1 Tuesday, 21 March 2000
2 [Closed session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of Trial Chamber]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.38 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court].
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good
6 morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning, sound
7 engineers; good morning, interpreters. I trust you're
8 there. Yes, they are. Good morning, counsel for the
9 Prosecution, for the Defence. General Krstic, good
10 morning. We are back here to resume our case. The
11 difference from yesterday is that Judge Riad has joined
12 us again, and I should like to greet him back.
13 We have also taken -- we have to take a
14 decision today with regard to the matter raised
15 yesterday, and that decision will be pronounced
16 verbally, that is, yesterday, but the Prosecutor asked
17 to tender into evidence certain exhibits, that is, 14,
18 17, and 18, to which the Defence objected, claiming
19 that they related to Nova Kasaba and the Jadar River.
20 Those are places not indicated in paragraphs 24 to 26
21 of the indictment.
22 In fact, the paragraph 24 of the indictment
23 says that between the 11th and the 18th of July, the
24 executions of the Muslims in Bosnia
25 executions and that they took place in Srebrenica and
1 its environs; that is, the places which are then
3 The expression used here is clearly
4 indicative of this list as an example rather than the
5 exhaustive list of places mentioned here. Beyond this,
6 the principles of the material truth which govern
7 criminal law, and in particular international criminal
8 law, require that truth and the whole truth be
9 established while respecting the rights of the
10 accused. Therefore, there are no violations of the
11 rights of the accused, because the accused knew of
12 these places, owing to the fact that the Prosecution
13 had disclosed documents to the Defence.
14 The Chamber, therefore, has decided to admit
15 all of the exhibits that were tendered by the
16 Prosecution, including Exhibits 14, 17, and 18. So
17 this is the decision of the Chamber.
18 I should like to ask the registrar,
19 Mr. Dubuisson, to take note of this decision and do
20 whatever is necessary in this respect. So this is the
21 decision of the Chamber.
22 Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Do you wish to say
24 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,
25 will the decision be also taken in writing or is this
1 the final decision, the verbal decision, as you have
2 just pronounced it?
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You should
4 take it as the verbal decision which was taken. We
5 have not made the decision in writing, so preferably we
6 shall take our decisions in this manner unless,
7 exceptionally, there are certain reasons when, for
8 instance, a motion or objection is submitted in
9 writing, in which case the Chamber will respond in
10 writing. But this is the final decision, and that is
11 why I drew the attention of the Registry to take note
12 of this decision. There will be no decision in
13 writing. This is the decision of the Chamber.
14 Thank you very much, Mr. Petrusic.
15 So the witness, whom we were hearing
16 yesterday, can resume his testimony, and I, therefore,
17 give the floor to Mr. McCloskey.
18 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Then we would ask that protected Witness B come back.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 WITNESS: WITNESS B [Resumed]
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good
24 morning. Can you hear me? Good morning. I should
25 like to remind you that you are still under oath and
1 you will now answer further questions that
2 Mr. McCloskey will have to ask of you. Thank you.
3 THE WITNESS: I have the translation in
4 Serbo-Croatian, so I don't think that's correct.
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: You probably want to change
6 it to channel 4.
7 Examined by Mr. McCloskey: [contd]
8 Q. All right. You may have heard, as the tape
9 was being played, that General Mladic made a reference
10 to who actually invited who to the meeting. What is
11 your recollection about who called the meeting?
12 A. In my recollection, the battalion Commander
13 was ordered to go to Fontana, so I think that Mladic
14 ordered to come there. So he organised the meeting.
15 Q. And he also -- General Mladic also, and I'll
16 refer to Exhibit 39A, the transcript, he states on the
17 bottom of the page 15: "And you've isolated our
18 people, especially that guy of yours Van den Broek.
19 He's one of those who have destroyed the dream of a
20 state both to us and the Muslims. Sir, we were a happy
21 country and happy peoples, and we had a good life both
22 in Srebrenica and here until the Muslims began to
23 listen to Van den Broek, Zimmerman, Kohl, and similar
24 Western Mafia were telling them."
25 Who was Van den Broek at the time?
1 A. At that time Van den Broek was the Minister
2 of Foreign Affairs in Holland, and he was several
3 times also by the soldiers we had contact with --
4 Jovo's accused that he was one of the men who arranged
5 what was going on and was for the Muslims and against
6 the Serbs.
7 Q. And during that meeting, you can be seen
8 standing there near Mladic, next to Colonel Karremans.
9 How did you feel during that meeting?
10 A. Well, very uncomfortable, because when I saw
11 the tape, I think I missed some parts of the tape, and
12 in my opinion and in my notes I can find that he
13 threatened us that when there would be airstrikes again
14 on his, say, soldiers, then he would start shooting at
15 the compound and at the refugees, and also our hostages
16 could be targets, the hostages in Bratunac. After he
17 started screaming to Colonel Karremans and accusing him
18 of asking for the airstrikes, after that he did the
19 same to me and after that he did the same to Major
20 Boering. In the first ten minutes I was very
21 uncomfortable, and I had the idea that it was possible
22 that we would be brought out and be shot.
23 Q. Now, the meeting ended with another meeting
24 planned. Can you tell us what happened after the
25 meeting ended?
1 A. After the meeting ended we just visited for a
2 few minutes our soldiers. I think we were allowed to
3 be there five minutes. After that we were let out of
4 the hotel. We went back to the compound in Potocari
5 and had to find a representative, and after talking
6 with men or women we knew and we had seen in the
7 refugees -- in or outside the compound, we found out
8 that Mr. Mandzic was there, and we knew Mr. Mandzic,
9 because we visited him several times at the secondary
10 school in Srebrenica. And then we thought it would be
11 a good representative if he would like to do it for
12 us. And we asked him and, well, he was free to go with
14 Q. All right. And so then what did you do?
15 A. At 2300 hours we went back to the Hotel
16 Fontana for a meeting.
17 Q. And who went?
18 A. Mr. Boering, Mr. Karremans, myself and
19 Mr. Mandzic.
20 Q. And were you escorted back to the hotel by
22 A. I can't remember, but I think that we were
23 escorted from Jovo's place to the hotel. Well, I'm not
24 sure, but I think it was Nikolic again, but I'm not
25 sure of that.
1 Q. And when you got to the hotel, who was there
2 at this second meeting?
3 A. Well, I wrote it down in my notes. General
4 Mladic was there; Nikolic was there, Major Nikolic;
5 Colonel Jankovic; somebody who was called a
6 representative of the Drina Corps. Later on it seemed
7 that it was the General Krstic. Kosoric was there, the
8 film team was there, and a lot of civilians, and one of
9 them was Ljubisav Simic. It was a name which was
10 mentioned sometime before by Jovo. He was announced as
11 the mayor of Bratunac. And during that meeting we
12 discovered that he was a former colleague from
13 Mr. Mandzic, so that's why I know his name.
14 Q. Now, the person who your notes indicate was a
15 representative of the Drina Corps. Do your notes or
16 does your memory indicate getting a name or a rank of
17 that person?
18 A. No, not in my notes; only as a representative
19 of the Drina Corps in my notes.
20 Q. Had you ever seen that person before?
21 A. No, never.
22 Q. And did you later see him on television?
23 A. Yes, when he was arrested inside.
24 Q. Are you sure that that's the same person --
25 A. Yes, I'm sure that's the same.
1 Q. Do you see that person that was introduced to
2 you as a representative of the Drina Corps present in
3 the courtroom today?
4 A. Yes. He's sitting over there.
5 Q. Can you point out what he's wearing so we
6 know who you're talking about?
7 A. It's not the guard but the man sitting with
8 the headphones on his head, in I think a blue or a grey
10 Q. Will the record indicate he's identified the
11 defendant, General Krstic.
12 Now, who was leading the meeting?
13 A. General Mladic was leading.
14 Q. And can you tell us what the first thing you
15 remember occurring at this meeting?
16 A. Well, we took a seat, and after that somebody
17 opened the window and the curtains from the room we
18 were sitting in, and a pig was slaughtered under the
19 window. It screamed terrible, and I think it was just
20 to intimidate us.
21 Q. And how long did this pig scream for?
22 A. Well, it's very difficult to say now, but
23 maybe two, maybe three minutes. But in that situation
24 it's hard, very difficult, to know the exact time. I
25 wrote it down in my notes. We were there at 2300
1 hours, and at 5 minutes past 11.00 in the evening, the
2 slaughtering of the pig started.
3 Q. And what happened after the pig stopped?
4 A. After the pig stopped, they closed the
5 window. A lot of them, of the Serbs who were in the
6 room, were just smiling. The window was closed, the
7 curtain was closed, and we started with the meeting, in
8 which Mladic started to tell us that he did not find
9 any medicines in Srebrenica. When he arrived in the
10 hospital, all the medicines were gone. That was the
11 first item.
12 Q. In the last several months have you had a
13 chance to see a partial video of that second meeting?
14 A. Yes, I've seen a small part of it.
15 Q. Did that help refresh your recollection as to
16 who was at that meeting?
17 A. I've seen -- there was General Krstic, which
18 I didn't remember by name, but after seeing him on
19 television in 1998, I knew his name.
20 Q. And where was he seated at that second
22 A. At the left side of General Mladic.
23 Q. And what was the next subject that was
24 discussed, as far as you can recall?
25 A. Well, I found my notes from that meeting at
1 15 minutes past 11.00. Mladic showed us a board that
2 he took from the opstina in Srebrenica. He showed as a
3 trophy and I think he told us that Srebrenica was his
4 town now.
5 After that he had a talk with Mr. Mandzic,
6 and it was very difficult for me to follow that speech,
7 because they were sitting rather next to each other.
8 Petar was interpreting for the Colonel Karremans and
9 there were, I think, two persons sitting between them
10 and myself, so I just picked up some things. It was a
11 rather relaxed talk, and Mladic explained to Mandzic
12 that the population had to choose and had to say who
13 wants to go where when they left the enclave. It was
14 also possible to stay, but I don't think it was a real
16 Q. So you had a difficult time hearing the
17 translation --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- because of where you were seated? And
20 about how long did that meeting last?
21 A. It lasted till about 12.00 in the evening.
22 After the talk with Mandzic, Mladic told that he was
23 able to arrange buses to transport the people where
24 they wanted to go. At 20 minutes past 11.00 there was
25 a statement from Mandzic, and I don't know, because it
1 was in Serbo-Croatian and I didn't get the translation
2 exactly what he said, but it was a rather calm talk.
3 After that there was a statement from General
4 Mladic, in which I could hear also from -- parts from
5 the translation that he was accusing Mandzic and the
6 Muslims for what they have done, going out of the
7 enclave, killing Serb people outside the enclave. He
8 was looking very mean and it was a very tense moment
10 At that same meeting we had talks about food
11 for the refugees, eventual Medevacs for the wounded
12 which were on the compound, maybe bringing in food by
13 UNHCR, providing diesel for the buses and the trucks,
14 who would do it and if there were possibilities. Well,
15 we had no logistic convoy, so we couldn't provide it,
16 but I think that they said there would be a convoy.
17 There was a discussion about the buses and I think we
18 tried to find a time schedule, but there were no
19 details in that meeting.
20 Q. There were no details to what in that
22 A. A time schedule, who would provide the buses,
23 who would provide the diesel. Well, it was just -- it
24 had to be arranged, but nobody said, well, you will do
25 this and I will do that.
1 Q. Was there any indication it would happen the
2 next day?
3 A. No. Just that it would happen and there
4 would be buses somewhere and some when, but not when
6 Q. Was anything specifically planned for the
7 next day?
8 A. Yes. A new meeting at 10.00, because Mladic
9 ordered Mandzic to go back and see where the population
10 wanted to go, and he had to come back the next morning
11 at 10.00 for a new meeting.
12 Q. And did Mladic say anything about the
14 A. Yes, of course. He tried several times to
15 inform Colonel Karremans that he needed a contact with
16 the military leaders from the Muslims. He wanted that
17 they would surrender, hand over their weapons.
18 Q. All right. And then --
19 A. For the BSA, he promised that there would be
20 a ceasefire up till 10.00 the next morning, so 10.00 on
21 the 12th of July.
22 Q. Is that most of what you recall about the
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And what happened after the meeting ended?
1 A. The meeting ended, we went back to the
2 compound in Potocari, and I don't know if we did it,
3 but I think that Mr. Mandzic did it. He found two
4 other representatives from the population, Camila and
5 Ibro Nuhanovic, who would support him. Colonel
6 Karremans made his report. That's what he told us and
7 sent his reports to north-east command, his higher
8 echelon, and I think also to Sarajevo
9 Q. All right. And then did you -- where did you
10 spend the night?
11 A. I spend the night in the compound in
13 Q. And what happened in the morning of July
15 A. Well, in the morning we first had a meeting
16 with the representatives of the civilian population.
17 They wanted to inform Mr. Mulatovic, Izetbegovic, and
18 Silajdzic. That's what they told. They tried to use
19 our telephone, but they had a big problem to get in
21 Q. And who were those individuals they wanted to
23 A. Those were the Muslim representatives in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the government. At the same
25 moment we tried to talk about creating safe zones for
1 the refugees, where they could stay, because we didn't
2 know how long they had to stay there, and about some
3 home rules that had to be made, because there were a
4 lot of refugees on the compound and outside the
5 compound, and we had to arrange something.
6 Now, that was a small problem because at
7 9.00, although it was a promise that there would be a
8 ceasefire till 10.00, at three minutes past nine, a
9 round from a tank hit one of the houses at the OP site
10 opposite side of the compound. After that, several
11 tank rounds for the next ten --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow
13 down, please?
14 A. Okay. After that, the first round at three
15 minutes past nine, in the next ten minutes several
16 rounds hit the houses at the OP site, opposite side of
17 the compound.
18 I had to do some other jobs inside the
19 compound. We started with destroying some information
20 we had from which we thought that it was not good that
21 the Serbs get it in their hands.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY:
23 Q. Why did you think the Serbs might get it in
24 their hands?
25 A. Because at the same moment, at 9.00, when the
1 rounds hit the houses, the Serbs entered -- and I can
2 show it on the map -- from OP Papa, from the north in
3 Potocari, at the east and west side of the road. They
4 went southwards in the direction of the compound. So a
5 big group of Serb soldiers came in the vicinity of the
6 compound, and we did not know what they wanted to do,
7 if they would come on the compound.
8 Q. Were you able to you see them enter the area
9 with your own eyes?
10 A. Yes, I seen them enter the area. They split
11 up and came in a very bright front forward to the
13 Q. Then what happened?
14 A. Well, between 9.00 and 10.00, I think, they
15 walked forward burning haystacks. I think they did it
16 so they could see where they had to stay on the line
17 and go forward all together. There were groups with
18 dogs with them walking through the fields.
19 Q. How many dogs did you see?
20 A. I think I saw five or six groups with dogs.
21 A group of five or six men with a dog.
22 Q. All right. Then what happened?
23 A. Well, nothing happened. They just walked
24 around the compound at the east and the west side.
25 They did not enter the compound, did not go to the
1 refugees in the factories south of the compound, and
2 just stayed there.
3 Q. Could you tell how the refugees reacted when
4 the Serb soldiers appeared on the scene?
5 A. Of course when the first tank rounds landed
6 in the houses, there was a lot of screaming and a lot
7 of anxious people all over the place, of course. And,
8 of course, when the Serb soldiers came closer to the
9 refugees, they were very anxious. But I wasn't in the
10 factories at the moment. I stayed inside the compound
11 because I had a lot of other things to do.
12 Q. The third meeting was scheduled to be held
13 at --
14 A. At 10.00. Well, I know -- I don't know when
15 they left, but I know that the three representatives of
16 the civilian population, Major Boering, and Karremans
17 went to Fontana again.
18 Q. Why didn't you go this time?
19 A. Well, I had to do some other things.
20 Emergency sorting inside the compound and somebody had
21 to do that, so I couldn't go with them.
22 Q. Okay. Can you tell us what significant
23 things happened that morning, after 10.00, that you
24 were able to experience?
25 A. Not specifically on the compound. I know
1 that Karremans, Major Boering, and representatives came
2 back after the meeting. They had talked about fuel,
3 buses, time schedule. That's what I thought, but again
4 there was no concrete deal over what would happen.
5 So the Colonel Karremans ordered Major
6 Boering and myself to go back to Fontana
7 find out how the situation with the fuel should be
8 arranged and how many buses would be provided by Mladic
9 and the time schedule, when what would happen.
10 Q. Can you tell us: At that point, was there an
11 anticipation or information that it would happen that
12 very day?
13 A. No. Because they came back from that
14 meeting, and I think they still had no idea when it
15 would happen. And that has been confirmed, because at
16 12.00 I went with Major Boering back to the Hotel
17 Fontana to find out what I just told you and nobody was
18 there. Well, a lot of soldiers, but no representatives
19 we could deal with. And I think that somebody in the
20 hotel phoned for the Major Nikolic, which we asked for,
21 and Major Nikolic showed up with Kosoric.
22 We had a small talk outside -- or in the
23 lobby of the hotel, and suddenly they told us we had to
24 go back because the buses were already there and they
25 would start the evacuation.
1 Well, we were very surprised and went back, I
2 think about 1.00, to Potocari. When we arrived there
3 were already, I think, 15 buses standing in front of
4 the compound.
5 Q. When you had left the compound that morning,
6 were there any vehicles, buses, or trucks along the
7 road between the compound and Bratunac?
8 A. I can't remember that there was any vehicle.
9 Q. Was that an area that was cordoned off by you
10 before you were taken over by the Serbs, the roadway
11 between the UN base and OP Papa?
12 A. Not at that moment again, but we had the
13 OP Papa, and then, of course, that was at the entrance
14 of the enclave. So that was cut off till the moment
15 that the Serbs enter the enclave.
16 Q. When you had left to go to the hotel that
17 morning, had the Serbs already entered the enclave?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. But -- and we had --
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
21 Mr. McCloskey, I'm sorry that I have to interrupt you,
22 but I do not think that at this speed we can really do
23 our work. The interpreters are following you only with
24 very great difficulty.
25 Witness, you must be aware of the existence
1 of interpreters. You already had some experience.
2 You've worked with interpreters.
3 Mr. McCloskey, you should establish the
4 pace. If you make a break, if you make a pause, and if
5 you speak slowly, then, I believe, the witness will do
6 the same. I am sorry for having to interrupt you, but
7 it is in the interests of work and in the interests of
8 justice. When a witness says things that are very
9 important, then we really have to follow him and
10 understand him. If he goes too fast, we simply miss
11 some of this information.
12 So will you please speak slowly, as I do now,
13 with pauses so that the interpreters can follow us.
14 Right. Very well. I'm quite sure that you can do it.
15 Please go on. Thank you.
16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. I
18 Q. Now if I can remember where I was. I'm
19 sorry. I was asking you buses and the enclave when you
20 went to Bratunac. Again, you said there were no buses
21 in the enclave area when you went to Bratunac.
22 A. When I left -- I think it was 12.00 -- there
23 were no buses.
24 Q. When you came back at 1.00, there were buses?
25 A. Yes. When we came back, I think there were
1 15 buses standing in front of the compound.
2 Q. What was the -- what was the next thing that
3 happened when you got back that afternoon and saw these
5 A. Well, we -- I think the first thing we did,
6 entered the compound, report to Colonel Karremans what
7 happened to us. After that we went outside because we
8 had the indication that evacuation or deportation
9 started. People were led into the buses.
10 Q. Did you see that?
11 A. Yes. I went out and I saw that people were
12 led into the buses from the area where they were
14 Q. Can you describe that process as you saw it?
15 A. Well, of course, the refugees were deadly
16 afraid. They saw the buses and that was for them the
17 indication, "Well, they bring us to a safer place. So
18 let's go as quick to the buses, go as fast as possible
19 to the buses," and, "I will be first."
20 Q. Okay. And what else?
21 A. There was talk in the buses. First, the
22 wounded. Well, it was the request of Mr. Mandzic,
23 first the wounded and then elderly people and women.
24 After that the rest would be evacuated. Well, at that
25 moment, everybody was able to stand up, pick up his
1 luggage, went to the buses, and they overcrowded the
2 buses. We tried to arrange, at that moment, to put an
3 UN soldier in each bus to accompany and escort them,
4 but that was not possible because the buses were too
6 At that moment, Major Boering and Captain
7 Voerman were ordered to take a jeep and escort the
8 buses to where wherever they would go, and we heard
9 that they went to Kladanj.
10 Q. Was there any separation of the men at that
11 early stage?
12 A. Well, I don't remember if it happened with
13 the first few buses that there was already a
14 separation. I think that at the end of filling up the
15 buses, the first separation started. When men went
16 forward to go to the buses, they were separated and
17 brought to the White House near the entrance of the
19 Q. Can you describe that process as you saw it?
20 A. I don't know exactly at what moment it
21 started, but I think when the first buses were there;
22 otherwise, for sure when the second buses -- group of
23 buses was there. The people were able to go forward to
24 the buses. Everybody tried to go, most of them they
25 went to the right side of the bus. I don't know why
1 the right side, but it just happened. But at that
2 moment, the Serb soldiers started to pick out of the
3 refugees the men, I think from the age from 17 up to 70
4 years old and led them to the White House near the
5 entrance of the compound. They told us that they had
6 to do that because they wanted to find out if they were
7 soldiers and if they were in the army during the war.
8 If they were in the army, they would be separated, be
9 made prisoners of war.
10 Q. Did some of these men have property?
11 A. Yeah. Everybody who could carry something
12 had his property with him, as far as they could take
13 it, but the women and children and elderly men who were
14 brought to the buses were able to take the property
15 inside the buses, most of it, and the men who were
16 brought to the White House had to leave their luggage
17 outside of the house and were brought, without any
18 luggage, inside the house.
19 Q. Did you see what happened to the men after
20 they went to the White House?
21 A. Well, they first stayed for an interrogation
22 inside the house. Outside I talked with
23 General Mladic, who showed up that afternoon. I asked
24 what was going on with the men who were separated and
25 who were brought into the house, and he told me that --
1 and tried to find out if there were soldiers among
2 them, and if it was so, they would be separated, be
3 made prisoners of war, brought to a prison camp in the
4 vicinity of Bijeljina and exchanged for Serb prisoners
5 of war.
6 Q. Do you know what time General Mladic arrived
7 in the area of Potocari?
8 A. It was somewhere in the afternoon. I think
9 in the middle of the afternoon, but ...
10 Q. Did you see -- when did you first see men
11 separated and put on buses?
12 A. Well, I can't remember the first. I think
13 15 buses, if it already happened, because I am for sure
14 in those bus there were some men, but at the same
15 moment or shortly after it, the separation started.
16 Q. What did you see? Can you describe that?
17 A. Well, men would like to go with their
18 families into the buses. They just were separated, led
19 to the White House. They had to leave their luggage
20 outside and were brought in the White House. I think
21 at the second part of that afternoon, at least three
22 buses of men were filled up in front of the White
23 House, and they were brought in the direction of
25 Q. Did you see that yourself?
1 A. Yes, I saw it myself. When they left, one of
2 our vehicles with Versteeg, I mentioned his name also
3 yesterday, they escorted the buses in the direction of
4 Bratunac. Later on, I heard in Bratunac the UN vehicle
5 was stopped and was not able to escort the buses
6 further on.
7 Q. Did you ever -- how did the Serb soldiers do
8 this separation process? Was it friendly?
9 A. Well, I don't remember that during the
10 separation they used force, because the men who were
11 separated just did what they had to do and they listen
12 to the Serb soldiers.
13 When they came out of the White House, I seen
14 several times that the men were very afraid, tried to
15 escape, started screaming, did not want to go into the
16 buses. At that moment, some force was used. They were
17 hit and kicked into the buses.
18 When they were in the buses and they tried to
19 get out of the bus, you can see from the entrance of
20 our compound that they were ordered to sit in the bus
21 with their head down so that they could not see what
23 Q. That afternoon of the 12th, did you recognise
24 any other Serb soldiers besides General Mladic?
25 A. Colonel Jankovic was always around and a lot
1 of other Serb soldiers, but none of them I can
3 Q. Did you see General Krstic there that
5 A. I can't remember.
6 Q. Were you able to make out particular units
7 from insignia or from anything else about, you know,
8 what kind of Serb units these were?
9 A. No, but I had the idea that the Serb units
10 who entered the enclave were normal Serb units. During
11 that afternoon, I heard that some of our vehicles were
12 captured on the road to Kladanj by non-regular troops
13 in several uniforms, civilian clothes, some in black
14 overalls, but I didn't recognise any specific ...
15 Q. During this process in the afternoon when
16 people are taken to the White House and people are put
17 on buses, did you hear any gunfire in the area?
18 JUDGE RIAD: May I just ask. He used the
19 word "Serb units." Does he mean the units from the
20 Serb army or Bosnian Serb units.
21 THE WITNESS: Bosnian Serb units.
22 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY:
24 Q. Did you ever have any indication that there
25 were Serb units from Serbia involved in this
2 A. No. The only information we got, when the
3 enclave was still in our hands, that some units of
4 Arkan were in the vicinity, but I've never seen them
6 Q. Did you, that afternoon while this was
7 happening, hear any gunfire in the area?
8 A. Yes, because we heard all the time gunfire.
9 The units who spread up in the northern part and
10 marched forward to the south were all over the place
11 and we heard all the time gunfire from the mountains
12 surrounding the compound.
13 Q. Could you tell whether there was gunfire
14 coming from the area around the factories and the
16 A. Not specifically in the area from the
17 compound or the factories, just in the hills which were
18 around it, and it's very difficult when you hear
19 gunfire, to point it out, where it's coming from.
20 Q. How did the Serb soldiers react to the
22 A. Well, I think the same as we did. We got
23 used to it. We had the idea that we were no targets,
24 so it just happened.
25 Q. What else happened that afternoon? What else
1 were you involved in?
2 A. I went out several times to go to the
3 refugees outside in the factories. Once there was the
4 interpreter of the Bravo Company, Mr. Hodzic. I don't
5 know exactly, but there is a story that one of the
6 bodyguards of Mladic took his ID card, and I think that
7 I took it back from him, and he was so afraid that I
8 had to bring him back to the compound. It was not
9 possible for me to use him as an interpreter to talk to
10 the refugees.
11 After that, I went out with one of the
12 representatives, Ibro Nuhanovic, to go to the refugees,
13 and when we left the front gate of the compound,
14 suddenly a Serb soldier came to him and started beating
15 him in his face. I was able to stop it and after that
16 we returned to the compound, because it was not safe to
17 take him to the refugees.
18 Q. Ibro Nuhanovic was one of the representatives
19 that had gone to the Hotel Fontana that morning; is
20 that right?
21 A. That's correct. And in the same meeting
22 General Mladic promised safety for him.
23 Q. All right. And did you have a meeting with
24 Mr. Nuhanovic and other representatives that afternoon?
25 A. Yes. In the afternoon we had a meeting with
1 the representatives, and several subjects were
2 discussed. Of course there was a lot of panic because
3 it started so quick, and the representatives told us
4 that although there was a deal that first the wounded,
5 then the elderly, and then the sick people, and then
6 women and children would be evacuated, now they saw
7 there was a mix-up, and not only a mix-up from all
8 those groups, but also that men were separated.
9 Q. And how did the representatives -- what did
10 the representatives think of that?
11 A. Well, they had a very bad feeling about it,
12 because they referred to what happened in 1992 and
13 1993, when also a lot of men were separated and brought
14 to a soccer field in Bratunac and were killed over
15 there, and they thought that this would happen again.
16 Well, we could only promise, of course, that we would
17 try to monitor it and escort the vehicles, but they
18 told us that, well, we had no choice and the UN was not
19 able to protect them, because the UN was not arranging
20 anything; General Mladic was ordering what happened.
21 Q. I notice you looked at your notes when you
22 said that. Did you take notes at that particular
24 A. Yes, I have a lot of notes from that meeting,
25 because they were very concerned and had a lot of
1 subjects which they would like to talk about.
2 Q. And what else did they talk about?
3 A. Well, they didn't agree with the sequence
4 from the evacuation. They had no choice -- we had no
5 choice again, because Mladic was arranging things, and
6 not the UN. They requested us to phone to Tuzla
7 if things were arranged over there. When the refugees
8 went to Kladanj, after that they should be brought to
9 Tuzla, and of course they wanted to know what happened
10 in Tuzla.
11 They ordered us to inform the refugees over
12 what's going on now, what will happen the coming hours,
13 or maybe days, inform them what was arranged with
14 Mladic, tell them that he said there was safety and
15 security for them, and try to avoid that there was
16 panic among the refugees. But of course they were very
17 afraid, so that was very difficult.
18 They asked us to report to the world what was
19 going on, and of course we told them that all the
20 things we saw and what was happening was reported to
21 our higher echelons.
22 Mr. Nuhanovic told us that he agreed to go to
23 the meeting that morning because he wanted to do
24 something for his people and also for the battalion,
25 but at that specific moment he had the idea that he was
1 doing a dirty job, because it was no longer the UN who
2 arranged things, but the Serbs did.
3 And after the meeting that morning, because
4 nothing was really arranged, the evacuation should not
5 have started. He told us that when he had known that
6 there were cameras, then he did not -- he wouldn't have
7 gone over there. When things were going on in the way
8 they did now, men would try to escape and flee into the
10 Mr. Mandzic had a contact with the
11 representatives of the BH government in Central Bosnia
12 and I don't know with whom, but he told us that they
13 informed him that they should not let go buses or
14 evacuations going on without a UN escort. And again
15 they told us that Mladic promised and guaranteed
16 security for all of them, but they had their doubts
17 about it.
18 Q. All right. And after that meeting did the
19 separations and transportation continue?
20 A. Yes, it continued, I think, till 8.00 in the
21 evening. Also at the end of that afternoon, there
22 should be a medical evacuation to Kladanj. Fifty-four,
23 that's what's in my notes, persons wounded were let
24 into the buses or into trucks and brought to Kladanj.
25 Some of them, and I don't know, but I think it was
1 about 20 people, were able to leave the buses in
2 Kladanj and go by foot across the border. The rest of
3 them were not able to go there by themselves, so they
4 stayed in the buses and in the trucks and went back
5 with one of our escorts to Bratunac, to the checkpoint
6 with Jovo's. They were not allowed to go to the
7 hospital in Bratunac or the hospital in our compound;
8 they had to stay at Yellow Bridge, and I'm for sure
9 that I got the information that night that one of the
10 wounded died.
11 Q. Anything else of significance that you recall
12 occurring before you -- before the evening ended?
13 A. That is all I have in my notes from the 12th.
14 Q. All right. And the morning of the 13th, can
15 you describe to us what occurred on the 13th, from your
16 memory and your notes?
17 A. Yes. I think that between 7.00 and 8.00 in
18 the morning, the evacuation started again. That
19 morning we got the information from the Lieutenant de
20 Ruiter that he found nine dead bodies in the vicinity
21 of the compound, all shot, all with a hole in the back,
22 so he thought it was an execution. Of course he could
23 not prove that, but he went there with Lieutenant
24 Koster. Lieutenant Koster sat down between the dead
25 bodies and de Ruiter took a picture.
1 After that they tried to get back to the
2 refugees where they had to stay. They were seen by a
3 Serb soldier and they told me that somebody shot at
5 Q. That night in the compound, as you were
6 sleeping, the night of the 12th/early morning hours of
7 the 13th, did you hear any gun fire in the vicinity of
8 the compound or the area?
9 A. Yes. As I said, the gun fire was still going
10 on and we were so used to it that we didn't hear
11 specifically that it was in an other way than we were
12 used to.
13 Q. After the report of the bodies by de Ruiter
14 what was the next thing that occurred?
15 A. In my notes I see that General Mladic was
16 again present in the morning and he had a contact with
17 Colonel Karremans. I wasn't at that meeting, so I
18 don't know what they talked about. And that same
19 morning I had a small talk with General Mladic about
20 the theft from weapons and materiel by the Serb
21 soldiers from our soldiers, and asked to get all those
22 things, weapons and flak jackets, back from them.
23 Well, he promised me that of course at this moment it
24 was a problem, but he should order his soldiers to stop
25 and not steal anything from the UN soldiers.
1 At that same time he told me that fights were
2 going on in the north-western part of the enclave, and
3 that was one thing we knew already, because when the
4 refugees were brought from Bratunac to Kladanj via this
5 road, we heard that lots of fightings were going on on
6 this road. And when Mladic told us that fights were
7 going on in the north-western part of the enclave, it
8 was nothing amazing for us. He told me that we had to
9 inform the Muslim army that they had to stop and
10 surrender and to hand over their weapons, because a lot
11 of them were killed and also a lot of Serb soldiers
12 were killed, and it would be good for us to inform the
13 Muslims to stop.
14 Q. Did you see any other VRS soldiers or
15 officers that you recognised around that time?
16 A. No. Again, Mladic with his bodyguards, and
17 Jankovic, he was all the time around.
18 Q. So did you see Jankovic on the 13th also?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In Potocari?
21 A. In Potocari.
22 Q. All right. And then what happened?
23 A. Well, because a lot of vehicles were stolen
24 on the road from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje and
25 Kladanj, it was not possible to escort all the
1 transports, so somebody, and I think that Major Franken
2 or Colonel Karremans, took the decision to create four
3 mobile checkpoints on the road to see if the buses
4 passed and so that they had at least something to
5 inform us what happened on that road.
6 That same day, I think in the second part of
7 the morning, between 10.00 and 11.00, Colonel Akamovic
8 showed up. He told us that he was a logistic officer
9 and told us that we would get a logistical convoy. It
10 would be able to bring in 15.000 litres of water,
11 36.000 litres of diesel, and 20.000 rations. At the
12 same moment he told us that from the 36.000 litres of
13 diesel, we had to give some of it to the Serbs. We had
14 to share it together, because they provided up till
15 that moment the diesel for the evacuation buses and
17 And maybe I jump further on. At the end of
18 the day I know that a convoy arrived, that there was
19 diesel in it. And Major Franken and Colonel Jankovic
20 made the deal, and I don't know exactly, but I know
21 that 30.000 litres of our diesel went to the BSA in
23 Q. Did that occur on the end of the day of the
24 13th or on the 14th?
25 A. No. It arrived on the 14th, and on the 14th
1 they supported the BSA with the diesel.
2 Q. So the fuel arrived the next day after your
3 meeting --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- with Acamovic?
6 A. Acamovic told us that there should be made a
7 list from all the personnel, from the local staff, the
8 UNHCR, the MSF, which would stay with us and leave with
9 us in the enclave. So we made a list with names:
10 first names, male or female, date of birth, and since
11 when they worked for the UN that day.
12 That same morning, outside the compound, I've
13 seen that Mr. Kingori, one of the UNMOs, had a lot of
14 talks with Colonel Jankovic outside, because he got the
15 information and also was able to go into the White
16 House to see that it was overcrowded. It was again a
17 very hot day, so all the days at that moment, and it
18 was a very bad situation in the White House. So
19 Kingori decided to ask Jankovic to provide some buses
20 and transport some men from the White House to create a
21 better situation, because it was very bad at that
23 I can remember that I think in the first part
24 of the afternoon, two buses were provided and two buses
25 brought some men. And I don't know if they went
1 separate or in a convoy. They left in the direction of
3 Q. Let me take you back to Acamovic, Colonel
4 Acamovic. Is that a name that you're sure about?
5 A. Yes, because we just sat down inside the
6 compound and I had all the time to write his name
7 down. I've got it in my notes.
8 Q. Did he say anything that restricted the
9 movement of the UN troops to you?
10 A. Yes, but it was in the second meeting we had
11 that day. At the end of the afternoon, at half past
12 4.00, Akamovic showed up again and told us that there
13 would be a Medevac, medical evacuation, from Bratunac.
14 He told us that the civilian staff could stay with the
15 battalion, that there would be a convoy today from the
16 UNHCR with food in it and we were able to give it to
17 the refugees. It was a very strange situation, of
18 course, because most of the refugees at that moment
19 already left. There never arrived a convoy that day.
20 He ordered us when all the refugees are gone,
21 we have to assemble all the Dutch personnel and we have
22 to stay inside the compound, and the next day, by
23 daylight, there would be a check from the compound if
24 no BiH soldiers stayed behind in the compound.
25 That same moment he took our list we
1 established for him with the local staff and the other
2 personnel, and in my notes I also see that that same
3 afternoon we made a list with 239 names on it from the
4 males who were inside the compound. We made that list
5 and sent it to Tuzla, because we had no possibility to
6 check if everybody arrived in Tuzla
7 us a list, and one of the -- or several interpreters
8 tried to establish a list for us with all those names
9 from male Muslims inside the compound. We faxed it to
10 Tuzla so they could check if the men would arrive in
12 Q. Was 239 a complete list of all the men --
13 A. No.
14 Q. -- inside the compound? Excuse me.
15 A. It was a list from all those men who wanted
16 to be on that list, because not everybody wanted to be
17 on that list and not everybody wanted to give his
18 name. That's what the interpreters told us.
19 Q. Did you know one particular Muslim man that
20 was in the compound that you had a concern about? I
21 believe it was Camila Osmanovic's relative.
22 A. Yes. Camila Osmanovic broke down that day.
23 Her brother was also in the compound. He was the cook
24 of the MSF and he was also on the list from our local
25 staff and would be able to go with us. He was very
1 afraid about what was going to happen, so afraid that
2 he had a rope in his pocket and told me that when Serbs
3 entered the compound, he would hang himself.
4 Q. Did you believe him?
5 A. Yes, I believed him, because he really was
6 very afraid.
7 Q. And what time were all the Muslim refugees
8 finally shipped out of the area on the 13th?
9 A. At about 8.00 in the evening it was the end
10 of the evacuation. Everybody left. At that moment our
11 soldiers went inside the compound. I myself and some
12 other soldiers went to the factories inside of the
13 compound to check if there were no refugees left, if
14 there were no dead bodies or anything else, but we
15 didn't find anything, so at 8.00 everything and
16 everybody was gone.
17 Q. And on the 14th you were left, I think you
18 said, with 6.000 litres of fuel, and the VRS took
19 30.000; is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's correct. And I don't know the
21 exact arrangement which Major Franken made with
22 Jankovic, but I know that a truck went first to the
23 compound, or directly to Bratunac, to support the BSA
24 with the diesel.
25 Q. And the 6.000 that you had, was that enough
1 to fill your vehicles and to get you transported out of
2 the area?
3 A. Yes, it must be, because we didn't get any
4 diesel after it, and we got out and we managed, so it
5 was enough.
6 Q. And finally, when did DutchBat leave?
7 A. We finally left at the 21st of July.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 That's all the questions I have now.
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
11 Mr. McCloskey. I was actually going to interrupt you
12 it so that we could have a break now, and I think this
13 is a good moment for a recess. We will have,
14 therefore, a 20-minute break and then we will resume
15 after that.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We are
19 going to resume with the cross-examination, but we
20 don't seem to have the witness.
21 Mr. Dubuisson, what is happening? Where is
22 our witness?
23 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The usher has
24 gone out to fetch him.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness B,
3 are you comfortable?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let me
6 remind you once again that you have to speak slowly.
7 Now you're going to answer questions put do you by the
8 Defence. I believe it is going to be Mr. Petrusic who
9 will cross-examine you.
10 Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.
11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,
12 Mr. President.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:
14 Q. Witness B, on the meeting held on the 6th of
15 January, 1995 in Bratunac, you met General Zivanovic,
16 Lieutenant Colonel Vukovic, Major Nikolic, and Major
17 Sarkic. That introduction was done by General
18 Zivanovic, I believe. Did he introduce the said
19 Generals as Generals of the Drina
20 Republika Srpska?
21 A. No. He just introduced himself as the
22 General Zivanovic, and our predecessors told us he was
23 the Commander of the Drina Corps.
24 Q. You spent some time in the enclave. As of
25 the month of January that year, could you describe the
1 security situation in the area?
2 A. Do you mean the security -- well, for the
3 people over there or for --
4 Q. I mean the security situation inside the
5 enclave itself.
6 A. Well, I think we had a rather good security
7 situation inside the enclave. We did not have very big
8 problems. The biggest problems we had were at the
9 borders of the enclave because there was frequent
10 shooting from BSA side to the Muslim side and also from
11 the Muslim side to the BSA side, but indeed the enclave
12 the situation was rather calm.
13 Q. Were you aware of an incident where a patrol
14 of the Dutch Battalion was captured inside the enclave,
15 that is, in the area called the Bandera triangle?
16 A. There was not a patrol captured inside the
17 enclave. There were some incidents in that vicinity
18 called the Bandera triangle, and at one moment some
19 patrols were stopped and not allowed to go in there.
20 After that, that problem was solved. We frequently had
21 problems to go there, and the Muslims denied us to go
22 in that triangle.
23 Q. Did you know anything about the reasons why
24 Muslims denied you access to the Bandera triangle?
25 A. Yes. As they told us, and maybe I can show
1 it on the map, the Muslims were afraid that the Milici
2 Brigade would attack this vicinity and the villages in
3 this vicinity. They tried to order us to take a
4 position in the OP Bravo, but we were not allowed to go
5 there and we would not take the position. They ordered
6 us. We would choose it ourselves, and they did not
7 agree with the positions we would like to take. That
8 was one of the reasons for the struggle we had with
10 Q. According to the information you had, was the
11 protected zone of Srebrenica completely demilitarised?
12 A. When you mean "demilitarised," there were no
13 regular army units, it's yes, but, of course, it was
14 not completely demilitarised because there were men who
15 were in the army before, in the war, and there was
16 still the 8th Operational Group from the BiH in charge
17 and they had a big influence. So it was not completely
18 demilitarised. The only thing we were able to do is
19 deny them to exercise as militaries and they did not;
20 to disarm them, and that was the utmost that we could
21 do and what we did.
22 Q. Do you have any knowledge to the effect that
23 during your time there there had been attacks of the
24 forces of the 8th Operational Group against Serb
25 positions, that is, the villages situated outside the
1 protected area?
2 A. No. From both sides, as well from the
3 military leaders inside the enclave, as from the
4 Serbian side, we got frequently the information that
5 fights were going on inside the enclave, and at that
6 moment the Muslims accused the Serbs entering the
7 enclave, and outside the enclave the Serbs accusing the
8 Muslims going out and attacking people there.
9 Q. Do you know anything about an attack by the
10 8th Operational Group on the village of Visnjica on the
11 25th and the 26th of July, 1995 -- I'm sorry, 25th,
12 26th of June, that is, prior to the fall of the
14 A. I have nothing in my notes, but I can check
15 my other notebook. You said the 25th?
16 Q. 25th and 26th.
17 A. No. I have no information that there was an
18 attack. Nothing in -- no invites for meetings with the
19 BiH or the BSA side. I have nothing in my notes.
20 Q. During your time in the area, did you ever
21 talk to the commanders of the 8th Operational Group in
22 Srebrenica? Because the group was quartered in
23 Srebrenica. And I have a Mr. Moric [sic] in mind, in
25 A. I don't know the name "Moric." The only --
1 Naser Oric I think you mean.
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. Naser Oric. Yes. We had contact with him
4 for the first few months in the enclave, and I think
5 that in March he disappeared. We had no contact with
6 him after the month of March.
7 Q. Let us move on to the events that took place
8 in July 1995. You testified that on the 9th of July, a
9 wounding incident took place, including the Commander
10 van Rensen, who died as a result of the injuries
11 several days later. After that incident did the
12 confidence of the members of the Dutch battalion in
13 respect of Muslim forces subside in the area?
14 A. No. What happened, that when the people on
15 the OP Foxtrot, it was the manning from the OP, and one
16 of the Dutch soldiers died, got into that situation.
17 Of course everybody was informed after that, and when
18 that's on your mind, when you try to use your freedom
19 of movement and act military-wise, as they learned, go
20 backwards with your APC or other vehicles and go
21 forward in another place, and you had an incident like
22 this, and you see when you want to go backward that
23 there are Muslim men, armed Muslim men who maybe want
24 to stop you, well I think at that moment there's
25 something -- there's a change in your mind. But
1 towards the Muslim people, I don't think that the
2 attitude was different than before, because everybody
3 saw it as an incident, I think.
4 Q. Well, my question did not target the Muslim
5 population as such; I was referring to the Muslim
6 forces. The question, therefore, concerned the
7 Muslim-armed forces.
8 A. Well, there were no regular armed forces at
9 that moment. Of course, we had our frequent contacts
10 with the Chief of Staff from the 8th OG. Ramiz was
11 acting as the leader of the military people, as far as
12 we knew, in the enclave. Of course, we complained that
13 this situation happened, but it was a civilian, in our
14 view, who killed soldier van Rensen, a Muslim soldier.
15 Q. On the 10th of July you went to the PTT
16 building. Could you please tell us whether Muslims,
17 that is, the civilians, made a decision at that time to
18 move into the direction of Potocari?
19 A. No. We had a meeting in the PTT building at
20 11.00 in the evening. Colonel Karremans told them that
21 there would be airstrikes the next morning, when the
22 ultimatum was not held. Nothing happened further on.
23 When we left the PTT building we saw a lot of men in
24 uniform and in civilian clothes, with arms, going to
25 the north-western part, leaving the town of Srebrenica
1 in the north-western direction, but not in a direction
2 to Potocari, because everybody stayed in Srebrenica.
3 There was a UN compound in the town of Srebrenica
4 the anxious people were in the vicinity of that
5 compound. And nobody decided to go to Potocari.
6 Q. And do you have any knowledge as to the time
7 when the decision to go to Potocari was reached?
8 A. I think that nobody took a decision to go to
9 Potocari. When the attacks went on on the 11th of
10 July, the refugees collected in the vicinity of the
11 compound of the Bravo Company in Srebrenica. I wasn't
12 outside, but I think, of course, some of them went
13 maybe to Potocari. At 10 minutes past 2.00, according
14 to my notes, there was an airstrike and the mortar
15 shells landed in the compound. That was for us the
16 reason to try, I think, at 12.00 already, to get the
17 people to Potocari, because we had not enough place on
18 the compound to let all the refugees on the compound,
19 and when they would like to go on the UN base, they had
20 to go to Potocari. I did not know at that moment that
21 it was -- that there were so many refugees who would
22 like to go there. But the civilian leaders from the
23 Muslims in the enclave, and also not the military
24 leaders, took that decision. We just told the people,
25 "Well, go to Potocari, because there is no space
1 enough on this compound."
2 Q. Do you know when the Muslim military forces
3 reached a decision to go to the town of Susnjari
4 A. I don't know if there were a real decision to
5 go there. When we left in the night from the 10th to
6 the 11th the PTT building, we saw a lot of armed men
7 going in the north-western direction, leaving the town
8 in that direction. The next day, when I was on the
9 compound of the Bravo Company, I did not see a lot of
10 armed men in that vicinity. Most of them were elderly
11 people, women and children.
12 Q. Could you identify the units in somewhat more
13 precise terms than simply units of the army of
14 Republika Srpska? And I'm referring to the units who
15 were present in Potocari on the 12th and the 13th of
17 A. I don't know what kind of units it were. I
18 think it was infantry, because they were walking in, I
19 think, the strength of a company in the vicinity of the
20 compound. And they wore Bosnian Serb uniforms, as we
21 saw them several times before when we were at the
22 meetings in Bratunac. That's for me that I think this
23 were the regular Serb forces and infantry, because they
24 walked and they had no vehicles or tanks or APCs with
1 Q. The meeting that was held in Bratunac in the
2 Fontana Hotel on the 11th of July, around 10.00 p.m.
3 could you please describe the participation of General
4 Krstic in that meeting, or rather the role of General
5 Krstic in that meeting?
6 A. Well, my notes are here and, as I said, at
7 that moment I did not know it was General Krstic. He
8 was announced as a representative; in my view, a
9 representative of the Drina Corps. He was sitting next
10 to General Mladic and looked just what happened and did
11 not do anything: did not speak, did not mix up in the
12 discussions or anything else; just was there.
13 Q. Did General Zivanovic attend that meeting
15 A. No. The last time I've seen General
16 Zivanovic was in the first meeting at 8.00, and after
17 that I've never seen General Zivanovic again.
18 Q. And you stayed at the meeting until the end,
19 the second meeting?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,
22 Witness B. I have no further questions. Thank you.
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
24 Mr. Petrusic.
25 Mr. McCloskey, do you have any questions now
1 on re-examination?
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour, just a few,
3 and one thing I forgot to ask him the first time
4 Re-examined by Mr. McCloskey:
5 Q. During the second meeting did any VRS officer
6 or soldiers besides Mladic say anything at those
8 A. No. As far as I remember and see in my
9 notes, there is only General Mladic who was talking to
10 Mr. Mandzic and to Colonel Karremans and making
11 statements. I don't have anything in my notes that
12 somebody else talked or mixed in.
13 Q. All right. And I asked you earlier to
14 correct the mistake of OP Echo on the map, and were you
15 able to do that?
16 A. Yes. I put the new OP Echo on the map, over
17 here. It's just at the crossroad over here, and not
18 over there. So it's changed.
19 Q. You've marked it with a little black "E"?
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Could you refer to what is marked as
22 Exhibit 28, which I know you've had a chance to look
23 at, and if you could go to what is tab 2,
24 Exhibit 28/4.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can he get some help with the
1 ELMO on that.
2 Q. All right. Do you recognise someone on that
4 A. Yes. General Zivanovic.
5 Q. So you're pointing out the fellow with the
6 more orange face?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Could you go to tab 3, Exhibit 28 -- I
9 believe it's 28/5.1. Excuse me. That is 28/5 and
10 that's fine. 28/5 is fine. You can -- all right.
11 Well, now we're looking at 28/5. Do you recognise that
13 A. Yes. That's Mr. Kosoric.
14 Q. That's a frame that is divided in half but
15 that's the same individual; is that right?
16 A. Yes, twice.
17 Q. Okay. If you could go to what is tab 11,
18 Exhibit 28/13. Can you identify those two
20 A. Yes. General Mladic and Colonel Jankovic.
21 Q. Do you recognise where that photo was taken
23 A. I don't know exactly. I think it is in one
24 of the meetings in Hotel Fontana.
25 Q. All right.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honours, Mr.
2 President. I have no further questions.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
4 Mr. Petrusic, do you perhaps have any additional
5 questions, because we have heard some new things here.
6 Would you have anything else to ask of this witness?
7 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, the last
8 photograph, in point of fact.
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:
10 Q. During your testimony --
11 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Witness B said
12 that at the second meeting it was Colonel Jankovic who
13 was sitting to the left of General Mladic.
14 Q. On this photograph that we just saw, was that
15 the photograph of that second meeting, that is, the
16 11th of July?
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,
18 Mr. Petrusic. Yes. You may ask the question directly,
19 Mr. Petrusic.
20 A. I don't know for sure if it's the second
21 meeting. I don't think so because in my view, in the
22 second meeting General Krstic was sitting to the left
23 of General Mladic. I only know the background, the
24 curtains in the Hotel Fontana, so but I think it is in
25 one of the meetings, but I don't know if it is in one
1 of the meetings I joined.
2 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. But on this photograph, is this the left-hand
4 side of General Mladic where Colonel Jankovic is
6 A. Yes. That's correct.
7 Q. Is that to the left of General Mladic? And
8 was this the meeting that cameramen recorded on the
10 A. As I told you, the cameras were in the first
11 and the second meeting. I'm not sure if we sat down
12 during the first meeting. I think we did. Now I maybe
13 jumped to a conclusion, and I don't think that's
14 correct. So this must be the first meeting, because in
15 my notes, I am for sure that General Krstic is, in the
16 second meeting, sitting to the left of General Mladic.
17 I don't know what meeting it is.
18 I think this picture is made in the Hotel
19 Fontana, because I think I recognise the curtains
20 behind those two men, but I don't know if it is a
21 picture made in one of the meetings I joined. So I
22 can't confirm this.
23 Q. Yesterday we saw the video of the -- first
24 meeting and all those present at the meeting were
1 A. Yes. That's correct. That's what we saw. I
2 also missed some things which I remembered from that
3 meeting which were not on the tape, so I don't think
4 the whole meeting is on the tape we saw yesterday,
5 because I think we saw a tape for maybe 30 minutes, but
6 some things happened at that first meeting I did not
7 see in the tape. I did not see and hear General Mladic
8 shouting at me and asking if I ordered the close-air
9 support, for example, or to Major Boering. In my mind,
10 I think that also during that meeting we had a seat.
11 Q. So you do not think it is possible that it
12 was as we saw it yesterday?
13 A. What we yesterday saw that we were standing
14 and talking. Now you can see, I think, that those two
15 men are sitting on the table. I think it is in the
16 Hotel Fontana. That's all I can say to this picture.
17 I don't know in what meeting this was made.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
20 Mr. Petrusic.
21 I believe my colleagues also have some
22 questions. Judge Riad.
23 Questioned by the Court:
24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Witness B, good morning.
1 A. Good morning.
2 JUDGE RIAD: I just have some few
3 clarifications to ask you about. When you were asked
4 by the Defence counsel if the protected zone of
5 Srebrenica was completely demilitarised, you said it
6 was not completely demilitarised but they were not
7 having any military exercises. Now, what do you mean
8 by "not completely"? Were people left with pistols,
9 with knives, with cannons? What was that meaning of
10 "not completely"?
11 A. We frequently got information from our
12 patrols and there the OPs that there were armed men in
13 the vicinity of our patrols and in the vicinity of our
14 OPs. So that means I can say it was not demilitarised
15 because there were armed men inside the enclave, which
16 is not the same as there are regular parts of armed
18 JUDGE RIAD: I mean, the people were armed
19 but not armed fighting units?
20 A. No, just individuals with arms. When we
21 discovered these kinds of men, we tried to disarm them.
22 JUDGE RIAD: And did you?
23 A. We did it several times and stocked the
24 weapons, after that, in the weapons collection point.
25 JUDGE RIAD: So the enclave became
2 A. Yes. It became demilitarised more and more.
3 But at the end, of course, we saw that there was so
4 many weapons among the people that we had to conclude,
5 after six months, that we have not been able to find
6 and collect all the weapons.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Now, when you were speaking
8 about the buses, where men were separated from women
9 and put into -- you mentioned three buses in particular
10 to be sent to Bratunac. People on these buses, were
11 they apparently fighting men or men -- just simple
12 citizens and civilians of all ages?
13 A. They were men from all ages. As I told you,
14 in the crowd of refugees, most of the men who were
15 there were elderly men or boys up to, I think, 17 years
16 old. Most of men between 17 and 50, 60 years were not
17 there. Some of them were there. They were separated
18 just because they were men and not because they were
19 able to recognise them as soldiers. They just wore
20 civilian clothes, and they had to go to the White House
21 to check the names by the BSA and see if they were
22 recognised as soldiers who fought in the war before.
23 JUDGE RIAD: Was there any procedure to make
24 sure that they were soldiers or not?
25 A. No. The only information we had, and then
1 that's what I got confirmed by the UNMO who was in the
2 White House, that men had to give their names. And I
3 don't know in what way they were checked if they were
4 soldiers before or no.
5 JUDGE RIAD: Did they have any military
6 clothes on?
7 A. No. They just wore civilian clothes.
8 JUDGE RIAD: You said they were accompanied
9 to Bratunac and then your people were not allowed to
11 A. Yes.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Did you have any information as
13 to what happened after the people left them?
14 A. No. All the buses disappeared from our view
15 in the direction of Bratunac. Those three buses were
16 accompanied by a UN vehicle. After that vehicle was
17 stopped, we don't know where the buses went and what
18 happened further on with the men in the buses.
19 JUDGE RIAD: You had no echoes, no people
20 came back from these buses?
21 A. No. Only our own soldiers returned and the
22 buses disappeared. I don't know if they disappeared in
23 Bratunac or the same way as the first convoy on their
24 way to Kladanj, because that was also possible.
25 JUDGE RIAD: Did you inquire after that where
1 they went or ask for information?
2 A. Of course we asked for information. We asked
3 several times for information. That was one of our
4 biggest concerns, because we were not allowed to escort
5 all the transports, but we never got an answer on
7 JUDGE RIAD: You also mentioned something and
8 the transcript gave two contradictory answers when you
9 were asked by the Defence counsel if it was a Muslim
10 soldier or civilian who killed, I think, the soldier
11 van Rensen. I think first you said it was a civilian
12 and then it appeared on the transcript that it was not
13 a civilian, it was a soldier. Could you then tell me
14 which one is the right thing? Was he a civilian or a
16 A. I think he was a civilian. He was a farmer
17 living in the vicinity of the road over there and
18 living in a house near the dirt road and the main
20 JUDGE RIAD: Well, I hope the transcript will
21 be corrected then. Could you tell us something about
22 how it happened?
23 A. No. I just got --
24 JUDGE RIAD: Was there any animosity between
25 the people and between him?
1 A. No.
2 JUDGE RIAD: Or between the troops, your
4 A. Our troops had to leave the OP and went with
5 the APC to the road. At that moment, the Muslim
6 population tried to make a blockade on the dirt road to
7 stop the APC, and that's what I mean with freedom of
8 movement. They frequently stopped us because they told
9 us, "You have to go forward. Our enemy and your enemy
10 is in front of you and not backwards." So that was the
11 reason why they tried to stop.
12 I know that they just drove on through the
13 blockade the Muslim people made there, and I'm not sure
14 if it was a shot from a gun or a hand grenade who
15 killed our soldier.
16 JUDGE RIAD: And just the last question:
17 When Defence counsel asked you about the meeting at
18 Bratunac in the Fontana Hotel on July 11th at 10.00
19 p.m., I think, you said that General Krstic was
20 announced as the representative of the Drina Corps.
21 Was he having any, in that meeting, any important
22 contribution in a speech or in a plan or anything?
23 A. No. He was just sitting beside
24 General Mladic and did not say anything.
25 JUDGE RIAD: I mean, did Mladic refer to him
1 as being responsible of any action?
2 A. No, nothing. He was not specifically
3 mentioned by General Mladic. He just was there, as
4 well as a lot of other people were there, and just was
5 sitting there and doing nothing.
6 JUDGE RIAD: But he was announced, you said,
7 as the representative of the Drina Corps?
8 A. That's correct.
9 JUDGE RIAD: The only representative or the
10 top representative?
11 A. Just as a representative of the Drina Corps.
12 That's what I can find in my notes.
13 JUDGE RIAD: Were there other representatives
14 for the Drina Corps?
15 A. Yes, there were, because Major Nikolic was
16 there and Kosoric was there, what I can see in my
17 notes, so ...
18 JUDGE RIAD: How was the hierarchy?
19 A. What do you mean by --
20 JUDGE RIAD: In the representatives of the
21 Drina Corps. Who was the most important?
22 A. At that moment I did not know the rank of
23 General Krstic. The only one I knew was a Major, was
24 Nikolic, but concerning to the fact that Krstic was
25 sitting beside Mladic he might have been a higher rank,
1 but it he was not announced as a Colonel or a General
2 or anything else.
3 JUDGE RIAD: General Krstic?
4 A. Yes.
5 JUDGE RIAD: He was not announced as a
6 General? He was or he was not at that time?
7 A. He was not announced as a General. He was
8 just announced as --
9 JUDGE RIAD: Was he a General, in your
10 knowledge, or was he a civilian?
11 A. No. He was in a uniform, and I did not know
12 if he was a General or not.
13 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Judge Wald.
15 JUDGE WALD: Witness B, do you have an
16 estimate of how many men were in the Potocari compound
17 before the evacuations began, before anybody was put on
18 buses? You mentioned at one point that later on they
19 got a list of the men, I think in the White House, and
20 it was only 239 but not everybody wanted to go on the
21 list, but do you have some estimate of how many men
22 were in the large assembly before the evacuations
24 A. I'm not for sure but I think it's a maximum
25 of 300 inside the compound. Of course, there were
1 outside the compound also a lot of men, but in total I
2 think that men between, and I have to guess, 17 and 70,
3 about of 600.
4 JUDGE WALD: Okay. During the meetings in
5 the Hotel Fontana that you were present at and
6 General Mladic was there, when General Mladic and
7 Colonel Karremans discussed possible evacuation of the
8 refugees from Potocari, was any distinction made in
9 those discussions between men, women, and children?
10 Was any reference made to the fact that, well, the
11 women and children might be let go but the men might
12 have to be screened or some made prisoners of war
13 exchange, et cetera?
14 A. No. The only thing what was mentioned was
15 that first the wounded, after that elderly people, and
16 then the rest, but not that men should be separated or
17 asked if they were military age or not. That we
18 discovered the next day, the 11th.
19 JUDGE WALD: Right. Was any mention made in
20 those meetings at all of the men that had gone off with
21 the column that was going off by itself in the
22 direction of Tuzla? Was that the subject of any
23 discussion in the meetings with Mladic that you were
24 present at?
25 A. No. The only thing was that Mladic asked us
1 to get in contact with the Muslim army to tell them to
2 surrender and to hand over their weapons, and that was
3 the only thing what was mentioned besides what I told
4 you. I think it was the 11th or the 12th that Mladic
5 told me that fights were going on and lots of Muslims
6 and Serbs soldiers were killed in the north-western
8 JUDGE WALD: You mentioned at, I think, the
9 second meeting at the Fontana, that General Mladic said
10 that he needed to talk to some of the representatives
11 of the Muslim civilians and, if possible, the military,
12 because the population -- I think this is right -- had
13 to choose where to go. What did you understand that to
14 mean, that the population could decide to stay in
15 Potocari or they could decide where they wanted to be
16 delivered or what was your understanding of what he
17 meant when he said they had to choose where to go?
18 A. I think he meant that people were free to
19 choose. That's what he told.
20 JUDGE WALD: To choose between what?
21 A. To choose between stay in the enclave, stay
22 in Srebrenica or leave the enclave. And after that
23 leaving, they could choose in several directions. At
24 the end, of course, we saw that there was no choice.
25 JUDGE WALD: There was no choice.
1 A. Nobody would like to stay, because they were
2 so anxious and there was so many fights going on from
3 the 9th and the 10th that nobody wanted to stay. They
4 just wanted to find a new safe haven to go to. And
5 they had no choice to choose another direction because
6 there was only one thing, get into the bus or the truck
7 like cattle and be brought to Kladanj.
8 JUDGE WALD: My last question is: You
9 mentioned that, I think it was Colonel Karremans, who
10 said because the UN escorts had not been allowed to go
11 along with all the buses past Bratunac, that five
12 checkpoints would be set up, which would then report, I
13 guess, whether or not they saw the buses go by. Do you
14 know of any foul-up on that, whether or not there were
15 any subsequent reports back from those checkpoints
16 about the buses?
17 A. Yes. We were allowed to go and escort the
18 convoys. The problem was that when we escorted
19 convoys, irregular troops, as it seemed, stole our
20 vehicles. And when we complained to General Mladic
21 that, in our view, BSA soldiers stole our vehicles, he
22 told us that those were not irregular troops who did
23 it, and he had nothing to say about that.
24 After that we made those four checkpoints --
25 not five, but four, I think -- and in my view they
1 reported, but I don't have any notes about that.
2 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness B,
4 I have three questions. My first question: At the
5 meeting held at the Fontana Hotel, where you said
6 General Krstic was present as a representative of the
7 Drina Corps, did you see anything, did you notice
8 anything that by which you could say that he did indeed
9 belong to the Drina Corps; that is, did he have any
10 flashes, any insignia? Did you have any outside signs
11 which could confirm -- by which you could conclude and
12 be certain in your mind that he did indeed belong to
13 the Drina Corps?
14 A. I was not certain about it, but he sore on
15 his breast the same gold-looking thing as General
16 Zivanovic wore. That was my only reference that it
17 might be a representative of the Drina Corps. That's
18 all. And I think it was his rank.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In other
20 words, any identification signs, apart from the uniform
21 and apart from that insignia, they were identical with
22 those that General Mladic had, were they, the uniform
23 and the flash or symbol?
24 A. I am not for sure if the uniform was the same
25 as General Mladic, because they had light and dark
1 uniforms. I can't say if it was the same. I'm not
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Sorry.
4 Excuse me. But I'm not speaking about General Mladic;
5 I'm talking about General Zivanovic.
6 A. I think he wore the same uniform as General
7 Zivanovic, and I think that the gold medal on his
8 breast was the same as those from General Zivanovic.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My second
10 question, Witness B, is as follows: You mentioned
11 that, I believe, on the 12th of July a UN vehicle was
12 stopped while escorting the buses. Could you tell us
13 who was it that intercepted, that stopped that UN
15 A. The only information I had was that
16 Lieutenant Versteeg was escorting the buses, that he
17 was stopped by BSA soldiers in Bratunac, and that's all
18 I can say about it. I have not seen the complete
19 report in the OPs room.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but it
21 was the soldiers of the Serb army which stopped the
22 vehicle; it was the military of the Serb army, weren't
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
1 I move on to my third question, which has to do also
2 with the question that Judge Riad has already asked of
4 You spoke about the demilitarisation of
5 Srebrenica. Do you have any knowledge -- do you know
6 what is the difference between the demilitarisation and
7 militarisation before it was pronounced a safe haven, a
8 protected zone, and after it was pronounced a protected
9 area? What was the situation before it was pronounced
10 a protected area and after it was pronounced a
11 protected area? What is the difference with regard to
12 the demilitarisation? Do you know what was the
13 situation before and after this proclamation as a
14 protected area?
15 A. The only information I've got, of course, is
16 from our predecessors, that when they came to the
17 enclave, the Canadians were already inside the enclave
18 and started to demilitarise the Muslims inside the
19 enclave. They already gathered a lot of heavy
20 equipment, mortars, heavy machine-guns on wheels, the
21 two tanks, which were stocked in the weapon collection
22 point, and the demilitarisation went on with the 1st
23 and the 2nd Battalion and also with our 3rd Battalion,
24 collecting the weapons and putting them in the weapon
25 collection point. That's the only thing I can tell you
1 about the demilitarisation, because most of the heavy
2 weapons the Muslims had after the war were already
3 collected in the weapon collection point.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,
5 Witness B. I have no more questions. I should also
6 like to thank my colleagues for questions they asked
7 you. The International Criminal Tribunal wishes to
8 thank you for coming here to testify. I know that you
9 had some hard experience at the time, but we hope that
10 you are recovered now in the calm of your beautiful
11 country. Thank you very much for testifying. You are
12 free to go.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
15 Mr. McCloskey do we have another witness? I believe
16 now we have worked for one hour. Perhaps we could make
17 a short break now before we begin, because if we do
18 begin, then we shall have to make a break straight
19 away, so perhaps it would be better to make a break
20 now. What do you think, Mr. McCloskey?
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour. This other
22 witness is not protected, so we'll take the time to
23 open up the courtroom and get prepared. I do have just
24 a few exhibits to offer into evidence. I can do that
25 now or later.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
2 So if there are some exhibits which need to be adduced,
3 perhaps it would be better to do it now rather than
4 when the other witness is coming in. So in this way we
5 shall not have to make any interruptions; we shall be
6 able to work straight on. So yes, please.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: First, I would like to offer
8 the tape of meeting 1, Exhibit 39; and secondly, the
9 transcript of that tape, Exhibit 39A; and then also the
10 three photographs identified by the witness: 28/4,
11 28/5 and 28/13. And that is all.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
13 Mr. Petrusic, do you have any objections to raise?
14 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No, Your
16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
17 Then these exhibits are admitted. And now we shall
18 make a break, and it will be a 15-minute break, to save
19 some time. So 15 minutes.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.
22 [Open session]
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I can see
24 that Mr. Cayley is about to take the floor.
25 MR. CAYLEY: I'm getting no sound at all, so
1 I will change headsets. I think that's fine. My
2 apology for that.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is it okay
5 MR. CAYLEY: It's perfect. Thank you,
6 Mr. President. With your permission, if I could call
7 the Prosecutor's next witness, which is Mr. Nesib
9 [The witness entered court]
10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could the
11 usher please help the witness with the headphones.
12 Can you hear me, Mr. Mandzic?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You're now
15 going to read the solemn declaration, please.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I, Nesib
17 Mandzic, solemnly declare that I will speak the truth,
18 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 WITNESS: NESIB MANDZIC
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You may sit
22 down, Mr. Mandzic. Thank you. Are you comfortable,
23 Mr. Mandzic?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I have
25 translation into Bosnian, please.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But you
2 understand French; is that the case?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could the
5 usher please check the channel.
6 Can you hear me in your language now?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I
8 understand now.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,
10 then. Thank you very much for coming here,
11 Mr. Mandzic. First of all, you are going to answer
12 questions put to you by Mr. Cayley, who is representing
13 the Prosecution.
14 Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Examined by Mr. Cayley:
17 Q. Now, Mr. Mandzic, I think you were born on
18 the 12th of November, 1962; is that correct?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. And I think by profession you're a
21 schoolmaster; is that correct?
22 A. Well, by profession I'm an electrical
23 engineer, but prior to the war I used to work in a
24 secondary school as a teacher in Srebrenica, and also
25 during the war I stayed in the same school, the
1 secondary school in Srebrenica, for a year and a half.
2 Q. And I think at the time of the events with
3 which this court is interested, in July of 1995, you
4 were the head teacher at that school in Srebrenica.
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Until January of 1993 you were a member of
7 the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And in January of 1993 I think you left the
11 Territorial Defence.
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. And you are a Muslim by faith?
14 A. Yes. I'm a Bosniak by nationality.
15 Q. Yes. What is your present position within
16 the municipal government in Srebrenica?
17 A. At present I'm the president of the
18 Srebrenica municipality. After the legal -- in
19 accordance with the results of the legal elections that
20 took place in 1997.
21 Q. I want to now take you back to July of 1995,
22 and it's important, as we've already discussed, that
23 you, in response to my questions, you tell the Judges
24 exactly what you heard and saw at the time, how you
25 felt about things, and your perceptions about the
1 feelings about the population in Srebrenica while these
2 events in July of 1995 were taking place. Let us go to
3 the 8th of July, 1995. Where were you on that day?
4 A. On that day, the 8th of July, 1995, I was in
5 Srebrenica, in the central area of the town, in the
6 Petrica Street. This is actually where I lived as a
7 refugee for more than three years.
8 Q. Now, on that day, can you tell the Judges
9 what you saw taking place?
10 A. On the 8th of July, 1995, late in the
11 afternoon I saw columns of people, columns of refugees
12 who had fled a temporary settlement, a temporary
13 shelter that was conducted by the Swedish government in
14 the place called Slapovici. The place was attacked by
15 the artillery of the Serb forces as well as the
16 infantry, and was exposed to an aggression by foot
17 soldiers who entered the said village. They started,
18 according to what those people had said, they started
19 burning down the houses, that is, the temporary shelter
20 that they were using at the time.
21 So on that day in the afternoon, in the
22 street where I used to live, I saw thousands of
23 displaced people who were terrified. There were quite
24 a few elderly people, very weak people, lots of women
25 with small children who were crying. They were in a
1 state of shock. They were looking for some kind of
2 accommodation, some food, clothes, and so on, but that
3 could not be found in Srebrenica in those days, nor
4 could it be found before that, in the previous months.
5 I have to stress that on that day, although a
6 number of columns of refugees were pouring in, the
7 artillery fire of the Serb army never stopped. Shells
8 were falling in the town area, including the places
9 where the refugees were staying, looking for some
10 accommodation that could not be provided.
11 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
12 Exhibit 4A, Mr. Dubuisson.
13 Q. These individuals, Mr. Mandzic, were they
14 residents originally from the area where the Swedish
15 Housing Project was located or were they from other
16 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Mr. Mandzic, if you could
17 answer that question first.
18 A. Yes. These people were mostly refugees,
19 displaced persons who, due to aggressive actions of the
20 Serb army, had been expelled from their homes in 1992
21 and 1993. By a decision of a Swedish government in
22 1993, some kind of temporary accommodation, a camp, was
23 built for that particular group of refugees.
24 They had come from a number of
25 municipalities, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica, and so
1 on. However, the majority of the people who were
2 temporarily accommodated in that housing project were
3 from the area of the Srebrenica municipality, from the
4 inhabited areas that were exposed to the actions of the
5 Serb army units.
6 As a result of those operations, the
7 population was expelled. A number of people had also
8 died in those operations but quite a few of them,
9 therefore, found themselves in Srebrenica.
10 At the beginning of 1993, they were all
11 staying in this shelter project in the village of
13 Q. Could you point to the village of Slapovici
14 on the map in front of you?
15 A. Here it is in the upper left corner
17 MR. CAYLEY: Could the exhibit be moved up.
18 I see. And let the record show that the witness is
19 pointing to the bottom left-hand square where it says
20 Slapovici. That is Exhibit 4A.
21 Q. Thank you very much indeed. Let's now move,
22 Mr. Mandzic, to the 9th of the July. First of all,
23 could you look at the map that is behind you, and if
24 you could point to your location on the 9th of July in
25 Srebrenica. Just an approximation would be fine, so
1 the Judges can orient themselves as to where you were
2 on that day.
3 A. Yes. What I'm showing here [indicates] is
4 the town area of Srebrenica.
5 Q. Let the record show that the witness is
6 pointing to an area just below and to the right of
7 where it says "UN Bravo Company" on Prosecutor's
8 Exhibit 1E, and in particular where there is a very
9 sharp, hairpin bend in the road going into Srebrenica.
10 A. Yes. So this is the road leading up to
11 Bratunac, and it goes further down to Potocari,
12 Srebrenica, Zeleni Jadar, south-east, leading up to my
13 birthplace, the village of Skelani.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mandzic. Could you tell the
15 Judges what you saw taking place from your advantage
16 place on the 9th of July, 1995?
17 A. Aggressive activities of the Serb army
18 continued on the following date, that is, the 9th of
19 July, 1995. The military forces of the Serb army
20 entered the areas inhabited by the people I mentioned.
21 They started setting their houses on fire. As a result
22 of that, the population was forced to flee so as not to
23 end up in the hand of the soldiers of the aggressor.
24 The offensive of the Army of the Republika
25 Srpska continued and moved further to the town area of
2 On the following day, on the 9th of July,
3 units of the Army of the Republika Srpska continued
4 with their offensive and entered a number of Bosniak
5 villages such as Pusmulici, for example, Bajramovici.
6 These villages are situated less than a one-hour walk
7 from the centre of town.
8 This again complicated the humanitarian
9 situation in the town itself. All of these people
10 needed some kind of accommodation. They needed food,
11 medicines, all of which was impossible to obtain.
12 I personally was convinced, as well as the
13 majority of the population, that due to the fact that
14 Srebrenica had been declared by the United Nations a
15 safe area, that such aggressive acts and offensives of
16 the Republika Srpska army would be stopped and that the
17 humanitarian catastrophe would be prevented. What we
18 feared most was a massacre of the civilian population
19 and we hoped that this would be prevented.
20 Unfortunately, the acts of the Army of the Republika
21 Srpska continued, and in the late afternoon of the
22 9th of July, the situation was the same.
23 On the next day, the 10th of July, in the
24 evening, units of the Republika Srpska army approached
25 the town area from the south and south-east side.
1 May I show this on the map, please? This
2 would be the area in question [indicated], the area
3 south-east and south of the town. They came very close
4 to the town itself.
5 Q. [Previous translation continue] ...
6 Mr. Mandzic. Could you please demonstrate again where
7 the VRS was on the 10th of July, on that exhibit?
8 A. Yes, I can show you that. This grey line
9 here [indicated] marks, I believe, the area in
10 question, that is, the boundaries of the safe area.
11 Approximately one or two kilometres away from that,
12 depending on the features of the terrain, prior to the
13 6th of July, units of the Dutch Battalion had been
14 stationed. They were there as part of UNPROFOR
16 The offensive of the VRS was such that those
17 points had to be moved further on. The Dutch troops
18 had to withdraw. You know very well what the reasons
19 for that were. The Serb forces continued along this
20 line, and on the 10th of July, they reached the first
21 street of the town, the Petrica Street. This is the
22 south-east part of the town. They also came from the
23 direction of the village of Slapovici, from the south
24 side of the town. The VRS army entered the village of
25 Slapovici on the 11th of July. So the VRS practically
1 captured the town from the southern part of the area,
2 and they forced the population to flee.
3 Q. Mr. Mandzic, just again don't say anything,
4 allow me to speak, because I need to indicate in the
5 record where you're pointing to on the exhibit.
6 On the 10th of July, could you point on
7 Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E where the location of the VRS
8 is in Srebrenica?
9 A. These are the -- this is where the units
10 were, and this is the area of Zeleni Jadar
12 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the
13 witness again is pointing to the area just to the right
14 of where it says "UN Bravo Company" within the area
15 marked as the UN enclave at the point in the road where
16 there is a hairpin bend.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Mandzic, I'd like to show you some
18 footage, a very short clip.
19 MR. CAYLEY: If the video booth could show
20 Prosecutor's Exhibit 3, the section from -- I think
21 it's 10 seconds in to 31 seconds.
22 Q. Say nothing, Mr. Mandzic, while the video is
23 playing, and then I'll ask you some questions after
24 you've seen that video footage. Thank you.
25 MR. CAYLEY: I apologise for the delay,
1 Mr. President.
2 Q. Mr. Mandzic, if you watch the screen in front
3 of you.
4 [Videotape played]
5 MR. CAYLEY: That's fine. Thank you. We can
6 stop now.
7 Q. Mr. Mandzic, did you witness those events?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. Could you explain to the Judges what you saw
10 and heard on the 10th of July where that event was
11 taking place and what the feelings of the population
12 were at the time?
13 A. Yes, I can do that. The video that we just
14 saw was taken on the 10th of July, 1995. As we can
15 see, there were thousands of residents of Srebrenica
16 there. They were all terrified at that time because,
17 as I have already told you, late in the afternoon of
18 that day, the VRS had already entered the first street
19 of the town from the south-east.
20 What I saw there was thousands of terrified
21 people who felt helpless. They were asking for help.
22 They turned to the military representatives of the
23 United Nations, that is, to the Dutch soldiers who were
24 there. They were asking for protection, but they
25 didn't get any answer, any response in terms of
2 On that night, approximately 40.000 people in
3 Srebrenica could have no sleep at all. I couldn't
4 sleep either, of course.
5 Q. Mr. Mandzic, could you just indicate on the
6 map behind you the location of that large group of
7 people that we've just seen on the video?
8 A. Yes. This gathering took place in front of
9 the compound of the Vezionica factory in Srebrenica,
10 and it is marked on the map here [indicated]. It's
11 this area that I'm pointing now [indicated].
12 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the
13 witness is pointing to the blue square marked "UN Bravo
14 Company" within the Srebrenica enclave on Prosecutor's
15 Exhibit 1E.
16 Q. Mr. Mandzic, let's move ahead in time to the
17 11th of July, 1995. You were still in the town of
18 Srebrenica. Can you tell the Judges what you saw and
19 heard on that day?
20 A. If we are talking about the urban area of
21 Srebrenica, from that area more than half of the
22 population had been expelled, forced out due to the
23 military activities of the VRS, who, as early as the
24 10th of July, started setting Bosniak houses on fire in
25 the Petrica Street. They were still firing from
1 infantry weapons and so on.
2 On the 11th of July, after 11.00 a.m., the
3 situation got further complicated, because the VRS
4 opened fire from their artillery, targeting the
5 population itself and opening fire on the area where
6 the population had gathered on the 10th of July, late
7 in the afternoon.
8 I was very close to the area, some 70 metres
9 as the crow flies, on the other side of the street. I
10 was standing next to a building, and I could hear very
11 well the sound of shells, artillery shells coming in.
12 Immediately after that, I would actually see the shell
13 fall on the group of between 5.000 and 10.000 refugees
14 who were staying there, expecting some kind of response
15 from the UNPROFOR forces. They somehow felt safer in
16 the vicinity of UNPROFOR.
17 Immediately after this shell had fallen, I
18 happened to see a terrible scene. I saw a column of
19 smoke rising from the spot where the people had
20 gathered. I heard screams, moans. There were some
21 wounded people there.
22 Q. On that day, I think there was an expectation
23 that there would be airstrikes. How did the population
24 in and around the UN Bravo Company react to these
1 A. Yes. It is true that we expected the NATO
2 air force to prevent the capture of the enclave and the
3 exodus of the population. Until 11.00 a.m. those were
4 some unreliable pieces of information that people
5 accepted in those situations, as a drowning man is
6 looking for a straw to hold on to to save himself. So
7 on that day for us, the only possibility, the only way
8 out was for this type of action. Only in this way
9 could the VRS be stopped.
10 In the afternoon of the 11th of July, I could
11 see, as far as I can remember, two aeroplanes in the
12 skies above Srebrenica, which did drop several bombs
13 on, I believe, Serbian artillery positions. And as far
14 as I can remember the area in question was south-east.
15 It was here [indicates], but it's not indicated on the
17 There is a feature there called Kvarc, and I
18 believe that that was the area where a radio
19 transmitter was stationed. My feeling is that this
20 was -- this area was the target of the NATO Air
21 Force. At any rate, this was close to the boundary of
22 the safe area.
23 Q. Let's move on in time, Mr. Mandzic. The
24 population started to move towards Potocari. Can you
25 tell the Judges when that happened and why it happened?
1 A. The population was forced to move. This
2 happened on the 11th of July, around 4.00 p.m. The
3 residents of the town started to move towards
4 Potocari. They were actually forced to leave the last
5 part of the safe area, because the VRS had continued
6 with its offensive activities. So the population was
7 actually being pushed from the area. They couldn't go
8 back. They couldn't go back to the enclave itself,
9 because everybody could see Bosniak houses on fire at
10 that time. So in view of the situation, in view of the
11 fear and feeling of helplessness, residents started to
12 move towards Potocari, which was the last safe haven in
13 the area, that is, the command of the Dutch battalion.
14 Q. Mr. Mandzic, are you aware as to whether or
15 not any senior member of the population, or members of
16 the population, took a decision that the population
17 would move to Potocari from Srebrenica?
18 A. It was no higher representative who would be
19 inviting people to head for Potocari. It was all
20 civilian population and they all thought about
21 Potocari. The majority of the civilians thought about
22 Potocari, because the major part of the enclave had
23 already been physically taken by the troops of the VRS
24 and there was nowhere else to go. We could only
25 withdraw by a couple of kilometres further on towards
1 the Dutch compound at Potocari.
2 So the passage of the civilian population
3 through the area, even those areas that were inhabited
4 by Bosniaks before the war, but they had been taken by
5 the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, so it was
6 impossible to go through those places. Both the Serb
7 artillery and infantry fire were targeting the
8 population directly, and it seemed that their objective
9 was to kill as many civilians as possible, to sow as
10 much panic, to sow as much chaos amongst them.
11 And I can also corroborate by saying the
12 following: On the 11th of July, I happened to be in
13 the column of the civilian population on the road to
14 Potocari. At that time the Serb artillery fired at
15 us. From the neighbouring hills we could clearly see
16 that there were -- they could see that there were tens
17 of thousands of refugees who were on their way to
18 Potocari, to the Dutch battalion. But they were so
19 aggressive that they simply opened direct fire on this
20 stream of refugees which was several kilometres long.
21 Q. Mr. Mandzic, try and speak more slowly,
22 because there are interpreters that have got to keep up
23 with you. I know it's difficult to speak about these
24 events, but stay calm, and we'll get through your
25 testimony as quickly as I can.
1 Let's move to the evening of the 11th of
2 July, 1995. Where do you find yourself?
3 A. I found myself at Potocari, or to be more
4 accurate, within the compound of the 11 of March
6 Q. Could you point on the map that's behind you
7 the approximate location of where you were on the
8 evening of the 11th of July?
9 A. Here [indicates].
10 Q. Let the record show that the witness is
11 pointing at Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E, to the
12 red-coloured triangle, just below where it's marked "UN
13 base," within the area marked as the Srebrenica
15 Can you tell the Judges the scene on the
16 evening of the 11th of July in and around the UN
17 compound at Potocari?
18 A. Yes, indeed. The scene was hair-raising.
19 Something about 25.000 of those expellees [Realtime
20 transcript read in error "ex-police"] were crowding in
21 a very small, in a very tight space. They tried to
22 find some accommodation in some ancient factory.
23 Q. Mr. Mandzic, if you could stop there.
24 There's a mistake in the transcript and then you said
25 the scene was hair-raising and then you said,
1 "Something about 25.000 of those..." Twenty-five
2 thousand of whom?
3 A. The expellees, the expelled refugees, Bosniak
4 people who had been expelled from the largest part of
5 the enclave, because only a minor part of the enclave
6 was surviving, and that was Potocari.
7 Q. Please continue with your testimony.
8 A. At that very small space of perhaps less than
9 one kilometre square, there were some 25.000 expelled.
10 Most of them were women with small children, elderly
11 and emaciated people. We were all without food or
12 water or medicines or clothing or footwear,
13 accommodation, or anything. We expected that the
14 International Community would give us protection,
15 fearing the worst from the Bosnian Serb army, and
16 indeed I do remember that 11th of July, sometime around
17 2100, the Bosnian Serb army launched an operation. As
18 far as I can remember, they opened artillery fire at
19 this crowd, this multitude of people forced into that
21 Q. Did you see the artillery firing?
22 A. Well, they fired over my head, over the heads
23 of 25.000 people.
24 Q. Do you know roughly how far away they were,
25 the VRS artillery, when they were firing at this huge
1 multitude of people?
2 A. Some 300 to 500 meters. From different
3 places, so I say it was 300 meters was the closest and
4 500 meters was perhaps the site furthest away.
5 Q. How did the population react to this
6 artillery fire?
7 A. We all tried to find some shelter, but there
8 was none, so we simply threw ourselves down on the
9 asphalt, somewhere in the street, that is, on the road
10 from Potocari to Bratunac, because they couldn't find
11 any shelter whatsoever. So panic again started,
12 screaming, and so --
13 Q. Do you know of any deaths or injuries that
14 were caused by that artillery fire?
15 A. As soon as this artillery fire stopped, the
16 Dutch battalion called me, and so that night I could
17 not really hear if there had been any wounded, because
18 that night, between the 11th and the 12th, I spent in
19 the camp of the Dutch soldiers.
20 Q. And now we very neatly move on to the next
21 part of your testimony. I think at about 9.30 that
22 evening you were called by a representative of the
23 Dutch battalion to act as a representative of the
24 civilian population. Could you tell the Judges about
25 that, please.
1 A. Yes. Sometime around half past 9.00 that
2 evening, between the 11th and the 12th of July, I was
3 asked over the PA system to report to the Dutch
4 battalion command. So I went to the commander of the
5 Dutch battalion. I did not know him before that, nor
6 did I know any of their officers, except Major Boering,
7 who used to come to the secondary school.
8 So after I was introduced to the commander of
9 the Dutch battalion and his officers, the Dutch
10 battalion commander, showing major concern, major
11 anxiety, and sounding very pessimistic, said that, as
12 he saw the situation, the Dutch soldiers, and he as a
13 commander, could do very little at that particular
14 point in time to help all those population who had
15 gathered force in Potocari; and also, as the commander
16 said, the situation was also highly unfavourable for
17 Dutch soldiers as well.
18 According to the commander of the Dutch
19 battalion, the only way out would be the negotiations
20 with the army of the Republika Srpska, and as far as I
21 can recall, that the army of the Republika Srpska was
22 demanding the Dutch officers to incorporate the Bosnian
23 side in the negotiations.
24 I commented, I said that I was not an
25 official representative of the civilian authorities in
1 the municipality of Srebrenica, and I said so to the
2 Dutch commander, and that I therefore had no authority
3 to represent anyone in a situation which was as complex
4 as that one. And the Dutch battalion commander said,
5 "Yes, we do know that, but the situation is very
6 dramatic. So come on behalf of these expelled people,
7 because they, and we, and everybody, needs help."
8 And having been given a promise by the Dutch
9 battalion commander that if I joined the negotiations,
10 that I would be -- that my requests, that my conditions
11 would be supported: that is, to begin with, to stop
12 firing at the civilian population, to resolve the
13 disastrous humanitarian situation; that is, to supply
14 the population with food, water, other arms of hygiene
15 and so on and so forth. And after I was promised that,
16 on the 11th of July, I set off for the negotiations in
18 Q. Mr. Mandzic, before we get to Bratunac, I
19 want to go back to the conversation that you had with
20 the Dutch commander. Did the Dutch commander, Colonel
21 Karremans, state to you what General Mladic had said to
22 him about the refugees in and around Potocari and about
23 his own soldiers that were, in fact, hostages at that
25 A. As far as I can remember, I know that the
1 Dutch battalion commander said that the situation was
2 also highly unpropitious for the Dutch soldiers who
3 were on the UNPROFOR mission in Srebrenica.
4 Q. Did he state to you whether Mladic had said
5 anything about the safety of the civilian population in
6 and around Potocari?
7 A. I don't remember. I do not know really what
8 you have in mind.
9 Q. Let's move on. You then went with the Dutch
10 officers to Bratunac. How did you feel at that time?
11 A. Right below the camp of the Dutch soldiers in
12 Potocari was the checkpoint of the VRS, and it was
13 right there at this first checkpoint that we were
14 stopped. And they asked who was I, I mean the soldiers
15 of the army of the Republika Srpska, and it was all in
16 rather threatening tones. And even as I was on the
17 road, I already was quite fearful. I didn't know what
18 might happen to me. And I was thinking about the worst
19 possible outcome, that I might be arrested and forced
20 to -- I don't know what. But I thought one thing, and
21 one thing only, and that was to try, to try to do my
22 best on behalf of the population which was left
23 completely without any protection, because I could
24 really see that the enclave was being taken and that an
25 area which had been protected by the United Nations was
1 being taken.
2 On the other hand, the United Nations kept
3 silent. And even the mildest type of reaction that
4 they could have done, they could have sent in teams of
5 the International Red Cross at least there, or the
6 UNHCR, to try to mitigate, to allay, to ease this
7 difficult, this horrible situation, especially the
8 humanitarian disaster. And in such good faith, to try
9 to alleviate the suffering of the population, is that I
10 went to Bratunac, but I was really frightened.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, at this point
12 we're going to move into some video evidence, and if
13 it's your wish, we might take a short break at this
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,
16 Mr. Cayley. Very well. We shall then make a break,
17 20-minute break.
18 --- Recess taken at 1.20 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.43 p.m.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,
21 you may continue.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Mr. Mandzic, if we can just reorient the
24 Court where we were. You left the Potocari compound at
25 about 2200 hours on the night of the 11th of July, and
1 you find yourself with members of the Dutch Battalion
2 driving towards Srebrenica?
3 A. Towards Bratunac.
4 Q. My apologies. You're quite correct. Towards
5 Bratunac. What time did you arrive in Bratunac?
6 A. Within approximately ten minutes.
7 Q. Where did you go within Bratunac?
8 A. We went to the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac.
9 Q. And I think it was there that you attended a
10 meeting with members of the VRS and the Bosnian Serb
11 civilian authorities; is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 MR. CAYLEY: At this point, Mr. President,
14 the Office of the Prosecutor would like to play a video
15 of that meeting. That video is a new exhibit. It's
16 Exhibit 4D. My apologies. It's Exhibit 40. It's
17 Exhibit 40. There are three transcripts of that
18 meeting, in English, French, and in B/C/S.
19 I would ask that the interpreters please
20 remain silent during the video, because I think it's
21 important for the Court to get a sense of that meeting
22 and the tone and intonation of the individuals who
23 speak at that meeting. So if you don't mind, Your
24 Honours, following in that transcript. It's an
25 accurate transcript of what was said at that meeting.
1 There are also some external noises that are actually
2 quite important that need to be heard, and they would
3 not be heard if the interpreters were speaking over the
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Okay. We'll do so.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. If
7 the video booth could please play Exhibit 40.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Mandzic, first an obvious
10 question but for the purposes of legal foundation of
11 the video: Is this a video recording of parts of the
12 meeting that happened on the 11th of July, 1995, in the
13 evening at the Hotel Fontana?
14 A. Yes. I think it reflects the essential part
15 of what was being discussed at the meeting.
16 Q. Are there parts of the meeting that are not
17 on that video recording?
18 A. Yes, there are certain parts. For example, a
19 part when General Mladic addressed me in a threatening
20 way, speaking about the genocide committed against the
21 Serbian people. He also referred to the fate of the
22 Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he blamed
23 high-ranking Bosniak politicians for that. He said,
24 General Mladic, "You see, they're unable to help you
25 now, neither Ganic, nor his people."
1 Q. Could you explain to the Judges who Ganic
2 was? Who was Mladic referring to?
3 A. Professor Dr. Ejub Ganic was a member of the
4 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 1992 until
5 1995. It was a collective body, leadership that was in
6 charge of the community as was Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 at that time.
8 Q. Do you recall anything else that
9 General Mladic said at that meeting which is not on
10 that video recording?
11 A. Yes. At several points, General Mladic
12 mentioned the fact that the VRS had completely defeated
13 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was referring
14 to the areas around Tuzla or Sarajevo. I'm not sure.
15 He wasn't very explicit.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, we've taken a
17 number of stills off the video which I'd like to show
18 the witness because that's the easiest way of having
19 him identify various individuals, rather than go back
20 through the video which will be a very lengthy
21 process. So we if we would make available, please,
22 Prosecutor's Exhibits 41 to 46 and also 48, please, to
23 the witness.
24 A. May I add something, please?
25 MR. CAYLEY:
1 Q. Of course you can, Mr. Mandzic.
2 A. According to my recollection from that first
3 meeting, most of the people present were high-ranking
4 officers of the VRS, and I did not notice
5 representatives of the civilian government.
6 Q. You're now referring to the meeting on the
7 11th of July?
8 A. Yes, I am. Yes, the first meeting.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If the Exhibit 41 could be
10 placed on the ELMO, please. We'll do this very
12 Q. This is Exhibit 41. Can you identify this
13 individual, please, Mr. Mandzic?
14 A. Yes. This is the commander of the Dutch
16 Q. What was his name?
17 A. Karremans. I don't know whether my
18 pronunciation is correct, and I don't know whether this
19 is his last name or first name.
20 Q. That is just fine, Mr. Mandzic. Exhibit 42.
21 Who is this individual, Mr. Mandzic?
22 A. The individual here is Petar, the
23 interpreter. Today he's working as an interpreter for
24 the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of
25 Zvornik, and you can often see him in Bratunac and
1 Srebrenica. He's working for the IPTF mission there.
2 MR. CAYLEY: The witness can be shown
3 Exhibit 43.
4 Q. Do you recognise this gentleman?
5 A. Yes, I do. This is an officer of the VRS.
6 As far as I can remember, he was the one who mentioned
7 the towns of Vlasenica, Rogatica, and Han Pijesak, and
8 this is how I concluded that he must have been from
9 that area or that the area in question was his zone of
11 Q. Do you recall where he was sitting during
12 this meeting?
13 A. He was sitting next to General Mladic.
14 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
15 the next exhibit.
16 Q. This is Exhibit 44. Can you identify that
17 individual in that photograph?
18 A. General of the VRS, the Commander of the VRS,
19 General Mladic, Ratko Mladic, whom in those days, from
20 the 11th until the 21st of July, I saw four times.
21 Q. If the witness could now be shown Exhibit
22 45. Do you recognise this individual?
23 A. Yes, I do. General Krstic, who is sitting
24 here on my left. On the 11th of July, General Krstic
25 was introduced by his commander, General Ratko Mladic.
1 He also introduced other officers from his command.
2 Q. Can you please identify. You said that
3 General Krstic is sitting here on my left. Could you
4 point across to the person that you recognise as
5 General Krstic in this courtroom.
6 A. Yes. He's sitting on my left. He's wearing
7 a blue shirt and a tie [indicates].
8 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show,
9 Mr. President that the witness has identified the
10 accused, General Krstic.
11 Q. And where was General Krstic sitting at this
12 meeting on the 11th of July?
13 A. Next to General Mladic. As far as I can
14 remember, he was sitting on his right-hand side. There
15 was another meeting where he also sat next to General
17 Q. Now, when you say, Mr. Mandzic, that he was
18 sitting on General Mladic's right-hand side, you are
19 saying that as if you were General Mladic, from General
20 Mladic's perspective?
21 A. If I understand you correctly, and according
22 to my recollection, at the table where we were sitting
23 in the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac, General Krstic was
24 sitting on General Mladic's right-hand side.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 A. Am I any closer in my description now?
2 Q. That's fine, and I think the video was very
4 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be
5 shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 46.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Mandzic, what is this object which I
7 think is in fact in front of you on the video?
8 A. This is a board carrying the inscription,
9 first of all, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina; underneath, Municipal Assembly of
11 Srebrenica; and at the bottom, in the last line,
12 Srebrenica. As I have said, this was on the municipal
13 building, on the town hall, and it marked the centre of
14 the municipal administration. And General Mladic
15 showed me this inscription and he asked me whether I
16 could recognise it, and I said, "Yes, I do recognise
18 Q. This broken sign that was placed before you,
19 at the time what significance did you feel that it had
20 that it was placed in front of you?
21 A. It was a clear message that the enclave had
22 been taken, that is, that the protected area had been
23 taken; a clear message that the civilian population
24 which had lived there could no longer stay there; a
25 clear message that in the days to come, the operations
1 of the VRS would target other enclaves; that is, first
2 of all, most of the population in those enclaves, such
3 as Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo. And it was also a
4 clear message that that could well be the end of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the order it represented. And
6 that after that, the army of the Republika Srpska would
7 make it possible to create a mono-ethnic state product
8 without the participation of the other two constituent
9 ethnicities, Croats and Bosniaks.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mandzic. On the video, on the
11 soundtrack of the video, near the beginning, there were
12 some screams that were heard. Can you tell the Judges
13 what those screams were and how you interpreted that at
14 the time of this meeting?
15 A. Yes. One could hear a pig screaming, or
16 rather that night, or at that moment, I thought that
17 perhaps some Serb soldiers were celebrating the taking
18 over of the protected area and the expulsion of
19 Bosniaks. And to be quite honest, that was the first
20 thing that I thought of. I did not attribute any
21 particular significance to the slaughter of that pig or
22 the festivity. But after all these years, I still
23 remember those screams. It was a message that the same
24 procedure would be applied, the same method, to also
25 bleed the Bosniaks, the Muslim Bosniaks.
1 Q. Very briefly, Mr. Mandzic, can you tell the
2 Judges the atmosphere at that meeting, how you felt in
3 front of General Krstic, General Mladic, these VRS
5 A. Very afraid, very ashamed, defenceless,
6 especially when I noticed that the commander of the
7 Dutch battalion could not properly voice, articulate
8 the needs of the expelled population, civilian
9 population. And also when General Mladic interrupted
10 me when I requested -- when I asked General Mladic and
11 the commander of the Dutch battalion whether all the
12 needs of the civilian population and the status of the
13 enclave had been reported to the civilian and military
14 structures of the International Community. And when
15 General Mladic cut me short and would not allow me to
16 continue speaking about that need, his tone was
17 threatening, he focused his eyes at me, he stared at
18 me. I think he wanted to frighten me. And he
19 frequently used the word that the fate of my people,
20 the people that I originated from, was in my hands.
21 Q. Briefly, Mr. Mandzic, I just want to address
22 with you some of the language that was used by General
23 Mladic at the meeting, and this is on page 8 of the
24 English transcript, line 3, when Mladic states:
25 "I need to have a clear position of the
1 representatives of your people on whether you want to
2 survive, stay, or disappear, and I am prepared to
3 receive a delegation tomorrow of responsible people
4 from the Muslim side here, at 1000 hours, with whom I
5 can discuss the salvation of your people from the
6 enclave, the former enclave of Srebrenica."
7 How did you interpret this when you heard
9 A. Major anguish, scared, really scared. I
10 really was very concerned what would happen to those
11 several dozen thousand of refugees, because General
12 Mladic repeatedly said "vanish or survive." And he
13 also used the word "the former enclave." And I
14 responded that same moment, because indeed the army of
15 the Republika Srpska, or rather the command of the VRS,
16 had decided to deport the Bosniak population by hook or
17 by crook. And that word, "to survive or to vanish," it
18 really frightened me, because he seemed to be
19 announcing already some steps, some measures which had
20 little to do with civilisation or with humanity.
21 Q. Do you recall him saying to you, "Do you
22 understand me, Nesib? The future of your people is in
23 your hands"?
24 A. Yes, yes, yes. Yes, I remember that. I do
25 indeed. I do not know what General Mladic wanted from
1 me. He wanted to demonstrate the force of his own, of
2 the power of his army on a civilian, saying that I
3 would be representing 30.000 other people. But yes,
4 indeed, during that meeting and during that night, from
5 what I heard from General Mladic, I was very
6 pessimistic as to the positive, as to the favourable
7 outcome for those 30.000 expelled.
8 Q. And I think he finally said to you, when you
9 advised him that you were an accidental representative,
10 he stated, "That is your problem. Bring people who can
11 secure the surrender of weapons and save your people
12 from destruction." And that, I think, was the end of
13 the meeting.
14 A. Yes. General Mladic was well aware that
15 there were between 25 and 30.000 of those expellees in
16 Potocari and that they were, by and large, women, small
17 children, elderly, sick people, and that there were no
18 armed groups amongst them. He also knew that his units
19 were a few steps away from that expelled population,
20 about a hundred or perhaps 200 meters, and that during
21 the night they would reach that expelled population of
22 -- those units of the VRS would reach that
23 population. He knew that, but insisting by saying, by
24 pointing out to me that the fate of the Bosnian people
25 was in my hands. I believe he wanted to discourage me
1 in voicing any other requests in the first place, to
2 treat that expelled population humanely, not to turn it
3 into a ghetto. And that indeed was a ghetto for all
4 those people.
5 I can confirm it now, and I was quite clear
6 then, that it had been a planned operation of the VRS
7 for those several days to force the civilian population
8 to leave their homes, to leave all their belongings
9 behind, and to be forced into a small place, into a
10 small compound, such as Potocari, and that the control
11 over that area should be taken over by the units of the
12 VRS and which would then turn it into a ghetto.
13 Q. At what time did you leave this meeting on
14 the 11th of July?
15 A. I think it was sometime between 11.00 and
16 half past eleven.
17 Q. Where did you go when you left?
18 A. I left the meeting together with the officers
19 of the Dutch Battalion, and I spent that night with
20 them at their headquarters in Potocari.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if you wish, I
22 can move on to the 12th of July or we can finish here,
23 however you wish.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So,
25 Mr. Cayley, there is still yet another exhibit, which
1 is 48, which I think was not shown the witness. Would
2 you please do that?
3 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President.
4 You're quite right. If the witness could be shown --
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And after
6 that we could, yes, adjourn for the day. But now I
7 believe we could really benefit from this occasion and
8 show the witness that exhibit.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If Exhibit 48 would be placed in
10 front of the witness.
11 Q. Mr. Mandzic, do you recognise this
13 A. I do. Yes. This is Major Boering, if I'm
14 pronouncing his name well, the liaison officer of the
15 Dutch Battalion. He came several times to the
16 secondary school where I worked, where I was the
17 principal, and I repeatedly informed Major Boering
18 about the needs of the pupils in that school, that they
19 needed various school aids and appliances because we
20 did not have that and we could not get any school aids
21 because the convoy couldn't enter Srebrenica because it
22 was prevented from doing so by the units of the VRS.
23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
24 We shall adjourn and tomorrow we shall resume at half
25 past nine. Until tomorrow then.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
2 at 2.30 p.m. to be reconvened on
3 Wednesday, the 22nd day of March, 2000
4 at 9.30 a.m.