1 Tuesday, 4 April 2000
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.45 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good
7 morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning counsel for
8 the Prosecution, for the Defence. General Krstic, good
9 morning. I hope the interpreters can hear me. Yes, it
10 seems so. Good morning to your sound engineers. We
11 shall resume the Krstic case. We have the same
12 witness, and Mrs. Malagic will continue her testimony
14 Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. Have you had a
15 good night's rest?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
17 Yes, I did.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
19 You will now continue to answer questions that
20 Mr. Cayley will be asking of you.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good
22 morning, Your Honours; good morning, counsel.
23 WITNESS: MIRSADA MALAGIC [Resumed]
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 Examined by Mr. Cayley: [Cont'd]
1 Q. Mrs. Malagic, first of all, I would remind
2 you that you are still under a solemn oath, the same
3 oath that you were under yesterday.
4 Secondly, if I can just refresh your memory
5 as to the point in time that we arrived at during your
6 testimony. If you recall, you were telling the Judges
7 about your journey from Potocari to Kladanj, and you
8 had arrived at a point in time on the road between
9 Bratunac and Konjevic Polje, where you saw a large
10 group of men in a meadow near Sandici. Can you
11 continue with your account of events from that point in
12 time to when you arrived in Kladanj?
13 A. Yes. When we passed by that meadow, where
14 they were there and I already knew that they were our
15 men who had been captured by Serb soldiers, the bus did
16 not stop again. We proceeded to Nova Kasaba, then via
17 Milici, Vlasenica. In Vlasenica, the bus stopped
18 because it had a failure, at least that is what the
19 driver said, a tyre evidently. So they changed the
20 tyre. And a Serb soldier came onto the bus but did not
21 talk. He simply brought three apples and gave them to
22 children who were sitting in the front seats and left
23 the bus. And then the driver was back and we went on.
24 When we arrived at a place, I believe it's
25 called Tisca, I'm not quite sure, the buses stopped
1 there and the driver told us we could get off the bus
2 and proceed on foot. We got off there. There were
3 again Serb soldiers by the buses to meet us, and as
4 there were no more men on the bus, that I was in, there
5 were only women and children, and they simply pointed
6 which direction that we should proceed. And at some
7 point our folk will be waiting for us, as they put it.
8 So we proceeded and as people said if there
9 happened to be men on the bus or young girls, then they
10 were separated by Serb soldiers, but I did not see
11 that. And we continued in a column, I don't know how
12 many kilometres that was, until we reached the
13 demarcation line, as we were explained.
14 We were first met by UNPROFOR soldiers. I
15 believe it was a Pakistani, but I can't remember. And
16 that was right at the entrance to Kladanj. They met us
17 there with some food, with hot drinks, of course if
18 people were up to eating at all. There were also some
19 Red Cross vehicles for people who had fallen ill and
20 were too weak to proceed by themselves.
21 After an hour or so, I'm not quite sure
22 because we had no watches, buses arrived and they took
23 us on further towards Dubrave.
24 At nightfall, with my son Adnan Malagic,
25 other people I arrived at Dubrave. There we were met,
1 or rather me specifically, my husband's sister, who had
2 been in Zivinice since earlier days. I did not spend
3 the night there. They took me up there and took me
4 over to Zivinice, and that's where I spent that night.
5 The next morning we registered at a school
6 and I stayed there until we were put up in houses that
7 were built by UNPROFOR.
8 And that was the end of that unfortunate
9 journey, I shall call it. As for my testimony, I
10 should like to finish it by saying something which is
11 very important for me, and I believe for this Court
12 too. With the fall of Srebrenica, rather when it was
13 taken by Serb soldiers, when the Serb soldiers took
14 that so-called protected area by the United Nations,
15 from the face of the earth were wiped off three
16 generations of men in the cruellest way possible. I can
17 corroborate it by a fresh example from my family.
18 My father-in-law, Omer Malagic, born in 1926,
19 his three sons, one of whom was my husband, Salko
20 Malagic, born in 1948. His two brothers, Osman
21 Malagic, born in 1953; Dzafer Malagic born in 1957.
22 His three grandsons, that is, my two sons Elvir Malagic
23 born in 1973; Admir Malagic born in 1979; and my
24 brother-in-law's son, Samir Malagic's son, born in
1 There are hundreds of such families in
2 Srebrenica and throughout eastern Bosnia, and to my
3 mind this testifies to the scale of the genocide
4 committed by Serb soldiers, commanded by the then
5 General Ratko Mladic, Stanislav Krstic, and others. I
6 can't remember all their names.
7 Thank you very much for giving me the
8 opportunity to say what I had -- to say all this before
9 this august Tribunal. Thank you for hearing what I had
10 to say.
11 Q. Mrs. Malagic, I don't want to dwell in your
12 grief over your loss, but there are a couple of final
13 exhibits that I'd like to show you and for you to
14 confirm some matters in those exhibits.
15 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could first of
16 all be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 80. If the usher
17 could turn to the page on that list, which is
18 highlighted in yellow, there is a name highlighted.
19 Q. Mrs. Malagic, I just want to return to a
20 point in time near the beginning of your testimony,
21 when you stated that the last that you saw of your son
22 Elvir was on a truck, a UN truck, travelling between
23 Srebrenica and Potocari. Can you look at that list in
24 front of you and identify the name that's been
25 highlighted on that list?
1 A. You mean my son's name only? Elvir Malagic,
2 do you ...
3 Q. If you could, please.
4 A. I don't understand.
5 Q. Is your son's name listed on that long list
6 of names? Do you see your son's name there?
7 A. I do. I do. Elvir Malagic, 1970. This is
8 an error. He was born in 1973, in Voljavica,
9 Bratunac. Yes, this is my son. I saw him on the
10 truck, as I told you. He raised his hand to greet me
11 and other relatives who were in the UNPROFOR compound
12 at that time.
13 After the fall of Srebrenica, I heard,
14 they've confirmed that he was there, and the UNPROFOR
15 soldiers, as I was told, were the ones who made this
16 list. This list turned up in Tuzla once, and I saw
17 it. When we went to the UNPROFOR base, somebody met us
18 there, I don't know who it was, a soldier, I don't know
19 what rank he was, a military, and he said that he did
20 not quite understand, that his superior was not there
21 and that he could not understand how did that list turn
22 up in public and who had made it and left it there.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Finally, if the witness could be
24 shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.
25 Q. Mrs. Malagic, you earlier said in your
1 testimony that your husband Salko and your son Admir
2 went to the woods with the other men at the time of the
3 fall of Srebrenica. How old was Admir at this time?
4 A. He was 15 and five months.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could place
6 the photograph.
7 Q. Could you just very quickly, Mrs. Malagic,
8 identify the man in this photograph.
9 A. Yes. This is my husband, Salko Malagic.
10 Q. Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much, indeed,
11 for your patience. The Defence will have a few
12 questions for you, and also the Judges.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
15 Mr. Cayley.
16 Mrs. Malagic, now you will be answering
17 questions that Mr. Petrusic will ask you. He's the
18 Defence counsel for General Krstic.
19 Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.
20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Good morning,
21 Your Honours; good morning, my learned friends.
22 Cross-examined by Mr. Petrusic:
23 Q. Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. I will ask only
24 one question, and it has to do with the final questions
25 by Mr. Cayley.
1 Mrs. Malagic, was it your conclusion, when
2 you said that it was all General Mladic's and General
3 Krstic's fault?
4 A. In my view, these military who committed the
5 genocide, who in a couple of days' time saw -- shot
6 dead, and in all sorts of ways to do away with the
7 thousands of men, must have done it at the orders of
8 their Generals. One man could not do it. But I do
9 believe that they could have issued such orders.
10 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I have no
11 further questions, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,
13 any additional questions?
14 MR. CAYLEY: No, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Judge Fouad
17 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Thank you,
18 Mr. President.
19 Questioned by the Court:
20 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. We
21 are very aware and compassionate with your great grief
22 and we admire your courage. I would like just to see
23 things a little bit more clearly, and I have one
24 general question or two and two specific questions.
25 You gave us a nutshell of the generations
1 which were exterminated. You started by your
2 father-in-law, Omer, who must be an elderly man; then
3 your husband and his brother, Salko and Osman; then
4 your sons, Admir and Elvir. But we didn't reach Adnan,
5 who was 11. So to start, was Admir and Elvir in the
6 fighting brigades? Were they more or less militarily
7 involved in anything, or were they taken just because
8 they represented the youth, the Muslim youth?
9 A. My children, and there were thousands of them
10 like that in Srebrenica, in 1992, in April 1992, for
11 instance, Admir Malagic was in the sixth grade only, he
12 was barely 12 at the time, and when Srebrenica fell he
13 was 15 years old only, and thereby, under any rule,
14 under any norm, any regulation, he simply could not be
15 a soldier. And my other son and the youngest one were
16 not soldiers.
17 As in 1993, early 1993, when UNPROFOR entered
18 the protected area of Srebrenica, or rather when
19 Srebrenica was already proclaimed a safe haven, then as
20 everybody there knew it, they pursued
21 demilitarisation. And those who were combatants, who
22 had some weapons, handed them over to UNPROFOR
23 soldiers. So that all those lads did not have any
24 weapons, they were bare-handed, barefoot. They had no
25 clothes. And I do not think they were soldiers. They
1 had nothing to defend themselves with. They believed
2 that they would be protected; they believed that
3 UNPROFOR would shield them and that perhaps we would be
4 taken to a place, to a destination where, if nothing
5 else, then life would be guaranteed to us.
6 And Adnan Malagic, my youngest son, I did not
7 mention him, well, because he crossed over with me, but
8 thank you for remembering him in the end. The traumas
9 he suffered, believe me, there are still effects of all
10 those traumas today.
11 JUDGE RIAD: Of course. But are you
12 convinced that all of them have disappeared, or just up
13 to now you are in search of them?
14 A. We mothers, wives, sisters, we're still
15 looking for our missing, and we hope. But deep down,
16 after all these years, I think we fear that they are no
17 longer among the living.
18 JUDGE RIAD: In fact, you mentioned that when
19 you saw men taken by Serb soldiers into the
20 interrogation house, you said they never came back.
21 You are just deducing that from the events, or there
22 are certain proofs that nobody came back?
23 A. Yes, I have proof too. I did not go into
24 those houses, even though there were women who were
25 with me there, whose -- and it was their children and
1 they were taken away, and these women simply could not
2 let them -- could not let it go, who pursued the truth
3 and went around neighbouring houses and they spoke to
4 people and talked to those who saw men beheaded, heads
5 separated from bodies. They saw blood in those
6 houses. On the road to the village of Budak, they saw
7 very many men with their throats slit.
8 One of my closest neighbours told me, when we
9 met in Tuzla, how a Serb soldier and two others had
10 taken them towards Budak and told them to wait for a
11 moment. But then other Serb soldiers came up, and he
12 knew one of them and they greeted one another, and that
13 Serb soldier asked him why he was waiting there, and he
14 said he was waiting for those Serb soldiers who brought
15 him there with other neighbours. However, he pointed
16 at those Serb soldiers who were aligned by that house,
17 and he said, the Serb soldiers said, "No, these are all
18 butchers. They are waiting to butcher you all, so get
19 away." And then he, the Serb soldier whom I did not
20 know and I did not see them, they took them to the
21 trucks and that man reached Tuzla and lives there
23 And there are many such stories. Whether
24 they will all appear before this Court to tell what
25 they saw with their own eyes, I don't know. But I did
1 not go into those houses because I simply couldn't do
2 that. But from such stories, I realise that only the
3 worst things happened there.
4 JUDGE RIAD: So this applies to all
5 generations of men, in your assessment.
6 A. Yes.
7 JUDGE RIAD: What about women?
8 A. According to unofficial sources, it is
9 thought, but I am not sure about the figure, that about
10 1.000 women did not arrive from Potocari, mostly young
11 women, and that about 650 children, below the age of
12 12, were also missing, those who were with their
13 mothers in Potocari. This is an unofficial record, but
14 there are some women who saw children who were slain,
15 amongst the -- in a maize field, because maize had
16 been sewn there beyond the Zinc Factory. In the
17 morning, that maize field was all surrounded, and there
18 were military who did not allow anyone to enter the
19 field. I did not see that, but these are figures,
20 testimonies of women who did not see their children.
21 There were women at Potocari who suffered, neighbours
22 broke down and who said that the children were snatched
23 from their arms and slain before them.
24 JUDGE RIAD: My last question is concerning
25 the buses. You said something rather interesting. You
1 said you saw many buses with headquarters in Serbia.
2 So these buses came from Serbia, not from Bosnia?
3 Thank you very much.
4 A. Yes. Yes, the headquarters of these
5 companies was in Serbia, even before the war. Strela,
6 Sabac, Raketa, Titovo Uzice, Lasta from Belgrade, and a
7 number of others, those who maintained regular
8 transportation to Srebrenica; for instance, Raketa from
9 Titova; Uzice, had a regular line with Srebrenica, so
10 on and so forth.
11 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. My question: Did
12 they come specially for this purpose, or were they
13 serving before the war? Were they on line all the
14 time, or did you discover that they were coming for the
15 purposes of transporting the refugees or the
16 condemned? Do you understand my question? Were they
17 new to the area?
18 A. I do. I do understand. Yes, those buses, I
19 know they came specially for the purpose, for us, to
20 take us away. There was a long, long column of buses,
21 and this to me is a fact, because during the war, while
22 we were in Srebrenica, not a single bus, or rather not
23 a single vehicle save the UNPROFOR vehicle appeared in
24 Srebrenica. There was absolutely no traffic. Nothing
25 worked. There was absolutely nothing, I already said
1 that. I do not think that a civilised world knows a
2 life like that. We never saw those buses until the
3 fall of Srebrenica, that is for those three years, and
4 then they were all aligned in columns, only to
5 transport us from there towards Kladanj.
6 JUDGE RIAD: Mrs. Malagic, thank you so
7 much. I'm sorry to ask you questions which might stir
8 up such bad memories, but you're a lady of great
9 courage. Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your
11 Honour, and I should like to thank all of those who
12 make it possible for us to come here, and if nothing
13 else, say what happened, to find some relief in saying
14 what happened to us, to try to show you what happened
15 when Srebrenica fell, and simply to wish that may
16 Srebrenica never happen again anywhere. Thank you.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
18 Judge Riad.
19 Mrs. Malagic, I believe that Judge Wald also
20 has some questions for you.
21 Judge Wald.
22 JUDGE WALD: Mrs. Malagic, I just have one
23 question. Your son that was on the UN transport, going
24 from Srebrenica to Potocari, and you didn't see him
25 again. When you got to Potocari, did you make
1 inquiries, did you -- I'm sure you looked around
2 yourself to see if you could locate him, and you
3 weren't able to. Is that right?
4 A. I looked for him in Potocari, although there
5 were so many people that it was very difficult. But,
6 yes, I made some inquiries among people I knew. But
7 across that barricade, as I called it, or rather the
8 UNPROFOR compound, we simply couldn't enter because
9 UNPROFOR soldiers wouldn't let us in. So that when I
10 arrived in Potocari, I did not see him again because
11 those who were in the compound could not come out, and
12 we could not get in. We had no access until we were
13 made to board buses.
14 JUDGE WALD: So it is your belief or
15 assumption that your 15-year-old son was put on the
16 buses with the men in Potocari; is that right?
17 A. Well, I suppose so. I suppose so, according
18 to others who were there. They were also separated and
19 taken away from Potocari by separate buses.
20 JUDGE WALD: Thank you for coming,
21 Mrs. Malagic.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
23 Mrs. Malagic, I do not have any questions for you. My
24 colleagues and counsel for the Prosecution and Defence
25 asked all the questions that I needed answers to. But
1 is there something that you would like to say and have
2 not had the opportunity of answering? If there is
3 anything else you wish to add, you may do so now,
4 Mrs. Malagic.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply want
6 to thank you once again.
7 Yesterday afternoon, when I returned from
8 here, I went out to walk around your city, that is what
9 I wanted to tell you. I couldn't really see much, but
10 what I really liked, what caught me eye, was a monument
11 that we visited and that was a monument to women, that
12 is, women awaiting sailors who never come back. And
13 the monument to those wives touched me profoundly. I
14 should like to find this statue and take it to Bosnia
15 with me. Perhaps it could be likened to mothers and
16 wives of Srebrenica who have been waiting and hoping
17 for all those years, except that we followed different
18 roads. We could turn to our empty forests. We saw our
19 sons and our husbands off to those woods and never
20 found out anything about them again, whether they are
21 alive or dead, where are their bones lying. Many
22 mothers have died hoping against hope, and it is quite
23 possible that all the other mothers would end up like
24 that because their numbers are dwindling every day.
25 Thank you once again.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We share
2 your grief, Mrs. Malagic, and the grief of all other
3 people, and I hope that in your misfortune you
4 nevertheless have a feeling for -- to manage to
5 overcome this suffering, and independently of who are
6 the responsible for this, they are no doubt a disgrace
7 to humanity.
8 But, Mrs. Malagic, I hope you will be able to
9 find hope again and that you will continue along with
10 this sensibility that you gave evidence of today.
11 Thank you very much and a safe journey home.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very
14 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation]
15 Mr. President, there are two exhibits. We need to know
16 what will happen to them.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
18 Mrs. Malagic, will you please wait for a moment while
19 he resolve this.
20 Mr. Cayley.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
22 In respect of Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, that will be
23 admitted into evidence by another witness, but I would
24 like to make application for admission into evidence of
25 the photograph, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 Mr. Petrusic, any objections?
3 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No,
4 Mr. President.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 Exhibit 81 is admitted, and we are still waiting for
7 the Exhibit 80, is it, to be tendered yet. Very well.
8 This exhibit is admitted.
9 Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much once
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I see that
14 Mr. Cayley is going to take the floor.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. We do have
16 another witness. It's Major Franken, who was the
17 second in command of the Dutch Battalion. We do need
18 to bring in a Dutch interpreter, who will be assisting
19 him but not actually -- a Dutch/English interpreter who
20 will be assisting him, not actually translating for
21 him. So I don't know whether you want to take a
22 five-minute break or whether the interpreter can walk
23 straight into the courtroom. However you wish.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Are there
25 any protective measures?
1 MR. CAYLEY: No.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No. So we
3 will be sitting in open session.
4 I should perhaps take this opportunity,
5 Mr. Cayley, and ask you something concerning the
6 decision that is still pending; namely, the
7 lack-of-contact decision. So perhaps we should have a
8 break now, and then later on proceed with the witness.
9 Who is going to speak about this decision, or
10 actually the application? I actually made a mistake, I
11 told you I would not be here today. Actually, I will
12 be absent tomorrow, and today the Chamber, because it
13 is sitting in full composition, can make the ruling. I
14 don't know whether Mr. Harmon wishes to take the floor
15 about this application, and then after we could perhaps
16 have a break.
17 MR. HARMON: Yes. I will be glad to inform
18 the Chamber of the Prosecutor's position in respect of
19 the defendant's motion.
20 The counsel for the Defence and I had an
21 opportunity to discuss the suggestion by the Chamber
22 after the break. We have concluded that the position
23 of the Prosecutor is one that we would like to put
24 forward jointly, that is, no contact after the witness
25 is sworn -- I should say after the direct examination
1 is concluded, and we both agree that we would not
2 pursue the issue, we would not like to see the issue of
3 the Prosecutor having contact with the Defence
4 witnesses as a condition to the contact being
5 permitted, and vice versa, that the Defence would have
6 contact when the Prosecutor has contact with witnesses
7 brought by the Prosecution.
8 So our view is, if you will, the original
9 position, and I think both counsel and I would tender
10 that to the Chamber as the positions upon which we have
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
13 Mr. Visnjic.
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,
15 I can just confirm what my learned colleague,
16 Mr. Harmon, has just stated. But if I may add,
17 yesterday we heard reasons, we heard arguments of the
18 Prosecution regarding your proposal. I should only
19 like to put forward arguments of the Defence. We
20 believe that your proposal is the best solution, and if
21 today were the first day of the trial, I think that
22 this suggestion, this proposal, would be the best way
23 to proceed. However, for the reason that I mentioned
24 yesterday, having to do with the number of witnesses
25 that have already been heard, I think that the
1 Prosecutor and the Defence have managed to find a
2 solution which is, at this moment, satisfactory to both
3 parties and acceptable to both.
4 So again, as I say, in principle, I do
5 believe that your suggestion is the best solution.
6 However, bearing in mind our current position, I think
7 this solution, as it has been put forth by the
8 Prosecution, is in the interests of both parties.
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you
10 very much, Mr. Visnjic.
11 Having heard your views and arguments, we
12 shall make a ruling later on. I hope that it will be
13 possible for us to find a convenient moment today, this
14 morning, but perhaps after the break we should proceed
15 with the witness, with the testimony right away, and I
16 hope that later on we will have an opportunity to
17 announce our ruling.
18 And now I think we should have a 20-minute
19 break. Mr. Dubuisson, after we have come back, I hope
20 that the witness will already be in the courtroom.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We're going
25 to resume the hearing.
1 Can you hear me, sir?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Will you
4 please read the solemn declaration that the usher will
5 give you.
6 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
7 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Please be
10 seated. Let me just remind the interpreter that we
11 consider this as a continuation of his previous work,
12 and he's also still under an oath.
13 Thank you, sir, for coming to testify before
14 the Tribunal. First of all you're going to answer
15 questions put to you by Mr. Cayley.
16 Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.
17 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 WITNESS: ROBERT ALEXANDER FRANKEN
19 Examined by Mr. Cayley:
20 Q. Major Franken, we are speaking the same
21 language in the courtroom. There are interpreters
22 between us. So I will go slowly and set a pace which
23 allows for good translation, but if you could try and
24 take a pause between my asking a question and you
25 answering it, it also gives you a moment to think about
1 a response.
2 A. Okay. I will try.
3 Q. Your name is Robert Alexander Franken; is
4 that correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. And you are Dutch by nationality.
7 A. That's correct as well.
8 Q. And you were born on the 24th of August,
10 A. That's correct, sir.
11 Q. And you are a Major in the Dutch army; is
12 that correct?
13 A. That's correct again.
14 Q. I think you are an infantry officer by
15 specialisation and career in the Dutch army; is that
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Am I right in saying that you joined the
19 Royal Dutch army in 1970.
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And I think you've held many positions over
22 30 years, including commander of a mechanised infantry
23 company, operations officer in an armoured brigade, a
24 tactics instructor at the infantry school, chief of
25 training at an infantry training unit, staff officer
1 concerned with logistics and intelligence at battalion
2 and brigade level. Have you done all of those jobs
3 within the Dutch army?
4 A. That's correct, sir.
5 Q. I think you are also trained as an airborne
6 officer, and those wings on your chest, I think,
7 indicate that; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. At the time of the events with which this
10 Court is concerned, you were the 2 IC, the second in
11 command, or the deputy commanding officer of the 1st
12 Netherlands UN Infantry Battalion in Srebrenica.
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. And I think you yourself were based in
15 Srebrenica from January of 1995 until July of 1995.
16 A. Yes, in the area of Srebrenica, actually in
18 Q. Could you explain to the Judges the mission
19 of the Dutch Battalion within the Srebrenica enclave?
20 A. Yes, I can. We were -- our mission was to
21 deter any attack on the safe area of Srebrenica by
22 presence, to demilitarise the area of the enclave, and
23 to support NGOs and other humanitarian organisations in
24 their task, in a humanitarian way.
25 Q. Now, you confirmed to me a moment ago that
1 you were the deputy commanding officer of the
2 battalion. Can you explain to the Judges your
3 responsibilities as the deputy commanding officer or
4 second in command of the battalion?
5 A. Yes. In fact, I was in charge of all
6 internal affairs of the battalion and a big part of the
7 operational affairs. Next to my duty as a DCO, I was
8 the SFOR of the battalion and my mission was to take
9 care of all logistics. So I had a double function,
10 more or less. It's usual in a Dutch battalion that a
11 commander sets a couple of directives within which his
12 staff operates, and that's what I did.
13 Q. You've used a couple of acronyms. SFOR, can
14 you explain to the Judges what is meant by SFOR?
15 A. That's the staff officer responsible for the
16 logistics, all logistics. That means food, fuel,
17 ammunition, medical care, et cetera.
18 Q. When you use the acronym "DCO," this means
19 deputy commanding officer.
20 A. Sorry for that, but it's a military habit to
21 talk in abbreviations.
22 Q. Who was the commanding officer of the Dutch
24 A. That was Colonel Karremans.
25 Q. As the deputy commanding officer, where were
1 you based for most of the time?
2 A. HQ in Potocari.
3 Q. When you say in the headquarters, were you
4 based in the operations room?
5 A. Yes. I was not always present in the
6 operations room, but actually the operations room
7 always directly reported to me, and when there were
8 events I went to the operations room and my place was
9 in that room.
10 Q. Now, the operations room was, I think, the
11 nerve centre of the battalion; is that correct?
12 A. That's correct, sir.
13 Q. And there were reports flowing into that
14 operations room from the various locations of Dutch
15 soldiers around the enclave; is that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Now, the reports that were written, did you
18 read many of them, all of them, the reports that were
20 A. No, not all of them. The duty officer
21 reported the most essential ones to me, and then I
22 heard the story and if I wanted, once in a while, I
23 read them. But it was a hell of a lot of information,
24 so the crew of the duty room selected that, analysed
25 it, and gave me the analysis of the information.
1 Q. You mentioned a moment ago, and I just want
2 to clarify it for the record, you said, and I'll
3 paraphrase what you said, the commanding officer set
4 the mission of the battalion and you essentially, as
5 the deputy commander, ensured with the other officers
6 that that was implemented; is that correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. You were the most senior officer amongst all
9 of the other officers, as the deputy commander.
10 A. That's correct as well, sir.
11 Q. Did you act for Colonel Karremans in his
13 A. Yes, that was one of my tasks.
14 Q. Now, you mentioned a moment ago that the
15 mission of the UN Battalion in Srebrenica was the
16 demilitarisation of the enclave. Can you explain to
17 the Judges whether, to your knowledge, the enclave was
18 ever demilitarised successfully by the Dutch Battalion?
19 A. No, it was not, sir. We had a minor amount
20 of small arms in the so-called weapon collection point,
21 but the mass of small arms was still in the enclave.
22 The problem was that we tried, the battalions who were
23 there before us and we as well tried to demilitarise
24 the enclave, but there were a couple of problems in
25 that; one of which was that we were not allowed to
1 enter private houses. When we saw somebody with a gun,
2 with a weapon, we followed him, we tried to catch him,
3 but the very moment he went into a house, we had to
4 stop and call in the local police to see whether the
5 weapon was still in the house. We tried that a couple
6 of times, but the result always was that the so-called
7 CIVPO, the civilian police, came out and said that
8 there were no weapons.
9 On three or four occasions, we succeeded to
10 catch somebody in the open field and we took his
11 weapon. The procedure then was that he got a receipt,
12 and the weapon was brought to the weapon collection
14 Q. What other weapons, apart from light weapons,
15 were in the weapons collection point?
16 A. There was a T-55. A T-55 is a main battle
17 tank. As far as we knew, there was no ammunition for
18 that tank. Some artillery pieces and some self-made
19 artillery pieces, for instance, a rocket pod, something
20 that's normally under an aeroplane or helicopter, an
21 armed helicopter, and they mounted that on two wheels
22 and probably tried or used it as an artillery piece.
23 Q. Just to make the record absolutely clear.
24 You were concerned with disarming Muslims within the
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Now, Major Franken, had you been a Muslim
3 within the Srebrenica enclave, would you have handed in
4 your weapon?
5 A. Seeing the fact that as the enclave started
6 or was organised, they were surrounded by pretty
7 heavily armed Serbs. There was a minor unit -- in
8 fact, a minor unit of the UN around, being a battalion,
9 which is for that area and that kind of terrain a very
10 small unit to do anything, seeing the fact that that
11 unit did not have the order to defend the enclave but
12 to deter, I would not have delivered my weapon, sir.
13 Q. So you would have kept your weapon had you
14 been a Muslim within the enclave in Srebrenica?
15 A. Yes, that's correct.
16 Q. Now, the Bosnian Muslim soldiers or
17 individuals who had weapons within the enclave, what
18 was the military structure to which they belonged; do
19 you know?
20 A. Yes, we knew. Initially it was called the
21 8th Operational Group, but later on it was called the
22 28th Division. It had a division structure, so it was
23 a division with four brigades and lower levels, as far
24 as we could see. There was below brigade was the
25 company level, led by non-trained commanders, but that
1 was on paper. Actually, there was not a real structure
2 and there was not, let's say, any discipline in that
3 unit. We found that out on several occasions, where
4 all arrangements made with divisional headquarters, or
5 the divisional leaders, were not followed by local
6 commanders. In the end phase, a couple of times we had
7 to ask the Chief of Staff of the division to go to a
8 Muslim position, to get them to reason, to get them
9 that far so that we could move with our APCs to another
10 position, because they, in most of the cases, wouldn't
11 let us, although the division said that we had freedom
12 of movement to move our forces around as we wished.
13 Q. Now, you mentioned that there was a
14 divisional headquarters. Did you ever visit the
15 divisional headquarters?
16 A. I've been at the gate of it, at the door of
18 Q. Could you describe that divisional
19 headquarters to the Judges?
20 A. Yes. It's more or less a conference room
21 with no maps inside. There were no communications
22 inside. Just a room with some desks, that was about
23 it, and in it were, at that moment and later on we
24 found out that the division staff was not more than
25 about ten guys.
1 Q. Now, you're a professional army officer,
2 you've been in the army for 30 years. Did it look like
3 a divisional headquarters to you?
4 A. No, absolutely not, because normally, you can
5 imagine that a divisional headquarters is about around
6 100 officers and NCOs and different specialisations who
7 have their maps, their gear, more or less. There is a
8 concentration of communication means, et cetera. So it
9 didn't look at all like a divisional headquarters, as I
10 know it.
11 Q. Now, you mentioned in your evidence that at
12 one time you had to call for the intervention of the
13 Chief of Staff --
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. -- of the 28th Division, in essentially
16 coercing the brigades within that division to obey
17 commands given by the divisional headquarters. I want
18 you to turn your mind to another discussion that you
19 had with the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, when
20 you discussed with him the prospect of the enclave
21 being attacked. Can you tell the Judges about that
23 A. Yes. It was a hypothetical conversation,
24 where the question was asked by the Chief of Staff of
25 the 28th Division what the UN or what DutchBat would do
1 when the enclave was attacked. I said that we would be
2 defending our positions because we were only allowed to
3 do self-defence, and I mean by "positions," our
4 observation posts. And during that conversation, we
5 came to the idea that when it would happen, it would be
6 possible that Muslim forces covered the areas between
7 the observation posts, which I remarked with, "I
8 understand what you mean, but then it would be that way
9 that they would stay out of sight of the observation
10 posts and it would look like a ring around the
11 enclave." That's the general idea of that
12 conversation, sir.
13 Q. Did that defence ever actually materialise in
15 A. No. Well, locally it did, but in the overall
16 situation, it did not. Essential for something like
17 that is that when your neighbour is going away, that
18 means when the Muslim forces would withdraw, they
19 inform you, but they never did. So that's one of the
20 reasons our OPs found themselves back in the midst of
21 Serb forces.
22 Q. Now, you've just mentioned Serb forces, and
23 I'd now like you to turn your mind to the Bosnian Serb
25 Do you recall, prior to the fall of the
1 enclave, the officers within the VRS with whom you were
3 A. Yes. It was, as far as I know, the official
4 liaison, Colonel Vukovic, he came from Skelani Brigade,
5 and there was a Major Nikolic who belonged to the
6 Bratunac Brigade. The position of Major Nikolic is a
7 bit unclear because when he was asked he gave a
8 different job every time. He said he was just a
9 liaison of the Bratunac Brigade on one occasion, and on
10 the other occasion he said he was the second in command
11 of the Bratunac Brigade. Then again he said he was the
12 commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and then he said,
13 "I'm the ops officer of the Bratunac Brigade." So we
14 couldn't place him really on a job, but obviously he
15 belonged to the Bratunac Brigade.
16 Colonel Vukovic never gave away what his real
17 function was. He always said he was the official
18 liaison of the Serb armed forces to DutchBat.
19 Q. Now, you mentioned at the beginning of your
20 testimony that the mission of the UN within the enclave
21 was to deter Serb attacks and to demilitarise Bosnian
22 Muslim forces within the enclave, and you've stated in
23 your evidence that you never successfully demilitarised
24 the enclave.
25 Now, did the Bosnian Serbs ever make
1 representations to you about this failure to
2 demilitarise the enclave?
3 A. In general, they did often, but I remember
4 two special occasions where they complained to us that
5 Muslim forces did kill Serb soldiers, and that was on
6 occasion in the area of about four or five kilometres
7 south of Zeleni Jadar, that is between the enclave
8 Sabar and the enclave of Srebrenica, where Serb
9 soldiers went into an ambush allegedly led by Bosnian
11 The second occasion was a report of our OP
12 Mike, observation post Mike, I should say, where they
13 reported battle noises, we called it, by night and
14 during the morning and they saw burning houses in the
15 area directly north of OP Mike, being Serb territory.
16 Q. Let's go back to the first incident, which
17 was in May of 1995, and if you could look at the map
18 next to you and if you could point out to the Judges
19 with a pointer the area in respect of which this
20 complaint was made.
21 A. It's out of the map, sir.
22 Q. It's off the map.
23 A. It's further down south than the map shows.
24 Q. Could you indicate with the pointer the
25 direction it is in.
1 A. Indicate here?
2 Q. No, just on the map.
3 A. Yes. It would have been around here
4 [indicates], this area.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the
6 witness is indicating south of Zeleni Jadar, on
7 Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E.
8 Q. Now, who complained about this ambush?
9 A. Major Nikolic did, sir.
10 Q. Did anybody in DutchBat see any evidence of
11 this ambush taking place?
12 A. No, we did not. You must consider the
13 terrain is hilly, so in a horizontal site, it is one
14 kilometre away, but there is a hill in between it, and
15 anything can happen at the other side and you won't see
16 or hear it.
17 Q. Now, in respect of the second complaint, who
18 did you hear that complaint from?
19 A. Again, Major Nikolic, sir.
20 Q. You've indicated, in fact, that members of
21 DutchBat actually observed that alleged incident taking
22 place; is that correct?
23 A. The consequences of it, burning houses. Yes,
25 Q. Do you recall any other complaints during
1 your time period, from the Bosnian Serbs?
2 A. No. As I said before, it was repeatedly a
3 complaint that we didn't disarm the Bosnian soldiers
4 but never related to a certain event, as far as I
6 Q. Now, the other way around. Do you recall
7 whether there were ever any complaints made by Bosnian
8 Muslims in respect of Serb action against the enclave?
9 A. Yes. Not in the way that they complained
10 about Serb raids, as we called actions like this, but
11 they complained that the Serbs were crawling forward
12 into the area of the Srebrenica enclave. The problem
13 with that was that there were three boundaries of the
14 enclave: there was a UN boundary; the Serbs had their
15 own boundary which was about two kilometres within the
16 boundary of the UN; and, of course, the Bosniaks and
17 Muslims, had their own boundary which was about two or
18 three kilometres outside the UN boundary. So it was
19 very hard to bring over a complaint from one party to
20 another, because at the very moment you came, you got
21 territory within the enclave, the only issue we had was
22 the UN boundary, which was not fully acknowledged by
23 both parties.
24 There was one occasion south of OP Romeo
25 where it was clear that the Serbs crossed the UN
1 boundary, and we managed to get them back to their own
2 side of the confrontation line.
3 Q. And I think -- you don't need to get up, but
4 on the map behind you, OP Romeo is the point that I
5 think is marked -- it's on the right-hand side of the
6 boundary marker of the enclave.
7 A. It's this one [indicates]. And the Serbs
8 directly south, alongside the road, going down to the
9 city of Srebrenica, they took positions there and they
10 were clearly out of their area and within the area of
11 the UN enclave. I say "UN enclave," I mean the area
12 marked by the UN boundary.
13 Q. Do you recall when that took place?
14 A. It should have been somewhere around April, I
15 suppose, sir.
16 Q. April of 1995.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Let's move ahead in time to the 11th of July,
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I think you find yourself in the operations
22 room of the battalion in Potocari. Do you recall the
23 reports that you started to receive at that time?
24 A. Yes. In fact, it started, the confrontation
25 with the Serbs started from the night before. We got
1 reports of pretty massive shelling of the city. We got
2 reports from B Company, who found out that the 28th
3 Division has disappeared from his flanks. And the
4 problem was that in the morning, the Bosnian civilians
5 overran the compound of B Company, so the HQ of the
6 company, in fact. And the commander of B Company tried
7 to organise it again by sending a patrol out and trying
8 to get the people in the direction of Potocari.
9 That's, in fact, when the second time, the move of the
10 civilians in the direction of Potocari started.
11 In that phase, we had contact with Serb
12 forces, not being -- yeah, well, some infantry, but
13 mainly tanks. That's about the situation in the
14 morning of the 11th, sir.
15 The situation on our own side was as well
16 that we were expecting and we thought we would get some
17 air support in order to equalise our combat, our lack
18 of combat power, I should say. That's generally
19 describing the situation on the morning of 11th.
20 Q. And when you say "equalise," equalise with
22 A. With the Serb forces confronting us.
23 Q. You said at the beginning of the answer to my
24 question, that you heard reports of pretty massive
25 shelling of the city, and you also said that at that
1 time, to your knowledge, the 28th Division had
2 vanished, had disappeared.
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Why was there shelling of the city taking
6 A. It's strange you ask me that question, but
7 there was not any military objective other than the
8 so-called telegraph, post and telegraph building, where
9 a part of the HQ of the 28th Division was, but that was
10 not in the city, that was in the northern part of the
11 city. The city itself did not give any military
12 objective in that stage, other than, of course, the UN
13 forces. But then again it was at random shooting at
14 the city.
15 Q. From your recollection, what was the calibre
16 of the artillery and mortars? And if you can remember
17 to pause between question and answer. I'll try and go
18 more slowly myself.
19 A. Mainly it was a bigger -- calibres of around
20 .100 millimetres. I did deduce that from the
21 explosions we heard and we saw. So it was heavy
23 Q. Any other weapons being used, Major Franken,
24 apart from heavy artillery?
25 A. Tanks were used, not only on the positions of
1 our own forces but also used to shoot into the area of
2 the city.
3 Q. From your recollection, thinking back now to
4 July of 1995, do you have any recollection of the
5 number of shells that fell on the city on that day?
6 A. Yes, I remember that I ordered B Company to
7 stop reporting every single explosion, and it was --
8 when we reached the figure of about 200.
9 Q. Now, you stated in an earlier response that
10 there was no military objective by this stage that
11 would require this level of firing, and I'll ask you
12 the question again: In your opinion, what was the
13 reason for this very heavy shelling?
14 A. There could have been two reasons, but was
15 the same effect: killing people or trying to raise a
16 panic by killing people. And I mean by "people," I
17 mean civilians, women and children.
18 Q. You've stated in your evidence that civilians
19 essentially overran the compound of B Company, based in
20 Srebrenica. Do you recall what orders you gave to B
21 Company after you received the reports about the heavy
22 shelling of the town?
23 A. The commander of B Company came himself with
24 the suggestion that he was not in control of his own
25 compound anymore, as you can imagine, because the
1 shelling was on the very location of the compound
2 itself as well. So I agreed on him going aboard his
3 APC and command his company from there, and try to get
4 the refugees in the direction of Potocari. We prepared
5 the arrival of the refugees before because there was,
6 as I told you before, a move of refugees in that
7 direction. So Major Otter, a Dutch officer being the
8 compound commander, was ordered by me to prepare that
9 and to guide the refugees through a safe route, into
10 the direct area of our HQ. I say "safe route" because
11 the whole road and our own compound was the very site
12 of the Serb artillery and tanks.
13 Q. When you say that -- you said the final
14 sentence, "I say safe route because the whole road was
15 the very site of the Serb artillery and tanks," can you
16 explain what you mean by that?
17 A. Well, I was convinced of the fact that as
18 soon as the Serbs would see that mass of refugees
19 approaching, they would open fire. They did that
20 before in the city. And on one occasion we were warned
21 that they would not allow us to have refugees on our
23 Q. Now, after you issued the orders to Major
24 Otter, can you recall what took place?
25 A. Yes. Well, the next report, or the essential
1 report that I got from B Company was that there was
2 Serb infantry in the high grounds west and east of the
3 city, so they, what we call, out-flanked us. As I said
4 before, the 28th Muslim Division was gone, so we had no
5 neighbours on our left and right side.
6 At that point, there was no use in keeping on
7 defending the city of Srebrenica, it was being left by
8 the refugees, and I, in fact, changed the intent of the
9 mission not to defend Srebrenica but try to protect the
10 refugees by withdrawing at the end of the refugee
11 column, in the direction of Potocari, and Captain
12 Groen, who was the company leader of that company, got
13 orders from me to take positions in the south on part
14 of Potocari, facing the Serb advance from the city of
16 Q. Sir, am I right in saying, from your
17 testimony, that B Company essentially withdrew on the
18 tail of the refugees, as they moved towards Potocari.
19 A. That's correct. I wanted absolutely to
20 prevent Serb infantry free access to those masses of
22 Q. What did you, at the time, believe would
23 happen if the Serb infantry got in amongst the
25 A. Seeing the experience with the shelling of
1 Srebrenica and the history on the Serb side, not
2 directly in the area of Srebrenica, I suggested that,
3 or I expected them to start killing, or things like
5 Q. Now, you also stated earlier in your
6 testimony that B Company was to withdraw and take up
7 new positions to the south of Potocari; is that
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And by doing that, what did you hope to
12 A. To gain time, first, and secondly bring those
13 people together on a smaller area where we would at
14 least be able to try to control it. If you are in an
15 area like Srebrenica, the village or city of Srebrenica
16 and Potocari, you need a hell of a lot of troops to
17 control it. With the means we had and the number of
18 troops we had, it was absolutely impossible. So the
19 only thing I could do was concentrate.
20 Q. You stated earlier in your evidence that one
21 of the missions of the battalion was to deter Serb
22 attacks on the enclave. At this point in time, did
23 you, with the commanding officer, consider making a
24 stand at Potocari?
25 A. We shortly did, but if you do not consider
1 the fact that I had about 150 combat-trained soldiers
2 over there, you do not consider the fact that I had
3 about 16 per cent of ammunition that I should have had,
4 and even for anti-tank and mortar ammunition, those
5 percentages were much lower, and seeing the fact that I
6 was in the midst of 30.000 civilians, our positions
7 where we had to defend them were about 20 or 15 metres
8 away from that mass of civilians, mainly women and
9 children, starting to fight was no option.
10 Q. Very briefly and to theorise, in your
11 opinion, Major Franken, what would have happened if the
12 Dutch army would have mounted a Defence in Potocari?
13 A. We would have had a massacre, and I mean a
14 massacre between women and children, who were mainly
15 the mass of refugees. The Serbs already proved that
16 they didn't respect anything about civilians or
17 non-combatants. They fired at them with artillery in
18 Srebrenica; they fired on them with artillery on the
19 way down to Potocari and further on. By means of -- by
20 communication means of one of our OP crews, we used a
21 radio of one of the APCs, after we had one air support,
22 close air support mission in the afternoon of the 11th,
23 the message came down from the Serbs that if we didn't
24 stop opposing them, specially if we didn't stop with
25 air support, they would fire on our compound and on the
1 refugees in Potocari, and they said they would kill our
2 POWs. By that the time we had about 50 POWs, crews of
3 our OPs -- sorry, observation posts who were captured
4 by the Serbs. And I believe that he would start firing
5 on that crowd, absolutely.
6 Q. Two questions to clarify matters. When the
7 Serbs made this threat, were they in a position to
8 carry it out?
9 A. Yeah, they were. As far as we counted, there
10 were about 35 pieces of artillery, with heavy calibre
11 confronting us, a couple of multiple-launch rocket
12 systems, tanks. So he didn't have to fight with us, he
13 could withdraw and shoot us to pieces without us being
14 able to do anything. I didn't have heavy equipment; I
15 didn't have artillery; I didn't have any means to
16 oppose their artillery, seeing the fact that I didn't
17 get defensive air support.
18 Q. You spoke very briefly about POWs that were
19 taken from your observation posts. Who are you
20 speaking of?
21 A. Crews of a couple of OPs. We had the --
22 yeah, well, all the OPs in the south were already taken
23 by the Serbs, and one exception was OP Delta,
24 observation post Delta, and the other observation posts
25 all were either captured by the Serbs or were ordered
1 by me to stay there in their position until they were
2 contacted by the Serbs. The reason for that was the
3 experience we had with the withdrawal of OP Foxtrot and
4 the killing of one of our soldiers at a roadblock
5 within the enclave.
6 Q. So these POWs were UN Dutch soldiers.
7 A. Dutch soldiers, that's correct.
8 Q. When the Serbs threatened to kill these
9 people, did you take that threat very seriously?
10 A. I didn't believe at that moment that they
11 would put them against the wall and shoot them, but I
12 was convinced of the fact that they would use them as a
13 shield against whatever, air support or things like
14 that. They did that before.
15 Q. Major Franken, let's move now to the next
16 day, to the 12th of July, and if you can tell the
17 Judges the first significant event that you recall from
18 that day.
19 A. Yes. NCO, the commanding officer,
20 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans was ordered by Mladic at
21 10.00 in Bratunac for another meeting, and at the very
22 same time, it appeared to be the start of an infantry
23 tank attack from the area OP Papa, so directly north of
24 our HQ --
25 Q. Could I interrupt you. Could you just
1 indicate to the Judges on the map that is there.
2 A. So this area [indicates], alongside this
3 road, our HQ was here [indicates], marked as "UN base,"
4 and the attack came from the area Yellow Bridge, as we
5 call it. So the surroundings of OP Papa, observation
6 post Papa, I should say.
7 MR. CAYLEY: I think the witness has
8 adequately explained his movements with the pointer and
9 that's on Prosecutor Exhibit 1E.
10 Q. So you observed an infantry tank attack, or
11 an infantry attack supported by armour --
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. -- coming from OP Papa. Can you describe to
14 the Judges, in your opinion, as a military man, how
15 well-organised that attack was at the time?
16 A. Very well organised. It looked like a kind
17 of demonstration, in fact. They were -- well, I
18 wouldn't perform an attack like that in that way, but
19 it looked very disciplined. They were -- the intervals
20 between the attacking soldiers were correct, they were
21 correctly dressed. It was obvious that there was a
22 coordination between the tank and the infantry next to
23 them. So that looked like a regular attack, performed
24 by trained and regular troops.
25 Q. Now, you said in response to one of my
1 earlier questions that Colonel Karremans was at a
2 meeting. Was he present when this attack took place,
3 or was he absent from the UN compound in Potocari?
4 A. He was absent, sir. He was in Bratunac with,
5 as far as I know, General Mladic.
6 Q. Do you see any significance in that absence?
7 A. Well, probably they tried to intimidate the
8 battalion again. There's no logic behind it, as far as
9 I know.
10 Q. When did Karremans return from the meeting in
12 A. Would have been around half past eleven,
14 Q. When he returned, did you speak with him?
15 A. Yes, of course. He debriefed me about what
16 was discussed over there. He gave the demands Mladic
17 made concerning what was called the evacuation of the
18 population, and, well, he didn't finish debriefing and
19 the first buses and trucks appeared.
20 Q. When you say "the first buses and trucks
21 appeared," can you explain what you mean by that to the
23 A. Colonel told me that the UN supposedly agreed
24 upon the execution of the evacuation by Serb forces and
25 that -- so the BSA, the VRS army, would perform that
1 action. The time he mentioned was as of 1600 hours, as
2 I recall well, but the very moment he told me that we
3 got a report that there were a hell of a lot of buses
4 and trucks appearing from the direction of Bratunac,
5 over the road going to the Potocari area.
6 Q. Now, you've said in response to my question
7 that the evacuation was to be carried out by Serb
8 forces. Who in the Serb forces was to carry out the
10 A. At that moment I did not know any name, but
11 later on I understood that we were ordered by the UN to
12 support or to facilitate that evacuation, and I was
13 ordered by Colonel Karremans to see for Acamovic, he
14 was somewhere outside the gate, to coordinate logistics
15 support as far as it was applicable. And then I met
16 that Colonel and he said that he was in charge, he said
17 he was a G-4, so a logistics officer, and he said that
18 he came from Pale.
19 Q. Can you recall anything of the conversation
20 that you had with Colonel Acamovic?
21 A. Yes. Well, he demanded transport and he
22 demanded fuel. Well, as is probably known, we didn't
23 have any fuel, and I didn't grant him transport as
24 well. I thought it was a very bad idea to have UN cars
25 with Serb drivers on it, riding around.
1 Q. Now, you're an officer of significant
2 experience, and now as your memory serves you, at the
3 time at what level, at what operational level, did you
4 think that Acamovic was working at when you were
5 speaking to him?
6 A. If you see the problems that the Serb forces
7 were confronted with, being what we call a mopping up
8 operation within the enclave, they had to counter the
9 outbreak of the 28th Division in the general northern
10 direction, and we're talking about 10.000 men going
11 out, of which 50 per cent are probably armed. The
12 organisation of the evacuation, the transport, securing
13 the routes, arrangements to be made at the crossing
14 point of Kladanj, I think there were four up to six
15 brigades at least involved, so we're talking about
16 corps level at least.
17 Q. Major Franken, you said in your evidence that
18 at the time you thought it was a very bad idea to have
19 UN cars with Serb drivers riding around. What decision
20 did you, in fact, make in respect of UN transport and
21 the refugees?
22 A. Well, we were confronted with the fact that
23 they started the evacuation without any coordination
24 with us. So the first thing I did was ordered two
25 officers, being Major Boering, our liaison officer, and
1 our personnel officer, Captain Voerman, to take a jeep
2 and to go with the first convoy wherever they went and
3 whatever would happen, stay with them. Then we rapidly
4 organised an escort. We gathered all the small
5 vehicles we had, jeeps, I mean, and manned them with an
6 NCO, or an officer and a soldier, and every time a
7 couple of buses left we tried to escort them, and
8 "escort" means, in fact, ride along with them.
9 Q. Can you explain to the Judges what actually
10 happened after you ordered this to take place?
11 A. It looked like in the beginning that we
12 succeeded in executing that escort, but pretty soon it
13 proved that it went wrong, that the escort vehicles
14 were either stopped by more or less regular forces,
15 with the excuse that "We are responsible for your
16 security. It's not secure over here, so you can't ride
17 on." The buses could. And otherwise they were robbed
18 or hijacked by militia-like types. So the amount of
19 small vehicles I had with the battalion decreases
20 pretty rapidly.
21 Q. When you say "stopped by more or less regular
22 forces," which forces are you referring to?
23 A. Well, you could say Rambo-types, wearing half
24 uniforms, not looking like a military unit but a bunch
25 of robbers.
1 Q. On which side of the conflict did these
2 forces belong to?
3 A. On the Serb side, obviously.
4 Q. Now, how many vehicles did you lose to this
5 activity, that you can recall?
6 A. In total we lost about 33 vehicles, but I
7 think concerning the convoys, it would be about 15, 16
8 jeeps, I suppose. But the figures are somewhere in the
9 documents, the exact figures, but that's what I recall
11 Q. Why do you think they were taking the jeeps?
12 Why were they stopping the Dutch escorts from
13 accompanying the buses?
14 A. Because they didn't want anybody to be
15 around; that's obvious. Otherwise they can't think of
16 any reason to stop them, because we were not a threat,
17 we were not a military potential. One jeep with two
18 guys in it is nonsense. And so obviously they didn't
19 want us to witness whatever would happen.
20 Q. Now, when you'd lost 16 jeeps, did you think
21 that there was any kind of significance or planning
22 that somebody had actually decided that this was to
24 A. It was obvious that the word was out to
25 frustrate the convoy escort, and the regular forces, as
1 far as we could judge, used the excuse of being
2 responsible for the safety of our personnel. And the
3 other ones didn't use any excuse; they just took the
4 men's gear, their weapons, and their cars.
5 Q. Did you make any complaints?
6 A. Yes, I did. I did complain several times to
7 a Colonel Jankovic, who in the meantime appeared to be
8 the central figure on the Serb side, and he said he
9 would look after it, but he also said that he did not
10 have all militia, et cetera, under control. So they
11 would look after it, and if I gave the exact figures,
12 et cetera, et cetera, and locations where they were
13 stolen, they would take care of it, but they never
15 Q. When you got this response from him, what did
16 you think?
17 A. "Nice response," but probably that nothing
18 would happen. And it proved out that nothing would
19 happen -- I'm sorry, nothing did happen.
20 Q. Now, you stated the number of vehicles in
21 total that you lost. Do you, in summary, recall
22 anything else that was lost by the battalion to Bosnian
23 Serb forces?
24 A. Yes. We lost the APCs of the observation --
25 APCs, armoured personnel carriers, which were posted at
1 the observation post taken by the Serbs, and we lost
2 about three APCs by a hit, or near-hit, of tanks.
3 Q. Do you recall any other losses of the
4 battalion in terms of equipment?
5 A. Yes, of course. We lost a hell of a lot of
6 small arms. Of course, all the POWs lost their small
7 arms. There was outposts I had around the perimeter of
8 Potocari were robbed by militia. Weapons were taken,
9 flak jackets were taken. Initially we sent out the
10 escort with weapons, but they lost their weapons pretty
11 quickly, so in the end I sent them out without a
12 weapon. So I suppose that about 150 -- the amount of
13 150 small arms were lost by the battalion.
14 Q. Let's return to the subject of Potocari. Can
15 you recall the state of the refugees at this time?
16 A. Yes. Partially in great fear, the major part
17 resigned, not responding, not reacting; just being
19 Q. Now, at this time you were in the battalion
20 operations room, and I think also making rounds outside
21 the compound and inside the compound.
22 A. That's correct. I did that at least twice a
23 day, to keep in contact with reality, so to say.
24 Q. You mentioned earlier a company attack by VRS
25 soldiers mounted on the compound. Do you recall when
1 the Serb soldiers actually arrived outside the UN
2 compound in Potocari?
3 A. Personnel in that attack force should have
4 been around, let's say, 11.00, they stopped at the
5 red/white tape that we drew around the factories and
6 locations where we had the -- where the refugees were
7 concentrated, and pretty quickly next to that, what I
8 called second and third echelon militia-like types
10 Q. What did these second and third echelon types
11 do when they got to your compound?
12 A. In the beginning they were -- sorry. In the
13 beginning they were pretty well controlled by the
14 regular troops who were part of that attacking force.
15 There was a group of about between 15 and 20 soldiers
16 in different uniforms who wanted to enter the compound
17 and started opening -- well, by force opening the fence
18 around the compound. I stopped them and they said they
19 wanted to enter. It was a unit -- or a unit -- it was
20 a group of Serbs partially in blue uniforms and with
22 Q. Major Franken, just to ask you, if you could
23 try --
24 A. Slow down.
25 Q. -- and slow down. I realise you're used to
1 giving orders at a rapid pace, but if you could try and
2 slow down a bit, then it makes the interpreters' task
3 easier and they get a more accurate translation of what
4 you're saying, they're able to do that.
5 A. Okay. I'll try.
6 Q. You said in your evidence that a group of 15
7 to 20 soldiers arrived, you stopped them, and they said
8 they wanted to enter, and then you were describing the
9 unit. Could you carry on with the description and then
10 explain what happened? And pause.
11 A. I will. They made clear to my men who were
12 posted over there that they wanted to enter the
13 compound. It was reported to me, so I left the OPs
14 room and went to the very spot that was on the western
15 side of our compound, near the road. They made it
16 clear that they wanted to enter. I said no, asked for
17 somebody who spoke English. One of the soldiers spoke
18 more or less English, and I asked what they wanted.
19 They wanted to control the compound, whether there were
20 BiH soldiers or military units within our compound.
21 Seeing the fact that I couldn't start a fight
22 over there, with the same reasons I had before, I said,
23 "Okay. You can come in, but accompanied by me, and
24 only two or three of your men. So give me the
25 commander and we'll make a round." After some
1 discussion within their ranks, they agreed upon that
2 and I took them along. They had a quick round over the
3 compound and then left through the same hole in the
4 fence as they came in.
5 Q. Can you describe the uniforms that these
6 individuals were wearing, if you recall?
7 A. As far as I remember, they were the standard
8 camouflage uniforms. A couple of them looked like,
9 well, what we call the Rambo uniform, so part of it
10 green, part of it camouflage jackets. And there were
11 five or six of them in blue uniforms, dark blue
12 uniforms, and those were the guys with the dogs.
13 Q. Do you recall what kind of dog they had with
15 A. Mainly German Shepherds.
16 Q. How did the people, the Bosnian Muslims that
17 were inside the compound, react when these individuals
19 A. They only got the Muslims inside, within the
20 big hall where they were, the big -- what do you call
21 it? -- hall, the big hall? I brought them to a corner
22 and I didn't grant them to go inside. I said, "I don't
23 want a panic over here." People who saw them, of
24 course, were in fear. They saw, as I gathered, about
25 10 or 12 UN soldiers around them, and then I went away
1 as quick as possible, and they hadn't been there longer
2 than about, I think, 30 or 45 seconds.
3 Q. Now, Major Franken, the refugees that were
4 present inside the compound and outside the compound,
5 were they mainly women and children, or men, women and
6 children? Can you remember the approximate proportion
7 of the refugees?
8 A. The main part were women and children. We,
9 for the occasion of a list -- probably we will speak of
10 that -- next to it there were about 300, 350 men within
11 the compound, and we estimated that there were 500 to
12 600 men outside the compound. The rest were women and
14 Q. The 500 or 600 men outside the compound, by
15 this time were you aware, in the operations room, from
16 the walk-abouts that you'd had, what was taking place
17 with the men?
18 A. Yes. One of the demands or rules Mladic gave
19 us was -- or his intents, he told us that he intended
20 to separate the men between 16 and 60 years to check
21 whether they were war criminals or soldiers. So it was
22 obvious that they were going to separate the men from
23 the women. And as it is, in the procedure, there's
24 nothing wrong, because it's a normal procedure when you
25 have a great amount of prisoners, is to separate them.
1 But I had my thoughts -- no, I had my fears about what
2 was going to happen to the men afterwards.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Registrar, we could have
4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 at the ready.
5 Q. Major Franken, can you tell the Judges, from
6 your recollection, what actually happened to the men?
7 A. They were separated and they were
8 interrogated in a house about 300, 400 metres outside
9 of our main gate. In an increasing amount, I got
10 reports that the interrogation was done with physical
11 violence, and I sent down first the UNMOs, United
12 Nations Military Observers, who were -- we had a party
13 of UNMOs within the enclave -- to check whether the
14 amount of men that went into the house was the same
15 that came out.
16 When they were came out, they were brought
17 into a blue bus, and that bus went with the other buses
18 outside the enclave. We tried to escort specifically
19 that bus, but we failed in that, because we were
20 stopped by Serb forces, or a column of 20 buses going
21 through a village or a city like Bratunac, if you have
22 one or two jeeps with them, you can't control it, and
23 you only can see outside the city that a couple of
24 buses are gone. So we didn't manage to escort the blue
25 bus. Even when we rode next to it, we were stopped by
1 OP Papa, or somewhere in Bratunac we were stopped by
2 Serb forces, and then the bus vanished.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17, and if it could be placed on
5 the ELMO.
6 Q. Major Franken, do you recall this building?
7 A. That is the White House, what I was
8 talking -- that I was talking about. It's this one
9 [indicates]. Sorry. This is the White House.
10 MR. HARMON: The witness is indicating on
11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 that the photograph
12 represents the White House.
13 Q. What happens at the White House? This is for
14 the purposes of making the transcript absolutely
16 A. Sorry. I misunderstood your question. Say
17 it again, please.
18 Q. Could you explain to the Judges what you saw
19 taking place at the White House?
20 A. Yes. Well, men were brought there. They had
21 to leave their gear, their personal belongings outside,
22 and then were interrogated. A couple of my officers
23 went down there. I sent down there the UNMOs. The
24 reports then were that they were not friendly, but
25 nothing serious happened. But going into the 12th, it
1 got more serious, it got more violent. In the end we
2 were not able to send down a patrol. Every time I got
3 a report, I tried to send down a patrol to the White
4 House. But by the end of the 12th, it was obvious we
5 were not in control anymore, because our patrols were
6 stopped by armed Serbs and outnumbered our forces
7 without, so we couldn't approach the White House
9 Q. From your memory at the time, why did they
10 want to stop the Dutch patrols moving around the White
11 House, Major Franken?
12 A. I suppose for the same reason as they stopped
13 our escorts: They didn't want witnesses.
14 Q. Now, you said earlier in your testimony that
15 it's normal procedure to separate individuals when you
16 have a large number of individuals. Is it normal
17 procedure, as far as you're aware, in international
18 law, under military law, to use violence when you
19 interrogate people?
20 A. No, absolutely not. It is forbidden, and in
21 fact there's an international law that says that a POW,
22 or somebody in that group who looks like a POW, is only
23 entitled to give his name, his rank, and his
24 registration number, and that's it, and you're not
25 allowed to force him to say more, in any way.
1 Q. Why did you conclude that there was violence
2 taking place in the White House?
3 A. Reports from my post that there was -- they
4 saw a man outside being beaten up: "We heard noises,
5 we heard yelling," et cetera.
6 Q. Those types of noises were heard coming from
7 the White House?
8 A. Cries.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you wish to
10 break at this point?
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes,
12 Mr. Cayley. I think this is a convenient time, so that
13 the witness can have some rest as well.
14 A 20-minute break.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Cayley,
18 you may continue. We have two hours of work left. We
19 will divide the remaining time in two parts, with a
20 break in between, halfway through, so you will know
21 when to ask for a break.
22 You may continue now, Mr. Cayley.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Major Franken, if I could first of all remind
25 you again to take a pause between my question and your
1 answer, and if you could speak slowly. It's very, very
2 clear, in English, what you're saying, it's just it's a
3 little bit too rapid to give the fullest translation
4 that the interpreters want to give.
5 You said earlier in your testimony that
6 Colonel Karremans had been to Bratunac on the morning
7 of the 12th of July, to meet with General Mladic. Do
8 you recall that?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Do you recall with whom Colonel Karremans
11 went to that meeting with?
12 A. Yes, with two of our liaison officers, Major
13 Boering and Warrant Officer Rave.
14 Q. Did anybody else accompany Colonel Karremans
15 on that trip; do you recall?
16 A. As far as I know, not, sir.
17 Q. Were there any representatives of the Muslim
19 A. Yes. That is correct. The representatives
20 of the Muslim community were present, three people were
22 Q. Do you recall the names of any of those
24 A. There was Mister, as I know him, Mandzic, the
25 father of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs. I
1 don't know his name. I don't recall his name, I should
2 say. And a lady, whose name I can't recollect, but
3 I've still got a picture with her.
4 Q. Now, it's the second person that you
5 mentioned that I want you to concentrate on, and you
6 said, I think in your evidence, that he was the father
7 of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs.
8 After Colonel Karremans returned, did you
9 have any contact with that man?
10 A. Yes. I had contact with him on the evening
11 of the 12th. He asked to speak to me.
12 Q. Can you tell the Judges the content of that
13 conversation that you had?
14 A. Yes. He asked me to stop the evacuation,
15 because he feared everybody would be killed by the
16 Serbs. I answered that I feared, in fact, for the men
17 as well but that, in fact, he asked me to make the
18 choice between thousands of women and children and the
19 men. And then he answered that he understood what I
20 meant, and he agreed and went away.
21 Q. If we can explore this a little bit more.
22 You said that you feared for the men as well but that
23 you had to make a choice at the time.
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. And I think I'm correct in paraphrasing your
1 evidence if I say that you had to choose between
2 thousands of women and children and the men that were
3 at the White House.
4 A. That is correct, sir.
5 Q. If you had stopped the evacuation of women
6 and children, what did you think, at the time, would
8 A. There were, in fact, two possibilities which
9 I estimated as being realistic. One of them was the
10 worst case, that Mladic would start firing upon them or
11 try to bring down the role of DutchBat to zero, so we
12 didn't have any influence at all more; secondly, he
13 could freeze the situation. Our logistics situation
14 was devastating. We did not have food and, more
15 important, we did not have water for 30.000 men,
16 people. There were no medical supplies. We didn't
17 have the necessary -- What do you call that? --
18 hygienic insulations, so we couldn't have sustained
19 that situation longer than about two or three days.
20 Q. Now, you said in your evidence that you were
21 concerned that Mladic would start firing upon "them."
22 Who do you mean by "them"?
23 A. I mean the refugees outside the camp, sir.
24 Q. Now, you say that after you had this
25 conversation with this gentleman, the father of one of
1 the interpreters of the UNMOs, that he understood what
2 you meant.
3 A. Yes. He understood obviously the problem we
4 had, the decision I had to make, and he supported the
5 decision we took. That's the impression I got of his
7 Q. Do you recall that man's name at this point?
8 A. Ibrahim. Sorry. I can't recall exactly.
9 Q. I'll lead you.
10 A. He was one of the three representatives of
11 the civil population.
12 Q. Was his surname, his last name, Nuhanovic?
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. So Mr. Ibrahim Nuhanovic.
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Now, you just stated in your evidence that
17 you discussed with him the problems with the men in the
18 White House. Did you take a decision at this time in
19 respect of those men who were in the compound?
20 A. Yes, I did. I tried to give them some
21 protection in a way Amnesty International uses.
22 Anonymous victims don't -- are not really -- it is not
23 possible to protect or to do something about anonymous
24 victims, so I suggested to the committee to register
25 all the men between the age 16 to 60, because that was
1 the age group Mladic told us he would check, register
2 them, make a list of it, and make the list public, as
3 we did, at least as we intended.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
5 Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, please.
6 Q. Major Franken, could you look through that
7 document -- I've shown it to you before -- and could
8 you tell the Judges the nature of that document?
9 A. Yes. It is a list of the major part of the
10 males in the -- between the refugees within our
11 compound, we registered their name, their first name,
12 year of birth, and place of birth, to give them an
13 identity. I counted them and signed them, and
14 afterwards I see I did some bad counting, but anyway,
15 that's the nature of that list.
16 Q. In fact, I think it says that there are 239
17 in total, but I've counted them and I make it 251. But
18 be that as it may, you say in your evidence that you
19 arranged this in order to give these men protection.
20 At the time, what did you believe they needed
21 protection from?
22 A. It was obvious that the men were not arriving
23 in the Kladanj area, on the evening of the 12th. We
24 checked that, at least at HQ. I asked there whether
25 there were men between the masses of refugees coming
1 across at the Kladanj crossing point. So at least they
2 were kept in a kind of concentration camps. In the
3 worst case, they were killed. And I tried by this list
4 to make them known to the world and perhaps give them
5 some protection by giving the Serbs the problem that
6 there were known people. They could be checked. We
7 knew who they were, who they are. That was the general
8 idea with this list, sir.
9 Q. Did you tell anybody about this list, apart
10 from the Muslims who you were dealing with inside the
12 A. I told the Serbs that I had the list, that I
13 registered the men, and I sent it by fax to the HQ of
14 Sector North-east, which was our direct higher echelon,
15 a UN HQ -- sorry, a UN headquarters. And I faxed it to
16 what we call the Crisis Staff here in The Hague, so
17 that is a Dutch headquarters, with the request to make
18 it known.
19 Q. And to your knowledge, was this list
20 published in any way?
21 A. No. It disappeared in some drawers or in any
22 bureaucratic swamp or whatever.
23 Q. Were all of the men inside the compound on
24 this list?
25 A. No. As reported to me by the committee,
1 about 70, 7-0, 70 of them did not want to give their
3 Q. You stated earlier in your testimony that
4 there were, I think you said, between 600 and 900 men
5 outside the compound. Did you consider them at all
6 while you were making this list?
7 A. Yes. The idea was to register them as well,
8 but at the very moment that our committee and
9 interpreters who we needed to speak to the men came
10 outside of the compound, they were intimidated by the
11 Serbs, and the lady, being a member of the committee,
12 was intimidated in such a harsh way that she got a
13 nervous breakdown and was to be brought to the
14 hospital, and was further in the period she stayed
15 there as a patient. So after that, our -- well, the
16 people didn't have the guts to go out. They didn't
17 have the courage to go out anymore. So that failed.
18 The registration of the men outside the compound
20 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
21 Prosecutor's 28/13.1, and if you could also get ready
22 Prosecutor's 62 and 5/3.
23 Q. Major Franken, do you recognise this man?
24 A. This is the man known to me as Colonel
1 MR. CAYLEY: Just for the purposes of the
2 record, this is Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/13.1, and the
3 witness has identified the individual as Colonel
5 Q. Did you have occasion to speak with Jankovic?
6 A. On several times --
7 Q. At about this time, on the 13th of July.
8 A. Yes. I spoke to him and -- that's correct,
9 yes. I had a contact with him.
10 Q. Do you recall what you spoke with him about?
11 A. All the details, the arrangement, and I
12 thought that this was the occasion where I informed him
13 of the existence of the list, that I informed him that
14 we had registered all men in the convoys.
15 Q. Now, you said earlier that you thought that
16 the procedure, that the treatment of the men that they
17 be separated was normal, and I think in that respect
18 you were thinking of prisoners of war. Did Jankovic
19 say to you anything about prisoners of war at that
21 A. I asked him, on several occasions, what --
22 where the men went. First he answered that there was
23 no problem, they went to a POW camp and would be
24 treated correctly, and he told me that ICRC was
25 monitoring the operation. The information we got from
1 the UN as well. That's, in fact, his answer when I
2 asked him about the men. At least twice I protested
3 about the treatment the men got at the White House, and
4 he said he'll go in for it and arrange it, but nothing
6 Q. Did he ever indicate to you the number of
7 prisoners of war that were under VRS protection?
8 A. Yes. We came to the -- and how exactly I do
9 not know, but we came to speak about the outbreak of
10 the 28th Division, and he told me that they already had
11 6.000 POWs.
12 Q. Do you recall on what date you had that
13 conversation with him?
14 A. It must have been on the 14th, sir, but I
15 don't exactly recall when, because I had quite a lot of
16 meetings with Colonel Jankovic.
17 Q. When you say "the 14th," you mean the 14th of
18 July, 1995.
19 A. Yes. Yes.
20 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
21 Prosecutor's Exhibit 62.
22 Q. This is an exhibit that I've previously shown
23 to you. Do you recognise this image?
24 A. Yes. The building you see is the so-called
25 White House. The road in front of is the road from our
1 main gate to -- the road that goes from right to
2 left -- is the road from -- sorry. The road on this
3 side [indicates], OP Papa Bratunac, going in that
4 direction, the direction of Srebrenica,
5 Potocari-Srebrenica. This is the so-called White
6 House, and this I have seen [indicates]. It was the
7 burning of the personal belongings left behind,
8 probably by the men who were separated and went to the
9 White House. I was reported that they were setting
10 fire to their belongings, and that's what I saw.
11 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record,
12 the witness pointed to the building that can be -- the
13 outline of the building which can be seen in the centre
14 of the photograph and indicates that that was the White
15 House and that the objects burning on the left-hand
16 side of the photograph were the belongings -- the
17 personal belongings of men who had been separated and
18 went to the White House.
19 Q. You saw that and that was reported to you as
20 well in the operations room.
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. At about this time, Major Franken, do you
23 recall any reports that you received from soldiers
24 within the battalion about events that had happened
25 outside the compound during the 12th and 13th of July?
1 A. Yes. On one occasion, it was reported to me
2 that they found nine dead men, dead bodies, in an area
3 directly south of the White House, near a brook, and
4 they were obviously executed, because the positions of
5 the bodies gave no occasion whatsoever that it would
6 have been as a consequence of combat.
7 And the second report I got was through
8 Colonel Karremans, that a soldier of C Company, being
9 at a post in the area of the Zinc Factory, that's one
10 of the -- there was a zinc industry, and one of the
11 buildings we used for the refugees to take shelter, and
12 he reported that he saw an actual execution of one
13 Muslim man by two Serb soldiers.
14 Q. Major Franken, if we can just return briefly
15 to the first incident, and if that exhibit can be
16 removed and Exhibit 5/3 placed on the ELMO. Who
17 reported to you, Major Franken, in respect of the nine
18 bodies by the brook?
19 A. It was Lieutenant, now Colonel Koster.
20 Q. If you recall, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3,
21 the area where he stated to you that those bodies were
23 A. Yes, I can. It was in this area, sir
25 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the
1 witness is --
2 Q. Could you point the pointer back there again,
4 A. Sure.
5 MR. CAYLEY: The witness is indicating a
6 clump of trees to the bottom -- to the middle
7 right-hand side of the picture and about seven or eight
8 centimetres to the right of two houses which are
9 prominently situated in the centre of the photograph,
10 just next to the road that runs through Potocari.
11 Q. Thank you, Major Franken.
12 The second report that you heard about in
13 respect of an individual -- let's see your exact words
14 from the transcript -- that I think a soldier had seen
15 somebody executed at the Zinc Factory. Did you take
16 that report seriously at the time?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. Why?
19 A. Well, I can't imagine somebody reporting
20 something grave like that just for fun, out of
21 imagination, and the situation was so grave that it was
22 an absolute reality, or a possibility that it could
23 have happened, and there was no reason for me to doubt
24 the words of that soldier.
25 Q. Did you know that soldier?
1 A. I don't know him by name now. He didn't
2 report it directly to me so I didn't speak to the
3 soldier. I got the report in a briefing from Colonel
5 Q. If we could now move ahead in time to the
6 17th of July of 1995, and I want you to cast your mind
7 back to a delegation who arrived at the compound. And
8 if you can tell the Judges who came on that day and
9 what they did within the UN compound.
10 A. Yes. The meeting was arranged concerning the
11 transfer of 59 patients and wounded of MSF, Medecins
12 Sans Frontiers, who were still in the compound, and a
13 number of wounded still in the Bratunac Serb hospital.
14 It was arranged that ICRC would take them over from me
15 and bring them to a safe area, and I don't mean a safe
16 area in Srebrenica, I mean a safe territory.
17 On that occasion, a Serb delegation came.
18 The leader was Colonel Jankovic; there was one civilian
19 who appeared to be, later on, the mayor, the new mayor
20 of Srebrenica; Major Nikolic was there with a
21 bodyguard; not by name known, a Colonel of the Serb
22 forces; and a Lieutenant-Colonel, being a lawyer, as he
23 indicated himself. And on my side there was later on
24 Mr. Mandzic, one of the three members of the civilian
25 committee, my G-5, a warrant officer Rave, and later on
1 the ICRC delegation. That's the, as far as I remember,
2 the complete crew in that room at that moment.
3 Q. Who were these patients, these wounded people
4 that you refer to?
5 A. Initially those were patients and wounded
6 evacuated from the civil hospital in Srebrenica, and we
7 tried before to bring out all the wounded during the
8 evacuation that failed at the crossing point in
9 Kladanj, for several reasons. When they returned, they
10 were not brought into the -- no, wrong. The Serbs did
11 not allow us to bring them back to the compound
12 partially, but took a couple of them to the hospital in
13 Bratunac. We left the Dutch doctor to watch over them
14 there, and there were still 59 wounded and patients
15 within the compound, and we're talking about those 59
16 wounded and patients of the MSF and the patients still
17 in the hospital in Bratunac.
18 Q. These people were local Bosnian Muslims from
20 A. Yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Now, this meeting took place in order to
22 facilitate their evacuation, and can you explain to the
23 Judges what you had to do in order to facilitate that
25 A. Yes, it was made clear to me that the Serbs
1 wanted a declaration in which the representative of the
2 civilian committee declared that everything went
3 according to the rules during the evacuation. At the
4 very moment it was presented to me, the declaration
5 was, it's called the Serbo-Croatic [sic] language. So
6 I said -- they asked me to sign it as a witness. I
7 said that I wanted to have it translated because I was
8 not going to sign any declaration in Serbo-Croat,
9 seeing the fact that I don't speak or can't read the
10 language, and I had my own interpreters translate it
11 into English.
12 Meanwhile, it was made clear to me that the
13 transport and the operation and the transport of the
14 wounded on our compound and the wounded in the Bratunac
15 hospital would be favourably influenced by that
16 declaration, to say, facilitate it, accelerate it, the
17 procedure, et cetera. So I had it --
18 Q. Major Franken, if I can interrupt you at this
19 point --
20 A. Sure.
21 Q. -- and just show you Prosecutor's Exhibit
23 Major Franken, do you recognise this
25 A. Yes. This is a document, a list with names
1 and birth years, et cetera, made by the MSF, as being
2 part of the standard procedure for getting a clearance
3 for a movement through VRS territory.
4 Q. And the 59 individuals listed on this list,
5 who are these people?
6 A. These are the same 59 people that I spoke of,
7 the 59 patients of MSF, in their custody, on the
9 Q. Were all of these people evacuated from the
10 UN compound?
11 A. In the end, yes. The problem was ICRC did
12 not have enough capacity on the spot to transport the
13 people, so they asked me to provide transport for seven
14 men and I granted that. I sent that truck with those
15 seven men down to Bratunac. I had it accompanied by an
16 UNMO Major De Haan. In Bratunac, he transferred them
17 to the ICRC again.
18 Q. Did you subsequently hear reports in respect
19 of those seven men?
20 A. Yes. It proved out that ICRC was not taking
21 them with them, for reasons not known to me. They
22 stayed in Bratunac. ICRC would monitor them, so
23 overlook them. I spoke to you before about the doctor
24 still in the Bratunac hospital, and he was called away
25 for lunch or whatever, and when he came back, the seven
1 men had disappeared. When he asked for them, he was
2 told that he better not ask if he wanted to return
3 safely to the compound.
4 Q. The doctor, who was he?
5 A. Colonel Schouten. He was one of our
7 Q. He was a Dutch army surgeon?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Do you have any idea to this day where those
10 seven men went to?
11 A. I fear they have -- well, at least they
12 disappeared. Whether they are still in some kind of a
13 camp, but probably they're dead.
14 Q. And these were all wounded individuals.
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Indeed, if you look at the list in front of
17 you, and you and I have reviewed this, and it's a
18 combination of male and female, which is indicated by
19 the "M" and "F," there are some elderly people, elderly
20 males on this list, are there not, Major Franken?
21 A. There are, absolutely. There is 1910, 1913,
22 1914, et cetera.
23 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be
24 shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 47A and 47B.
25 Q. Major Franken, you were -- you began to speak
1 of a declaration which you witnessed, and if you could
2 place the document that you signed on the ELMO in front
3 of you, and I think you also have an English
4 translation that is also in front of you. 47A is the
5 official English translation; 47B is the field
6 translation which you were referring to in your
7 evidence, which you requested before you signed it,
8 because you didn't understand the Serbo-Croat
10 Just to confirm, Major Franken, for the
11 purposes of the transcript, is this the document that
12 you witnessed?
13 A. That is correct. This is that document.
14 Q. I'd like to refer you to the -- what I would
15 call the operative paragraphs of this declaration. It
16 states the following was agreed, and I want to ask you
17 about each of these particular statements.
18 The agreement states that: "The civilian
19 population can remain in the enclave or evacuate,
20 dependent upon the wish of each individual."
21 Major Franken, is that a real statement?
22 A. I understand that General Mladic made that
23 statement, but hardly any realistic statement because
24 the fate of those who wanted to stay, even if they
25 could, was, let's say, uncertain. And in the end,
1 there was not a choice. Mladic ordered the population
2 to go to Kladanj, period.
3 Q. If we could now move to the next section.
4 "In the event that we wish to evacuate, it is possible
5 for us to choose the direction of our movement and have
6 decided that the entire population is to evacuate to
7 the territory of the County of Kladanj."
8 Major Franken, is this true?
9 A. No, it is not. You can't say that the
10 committee or Mr. Mandzic did decide anything. It was
11 dictated by Mladic that the evacuation would take place
12 to the crossing point at the Kladanj county. There's
13 not a choice, it was dictated.
14 Q. And the final paragraph: "It has been agreed
15 that the evacuation is to be carried out by the Army
16 and Police of the Republic of Srpska, supervised and
17 escorted by UNPROFOR."
18 A. That's about the same story. As far as I
19 know, Mladic demanded that it had to be carried out
20 like this, and there has been, as far as I know, any
21 contact between UN level. What level, I don't know.
22 And they -- by consequence they ordered us to assist or
23 to facilitate the evacuation. But it's not a choice
24 that it was done by the army and police of the
25 Republika Srpska, it was one of the demands of Mladic,
1 and obviously the UN was not able to counter that
3 Q. It then states: "After the agreement had
4 been reached, I assert that the evacuation was carried
5 out by the Serb side correctly and the clauses of the
6 agreement had been adhered to."
7 What do you say to that, Major Franken?
8 A. Well, it's not correct, and if you take the
9 last sentence, I added there that it would have been
10 that way, as far as convoys actually escorted by UN
11 forces are concerned, and none of them actually were
12 escorted in the military sense of the word by UN
13 forces. So that made for me this declaration
14 absolutely worthless. Perhaps to make clear what I
15 mean, with an actual escort, if you have a party of ten
16 buses going over a road, in covered terrain with a lot
17 of crews, you almost have to put a UN vehicle between
18 each bus to really escort them, to have constantly a
19 view of what's happening on that convoy. As you know,
20 we were not able to do that. Our escort was, when it
21 succeeded a few times, was just one jeep, riding
23 Q. Now, you stated in response to my question
24 that you added in a sentence, and I think you're
25 talking about the phrase in the very last paragraph,
1 where it states: "As far as convoys actually escorted
2 by UN forces are concerned."
3 How did the Bosnian Serbs react when you
4 added that phrase?
5 A. There were two reactions: The
6 Lieutenant Colonel who said he was a lawyer got mad and
7 started a pretty frantic discussion with his
8 colleagues, and Colonel Jankovic, well, reacted as,
9 "Let it be." Those were the two reactions that I
10 could see.
11 Q. Now, you've stated in your evidence that you
12 regard this declaration as absolutely worthless.
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Why did you sign it?
15 A. Well, as I told you, the message came to me
16 that in order to be sure that those 59 wounded and
17 patients and the civilians, and the patients wounded in
18 Bratunac, could get away with the Red Cross, the
19 signing of this declaration would be in favour of the
20 procedure and accelerate the procedure. And in my
21 opinion, making the declaration worthless, I could sign
22 that with the effect that it at least favoured the
23 routine with the wounded. That was my idea; that was
24 my motivation to sign it.
25 Q. We can leave that subject now, and I just
1 have two areas that I want to briefly cover with you.
2 I want you to think about the 12th and the
3 13th of July again, generally. The military operation
4 that you saw taking place. You mentioned General
5 Mladic a moment ago. Were you aware that he was at the
6 compound at Potocari on either of those dates, on the
7 12th and 13th of July?
8 A. He was not at the compound itself, he was at
9 the area outside, so the Potocari parameter where the
10 refugees were. Yes, that was reported to me.
11 Q. In your opinion, why was General Mladic
12 outside the compound?
13 A. Seeing the presence of Serb cameras, et
14 cetera, it was some kind of public relations or what we
15 call media operations trick.
16 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier in your evidence
17 that you assessed that this was a corps operation
18 taking place.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. When you look back now, why do you assess
21 that Mladic was present, since he was the chief of the
22 Main Staff, the Commander in Chief of the army?
23 A. Well, propaganda or public relations issues,
24 being the big hero of the Serb forces, showing off,
25 because where he appeared, there were cameras, as far
1 as we know. But was he really in the lead there, I
2 doubt that.
3 Q. When you say "in the lead," what do you mean
4 by that?
5 A. Actually commanding the troops on the spot,
6 because that would be highly unusual in a military
7 way. It's a high commander who passes all levels in
8 between and then interfering with details, he's making
9 a mess of an operation within a couple of hours.
10 Q. Who, in your opinion, would have been in
11 control of the operation that you're referring to?
12 A. Without naming a person, but it should have
13 been the commander of the corps level who was involved
14 in the operation, the commander and staff of that
15 corps. That would be a military norm.
16 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown
17 Prosecutor's Exhibit 45.
18 Q. Major Franken, I've shown you this photograph
19 previously. Do you recognise this man?
20 A. Yes, I recognise this man by face.
21 Q. Do you know where you've seen him previously?
22 A. Yes. I must -- not an exact probability.
23 Let's say it this way: Somewhere around the 12th,
24 13th, or 14th of July, and the most probable occasion
25 is when I met the first time with Colonel Ademovic
1 [Realtime transcript read in error "Erdemovic"] outside
2 the compound, because there was a circle of officers
3 discussing things, and I'm sure that I saw this man
5 Q. Major Franken, could you stand up and look
6 around the courtroom and see if you recognise anybody.
7 A. Yes. That's the man [indicates].
8 Q. Can you describe what the gentleman is
10 A. He was in a camouflage uniform.
11 Q. At the time that you saw him. Can you
12 describe what he's wearing now?
13 A. Sorry. A dark suit, a dotted tie, and a
14 light blue shirt.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show,
16 Mr. President, that the witness has identified the
18 Mr. President, I have no further questions
19 for the witness. I can now offer him for
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
22 Mr. Cayley.
23 I think that perhaps it will be better to now
24 make a break, rather than do it during the
25 cross-examination. Therefore, we shall now make a
1 15-minute break.
2 --- Recess taken at 1.11 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.30 p.m.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Now, Major
5 Franken, you will answer questions -- excuse me. I do
6 see Mr. Cayley.
7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to
8 interrupt you, but it was pointed out to me in the
9 break, and it's now just disappeared off the
10 transcript, that at line 1, of page 85, the name of an
11 individual was stated as "Erdemovic," and in fact what
12 the witness said at the time was "Ademovic." You can't
13 see it on the screen because it's scrolled over, but
14 just I thought I would point it out to the Court, and I
15 think it can also be corrected in the transcript when
16 the court reporter actually listens to the recording
18 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
20 Thank you very much, Mr. Cayley. Yes. The transcript
21 will be corrected.
22 As I was saying, Major, you will now answer
23 questions which Mr. Visnjic, I think, yes, Mr. Visnjic,
24 the Defence counsel for General Krstic, will ask you.
25 Yes, Mr. Visnjic, you have the floor.
1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,
2 Mr. President.
3 Cross-examined by Mr. Visnjic:
4 Q. Major Franken, I should like us to go back to
5 the beginning of your stay in the protected area of
6 Srebrenica, that is, the first months of your duty
7 there. According to our information, you tried to
8 normalise relations between the parties to the conflict
9 on several occasions, and one of such attempts was to
10 establish trade between the parties. Could you tell
11 the Chamber something more about that?
12 A. Yes, I could, although I was not personally
13 involved in that action. It came to me that from the
14 Serb side there was a proposal to open trade to the
15 enclave, on conditions like those already used in the
16 area of Gorazde. I know that there were a couple of
17 meetings concerning that proposal, which tried to
18 arrange details for that trade. That is correct.
19 Q. Did it ever come to fruition? Was this
20 agreement, this understanding, put through?
21 A. No. In the end, it was not. There never was
22 any formal trade between the Serbs and the Muslims
23 within the enclave, in our period.
24 Q. Would you know, why was this proposal on the
25 Serb side rejected?
1 A. The only thing I know is that it was
2 rejected, rejected by the leaders of the 28th Division,
3 then still called 8-0G. The formal reason was that
4 they didn't want to trade with the Serbs. That is what
5 came to my ...
6 Q. Major Franken, in your view, would have this
7 trade perhaps made the life of the civilian population
8 easier? I mean, food supplies and whatever other
10 A. If the trade would have concerned food
11 supplies or medical supplies, it indeed would
12 have enlightened the faith of the population.
13 Q. And in the end this was to be the trade in
14 food, medicines, and similar things, according to the
15 proposal, rather than trading weapons.
16 A. Yes. But the same goal could have been
17 achieved by allowing UN convoys to enter the enclave,
18 which the Serbs did not.
19 Q. Major Franken, was there, in the Srebrenica
20 enclave, a kind of a black market, trade in foodstuffs
21 and other necessities for the civilian population?
22 A. There was a market where things were traded,
23 like cigarettes and things like that. That's correct.
24 Q. And was food also sold on that black market,
25 in addition to cigarettes, I mean food and other basic
2 A. Yes, in small amounts, it was.
3 Q. And from the information that you gathered,
4 in one way or the other, would you know who was in
5 control of that black market?
6 A. Probably as we found out, there was some
7 leadership of the enclave involved in the black
8 market. We knew of the existence of a pony express, as
9 we called it, between the enclave of Zepa and the
10 enclave Srebrenica.
11 Q. Could we infer then that they wouldn't be
12 very happy if normal trade, normal commerce, were
13 established between the Serb and the Muslim side?
14 A. Yeah, probably, I suppose. But don't ask me
15 that question, ask them.
16 Q. My next question relates to the situation
17 regarding the taking of the OP Echo. Could you tell
18 the Chamber when did that happen, and explain the
19 situation which preceded -- which preceded the taking
20 of the OP Echo.
21 A. Yes. As far as I recollect, the attack on OP
22 Echo was on the 6th or the 8th of June, June with "N,"
23 November. I got a report early in the morning, there
24 was movement in the factory, in front of OP Echo, Serb
25 infantry was recognised. And then there was a voice by
1 an amplifier, whatever you call a thing like that, who
2 said that we had to leave OP Echo and there was a
3 deadline, I suppose. As I recollect, the deadline was
4 one hour or something like that.
5 Q. Near that OP was a furniture factory or a
6 timber processing plant. Were there any problems
7 before between the Muslim and the Serb side regarding
8 the use of that factory?
9 A. Yes. Muslims frequently tried to get in to
10 fetch wood or furniture, what was in that factory.
11 They said that the factory used to be a Muslim
12 factory. The Serbs always protested to the fact that
13 the Muslims entered the factory. In fact, we tried to
14 avoid that, that there was always trespassing into that
16 By patrolling in the area, and actually we
17 had a request to Serb forces to grant us material to
18 close it down, so I mean barbed wire, et cetera, et
19 cetera. As you probably know, the Serb forces actually
20 controlled the contents and the amount and the quantity
21 of the convoys coming into the enclave. So I
22 personally said to Colonel Vukovic, if you want us --
23 if you want to take out that possible source of
24 conflict, then let us bring in equipment so we can
25 close down that factory for both the Serb and Muslim
1 side. I never got that convoy granted.
2 Q. Who owned the factory at that time, or rather
3 could you tell us in whose territory was the factory?
4 A. The factory, a small part was on the Muslim
5 side of the UN enclave and a major part was on the Serb
6 side of the UN boundary of the enclave. So the
7 boundary, UN boundary, went across that factory. In
8 fact, we proposed to the Serbs to shift OP Echo further
9 down southwards, on the very edge of the UN boundary,
10 but they did not grant us that. They didn't want
12 Q. And in consequence, after the attack on the
13 OP Echo, this boundary shifted, or rather the OP Echo
14 moved into the depths of the territory, towards the
15 town of Srebrenica.
16 A. The boundary did not shift, but we were
17 forced to leave the boundary. The UN boundary was
18 still in its place, but we were not allowed to
19 overwatch it. We could not overwatch it after the
21 Q. In your view, why was the OP Echo taken?
22 What was the reason behind?
23 A. As we analysed it, the Serb forces wanted
24 free use of the road [Realtime transcript read in error
25 "word"] to Zeleni Jadar in the general western
1 direction going across or passing the mining areas
2 south of the enclave. Sorry, I see here in the script
3 that I'm wrongly translated. I said, the free use of
4 the road in the direction of -- west of Zeleni Jadar,
5 in the western direction, going. I mean this one
6 [indicates]. By having the area of the factory, the
7 small parts but essential parts of that road within the
8 Muslim territory were controlled by the Serb forces,
9 and that's what we thought as the deeper reason after
10 the attack of Echo, or behind the attack of Echo.
11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] For the record,
12 the witness indicated the road leading from Zeleni
13 Jadar to Milici, from Zeleni Jadar to the west and on
14 to Milici.
15 Q. And the enclave was attacked about a month
17 A. No. In fact, the enclave was attacked at the
18 very moment the Serb forces attacked OP Echo.
19 Q. Yes. But was that attack directly related to
20 events which took place a month later?
21 A. Yes. We analysed it as being a test case,
22 test case in the sense of will the UN react with air
23 support as they -- because one of the criteria for air
24 support was a direct attack on the UN force or a UN
25 establishment. That did not occur. There was no
1 counterattack by Muslim forces, and there was not a
2 real counterattack by UN forces. So we analysed it as
3 being a test case for the following attack on the
4 enclave in July.
5 Q. You said that there were three boundaries, or
6 rather three lines of conflict, three lines of
7 confrontation. Could we then say that conflicts prior
8 to July mostly took place along the boundaries of the
9 enclave and were due to the fact that both sides
10 refused to recognise the boundary as conceived, as
11 defined, by the other side?
12 A. Well, of course we can say anything, but it's
13 not applicable because after the Serb forces attacked
14 Srebrenica, there was no option that the boundary of
15 the UN enclave was in the city of Srebrenica. So if
16 you state that the conflicts -- sorry. I have to
17 correct that. You said that the conflicts prior to
18 July. I misread that. Sorry.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. I suppose so, yes, that's correct.
21 Q. Major Franken, did you have the information
22 that Muslim forces came out of the enclave and entered
23 the Serb territory?
24 A. Yes. As I stated before, I had two actual
25 reports of incidents. That was the incident south of
1 Zeleni Jadar, being an ambush where Serb soldiers were
2 killed, and an action of Muslim soldiers north of our
3 observation post Mike, as I stated before.
4 Q. Within the agreement on demilitarisation, was
5 it envisaged that your forces should go out of the
6 enclave and either prevent or constrain Muslim forces,
7 prevent them from leaving the enclave, or having some
8 control over happenings outside the enclave?
9 A. No, it was not emphasised that we went out of
10 the enclave.
11 Q. You told us during your examination-in-chief
12 about some of the difficulties that you encountered as
13 you tried to demilitarise the enclave. In your view,
14 what was the -- how many troops were needed in order to
15 demilitarise the enclave successfully? Did you feel
16 that you were too short of men and equipment to
17 completely demilitarise the enclave?
18 A. I've already stated that one of the reasons
19 that we were not able to demilitarise was a juridical
20 problem as not being allowed to enter houses; that's
21 one problem we had. The second problem was that if we
22 wanted to do that quickly with the consent of entering
23 houses, we would have needed two or three battalions,
24 and I mean battalions of the size that we were.
25 Q. In your previous statement, you described the
1 type of weapons that used to belong to Muslim forces
2 and that were controlled by your battalion. Could you
3 tell us, to your knowledge, which armaments did the
4 28th Division have, which was not under your control?
5 A. Mainly light armament, and I mean assault
6 rifles of the type Kalashnikov, probably a number of
7 machine-guns and light mortars.
8 Q. How did the Muslim forces come by, obtain
9 their weaponry?
10 A. We do not know. You can make all kinds of
11 assumptions. We assumed that they came down with the
12 so-called pony express from Zepa, and there were
13 reports of helicopter landings. I should say "supposed
14 helicopter landings".
15 Q. Could you tell us, in your view, how strong
16 was the 28th Division?
17 A. Combat power is not only a case of amount of
18 weapons, but in our esteem, they had about 4.000, 4.500
19 [Realtime transcript read in error "5.000"] men
20 weaponed, armed with Kalashnikov or equivalents. No,
21 that's wrong. I said 4.000 to 4.500.
22 Q. Apart from some observation posts, Muslims
23 soldiers also dug trenches and fortified their
24 positions. Was it in line with the technical joint
25 defence that you mentioned during your
2 A. I did not mention a tactical coordinated
3 defence, I mentioned a hypothetical discussion about
4 what would happen and what if. They dug trenches, that
5 is correct, but they did it, indeed, apart from the
6 observation posts, and the observation posts were not
7 an integrated part of those trenches.
8 Q. During your examination-in-chief, you mention
9 an incident in which a Dutch soldier was killed.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Could you tell us something more about the
12 incident? And how did he die?
13 A. Yes. It concerns the crew who was in the
14 position on OP Foxtrot, one of our observation posts in
15 the south-eastern part of the enclave. After being
16 shelled for a couple of days, and a Serb attack
17 withdrawal -- local withdrawal of the BiH forces, OP
18 Foxtrot found itself amidst Serb infantry. They were
19 allowed to withdraw to Srebrenica, and on the road back
20 to Srebrenica they encountered a Muslim roadblock. The
21 commander of the APC didn't trust the situation because
22 the men on the roadblock were very excited, they had
23 weapons, and he ordered them to go, as we call it,
24 under armour, so close all the hatches, and then
25 proceed. Obviously the gunner didn't succeed in
1 closing his hatch as fast as necessary, and he was shot
2 by one of the men at the roadblock.
3 He came to the compound alive but died pretty
4 shortly after.
5 Q. And the barricade was put up by Muslim
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. In your testimony in chief, you said that
9 your troops stayed at some OPs, observation posts,
10 until the arrival of the Serb troops. Could you tell
11 us something about the instruction or the order that
12 you received, directive, issued to that effect to your
14 A. I did not receive an order, I gave the
15 order. Seeing the fact that we had problems with local
16 BiH commanders performing their own war, not following
17 the directives of their own division, I gave an order
18 that they were to withdraw only in consent with the
19 local BiH commander. The reason for that was the
20 killing of soldier Renssen. If they could not
21 coordinate the withdrawal of their OP, then they had to
22 stay in place and wait for things to happen, and in
23 fact that meant wait until Serb forces made contact.
24 Q. Does that mean that you feared that the
25 Muslim forces might also treat the UN forces as hostile
2 A. Not in general, but we were not sure where
3 [Realtime transcript read in error "whether"] they
4 would or would not.
5 That's wrong. It's not "whether they would
6 or would not," "where they would." So locally there
7 were BiH commanders who allowed us to move with our
8 APCs; on other spots, there were BiH commanders locally
9 who did not want us to stay and not move. So where the
10 consent was not achieved, our troops had orders to stay
11 in place.
12 Q. And do you know the reason why, at some
13 point, the men of the 28th Division withdrew from the
14 defence lines and left, abandoned the defence of
16 A. No. I can only guess.
17 Q. What is your opinion?
18 A. Well, later on we heard that the 28th
19 Division broke -- tried to break out in the direction
20 of Tuzla, that could have been one of the reasons; and
21 an order from their higher echelon to maintain the mass
22 of the 28th Division and not sacrificing them in the
23 defence of the enclave. But again it's all
24 speculation, what I'm doing now.
25 Q. I should like to move on to the 11th of July,
1 that is, the period between the 8th and the 11th of
2 July, while the enclave was exposed to an attack coming
3 from the southern direction.
4 Could you indicate on the map what were the
5 main lines of attack of the Serbian army?
6 A. Yes. And then I have to give that out of
7 what was reported to me because we didn't have an
8 overview over the complete enclave. We had an overview
9 inside, around the area of Srebrenica.
10 The main axis of attack was, in fact, the
11 road Zeleni Jadar in a northern direction.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the other microphone be
13 switched on as well, please.
14 THE WITNESS: I need a microphone. This
15 one? Okay. I'll try it in this way.
16 A. The main axis of attack was the road between
17 Zeleni Jadar and Srebrenica, so directly from the
18 south, advancing in a northern direction. Later on
19 there was an attack from the northern, but then
20 Srebrenica already fell.
21 And we know of another axis of attack from
22 the region of Zeleni Jadar, in a western direction, in
23 this area [indicates], alongside the Jadar River, the
24 valley of the Jadar River. But we didn't have -- we
25 only could monitor that till our OPs were taken out.
1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. You testified that as your troops were
3 withdrawing from Srebrenica, the B Company was
4 following the refugees, trying to protect them from
5 possible contact with the Serb troops.
6 In accordance with what you have just stated,
7 the B Company was actually between the refugees moving
8 towards Potocari and the Serb forces coming --
9 advancing from south, towards north. Could you tell
10 us, did any contact occur between the B Company and the
11 Serbian army troops, and where exactly did the Serb
12 troops stop?
13 A. There was contact between B Company and Serb
14 troops. A position at the west of Srebrenica was under
15 fire of Serb tanks. On the -- already on the 10th --
16 on the evening of the 10th, an infantry came down to
17 the city; we answered that with fire and they
18 withdrew. And there was fire contact in the sense of
19 artillery fire and tank fire.
20 Q. So where did the Serb forces coming from the
21 south stop?
22 A. [Indicates]. They tried to come down the
23 slope from this area [indicates], down to the city, and
24 as we opened fire, they withdrew. And there was
25 fighting in the area of OP Hotel, which was an OP, an
1 observation post, directly east of the city, about 600,
2 700 metres in front of that OP. There was fighting
3 between BiH forces and Serb forces.
4 Q. On the 11th of July, your forces withdrew to
5 the Potocari base; is that correct?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Did the Serb forces, which were attacking the
8 town, also move in the direction of Potocari?
9 A. Not directly in front of us, but they did on
10 our flanks. That was, as I stated before, the reason
11 that I ordered the company to withdraw.
12 Q. Could you tell us where, on the 11th of July,
13 did the Serb forces stop?
14 A. I don't know the exact coordinate where they
15 were seen last, but it's in this area [indicates]. I'm
16 pointing to a location on higher grounds, parallel to
17 the northern part of the city. It was the last report
18 I got that Serb infantry was present. And we lost
19 contact with Serb forces halfway down the road between
20 Srebrenica and Potocari.
21 Q. If I understand you correctly, Serb forces
22 stopped at Srebrenica, or perhaps halfway towards
23 Potocari, and that was your last contact with them.
24 I'm referring to the Serb forces which were advancing
25 from the south, towards the north of the enclave.
1 A. I couldn't state that they stopped. The only
2 thing that I can say is that we lost contact with them,
3 and the last report was on the location I gave you.
4 Whether they entered Srebrenica, I do not know. We
5 couldn't see that because following withdrawing with
6 the tail of the column of refugees, we in front had not
7 more than 100, 150 metres line of fire because of the
8 buildings, et cetera, et cetera. So whether in that
9 moment there were Serb soldiers in the very town of
10 Srebrenica and in the area west and east, out of our
11 sight, I could not state that.
12 Q. Thank you. You testified during your
13 examination-in-chief about contacts with the United
14 Nations headquarters. I assume it was Colonel
15 Karremans who maintained those contacts in general.
16 And you also talked about their position about the
17 evacuation. Could you tell us something more about
19 A. That's correct. It was Colonel Karremans who
20 had those contacts, so all the information I have is
21 from hearsay, by briefings from his side. I know that
22 in the morning of the -- the evening of the 11th or on
23 the morning of the 12th, we got the order again to --
24 or again to defend the position Potocari. Colonel
25 Karremans informed the UN that it was impossible; I
1 described the situation to you before, being in
2 positions 20, 30 metres from a massive amount of
4 I got through Colonel Karremans the message
5 that the UN ordered us to facilitate the evacuation, as
6 it was called at that time. That's about all I can
7 state about that.
8 Q. During the examination-in-chief, you gave us
9 an estimate of males who were in your base in Potocari
10 and the number of men outside the base, outside the
12 As regards the first figure, I understand,
13 more or less, how you managed to establish it, that it
14 was thanks to the list and the registration that took
15 place. But could you tell me how you managed to assess
16 the number of men outside the compound?
17 A. Yes. We -- it was assessed by the local
18 guard commanders, officers of DutchBat who were in
19 command outside the compound, and asked for it, gave me
20 that number. I've been down there myself. It was
21 extremely difficult to make an estimation of that
22 amount because it was one big crowd, and then it is
23 difficult to esteem what exactly are males, et cetera.
24 But we took that figure for -- reliable for granted
1 Q. According to your estimate, how many refugees
2 were there inside the base and around the base?
3 A. Well, we had about 5.000 refugees inside the
4 base, and there were about 25.000, up to 30.000
5 [Realtime transcript read in error "2.500, up to
6 3.000"] refugees outside the base.
7 Q. At the end of your testimony, you described
8 how you saw General Krstic in the vicinity of the base,
9 accompanied by a number of other high-ranking
10 officers. Could you remember the time of the day when
11 it took place?
12 A. I said that it was at the meeting, at the
13 first meeting I had with Colonel Acamovic, and it would
14 have been on the 12th, afternoon, around 1400, 1500
15 hours. But again it's four and a half years ago, so
16 the esteem in time [sic], it was in that afternoon.
17 Q. My next question is probably equally
18 difficult for you. Could you tell us approximately how
19 long the General stayed in the area?
20 A. No, I can't. I know that I was in that area
21 for about ten minutes. I did not know that it was a
22 general and General Krstic. I recognised the face. I
23 was not introduced to him or anything like that. So I
24 can't tell you, when I went away, whether this person
25 stayed or went away as well. I don't know.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
2 Mr. Visnjic, I apologise for interrupting you, but as
3 far as I can see on the record, on page 103, as regards
4 the number of refugees, I heard the French
5 interpretation which was 25.000 to 30.000 refugees, and
6 here I can see "2.500, up to 3.000."
7 Could the witness once again tell us the
8 number of refugees that were outside the base.
9 A. Yes, I can, Your Honour. "2.500" is the
10 wrong figure. The correct figure is 25.000, up till
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well,
13 then. In this way, we can correct the transcript.
14 Sorry I had to interrupt you, but I wanted to
15 intervene while it was still on the screen. Thank
17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Let me go back once again to the time you saw
19 General Krstic in a group of some other high-ranking
20 officers. Did you notice, did you observe, that he was
21 giving orders at the time or was he involved in any
22 other such activity?
23 A. There was a discussion going on. I can't say
24 because I don't even have the slightest understanding
25 of Serbo-Croatic. But whether they were discussing any
1 other issue, I don't know. But it was not a line-up,
2 like issuing orders in a very formal way.
3 Q. Thank you very much, Major Franken.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,
5 this concludes my cross-examination.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you
7 very much, Mr. Visnjic, for your questions.
8 Mr. Cayley, do you have any additional
10 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. No, I
11 have nothing to ask the witness in re-examination.
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you,
14 Mr. Cayley.
15 Judge Fouad Riad.
16 JUDGE RIAD: [Interpretation] Thank you,
17 Mr. President.
18 Questioned by the Court:
19 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Major Franken, or
20 as you say in this country, "Goedemiddag."
21 A. Thank you.
22 JUDGE RIAD: Of course, you are an officer of
23 a high grade, especially when you were deputy commander
24 with the UN, and in this quality, perhaps you can give
25 us some kind of global assessment of the events you
1 lived at that time. My questions are very limited to
2 three or four.
3 The first, perhaps not in any order, the
4 first concerning the evacuation. You heard Colonel
5 Karremans saying, I don't remember the words exactly,
6 that the UN had agreed that this evacuation would be
7 undertaken by the Serb forces. Is that right?
8 A. That's correct. That's what Colonel
9 Karremans told me as well, sir.
10 JUDGE RIAD: Yes. I put this in connection
11 with other affirmations which you said. You said
12 you -- considering the history, that is, you were
13 saying that, considering the history of the Serb side,
14 not directly in the area of Srebrenica but on the
15 whole, "I expected the Serb forces to start killing
16 civilians indiscriminately." In other words, that
17 would be delivering the Srebrenican people to their
18 butchers, if I put your statement with the decision to
19 let the Serbs evacuate them.
20 A. That is correct, sir. I had those fears.
21 JUDGE RIAD: And then what did you call
22 "evacuation"? Does it mean that all the people of
23 Srebrenica were meant to leave, to be taken away?
24 A. That is correct as well, sir.
25 JUDGE RIAD: Then that is another word called
2 A. That is correct, but in the stage I made --
3 in that time frame, the word still was "evacuation" for
4 me, so I used that word as well.
5 JUDGE RIAD: So it was a planned
7 A. Yes.
8 JUDGE RIAD: Which the UN authorised.
9 A. That's, in fact, correct, sir.
10 JUDGE RIAD: And which it was given to be
11 performed by the Serbs.
12 A. That's what I was briefed by Colonel
13 Karremans. That is correct, sir.
14 JUDGE RIAD: Now, you also spoke about the
15 demilitarisation, and the demilitarisation amounted to
16 the fact of taking away all the weapons of the
17 civilians of Srebrenica, of the enclave, but not of the
18 Serbs surrounding the enclave.
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 JUDGE RIAD: The Serbs surrounding the
21 enclave were heavily armed.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 JUDGE RIAD: And it was supposed to be a
24 deterrent to any future, let's say, war between them.
25 A. Yes. Our initial mission was to deter any
1 offensive operation into the enclave, sir.
2 JUDGE RIAD: So by demilitarising one party
3 completely and leaving the other party stronger and
4 stronger, this is a deterrent?
5 A. We had problems with our mission as well,
7 JUDGE RIAD: Then we speak of your mission.
8 Your mission also was unable to protect them.
9 A. That's correct, sir.
10 JUDGE RIAD: So they are disarmed completely,
11 with your mission unable to protect them, with the
12 Serbs highly militarised, and according to your
13 statement, which I will not repeat, they would kill
15 A. That is correct, sir.
16 JUDGE RIAD: Now, the list of men which you
17 spoke about, who were between 16 and 60, of course your
18 view was to make it public.
19 A. That's correct.
20 JUDGE RIAD: But it disappeared.
21 A. In the sector north-east, the HQ initially
22 said that they didn't receive it. But from looking
23 afterwards, they discovered that they did receive them
24 but they didn't do anything with it. And the Dutch HQ,
25 a staff officer received it, didn't understand the
1 meaning of it, allegedly called the battalion in the
2 Potocari area and had a staff officer saying to them
3 that he also didn't know what it was all about, and
4 they put it in a drawer, sir.
5 JUDGE RIAD: But it was also put in the hands
6 of the Serbs.
7 A. No, the list was not given to the Serbs. I
8 told the Serbs that I had registered all the men in the
10 JUDGE RIAD: You're sure it did not fall into
11 their hands.
12 A. No, absolutely not, sir. Moreover, I brought
13 the list with me, out of the enclave, in my underpants
14 to be sure that it would not go in the hands of the
16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. Thank you
17 for coming.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you
20 very much, Judge Riad.
21 Judge Wald.
22 JUDGE WALD: Major Franken, you testified
23 early on that when it became apparent that the UN had
24 neither the ability nor maybe the will to defend
25 Srebrenica that you gave an order to guide the refugees
1 on to Potocari.
2 At that point did you or any of your
3 superiors, to your knowledge, have any kind of a plan
4 of what would happen when those 25.000 to 30.000 to
5 35.000 people got into Potocari on a very hot day,
6 without -- I mean, suppose the Serbs had never come
7 forward in any meeting with General Mladic to say,
8 "We'll evacuate them." I mean, what was going to
9 happen to them when they got there?
10 A. Seeing the amount of supplies and the water,
11 as the most important issue in this weather for little
12 children, et cetera, there would have been a
13 humanitarian disaster if there was not any resupply.
14 That was one of the reasons that I gave Mr. Ibrahim --
15 the father of one of the interpreters. Sorry, I lost
16 his name again -- for our decision or for the
17 impossibility to stop the evacuation at a later phase.
18 If the Serbs wouldn't have done anything and
19 just would have left us there with those 30.000 people,
20 where children were born, people were dying, without us
21 having the logistics supplies, medical, eat, food,
22 water, et cetera, yeah, it's almost cynical to say the
23 problem would have solved itself.
24 JUDGE WALD: So to your knowledge there was
25 no plans afoot at the UN to try to mobilise
1 humanitarian organisations or anything to do anything
2 once they got up to Potocari.
3 A. No, seeing the fact that we got orders to
4 defend the Potocari parameter, even if necessary with
5 defensive air support, and two hours later we got the
6 order to facilitate the deportation, it was obvious
7 there was no plan on the UN side.
8 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Later on you talked about
9 a conversation you had in which you talked to the
10 father of the UN interpreter, and you two seemed both
11 to recognise that there might be some kind of very
12 tragic trade-off between what was going to happen to
13 the men in Potocari and being able to get the women and
14 children away on buses.
15 What kind of assurance, or why were you even
16 convinced that the women and children on the buses
17 would be okay?
18 A. Because I got that confirmed from the UN
19 side, from the Kladanj area, where reports came in
20 through the HQ, headquarters, of sector north-east,
21 that massively women and children were crossing the
22 border and coming in. So I assumed that they were
23 relatively safe.
24 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question is: As
25 far as the list of the 219 or 250 men that you compiled
1 inside the compound, were you or anyone else, to your
2 knowledge, ever able to find out later on whether any
3 of those men survived, came out on the other side?
4 A. My hope was that -- well, I was not able to
5 check that because I went back to Holland, and that was
6 it. But I hoped the UN or ICRC, or whatever
7 organisation, would take it up and check whether they
8 were still alive. But to my knowledge, nobody did.
9 JUDGE WALD: So you don't know.
10 A. No.
11 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you, Major
13 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. You said that nobody
14 did survive, or you don't know?
15 A. No. Nobody did pick up that list to check
16 whether they did survive, sir. That's what I meant.
17 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you
19 very much, Judge Wald.
20 Major Franken, I too have a couple of
21 questions for you.
22 At one point, in response to a question put
23 to you by the Prosecutor, you said that somebody had
24 said that no refugees would be allowed in the UN base.
25 A. Somebody is -- it was a demand of General
1 Mladic, he demanded that no refugees were to be let
2 into our base. He said that and threatened with
3 artillery if it happened.
4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] When did he
5 say that, on what date, more or less?
6 A. It was in the afternoon of the 11th, when the
7 movement of the refugees already took place, and it was
8 the same message in reaction to the close air support
9 strikes over the city of Srebrenica, where he used one
10 of our APCs and communications and had that message
11 brought to us by one of our own sergeants in English,
12 but he had to read the text, sir.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My second
14 question for you is the following: You told us that
15 Colonel Karremans had informed you about what had been
16 discussed at the meeting in Bratunac, and you said that
17 he hadn't finished reporting what had been said at the
18 meeting -- that before he had actually finished, trucks
19 and buses started arriving in the base.
20 The wording that appears in the declaration
21 that you signed, on the 17th of July, is "negotiate and
22 attack." The purpose of the meeting was a
23 negotiation. However, Karremans didn't provide an
24 answer at all, and buses and trucks had already started
25 arriving. How do you explain that?
1 A. Well, the meeting didn't have the character
2 of a negotiation. It was Mladic who dictated exactly
3 what he wanted. I heard that afterwards. And they
4 already planned, obviously, the evacuation and had
5 their own time schedule. What they talked to us, told
6 us, was not evident, was not relevant or not
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] What you
9 have just said, can it be related to the incidents that
10 took place at the OP Echo or not?
11 A. Just to understand your question well, sir.
12 Do you mean that there was a bigger plan where Echo was
13 the trial and the whole situation was, in fact,
14 planned? Yes, that is to my conviction, sir. I'm
15 absolutely -- no, I'm not sure, but I'm convinced of
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Because
18 when you were speaking about the incident that took
19 place at the OP Echo, you said that the incidents were
20 some kind of a test in terms of preparations. Did you
21 mean to say a test or preparation for the upcoming
22 attack? Can we interpret it that way?
23 A. No, sir. I did not foresee an attack within
24 four weeks on the enclave. I just analysed it as being
25 a test case. One of the reasons I did so was that
1 normally when you do an advance or an attack on key
2 terrain, and OP Echo was key terrain, you keep up your
3 momentum, you go on, as long as you don't get
4 opponents. And after the attack on OP Echo, in fact
5 the road to Srebrenica was open. I ordered B Company
6 to go down there like hell with a couple of APCs to
7 block the Serb forces off, but as you can see on the
8 map, on that occasion, show our uniform were
9 established and we could go down south, almost to the
10 factory before we came to Serb forces. That's one of
11 the reasons that I said it was not Srebrenica now, it
12 must be a test case. But not foreseeing an attack on
13 the enclave then.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And my last
15 question, Major Franken: You compiled a list of men
16 who were within the compound. I should like to know if
17 you compiled that list before or after having seen the
18 belongings of the men who had entered the white
19 building being set on fire? Do you understand this?
20 Did you do it before or after their belongings were
22 A. It was before, sir. The trigger for me was
23 the -- sorry -- increasing violence in the
24 interrogation of the men. So I already stated that I
25 had the feeling in the late afternoon of the 12th that
1 we were not in control in any way anymore, and that
2 triggered me for this solution.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I see.
4 Well, thank you very much, Major Franken. Thank you
5 very much for coming here to testify. We understand
6 and we share your feeling of powerlessness, of
7 impotence, but perhaps -- and I do understand that your
8 feelings, as a professional and as a human being, were
9 deeply offended by what happened. But nevertheless we
10 wish to thank you for coming here to testify about
11 these painful events. We hope that you will regain
12 your peace and serenity in your country here.
13 Mr. Cayley, I believe that we have to settle
14 the exhibits now. We have to see what to do with
16 Perhaps Mr. Dubuisson could give us the
17 numbers of these exhibits.
18 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] This was the
19 decision which concerns 80 and 86.
20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 Mr. Cayley, 80, Exhibit 80 was already used, and you
22 said that you would await another witness. I do not
23 know whether this is the moment now, or do you still
24 wish to wait?
25 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you're quite
1 right. Exhibit 80 is the list which the previous
2 witness referred to and which this witness provided
3 evidential foundation for, so I would apply for that to
4 be admitted into evidence. And Exhibit 86 is the list
5 of the wounded in the compound, which again this
6 witness recognised, and I would ask for that to be
7 admitted into evidence, please.
8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation]
9 Mr. Visnjic, any objections?
10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No,
11 Mr. President.
12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.
13 Thank you very much. Therefore, 80 and 86 are
15 Could we abuse the interpreters for another
16 three minutes, please? Very well. The question is,
17 indeed, whether I am or am not abusing it, but I shall
18 nevertheless do it.
19 We have to deliver the decision that we
20 discussed earlier, and I have to do it now. I'd also
21 like to seize this opportunity to say that on Friday,
22 on Friday, we shall begin the hearing at 10.00 because
23 the Chamber will have another business to attend to,
24 and therefore we shall then sit as of 10.00, so that
25 you can sleep a little longer. Yes, you can sleep a
1 little longer.
2 There is yet another matter, and that is that
3 tomorrow, as I have announced, that is, a day where I
4 shall not be able to attend, I will not be here
5 tomorrow, and Judge Riad, being the older of the two
6 Judges, the senior of the two Judges, will be
8 Before we take the decision, I should like to
9 set free Major Franken. Thank you very much for coming
10 once again. Thank you very much.
11 Usher, will you please help Major Franken.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Right. The
14 decision of the Chamber regarding the contact of
15 parties with witnesses is as follows:
16 A few days ago, the Defence raised a question
17 of communication between the parties and the
18 witnesses. According to them, the parties should no longer
19 communicate with witnesses once the witnesses have
20 taken the oath. The Defence did not quote a specific
21 reason but stated that it was merely for the sake of
22 making clear the relations of the parties to the
24 The Chamber was informed by the parties that they had met
25 and agreed the contact would not be prohibited between a witness
1 and the party representing it, except after the
2 examination-in-chief of the witness. The parties
3 confirmed the understanding during court session
4 but after a suggestion of the Chamber
5 they changed their positions slightly.
6 The Chamber believes that it should specify certain
7 points. It notes first of all that no provision of
8 the Statute or of the Rules regulates the matter.
9 However, it believes that the procedure followed,
10 before this Tribunal, does not make part of
11 any specific legal system under Rule 99a of the Rules,
12 and that its application is to ensure the best
13 presentation by the parties of their evidence so
14 that the Chamber can arrive at the truth of the case
15 submitted to it in conformity with the solemn
16 declaration as envisaged by Rule 90b of the rules.
17 Moreover, the Rule 98, states
18 that the Chamber may summon witnesses whose testimony
19 is put in evidence with a view to establishing the truth.
20 Witnesses who appear before the Chamber, which ever
21 party calls them - be it
22 the Prosecution or the Defence,
23 are no longer witnesses of one of the parties,
24 but they are witnesses of justice. A party which
25 calls a witness has all the possibilities of
1 communicating with the witness before the witness takes
2 the oath and explain the procedure, specifically all
3 that refers to this decision.
4 However, from the moment the witness
5 has made the solemn declaration, this evidence may no longer
6 have any particular link
7 to either of the parties who may even
8 unwittingly or subconsciously interfere with the
9 spontaneity and the truth of the testimony as required
10 by the spirit of the Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal.
11 The Chamber, knows with how much care,
12 vigilance, and neutrality, the Victims
13 and Witnesses Unit takes care of the health, security and
14 the well-being of witnesses. Therefore there is no need
15 for the parties to have even for logistical reasons --
16 contact with any witness -- from
17 the beginning to the end of his
19 In view of the above , the Chamber
20 decides in accordance with the Rules 54, 99(G) and
21 90(G) of the Rules, that all contact between a witness
22 and the parties shall be prohibited
23 as of the moment when this witness takes the solemn
24 declaration and up to the end of his appearance before the
25 Chamber, -- Unless under exceptional circumstances one party
1 deems it necessary to contact a witness, this party
2 shall then inform the Chamber prior to the contact and clearly
3 state the reason and objective of its application. If
4 the Chamber accepts this application, then the Chamber
5 will also specify the conditions under which this
6 contact may take place.
7 This is the decision of the Chamber. We
8 discussed it at great length and we came to this
9 decision, which in our opinion strikes a balance between
10 different requests and needs. And so this is the
11 decision of the Chamber.
12 I should like to thank the interpreters and
13 all the personnel who were so kind as to stay a little
14 longer so that we could give you this ruling.
15 Therefore, tomorrow at 9.30, the Chamber will
16 be here with Judge Riad and Judge Wald, to continue the
17 hearing of this case.
18 Thank you very much. Have a nice afternoon.
19 Thank you.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
21 2.45 p.m., to be reconvened on
22 Wednesday, the 5th day of April, 2000,
23 the 9.30 a.m.