Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 878

          1                 Tuesday, 21 March 2000

          2  [Closed session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]

          3                 --- Upon commencing at 9.38 a.m.

          4                 [The accused entered court].

          5            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good

          6  morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning, sound

          7  engineers; good morning, interpreters.  I trust you're

          8  there.  Yes, they are.  Good morning, counsel for the

          9  Prosecution, for the Defence.  General Krstic, good

         10  morning.  We are back here to resume our case.  The

         11  difference from yesterday is that Judge Riad has joined

         12  us again, and I should like to greet him back.

         13            We have also taken -- we have to take a

         14  decision today with regard to the matter raised

         15  yesterday, and that decision will be pronounced

         16  verbally, that is, yesterday, but the Prosecutor asked

         17  to tender into evidence certain exhibits, that is, 14,

         18  17, and 18, to which the Defence objected, claiming

         19  that they related to Nova Kasaba and the Jadar River.

         20  Those are places not indicated in paragraphs 24 to 26

         21  of the indictment.

         22            In fact, the paragraph 24 of the indictment

         23  says that between the 11th and the 18th of July, the

         24  executions of the Muslims in Bosnia were mass

         25  executions and that they took place in Srebrenica and

Page 879

          1  its environs; that is, the places which are then

          2  listed.

          3            The expression used here is clearly

          4  indicative of this list as an example rather than the

          5  exhaustive list of places mentioned here.  Beyond this,

          6  the principles of the material truth which govern

          7  criminal law, and in particular international criminal

          8  law, require that truth and the whole truth be

          9  established while respecting the rights of the

         10  accused.  Therefore, there are no violations of the

         11  rights of the accused, because the accused knew of

         12  these places, owing to the fact that the Prosecution

         13  had disclosed documents to the Defence.

         14            The Chamber, therefore, has decided to admit

         15  all of the exhibits that were tendered by the

         16  Prosecution, including Exhibits 14, 17, and 18.  So

         17  this is the decision of the Chamber.

         18            I should like to ask the registrar,

         19  Mr. Dubuisson, to take note of this decision and do

         20  whatever is necessary in this respect.  So this is the

         21  decision of the Chamber.

         22            Yes, Mr. Petrusic.  Do you wish to say

         23  something?

         24            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

         25  will the decision be also taken in writing or is this

Page 880

          1  the final decision, the verbal decision, as you have

          2  just pronounced it?

          3            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You should

          4  take it as the verbal decision which was taken.  We

          5  have not made the decision in writing, so preferably we

          6  shall take our decisions in this manner unless,

          7  exceptionally, there are certain reasons when, for

          8  instance, a motion or objection is submitted in

          9  writing, in which case the Chamber will respond in

         10  writing.  But this is the final decision, and that is

         11  why I drew the attention of the Registry to take note

         12  of this decision.  There will be no decision in

         13  writing.  This is the decision of the Chamber.

         14            Thank you very much, Mr. Petrusic.

         15            So the witness, whom we were hearing

         16  yesterday, can resume his testimony, and I, therefore,

         17  give the floor to Mr. McCloskey.

         18            Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

         19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

         20  Then we would ask that protected Witness B come back.

         21                 [The witness entered court]

         22                 WITNESS:  WITNESS B [Resumed]

         23            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good

         24  morning.  Can you hear me?  Good morning.  I should

         25  like to remind you that you are still under oath and

Page 881

          1  you will now answer further questions that

          2  Mr. McCloskey will have to ask of you.  Thank you.

          3            THE WITNESS:  I have the translation in

          4  Serbo-Croatian, so I don't think that's correct.

          5            MR. McCLOSKEY:  You probably want to change

          6  it to channel 4.

          7                 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:  [contd]

          8       Q.   All right.  You may have heard, as the tape

          9  was being played, that General Mladic made a reference

         10  to who actually invited who to the meeting.  What is

         11  your recollection about who called the meeting?

         12       A.   In my recollection, the battalion Commander

         13  was ordered to go to Fontana, so I think that Mladic

         14  ordered to come there.  So he organised the meeting.

         15       Q.   And he also -- General Mladic also, and I'll

         16  refer to Exhibit 39A, the transcript, he states on the

         17  bottom of the page 15:  "And you've isolated our

         18  people, especially that guy of yours Van den Broek.

         19  He's one of those who have destroyed the dream of a

         20  state both to us and the Muslims.  Sir, we were a happy

         21  country and happy peoples, and we had a good life both

         22  in Srebrenica and here until the Muslims began to

         23  listen to Van den Broek, Zimmerman, Kohl, and similar

         24  Western Mafia were telling them."

         25            Who was Van den Broek at the time?

Page 882

          1       A.   At that time Van den Broek was the Minister

          2  of Foreign Affairs in Holland, and he was several

          3  times also by the soldiers we had contact with --

          4  Jovo's accused that he was one of the men who arranged

          5  what was going on and was for the Muslims and against

          6  the Serbs.

          7       Q.   And during that meeting, you can be seen

          8  standing there near Mladic, next to Colonel Karremans.

          9  How did you feel during that meeting?

         10       A.   Well, very uncomfortable, because when I saw

         11  the tape, I think I missed some parts of the tape, and

         12  in my opinion and in my notes I can find that he

         13  threatened us that when there would be airstrikes again

         14  on his, say, soldiers, then he would start shooting at

         15  the compound and at the refugees, and also our hostages

         16  could be targets, the hostages in Bratunac.  After he

         17  started screaming to Colonel Karremans and accusing him

         18  of asking for the airstrikes, after that he did the

         19  same to me and after that he did the same to Major

         20  Boering.  In the first ten minutes I was very

         21  uncomfortable, and I had the idea that it was possible

         22  that we would be brought out and be shot.

         23       Q.   Now, the meeting ended with another meeting

         24  planned.  Can you tell us what happened after the

         25  meeting ended?

Page 883

          1       A.   After the meeting ended we just visited for a

          2  few minutes our soldiers.  I think we were allowed to

          3  be there five minutes.  After that we were let out of

          4  the hotel.  We went back to the compound in Potocari

          5  and had to find a representative, and after talking

          6  with men or women we knew and we had seen in the

          7  refugees -- in or outside the compound, we found out

          8  that Mr. Mandzic was there, and we knew Mr. Mandzic,

          9  because we visited him several times at the secondary

         10  school in Srebrenica.  And then we thought it would be

         11  a good representative if he would like to do it for

         12  us.  And we asked him and, well, he was free to go with

         13  us.

         14       Q.   All right.  And so then what did you do?

         15       A.   At 2300 hours we went back to the Hotel

         16  Fontana for a meeting.

         17       Q.   And who went?

         18       A.   Mr. Boering, Mr. Karremans, myself and

         19  Mr. Mandzic.

         20       Q.   And were you escorted back to the hotel by

         21  anybody?

         22       A.  I can't remember, but I think that we were

         23  escorted from Jovo's place to the hotel.  Well, I'm not

         24  sure, but I think it was Nikolic again, but I'm not

         25  sure of that.

Page 884

          1       Q.   And when you got to the hotel, who was there

          2  at this second meeting?

          3       A.   Well, I wrote it down in my notes.  General

          4  Mladic was there; Nikolic was there, Major Nikolic;

          5  Colonel Jankovic; somebody who was called a

          6  representative of the Drina Corps.  Later on it seemed

          7  that it was the General Krstic.  Kosoric was there, the

          8  film team was there, and a lot of civilians, and one of

          9  them was Ljubisav Simic.  It was a name which was

         10  mentioned sometime before by Jovo.  He was announced as

         11  the mayor of Bratunac.  And during that meeting we

         12  discovered that he was a former colleague from

         13  Mr. Mandzic, so that's why I know his name.

         14       Q.   Now, the person who your notes indicate was a

         15  representative of the Drina Corps.  Do your notes or

         16  does your memory indicate getting a name or a rank of

         17  that person?

         18       A.   No, not in my notes; only as a representative

         19  of the Drina Corps in my notes.

         20       Q.   Had you ever seen that person before?

         21       A.   No, never.

         22       Q.   And did you later see him on television?

         23       A.   Yes, when he was arrested inside.

         24       Q.   Are you sure that that's the same person --

         25       A.   Yes, I'm sure that's the same.

Page 885

          1       Q.   Do you see that person that was introduced to

          2  you as a representative of the Drina Corps present in

          3  the courtroom today?

          4       A.   Yes.  He's sitting over there.

          5       Q.   Can you point out what he's wearing so we

          6  know who you're talking about?

          7       A.   It's not the guard but the man sitting with

          8  the headphones on his head, in I think a blue or a grey

          9  jacket.

         10       Q.   Will the record indicate he's identified the

         11  defendant, General Krstic.

         12            Now, who was leading the meeting?

         13       A.   General Mladic was leading.

         14       Q.   And can you tell us what the first thing you

         15  remember occurring at this meeting?

         16       A.   Well, we took a seat, and after that somebody

         17  opened the window and the curtains from the room we

         18  were sitting in, and a pig was slaughtered under the

         19  window.  It screamed terrible, and I think it was just

         20  to intimidate us.

         21       Q.   And how long did this pig scream for?

         22       A.   Well, it's very difficult to say now, but

         23  maybe two, maybe three minutes.  But in that situation

         24  it's hard, very difficult, to know the exact time.  I

         25  wrote it down in my notes.  We were there at 2300

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          1  hours, and at 5 minutes past 11.00 in the evening, the

          2  slaughtering of the pig started.

          3       Q.   And what happened after the pig stopped?

          4       A.   After the pig stopped, they closed the

          5  window.  A lot of them, of the Serbs who were in the

          6  room, were just smiling.  The window was closed, the

          7  curtain was closed, and we started with the meeting, in

          8  which Mladic started to tell us that he did not find

          9  any medicines in Srebrenica.  When he arrived in the

         10  hospital, all the medicines were gone.  That was the

         11  first item.

         12       Q.   In the last several months have you had a

         13  chance to see a partial video of that second meeting?

         14       A.   Yes, I've seen a small part of it.

         15       Q.   Did that help refresh your recollection as to

         16  who was at that meeting?

         17       A.   I've seen -- there was General Krstic, which

         18  I didn't remember by name, but after seeing him on

         19  television in 1998, I knew his name.

         20       Q.   And where was he seated at that second

         21  meeting?

         22       A.   At the left side of General Mladic.

         23       Q.   And what was the next subject that was

         24  discussed, as far as you can recall?

         25       A.   Well, I found my notes from that meeting at

Page 887

          1  15 minutes past 11.00.  Mladic showed us a board that

          2  he took from the opstina in Srebrenica.  He showed as a

          3  trophy and I think he told us that Srebrenica was his

          4  town now.

          5            After that he had a talk with Mr. Mandzic,

          6  and it was very difficult for me to follow that speech,

          7  because they were sitting rather next to each other.

          8  Petar was interpreting for the Colonel Karremans and

          9  there were, I think, two persons sitting between them

         10  and myself, so I just picked up some things.  It was a

         11  rather relaxed talk, and Mladic explained to Mandzic

         12  that the population had to choose and had to say who

         13  wants to go where when they left the enclave.  It was

         14  also possible to stay, but I don't think it was a real

         15  option.

         16       Q.   So you had a difficult time hearing the

         17  translation --

         18       A.   Yes.

         19       Q.   -- because of where you were seated?  And

         20  about how long did that meeting last?

         21       A.   It lasted till about 12.00 in the evening.

         22  After the talk with Mandzic, Mladic told that he was

         23  able to arrange buses to transport the people where

         24  they wanted to go.  At 20 minutes past 11.00 there was

         25  a statement from Mandzic, and I don't know, because it

Page 888

          1  was in Serbo-Croatian and I didn't get the translation

          2  exactly what he said, but it was a rather calm talk.

          3            After that there was a statement from General

          4  Mladic, in which I could hear also from -- parts from

          5  the translation that he was accusing Mandzic and the

          6  Muslims for what they have done, going out of the

          7  enclave, killing Serb people outside the enclave.  He

          8  was looking very mean and it was a very tense moment

          9  again.

         10            At that same meeting we had talks about food

         11  for the refugees, eventual Medevacs for the wounded

         12  which were on the compound, maybe bringing in food by

         13  UNHCR, providing diesel for the buses and the trucks,

         14  who would do it and if there were possibilities.  Well,

         15  we had no logistic convoy, so we couldn't provide it,

         16  but I think that they said there would be a convoy.

         17  There was a discussion about the buses and I think we

         18  tried to find a time schedule, but there were no

         19  details in that meeting.

         20       Q.   There were no details to what in that

         21  meeting?

         22       A.   A time schedule, who would provide the buses,

         23  who would provide the diesel.  Well, it was just -- it

         24  had to be arranged, but nobody said, well, you will do

         25  this and I will do that.

Page 889

          1       Q.   Was there any indication it would happen the

          2  next day?

          3       A.   No.  Just that it would happen and there

          4  would be buses somewhere and some when, but not when

          5  exactly.

          6       Q.   Was anything specifically planned for the

          7  next day?

          8       A.   Yes.  A new meeting at 10.00, because Mladic

          9  ordered Mandzic to go back and see where the population

         10  wanted to go, and he had to come back the next morning

         11  at 10.00 for a new meeting.

         12       Q.   And did Mladic say anything about the

         13  military?

         14       A.   Yes, of course.  He tried several times to

         15  inform Colonel Karremans that he needed a contact with

         16  the military leaders from the Muslims.  He wanted that

         17  they would surrender, hand over their weapons.

         18       Q.   All right.  And then --

         19       A.   For the BSA, he promised that there would be

         20  a ceasefire up till 10.00 the next morning, so 10.00 on

         21  the 12th of July.

         22       Q.   Is that most of what you recall about the

         23  meeting?

         24       A.   Yes.

         25       Q.   And what happened after the meeting ended?

Page 890

          1       A.   The meeting ended, we went back to the

          2  compound in Potocari, and I don't know if we did it,

          3  but I think that Mr. Mandzic did it.  He found two

          4  other representatives from the population, Camila and

          5  Ibro Nuhanovic, who would support him.  Colonel

          6  Karremans made his report.  That's what he told us and

          7  sent his reports to north-east command, his higher

          8  echelon, and I think also to Sarajevo, to BH Command.

          9       Q.   All right.  And then did you -- where did you

         10  spend the night?

         11       A.   I spend the night in the compound in

         12  Potocari.

         13       Q.   And what happened in the morning of July

         14  12th?

         15       A.   Well, in the morning we first had a meeting

         16  with the representatives of the civilian population.

         17  They wanted to inform Mr. Mulatovic, Izetbegovic, and

         18  Silajdzic.  That's what they told.  They tried to use

         19  our telephone, but they had a big problem to get in

         20  contact.

         21       Q.   And who were those individuals they wanted to

         22  inform?

         23       A.   Those were the Muslim representatives in

         24  Bosnia-Herzegovina in the government.  At the same

         25  moment we tried to talk about creating safe zones for

Page 891

          1  the refugees, where they could stay, because we didn't

          2  know how long they had to stay there, and about some

          3  home rules that had to be made, because there were a

          4  lot of refugees on the compound and outside the

          5  compound, and we had to arrange something.

          6            Now, that was a small problem because at

          7  9.00, although it was a promise that there would be a

          8  ceasefire till 10.00, at three minutes past nine, a

          9  round from a tank hit one of the houses at the OP site

         10  opposite side of the compound.  After that, several

         11  tank rounds for the next ten --

         12            THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness slow

         13  down, please?

         14       A.   Okay.  After that, the first round at three

         15  minutes past nine, in the next ten minutes several

         16  rounds hit the houses at the OP site, opposite side of

         17  the compound.

         18            I had to do some other jobs inside the

         19  compound.  We started with destroying some information

         20  we had from which we thought that it was not good that

         21  the Serbs get it in their hands.

         22            MR. McCLOSKEY:

         23       Q.   Why did you think the Serbs might get it in

         24  their hands?

         25       A.   Because at the same moment, at 9.00, when the

Page 892

          1  rounds hit the houses, the Serbs entered -- and I can

          2  show it on the map -- from OP Papa, from the north in

          3  Potocari, at the east and west side of the road.  They

          4  went southwards in the direction of the compound.  So a

          5  big group of Serb soldiers came in the vicinity of the

          6  compound, and we did not know what they wanted to do,

          7  if they would come on the compound.

          8       Q.   Were you able to you see them enter the area

          9  with your own eyes?

         10       A.   Yes, I seen them enter the area.  They split

         11  up and came in a very bright front forward to the

         12  south.

         13       Q.   Then what happened?

         14       A.   Well, between 9.00 and 10.00, I think, they

         15  walked forward burning haystacks.  I think they did it

         16  so they could see where they had to stay on the line

         17  and go forward all together.  There were groups with

         18  dogs with them walking through the fields.

         19       Q.   How many dogs did you see?

         20       A.   I think I saw five or six groups with dogs.

         21  A group of five or six men with a dog.

         22       Q.   All right.  Then what happened?

         23       A.   Well, nothing happened.  They just walked

         24  around the compound at the east and the west side.

         25  They did not enter the compound, did not go to the

Page 893

          1  refugees in the factories south of the compound, and

          2  just stayed there.

          3       Q.   Could you tell how the refugees reacted when

          4  the Serb soldiers appeared on the scene?

          5       A.   Of course when the first tank rounds landed

          6  in the houses, there was a lot of screaming and a lot

          7  of anxious people all over the place, of course.  And,

          8  of course, when the Serb soldiers came closer to the

          9  refugees, they were very anxious.  But I wasn't in the

         10  factories at the moment.  I stayed inside the compound

         11  because I had a lot of other things to do.

         12       Q.   The third meeting was scheduled to be held

         13  at --

         14       A.   At 10.00.  Well, I know -- I don't know when

         15  they left, but I know that the three representatives of

         16  the civilian population, Major Boering, and Karremans

         17  went to Fontana again.

         18       Q.   Why didn't you go this time?

         19       A.   Well, I had to do some other things.

         20  Emergency sorting inside the compound and somebody had

         21  to do that, so I couldn't go with them.

         22       Q.   Okay.  Can you tell us what significant

         23  things happened that morning, after 10.00, that you

         24  were able to experience?

         25       A.   Not specifically on the compound.  I know

Page 894

          1  that Karremans, Major Boering, and representatives came

          2  back after the meeting.  They had talked about fuel,

          3  buses, time schedule.  That's what I thought, but again

          4  there was no concrete deal over what would happen.

          5            So the Colonel Karremans ordered Major

          6  Boering and myself to go back to Fontana and try to

          7  find out how the situation with the fuel should be

          8  arranged and how many buses would be provided by Mladic

          9  and the time schedule, when what would happen.

         10       Q.   Can you tell us:  At that point, was there an

         11  anticipation or information that it would happen that

         12  very day?

         13       A.   No.  Because they came back from that

         14  meeting, and I think they still had no idea when it

         15  would happen.  And that has been confirmed, because at

         16  12.00 I went with Major Boering back to the Hotel

         17  Fontana to find out what I just told you and nobody was

         18  there.  Well, a lot of soldiers, but no representatives

         19  we could deal with.  And I think that somebody in the

         20  hotel phoned for the Major Nikolic, which we asked for,

         21  and Major Nikolic showed up with Kosoric.

         22            We had a small talk outside -- or in the

         23  lobby of the hotel, and suddenly they told us we had to

         24  go back because the buses were already there and they

         25  would start the evacuation.

Page 895

          1            Well, we were very surprised and went back, I

          2  think about 1.00, to Potocari.  When we arrived there

          3  were already, I think, 15 buses standing in front of

          4  the compound.

          5       Q.   When you had left the compound that morning,

          6  were there any vehicles, buses, or trucks along the

          7  road between the compound and Bratunac?

          8       A.   I can't remember that there was any vehicle.

          9       Q.   Was that an area that was cordoned off by you

         10  before you were taken over by the Serbs, the roadway

         11  between the UN base and OP Papa?

         12       A.   Not at that moment again, but we had the

         13  OP Papa, and then, of course, that was at the entrance

         14  of the enclave.  So that was cut off till the moment

         15  that the Serbs enter the enclave.

         16       Q.   When you had left to go to the hotel that

         17  morning, had the Serbs already entered the enclave?

         18       A.   Yes.

         19       Q.   But -- and we had --

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

         21  Mr. McCloskey, I'm sorry that I have to interrupt you,

         22  but I do not think that at this speed we can really do

         23  our work.  The interpreters are following you only with

         24  very great difficulty.

         25            Witness, you must be aware of the existence

Page 896

          1  of interpreters.  You already had some experience.

          2  You've worked with interpreters.

          3            Mr. McCloskey, you should establish the

          4  pace.  If you make a break, if you make a pause, and if

          5  you speak slowly, then, I believe, the witness will do

          6  the same.  I am sorry for having to interrupt you, but

          7  it is in the interests of work and in the interests of

          8  justice.  When a witness says things that are very

          9  important, then we really have to follow him and

         10  understand him.  If he goes too fast, we simply miss

         11  some of this information.

         12            So will you please speak slowly, as I do now,

         13  with pauses so that the interpreters can follow us.

         14  Right.  Very well.  I'm quite sure that you can do it.

         15  Please go on.  Thank you.

         16            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I

         17  understand.

         18       Q.   Now if I can remember where I was.  I'm

         19  sorry.  I was asking you buses and the enclave when you

         20  went to Bratunac.  Again, you said there were no buses

         21  in the enclave area when you went to Bratunac.

         22       A.   When I left -- I think it was 12.00 -- there

         23  were no buses.

         24       Q.   When you came back at 1.00, there were buses?

         25       A.   Yes.  When we came back, I think there were

Page 897

          1  15 buses standing in front of the compound.

          2       Q.   What was the -- what was the next thing that

          3  happened when you got back that afternoon and saw these

          4  buses?

          5       A.   Well, we -- I think the first thing we did,

          6  entered the compound, report to Colonel Karremans what

          7  happened to us.  After that we went outside because we

          8  had the indication that evacuation or deportation

          9  started.  People were led into the buses.

         10       Q.   Did you see that?

         11       A.   Yes.  I went out and I saw that people were

         12  led into the buses from the area where they were

         13  assembled.

         14       Q.   Can you describe that process as you saw it?

         15       A.   Well, of course, the refugees were deadly

         16  afraid.  They saw the buses and that was for them the

         17  indication, "Well, they bring us to a safer place.  So

         18  let's go as quick to the buses, go as fast as possible

         19  to the buses," and, "I will be first."

         20       Q.   Okay.  And what else?

         21       A.   There was talk in the buses.  First, the

         22  wounded.  Well, it was the request of Mr. Mandzic,

         23  first the wounded and then elderly people and women.

         24  After that the rest would be evacuated.  Well, at that

         25  moment, everybody was able to stand up, pick up his

Page 898

          1  luggage, went to the buses, and they overcrowded the

          2  buses.  We tried to arrange, at that moment, to put an

          3  UN soldier in each bus to accompany and escort them,

          4  but that was not possible because the buses were too

          5  overcrowded.

          6            At that moment, Major Boering and Captain

          7  Voerman were ordered to take a jeep and escort the

          8  buses to where wherever they would go, and we heard

          9  that they went to Kladanj.

         10       Q.   Was there any separation of the men at that

         11  early stage?

         12       A.   Well, I don't remember if it happened with

         13  the first few buses that there was already a

         14  separation.  I think that at the end of filling up the

         15  buses, the first separation started.  When men went

         16  forward to go to the buses, they were separated and

         17  brought to the White House near the entrance of the

         18  compound.

         19       Q.   Can you describe that process as you saw it?

         20       A.   I don't know exactly at what moment it

         21  started, but I think when the first buses were there;

         22  otherwise, for sure when the second buses -- group of

         23  buses was there.  The people were able to go forward to

         24  the buses.  Everybody tried to go, most of them they

         25  went to the right side of the bus.  I don't know why

Page 899

          1  the right side, but it just happened.  But at that

          2  moment, the Serb soldiers started to pick out of the

          3  refugees the men, I think from the age from 17 up to 70

          4  years old and led them to the White House near the

          5  entrance of the compound.  They told us that they had

          6  to do that because they wanted to find out if they were

          7  soldiers and if they were in the army during the war.

          8  If they were in the army, they would be separated, be

          9  made prisoners of war.

         10       Q.   Did some of these men have property?

         11       A.   Yeah.  Everybody who could carry something

         12  had his property with him, as far as they could take

         13  it, but the women and children and elderly men who were

         14  brought to the buses were able to take the property

         15  inside the buses, most of it, and the men who were

         16  brought to the White House had to leave their luggage

         17  outside of the house and were brought, without any

         18  luggage, inside the house.

         19       Q.   Did you see what happened to the men after

         20  they went to the White House?

         21       A.   Well, they first stayed for an interrogation

         22  inside the house.  Outside I talked with

         23  General Mladic, who showed up that afternoon.  I asked

         24  what was going on with the men who were separated and

         25  who were brought into the house, and he told me that --

Page 900

          1  and tried to find out if there were soldiers among

          2  them, and if it was so, they would be separated, be

          3  made prisoners of war, brought to a prison camp in the

          4  vicinity of Bijeljina and exchanged for Serb prisoners

          5  of war.

          6       Q.   Do you know what time General Mladic arrived

          7  in the area of Potocari?

          8       A.   It was somewhere in the afternoon.  I think

          9  in the middle of the afternoon, but ...

         10       Q.   Did you see -- when did you first see men

         11  separated and put on buses?

         12       A.   Well, I can't remember the first.  I think

         13  15 buses, if it already happened, because I am for sure

         14  in those bus there were some men, but at the same

         15  moment or shortly after it, the separation started.

         16       Q.   What did you see?  Can you describe that?

         17       A.   Well, men would like to go with their

         18  families into the buses.  They just were separated, led

         19  to the White House.  They had to leave their luggage

         20  outside and were brought in the White House.  I think

         21  at the second part of that afternoon, at least three

         22  buses of men were filled up in front of the White

         23  House, and they were brought in the direction of

         24  Bratunac.

         25       Q.   Did you see that yourself?

Page 901

          1       A.   Yes, I saw it myself.  When they left, one of

          2  our vehicles with Versteeg, I mentioned his name also

          3  yesterday, they escorted the buses in the direction of

          4  Bratunac.  Later on, I heard in Bratunac the UN vehicle

          5  was stopped and was not able to escort the buses

          6  further on.

          7       Q.   Did you ever -- how did the Serb soldiers do

          8  this separation process?  Was it friendly?

          9       A.   Well, I don't remember that during the

         10  separation they used force, because the men who were

         11  separated just did what they had to do and they listen

         12  to the Serb soldiers.

         13            When they came out of the White House, I seen

         14  several times that the men were very afraid, tried to

         15  escape, started screaming, did not want to go into the

         16  buses.  At that moment, some force was used.  They were

         17  hit and kicked into the buses.

         18            When they were in the buses and they tried to

         19  get out of the bus, you can see from the entrance of

         20  our compound that they were ordered to sit in the bus

         21  with their head down so that they could not see what

         22  happened.

         23       Q.   That afternoon of the 12th, did you recognise

         24  any other Serb soldiers besides General Mladic?

         25       A.   Colonel Jankovic was always around and a lot

Page 902

          1  of other Serb soldiers, but none of them I can

          2  recollect.

          3       Q.   Did you see General Krstic there that

          4  afternoon?

          5       A.   I can't remember.

          6       Q.   Were you able to make out particular units

          7  from insignia or from anything else about, you know,

          8  what kind of Serb units these were?

          9       A.   No, but I had the idea that the Serb units

         10  who entered the enclave were normal Serb units.  During

         11  that afternoon, I heard that some of our vehicles were

         12  captured on the road to Kladanj by non-regular troops

         13  in several uniforms, civilian clothes, some in black

         14  overalls, but I didn't recognise any specific ...

         15       Q.   During this process in the afternoon when

         16  people are taken to the White House and people are put

         17  on buses, did you hear any gunfire in the area?

         18            JUDGE RIAD:  May I just ask.  He used the

         19  word "Serb units."  Does he mean the units from the

         20  Serb army or Bosnian Serb units.

         21            THE WITNESS:  Bosnian Serb units.

         22            JUDGE RIAD:  Thank you.

         23            MR. McCLOSKEY:

         24       Q.   Did you ever have any indication that there

         25  were Serb units from Serbia involved in this

Page 903

          1  operation?

          2       A.   No.  The only information we got, when the

          3  enclave was still in our hands, that some units of

          4  Arkan were in the vicinity, but I've never seen them

          5  myself.

          6       Q.   Did you, that afternoon while this was

          7  happening, hear any gunfire in the area?

          8       A.   Yes, because we heard all the time gunfire.

          9  The units who spread up in the northern part and

         10  marched forward to the south were all over the place

         11  and we heard all the time gunfire from the mountains

         12  surrounding the compound.

         13       Q.   Could you tell whether there was gunfire

         14  coming from the area around the factories and the

         15  compound?

         16       A.   Not specifically in the area from the

         17  compound or the factories, just in the hills which were

         18  around it, and it's very difficult when you hear

         19  gunfire, to point it out, where it's coming from.

         20       Q.   How did the Serb soldiers react to the

         21  gunfire?

         22       A.   Well, I think the same as we did.  We got

         23  used to it.  We had the idea that we were no targets,

         24  so it just happened.

         25       Q.   What else happened that afternoon?  What else

Page 904

          1  were you involved in?

          2       A.   I went out several times to go to the

          3  refugees outside in the factories.  Once there was the

          4  interpreter of the Bravo Company, Mr. Hodzic.  I don't

          5  know exactly, but there is a story that one of the

          6  bodyguards of Mladic took his ID card, and I think that

          7  I took it back from him, and he was so afraid that I

          8  had to bring him back to the compound.  It was not

          9  possible for me to use him as an interpreter to talk to

         10  the refugees.

         11            After that, I went out with one of the

         12  representatives, Ibro Nuhanovic, to go to the refugees,

         13  and when we left the front gate of the compound,

         14  suddenly a Serb soldier came to him and started beating

         15  him in his face.  I was able to stop it and after that

         16  we returned to the compound, because it was not safe to

         17  take him to the refugees.

         18       Q.   Ibro Nuhanovic was one of the representatives

         19  that had gone to the Hotel Fontana that morning; is

         20  that right?

         21       A.   That's correct.  And in the same meeting

         22  General Mladic promised safety for him.

         23       Q.   All right.  And did you have a meeting with

         24  Mr. Nuhanovic and other representatives that afternoon?

         25       A.   Yes.  In the afternoon we had a meeting with

Page 905

          1  the representatives, and several subjects were

          2  discussed.  Of course there was a lot of panic because

          3  it started so quick, and the representatives told us

          4  that although there was a deal that first the wounded,

          5  then the elderly, and then the sick people, and then

          6  women and children would be evacuated, now they saw

          7  there was a mix-up, and not only a mix-up from all

          8  those groups, but also that men were separated.

          9       Q.   And how did the representatives -- what did

         10  the representatives think of that?

         11       A.   Well, they had a very bad feeling about it,

         12  because they referred to what happened in 1992 and

         13  1993, when also a lot of men were separated and brought

         14  to a soccer field in Bratunac and were killed over

         15  there, and they thought that this would happen again.

         16  Well, we could only promise, of course, that we would

         17  try to monitor it and escort the vehicles, but they

         18  told us that, well, we had no choice and the UN was not

         19  able to protect them, because the UN was not arranging

         20  anything; General Mladic was ordering what happened.

         21       Q.   I notice you looked at your notes when you

         22  said that.  Did you take notes at that particular

         23  meeting?

         24       A.   Yes, I have a lot of notes from that meeting,

         25  because they were very concerned and had a lot of

Page 906

          1  subjects which they would like to talk about.

          2       Q.   And what else did they talk about?

          3       A.   Well, they didn't agree with the sequence

          4  from the evacuation.  They had no choice -- we had no

          5  choice again, because Mladic was arranging things, and

          6  not the UN.  They requested us to phone to Tuzla to see

          7  if things were arranged over there.  When the refugees

          8  went to Kladanj, after that they should be brought to

          9  Tuzla, and of course they wanted to know what happened

         10  in Tuzla.

         11            They ordered us to inform the refugees over

         12  what's going on now, what will happen the coming hours,

         13  or maybe days, inform them what was arranged with

         14  Mladic, tell them that he said there was safety and

         15  security for them, and try to avoid that there was

         16  panic among the refugees.  But of course they were very

         17  afraid, so that was very difficult.

         18            They asked us to report to the world what was

         19  going on, and of course we told them that all the

         20  things we saw and what was happening was reported to

         21  our higher echelons.

         22            Mr. Nuhanovic told us that he agreed to go to

         23  the meeting that morning because he wanted to do

         24  something for his people and also for the battalion,

         25  but at that specific moment he had the idea that he was

Page 907

          1  doing a dirty job, because it was no longer the UN who

          2  arranged things, but the Serbs did.

          3            And after the meeting that morning, because

          4  nothing was really arranged, the evacuation should not

          5  have started.  He told us that when he had known that

          6  there were cameras, then he did not -- he wouldn't have

          7  gone over there.  When things were going on in the way

          8  they did now, men would try to escape and flee into the

          9  woods.

         10            Mr. Mandzic had a contact with the

         11  representatives of the BH government in Central Bosnia,

         12  and I don't know with whom, but he told us that they

         13  informed him that they should not let go buses or

         14  evacuations going on without a UN escort.  And again

         15  they told us that Mladic promised and guaranteed

         16  security for all of them, but they had their doubts

         17  about it.

         18       Q.   All right.  And after that meeting did the

         19  separations and transportation continue?

         20       A.   Yes, it continued, I think, till 8.00 in the

         21  evening.  Also at the end of that afternoon, there

         22  should be a medical evacuation to Kladanj.  Fifty-four,

         23  that's what's in my notes, persons wounded were let

         24  into the buses or into trucks and brought to Kladanj.

         25  Some of them, and I don't know, but I think it was

Page 908

          1  about 20 people, were able to leave the buses in

          2  Kladanj and go by foot across the border.  The rest of

          3  them were not able to go there by themselves, so they

          4  stayed in the buses and in the trucks and went back

          5  with one of our escorts to Bratunac, to the checkpoint

          6  with Jovo's.  They were not allowed to go to the

          7  hospital in Bratunac or the hospital in our compound;

          8  they had to stay at Yellow Bridge, and I'm for sure

          9  that I got the information that night that one of the

         10  wounded died.

         11       Q.   Anything else of significance that you recall

         12  occurring before you -- before the evening ended?

         13       A.   That is all I have in my notes from the 12th.

         14       Q.   All right.  And the morning of the 13th, can

         15  you describe to us what occurred on the 13th, from your

         16  memory and your notes?

         17       A.   Yes.  I think that between 7.00 and 8.00 in

         18  the morning, the evacuation started again.  That

         19  morning we got the information from the Lieutenant de

         20  Ruiter that he found nine dead bodies in the vicinity

         21  of the compound, all shot, all with a hole in the back,

         22  so he thought it was an execution.  Of course he could

         23  not prove that, but he went there with Lieutenant

         24  Koster.  Lieutenant Koster sat down between the dead

         25  bodies and de Ruiter took a picture.

Page 909

          1            After that they tried to get back to the

          2  refugees where they had to stay.  They were seen by a

          3  Serb soldier and they told me that somebody shot at

          4  them.

          5       Q.   That night in the compound, as you were

          6  sleeping, the night of the 12th/early morning hours of

          7  the 13th, did you hear any gun fire in the vicinity of

          8  the compound or the area?

          9       A.   Yes.  As I said, the gun fire was still going

         10  on and we were so used to it that we didn't hear

         11  specifically that it was in an other way than we were

         12  used to.

         13       Q.   After the report of the bodies by de Ruiter

         14  what was the next thing that occurred?

         15       A.   In my notes I see that General Mladic was

         16  again present in the morning and he had a contact with

         17  Colonel Karremans.  I wasn't at that meeting, so I

         18  don't know what they talked about.  And that same

         19  morning I had a small talk with General Mladic about

         20  the theft from weapons and materiel by the Serb

         21  soldiers from our soldiers, and asked to get all those

         22  things, weapons and flak jackets, back from them.

         23  Well, he promised me that of course at this moment it

         24  was a problem, but he should order his soldiers to stop

         25  and not steal anything from the UN soldiers.

Page 910

          1            At that same time he told me that fights were

          2  going on in the north-western part of the enclave, and

          3  that was one thing we knew already, because when the

          4  refugees were brought from Bratunac to Kladanj via this

          5  road, we heard that lots of fightings were going on on

          6  this road.  And when Mladic told us that fights were

          7  going on in the north-western part of the enclave, it

          8  was nothing amazing for us.  He told me that we had to

          9  inform the Muslim army that they had to stop and

         10  surrender and to hand over their weapons, because a lot

         11  of them were killed and also a lot of Serb soldiers

         12  were killed, and it would be good for us to inform the

         13  Muslims to stop.

         14       Q.   Did you see any other VRS soldiers or

         15  officers that you recognised around that time?

         16       A.   No.  Again, Mladic with his bodyguards, and

         17  Jankovic, he was all the time around.

         18       Q.   So did you see Jankovic on the 13th also?

         19       A.   Yes.

         20       Q.   In Potocari?

         21       A.   In Potocari.

         22       Q.   All right.  And then what happened?

         23       A.   Well, because a lot of vehicles were stolen

         24  on the road from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje and

         25  Kladanj, it was not possible to escort all the

Page 911

          1  transports, so somebody, and I think that Major Franken

          2  or Colonel Karremans, took the decision to create four

          3  mobile checkpoints on the road to see if the buses

          4  passed and so that they had at least something to

          5  inform us what happened on that road.

          6            That same day, I think in the second part of

          7  the morning, between 10.00 and 11.00, Colonel Akamovic

          8  showed up.  He told us that he was a logistic officer

          9  and told us that we would get a logistical convoy.  It

         10  would be able to bring in 15.000 litres of water,

         11  36.000 litres of diesel, and 20.000 rations.  At the

         12  same moment he told us that from the 36.000 litres of

         13  diesel, we had to give some of it to the Serbs.  We had

         14  to share it together, because they provided up till

         15  that moment the diesel for the evacuation buses and

         16  trucks.

         17            And maybe I jump further on.  At the end of

         18  the day I know that a convoy arrived, that there was

         19  diesel in it.  And Major Franken and Colonel Jankovic

         20  made the deal, and I don't know exactly, but I know

         21  that 30.000 litres of our diesel went to the BSA in

         22  Bratunac.

         23       Q.   Did that occur on the end of the day of the

         24  13th or on the 14th?

         25       A.   No.  It arrived on the 14th, and on the 14th

Page 912

          1  they supported the BSA with the diesel.

          2       Q.   So the fuel arrived the next day after your

          3  meeting --

          4       A.   Yes.

          5       Q.   -- with Acamovic?

          6       A.   Acamovic told us that there should be made a

          7  list from all the personnel, from the local staff, the

          8  UNHCR, the MSF, which would stay with us and leave with

          9  us in the enclave.  So we made a list with names:

         10  first names, male or female, date of birth, and since

         11  when they worked for the UN that day.

         12            That same morning, outside the compound, I've

         13  seen that Mr. Kingori, one of the UNMOs, had a lot of

         14  talks with Colonel Jankovic outside, because he got the

         15  information and also was able to go into the White

         16  House to see that it was overcrowded.  It was again a

         17  very hot day, so all the days at that moment, and it

         18  was a very bad situation in the White House.  So

         19  Kingori decided to ask Jankovic to provide some buses

         20  and transport some men from the White House to create a

         21  better situation, because it was very bad at that

         22  moment.

         23            I can remember that I think in the first part

         24  of the afternoon, two buses were provided and two buses

         25  brought some men.  And I don't know if they went

Page 913

          1  separate or in a convoy.  They left in the direction of

          2  Bratunac.

          3       Q.   Let me take you back to Acamovic, Colonel

          4  Acamovic.  Is that a name that you're sure about?

          5       A.   Yes, because we just sat down inside the

          6  compound and I had all the time to write his name

          7  down.  I've got it in my notes.

          8       Q.   Did he say anything that restricted the

          9  movement of the UN troops to you?

         10       A.   Yes, but it was in the second meeting we had

         11  that day.  At the end of the afternoon, at half past

         12  4.00, Akamovic showed up again and told us that there

         13  would be a Medevac, medical evacuation, from Bratunac.

         14  He told us that the civilian staff could stay with the

         15  battalion, that there would be a convoy today from the

         16  UNHCR with food in it and we were able to give it to

         17  the refugees.  It was a very strange situation, of

         18  course, because most of the refugees at that moment

         19  already left.  There never arrived a convoy that day.

         20            He ordered us when all the refugees are gone,

         21  we have to assemble all the Dutch personnel and we have

         22  to stay inside the compound, and the next day, by

         23  daylight, there would be a check from the compound if

         24  no BiH soldiers stayed behind in the compound.

         25            That same moment he took our list we

Page 914

          1  established for him with the local staff and the other

          2  personnel, and in my notes I also see that that same

          3  afternoon we made a list with 239 names on it from the

          4  males who were inside the compound.  We made that list

          5  and sent it to Tuzla, because we had no possibility to

          6  check if everybody arrived in Tuzla.  So we asked, give

          7  us a list, and one of the -- or several interpreters

          8  tried to establish a list for us with all those names

          9  from male Muslims inside the compound.  We faxed it to

         10  Tuzla so they could check if the men would arrive in

         11  Tuzla.

         12       Q.   Was 239 a complete list of all the men --

         13       A.   No.

         14       Q.   -- inside the compound?  Excuse me.

         15       A.   It was a list from all those men who wanted

         16  to be on that list, because not everybody wanted to be

         17  on that list and not everybody wanted to give his

         18  name.  That's what the interpreters told us.

         19       Q.   Did you know one particular Muslim man that

         20  was in the compound that you had a concern about?  I

         21  believe it was Camila Osmanovic's relative.

         22       A.   Yes.  Camila Osmanovic broke down that day.

         23  Her brother was also in the compound.  He was the cook

         24  of the MSF and he was also on the list from our local

         25  staff and would be able to go with us.  He was very

Page 915

          1  afraid about what was going to happen, so afraid that

          2  he had a rope in his pocket and told me that when Serbs

          3  entered the compound, he would hang himself.

          4       Q.   Did you believe him?

          5       A.   Yes, I believed him, because he really was

          6  very afraid.

          7       Q.   And what time were all the Muslim refugees

          8  finally shipped out of the area on the 13th?

          9       A.   At about 8.00 in the evening it was the end

         10  of the evacuation.  Everybody left.  At that moment our

         11  soldiers went inside the compound.  I myself and some

         12  other soldiers went to the factories inside of the

         13  compound to check if there were no refugees left, if

         14  there were no dead bodies or anything else, but we

         15  didn't find anything, so at 8.00 everything and

         16  everybody was gone.

         17       Q.   And on the 14th you were left, I think you

         18  said, with 6.000 litres of fuel, and the VRS took

         19  30.000; is that right?

         20       A.   Yes, that's correct.  And I don't know the

         21  exact arrangement which Major Franken made with

         22  Jankovic, but I know that a truck went first to the

         23  compound, or directly to Bratunac, to support the BSA

         24  with the diesel.

         25       Q.   And the 6.000 that you had, was that enough

Page 916

          1  to fill your vehicles and to get you transported out of

          2  the area?

          3       A.   Yes, it must be, because we didn't get any

          4  diesel after it, and we got out and we managed, so it

          5  was enough.

          6       Q.   And finally, when did DutchBat leave?

          7       A.   We finally left at the 21st of July.

          8            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

          9  That's all the questions I have now.

         10            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         11  Mr. McCloskey.  I was actually going to interrupt you

         12  it so that we could have a break now, and I think this

         13  is a good moment for a recess.  We will have,

         14  therefore, a 20-minute break and then we will resume

         15  after that.

         16                 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.

         17                 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

         18            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We are

         19  going to resume with the cross-examination, but we

         20  don't seem to have the witness.

         21            Mr. Dubuisson, what is happening?  Where is

         22  our witness?

         23            THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The usher has

         24  gone out to fetch him.

         25            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 917

          1                 [The witness entered court]

          2            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness B,

          3  are you comfortable?

          4            THE WITNESS:  Yes, thank you.

          5            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let me

          6  remind you once again that you have to speak slowly.

          7  Now you're going to answer questions put do you by the

          8  Defence.  I believe it is going to be Mr. Petrusic who

          9  will cross-examine you.

         10            Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.

         11            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         12  Mr. President.

         13                 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:

         14       Q.   Witness B, on the meeting held on the 6th of

         15  January, 1995 in Bratunac, you met General Zivanovic,

         16  Lieutenant Colonel Vukovic, Major Nikolic, and Major

         17  Sarkic.  That introduction was done by General

         18  Zivanovic, I believe.  Did he introduce the said

         19  Generals as Generals of the Drina Corps of the Army of

         20  Republika Srpska?

         21       A.   No.  He just introduced himself as the

         22  General Zivanovic, and our predecessors told us he was

         23  the Commander of the Drina Corps.

         24       Q.   You spent some time in the enclave.  As of

         25  the month of January that year, could you describe the

Page 918

          1  security situation in the area?

          2       A.   Do you mean the security -- well, for the

          3  people over there or for --

          4       Q.   I mean the security situation inside the

          5  enclave itself.

          6       A.   Well, I think we had a rather good security

          7  situation inside the enclave.  We did not have very big

          8  problems.  The biggest problems we had were at the

          9  borders of the enclave because there was frequent

         10  shooting from BSA side to the Muslim side and also from

         11  the Muslim side to the BSA side, but indeed the enclave

         12  the situation was rather calm.

         13       Q.   Were you aware of an incident where a patrol

         14  of the Dutch Battalion was captured inside the enclave,

         15  that is, in the area called the Bandera triangle?

         16       A.   There was not a patrol captured inside the

         17  enclave.  There were some incidents in that vicinity

         18  called the Bandera triangle, and at one moment some

         19  patrols were stopped and not allowed to go in there.

         20  After that, that problem was solved.  We frequently had

         21  problems to go there, and the Muslims denied us to go

         22  in that triangle.

         23       Q.   Did you know anything about the reasons why

         24  Muslims denied you access to the Bandera triangle?

         25       A.   Yes.  As they told us, and maybe I can show

Page 919

          1  it on the map, the Muslims were afraid that the Milici

          2  Brigade would attack this vicinity and the villages in

          3  this vicinity.  They tried to order us to take a

          4  position in the OP Bravo, but we were not allowed to go

          5  there and we would not take the position.  They ordered

          6  us.  We would choose it ourselves, and they did not

          7  agree with the positions we would like to take.  That

          8  was one of the reasons for the struggle we had with

          9  them.

         10       Q.   According to the information you had, was the

         11  protected zone of Srebrenica completely demilitarised?

         12       A.   When you mean "demilitarised," there were no

         13  regular army units, it's yes, but, of course, it was

         14  not completely demilitarised because there were men who

         15  were in the army before, in the war, and there was

         16  still the 8th Operational Group from the BiH in charge

         17  and they had a big influence.  So it was not completely

         18  demilitarised.  The only thing we were able to do is

         19  deny them to exercise as militaries and they did not;

         20  to disarm them, and that was the utmost that we could

         21  do and what we did.

         22       Q.   Do you have any knowledge to the effect that

         23  during your time there there had been attacks of the

         24  forces of the 8th Operational Group against Serb

         25  positions, that is, the villages situated outside the

Page 920

          1  protected area?

          2       A.   No.  From both sides, as well from the

          3  military leaders inside the enclave, as from the

          4  Serbian side, we got frequently the information that

          5  fights were going on inside the enclave, and at that

          6  moment the Muslims accused the Serbs entering the

          7  enclave, and outside the enclave the Serbs accusing the

          8  Muslims going out and attacking people there.

          9       Q.   Do you know anything about an attack by the

         10  8th Operational Group on the village of Visnjica on the

         11  25th and the 26th of July, 1995 -- I'm sorry, 25th,

         12  26th of June, that is, prior to the fall of the

         13  enclave?

         14       A.   I have nothing in my notes, but I can check

         15  my other notebook.  You said the 25th?

         16       Q.   25th and 26th.

         17       A.   No.  I have no information that there was an

         18  attack.  Nothing in -- no invites for meetings with the

         19  BiH or the BSA side.  I have nothing in my notes.

         20       Q.   During your time in the area, did you ever

         21  talk to the commanders of the 8th Operational Group in

         22  Srebrenica?  Because the group was quartered in

         23  Srebrenica.  And I have a Mr. Moric [sic] in mind, in

         24  particular?

         25       A.   I don't know the name "Moric."  The only --

Page 921

          1  Naser Oric I think you mean.

          2       Q.   Yes.

          3       A.   Naser Oric.  Yes.  We had contact with him

          4  for the first few months in the enclave, and I think

          5  that in March he disappeared.  We had no contact with

          6  him after the month of March.

          7       Q.   Let us move on to the events that took place

          8  in July 1995.  You testified that on the 9th of July, a

          9  wounding incident took place, including the Commander

         10  van Rensen, who died as a result of the injuries

         11  several days later.  After that incident did the

         12  confidence of the members of the Dutch battalion in

         13  respect of Muslim forces subside in the area?

         14       A.   No.  What happened, that when the people on

         15  the OP Foxtrot, it was the manning from the OP, and one

         16  of the Dutch soldiers died, got into that situation.

         17  Of course everybody was informed after that, and when

         18  that's on your mind, when you try to use your freedom

         19  of movement and act military-wise, as they learned, go

         20  backwards with your APC or other vehicles and go

         21  forward in another place, and you had an incident like

         22  this, and you see when you want to go backward that

         23  there are Muslim men, armed Muslim men who maybe want

         24  to stop you, well I think at that moment there's

         25  something -- there's a change in your mind.  But

Page 922

          1  towards the Muslim people, I don't think that the

          2  attitude was different than before, because everybody

          3  saw it as an incident, I think.

          4       Q.   Well, my question did not target the Muslim

          5  population as such; I was referring to the Muslim

          6  forces.  The question, therefore, concerned the

          7  Muslim-armed forces.

          8       A.   Well, there were no regular armed forces at

          9  that moment.  Of course, we had our frequent contacts

         10  with the Chief of Staff from the 8th OG.  Ramiz was

         11  acting as the leader of the military people, as far as

         12  we knew, in the enclave.  Of course, we complained that

         13  this situation happened, but it was a civilian, in our

         14  view, who killed soldier van Rensen, a Muslim soldier.

         15       Q.   On the 10th of July you went to the PTT

         16  building.  Could you please tell us whether Muslims,

         17  that is, the civilians, made a decision at that time to

         18  move into the direction of Potocari?

         19       A.   No.  We had a meeting in the PTT building at

         20  11.00 in the evening.  Colonel Karremans told them that

         21  there would be airstrikes the next morning, when the

         22  ultimatum was not held.  Nothing happened further on.

         23  When we left the PTT building we saw a lot of men in

         24  uniform and in civilian clothes, with arms, going to

         25  the north-western part, leaving the town of Srebrenica

Page 923

          1  in the north-western direction, but not in a direction

          2  to Potocari, because everybody stayed in Srebrenica.

          3  There was a UN compound in the town of Srebrenica, so

          4  the anxious people were in the vicinity of that

          5  compound.  And nobody decided to go to Potocari.

          6       Q.   And do you have any knowledge as to the time

          7  when the decision to go to Potocari was reached?

          8       A.   I think that nobody took a decision to go to

          9  Potocari.  When the attacks went on on the 11th of

         10  July, the refugees collected in the vicinity of the

         11  compound of the Bravo Company in Srebrenica.  I wasn't

         12  outside, but I think, of course, some of them went

         13  maybe to Potocari.  At 10 minutes past 2.00, according

         14  to my notes, there was an airstrike and the mortar

         15  shells landed in the compound.  That was for us the

         16  reason to try, I think, at 12.00 already, to get the

         17  people to Potocari, because we had not enough place on

         18  the compound to let all the refugees on the compound,

         19  and when they would like to go on the UN base, they had

         20  to go to Potocari.  I did not know at that moment that

         21  it was -- that there were so many refugees who would

         22  like to go there.  But the civilian leaders from the

         23  Muslims in the enclave, and also not the military

         24  leaders, took that decision.  We just told the people,

         25  "Well, go to Potocari, because there is no space

Page 924

          1  enough on this compound."

          2       Q.   Do you know when the Muslim military forces

          3  reached a decision to go to the town of Susnjari?

          4       A.   I don't know if there were a real decision to

          5  go there.  When we left in the night from the 10th to

          6  the 11th the PTT building, we saw a lot of armed men

          7  going in the north-western direction, leaving the town

          8  in that direction.  The next day, when I was on the

          9  compound of the Bravo Company, I did not see a lot of

         10  armed men in that vicinity.  Most of them were elderly

         11  people, women and children.

         12       Q.   Could you identify the units in somewhat more

         13  precise terms than simply units of the army of

         14  Republika Srpska?  And I'm referring to the units who

         15  were present in Potocari on the 12th and the 13th of

         16  July.

         17       A.   I don't know what kind of units it were.  I

         18  think it was infantry, because they were walking in, I

         19  think, the strength of a company in the vicinity of the

         20  compound.  And they wore Bosnian Serb uniforms, as we

         21  saw them several times before when we were at the

         22  meetings in Bratunac.  That's for me that I think this

         23  were the regular Serb forces and infantry, because they

         24  walked and they had no vehicles or tanks or APCs with

         25  them.

Page 925

          1       Q.   The meeting that was held in Bratunac in the

          2  Fontana Hotel on the 11th of July, around 10.00 p.m.,

          3  could you please describe the participation of General

          4  Krstic in that meeting, or rather the role of General

          5  Krstic in that meeting?

          6       A.   Well, my notes are here and, as I said, at

          7  that moment I did not know it was General Krstic.  He

          8  was announced as a representative; in my view, a

          9  representative of the Drina Corps.  He was sitting next

         10  to General Mladic and looked just what happened and did

         11  not do anything:  did not speak, did not mix up in the

         12  discussions or anything else; just was there.

         13       Q.   Did General Zivanovic attend that meeting

         14  too?

         15       A.   No.  The last time I've seen General

         16  Zivanovic was in the first meeting at 8.00, and after

         17  that I've never seen General Zivanovic again.

         18       Q.   And you stayed at the meeting until the end,

         19  the second meeting?

         20       A.   Yes.

         21            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         22  Witness B.  I have no further questions.  Thank you.

         23            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         24  Mr. Petrusic.

         25            Mr. McCloskey, do you have any questions now

Page 926

          1  on re-examination?

          2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Your Honour, just a few,

          3  and one thing I forgot to ask him the first time

          4                 Re-examined by Mr. McCloskey:

          5       Q.   During the second meeting did any VRS officer

          6  or soldiers besides Mladic say anything at those

          7  meetings?

          8       A.   No.  As far as I remember and see in my

          9  notes, there is only General Mladic who was talking to

         10  Mr. Mandzic and to Colonel Karremans and making

         11  statements.  I don't have anything in my notes that

         12  somebody else talked or mixed in.

         13       Q.   All right.  And I asked you earlier to

         14  correct the mistake of OP Echo on the map, and were you

         15  able to do that?

         16       A.   Yes.  I put the new OP Echo on the map, over

         17  here.  It's just at the crossroad over here, and not

         18  over there.  So it's changed.

         19       Q.   You've marked it with a little black "E"?

         20       A.   Yes, that's correct.

         21       Q.   Could you refer to what is marked as

         22  Exhibit 28, which I know you've had a chance to look

         23  at, and if you could go to what is tab 2,

         24  Exhibit 28/4.

         25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can he get some help with the

Page 927

          1  ELMO on that.

          2       Q.   All right.  Do you recognise someone on that

          3  photo?

          4       A.   Yes.  General Zivanovic.

          5       Q.   So you're pointing out the fellow with the

          6  more orange face?

          7       A.   Yes.

          8       Q.   Could you go to tab 3, Exhibit 28 -- I

          9  believe it's 28/5.1.  Excuse me.  That is 28/5 and

         10  that's fine.  28/5 is fine.  You can -- all right.

         11  Well, now we're looking at 28/5.  Do you recognise that

         12  individual?

         13       A.   Yes.  That's Mr. Kosoric.

         14       Q.   That's a frame that is divided in half but

         15  that's the same individual; is that right?

         16       A.   Yes, twice.

         17       Q.   Okay.  If you could go to what is tab 11,

         18  Exhibit 28/13.  Can you identify those two

         19  individuals?

         20       A.   Yes.  General Mladic and Colonel Jankovic.

         21       Q.   Do you recognise where that photo was taken

         22  from?

         23       A.   I don't know exactly.  I think it is in one

         24  of the meetings in Hotel Fontana.

         25       Q.   All right.

Page 928

          1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Your Honours, Mr.

          2  President.  I have no further questions.

          3            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

          4  Mr. Petrusic, do you perhaps have any additional

          5  questions, because we have heard some new things here.

          6  Would you have anything else to ask of this witness?

          7            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, the last

          8  photograph, in point of fact.

          9                 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:

         10       Q.   During your testimony --

         11            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Witness B said

         12  that at the second meeting it was Colonel Jankovic who

         13  was sitting to the left of General Mladic.

         14       Q.   On this photograph that we just saw, was that

         15  the photograph of that second meeting, that is, the

         16  11th of July?

         17            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,

         18  Mr. Petrusic.  Yes.  You may ask the question directly,

         19  Mr. Petrusic.

         20       A.   I don't know for sure if it's the second

         21  meeting.  I don't think so because in my view, in the

         22  second meeting General Krstic was sitting to the left

         23  of General Mladic.  I only know the background, the

         24  curtains in the Hotel Fontana, so but I think it is in

         25  one of the meetings, but I don't know if it is in one

Page 929

          1  of the meetings I joined.

          2            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

          3       Q.   But on this photograph, is this the left-hand

          4  side of General Mladic where Colonel Jankovic is

          5  sitting?

          6       A.   Yes.  That's correct.

          7       Q.   Is that to the left of General Mladic?  And

          8  was this the meeting that cameramen recorded on the

          9  video?

         10       A.   As I told you, the cameras were in the first

         11  and the second meeting.  I'm not sure if we sat down

         12  during the first meeting.  I think we did.  Now I maybe

         13  jumped to a conclusion, and I don't think that's

         14  correct.  So this must be the first meeting, because in

         15  my notes, I am for sure that General Krstic is, in the

         16  second meeting, sitting to the left of General Mladic.

         17  I don't know what meeting it is.

         18            I think this picture is made in the Hotel

         19  Fontana, because I think I recognise the curtains

         20  behind those two men, but I don't know if it is a

         21  picture made in one of the meetings I joined.  So I

         22  can't confirm this.

         23       Q.   Yesterday we saw the video of the -- first

         24  meeting and all those present at the meeting were

         25  standing.

Page 930

          1       A.   Yes.  That's correct.  That's what we saw.  I

          2  also missed some things which I remembered from that

          3  meeting which were not on the tape, so I don't think

          4  the whole meeting is on the tape we saw yesterday,

          5  because I think we saw a tape for maybe 30 minutes, but

          6  some things happened at that first meeting I did not

          7  see in the tape.  I did not see and hear General Mladic

          8  shouting at me and asking if I ordered the close-air

          9  support, for example, or to Major Boering.  In my mind,

         10  I think that also during that meeting we had a seat.

         11       Q.   So you do not think it is possible that it

         12  was as we saw it yesterday?

         13       A.   What we yesterday saw that we were standing

         14  and talking.  Now you can see, I think, that those two

         15  men are sitting on the table.  I think it is in the

         16  Hotel Fontana.  That's all I can say to this picture.

         17  I don't know in what meeting this was made.

         18       Q.   Thank you.

         19            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,

         20  Mr. Petrusic.

         21            I believe my colleagues also have some

         22  questions.  Judge Riad.

         23                 Questioned by the Court:

         24            JUDGE RIAD:  Thank you, Mr. President.

         25            Witness B, good morning.

Page 931

          1       A.   Good morning.

          2            JUDGE RIAD:  I just have some few

          3  clarifications to ask you about.  When you were asked

          4  by the Defence counsel if the protected zone of

          5  Srebrenica was completely demilitarised, you said it

          6  was not completely demilitarised but they were not

          7  having any military exercises.  Now, what do you mean

          8  by "not completely"?  Were people left with pistols,

          9  with knives, with cannons?  What was that meaning of

         10  "not completely"?

         11       A.   We frequently got information from our

         12  patrols and there the OPs that there were armed men in

         13  the vicinity of our patrols and in the vicinity of our

         14  OPs.  So that means I can say it was not demilitarised

         15  because there were armed men inside the enclave, which

         16  is not the same as there are regular parts of armed

         17  units.

         18            JUDGE RIAD:  I mean, the people were armed

         19  but not armed fighting units?

         20       A.   No, just individuals with arms.  When we

         21  discovered these kinds of men, we tried to disarm them.

         22            JUDGE RIAD:  And did you?

         23       A.   We did it several times and stocked the

         24  weapons, after that, in the weapons collection point.

         25            JUDGE RIAD:  So the enclave became

Page 932

          1  demilitarised?

          2       A.   Yes.  It became demilitarised more and more.

          3  But at the end, of course, we saw that there was so

          4  many weapons among the people that we had to conclude,

          5  after six months, that we have not been able to find

          6  and collect all the weapons.

          7            JUDGE RIAD:  Now, when you were speaking

          8  about the buses, where men were separated from women

          9  and put into -- you mentioned three buses in particular

         10  to be sent to Bratunac.  People on these buses, were

         11  they apparently fighting men or men -- just simple

         12  citizens and civilians of all ages?

         13       A.   They were men from all ages.  As I told you,

         14  in the crowd of refugees, most of the men who were

         15  there were elderly men or boys up to, I think, 17 years

         16  old.  Most of men between 17 and 50, 60 years were not

         17  there.  Some of them were there.  They were separated

         18  just because they were men and not because they were

         19  able to recognise them as soldiers.  They just wore

         20  civilian clothes, and they had to go to the White House

         21  to check the names by the BSA and see if they were

         22  recognised as soldiers who fought in the war before.

         23            JUDGE RIAD:  Was there any procedure to make

         24  sure that they were soldiers or not?

         25       A.   No.  The only information we had, and then

Page 933

          1  that's what I got confirmed by the UNMO who was in the

          2  White House, that men had to give their names.  And I

          3  don't know in what way they were checked if they were

          4  soldiers before or no.

          5            JUDGE RIAD:  Did they have any military

          6  clothes on?

          7       A.   No.  They just wore civilian clothes.

          8            JUDGE RIAD:  You said they were accompanied

          9  to Bratunac and then your people were not allowed to

         10  continue.

         11       A.   Yes.

         12            JUDGE RIAD:  Did you have any information as

         13  to what happened after the people left them?

         14       A.   No.  All the buses disappeared from our view

         15  in the direction of Bratunac.  Those three buses were

         16  accompanied by a UN vehicle.  After that vehicle was

         17  stopped, we don't know where the buses went and what

         18  happened further on with the men in the buses.

         19            JUDGE RIAD:  You had no echoes, no people

         20  came back from these buses?

         21       A.   No.  Only our own soldiers returned and the

         22  buses disappeared.  I don't know if they disappeared in

         23  Bratunac or the same way as the first convoy on their

         24  way to Kladanj, because that was also possible.

         25            JUDGE RIAD:  Did you inquire after that where

Page 934

          1  they went or ask for information?

          2       A.   Of course we asked for information.  We asked

          3  several times for information.  That was one of our

          4  biggest concerns, because we were not allowed to escort

          5  all the transports, but we never got an answer on

          6  that.

          7            JUDGE RIAD:  You also mentioned something and

          8  the transcript gave two contradictory answers when you

          9  were asked by the Defence counsel if it was a Muslim

         10  soldier or civilian who killed, I think, the soldier

         11  van Rensen.  I think first you said it was a civilian

         12  and then it appeared on the transcript that it was not

         13  a civilian, it was a soldier.  Could you then tell me

         14  which one is the right thing?  Was he a civilian or a

         15  soldier?

         16       A.   I think he was a civilian.  He was a farmer

         17  living in the vicinity of the road over there and

         18  living in a house near the dirt road and the main

         19  road.

         20            JUDGE RIAD:  Well, I hope the transcript will

         21  be corrected then.  Could you tell us something about

         22  how it happened?

         23       A.   No.  I just got --

         24            JUDGE RIAD:  Was there any animosity between

         25  the people and between him?

Page 935

          1       A.   No.

          2            JUDGE RIAD:  Or between the troops, your

          3  troops?

          4       A.   Our troops had to leave the OP and went with

          5  the APC to the road.  At that moment, the Muslim

          6  population tried to make a blockade on the dirt road to

          7  stop the APC, and that's what I mean with freedom of

          8  movement.  They frequently stopped us because they told

          9  us, "You have to go forward.  Our enemy and your enemy

         10  is in front of you and not backwards."  So that was the

         11  reason why they tried to stop.

         12            I know that they just drove on through the

         13  blockade the Muslim people made there, and I'm not sure

         14  if it was a shot from a gun or a hand grenade who

         15  killed our soldier.

         16            JUDGE RIAD:  And just the last question:

         17  When Defence counsel asked you about the meeting at

         18  Bratunac in the Fontana Hotel on July 11th at 10.00

         19  p.m., I think, you said that General Krstic was

         20  announced as the representative of the Drina Corps.

         21  Was he having any, in that meeting, any important

         22  contribution in a speech or in a plan or anything?

         23       A.   No.  He was just sitting beside

         24  General Mladic and did not say anything.

         25            JUDGE RIAD:  I mean, did Mladic refer to him

Page 936

          1  as being responsible of any action?

          2       A.   No, nothing.  He was not specifically

          3  mentioned by General Mladic.  He just was there, as

          4  well as a lot of other people were there, and just was

          5  sitting there and doing nothing.

          6            JUDGE RIAD:  But he was announced, you said,

          7  as the representative of the Drina Corps?

          8       A.   That's correct.

          9            JUDGE RIAD:  The only representative or the

         10  top representative?

         11       A.   Just as a representative of the Drina Corps.

         12  That's what I can find in my notes.

         13            JUDGE RIAD:  Were there other representatives

         14  for the Drina Corps?

         15       A.   Yes, there were, because Major Nikolic was

         16  there and Kosoric was there, what I can see in my

         17  notes, so ...

         18            JUDGE RIAD:  How was the hierarchy?

         19       A.   What do you mean by --

         20            JUDGE RIAD:  In the representatives of the

         21  Drina Corps.  Who was the most important?

         22       A.   At that moment I did not know the rank of

         23  General Krstic.  The only one I knew was a Major, was

         24  Nikolic, but concerning to the fact that Krstic was

         25  sitting beside Mladic he might have been a higher rank,

Page 937

          1  but it he was not announced as a Colonel or a General

          2  or anything else.

          3            JUDGE RIAD:  General Krstic?

          4       A.   Yes.

          5            JUDGE RIAD:  He was not announced as a

          6  General?  He was or he was not at that time?

          7       A.   He was not announced as a General.  He was

          8  just announced as --

          9            JUDGE RIAD:  Was he a General, in your

         10  knowledge, or was he a civilian?

         11       A.   No.  He was in a uniform, and I did not know

         12  if he was a General or not.

         13            JUDGE RIAD:  Thank you very much.

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Judge Wald.

         15            JUDGE WALD:  Witness B, do you have an

         16  estimate of how many men were in the Potocari compound

         17  before the evacuations began, before anybody was put on

         18  buses?  You mentioned at one point that later on they

         19  got a list of the men, I think in the White House, and

         20  it was only 239 but not everybody wanted to go on the

         21  list, but do you have some estimate of how many men

         22  were in the large assembly before the evacuations

         23  began?

         24       A.   I'm not for sure but I think it's a maximum

         25  of 300 inside the compound.  Of course, there were

Page 938

          1  outside the compound also a lot of men, but in total I

          2  think that men between, and I have to guess, 17 and 70,

          3  about of 600.

          4            JUDGE WALD:  Okay.  During the meetings in

          5  the Hotel Fontana that you were present at and

          6  General Mladic was there, when General Mladic and

          7  Colonel Karremans discussed possible evacuation of the

          8  refugees from Potocari, was any distinction made in

          9  those discussions between men, women, and children?

         10  Was any reference made to the fact that, well, the

         11  women and children might be let go but the men might

         12  have to be screened or some made prisoners of war

         13  exchange, et cetera?

         14       A.   No.  The only thing what was mentioned was

         15  that first the wounded, after that elderly people, and

         16  then the rest, but not that men should be separated or

         17  asked if they were military age or not.  That we

         18  discovered the next day, the 11th.

         19            JUDGE WALD:  Right.  Was any mention made in

         20  those meetings at all of the men that had gone off with

         21  the column that was going off by itself in the

         22  direction of Tuzla?  Was that the subject of any

         23  discussion in the meetings with Mladic that you were

         24  present at?

         25       A.   No.  The only thing was that Mladic asked us

Page 939

          1  to get in contact with the Muslim army to tell them to

          2  surrender and to hand over their weapons, and that was

          3  the only thing what was mentioned besides what I told

          4  you.  I think it was the 11th or the 12th that Mladic

          5  told me that fights were going on and lots of Muslims

          6  and Serbs soldiers were killed in the north-western

          7  region.

          8            JUDGE WALD:  You mentioned at, I think, the

          9  second meeting at the Fontana, that General Mladic said

         10  that he needed to talk to some of the representatives

         11  of the Muslim civilians and, if possible, the military,

         12  because the population -- I think this is right -- had

         13  to choose where to go.  What did you understand that to

         14  mean, that the population could decide to stay in

         15  Potocari or they could decide where they wanted to be

         16  delivered or what was your understanding of what he

         17  meant when he said they had to choose where to go?

         18       A.   I think he meant that people were free to

         19  choose.  That's what he told.

         20            JUDGE WALD:  To choose between what?

         21       A.   To choose between stay in the enclave, stay

         22  in Srebrenica or leave the enclave.  And after that

         23  leaving, they could choose in several directions.  At

         24  the end, of course, we saw that there was no choice.

         25            JUDGE WALD:  There was no choice.

Page 940

          1       A.   Nobody would like to stay, because they were

          2  so anxious and there was so many fights going on from

          3  the 9th and the 10th that nobody wanted to stay.  They

          4  just wanted to find a new safe haven to go to.  And

          5  they had no choice to choose another direction because

          6  there was only one thing, get into the bus or the truck

          7  like cattle and be brought to Kladanj.

          8            JUDGE WALD:  My last question is:  You

          9  mentioned that, I think it was Colonel Karremans, who

         10  said because the UN escorts had not been allowed to go

         11  along with all the buses past Bratunac, that five

         12  checkpoints would be set up, which would then report, I

         13  guess, whether or not they saw the buses go by.  Do you

         14  know of any foul-up on that, whether or not there were

         15  any subsequent reports back from those checkpoints

         16  about the buses?

         17       A.   Yes.  We were allowed to go and escort the

         18  convoys.  The problem was that when we escorted

         19  convoys, irregular troops, as it seemed, stole our

         20  vehicles.  And when we complained to General Mladic

         21  that, in our view, BSA soldiers stole our vehicles, he

         22  told us that those were not irregular troops who did

         23  it, and he had nothing to say about that.

         24            After that we made those four checkpoints --

         25  not five, but four, I think -- and in my view they

Page 941

          1  reported, but I don't have any notes about that.

          2            JUDGE WALD:  Thank you.

          3            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness B,

          4  I have three questions.  My first question:  At the

          5  meeting held at the Fontana Hotel, where you said

          6  General Krstic was present as a representative of the

          7  Drina Corps, did you see anything, did you notice

          8  anything that by which you could say that he did indeed

          9  belong to the Drina Corps; that is, did he have any

         10  flashes, any insignia?  Did you have any outside signs

         11  which could confirm -- by which you could conclude and

         12  be certain in your mind that he did indeed belong to

         13  the Drina Corps?

         14       A.   I was not certain about it, but he sore on

         15  his breast the same gold-looking thing as General

         16  Zivanovic wore.  That was my only reference that it

         17  might be a representative of the Drina Corps.  That's

         18  all.  And I think it was his rank.

         19            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In other

         20  words, any identification signs, apart from the uniform

         21  and apart from that insignia, they were identical with

         22  those that General Mladic had, were they, the uniform

         23  and the flash or symbol?

         24       A.   I am not for sure if the uniform was the same

         25  as General Mladic, because they had light and dark

Page 942

          1  uniforms.  I can't say if it was the same.  I'm not

          2  sure.

          3            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Sorry.

          4  Excuse me.  But I'm not speaking about General Mladic;

          5  I'm talking about General Zivanovic.

          6       A.   I think he wore the same uniform as General

          7  Zivanovic, and I think that the gold medal on his

          8  breast was the same as those from General Zivanovic.

          9            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My second

         10  question, Witness B, is as follows:  You mentioned

         11  that, I believe, on the 12th of July a UN vehicle was

         12  stopped while escorting the buses.  Could you tell us

         13  who was it that intercepted, that stopped that UN

         14  vehicle?

         15       A.   The only information I had was that

         16  Lieutenant Versteeg was escorting the buses, that he

         17  was stopped by BSA soldiers in Bratunac, and that's all

         18  I can say about it.  I have not seen the complete

         19  report in the OPs room.

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but it

         21  was the soldiers of the Serb army which stopped the

         22  vehicle; it was the military of the Serb army, weren't

         23  they?

         24       A.   Yes, that is correct.

         25            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 943

          1  I move on to my third question, which has to do also

          2  with the question that Judge Riad has already asked of

          3  you.

          4            You spoke about the demilitarisation of

          5  Srebrenica.  Do you have any knowledge -- do you know

          6  what is the difference between the demilitarisation and

          7  militarisation before it was pronounced a safe haven, a

          8  protected zone, and after it was pronounced a protected

          9  area?  What was the situation before it was pronounced

         10  a protected area and after it was pronounced a

         11  protected area?  What is the difference with regard to

         12  the demilitarisation?  Do you know what was the

         13  situation before and after this proclamation as a

         14  protected area?

         15       A.   The only information I've got, of course, is

         16  from our predecessors, that when they came to the

         17  enclave, the Canadians were already inside the enclave

         18  and started to demilitarise the Muslims inside the

         19  enclave.  They already gathered a lot of heavy

         20  equipment, mortars, heavy machine-guns on wheels, the

         21  two tanks, which were stocked in the weapon collection

         22  point, and the demilitarisation went on with the 1st

         23  and the 2nd Battalion and also with our 3rd Battalion,

         24  collecting the weapons and putting them in the weapon

         25  collection point.  That's the only thing I can tell you

Page 944

          1  about the demilitarisation, because most of the heavy

          2  weapons the Muslims had after the war were already

          3  collected in the weapon collection point.

          4            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,

          5  Witness B.  I have no more questions.  I should also

          6  like to thank my colleagues for questions they asked

          7  you.  The International Criminal Tribunal wishes to

          8  thank you for coming here to testify.  I know that you

          9  had some hard experience at the time, but we hope that

         10  you are recovered now in the calm of your beautiful

         11  country.  Thank you very much for testifying.  You are

         12  free to go.

         13                 [The witness withdrew]

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

         15  Mr. McCloskey do we have another witness?  I believe

         16  now we have worked for one hour.  Perhaps we could make

         17  a short break now before we begin, because if we do

         18  begin, then we shall have to make a break straight

         19  away, so perhaps it would be better to make a break

         20  now.  What do you think, Mr. McCloskey?

         21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Your Honour.  This other

         22  witness is not protected, so we'll take the time to

         23  open up the courtroom and get prepared.  I do have just

         24  a few exhibits to offer into evidence.  I can do that

         25  now or later.

Page 945

          1            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

          2  So if there are some exhibits which need to be adduced,

          3  perhaps it would be better to do it now rather than

          4  when the other witness is coming in.  So in this way we

          5  shall not have to make any interruptions; we shall be

          6  able to work straight on.  So yes, please.

          7            MR. McCLOSKEY:  First, I would like to offer

          8  the tape of meeting 1, Exhibit 39; and secondly, the

          9  transcript of that tape, Exhibit 39A; and then also the

         10  three photographs identified by the witness:  28/4,

         11  28/5 and 28/13.  And that is all.

         12            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]

         13  Mr. Petrusic, do you have any objections to raise?

         14            MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No, Your

         15  Honour.

         16            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         17  Then these exhibits are admitted.  And now we shall

         18  make a break, and it will be a 15-minute break, to save

         19  some time.  So 15 minutes.

         20                 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.

         21                 --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.

         22                 [Open session]

         23            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I can see

         24  that Mr. Cayley is about to take the floor.

         25            MR. CAYLEY:  I'm getting no sound at all, so

Page 946

          1  I will change headsets.  I think that's fine.  My

          2  apology for that.

          3            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is it okay

          4  now?

          5            MR. CAYLEY:  It's perfect.  Thank you,

          6  Mr. President.  With your permission, if I could call

          7  the Prosecutor's next witness, which is Mr. Nesib

          8  Mandzic.

          9                 [The witness entered court]

         10            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could the

         11  usher please help the witness with the headphones.

         12            Can you hear me, Mr. Mandzic?

         13            THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can, Your Honour.

         14            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You're now

         15  going to read the solemn declaration, please.

         16            THE WITNESS:  [Interpretation] I, Nesib

         17  Mandzic, solemnly declare that I will speak the truth,

         18  the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

         19                 WITNESS:  NESIB MANDZIC

         20                 [Witness answered through interpreter]

         21            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You may sit

         22  down, Mr. Mandzic.  Thank you.  Are you comfortable,

         23  Mr. Mandzic?

         24            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I have

         25  translation into Bosnian, please.

Page 947

          1            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But you

          2  understand French; is that the case?

          3            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

          4            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could the

          5  usher please check the channel.

          6            Can you hear me in your language now?

          7            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes, I

          8  understand now.

          9            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,

         10  then.  Thank you very much for coming here,

         11  Mr. Mandzic.  First of all, you are going to answer

         12  questions put to you by Mr. Cayley, who is representing

         13  the Prosecution.

         14            Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.

         15            MR. CAYLEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

         16                 Examined by Mr. Cayley:

         17       Q.   Now, Mr. Mandzic, I think you were born on

         18  the 12th of November, 1962; is that correct?

         19       A.   Yes, that is correct.

         20       Q.   And I think by profession you're a

         21  schoolmaster; is that correct?

         22       A.   Well, by profession I'm an electrical

         23  engineer, but prior to the war I used to work in a

         24  secondary school as a teacher in Srebrenica, and also

         25  during the war I stayed in the same school, the

Page 948

          1  secondary school in Srebrenica, for a year and a half.

          2       Q.   And I think at the time of the events with

          3  which this court is interested, in July of 1995, you

          4  were the head teacher at that school in Srebrenica.

          5       A.   Yes, that's correct.

          6       Q.   Until January of 1993 you were a member of

          7  the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that

          8  correct?

          9       A.   Yes.

         10       Q.   And in January of 1993 I think you left the

         11  Territorial Defence.

         12       A.   Yes, that is correct.

         13       Q.   And you are a Muslim by faith?

         14       A.   Yes.  I'm a Bosniak by nationality.

         15       Q.   Yes.  What is your present position within

         16  the municipal government in Srebrenica?

         17       A.   At present I'm the president of the

         18  Srebrenica municipality.  After the legal -- in

         19  accordance with the results of the legal elections that

         20  took place in 1997.

         21       Q.   I want to now take you back to July of 1995,

         22  and it's important, as we've already discussed, that

         23  you, in response to my questions, you tell the Judges

         24  exactly what you heard and saw at the time, how you

         25  felt about things, and your perceptions about the

Page 949

          1  feelings about the population in Srebrenica while these

          2  events in July of 1995 were taking place.  Let us go to

          3  the 8th of July, 1995.  Where were you on that day?

          4       A.   On that day, the 8th of July, 1995, I was in

          5  Srebrenica, in the central area of the town, in the

          6  Petrica Street.  This is actually where I lived as a

          7  refugee for more than three years.

          8       Q.   Now, on that day, can you tell the Judges

          9  what you saw taking place?

         10       A.   On the 8th of July, 1995, late in the

         11  afternoon I saw columns of people, columns of refugees

         12  who had fled a temporary settlement, a temporary

         13  shelter that was conducted by the Swedish government in

         14  the place called Slapovici.  The place was attacked by

         15  the artillery of the Serb forces as well as the

         16  infantry, and was exposed to an aggression by foot

         17  soldiers who entered the said village.  They started,

         18  according to what those people had said, they started

         19  burning down the houses, that is, the temporary shelter

         20  that they were using at the time.

         21            So on that day in the afternoon, in the

         22  street where I used to live, I saw thousands of

         23  displaced people who were terrified.  There were quite

         24  a few elderly people, very weak people, lots of women

         25  with small children who were crying.  They were in a

Page 950

          1  state of shock.  They were looking for some kind of

          2  accommodation, some food, clothes, and so on, but that

          3  could not be found in Srebrenica in those days, nor

          4  could it be found before that, in the previous months.

          5            I have to stress that on that day, although a

          6  number of columns of refugees were pouring in, the

          7  artillery fire of the Serb army never stopped.  Shells

          8  were falling in the town area, including the places

          9  where the refugees were staying, looking for some

         10  accommodation that could not be provided.

         11            MR. CAYLEY:  If the witness could be shown

         12  Exhibit 4A, Mr. Dubuisson.

         13       Q.   These individuals, Mr. Mandzic, were they

         14  residents originally from the area where the Swedish

         15  Housing Project was located or were they from other

         16  parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Mr. Mandzic, if you could

         17  answer that question first.

         18       A.   Yes.  These people were mostly refugees,

         19  displaced persons who, due to aggressive actions of the

         20  Serb army, had been expelled from their homes in 1992

         21  and 1993.  By a decision of a Swedish government in

         22  1993, some kind of temporary accommodation, a camp, was

         23  built for that particular group of refugees.

         24            They had come from a number of

         25  municipalities, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, and so

Page 951

          1  on.  However, the majority of the people who were

          2  temporarily accommodated in that housing project were

          3  from the area of the Srebrenica municipality, from the

          4  inhabited areas that were exposed to the actions of the

          5  Serb army units.

          6            As a result of those operations, the

          7  population was expelled.  A number of people had also

          8  died in those operations but quite a few of them,

          9  therefore, found themselves in Srebrenica.

         10            At the beginning of 1993, they were all

         11  staying in this shelter project in the village of

         12  Slapovici.

         13       Q.   Could you point to the village of Slapovici

         14  on the map in front of you?

         15       A.   Here it is in the upper left corner

         16  [indicates].

         17            MR. CAYLEY:  Could the exhibit be moved up.

         18  I see.  And let the record show that the witness is

         19  pointing to the bottom left-hand square where it says

         20  Slapovici.  That is Exhibit 4A.

         21       Q.   Thank you very much indeed.  Let's now move,

         22  Mr. Mandzic, to the 9th of the July.  First of all,

         23  could you look at the map that is behind you, and if

         24  you could point to your location on the 9th of July in

         25  Srebrenica.  Just an approximation would be fine, so

Page 952

          1  the Judges can orient themselves as to where you were

          2  on that day.

          3       A.   Yes.  What I'm showing here [indicates] is

          4  the town area of Srebrenica.

          5       Q.   Let the record show that the witness is

          6  pointing to an area just below and to the right of

          7  where it says "UN Bravo Company" on Prosecutor's

          8  Exhibit 1E, and in particular where there is a very

          9  sharp, hairpin bend in the road going into Srebrenica.

         10       A.   Yes.  So this is the road leading up to

         11  Bratunac, and it goes further down to Potocari,

         12  Srebrenica, Zeleni Jadar, south-east, leading up to my

         13  birthplace, the village of Skelani.

         14       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Mandzic.  Could you tell the

         15  Judges what you saw taking place from your advantage

         16  place on the 9th of July, 1995?

         17       A.   Aggressive activities of the Serb army

         18  continued on the following date, that is, the 9th of

         19  July, 1995.  The military forces of the Serb army

         20  entered the areas inhabited by the people I mentioned.

         21  They started setting their houses on fire.  As a result

         22  of that, the population was forced to flee so as not to

         23  end up in the hand of the soldiers of the aggressor.

         24            The offensive of the Army of the Republika

         25  Srpska continued and moved further to the town area of

Page 953

          1  Srebrenica.

          2            On the following day, on the 9th of July,

          3  units of the Army of the Republika Srpska continued

          4  with their offensive and entered a number of Bosniak

          5  villages such as Pusmulici, for example, Bajramovici.

          6  These villages are situated less than a one-hour walk

          7  from the centre of town.

          8            This again complicated the humanitarian

          9  situation in the town itself.  All of these people

         10  needed some kind of accommodation.  They needed food,

         11  medicines, all of which was impossible to obtain.

         12            I personally was convinced, as well as the

         13  majority of the population, that due to the fact that

         14  Srebrenica had been declared by the United Nations a

         15  safe area, that such aggressive acts and offensives of

         16  the Republika Srpska army would be stopped and that the

         17  humanitarian catastrophe would be prevented.  What we

         18  feared most was a massacre of the civilian population

         19  and we hoped that this would be prevented.

         20  Unfortunately, the acts of the Army of the Republika

         21  Srpska continued, and in the late afternoon of the

         22  9th of July, the situation was the same.

         23            On the next day, the 10th of July, in the

         24  evening, units of the Republika Srpska army approached

         25  the town area from the south and south-east side.

Page 954

          1            May I show this on the map, please?  This

          2  would be the area in question [indicated], the area

          3  south-east and south of the town.  They came very close

          4  to the town itself.

          5       Q.   [Previous translation continue] ...

          6  Mr. Mandzic.  Could you please demonstrate again where

          7  the VRS was on the 10th of July, on that exhibit?

          8       A.   Yes, I can show you that.  This grey line

          9  here [indicated] marks, I believe, the area in

         10  question, that is, the boundaries of the safe area.

         11  Approximately one or two kilometres away from that,

         12  depending on the features of the terrain, prior to the

         13  6th of July, units of the Dutch Battalion had been

         14  stationed.  They were there as part of UNPROFOR

         15  forces.

         16            The offensive of the VRS was such that those

         17  points had to be moved further on.  The Dutch troops

         18  had to withdraw.  You know very well what the reasons

         19  for that were.  The Serb forces continued along this

         20  line, and on the 10th of July, they reached the first

         21  street of the town, the Petrica Street.  This is the

         22  south-east part of the town.  They also came from the

         23  direction of the village of Slapovici, from the south

         24  side of the town.  The VRS army entered the village of

         25  Slapovici on the 11th of July.  So the VRS practically

Page 955

          1  captured the town from the southern part of the area,

          2  and they forced the population to flee.

          3       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, just again don't say anything,

          4  allow me to speak, because I need to indicate in the

          5  record where you're pointing to on the exhibit.

          6            On the 10th of July, could you point on

          7  Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E where the location of the VRS

          8  is in Srebrenica?

          9       A.   These are the -- this is where the units

         10  were, and this is the area of Zeleni Jadar

         11  [indicates].

         12            MR. CAYLEY:  Let the record show that the

         13  witness again is pointing to the area just to the right

         14  of where it says "UN Bravo Company" within the area

         15  marked as the UN enclave at the point in the road where

         16  there is a hairpin bend.

         17       Q.   Now, Mr. Mandzic, I'd like to show you some

         18  footage, a very short clip.

         19            MR. CAYLEY:  If the video booth could show

         20  Prosecutor's Exhibit 3, the section from -- I think

         21  it's 10 seconds in to 31 seconds.

         22       Q.   Say nothing, Mr. Mandzic, while the video is

         23  playing, and then I'll ask you some questions after

         24  you've seen that video footage.  Thank you.

         25            MR. CAYLEY:  I apologise for the delay,

Page 956

          1  Mr. President.

          2       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, if you watch the screen in front

          3  of you.

          4                 [Videotape played]

          5            MR. CAYLEY:  That's fine.  Thank you.  We can

          6  stop now.

          7       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, did you witness those events?

          8       A.   Yes, I did.

          9       Q.   Could you explain to the Judges what you saw

         10  and heard on the 10th of July where that event was

         11  taking place and what the feelings of the population

         12  were at the time?

         13       A.   Yes, I can do that.  The video that we just

         14  saw was taken on the 10th of July, 1995.  As we can

         15  see, there were thousands of residents of Srebrenica

         16  there.  They were all terrified at that time because,

         17  as I have already told you, late in the afternoon of

         18  that day, the VRS had already entered the first street

         19  of the town from the south-east.

         20            What I saw there was thousands of terrified

         21  people who felt helpless.  They were asking for help.

         22  They turned to the military representatives of the

         23  United Nations, that is, to the Dutch soldiers who were

         24  there.  They were asking for protection, but they

         25  didn't get any answer, any response in terms of

Page 957

          1  protection.

          2            On that night, approximately 40.000 people in

          3  Srebrenica could have no sleep at all.  I couldn't

          4  sleep either, of course.

          5       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, could you just indicate on the

          6  map behind you the location of that large group of

          7  people that we've just seen on the video?

          8       A.   Yes.  This gathering took place in front of

          9  the compound of the Vezionica factory in Srebrenica,

         10  and it is marked on the map here [indicated].  It's

         11  this area that I'm pointing now [indicated].

         12            MR. CAYLEY:  Let the record show that the

         13  witness is pointing to the blue square marked "UN Bravo

         14  Company" within the Srebrenica enclave on Prosecutor's

         15  Exhibit 1E.

         16       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, let's move ahead in time to the

         17  11th of July, 1995.  You were still in the town of

         18  Srebrenica.  Can you tell the Judges what you saw and

         19  heard on that day?

         20       A.   If we are talking about the urban area of

         21  Srebrenica, from that area more than half of the

         22  population had been expelled, forced out due to the

         23  military activities of the VRS, who, as early as the

         24  10th of July, started setting Bosniak houses on fire in

         25  the Petrica Street.  They were still firing from

Page 958

          1  infantry weapons and so on.

          2            On the 11th of July, after 11.00 a.m., the

          3  situation got further complicated, because the VRS

          4  opened fire from their artillery, targeting the

          5  population itself and opening fire on the area where

          6  the population had gathered on the 10th of July, late

          7  in the afternoon.

          8            I was very close to the area, some 70 metres

          9  as the crow flies, on the other side of the street.  I

         10  was standing next to a building, and I could hear very

         11  well the sound of shells, artillery shells coming in.

         12  Immediately after that, I would actually see the shell

         13  fall on the group of between 5.000 and 10.000 refugees

         14  who were staying there, expecting some kind of response

         15  from the UNPROFOR forces.  They somehow felt safer in

         16  the vicinity of UNPROFOR.

         17            Immediately after this shell had fallen, I

         18  happened to see a terrible scene.  I saw a column of

         19  smoke rising from the spot where the people had

         20  gathered.  I heard screams, moans.  There were some

         21  wounded people there.

         22       Q.   On that day, I think there was an expectation

         23  that there would be airstrikes.  How did the population

         24  in and around the UN Bravo Company react to these

         25  rumours?

Page 959

          1       A.   Yes.  It is true that we expected the NATO

          2  air force to prevent the capture of the enclave and the

          3  exodus of the population.  Until 11.00 a.m. those were

          4  some unreliable pieces of information that people

          5  accepted in those situations, as a drowning man is

          6  looking for a straw to hold on to to save himself.  So

          7  on that day for us, the only possibility, the only way

          8  out was for this type of action.  Only in this way

          9  could the VRS be stopped.

         10            In the afternoon of the 11th of July, I could

         11  see, as far as I can remember, two aeroplanes in the

         12  skies above Srebrenica, which did drop several bombs

         13  on, I believe, Serbian artillery positions.  And as far

         14  as I can remember the area in question was south-east.

         15  It was here [indicates], but it's not indicated on the

         16  map.

         17            There is a feature there called Kvarc, and I

         18  believe that that was the area where a radio

         19  transmitter was stationed.  My feeling is that this

         20  was -- this area was the target of the NATO Air

         21  Force.  At any rate, this was close to the boundary of

         22  the safe area.

         23       Q.   Let's move on in time, Mr. Mandzic.  The

         24  population started to move towards Potocari.  Can you

         25  tell the Judges when that happened and why it happened?

Page 960

          1       A.   The population was forced to move.  This

          2  happened on the 11th of July, around 4.00 p.m.  The

          3  residents of the town started to move towards

          4  Potocari.  They were actually forced to leave the last

          5  part of the safe area, because the VRS had continued

          6  with its offensive activities.  So the population was

          7  actually being pushed from the area.  They couldn't go

          8  back.  They couldn't go back to the enclave itself,

          9  because everybody could see Bosniak houses on fire at

         10  that time.  So in view of the situation, in view of the

         11  fear and feeling of helplessness, residents started to

         12  move towards Potocari, which was the last safe haven in

         13  the area, that is, the command of the Dutch battalion.

         14       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, are you aware as to whether or

         15  not any senior member of the population, or members of

         16  the population, took a decision that the population

         17  would move to Potocari from Srebrenica?

         18       A.   It was no higher representative who would be

         19  inviting people to head for Potocari.  It was all

         20  civilian population and they all thought about

         21  Potocari.  The majority of the civilians thought about

         22  Potocari, because the major part of the enclave had

         23  already been physically taken by the troops of the VRS

         24  and there was nowhere else to go.  We could only

         25  withdraw by a couple of kilometres further on towards

Page 961

          1  the Dutch compound at Potocari.

          2            So the passage of the civilian population

          3  through the area, even those areas that were inhabited

          4  by Bosniaks before the war, but they had been taken by

          5  the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, so it was

          6  impossible to go through those places.  Both the Serb

          7  artillery and infantry fire were targeting the

          8  population directly, and it seemed that their objective

          9  was to kill as many civilians as possible, to sow as

         10  much panic, to sow as much chaos amongst them.

         11            And I can also corroborate by saying the

         12  following:  On the 11th of July, I happened to be in

         13  the column of the civilian population on the road to

         14  Potocari.  At that time the Serb artillery fired at

         15  us.  From the neighbouring hills we could clearly see

         16  that there were -- they could see that there were tens

         17  of thousands of refugees who were on their way to

         18  Potocari, to the Dutch battalion.  But they were so

         19  aggressive that they simply opened direct fire on this

         20  stream of refugees which was several kilometres long.

         21       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, try and speak more slowly,

         22  because there are interpreters that have got to keep up

         23  with you.  I know it's difficult to speak about these

         24  events, but stay calm, and we'll get through your

         25  testimony as quickly as I can.

Page 962

          1            Let's move to the evening of the 11th of

          2  July, 1995.  Where do you find yourself?

          3       A.   I found myself at Potocari, or to be more

          4  accurate, within the compound of the 11 of March

          5  Factory.

          6       Q.   Could you point on the map that's behind you

          7  the approximate location of where you were on the

          8  evening of the 11th of July?

          9       A.   Here [indicates].

         10       Q.   Let the record show that the witness is

         11  pointing at Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E, to the

         12  red-coloured triangle, just below where it's marked "UN

         13  base," within the area marked as the Srebrenica

         14  enclave.

         15            Can you tell the Judges the scene on the

         16  evening of the 11th of July in and around the UN

         17  compound at Potocari?

         18       A.   Yes, indeed.  The scene was hair-raising.

         19  Something about 25.000 of those expellees [Realtime

         20  transcript read in error "ex-police"] were crowding in

         21  a very small, in a very tight space.  They tried to

         22  find some accommodation in some ancient factory.

         23       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, if you could stop there.

         24  There's a mistake in the transcript and then you said

         25  the scene was hair-raising and then you said,

Page 963

          1  "Something about 25.000 of those..."  Twenty-five

          2  thousand of whom?

          3       A.   The expellees, the expelled refugees, Bosniak

          4  people who had been expelled from the largest part of

          5  the enclave, because only a minor part of the enclave

          6  was surviving, and that was Potocari.

          7       Q.   Please continue with your testimony.

          8       A.   At that very small space of perhaps less than

          9  one kilometre square, there were some 25.000 expelled.

         10  Most of them were women with small children, elderly

         11  and emaciated people.  We were all without food or

         12  water or medicines or clothing or footwear,

         13  accommodation, or anything.  We expected that the

         14  International Community would give us protection,

         15  fearing the worst from the Bosnian Serb army, and

         16  indeed I do remember that 11th of July, sometime around

         17  2100, the Bosnian Serb army launched an operation.  As

         18  far as I can remember, they opened artillery fire at

         19  this crowd, this multitude of people forced into that

         20  space.

         21       Q.   Did you see the artillery firing?

         22       A.   Well, they fired over my head, over the heads

         23  of 25.000 people.

         24       Q.   Do you know roughly how far away they were,

         25  the VRS artillery, when they were firing at this huge

Page 964

          1  multitude of people?

          2       A.   Some 300 to 500 meters.  From different

          3  places, so I say it was 300 meters was the closest and

          4  500 meters was perhaps the site furthest away.

          5       Q.   How did the population react to this

          6  artillery fire?

          7       A.   We all tried to find some shelter, but there

          8  was none, so we simply threw ourselves down on the

          9  asphalt, somewhere in the street, that is, on the road

         10  from Potocari to Bratunac, because they couldn't find

         11  any shelter whatsoever.  So panic again started,

         12  screaming, and so --

         13       Q.   Do you know of any deaths or injuries that

         14  were caused by that artillery fire?

         15       A.   As soon as this artillery fire stopped, the

         16  Dutch battalion called me, and so that night I could

         17  not really hear if there had been any wounded, because

         18  that night, between the 11th and the 12th, I spent in

         19  the camp of the Dutch soldiers.

         20       Q.   And now we very neatly move on to the next

         21  part of your testimony.  I think at about 9.30 that

         22  evening you were called by a representative of the

         23  Dutch battalion to act as a representative of the

         24  civilian population.  Could you tell the Judges about

         25  that, please.

Page 965

          1       A.   Yes.  Sometime around half past 9.00 that

          2  evening, between the 11th and the 12th of July, I was

          3  asked over the PA system to report to the Dutch

          4  battalion command.  So I went to the commander of the

          5  Dutch battalion.  I did not know him before that, nor

          6  did I know any of their officers, except Major Boering,

          7  who used to come to the secondary school.

          8            So after I was introduced to the commander of

          9  the Dutch battalion and his officers, the Dutch

         10  battalion commander, showing major concern, major

         11  anxiety, and sounding very pessimistic, said that, as

         12  he saw the situation, the Dutch soldiers, and he as a

         13  commander, could do very little at that particular

         14  point in time to help all those population who had

         15  gathered force in Potocari; and also, as the commander

         16  said, the situation was also highly unfavourable for

         17  Dutch soldiers as well.

         18            According to the commander of the Dutch

         19  battalion, the only way out would be the negotiations

         20  with the army of the Republika Srpska, and as far as I

         21  can recall, that the army of the Republika Srpska was

         22  demanding the Dutch officers to incorporate the Bosnian

         23  side in the negotiations.

         24            I commented, I said that I was not an

         25  official representative of the civilian authorities in

Page 966

          1  the municipality of Srebrenica, and I said so to the

          2  Dutch commander, and that I therefore had no authority

          3  to represent anyone in a situation which was as complex

          4  as that one.  And the Dutch battalion commander said,

          5  "Yes, we do know that, but the situation is very

          6  dramatic.  So come on behalf of these expelled people,

          7  because they, and we, and everybody, needs help."

          8            And having been given a promise by the Dutch

          9  battalion commander that if I joined the negotiations,

         10  that I would be -- that my requests, that my conditions

         11  would be supported:  that is, to begin with, to stop

         12  firing at the civilian population, to resolve the

         13  disastrous humanitarian situation; that is, to supply

         14  the population with food, water, other arms of hygiene

         15  and so on and so forth.  And after I was promised that,

         16  on the 11th of July, I set off for the negotiations in

         17  Bratunac.

         18       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, before we get to Bratunac, I

         19  want to go back to the conversation that you had with

         20  the Dutch commander.  Did the Dutch commander, Colonel

         21  Karremans, state to you what General Mladic had said to

         22  him about the refugees in and around Potocari and about

         23  his own soldiers that were, in fact, hostages at that

         24  time?

         25       A.   As far as I can remember, I know that the

Page 967

          1  Dutch battalion commander said that the situation was

          2  also highly unpropitious for the Dutch soldiers who

          3  were on the UNPROFOR mission in Srebrenica.

          4       Q.   Did he state to you whether Mladic had said

          5  anything about the safety of the civilian population in

          6  and around Potocari?

          7       A.   I don't remember.  I do not know really what

          8  you have in mind.

          9       Q.   Let's move on.  You then went with the Dutch

         10  officers to Bratunac.  How did you feel at that time?

         11       A.   Right below the camp of the Dutch soldiers in

         12  Potocari was the checkpoint of the VRS, and it was

         13  right there at this first checkpoint that we were

         14  stopped.  And they asked who was I, I mean the soldiers

         15  of the army of the Republika Srpska, and it was all in

         16  rather threatening tones.  And even as I was on the

         17  road, I already was quite fearful.  I didn't know what

         18  might happen to me.  And I was thinking about the worst

         19  possible outcome, that I might be arrested and forced

         20  to -- I don't know what.  But I thought one thing, and

         21  one thing only, and that was to try, to try to do my

         22  best on behalf of the population which was left

         23  completely without any protection, because I could

         24  really see that the enclave was being taken and that an

         25  area which had been protected by the United Nations was

Page 968

          1  being taken.

          2            On the other hand, the United Nations kept

          3  silent.  And even the mildest type of reaction that

          4  they could have done, they could have sent in teams of

          5  the International Red Cross at least there, or the

          6  UNHCR, to try to mitigate, to allay, to ease this

          7  difficult, this horrible situation, especially the

          8  humanitarian disaster.  And in such good faith, to try

          9  to alleviate the suffering of the population, is that I

         10  went to Bratunac, but I was really frightened.

         11            MR. CAYLEY:  Mr. President, at this point

         12  we're going to move into some video evidence, and if

         13  it's your wish, we might take a short break at this

         14  time.

         15            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,

         16  Mr. Cayley.  Very well.  We shall then make a break,

         17  20-minute break.

         18                 --- Recess taken at 1.20 p.m.

         19                 --- On resuming at 1.43 p.m.

         20            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,

         21  you may continue.

         22            MR. CAYLEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

         23       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, if we can just reorient the

         24  Court where we were.  You left the Potocari compound at

         25  about 2200 hours on the night of the 11th of July, and

Page 969

          1  you find yourself with members of the Dutch Battalion

          2  driving towards Srebrenica?

          3       A.   Towards Bratunac.

          4       Q.   My apologies.  You're quite correct.  Towards

          5  Bratunac.  What time did you arrive in Bratunac?

          6       A.   Within approximately ten minutes.

          7       Q.   Where did you go within Bratunac?

          8       A.   We went to the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac.

          9       Q.   And I think it was there that you attended a

         10  meeting with members of the VRS and the Bosnian Serb

         11  civilian authorities; is that correct?

         12       A.   Yes.

         13            MR. CAYLEY:  At this point, Mr. President,

         14  the Office of the Prosecutor would like to play a video

         15  of that meeting.  That video is a new exhibit.  It's

         16  Exhibit 4D.  My apologies.  It's Exhibit 40.  It's

         17  Exhibit 40.  There are three transcripts of that

         18  meeting, in English, French, and in B/C/S.

         19            I would ask that the interpreters please

         20  remain silent during the video, because I think it's

         21  important for the Court to get a sense of that meeting

         22  and the tone and intonation of the individuals who

         23  speak at that meeting.  So if you don't mind, Your

         24  Honours, following in that transcript.  It's an

         25  accurate transcript of what was said at that meeting.

Page 970

          1  There are also some external noises that are actually

          2  quite important that need to be heard, and they would

          3  not be heard if the interpreters were speaking over the

          4  soundtrack.

          5            JUDGE RODRIGUES:  Okay.  We'll do so.

          6            MR. CAYLEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.  If

          7  the video booth could please play Exhibit 40.

          8                 [Videotape played]

          9            MR. CAYLEY:  Mr. Mandzic, first an obvious

         10  question but for the purposes of legal foundation of

         11  the video:  Is this a video recording of parts of the

         12  meeting that happened on the 11th of July, 1995, in the

         13  evening at the Hotel Fontana?

         14       A.   Yes.  I think it reflects the essential part

         15  of what was being discussed at the meeting.

         16       Q.   Are there parts of the meeting that are not

         17  on that video recording?

         18       A.   Yes, there are certain parts.  For example, a

         19  part when General Mladic addressed me in a threatening

         20  way, speaking about the genocide committed against the

         21  Serbian people.  He also referred to the fate of the

         22  Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he blamed

         23  high-ranking Bosniak politicians for that.  He said,

         24  General Mladic, "You see, they're unable to help you

         25  now, neither Ganic, nor his people."

Page 971

          1       Q.   Could you explain to the Judges who Ganic

          2  was?  Who was Mladic referring to?

          3       A.   Professor Dr. Ejub Ganic was a member of the

          4  Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 1992 until

          5  1995.  It was a collective body, leadership that was in

          6  charge of the community as was Bosnia and Herzegovina

          7  at that time.

          8       Q.   Do you recall anything else that

          9  General Mladic said at that meeting which is not on

         10  that video recording?

         11       A.   Yes.  At several points, General Mladic

         12  mentioned the fact that the VRS had completely defeated

         13  the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He was referring

         14  to the areas around Tuzla or Sarajevo.  I'm not sure.

         15  He wasn't very explicit.

         16            MR. CAYLEY:  Mr. President, we've taken a

         17  number of stills off the video which I'd like to show

         18  the witness because that's the easiest way of having

         19  him identify various individuals, rather than go back

         20  through the video which will be a very lengthy

         21  process.  So we if we would make available, please,

         22  Prosecutor's Exhibits 41 to 46 and also 48, please, to

         23  the witness.

         24       A.   May I add something, please?

         25            MR. CAYLEY:

Page 972

          1       Q.   Of course you can, Mr. Mandzic.

          2       A.   According to my recollection from that first

          3  meeting, most of the people present were high-ranking

          4  officers of the VRS, and I did not notice

          5  representatives of the civilian government.

          6       Q.   You're now referring to the meeting on the

          7  11th of July?

          8       A.   Yes, I am.  Yes, the first meeting.

          9            MR. CAYLEY:  If the Exhibit 41 could be

         10  placed on the ELMO, please.  We'll do this very

         11  quickly.

         12       Q.   This is Exhibit 41.  Can you identify this

         13  individual, please, Mr. Mandzic?

         14       A.   Yes.  This is the commander of the Dutch

         15  Battalion.

         16       Q.   What was his name?

         17       A.   Karremans.  I don't know whether my

         18  pronunciation is correct, and I don't know whether this

         19  is his last name or first name.

         20       Q.   That is just fine, Mr. Mandzic.  Exhibit 42.

         21  Who is this individual, Mr. Mandzic?

         22       A.   The individual here is Petar, the

         23  interpreter.  Today he's working as an interpreter for

         24  the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of

         25  Zvornik, and you can often see him in Bratunac and

Page 973

          1  Srebrenica.  He's working for the IPTF mission there.

          2            MR. CAYLEY:  The witness can be shown

          3  Exhibit 43.

          4       Q.   Do you recognise this gentleman?

          5       A.   Yes, I do.  This is an officer of the VRS.

          6  As far as I can remember, he was the one who mentioned

          7  the towns of Vlasenica, Rogatica, and Han Pijesak, and

          8  this is how I concluded that he must have been from

          9  that area or that the area in question was his zone of

         10  responsibility.

         11       Q.   Do you recall where he was sitting during

         12  this meeting?

         13       A.   He was sitting next to General Mladic.

         14            MR. CAYLEY:  If the witness could be shown

         15  the next exhibit.

         16       Q.   This is Exhibit 44.  Can you identify that

         17  individual in that photograph?

         18       A.   General of the VRS, the Commander of the VRS,

         19  General Mladic, Ratko Mladic, whom in those days, from

         20  the 11th until the 21st of July, I saw four times.

         21       Q.   If the witness could now be shown Exhibit

         22  45.  Do you recognise this individual?

         23       A.   Yes, I do.  General Krstic, who is sitting

         24  here on my left.  On the 11th of July, General Krstic

         25  was introduced by his commander, General Ratko Mladic.

Page 974

          1  He also introduced other officers from his command.

          2       Q.   Can you please identify.  You said that

          3  General Krstic is sitting here on my left.  Could you

          4  point across to the person that you recognise as

          5  General Krstic in this courtroom.

          6       A.   Yes.  He's sitting on my left.  He's wearing

          7  a blue shirt and a tie [indicates].

          8            MR. CAYLEY:  Let the record show,

          9  Mr. President that the witness has identified the

         10  accused, General Krstic.

         11       Q.   And where was General Krstic sitting at this

         12  meeting on the 11th of July?

         13       A.   Next to General Mladic.  As far as I can

         14  remember, he was sitting on his right-hand side.  There

         15  was another meeting where he also sat next to General

         16  Mladic.

         17       Q.   Now, when you say, Mr. Mandzic, that he was

         18  sitting on General Mladic's right-hand side, you are

         19  saying that as if you were General Mladic, from General

         20  Mladic's perspective?

         21       A.   If I understand you correctly, and according

         22  to my recollection, at the table where we were sitting

         23  in the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac, General Krstic was

         24  sitting on General Mladic's right-hand side.

         25       Q.   Thank you.

Page 975

          1       A.   Am I any closer in my description now?

          2       Q.   That's fine, and I think the video was very

          3  clear.

          4            MR. CAYLEY:  If the witness could now be

          5  shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 46.

          6       Q.   Now, Mr. Mandzic, what is this object which I

          7  think is in fact in front of you on the video?

          8       A.   This is a board carrying the inscription,

          9  first of all, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

         10  Herzegovina; underneath, Municipal Assembly of

         11  Srebrenica; and at the bottom, in the last line,

         12  Srebrenica.  As I have said, this was on the municipal

         13  building, on the town hall, and it marked the centre of

         14  the municipal administration.  And General Mladic

         15  showed me this inscription and he asked me whether I

         16  could recognise it, and I said, "Yes, I do recognise

         17  it."

         18       Q.   This broken sign that was placed before you,

         19  at the time what significance did you feel that it had

         20  that it was placed in front of you?

         21       A.   It was a clear message that the enclave had

         22  been taken, that is, that the protected area had been

         23  taken; a clear message that the civilian population

         24  which had lived there could no longer stay there; a

         25  clear message that in the days to come, the operations

Page 976

          1  of the VRS would target other enclaves; that is, first

          2  of all, most of the population in those enclaves, such

          3  as Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo.  And it was also a

          4  clear message that that could well be the end of

          5  Bosnia-Herzegovina and the order it represented.  And

          6  that after that, the army of the Republika Srpska would

          7  make it possible to create a mono-ethnic state product

          8  without the participation of the other two constituent

          9  ethnicities, Croats and Bosniaks.

         10       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Mandzic.  On the video, on the

         11  soundtrack of the video, near the beginning, there were

         12  some screams that were heard.  Can you tell the Judges

         13  what those screams were and how you interpreted that at

         14  the time of this meeting?

         15       A.   Yes.  One could hear a pig screaming, or

         16  rather that night, or at that moment, I thought that

         17  perhaps some Serb soldiers were celebrating the taking

         18  over of the protected area and the expulsion of

         19  Bosniaks.  And to be quite honest, that was the first

         20  thing that I thought of.  I did not attribute any

         21  particular significance to the slaughter of that pig or

         22  the festivity.  But after all these years, I still

         23  remember those screams.  It was a message that the same

         24  procedure would be applied, the same method, to also

         25  bleed the Bosniaks, the Muslim Bosniaks.

Page 977

          1       Q.   Very briefly, Mr. Mandzic, can you tell the

          2  Judges the atmosphere at that meeting, how you felt in

          3  front of General Krstic, General Mladic, these VRS

          4  officers.

          5       A.   Very afraid, very ashamed, defenceless,

          6  especially when I noticed that the commander of the

          7  Dutch battalion could not properly voice, articulate

          8  the needs of the expelled population, civilian

          9  population.  And also when General Mladic interrupted

         10  me when I requested -- when I asked General Mladic and

         11  the commander of the Dutch battalion whether all the

         12  needs of the civilian population and the status of the

         13  enclave had been reported to the civilian and military

         14  structures of the International Community.  And when

         15  General Mladic cut me short and would not allow me to

         16  continue speaking about that need, his tone was

         17  threatening, he focused his eyes at me, he stared at

         18  me.  I think he wanted to frighten me.  And he

         19  frequently used the word that the fate of my people,

         20  the people that I originated from, was in my hands.

         21       Q.   Briefly, Mr. Mandzic, I just want to address

         22  with you some of the language that was used by General

         23  Mladic at the meeting, and this is on page 8 of the

         24  English transcript, line 3, when Mladic states:

         25            "I need to have a clear position of the

Page 978

          1  representatives of your people on whether you want to

          2  survive, stay, or disappear, and I am prepared to

          3  receive a delegation tomorrow of responsible people

          4  from the Muslim side here, at 1000 hours, with whom I

          5  can discuss the salvation of your people from the

          6  enclave, the former enclave of Srebrenica."

          7            How did you interpret this when you heard

          8  this?

          9       A.   Major anguish, scared, really scared.  I

         10  really was very concerned what would happen to those

         11  several dozen thousand of refugees, because General

         12  Mladic repeatedly said "vanish or survive."  And he

         13  also used the word "the former enclave."  And I

         14  responded that same moment, because indeed the army of

         15  the Republika Srpska, or rather the command of the VRS,

         16  had decided to deport the Bosniak population by hook or

         17  by crook.  And that word, "to survive or to vanish," it

         18  really frightened me, because he seemed to be

         19  announcing already some steps, some measures which had

         20  little to do with civilisation or with humanity.

         21       Q.   Do you recall him saying to you, "Do you

         22  understand me, Nesib?  The future of your people is in

         23  your hands"?

         24       A.   Yes, yes, yes.  Yes, I remember that.  I do

         25  indeed.  I do not know what General Mladic wanted from

Page 979

          1  me.  He wanted to demonstrate the force of his own, of

          2  the power of his army on a civilian, saying that I

          3  would be representing 30.000 other people.  But yes,

          4  indeed, during that meeting and during that night, from

          5  what I heard from General Mladic, I was very

          6  pessimistic as to the positive, as to the favourable

          7  outcome for those 30.000 expelled.

          8       Q.   And I think he finally said to you, when you

          9  advised him that you were an accidental representative,

         10  he stated, "That is your problem.  Bring people who can

         11  secure the surrender of weapons and save your people

         12  from destruction."  And that, I think, was the end of

         13  the meeting.

         14       A.   Yes.  General Mladic was well aware that

         15  there were between 25 and 30.000 of those expellees in

         16  Potocari and that they were, by and large, women, small

         17  children, elderly, sick people, and that there were no

         18  armed groups amongst them.  He also knew that his units

         19  were a few steps away from that expelled population,

         20  about a hundred or perhaps 200 meters, and that during

         21  the night they would reach that expelled population of

         22   -- those units of the VRS would reach that

         23  population.  He knew that, but insisting by saying, by

         24  pointing out to me that the fate of the Bosnian people

         25  was in my hands.  I believe he wanted to discourage me

Page 980

          1  in voicing any other requests in the first place, to

          2  treat that expelled population humanely, not to turn it

          3  into a ghetto.  And that indeed was a ghetto for all

          4  those people.

          5            I can confirm it now, and I was quite clear

          6  then, that it had been a planned operation of the VRS

          7  for those several days to force the civilian population

          8  to leave their homes, to leave all their belongings

          9  behind, and to be forced into a small place, into a

         10  small compound, such as Potocari, and that the control

         11  over that area should be taken over by the units of the

         12  VRS and which would then turn it into a ghetto.

         13       Q.   At what time did you leave this meeting on

         14  the 11th of July?

         15       A.   I think it was sometime between 11.00 and

         16  half past eleven.

         17       Q.   Where did you go when you left?

         18       A.   I left the meeting together with the officers

         19  of the Dutch Battalion, and I spent that night with

         20  them at their headquarters in Potocari.

         21            MR. CAYLEY:  Mr. President, if you wish, I

         22  can move on to the 12th of July or we can finish here,

         23  however you wish.

         24            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So,

         25  Mr. Cayley, there is still yet another exhibit, which

Page 981

          1  is 48, which I think was not shown the witness.  Would

          2  you please do that?

          3            MR. CAYLEY:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.

          4  You're quite right.  If the witness could be shown --

          5            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And after

          6  that we could, yes, adjourn for the day.  But now I

          7  believe we could really benefit from this occasion and

          8  show the witness that exhibit.

          9            MR. CAYLEY:  If Exhibit 48 would be placed in

         10  front of the witness.

         11       Q.   Mr. Mandzic, do you recognise this

         12  individual?

         13       A.   I do.  Yes.  This is Major Boering, if I'm

         14  pronouncing his name well, the liaison officer of the

         15  Dutch Battalion.  He came several times to the

         16  secondary school where I worked, where I was the

         17  principal, and I repeatedly informed Major Boering

         18  about the needs of the pupils in that school, that they

         19  needed various school aids and appliances because we

         20  did not have that and we could not get any school aids

         21  because the convoy couldn't enter Srebrenica because it

         22  was prevented from doing so by the units of the VRS.

         23            JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

         24  We shall adjourn and tomorrow we shall resume at half

         25  past nine.  Until tomorrow then.

Page 982

          1                 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

          2                 at 2.30 p.m. to be reconvened on

          3                 Wednesday, the 22nd day of March, 2000

          4                 at 9.30 a.m.