems, whether it was a Serb or a Muslim, with

23 their flags, it was unheard of that the person would be killed and his

24 flag seized. That killing of a Serb at a wedding was the first situation

25 that could have served as a spark for the war. Thank God for those people

1 who were there then, Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Ejub Ganic, who was head of the

2 Crisis Staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there were Mrs. Plavsic and

3 they -- and Mr. Dukic, and they dealt with the situation. But it is still

4 believed that this was a fatal incident that contributed to the outbreak

5 of the war, although the war actually broke out a month later, not then.

6 Why do I say that the Muslim side actually, in my opinion, didn't

7 want this? I read the memoirs of late Mr. Izetbegovic, and I read there

8 that he was very unhappy over the incident because the referendum was

9 about to take place, and it wasn't in his interest to give any food to

10 Serb arguments. It was a very grave incident that could have had very

11 grave consequences for a much broader area than Sarajevo, and later indeed

12 it did have fatal consequences. So I maintain that it was bad for the

13 Muslim side as well, although I have no reason to defend either the

14 Muslims or Mr. Izetbegovic.

15 Q. The interview that you have just referred to, is the one that I

16 handed you on Friday; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. For the Court that is P853, and as Mr. Krajisnik has said, perhaps

19 we'll refer to it -- return to it later.

20 Just want to ask you about the barricades, Mr. Krajisnik. It's

21 said that these were erected by both sides spontaneously. What did you,

22 the Bosnian Serb leadership, do about that?

23 A. Let me just explain why I said it was spontaneous. The immediate

24 reason was this killing. Nobody could have planned, logically speaking,

25 that something like this would happen, especially not on the Serb side.

1 So it -- if it did happen, it had to be spontaneous. I later made

2 inquiries. It was certainly spontaneous on the Serb side. And why do you

3 think it was spontaneous on the Muslim side as well? Because it was a

4 reaction to this action they had taken.

5 Excuse me, your question was what did we do. What we did was to

6 deal with the whole situation a bit later. It took some time. An

7 agreement was reached, a joint statement was drafted between Mrs. Plavsic

8 and Mr. Dukic on one side and Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Ganic on the other

9 side. It was made as a press release and the situation was dealt with.

10 And on the issue of barricades, Mr. Kukanjac came to the assembly to see

11 me one day, I was very surprised, and he said, "Come with me, I'm going to

12 Zabrdje, your home place." And we -- there were barricades on the way.

13 We talked both to Muslims and to Serbs, asking them, Why are you doing

14 this? And each side answered, We are afraid of the other side. Suddenly,

15 there were weapons all around, and suddenly you see this great turnaround

16 away from peace and you see yourself sliding towards war.

17 MR. JOSSE: Perhaps we could take the break now. I'd like to

18 discuss with Mr. Stewart whether I should ask any more questions in

19 relation to this.

20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break until quarter past 4.00.

21 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

22 --- On resuming at 4.27 p.m.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue the lifting of confidentiality of

24 exhibits 152 up til and including 156, you'll find that on the 28th of

25 February 2005, and where I may not have been -- it was in private session

1 and where it has not been sufficiently clear where I said the

2 confidentiality -- finally the confidentiality will be lifted, that of

3 course should be understood as an order for the Registry to lift that but,

4 of course, that takes some administrative activity before it really is

5 lifted.

6 I also draw the attention of the parties that although that has --

7 confidentiality has been lifted, that's true for the transcript, and it's

8 true for the exhibits, but it's not true for everything related to that.

9 That's clearly explained on these pages, the pages are 9544 and/or 9545.

10 I have two different versions. Page numbering is not exactly the same.

11 Mr. Stewart? Is it you or will we have some additional questions?

12 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is, Your Honour. We decided that Mr. Josse

13 has concluded that bit for the moment though we may return in due course

14 to one or two of those topics.

15 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when we got to the end of the session on Friday,

17 chronologically we had come up to the ends of February 1992 and we had

18 just been considering some aspects of March. When we get to the beginning

19 of March 1992 -- first of all very briefly, your -- your personal

20 circumstances involved the continuing serious illness of your wife, didn't

21 they?

22 A. Yes. I had the bad fortune that my wife was very seriously ill.

23 She even spent some time in a coma.

24 Q. What was, just in summary, your day-to-day working life at that

25 time? You were still living in Sarajevo. What was the length of your

1 working day?

2 A. I think I have answered that question one of the previous times

3 but I'm going to add to my previous answer. I am the kind of man who

4 likes to work, and I work long hours. I worked long hours in my office,

5 and I called home very often to keep in touch, to see how my wife was

6 doing. Just as an example she was in a very bad condition at one stage

7 and she had a fit. I got into a car with Abdulah Konjicija and we drove

8 her to a hospital and hospitalised her and it was only thanks to that

9 quick intervention that she pulled through. It was a heavy burden on me,

10 I must say.

11 As for work, March was the busiest month, because we had

12 inter-party talks, visits by Mr. Cutileiro, travel, and although there

13 were some assembly sessions, sessions of the Assembly of the Serbian

14 People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of my time was taken up by

15 negotiations, either in Sarajevo or at international conferences in

16 Geneva, Brussels, et cetera. So I had very little spare time, and would

17 only have some time to spend at home on weekends. Otherwise, I came home

18 very late at night. If you want more details, I can provide them. You

19 can see even from the documents that it was a very, very busy month,

20 filled with various activities, and all those activities were geared at

21 finding a solution for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. Well, first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, you've said that -- the way you

23 put it was, most of your time was taken up by negotiations. And you're

24 talking specifically about international negotiations, are you, or when

25 you referred to Sarajevo are you including domestic negotiations with

1 other parties in Bosnia?

2 A. A constantly burning issue was what was going to become of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and talks were held at various levels, with president

4 of the club, with some intellectual, with the party leader. Even within

5 families, all discussions were about what kind of solution would be found

6 for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even at parties, people discussed the same

7 issue. At the assembly we had the Presidency of the assembly, the

8 president, vice-president, secretary, council chairman, and we discussed

9 it all the time, trying to find a solution, and whenever there was a --

10 the smallest indication of a -- something positive, we were all very

11 happy. The crisis developed very fast, as a cancer, and everybody was

12 anxious to find a solution. I don't think there was any topic that was

13 more important, even football was pushed on a back burner. Television was

14 watched very closely, and every smallest development was weighed from the

15 standpoint of whether it was good or bad for that issue. I always said

16 that we should do our best to hold our assembly sessions, to keep the

17 talks going, because as long as we keep up the contacts we are avoiding

18 war. And when the war broke out, I must say, I felt --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Correction of the interpreter: Looking back I

20 feel some remorse now over the fact that I spent so little time with my

21 family, but the situation was such that I simply couldn't help it.

22 MR. STEWART:

23 Q. Now, so far as the continuing European Community and Cutileiro

24 talks were concerned, is this correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that as well as

25 meetings with Mr. Cutileiro and his colleagues, you were having -- in

1 March 1992 and possibly towards the end of February, you were having

2 separate discussions with representatives of the Croat community? Is that

3 correct?

4 A. Yes, correct.

5 Q. And were those -- the fact that you were having those discussions,

6 was that known to Mr. Cutileiro?

7 A. In hindsight, I'm afraid of making a mistake now, but one thing is

8 certain: Mr. Cutileiro was a wonderful man, a brilliant diplomat, who

9 always encouraged our bilateral talks. He wanted us to sit down together,

10 bilaterally or in a tripartite setting, if bilaterally then not to the

11 prejudice of the third side, to keep talking and trying to find a

12 solution. There was one meeting when he knew that we went from Brussels

13 to Graz to meet with the other side. Any side could meet with another

14 side, but there was no solution without involving the third side.

15 Cutileiro encouraged it all. He said, "Do whatever, just find a solution.

16 The European Community would be only too happy."

17 Q. And did the negotiators for the Bosnian Serbs continue to be you,

18 Dr. Karadzic, and Mr. Koljevic? Did they?

19 A. Yes, yes. Mainly the three of us, although there were other

20 people involved. The other people were mainly experts. The three of us

21 were the main negotiators. I can even say why it was the three of us, if

22 you think it's necessary.

23 Q. I won't ask you about that now, Mr. Krajisnik. If you -- if you

24 can put some sort of figure on it, over the whole of the month of March

25 1992, roughly what proportion of your total working time was devoted to

1 the international negotiations? And I include the meetings, any

2 preparation, any work related to those.

3 A. The hardest thing for me to answer is when you from the West ask

4 me for a number. Whatever number I give you, it won't be accurate. I

5 keep telling you we worked on it all the time, both at the office and

6 amongst us, and so on and so forth. Those international talks are a

7 matter of common knowledge. You can find about it from newspaper reports,

8 in Sarajevo, in Brussels, in Lisbon, in Geneva, but apart from that,

9 contacts took place on a daily basis. Maybe not literally on a daily

10 basis but we worked continuously and constantly tried to tie up the loose

11 ends that were sometimes minor or looked minor but they were important to

12 the overall solution.

13 Unless you tell me that I didn't answer your question, I will tell

14 you that we were happy when a mediator appeared. And our domestic

15 meetings in Sarajevo served as a preparation for international talks. We

16 wanted to clear up some issues that needed sorting out before we came to

17 Geneva or wherever. One witness here talked about all the places we've

18 been, the only place we haven't been is the US, it seems. All the work we

19 were doing was aimed at resolving the crisis and I cannot give you a

20 number because it would be sheer guesswork, two times or five times, 10

21 per cent or 15 per cent, it would all be speculation, but our main

22 concern, our main job, all our -- all of our work was geared at solving

23 the crisis.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Krajisnik offered to explain to us

25 why it was the three of them that were the negotiators and I'd like to

1 hear that explanation, since it's not in every jurisdiction that the

2 assembly speaker would participate in foreign negotiations. Therefore,

3 I'd like to hear that.

4 MR. STEWART: Certainly, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could you please give that explanation,

6 Mr. Krajisnik?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Stewart was talking about, or

8 rather asked which three talked to the other side, I mean the Muslim and

9 Croatian side. Of course, later on, as a delegation of the Serb side in

10 the negotiations. Mr. Karadzic had close relations with the Croatian

11 side, if I can put it that way, and the Croatian side was well disposed

12 towards Karadzic. The Muslim side several times expressed the desire to

13 have Krajisnik on the team and then they criticised me, the Serb side

14 criticised me, saying that the Muslim side had liked me, in a way. And

15 they would say, "Well, I like it when Krajisnik comes in to express some

16 views." What I mean to say is -- well, it did have some depth to it but

17 what I want to say is that it was difficult, once you're in a conflict,

18 sometimes the delegation is decided on by the other side. We didn't

19 meddle into the affairs of the Croatian side or Bosnian side in setting a

20 delegation but Mr. Koljevic and I myself, who were in the

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation, we stayed in that delegation but what I

22 said a moment ago helped a little. And that's why I said, I gave you the

23 example that Mr. Karadzic was on a secret visit to the -- went to the

24 Croatian side on a secret visit. Sometimes one side prefers talking to

25 one person rather than another person. Well, that might not be too

1 important but it is nevertheless a characteristic or a secret of

2 negotiations and just a fact of life.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer. I must admit that I was a

4 bit confused because I didn't follow the question because the question was

5 about negotiators for the Bosnian Serbs, where I still in my mind was with

6 the international negotiations, where the question clearly pointed at the

7 domestic negotiations between the parties. But even that confusion now

8 has been taken away. So thank you.

9 Judge Hanoteau has a question.

10 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would just like to add

11 something to that question. Was there a type of -- or let me rephrase my

12 question. Who made the decision that those three people would be the

13 negotiators, you being one of them? Was there a meeting, for instance, an

14 SDS meeting? Were there deputies of the assembly who decided on this?

15 Was there a mandate? And who gave you this mandate? Please tell us,

16 Witness.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'll answer

18 straight away. The meeting of the 24th of October, and later meetings,

19 too, put forward a certain number of people who would be in a position to

20 negotiate with the opposite side. As far as I know, there were five or

21 six of them, Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik, Plavsic, Maksimovic, and Buha.

22 And on the 27th of July, and you'll find that in the assembly, after the

23 12th of May, the first assembly during the war, the question of who would

24 be a member of the delegation arose and we were supposed to go to London,

25 and as we had a deputies club, I saw that many people wanted to be members

1 of that delegation. I offered not to go and I asked for somebody to

2 replace me, and you'll be able to read that in that assembly session. And

3 there was a lengthy discussion and the upshot of it was, we authorised

4 those six individuals or rather Karadzic can say who the three best men

5 would be, and Karadzic explained this. He said the Muslim side likes to

6 see a tete-a-tete meeting but I would like to have more people present so

7 that it is not a tete-a-tete negotiation, because that would be like some

8 sort of complicity. There was a second meeting where -- which was in

9 Bijeljina. I saw that certain people were jealous of me. Not Bijeljina,

10 Zvornik. I apologise, it was Zvornik. So to have me part of the

11 delegation was something that the assembly had decided and that

12 Mr. Karadzic had decided for the international negotiations. And you can

13 see all this on the basis of the assembly meetings and the stenograms of

14 those meetings.

15 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

16 MR. STEWART:

17 Q. And the experts that you referred to, that was at page 36, about

18 line 9, as being involved, you're talking there about technical experts

19 rather than people drawn from the deputies or other politicians that we've

20 heard mentioned, are you?

21 A. Yes. You're quite right. They were foremost lawyers. First and

22 foremost, people well-versed in the law who were necessary for

23 negotiations of this kind.

24 Q. Now, during the month of March 1992, we know it's a matter of

25 record, there were five assembly sessions, though two of them were held on

1 the same day, the 24th of March, one straight after the other, there were

2 sessions on the 11th, the 18th, two on the 24th and one on the 27th. So

3 you've told Their Honours about your work in relation to negotiations and

4 there were those assembly sessions. Did you have any other areas of

5 practical responsibility during that month?

6 A. I cannot remember anything special, anything of particular

7 importance, but I'm not sure what you would like to hear. I was very busy

8 going about my assembly business and taking part in the negotiations. I

9 had my hands full. And I didn't take part in any party business. Those

10 assertions are just not correct. I didn't have time to do so and for

11 purposes of illustration, all the Executive Board meetings for example of

12 the SDS I was not able to attend a single one, whereas Karadzic, Koljevic,

13 and others did attend. I could have attended in the capacity of guest but

14 I just didn't have the time to do so. It took up too much of my time, and

15 in addition to the private problem that I had, I tried to whittle my

16 business down to what I had to do and you can all see all this on the

17 basis of the documents available.

18 Q. Did you have, during that month, contacts with representatives of

19 municipalities at which you discussed any issues of organisation within

20 the municipalities?

21 A. During my responses to your questions I said where I was during my

22 one-year term of office. I don't remember whether anything similar

23 happened in March but I did not take part in discussing how a municipality

24 would be organised, for instance. Perhaps there might have been a problem

25 once or twice, and there should have been a mediatory role. For example

1 the Novo Sarajevo municipality, in the case of that municipality, that was

2 presented here was something that I helped overcome. If a delegation

3 would come and visit me and I'll quote an example, I don't know whether it

4 was March or not, but anyway a delegation from Drvar came to see me or

5 rather came to see Mr. Karadzic and he said, This isn't party business.

6 Go and see the president of the assembly. When they came to see me, my

7 wife was in a very serious situation at the time. They were arguing in

8 Drvar, which is only inhabited by the Serbs, about how some construction

9 work was going to proceed, who would get what land and so on. I tried to

10 solve this problem because unfortunately at that time the Serbian

11 municipalities went to Muslim -- to Serb representatives, the Muslims went

12 to the Muslim and the Croats went to the Croatians and as a Serb

13 municipality, they came to see me, although it wasn't within my remit at

14 all. And I just finished all that business and went to visits my wife and

15 I happened to return and they had managed to argue amongst themselves

16 again, and a delegation went on location to visits the site, to see what

17 was going on or maybe I went myself, to see what I could do, but you have

18 the constitution and the rules of procedure for the assembly, the assembly

19 of Republika Srpska did not, pursuant to the constitution, have any

20 authority over the municipal assembly, and by the same token, neither did

21 the president of the republican assembly, he had no jurisdiction over the

22 municipal assemblies. All he could do was to be the mediator or to assist

23 in solving a problem but he couldn't do anything, he couldn't replace

24 anyone or anything like that. You can see the rules of procedure

25 governing the assembly and you'll be able to find that in there.

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I suspect you're probably going a little fast

2 for -- faster than is comfortable for all concerned, so I'd suggest that

3 perhaps you go a little bit more slowly.

4 Did you in the month of March 1992, have any meetings with

5 representatives of any Crisis Staff of any municipality?

6 A. I don't remember having had any such meeting. As for the Crisis

7 Staffs -- or, rather, with the Trial Chamber's permission, I would like to

8 give a brief explanation.

9 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I think you're perfectly entitled to give any

10 explanation which is part of an answer to the question, of course.

11 A. The Crisis Staff, as a title, in our former system, was a

12 customary body which was established and which is established when a

13 crisis breaks out and that's why it's called Crisis Staff. If there was a

14 strike in a company or if there was a flood or anything like that. So

15 that was quite normal. I don't know whether this has been written down

16 anywhere, but it was normal to set up a body with that name. People would

17 get together and this ad hoc body would step in to solve a problem.

18 That's why I'm trying to be very precise here, because I don't think it's

19 a lack of understanding but reference is made to Crisis Staffs which had a

20 political role to play.

21 Apart from the Novo Sarajevo, if you remember that discussion,

22 where the two parts were -- sides were in conflict, I didn't understand

23 this to be any Crisis Staff, but that it was a dispute between the party

24 and people who were in authority. And I know that a man came to see me

25 and another man went to see Karadzic, and then we brought the two together

1 and discussed the matter, discussed the issue. So I'm quite sure that I

2 did not talk to any, in inverted commas, Crisis Staff. I don't excludes

3 the possibility that it was indeed a Crisis Staff but I wasn't conscious

4 of it being a body with that name as a separate body.

5 A Prosecution witness from Doboj explained all this on one

6 occasion, when he said, well we had Crisis Staffs, too, and was quite

7 normal to form Crisis Staffs in situations of crisis. Especially with war

8 looming. Anybody could set up a Crisis Staff. And there is a piece of

9 information from Bratunac. In June 1991, for instance, a small village

10 set up its Crisis Staff and nobody knew about it. So that's my answer, my

11 attempt to explain the situation to you as it existed. We didn't consider

12 this to be anything bad. Go ahead, please.

13 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you referred when Mr. Josse was asking

14 questions earlier to the incident about the killing of somebody involved

15 in a Serb wedding. Whatever precisely occurred on that occasion, there

16 seems to be general agreement that it was the 1st of March 1992. Just

17 going ahead for the moment to early -- late March, early April, within

18 that range, what did you regard as the start of the war?

19 A. I criticised the reporter who reported erroneously, and asked for

20 your assistance in the matter, was interpreted in the following way: That

21 a referendum which I blamed the SDA party for, was the main cause of the

22 war. I did not say that. Nor was the referendum the main problem. The

23 Serb people called for a plebiscite and war did not break out. I consider

24 and I still do consider today, that it was the premature recognition of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any transformation, as was promised, was one

1 of the triggers for creating this unhealthy mood, and we can blame anyone

2 we like for that. If you look at the consequences you don't know who

3 began it all, who started it all, but I cannot, and I'm sure that Mr.

4 Stewart will allow me to explain.

5 At that time, the Muslim side was faced with a great problem. The

6 European Community said, have a referendum, we'll recognise you and you'll

7 get a state. It's no secret the Muslims in ten years' time, with their

8 birthrate, could have had a demographic majority. Now to Momcilo

9 Krajisnik, the European Community in 1993, and I was a member of the

10 delegation with Mr. Buha, said something similar, and offered a similar,

11 attractive conclusion, and we signed a declaration in September 1993 in

12 Geneva where we said, We'll have Bosnia-Herzegovina for five years and

13 after that Republika Srpska can vote to step down from Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 and just as I signed as Messrs. Stoltenberg, Owen, and Izetbegovic signed

15 as well, Mr. Izetbegovic was prone to take this up, was tempted to do so.

16 But I think that the blame should be placed on the speedy recognition of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was clear that the Serbs were against because this

18 was done unconstitutionally and that, as far as I'm concerned, was the

19 main reason for the war breaking out.

20 And the mobilisation and everything else that followed, all that

21 was an act that was not well thought out. And once war broke out, it was

22 difficult to retain anything, so as far as I was concerned, the

23 referendum, and Their Honours saw this, we held a meeting, we said we have

24 nothing against a referendum at all. We are going to consider that it is

25 a voice for the peoples to declare themselves and express their wishes but

1 the mediators are there to decide, to act as arbiter and to say that such

2 and such a thing should be done.

3 Now, what caused disquiet among the Serbs was the fact that the

4 convention on national minorities was asked to be accepted, adopted. If

5 you were a nation to begin with and then were supposed to turn into a

6 national minority this led to a great deal of disquiet. I'm quite certain

7 that that war was not caused or started by the Serb people. It was

8 politics. Now, on a local level, there were of course various incidents

9 that broke out. So this was an explanation that I wanted to give. And

10 thank you, Your Honours, for giving me the opportunity of giving that

11 explanation.

12 Now, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina knows this and each and every

13 man knows that. People living over there know what I'm talking about.

14 You can't hide anything. And it would be unjust if I said, Yes, there was

15 a referendum and you yesterday, the Serbs, went ahead with a plebiscite,

16 there were no incidents, the Muslims were not against, so why would you be

17 against it, without this -- against there unrecognised referendum? But

18 what happened was the premature, speedy recognition, and that's what led

19 to war.

20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, then, the question now I'm putting to you relates

21 to, not then the causes of the war, but when it started. And just to

22 remind ourselves, the referendum that you've referred to was held on the

23 29th of February and the 1st of March. The wedding incident that has been

24 considered today was also on the 1st of March. On all the evidence we've

25 heard in this case, it's perfectly clear that by the second half of April,

1 a war had broken out. In that range, though, Mr. Krajisnik, at what point

2 did you say to yourself, "We are at war. We haven't avoided war, there is

3 war"? At what point did you consider that was the position?

4 A. Thank you for asking me that. Your Honours, you see, a month went

5 by, at least a month, from the referendum up until the war, 4th or 5th of

6 April, and that's when recognition came about. Throughout that time, from

7 the referendum onwards, we held negotiations and sought solutions. Had

8 that not been the case there would have been war at the beginning of

9 March. So the essence of it was this: When the other side learned that

10 Bosnia would be recognised, mobilisation was called, and this was

11 proclaimed by the Presidency, unconstitutionally, the rump Presidency,

12 without the Serb representatives, and that mobilisation was the spark. It

13 was like bringing a lighter to some petrol. If you engage in mobilisation

14 without Serb representatives, it wasn't the result of a foreign enemy, it

15 was aimed against the Serbs, that the Muslim and Croatian representatives

16 had proclaimed a mobilisation, and Mr. Stewart knows this full well. He's

17 going to ask me what I did to have Izetbegovic withdraw the decision,

18 which I thought was a very dangerous one.

19 Q. During the month of March, then, and that early part of April, so

20 we've got a period of about five weeks from the referendum up to the date

21 which you identify as essentially when the war started, were, first of

22 all, you personally involved in any preparations by the Bosnian Serb SDS

23 leadership for an imminent conflict?

24 A. Not I personally, not only I personally, but nobody was included

25 in that. And here is a piece of information in that regard. On the 5th

1 or 6th of April, a so-called large-scale rally was organised of the

2 assembly in front of the Holiday Inn. There might have been 50.000 people

3 or 100.000 people attending. It was organised by the other side, whether

4 the opposition or whoever. The leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party

5 was in the Holiday Inn building itself and at one point, a television

6 speaker said that from the Holiday Inn, which is a hotel nearby the

7 assembly, that the snipers were targeting the people. And all these

8 citizens went into the Holiday Inn and it was very difficult for Buha,

9 Koljevic, Karadzic, the leadership, to escape and reach Serb territory, if

10 I can put it that way. Had there been any preparation, they would have

11 been there -- they wouldn't have been there where they could have been

12 captured. And later on, on television, they showed a young man who was

13 the secretary in the Secretariat of Mr. Karadzic, as a sniper, and I just

14 had to laugh because the man had nothing to do with any of it. He was

15 just a clerk, a white collar worker in some administrative department.

16 So quite certainly, there were no preparations whatsoever. Let me

17 repeat this. We believed 100 per cent that the Yugoslav People's Army was

18 fully capable of protecting our people and that we would be able to find a

19 solution. The peace process was to topple Izetbegovic and the national

20 party and they made a national -- formed a national assembly which did not

21 wish to leave the assembly building and to call for new elections. They

22 wanted either to kill or to capture Mr. Karadzic. That was their aim.

23 And all this is contained in the articles that appeared at that time. You

24 can check it out quite easily. And let me just add, as far as I

25 personally am concerned, the day before I was in the assembly myself,

1 sitting in my own offices, and I was supposed to go to work that morning.

2 My escorts came by with the driver and said something is happening in

3 front of the assembly, something is going on, and they said, "You stay

4 where you are and we'll go to the assembly building to see what's going

5 on. And if the situation is safe, we'll come back and get you."

6 What happened was that my escort was taken prisoner and we had a

7 hard time exchanging him. That's why I didn't go to the assembly that

8 morning. So that's what I thought, that war could break out.

9 Q. During that five-week period and from the beginning of March,

10 after that wedding incident, did you observe, yourself, anything in

11 Sarajevo by way of violent conflict or by way of a sign of likely imminent

12 conflict?

13 A. I have already described to you, Mr. Stewart, one incident when

14 Mr. Kukanjac came to my office to escort me to my own house, to my own

15 home. I wondered why he had come to see me, but the reply became obvious

16 very soon. I was the only one who lived on the periphery, outside of

17 town. Everybody else lived within a circle of half a kilometre from the

18 office. So he had come as a military man, to protect me by his own

19 presence. On the way, we came across barricades, manned by various

20 people. And everybody was seized by fear. Whenever an incident occurred

21 of an ethnic nature, even if it was just about regular crime, it assumed

22 new dimensions because it happened within -- sorry, between persons of

23 different ethnicities. However, there is a lot of wishful thinking in

24 people and you tend to minimise whatever is going on, especially since we

25 were maintaining negotiations and we were receiving various favourable

1 reports as well, and thanks to those reports, I maintained my faith in a

2 good solution.

3 Q. Did you see barricades yourself in March 1992?

4 A. Yes, I did. For the sake of truth and God himself, I'll tell you

5 something. I came across a Muslim barricade in a village next to my own,

6 the village of Sokolje and I saw some people there who said, "Just don't

7 attack us yourselves because we will never attack you." And I was happy.

8 I came back to Zabrdje and I told people, "See what kind of message I got?

9 On the local level you can achieve apparently much more than you can at a

10 global level." You heard Zekerijah Smajic who gave that interview and his

11 telephone conversation but believe me, when General Kukanjac and I talked

12 to those people, they were holding weapons without knowing apparently what

13 to do with them. It was just one time when I simply went along the road

14 and I saw those scenes. I heard about other barricades, but that's not my

15 firsthand experience.

16 Q. This was a -- was this a barricade in the nature of a check-point

17 that you had to pass through or something else?

18 A. Yes, yes. We called that barricade, although it's actually a

19 roadblock. There was an armed group of people who stood there and stopped

20 passersby. That's the kind of, quote unquote, "barricade" that I saw on

21 that occasion. There were roadblocks later as well. I talked to that

22 group. There is a fountain nearby, we drank water from it together and

23 talked. It was on the 4th of April, just a few days before.

24 Q. So during the period from the beginning of March to 4th or 5th of

25 April, were there any active preparations for Serbs for an imminent

1 conflict, of which you were personally aware?

2 A. I answered most sincerely that I didn't know about any

3 preparations, and I'm certain that everything concerning the Holiday Inn

4 and the leadership and all that I told you about. All the information I

5 had told me that there would be no conflict, and then the fatal moment

6 occurred. I had no information from the ground or anywhere else that a

7 conflict was in preparation. All the elements that I had indicated that a

8 solution would eventually be found. I know that Mr. Karadzic didn't even

9 take his elementary personal effects with him that day. I'm not speaking

10 in defence of Mr. Karadzic. I'm telling the truth.

11 Q. Was there any sort of war planning group within the SDS leadership

12 in March 1992, whatever its title or name?

13 A. I heard a lot of bragging at various assembly meetings about

14 people arming themselves, but as far as I know there was no plan, at the

15 republican level or otherwise, for war. But there was a lot of bragging.

16 People liberating this town and that town, arming that group or that

17 village. It was sickening. There was even a book that we saw here, "Who

18 is who in Republika Srpska?" There is no Krajisnik there. There are a

19 lot of braggarts there featuring in that book. Everybody wanted to be in

20 that book. War brings with it a lot of vice, and among other things bad

21 things suddenly acquire a value and are praised and bragged about. I am

22 certain that there was no plan. Why otherwise would they be in Holiday

23 Inn that day? I really can't think of anything that could even remotely

24 be used as evidence of the existence of such a plan that anybody could

25 point out, because as I said, we were relying on the JNA to keep the

1 peace.

2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I now want us to go back, please, to an exhibit. I

3 wonder if you can be given Exhibit 412.

4 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, this is minutes of ministerial council

5 of the Assembly of the Serbian People, Sarajevo, 13th January, 1992.

6 Q. We've seen this document before, Mr. Krajisnik, not in the course

7 of your own evidence. Do you see that it was chaired by Mr. Simovic and

8 it lists a number of members of the ministerial council. The ministerial

9 council was a newly established body, wasn't it?

10 A. Yes, you're right.

11 Q. And is it correct that the ministerial council was effectively the

12 first government of the Serb republic until you formally and technically

13 established a government a couple of months later?

14 A. Just a small correction. The ministerial council meant that, just

15 like deputies were simultaneously in the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

16 the ministers in the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted at

17 the same time the ministerial council or their deputies. And that body

18 was supposed to deal with affairs that couldn't efficiently be dealt with

19 within the government because it wasn't working properly. It's not a

20 government as elected by law. These -- this body was made up of ministers

21 on the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the Serbian people, and

22 they were an executive body of the assembly, and you could say that the

23 way Mr. Stewart put it is correct, and they were supposed to function as a

24 government does.

25 Q. Now, you were present, your shown as present at this meeting as is

1 Dr. Karadzic. That's at about the fourth paragraph. I just want to ask

2 you about one item at the moment, which is at the foot of page 2 of the

3 English version. It's under the heading, "Conclusion 2." It would be

4 about a couple of pages into the document. There is an underlined -

5 should be underlined anyway - heading, execution of tasks resulting from

6 the declaration of the promulgation of the Republic of the Serbian people.

7 Do you see that heading, Mr. Krajisnik?

8 A. I can see it in more than one place.

9 Q. It's in the middle of page 2, I think it is. That's --

10 A. Yes. Realisation of tasks that follow from the promulgation of

11 the Republic of the Serbian people, Republika Srpska.

12 Q. Now, I'm looking at the second paragraph under that heading, then,

13 it says, "It was concluded that the priorities springing from the

14 declaration included the defining of ethnic territory, establishment of

15 government organs in the territory, and the economic disempowerment of the

16 current authorities in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In

17 this respect it was pointed out it was necessary to draw a clear line

18 between the regulations in force which are not contrary to the federal

19 regulations and those republican and municipal regulations which would not

20 be enforced on the ground." So the priority of defining the ethnic

21 territory, how was it planned at that point that that would proceed? Who

22 would do it? And what would they do?

23 A. I'm really grateful that you brought this up, although there is

24 another document, minutes from the ministerial council, and I thought it

25 was a different one.

1 What I want to say is, talks had already been held and it was

2 already clear what kind of model the future Bosnia-Herzegovina should

3 follow. It was clear that it was necessary to establish in which areas a

4 certain ethnic community had a majority population. Since Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina had already applied for independence, for recognition, this

6 was a political move but also an actual move aimed at pointing out areas

7 in which Serbs had a majority, and the ministerial council was supposed to

8 identify it in negotiations so that we have arguments when saying this map

9 needs to be adjusted, there is a little more population here and a little

10 less there. On the 10th of December, when an invitation was sent to

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina to apply for recognition, you saw how we reacted at

12 that session of the 21st December.

13 Your Honours, on the 9th of January, Republika Srpska was indeed

14 promulgated, proclaimed. However, in the decision that was suggested by

15 the team, by the leadership of the assembly, it was conditional. The OTP

16 has it because they took it from the office of Mrs. Plavsic. It was

17 formulated in conditional terms, namely that the decision would become

18 effective if Bosnia was recognised as an independent state. On the 17th

19 of January, forgive me for a lengthy answer, on the 17th of January,

20 Mr. Karadzic said publicly, regardless of this decision, "We are not

21 asking for a division of Bosnia. What we want is transformation of

22 Bosnia." This was followed by the decision of the assembly of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we had a bitter struggle for three days to find

24 the right solution, as to when to call a referendum. It was supposed to

25 be on the 25th of January. However, it all fell through. The referendum

1 took place without the consent of the Serb representatives.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, for practical reasons, the Chamber would

3 like to have an early break.

4 MR. STEWART: Of course, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until ten minutes to 6.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.28 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

9 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at the exhibit, P412, the document

11 on -- from the 11th of January. If we turn on in that document to -- it's

12 under, I think, this big, broad heading 2. Do you see some numbered

13 points?

14 A. I cannot find it. Just a minute.

15 Q. We could probably find another one for you, Mr. Krajisnik. I

16 suppose you've been handed the actual exhibit?

17 A. I'll find it, because I turned it all over. Just a minute.

18 Q. Yes. What I'm looking at, Mr. Krajisnik, is page 3 of your

19 version.

20 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, it's also page 3 of the English and

21 it's numbered paragraph 4.

22 Q. It should be right in the middle of page 3 of your copy,

23 Mr. Krajisnik.

24 A. I'm really sorry but I have to take some time to look for it.

25 When I was gathering up my papers, I must have --

1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I can hand up another copy and then we

2 can perhaps find that one later. It's in the middle of a batch but there

3 it is.

4 Q. Don't worry, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm sure we can track the original one

5 down later.

6 The --

7 A. I'm sorry about creating this little problem. Please go ahead.

8 Q. Okay. The document that you've got open in front of you now,

9 Mr. Krajisnik, if you go to the third page, at the very top of the page

10 and it's just about halfway up above the middle of page 3 in the English,

11 it says, "On the basis of the presented information, the ministerial

12 council reached the following conclusions." And do you see the number of

13 conclusions following there? And if we go to number 4, do you see

14 that? "The working group comprising Mico Stanisic," do you see that?

15 Page 3, about halfway down.

16 A. Yes. Yes. I found it.

17 Q. Okay. A working group comprising Mico Stanisic, Dr. Vitomir

18 Zepinic, Nedeljko Naic, and Bozo Novakovic will deal with the issues

19 regarding the organisation and scope of national security and will frame a

20 concept about this. Mico Stanisic is responsible for the work of this

21 group.

22 Are you able to say, Mr. Krajisnik, more specifically, what was

23 contemplated there? The reference to issues regarding the organisation

24 and scope of national security.

25 A. I know that members of the ministerial council were supposed to

1 make their respective proposals, each in their own remit, a proposal of

2 measures, a draft, a plan, that would help us in the negotiations, to

3 adequately represent what we were seeking. When we look at it just at

4 first glance, it looks a bit mysterious. I don't know whether it was the

5 intention of the authors, but the purpose of this was to cover each area

6 in the republic, to make a contribution to the plan that we expected would

7 be signed. That was the purpose of this plan of the ministerial council.

8 Maybe it was given as background material to the working group, but I

9 don't remember whether they actually made something out of it. I know

10 what the ministerial council was supposed to do. Everyone was required to

11 make a draft, a plan, in their own area of expertise, for the

12 negotiations, for the future plan to be signed, such as future bills,

13 laws, et cetera.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I don't want to cut you off inappropriately. The

15 general scheme, and the general planning arrangements here can probably be

16 seen by the Trial Chamber reasonably clearly from the nature or the

17 contents of the document. I'm focusing specifically on that point 4. If

18 you don't know, Mr. Krajisnik, then please say you don't know. But it's

19 specifically that point, I'm asking if you can say more specifically what

20 was meant by the work to be done by the working group comprising

21 Mr. Stanisic and others, regarding the organisation and scope of national

22 security. Can you identify the issues regarding organisation and scope of

23 national security which were in contemplation there?

24 A. I told you what the task facing the working group was, but I

25 cannot interpret exactly what this means from this distance because I

1 don't remember these conclusions. I'm just looking at them now and trying

2 to interpret them. Nothing in particular, in fact. I know that they were

3 required to help us achieve as good a position at the negotiations as we

4 possibly could have.

5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'll move on, then, to a different document. You

6 can put that on one side. Well, actually, you could find it in there as

7 well. It's 415. If Mr. Krajisnik could be given P415. Now, we again we

8 have seen this document before in the course of the case, but quite some

9 time ago. Mr. Krajisnik, it's a minute of a meeting held in Banja Luka on

10 the 11th of February 1992. Now, you are not among the people listed as

11 having been at this meeting. Mr. Krajisnik, would you first of all just

12 please cast your eye over this document so that you can see what it is,

13 and the question for you is whether, at the time, in February 1992, you

14 knew that this meeting was taking place.

15 A. No. I didn't know. I had this document in my hands on two

16 occasions. It was a surprise to me that this meeting was held, but I

17 wasn't aware of it at the time.

18 Q. When you say you had this document in your hands on two occasions,

19 are you referring to occasions during this trial or earlier occasions some

20 years ago?

21 A. I meant during the trial, although I said two occasions. I'm not

22 sure about two, but at least once during the trial. Maybe during the

23 testimony of Mr. Mandic, I had this -- these minutes in my hand.

24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I really doubt for the Trial Chamber's purposes

25 whether they are worried about how many times you've will it in the course

1 of this trial. So we can look, and Mr. Krajisnik you're quite right it

2 came up in the context of Mr. Mandic's evidence.

3 The -- under the heading, "Names, Mico Stanisic", do you see that?

4 That's quite early in this document, there is a heading, "Mico Stanisic."

5 Do you see that? You're not looking, Mr. Krajisnik so --

6 A. Yes, I see it.

7 Q. It says, "The ministerial council's position put forth at the last

8 session is that the territory of SRBH which is under Serbian power, this

9 power has to be felt. The Ministry of the Interior, or the MUP, as we

10 often refer to it as, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SRBH, is held by the

11 Muslims and not by the Serbs as the general public is being led to believe

12 because the SDA, Party of Democratic Action, has about 1.000 people on

13 reserve in the Stari Grad police station out of whom only 30 or so are

14 Serbs who almost do not even have uniforms unlike the others who are armed

15 with the most modern weapons. Work should be done on the organisation of

16 a Serbian MUP, starting with municipal and regional branches to the

17 Serbian ministry itself. The Serbian staff in the MUP has to be the

18 source of the replenishment and supply of Serbian MUP and the guarantee

19 that the resources will be distributed proportionally across the board. A

20 minimum number of unresolved requests have to be collected at this meeting

21 and sent to minister Alija Delimustafic, and an appropriate deadline

22 should be proposed for dealing with those requests."

23 Mr. Krajisnik, were you aware that work was to be done on the

24 organisation of a Serbian MUP at this time?

25 A. In the course of negotiations, under every option considered, it

1 was envisaged that every constituent unit has its own MUP, that the

2 police, in other words, belongs to the constituent unit. And among the

3 options considered for this future Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the

4 option that we would have three MUPs, the Croatian, Serbian, and Muslim.

5 As for this organisation you're asking me about, there was no mention of

6 any practical or actual organisation. Instead, whenever there was talk

7 about forming a certain body, it was a mild form of pressure on the other

8 side aimed at encouraging them to continue the negotiations, and this

9 contribution of Mr. Stanisic is mostly true about the Stari Grad

10 municipality, that disagreements, and disharmony in the MUP and all the

11 false presentations made in the public that the MUP is united, that there

12 were no problems, that was not true. The reserve forces were being

13 divided. Serb staff was not hired. The problem of discrimination was

14 constant, et cetera, et cetera.

15 Q. And if we look, there are various contributions from people

16 present at the meeting, of course, but if we look at the conclusions,

17 which are on page 4 of the English, and will be at page 6 of your copy,

18 your version, do you see that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It's a list of 19 conclusions. And number 1, the Serbian advisory

21 board is hereby established at the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP, consisting of

22 the Serbian staff in leading positions across all lines of work in the

23 SRBH MUP. Did you know, at this time or shortly after this meeting, that

24 such an advisory board had been established?

25 A. No, I wasn't aware of it. I was aware of something else, though.

1 I knew that there were fierce objections against Mr. Zepinic who, ex

2 officio, was supposed to be the person number 1 on the MUP, and this must

3 be a reaction against him in anger because he had not seen to it that Serb

4 staff was equally represented in the police, and was not able to perform

5 their duties. I know, from other meetings, that everybody attacked

6 Mr. Zepinic over this. However, I wasn't aware of this.

7 Q. And, well, if we go back to page 2 of the English, we see a

8 contribution from Mr. Andrija Bjelosevic?

9 A. I got it.

10 Q. It's at the foot of page 2 of your version. And he is saying,

11 among other things, third paragraph, he says, "I would also like to voice

12 my complaints about the work of deputy minister Vitomir Zepinic. He signs

13 letters of appointment for Muslims in Doboj but not for Serbs." So that

14 was typical of the sort of complaints being made of him at that time, was

15 it?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And if we go back to those conclusions, the second one, number 2,

18 is the Serbian advisory board at the SRBH MUP shall be headed by deputy

19 minister, Momcilo Mandic, who would also make sure the conclusions are

20 acted upon and carried out. 3, the Serbian advisory board, the SRBH MUP

21 is hereby ordered to carry out all the necessary preparations for the

22 functioning of the Serbian MUP after the adoption of a constitution of the

23 Serbian Republic of BH, and then there is a deadline of 14th February for

24 proposals on systematisation of jobs and so on, and 5, not a single

25 decision on the personnel policy in the SRBH MUP shall be carried out

1 without the prior consent of deputy minister Momcilo Mandic.

2 Mr. Krajisnik, what was the -- sorry, Your Honour?

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

4 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. There is, for example, an order being given in conclusion 3 there,

6 the Serbian advisory board is hereby ordered to--

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.

8 MR. STEWART: So sorry, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

10 MR. STEWART: Am I going to fast, Your Honour?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

12 MR. STEWART: Yes, I beg your pardon.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. The -- what was this -- do you know, Mr. Krajisnik, what was this

16 group or body that was giving an order? We see the list of individuals.

17 We see minutes of the meeting. Do you know what it was?

18 A. This body -- I'm convinced, in fact, these are in a certain way

19 the leading people of the Serbs on the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina coming

20 from various areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as I can see from

21 this. So they met here, and adopted these conclusions. It's an

22 unofficial body, informal body, such a body did not exist. They simply

23 met spontaneously, each one of them was -- had been autonomous in their

24 respective jobs in Nevesinje, Bijeljina, in Sarajevo, some of them

25 certainly on the republican level.

1 Q. And I'm not going to go to every one of these numbered

2 conclusions, Mr. Krajisnik, but let's go to 12, which says, "Establish a

3 commission which will put forth proposals for the emblem of the Serbian

4 MUP as well as other insignia by 1st of March 1992, 16, work intensively

5 on the training and arming of our employees in the police. And then 18 is

6 to inform the ministerial council of the aforementioned conclusions.

7 Mr. Krajisnik, are these conclusions and decisions of this group

8 in its meeting here, were they consistent with the position and policies

9 of the leadership of the SDS?

10 A. Definitely, this is not in line with what we wanted. Everything

11 that I saw here is mainly accurate, but there was an incident before the

12 last meeting that probably had an effect on what later happened with the

13 MUP and this self-proclamation. But these conclusions here are a product

14 of a certain sentiment among the Serbian personnel of the MUP of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they are thinking forward. Once the Republic of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina is proclaimed, once a certain option is validated, we

17 will give in this way our contribution in the shaping of the new police

18 force. I repeat: In every option, it was envisaged that the police force

19 would be under each constituent unit. So they were just planning ahead.

20 We did not think it was in our interest to divide the police force while

21 the negotiations were going on, and that's why what happened at the last

22 meeting in Brussels came to us as a surprise, when Mr. Mandic sent that

23 dispatch.

24 Q. So at this point, in February, that we are talking about, February

25 1992, this was not in line with what you wanted in what specific respects?

1 A. All our activities were supposed to serve as political pressure in

2 order to achieve a political solution to the crisis, all of them. We

3 didn't want to make a single active move that would lead to conflict, and

4 even this here, all that they did, it's really a meeting initiated by

5 them, but they only held it after suffering a very unfair situation and a

6 very bad situation in the MUP for a long, long time, and in particular the

7 inadequate service of Mr. Zepinic, with regard to the Serb personnel in

8 the MUP. This is the main reason why they were doing this.

9 Q. So, and by reference to specific conclusions set out here, if it

10 helps, Mr. Krajisnik, was the -- was the problem or the difference between

11 this group's position and what you, the leadership, wanted, was it a

12 matter of timing of these proposals or were there some of the proposals

13 which were not what you wanted regardless of timing?

14 A. Regardless of timing, we only wanted everyone to make certain

15 proposals in their own area of expertise as a contingency plan for a

16 certain political solution that was already a writing on the wall. We

17 never intended to make any radical, unilateral moves. There are certain

18 conclusions that might look like -- like it. They may look like a

19 gauntlet being thrown, like something being done contrary to an agreement

20 that hadn't been reached yet.

21 Q. Did the SDS leadership want eventually to have a separate Serbian

22 MUP?

23 A. The leadership of the Serbian people, or rather the negotiating

24 team to be more precise, and the broader platform, in fact, was that we

25 wanted what was proposed by the European Community, and that was that the

1 constituent units -- that the MUP be within that constituent unit which

2 would not be literally Serb but would be composed of a proportionate

3 number of persons from that constituent unit. In the Republic of the Serb

4 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the majority would be Serbs in the police

5 force because the majority of the population would be Serb there. But we

6 are talking about peace and about negotiations. So this Serb MUP was

7 divided under abnormal conditions. There were cadres set aside in every

8 municipality, not on the basis of a political settlement but as the result

9 of a crisis. So the negotiations provided for the fact that the MUP be

10 within a constituent unit.

11 Q. Was this proposal or these proposals that we've just seen in the

12 document we have just been looking at, were they subsequently referred to

13 any group of which you were a member?

14 A. I don't remember these proposals. I don't remember ever having

15 seen them before. When I came here, I saw these minutes, and all the rest

16 of it, but I don't remember that anybody presented me with that document

17 or things of that kind. Especially as I knew that anything that anybody

18 else did was within the frameworks of preparation and political pressure,

19 not the realisation of something that could be implemented in practice.

20 That is the absolute truth of it. It should have exerted, served to exert

21 pressure. We had no other way. This was one of the ways in which we

22 tried to arrive at a political solution. We couldn't outvote anyone. We

23 couldn't resort to the use of force or anything of that kind. This was

24 the only way we could bring pressure to bear.

25 Q. I would like you to be given now, Mr. Krajisnik, P420.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, the document says that a --

2 MR. STEWART: Sorry, 415, Your Honour. 415.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm still -- the one you're asking questions

4 about, Mr. Krajisnik, it says that the agreement reached at this meeting

5 should be presented to the ministerial council and the assembly of the

6 Serbian Republic of BH, and after its certification an action should be

7 launched. Do you have any recollection of it ever being sent, even if you

8 would not have seen it at that time, to the assembly of the Serbian

9 Republic of BH, since it so expressly mentions it?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If it was sent, it must have been at

11 the meeting. That is the logic of it. But I really don't remember. And

12 I state now on the assumption that somebody sent this out, I assure you

13 that had I received this, I would consider -- have considered it to be

14 political pressure, not realisation. But everything is contained in the

15 minutes, whether a report of there kind existed or not. I personally

16 don't remember it.

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I simply observe that the

18 particular citation that Your Honour has just given from the document is

19 actually something said by Mr. Slavko Drazkovic [phoen], as opposed to

20 what is contained in the conclusions of the meeting? The conclusion in 18

21 which I read earlier informed inform the ministerial council of the

22 aforementioned conclusions. So Your Honour, you see my point, Your

23 Honour. Your Honour put it to him it says in the agreement reached in

24 this meeting --

25 JUDGE ORIE: I fully do agree with you that it's one of the

1 participants who said this and it's not part of the conclusions of the

2 meeting. That's perfectly right that you draw my attention to it.

3 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I thought I should do

4 that.

5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if you could be given 420, P420, and we have seen

6 this document before in the course of Mr. Mandic's evidence. It's signed

7 by him, dated or stamped the 31st of March 1992. And it's sent -- it

8 appears -- to the minister, that's the Bosnia-Herzegovina minister, and

9 that was Mr. Delimustafic. That's correct, isn't it?

10 A. Excuse me, this was a telegram or dispatch from Mr. Mandic, right?

11 Q. Yes, it was, yes.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The minister at the time, the Minister of was Mr. Delimustafic?

14 A. Yes you're quite right. I understand. Mr. Alija Delimustafic was

15 indeed the Minister of MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Q. And it's addressed to -- well, the English is perhaps not as

17 crystal clear as probably the Serbian is but the -- it says, I'll just

18 read, SJB, Public Security Services and SDB, State Security Service

19 administrations, to all, then to the head, CSB, security services centre,

20 to all, to the chief SJB, to all, to the chief SUP, the SUP Secretariat of

21 the Interior, Sarajevo. So it's been given very wide circulation. That's

22 clear, at least on the face of it. And it says, "At its meeting held on

23 27th March 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina in accordance with the political orientation of the Serbian

25 people and the Sarajevo agreement, promulgated the constitution of the

1 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the Assembly of

2 the Serbian People passed a number of laws and other regulations necessary

3 for the functioning of the Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina. In that respect it passed a law on internal affairs which

5 shall be uniformly applied on the territory of the Republic of the Serbian

6 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 1st April 1992, and appointed Mico

7 Stanisic, until now an adviser in the BH MUP, as minister, and we'll come

8 to that assembly session, Mr. Krajisnik, but he was appointed the Minister

9 of the Interior. We do see that. "This law, among other things, regulates

10 a unified Public Security Service, regulates and organises the National

11 Security Service within the framework of the rights and duties of the

12 Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regulates the

13 duties and powers of MUP employees, mutual relationships and cooperation

14 between the organs of the Interior and the education, professional

15 training, and specialist training of employees, in order to conduct

16 internal affairs on the territory of the Republic of Serbian people in

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian

18 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo, is setting up the

19 following security services centres as territorial units." And then they

20 are listed. Banja Luka, for the autonomous regions in which they are

21 placed but I'll just list the places. Banja Luka, Trebinje, Doboj,

22 Sarajevo, Guglijevik [phoen]. "Within the above-mentioned security

23 services centres, in order to carry out specific tasks and duties within

24 the competence of the organs of internal affairs, public security stations

25 are set up for the territories of municipalities. On the day this law

1 comes into force, the Security Services Centres and public security

2 stations of SRBH MUP on the territory of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina are abolished and cease to function and their authority,

4 i.e. tasks and duties, within the competence of organs of internal

5 affairs, are taken over by the above-mentioned organisational units of MUP

6 of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All employees in

7 service on this -- on the day this law comes into force in the

8 administrations at seat of SRBH MUP, as well as employees of the abolished

9 CSBs and SJBs who so wish will be taken over by MUP of the Republic of the

10 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina which will secure financial

11 resources for normal work, salaries, joint consumption, material

12 expenditures, et cetera. Prior to the engagement employees are obliged to

13 swear an oath of allegiance before the minister or an official authorised

14 by him. The contents of this dispatch should be made known to all the

15 employees of the SRBH MUP in order to provide objective and timely

16 information and to avoid incidents or disagreeable situations."

17 Mr. Krajisnik, did this --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --

19 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, it's only now that the French

21 interpreters have finished their work. Perhaps you're confusing that if

22 you speak softly, that it goes less quickly. Gerald Moore wrote the book,

23 Am I Too Loud? That's not the issue. It's, am I too quick? Please

24 proceed.

25 MR. STEWART:

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did this document have the approval of the Bosnian

2 Serb leadership, including yourself?

3 A. Absolutely not. We were at the meeting in Brussels, I believe it

4 was, when, like a stroke of lightening, this dispatch reached us and

5 Mr. Silajdzic presented it and said, "We are negotiating. Take a look at

6 this telegram that's just arrived." And may I be allowed to add something

7 and tell you what happened before that and why this came about in the

8 first place. But anyway, all three of us or four of us who were there, we

9 were absolutely taken aback when we received this telegram.

10 It is quite unfounded, in all its points. Nobody could do

11 anything like this. I could analyse it point by point and tell us all the

12 mistakes, the mistakes for which -- and the reason for which nobody had

13 the right to send out anything like this.

14 Q. First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, before I invite you to do that, do

15 you know, then -- I'll rephrase that. Did you know at the time, when you

16 received this news, anything about how it had happened that this document

17 had been produced?

18 A. Absolutely not.

19 Q. And what are, then, the main points on which, as you put it,

20 nobody had the right to send out anything like this?

21 A. I gave the Trial Chamber the draft constitution and constitution

22 that was adopted on the 27th, and I think the last page of that

23 constitution states that the constitution would be dovetailed and

24 harmonised with the negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina. So that was

25 one of the provisions. Secondly, the law on MUP was adopted. However, it

1 cannot be put into practice until the constitution is realised. The

2 constitution was proclaimed on the 27th of March, but it was neither

3 published in the papers or anything else, or ultimately was the government

4 set up, and an assistant minister, who was not in charge of the ministry

5 do anything like this. In Sarajevo we had Mr. Djeric, he could have been

6 consulted. He was in Sarajevo at the time. And he was also the Prime

7 Minister-designate. And this goes much deeper. Secondly, you can't

8 organise a MUP. You have to go to the assembly. You can't abolish

9 anything with a mere telegram. Now, what I want to tell you is why this

10 was compiled and produced in the first place, in my opinion. Prior to our

11 departure for Brussels, at the assembly on the 27th of March, and this was

12 on the 25th of March, there was a press conference that was held on the

13 Muslim side, and I have it here, and the Muslim side stated loud and

14 clear, "We, throughout the negotiations, tried to defer the issue, not to

15 be proclaimed the culprits because we had the international community and

16 the Croats and the Serbs against us. We did not agree to the agreement

17 reached in Sarajevo." So they were buying time. That's what they said.

18 Whereas we went to the negotiations to finalise the agreement. So there

19 was a press conference that was held by the SDA party, and we went over

20 there to negotiate and to discuss matters, whereas in the meantime, there

21 was some division in the MUP and we decided upon the division of MUP, they

22 decided on the division of MUP, because they considered that nothing

23 functioned any more. An irresponsible act. But we did not reach any kind

24 of agreement in Brussels. If you want to see the document on the press

25 conference, I can tell you what Mr. Ifran Ajanovic said, their man who

1 held the press conference, how the SDA party behaved, and as we are

2 talking about the end of March, he said, "We called the opposition, we

3 called on the opposition, and all patriots in Bosnia-Herzegovina to attend

4 a meeting to stand up against the agreement." And that meeting was indeed

5 organised. I mentioned it a moment ago, when they attacked the Holiday

6 Inn, and when problems arose in that regard.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I don't know whether you finished with

8 the document. Otherwise I would have one question to clarify one of the

9 answers.

10 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I haven't, but by all means,

11 Your Honour, I don't have any problem with --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, you say in your testimony that this

13 law could not become effective before the constitution would have been

14 finalised. Is there any clause, and I don't know whether this law we are

15 talking about is in evidence, yes or no. If we have a text, does it say

16 anything about when it enters into force, which is, well, very common for

17 legislation to say, at the end, this law enters into force at such and

18 such date or after this or that happened. Do we have any information

19 about that? I'm looking both to Mr. Stewart, to you, Mr. Krajisnik, and

20 also to Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I had thought that I would -- I

22 did have it here the other day but, of course, as luck would it, I don't

23 have it with me right now. I thought I would have a look over night and

24 then can pick that up first thing in the morning, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

1 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour, are you talking about the law on

2 internal affairs?

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the law on which Mr. Krajisnik just testified

4 that it could not -- could be implemented without -- yes.

5 MR. TIEGER: I have a scrolling version so I can't make specific

6 reference looking at the words to Mr. Krajisnik's previous reference so I

7 can only respond to the specific documents that I know are or are not in

8 evidence. For what it's worth I think the law on internal affairs is.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think it is as well but, Your Honour,

10 it --

11 JUDGE ORIE: I don't find, please look at it overnight and then --

12 MR. STEWART: We will probably get --

13 JUDGE ORIE: -- inform the Chamber tomorrow.

14 MR. STEWART: It will take more time if we deal with it now than

15 if we sort it out over night.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

17 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can I seek clarification? Excuse me I'll just have

19 to now scroll up this screen. You said a moment ago or a few moments ago,

20 that -- yes, yes, it's page 71, Your Honours, it was line 10. The answer

21 you gave, you said, so there -- or part of your answer, "So there was a

22 press conference that was held by the SDA party and we went over there to

23 negotiate and to discuss matters, whereas in the meantime, there was some

24 division in the MUP and we decided upon the division of MUP, they decided

25 on the division of MUP because they considered that nothing functioned

1 anymore."

2 Now, I heard that as a correction in the course of your answer, I

3 heard it, Mr. Krajisnik. I don't know whether anybody else suggests I'm

4 wrong, as a slip of the wrong when you said we decided upon the division

5 of the MUP, they decided on the division of the MUP but perhaps you would

6 clarify who you were saying had decided on the division of the MUP?

7 A. I said they, and I meant MUP. That is to say the representatives

8 of MUP in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both the Serb, the Muslim and Croatian, that

9 they reached some sort of agreement in our absence. And this continued

10 later on, but I was referring to -- just a moment. This telegram, this

11 dispatch, if that's what we are discussing now, quite obviously it was

12 taken at their own initiative but at one point in time, whether then or

13 later, all the MUP employees decided about dividing up MUP. Now, I can't

14 pinpoint the exact time but both the Serb, the Muslim and the Croat, they

15 had -- well, I wasn't there at that meeting. I attended another meeting

16 when Mr. Zepinic was there, and I can explain that but that has nothing to

17 do with this and this division of MUP that I'm talking about. And as to

18 the press conference, I can show you the document on it, if you're

19 interested.

20 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, just a moment ago, can we be absolutely

21 clear, you -- when you -- you talked about an irresponsible act. You said

22 they decided on the division of MUP because they considered that nothing

23 functioned anymore, an irresponsible act. You're talking about an act in

24 late March 1992, are you, or at some other time?

25 A. I'm talking about the end of March and beginning of April, so

1 that's the critical point in time.

2 Q. That's when the press conference was held; is that right?

3 A. The 25th of March was when the press conference was held, before

4 our departure or perhaps the 26th, before our departure for Brussels when

5 all three delegations went to Brussels to attend the conference on

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. And in that answer, you said but the name doesn't appear to be on

8 the transcript, you said, "I can tell you what Mr." -- and then we have a

9 blank on the transcript -- "their man who held the press conference, how

10 the SDA party behaved." I'm afraid I don't remember whether you gave a

11 name at that point, Mr. Krajisnik, that hasn't appeared on the transcript.

12 A. Mr. Irfan Ajanovic held a press conference. He was the

13 vice-president of the assembly of Yugoslavia before that, and he was a

14 deputy in the Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly, and he was a high-ranking

15 person in the Party of Democratic Action.

16 Q. When you receive this news in Brussels, what was -- was

17 Dr. Karadzic there?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was his reaction?

20 A. Well, for all of us, when I say us, to all three of us, it was a

21 great blow because we were blamed there, and he felt very uncomfortable,

22 because it was a very bad political blow in the negotiations, because

23 something was done in concrete terms, which upset any agreement, and the

24 Muslim side made use of that to blame us and say that we were undermining

25 the negotiations.

1 Q. Was your -- well, consternation does seem to be an apt word to

2 summarise what you've already described to the Trial Chamber. Was your,

3 the Bosnian Serb negotiators, was your consternation made apparent to

4 the -- to all the others there in the meeting in Brussels?

5 A. Mr. Silajdzic came in bringing a telegram. We thought it was a

6 false telegram to begin with. And then it was investigated and seen that

7 it was not a false telegram, and then there were -- he hurled blame at us,

8 look at what you're doing whiling we are negotiating. And this wiped out

9 everything that was said at the press conference. So it had such a

10 negative impact, you were in such a negative position when you received

11 something like that, a telegram of that kind as coming from your side and

12 your side had done something like that. So we received it at the

13 conference itself, the meeting itself.

14 Q. Was Mr. Cutileiro in the room at that point?

15 A. Yes, he was.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm looking at the clock. I don't know

17 whether if you would say I can finish in one or two minutes, the line of

18 questioning, otherwise I would like to invite you to continue tomorrow

19 because I have for two minutes.

20 MR. STEWART: I'm more than happy to -- the reference to that law,

21 those Article 126 is P64A tab 598 in case that's helpful.

22 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact I found it meanwhile. And I also

23 found the article on which the -- since you are raising the issue, it --

24 Article 130 reads, "The present law shall enter into effect eight days

25 after its publication in the Official Gazette of the Serb people in

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina," whereas Article 129 reads, "General acts on internal

2 organisation of the ministry and the Public Security Services shall be

3 enacted within 15 days from the day the present law has entered into

4 effect."

5 Ten minutes ago, I was -- I had forgotten about matters but

6 looking it up it clarifies matters.

7 Therefore, only two matters. The first one is, Mr. Stewart, I

8 hope that you received the update, as the matters stand now, the updated

9 version of the exhibit list.

10 MR. STEWART: It arrived this morning, I think, Your Honour, or

11 very recently. I've had it by e-mail extremely recently, yes, thank you.

12 JUDGE ORIE: So you're invited to make further updates, that is to

13 take any further published exhibits from the judicial data base. I

14 inquired into the matter. It takes even without legal training, but for

15 someone who is just administrative support, it takes approximately two

16 exhibits a minute. So therefore, 100 an hour approximately. So we do the

17 same.

18 MR. STEWART: We thought it could be done a bit quicker

19 Your Honour, but there were 2700 of them. But, Your Honour, there's --

20 JUDGE ORIE: But the bulk is there at this moment. I think it's

21 only a limited number that would be added. The pace since Mr. Treanor and

22 Ms. Hanson disappeared for the time being, we don't have the similar bulk

23 material.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, there is no problem about that. The

25 value of having those 2700 is obvious. Could I just ask a small point,

1 Your Honour, is -- perhaps I'm just not thinking through this clearly

2 enough but the -- all we need for that purpose is it -- for it to be

3 plainly identified for us which of the items which have just been added to

4 the JDB. As long as we know that we can do that exercise. If we don't

5 know that then we really are hunting around.

6 JUDGE ORIE: I think as a matter of fact that Mr. Registrar is

7 informing the team and Mr. Registrar to the extent possible would you

8 please include the Defence, perhaps also the Prosecution, if they were

9 interested to learn about it, in what had been recently scanned and has

10 become part of the judicial database.

11 MR. STEWART: Mr. Haider already knows how helpful we have found

12 his work over the last few days, Your Honour, for which I offer our

13 appreciation.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Then before adjourning, Mr. Krajisnik, and after

15 having instructed you again not to speak with anyone about your testimony,

16 I just wanted to let you know that although the focus may be in

17 questioning, of course, is on what was part of your professional duties,

18 the Chamber will understand what it takes from you to be taken back to

19 moments where not professional duties but also more personal matters were

20 very important for you. The Chamber is aware of that, that that's also

21 part of your testimony.

22 We will adjourn until tomorrow.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Tomorrow afternoon, same courtroom, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Same courtroom, tomorrow afternoon.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

1 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of May,

2 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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