Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25543

1 Monday, 12 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.12 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.

6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10 The Chamber received this morning another bundle of material which

11 has been given to the parties. I do understand that there's a cover page

12 which briefly sets out what is contained in this material. The parties

13 can consider whether it's of any use to bring it to the attention of the

14 Chamber. The Chamber will not look at it, apart from having a look at the

15 summary provided in this cover page once it has been translated.

16 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I was informed that you would like to add

17 something to one of the things you said, so part of your testimony last

18 Friday. I'll give you an opportunity to do so, but not until after I have

19 reminded you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've

20 given at the very beginning of your testimony. So therefore, if you'd

21 like to add something, please proceed.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I only wish to

23 correct something, introduce a small correction into my statement.

24 I said that together with Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic, the late

25 Mr. Koljevic, I went to Herzegovina after the session of the 12th of May.

Page 25544

1 I have checked this, and I did go before the session to Nevesinje, that

2 is. That's one correction.

3 And the second correction, I mentioned Vance's book, but that was

4 an error. The book, The Balkan Odyssey was written by David Owen. Thank

5 you very much.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik, for these corrections.

7 Then Mr. Tieger or Mr. Harmon, are you ready to continue the

8 cross-examination of Mr. Harmon.

9 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. Good morning.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 Cross-examination by Mr. Harmon: [Continued]

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, good morning.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik on Friday you were testifying about the strategic

17 objectives, and in your evidence found at lines -- page -- 17:22:32, you

18 said that not a single deputy, not even Mr. Beli understood Mr. Karadzic

19 to be saying that the strategic objectives were strategic priorities to be

20 achieved by military means, you said: "Not even Mr. Beli nor any other

21 deputy."

22 Later on in your examination Mr. Tieger, at 17:03:30, suggested to

23 you that you and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership knew full

24 well and intended that the effort to achieve those goals would be pursued

25 through negotiations and through military efforts. And your answer at

Page 25545

1 17:03:54 was: "It was not so."

2 Mr. Krajisnik, at the 16th Session, General Mladic was present

3 when those goals were enunciated. In addition, there were other military

4 figures who were present at the 16th Session. Can you identify those

5 other military figures besides General Mladic who were present when the

6 strategic objectives were announced by Dr. Karadzic.

7 A. I can't recall, but apart from Mr. Mladic there were other

8 military representatives there as well.

9 Q. All right. Then if you can't recall we'll -- we won't pursue that

10 further. What I'd like to do, have you examine --

11 MR. HARMON: If Mr. Krajisnik can be given the bundle starting

12 with Exhibit 214.

13 We'll distribute those now, Your Honour.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just for your information I'm going to be directing

15 you to tab 218.

16 Mr. Krajisnik, at tab 218 is a document that has been previously

17 exhibited. It is P64, P529, Hanson tab 255. It is the analysis of the

18 combat readiness and activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in

19 1992. It is from the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska. It

20 is a strictly confidential military secret. And this document,

21 Mr. Krajisnik, was, as you recall, the result of a meeting that took

22 place. If you turn to -- in the B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik --

23 MR. HARMON: If Your Honours turn to pages 4 and -- I'm sorry, the

24 second and third pages in the text following the cover -- following the

25 cover sheet.

Page 25546

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let me see where I can locate that for you.

2 [Prosecution counsel confer]

3 MR. JOSSE: If my learned friend has a spare bundle and can have

4 it given to Mr. Sladojevic and he'll assist as best he can.

5 JUDGE ORIE: The 1st Drina Corps appears on page 135 in the B/C/S

6 version, and that's what I find on page -- on the -- as you said, Mr. --

7 oh, no, that's the second page.

8 MR. HARMON: I have it, Your Honour, now in a different bundle.



11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it is found with the ERN pages the last four digits

12 are 7343, if you look at upper right-hand corner, and it follows the cover

13 sheet. It's pages 5, 6, and 7. Mr. Krajisnik, it looks like this. You

14 must have the same copy that I have, so let me pass this to you.

15 A. No, it's not here.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, the last four digits in B/C/S ERN number

17 always start with 74 in my copy not 73.

18 MR. HARMON: Mr. Krajisnik's copy does not have apparently the

19 pages that I'm referring to, my copy does not have those pages. So

20 Mr. Krajisnik has been given a copy with the relevant pages. Now, does

21 Your Honour -- do Your Honours have copies of the --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you referred to the pages as the third and the

23 fourth after the cover page, so we have that, but whether these are the

24 same as you have in mind is a different matter.

25 MR. HARMON: Well, it's the plan, Your Honour, and it starts on

Page 25547

1 the upper right-hand corner. The ERN number is 01103022. It should be

2 the first page after the cover sheet of the --

3 JUDGE ORIE: I have pages -- I have a numbering through at the

4 bottom starting with 154, 155, is that --

5 MR. HARMON: Apparently there's been a mistake, Your Honour. Your

6 Honours don't have it. I can move on. It's not that important. It's in

7 the exhibit itself, Your Honour, and what the exhibit shows and what

8 Mr. Krajisnik has in front of him is essentially the plan that was the

9 agenda for the meeting that gave rise to ultimately this report. It's in

10 the exhibit itself. I don't intend to question at length about this.

11 I'll move on from this.

12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's move on to the contents of this particular

13 report. What I'd like to do is to refer you, Mr. Krajisnik, to page --

14 MR. HARMON: The Court, first of all, to page 158 of the report.

15 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik, for -- in the B/C/S it is -- the ERN number has

16 the last four digits of 7476.

17 A. Yes, yes, I have found it.

18 Q. All right. And this -- first of all, it's the part of the report

19 that deals with the basic characteristics of the operational and tactical

20 utilisation of the Army of the Republika Srpska.

21 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, if Your Honours turn to page 159, the

22 first full paragraph.

23 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, this should be found for your benefit on the

24 next page. It is page that has the ERN numbers, last four digits 7477.

25 And I'm referring, Mr. Krajisnik, to the top paragraph.

Page 25548

1 In this then, Mr. Krajisnik, this report on the army on the basic

2 characteristics of the operational and tactical utilisation of the Army of

3 the Republika Srpska, I'm going read to you from the passage I've directed

4 your attention to: "The strategic objectives of our war which were

5 promptly defined and set before the Main Staff of the Army of RS, the

6 commands and units, served as general guidelines upon which we planned the

7 actual operations and concerted battles. This means that objectives were

8 set before us rather than specific tasks spelled out, although the

9 president of the republic, that is the supreme commander of the armed

10 forces of RS, did orally assign a number of tasks which were of general

11 and vital significance to our struggle in protecting the Serbian people

12 and its territories. The Main Staff of the Army of RS translated the set

13 objectives and tasks into general and individual missions of the Army of

14 RS and of the individual operational and tactical formations with the

15 goals of every individual combat action, operation, or battle being

16 specifically defined."

17 Mr. Krajisnik, if you read further down the page you'll see a

18 number of bullet points, and I'm going to direct your attention to some of

19 those.

20 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, on the same page, 159, the last

21 sentence in that paragraph from which I read it says: "We can -- we can

22 say with certainty that even though often without an operational tactical

23 link, i.e., contact, our operations of the operations of all units are

24 mutually supportive in pursuit of single goals which we have defined such

25 as ..."

Page 25549

1 And the first bullet point is: "The defence of the Serbian people

2 against genocide at the hands of Muslim/Croat forces."

3 And the second -- the third bullet point is: "The liberation of

4 territories which are ours and which belong to us by historical birth

5 right."

6 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, what did that last bullet point mean? "The

7 liberation of territories which are ours and which belong to us by

8 historic birth right," what did that mean?

9 A. I don't know. This is military terminology. I can only speculate

10 and say that they had to liberate Serb ethnic areas that had been taken by

11 the Muslims and the Croats.

12 Q. Well, this language echoes very clearly language -- political

13 language that we have heard in the Assembly sessions and we have seen in

14 other documents. So, Mr. Krajisnik, this should not be a turn of a phrase

15 that is a surprise to you. What specifically do you believe "the

16 liberation of territories which are ours and which belong to us by

17 historical birth right," what do you think that means? What do you think

18 the army understood that as they say a goal that they pursued?

19 A. I cannot interpret what the army did, but all this here is not

20 linked to the strategic objectives adopted at the Assembly of the 12th of

21 May. This is a plan of the army. The army was established and was

22 operating in 1992, and it was carrying out its activities. I can only

23 guess if you want me to.

24 Q. Well, I'm not interested in your guessing, Mr. Krajisnik. You

25 said at the -- in your evidence on Friday that the military strategic

Page 25550

1 objectives were not interpreted -- essentially these were objectives to be

2 pursued by the army. And we see in this report, Mr. Krajisnik, according

3 to this report the strategic objectives were promptly defined before the

4 Main Staff, promptly defined before the commands, promptly defined before

5 the units, and they served as general guidelines for actual operations and

6 battles. So there -- I'm submitting to you, Mr. Krajisnik, there was a

7 link between what Dr. Karadzic said and the actions and activities of the

8 army. Is that something that you do not agree with?

9 A. No, I do not agree at all. Military strategic goals differ from

10 political strategic objectives. Karadzic, as the supreme commander, may

11 have discussed military strategic objectives with them but at the Assembly

12 their strategic objectives were exclusively political ones, intended for

13 negotiation.

14 Q. And are you saying that they were not intended to convey a message

15 or a programme of goals to the military?

16 A. No. Today I handed over documents which go to deny this and which

17 show that both Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic and the minister of the MUP said

18 that every cease-fire had to be respected. This means that he understood

19 the messages sent by the Assembly.

20 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, let's first of all take a look at your

21 answer. I want to make sure that I understand it.

22 Are you saying that when Dr. Karadzic enunciated the strategic

23 objectives at the 16th Assembly Session in the presence of General Mladic

24 and in the presence of other military officers, those goals were in no way

25 intended to form part of the military planning that was to implement the

Page 25551

1 programme of war that was being pursued at the time by the army?

2 A. Absolutely not. Mr. Karadzic enunciated the platform for

3 negotiations, what we were to advocate at negotiations. And he also

4 advocated the continuation of the conference. This has absolutely nothing

5 to do with military objectives.

6 Q. Well, let's take a look, Mr. Krajisnik, if we could, at tab 195.

7 MR. HARMON: If that bundle could be distributed as well.

8 This 195, Your Honour, has been previously exhibited. It's

9 Prosecution Exhibit 244.

10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the exhibit that is in tab 195, Prosecution

11 Exhibit 244, is a document that we have seen before in this court. It is

12 the minutes taken by Captain Dmitrovic from the command of the 1st

13 Partisan Brigade. It's a meeting that occurred on the 14th of May, 1992

14 with the presidents of municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the

15 1st -- of the division. And if you go following the agenda in the four

16 items at the top of the page, you'll see present at the meeting, and it

17 identifies various persons who were present at the meeting. They included

18 the commander of the 30th Partisan Division Colonel Stanislav Galic; the

19 commander of the 6th Partisan Brigade, Colonel Branko Basara. And you may

20 recall, Mr. Krajisnik, that we looked at Colonel Basara's war diary last

21 week. Colonel Basara, who later became a member of the Crisis Staff in

22 Sanski Most. The other attendees were the Chief of Staff of the 30th --

23 it looks like Partisan Brigade Lieutenant-Colonel Stevan Kokovic; the

24 commander of the territorial staff of Kljuc, I won't name him; and the

25 presidents of six municipalities, Kljuc, Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad, Jajce,

Page 25552

1 Donji Vakuf, Bugojno. And at this meeting, Mr. Krajisnik, the various

2 individuals [indiscernible] what their status was in their municipalities.

3 And, Mr. Krajisnik, if you turn to page 3 in the B/C/S.

4 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, if Your Honours turn likewise to

5 the third page, you'll see items 1 through 6 identified. And this,

6 Mr. Krajisnik, at this meeting two days after the strategic objectives

7 were announced by Dr. Karadzic, the president, and I'm quoting: "The

8 president of Mrkonjic Grad SO Milan Malidza presented the conclusions from

9 the meeting held at Banja Luka."

10 And further down in the next paragraph it says: "The strategic

11 goals formulated at the meeting in Banja Luka were presented." And it

12 identifies each of the strategic objectives. At the end of this

13 particular meeting, according to this document, these strategic objectives

14 were unanimously adopted.

15 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, within two days of the enunciation of the

16 strategic objectives, these -- it's clear from this document that these

17 objectives were being enunciated in both a political and a military

18 context; in other words, the word of those objectives was being

19 disseminated. Isn't that correct?

20 A. Mr. Malidza was a deputy. He was a president of the

21 municipality. And as he attended the meeting, he provided information

22 about what had happened in Banja Luka. Had this been a war objective, it

23 would have had to be transformed into an order and distributed to the

24 units. It's evident here that this was simply a briefing at a meeting

25 where the army was present. You have another municipality president who

Page 25553

1 says in Kljuc: We want everything to be settled by peaceful means. This

2 was a general meeting. It has nothing to do with military objectives

3 because military objectives have to be translated into orders which are

4 then forwarded to the units. It's evident here that these are not war

5 objectives and they are not properly interpreted. This deputy interpreted

6 them freely.

7 Q. Well, we'll come to the -- I don't think there's any disagreement

8 between us, Mr. Krajisnik, that the strategic objectives needed to be

9 translated into war objectives. In a few minutes we're going to come to

10 some documents that I'm going to ask you some questions about. But I'd

11 like to turn your attention, Mr. Krajisnik, to the next document which is

12 found at tab 220. And this is a military document.

13 MR. JOSSE: I'm only going to interrupt because my learned friend

14 made an assertion. I don't think there's any disagreement between us that

15 the strategic objectives needed to be translated into war objectives.

16 Could that be put, please?

17 MR. HARMON: I said to Mr. Krajisnik that I was going to be

18 turning to those documents in a few minutes.

19 Q. Let's start, Mr. Krajisnik --

20 MR. JOSSE: I'm taking the point, Your Honour, because if an

21 assertion like that is going to be made --

22 JUDGE ORIE: I think as a matter of fact what Mr. Harmon did was

23 to -- to summarise the answer of Mr. Krajisnik, who said that you would at

24 least need military orders if you would give a fact to anything, and that

25 Mr. Harmon more or less said that he did not disagree with that but that

Page 25554

1 he would come to that at a later stage.

2 But if this is a wrong understanding, Mr. Krajisnik, please

3 correct me.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was speaking about this meeting.

5 I said had this been a war objective, there would have had to be a

6 document in the form of an order under discussion. But however, the

7 president of the municipality was simply briefing the others on what had

8 happened in Banja Luka. For a command to be briefed, it would have had to

9 come from the commander.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You would say in order to implement whatever

11 goal, you would at least -- to implement it militarily, you would need an

12 order. And I think as a matter of fact that I think Mr. Harmon in that

13 respect expressed that he did not disagree.

14 Is that a correct understanding, Mr. Harmon?

15 MR. HARMON: That's a correct understanding.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.

17 Mr. Josse, I take it that the matter has been sufficiently

18 clarified.

19 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can you turn to the document that's found at

23 tab 220. This is document that has been exhibited. It's Prosecution

24 Exhibit 892, tab 58. This is a document, Mr. Krajisnik, that is from the

25 1st Krajina Corps command. It's dated the 21st of May, 1992. The author

Page 25555

1 of this document is the assistant commander for moral guidance, Colonel

2 Milutin Vukelic, and this is a document that was sent to all of the corps

3 units within the 1st Krajina Corps command. I'd like to direct your

4 attention, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 1 in the B/C/S. It's item 2, the bottom

5 part of the paragraph.

6 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, I would like to direct Your

7 Honours to the top of page 2 in the English, the top paragraph.

8 Q. And in this document, Mr. Krajisnik, this is again a document that

9 is only approximately a week after the strategic objectives were

10 identified, Colonel Vukelic, in addressing all of the commands says the

11 following, and I quote: "The constituent Serbian people who live on

12 around 65 per cent of the area and represent more than 35 per cent of the

13 population of BH must struggle for complete separation from the Muslim and

14 Croat peoples and form their own state. Only after that will they be able

15 to decide with whom and how they will unite and associate."

16 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, that is strategic objective number 1, that

17 Colonel Vukelic is disseminating to all of the units in the 1st Krajina

18 Corps. That's a reference to strategic objective 1, isn't it?

19 A. This is information, Mr. Prosecutor, and this was in the strategic

20 objectives. But he's not referring to the strategic objectives; rather,

21 he is referring to our general objectives. However, it is, yes, found in

22 the first strategic objective. However, this is information for all the

23 units; it's not an order.

24 Q. That is correct. We don't disagree on that, Mr. Krajisnik. And

25 that strategic objective that Colonel Vukelic is referring to is the

Page 25556

1 strategic objective that you considered to be the most important objective

2 of the six. And you so stated that at the 16th Assembly Session, didn't

3 you?

4 A. Mr. Vukelic is not invoking the strategic objective adopted on the

5 12th of May. He's just stating the goals of the Serbian people that

6 predate the war by a long time; namely, that we wanted Republika Srpska

7 which was formed in January 1992. However, a link can be established with

8 the first strategic goal, I agree.

9 Q. And my question to you that you did not answer, Mr. Krajisnik, was

10 the first strategic objective, that is the separation of the Muslim and

11 Croat people from the Serbian people, was the objective that you

12 considered at the 16th Session of the Assembly to be the most important of

13 the six strategic objectives. That's correct, isn't it?

14 A. Yes, that was translated in this way, namely that Republika Srpska

15 should have its own constituent unit separate from the other two ethnic

16 communities, and that was to be our most important strategic goal in

17 negotiations because we had already established the Serb republic and

18 proclaimed it on the 19th of January, based on the Cutileiro Plan that we

19 had endorsed.

20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's go back to tab 218, the analysis on the

21 combat readiness of the activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska.

22 A. Yes, please go ahead.

23 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I'd like to direct Your Honours'

24 attention to the first paragraph at the top of 160.

25 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to direct your attention to page

Page 25557

1 bearing the last -- the ERN number with the last four digits of 7477.

2 A. Give me a second to find it. I will be able to follow you. Yes.

3 Q. Page 139 at the lower right-hand column -- the lower right-hand of

4 the page.

5 Now, in -- according to this report the objectives that had been

6 set forth, the political objectives that had been set forth, were

7 implemented seriatim. And if we turn to this top paragraph on

8 page 160: "Priorities in discharging set or approved tasks were selected

9 depending on the actual stage of the war, the situation in the various

10 areas of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the general social and economic

11 circumstances, thus the prior focus for the army" --

12 A. Excuse me, you said 160. I don't have 160. I have 139.

13 JUDGE ORIE: In your version it's page 139, Mr. --


15 Q. Page 139 of your version.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Middle of the page, after the seven bullet points.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. 139, I found it.

18 MR. HARMON: I'm going to continue reading. I'll start where I

19 left off in part: "Thus the prior focus of the Army of RS for quite some

20 time had been to open and maintain a corridor linking the republic of

21 Serbian Krajina through the Bosnian Krajina with Serbia. In the

22 utilisation of the units of the Army of RS, this is still a priority,

23 gaining control of the area of northern Bosnia and Posavina, with

24 particular emphasis on Bosanski Brod and Derventa or gaining control over

25 the broader area of Jajce and Paljevo has also been a priority on which

Page 25558

1 our forces have focussed. In the last month and a half our operations

2 have concentrated on the liberation of Podrinje and thereby the strategic

3 objective of our war would be realised, one that could be defined

4 as 'establishing contact with Serbia on the river Drina or the Drina

5 ceasing to be a frontier.'"

6 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, what this report is referring to in terms of

7 implementing the tasks depending on the actual stage of the war and the

8 situation, the first strategic objective that they referred to in this

9 paragraph is the establishing a corridor. That's one of the express

10 strategic objectives that was enunciated by Dr. Karadzic at the 16th

11 Session; that's strategic objective number 2, isn't it?

12 A. Yes. The corridor was a strategic objective, political strategic

13 goal number 2, a corridor through Posavina.

14 Q. And according to this same paragraph, the reference to the

15 liberation of Podrinje, "thereby the strategic objective of our war would

16 be realised, specifically establishing contact with Serbia on the River

17 Drina or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier," that was also -- that was

18 another strategic objective, isn't it? That was strategic objective

19 number 3, wasn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?

20 A. No, it's not the strategic objective number 3. The definition of

21 that goal was completely different. I explained what our strategic goal

22 was and how to -- how we were to achieve the Drina should no longer be a

23 border, how to establish communication.

24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm looking at an exhibit which is P47 which are

25 the strategic objectives, and strategic objective 3 in P47 reads in

Page 25559

1 part "eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states."

2 The report on the army says that: "A strategic objective of our

3 war would be realised, the Drina ceasing to be a frontier."

4 That's the same objective, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik? There's a

5 reference to strategic objective number 3 in the army report. Do you

6 dispute that?

7 A. No. I have also explained, if you look at the 16th Session of the

8 Assembly, it is said there that we must fight for the Drina to no longer

9 be a border between two worlds, whereas here it states that it shouldn't

10 be a border between two states in 1993, mistakenly. And I have also

11 explained how it was stated that the second congress of the SDA by

12 Mr. Izetbegovic, namely that the Drina should not be a border

13 psychologically with the use of passports, like we had a border between --

14 on the Una river with Croatia. And that should be achieved politically,

15 like it was at Dayton. And that was our strategic goal. We did not

16 achieve, however, the goal stated here by the army. The -- the border was

17 not erased, it remained there.

18 Q. We've been talking, Mr. Krajisnik, about what the army, how the

19 army interpreted Dr. Karadzic's strategic objectives that he enunciated at

20 the 16th Session. In this report, Mr. Krajisnik, it indicates that the

21 primary focus of the RS was strategic objective number 2, establishing a

22 corridor; and in the second -- in the latter part of the year 1992, the

23 objective was to essentially establish contact with Serbia on the river

24 Drina and make the Drina no longer a frontier. Now, those are two of the

25 strategic objectives that the army, according to their own report, were

Page 25560

1 implementing. And if we turn further in this report, Mr. Krajisnik.

2 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, if Your Honours turn to pages --

3 page 162, I'm going to be referring to the top small paragraph and the --

4 some of the bullet points that follow.

5 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, if you turn to page -- the page bearing the

6 ERN number 7479, that is page 141 of the report, the lower right-hand

7 corner. Do you have that, Mr. Krajisnik?

8 A. Yes, I got it.

9 Q. This report of the army, which was a military secret, goes on to

10 say at the top of page 162, and I quote: "In analysing the results of the

11 utilisation of individual units, we think that the following should be

12 emphasised."

13 And the first bullet point says: "The 1st Krajina Corps has

14 preserved and expanded the existing border of Republika Srpska, broken up

15 enemy groupings in Central Bosnia and Posavina, liberated Bosanski Brod,

16 Jajce, and other towns, forced through and maintained a corridor through

17 Posavina and significantly contributed to the Serbian -- the protection of

18 the Serbian people."

19 That, Mr. Krajisnik, is again a reflection of strategic objective

20 number 2, isn't it?

21 A. It has nothing to do with strategic goal number 2. The army

22 worked completely separately, guided by the situation. Please. On the

23 13th of May, just a day later, you can see the documents telling how

24 Mr. Mladic, how Mrs. Plavsic, and the MUP minister interpreted them as

25 political goals conducive to continued negotiations of the conference. I

Page 25561

1 provided documents today testifying to their commitment to continuing

2 negotiations. This is a document telling us about the conduct of the army

3 in 1992.

4 For the strategic goals of the 16th Session to be compulsory for

5 the army, they would have had to be endorsed as a separate decision. The

6 supreme commander should have had issued adequate orders to be reflected

7 in orders of subordinate commanders to be implemented by the units. None

8 of that was done, so there is no comparison with what the army was doing.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, in order to avoid whatever

10 misunderstanding, when you refer to what was said on the 13th of May, you

11 stressed that the strategic objectives were interpreted on that day as

12 "political goals conducive to continued negotiations of the conference."

13 I think, as a matter of fact, that that seems not to be an answer

14 to what Mr. Harmon is putting to you because - but Mr. Harmon will correct

15 me if I'm wrong - does not put it to you that these strategic objectives

16 were not pursued also through negotiations, but he puts to you that

17 military documents describe, for example this one, the results of military

18 operations in terms which -- and language either are identical or very

19 much resemble what appears in the strategic objectives.

20 So, Mr. Harmon, if I not correctly understood you, please tell me.

21 But therefore, Mr. Krajisnik, to say: You see, we wanted to

22 pursue these matters politically in negotiations is not an answer, I

23 think, to what Mr. Harmon puts to you. And I think that should be clear

24 at this moment so that we are not ending up in a kind of a -- well, in an

25 exchange of views which finds not its basis in what in this case the other

Page 25562

1 party, Mr. Harmon, says.

2 Please proceed and keep this in mind.

3 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, for your reference in tab 198, I

4 believe, are the strategic objectives, so they may be used for reference.

5 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik, is -- for your reference as well, tab 198

6 should be the strategic objectives.

7 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, let's go back to this part that I had just

8 read to you. I'd like to take a look at the second bullet point. The

9 second bullet point says: "The 2nd Krajina Corps has successfully

10 defended the north-west borders of the republic at the River Una," and it

11 then goes on and describes other actions of the army.

12 Now, the actions of the 2nd Krajina Corps reflect, do they not,

13 actions that are consistent with strategic objective number 4,

14 establishing a border on the Una and the Neretva Rivers. That's correct,

15 isn't it?

16 A. No. In 1992 they were on the Neretva and then they withdrew.

17 However, they were positioned on the Una before the strategic goals. That

18 border was established before any negotiations ever started. They just

19 kept the existing border.

20 Q. Well, let's turn, Mr. Krajisnik, to the sixth bullet point. The

21 sixth bullet point: "By taking Kamenica, Cerska, Glogova, the region of

22 Osmaci village and Jadar, the Drina Corps has considerably expanded the

23 free territory and will shortly have achieved the strategic task assigned

24 to it by the Supreme Command while at the same time providing protection

25 for the Serbian people."

Page 25563

1 We know from evidence in this case that Glogova and the areas of

2 Cerska and that area of Kamenica is in the Bratunac municipality along the

3 Drina River. So this action I'm putting to you, Mr. Krajisnik, that was

4 emphasised by the army deals with strategic objective

5 number 3: "Establishing a corridor in the Drina River valley, that is

6 eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states."

7 Do you agree or disagree with that, Mr. Krajisnik?

8 A. I don't agree, and here I'll explain, if you want me to, why I

9 don't agree.

10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

11 A. You have presented a directive issued by Mladic through one

12 witness, Mr. Savkic, if you remember, who was describing a proposed

13 concerted action. And that's the basis for this. The basis for this is a

14 directive by the commander who told his units what they should actually be

15 doing on the ground.

16 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, it's your evidence that the portion I've just

17 read to you bears no relationship to strategic objective number 3?

18 A. Yes, I claim that and I also claim that in the end we didn't

19 achieve any of the strategic goals set on the 12th of May, apart from the

20 goal that had to do with Republika Srpska.

21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not discussing with you what ultimately was

22 achieved; I'm discussing with you what the army understood to be the

23 import of the strategic objectives and what they attempted to achieve in

24 1992. That's the focus of my examination on these points.

25 Now, again, Mr. Krajisnik, I put to you: Are you asserting that

Page 25564

1 these parts of the page that I have read to you saying that we think the

2 following should be emphasised, and I read to you the first, second, and

3 sixth bullet points, that those had nothing to do with the army attempting

4 to achieve strategic objectives 2, 3, and 4?

5 A. What exists here has nothing whatsoever to do with the strategic

6 objectives adopted on the 12th of May, 1992, because they were neither

7 published nor forwarded to commands for implementation in 1992. They were

8 not known.

9 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I -- I submitted to you a few minutes ago a

10 document from the partisan brigade dated the 14th of May that contradicts

11 what you just said. They were disseminated. We took a look at a document

12 with -- from the 1st Partisan Brigade where the strategic objectives were

13 disseminated to, among others, to Colonel Basara. They were disseminated

14 to the political leaders of at least six municipalities. Do you still

15 stand by what you just said, Mr. Krajisnik, that they were neither

16 published nor forwarded to the commands for implementation in 1992?

17 A. You understood me perfectly well. The strategic goals are not

18 forwarded to the army in that way, nor are they discussed. There is a

19 procedure for that. What you referred to was a briefing held by one MP

20 who attended that Assembly session.

21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's stay on the document then that I'm -- we've

22 been looking at.

23 MR. HARMON: I'd like to turn Your Honours' attention to page 163.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, when you said:

25 What you referred to was a briefing held MP who attended the Assembly

Page 25565

1 session, were you referring to the meeting where I think at that time

2 Colonel Galic spoke?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

4 JUDGE ORIE: That was a meeting in which, from what I read, it was

5 not just briefing by a -- by an Assembly member. I mean, the role of the

6 military in that meeting, are you saying, well, that they were just there

7 to listen? Are you saying that they -- there was no adoption of

8 conclusions, there was no input by the military persons that were --

9 attended that meeting? I mean, you described that as a meeting by which

10 there was just some briefing by a civilian person, member of the Assembly,

11 but then what was the role of military members being present? I mean, if

12 it's so strictly separated as you again and again bring to our attention,

13 this was the army, that were the civilian authorities, well, you may not

14 have missed it that we heard a lot of evidence in which you see that the

15 representatives of the armed forces are united with civilian authorities

16 in some bodies and that they're discussing that -- there's coordination,

17 there's cooperation, and you are again and again saying: Well, this is

18 the army. If I don't see any order, then it's -- could you tell us then

19 how you looked -- if there was such a strict operation, could you then

20 tell us what the role of the military in such a meeting as you just

21 discussed as being just a briefing by a member of parliament, what

22 military had to do there, what the role was of, for example, but he was

23 not the only one, Colonel Galic.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was a meeting that was probably

25 convened by Colonel Galic, and he invited all presidents of Assemblies in

Page 25566

1 order to provide support to his division. And in addition to Mr. Malidza,

2 who was an MP, there were other presidents of municipalities as well, and

3 there were a number of items on the agenda and a number of contributions.

4 Mr. Malidza as an MP attending that meeting, which was broader in form,

5 presented what he had heard in Banja Luka as an MP. And what I'm trying

6 to say is the following: If Mr. Galic as division commander had to accept

7 strategic goals as an obligation, then he should have received them

8 through the line of command as an order.

9 This, on the other hand, was just a meeting. There were a lot of

10 such meetings on the ground, in municipalities, because municipalities

11 supported the army. I'm not saying that they didn't know about strategic

12 goals. I'm just pointing out the proper procedure that should have been

13 followed in practice for a soldier, a military man, to receive a document

14 on the basis of which he was supposed to do something.

15 JUDGE ORIE: And the adoption of conclusions in that meeting, from

16 what I remember, proposed by Colonel Galic?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, conclusions are various, just

18 look at them. He must have told them that there were a lot of conclusions

19 adopted on the 12th of May to continue the conference, to achieve a

20 peaceful solution, et cetera, et cetera, all of them were adopted on the

21 12th of May. This is just a point-by-point account. The discussion was

22 probably much broader.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This is -- what makes you -- what makes you

24 think that the discussion was probably much broader?

25 MR. JOSSE: Could Mr. Krajisnik have the document in front of him?

Page 25567

1 It's tab 195.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's 195. Yes.

3 But perhaps first since, Mr. Krajisnik, you said there were a lot

4 of conclusions adopted on the 12th of May, but of course I was referring

5 you to the meeting on the 14th of May, which seems to be very much that

6 Mr. -- that Colonel Galic proposes to these mainly civilian authorities

7 present to adopt conclusions which are all, apart from the first one, put

8 in rather military terms.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, on the -- under

10 point 3 it says that the positions achieved so far should be kept and

11 defended without war. That's the cease-fire adopted on the 12th of May.

12 And then --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but still put -- and if you say: Hold the lines

14 and preferably no further combat, that is still -- but let's not argue on

15 one or two of them. Most of them -- I see here an army officer calling

16 for a meeting with civilian authorities proposing to adopt conclusions

17 which are -- well, let's then say mainly put in military terms. Whether

18 they are exclusively in military terms is still to be seen. And in almost

19 all of your answers you say: If I do not see an order, the army was

20 totally separate from civilian authorities. I'm just trying to reconcile

21 your answers with what I read here.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I am referring only

23 to the strategic objectives. As for the army, I don't know whether or not

24 they had orders as to the other things they were to do. They probably

25 did. But what I was saying was when something had to be implemented what

Page 25568

1 could he have implemented of the strategic goals in that area? Neither

2 Sarajevo nor the corridor nor anything else. Only the cessation of

3 hostilities.

4 I'm only trying to assist. I don't actually know what they were

5 saying there, but what I do know is the strategic objectives were

6 political objectives and had nothing to do with the war. I wasn't present

7 at this meeting. I don't know what they said, but I know that Malidza was

8 briefing the others. And what I'm saying is: Had these been military

9 objectives there would have been orders issues. That's my explanation.

10 JUDGE ORIE: And then just where the language used by the military

11 is, if not for the full hundred per cent, then at least to the gist of

12 what they are saying, is reflecting very much the strategic objectives,

13 that's all coincidence. Is that what you tell us? Because we went over

14 this now for five, six, four examples, and then your answer is again and

15 again it must be coincidence that they used the same language, or is

16 that -- it's a wrong understanding because it has got nothing to do one

17 with the other.

18 And again here we have two different questions. The first

19 question is whether these strategic objectives were meant to give

20 instructions for the military as well; that's the first question. And the

21 second question, clearly to be separated from the first one, is whether,

22 right or wrong, the military understood those strategic objectives as

23 addressed to them as well so that they would take them into consideration

24 when planning their operations.

25 So is it that you say they were just meant for political purposes;

Page 25569

1 that's what you say? Or do you say that they were not only meant for

2 political purposes for negotiations only, but this was also well

3 understood by the military, because the military did not understand them

4 as guiding them in preparing their operations?

5 So two different questions, and I'd like to know if you -- if the

6 second question you say: Well, no, they understood that well, then of

7 course my next question would be is it all just coincidence that the same

8 language, the same content more or less is used when they're talking about

9 their operations and when you're talking about negotiations and politics?

10 This is a bit of a long question but I hope you understood it.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With respect to your first question,

12 there is no dispute that they were intended as political objectives.

13 As for your second question, did the army understand them as

14 military objectives --

15 JUDGE ORIE: There is dispute about this answer because Mr. Harmon

16 puts it to you that it was not exclusively for political purposes, but

17 okay, let's forget about that at this moment. Your testimony is they were

18 exclusively meant for political purposes and negotiations. So that's an

19 answer to my first question.

20 Now, the second question, whether this was well understood by the

21 military.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the supreme

23 commander, Mr. Karadzic, was supposed to understand that this was a

24 military objective and issue orders to Mladic, and Mladic was to issue

25 further orders to implement these. But as far as I know, he did not

Page 25570

1 understand these objectives as military ones and the army could not have

2 done this on their own.

3 As for the fact that they correspond, maybe somebody did this, I

4 don't know, but what I'm trying to explain is how things functioned.

5 Mladic would have had to issue orders and he didn't, not that I know of --

6 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I think there's a translation problem

7 there.

8 JUDGE ORIE: There's a translation problem. Which would be?

9 MR. JOSSE: That it was Karadzic who understood --


11 MR. JOSSE: -- the --

12 JUDGE ORIE: That's what the transcript says. "The supreme

13 commander, Mr. Karadzic, was supposed to understand that this was a

14 military objective."

15 MR. JOSSE: Next sentence, Your Honour, may be the problem.

16 JUDGE ORIE: "... and issue orders to Mladic." And then it

17 reads: "... and Mladic was to issue further orders to implement these."

18 MR. JOSSE: That's where we think the problem may be.

19 JUDGE ORIE: And would that be --

20 Mr. Krajisnik, I'll slowly read, and please correct me where what

21 I read does not reflect your answer.

22 "The supreme commander, Mr. Karadzic, was supposed to understand

23 that this was a military objective and issue orders to Mladic, and Mladic

24 was to issue further orders to implement these, but as far as I know he

25 did not understand these objectives as military ones and the army could

Page 25571

1 not have done this on their own."

2 Is there anything not correct, then please ...

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that he proposed these

4 objectives as political objectives at the session.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That was not my question. My question, first

6 of all, was whether there was anything wrong. There seems to be no

7 translation problem. And I understood that the first orders to be given

8 by the supreme commander and then follow-up orders further down by Mladic,

9 that that would have been needed.

10 MR. JOSSE: If that's what Mr. Krajisnik's saying, then of course

11 I've got no problem. Thank you for that.


13 Now, we see in some of these documents that the same language is

14 used. You say Mr. Karadzic was supposed to understand that this was a

15 military objective and issue orders to Mladic, and Mladic was to issue

16 further orders to implement these. But as far as you knew, he did not

17 understand these objectives as military ones. But in the reports,

18 including this - what was it? - the 1993 report and was it -- the report

19 says that instructions were received from the supreme commander further

20 and -- could someone help me out which tab number?

21 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour, that is tab number 218.

22 JUDGE ORIE: 218, yes.

23 Mr. Krajisnik --

24 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour.


Page 25572

1 MR. JOSSE: I'm very sorry.


3 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour says: But as far as you knew, he did not

4 understand these objectives as military ones. Could we know who "he" is

5 in that regard?

6 JUDGE ORIE: I did understand this to be Mladic. That's from the

7 logic of the answer and from the sequence, I took that.

8 MR. JOSSE: I'd rather assumed that, but perhaps that could just

9 be clarified.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is that correct?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic intended these

12 objectives to be political ones, and it was not from -- or rather, the

13 idea that these -- there was no idea that these should be military

14 objectives coming from Karadzic. And Mladic's understanding was the same

15 on the 12th of May.

16 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, clearly Mr. Sladojevic had somehow

17 discerned that from the original language that the witness meant Karadzic,

18 not Mladic.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, okay, fine. Then let's take it -- yes. In

20 this analysis of April 1993, Mr. Krajisnik, it reads: "The strategic

21 objectives of our war which were promptly defined and set before the Main

22 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, the commands and units, served as a

23 general guideline upon which we planned the actual operations and

24 concerted battles."

25 And then it continues that: "The objectives were set before us

Page 25573

1 rather than specific tasks spelled out, although the president of the

2 republic as the supreme commander of the armed forces did orally assign a

3 number of tasks which were of general and vital significance to our

4 struggle in protecting the Serbian people and its territories."

5 And then it says that: "The Main Staff translated the set

6 objectives and tasks into general and individual missions."

7 Are you saying that the objectives meant here which were not, from

8 what I understand, operational objectives yet and still were in need of

9 translation, is something totally different from the strategic objectives

10 as they were adopted or proposed at the 16th Session?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Completely different. This is

12 military terminology. What they were saying is something else. The

13 strategic objectives were not adopted as a decision on the 12th of May.

14 Had they been, then that would have been a basis for Mr. Karadzic. The

15 strategic objectives are a huge amount of material. They're enormous, and

16 it was just a political groundwork. At the 16th Session it's quite clear

17 that these were political objectives, and anyone would have understood

18 them as such. And the fact that someone invokes them, well --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, and then if the creation of a corridor

20 is described later on, it's all unrelated, it's just all coincidence?

21 Because that's what you tell us more or less or what you say perhaps that

22 they came to the same -- not only the same ideas but even the same

23 language, they used the same language, but that was coincidence rather

24 than that there was any relation between the operations and the language

25 of the military compared to the objectives and the language used by the

Page 25574

1 politicians.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, after the 12th of

3 May, discussions were held with UNPROFOR to give or to open up a blue road

4 in order to be able to pass through the territory. Many meetings were

5 held in Banja Luka, and the army was present, in order to open up a

6 corridor for humanitarian aid. In Podrinje, if you recall Mr. Salkic's

7 testimony --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I did put a clear question to you.

9 When we are talking about corridors, we are not talking about a blue road.

10 I was referring you to this analysis in which the corridor is certainly

11 not a humanitarian corridor but is the -- well, mention is made of

12 Posavina, northern Bosnia, so we are -- it's quite clear what kind of

13 corridor was referred to that -- there.

14 So I again put the same question to you, is whether the operations

15 as described by the military and the language used by them compared to the

16 objectives adopted by the politicians and the language in which this was

17 done, whether that's coincidence or whether there was any link between the

18 two of them.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's no link. There's no link.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's no link.

22 JUDGE ORIE: There's no link, thank you.

23 Well, please -- well, I'm looking at the clock, Mr. Harmon.

24 We will have a break until 11.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

Page 25575

1 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed.


4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I would like to stay with the document that is

5 found in tab 218. I'd like to refer you, Mr. Krajisnik, to pages bearing

6 the ERN number 7479. That would be page 141. And I would like to direct

7 your attention, Mr. Krajisnik, to the last paragraph above the first

8 bullet point.

9 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, I would direct Your Honours'

10 attention to page 163, starting at the paragraph after the first two

11 bullet points.

12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this again is under the chapeau in the report of

13 the basic characteristics of the operational and tactical utilisation of

14 the Army of Republika Srpska. And I quote: "I propose that corps

15 commands continue with the execution of planned combat operations as

16 follows."

17 I'm going to direct your attention to a number of these points,

18 starting with the first bullet point, Mr. Krajisnik, which deals with the

19 1st Krajina Corps. And it says, and I quote: "The 1st Krajina Corps to

20 secure border towards Croatia and the Cazin Krajina and to be ready, in

21 cooperation with the IBK and the Army of Republika Serbian Krajina, to

22 prevent a break-through of Ustashi forces from the territory of the Cazin

23 area and active operations by the armed forces of Croatia towards the

24 corridor, the lifting of the blockade on Bratstvo-Jedinstvo highway," and

25 it goes on.

Page 25576

1 This execution of planned operations deals with -- again with

2 strategic objective number 2. It deals with the protection of the

3 corridor which was considered to be of vital strategic interest to your

4 government. Do you agree with me, Mr. Krajisnik, that this reflects

5 strategic objective number 2?

6 A. No, that's not that corridor. This concerns the highway to

7 Western Slavonia. My answer is no.

8 Q. Okay. Let's take a look at the second bullet point. The second

9 bullet point is addressed to the 2nd Krajina Corps, and it says: "The

10 2nd Krajina Corps to regroup its forces along the line: Petrovac-Bihac

11 and Petrovac Krupa" --

12 JUDGE ORIE: First, Mr. Harmon, could Mr. Krajisnik first then

13 tell us what corridor was mentioned here -- what corridor was meant here

14 where he says: "To prevent a break-through of Ustashi forces from the

15 territory of Cazin Krajina and active operations by the armed forces of

16 Croatia towards the corridor." What corridor was meant there,

17 Mr. Krajisnik?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm referring to lifting the

19 blockade on the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo highway. That's --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand that you're referring us to

21 something different, but I'm asking you what corridor was mentioned here,

22 because I thought that Mr. Harmon wondered whether this was a reference to

23 the corridor as we find them in the strategic objectives.

24 So could you please tell us if this is not the corridor which we

25 find in the strategic objectives, what corridor it then is.

Page 25577

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. This is the corridor

2 between the Bosnian Krajina and Semberija, yes, from Croatia, so that it

3 would not be under threat from Croatia, that is. But I was thinking of

4 the highway, that's why I said what I did.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think as a matter of fact that -- let me just

6 check for one second.

7 Yes, Mr. Harmon specifically mentioned the corridor in his

8 question, so would you please focus on the question put to you. But the

9 matter has been clarified now.

10 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

11 MR. HARMON: Yes.

12 Q. The second bullet point, Mr. Krajisnik, I'll read it: "The 2nd

13 Krajina Corps to regroup its forces along the line

14 Petrovac-Bihac/Petrovac-Krupa shattered the Muslim forces on the stated

15 lines, reached the right bank of the river Una and take control of the

16 opposite bank of the river Una."

17 Mr. Krajisnik, that is a reflection, is it not, of strategic

18 objective number 4: Establish a border on the Una?

19 A. No, there was a border on the Una before that. I don't know what

20 he's talking about here, maybe another area. You know that at the 16th

21 Session Karadzic said we got this from Cutileiro, from the international

22 community. The international community gave us a border on the Una. And

23 as for Petrovac, that's deeper task.

24 Q. All right. So I take your answer this has nothing to do with

25 strategic objective number 4. That's your answer, isn't it,

Page 25578

1 Mr. Krajisnik?

2 A. It has nothing to do with strategic objective number 4. It's

3 quite separate.

4 Q. Let's go to the fifth bullet point: "The tasks -- the planned

5 combat operation for the Herzegovina Corps."

6 And I will read the second sentence in that bullet

7 point: "Thoroughly plan and prepare the offensive operation, gain control

8 of the left bank of the river Neretva as soon as possible, and reach the

9 administrative border of the Republic of Croatia."

10 Again, Mr. Krajisnik, I put to you that deals with strategic

11 objective number 4, does it not?

12 A. I'm telling you that in early 1992 they were at the Neretva and

13 that they withdrew. As for the strategic objectives, they were on the

14 Neretva and they are now trying to regain the lines they had lost. And

15 they had been on the border with Croatia previously and then they lost

16 that area.

17 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, could I again ask you to answer to the

19 questions. The question was not whether the positions at Neretva river

20 have been consistent in all times. Mr. Harmon is asking you whether

21 this -- whether this plan and preparation for an offensive operation to

22 gain control of the left bank of the river Neretva, whether that is in any

23 way related to the strategic objective. I mean, Mr. Krajisnik, you're

24 doing it not for the first time that you're evading to address the matter

25 which is clearly put to you in a question. It can well be that you've

Page 25579

1 given up earlier that you want to regain terrain which would be consistent

2 with the strategic objectives, it could well be that it has got nothing to

3 do with it, but that is what the question is focussing at. And I'd like

4 you to carefully listen to the question, because the previous one you

5 said: No, this is not the corridor. And then you continue to talk about

6 the highway, whereas asked what then that corridor was you said: Yes,

7 yes, of course that was the corridor, but I was talking about the highway.

8 No, you were saying: This is not the corridor.

9 So therefore, please focus on the questions and try to answer

10 them.

11 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

12 Yes, and Judge Hanoteau has a question, so perhaps the first --

13 yes, please proceed.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, excuse me to interrupt

15 Mr. Harmon.

16 Mr. Krajisnik, please, let's maybe stop analysing all these

17 documents. This is what I'd like to know: When there were all these

18 movement of troops and combat, how did you get information on what

19 happened? What did you know about what was going on in the field where

20 you were, from where you were?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When actions were planned, in the

22 initial stage I knew nothing about any of them. Once they were completed,

23 I was informed about them just as everybody was.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: What do you mean like everybody?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean I attended a meeting and -- I

Page 25580

1 would attend a meeting and they would say: Our army has liberated this or

2 that. That was how I got my information.

3 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] What do you mean you went to the

4 meetings?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I meant the consultative meetings,

6 the -- which were termed the meetings of the Presidency. We would meet

7 and then we would be provided with information about what had happened a

8 day or two before, where our army had liberated a certain territory.

9 Those are the meetings I'm referring to, although there were other

10 meetings as well.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] [Microphone not activated].

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So you said you were given

14 information. But who is -- given by whom?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I may be wrong, but the participants

16 in the meeting, the attendees, could have been Mr. Karadzic or a minister.

17 It's very hard for me to say who. I did not have first-hand information,

18 so I was not able to brief anybody at those meetings.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. But please refresh your

20 memory. I mean, I'm sure that it's an important period for you. There

21 was a war going on, there were military operations going on, large-scale

22 operations. So how did you get that information? What was in place to

23 get information on the military situation? You are saying that it's

24 meetings of the Presidency, but who was reporting? Who reported?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sometimes it was Mr. Mladic, but

Page 25581

1 it's hard for me to say now. Maybe a member of the Main Staff, maybe the

2 minister of defence, maybe the minister of the MUP, maybe Mr. Karadzic.

3 Those were the people who could have provided such information, although

4 I'm not sure it was actually them. It might have been someone else. But

5 the information was common knowledge; it was generally known. So I could

6 also have learnt it from the media, from a television broadcast, for

7 example. There was the SRNA agency.

8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Did -- were you kept informed by

9 the civilian authorities on the ground, the municipalities, the

10 authorities in the municipalities, or the MPs who were sitting in these

11 municipalities? Did they keep you informed also? Excuse me, through

12 informal discussions maybe?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When we arrived at an Assembly

14 session, MPs informally informed others about the situation in their

15 municipality, whether the situation was redressed. It was not a formal

16 briefing, but I was able to find out from MPs.

17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] What about yourself? Did you

18 sometimes meet with representatives of municipalities in our office, with

19 informal contacts, people coming to tell you what was happening on the

20 field?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Presidents of municipalities,

22 for instance from the Sarajevo region, would come. However, during

23 sessions I would often sit down with MPs in my office and discuss various

24 issues including those. I mean when we had sessions at Pale or Mount

25 Jahorina. At other sessions in other places, that would have been

Page 25582

1 difficult and I didn't have much contacts there.

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] In this meeting of May 14th,

3 1992, that's on tab 195 that we mentioned earlier, it's the meeting where

4 military leaders are with authorities from municipalities. And among the

5 civilians, as you said, we have the MP Malidza, you remember all that,

6 right, because we mention all this earlier. So did you know that there

7 were regional meetings among civilian authorities and military authorities

8 going on?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was able to assume, but I didn't

10 know specifically about that meeting in particular. I didn't know about

11 many meetings in fact, because I didn't have contact with them. I wasn't

12 in touch with them. On the 14th, I was on my way from Banja Luka to

13 Belgrade by air.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Well, for example, did

15 Mr. Malidza tell you about this meeting? It seems that it was an

16 important meeting. So did he keep you informed as an MP, you know, that

17 the military had convened this meeting with civilian authorities on

18 May 14th, 1992. Were you kept informed? Not before the fact but after

19 the fact, did anyone report? Did Mr. Malidza, for example, report to you?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely not. Nor was that

21 customary for an MP to give such a report. The next session was only on

22 the 27th July for me. That's two months later on Mount Jahorina. That

23 would have been his next opportunity to inform me, but I don't remember

24 that he told me anything then either. I'm certain he didn't.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 25583


2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let me go back to the question that we were dealing

3 with and that is the bullet point 5. I want to get a direct answer from

4 you. The tasks of the Herzegovina Corps which were to prepare offensive

5 operations and gain control of the left bank of the river Neretva as soon

6 as possible, does that bear a relationship to strategic objective

7 number 4?

8 A. No relationship at all.

9 Q. Would you turn to the next bullet point, tasks assigned to the

10 Drina Corps: "The Drina Corps, as soon as possible, shatter remaining

11 Muslim forces in the regions of Srebrenica and Zepa and then regroup

12 forces and orient them toward Gorazde."

13 Now, we know that those locations are in Eastern Bosnia,

14 Mr. Krajisnik. Do those directives to the Drina Corps have anything to do

15 with strategic objective number 3, which was to establish a corridor in

16 the Drina river valley and eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serb

17 states.

18 A. It has nothing to do with the strategic objective number 3.

19 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, just before the break you gave evidence, and

20 I'm referring to your testimony at 9:59:21. You -- your evidence was

21 before the -- and I'm quoting. "For the strategic goals of the 16th

22 Session to the compulsory for the army, they would have had to be endorsed

23 as a separate decision. The supreme commander should have -- should have

24 had issued adequate orders to be reflected in orders of subordinate

25 commanders to be implemented by the units. None of that was done, so

Page 25584

1 there is no comparison with what the army was doing."

2 Now, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, the army was the highest formation in

3 the Republika Srpska that was able to achieve on the ground the strategic

4 objectives. Isn't that correct?

5 A. No, that's not correct.

6 Q. And in fact, the army was issued the task of implementing the

7 strategic objectives and you knew that.

8 A. No, that's not correct.

9 Q. Let's take a look at page 158 of the report on the army.

10 Mr. Krajisnik, for your benefit it is found at page 138 in the B/C/S.

11 It's the page with the last four ERN numbers 7476.

12 MR. HARMON: I'm referring to the top paragraph, Your Honours.

13 Q. And I will quote. It says: "In the past year, 1992, some

14 self-organised units at the local level, the Army of Republika Srpska has

15 grown into the highest strategic organisational formation of the Serbian

16 people in former BH capable of realising the strategic and other

17 objectives assigned to it by the Supreme Command and the president of

18 Republika Srpska and its supreme commander."

19 So again I put to you, Mr. Krajisnik, the army not only understood

20 the strategic objectives at the 16th Session of the Assembly, but they

21 were tasked with implementing on the ground the realisation of those

22 objectives. Isn't that correct?

23 A. Absolutely not, because the strategic objectives were not even

24 adopted at the Assembly session as a separate decision.

25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's really focus your attention on the document

Page 25585

1 that's found at tab 197. This is a document that is already in evidence.

2 It is Exhibit P1154.

3 [Prosecution counsel confer]

4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I am informed that the translation for

5 P1154, there is a new translation that is now inserted into the binder --

6 into the bundles that Your Honours have. And I'll be referring to this

7 new translation.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's -- I don't remember that there was a

9 translation issue earlier, but --

10 MR. HARMON: We looked at it, Your Honour, and there was some

11 adjustments that needed to be made and we made those adjustments.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do you know which ones? Because if you change

13 translations halfway I think it would be fair if the Defence would be

14 informed about what portions are changed so that they can verify.

15 Then Mr. Registrar is provisionally instructed to replace

16 Exhibit P1154, the new translation, so that would be P1154.1, taking out

17 the old translation, but to keep the old translation for the time being so

18 that it could be undone if need be.

19 MR. HARMON: Yes, I will work with the Defence and identify those

20 changes.

21 MR. JOSSE: I'm confident we can agree upon this.


23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this document that we're looking at is the first

24 directive issued by General Mladic. It is dated the 6th of June, 1992.

25 It is a directive issued to the various subordinate units in the Army of

Page 25586

1 the Republika Srpska by General Mladic, and I'm going to direct your

2 attention to the paragraph 5. This is found on page 2 of the B/C/S,

3 Mr. Krajisnik, paragraph --

4 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, it's found on page 3,

5 mid-paragraph, number 5: "Tasks of the units."

6 Q. And this directive for further actions issued by General Mladic

7 reads as follows: "The 1st Krajina Corps from OG Doboj, uses its main

8 forces to defend the attained lines, and part of its forces implements

9 offensive actions along the main line Derventa-Modrica and

10 Doboj-Podnovlje. The task: By persistent and active defence and in

11 concert with the 2nd Krajina Corps maintain the attained front line. Use

12 appropriate grouping of forces and co-action with East Bosnia Corps to

13 break enemy forces on the lines of attack and reject him to the Sava

14 River. Implement strong pressure on Modrica, from the west; at the same

15 time secure the directions Slavonski Brod, Derventa,

16 Odzak-Modrica-Tesic-Doboj from enemy actions. Upon request support air

17 force of Serbian Republic of BH." .

18 And then if we go over, Mr. Krajisnik, to the task assigned to the

19 East Bosnia Corps.

20 MR. HARMON: That's found, Your Honours, on page 4 of the English

21 at the top.

22 Q. And page 3, Mr. Krajisnik, in the B/C/S.

23 "The East Bosnia Corps defends the current lines with one part of

24 its forces; necessary regrouping to be carried out, then use energetic

25 actions in a joint operation with the 1st Krajina Corps to liberate

Page 25587

1 Modrica, take the bridges over the Bosna River and provide secure traffic

2 from Modrica to Bosanski Samac. Further, using strong security toward

3 Tuzla and Zupanija, Cistiti, mop up or cleanse the territory of remaining

4 groups and of individuals belonging to the enemy, and establish stronger

5 connection with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; secure

6 Zvornik-Milici-Vlasenica road: Ocistiti, mop up or cleanse Birac of

7 remaining enemy forces."

8 Mr. Krajisnik, this was the directive issued by General Mladic

9 approximately less than a month after the strategic objectives were

10 announced at the 16th Session to take the corridor. These were the

11 directives for the corridor action, weren't they?

12 A. No, no. It is not related to that, the two are totally unrelated.

13 This whole directive is unrelated to the strategic objective.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you dispute that the corridor operation started

15 on the 24th of June, 1992, approximately six weeks after the strategic

16 objectives were announced in the -- at the 16th Session?

17 A. 24th of June I understood?

18 Q. That's what I said.

19 A. And the Assembly session was on the 12th of May, if that is

20 undisputed.

21 Q. My question to you is, Mr. Krajisnik: Do you agree with me or

22 disagree with me that the operation to seize the corridor started on the

23 24th of June, 1992?

24 A. I don't know exactly when they started, but I know they ended on

25 the 28th of June, which means you're probably right.

Page 25588

1 Q. Okay. So within about seven weeks of the announcement of the

2 strategic objectives for General Mladic at the Assembly, one of the

3 strategic objectives had been implemented and had been attained. That's

4 correct, isn't it?

5 A. The corridor was taken by military means on the 28th of June,

6 that's correct, by military means, not political ones. I would like you

7 to read the last sentence of this directive. It's very interesting.

8 [Prosecution counsel confer]

9 MR. JOSSE: Can I suggest Mr. Krajisnik just read it out, Your

10 Honour?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, if you would like to.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "I strictly prohibit any

13 maltreatment of civilian, unarmed population, whereas prisoners must be

14 treated or shall be treated pursuant to the Geneva Convention. Commander

15 Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic."


17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, now let us turn to the exhibit that is found at

18 tab --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue.

20 Mr. Krajisnik, you point to a line in this same document you

21 consider to be important, although it was, I would say, unrelated to the

22 question put to you by Mr. Harmon from what I see. Did you draw our

23 attention to it because you considered it important for us to see that

24 these instructions were given or is it because you consider this to be an

25 instruction which was implemented on the ground?

Page 25589

1 Is it -- we heard quite some evidence on -- on the treatment of

2 civilian population, and we heard also some information about prisoners.

3 And I take it that the text just say "prisoners" and not "prisoners of

4 war." But is it because you take the position that this instruction was

5 implemented, in general terms of course? I would not -- is that your

6 position or is it -- or don't you know?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're right. I don't know how it

8 was implemented. I just thought it was interesting to bear in mind that

9 somebody sent out something like this.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You say, at least that is how it is

11 translated: "I don't know how it was implemented," which suggests that

12 it was implemented. Do you say: I don't know how it was implemented, or

13 do you say: I don't know whether it was implemented?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how it was implemented.

15 I don't even know whether it was implemented.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That provides me with the -- with an answer.

17 Please, Mr. Harmon.

18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'd like to refer Your Honours to two

19 exhibits. One I'm going to distribute, and the other, Your Honour.

20 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, that is found in tab 217. These are related

21 documents.

22 MR. HARMON: Mr. Registrar, the document that is found in tab 217

23 will need a number.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be, Your Honours, P1235.

Page 25590


2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if we could start with the document, examination of

3 this document in tab 217. This is a document that is dated the 1st of

4 July, 1992. It is a document that was issued by General Mladic. It is a

5 tribute to the 1st Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, and other units

6 for their success in battles in Bosanska Posavina, and it was directed to

7 all members of the army. And in the first paragraph it says,

8 Mr. Krajisnik, General Mladic is paying tribute and expressing his

9 gratitude to the soldiers, and I quote: "For successfully organised and

10 implemented operation for break-through, expansion and cleansing of

11 corridor in Bosanska Posavina, between eastern and western Bosnia, as well

12 as excogitation," I'm not familiar with that word in my language, "and

13 organise joined action and coordination of combat units' activities."

14 And if we go to the third paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik, and I believe

15 it would be also the third paragraph in the first page of your document.

16 The second sentence, it says: "The units of this corps in this territory

17 also showed that only unified combat against the enemy of Serbianhood in

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina will bring us to realisation of military and

19 political roles."

20 Now, it seems in this document, Mr. Krajisnik, that General Mladic

21 is very, very aware of both the military and the political goals and is,

22 in fact, congratulating members of his corps for the successful

23 realisation of the strategic objective that his forces had just achieved.

24 Now, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, General Mladic was very sensitive and aware

25 of the political goals that you and other Bosnian Serb leaders set at the

Page 25591

1 16th Session of the Assembly. Isn't that correct?

2 A. Mr. Mladic heard what our political goals were, and he was

3 familiar with them. He was present at the 16th Session.

4 Q. And he worked very closely with political leaders in order to

5 achieve those goals militarily?

6 A. No. He didn't work very closely. He was far away, and he acted

7 with - how shall I put it? - autonomy.

8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, if you do not know the -- if you're not

10 familiar with the meaning of the word "excogitation," could we perhaps

11 find out because it might be a bad idea. In my ears it sounds as using

12 force in an external direction ex and cogiterra [phoen] but ...

13 MR. JOSSE: I couldn't help.

14 JUDGE ORIE: You can't help. Then perhaps we should go back to

15 the --

16 MR. STEWART: I can't either. I really don't -- I've never heard

17 any such word. I'm in the same position as everybody else. I've actually

18 checked the particular word on Google while we've been in court, and I

19 don't find it at all. They say: Are you looking for something else.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then perhaps could we --

21 MR. STEWART: It could be excogitation. It could be that. I

22 don't think that's what -- that's not the word on the text, I think .

23 Excogitation is a word but it's not in everyday use probably.

24 JUDGE ORIE: I think that was the word you were talking about,

25 Mr. Harmon, isn't it?

Page 25592

1 MR. HARMON: Yes, that's the word, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: What would it mean although not --

3 MR. STEWART: It's sort of thinking something unusual or

4 extraordinary or something like that. Your Honour, I -- Mr. Josse is

5 following what's happening more, but as far as that word is concerned,

6 that's roughly what it means.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Could we perhaps look at the original text and -- to

8 see whether we have -- whether the interpreters would come up with

9 something more familiar to us.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note the word used in Serbian is

11 rather simpler. It means well thought through, well devised, well thought

12 out.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could we -- do you have the -- do the

14 interpreters have the B/C/S text? Could they perhaps spend -- read then

15 what the translation should be approximately of these last few lines,

16 perhaps on from "for successfully organised and implemented operation,"

17 would the interpreters be so kind as to see whether they could, on the

18 basis, of the B/C/S ...

19 THE INTERPRETER: So the paragraph begins "for a successfully

20 organised and performed operation, to break through, expand, and mop up

21 the corridor in Bosanska Posavina between eastern and western Bosnia and

22 for a well thought out and organised, concerted action," and it goes on.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and could you please also do the last few --

24 [Microphone not activated].

25 THE INTERPRETER: So after the last word "concerted action,

Page 25593

1 cooperation and coordination of combat operations of units of the

2 1st Krajina and the East Bosnian Corps and the air force and air defence

3 of the Army of the Serbian Republic of BH, I pay tribute and express my

4 gratitude to the soldiers and commanding officers of the 1st Krajina Corps

5 and the Eastern Bosnian Corps, members of the air force and air defence of

6 the Army of the Serbian Republic of BH, and the Serbian civilian

7 population in the zone of combat activities."

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

9 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.


11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in one of your answers --

12 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, could I say I was anyway going to take

13 the point of the use of the word "cleansing" in the document, but that has

14 now been clarified. I was intending to do that in any event. In other

15 words, this document will need to be retranslated, in my submission.

16 JUDGE ORIE: In total or just this word, Mr. --

17 MR. JOSSE: Well, that first paragraph.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is there any -- apart from -- apart from the

19 word "cleansing," which was now translated by "mopping up," is there any

20 other matter which --

21 MR. JOSSE: I need to look at it, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. If you would please let us now, because

23 otherwise have it been sent back to CLSS -- if it's just the one-word

24 issue, then we might find more practical solutions.

25 MR. JOSSE: Might I observe, and this isn't a criticism, it says

Page 25594

1 very clearly across the face of this document "unrevised" and it's been

2 translated in this unrevised version by OTP interpreters. I make no

3 criticism at all, it's simply an observation.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Please have a look at it and see

5 whether it needs more thorough review.

6 MR. HARMON: We will do that, Your Honour.


8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me, if I may just add word to

9 that.

10 We have been at great pains to -- it's not a -- we've come across

11 that word repeatedly before. We've made efforts to have it translated

12 in -- correctly as "cleanse" or "mop up," mop up or cleanse. Not every

13 document can be corrected in that fashion. But where that's been

14 possible, we have put in the alternative so the Court can make the proper

15 determination in context.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I think as a matter of fact that Mr. Josse tended to

17 agree if it was just the one-word issue, of course this sensitive

18 translation issue, which everyone is very well aware of, that perhaps it

19 might not be needed to go through all of it again. But since the OTP has

20 now offered to have the translation reviewed anyhow, I think the problem

21 is resolved. And where Mr. Josse said that it was no criticism, I think

22 as a matter of fact that he might have thought in similar lines as you do,

23 Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. JOSSE: Absolutely, Your Honour, and I appreciate my learned

25 friend putting that on the record.

Page 25595

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.


3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you said in partial response to the last series of

4 questions I asked you, you said that General Mladic didn't work very

5 closely, he was far away. He did in fact implement the political goals on

6 the ground through military means, didn't he? Whether he was close or far

7 away, that's what he did?

8 A. I don't know what goals were being implemented. I can't say yes

9 or no. If he was aware of something as a goal, he implemented it. If he

10 didn't, then he didn't implement it. I really don't know how to answer

11 this clearly. I know that he acted with autonomy, as I said, that's my --

12 that's what I know. And that he acted with autonomy we can see from these

13 papers.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, let me try to get things clear again.

15 What Mr. Harmon is asking you is the following. If a strategic goal

16 adopted in a political form says: We should establish a corridor, and if

17 in that same area the army does establish a corridor, the question now

18 from Mr. Harmon is whether the operations on the ground was what was

19 described in the strategic objective. I think that's the basic --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, it's explained at

21 the session how we would get the corridor, by an exchange of territories.

22 So my answer is no.

23 JUDGE ORIE: That's explained, but the strategic objective doesn't

24 say how it was done. It's just corridor should be established. I'm now

25 making it simple. Mr. Harmon now says: We see that the army says we have

Page 25596

1 established a corridor, and he is asking whether what the army did,

2 whether that is exactly what you find in the text of the strategic

3 objective. I earlier said: Compare the operations between the -- compare

4 between the operations and the language with the political objectives and

5 the language used to formulate them. And he is now asking: Isn't that

6 the same?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not the same. This order

8 was not issued on the basis of the strategic objectives, no.

9 JUDGE ORIE: That's not what he asked you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, can you tell me what your

11 question is, please.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I was referring to Mr. Harmon's question.

13 MR. HARMON: My question, Your Honour, was: Even though Mr. --

14 General Mladic was, according to your testimony, far away, he implemented

15 the political goals on the ground through military means, didn't he?

16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, could we perhaps first of all then perhaps I

17 would admit and understood -- is what was done by the army, did it -- was

18 this not consistent with what was formulated in the strategic objectives?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's not. The strategic

20 objectives say: Exchange of territories. They were carrying this out for

21 other reasons which emerged later on because humanitarian aid could not

22 get through. And the fact that it corresponds well, they waited for it

23 two months -- coincides.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, not corresponds.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, out of all this

Page 25597

1 could we understand that General Mladic had another intelligence of the

2 strategic objectives and of the means to achieve these strategic

3 objectives, he had another idea?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. He understood them exactly as

5 we presented them on the 12th of May, and there's a document to show that.

6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. Then, Mr. Krajisnik, in the

7 passage that was read by Mr. Harmon, could you please take a look at it on

8 tab 217. I mean, you have it, I think, right in front of you.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So Mr. Harmon read the

11 following: "[In English] Also show that only unified combat," et cetera.

12 [Interpretation] And then the next sentence was not read: "[In

13 English] It is confirmed the position of the Main Staff that the only

14 justified goal is the joint combat for preservation of Serbianhood. That

15 means that there is no room among us for those who are trying to realise

16 personal or some of the goals in the war."

17 [Interpretation] So how do you understand this second part of the

18 sentence, the second part of the paragraph? What can you read out of it?

19 "[In English] There is no room among us" --

20 [Interpretation] "There is no room among us for those who want to

21 achieve personal goals or other goals in this war."

22 What exactly does this mean for you? What was intended?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It means that an individual cannot

24 implement goals of his own, but only those for which all Serbs or most

25 Serbs have an interest, if we are referring to the Serbs here.

Page 25598

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

2 continues] ...

3 JUDGE ORIE: May I just -- one thing, Mr. Harmon.

4 Mr. Krajisnik, you said several times that the exchange of

5 territories was in the strategic objectives. In the formulation as

6 published it's not. I just wanted to draw your attention to that, because

7 it just says: Set up a corridor between --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Mr. President. In the

9 conversation with the Croats when Karadzic is speaking, there he explains

10 how we are going to get the corridor by an exchange of territories. And

11 you have it in the 16th Session. That was our goal, our political goal,

12 and what we agreed on in Grac [phoen]. If you find that session you'll

13 see.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please, Mr. Harmon, please proceed.


16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, take a look at the other document that I passed --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Harmon, can you please put your microphone a

18 bit closer? Thank you.

19 MR. HARMON: I have two microphones on, I don't think I can deal

20 with them any better than I am. I'll try to stand closer.

21 THE INTERPRETER: This is better already. Thank you very much.

22 MR. HARMON: I will try to do this.

23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if you take a look at the document that I also

24 passed out as an extra document. It is exhibited already. It's

25 Prosecution Exhibit 892, tab 63. This also is a congratulations from the

Page 25599

1 commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, General Talic. And he says as follows

2 in this interview, he says, and I quote: "You know that we have achieved

3 our aim of linking up with the East Bosnia Corps and further on with

4 mother Serbia."

5 Now, let's take a look in relation to those congratulations to the

6 next document. The next document is found at tab 216.

7 MR. HARMON: And this needs a number.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1236, Your Honours.


11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is another directive issued by General

12 Mladic. And I am going to be referring you, Mr. Krajisnik, to the first

13 page of that document.

14 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, likewise to the first page of the

15 document in English.

16 Q. And this document, Mr. Krajisnik, again issued by General Mladic

17 and delivered to a number of his subordinate units. We can see that on

18 the last page of the document. It is an urgent document. It is

19 entitled "further activities of the Army of the BH Republic of Srpska

20 directive." And it is to the attention of commander, that he issues the

21 following directive.

22 We turn to 4, again he refers to the corridor operation. He says,

23 and I quote: "We have broken through corridors in Eastern Bosnia and

24 Bosanska Posavina, and thus made possible the centuries-long aspiration of

25 the Serbian people from BiH and the Serbian Republic of Krajina to be

Page 25600

1 joined with the fatherland Serbia."

2 Now, it appears from the documents we have been examining,

3 Mr. Krajisnik, again these relate to the strategic objective of creating a

4 corridor, and it appears from the text I have just read that General Talic

5 and General Mladic certainly were in harmony on the objectives that they

6 were -- that they had achieved. Isn't that correct, Mr. Krajisnik?

7 A. Yes. What you are saying is correct, what it says here.

8 Q. If we turn to the first point under the -- the second first point,

9 because there are two point number 1s in the English. If we turn to the

10 second point number 1, Mr. Krajisnik, I will read it.

11 "We liberated the territories we consider ours and created

12 conditions for political and military leadership of SR BiH so that they

13 could perform all activities and negotiations regarding the future state

14 of BiH from the position of the stronger one in this territory."

15 Mr. Krajisnik, that sounds very similar to the language that you

16 used at the 11th Session of the Assembly on the 18th of March, four months

17 earlier, when you said, and I quote: "In this respect, it would be good

18 if we could do one thing for strategic reasons, if we could start

19 implementing what we have agreed upon the ethnic division on the ground,

20 that we start determining the territory, and once the territory is

21 determined it remains to be established in additional negotiations whose

22 territories are to function and in what way."

23 It seems, Mr. Krajisnik, from reading the text of General Mladic

24 and your statement from the 11th Session, that you and General Mladic were

25 very much in accord that you achieve the taking of territories on the

Page 25601

1 ground and that would assist in future negotiations with the other

2 parties. You and Mr. -- General Mladic were in sync on that, weren't you,

3 Mr. Krajisnik?

4 A. This is not connected at all. Mladic did not come to see us on

5 the 18th of March and he didn't know what I was thinking. Let me remind

6 you, on the 18th of March there was discussion of the Cutileiro Plan and

7 ethnical divisions according to the Cutileiro Plan, whereas he is here

8 talking about some kind of military engagement.

9 Q. When General Mladic says that the liberation of territories that

10 were considered to be Serbs had been accomplished and that they would

11 essentially assist in negotiations regarding the future state of BH from a

12 position of strength, essentially, it's a fact, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik,

13 that additional negotiations after the last negotiations with Ambassador

14 Cutileiro, that additional negotiations were, in fact, contemplated. You

15 had intended after the failure of the Cutileiro Plan to continue to

16 negotiate, and in fact you did negotiate?

17 A. Yes, there was the London Conference, both London Conferences at

18 this time. And the actual situation was completely eliminated. A new

19 plan was on the table. This is his terminology as a soldier, but it is

20 not based on the plan. We went to London twice for meetings in July.

21 Q. New negotiations commenced, but the situation on the ground had

22 changed from the last failed negotiations, hadn't they? Since the last

23 negotiations, in other words, Mr. Krajisnik, since the failure of the

24 Cutileiro negotiations, the Army of the Republika Srpska seized territory,

25 the corridor, and the situation on the ground changed. That's correct,

Page 25602

1 isn't it?

2 A. Yes, it changed significantly in favour of the Serb side. It

3 changed significantly.

4 Q. And in future negotiations, Mr. Krajisnik, did the Bosnian Serbs

5 agree to give up the Posavina corridor?

6 A. The Serbs from Bosnia in negotiations - and I gave you the map -

7 agreed to get whatever they could by negotiation. We never agreed not to

8 have the corridor, but the corridor was to be achieved by agreement not by

9 military means. There were negotiations with the Croats in Grac. You can

10 see that, at the 16th Session, and those are our demands for a corridor.

11 Q. My question was: In the future negotiations, Mr. Krajisnik, did

12 the Bosnian Serbs agree to voluntarily relinquish the territory that

13 General Mladic had seized via Operation Corridor?

14 A. No, not the corridor, but there was a significant amount of

15 territory that the Serbs did agree to give up that had been taken by the

16 army.

17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch the percentage.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Around 30 per cent.


20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's return to tab 218. It is the report on the

21 army, and I refer you, Mr. Krajisnik --

22 MR. HARMON: And again, Your Honours, just briefly to page 160.

23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, that is -- the section I'm referring to is found on

24 page 139 in the Cyrillic text, last four digits are 7477 of the ERN.

25 A. Yes, I have found it. Please proceed.

Page 25603

1 Q. In the top paragraph -- we've already referred to this, but it

2 refers to the activities of the army, and it says: "In the last month and

3 a half that the army operations concentrated on liberation of Podrinje,

4 and thereby the strategic objective of our war would be realised, that one

5 could be defined as 'establishing contact with Serbia on the river Drina

6 or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier.'"

7 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I want to look at the directive that is

8 directive 4. It is found at tab 222. It has already been exhibited. It

9 is Prosecution Exhibit 272, and this document, Mr. Krajisnik --

10 A. The information you mean, 220?

11 Q. 222, tab 222 --

12 A. Oh, 222, excuse me.

13 Q. Yes. Tab 222, this is a document which is a document that was

14 issued --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- by General Mladic. You can see in the upper left-hand corner

17 on the first page it's from the Main Staff of the Army of the RS. It's

18 dated the 19th of November, 1992. It's very urgent. It is a directive

19 for further operations of the Army of Republika Srpska. It's addressed to

20 the commander (Chief of Staff) personally. I'd like to direct your

21 attention, Mr. Krajisnik, to the ERN on the page -- bearing the last four

22 digits of the ERN 6282.

23 MR. HARMON: And Your Honours to page 5, subpart D, the directive

24 to the Drina Corps.

25 Q. Tell me when you've found that, Mr. Krajisnik. Do you have that,

Page 25604

1 Mr. Krajisnik?

2 A. Yes. It's not very legible. I found 6278 -- just a moment.

3 Q. 6282, Mr. Krajisnik, and it is the second -- it's the first full

4 paragraph --

5 A. Oh, 82, sorry. But, yeah, it's very difficult to see this, too,

6 but please go ahead.

7 Q. Let me read it. This is the direction that General Mladic issues

8 to the Drina Corps.

9 "The Drina Corps. From its position -- present positions, its

10 main forces shall persistently defend Visegrad, the dam, Zvornik and the

11 corridor, while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall

12 exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, and force

13 him to leave Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas together with the Muslim

14 population."

15 Mr. Krajisnik, this directive to the Drina Corps, first off would

16 you agree or disagree with me, Mr. Krajisnik, this deals with strategic

17 objective number 3, to establish a corridor in the Drina River valley and

18 to eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states. First off,

19 do you agree with me or disagree with me?

20 A. No, I don't agree.

21 Q. Let's take a look, Mr. Krajisnik, at how the commander from the

22 Drina Corps who received this document, this directive from the Main

23 Staff, understood it and conveyed it to his subordinate units. And to do

24 that we need to turn to tab 236, Mr. Krajisnik. And 236 is Exhibit P892,

25 tab 13. This will refer you, Mr. Krajisnik, to the first paragraph of

Page 25605

1 this document?

2 MR. HARMON: Likewise, Your Honour, paragraph number 1.

3 Q. This is a strictly confidential Drina Corps command decision on

4 further activities. It's dated the 24th of November, 1992, and this

5 particular document is directed to the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade

6 command. And it says as follows in paragraph 1, and it's pursuant to the

7 directive.

8 "Cause as many losses as possible to the enemy with the active

9 involvement of main forces and equipment, wear the enemy out, break it up

10 or force it to surrender, and force the Muslim population to leave the

11 area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde."

12 Mr. Krajisnik, this order from General -- and this order was then

13 issued by General -- the commander of the Drina Corps, General -- sorry,

14 Colonel Zivanovic, then-Colonel Zivanovic. The order was also issued to

15 other subordinate units of the Drina Corps.

16 MR. HARMON: I can refer Your Honours to tab 237 for your

17 information.

18 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, similar order issued on the same date to the

19 Bratunac Brigade implementing the directive. And I can refer you,

20 Mr. Krajisnik, to tabs 238, 239, and 240, which are even lower echelon

21 formations who received the order from their superior command. So one can

22 see from this series of documents starting with the directive issued by

23 General Mladic to the Drina Corps command, and then from -- from

24 then-Colonel Zivanovic to his subordinate brigades. And then further down

25 yet to the lowest echelons that the task of forcing the Muslim population

Page 25606

1 to leave the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde was issued, and

2 we know from the evidence that it was implemented. Mr. Krajisnik, the

3 order which forces the Muslim population to leave those areas is

4 consistent with strategic objective number 1, which was to separate the

5 Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities. Isn't that correct?

6 A. No, no, that's not true. And this was not implemented except in

7 relation to Cerska, if at all, in 1995, neither Gorazde nor Zepa nor

8 Srebrenica. And it cannot be connected with any of the strategic

9 objectives, this driving out of the population, this -- this transfer or

10 re-settlement of the population.

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, whether it was successful in 1992, it was ordered

12 by General Mladic, it was ordered by his subordinate commander to

13 subordinate units, and it was an order to separate the Muslim population

14 from those particular areas. Do we agree on that or disagree on that?

15 A. What Mladic ordered and what you're saying is correct is correct,

16 but a moment ago you also said it was implemented and I'm just saying it

17 wasn't.

18 Q. And the order issued by General Mladic was consistent with

19 strategic objective number 1, separation of the Serb people from the other

20 ethnic communities in Bosnia. Do you agree with that or do you disagree

21 with that?

22 A. No, no, I completely disagree and you're completely wrong. It's

23 not remotely connected with this. Our strategic goal was to create

24 Republika Srpska with -- through -- with the three ethnic communities

25 separated and Republika Srpska established. It has nothing to do with it.

Page 25607

1 Q. Okay, Mr. Krajisnik. In fact, Mr. Krajisnik --

2 A. Just a minute, if you don't mind. You have my statement from

3 October and November where I said clearly: I am deeply against ethnic

4 cleansing. It is in evidence if you are driving at ethnic cleansing.

5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Before we -- you continue, Mr. Harmon.

7 This order, is this, in your view ethnic cleansing, this ethnic

8 cleansing order? So apart from whether it was successful, whether it was

9 implemented, do you consider this to be an order for ethnic cleansing?

10 That is: "Force the Muslim population to leave the area."

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: So you consider this to be illegal or ...

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe it is illegal,

14 unlawful. Nobody has the right to force one ethnic community, one people,

15 to leave.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

17 Yes, Judge Hanoteau has a question.

18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] But, Mr. Krajisnik, how can you

19 explain that such orders were signed?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I don't know

21 about that dispatch, about that order that he sent to units. I'm seeing

22 it for the first time. In fact, I saw it here at the Tribunal for the

23 first time. Why did he write that? Because the people themselves were an

24 army, but of course he had no right to say: Force the Muslim population

25 out. Of course that's unlawful, that's a crime. I don't know why he did

Page 25608

1 that.

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] But you think that he was

3 controlled or under the influence of the civilian authorities of the

4 country?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that this was not done

6 under any orders of the civilian authorities. I told you, I gave two

7 statements in October and November, right here, in which I said I was

8 against any kind of ethnic cleansing. It was published. It was in public

9 domain. I didn't know about this particular affair, but there had been

10 complaints and I spoke out on the issue.

11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

13 MR. HARMON: I seem to be missing two pages in this, Your Honour,

14 but I can refer Your Honours to the exhibit and the references, and I read

15 part of it into the record.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in this report on the army, first of all -- before

17 I get there, Mr. Krajisnik. The military kept the --

18 A. You mean the same one, 236?

19 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, before you pay attention to the

20 document in front of you you'll find that the part I'm going to quote you

21 is not in front of you.

22 Let me ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, this: The military

23 was keeping the political authorities, including yourself, apprised of the

24 operations that had been conducted and were about to be conducted in the

25 Republika Srpska in 1992. Isn't that the case?

Page 25609

1 A. I don't remember that anybody informed me of actions like this

2 before they happened. Whether they copied such documents to somebody

3 else, I don't know.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in the report on the army, part of the text is

5 missing in the exhibit in front of you.

6 MR. HARMON: But I can refer Your Honours and counsel to the pages

7 I'm referring to. I'm referring to pages 153 and 154 --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, Mr. Harmon, your question to

9 Mr. Krajisnik was whether the military was keeping the political

10 authorities, including yourself, apprised of the operations that had been

11 conducted and were about to be conducted in the Republika Srpska ..."

12 The answer limited itself where you said, Mr. Krajisnik: "I don't

13 remember that anybody informed me of actions like this before they

14 happened."

15 But the question was larger. It was whether you were informed

16 when these operations were about to be conducted, but also whether you

17 were informed about the operations that had been conducted, so that's

18 after they had been conducted. Could you also answer the second part of

19 the question.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. As for completed

21 operations, whether somebody from the Main Staff sent some sort of report,

22 I don't know, I don't remember. I told you how I was informed by MPs that

23 a certain territory had been liberated. If there's some sort of report in

24 existence, I would like to see it and to be able to comment on it. But I

25 don't remember that they reported after an operation or a job had been

Page 25610

1 completed, especially not to me.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now you make reference to MPs as a source of

3 information. Didn't you say that during these meetings, consultative

4 meetings which you said were named Presidency meetings that military staff

5 would inform you about the situation on the ground as well? I could go

6 back to that portion of your testimony if you'd like to.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. Correct. That was

8 also true, and I said it. At consultative meetings we frequently received

9 reports or information that a certain operation had been completed. And I

10 was aware that a certain place had been liberated; that is not in dispute.

11 But how and what the directive had been, I didn't know that.


13 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.

14 MR. HARMON: If I could have the assistance of the usher in

15 retrieving from Mr. Krajisnik the documents that are in front of him. It

16 may well be that the documents that are missing from my set are in the set

17 in front of Mr. Krajisnik.

18 What I'm looking for, Your Honours, and perhaps Your Honours have

19 an incomplete set as well, if I could be informed. I'm looking for, I

20 believe it's pages 152 and 153 in the report on the army. It should be in

21 tab 218.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. They are missing -- at least in my --

23 MR. HARMON: Let me see if they are in Mr. Krajisnik's set.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will be happy if I can be of

25 assistance to the Prosecutor.

Page 25611

1 MR. HARMON: They appear in the English, Your Honour, in

2 Mr. Krajisnik's set. So if I could --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Are you sure about that, because what I -- oh,

4 Mr. Krajisnik's set --

5 MR. HARMON: Mr. Krajisnik's set.

6 JUDGE ORIE: That starts then not at page 154 but earlier?

7 MR. HARMON: I have in tab 218 the English of the report on the

8 army. It's pages 152 and 153. Perhaps --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we don't have them. And --

10 MR. HARMON: Perhaps they can be put on --

11 JUDGE ORIE: And the B/C/S version starting with page 134, which

12 is the first page we have in the B/C/S, corresponds with page 154 rather

13 than any earlier page.

14 MR. HARMON: Yes.

15 JUDGE ORIE: It's about the analysis NNA.

16 MR. HARMON: Yes, that's correct. So there's a mistake,

17 obviously, with these documents. I can disassemble this. I could put the

18 English on the ELMO and I can refer to the B/C/S version for

19 Mr. Krajisnik.

20 JUDGE ORIE: If you would prepare that for after the break,

21 Mr. Harmon.

22 MR. HARMON: That would be fine. Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break until five minutes to 1.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.

Page 25612

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, do you -- have you sorted out all the

2 pages in front of us?

3 MR. HARMON: Yes. Thank you very much.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in fact in 1992 the military leaders were keeping

5 fully informed, you and the political leaders of the Bosnian Serbs of the

6 state of the military operations, what they had accomplished, what they

7 intended to accomplish. Correct?

8 A. I have said that as far as I'm concerned, I don't remember that

9 they informed me when they were to complete something, and whether they

10 informed other people, I don't know.

11 Q. Let's take a look at tab 218 in the -- again, the report on the

12 army. And the pages I'm going to be referring you to, Mr. Krajisnik, I've

13 marked with a yellow tab in your copy.

14 MR. HARMON: This, Your Honours, is pages 152 and 153 on the

15 report on the army.

16 Q. These are the concluding remarks of Dr. Karadzic on the findings

17 of the analysis of the combat readiness and activities of the Army of

18 Republika Srpska in 1992.

19 MR. HARMON: Does the Court have a set of these documents? I

20 thought they were distributed.

21 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Excuse me.

22 JUDGE ORIE: We all have them.

23 MR. HARMON: All right. We can proceed. I'm referring, Your

24 Honours, to page 153, paragraph 4, the top. And in the end of paragraph 4

25 as well.

Page 25613

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, reading from paragraph 4, Dr. Karadzic says, and I

2 quote: "The Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every individual

3 member of the Supreme Command, were informed of the objectives of planned

4 operations and concerted battles, and of their results, frequently and in

5 great detail."

6 Then if you go to the next paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik. Halfway

7 through that paragraph Dr. Karadzic says: "This relationship between the

8 command structures and the organs of government and the Supreme Command

9 made it impossible for the Main Staff to make decisions absolutely on its

10 own, rather every operational battle was politically endorsed on the basis

11 of the interest of the Serbian people, and approved by the highest

12 authorities of Republika Srpska."

13 Mr. Krajisnik, you were informed, as was Dr. Karadzic and other

14 leaders in the Republika Srpska of the objectives and results of the

15 military operations that were being conducted by the VRS in 1992. Isn't

16 that correct?

17 A. I have said in which way I was informed at meetings, but I was not

18 informed by the Main Staff. I was not part of the Supreme Command, and I

19 did not receive direct information.

20 Q. Did you become a member of the Supreme Command in late November of

21 1992, Mr. Krajisnik?

22 A. That was an advisory body, correct. In end 1992, in December, and

23 in 1993, I attended a few meetings of the Supreme Command, and the

24 military were present as well.

25 Q. And prior to your becoming a member of the Supreme Command, you

Page 25614

1 were advised and informed by the army of the results of military

2 operations as well as the objectives of future operations that were to

3 take place. Isn't that correct, Mr. Krajisnik?

4 A. No, no, that's not the way it was. The army did not inform me.

5 You have a series of documents wherein they informed the government and

6 the president of the Presidency. In their eyes the supreme commander is

7 one man. I don't rule out the possibility that they sent me a copy here

8 and there, but I certainly wasn't informed, nor was it their obligation.

9 Q. Let's take a look at the document found at tab 215,

10 Mr. Krajisnik -- 214, I'm sorry. This is Exhibit P892, tab 37.1.

11 Mr. Krajisnik, this is a document from the Main Staff of the Army

12 of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's a highly

13 confidential document. It is dated the 1st of June, 1992,

14 entitled "meeting of the corps commanders," and it's an order personally

15 to the commanders of units that are identified at the second page of the

16 English, at the end of the document. And it says, and I quote: "Pursuant

17 to the decision of the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina and the Main Staff of the army, a meeting of the political

19 leadership of the republic and the military commanders is to be held in

20 Pale on 3 June 1992."

21 Then General Milovanovic orders that the corps commanders appear

22 and that they prepare the following. And the second bullet point is a

23 state of affairs in their own units. And the fourth bullet point is a

24 proposal for future activities, and each of the commanders was to brief

25 the persons assembled for ten to 15 minutes.

Page 25615

1 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, it appears from this document that there were

2 meetings where the military specifically informed political -- the

3 political leadership of the republic of the proposal for future

4 activities. Isn't that correct?

5 A. I attended two conferences with the army attended by a number of

6 civilian representatives, members of the Presidency, the president of the

7 Assembly, Prime Minister, and some ministers. But that was an advisory

8 meeting. One took place in Bijeljina and another one in Pale to the best

9 of my recollection.

10 Q. And to the rest of your recollection, Mr. Krajisnik, does this

11 directive of General Milovanovic reflect the approximate date and time of

12 the meeting that you attended with other members of the political

13 leadership?

14 A. I don't know, but I'm not saying it's not possible. I probably

15 was there if the others were there as well.

16 Q. And in addition, Mr. Krajisnik, to --

17 JUDGE ORIE: May I again -- Mr. Krajisnik, may I again draw your

18 attention to the fact. The only thing Mr. Harmon asked you is whether the

19 military informed political -- the political leadership of the republic of

20 the proposal for future activities. And then you say: It was just an

21 advisory meeting. It was not suggested in the question that it was a

22 meeting in which decisions were taken; Mr. Harmon was focussing on whether

23 the political leadership was informed about these matters. So please try

24 to understand what Mr. Harmon is asking you and not include in your

25 answers -- of course if there's some really relevant issue. But there's

Page 25616

1 no need to contradict something which is not even suggested in the

2 question.

3 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.


5 Q. Can you answer the question, Mr. Krajisnik?

6 A. I answered the question. I said they did not inform me. However,

7 you gave me a document to look through, so I'm commenting upon it. I was

8 not informed by military bodies, and I didn't have any more meetings of

9 that kind, apart from those two advisory ones.

10 Q. And apart from the meeting that took place on the -- in respect of

11 the meeting that took place on the 1st of June where General Milovanovic

12 specifically orders his commanders to brief the political leadership of

13 the future activities of the Army of Republika Srpska, did you attend such

14 a meeting where that took place?

15 A. I said I don't know, but I believe I did.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Because -- I believe I did, I don't know. But I attended two

18 meeting of this kind, so this was probably one of them.

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the record, Mr. Harmon, the meeting was

21 held -- at least that's what we read in this document dated the 1st of

22 June, the meeting was held on the 3rd of June in order to avoid whatever

23 misunderstanding.

24 MR. HARMON: Yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

Page 25617


2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in addition to meetings you attended with the

3 military, specifically the type of which are found in tab 214, there were

4 a number of briefings at the Presidency sessions where the members of the

5 Presidency in attendance were informed by either General Mladic, General

6 Gvero, General Tolimir, or other military representatives of the situation

7 on the front, the military situation in the Republika Srpska, as well as

8 the military political situation that the army -- strike that --

9 specifically strategic questions that were confronting the army in the

10 execution of its tasks. Do you understand my question or should I repeat

11 it?

12 A. I will answer your question. At the meetings attended by the

13 military at those consultative meetings of the leadership which are termed

14 the Presidency meetings, the soldiers put forward the problems they were

15 coming across in their activities. Conclusions were put forward as to how

16 the civilian authorities could help the military solve their problems on

17 the ground.

18 Q. In addition to which, Mr. Krajisnik, for example during the 27th

19 Session of the Presidency on the 31st of August, it says, and I

20 quote: "During the session of the Presidency, representatives of the Army

21 of the Serbian Republic Colonel-General Mladic and Major-General Gvero

22 arrived. The generals briefed the Presidency on military and strategic

23 questions," and it goes on.

24 So these were meetings where the leadership was informed, for

25 example, of strategic questions. Isn't that correct?

Page 25618

1 A. No. They were informed of what was happening on the ground and

2 what the problems were. The civilian organs immediately took steps to

3 solve these issues, such as the appearance of paramilitary formations,

4 looting and theft, lack of food, and so on. They were always putting

5 forward requests.

6 Q. They were also informing the Presidency of their accomplishments;

7 for example, that the corridor operation had been completely successful.

8 Isn't that correct?

9 A. The corridor operation was well known from the newspapers, even

10 before they informed about it. It was in all the newspapers that a

11 corridor had been established between Krajina and Serbia, and they

12 probably informed us about this, too.

13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in the many meetings that you had in the Presidency

14 with members of the military and other meetings that you attended outside

15 of the Presidency, did you ever inquire of the army what their objectives

16 were? Did you ever ask them: What are you doing?

17 A. I didn't attend many meetings, first of all; and secondly, they

18 were telling us what they were doing and what their problems were. It was

19 simply a dialogue. They would say: We need food, we need clothing, and

20 so on and so forth. They saw the civilian authorities as logistical

21 support, and they asked for help where they thought the civilian

22 authorities could assist them in cases of theft and so on. There was no

23 discussion of military operative issues, only the support they needed in

24 order to act. And all their other problems they could deal with in the

25 Ministry of Defence. That's where they could go.

Page 25619

1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, considering you were one of the paramount leaders

2 in the Republika Srpska, the Republika Srpska was expending its precious

3 treasury and capital, both materiel capital and human capital, did you

4 ever ask the military: What are your objectives? What are you trying to

5 achieve?

6 A. Well, you're asking me to guess now, to speculate. I was in

7 dialogue with them. I can't remember what I did.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You're not invited to speculate. The question was

9 whether you ever asked it. If the answer is: No, then please tell us.

10 If the answer is yes --

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember having asked such a

12 question.

13 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, thank you.

15 MR. HARMON: I yield the floor to Mr. Tieger.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I would have one additional question then. But,

17 Mr. Krajisnik, whether or not you ever asked them what their objectives

18 were, it sounds as if you would have no idea about whether you would end

19 up with your front lines in mid-Italy or in the south of Bosnia or in the

20 middle of Kosovo or -- I mean, it could be anywhere, isn't it, if the

21 military objectives are unknown to you, then whether you would finally --

22 if it would have been possible, occupy a hundred per cent of Bosnian

23 territory or 40 per cent or 60 per cent -- I'm just trying to find out --

24 I -- let me say the following. It's not easy for me to understand how

25 political leaders would sit there and wait what the military would come

Page 25620

1 with and then say: Oh, well, they took 90 per cent or 30 per cent or

2 45 per cent of the territory, so I can't imagine -- at least I have

3 difficulties in imagining such a situation.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you allow me to explain

5 without interruption, please, and I'll explain to you exactly what I

6 meant.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I'll -- I -- I'll try not to interrupt you if you

8 answer my question and an explanation is fine. But if you start telling

9 us a lot of things which are not directly related to the question, I do

10 not deprive myself of the possibility of interrupting you.

11 Please proceed.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, all of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina was a war front, all of it. The soldiers had only one goal:

14 To hold the front line. And if they took any action in certain areas, it

15 would depend on the situation. It was not our goal to take Tuzla or

16 anywhere else. It all depended on the situation, what the men on the

17 ground were able to do. They won and lost territories. The situation

18 kept fluctuating throughout the war. This was the only goal I was aware

19 of, and they were aware of it, too. All these directives were directives

20 which were never achieved, or at least many of them were never achieved

21 because it was not possible. What's put down on paper is not actually the

22 solution to the problem.

23 These consultative meetings, Your Honour, various discussions were

24 conducted. Of course I was interested in what was happening on the

25 ground, but there is no objective that can be achieved if it's impossible.

Page 25621

1 You can't tell them: Do this or that if there is a strong force opposing

2 it and they couldn't do it. Of course I was not disinterested --

3 THE INTERPRETER: I was not uninterested, in other words,

4 interpreter's correction.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for not interrupting me.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although I get a bit the feeling that you're

7 mixing up objectives and possibilities to achieve them and problems you

8 may find on your way if you are trying to achieve objectives, your answer

9 containing a bit of everything, I will not further pursue this matter at

10 this moment.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I -- just in connection with the

12 corridor, may I say something, Mr. President?

13 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Krajina was cut off. The

15 western part was cut off from Pale. All action was agreed on in the

16 Krajina Corps in Banja Luka because people couldn't get humanitarian aid

17 through. And we learned about this at Pale only when it was all over, at

18 least I did. But the military felt they had to establish a corridor by

19 force because humanitarian assistance couldn't get through. Nine babies

20 died for lack of oxygen, as they told us. We had no territorial link with

21 them at all until the corridor was established.

22 And one more thing. During the war a lot of lies were told. When

23 somebody was giving you information, half of it you would disregard as

24 unrealistic. People bragged a lot, they boasted.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

Page 25622

1 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]

2 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Krajisnik.

3 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Tieger.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I would like to ask you some questions about some

5 of the specific strategic objectives. And I'd like it begin with

6 strategic objective number 3 and some of the things that you've told us

7 about that objective.

8 Now, you were asked some questions during the course of your

9 examination-in-chief about that particular strategic goal on the 16th of

10 May, first at --

11 A. Excuse me. What is this strategic objective? Can you tell me its

12 name? The third strategic objective as Dr. Karadzic enunciated it at the

13 16th Session is to establish a corridor in the Drina valley, that is

14 elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds.

15 A. Yes, thank you. Thank you very much.

16 Q. And as it's articulated in the decision on strategic objectives of

17 the Serbian People, it is establish a corridor in the Drina River valley,

18 that is eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states.

19 Now, on the 16th of May at approximately 12.22 to 12.23 you

20 explain something of what Dr. Karadzic was saying and indicated that at

21 some point in his enunciation of the goal, he should have stopped but he

22 went on. And then you said: "But he knew according to the Cutileiro Plan

23 this belonged to the other ethnic community, and it would have to be

24 resolved in a different way, either through exchanges or through

25 annexation or that their ethnic community would consist of several parts.

Page 25623

1 Well, I don't agree with that. He doesn't agree with that either but

2 that's the way he put it."

3 Now, I'm going to talk to you in a moment about Dr. Karadzic's

4 enunciation of a goal that he didn't agree with at the time he enunciated

5 it, but first I wanted to turn to your comment about the Cutileiro Plan.

6 You showed us a map in connection with that as I recall, and I think that

7 map is found at tab 228. So if we could take a quick look at that. I

8 don't know if you have those documents in front of you, Mr. Krajisnik, or

9 if they need to be distributed. I know you're familiar with that map.

10 A. Yes, yes, I know, yes.

11 Q. And that's D192A, which is an -- a map of the ethnic structure of

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina according to settlements, as it appears in the

13 legend of that map. And on it you've provided a red line which appears to

14 leave a course between Muslim-dominated local settlements which, as I

15 understand it, you indicated was the corridor envisioned, according to

16 you, by the Cutileiro Plan and the corridor envisioned by the strategic

17 objectives. Do I have that roughly right?

18 A. No, no, but you're close. I will explain what I said then and I

19 know what I meant to say.

20 Q. Well, what is -- what, if any, is the relationship between the

21 line that you provided in red on D192A and the strategic objectives?

22 A. When asked by His Honour, I explained it. When he asked me why

23 the line was like this, I said to him: Look at the Cutileiro map. In

24 only two places is the territory, our territory, not linked up. And this

25 is the real corridor. I was only explaining where the Serb territories

Page 25624

1 were here and where a road would go. And that's the map in dispute. I

2 was showing where the road would go, and it's surrounded by Serb

3 territory. You can find it in my answer. Only at the top is there a

4 corridor where there's Muslim territory and we cannot link up our

5 territories according to the Cutileiro Plan and the Cutileiro map.

6 Q. I believe I understood all that and maybe my question wasn't

7 specific enough. I understood you to say that the strategic objectives

8 were simply the recitation of the objectives or the -- essentially a

9 recitation of the Cutileiro Plan. And I understood you to say that D192A

10 with that red line is a reflection of the Cutileiro Plan. Therefore, I

11 understood you to say that looking at D192A we can see the enunciation of

12 strategic goal 3. Right or wrong?

13 A. We based the third goal, the third objective, on the Cutileiro map

14 to have the corridor here. That's correct. But not on this map, on the

15 Cutileiro map, the one I gave you, if you recall.

16 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm looking at D192A at tab 228 and

17 simultaneously looking at strategic objective number 3: "Establish a

18 corridor in the Drina River valley, that is eliminate the Drina as a

19 border separating Serbian states." And that seems to raise two questions.

20 Number one, your red line seems substantially removed from the Drina; and

21 number two, it's very difficult to see how that would accomplish the

22 objective of eliminating the Drina as a border between two Serbian worlds.

23 A. Yes, as I explained, the map you have, that's the part that's not

24 linked up. And I said it would pass through our territory.

25 As for the other part of your question, I'll answer it. Removing

Page 25625

1 the Drina as a border, as I explained, was to have been done on the basis

2 of special -- a special relationship not to have passports and visas, not

3 to have the Drina as a psychological border. So I explained all this at

4 the meeting with the SDA. So this was to be just a special relationship,

5 not territorial linkage. So these were actually two objectives, so to

6 speak.

7 Q. So strategic objective number 3 should actually have read

8 something like: Eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states

9 by enacting some kind of mutual relationship so that Serbs will not need

10 visas to cross Muslim territory and get into Serbia. Is that it?

11 A. Well, you've added something here. The psychological border and a

12 border where you need a passport to go across, where you can't have

13 cultural links and so on, we wanted to have everything linked up with

14 Serbia except to be the same state. We couldn't be the same state, and

15 that is pointed out in this document which I gave to Mr. Izetbegovic. Had

16 we said: Eliminate the border, that would have meant unification with

17 Serbia, but that was not it. On the contrary.

18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the fact is, as clearly articulated by Dr. Karadzic

19 on the 16th -- at the 16th Session on May 12th, the objective was to

20 eliminate the Drina as a border by ensuring that Serbs occupied and held

21 the territory on both sides so that the Drina was effectively the backbone

22 of those two worlds and not a border between them. That's the long and

23 the short of it, isn't it? ?

24 A. Well, no, no. Mr. Karadzic said there would be enclaves along the

25 Drina. It's all put down here in writing. Those are the enclaves that

Page 25626

1 exist in the Cutileiro Plan. There's a whole Muslim area along the Drina,

2 you can see that at the 16th Session when he explains it.

3 Q. Small Muslim enclaves, just as Dr. Karadzic indicated in his

4 October 12th, 1992, telephone call with Gojko Djogo, small Muslim enclaves

5 amidst predominantly Bosnian Serb territory. That's it?

6 A. Yes, he said "small," but that doesn't mean that -- well, it would

7 depend on what was achieved in negotiations. But he did announce that

8 there would be enclaves, not that everything would be cleansed as one

9 could interpret it all the way up to the river Drina.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, before you put your next question to

11 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Josse asked a couple of minutes to address the matter

12 of the photographic material. We are 20 minutes to 2.00, so I'd like to

13 give Mr. Josse an opportunity to make any brief submissions in that

14 respect at this moment.

15 MR. TIEGER: Of course, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse.

17 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I spoke briefly to Mr. Harmon. I am

18 aware that the Chamber does not have this material at the moment, and the

19 submissions that I wish to make relate, in effect, to the index or

20 schedule that accompany the photographs. The position is this: That the

21 index states, really as the Chamber requested back on the 8th of March of

22 this year, with municipality, location, then the object, and then the date

23 destroyed. It also deals with the date the photograph was taken and by

24 whom it was taken.

25 Your Honour, the Defence are not in a position to agree or admit

Page 25627

1 any of what is stated within the schedule. Now, the Chamber might well

2 take the view that to ask the Prosecution to technically prove this

3 Chamber -- I beg your pardon, to technically prove this schedule is

4 cumbersome and unnecessary because I want to make it clear that the

5 Defence don't say that the schedule is inaccurate, it's simply that we've

6 not in a position to say that it is actually accurate, and therefore we're

7 not prepared to admit it. Precisely how the Chamber want to proceed in

8 those circumstances is a matter for the Court to consider.

9 JUDGE ORIE: What's the main issue, Mr. Josse? Is the main issue

10 the date of destruction? I mean --

11 MR. JOSSE: The main issue I'm taking?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, it seems that you -- or do you say:

13 Well, they could present a picture from Rwanda and say it's Visegrad or is

14 it ...

15 MR. JOSSE: All of those points.

16 JUDGE ORIE: All of those points.

17 MR. JOSSE: All of those points. But I want to make it clear,

18 Your Honour, that I'm simply stating to some extent based on my own, to

19 use a word Mr. Tieger did the other day, my own training sort of

20 observations I might make to a court in England in the same circumstances.

21 If the Chamber takes the view, well, these are absurd, pedantic points and

22 really we're not very interested in this at all, then let me make it clear

23 again: The Defence are not in a position to rebut what the Prosecution

24 are saying. But for example, some legal systems would insist on a

25 statement from the photographer saying: Well, I was in X place on Y day,

Page 25628

1 I took this photograph. There is no evidence such as that in the bundle

2 that has been given to me.

3 Could I make one other observation, and it's perhaps a little bit

4 more important and it's this. In the middle of the schedule it

5 says: "Evidence/information," and contained is a evidential entry, in

6 effect, which tries to link the photograph in question to the evidence in

7 this case. That I do take greater objection to. That, we submit, is

8 really going too far and amounts to a commentary on the evidence to try

9 and link it to the photograph, which isn't, we submit, what the Chamber

10 had in mind when it asked for this exercise to be carried out.

11 So, Your Honour, those really are my observations so far as the

12 photographs are concerned.

13 Briefly there is also this CD. The CD is about two and a half

14 hours long. In part -- and I can't say I've watched it all but I've

15 watched some of it. But in part it contains some English commentary. The

16 Defence want to know really the purpose of the CD being admitted in

17 evidence; secondly, if it's going to be admitted, what is going to happen

18 about that commentary? Is there going to be a transcript? Is there any

19 attempt to have the commentary as part of the evidence? Or is it expected

20 that the Chamber will watch this two and a half hour CD in silence, as

21 they have been requested to do, for example, in relation to the Tuzla

22 convoy CD. So that is a different issue.

23 Thirdly is this: I did last week briefly speak to Mr. Krajisnik

24 about the photographic material. He, as I pointed out to the Court last

25 week, has very substantive objections. Perhaps the best way of dealing

Page 25629

1 with those is simply for someone to ask him about them whilst he remains

2 in the witness box, not of course now. But his objections I think it's

3 fair to say, I didn't spend very long with him on the subject, don't

4 really relate to some technical points that I'm taking. They more relate

5 to the evidence itself.

6 I hope that's helpful.


8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE ORIE: We'll discuss the matter, but if there's any

10 immediate response at this moment from the Prosecution, if that would take

11 not more than two minutes, then we would like to hear it.

12 MR. TIEGER: Just one quick point, Your Honour, that may be of

13 assistance to the Court.

14 With respect to the commentary on the video -- no, the Court is

15 certainly welcome to listen to it in silence. My recollection is that

16 it's -- the commentary consists of information about precisely where the

17 shots are taken. But I think with the -- for these purposes it's not

18 necessary to listen to it. If counsel wants to talk to me about that and

19 we -- and thinks it might be of assistance to the Court, we're fine on

20 that either way. So that shouldn't be a point of contention in any way.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

22 We'll consider the matter.

23 Mr. Krajisnik, we might -- we still have to consider that as well.

24 We might give you an opportunity to just briefly comment on your

25 objections against the material.

Page 25630

1 One question, Mr. Josse, did the Defence prepare any material to

2 visualise any damage done in non-indictment municipalities?

3 MR. JOSSE: No, Your Honour. Could I say to the best of my

4 knowledge, we are not in possession of any such material, and if we are it

5 is of such a random nature that we are not in the position to present it

6 to this Chamber in any meaningful way.


8 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, if we would invite you to -- give the reasons

9 why you would not agree with this material to be admitted into evidence,

10 even for the very limited purposes the Chamber made clear, of course we

11 are not going to establish on the basis of some comment to a photograph

12 that something happened if there's not a solid evidentiary basis for such

13 a finding, we would not do that on the basis of those photographs, which

14 leaves of course open the issue of the evidential entry, as you said, Mr.

15 Josse. We'll have to look at that. But would you then at least prepare

16 yourself to do that in a relatively brief way so that we could hear it.

17 But we still have to consider whether such an opportunity will be given to

18 you.

19 We'll then -- I further wanted to announce that -- I take it that

20 the appointment with the dentist now is fixed for Wednesday morning. The

21 Chamber is still considering at what time exactly then to start because we

22 have to use that time for other matters, and it might be that we could not

23 fit in just three-quarters of an hour or one hour. So it might be that we

24 start at 10.30 or even at 11.00. We're still considering how to use our

25 time and what flexibility it leaves us, the starting time on Wednesday

Page 25631

1 morning. So the parties should be prepared to start anywhere

2 between 10.00 and 11.00.

3 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, you're instructed again not to speak with

4 anyone about the testimony already given or still to be given.

5 And we'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, in this same

6 courtroom.

7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.,

8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 13th day of

9 June, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.