Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

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          1                 Monday, 20 March 2000

          2                 [Open session]

          3                 --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.

          4                 [The accused entered court]

          5            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good

          6  morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the

          7  technicians, to our interpreters; good morning to

          8  counsel for the Prosecution, counsel for Defence; good

          9  morning, General Krstic.

         10            We will resume our proceedings today.  We

         11  will be sitting in the present composition, as it has

         12  been announced, Judge Wald and myself.  We will be

         13  acting pursuant to Rule 15 bis of our Rules of

         14  Procedure and Evidence, but maybe only for today.

         15            So without much further ado, we will go on

         16  with the testimony of Mr. Jean-Rene Ruez.

         17            Is that the case, Mr. Harmon?  You have the

         18  floor.

         19            MR. HARMON:  Good morning, Mr. President;

         20  good morning, Judge Wald.  That is the case.

         21            Good morning, counsel.

         22                 [The witness entered court]

         23                 WITNESS:  JEAN-RENE RUEZ [Resumed]

         24            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good

         25  morning, Mr. Ruez.  Can you hear me?  May I remind you

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          1  that you are still under an oath.  We're going to

          2  continue now with your testimony.  You will be

          3  answering questions by Mr. Harmon.  Thank you.

          4                 Examined by Mr. Harmon: [Cont'd]

          5       Q.   Good morning, Mr. Ruez.  If you would

          6  approach the Prosecutor's exhibit, the large map, and

          7  again orient us to the location of the Pilica Cultural

          8  Centre.

          9       A.   I don't have a microphone which I used to

         10  have in the other courtroom.  I'll just use this one.

         11       Q.   Now, Mr. Ruez, we concluded last week's

         12  session with looking at a film of the Pilica Cultural

         13  Centre; is that correct?

         14       A.   That is correct.  And the location of that

         15  place on this map is precisely where I'm going to

         16  indicate it [indicates].  The purple triangle at the

         17  top of this exhibit, just under the border of Drina

         18  Corps, the Drina Corps limit, the north limit of the

         19  corps.

         20       Q.   Mr. Ruez, would you start your presentation

         21  with Prosecutor's Exhibit 25/A?

         22       A.   This exhibit is a photocopy of the map of the

         23  area, scale 1:50.000, and pinpoints the precise

         24  location of the so-called Dom of Culture of Pilica.

         25  One can see on this map that it is approximately

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          1  2 kilometres by a dirt road from the Branjevo Farm to

          2  the Pilica Dom of Culture.  This is the way that the

          3  executioners took that day.

          4            The next exhibit, 25/1.  It is an aerial

          5  photograph of Pilica, and I will show you the

          6  Exhibit 25/2, which is exactly the same photograph with

          7  markings on it.  I would need to enlarge this.

          8            So on this photograph, one can first see the

          9  national road that goes towards Bijeljina if one takes

         10  the north, and Zvornik if one takes the direction of

         11  the south.  Also, the cafe is pinpointed, the location

         12  from which Drazen Erdemovic could witness the events.

         13            You can also see on the photograph the

         14  cultural hall, which is the main building of that

         15  location.  There will be also an unidentified vehicle

         16  which is visible on this photograph and will be seen on

         17  another one.  We will comment on this one later on.

         18  One can see from that photograph that it is a populated

         19  area.

         20            The next exhibit, 25/3, will give a better

         21  view of the area.  It is a helicopter view, photograph

         22  dated 1999, and I will circle both the Dom of Culture

         23  and the cafe in front of it on the photograph [marks].

         24  I will mark "A" the Dom of Culture and "B" the little

         25  cafe.  One can clearly see on this photograph that they

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          1  are houses, and as one could see on the film dated

          2  1996, these houses were also occupied at the time.

          3       Q.   So, Mr. Ruez, these executions took place in

          4  a populated area; is that correct?

          5       A.   This is absolutely correct, yes.

          6            The next exhibit is 25/4.  It is a closer

          7  view of the Dom of Culture in relation with the cafe,

          8  which I'm going to again circle "A" and "B", "A" being

          9  the Dom of Culture and "B" the cafe [marks].

         10            Exhibit 25/5 is a view from above of the same

         11  Dom of Culture.  It happened at random that day that a

         12  double bus, the same ones which are used by the Milici

         13  bauxite mine company and which provided also

         14  transportation for both people deported or being

         15  executed, was standing just in front of the Dom,

         16  probably in the same position buses were standing at

         17  the time of the events, but this photograph is dated

         18  1999.  The access to the house of culture, I will mark

         19  it with an arrow [marks].  This is the access way to

         20  the entrance of the Dom of Culture.

         21       Q.   Mr. Ruez, let me direct your attention to an

         22  object or two objects that appear behind the bus and

         23  between the bus and the cultural Dom.  Do you see the

         24  two objects I'm referring to?  Two large objects that

         25  appear to be in stone.  Can you tell the Judges (1)

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          1  whether your investigations show that those objects

          2  were present at the time of the execution and, if not,

          3  what are they?

          4       A.   Yes.  These objects are a monument related to

          5  the school but the monument has changed since.  Now it

          6  is turning into a religious monument in that location.

          7  It is under construction.  It is not finished.

          8       Q.   In 1995, were these two large monuments

          9  present?

         10       A.   They were present but they are getting

         11  transformed.  There will be another exhibit, 25/7,

         12  which will show how these monuments were in 1996, and

         13  they are currently under change.

         14       Q.   Thank you.

         15       A.   Exhibit 25/6 is the plaque which indicates

         16  the location and which is to be in the front facade of

         17  the Dom of Culture.  It is seen on the film, and it

         18  indicates the location, Pilica.

         19            The next exhibit, the 25/7, is a view of the

         20  front facade of the building on which the two monuments

         21  you were referring to can be seen.

         22            Exhibit 25/8 is a view on the entrance door,

         23  the main entrance door of the Dom of Culture.  There is

         24  another door also, and I will mark it with an arrow

         25  [marks].  And this is the door from which the witness

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          1  could see men running out of the building and being

          2  shot in the street.  As far as we know, there is not

          3  one single survivor from this event.  We have never

          4  interviewed anyone who survived this location, nor have

          5  talked with anyone who knew someone who had survived

          6  this event.  Without the testimony of Drazen Erdemovic,

          7  we would not know about this situation.  He's the only

          8  one who provided information about what happened there.

          9            The next exhibit, 25/9, goes in relation with

         10  Exhibit 25/10.  These two exhibits form a panorama

         11  which shows in what state was the door before we

         12  entered the place and filmed the piece of footage which

         13  we showed to the Court.  I have a problem with my

         14  device here.  Yes, okay.  Sorry.  So as one can see on

         15  this photograph, there are a certain number of spider

         16  nests in between these two iron doors.  These spider

         17  nests seem to indicate that no one has entered this

         18  location for a while.  This footage was -- our entrance

         19  is dated June 1996, so between July 1995 and June 1996

         20  most probably no one entered this location before we

         21  got in, so we probably were the first ones to get in

         22  just after the cleaning process was conducted in 1995.

         23            Exhibit 25/11 is a view photographed from the

         24  openings in the first floor, these holes which are most

         25  probably the holes of the projectionist when they were

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          1  passing movies inside this theatre.  One can also see

          2  on this photograph the other door I was referring to,

          3  which I'm going to mark with an arrow [marks].

          4            Exhibit 25/12 is a close-up on some of the

          5  most significant bloodstains that one could see inside

          6  this building.

          7            25/13 shows one of the walls during a process

          8  where samples were taken from the wall.

          9            And Exhibit 25/14 is a photograph of the wall

         10  at the back of the building where the main destructions

         11  occurred, above the stage where probably the people

         12  were jammed, trying to avoid the bullets and the

         13  grenade explosions.

         14            The Exhibit 25/15 is a view of the cafe,

         15  which is just in front of the House of Culture.

         16            The Exhibit 25/16 is a black and white

         17  photocopy of a black and white aerial photograph.  The

         18  quality of the photocopy is fairly poor, but this is a

         19  blow-up of the previous aerial photograph where an

         20  unidentified vehicle was marked.  We have been told

         21  that this unidentified vehicle is indeed a truck.  I am

         22  going to circle this object on the photograph [marks].

         23  The photograph is dated 17 July 1995.  The event we are

         24  talking about was 16 July, so this photograph is one

         25  day after all the murders happened.  One could conclude

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          1  that this truck is parked here in order to take out the

          2  bodies of the victims away from the Dom of Culture.

          3            Another element that is visible on the

          4  photograph are tyre tracks, which I'm going to mark as

          5  well [marks], and these tyre tracks lead to the side

          6  door which I marked on a previous exhibit.  And I'm

          7  going to mark with an arrow the location of the side

          8  door.  So another vehicle might have got into that area

          9  to assist the cleaning process, if not the same one.

         10       Q.   Mr. Ruez, does that conclude your

         11  presentation on the Pilica Cultural Dom?

         12       A.   Yes, it does.

         13       Q.   Let's turn our attention next to Prosecutor's

         14  Exhibit 26, which is the Rocevici school, and if you

         15  would start again by orienting the Judges to that

         16  location on the big map.

         17       A.   The Rocevici school is a school located close

         18  to the national road that goes from Zvornik towards

         19  Bijeljina.  It is located in fact in between Kozluk and

         20  Pilica.  I'm going to point this detention facility on

         21  the main exhibit, where the purple triangle is marked

         22  on the main exhibit map.

         23            The next exhibit is 26A.  It is a photocopy

         24  of a map of the area, and the green dot marks the

         25  precise location of the school.  Seen from the road, it

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          1  is just on top of the hill that goes in a soft slope

          2  uphill, and the school is at the top.  We have no

          3  indication of how many people were taken to that

          4  school, nor how long they were -- they stayed inside.

          5            The Exhibit 26/1 is a photograph of that

          6  school.  The frame could be enlarged so that it only

          7  shows this main building.  There are other buildings

          8  behind, but this is the view one can have by zooming on

          9  this building seen from the road.

         10       Q.   Mr. Ruez, let's turn our attention now to

         11  Kozluk.  Again, please orient the Judges with the large

         12  map and then turn your attention, if you would, to

         13  Prosecutor's Exhibit 27A, the small map.

         14       A.   So Kozluk, as marked on this map, is an

         15  execution site and an initial mass grave site.  It is

         16  located just north-east of Kozluk.  One has to drive

         17  through the town coming from the south and turn right

         18  once inside the town to reach a dirt road that then

         19  brings us to a spot which is just next to the Drina

         20  Valley.  And on the map I pinpoint it [marks], is right

         21  here.

         22            Exhibit 27A is a map of the area.  I will

         23  pinpoint more precisely on this exhibit the location of

         24  the execution sites.  The black line that turns right

         25  towards the Drina River is a dirt road.  And where I'm

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          1  going to mark the cross, or a little circle, is the

          2  area where the execution spot was located [marks].

          3            We have no survivor from this situation.  The

          4  information, as we have been told -- sometimes

          5  difficulties to reach the area of Zvornik.  It has

          6  difficulties to reach the headquarters of the Drina

          7  Corps located in Vlasenica.  But the information we

          8  received about the event which happened in Kozluk

          9  arrived from this area to the community of refugees in

         10  Germany.  From the information we received about this

         11  location, we could request an imagery check of the area

         12  to confirm the event, and that led to the Exhibit

         13  27/1.  Following the information we received from the

         14  rumour I mentioned, we could gain access to these two

         15  photographs.  The one on the left is dated 5 July

         16  1995.  The photograph on the right shows the ground

         17  17 July 1995.

         18            On the photograph which is at the left, one

         19  can see an area completely at the left of the picture,

         20  which is grey and white.  This is the Drina River.  The

         21  little path, which is going just underneath where the

         22  date is written, 5 July 1995, is the little path which

         23  I marked on the previous exhibit.

         24            As one can see on the photograph on the right

         25  hand, there are several areas of disturbed soil, with a

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          1  main area which I'm going to circle as area "A"

          2  [marks].  One can see on this photograph, for example,

          3  a pit, a very clean pit, which I'm going to mark "B"

          4  [marks].  Just a reference so that you can have an idea

          5  of how the things looked from above.

          6            This pit has not been used.  It was probably

          7  used only to cover, to take soil and cover then the

          8  victims.  "B" is the area of the pit, how the pit looks

          9  like as seen from above.

         10            The next exhibit is 27/2.  It's an aerial

         11  view of the area.  It shows, on the left of the

         12  picture, the area I will mark "A", which is the area

         13  where the grave is and the execution site.  I pinpoint

         14  it with an arrow inside the circle "A" [marks].

         15            One can see also on this photograph Kozluk

         16  town at the top of the picture, and also at the top

         17  right of the picture a building which I'm going to

         18  circle and which is a factory of bottles, Vitinka

         19  Factory, Kozluk [marks].  It was also the headquarters

         20  of the Drina Wolves, which was a unit, part of the 1st

         21  Zvornik Brigade at the time.  There is only one way to

         22  exit this area, which is to pass in front of this

         23  factory and in front of the Drina Wolves' barracks.

         24       Q.   Would you mark the Drina Wolves' barracks and

         25  the bottle factory with a letter "B", please?

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          1       A.   The circle is now marked "B" [marks].

          2            The Exhibit 27/3 is another view from the

          3  site, which is the exact location of the execution site

          4  and burial site, and I will circle it [marks].  The

          5  circle is marked "A".  Just at the opposite side of the

          6  river is a territory of the Federal Republic.

          7            The Exhibit 27/4 is a photograph of the site

          8  taken from the ground the first day we approached it

          9  which was in June 1998.  This is a scene from the

         10  ground.  One can see it is also a remote and hidden

         11  area.

         12            Photograph 27/5 is a summary of the items

         13  which we found the first day we approached the place.

         14  The main elements one can see here is broken glass.

         15  The area is, in fact, the dump site for broken glass

         16  from the factory.  All these elements are of interest

         17  since they enable you to make the connection between

         18  the primary mass grave, which is to be found on this

         19  location, which like all the other sites, has been

         20  disturbed by the perpetrators before Dayton and the

         21  bodies hidden in remote locations, but these locations

         22  were found and partially exhumed.

         23            These items were also found inside, glass,

         24  shell casings.  Here you also have body parts, which

         25  I'm going to circle on this photograph [marks], which

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          1  were popping out of the soil and that we could excavate

          2  a little bit that day.

          3            The following exhibit is 27/6.  The next

          4  exhibit is 27/6.  It is a photograph of a wall just

          5  next to the bottle factory and it shows the trademark

          6  of this factory, Vitinka, Kozluk.

          7            The Exhibit 27/7 is this factory with, next

          8  to it, the Drina Wolves' barracks, you can see a member

          9  of the Drina Wolves, and this photograph is dated

         10  1988.

         11            MR. HARMON:  We are now going to show a

         12  film.  It is Prosecutor's Exhibit 27/18.  If the lights

         13  could be dimmed and we can play that particular film.

         14            Mr. Ruez, would you narrate this as you deem

         15  appropriate in the course of the showing of this film.

         16            I'm sorry, it's 27/8, not 18.

         17                 [Videotape played]

         18       A.   This is an aerial view of the area.  This is

         19  the Drina Valley.  On the left you have -- now in front

         20  of the Drina.  This is the area of the site, execution

         21  site and mass grave.  On the opposite side of the river

         22  is the Federal Republic.  This is the path that then

         23  leads towards Kozluk.  Zooming towards Kozluk, here you

         24  have the buildings which I had marked "B" on an

         25  exhibit.  This is a view of the environment that shows

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          1  that it is a deserted area, this kind of -- what one

          2  could think of when looking only at the map.

          3            This is the area seen from the ground just

          4  next to the river.  This is the ground, how it was when

          5  we arrived the first day on this site.

          6            Here at the bottom you can see broken glass,

          7  here a piece of human remains.  There are several piles

          8  of broken glass in this environment.

          9            This is at the edge of a slope, and here is a

         10  foot, a shoe with still the foot inside.  Another

         11  shoe.  A pile of broken glass.

         12            Shell casings were to be found just at the

         13  edge of the grave, on the path.  Additional shell

         14  casings were collected during the exhumation.  Shell

         15  casings were mixed with the soil and the glass.

         16            A vertebra.  Another shoe.  Trying to remove

         17  these shoes, we discovered that, in fact, there were

         18  bodies underneath, and that this was a very shallow

         19  grave and that the disturbance had obviously been very

         20  badly done since body parts were just underneath the

         21  surface.

         22            This is the area in the vicinity of the

         23  execution site and burial site.  There were several

         24  piles of trash.

         25            This area was obviously a former Muslim

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          1  cemetery.  We found one gravestone just in the

          2  vicinity.

          3            These are stacks of labels from the bottle

          4  factory.  We found exactly these same type of labels in

          5  a secondary site.

          6            This is the exit towards Kozluk, the

          7  headquarters of the Drina Wolves, with the bottle

          8  factory just next to it.  The distance between the two

          9  sides is approximately 1 kilometre.

         10            This is the patch of a Drina Wolf, a black

         11  wolf yelling in a blue circle.

         12            This is Kozluk town, and the vehicle just

         13  exited the access to the site.  This is town centre.

         14  According to the rumour, the prisoners had to sing Serb

         15  songs.  Meanwhile, they were driven on army trucks

         16  towards the execution site.

         17            Later on, the exhumation took place here.

         18  This is another view of the site during the

         19  exhumation.  This is the entire area of the exhumation

         20  site.  The exhumation here is over, finishing.  The

         21  report will be given about this exhumation.

         22            Here you have a slope where bodies were

         23  found.

         24            Mr. Ruez, I'm going to show you two large

         25  photographs that I used in my opening statement and ask

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          1  you if you can identify the locations where these

          2  photographs were taken.  Mr. Ruez, the usher will hold

          3  it up against the map, and that is Prosecutor's Exhibit

          4  1I.  Do you recognise that photograph and can you tell

          5  the Judges where that photograph was taken?

          6       A.   Yes.  This is a photograph taken during the

          7  exhumation at the Kozluk site and which shows an area

          8  which is in fact the most north of the site, where

          9  bodies were found exactly in the position where they

         10  were lying at the time of the execution.

         11       Q.   Mr. Ruez, let me show you Prosecutor's

         12  Exhibit 1H and again ask you if you can identify this

         13  particular photograph and tell the Judges where this

         14  photograph was taken.

         15       A.   Yes.  This photograph is the photograph of

         16  one of the 340 bodies which were recovered from the

         17  Kozluk exhumation, 340 being only part of the total

         18  number of bodies on this site, like on all the others,

         19  most of the others, a disturbance took place.  Other

         20  bodies to be found in the valley we call the Cancari

         21  Valley.

         22       Q.   Keep that photograph there, please,

         23  Mr. Usher, and if you would hand Mr. Ruez Prosecutor's

         24  Exhibit 27/9.

         25            Mr. Ruez, can you identify that particular

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          1  exhibit and tell the Judges what it is, please.

          2       A.   Yes.  This exhibit is a blindfold which was

          3  found during the exhumation at Kozluk; very precisely,

          4  on the head of the man who is lying on the ground with

          5  his hands attached in the back on this photograph.

          6       Q.   In photograph Prosecutor's Exhibit 1H?

          7       A.   Yes.

          8       Q.   Mr. Ruez, my last exhibit is going to be a

          9  map which in many respects is identical in terms of the

         10  relevant locations to the large map in front of you.

         11  Would you identify this exhibit and explain to the

         12  Judges what it is and what it represents.

         13       A.   So this exhibit is indeed the same one than

         14  the main map.  The difference between the two mainly is

         15  that on the last exhibit you have here, you can see the

         16  terrain, and the terrain is a very important aspect to

         17  properly understand all these events, due to the fact

         18  that all these areas have not been selected at random.

         19  Most of them are in remote places, away from populated

         20  areas, and this will be made very obvious when we will

         21  develop the part regarding the disturbance of all these

         22  graves.  Then the terrain becomes a very important

         23  element.

         24            All the symbols which are marked on the main

         25  exhibit are also marked on this one but with different

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          1  symbols on it.  The only confusing element in this map

          2  is that on the bottom right of the map you have the

          3  border of the enclave, which is marked, with all the

          4  observation posts marked in yellow.  And this can

          5  create a confusion with the secondary sites, which are

          6  also marked in yellow, but they are triangles, and you

          7  have a concentration of these triangles at the south of

          8  the enclave, together also with observation posts.  But

          9  if not, this map has all the elements we have exposed

         10  during these three days.  All these elements are marked

         11  on this exhibit.

         12       Q.   And the observation posts, Mr. Ruez, are

         13  squares in yellow with a letter in the middle of the

         14  square; is that correct?

         15       A.   Yes, this is correct.  These symbols mark UN

         16  observation posts.

         17       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ruez.

         18            MR. HARMON:  Mr. President and Your Honours,

         19  I've concluded my direct examination of Mr. Ruez.

         20            THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Could you

         21  please give me the number of this last exhibit,

         22  Mr. Harmon.

         23            MR. HARMON:  Exhibit 29.

         24            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         25  Mr. Harmon.  Very well.  We shall now move on to the

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          1  cross-examination by the Defence.  But perhaps it would

          2  be good if we made a short break now so the Defence

          3  could organise themselves and prepare for the

          4  cross-examination.

          5            Mr. Petrusic, would you agree with that?

          6  Would it be convenient for you to make a break before

          7  you begin?

          8            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes,

          9  Mr. President, because we have also to talk to the

         10  audio booth.  So yes, a few minutes would be very

         11  convenient.  Thank you.

         12            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         13  We shall then make a 20-minute break, and after that we

         14  shall resume or, rather, the Defence will begin its

         15  cross-examination.

         16                 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.

         17                 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.

         18            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         19  Let us now move on to the cross-examination of the

         20  witness, Mr. Jean-Rene Ruez.

         21            Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.

         22            MR. PETRUSIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

         23                 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:

         24       Q.   Mr. Ruez, the Defence will begin with the

         25  10th of July, 1995.  During the examination-in-chief,

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          1  you said that the crucial moment is when a decision was

          2  taken to set off either towards Potocari or towards the

          3  woods, towards the forest.  Could you please clarify

          4  that.  Could we now see the film.

          5       A.   I did not hear a question.  I only heard a

          6  fact.

          7       Q.   Do you know who took that decision, who made

          8  the decision?

          9       A.   Negative.  We do not know who took the

         10  decision.  I could develop a bit on this if you want a

         11  more complete answer.  As far as we know, decisions

         12  were already made earlier than the 10th to get out of

         13  the enclave.

         14       Q.   Mr. Ruez, was the decision made by civilian

         15  or military authorities?

         16       A.   Yes.  I am also listening to the

         17  translation.  This is why I take a little while before

         18  answering more completely your question.

         19            The decision initially was not taken in a

         20  concerted effort.  Groups of people made the decision

         21  by their own.  What happened is mainly the 11th of

         22  July, once the people were assembled in Srebrenica town

         23  -- and they didn't assemble themselves under any kind

         24  of instruction; it was a normal movement that they took

         25  that day.  The reason was that the people understood

Page 794

          1  that day that if nothing happened, the enclave would

          2  fall.  And that day everyone was expecting the

          3  airstrikes.  All the population was assembled and

          4  waiting for planes to strike in the area.  Instead of

          5  that, in the morning of the 11th, once the population

          6  entered the compound of the United Nations, the Company

          7  B, a shell hit the crowd, a mortar shell hit the crowd,

          8  and that generated additional panic.

          9            After this event, the people were still

         10  waiting for the airstrikes, but all of the men took the

         11  direction of the woods.  And only then, after the

         12  failure of the airstrikes, which was observed by the

         13  people who were overlooking the situation from uphill

         14  -- I correct for the French translation.  There was an

         15  airstrike.  The people were waiting for the airstrike,

         16  and the airstrike was inefficient, according to their

         17  view.  The reason why the final decision was made

         18  indeed, for all the men who didn't dare facing the

         19  Bosnian Serb army, to flee through the woods.

         20       Q.   Mr. Ruez, the convoy of the refugees starting

         21  from Srebrenica towards Potocari, were they escorted by

         22  the members of the Dutch battalion or, rather, the

         23  company of the Dutch battalion that was stationed in

         24  Srebrenica?

         25       A.   No.  There was no escort provided by UN

Page 795

          1  forces to the people at the moment they were leaving

          2  towards the woods.  At that moment, the UN forces

          3  within the enclave were retreating from their blocking

          4  positions which were installed at the south of the

          5  enclave, and at that moment there was already a free

          6  access for the Bosnian Serb forces coming from the

          7  south of the enclave.

          8            What happened is that the Muslim forces

          9  inside the enclave abandoned the responsibility to

         10  defend the place to the United Nations.  Therefore,

         11  they decided to flee through the woods.

         12            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] We're still

         13  dealing with Exhibit 3.  So could the booth please show

         14  the film.

         15                 [Videotape played]

         16            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

         17       Q.   What we have just seen is when the units of

         18  the army of Republika Srpska, General Mladic,

         19  General Zivanovic, and General Krstic in the rear are

         20  entering Srebrenica.  The transcript of this film was

         21  not produced, was not submitted to the Chamber, was

         22  it?

         23       A.   I believe it's going to be done very soon, as

         24  far as I understood.

         25       Q.   Mr. Ruez, would you agree with me when I say,

Page 796

          1  since you must have, during your investigation, heard

          2  Mr. Mladic's speech, that when entering Srebrenica,

          3  General Mladic says, "Come on.  Hurry.  Hurry.

          4  Direction Bratunac, Potocari."

          5       A.   Yes.  That is absolutely correct.  This is

          6  what General Mladic is saying to the troops when they

          7  enter Srebrenica town the 11 July.

          8       Q.   Was General Mladic the Commander or the Chief

          9  of Staff of the army of Republika Srpska?

         10       A.   General Mladic was the Chief of the Bosnian

         11  Serb army at that time.

         12       Q.   But on that particular occasion, as we see in

         13  Exhibit 3, he has the highest rank of all the present

         14  officers and the highest commanding post, doesn't he?

         15       A.   Yes.  Definitely.  At this moment, General

         16  Mladic is the higher ranked Bosnian Serb officer

         17  present in town.

         18       Q.   And the words which General Mladic pronounced

         19  there, could they be interpreted as an order?

         20       A.   They could be considered as an encouragement

         21  to the troops he's visiting that day, which he was

         22  visiting that day.  Yes.

         23       Q.   Mr. Ruez, did General Mladic enter together

         24  with the units of the VRS in Srebrenica on the 11th of

         25  July?

Page 797

          1       A.   As soon as the town was taken over by

          2  elements of the 10th Sabotage Detachment and Drina

          3  Wolves, then General Mladic and the officers who were

          4  together with him at the forward command post of

          5  Pribicevac went down from the forward command post and

          6  visited the town.

          7       Q.   From what part of the enclave did the units

          8  arrive?

          9       A.   The Bosnian Serb forces entered the enclave

         10  from the south, which is the most difficult terrain to

         11  conduct such an operation.  One could have expected

         12  armoured forces to punch through coming from the north

         13  but, in fact, the enclave was taken from the south.

         14       Q.   Mr. Ruez, during your investigation, did you

         15  find out that General Mladic was commanding the units

         16  directly?

         17       A.   Negative.  We do not have such knowledge.  We

         18  can say that he had a very tough control on everything,

         19  what was going on, but we are not in a position here to

         20  say that he was the one giving the orders.  I said it

         21  in the present.  Was giving the orders.

         22            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could the

         23  technical booth please show the next tape.

         24                 [Videotape played]

         25            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

Page 798

          1       Q.   Mr. Ruez, are these the police forces which

          2  are running -- which are controlling the separation of

          3  men from women and children at Potocari?

          4       A.   Yes.  The man that can be see on the film is

          5  probably someone from the Special Police, in charge of

          6  the deportation of the population.  The man which was

          7  seen on the left side of the picture is not yet

          8  identified.  The investigation on him is still

          9  ongoing.

         10       Q.   Thank you.

         11            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could we see

         12  now the third fragment, please.

         13                 [Videotape played]

         14            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

         15       Q.   There is an error here, but could you comment

         16  on this, because it is quite evident that this is one

         17  of the Dutch military.

         18       A.   Yes.  The man who was wearing the blue beret

         19  is a UN officer.  The location is in Potocari, on the

         20  parking lot just in front of the so-called Blue

         21  Building.  It is just north of the separation line,

         22  approximately 50 metres north from the separation

         23  line.

         24            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could we see

         25  now the next fragment, please.

Page 799

          1                 [Videotape played]

          2            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

          3       Q.   This was taken in Sandici.  The part of the

          4  uniform on the man we just saw, was it part of the

          5  uniform that the members of the Dutch battalion or,

          6  rather, the UN forces wore?  I'm referring to the

          7  T-shirt.

          8       A.   The solder who is to be seen on the film is a

          9  Muslim soldier.  He is wearing a T-shirt, a T-shirt

         10  with a camouflage pattern on it.

         11            I don't have any sound in French in my helmet

         12  at this moment.

         13            No.  We have a very precise description of

         14  the camouflage pattern since we can see it on the

         15  film.  What I cannot tell you, because we didn't study

         16  the question, is if the camouflage pattern is from the

         17  Dutch army.  I don't believe so, just by looking at it

         18  like this, but this could be a possibility.  One has to

         19  know that in the area, what was mainly making the

         20  difference between a soldier and a civilian was not

         21  really the way he was dressed.  It was, in fact, if he

         22  had or not a rifle in the hands.

         23            It could very well be that the T-shirt that

         24  one can see on this film appeared to be a Dutch army

         25  camouflage pattern.  It could be that someone had given

Page 800

          1  it to this man as a souvenir, but, again, I don't know

          2  if it is a Dutch one or not.

          3            The main event, what one can see on this

          4  piece of footage, is that, as all the witnesses will

          5  come and tell you, most of the soldiers -- most of the

          6  soldiers were getting rid of any element which could

          7  identify them as combatants.  The reason is that they

          8  had the absolute certainty that they would immediately

          9  be murdered if they were found out being combatants.

         10  Most of those who were captured and were dressed in the

         11  style this man was dressed were taken aside for special

         12  treatment.

         13            The next step on this film, which is not on

         14  film, is that indeed, as you can see, the man is forced

         15  to take his T-shirt off so that he has no reason to be

         16  proud of being from the army.  We don't know what

         17  happens to him.  The only thing we know is that he is

         18  on the list of missing persons.

         19       Q.   Mr. Ruez, could you tell us which is the

         20  camouflage paint on the weapons, on tanks, guns, and

         21  other weaponry of the army of Republika Srpska, rather,

         22  the Drina Corps?  What colour are those weapons?

         23       A.   If I understand probably the question, the

         24  question is -- the question is if I know what kind of

         25  camouflage is in use by the Bosnian Serb army at the

Page 801

          1  time.

          2       Q.   Yes.

          3       A.   Okay.  So there was no specific camouflage

          4  pattern for the Bosnian Serb.  The equipment which was

          5  used by the JNA at the time, it was the JNA -- the

          6  colour was olive-green.  Later during the war, you can

          7  see a variety of various camouflage patterns appearing

          8  on vehicles, in accordance with no harmonised pattern.

          9  We could show you photographs of heavy equipment,

         10  tanks, and APCs that we photographed in 1996, and one

         11  would see that it is, in fact, depending on the

         12  artistic skills of the crew.

         13            What is translated as an "extract," I was

         14  talking about photographs.

         15            This was used for the heavy equipment, for

         16  what is used by the soldiers.  The camouflage pattern

         17  is always the same.  It's a variety of green and dark

         18  green.  But the same situation.  Some flak jackets were

         19  purchased in foreign countries, so you don't have --

         20  and you can have situations where various camouflage

         21  patterns can be seen also on soldiers.  Flak jackets.

         22  Yes.

         23       Q.   I'm referring to the heavy equipment.  Can

         24  one distinguish between the police and purely military

         25  means of warfare or, rather, the difference between the

Page 802

          1  military and the police heavy weaponry when we're

          2  talking about camouflage colours?

          3       A.   We didn't see the heavy equipment belonging

          4  to police forces.  We didn't see any of this on film.

          5  And for the rest of the equipment, we have the records

          6  of Zvornik Brigade; we have a listing of the equipment

          7  of the Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade, a list

          8  of equipment of; and the material that we can see from

          9  time to time on film belongs to the Drina Corps, not to

         10  the police.

         11            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could the

         12  technical booth now show the next fragment, please.

         13                 [Videotape played]

         14            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation].

         15       Q.   This military vehicle or, rather, this tank,

         16  is blue, a camouflage blue.

         17       A.   I don't see a blue tank on this photograph.

         18  I can see a tank of dark colour, maybe grey or dark

         19  olive, with indeed some white or dark grey stripes on

         20  the barrel of the gun.

         21       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ruez.

         22            Exhibit 12/5, please.

         23       A.   I see the one you are referring to.

         24       Q.   Nova Kasaba.

         25       A.   That is correct.

Page 803

          1       Q.   Do you know which units were stationed in

          2  Nova Kasaba?

          3       A.   The question would have to be broken in two.

          4  Units were permanently residing in Nova Kasaba.  The

          5  unit which was permanently fixed there at the time was

          6  an element of the 65th Protection Regiment, which is,

          7  as you know, a unit which is specially attached to the

          8  protection of the Main Staff.

          9            What you also have in this area is the Milici

         10  Brigade.  In a very close vicinity, about 10, 15

         11  kilometres, the headquarters of the Drina Corps in

         12  Vlasenica.  Less than 10 kilometres north from this

         13  location, at the intersection of Konjevici, was the 5th

         14  Engineer Regiment.

         15            So there were indeed several units constantly

         16  located in this environment.  In addition to these

         17  elements, you also had reinforcement from the Zvornik

         18  Brigade at the time of the events.  Reinforcements,

         19  reeforcements [French].  Thank you.

         20       Q.   Can you identify that unit on the photograph?

         21       A.   I don't know to what unit these dog handlers

         22  belonged to.  These dog handlers belonged to,

         23  maitres-chiens [French].  They were on this soccer

         24  field.  The first day when we entered Republika Srpska

         25  to conduct missions there, you will hear from a Dutch

Page 804

          1  soldier -- no, complete mistranslation.  We never heard

          2  that from the Dutch soldier.  You will hear soon from a

          3  Dutch soldier.  He will talk about dog handlers who

          4  were explaining the use they made of their dogs, and

          5  that conversation was overheard in Bratunac, but we do

          6  not know if these dog handlers are the same ones.  The

          7  photograph only shows that these people were in the

          8  area, but it doesn't say these were the ones who were

          9  operating in July 1995.

         10       Q.   Mr. Ruez, is it true that in July 1995 the

         11  65th Motorised Protection Regiment was under the

         12  command of the Main Staff.

         13       A.   The 65th Protection Regiment is a unit

         14  designed to protect the Main Staff.  We do not know at

         15  this stage if this unit was or not resubordinated to

         16  the Drina Corps for the sake of its participation in

         17  the operation.  So if it did participate, we would make

         18  the assumption that it was at that moment put under the

         19  authority of the Drina Corps commander.

         20       Q.   That of course is an assumption.

         21       A.   Yes.  It would only be a supposition.

         22       Q.   During your testimony, Mr. Ruez, you

         23  mentioned a piece of information to the effect that

         24  during your investigation you talked to Mr. Miroslav

         25  Deronjic.  Do you know that on the 11th of July, Mr.

Page 805

          1  Miroslav Deronjic was appointed civilian commissioner

          2  for the municipality of Srebrenica by Mr. Radovan

          3  Karadzic, the president of the Republika Srpska?

          4       A.   Yes, we know that, and this is mainly the

          5  reason why we interviewed Mr. Deronjic.

          6       Q.   Mr. Ruez, are you familiar with the contents

          7  of the decree whereby Mr. Karadzic appointed Mr.

          8  Deronjic to the position of civilian commissioner?

          9       A.   I did not get the full translation.  Yes, we

         10  do know about the decree nominating Miroslav Deronjic

         11  civilian commissioner for Srebrenica.

         12       Q.   According to that decree, his

         13  responsibilities are as of the month of July, that is,

         14  the 11th of July of 1995.  Pursuant to the said decree,

         15  was Mr. Deronjic authorised to organise civilian

         16  authority, both civilian and police authority in the

         17  territory of the Srebrenica municipality as of the 11th

         18  of July?

         19       A.   I would like to have the question repeated,

         20  please.

         21       Q.   Pursuant to the said decree, and you say you

         22  are familiar with the contents of that decree, did Mr.

         23  Karadzic authorise Mr. Deronjic to organise the

         24  civilian authority in the municipality of Srebrenica,

         25  including the police forces in the territory of the

Page 806

          1  Srebrenica municipality, which of course encompassed

          2  certain rights and obligations?

          3       A.   The task and the mission which was given to

          4  Miroslav Deronjic by his president, Radovan Karadzic.

          5       Q.   Was the locality of Potocari within the

          6  territory of the Srebrenica municipality?

          7       A.   Potocari indeed belongs to the Srebrenica

          8  municipality, the former municipality of Srebrenica,

          9  since, as far as I know, once the enclave was retaken,

         10  the municipality of Srebrenica vanished and was

         11  integrated into the municipality of Skelani.  But if

         12  not, Potocari indeed belongs to the municipality of

         13  Srebrenica.

         14       Q.   Mr. Ruez, in the vicinity of the town of

         15  Potocari -- and when I say "vicinity", I have the

         16  distance of between 10 and 20 kilometres in mind -- is

         17  it true that there is a number of transport companies

         18  that are situated there in that area?

         19       A.   Yes.  Yes, there are several.  In fact,

         20  mainly two:  Vihor Transport based in Bratunac, and

         21  also the military bauxite mine company has

         22  transportation means available which is not for public

         23  transportation but for the transportation of the

         24  workers.

         25            Yes, but I have to say for the French

Page 807

          1  translation that I did not say "Bratunac"; I said

          2  "Milici."  Bratunac is Vihor; Milici is military

          3  bauxite mine transportation.

          4            Other companies which had their names written

          5  on buses, which is Drina Trans, Central Trans,

          6  companies who are covering the nation before the war,

          7  and then the buses were used by those who kept them.

          8       Q.   Therefore it is possible for the buses to

          9  reach Potocari from those locations in a relatively

         10  short time?

         11       A.   The buses which are detained by these

         12  companies, yes.  But for the sake of this operation,

         13  more transport means were needed.  The army

         14  requisitioned materiel.  The civilian authorities made

         15  an appeal over the radio.  Even persons who possessed

         16  vehicles who could transport people were requested to

         17  provide these vehicles to assist in the process.

         18       Q.   Mr. Ruez, at the end of your testimony you

         19  referred to exhibit number 2.  It is a map of the

         20  Zvornik Brigade.  You said that you will speak about

         21  the agreement between the Zvornik Brigade and the 28th

         22  Division more later on.

         23       A.   I'm not sure I know what exhibit we are

         24  talking about.  Are we talking about the big map?

         25       Q.   Yes, exactly.

Page 808

          1       A.   Yes.  In fact, I said exactly the opposite.

          2  What I said at that time is that I would not develop on

          3  that part.  The reason is that the criminal

          4  investigation is -- the criminal investigation is

          5  focusing on the chain of massacres which constitute the

          6  entire extermination of these prisoners.  The

          7  investigation did not focus on the military aspects of

          8  the battle.

          9            I was mentioning this event for the sake of

         10  the reason that at the moment these intense combat

         11  activities were happening in the vicinity of Zvornik,

         12  there was a vacuum of forces to protect Zvornik.  The

         13  reason was that the forces were down towards

         14  Srebrenica, to conduct the Srebrenica offensive.

         15            This situation had two consequences.  The

         16  consequence number one is that there was a requisition

         17  of all vallied personnel in order to confront the

         18  column in the woods and set ambushes on its way.  And

         19  to set ambushes.

         20            The other consequence is that the Serb forces

         21  who were trying to oppose this column suffered quite a

         22  significant number of casualties.  Once you will

         23  overlay the Exhibit number 2, which is the map of the

         24  extermination operation, when you will overlay this map

         25  with the map which was seized at the headquarters of

Page 809

          1  the Zvornik Brigade, you will easily realise that at

          2  the same moment, at the same moment people were getting

          3  killed in combat in the forest.  Forces which could

          4  have been used also to fight this column were derouted

          5  to conduct exterminations on execution fields.  This is

          6  the paradox of the situation at that time in that

          7  location.

          8            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] This concludes

          9  my cross-examination, Mr. President.

         10       Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Ruez.

         11            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Judge Wald,

         12  you have the floor.  Oh.  Excuse me.  I apologise.

         13            I'm sorry, Mr. Harmon.  Of course you have

         14  the right to redirect examination.  I'm sorry.

         15            MR. HARMON:  I have no redirect examination,

         16  Mr. President.  Thank you.

         17            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In any

         18  case, it is very important to have that on the record.

         19  Thank you very much.

         20            Judge Wald.

         21                 Questioned by the Court:

         22            JUDGE WALD:  Mr. Ruez, I wonder if you would

         23  be able to summarise, on the basis of what you've

         24  already testified and on the exhibits that we've

         25  already seen, the points on the journey, on the map

Page 810

          1  next to you, where there was visible presence of either

          2  elements of the Drina Corps or other elements of the

          3  VRS, either people or equipment, after Potocari, after

          4  both the column left Srebrenica that went toward Tuzla

          5  and the convoys left Potocari?

          6       A.   Yes, I could do that.

          7            JUDGE WALD:  Just very briefly the spots, by

          8  pointing to the spots.

          9       A.   In fact, all the spots, in absolutely all the

         10  spots, but details about that would come from the

         11  witnesses who would say who was guarding them --

         12            JUDGE WALD:  I understand.

         13       A.   -- and what was in their environment, but

         14  let's take it from south to north.  In Sandici,

         15  military forces were seen, and as you can see on the

         16  film, heavy equipment as well, a tank and an APC.

         17            In the area of Nova Kasaba also, witnesses

         18  talk about presence of forces.  When going up to the

         19  main execution sites, the personnel guarding and

         20  executing the prisoners are elements from the corps.

         21            JUDGE WALD:  Which location was that?  Which

         22  location did you just mention?

         23       A.   The Grbavci School, and attached to the

         24  execution sites of Orahovac.  A lot of the elements

         25  which are connecting these crime scenes to the

Page 811

          1  perpetrators will come from the military analysis

          2  conducted from the documents that we seized at the

          3  headquarters of the Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac

          4  Brigade in January 1998.  This collection of documents

          5  is the foundation of all the knowledge, the detailed

          6  knowledge that we have about the participants in these

          7  operations.

          8            We have the same situation also at the Dam.

          9  Same thing for the school of Pilica, where elements of

         10  the Drina Corps have these people under their control.

         11            Then for the execution at the Branjevo Farm,

         12  we know from Drazen Erdemovic that the main

         13  participants were initially the 10th Sabotage

         14  Detachment, very quickly joined by people who arrived

         15  late from Bratunac.  We know that these same people are

         16  the ones who committed the executions at the Dom of

         17  Culture.

         18            Finally, we have the situation of Kozluk,

         19  where more details will come and where we indeed know

         20  that people were taken in army trucks near this Drina

         21  Wolf barracks.

         22            So, in fact, on all the crime scenes, we have

         23  people who witnessed the presence of the VRS in a large

         24  sense for this moment.

         25            JUDGE WALD:  Thank you.  My second question

Page 812

          1  is:  Do you have any estimates, reliable estimates, of

          2  the number of men who left Srebrenica in the column

          3  that moved toward Tuzla?  Just a rough estimate.

          4       A.   Indeed it is a rough estimate.  The number we

          5  are always using is the assessment of 15.000 men.

          6            JUDGE WALD:  How many of those do we know

          7  survived, got through to the Bosnian side?

          8       A.   We could have a precise number on this.  We

          9  know that approximately 6.000 men reached Tuzla area

         10  and were then integrated, for most of them, into the

         11  2nd Corps of the BiH army.  The figure should be quite

         12  precise.  It should not be difficult to have

         13  confirmation about that number from the Bosniak

         14  authorities and from the BiH army.

         15            JUDGE WALD:  The second and last part of my

         16  question is:  Do we also have any estimates of the

         17  number of men who stayed in Potocari and got on the

         18  buses or were taken separately in the convoys?

         19       A.   We have an estimate on this.  There was a

         20  figure given in the situation reports which were

         21  drafted at the time.  The person who drafted that part

         22  of the report was Major Kingori.  His estimate of the

         23  number of men present at the time is 3.000 men in

         24  Potocari.  That figure would have to be double-checked

         25  for the reason that the counting system was far from

Page 813

          1  being accurate.  So I would take that figure only as a

          2  very rough estimate.

          3            When we see films taken during these days,

          4  the 11 -- mainly the 12th and the 13th, it is obviously

          5  that there is still a large number of men in Potocari,

          6  but to have a precise figure is something that I would

          7  not risk myself to try to give you now.

          8            JUDGE WALD:  The final part of my question

          9  is:  Do we have any reliable estimate of how many of

         10  those men who were in Potocari and either went on the

         11  convoys separately or some with the women and children,

         12  how many of those do we know survived?

         13       A.   We only know about one man who survived after

         14  having gotten on board the bus.  The reason why he

         15  survived is that he knew the driver, and arrived at the

         16  final checkpoint and the driver knew a commanding

         17  officer there and passed a request for this man to go

         18  through and this was immediately done.  We have no

         19  other example like this.

         20            When we look at the video footage of the men

         21  arriving in Kladanj the first day of the deportation,

         22  some men can be seen.  So it seems that men were able

         23  to get on board of buses.  These men are old men.

         24            We also know from all the witnesses from the

         25  very beginning of the deportation process, men could

Page 814

          1  get on board of buses but very, very quickly, mainly

          2  after the arrival of Mladic in Potocari, that

          3  possibility stopped and the men were systematically

          4  separated.

          5            JUDGE WALD:  But do we know whether or not

          6  any men got over into Kladanj along with the women and

          7  children?

          8       A.   As far as we know, only very old men managed

          9  to pass through these checkpoints.  All the

         10  military-aged men and that fork of age is very wide.

         11  It goes from approximately 15, 16 to 60 if not above.

         12  All these men were systematically separated.

         13            JUDGE WALD:  Thank you, Mr. Ruez.

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Ruez,

         15  in order to sum up a little bit your testimony, I would

         16  like to ask two questions.

         17            As far as I have understood, the initial

         18  objective of the army of Bosnian Serbs was not to take

         19  over Srebrenica but to reduce the area in terms of

         20  borders.

         21       A.   There has never been any limit fixed to the

         22  enclaves.  What marks the border of the enclave is the

         23  position of the observation posts.  Therefore, the

         24  intention of the Bosnian Serb army, at one point, was

         25  to shrink the enclave and to shrink it at the size of

Page 815

          1  the town.  The end result of this would have been that

          2  no more combat activities could have been launched by

          3  little groups from the inside of the enclave by using

          4  this large surface of wooded hills and create what one

          5  could call, in brackets, a large open-air concentration

          6  camp where people were living in awful conditions, all

          7  this in the aim to force the United Nations to take the

          8  decision to evacuate all these people.

          9            Reputting this in context, one has to recall

         10  that any evacuation of victims from an area at that

         11  time, an evacuation conducted by the UN, was

         12  immediately interpreted as assistance to ethnic

         13  cleansing.  So that was putting everyone in an infernal

         14  situation.

         15            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My first

         16  question, in connection to that, is the following:  The

         17  objective of the army was to shrink the enclave and not

         18  take over the enclave of Srebrenica, which means that

         19  the preparations were conducted with that objective in

         20  mind.  At one point in time, there was a change in

         21  objective.

         22            Are you in the position to tell us what kind

         23  of changes were made in terms of preparations of the

         24  operation?

         25       A.   The main change, as we view it, is that

Page 816

          1  switching from a situation only to shrink the enclave

          2  at the size of the town and capturing it militarily

          3  didn't make much of a difference on a military point of

          4  view.  The only tricky part of that was, in fact, the

          5  reaction of UNPROFOR.  But once it became clear that

          6  there would be no strong reaction of the United Nations

          7  regarding that element, the main new factor the Bosnian

          8  Serb army had to take in consideration, at that moment,

          9  was the fate of the prisoners.  The fact is that at

         10  that moment, the Bosnian Serb army could not anticipate

         11  capturing such a large number of men without fighting.

         12            So this is indeed the moment all the planning

         13  for the part of the operation, which is not recorded by

         14  the Bosnian Serb archives and which is the exhibit --

         15  the map of Exhibit number 2, this is the moment indeed

         16  where these questions started to get raised and where

         17  decisions were starting to be made by those who made

         18  them.

         19            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We can,

         20  therefore, conclude that the organisation of the

         21  evacuation itself, bearing in mind the scale of the

         22  evacuation, that is, the number of persons involved,

         23  was not something that had been previously foreseen.

         24  The procedure that we can see from that map, among

         25  other things, is it something that can tell

Page 817

          1  you -- were there any elements that show you, that

          2  point to the fact that there had been some kind of

          3  organisation, even at the last minute or not?

          4       A.   These elements -- unfortunately, I think it's

          5  a bit too early for me, at this stage, to disclose

          6  these elements, but we have clues, very precise clues

          7  which show us that 13 July 1995, all decisions were

          8  already made in terms of what to do with these men, and

          9  that specialised personnel was visiting the area, the

         10  Zvornik area, in order to find the locations where to

         11  keep all these prisoners without any anticipation of

         12  needs like food and probably also looking for a remote

         13  and hidden execution sites.

         14            The earliest we can date these activities are

         15  13 July 1995.  This will come from the analysis of

         16  Richard Butler, our military analyst, who will develop

         17  it for you at a later stage.

         18            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, Your Honour.

         19            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] One other

         20  question, Mr. Ruez.  You mentioned several times that

         21  an execution squad would be waiting for the prisoners.

         22  I don't know if I'm correct in thinking that there had

         23  already been, on the spot, an execution squad which was

         24  supposed to execute the prisoners.

         25            Again, in order to sum up a little bit your

Page 818

          1  testimony, could you tell us:  What is the explanation

          2  of that particular fact in view of the overall

          3  organisation of the evacuation of the Srebrenica

          4  enclave?  Have you understand my question?  Thank you.

          5       A.   The plan related to the enclave, this appears

          6  nowhere.  This appears as an element of organisation

          7  for this extermination process phase.  For every one of

          8  these detention sites and killing sites, the main

          9  elements on which to focus is indeed who was

         10  transporting the people to the site, who was guarding

         11  them once they were on this site, and then who was

         12  executing them on the execution site.  But the fact is

         13  that there was a clear organisation and distribution of

         14  the roles.  It's not the same people who are mixing the

         15  roles.  Some are indeed guarding during the travels,

         16  others are guarding in the detention facilities like

         17  the schools.  During this process, indeed execution

         18  squads are still -- are already waiting for their

         19  victims on a predetermined execution site.

         20            This is the case for the Grbavci school and

         21  the attached site of Orahovac.  This is also the case

         22  at the Petkovci school and the Petkovci Dam.  It is

         23  also the case at the Pilica school and the Branjevo

         24  Farm.  It is most probably also the case at Kozluk, but

         25  in Kozluk, as I told you, we don't have the information

Page 819

          1  coming neither from the perpetrator, nor the victim, so

          2  we don't know exactly what was the scenario on this

          3  spot.

          4            The only exception to this is the Dom of

          5  Culture of Pilica, where the same execution squads went

          6  from the Branjevo Farm toward the House of Culture,

          7  where a number of 500 people were supposed to try to

          8  break out.  The reason why?  They had to be killed in

          9  that location.

         10            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My last

         11  question, Mr. Ruez:  You happened to mention the fact

         12  about the soldiers, members of the VRS, who wore

         13  UN uniforms which they had taken from Dutch soldiers.

         14  This kind of conduct, could it, from your point of

         15  view, be considered as an expression of some problems

         16  faced by the Bosnian Serb army to conduct this whole

         17  procedure and to facilitate its task by using the

         18  uniforms and other things which perhaps might persuade

         19  the prisoners to behave in a different manner?  What do

         20  you think about this, Mr. Ruez?

         21       A.   The main reason for the use of the equipment

         22  was, without any doubt on our side, to lure the people

         23  and make them -- bring them to surrender, in order not

         24  having to fight them, capture them easily.

         25            The way the situation developed might be even

Page 820

          1  more interesting.  The reason is that the Dutch command

          2  got the agreement that UN soldiers would escort buses

          3  and trucks of prisoners towards Kladanj to make sure

          4  they would reach their destination.  That means all

          5  along the way, they could witness already events.

          6  There was obviously a blank cheque to kill in this

          7  area, and the Dutch soldiers could witness all these

          8  events when they were driving alongside the road.

          9            As pinpointed on the map, they are sites

         10  which we call small execution sites but which are quite

         11  massive.  Some are above 100 people.  All these bodies

         12  were to be seen along the road.  We didn't say a word

         13  about the number of bodies that the people could

         14  observe from the windows of the buses by moving out of

         15  this area, and it's a clear fact that none of the

         16  persons who arrived on the asphalt road had a reason to

         17  turn a weapon against anyone.  If so, it would be

         18  instant death.  So maybe some did in order to commit

         19  suicide and die honourably, if one can say so.  Most of

         20  the others didn't but most didn't and were probably

         21  killed on the spot.  So that generated a lot of

         22  witnesses in the area.

         23            So there was an absolute need anyhow for the

         24  VRS to get rid of these witnesses, these UN witnesses.

         25  Steal their equipment was a consequence of this process

Page 821

          1  of removing them from the area, putting them in

          2  detention sites like the special -- I mean, the

          3  compound of the 65th Protection Regiment in Nova

          4  Kasaba, where indeed they have interesting things that

          5  they saw and that they heard.

          6            Once all this was done, the material was then

          7  derouted in order to make the people believe that all

          8  this operation was still monitored by the United

          9  Nations.  This led indeed to the use of this equipment,

         10  very obviously in front of commanders passing by.

         11            We didn't show that piece of footage, but as

         12  soon as the 11th of July, UN equipment was already

         13  taken from observation posts, and there is a piece of

         14  footage where General Mladic and General Krstic are

         15  standing nearby a tank driven by a Bosnian Serb soldier

         16  who is standing, with a blue beret slipped in his

         17  belt.  We don't know what use this one made of this

         18  equipment, but we know what the others did with it.

         19  Obviously everyone was aware, informed, and no one

         20  opposed that.

         21            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you

         22  very much, Mr. Ruez.  We're still in the early days of

         23  the case and that is why we have so many questions, but

         24  I should like to thank you for coming here to testify.

         25            We shall move on to another witness, but I

Page 822

          1  believe this would be a good time to make a break.  The

          2  next witness will be a protected witness, Mr. Harmon,

          3  isn't it?

          4            MR. HARMON:  Yes.  That's correct.  I have

          5  some exhibits I'd like to present before we go into the

          6  protected witness mode.  We can do that after the

          7  recess.  I'd also like to move into evidence about

          8  various exhibits that were introduced and identified by

          9  Mr. Ruez, and I can wait until after the break to do

         10  that as well.

         11            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Excuse me.

         12  And you want to do that with Mr. Ruez?

         13            MR. HARMON:  No.  He can --

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No.  I

         15  see.  Well, in that case, Mr. Ruez is free to go, and

         16  you will have the opportunity to introduce those

         17  documents and make a break.  How long will you need,

         18  Mr. Harmon?

         19            MR. HARMON:  Ten minutes.

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.

         21  Excuse me.  I will, therefore, go back on what I said.

         22  I think it is better to make a break and then we shall

         23  resume.

         24            Mr. Ruez, thank you very much for your

         25  testimony before the Tribunal.  Lots of success in the

Page 823

          1  future.

          2            Now, we have shall a 20-minute break and then

          3  we shall resume.

          4                 [The witness withdrew]

          5                 --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.

          6                 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.

          7            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

          8  We are now resuming the hearing.  Mr. Harmon, you have

          9  the floor.

         10            MR. HARMON:  Mr. President and Your Honours,

         11  I would like to first introduce a number of exhibits

         12  that have been referred to either in my opening

         13  statement or through the testimony of Mr. Ruez.

         14            I'd like to move into evidence Prosecutor's

         15  Exhibit 1A and 1B.  Those are two small maps showing,

         16  (1) the location of the Srebrenica municipality; and

         17  (2) showing the location of three enclaves.

         18            I would like to introduce 1E bis -- I'm

         19  sorry.  1E, which is this large map that Ruez referred

         20  to frequently; 1E bis, which is a separate legend to

         21  that map; 1I -- I'm sorry -- yes, 1I, which is a large

         22  photograph showing skeletons in a trench; 1H which is

         23  another photograph I referred to in my opening

         24  statement; Prosecutor's Exhibit number 2, which is the

         25  large map, Krivaja 95, the operations map; Prosecutor's

Page 824

          1  Exhibit 3, which is a film used by Mr. Ruez;

          2  Prosecutor's Exhibits 4 through 27, which are the two

          3  volumes of photographs, as well as associated videos

          4  that were played during Mr. Ruez's presentation;

          5  Prosecutor's Exhibit 16/6, which is a wire ligature;

          6  27/9, which is a blindfold; and Prosecutor's Exhibit

          7  29, which is a large map introduced at the end of

          8  Mr. Ruez's testimony, showing the contours of the land

          9  and relevant sites.  So we would move those into

         10  evidence.

         11            In addition, Mr. President, I would now like

         12  to distribute to Your Honours and to counsel three

         13  separate exhibits:  Prosecutor's Exhibit 30 and 30A,

         14  which will be the report of the Secretary-General

         15  pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35.  It's

         16  entitled "The Fall of Srebrenica."  30 is the English

         17  version of this report and 30A is the French version of

         18  the report.  In addition, Mr. President and Judge Wald,

         19  there are annexes to that report which are found in

         20  Prosecutor's Exhibit 31.  And the last -- which

         21  Mr. Dubuisson will now distribute, and then I'll turn

         22  to my last exhibit.

         23            The last exhibit is Prosecutor's Exhibit 33A

         24  through 38B, and I will identify each of those separate

         25  exhibits.  These exhibits include reports in French and

Page 825

          1  English.  They are the reports on the situation of

          2  human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

          3  that were submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki, who was the

          4  Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights,

          5  and these reports are a series of reports that were

          6  submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki.  They start in

          7  Prosecutor's Exhibit 33A with a report dated the 28th

          8  of August, 1992.  There's a series of six reports.  The

          9  last report is a report that was submitted by

         10  Mr. Mazowiecki on the 22nd of August, 1995.  Again,

         11  this was the final periodic report on the situation of

         12  human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

         13  submitted by Mr. Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the

         14  Commission of Human Rights.

         15            So we would move these various reports into

         16  evidence as well.  And that completes, with the

         17  submission of these exhibits, it completes the overview

         18  of events that took place in Srebrenica.

         19            And now, Mr. President, without further ado

         20  I'll yield the floor to my colleague, Mr. McCloskey,

         21  who will lead the next witness.  And we will proceed --

         22  we'd make a request that we proceed in closed session.

         23            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Before

         24  that, perhaps, Mr. Harmon, I should like to ask the

         25  Defence if they have any objections to any one of these

Page 826

          1  exhibits.

          2            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

          3  the Defence objects when it comes to Exhibit 14, that

          4  is, Nova Kasaba; Exhibit 17, Konjevic Polje; and

          5  Exhibit 18, the Jadar River.

          6            Let me explain.  In Mr. Ruez's testimony, the

          7  Prosecutor adduced those exhibits and Mr. Ruez referred

          8  to them as places where executions took place.

          9  However, if we look at the indictment, and I believe we

         10  have to really go by the indictment, these localities,

         11  these are not mentioned in counts 24 to 26 of the

         12  indictment, and the Defence therefore believes that

         13  these exhibits may not be -- may not make part of

         14  evidence.  They may not be used in the hearing in

         15  consideration of the case.  Thank you.

         16            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon.

         17            MR. HARMON:  Mr. President, the indictment,

         18  paragraph 24, is a list of various locations that is

         19  not exclusive.  It says in paragraph 24:  "The

         20  wide-scale and organised killings of Bosnian Muslim men

         21  which occurred in several different locations in and

         22  around Srebrenica enclave from 11 July 1995 until 18

         23  July 1995 included ..."  It didn't say it was limited

         24  to these locations, and therefore we believe that the

         25  locations that are described in this are relevant.  In

Page 827

          1  addition, I might add that the Jadar River site is a

          2  location that the Defence received the discovery from

          3  the Prosecution, has received evidence of a statement

          4  from the survivor of that location and has been fully

          5  aware that we intend to lead that evidence in the

          6  course of this trial.

          7            Lastly, Mr. President, in respect of the

          8  location at Nova Kasaba, I believe there are aerial

          9  images of that location that were shown to the Defence

         10  prior to the commencement of this trial pursuant to our

         11  obligation under Rule 70B, and the location of Konjevic

         12  Polje, likewise, we believe are relevant under the

         13  terms of paragraph 24.

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon,

         15  I heard the translation that the sites mentioned under

         16  paragraph 24 to 26 are not exclusive.  You meant

         17  perhaps that this is not the exhaustive list of sites;

         18  they are merely some of the places by way of example.

         19            MR. HARMON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

         20            JUDGE WALD:  Mr. Harmon, just to make sure I

         21  understood your explanation, was the Defence in fact

         22  alerted to the fact that the exhibits -- or the

         23  locations involved in Exhibits 14, 17, and 18 would be

         24  the subject of evidence?  I think you mentioned one or

         25  two, but I wasn't sure whether you mentioned the

Page 828

          1  third.  In other words, was supporting material,

          2  various other things, they knew that these would be the

          3  subject of evidence?

          4            MR. HARMON:  That's correct.  The first item,

          5  which is 14, which is Nova Kasaba, includes -- let me

          6  just take a look at this for a minute.  Let me return

          7  to Nova Kasaba in just a minute.

          8            17, paragraph 17, is Konjevic Polje.  These

          9  items were known to the Defence.  Item 18, the Jadar

         10  River, was known to the Defence.  We provided them with

         11  a copy of a survivor's statement from the Jadar River.

         12  In respect of the locations of grave sites described in

         13  those particular locations, we have provided the

         14  Defence with exhumation reports relating to each of

         15  those locations where there's a grave site included.

         16            JUDGE WALD:  You said you'd go back to Nova

         17  Kasaba.

         18            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for her honour.

         19            MR. HARMON:  Just a minute.  Let me grab my

         20  exhibit binder.  Yes, Judge Wald.  The Nova Kasaba

         21  grave sites were divulged to the Defence.  One, there

         22  are aerial images that the Defence was shown, and two,

         23  Nova Kasaba grave sites are the subject of an

         24  exhumation report that was provided to the Defence.

         25            JUDGE WALD:  Thank you.

Page 829

          1            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So the

          2  Defence objects against Exhibits 14, 17, 18, and we

          3  heard the explanation of the Prosecution.  So now we

          4  have to examine it in greater detail, and after the

          5  deliberation, the Chamber will pass its decision.  At

          6  the moment, we cannot really take the decision

          7  immediately.  We have to go into it and we shall then

          8  make our decision, and that will be tomorrow perhaps.

          9  So now I think the Prosecution will now continue with

         10  the production of evidence, and I believe it was

         11  Mr. McCloskey who will take over.

         12            Mr. Harmon.

         13            MR. HARMON:  Yes.  We will proceed in a

         14  closed session on the next witness.

         15            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.  Does

         16  the Defence know and does it agree with the protection

         17  measures for this witness, Mr. Petrusic?

         18            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  We know

         19  about that and we agree with the measures as proposed.

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon,

         21  therefore, we can take all the necessary measures so

         22  that we could proceed with this witness.

         23            For the public, I need to say we will be

         24  hearing evidence with protective measures, and we will

         25  now change to a closed session.

Page 830

          1  [Closed session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

          2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President and Your

          3  Honours, I believe I'm waiting for the confirmation of

          4  the closed session.  This is all new to me, so I hope

          5  that I don't slip up.

          6                 [The witness entered court]

          7            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.  We're

          8  waiting for the witness.  Yes.  Here he is.

          9            Can you hear me, sir?

         10            THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can.

         11            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         12  Now you will take the solemn declaration.

         13            THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will

         14  speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

         15  truth.

         16                 WITNESS:  WITNESS B

         17            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you.

         18  You may be seated.  You will now be shown a small piece

         19  of paper with a name, and you will merely say yes or

         20  whether this is your name or not.  Just yes or no.

         21       A.   Yes.

         22            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         23  As you know, for reasons of your safety, the Tribunal

         24  has taken protective measures in terms of your

         25  identity, and you will, therefore, be addressed as

Page 831

          1  Witness B.  Yes, Witness B, you will testify now as

          2  Witness B.  Thank you for coming to the Tribunal.  You

          3  will now answer questions which the Prosecution will

          4  ask you, and after that, when the time comes, you will

          5  do the same for the Defence.

          6            So counsel for the Prosecution, you may

          7  proceed now.  Thank you.

          8                 MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you,

          9  Mr. President.

         10                 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:

         11       Q.   Would you state your present occupation,

         12  please?

         13       A.   The place I'm working now or --

         14       Q.   What you do.

         15       A.   I'm working in the Dutch army.  I'm a Warrant

         16  Officer 1st Class.  I'm working in The Hague in the

         17  Intelligence Branch.

         18       Q.   Does that work occasionally take you to

         19  sensitive spots and that is basically the reason for

         20  your requesting closed session?

         21       A.   Yes, that's true.

         22       Q.   All right.  Did you participate in the UN

         23  peacekeeping mission to Bosnia in 1995?

         24       A.   Yes.  I was there in 1995 with UNPROFOR.

         25       Q.   What was your rank and position when you went

Page 832

          1  to Bosnia?

          2       A.   I was a Warrant Officer 2nd Class.  I was a

          3  liaison officer and advisor of field security from the

          4  so-called DutchBat.

          5       Q.   Where did you go?  Where was DutchBat

          6  stationed when you first went to Bosnia in 1995?

          7       A.   I went there on the 3rd of January to the

          8  enclave of Srebrenica, and I was stationed in

          9  Potocari.

         10       Q.   Can you briefly describe what the UN

         11  peacekeeping mission was, based on your understanding

         12  of it at the time when you got there?

         13       A.   Well, when we got there, we had to protect

         14  the people inside the enclave, help and protect the

         15  NGOs, and the MSF, and the UNHCR, and help them with

         16  the food supply and other supplies in the enclave for

         17  the civilian population, man the observation posts, and

         18  eventually try to deter attacks.

         19       Q.   What was your responsibility --

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Excuse me

         21  for interrupting you, Mr. McCloskey, but you should

         22  know something about our reality, and that is that

         23  there is always an interpreter between you and me, so

         24  could you please just make a pause between question and

         25  answer to give the interpreters time to interpret both

Page 833

          1  of you.  Otherwise, it becomes very difficult.  Thank

          2  you very much.

          3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Thank you,

          4  Mr. President.

          5       Q.   What were your responsibilities in regard to

          6  the Muslim military situation in the enclave?

          7       A.   Well, we had to negotiate, as the liaison

          8  team, with the Muslim military and civilian population,

          9  and sometimes there was a mix between civilian and

         10  military population because there was not a real army

         11  which you had to deal with in the enclave.

         12       Q.   What kind of army was there?

         13       A.   Well, it was the 8th Operational Group from

         14  the Muslim army which was in the enclave, but it was

         15  not really a group.  We had to deal with the leader of

         16  the group, Mr. Nasir Oric and his Chief of Staff Ramiz

         17  Becirovic.  Those were the men we had to mostly deal

         18  with, and for the rest there was not really a standing

         19  army.

         20       Q.   Did they have heavy weapons?

         21       A.   No.  They had weapons but not heavy weapons

         22  because the two battalions which were before us in the

         23  enclave disarmed them for the most part, and most of

         24  the heavy weapons in the enclave were collected in the

         25  weapons collection point.

Page 834

          1       Q.   Where was it and what was in it?

          2       A.   The weapon collection point was in the

          3  compound of the Bravo Company in Srebrenica, and they

          4  were mortars, at least two tanks, some heavy

          5  machine-guns, and a lot of small arms.

          6       Q.   Were there small arms that were not stored in

          7  the weapons storage centre that were in the hands of

          8  the Muslim population?

          9       A.   Yeah.  We had several times during the six

         10  months we were there that our soldiers saw Muslim men

         11  with arms, and most of the time they succeeded in

         12  disarming them, because that was one of our targets.

         13       Q.   Can you briefly describe what your duties

         14  were throughout your stay there and what your rank

         15  was?

         16       A.   Well, I was a Warrant Officer 2nd Class, and

         17  as a liaison officer, we had to keep in contact with

         18  the civilian and Muslim population inside the enclave

         19  and, of course, with the population outside the

         20  enclave, which was for us the VRS.

         21       Q.   Did you have --

         22       A.   The BSA, correction.

         23       Q.   Yes.  Either one is fine.  Did you have

         24  security and intelligence duties associated with your

         25  liaison duties?

Page 835

          1       A.   Not in relation to my liaison duties.  My

          2  second job was an advisor of field security for the

          3  Commander of DutchBat and to advise him in taking

          4  protective measures relating to personnel, materiel,

          5  information, and all those kind of things.

          6       Q.   In the period leading up to the fall of the

          7  enclave on July 11th, did you get to know certain VRS

          8  personalities or people on the ground in the area?

          9       A.   Yes.  The first time I met the VRS or the

         10  Bosnian Serb people in the region was on the 6th of

         11  January when we had our first meeting in the Hotel

         12  Fontana by the handover from the former battalion to

         13  our battalion.

         14       Q.   Who did you meet there?

         15       A.   I have to look at my notes.  We met General

         16  Zivanovic, as the Commander of the Drina Corps; Colonel

         17  Vukovic, as the liaison officer for the battalion;

         18  Major Sarkic, he used to work in the western part, in

         19  the Milici Brigade; and Major Nikolic was in the

         20  Bratunac Brigade; and they had an interpreter called

         21  Petar.

         22       Q.   You said that Major Sarkic used to work for

         23  the Milici Brigade.  I don't know if that's translation

         24  or what.

         25       A.   I think it's the translation.  He told me he

Page 836

          1  worked in the Milici Brigade.

          2       Q.   All right.  And Colonel Vukovic, did you know

          3  where he came from or what his background was?

          4       A.   Well, I remember that he worked in the

          5  southern part, in the Skelani Brigade, but one of his

          6  duties was being the LSO towards the Dutch battalion.

          7       Q.   LSO meaning?

          8       A.   The liaison officer.  When there was anything

          9  to talk about, he was in charge of us, but it was

         10  Major Nikolic we would deal with, not Colonel Vukovic,

         11  because most of the time he was not available.

         12       Q.   What was your understanding of Major

         13  Nikolic's position in the Bratunac Brigade?

         14       A.   I had the idea that he was the Chief of Staff

         15  in the Bratunac Brigade, not in the Milici Brigade, in

         16  the Bratunac Brigade.

         17       Q.   Sorry.  Thank you.

         18       A.   After several months, he told us that Colonel

         19  Vukovic was no longer available and he was the man we

         20  had to deal with as the LSO for the whole enclave.  So

         21  as well the Bratunac, the Skelani, and the Milici

         22  Brigade.

         23       Q.   So did he hold himself out as the Chief of

         24  Staff for the Bratunac Brigade or is that just what you

         25  thought?

Page 837

          1       A.   I think that's what I thought, because I

          2  can't imagine he was the Chief of Staff of the

          3  brigade.

          4       Q.   All right.  Can you briefly describe the

          5  significant events in 1995 that led up to the fall of

          6  the enclave on July 11th?

          7       A.   Yes, and I have to use my notes.  Of course

          8  there was a tense situation all the time.  There were a

          9  lot of problems.  We had a lot of problems with

         10  supplies for ourselves, with diesel, with food

         11  supplies.  We had problems to go on leave.  There were

         12  no clearances.  There were a lot of problems from the

         13  Serb side, that they would like to help us, send us

         14  material to build OPs to do our job properly, but at

         15  the end it was no cooperation because they didn't

         16  support us at all.

         17            Most of the time when we would like to have a

         18  contact with the LSO, in this case Major Nikolic, it

         19  was a problem to come in contact with him because when

         20  they didn't like to speak to us, they didn't show up.

         21  So there was no real contact.  We had no possibility to

         22  use the phone and ask for a meeting.  We always had to

         23  use some soldiers at the checkpoint, Yellow Bridge, as

         24  we called it.  Mr. Jovo was there and that was the man

         25  who normally arranged the meetings.

Page 838

          1       Q.   Excuse me.  Before you go on, can you briefly

          2  describe the chain of command in DutchBat at the time?

          3  Who were the top people basically?

          4       A.   The top people were the Colonel Karremans,

          5  who was the battalion Commander.  Then Major Franken,

          6  the second Command.  And for doing the LSO jobs, there

          7  was Major Boering.  Major van Alphen when we started,

          8  he had to leave after some months, and it became

          9  Captain Melchers and myself.

         10       Q.   And continue your explanation of the

         11  situation overall as it led up.

         12       A.   Well, we had all the time the feeling that we

         13  were prisoners or hostages in the enclave and they

         14  could decide whether we could go or to stay.

         15            The 31st of May, there was a meeting

         16  requested by the Colonel Vukelic by Major Nikolic, and

         17  he wanted to see us at the OP Echo, and he told us that

         18  the Muslim army attacked on several places the Serb

         19  side, and that they had problems to use the road on

         20  which our OP Echo in the southern part were, because

         21  they wanted to use the road from Milici, Milici in the

         22  south, in the direction of Han Pijesak.

         23       Q.   Could you take a moment -- there should be a

         24  pointer there -- and show the Court roughly -- well,

         25  show them where the OP Echo is.  I believe you told me

Page 839

          1  before it is not quite marked on that map.  Is that

          2  right?

          3       A.   No.  OP Echo is here on the line.  It should

          4  be on the crossroad over here.  It was just on the

          5  crossroad, and the Serb army or the Serb people had no

          6  possibility to pass by the OP because it was not

          7  allowed to pass this side of the road.  And they wanted

          8  to use the road.  That's what they told us, and that

          9  was one of the most important reasons for them to tell

         10  us that we had to leave our OP, because they would

         11  start using the road.

         12       Q.   So what happened?

         13       A.   Well, the situation got a bit tense, and we

         14  told Colonel Vukovic that we would not leave the OP

         15  Echo because we had to stay there, and I think he told

         16  us that he would take the OP with force eventually.

         17  After that, we told him that if he would use force, we

         18  would ask for close-air support when it was necessary,

         19  so it is better for him not to take over the OP.

         20            The situation got tense, and on the 2nd of

         21  June, we got information that in the southern part, in

         22  the vicinity of OP Echo, a lot of BSA soldiers have

         23  been seen, that there are tanks in the southern part,

         24  in the vicinity of Vukova Glava and Jasenovac.  It's

         25  south from the OP Echo on this side, the Serb side.

Page 840

          1  And from the Chief of Staff from the Muslims, Ramiz, he

          2  told us that he had information that the OP Foxtrot

          3  would be taken over.

          4       Q.   Then what was the next significant thing that

          5  occurred?

          6       A.   Well, at the 3rd of June, there was an attack

          7  from the BSA at half past eight on the OP Echo with a

          8  lot of machine gun and gunfire, using hand grenades,

          9  mortars, and they just kicked out our OP.

         10       Q.   Were any Dutch soldiers hurt?

         11       A.   No.  They tried to succeed and to fly.

         12       Q.   So the Dutch soldiers were able to leave?

         13       A.   Yes.  Yes.

         14       Q.   What's the next significant thing that

         15  happened?

         16       A.   At that moment, of course, several things

         17  happened at the same moment.  The Muslims asked us to

         18  attack the BSA, because they would not allow the BSA to

         19  use the road.  They said, "You are there to protect us,

         20  so please take over the OP Echo again."  They asked if

         21  we would hand over the weapons from the weapons

         22  collection point.  Well, we refused it, because we told

         23  them that the Serbs did not enter the enclave and this

         24  was not the moment to make the situation more tense by

         25  handing over the weapons.

Page 841

          1            A new OP was made, the OP Uniform, which was

          2  not there before, but it was a new OP.  And on the 8th

          3  of June we got the information that -- Ramiz told us

          4  that he had got some information from his sources that

          5  this General Mladic ordered to take over all the OPs in

          6  the enclave.  Nothing happened, but at the end of June,

          7  the situation got more tense and we got more and more

          8  information that a lot of men, equipment, tanks, were

          9  in the surroundings of the enclave.

         10            Then on the 6th of June, a rocket --

         11       Q.   The 6th of --

         12       A.   6th of July.  Sorry.  6th of July a rocket

         13  attack took place and a lot of fire fights in the

         14  western part, as we called it, the Bandera triangle.  A

         15  lot of fights were going on there [marks].

         16       Q.   Could the record indicate that he drew just a

         17  rough circle just to the right of OP --

         18            THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel for the

         19  Prosecution speak into the microphone, please.

         20            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Sorry.

         21       Q.   That he drew a rough circle to the right side

         22  or eastern side of OP B or Bravo?

         23       A.   Well, it was -- the Bandera triangle is this

         24  part of the area in which a lot of fights were going on

         25  and a lot of shelling.

Page 842

          1       Q.   Basically you went between OP B, C, and the S

          2  in Srebrenica, just for the record?

          3       A.   Yes.  That's correct.

          4       Q.   Okay.

          5       A.   Also a lot of shooting in the vicinity of the

          6  OP Foxtrot.  Sierra and Uniform, which were the new

          7  OPs.  Sierra and Uniform, they were not there before.

          8  At 1.00 on the 6th of July, the first tank round hit

          9  the defence wall in OP Foxtrot.

         10            On the 7th of July, the whole day there were

         11  artillery and mortar fires and multiple rocket launches

         12  fired all over the enclave.

         13       Q.   Was this -- could you tell who -- which side

         14  was firing these things?

         15       A.   The Bosnian Serbs.  The BSA were firing.  I

         16  was on Potocari at that moment.  In the evening, I saw

         17  that 27 multiple-rocket-launcher rounds were fired

         18  along the compound.  We got a lot of reports that there

         19  were wounded in Potocari and Srebrenica, and I saw a

         20  lot of impacts in the vicinity of our compound, in the

         21  vicinity of Potocari on several houses and the

         22  electrician house which was standing there.

         23       Q.   Who was wounded?

         24       A.   Civilians.  We got the information from the

         25  Bravo Company, from the UNMOs, the military observers

Page 843

          1  in Srebrenica, and from the MSF in the hospital.

          2       Q.   These houses that were fired upon that were

          3  near your Potocari base, what kind of houses were

          4  those?

          5       A.   Well, just normal houses.  It was a small

          6  village called Budak in which people lived, and they

          7  just were attacked.

          8       Q.   What's the next thing that happens?

          9       A.   The whole night there was a lot of artillery

         10  and mortar fire in the enclave.  On the next day,

         11  Saturday, the 8th of July, at 2.00, there were three

         12  tank rounds that hit OP Foxtrot.  And at 3.00, the

         13  Commander of the Bravo Company orders if it's possible

         14  to leave the OP Foxtrot and go back to the compound.

         15            When the people from the OP leave the OP in

         16  an APC -- when they leave the OP and come from a dirt

         17  road on the main road from Echo, from OP Echo to

         18  Srebrenica, some Muslim people tried to stop the APC

         19  because they wanted to order them to go forward and

         20  defend the enclave instead of going back, and at that

         21  moment a hand grenade or a gunshot was on the APC from

         22  the Muslim side, and one of our soldiers, at the end of

         23  the day, died by that incident.

         24            That same day we had a lot of meetings with

         25  armies from the 8th OG to guarantee our freedom of

Page 844

          1  movement, because one of the problems was all the

          2  time -- and we had it before in the vicinity of OP

          3  Echo -- all the time when we would like to go backward

          4  and after that going forward in another place, which is

          5  a normal military strategy, they blocked us and ordered

          6  us just to go forward and defend the enclave.  And the

          7  enemies in front of you don't go back; go forward.

          8  That was one of our biggest problems and biggest

          9  concerns at that moment.  We had no freedom of movement

         10  inside the enclave.

         11            That same day, the Saturday, the 8th of July

         12  between 6.00 and 7.00 in the evening, the BSA is on the

         13  OP Uniform in the southern part.  And the men from the

         14  OP, they only have one possibility:  that's going

         15  forward and surrender to the BSA, because they were

         16  just afraid going backwards, where the Muslims tried to

         17  stop them, and they had that incident on the same day

         18  some hours before when the soldier Raviv van Rensen was

         19  killed.

         20       Q.   So how many Dutch soldiers were at -- roughly

         21  at that OP that surrendered to the BSA or went with the

         22  BSA?

         23       A.   I think about ten.

         24       Q.   And where did they go?

         25       A.   They surrendered and they went to the south

Page 845

          1  and then via the eastern side, over this road, to

          2  Bratunac.

          3       Q.   And then what happened?

          4       A.   Well, still a lot of rocket launchers and

          5  artillery fire in the vicinity of Potocari.  Then

          6  Sunday the 9th --

          7       Q.   Let me ask you:  Was there -- besides your

          8  military facility that was in Potocari, were you aware

          9  of any Muslim military facilities that was in the area

         10  where this fire was occurring?

         11       A.   Yes.  When the attacks on OP Uniform and

         12  Foxtrot started, the Muslims were in a lot of cases in

         13  the vicinity of our OPs, just firing at the BSA and

         14  trying to get in fire contact with them in the hope

         15  that after that the UN was forced to attack because the

         16  BSA attacked the UN.

         17       Q.   How about around Potocari?  You mentioned

         18  that there was a firing upon Potocari earlier.  Was

         19  there any Muslim military facility around Potocari?

         20       A.   No.  In Potocari there was nothing going on.

         21  There were only civilians in the vicinity in the

         22  village of Budak, in the village of Potocari.

         23       Q.   All right.  And then what's the next thing

         24  that occurs?

         25       A.   Well, the situation is still getting tense.

Page 846

          1  The dead body of Raviv van Rensen should be brought out

          2  on the Sunday, the 7th.  Well, as I told you before, we

          3  always had to ask clearances, and they refused it

          4  several times.  And so they did it again.  The first

          5  moment that the dead body should be taken out of the

          6  enclave was 9.00 in the morning.  At least after a lot

          7  of negotiations and a lot of troubles, we managed to

          8  get the body out at 3.00.

          9       Q.   Who were you dealing with?  Do you know who

         10  your command was dealing with in the VRS in order to

         11  negotiate the --

         12       A.   It was always -- mostly with Jovo.  He had

         13  telephone calls with his commanders, and I think most

         14  of the time was Major Nikolic.

         15       Q.   Now, this fellow you've nicknamed "Jovo,"

         16  what was his rank, if you knew?

         17       A.   I think he was a soldier, and he was the man

         18  who was always occupying the checkpoint.

         19       Q.   So that was more of a matter of convenience

         20  to communicate that developed over time with him?

         21       A.   Yes.

         22       Q.   Okay.  And then what happens?

         23       A.   That same day, the 9th of July, the OPs

         24  Sierra and Kilo have to surrender, and they do the same

         25  as the man from the OP Uniform.  They go forward,

Page 847

          1  because they had no possibility to go backward.  They

          2  had no freedom of movement.  And they also surrendered

          3  to the Serbs and were also brought to Bratunac.

          4       Q.   And then what?

          5       A.   Well, at that moment, the Swedish shelter

          6  project, in the vicinity of OP Sierra and Kilo, in

          7  which were approximately 4.000 Muslim refugees, they

          8  had no protection any longer and they started moving

          9  about to Srebrenica as refugees.

         10       Q.   I'm sorry.  What date did that occur?

         11       A.   On the 9th of July.  Then we got the first

         12  information that there was no protection of the Swedish

         13  shelter project and that they -- that the population

         14  fled to Srebrenica.  Of course, it was one of the

         15  concerns from the civilian leaders in the enclave that

         16  they suddenly would have again 4.000 refugees in the

         17  town of Srebrenica, and it was already overoccupied, so

         18  there would be a big problem.

         19       Q.   And what happened after that?

         20       A.   That same day, a lot of shooting also in the

         21  vicinity of Srebrenica.  The UNMOs who were stationed

         22  in the PTT building in Srebrenica had to leave the PTT

         23  building because it was no longer safe for them to stay

         24  there, and I got the information from Colonel Karremans

         25  that UNPROFOR had an ultimatum.  And I don't know

Page 848

          1  UNPROFOR from Zagreb or Sarajevo.  I don't know.

          2       Q.   Let me stop you for a second.  First of all,

          3  could you tell the Court what an UNMO is?

          4       A.   UNMO is a UN military observer.

          5       Q.   And how is that different from an UNPROFOR,

          6  your peacekeeping mission?

          7       A.   Well, we had a peacekeeping mission.  We have

          8  armed and had also the possibility to deter, if it's

          9  possible, to deter attacks on the enclave.  The UNMOs

         10  just were there for observation in arriving reports

         11  directly to the headquarters, and were not armed and

         12  had not the facilities we had.

         13       Q.   And where did the UNMOs stay usually?

         14       A.   The UNMOs stayed in the PTT building in

         15  Srebrenica.

         16       Q.   And that's downtown Srebrenica?

         17       A.   Yes.

         18       Q.   And who were the UNMOs, as best you can

         19  recall, that were stationed in Srebrenica at the time

         20  frame we're talking about?

         21       A.   At that moment, I know the major Andre de

         22  Haan, the Major Kingori, Josef Kingori, Captain Tetee.

         23  I think that that was the only three which were left at

         24  that moment.  The rest of the UNMOs already left the

         25  enclave for going on leave or for rotation, and there

Page 849

          1  should be in some new UNMOs, but they were not able to

          2  get in.

          3       Q.   I'm sorry.  I interrupted your testimony just

          4  as you were talking about the UNMO situation in

          5  Srebrenica.  Could you go back a bit and continue that?

          6       A.   Yes.  There were a lot of shootings and then

          7  they had to leave the PTT building and to try to get

          8  some protection from UNPROFOR, so from us, and they

          9  went up to Potocari and stayed in our compound for the

         10  rest of the stay there.  Well, there was, I told you,

         11  an ultimatum from UNPROFOR to the BSA that if the

         12  attacks on the OPs -- correction, on the blocking

         13  positions would go on, there would be airstrikes

         14  against the BSA.

         15       Q.   You mentioned blocking positions.  What do

         16  you mean -- can you explain what the blocking positions

         17  were and what that is?

         18       A.   Yes.  As I told you, it's usual that when we

         19  had to leave an OP, we go backwards, try to find a new

         20  position and take a new position.  The commander of

         21  DutchBat ordered to take some blocking position in the

         22  south of Srebrenica, from where you can see what was

         23  going on in the southern part, and if the BSA was going

         24  forward and attacking the town of Srebrenica.

         25       Q.   And so how many blocking positions did you

Page 850

          1  have about that time?

          2       A.   At that time at least two blocking

          3  positions.  That's what I know.

          4       Q.   And this ultimatum that UNPROFOR delivered to

          5  the BSA, what day was that again?

          6       A.   The 9th of July.

          7       Q.   And do you know about what time?

          8       A.   I think it was -- it started at 2100 hours.

          9  And after that, when there was an attack on the

         10  blocking positions, that close-air support would be

         11  used and they would attack the BSA is it.

         12       Q.   Did anything happen?

         13       A.   No, nothing happened.  Well, something

         14  happened.  The BSA went forward with their attack,

         15  shooting on the town of Srebrenica, firing rounds, also

         16  in the vicinity of our blocking positions.  And I don't

         17  know if close-air support was demanded.  I know it was

         18  demanded the next day, the 10th of July.

         19       Q.   Why don't you continue on with what happened

         20  on the 10th of July then.

         21       A.   On the 10th we took the blocking positions in

         22  the southern part of Srebrenica, as I told you, just to

         23  block the road to Srebrenica and to see what was going

         24  on and eventually try to stop the BSA.  Again we had

         25  negotiations with Ramiz for the freedom of movement,

Page 851

          1  which was a big problem, and because the BSA still went

          2  forward, we asked for close-air support, but it was not

          3  available they told us, and we didn't get any close-air

          4  support.

          5       Q.   And where were you on the 10th?

          6       A.   Well, on the 10th I was all the time on my

          7  way between Potocari and Srebrenica, because the UNMOs

          8  went to Potocari.  They didn't dare to go back to their

          9  office in Srebrenica.  And somebody had to deal with

         10  the civilian people, with the major, with the president

         11  and with the military leaders in the enclave, so the

         12  liaison team from the battalion had to go frequently

         13  from Potocari to Srebrenica, and all the day I went

         14  that road.

         15       Q.   Can you describe the situation in Srebrenica

         16  on the 10th?

         17       A.   It was --

         18       Q.   Downtown.

         19       A.   It was a rather tense situation, of course.

         20  A lot of people were going out of the houses, taking

         21  all their goods they could carry with them, just like

         22  refugees do.  They were in the streets that day

         23  already.  Although there was not a real attack at that

         24  moment at Srebrenica, but a lot of mortar and artillery

         25  rounds I think landed in the town of Srebrenica.

Page 852

          1       Q.   On the 10th?

          2       A.   On the 10th.  In the evening, we had to go

          3  with the battalion commander to the PTT building in

          4  Srebrenica, and that was in the evening, and then you

          5  got the situation that there was no light.  A lot of

          6  mortar and artillery, firing going on, a lot of people

          7  in the streets, and of course women and children very

          8  anxious.  And all the streets were occupied and

          9  overcrowded.

         10       Q.   Can you give us an idea of how many people

         11  were in the streets of downtown Srebrenica the night of

         12  the 10th?

         13       A.   Well, that's difficult to say.  In the

         14  vicinity of the Bravo Company and PTT building there

         15  are, I think, two or three hundred meters between it.

         16  In the vicinity of the Bravo Company were hundreds of

         17  people.  They blocked the road with some trees because

         18  they would guarantee that the Bravo Company would not

         19  leave and no longer protect them, so they tried to keep

         20  the Bravo Company where they were.  We had to pass the

         21  trees.  In the vicinity of the PTT building it was

         22  overcrowded, especially with men, at the moment we

         23  arrived there, and it was 11.00 in the evening.

         24       Q.   And did you see any armed Muslim men at that

         25  time?

Page 853

          1       A.   Yes, at that moment, outside the PTT

          2  building, there were a lot of armed men that were

          3  carrying guns, machine-guns, rocket launchers, hand

          4  grenade launchers.  And when we went into the PTT

          5  building, the civilian as well as the military leaders

          6  were all there and they were all wearing uniforms and

          7  also a lot of them were wearing weapons.

          8       Q.   And what occurred at this meeting?

          9       A.   Well, Colonel Karremans told them that the

         10  next morning, the 11th, at 6.00, when the BSA did not

         11  withdraw, there would be an airstrike in the positions

         12  of the BSA, and there would either be a killing box, a

         13  certain part of the terrain, which would be completely

         14  destroyed.  Of course, the civilian and military

         15  leaders did not believe him, because we often promised

         16  them that we would get close-air support, that we would

         17  get some help from outside, and till that moment

         18  nothing happened.  So they doubted about it if it would

         19  happen this time.

         20       Q.   Was anything resolved from the meeting

         21  besides what Karremans said and the disbelief of the

         22  other parties?

         23       A.   No, not really.  He just informed them, next

         24  morning at 6.00, the ultimatum was -- would end, and

         25  after that the problems would be solved by the air

Page 854

          1  force.

          2       Q.   And then what did you see happen after that,

          3  after the meeting was over?

          4       A.   Well, after the meeting was over, we went

          5  outside and there were still a lot of men in the

          6  vicinity of the PTT building.  Also a lot of them were

          7  already leaving the town, which would go on after, we

          8  heard later on.  They went in the north-western

          9  direction, via a road in the vicinity of the PTT

         10  building.  Colonel Karremans went back to Potocari and

         11  I stayed in the compound of the Bravo Company in

         12  Srebrenica.

         13       Q.   Was anyone else with the liaison team with

         14  you in the compound in Srebrenica?

         15       A.   Yes.  Major Boering was also there.

         16       Q.   Okay.  So the night of the 10th, early

         17  morning hours of the 11th, did anything occur that you

         18  noticed, anything specifically?

         19       A.   Yes.  There was frequent shelling of the

         20  town.  I met a lieutenant who was in the southern part,

         21  I think in one of the blocking positions.  I met him at

         22  1.00 in the night, so at 1.00 on the 11th, and he told

         23  me that he had seen the BSA cleansing the houses in the

         24  southern part of the enclave.

         25       Q.   Did he say what he meant by that?

Page 855

          1       A.   No, not specifically.  They went into the

          2  houses, started shooting, burning houses.  That's what

          3  he told me.

          4       Q.   What was the name of that lieutenant?

          5       A.   Lieutenant Versteeg.

          6       Q.   Could you spell that for the record?

          7       A.   V-e-r-s-t-e-e-g.

          8       Q.   And then what occurred?

          9       A.   That night, the OP Hotel, this one, was also

         10  shelled, and also the manning of that OP had to turn

         11  back to the base.  The next morning at about 6.00 we

         12  had to try to get a confirmation that the BSA did not

         13  withdraw, so we sent forward -- the commander of the

         14  Bravo Company sent forward an APC, and at that moment a

         15  tank round was fired on the APC, and did not hit him.

         16  But we got the confirmation that the fight was still

         17  going on, so we ordered -- reported to the OPs room in

         18  Potocari that it was still going on and that it was

         19  time to try to get the airstrikes.

         20       Q.   What happened then?

         21       A.   Well, nothing happened.  We had several

         22  requests for close-air support and nothing happened.  A

         23  lot of shelling all over the place, a lot of panic

         24  among the population in Srebrenica, which were

         25  gathering together in front of the compound from the

Page 856

          1  Bravo Company, asking for help, asking to let them on

          2  the compound, because they thought that that was one of

          3  the places which would be safe.

          4       Q.   And what was the atmosphere that day and how

          5  did the people feel?

          6       A.   Well, anxious, screaming, crying; women,

          7  children with all their luggage running around and

          8  didn't know where to go.  And we also did not know what

          9  was -- didn't know what was going on, because we had no

         10  possibilities to do something ourselves.  I think that

         11  in the morning, at 10.00 or maybe at 11.00, we got the

         12  request from the MSF to support them by getting out the

         13  wounded from the hospital when necessary, so we

         14  prepared some trucks on the compound of the Bravo

         15  Company to support the MSF with the wounded.  At that

         16  moment, also the refugees broke through the defence of

         17  the Bravo Company and came on the compound.

         18       Q.   Roughly how many people were now around or in

         19  the Bravo Company area?

         20       A.   Well, in and around, I think, thousands.  It

         21  was all occupied.  It was totally overcrowded.

         22       Q.   And then what happened?

         23       A.   Well, the patients came out of the hospital.

         24  We had no possibility to treat them in any way; just to

         25  put them in some trucks we had separated on the

Page 857

          1  compound.  The rest of the refugees went onto the

          2  trucks and maybe you have seen in the films from the

          3  overcrowded trucks.

          4       Q.   Did any shells land in the compound?

          5       A.   Yes.  I don't know the time, but around noon,

          6  I think, a mortar shell landed between two APCs on the

          7  compound and we had several wounded.  I've seen at

          8  least three or four wounded which were brought into the

          9  first-aid place from the Bravo Company.

         10       Q.   So what did you decide to do now?

         11       A.   At that moment we had no possibility to do

         12  anything else other than trying to get the people on

         13  the way to Potocari, because that was maybe the only

         14  safe place there was for us, because we had the idea

         15  that Srebrenica was taken over by the BSA.  So we asked

         16  them to go up to Potocari.  That was a problem.  They

         17  didn't want to leave the compound, because that was the

         18  place where they felt safe.  And after, at I think 10

         19  minutes past 2.00, we got some airstrikes.  There were

         20  some planes and some attacks from the air force.  After

         21  that we got maybe some confidence from the population

         22  that something happened, and they tried to go up to

         23  Potocari.

         24       Q.   Was there a reason for confidence after the

         25  air attacks?

Page 858

          1       A.   No, because it was maybe 5 or 10 minutes and

          2  then it stopped again.  There was no follow-up from the

          3  airstrikes.

          4       Q.   The planes left?

          5       A.   The planes left.

          6       Q.   And then what did you do?

          7       A.   Well, I stayed at Potocari -- I stayed at

          8  Srebrenica I think till 3.00 in the afternoon, and

          9  after that we could do nothing anymore over there, so I

         10  got into a Jeep with Major Boering and a lot of

         11  refugees, as much as we could take, and went on the

         12  road to Potocari.  The road was overcrowded and shells

         13  were falling at the sides of the road, I think at 100,

         14  150 meters.

         15       Q.   And how did you react to these shells falling

         16  on the side of the road?

         17       A.   Well, we got used to it, I think, because

         18  shells were going on for several days and, well, it

         19  just happened.  But I have the idea they shelled the

         20  road to take care that the population would go to the

         21  north, to Potocari, because they wanted -- I think they

         22  wanted that Srebrenica was left by all the population.

         23       Q.   So none of the shells hit on the road where

         24  the refugees were; just along the sides the road?

         25       A.   Well, at the moment I drove along the side of

Page 859

          1  the road, I have not seen that any wounded were on the

          2  road or dead people were on the road.  The only thing

          3  left on the road was a lot of luggage.  And for the

          4  rest, people were marching forwards to Potocari,

          5  especially elderly men, women, and children.

          6       Q.   And about what time did you get to Potocari?

          7       A.   I think I was at Potocari around 5.00,

          8  between 4.00 and 5.00.  At that moment Lieutenant

          9  Koster was already there, splitting up the refugees to

         10  the several factories in the vicinity of our compound,

         11  because there were already I think five or six thousand

         12  refugees on the compound and it was not possible to get

         13  more on the compound.  And he told me that there was

         14  information that the BSA did not allow us to let the

         15  refugees on the compound because otherwise they would

         16  start shelling the compound.

         17       Q.   So at the time that you returned to Potocari,

         18  roughly how many Muslims were in and around the

         19  compound?

         20       A.   Well, 10.000, maybe 15.000.

         21       Q.   Can you describe the atmosphere of the

         22  situation then?

         23       A.   Well, an overcrowded place with refugees

         24  carrying the luggage, elderly people, sick people,

         25  young children, mothers and children, all anxious and

Page 860

          1  not knowing where to go; only searching for help by the

          2  UN.  And the only thing we could offer them was some

          3  medical help by the MSF which was over there, trying to

          4  help and create some places in the factories in the

          5  vicinity.

          6       Q.   And what did you -- what were your duties?

          7       A.   At that moment I arranged with Lieutenant

          8  Koster that more factories were broken open, that it

          9  would be possible to go in the factories.  And at, I

         10  think, 7.00, I went to the compound in Potocari.

         11       Q.   And then what occurred?

         12       A.   I got the order from the Colonel Karremans to

         13  accompany him, together with Major Boering, to a

         14  meeting which should be held in the Hotel Fontana in

         15  Bratunac, and he was ordered to be there at 8.00.

         16       Q.   Did you have any other information about what

         17  this meeting was about or what to expect?

         18       A.   No, nothing, just that there was a meeting

         19  with the BSA and -- well, I think that we expected that

         20  there would be somebody who would ask us to surrender

         21  and try to arrange something, because at that moment, I

         22  think, we had the idea that we lost the war.

         23       Q.   Okay.  Were you able to get to Bratunac with

         24  your party?

         25       A.   Yes.  It was no problem.  I think that

Page 861

          1  between half past seven and 8.00, we went with a

          2  Mercedes jeep to Yellow Bridge, to Jovo, to go to

          3  Fontana.  We were stopped there.  I think that

          4  Major Nikolic, in his private car, accompanied us,

          5  driving in front of us to the Hotel Fontana in

          6  Bratunac.

          7       Q.   Now you say you think.

          8       A.   We were accompanied, and the only man I can

          9  remember was Major Nikolic, because he also brought us

         10  back to Fontana.  So I think he brought us there.

         11       Q.   All right.  What time did you arrive at the

         12  Hotel Fontana?

         13       A.   I think it was around 8.00.

         14       Q.   Can you describe the scene upon entering the

         15  hotel and what you learned and who you saw?

         16       A.   Well, we've been there several times before.

         17  We had our first meeting on the 6th of January over

         18  there, and when we entered the room, at the right side

         19  where we entered the meeting, there were a lot of our

         20  soldiers sitting, they were the hostages, a lot of BSA

         21  soldiers in front of the hotel and in the hotel, all

         22  armed.  And we had to go to the back side of the hotel,

         23  a small room, which was rather overcrowded, and we saw

         24  some people we knew.

         25            Major Boering, at that moment, just went to

Page 862

          1  the right and walked to the soldiers who were sitting

          2  there in that small room.  Although the guards who were

          3  around there tried to stop him, well, he just went

          4  there, and after some moments he had to leave to that

          5  room and went to the same room which we were in, so

          6  Colonel Karremans and I.

          7       Q.   Were you able to make out any insignia or any

          8  unit patches from any of the guards, VRS guards that

          9  you saw around the hotel or inside the hotel?

         10       A.   No.  I only remember the VRS uniforms.

         11       Q.   Anything distinctive about them that would

         12  indicate unit or -- that you saw?

         13       A.   No, not something that I can remember.

         14       Q.   Okay.  What happened next?

         15       A.   Well, when we were in that room, we were

         16  rather surprised, because we thought that

         17  General Mladic was there, and in the first place we

         18  couldn't believe he was there, but afterwards it was

         19  General Mladic, because we expected that the

         20  General Zivanovic, as Commander of the Drina Corps,

         21  should be there and he was there, but we did not expect

         22  General Mladic over there.  But as I said, he was

         23  there.

         24            Further on, Major Nikolic, Petar as an

         25  interpreter, several civilians which we didn't know,

Page 863

          1  and a camera team, and also some other military men

          2  which we did not know at that moment but later on -- I

          3  can describe them as Colonel Jankovic, which we had to

          4  deal with in the coming days several times, and I think

          5  it was Lieutenant but Mr. Korsoric.

          6       Q.   Jankovic, do you know where he was from, what

          7  rank, what unit?

          8       A.   No.  He was just standing there.  I did not

          9  know his rank.  He was introduced as a Colonel, I

         10  think, because when we entered the room, the

         11  interpreter Petar, which we used before and which was

         12  the interpreter from the UNMOs was not there, and at

         13  that moment that Colonel Jankovic was the only one that

         14  spoke English.

         15       Q.   Okay.  How about Korsoric?  Did you know

         16  anything about where he was from and what unit he

         17  belonged to?

         18       A.   No.  I have no idea, because he was with

         19  Major Nikolic in the vicinity of -- in back of the

         20  camera team, and I did not know him at that moment.

         21  Later, the next two days, I know that's Korsoric but I

         22  did not know him before.  He was just, for me, a VRS

         23  soldier, officer.

         24       Q.   Something rather unique about him, the way he

         25  looks?

Page 864

          1       A.   Yeah.  His head without any hair at the top,

          2  his big moustache, and a tattoo on his arms.

          3       Q.   Okay.  Was General Krstic at that first

          4  meeting?

          5       A.   No.  I don't remember him.

          6       Q.   Can you describe what you recall occurring at

          7  that first meeting?  What happened as you went in?

          8       A.   Well, the first moment there was confusion,

          9  of course.  Well, this cannot be true.  This isn't

         10  General Mladic.  Well, it seems to be that he was.

         11            We had a little talk, and very soon I came

         12  under a lot of pressure.  Petar, as interpreter, came

         13  in and started to translate what Mladic said.

         14       Q.   Who started out as the interpreter?

         15       A.   I think that first Jankovic was an

         16  interpreter, in the first talks, and after that Petar

         17  came in.

         18       Q.   You've had a chance to see a video of part of

         19  this meeting, I take it.

         20       A.   Yes.

         21       Q.   We'll get to that a little bit later.  Okay.

         22  What's the necessary thing you recall happening?  Petar

         23  comes in to do interpreting now.  What happens now?

         24       A.   Well, pictures are taken, the film crew is

         25  active, General Mladic is making a lot of noise,

Page 865

          1  shouting at us, shouting at Colonel Karremans, accusing

          2  him that he shot at his soldiers.  He asked if

          3  Colonel Karremans asked for airstrikes and if he was

          4  responsible for what happened that afternoon, and,

          5  well, he was there as the man who won, who was on the

          6  first place, and he dictated at that moment -- well,

          7  that's not the right word, but I think the total show

          8  that went on at that moment there.

          9       Q.   Did he direct his comments to anyone besides

         10  Colonel Karremans?

         11       A.   Yeah.  After -- first he asked several times

         12  Colonel Karremans if he ordered the airstrikes, and

         13  Colonel Karremans told him that he just asked for it

         14  but he was not the one who decides that it would take

         15  place.  After that, General Mladic turned over to me

         16  and did the same.  After that, he went to the Major

         17  Boering and did also the same.  So they also asked us,

         18  in the same way as he did to Karremans, if we ordered

         19  the attacks.

         20       Q.   What other subjects were discussed at the

         21  meeting after that?

         22       A.   I think after that induction, I think we sat

         23  down and we talked about several subjects.

         24  General Mladic wanted to have contact with

         25  representatives of the civilian population, because he

Page 866

          1  wanted to tell them that they were not his target, that

          2  they were free to go, and if they would like to leave

          3  it was possible.  He also asked for contact with the

          4  military leaders inside the enclave or somebody from

          5  the military in the enclave, and he especially called

          6  for Zulfo Tursunovic.  At that moment, he told that

          7  Nasir Oric was not in the enclave -- that was what he

          8  knew that already -- so he wanted contact with Zulfo

          9  Tursunovic.

         10       Q.   Who is Mr. Tursunovic, to your knowledge?

         11       A.   Tursunovic was one of the military leaders in

         12  the enclave, in the western part of the enclave, where

         13  he also lived.

         14       Q.   How concerned was Mladic with the military?

         15  What else did he say about the military?

         16       A.   Well, he just wanted one thing.  When we told

         17  him that we had no contact with the military leaders,

         18  he told us that we had to go there and try to get in

         19  contact with the military leaders because they had to

         20  lay down the weapons and surrender.  And if they

         21  surrendered, there was no problem.  Then they would be

         22  taken prisoners of war and detained.

         23       Q.   Okay.  What other subjects do you recall

         24  being discussed, if any?

         25       A.   Well, he told us that if there should be new

Page 867

          1  airstrikes, then he should shell the compound and the

          2  refugees, and also the hostages could be targets, the

          3  hostages which were in Bratunac.  Colonel Karremans

          4  asked for food and medicines for the refugees in the

          5  vicinity of Potocari.  Well, I can't remember, but I

          6  think that Mladic promised us that he would see what he

          7  could do, not specifically give any answers on the

          8  requests.

          9            One of the things I remember is that he asks

         10  Colonel Karremans if it was possible for him to arrange

         11  buses to transport refugees to places where they would

         12  like to go.

         13       Q.   And Mladic asked that to Karremans?

         14       A.   Yes.

         15       Q.   And what does Karremans say?

         16       A.   Well, I don't know if he promised, but I

         17  think that he promised that he would see if UNPROFOR

         18  could provide some buses.

         19       Q.   What other discussion was there, if any,

         20  about the movement of the refugees?

         21       A.   Nothing else.  The only thing that the people

         22  were free to go and transport had to be arranged.  It

         23  was, in that first meeting, the only subject.

         24       Q.   What would you say the main subject was at

         25  the first meeting, as you recall now?

Page 868

          1       A.   I think the main subject was making contact,

          2  showing who was the boss, and try to get in contact

          3  with the civilian and military population, and try to

          4  inform the military population inside the enclave that

          5  they should be disarmed and that they should

          6  surrender.

          7       Q.   Now, you've had a chance to see probably

          8  various videos of the various meetings.  From your

          9  recollection of those videos, did those videos contain

         10  everything that occurred at the meeting?

         11       A.   No.  I think -- what I've seen, and I don't

         12  know if I've seen everything, but I've seen only the

         13  shots on the several Nova programmes, but I don't think

         14  everything from the meeting is on the tape.

         15       Q.   You were able to see some of the video that

         16  we showed you before your testimony, on the same

         17  meeting; is that correct?

         18       A.   That's correct.

         19            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

         20  Mr. McCloskey, sorry if I'm interrupting you, but I do

         21  not think we can go on until 2.30 without a break.  I

         22  believe everybody's tired.  So I am going to announce a

         23  break of 15 minutes and then we shall proceed until

         24  2.30.  Will that be all right?

         25                 --- Recess taken at 1.38 p.m.

Page 869

          1                 --- On resuming at 1.57 p.m.

          2            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

          3  Mr. McCloskey, you may continue.

          4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  We

          5  have the tape of the first meeting, which is about

          6  40 minutes.  So it would run a little bit over, but I

          7  would offer to play it at this time after just one or

          8  two quick questions.

          9            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think it

         10  is acceptable that we work ten minutes later than

         11  usual.  Thank you very much.  The interpreters are

         12  always forthcoming.  Thank you very much,

         13  Mr. McCloskey.  You have the floor.

         14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I've been informed, Your

         15  Honour, that this witness will be the pseudonym of

         16  Witness B, for the record.

         17       Q.   Now, briefly, before we start the video, can

         18  you tell us the people that can be seen?  You've seen

         19  this video.  Can you tell us the people that can be

         20  seen on the video as it opens up and as it goes through

         21  the video?

         22       A.   I think when it opens up there is

         23  General Mladic; Colonel Jankovic; Colonel Karremans;

         24  and myself; and after that Petar is there; Major

         25  Boering; and after having a drink, also General

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          1  Zivanovic is on the tape.

          2       Q.   General Zivanovic comes in right at the end

          3  of the tape?

          4       A.   At the end when we have a drink.

          5       Q.   That means who cannot be seen on the video

          6  who was present there?

          7       A.   I think Korsoric and the civilians and the

          8  camera team cannot be seen.  I told you that

          9  General Mladic, Zivanovic, Major Nikolic, Colonel

         10  Jankovic were there, and Korsoric, and the civilians

         11  camera team.

         12       Q.   So we won't be able to see Nikolic either on

         13  the tape?

         14       A.   No.  I don't think so.

         15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Then we have --

         16  the tape is Exhibit 39, and I would ask for one pause

         17  at a particular point in the tape to ask a few -- one

         18  or two questions, and then we'll continue.  It

         19  shouldn't take long.  But if you could play Exhibit

         20  39.

         21                 [Videotape played]

         22            THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "NATO planes

         23  have bombed us at your request.  Whose planes were

         24  they?  Dutch.  Who?  Did you order UNPROFOR forces to

         25  be active against my army in the area of Srebrenica

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          1  today?  Your forces.  Peacekeeping forces in the area

          2  of Srebrenica opened fire against my units.  Did you

          3  order this?  Where did you hail from?  Translate this.

          4  Ask him whether his forces opened fire today on my

          5  forces in the Srebrenica area following his orders?"

          6            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me.  Could we stop the

          7  tape for one brief second.  Could I ask the interpreter

          8  not to interpret over Mladic?  I'm sorry we're giving

          9  her mixed signals on that, but I think it's important

         10  to be able to hear his tone, and if we could follow the

         11  transcript for the next few minutes.  Thank you.

         12            You may continue with the tape.

         13                 [Videotape played]

         14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, that

         15  concludes, obviously, the video, and I suggest we start

         16  up again with this witness in the morning.

         17            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank

         18  you, Mr. McCloskey.  So we will continue tomorrow

         19  morning with the witness that is here today.  So I'll

         20  see you again tomorrow morning at 9.30.

         21                 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

         22                 at 2.43 p.m., to be reconvened on

         23                 Tuesday, the 21st day of March, 2000,

         24                 at 9.30 a.m.