1 Wednesday, 10 May 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

7 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. Good afternoon to

9 everyone. There are a few procedural matters to be discussed but the

10 Chamber would prefer to do that after the first break. That means that

11 I'll first remind you, Mr. Krajisnik, that you are still bound by the

12 solemn declaration. I think you can repeat my words by heart by now but

13 it's my duty to remind you.

14 Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.

15 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking yesterday evening at the very end

20 of the 10th session of the Serb Assembly. That was page 50 in the

21 English, page 77. Do you see that, Mr. Krajisnik? It's the conclusions.

22 It's where there was a -- first of all a rejection of the European

23 Community documents.

24 A. That's the session of the 11th of March, right?

25 Q. It is, yes.

1 A. Yes. And the page is 50 -- no, 77 -- no, 77 in our version, yes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Remind us, we did read this. You made the following proposals and

5 it was to authorise the representatives to continue negotiations with the

6 other two ethnic communities in the presence of the European Community.

7 And then, subject to the following restrictions and the minimum below

8 which the negotiators must not go in representing the interests of the

9 Serbian people, are the results of the plebiscite or a confederal setup of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina which entails three sovereign national states which may

11 be linked up on the confederal principle.

12 Mr. Krajisnik, that wasn't what you wanted, was it?

13 A. Mr. President, you said that there was a mistake here. First of

14 all, on our agenda, according to our agenda we were supposed to state our

15 views on the European Union whereas here I am presenting the conclusions

16 of the working group which had been established earlier on, as mentioned

17 on the previous page. This is a working group that provided an

18 alternative, so that everything would not be rejected. That is to say the

19 proposal of the European Union. That is why I presented this on behalf of

20 the working group. Actually, the vice-president who was chairing the

21 session asked me to do that. So the Presiding Judge was right.

22 Q. You've lost me, Mr. Krajisnik. I'm more interested in simply your

23 answer to my question than the reminder that His Honour was correct

24 previously.

25 JUDGE ORIE: No. I think -- one of the last things I said

1 yesterday to Mr. Krajisnik, please think it over, overnight, and he now,

2 in order not to forget it, I take it, you revisit the matter, which has

3 been done now. So perhaps the next you do is to answer the question now

4 of Mr. Stewart.

5 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered your question. Perhaps

8 implicitly. What I presented here was not my own proposal but the

9 proposal of the working group. I was neutral. Because these conclusions,

10 in a way, gave the negotiations a chance to be continued, and that was my

11 objective. My objective was not to have them rejected but to have them

12 continued. If I may say, I favoured such conclusions but these were the

13 proposals of the working group.

14 I do beg your pardon for answering the Presiding Judge as well,

15 but I just wanted to say that this was the proposal of the working group

16 which I presented.

17 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, the questions come from me, the answers

18 really are for Their Honours. Let's break it down. There are two

19 elements there. The first one, as you've made clear, authorisation to

20 continue the negotiations. That plainly was what you wanted. That's

21 clear, isn't it?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. But the second limb, the restriction, the minimum below which the

24 negotiators must not go, so you were on the face of this to be tied by the

25 Assembly decision here, adopting those proposals, you were to be tied to

1 the results of the plebiscite or a confederal setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

2 which entailed three sovereign national states, you -- you, the

3 negotiating team, didn't want that restriction, did you?

4 A. No. But these were the conclusions from the previous session so

5 this working group built this into it. No, we didn't want that, but I

6 already mentioned what the working group proposed. The first conclusion

7 was the most important one for me, that we should continue the

8 negotiations. As for the rest, we didn't really want that because our

9 possibilities were highly restricted. There was very little manoeuvring

10 space for negotiations.

11 Q. Then if we go over the -- we can see that that was -- that

12 proposal you put with the restriction was unanimously adopted, and then if

13 we go over the page to 51 of the English, it's probably 78, the next page,

14 could even be 79 in your version, we see under heading of a contribution

15 by you, "Please take note of the fact that the authorised persons are ..."

16 and then you list them: "Karadzic, Koljevic, Plavsic, Buha, Maksimovic,

17 and myself, said Mr. Krajisnik." So in the end that proposal was adopted

18 and the negotiating team, as authorised, from then on consisted of the six

19 of you, didn't it?

20 A. Yes. It was confirmed that which had already been passed as an

21 Assembly decision previously.

22 Q. Can we turn back, then, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 54 of this document

23 in your version.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, it's page 36 of the English.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Mr. Rakic speaking. And more or less against number 14 in the

2 margin, there is a paragraph beginning, "On the basis of everything we

3 have gone through ..." Do you see that? Just above the number 14.

4 A. What I see here is I propose that we take our territories, and

5 where is this section you're referring to?

6 Q. It's the immediately preceding paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik.

7 A. Oh, I see. It's different here. Yes, "From the elections until

8 this day ..." that's probably what you're referring to, that's that

9 paragraph.

10 Q. It is indeed. "On the basis of everything we have gone through

11 since the elections to date, we Serbian deputies have reached the

12 conclusion that we simply must not agree to a solution different from that

13 expressed at the plebiscite or, at worst, our own state of BH. Everything

14 else poses a danger to peace. It has already been endangered, and the

15 only alternative is not to allow the formation of Independent State of

16 Croatia in these territories.

17 "I propose that we occupy our territories and keep them, and not

18 surrender them to anyone."

19 Did you understand Mr. Rakic to be talking about territories which

20 were in dispute or in conflict with Croats or more widely about Serb

21 territories throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22 A. I didn't understand what he was saying at all. And I wasn't

23 paying any attention to what he was saying because it was not important.

24 I can interpret this, if you wish, what he meant by this, because I know

25 where he's from and I know what his meaning was.

1 Q. In referring to occupation of territories, was he at that --

2 proposing action on the ground to take over territory?

3 A. Oh, no. What he thought was that we should now take our

4 territories in the sense of introduce our government in our territories

5 and not let anyone in. It's this regionalisation that was already

6 referred to, that we should safeguard this and not let anyone in. That is

7 totally unrealistic and that's why I didn't pay any attention to this,

8 because we are talking about a solution for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not

9 about a unilateral move, that we won't let our own go and the rest should

10 be in accordance with the agreement. This was no war option. He means we

11 are going to keep our own territories and we won't let anyone in, because

12 what is being discussed here is a political solution all the time. There

13 was no mention of war.

14 Q. The next speaker, and that's page 37 of the English, and it will

15 be, I think, probably page 56 on yours, but Professor Vojislav Maksimovic

16 speaks. Do you see the heading where he begins? It's immediately after

17 Mr. Rakic.

18 A. Yes, yes, I see it, yes.

19 Q. And let's go to -- it's marked 15A in the margin of your version.

20 That's page 57. It's right in the middle of page 38 of the English. And

21 he says, "From this place --" We have just seen a moment ago that Mr.

22 Maksimovic is one of the people who is to be a member of the negotiating

23 team as approved by this Assembly. Here he says: "We are fully aware of

24 the discord in Serbia and Montenegro and will not --" So sorry, I meant

25 to start the previous paragraph. "From this place let us also send a

1 message to our brethren in Serbia and Montenegro to wake up in the face of

2 danger, and warn them that if they adopt a passive stance, a vast part of

3 the Serbian nation, perhaps the most select part - our people in Bosnia

4 and Herzegovina - will be cut off from the whole of our national being.

5 "We are fully aware of the discord in Serbia and Montenegro and

6 will not add to it. But, we Serbs in BH cannot wait for things to calm

7 down nor bear too long their ruthless struggle for power. That is why we

8 should refrain from taking sides in the Serbo-Montenegrin political

9 confrontations. Instead, we should reproach them for their narrow and

10 selfish views. We have not had words of encouragement or real support

11 from Serbia and Montenegro for days now. It seems as --" as if, it must

12 be -- "It seems as if the main political factors and figures in Serbia

13 are silently watching our drama in BH. That is what our people are

14 thinking, and they are waiting."

15 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, at this time, how well informed would

16 -- was Mr. Maksimovic about the politics and the policies affecting the

17 Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Serb leadership as compared with yourself?

18 A. Professor Maksimovic was president of the Deputies Club, a

19 university professor, and a very influential MP. It is certain - at least

20 that's what I think - that he knew everything the negotiating team knew.

21 By his very nature, he's a bit temperamental and a bit radical, but at any

22 rate he is a disciplined and reasonable person. At that time, he was not

23 even a member of the Serb Democratic Party because he was the president of

24 Prosvjeta. He is complaining about the lack of support from Serbia and

25 Montenegro, and he is saying that before we kept hearing things from there

1 to the effect that there would still be a Yugoslavia and now all of a

2 sudden everybody is keeping silent so we have to rely upon our own

3 resources only and find a solution. I would say that what you read out,

4 up to that point, in terms of what he said, was realistic, positive, a bit

5 temperamental, but you cannot say that he was not versed into what was

6 going on. He chaired the club too, except for when Trifko Radic would

7 take over for him.

8 Q. Can we go, then, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 73, which in the English

9 is page 48.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And Professor Unkovic speaking. Was Professor Unkovic an

12 influential deputy?

13 A. I mentioned Mr. Unkovic. He was not a deputy. I said that he was

14 a candidate from our unit. He was candidate number 1 and I was number 2,

15 and he was here as a guest from the municipality of Novi Grad.

16 Q. I'll put it a different way, then. Was he an influential person

17 in the Assembly when he was present?

18 A. No. He was not influential. I mean, he could take part in the

19 debate but he could not make any decisions. His discussion would probably

20 differ from that what others had to say but he had no influence. Which is

21 not to say that what he was saying wasn't similar to what some other

22 deputies were saying, but he did not have any influence.

23 Q. In the middle of page 48 of the English, it is six paragraphs --

24 well, it's five paragraphs down, I think: "I therefore --" Do you see a

25 paragraph beginning, "I therefore kindly ask you, gentlemen deputies ..."?

1 It's the fifth paragraph in Mr. Unkovic's contribution.

2 A. Yes. I found it.

3 Q. "I therefore kindly ask you, gentlemen deputies, members of the

4 Presidency, Mr. Karadzic, to tell our army, the army in BH, the generals

5 in BH: no more of either 'this' or 'that'. It must be either this or

6 that. They finally must clearly state their stands."

7 Was this position being adopted by Mr. Unkovic one to which a

8 number of other deputies subscribed?

9 A. I said several times that there were radical presentations, but

10 that was a minority. A vast majority thought differently. Perhaps

11 individuals had such a view, or, rather, not such a view, they were just

12 saying that. I think that even Mr. Unkovic did not have this kind of

13 view. Sometimes, quite simply, people are trying to come up with a

14 version which is far more patriotic than others. Patriotic under

15 quotation marks, that is.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. You can put that particular

17 document aside, please. And I want to go to the 11th session, which was

18 held on the 18th of March, and that's to be found in two places: P65,

19 binder 10, tab 109, or P529, binder 10, tab 388.

20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think we are all working from the

21 same English version.

22 Q. Now, we see, first of all, it's page 5 of both your version and

23 the English, Mr. Krajisnik, that an early topic of discussion here is

24 Dr. Karadzic presenting the latest paper from the Cutileiro discussions,

25 so he goes through that. I'm not going to dwell on that. He goes through

1 that in some detail. If we then go on to contribution from you, which is

2 at page 16 - and that's page 12 of the English, it's at the foot of page

3 12 in the English --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- there is a very short paragraph: "What is the problem?" This

6 is you speaking, Mr. Krajisnik. "What is the problem?

7 "I think the problem is that they want Bosnia and Herzegovina to

8 be internationally recognised at any cost. They want it to be a state.

9 "In this respect, it would be good if we could do one thing for

10 strategic reasons: If we could start implementing what we have agreed

11 upon, the ethnic division on the ground. That we start determining the

12 territory, and once the territory is determined, it remains to be

13 established in additional negotiations whose authorities are to function

14 and in what way."

15 Mr. Krajisnik, when you were saying there, "... it would be good

16 if we could do one thing, start implementing what we've agreed upon ..."

17 were you talking there about a unilateral action by the Bosnian Serbs?

18 A. No. I've already explained this once but I can explain again.

19 No. I was talking about agreement among the three sides. I was talking

20 about the Sarajevo agreement.

21 Q. That's what I was asking you, Mr. Krajisnik.

22 If we then go on, please, to page 24, which is page 18 in the

23 English --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Mr. Srdja Srdic who is speaking and asks for the photocopies and

1 so on, and then the third paragraph, it's the last paragraph, his

2 contribution, he says: "I have had the chance to glance at some of the

3 HDZ and SDA maps which Mr. Krajisnik has and which already contain the

4 markings. I am a representative from Prijedor and I can tell you that the

5 entire Prijedor area has been shaded as a municipality that belongs to the

6 Muslims. Prijedor, however, is a municipality which definitely, even

7 after the census and the elections, belongs to the Serbs. The reason why

8 the municipality belongs to the Serbs is the fact that Serbs hold almost

9 more than 70 per cent of the municipal territory, that is, of the land. I

10 would therefore ask that all maps supplied and other materials be copied

11 and distributed to all deputies. I do believe that our input in the way

12 of corrections would help our negotiators."

13 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, we can look at the maps, if necessary, but it

14 was clear, wasn't it, that Prijedor was a municipality where there was a

15 Muslim majority, taking the municipality as a whole.

16 A. Yes. You're right. According to that map of yours, the Muslim

17 population had a very small advantage, looking at the municipality as a

18 whole, the entire territory of the municipality, that is.

19 Q. Yes. And then the map that you prefer, P293, the one that shows

20 the smaller areas, inevitably that produces a more complicated picture,

21 doesn't it, where there are significant bits of the municipality that are

22 clearly Serb-majority areas. That's the position, isn't it? Just to

23 remind ourselves of the figures, it was, according to the map P211, 44 --

24 it's a relative majority: It was 44 per cent Muslims, 42 per cent Serbs,

25 and then 8 Yugoslavs and 6 Croats, so they are relatively minor in that

1 municipality.

2 But Mr. Srdja is talking -- Srdic, I beg his pardon, is talking

3 about territory there, isn't he, Mr. Krajisnik, and what was the approach

4 at this time of the negotiating team to the issue of municipalities where

5 a substantial majority of the territory belonged to Serbs but there was

6 nevertheless an overall majority lying with one of the other national

7 groups?

8 A. We had the same approach, like Mr. Cutileiro. And this is what it

9 was: We cannot view the municipality as a whole -- how should I put this?

10 We should look at parts of the municipality, at the territory, and then on

11 that territory, one settlement, if it belongs to one ethnic group, then it

12 belongs to that ethnic group where there is a majority, relative or

13 absolute, and in that municipality, a different ethnic group could have a

14 majority in the settlement too and then it would belong to the different

15 ethnic group. That is why I was saying that this map was the proposal

16 underlying the maps. If you remember Mr. Cutileiro's map, near Prijedor,

17 there is a part that is marked as the Croat part and the Muslim part,

18 whereas Mr. Srdja is talking about the map that he saw, which was the

19 Muslim proposal, where basically all of Prijedor was marked as Muslim.

20 That is what their proposal had been.

21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to explore a particular distinction with

22 you, and first of all make sure we got the distinction clear, and then ask

23 you a question based on it. You can have a municipality -- and we see

24 that with Prijedor -- you can have a municipality, say, where the Muslims

25 are in the majority in that municipality. So on what you would regard as

1 the more simple map, that gets coloured one colour as a Muslim

2 municipality. On the more complicated map, where you break that

3 municipality down into constituent units, you get a different picture, of

4 course, because some of those - I apologise for the phrase - constituent

5 units, which appears elsewhere, but the constituent units within that

6 municipality, as we've seen and as you've explained, some of those will be

7 majority Serb, some of those would be majority Muslim and, of course --

8 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. If I can offer a small suggestion. It seems

9 to me that the use of "constituent units" is -- offers a characterisation

10 that's -- invites some ambiguity later on. The map itself uses the term

11 "settlements." It says so on the map. That might be the simplest way of

12 identifying what we are talking about to make that clear.

13 MR. STEWART: I'm happy to make that change. I found I'd

14 accidentally used the term "constituent units" and just continued with it,

15 but I'm happy to switch to "settlements" if it helps in future.

16 Q. So the settlements within the municipality, they may, of course,

17 then be in some instances also majority Muslim, in some instances majority

18 Serb, and so you can produce -- you can have a situation, can't you, where

19 a municipality overall is, say, a Muslim majority, but the settlements, as

20 they are shown on the more complicated map, where there is a Serb majority

21 may constitute more than half of the total area of the municipality.

22 A. You're quite right. In one municipality, there can be a

23 concentration of one national group in one territory bigger than in the

24 rest of the territory in terms of the other national group. So in that

25 case, the entire municipality belongs to that national group which is a

1 majority there. We were discussing territories here, who was in which

2 microterritory, so who was a majority in some microterritory, that

3 territory belongs to them. A town, for example, is a true wealth, and

4 villages will belong to others, to those who live there, whereas the town

5 is going to belong to the majority that lives there. It's not the same

6 quality. You've got forests and hills and mountains and also, on the

7 other hand, you've got urban areas. So maps can be misleading when we are

8 talking only about maps. We could look at the entire republic that way.

9 So Muslims are a relative majority in the republic and then we can say

10 that the entire republic belongs to the Muslims because there is the

11 republic, there is municipalities, there is local communes, there is

12 villages, so that was the organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so we

13 were looking at the lowest level group, that we base this division on the

14 lowest level group, which was only logical.

15 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I ask you, we have spent quite some

17 time now - more than two minutes - on explaining something which is, I

18 would say, so obvious. I mean, in any district system, you have ten

19 municipalities, eight of the municipalities have a majority of 51 per

20 cent, the two remaining municipalities have a majority of 100 per cent for

21 the others, then you have eight votes gained in the eight majorities

22 although the overall majority is of the different party.

23 That's all really obvious.

24 MR. STEWART: I completely agree, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I mean, the English system of voting is

1 different from the Dutch system, and you couldn't, with a -- which a

2 minority could nevertheless gain the elections. That's for sure. That's

3 -- depends on how the parties are spread over the different

4 municipalities. So therefore, I think it has been hinted at already,

5 well, five or ten times over the last couple of days. Let's proceed.

6 MR. STEWART: Yes.

7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, there is -- so we got that clear. Now, there is in

8 principle, isn't there, another way of doing a map of a municipality,

9 where you could colour in, in different colours, the land that was

10 actually owned by different -- members of different ethnic groups.

11 A. Correct, correct. Precisely. That is exactly what I meant. We

12 were talking about land, not about a population. In one skyscraper you

13 can have more people than in one entire neighbourhood.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what I'm trying to do first is make sure we have a

15 very clear distinction that there are three possibilities. There may be

16 more in the world, but three that we are talking about. One is what might

17 be labelled the crude simple method of simply colouring the municipality

18 according to its basic majority. The next is the one that we did spend a

19 few minutes considering just now, where it's broken down into settlements.

20 But, Mr. Krajisnik, do you agree that what I have just put to you a moment

21 ago, where you colour in the land according to the actual ownership of the

22 land is different from that method, isn't it?

23 A. Yeah. That's a third system but it's rather close to the second

24 system we discussed, because the land that people live on is their land.

25 I don't think the Prosecutor is right when he says that there is a lot of

1 state-owned land. It's a fallacy placed by the Muslim side. On the

2 contrary, there is very little state-owned land, only a couple of

3 agricultural complexes.

4 JUDGE ORIE: I think Mr. Stewart was asking about the systems

5 first. If you take large units, then it could not properly reflect all

6 the details on the map which might create a different colouring of the

7 map. So therefore, the second system is you take the smaller unit and you

8 get a different map. We've seen that. This map gives a different picture

9 from this map. And then finally, if you would put on the map land

10 ownership and the area of land owned by those persons, then both with an

11 absolute minority over the whole and an absolute minority on all of the

12 tiny little communities, et cetera, you nevertheless could have a majority

13 ownership. These are the systems. Part of your answer was about facts,

14 whether that was true or not, and you say the Prosecution was not right.

15 I'd like to make a clear distinction between systems and how these systems

16 would be filled in with facts. Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

17 MR. STEWART:

18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, where Mr. Srdic is speaking here and he says, the

19 reason -- because let's be clear about this. If we apply what Mr. Srdic

20 says to our maps here, basically what Mr. Srdic is saying could be

21 regarded as saying the very simple map that shows Prijedor coloured for

22 the Muslims is not the way it really is. That's one thing he's saying,

23 isn't he?

24 A. Yes. That's what he says, although he exaggerates the percentage

25 a little bit.

1 Q. Then he says the reason why the municipality belongs to the Serbs

2 is that Serbs hold almost more than 70 per cent of the municipal

3 territory. That is of the land, he used the word "land." Do you

4 understand Mr. Srdic to be saying that in terms of private ownership of

5 land in Prijedor, the Serbs own more than -- whether he exaggerates the

6 exact percentage, but the Serbs own substantially more than half the land

7 in Prijedor and therefore Prijedor is a municipality that belongs to the

8 Serbs?

9 A. That's how I understood him, but if I may add, in Prijedor the

10 Muslims and Serbs made an agreement about a transformation of the Prijedor

11 municipality into two municipalities. There were talks about that and

12 they negotiated between themselves, so he is better informed than I am.

13 They wanted to divide Prijedor into the Serb and Muslim municipalities.

14 That's what he says. The same thing that was done in many municipalities.

15 Q. That's, for the purposes of my questions at the moment,

16 Mr. Krajisnik, that's slightly another issue altogether. On the basis of

17 what you have said, your understanding of Mr. Srdic's analysis here, was

18 it the negotiating team's approach that a municipality where Serbs owned

19 more than 70 -- more than 50 per cent of the land, effectively a

20 municipality that belonged to the Serbs?

21 A. No. It's not a Serbian proposal. It was accepted as a model that

22 all of Bosnia would be divided into the smallest possible units so as to

23 identify territories where this or that side has a majority. For

24 instance, down to a village. There is a correlation with property. But

25 there may be people who reside in a certain populated area but own no

1 land. Our approach was that the geographical and communication factor

2 also has to play a part, because you cannot leave an enclave cut off if it

3 is not contiguous to the territory of its mother constituent unit. So the

4 ethnic factor could not be the only one. You had to apply some other

5 factors too.

6 Q. Can you go to page 32, Mr. Krajisnik, which is page 23 in the

7 English.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. This is Mr. Milovan Bjelosevic who is speaking, and he says, right

10 against point 4C in the margin, he says secondly -- it's right in the

11 middle of page 23 in the English. "Secondly, I would want to see more

12 speed in the implementation of the law on internal affairs, I would want

13 to see that things fall in their right place, and by that I mean things

14 concerning the Ministry of the Interior and personnel decisions in the

15 Ministry. I touched upon the subject two or three months ago, in the

16 Assembly, but you, Mr. President, not only tried to stop me but prevent it

17 altogether, saying that it should be accepted." Where he's talking about

18 things concerning the Ministry of Interior and personnel decisions in the

19 ministry, is he talking about the proposed or potential split in the MUP?

20 A. No. He's not talking about that, although from the first sentence

21 you could think that he is. This entire comment relates to appointments

22 in the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if you take it in reverse, if you

23 take it inversely, he says, "None of this is functioning. You proposed

24 candidates and you stood in my way," addressing Mr. Karadzic. We should

25 transform and amend our law on the Interior. So he's complaining not

1 about appointments in -- he is complaining about appointments in the MUP

2 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Ministry of the Interior, and that was the

3 main line of division, the cause of the rift. There were people in the

4 SDA who stood in the way of any improvement and they were assisted by

5 Mr. Zepinic who didn't implement any of the necessary changes.

6 Q. If we go on to page 53, which is page 37 in the English, we've got

7 Mr. Vjestica speaking. And he says -- do you see point 5 in the margin?

8 There is a paragraph --

9 A. Yes, yes, I see that.

10 Q. There is a paragraph immediately above that, which begins, "In

11 addition to these two conditions ..." Do you see that?

12 A. Yes. I got it.

13 Q. "In addition to these two conditions, we must urgently establish a

14 Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must

15 establish national defence, our Serbian army, which is already there on

16 the ground, we just need to transform it into what we need to have.

17 "In addition to this, we must urgently establish our own money

18 transfers system. Following all this, we must take possession of all our

19 Serbian territories, physically, with our own Territorial Defence, our

20 Serbian police."

21 Mr. Krajisnik, did you understand his proposal of taking

22 possession of Serbian territories physically to mean exactly that, that he

23 was suggesting that there should be action by presumably armed forces to

24 take over territory?

25 A. I'm a bit handicapped because I read the interview given by

1 Mr. Vjestica to the Office of the Prosecutor where he explained all of

2 this. At that time, I didn't read anything much into his words because I

3 know the man. He's very radical, temperamental. He talks more than he

4 does, to put it that way. So I concentrated only on those of his

5 proposals and points that were specific, concrete. He's saying here that

6 he doesn't believe in Bosnia, but that's empty talk. But whenever you ask

7 him, "And how do you intend to do that?" he doesn't know what to say.

8 There are people who just find a valve, an outlet, in this kind of talk.

9 I -- I read, as I said, his interview that he gave here at the Tribunal,

10 and I know the way he explained this, and he did exactly what he said.

11 He's a big man, not ill-intentioned. He talks too much, I would say, but

12 there is no ill will behind it.

13 Q. If we go on to page 63, Mr. Krajisnik, which is page 44 in the

14 English, this is Dr. Karadzic speaking. And against 6B in the margin, he

15 says: "According to the constitution and the laws there is a

16 possibility for withdrawing all our men, from the MUP too. You will

17 decide on when it is going to happen.

18 "There is a law on SDA, and a decision has to be reached to

19 activate it so that we would be able to formulate the Serbian Republic of

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina budget.

21 "It is good that we have created legal and political foundations

22 for further actions, and it is upon you to decide when we will reveal our

23 next move. It will all be happening in a flash and the setup of the de

24 facto situation based on our documents. I think that the Council of

25 Ministers will have to work around the clock to be able to prepare some

1 additional laws, establish the SDK and so forth. We shall announce our

2 withdrawal from MUP, not to mention that we have already obtained the

3 badges. Our police will have to act in accordance with the law, no one

4 must be harmed regardless of their religion, nation. Everyone must feel

5 absolutely safe."

6 Mr. Krajisnik, in talking about announcing "our withdrawal from

7 MUP," whenever it might happen, was Dr. Karadzic referring to the same

8 process that was in fact purported to be implemented by Mr. Mandic by the

9 document that we have seen this week?

10 A. I'm very glad that you read this passage out. This position was

11 very topical at the time. There is a decision about the withdrawal of

12 Serb personnel. It was adopted on the 17th of April, 1992, whereby all

13 personnel would withdraw - in fact, had withdrawn - except for the speaker

14 of the Assembly. In other words, I did not walk out of the Assembly of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Mr. Karadzic here is saying what I said yesterday. The Assembly

17 is the one to decide when that would happen. Why did they stress the

18 Ministry of the Interior? Because the Ministry of the Interior was very

19 topical, very important, and most of those who spoke at the session were

20 unhappy about the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the same time they saw

21 that, according to the new arrangement, the police would belong to the

22 Republika Srpska and they want the Serbian MUP to be established as soon

23 as possible. He says this will be done, this will be done very soon, but

24 this is a timed move. You cannot just go and set up your own MUP because

25 you're unhappy with the present one without having reached an agreement

1 about it. All we have for the time being are underlying principles.

2 However, after this, the Assembly never endorsed -- never passed a

3 decision for the separate MUP to be established, unlike what Mr. Mandic

4 wrote. It was only on the 17th of April that the Serb personnel of the

5 SDS party withdrew. It's all documented. The Assembly never took that

6 decision. Which means that Mandic could not do this. And this is a good

7 remark, actually, very well observed. The Assembly will decide. One

8 person cannot take decisions of that kind.

9 Q. And then if we turn on to page 66, which is page 45 in the

10 English, we see a contribution from you, Mr. Krajisnik, against the letter

11 6C in the margin. You say, just above that: "And since there were

12 additional proposals, a schedule of our Assembly should be --" sorry, "a

13 session of our Assembly should be scheduled for later because there is a

14 whole series of laws that need to be prepared, and documents and proposals

15 too, dealing with how to take over the de facto situation.

16 "I have realised that responsible government should be established

17 in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 "- to find the mechanisms for implementing the BH constitution;

19 "- urgently form MUP, national defence ..."

20 Pausing there, Mr. Krajisnik, by your reference there to "urgently

21 forming MUP, national defence," were you intending to say anything

22 different from what Dr. Karadzic had been saying?

23 A. I chaired that session, and at that point, I was summing up all

24 the proposals made by MPs, by various MPs. Each of those proposals was

25 made by somebody. So I told them, "You proposed this." And there is a

1 sentence where I say, "It's not my proposal. You suggested all these

2 things. However, I suggest to you one conclusion." And that was later

3 endorsed. What you read here are the proposals made by various MPs, and

4 according to the rules of procedure, each proposal was to be put up for

5 voting. But this was not consistent with our procedure, so I wanted to

6 bridge this gap by making this summary and putting it up for a vote, the

7 summary of these proposals, and I told them, all the draft laws and the

8 proposed legislation, let's leave that for another time, for next time.

9 Q. And you referred then to money transfer systems and then "take the

10 Serbian territories," and there again, Mr. Krajisnik, was what you were

11 referring to there, "take the Serbian territories," did that -- was that

12 meant to imply any physical action to occupy actual territory on the

13 ground?

14 A. Maybe this translation is not good. I was summing up what the MPs

15 had said, without going into the meaning. You will find this wording,

16 "take the Serbian territories," in the contribution of one of the MPs.

17 Another MP referred to the money transfer system. The only thing that I

18 said in my own name is the conclusion I suggested at the end. What I

19 expressed here is not my own opinion or my own proposal. It's the summary

20 of their proposals. On the contrary, if I had put this up for a vote,

21 they should have replaced me then and there because it was not in

22 conformity with the procedure. However, it was my duty under the rules of

23 procedure to present this.

24 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps I can tell you that whatever the

25 Serbian says, the English phrase which appears here is certainly ambiguous

1 as to whether it means physical occupation of ground, so I seek that

2 clarification from you - yes or no - as to whether you had any such

3 meaning of physical taking over of territory in mind there.

4 A. Mr. Stewart, it's not I who said that. I just repeated what the

5 MPs had said, without commenting upon it. I don't care what he meant.

6 You read a moment ago that it was Milosevic [as interpreted] who said it.

7 I just said, "These are the things that you said. I for my part suggest

8 to you to endorse only this."

9 I didn't suggest that we pass the law on the MUP, the money

10 transfer, et cetera. I just summed up what the MPs had said. That is the

11 duty of the chairman, to summarise what the MPs had said and to put it up

12 for a vote. I included even the contribution of this man Unkovic. If

13 this is not properly translated or interpreted, and if I need to repeat it

14 ten times, I will repeat it ten times, so long as you understand what this

15 is all about.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, on the transcript, the name

17 "Milosevic" appeared a few lines ago and the person concerned, we saw

18 that earlier, is pretty clearly Mr. Bjelosevic.

19 A. Yes, Bjelosevic; MP from Derventa, now dead.

20 MR. STEWART: Excuse me one moment, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would have a question.

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Krajisnik is not

23 saying, "I have realised [In English] that responsible government should

24 be established in Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. - to find," et cetera,

25 et cetera, but [Interpretation] you're not disputing this sentence [In

1 English] "responsible government be established." [Interpretation] What

2 you are not saying, you're not saying "I will summarise the proposals made

3 by various deputies." You say, "I realised that the government, the

4 responsible government, a responsible government, should be established in

5 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" in order to do such and

6 such a thing. I realise that responsible government should be realised in

7 order to do something. Is that the correct translation, or are you

8 disputing this translation, sir?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would appreciate it

10 very much if you could read the paragraph before that. I could actually

11 read it out, by your leave, because it ties in with what follows.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Go ahead, sir.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Since there were additional

14 proposals, a session of our Assembly should be scheduled for later because

15 there is a whole series of laws that need to be prepared, and documents

16 and proposals too, dealing with how to take over the de facto situation."

17 And then follows this passage: "I have realised --" I have

18 understood. Meaning on the basis of their proposals, I have understood

19 that an accountable government and a responsible government should be

20 established in Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 If we look at it in isolation, then you can understand it the way

22 you understood. But what I said before was that I understood, or I

23 realised, meaning I understood what you want. And then I enumerated their

24 proposals. That's the way it reads.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. TIEGER: Just so the record is clear, I imagine it is if one

3 is looking both at the session transcript and the transcript today, but

4 after Mr. Krajisnik read out the paragraph preceding the one to which

5 Judge Hanoteau brought his attention, the -- Mr. Krajisnik then both read

6 and commented upon simultaneously the next paragraph. Simply indicating

7 that that is not a verbatim account of that particular paragraph. I know

8 Mr. Krajisnik didn't intend -- I don't believe he intended to indicate

9 that it was, but the record might otherwise be unclear.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor is right, but please,

11 this is very important. If there is any doubt about it, I would like it

12 cleared up. This is not my proposal and I was neither for or against. I

13 just summed it up. I don't know how it was translated. It could be

14 ambiguous.

15 JUDGE ORIE: If there is any translation issue left,

16 Mr. Krajisnik, I suggest that, of course, since you are not in a position

17 at this moment to discuss the matter with counsel, that the Defence will

18 take the effort to specifically look on whether the original is translated

19 here in the best possible way. I mean, we can't have anything more.

20 You've explained what -- how you interpret these words, how you meant

21 them. If there is any linguistical issue to be raised, certainly now the

22 attention has been specifically drawn to it by you so that Mr. Stewart and

23 Mr. Sladojevic and Mr. Josse know exactly what to do, that is to carefully

24 review whether there could be any translation issue. Please proceed.

25 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm finished with this session now.

1 And if it weren't inconvenient for Your Honours, although we are a few

2 minutes earlier than the norm, it would be helpful, for practical reasons,

3 to -- if the break were taken now.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE ORIE: It would suit us perfectly, since, Mr. Stewart, the

6 Chamber also, for practical purposes, would like to have a break a little

7 bit longer than usual. So we would have a break now and restart at ten

8 minutes past 4.00.

9 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.

11 --- On resuming at 4.25 p.m.

12 JUDGE ORIE: As I said before the break, I'd like to deal with

13 some procedural issues after the break. And I see that we received,

14 during our first session -- yes. First, we deal with the, if I could say

15 so, the double pension issue, the translation of the legislation.

16 Mr. Josse, I read just now your e-mail that was sent today at half past

17 12. I do understand that translation causes some problems. That's number

18 1. That there was communication between you and the Prosecution, that

19 you're trying to resolve the matter, but before entering into an agreement

20 that you would also need to speak briefly about that with Mr. Krajisnik.

21 One question: Would, not necessarily today, but would be a short meeting

22 during a break just to discuss this matter, would that be sufficient?

23 MR. JOSSE: It probably would, Your Honour. However, I need to

24 meet with Mr. Harmon first of all.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. No. Therefore I'm just talking in terms

1 of future. So you would first meet and then, if there is any chance of

2 reaching an agreement, then you would like to discuss it with

3 Mr. Krajisnik.

4 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

5 JUDGE ORIE: And most probably a break, perhaps the first break of

6 a day, a bit longer break would do.

7 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. Could I put on record briefly that I know

8 the ODM heard my remarks yesterday. They have corresponded with me and a

9 member of our team today and they really have been most helpful in trying

10 to resolve this issue as speedily as possible.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand. ODM, again?

12 MR. JOSSE: Office of Document Management.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think they will appreciate that you put that

14 on the record.

15 So then we'll hear from you, I hope, soon. Could I expect that

16 the Chamber will be informed not later than 10 days from now so that we

17 are updated on how matters stand. Not necessarily that translations are

18 already there, but just to be updated.

19 MR. JOSSE: Certainly. And come the moment that I actually need

20 to speak to Mr. Krajisnik, I will apply to the Court again.

21 JUDGE ORIE: One word at that moment will be good enough and we'll

22 consider the matter prior to such a request to be made.

23 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Then, yes, we have -- the Prosecution has submitted

25 the exemplars of contracts in relation to housing. We have never set a

1 time limit for any response. Mr. Josse, I don't know whether it's you or

2 whether --

3 MR. JOSSE: There will a response, that I can assure the Chamber

4 and my learned friends.

5 JUDGE ORIE: So you're interested in know how much time you have

6 got to respond. How much time would you need?

7 MR. JOSSE: Well, I was working on a seven-day basis. There will

8 be a written filing from the Defence in relation to this rather large

9 filing from the Prosecution.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's, then -- things not always go as one

11 wishes. Today is the 10th of May. Could we receive it by the 20th of

12 May?

13 MR. JOSSE: Yes. Could I say, I see Mr. Krajisnik is looking a

14 little puzzled. It's worth remembering that of course he is not aware of

15 any of these things the way that he normally would have been. No doubt in

16 due course he will get this when it's been translated, but I just mention

17 that in passing, that at the moment he is not aware of these type of

18 developments until the filing has been translated into his language.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As a matter of fact, I do not know whether we

20 discussed the matter in his presence and whether it was at that time

21 translated to him or not. But --

22 MR. JOSSE: He is certainly aware that this is a live issue

23 because it predates his going into the witness box.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. And even now, of course, although he's a

25 witness, we did not send out the witness, so the witness - but also the

1 accused - can hear what we are discussing at this moment. So then, we'll

2 receive your response in not later than 10 days from now on.

3 MR. JOSSE: I'm grateful.

4 JUDGE ORIE: If there would be any need, since you have no

5 possibility to communicate, we perhaps -- if you're response arrives, we

6 could briefly summarise in three, four, five lines, what you submitted so

7 that -- it's not of direct relevance, I would think, for Mr. Krajisnik's

8 own testimony, and if it's not, we could inform Mr. Krajisnik in this way

9 that he's at least aware, without any further communication, what you did

10 for him.

11 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Then Nielsen material. You asked for another day.

13 Was that in order to orally argue the matter or to submit a written

14 response?

15 MR. JOSSE: We have submitted a filing in relation to this during

16 the last break, and so the Chamber should receive that shortly.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then that matter has been resolved as well.

18 Then I would like to go into private session, or even closed session. I

19 don't know there is anyone in the public gallery. It's reflecting very

20 much, so I don't know whether it's --

21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm having difficulty telling, myself.

22 There is quite a reflection.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what mirrors do, isn't it? Perhaps out

24 of an abundance of caution, we would go in closed session. Perhaps that's

25 the safest way of dealing with the matter.

1 [Closed session]

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25 [Open session]

1 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed. We are in open session.

3 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. We did --

4 Mr. Sladojevic did have a look at that passage over the adjournment, Your

5 Honour, and it's -- the passage is on the screen now, which was what we

6 were looking at, "And since there were additional proposals ..." That

7 paragraph and the next paragraph, "I have realised ..." Your Honour, it

8 does appear to us that there is a translation issue here, so perhaps take

9 it from there.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we will do the same. If there is one

11 specific translation issue, perhaps it could be briefly put on paper,

12 given to the Registrar. Let's limit ourselves to what is really

13 necessary, because the translators have a lot of work and therefore we

14 limit it to the lines that are in issue. Unless you could explain it

15 briefly in a way which could even result in agreement with the

16 Prosecution. Of course, that's another way of doing it, if you just, in

17 the next break, tell Mr. Tieger or Mr. Harmon what the issue is, they

18 might consult their language assistants, and if the parties would agree on

19 what the issue is, then tell the Chamber. That would even save further

20 work for the interpreters -- for the translators.

21 MR. TIEGER: That's fine with us, Your Honour.

22 MR. STEWART: I can say, Your Honour, it relates only to those

23 first two lines before we get to the numbered -- the points with the

24 dashes. So it's -- I have -- what we were looking at before in English:

25 "I have realised that responsible government ..." It really relates only

1 to those two lines, Your Honours, and we're as keen as --

2 JUDGE ORIE: If you can resolve the matter, please do so in the

3 next break. If not, then we'll send those two lines for review of the

4 translation.

5 MR. STEWART: Very well, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I had left, then, that session, and we

8 are going now to the 12th session. The exhibit numbered there, again

9 there are two possibilities: P64, tab 266. Not sure which binder it's

10 in, but it's tab 266. Alternatively, P529, binder 13 or folder 13, tab

11 443. And this is the 12th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People,

12 24th of March 1992. We got the version for Mr. Krajisnik in his own

13 language, Your Honour, in the usual way.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We have two sessions at that day. And this is

15 the first, because I think both the 12th and the 13th session are on the

16 24th of March, just to avoid whatever confusion, so we are now talking

17 about the 12th. By the way, you said tab 443, and that seems to be -- let

18 me just have a look -- at least, in the list I have here, tab 443 is the

19 13th session, also on the 24th of March.

20 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please correct me when I'm wrong, but -- perhaps you

22 could give the ERN numbers, Mr. Stewart, then.

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we think it's binder 12, tab 266. It's

24 possible, Your Honour, that I --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Could you, in order to avoid whatever confusion, when

1 we start, the first page you deal with, could you please give us the ERN

2 number.

3 MR. STEWART: Yes, of course, Your Honour. This is SA02 5781.

4 JUDGE ORIE: I'm afraid that I do have a problem there. Let's be

5 very alert on it and we'll find out immediately once you start quoting or

6 reading. First part you'd like to draw our attention to, Mr. Stewart,

7 would be which page in English?

8 MR. STEWART: It's on page 16 of the English.

9 JUDGE ORIE: 16 of the English. The other one is supposed to be

10 only 15 pages. That would resolve the matter. Yes the other one is only

11 16 --

12 MR. STEWART: Yes. It seems to -- Your Honour, the ERN number

13 seems to be the one that matches the exhibit list.

14 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that's consistent with our -- the ERN

15 recited by Mr. Stewart and in fact in front of me at the -- at this moment

16 in the B/C/S is indeed SA02 5781, but we have that as P64, P65, Treanor

17 11, tab 113. Also appears as P529, Hanson tab 389.

18 MR. STEWART: It's --

19 JUDGE ORIE: 389, yes, let me just have a look. Yes. I have the

20 same sources and that's for the 12th session, 24th of March, although we

21 still have some difficulties in having the ERN numbers, but let's proceed

22 on the basis of what seems to be --

23 MR. STEWART: It's also P64A, tab 266.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Well, perhaps I've got that one in front of me, but

25 I'll be alert on any translation issues.

1 MR. STEWART: I think in the end the net result, Your Honour, is

2 we've all got the same document, whatever its number.

3 JUDGE ORIE: That would be great.

4 MR. STEWART: I think we have. Famous last words. Page 16, Your

5 Honour, it's 27 of what you have, Mr. Krajisnik. This is Dr. Karadzic

6 speaking, and he says, against the number 1 we have put in the margin, "I

7 ask you now that following some instructions ..." Do you see that

8 paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik?

9 A. I see it.

10 Q. "I ask you now that following some instructions for national

11 defence, information systems, et cetera that will be given here, the real

12 and sovereign authority of the Serbian Assembly and Serbian people be

13 established on the ground as soon as possible. As soon as we are informed

14 that we have our own separate MUP, which will probably follow the coming

15 session, all the newly-established municipalities should immediately set

16 up police stations and all policemen should be withdrawn. Because this

17 is, in fact, what life has taught us. Our policemen were forced out of

18 the municipalities of Stari Grad, Gorazde and I think from Visegrad as

19 well, et cetera. Policemen simply do not work together any more and this

20 fact must simply be accepted even though it was forced upon us and

21 tolerated so that supervision can be exercised."

22 Mr. Krajisnik, are you -- do you know what instructions there

23 Dr. Karadzic was talking about?

24 A. I really don't know.

25 Q. Had you, since the previous Assembly session on the 18th of March,

1 six days previously, had you been involved in any sort of discussions in

2 which there had been any change in the leadership's position in relation

3 to the MUP?

4 A. I've said here what it was that I participated in, if that is what

5 this is about. That did not happen during this period of time.

6 Q. Could we go, then, to page 37, Mr. Krajisnik, which in the English

7 is page 21. Dr. Karadzic again. He says: "Together with people who know

8 these things we have studied what the establishment of the National Guard

9 would imply at this moment. You can rest assured that the forming of the

10 National Guard would also lead to the establishment of another two

11 National Guards." Mr. Krajisnik, it's fairly clear, isn't it, that when

12 he says "another two National Guards" he means that the Muslims and the

13 Croats would also establish National Guards.

14 You're nodding, Mr. Krajisnik. The tape --

15 A. Yes, yes. Because that's in the agreement that we discussed, that

16 is what was envisaged by the agreement. I mean with the European

17 Community, that is.

18 Q. And was -- did you understand Dr. Karadzic to be using that

19 conclusion, that another two National Guards would be formed, as a point

20 in favour of or against going ahead with the establishment of a Serb

21 National Guard at that point?

22 A. Against the establishment of a Serb National Guard.

23 Q. And then --

24 A. At this point in time, that is.

25 Q. And then, if you go on to where you find number 4 in the margin,

1 it's page 22 of the English, 38 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik.

2 A. Yes, yes. I've found it.

3 Q. The paragraph beginning, "You can be sure that numbers the police

4 --" must be numbers of the police. "You can be sure that numbers of the

5 police are quite sufficient. I know that the Serbs cannot do what the HOS

6 is doing, to do things which are not based on law. We have a legal basis

7 in the Law on Internal Affairs and we also have the insignia and at a

8 desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can form whatever we want.

9 There are reasons why this could happen in two or three days. Such are

10 the forecasts but I cannot tell you the reasons now. At that moment, all

11 the Serbian municipalities, both the old ones and the newly established

12 ones, would literally assume control of the entire territory of the

13 municipality concerned. The Zvornik municipality takes control over

14 everything that constitutes the Serbian Municipality of Zvornik. Then, at

15 a given moment, in the next three or four days, there will be a single

16 method used and you will be able to apply it in the municipalities you

17 represent, including both things that must be done as well as how to do

18 them. How to separate the police force, take the resources that belong to

19 the Serbian people and take command. The police must be under the control

20 of the civilian authority, it must obey it, there is no discussion about

21 that - that's the way it must be. I think we shall hear it today in the

22 form of instructions at the Deputies' Club.

23 "The decision must, therefore, be adopted but its effect must be

24 delayed. It should not be at this moment for numerous reasons."

25 Mr. Krajisnik, earlier in that passage, in the first couple of

1 sentences, where Mr. Karadzic referred to the law on internal affairs, and

2 then he said, "... at a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we can

3 form whatever we want. There are reasons why this could happen in two or

4 three days. Such are the forecasts but I cannot tell you the reasons

5 now." Can you say what he was referring to in mentioning reasons which he

6 was not able to divulge to the Assembly?

7 A. What happened two or three days later was that the Muslim side

8 publicly denounced the Lisbon Agreement. Mr. Karadzic is talking about

9 the police here as an argument why we should not establish the National

10 Guard, and he's saying that in two or three days, at the Assembly, they

11 will receive instructions in terms of how they should act. We held that

12 Assembly two or three days later, indeed, on the 27th of March.

13 Q. And then we can put this document aside, Mr. Krajisnik. There was

14 another Assembly on the same day, the 13th session.

15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, this -- I give Your Honours the ERN

16 number. SA02 5828 is what we have. And we have it, Your Honour, that

17 that's found in P64A, tab 609. I hope that's the same one that everybody

18 has.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I have a reference to P65, tab 114, and P529, tab

20 443. Let's again hope that we are talking about the same document. At

21 least the last document translation seemed to be literally the same, so

22 therefore I take it that it is the same version of the --

23 MR. TIEGER: Seems to be, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.

25 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I take it if the ERN numbers are the

1 same, then they tell us --

2 JUDGE ORIE: I don't find these ERN numbers on the copies.

3 MR. STEWART: I beg Your Honour's pardon. I didn't realise that

4 Your Honour faced that practical difficulty.

5 Q. So in this document, Mr. Krajisnik, at page 5 of -- on this point

6 -- both the B/C/S and the English version, it's at the foot of page 5 of

7 the English, Mr. Stanisic is speaking. "Mr. President, dear deputies and

8 guests, I am Mica Stanisic.

9 "You know very well my views and thoughts about the existing BH

10 MUP Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After all, I spoke up

11 loud and clear at the press conference which we gave as Serbian officials

12 about five or six days ago and which was organised by Mr. Velibor Ostojic,

13 minister for information.

14 "I do not think that the BH MUP is the MUP to perform the

15 functions for which it was created. I said that publicly the other day."

16 Mr. Krajisnik, we are seeing what we can do to get any published

17 material or any documentary material relating to that press conference but

18 not succeeded so far. Is that -- is that a press conference in which you

19 participated?

20 A. No. No. I did not participate. These are Serb appointees in the

21 MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under the auspices of the minister for

22 information, Mr. Velibor Ostojic, the government of the

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it is those cadres that had the press conference

24 and presented the problems in the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Q. So it was a -- it was a, if you like, a separate press conference

1 of Serbs only that were part of the MUP or the relevant ministries?

2 A. Yes, yes. Serb cadres in the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was

3 their press conference. And the minister of information was there, who

4 was there by way of providing a service.

5 Q. Were you consulted in any way in advance of that press conference

6 as to whether it should be held and what form it should take?

7 A. No way. That press conference, there was no need for that, and no

8 one consulted me about that.

9 Q. If we go to page 9 in your version, Mr. Krajisnik - this is page 8

10 in the English - you'll see a number 2 in the margin, and Mr. Vjestica is

11 speaking.

12 A. Yes, yes. I see it.

13 Q. He says, "I have not written any conclusion --" I'd better read

14 the previous few lines. "The chairman --"

15 JUDGE ORIE: I think Judge Hanoteau has not found it yet.

16 MR. STEWART: So sorry. It's page 8 of the English.

17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but we don't have the

18 same version, apparently. Because for us it's page 12, I believe. "[In

19 English] I have not written any conclusion --"

20 MR. STEWART: That's what it says in --

21 JUDGE HANOTEAU: It's page 12 in our version -- in my version.

22 MR. TIEGER: I only wanted to say that from what I've been able to

23 tell so far, it appears to be a formatting difference rather than --

24 JUDGE ORIE: I see the numbers that appear on the top of the pages

25 in our version are the L000, and then 1495, up to 1509, and that should

1 correspond to SA02 5828, up to and including, I take it, 5840, and that

2 corresponds with P529, tab 443, and P64A, tab 609.

3 MR. TIEGER: That's completely consistent with our information.

4 JUDGE ORIE: So if it's just a matter of language, then it might

5 be the layout rather than anything else.

6 MR. STEWART: It's entirely consistent with our information and

7 understanding as well, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: So we only have to look at page numbers. Please

9 proceed.

10 MR. STEWART:

11 Q. So immediately above where Mr. Vjestica speaks: "The chairman

12 pointed out that the proceedings in the Assembly should be concluded with

13 this item.

14 "However, since a conclusion has been submitted for consideration

15 by the Assembly, I would like to ask Mr. Miroslav Vjestica to read the

16 text of the conclusion."

17 Then Mr. Vjestica says: "Well, I've not written any conclusion.

18 However, it appears from the debate which we've had here that the Assembly

19 should adopt a conclusion instructing the Prime Minister of the Serbian

20 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ministers to prepare, by

21 Friday, an operational plan for assuming power, that is, for establishing

22 power in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular

23 in the field of internal affairs, national defence and payment

24 transactions, so that afterwards we may together decide in the Assembly as

25 of which date we are to establish full power and control of the Serbian

1 territory in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This should

2 be simultaneously effected in all municipalities where we already have a

3 Serbian authorities and in those municipalities where we have only

4 recently established Serbian municipalities."

5 Very technically speaking, Mr. Krajisnik, there wasn't yet a Prime

6 Minister, was there, but Mr. Djeric was about to become the Prime Minister

7 in just a very few days, wasn't he?

8 A. I think the Prime Minister was elected at this session and he

9 nominated two ministers. I think it's in the item of the agenda just

10 before this one.

11 Q. I think you may be right about that, Mr. Krajisnik.

12 A. And he proposed Mr. Stanisic as a minister.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Krajisnik, and we get

14 Mr. Djeric speaking at, it's page 9 of the English, it's point 3 in the

15 margin in your version, which is page 10, and Mr. Djeric says: "The

16 government will have the duty to draw up an operational plan and to submit

17 it for adoption. We shall do our best to speed things up, to gain time

18 wherever possible. There is no reason to think that we are running late

19 in assuming power because a lot has been accomplished to date. Please do

20 not take things in your own hands. You will receive your instructions and

21 you will proceed as instructed."

22 Mr. Krajisnik, was the task, then, of drawing up an operational

23 plan, was it left in the hands of the government under Mr. Djeric, as

24 indicated there?

25 A. Exactly. That's how it was supposed to be done and that's how it

1 was done, and it was the job of that small government that consisted only

2 of three or four ministers.

3 Q. Then we can -- yes, we can leave this.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could we just ask for some additional

5 information in this answer. When was it done and was it sent to the

6 Assembly for adoption or approval in accordance with, I think it was

7 Article 25, of the -- of the law?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This was not proposed on the

9 27th, because that was -- that one was postponed. The next session was on

10 the 27th of March.

11 JUDGE ORIE: No. There seems to be some misunderstanding. You

12 were asked by Mr. Stewart, "... was the task, then, of drawing up an

13 operational plan, was it left in the hands of the government under

14 Mr. Djeric ..." And you said, "Exactly. That's how it was supposed to be

15 done and that's how it was done ..." My question is: Was it then later

16 on submitted to the Assembly for approval, as you earlier explained us

17 would be needed? And where do we exactly find the plan as drawn by the

18 small government?

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I -- perhaps we are at

20 cross-purposes. Your Honour specifically mentioned Article 25 a moment

21 ago.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I think, as a matter of fact, that I referred to 25

23 since earlier Mr. Krajisnik explained that in Article 25 the mechanism was

24 described that plans should develop by the government and then put again

25 to the Assembly for approval or adoption. That's the reason why I

1 considered this, where it said government do so-and-so and then please

2 come back to the Assembly, but perhaps too quickly I considered this to be

3 what Mr. Krajisnik explained to us earlier.

4 MR. STEWART: Well, my observation is only this, Your Honour:

5 That the -- in the record of the proceedings here at page 8, or page 12

6 possibly, of Your Honour's English version, when Mr. Miroslav Vjestica is

7 summarising the conclusion, the operational plan covered a wider range of

8 issues than those to which only the -- to which the law on internal

9 affairs related.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Let's forget about Article 25. Mr. Krajisnik said it

11 was done as it was suggested here, government would draw a plan. And my

12 question was: Where do we see that plan and was it then again submitted

13 to the Assembly?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether I made a slip

15 of the tongue. I said yes, the government was tasked with preparing this

16 programme, and it is normally its job. That's how it was done. I said

17 normally the task was given to the government. It's not something that

18 could have been done by an individual. I was talking about the task given

19 to the government. I didn't say the plan was made and that it was

20 submitted to the Assembly of the Serbian Republic.

21 JUDGE ORIE: So when your answer, I read that you said -- I repeat

22 the question again. The question to you was: "Mr. Krajisnik, was the

23 task, then, of drawing up an operational plan, was it left in the hands of

24 the government under Mr. Djeric, as indicated there?" Your answer was:

25 "Exactly. That's how it was supposed to be done and that's how it was

1 done." So you meant to say by that that it was supposed to be left in the

2 hands of the government and it was left in the hands of the government,

3 but not an answer to my next question, as a matter of fact, whether that

4 plan was ever adopted by the government and whether it was submitted to

5 the Assembly. You said that's a different matter. Was that done finally

6 or was it not?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we have the minutes of

8 the 27th of March. As far as I remember, no such plan was presented. It

9 is easily verifiable. We can look it up even here. I only gave the task

10 to the government to prepare an operative programme, an operational

11 programme. That was just a task. That was how it was supposed to be.

12 And when I said, yes, that's how it was supposed to be done, I suppose --

13 I meant to say that it should have been the procedure, the proper

14 procedure.

15 JUDGE ORIE: You were talking about tasking the government, not

16 about how this task was executed. It's clear now. Please proceed.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right, correct. Maybe I was not too

18 precise before.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

20 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, I was just about to leave this

21 12th session. It may be worth, in light of Your Honour's observation,

22 just noting that the -- that page, it's the last page in the English,

23 whatever number it is, that: "The chairman suggested that the adoption --

24 suggested the adoption of a conclusion that the government should create a

25 plan which should be timed carefully for operational reasons, and that as

1 many proposals as possible should be considered by Friday -" which was the

2 27th of March, I note, and interject - "when the plan will be submitted to

3 the Assembly. The rest can be done at a later stage." And then it was

4 agreed there should be the next Assembly on Friday, the 27th.

5 And Your Honour, we can go straight away, then, to that Assembly

6 at the end of the same week. Your Honour, the ERN there is SA02 5841.

7 And we have it at P64A, binder 14, tab 362; P65, binder 11, tab 115; or

8 P529, binder 3, tab 72. I suppose you pays your money and you takes your

9 choice for exhibits there.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, two out of the three [indiscernible]. Please

11 proceed.

12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the first point is at page -- some

13 hesitation, trepidation about page numbers -- page 12 of your copy,

14 Mr. Krajisnik, page 9 -- sorry, you need the piece of paper first, beg

15 your pardon.

16 Your Honour, is it page 9 of the English? If it is, then I shall

17 know we are probably going to be on the same page numbers.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you start reading, then we can verify.

19 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, yes. It's draft law, in the

20 middle of page 9: "Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

21 "Let's now wrap up the first item on the agenda."

22 JUDGE ORIE: That seems not to be on the page 9, as far as we --

23 MR. STEWART: I'm quite sure, Your Honour, although it's a

24 nuisance to Your Honours, I'm quite sure it's exactly what Mr. Tieger

25 said, it's got reformatted and printed out in a different way. I'm sorry

1 it's a nuisance to Your Honours.

2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you have that at page 12 where you should have the

3 number 1 in the margin.

4 A. Yes.

5 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just trying --

6 MR. TIEGER: I think the reference by Mr. Stewart is at page 10

7 but it does immediately appear that the two translations are at least

8 slightly different. I have the -- what brought me to this particular

9 portion of the translation in front of me is the sentence, "The chairman

10 thanks the speaker and gives the floor to Dr. Radovan Karadzic." It seems

11 that Mr. Stewart has it in a slightly different way.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If Mr. Stewart reads, then we will follow the

13 other version and see whether there are any differences which are --

14 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. Harmon is now bringing my attention to the

15 top of page 13 of the English, which is more similar to what Mr. Stewart

16 read.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If Mr. Stewart starts reading.

18 MR. STEWART: Yes. "Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

19 "Let us now wrap up the first item on the agenda."

20 And then -- well, I can go item number 2: "Draft Law on the

21 Territories of the Serbian Municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 "- There were objections related to this law in preparing for

23 this session, and if those proposing the law feel obliged to tender an

24 explanation, I would ask them to do so. Then we would open a discussion

25 of the law."

1 And then we can go down a few lines to where Mr. Marinko Kontic

2 speaks: "Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, my basic objection is that what has

3 been put forward is a bill rather than a draft law. I think the law was

4 drafted too quickly and is riddled with errors. One of those errors, for

5 example, is that all the regions which should form part of Serbian Bosnia

6 and Herzegovina have not been enumerated. For example, the region of the

7 Kupres municipality has been completely left out. When I spoke with the

8 gentleman who prepared this law, I was told that this was a result of no

9 decision having been taken. As far as I can remember, at earlier

10 Assemblies of the Serbian people, the decision was adopted that those

11 municipalities which belong to regions represent constituent parts of

12 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. And you know that among the first 17

13 municipalities, Kupres became part of Bosnian Krajina. Consequently,

14 according to this logic, it had to be incorporated in this law.

15 "My proposal is that we discuss the law today as a draft since

16 there are probably additional errors ..."

17 And then you, a couple of paragraphs further on, said: "Is the

18 proposal adopted that we shall discuss the draft today, with the proviso

19 that we will have the opportunity to incorporate all objections by the

20 next session and then present the bill and declare ourselves in favour or

21 against it?"

22 And the Assembly unanimously adopted the proposal. And then

23 Mr. Rasula, just shortly afterwards, makes a similar objection in relation

24 to Sanski Most.

25 Mr. Krajisnik, so far as you can recall, these objections, points

1 raised in relation to Kupres and Sanski Most, they turned out to be quite

2 correct, these intervenors, in their pointing out of errors, did they not?

3 A. Well, I can only try to interpret. Sanski Most has more Muslims

4 by one or 2 per cent. That's probably why the proponent of this law left

5 Sanski Most out of this. The situation was similar in Kupres. I think

6 the Serbs have a majority of 1 per cent over the Muslims. We adopted it

7 as a draft, and anyone who had any objection was supposed to submit them

8 to the proponent so that these objections could be incorporated as

9 amendments, and can be incorporated in the next version, to be put before

10 the next Assembly session that was going to vote on it.

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we can see from the record of these Assembly

12 meetings held with some frequency in March, the number of items and the

13 number of issues that came up for discussion, and the number of documents.

14 How well were your resources coping at that time with the generation of

15 all this new material?

16 A. On principle -- or rather, not on principle, but as a rule, every

17 proponent was to give a rationale for their bill, to give background

18 material to all the MPs to study, and then the MPs were supposed to voice

19 their proposals. I, as an MP, also had this in my hand but I didn't have

20 time to study it in order to express an opinion. I took the opinion of

21 other MPs and the proponent as meritorious, so I refrained from debating

22 this draft law because organisationally I just couldn't make it. I didn't

23 have time. We didn't have commissions to discuss various bills. They

24 were later established as bodies of the Assembly for that purpose.

25 Q. Could you turn on, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 31.

1 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, it's, at risk, page 20 but maybe

2 I'm the only one with page 20 in my version. But it's a long -- in this

3 English version. It's a -- it's a contribution by Dr. Karadzic.

4 MR. TIEGER: Beginning at the bottom of page 22 of the English

5 version we have in front of us, Your Honour.

6 MR. STEWART: Thank you.

7 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik, you've got a number 3 in the margin and a

8 paragraph beginning, "We know --" I'm sorry: "We have some indications

9 --" I'm sorry, I'm going to go up a few paragraphs: "We have some

10 indications that Mr. Izetbegovic has gone to Libya." Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, yes, I found it.

12 Q. "We have some indications that Mr. Izetbegovic has gone to Libya

13 for consultations with ... which finances various projects and which will

14 perhaps attempt to ensure for him justification in Europe to walk out of

15 the conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 "We also know that they are looking for a cabinet for him over

17 there and so forth. This means that we can count on their preparing for

18 war in those -- in their words, they are attempting something."

19 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, you were -- you were expecting to be holding,

20 weren't you, a further meeting of the conference, the European Community

21 conference, the Cutileiro talks, within a very few days after this

22 Assembly session, weren't you?

23 A. Yes. We did go to that session in Brussels.

24 Q. And at this point, the session in Brussels was on the 30th and

25 31st of March, wasn't it?

1 A. Yes. I think that was the date.

2 Q. At the point here, the 27th of March, so that's just a few --

3 that's a Friday, the 27th, I think, you, looking ahead to those resumed

4 talks, what was -- I'm asking about you, Mr. Krajisnik, personally -- what

5 was your expectation of what was going to happen at those resumed

6 Cutileiro talks a few days later?

7 A. I believed that by virtue of its authority, the European Community

8 will succeed in forcing Mr. Izetbegovic and the Muslim side to abandon

9 their decision that they had previously declared, namely that they were

10 reneging on the agreement that we had reached in Sarajevo, and I expected

11 that, instead, we would continue the negotiations and find a solution.

12 Because prior to that, they had issued a statement saying that they were

13 reneging on the agreement.

14 Q. And then Dr. Karadzic carries on: "They can attempt to intimidate

15 the Serbs here and there in Gorazde, they can kill someone in Brod, but

16 they can never incorporate Serbian areas into their state or conquer them

17 because they do not possess the forces required for the extensive

18 territory held by the Serbs.

19 "We know that our people have armed themselves. We don't know the

20 various ways and means by which this was done, but we do know that the

21 people have enough weapons."

22 Mr. Krajisnik, by this time, the 27th of March, did you have

23 available to the Bosnian Serb leadership, any sort of intelligence

24 service?

25 A. No. There were the existing services, the services that existed

1 before, from the military, the MUP. I don't know all the services from

2 which information and reports came, but I must say I rarely received

3 information from them. I mostly received reports from my own associates.

4 We didn't have a particular service, intelligence service, of our own.

5 Q. What -- what sources of information, then, were available to

6 Dr. Karadzic as to the arming of "our people," by which we can probably

7 safely assume he means Bosnian Serbs?

8 A. Well, I suppose that he received such reports in contacts with the

9 representatives of the SDS. I don't believe he had other sources. He

10 received reports from the Serbian people. If he received any information,

11 he couldn't have received it from anyone else. And that the people had

12 weapons became obvious once the war broke out. All the three sides had

13 weapons.

14 Q. Did you, Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, know that Bosnian Serbs had

15 armed themselves?

16 A. I don't know how to answer this. I didn't know in which way and

17 how they were arming themselves. I just gave you an example as to how a

18 resident of my village got a weapon. The army gave them 200 rifles and

19 gave somebody else 800 rifles. I believe that most of them got weapons

20 when they received call-up for mobilisation. As for things I heard

21 second-hand, stories circulated that people were receiving weapons, and I

22 heard some stories like that, like rumours, but nothing specific. I heard

23 more about what the other sides were doing, that they were arming

24 themselves. I heard more about them than I heard about the Serbs. I

25 don't know whether it -- why.

1 Q. Dr. Karadzic continues then --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could we receive clarification of the previous answer

3 you have given, Mr. Krajisnik. You said, "I just gave you an example as

4 to how a resident of my village got a weapon. The army gave them 200

5 rifles and gave somebody else 800 rifles." What army are you talking

6 about?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A witness was here, Krsman Sinisa,

8 and he said that Zabrdje got, from the Yugoslav People's Army, from the

9 Rajlovac garrison, 200 rifles, whereas another place got 800. I am

10 talking about what was heard here, and I knew that that is what was done.

11 I knew that Colonel Miletic did that. He testified here.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Is it somebody else that causes concerns?

13 MR. STEWART:

14 Q. Another place got 800. That -- well, we can check previous

15 witness's evidence, Mr. Krajisnik, but what was that other place?

16 A. Zabrdje, my village, and Sokolje, the Muslim village. That was

17 the testimony of Mr. Sinisa Krsman, and that is what I knew too. Not in

18 terms of these numbers but that is what happened, that they got weapons

19 from the Rajlovac garrison.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau has a question.

21 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, when talking about

22 Mr. Karadzic, you said, "[In English]... received such reports in contacts

23 with the representatives of the SDS. I don't believe he had other

24 sources. He received reports from the Serbian people." [Interpretation]

25 My question is as follows: You yourself never received these reports?

1 Can you tell me that you were more cut off from the Serbian people or the

2 representatives of the SDS than Mr. Karadzic? Is that what you are trying

3 to tell us? Why was Mr. Karadzic better-informed than yourself,

4 considering the position you held? At least, the way I see things, the

5 way I understand things, you were not a simple member of an

6 administration, you were not just any elected representative. You were a

7 prominent personality. You were close to the people probably. So why,

8 under these circumstances, was Mr. Karadzic well-informed about what --

9 about the people arming themselves, and why were you not informed of this?

10 Can you please clarify that point for me. Thanks.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know whether a

12 word was missing but I'm saying that I assume that Mr. Karadzic received

13 reports from representatives of the SDS, because that is logical, as far

14 as I'm concerned. He was president of the SDS. If there was a party, and

15 the SDS was a Serbian movement, he could have received reports from those

16 who had armed themselves.

17 I'm not trying to pardon myself now, that he knew about it and

18 that I didn't. I'm just making a comment regarding his statement. I'm

19 just saying how it was that he could have received this information. As

20 for me, when the lawyer asked me, I heard some information from some

21 people, but undefined. It's not that I'm saying now that I was not

22 important and that Karadzic was important. Arming people was a secret.

23 Perhaps people spoke about it only tete-a-tete. I spent more time in

24 government agencies, whereas I assume - again I'm saying I assume - that

25 he spent more time with representatives of municipalities, of local

1 boards, and so on and so forth. So this is the grassroots, this is much

2 bigger.

3 I wanted to support this with an example from my own village. Had

4 I known anything about this arming, I would have armed those people first

5 of all. It was only when the war started that they got weapons from the

6 Rajlovac garrison, because it was realistic that those who wanted to have

7 weapons had to be members of the Yugoslav People's Army. What is referred

8 to here are the people, I assume, although Mr. Karadzic says we don't have

9 any paramilitary formations. But if somebody has some weapons at home,

10 then - how should I put this? - it will be consolidated fast if there is a

11 crisis.

12 Well, that's what I managed to say by way of an answer. And then

13 I added: Later I saw that people had lots of weapons, on all three sides.

14 That is to say all of 1991 was involved in arming. How? That should

15 probably be investigated. But that's my answer.

16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. STEWART:

19 Q. And when Mr. Karadzic said, "I must say, however, that we do not

20 have paramilitary units," as at the 27th of March 1992, was that true?

21 A. Well, I have no idea. Perhaps there were guards or whatever. I

22 didn't pay any attention to this. But I assume that a maximal number of

23 Serbs were in the Yugoslav People's Army. Paramilitary units were

24 superfluous if you were in the Yugoslav People's Army. So my answer is,

25 if I'm going to be honest, that I would believe this, because it's

1 logical. However, when the war broke out, I saw some people who were

2 armed but it wasn't that these were paramilitary units that had been

3 formed - that's for sure - but these village guards or whatever. So I

4 would support Mr. Karadzic in this, because that was his policy and his

5 knowledge, and he kept saying, "Report and be on -- under the command of

6 the Yugoslav People's Army. We don't want to establish a parallel army of

7 our own." The policy was not to have any paramilitary units. Because

8 paramilitary units only create problems. And you, on the other hand, have

9 cooperation with and the support of the Yugoslav People's Army.

10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, is this the point where we take the

11 break?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I had forgotten about the clock. We will

13 adjourn -- have a break until 6.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 5.41 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Referring to a matter that was raised during closed

17 session, I can inform the parties that Mr. Registrar has CD-ROMs available

18 for the parties.

19 Mr. Tieger, unless you would ask us to go into closed session, I

20 take it that you have no responses yet to the questions earlier, or Mr.

21 Harmon, so we'll wait. Could you please make clear to me whenever you

22 have answers, that we turn into closed session.

23 Yes.

24 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, could I please have one

1 of those CD-ROMs? If it's not a problem.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I'll discuss that with my colleagues. It is a bit of

3 a different procedure, as a matter of fact. It's the -- I'll discuss it,

4 whether or not.

5 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we'll think about it as well too.

7 JUDGE ORIE: If there any need to -- if you would like to make any

8 submissions in relation to that, we should do it in closed session. So

9 whoever asks for closed session, we will hear the reasons at that time.

10 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we are looking at page 31 of the document in front

12 of you, in your version. Dr. Karadzic is speaking and there is a

13 paragraph that begins, "When you return to your municipalities ..." Do

14 you see that?

15 A. Yes, I see that.

16 Q. "When you return to your municipalities, especially the

17 newly-formed municipalities, I ask you to do what you are required and

18 entitled to do under the law. The moment you arrive in your

19 municipalities, you must urgently establish crisis staffs. You must try

20 to organise the people so that they can defend themselves."

21 Mr. Krajisnik, at this point, 27th of March, what was your -- and

22 I mean you personally -- what was your belief as to the extent to which

23 Crisis Staffs had been established already by Serbs in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina?

25 A. I didn't have any knowledge, but I certainly did not preclude the

1 possibility of certain areas having established Crisis Staffs. As I've

2 already explained, it is so easy to establish a Crisis Staff if there is a

3 crisis in an area. Mr. Karadzic is talking here about a Crisis Staff in

4 relation to what was previously said, namely in respect of the crisis and

5 negotiations at the level of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is something

6 completely different.

7 Q. And so he continues: "Find a number of reserve officers for those

8 staffs and have them register everyone who owns weapons as well as units.

9 They should organise territorial defence, and if the JNA is there, they

10 must be placed under its command. If they are not, let them be placed

11 under the command of reserve officers. They may not go anywhere but must

12 remain in place to defend their territories. Half the numbers may be

13 allocated exclusively for the defence of threatened regions."

14 Mr. Krajisnik, before this Assembly session, had you been involved

15 in any discussion with Mr. Karadzic about what he then said here to the

16 Assembly?

17 A. I did not participate. This is an improvisation presented by

18 Mr. Karadzic, and it has a certain political weight; that is to say, to

19 calm down the people who had taken part in the discussion previously. And

20 to give them some instructions too.

21 Q. And then the next paragraph, I won't pause on that, in Gorazde and

22 so on. But then after that, a paragraph starting, "A war in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina will not solve anything." You see that?

24 A. Yes, yes. I see that.

25 Q. "If it breaks out, you will get the plans. But I urge you to

1 immediately organise the people within Territorial Defence units headed by

2 reserve officers, form squads, platoons and crisis staffs and engage

3 retired officers. This must be done throughout our areas."

4 When Dr. Karadzic referred to the plans, were you -- did you have

5 any knowledge of any, first of all, written plans already existing or in

6 draft, such as Mr. Karadzic was referring to there?

7 A. No. I mean, there weren't any plans and he didn't discuss any

8 concrete plans. Mr. Djeric said something similar when he said don't do

9 anything on your own, you will get instructions. That's a message. So

10 that they should not think that a war would break out the following day.

11 He's saying if a war breaks out, you will receive instructions, but there

12 is time.

13 Q. And then -- no, I can leave this document now.

14 Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. I've finished questions on this

15 document.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we can put that on one side.

17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it appears that there was a further session of the

18 Assembly, the Serb Assembly, in early April. That would have been after

19 the meeting in Brussels with Mr. Cutileiro, in pursuance of the European

20 Community negotiations. How were things left at the end of the meeting in

21 Brussels? I'll rephrase that. When you left Brussels at the end of that

22 meeting at the end of March, how did you view the prospects for some

23 resolution resulting from the Cutileiro talks?

24 A. I was still confident that we would find a solution, because in

25 Brussels, Mr. Cutileiro had not concluded the conference. He said, "We

1 will continue talks further." So irrespective of the Muslim side that had

2 revoked its agreement on the Lisbon-Sarajevo agreement, there was optimism

3 that a solution would be found before Bosnia and Herzegovina is proclaimed

4 an independent state, because that was imperative. So I was an optimist,

5 and that's the way everything looked, as far as I'm concerned.

6 Q. Now, a few days after those further talks at the end of March,

7 there was apparently a further session of the Serb Assembly. At that

8 Assembly meeting, was it the prevailing view among the deputies that you

9 were effectively at war?

10 A. As for this session that you're referring to, and the only one

11 that I know of, is when the Serb Republic was proclaimed in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was in Banja Luka. That was just a few hours

13 before it was publicly stated that the European Community had recognised

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I did not attend that session. That session was held

15 in Banja Luka. There was just one item on the agenda, a political

16 manifestation in response to what happened two or three hours later,

17 perhaps a bit more than that. It was not a special session. We don't

18 even have the minutes of that session. We don't even have stenographic

19 notes. Just a declaration. I beg your pardon. These deputies in the

20 western part of Republika Srpska, around Banja Luka, I think that they

21 voted for two ministers, one for finance and the other one for defence. I

22 don't know why. But there are no minutes and there are no stenographic

23 notes from that session, and as far as I can remember, no notes were kept

24 anyway. I don't think the second session was held at all. I mean any

25 other session, rather. I can't remember but I don't think that one was

1 held anyway. I mean apart from this one.

2 Q. Why did you not attend the Assembly session you've just described

3 in Banja Luka?

4 A. You put a question a while ago and I did not give you a direct

5 answer, so let me say that by then the crisis had already culminated. Or

6 to put it better, I saw everywhere that mobilisation had started, that

7 this proclamation was being prepared, and there was a war psychosis in the

8 making. Deputies could not travel to Sarajevo or from Sarajevo to Banja

9 Luka. Quite simply, the situation was such that it was unsafe to travel

10 around Bosnia-Herzegovina. We discussed it over the telephone and gave

11 our agreement by telephone whereas they, in Banja Luka, had a quorum.

12 Q. So who did you arrange it with in Banja Luka -- who was at the

13 Banja Luka end arranging this Assembly meeting with you?

14 A. It was the vice-president, Milovan Milanovic. I agreed, and in

15 accordance with the rules of procedure, I gave my consent that he could

16 have a session held there, because that is one of the rights of the

17 president, that he can transfer his powers to the vice-president.

18 Q. Was there any particular need to have an Assembly session at that

19 point?

20 A. Well, there was a need, because we felt betrayed. We were given a

21 profound promise that these agreements would be brought to an end, that

22 all of us together would have a referendum, that there would be a

23 transformation of Bosnia, and that then we would change the constitution,

24 and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be recognised. The recognition of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina came without an agreement, without transformation, and

1 it was completely opposite to what we had agreed upon at the very

2 beginning, as stated in various documents and in Mr. Cutileiro's

3 statement, when, on the 18th of March, we clearly reached an agreement and

4 he made a statement that was recorded in the media. And that was the

5 position of the European Community at the time.

6 Q. Between returning from Brussels and the time of the meeting, the

7 Assembly session in Banja Luka that you weren't at, did you have any

8 contact with the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. And first of all, with whom did you have such contact?

11 A. With Professor Muhamed Filipovic and the late Alija Izetbegovic.

12 Q. Together or -- those two together or separately?

13 A. Separately. I had talks separately.

14 [Defence counsel confer]

15 MR. STEWART:

16 Q. And were -- was your contact with -- excuse me one second. Was

17 your contact with each of those Muslim leaders a contact just you

18 individually or did you contact them together with others of your

19 colleagues?

20 A. I had contact with Mr. Filipovic on my own. And I telephoned

21 Mr. Izetbegovic and contacted him directly. I don't know whether there

22 was anyone in my office but I did it myself, and there weren't any more of

23 us.

24 Q. Which -- which did you -- or who did you contact first;

25 Mr. Filipovic or Mr. Izetbegovic?

1 A. First I contacted Mr. Filipovic. I can explain both of these

2 contacts to you, if you're interested. But Mr. Filipovic came to see me

3 regarding this request to have an Assembly meeting held, and I have a book

4 here where he notes everything down, what happened on that day, which is

5 quite reliable.

6 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, could you describe what you

7 remember happened by way of your contact with Mr. Filipovic on that

8 occasion.

9 A. Mr. Filipovic is a renowned Muslim intellectual, an academician.

10 He was president of the club of the Muslim Bosniak Organisation. They had

11 two MPs. I had consideration for him because he was an elderly man and he

12 had quite a reputation too. He could come and see me any day and any time

13 to discuss any problem. One day he came to see me - this was after all

14 the barricades and the crisis and everything - and we talked and he said

15 that he was aware of the fact that there were problems in

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me just say one more thing: He was an advocate

17 of that historic agreement between the Muslims and the Croats -- sorry,

18 the Muslims and the Serbs, together with Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic. Then he

19 said it would be a good thing if an Assembly meeting were to be held so

20 that we could discuss this problem. That was one of the subjects. And,

21 of course, that the severed ties between the Serb and the Muslim side be

22 re-established because obviously the most difficult problem was the one

23 between these two ethnic communities.

24 This was a rather lengthy conversation and then I suggested to him

25 that he and I take action on this, that he ask Izetbegovic, that I ask

1 Karadzic, and that we bring them together in order to see whether anything

2 could be done in order to avert the obvious pending misfortune.

3 Mr. Filipovic left, as far as I know, and a day or two or three later, I

4 don't know, he informed me, saying, "I'm sorry I could not establish

5 contact with Mr. Izetbegovic." So that was my contact. Because I wanted

6 us to make a last-ditch attempt to avert a war, if at all possible.

7 Q. And then your -- and then your contact with Mr. Izetbegovic, how

8 exactly did that come about?

9 A. When the Presidency, without the Serb representatives, passed the

10 decision to proclaim a mobilisation, and I must say that Mrs. Plavsic and

11 late Mr. Koljevic were sent to run an errand so that they could not

12 attend, and in their absence, they proclaimed a mobilisation. Then I

13 called up Mr. Izetbegovic, and when he answered, I informed him of the way

14 that they had adopted this decision, because it was an unconstitutional

15 decision for the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make, and it was not

16 appropriate to mobilise that population, the Muslims and Croats, because

17 the institution that should have conducted the mobilisation was the JNA,

18 which had Serbs in it. So this mobilisation that they proclaimed could

19 only have been aimed against the Serbian people, and I asked him to do his

20 best to cancel that decision because it was a dangerous one. I have to

21 tell you the truth now. He told me, It's late, I can't do anything. And

22 I felt when he said that that he wasn't quite happy about it. He wasn't

23 glad that it happened, but the process had already started, and it wasn't

24 going to bring anything good. So that conversation was a failure.

25 Q. And did the conversation end with there being no arrangement or

1 agreement for you and Mr. Izetbegovic to meet or discuss further?

2 A. As far as I can remember, it was a day or maybe two before the

3 war, before the armed conflict. Maybe it was even on the eve of the war.

4 It was to be expected that I would turn up for work the next day, that we

5 could try again to talk and agree on something, to see if we could do

6 something. I couldn't dream that the next day would be a day when I

7 wouldn't go to work, the day when there would be a, quote unquote, "peace

8 gathering" that degenerated into chaos and set on fire the entire Bosnia

9 and Herzegovina.

10 Q. So which was the first day that you didn't go to work?

11 A. I think it's the 5th or maybe the 6th of April. I can't tell you

12 exactly. It is a well-known date. I'm just afraid to get it wrong now.

13 1992.

14 Q. Of course, Mr. Krajisnik. Now, up until that day when you didn't

15 go in to work, you were working in the same office in the Assembly

16 building, were you?

17 A. Yes. I worked in that office.

18 Q. And was Dr. Karadzic continuing to work in Sarajevo for at least

19 for those first few days in April?

20 A. Yes. He worked also until the same day. Maybe he continued even

21 for a day longer than I. He had a meeting at the Holiday Inn while that

22 peace gathering, as they called it, took place.

23 Q. So Dr. Karadzic's office was still in the Holiday Inn, was it?

24 A. I have to explain that. The headquarters of the Serbian

25 Democratic Party was about a kilometre or a kilometre and a half away from

1 the Assembly and the Holiday Inn Hotel. It was in Djuro Djakovic Street,

2 the former seat of the Club of Deputies of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's

3 where the office of Mr. Karadzic was. There was a bauxite company that

4 had offices in Holiday Inn that offered Mr. Karadzic the use of a room or

5 some office space. So it wasn't his real office. It was just something

6 that he used temporarily. I don't know whether it was one or two rooms,

7 although I visited.

8 Q. Did Mr. Djeric, who, of course, had very recently become the Prime

9 Minister of the Serb Republic, did Mr. Djeric have an office in Sarajevo?

10 A. Mr. Djeric was a minister without portfolio in the government of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he had an office in the building of the

12 government, which was just across the street from the Assembly and the

13 Holiday Inn. That was the only office he had. He did not have any other

14 offices at the Prime Minister of the Serbian Republic. He continued on

15 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Q. And Mr. Ostojic, did he have an office in the same building as

17 Mr. Djeric?

18 A. Yes, yes, the same building.

19 Q. And Mr. Maksimovic?

20 A. Mr. Maksimovic, as president of the club, who was otherwise

21 working in the philosophy school of the university, had an office in the

22 Club of Deputies to the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just like all

23 the other MPs.

24 Q. When you made the contacts that you've described with

25 Mr. Filipovic and with Mr. Izetbegovic, did you seek the approval of

1 Dr. Karadzic before initiating those contacts?

2 A. No, I didn't. I thought the two of us should get in touch with

3 party leaders. I believe that I did get in touch with Mr. Karadzic,

4 although I cannot be certain now, but I assumed he would have nothing

5 against meeting Mr. Izetbegovic because it was in the interest of our side

6 to keep the contacts going in order to reach some sort of solution, and we

7 didn't want the contacts and the negotiations to stop.

8 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, we know that in April, 1992, the Bosnian Serb

9 leadership moved to Pale. Who went first to Pale among the Bosnian Serb

10 leaders?

11 A. I don't know who went first. All I know is that Karadzic and

12 Koljevic went there from the Holiday Inn. I can't tell you all the people

13 who went there, who moved there, because I spent that time in Zabrdje, at

14 home. But even Mrs. Plavsic was not in the first group. She came later.

15 And then gradually, more and more people called and went to Pale. I

16 cannot tell you who went first. I just gave you the general picture as I

17 know it.

18 Q. Well, you said it wasn't Mrs. Plavsic, she wasn't in the first

19 group, but you were not either in the first group, correct?

20 A. No, no, I wasn't either.

21 Q. Did you -- did you eventually go to Pale without returning to work

22 in your office in Sarajevo?

23 A. I once went to Pale and then went to Zabrdje and then went to Pale

24 again. I had a reason for that. And as far as I remember, between my

25 first trip to Pale and my second one, I had that meeting at my office that

1 you are talking about.

2 Q. Well, I hadn't just then talked about a meeting at your office,

3 Mr. Krajisnik, but -- so identify which meeting -- oh, you're talking

4 about the meeting with Mr. Filipovic, or some other meeting?

5 A. No, no. You asked me whether, before my departure for Pale, I was

6 at my office. I told you that the 4th or the 5th or the 6th - I don't

7 know any more - was my last day at my office, and then I went to Zabrdje.

8 My meeting with Mr. Filipovic was before. And after that, the war

9 started, so I didn't go to work any more. So all my activities, my

10 meetings with Filipovic and Izetbegovic, my work at the office, all of

11 that took place before the 4th.

12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it was your answer, you said, as far as you

13 remember, between your first trip to Pale and your second one, you had

14 that meeting at your office that I, your counsel, was talking about. I

15 actually don't see or recall from the record that I was talking about any

16 such meeting. So perhaps you can identify the meeting that you were

17 referring to there.

18 A. I thought we had finished with Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Filipovic,

19 and that we had finished with my work at the office. The war started

20 then. And then we discussed the matter of my going to Pale and when I

21 went. I told you I went to Pale once, returned home, and then went to

22 Pale again. And between those two trips, I was at my office, attending a

23 meeting. That was already after the war started. I thought you meant to

24 ask me whether I went back to my office again after that date. So this

25 day that I'm now referring to could be the 15th of April or maybe later.

1 Q. Who was the meeting with?

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm not quite sure. Is the meeting of

3 any -- because it came up without you having asked about it, was it any

4 specific meeting or was it just the last meeting you have in your office?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I should have explained before. On

6 the 15th of April, I was at Pale. That was after the war started. The

7 14th or the 15th. So I had went -- I had gone there and went back home.

8 And then I went back to Pale again. And between the 15th and the second,

9 there was this meeting at my office.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Was this any specific meeting or was it just one of

11 many meetings and just being the last one? We are spending a lot of time

12 on that meeting without even knowing whether it was just a meeting, or

13 something special.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I meant the meeting that

15 Mr. Kecmanovic explained about when I met with Mr. Izetbegovic during the

16 war at my office. That's the only meeting we had after the war started.

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think we are on track. What seems to

18 have happened, Mr. Krajisnik, you -- Mr. Krajisnik correctly guessed that

19 I was going to ask him about a meeting but didn't notice that I hadn't yet

20 asked him. I think that's really what happened, Your Honour.

21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, yes, the meeting with Mr. -- with Mr. Izetbegovic,

22 how did it -- I'm asking for your recollection and your evidence on this,

23 Mr. Krajisnik. How did it come about?

24 A. Maybe it would be a good idea to put the map of Sarajevo on the

25 screen so that you can see where Pale is, where Zabrdje is, where is the

1 centre of the town. It would be useful because then it would be much

2 easier to explain things, by your leave.

3 I have a map here. I can give you one. Just for illustration.

4 Q. I'm not spurning your offer, Mr. Krajisnik. I'm just seeing

5 whether we can find one that's conveniently already in evidence. The one

6 which is in Exhibit 527, I think it is, isn't it, it's P527, at page 25, I

7 wonder if that would be good enough for your purposes, Mr. Krajisnik.

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. We could use that one, then. Can that come up on the ELMO? Okay.

10 So there we are, Mr. Krajisnik. We've got the Sarajevo map.

11 A. This is the strict centre of Sarajevo. That's downtown. The

12 yellow area. This is Pale, and this is Zabrdje, here. And now, from

13 Zabrdje I went to Ilidza. That's here. This line. There is a road

14 there. Whereas Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic came from Pale. All of this

15 is Serbian territory, was Serbian territory at the time. They came here,

16 where the airfield was. And here, in Novo Sarajevo, in Lukavica, because

17 there is Lukavica I'm showing now, roughly, from here, they crossed to the

18 other side - this is Hrasnica, the Muslim area - and we had a meeting at

19 Ilidza on the occasion of the arrival of Mr. Cutileiro. So they came

20 across this territory and I came from the other side, from here.

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted). I have never seen

23 the man. I had never seen the man before. The only reason I went there

24 was to see Mr. Cutileiro and Mr. Darwin, and I was with them during that

25 meeting. There were two delegations attending from Sarajevo. They came

1 by this road here. One delegation comprised Mr. Kecmanovic, and he told

2 you who had been with him then. The other delegation consisted of

3 Mr. Rasim Kadic, then president of the Liberal Party, or maybe the Youth

4 Party, I don't remember what it was called, and Martin Raguz. We

5 discussed how to stop the war that had already started. The idea of both

6 delegations was to get the approval of Mr. Izetbegovic to meet here in the

7 centre, downtown, near the Assembly building. I can't pinpoint it

8 exactly, but roughly here. So I should have taken this road through

9 Muslim territory to meet Mr. Izetbegovic at my office in the Assembly

10 building.

11 From that meeting, together with Mr. Tadic, who is a Muslim, and

12 Mr. Raguz, who is a Croat, I went to my home, and I returned again with

13 them. Mr. Kadic then went and organised a meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic in

14 order for that meeting to take place between Izetbegovic, Kecmanovic, and

15 myself. On that occasion, I took Mr. Kadic to my home, and his intention

16 was to go to Breza, which is a municipality behind Ilijas. I asked some

17 people who were there to do me a favour and provide him with escort. And

18 they did. But he told me, he had received confirmation from Mr.

19 Izetbegovic, that Mr. Izetbegovic was willing to meet me that evening at

20 the Assembly building. And that evening, I got into the police car

21 belonging to the police station of Ilidza with two escorts, went to the

22 Assembly and met with Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Kecmanovic, and we met

23 exactly as Witness Kecmanovic described during his evidence.

24 There was a question that arose that I'm answering now as to how

25 this meeting occurred in the first place. And then when I returned from

1 the Assembly, I went to Pale.

2 Q. And what time of day or night was it, then, when you met

3 Mr. Izetbegovic with Mr. Kecmanovic?

4 A. I heard a variety of versions. It was near dusk, so it could have

5 been 5, 6 p.m., I'm not sure. But still, we talked long enough to be

6 caught by the curfew and we were told that we had to leave as soon as

7 possible because a curfew applied at that time. So we had that meeting at

8 my office by night. It was dark. I don't know whether there were any

9 lights available but they were not on.

10 Q. How long did the meeting last altogether?

11 A. Less than an hour.

12 Q. And were you, Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Kecmanovic present

13 throughout?

14 A. The three of us were in one and the same room all the time,

15 talking.

16 Q. And was there anybody else present at any point?

17 A. No. Our escorts were left behind in the room occupied by the

18 secretary. There was nobody else in that room with us.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm obviously moving to the content of

20 the meeting, but I see the clock as well.

21 JUDGE ORIE: It might not be wise to start that at one minute to

22 seven. We will adjourn for the day and will resume tomorrow, quarter past

23 two, same courtroom.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 11th day of May,

1 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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