1. 1 Wednesday, 5 April 2000

    2 [Open session]

    3 --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.

    4 [The accused entered court]

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning. I would like to

    6 greet the parties, the accused, the technical staff,

    7 the legal officers, the stenotypists, and the ushers.

    8 And I would like to extend my greeting to the public

    9 gallery.

    10 Would you please let in the witness.

    11 [The witness entered court]

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Good morning. Before we start,

    13 kindly take an oath. We appreciate you very much for

    14 coming. Thank you. Now, if you will please take the

    15 oath, as he will show you.

    16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    17 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    18 truth.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Please be seated.

    20 Mr. Harmon, you are today our Prosecutor.

    21 MR. HARMON: That's correct, Judge Riad.

    22 Good morning, Judge Riad, Judge Wald. Good morning

    23 colleagues from the Defence, and good morning Captain

    24 Rutten.


  2. 1 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

    2 Q. Could you state your name please and spell

    3 your last name for the record.

    4 A. My name is Captain Rutten, and I could spell

    5 my name, it's R-u-t-t-e-n.

    6 Q. Captain Rutten, you're a professional soldier

    7 in the Royal Dutch army; is that correct?

    8 A. That's correct.

    9 Q. And you currently hold the rank of captain.

    10 A. That's also correct.

    11 Q. Now, when you and I speak, in the course of

    12 my examination, as I've told you before, it's important

    13 that you pause after I ask a question so the

    14 interpreters can have time to interpret my question and

    15 interpret your answer.

    16 A. Okay.

    17 Q. Now, you joined the Royal Dutch army in 1981;

    18 is that correct?

    19 A. That's also correct.

    20 Q. And you served in DutchBat III in the

    21 Srebrenica enclave from January of 1995 until the 21st

    22 of July, 1995.

    23 A. That's correct.

    24 Q. Now, one of your mandates while you were

    25 serving in DutchBat was to assist in the delivery of

  3. 1 humanitarian aid; is that correct?

    2 A. That is correct.

    3 Q. And while you were in the enclave, did aid

    4 convoys carrying humanitarian aid in the form of food

    5 and medicine arrive in the enclave?

    6 A. They did -- convoys from the UNHCR arrived in

    7 the enclave, yes.

    8 Q. Was there any obstruction of those

    9 humanitarian aid convoys?

    10 A. They had -- first there was a lot of

    11 paperwork with the Serbs before any UNHCR convoy was

    12 coming in, and during the whole period in the enclave,

    13 we saw decreasing, the number of convoys during the

    14 seven months we were there.

    15 Q. And why were the number of convoys carrying

    16 humanitarian aid in the form of food and medicine and

    17 the like, why did they decrease?

    18 A. The Serbs wouldn't let in more. The

    19 situation in the enclave was, at a certain point, real

    20 bad and the Dutch LO team, which means the local

    21 negotiators, asked for more assistance from the UNHCR,

    22 but the Serbs wouldn't let come in no more.

    23 Q. Now, what effect, Captain Rutten, did the

    24 obstruction of those humanitarian aid convoys have on

    25 the population who resided within the enclave?

  4. 1 A. Everything that was edible, they tried to

    2 get. Even where our garbage was dumped, there was a

    3 lot of people when the garbage was really dumped,

    4 trying to found something edible in our garbage.

    5 Q. Was there sufficient food for the civilian

    6 population?

    7 A. No, certainly not.

    8 MR. HARMON: Now, can I have Prosecutor's

    9 Exhibit 85, which is a photograph, distributed, and if

    10 the usher could place a copy of Prosecutor's 85 on the

    11 ELMO, please.

    12 Q. While we're waiting for the distribution of

    13 this exhibit, Captain Rutten, was the obstruction of

    14 the aid convoys by the Bosnian Serbs something that you

    15 saw on a constant basis or did the obstructions

    16 increase as time went on?

    17 A. It probably increased because we saw less

    18 convoys coming in during the period.

    19 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, there's been a

    20 photograph placed on the ELMO. Did you take this

    21 photograph?

    22 A. Yes, sir.

    23 Q. When did you take this photograph?

    24 A. During patrolling in the enclave, on the

    25 route to OP Quebec and Romeo, we saw our garbage truck

  5. 1 that we hired local, from the local people there, and

    2 they had picked up our garbage there. That was dumped

    3 on a mountainside, and these are the local people, the

    4 refugees that were inside the enclave of Srebrenica and

    5 tried to something edible around the garbage that was

    6 dumped in the place where you see on the photograph.

    7 Q. Did this scene repeat itself every time the

    8 UN garbage truck went to the dump site?

    9 A. Yes. I'm not the only one that have seen

    10 that scene. My colleagues told a lot about it because,

    11 yeah, they find it unbelievable that people do that in

    12 such a way, as you see here on the photograph.

    13 Q. Captain Rutten, when did the attack on the

    14 enclave start? What date?

    15 A. We had some problems in June, but the real

    16 attack on the enclave, from out of the northern side

    17 also firing, started on the 10th of July.

    18 Q. All right. And tell the Judges what occurred

    19 on the 10th of July, as you recall it, and what you

    20 did.

    21 A. On the 10th of July, we heard during the

    22 night some impact just behind the compound, real severe

    23 impacts. Later it appeared to be fired from a rocket

    24 launcher, an M-77 Oganj that was placed in Bratunac.

    25 We knew that because later on our local negotiators

  6. 1 saw, during the negotiations in Bratunac, that the

    2 Oganj, the M-77, was still in place there. And the day

    3 after the shelling, at night we found one of the

    4 rockets that had not gone off just behind the

    5 compound.

    6 The days after that, the shelling started

    7 more heavier during the day and it stopped during the

    8 night, in the late evening. They tried to bind us,

    9 more or less, on the compound so we couldn't get off.

    10 From out of the hills of Birici, that's near OP Papa,

    11 at the entrance of the enclave, they shot more or less

    12 in a lane, which is the road that leads from Potocari

    13 to Srebrenica, also on our vehicles or nearby, just to

    14 intimidate us and to try to stay -- to let us stay at

    15 the compound.

    16 That evening, on Monday evening exactly, we

    17 heard about our other company that was at that moment B

    18 Company in Srebrenica, that the situation was growing

    19 out of hand and people, the refugees itself from the

    20 enclave, were on the move to Potocari. At that point,

    21 I got the order to make a hole at the rear side of the

    22 compound in the fence so that we could let people in,

    23 not by the main entrance but just at the rear side of

    24 the compound, if there was a necessity.

    25 That evening, some soldiers of the B Company

  7. 1 came along with the first refugees, and we kept them at

    2 the bus remise because we didn't want to have too much

    3 refugees at that time at the compound, at least I

    4 haven't got an order at that time to let the people

    5 in.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon. Captain

    7 Rutten just said Monday evening. Was the 10th of July

    8 Monday, or was it the 11th?

    9 A. I started on the 10th, and that's the Sunday,

    10 and the 11th is Monday.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: That was the 11th. Thank you.

    12 MR. HARMON:

    13 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, while you were in

    14 Srebrenica, what were your normal duties and functions?

    15 A. My normal duty was -- I was commander of an

    16 anti-tank platoon, but since the means were on the OPs

    17 itself and the soldiers also, my second duty was patrol

    18 coordinator in the northern area of the enclave and

    19 intelligence officer of the battalion.

    20 Q. Captain Rutten, you've described heavy

    21 shelling in the Srebrenica enclave. Can you tell me,

    22 based on your presence on patrols and your experience

    23 in the enclave, were there any military targets in the

    24 town of Srebrenica or in the town of Potocari?

    25 A. There were no real military targets. The

  8. 1 military targets that were there were on the

    2 confrontation or border line at that time of the

    3 enclave. There were some BiH soldiers still, but not

    4 in Potocari or Srebrenica itself.

    5 Q. What is your view on the purpose of the

    6 shelling?

    7 A. The purpose of the shelling was, at first, to

    8 intimidate us not to leave the compound anymore or to

    9 see what was really happening outside of the compound,

    10 and to, yeah, more or less it was a terror act because

    11 the shelling was not on marked goals, you could say,

    12 not on marked military goals, you could say.

    13 Q. I'd like to focus your attention on the 11th

    14 of July. Tell the Judges what happened.

    15 A. The 11th of July, as I told you before, it

    16 was in the evening, we made a hole in the fence.

    17 Eventually no one came in. We sent out a Red Cross APC

    18 because they were shelling on the people that had left

    19 Srebrenica, on the way to Potocari. They were

    20 accompanied by some Dutch -- by a Dutch group of the B

    21 Company that had left Srebrenica to accompany them to

    22 Potocari.

    23 Because of the shelling they had to stay and

    24 they came no further than the bus remise. We sent out

    25 the Red Cross APC to give assistance over there to the

  9. 1 wounded, and that was at that time the stage. I was

    2 with a group near the rear side of the compound, at the

    3 fence, waiting if there were probably refugees coming

    4 in.

    5 Q. Captain Rutten, when did the large influx of

    6 refugees arrive at the Potocari compound?

    7 A. On Monday evening, finally we closed the

    8 fence again, the hole that I made, because no one was

    9 coming in. Only a heavily wounded woman we carried

    10 over the fence because we had closed the fence then.

    11 She was cared for at our battalion hospital, you could

    12 say, at Potocari, and brought later in the evening,

    13 when she was stabilised, back to Srebrenica again, with

    14 a Dutch APC, a Red Cross APC.

    15 The next day, and I speak of Tuesday, we were

    16 all in a bunker because of the shelling and had to

    17 wait. In the morning, I was sent out again because

    18 someone was at the main gate and waved with something

    19 that looked like a card or a map of the area, and they

    20 assumed, the guard assumed, that probably that was a

    21 Muslim leader of the Muslim party or whatever.

    22 I went out with a colleague, a colleague

    23 lieutenant, to see what really was happening. But

    24 there were no leaders, there were two soldiers. One

    25 was wounded who had a shot through the underarm and was

  10. 1 taken care of, before when I saw him, by a Dutch

    2 soldier, and I could see that there was a card on his

    3 arm and on the card you could see what treatment he had

    4 given, the Dutch soldier. We asked him where he came

    5 from. He came from the surroundings of OP Mike. And

    6 we sent him back to Srebrenica because we couldn't help

    7 him. We gave him something to drink and that was the

    8 whole of it.

    9 Q. Let me interrupt you there. Was that a

    10 Muslim soldier?

    11 A. Sorry. That was a Muslim soldier.

    12 Q. Please continue.

    13 A. At that time, I went back to the bunker,

    14 reported it, what I've seen, to the operations room,

    15 and we -- shortly after that we got a new assignment

    16 with a group of almost ten men to open the hole in the

    17 gate that I made the night before again.

    18 I opened it again and we had to wait for what

    19 was going to happen. A new group also came out with

    20 Lieutenant Koster as leader and had to go to the bus

    21 remise to see what was happening over that. At that

    22 time, I heard by my communication means that large

    23 refugee groups were coming to Potocari, and the B

    24 Company had to leave Srebrenica because of the shelling

    25 and the total chaos over there.

  11. 1 We sent out, from out of the Potocari

    2 compound, a lot of trucks so they could assist to get

    3 the refugees to the Potocari compound. At that time,

    4 the first groups of refugees came by the rear side,

    5 sent out by Lieutenant Koster, with his group of men

    6 that were, at that time, at the bus remise, sent in at

    7 the rear side. That went on almost the whole day,

    8 until more or less 5.00, 6.00 in the evening, and more

    9 or less 4.000 to 5.000 refugees we held in the compound

    10 at that time. At that time also I got the order not to

    11 let in more refugees because the factory hall itself

    12 was completely filled up with the refugees of the

    13 enclave then, and we couldn't have more people over

    14 there. There were prepared some meals of the rest of

    15 the things we had for the refugees.

    16 Still waiting at the fence and had to close

    17 it. I got back, and we got with a few colleague

    18 lieutenants, from Major Otter, a new assignment to get

    19 together three groups of ten men and to secure the

    20 refugees during the night that had stayed outside, near

    21 the bus remise. We prepared for that, and as it got

    22 dark, we went out to secure those refugees that had

    23 stayed outside.

    24 MR. HARMON: Could I have the usher's

    25 assistance, please, and could you place Prosecutor's

  12. 1 Exhibit 5/2 on the ELMO.

    2 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, you've referred to the

    3 bus remise. Would you take a look at Prosecutor's

    4 Exhibit 5/2 and can you identify what you have called

    5 the bus remise on Prosecutor's 5/2.

    6 A. [Indicates]

    7 MR. HARMON: Indicating for the record the

    8 Express Bus Compound.

    9 A. I'm now showing with a pencil where the words

    10 say Express Bus Compound. That is that side where I

    11 stayed with my group of ten men. In the middle there

    12 was another group of Lieutenant Koster's of ten men,

    13 and at the Zinc Factory, at the other side, were also a

    14 lot of refugees. The group of Lieutenant Schotman also

    15 consisted of ten Dutch soldiers with him.

    16 MR. HARMON: So for the record, Lieutenant

    17 Schotman stayed on the right side of the road that

    18 bisects the Prosecutor's 5.2 in the area of the Zinc

    19 Factory, and Lieutenant Koster stayed on the left side

    20 of the road between the road and the Express Bus

    21 Compound on Prosecutor's 5/2.

    22 Q. Is that correct?

    23 A. That is correct, sir.

    24 Q. Now, did you stay there the whole night?

    25 A. We had the order to stay there the whole

  13. 1 night. We saw that there were very many refugees over

    2 there. We tried to organise it more or less by -- had

    3 red/white tape around the whole area, that everyone

    4 could see that that was the area where the refugees

    5 were kept by us, because we had no other means to do

    6 that, and so making clear to everyone that that was the

    7 secure area that was under UN surveillance.

    8 Q. Now, the following morning, what did you

    9 observe?

    10 A. The following morning, in the early morning,

    11 there was again some firing on the hills.

    12 Q. When you say "firing," what kind of firing do

    13 you mean?

    14 A. Small arms, that was the thing that we heard

    15 at first, and later on there was some mortar fire, and

    16 we saw some houses burning and some pile of hay that

    17 were also on the -- that was harvested by the farmers,

    18 was also in flames then. That was to -- I think to

    19 make the situation look more worse than it really was

    20 at that time.

    21 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, let me show you another

    22 photograph.

    23 MR. HARMON: And if I could have Prosecutor

    24 Exhibit 5/19 placed on the ELMO.

    25 Q. Captain Rutten, are you familiar with the

  14. 1 area depicted in Prosecutor's 5/19?

    2 A. Yes, it's familiar to me.

    3 Q. Have you seen this area on the morning you

    4 have just been testifying about?

    5 A. Yes, I saw that area, yes.

    6 Q. Can you tell the Judges what you saw in this

    7 area?

    8 A. When you look at this area, it was all filled

    9 up with refugees and --

    10 Q. Pointing to the blue buildings.

    11 A. Pointing to the blue building, yes. It was

    12 all filled up around here, almost packed up with

    13 refugees. And on the hillside, there were some houses

    14 burning. There were harvested crops that day set

    15 afire, just to -- and when I mean "they," they were the

    16 first Serb soldiers that we saw who came down from the

    17 hills. And what kind of types were they? The first

    18 one that got to me were more or less the Rambo-types.

    19 Q. Captain, let me ask you, did you see anything

    20 in respect of the houses in the foreground in this

    21 Prosecutor's 5/19?

    22 A. Some of the houses were burning too that were

    23 here [indicates], around the bus remise.

    24 Q. And what effect did these objects that were

    25 burning have on the refugees?

  15. 1 A. The effect was that there was a total panic

    2 then because the shooting, the fire, and seeing the

    3 Serb soldiers coming in from all sides, the people

    4 thought that this was -- something really bad was going

    5 to happen. We tried to calm down everything, and as

    6 the first soldiers came down, Serb soldiers, I spoke to

    7 the first of them that looked to me like a leader. I

    8 didn't know if he was one. And I said to him, "You

    9 can't go behind the red/white tape because it's UN

    10 territory and there are refugees under our surveillance

    11 there." He didn't -- not he, but also the rest of the

    12 Serb soldiers were just laughing and trying to step

    13 over the red/white tape and do as they please.

    14 Q. Did you see any of the soldiers threaten any

    15 of the refugees?

    16 A. We had, during the night, a man in a

    17 wheelbarrow came in. I knew the man because he was in

    18 the BiH army. Now he was in civilian clothes, wounded

    19 at his leg, he had a shot through his leg. The doctor

    20 that was with me that night cared for him near the bus

    21 remise. The first Serb soldier that was more or less

    22 what I just called the Rambo-type made that sign

    23 [indicates], a sign along the throat, to the more or

    24 less young Muslim soldier that was in the wheelbarrow.

    25 MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the

  16. 1 sign being a finger running across the throat.

    2 Q. What was your interpretation of that sign?

    3 A. My interpretation of that sign, that from

    4 that moment on, it was very clear for me that they

    5 looked for the man, and it was also very clear to me

    6 that the things that were going to happen with the men

    7 predicted nothing good.

    8 Q. Now, were you still at the same location near

    9 the bus remise?

    10 A. Yes, I was still at the same location.

    11 Q. And you had your squad of soldiers with you;

    12 is that correct?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Did anything happen to your equipment?

    15 A. We had between some old buses that were shot

    16 and completely torn down, we had to spend the night in

    17 shifts, and we had our gear there, our bags, for

    18 staying for the night because we didn't know how long

    19 we were staying. At that moment, the first Serb

    20 soldiers that came in stole a part of the equipment,

    21 what they could use, and some personal belongings that

    22 were in our equipment. I sent out some soldiers to

    23 prevent that, but they were pushed away and sent back

    24 to me, and said "Get out of here."

    25 At that time that the soldiers were walking

  17. 1 back, or tried to walk back, there was some gunfire

    2 that came down from the hill, the BiH probably, and

    3 then the Serb soldiers fired back using a few of my men

    4 as a shield. At that time I walked to the Serb

    5 soldiers and said that I had to bring my men back. It

    6 was a panic situation, more or less. I grabbed my

    7 weapon, I pointed it at the Serbs, and at that time

    8 they let go of my personnel so they could get back to

    9 me. And then eventually the firing stopped and they

    10 went on with the stealing from our gear.

    11 Q. Captain Rutten, did you make a complaint

    12 about that?

    13 A. Later, sometime later, I think one hour, I

    14 saw our Dutch Captain Matthijsen, which was on the S-5

    15 team, and with him was a Major -- to me known as a

    16 Major Nikolic.

    17 Q. Was Major Nikolic a member of the BSA, the

    18 Bosnian Serb army?

    19 A. That is correct, yes. I made a complaint to

    20 Matthijsen that we were looted by the Serb soldiers and

    21 they were threatening the refugees. I also addressed

    22 the BSA Major Nikolic, he said that he could do nothing

    23 about it but they wouldn't harm the refugees at that

    24 time. And he said that it was very difficult for him

    25 to get our stuff back. So I made a complaint but I

  18. 1 doubted that that was of any use at all.

    2 Q. Now, let me focus your attention on Major

    3 Nikolic. Did you know from what unit Major Nikolic

    4 came?

    5 A. To me, it was known that Major Nikolic was

    6 our contact person of the battalion, at least, of the

    7 northern part, and in the northern part the Bratunac

    8 Brigade was located.

    9 Q. To your knowledge, was there another liaison

    10 officer from the Bosnian Serb army?

    11 A. There was -- to my knowledge, there was

    12 another Bosnian soldier that was also there that was

    13 called Jovo at OP Papa. That was the contact, the

    14 first contact between OP Papa, the battalion, and the

    15 BSA, you could say.

    16 Q. So if you needed to make a contact with Major

    17 Nikolic, for example, you would go to Jovo, who was at

    18 OP Papa, and the request would be communicated to Major

    19 Nikolic; is that how it worked?

    20 A. That is how it worked, sir.

    21 Q. Now, at some point in time, did something

    22 happen to you and your men, that same day?

    23 A. The time the BSA soldiers came in, we had our

    24 vests, we had our weapons, and I had my two

    25 communication sets for doing my job over there. During

  19. 1 the day I got threatened by the BSA soldiers to give up

    2 my weapon, my communication sets, and my vest.

    3 Q. Now, when that happened, let me ask you to

    4 put it in the context of the time, had buses arrived

    5 yet in the enclave, or was this before the arrival of

    6 the buses in the enclave?

    7 A. The threatening started before the buses

    8 arrived, and the real -- the real threat later on was

    9 when the buses already were coming in.

    10 Q. So the event that you just described occurred

    11 as the buses were coming in.

    12 A. Yes, that is correct.

    13 Q. Okay. Now, continue, please, if you would,

    14 describing what happened to you and to your men at that

    15 time.

    16 A. At the point that the buses were coming in,

    17 we were threatened, and I at first, had to give up my

    18 weapon and my vest and the rest of my things. I sent

    19 the men back, because I said, "I don't talk to an NCO,"

    20 which he probably was, "I need to speak to your

    21 commander." And "This is UN gear so I can't give up my

    22 gear."

    23 Q. Now, did the same thing that was happening to

    24 you happen to your ten men as well?

    25 A. Yes. And I ordered them not to give up my --

  20. 1 I ordered them not to give up their weapons or

    2 whatsoever.

    3 Q. Did they give up their weapons?

    4 A. Finally they had to because they were

    5 threatened with weapons and had to give up their vests

    6 and their armoury.

    7 Q. Did the same thing happen to you? Did you

    8 have to give up your weapon and your armour?

    9 A. Yes. Also the doctor that was standing next

    10 to me, someone, a BSA soldier, probably the commander

    11 at least, he looked to me like one, came to me and

    12 said, "I need your stuff." There was a soldier next to

    13 him, grabbing my weapon, and I said, "I can't do that,"

    14 and I turned away from him, with my back to him. He

    15 pulled his gun on my head, at the rear side, and said,

    16 "I need your communications set now." I gave him one,

    17 and I grabbed my other one and I made my last signal to

    18 my superior officer that I lost my weapon now, and that

    19 that had been kept now by the Bosnian Serb army.

    20 At that time we were taken -- I was at the

    21 time at a small bridge in the middle of the bus

    22 remise. We were taken to a place next to the bus

    23 remise again with the whole group, and we had to stay

    24 there, under the surveillance of two Bosnian Serb

    25 soldiers.

  21. 1 Q. How long did you stay at the location where

    2 you were being detained?

    3 A. A few hours.

    4 Q. Did that include your other men as well? You

    5 and the men?

    6 A. Yes, that was including my ten men and the

    7 doctor that was with me. At that time I saw someone

    8 that looked to me also as an officer, and later on he

    9 became known to me as the so-called Captain Mane. I

    10 protested with him that we were held there, and I

    11 protested to him that we had lost our equipment. He

    12 didn't even bother to look at me and sent me back to

    13 the rest of the group. Later on when he came back, and

    14 I say later on, a few hours later, I protested again

    15 and I said that we could do nothing more there and that

    16 we had to go back to the compound. And finally he said

    17 that we could go back and sent with my group two

    18 Bosnian Serb soldiers to escort me to the compound

    19 again.

    20 MR. HARMON: Could I have Prosecutor's

    21 Exhibit 71, please, and could that be placed on the

    22 ELMO.

    23 Q. Captain Rutten, can you identify the

    24 individual on the left-hand side of this Prosecutor's

    25 Exhibit 71?

  22. 1 A. That was the so-called Captain Mane.

    2 Q. Now, let me ask you, did you at some point

    3 that day, after your release from captivity, did you

    4 see General Mladic in the area of Potocari?

    5 A. Not the 12th, because the 12th we got back to

    6 the compound and we stayed the night over at the

    7 compound. But on the 13th, in the afternoon, early

    8 afternoon, I saw Mr. Mladic arriving at the compound.

    9 And I must correct that. On the 12th, I saw Mr. Mladic

    10 for the first time, handing out -- his troops were

    11 handing out some bread and water then. That was on the

    12 12th.

    13 MR. HARMON: Now, let me ask if I could have

    14 the lights dimmed and if I could have Prosecutor's

    15 Exhibit 78 played, please.

    16 The Court has already seen this exhibit, but

    17 for purposes of showing this witness and putting his

    18 testimony in context, I'm replaying it.

    19 [Videotape played]

    20 MR. HARMON:

    21 Q. Captain Rutten, that was a very brief snippet

    22 of a film that you have seen in my office prior to

    23 coming here to testify. Did you see that scene?

    24 A. Yes, that was the scene near the road, a

    25 house near the road that led from Potocari to

  23. 1 Srebrenica. That was the moment on the 12th when

    2 Mladic came in, with his bodyguards around him, and

    3 there was also a truck behind him and also a

    4 firetruck. In the first truck there was bread being

    5 distributed among the refugees, and in the firetruck

    6 they brought along to give the refugees water they had

    7 brought with them.

    8 Q. Now, tell the Judges what you saw happen --

    9 actually, let me ask you another question. At the time

    10 the candy was being distributed, we've seen the film of

    11 at least a portion of that episode, was the

    12 distribution of the bread also filmed?

    13 A. Both scenes were filmed, as well as the

    14 distributing of the bread, the water, and the handing

    15 out of the candy to some children near the house. It

    16 was only a short instant that they filmed over there.

    17 Q. What happened after the filming stopped?

    18 A. After the filming stopped, they stopped also

    19 handing out the bread, the water, and the candy. They

    20 even took back some of it that they gave to the

    21 refugees.

    22 Q. At any other time while you were in Potocari

    23 on the 12th and the 13th did you see the Bosnian Serbs

    24 distribute any other bread, water, food, or anything

    25 that would help the refugees?

  24. 1 A. No, they did not. The only thing that got

    2 distributed was given by us, and that was some water

    3 and the things that we had left for the refugees on the

    4 compound.

    5 Q. Did the image that you just saw on

    6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 78 of a soldier, a Bosnian Serb

    7 soldier, handing out candy and the scenes that you saw

    8 of the distribution of the bread and the water, did

    9 that create a correct and accurate impression of the

    10 way that the Bosnian Serb soldiers in the enclave were

    11 treating the refugees?

    12 A. No, not really, because it was a short moment

    13 that they showed some, you could say, mercy to the

    14 refugees, but it stopped at the moment the cameras went

    15 away. And from that moment on, they started filling up

    16 the buses that had also arrived then, and behind the

    17 buses, there you directly saw that the men were

    18 separated from the rest of the refugees.

    19 Q. Captain Rutten, what's your impression of the

    20 purpose of that filming of those generous moments?

    21 A. To me it looked more or less like a media

    22 campaign or propaganda, whichever word you want to use,

    23 because it stopped after a very short time. It looked

    24 like, to the world and to us at first, that they were

    25 showing, as I told you, some mercy to the refugees, but

  25. 1 in fact it was all a big play and well registered.

    2 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, did you have access to

    3 Dutch national television in your compound?

    4 A. Yes, we had.

    5 Q. And was that through a satellite

    6 transmission?

    7 A. We had a satellite transmission, but the days

    8 that we had to cope with the refugees and when we had

    9 to do our task, we couldn't see any of it. But two

    10 days later, on Friday, we saw the Dutch news on our

    11 TVs, and we saw the same scenes, on which we saw one of

    12 them here right now, Mladic with his soldiers handing

    13 out candy, bread, and that was what the world saw two

    14 days later. We were completely astonished then in our

    15 room where we had our TV because, yeah, we couldn't

    16 understand that those films were that fast shown to the

    17 whole world.

    18 Q. And at the time you saw those films, were

    19 there any refugees left in and around the compound at

    20 Potocari?

    21 A. There were none left then, the moment we saw

    22 it. It was Friday then.

    23 Q. I'd like to show you Prosecutor's Exhibit

    24 28/4, please, and if that could be placed on the ELMO.

    25 Before we put that on the ELMO, Captain, did

  26. 1 I show you the exhibit that the usher is holding in his

    2 hand, this binder with a number of individuals in it,

    3 and did you identify somebody in that binder?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 MR. HARMON: Would you place Prosecutor's

    6 Exhibit 28/4 on the ELMO, please.

    7 Q. Captain Rutten, do you recognise anyone in

    8 this particular image?

    9 A. Yes. I recognise that man [indicates].

    10 MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the

    11 second individual from the right-hand side of the

    12 image, the man in the foreground with an orange face.

    13 Q. Where did you see that individual?

    14 A. I saw him in one of the cars that accompanied

    15 Mr. Mladic near the compound.

    16 Q. Now, let me change the topic and ask you,

    17 Captain Rutten, are you familiar with a location known

    18 as the White House?

    19 A. Yes, I'm familiar with it.

    20 Q. Did you go to the White House?

    21 A. Yes, several times.

    22 Q. When did you first go to the White House?

    23 What date?

    24 A. First I went to the White House on the

    25 Thursday, Thursday morning.

  27. 1 Q. Okay.

    2 MR. HARMON: Now, could I have Prosecutor's

    3 Exhibit 5/17 and then 83 given to the usher.

    4 Mr. Usher, if you could place Prosecutor's

    5 5/17 on the ELMO, and if the assistant could

    6 disseminate Prosecutor's Exhibit 83 to the Judges and

    7 to counsel before I show it. Could you place

    8 Prosecutor's 5/17 on the ELMO.

    9 Q. Do you recognise that particular building,

    10 Captain Rutten?

    11 A. That was what we all called the White House.

    12 MR. HARMON: Now, Mr. Usher, if you could

    13 place Prosecutor's Exhibit 83 on the ELMO, please.

    14 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, this is a picture that

    15 you took; is that correct?

    16 A. Yes, that is correct.

    17 Q. Can you identify the location of the front

    18 gate of the UN compound and the location of the White

    19 House?

    20 A. This is the entrance of the compound

    21 [indicates].

    22 Q. Keep your pointer there for just a moment so

    23 I can describe it.

    24 MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, in

    25 about the middle of the picture, near the road, there

  28. 1 appears to be a road that travels from the middle of

    2 the picture diagonally to the left, and there is a

    3 bunker facility that has a blue flag atop it.

    4 Q. And that's the entrance; is that correct?

    5 A. That is correct.

    6 Q. Now, could you move your pointer to the

    7 location of the White House?

    8 A. This is the White House [indicates].

    9 MR. HARMON: Indicating a building with a

    10 rusted roof on, looks like, a flat field or a flatter

    11 area below the hill, and it's to the left of the

    12 entrance to the compound.

    13 Q. Thank you very much, Captain Rutten. So the

    14 White House really wasn't far from the entrance to the

    15 UN compound.

    16 A. No. We could see it when we were at the

    17 entrance and the guard could see it almost constantly.

    18 Q. Why did you go to the White House?

    19 A. That morning I had a duty at the operations

    20 room, and we heard that -- by transmission, that a

    21 colleague had seen two buses leave, and the colleague

    22 was a Lieutenant Versteeg who saw two buses leave

    23 nearby the White House, filled up with men. We had

    24 outside several jeeps in place to accompany or to

    25 escort the buses when they left the enclave. This

  29. 1 lieutenant saw the two buses leave and asked to our ops

    2 room if he had to escort those two buses. I ordered

    3 him to immediately follow those two buses because they

    4 were separately leaving and not leaving with the

    5 greater amount of buses that were also ready along the

    6 road.

    7 At that time he accompanied the buses to

    8 Bratunac, and the next transmission we got was the bus

    9 is going not on the way to Kladanj, but turns another

    10 way, "and I am being obstructed now by Bosnian Serb

    11 soldiers to follow the bus." I said to him, "Try to

    12 stay with the bus," but it wasn't possible at all

    13 because the Bosnian Serbs blocked his car and even

    14 hijacked his car, more or less. And he and his driver

    15 were later on brought back to the compound. So we

    16 never knew where those two buses went.

    17 Q. So based on that series of events, did you

    18 decide to go to the White House personally?

    19 A. I spoke to my company commander and I said,

    20 "Perhaps it's good to have a look outside, at what's

    21 really happening, because if we get everything through

    22 transmission, we might not be getting a clear

    23 picture." So I went outside, accompanied by a sergeant

    24 major. We took with us a wheelbarrow with water,

    25 filled up with packages of water, and went to the White

  30. 1 House to have a reason to be there, and tried to get

    2 into the White House.

    3 As we came at the gate, we saw that, on the

    4 left side of the entrance, where the pointer is now, a

    5 great, a huge pile of rucksacks and another belongings

    6 of the refugees. A few metres further on, on the

    7 ground there were all kinds of identity cards,

    8 passports. And then you get to the house, and that was

    9 guarded, well guarded by Bosnian Serb soldiers. We

    10 tried to get in at first but they wouldn't let us.

    11 There were also, in front of the house, two Dutch

    12 soldiers that had been given stars on their soldiers,

    13 that were in effect corporals. Why they got stars, it

    14 looked better to the Bosnian Serbs that there is a

    15 lieutenant around than if there is just a mere soldier

    16 around.

    17 We tried to inspect the house but we didn't

    18 come in at first. We walked around the house. We got

    19 in at the rear side, and I can point it out to you.

    20 This is the rear side of the house [indicates].

    21 MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, it

    22 appears the pointer is on the left-hand side of the

    23 house.

    24 A. We went in, and that means the sergeant major

    25 and I. We had a look around, downstairs and on the

  31. 1 first floor, and everywhere, in every room we came, we

    2 found on the ground, on the couches, and on the bed,

    3 all kinds of photographs laying next to each other. It

    4 looked to me whether they were looking for something or

    5 some familiar faces or something, and, yeah, the whole

    6 house was -- yeah, it looked like if there was just a

    7 burglary. And, okay, we couldn't find nothing there.

    8 In that part of the house, there was no one around. So

    9 we tried to go around the house.

    10 I saw behind the house, and that's here

    11 [indicates], behind the electricity pole, some --

    12 sitting on two chairs, Serb soldiers, two of them. I

    13 went to them. They sat in front of a little orchard.

    14 I asked them whether I could go further, to have a look

    15 around. They wouldn't let me. And if I persisted to

    16 go on, one of them pointed a weapon at me and said,

    17 "Get the hell out of here," so I had to leave.

    18 Coming at the entrance again, or I went back

    19 to the house and I heard some voices at the rear side

    20 of the house, inside of the house. I couldn't see

    21 through the window because it was blinded, more or

    22 less. I said to the sergeant major, we tried to get in

    23 again. We went to the wheelbarrow, we offered the Serb

    24 soldiers some water, and that was the moment we could

    25 get in.

  32. 1 When we came in the corridor, there was a

    2 Muslim man hanging at the staircase with one arm. I

    3 asked the Bosnian Serb soldier to lower him so he could

    4 reach his two feet to the ground, so he would be more

    5 comfortable, and at that time, when I was asking that,

    6 I went to the right side of the corridor and that was

    7 the room that -- where I heard the voices before, and

    8 it looked to me as an interrogation room and I tried to

    9 get in. But at that moment, the Bosnian Serb soldier

    10 put a weapon in my face and eventually he stuck it in

    11 my mouth, so it -- I had to leave, so I had to pull

    12 back more or less.

    13 At that time it was very clear to me that

    14 there was something going on, and I tried to get a

    15 better picture of it. We got some new water, and I

    16 told the sergeant major that he had to stay on the

    17 staircase and that I would go upstairs to have a look.

    18 At that moment, as we stepped outside, we saw

    19 at the entrance new men coming in. The soldier at the

    20 gate, the Serb soldier at the gate, said "Throw down

    21 your things," made just an arm gesture, and a few

    22 metres further on, they had to throw their identity

    23 cards.

    24 At that moment I went in again, went

    25 upstairs. The sergeant major stayed at the staircase.

  33. 1 As I came up to the first floor, there were two rooms.

    2 They were filled up with, more or less, 50 men, and by

    3 "men," I mean men from 45 to 55, and some children,

    4 some 12 to 13 years old, all boys.

    5 I made one arm gesture, upstairs in both

    6 rooms, meaning that they have to sit next to each other

    7 so that I could make a photograph. I had a camera with

    8 me. I made a picture, several pictures, in both rooms,

    9 to have a picture of them and, yeah, to testify, to

    10 clear, or whatever it later may be good for, that those

    11 men were in that house on that day.

    12 I had to stop because new men came in, and a

    13 Serb soldier came up. So I put away my camera and went

    14 down again, and we left the house. It was clear to me

    15 that the moment we left the house, that this was no

    16 normal interrogation, as we normally teach our own

    17 soldiers, because we let the ID and the belongings of

    18 the soldiers, when we take someone into custody, or a

    19 prisoner of war, in an envelope, and we more or less

    20 mark the person that goes with the envelope; otherwise,

    21 you cannot clear or state later what person belongs to

    22 the belongings or to the IDs.

    23 So it was to me very clear that they wouldn't

    24 be needing it anymore, the IDs and their belongings.

    25 Q. Captain Rutten, did you eventually see what

  34. 1 happened to those belongings that were in front of the

    2 White House?

    3 A. In the late evening, on Thursday, and in the

    4 early morning, they set all the stuff that was outside,

    5 the belongings and the IDs, afire.

    6 MR. HARMON: Could I have Prosecutor's

    7 Exhibit 84, please, placed on the ELMO.

    8 Your Honours have already seen a previous

    9 exhibit of these items in front of the White House set

    10 on fire, but let me introduce another exhibit, a

    11 similar exhibit.

    12 Q. Captain Rutten, what is this exhibit?

    13 A. This is a photograph that I made, standing on

    14 a table, looking over our prefabs that you see in front

    15 of the photograph, here [indicates], and what you see

    16 is here is the entrance of the gate and here

    17 [indicates], what is burning, is in front of the White

    18 House, and that is the White House.

    19 Q. Right. The smoke.

    20 A. You see the smoke of the burning of the

    21 belongings and of the IDs of the men that came into the

    22 house, of the Muslim men that came into the house.

    23 Q. How long do you recall that fire burning?

    24 A. It burned almost for two days.

    25 Q. Now, let me just clarify just a couple parts

  35. 1 of your testimony about your visit to the White House.

    2 You said in your testimony that when you

    3 first went to the White House, you went to the

    4 left-hand side of it, to the rear, and you entered an

    5 area that was apparently vacant, there was nobody in

    6 it. Was this White House divided into two portions?

    7 A. Yes, you could say that it was a -- that

    8 there were actually two houses under one roof, two

    9 separate houses under one roof.

    10 Q. You mentioned, Captain Rutten, that you saw a

    11 number of photographs laid out. Were these photographs

    12 laid out in an orderly fashion, or did it appear that

    13 they were thrown about at random?

    14 A. No. They were laying down in an orderly

    15 fashion, and the ones that were laying next to each

    16 other were all men and not women.

    17 Q. Who did you think had laid out those

    18 photographs?

    19 A. I think that it was the men, the Bosnian Serb

    20 men that were around there and in the other side of the

    21 house.

    22 Q. Now, let me ask you one point of

    23 clarification. You said at one point you tried to

    24 enter an interrogation room, and a weapon was placed

    25 near your face. Could you describe the man who did

  36. 1 that? What was he wearing?

    2 A. He was a Bosnian Serb soldier. He was

    3 wearing a green camouflage uniform.

    4 Q. Now, after you left the White House, Captain

    5 Rutten, where did you go?

    6 A. After we went -- after that we went to the

    7 blockade of four APCs. There I spoke to a local

    8 interpreter of ours, a Muslim who lived in the

    9 enclave. Admir was his name. And he said that there

    10 were rumours from the refugees that there were men

    11 killed near a well, near the road, on the Budak side.

    12 I asked my colleague, who was in charge

    13 there, and that was Lieutenant Koster, that it seemed

    14 to me that we had a look over there because under our

    15 eyes, more or less, was happening something that we

    16 hadn't heard earlier about it or, yeah, we hadn't

    17 seen. So I went together with Lieutenant Koster and

    18 Sergeant Major van Schaik through the blockade, through

    19 the APC blockade, that consisted of four APCs where the

    20 Lieutenant van Duijn was around, the Dutch Lieutenant

    21 van Duijn.

    22 MR. HARMON: Captain, let me interrupt you

    23 there for just a moment. It will be perhaps easier for

    24 you to illustrate with the Prosecutor's next exhibit

    25 where you went. And if I can have Prosecutor's Exhibit

  37. 1 5/3C placed on the ELMO.

    2 Q. If you could use this exhibit, Captain

    3 Rutten, to illustrate where you started, where the

    4 blockade was, and where you went.

    5 A. On this image you see that the blockade was

    6 here [indicates] and here were the four APCs --

    7 MR. HARMON: Indicating where the yellow line

    8 starts, at the other end of the yellow line is an oval

    9 shape with the word "bodies".

    10 Q. Please proceed.

    11 A. Then the three of us went up to where the

    12 yellow line starts, go to the right, up along the

    13 road. It is a dirt road. Here [indicates] we saw a

    14 man running from one of these houses, running down. I

    15 tried to speak to him but he ran just away. Further up

    16 I saw a woman. I asked her if she heard something

    17 about any men or whatever, or a well. I know a few

    18 words that I learned during patrolling. She marked at

    19 me and pointed further up the road, and what she marked

    20 was that there were some killings. She also made that

    21 sign along her throat [indicates], that there were some

    22 killings up that road.

    23 So we went up the road. It's a real bushed

    24 area. We saw here [indicates] a small stream at the

    25 left side, just behind the house, and there is a

  38. 1 meadow. And the moment we saw the meadow, we saw also,

    2 along the stream, some men lying there. As we got into

    3 the meadow, we saw that the men were shot down. I

    4 inspected all the men that were on the ground. They

    5 were all civilian men, at least they had civilian

    6 clothes on. There were nine of them. They were laying

    7 with their faces towards the stream. Two were laying

    8 on their sides, as if they had looked back. The rest

    9 of them were laying with their faces to the stream.

    10 They all had shots at their back, at heart height.

    11 They were shots of small calibre weapons. The men were

    12 all about 45 to 55 years old. The blood was still

    13 running. There were no flies on them. It was very

    14 warm that day. So you could easily say that it hadn't

    15 been long ago that they were shot.

    16 At that moment I said to the sergeant major

    17 to pick up the ID that was on the grass in the meadow,

    18 in front of the refugees, and I made a photo, one

    19 photo, with my colleague, with Lieutenant Koster,

    20 sitting on his knees between the dead men, and I made a

    21 photo as a whole of the nine men that were laying along

    22 the stream.

    23 At that moment there was some firing at us,

    24 so we couldn't stay any longer there. The moment the

    25 firing started, first a shot, I saw a woman running out

  39. 1 of the houses that are here [indicates] between the

    2 bushes, and she was chased by a Bosnian Serb soldier.

    3 At that moment I said to the sergeant major, "Okay.

    4 Drop all the ID that you've got in your -- that you

    5 picked up, and we have to leave here now." Lieutenant

    6 Koster said there was another shot -- we heard

    7 something and he said, "The shots are nearby. We have

    8 to leave." And at that moment we went again up the

    9 dirt -- down the dirt road, to more or less the street

    10 from Potocari to Srebrenica. And we tried to get

    11 back.

    12 At the blockade we grabbed a stretcher, more

    13 or less so it looked like we were helping some

    14 refugees, and got back to the blockade, to the Dutch

    15 side. Some time later, and I think five or ten minutes

    16 later, I spoke to the Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans,

    17 that I found nine bodies and that I made a picture of

    18 them. And I said, "It is very clear now that they do

    19 shoot the men that are around," the Muslim men.

    20 Q. Captain Rutten, let me just make a number of

    21 clarifications on your testimony.

    22 MR. HARMON: For the purposes of the record,

    23 in Captain Rutten's testimony, he indicated that on his

    24 way up, and before he found the bodies, he saw a man

    25 running from the house, and for purposes of the record,

  40. 1 Captain Rutten pointed to a number of houses, three

    2 houses above the yellow dotted line that are in the

    3 centre of the picture, and it was from that location

    4 that he said he saw the man running from the houses.

    5 Also, when he said the woman near the well

    6 who he had talked to who had indicated a direction to

    7 travel, it indicated a sign again, the sign that was

    8 used by Captain Rutten was a finger going across the

    9 throat.

    10 When Captain Rutten testified that he saw a

    11 woman running out of a house near the trees, he was

    12 referring to a location that was in the trees, slightly

    13 to the left of the oval shape and before one gets out

    14 onto the clear road that leads to the main road to

    15 Bratunac and Potocari. I wanted to clarify the record

    16 for those purposes.

    17 Q. Let me just ask you a couple of other

    18 questions in respect of your observations. You

    19 personally went down and touched these bodies, didn't

    20 you, Captain Rutten?

    21 A. Yes, I did.

    22 Q. Were the bodies cold? Were they warm?

    23 A. No, they were warm.

    24 Q. Were there any boys amongst the nine bodies

    25 that you saw?

  41. 1 A. No, there were no boys around.

    2 Q. Were any of the bodies that you saw wounded

    3 in the head?

    4 A. No, none. All had back shots.

    5 Q. All right.

    6 MR. HARMON: Now, let me place on the ELMO

    7 Prosecutor's Exhibit 82.

    8 Q. Captain Rutten, this was in the area with

    9 which you were familiar, because this was an area where

    10 you had done your patrols; isn't that correct?

    11 A. Yes. I'm very familiar with the terrain over

    12 there.

    13 Q. Now, are you aware that other colleagues of

    14 yours had also found bodies in that same area?

    15 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.

    16 Q. All right. And one of those colleagues was

    17 named "Oosterveen"?

    18 A. Yes, that was the Warrant Officer Oosterveen.

    19 Q. The diagram that is in Prosecutor's 82 is a

    20 diagram that you prepared. Isn't that correct?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Could you show the Court using your pointer

    23 the road that you took, that was indicated on the

    24 previous exhibit, in the general area where you found

    25 the bodies that you found, using your pointer.

  42. 1 A. Okay. This is the road that I used

    2 [indicates], and I went up here. This is the meadow

    3 that I talked about [indicates], and here are nine

    4 little lines, indicating the nine bodies I found.

    5 MR. HARMON: For the record, there's a

    6 rectangle at the top of the diagram, and there are nine

    7 parallel lines, and it is the area that Captain Rutten

    8 was just referring to. And the road that Captain

    9 Rutten took on Prosecutor's 82 is the road that is seen

    10 starting on the right-hand side of that rectangle and

    11 going directly down, intersecting with a road that

    12 leads from the right to the left of the page.

    13 Q. Now, Captain Rutten, was it Lieutenant

    14 Oosterveen who discovered the other bodies?

    15 A. No, it was a NCO, a warrant officer, a senior

    16 warrant officer.

    17 Q. Senior Warrant Oosterveen. Show the Court

    18 the route that senior officer Oosterveen took in the

    19 location where he found the bodies?

    20 A. Oosterveen went up here, and that is also a

    21 small stream, at least when it had rained, there was a

    22 small stream here, and he went up here [indicates] and

    23 that's where he made his photograph, he said to me.

    24 Oosterveen was a staff NCO, so he was not as much

    25 outside as we were. And our bodies, as I call them

  43. 1 like that, that I indicated on the meadow, is along a

    2 stream that flows from the north to south, and there

    3 was a water wheel just behind the house. Here is also

    4 a stream, but that stream was also -- only filled with

    5 water during heavy rainfall.

    6 Q. Now, let me ask you this question, Captain.

    7 MR. HARMON: For the record, by the way, the

    8 path indicated by Captain Rutten on Prosecutor's 82 is

    9 a -- starts to descend below the words "pad Oosterveen"

    10 and the line and the route of Warrant Officer

    11 Oosterveen again intersects with the same main road in

    12 the -- going from the right to the left-hand side of

    13 the diagram.

    14 Now, could I have Prosecutor's 82 -- I'm

    15 sorry, 5/3A placed on the ELMO.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, do you think 11.00

    17 would be a suitable time for a break?

    18 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Good. Thank you.

    20 MR. HARMON: This is a diagram, Mr. President

    21 and Your Honours, that was introduced through

    22 Witness F.

    23 Q. Do you see the oval-shaped area in -- the

    24 upper oval-shaped area in Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3A?

    25 A. [Indicates]

  44. 1 Q. Yes, that area. Now, is that area the same

    2 area or a different location where you found your

    3 bodies?

    4 A. To me, when you look at the map, it is a

    5 different area because in the drawing that you saw just

    6 before, you can easily see that this is the path that

    7 I'd drawn there.

    8 Q. That was Oosterveen's path.

    9 A. That was Oosterveen's path. And I went up

    10 here [indicates], where you see the APCs, I went up

    11 here and went right at this larger road, went up higher

    12 here [indicates], to the meadow that is here just

    13 behind the house. And here is the house with -- that

    14 house. Just behind that house there was a small stream

    15 with a waterwheel.

    16 Q. Captain Rutten, do you therefore conclude

    17 that the bodies that you saw were different than the

    18 bodies that were seen by Warrant Officer Oosterveen.

    19 A. Yes.

    20 MR. HARMON: I think this is an appropriate

    21 time to conclude.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. We'll be back in 20

    23 minutes.

    24 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

    25 --- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.

  45. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you can proceed.

    2 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.

    3 Q. Captain Rutten, before the break we were -- I

    4 was asking you questions about the discovery of certain

    5 bodies, and you had testified that when you returned

    6 from the discovery of those bodies, you went, took a

    7 stretcher, and returned to the compound, I believe. Is

    8 that correct?

    9 A. No, we didn't go directly to the compound.

    10 At first I saw, a few minutes later, the

    11 Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans. I spoke to him and I

    12 said that I'd found nine bodies in the meadow and that

    13 I made some pictures of it. He said that he would give

    14 the report to a higher level. And from that moment on,

    15 we didn't go directly back to the compound. We stayed

    16 around with the blocking, with the blockade, where the

    17 APCs are. There I tried to make some pictures behind

    18 the APCs, showing what the Serbs were doing and more or

    19 less also what we were doing.

    20 Looking through the camera I saw a picture

    21 that didn't look that good, because one of our

    22 lieutenants and our men were actually assisting the

    23 deportation of the Muslims, trying to do their best to

    24 help the refugees. But looking through the camera, as

    25 I said, it wouldn't give too good an idea of what the

  46. 1 UN was doing over there.

    2 Q. Let me ask you, Captain Rutten, the pictures

    3 that you took in the White House, the pictures that you

    4 took of the bodies, were those pictures developed, or

    5 did something happen to those pictures in the

    6 development process and therefore they were never

    7 developed?

    8 A. I kept the film with me, until I got back in

    9 Holland again, after the 21st of July, 1995. Two days

    10 later, a day later, in fact, the 23rd, someone of the

    11 intelligence branch of the army came to me and picked

    12 up the film, and I gave it to him with the idea that it

    13 got developed.

    14 Q. In fact, you were informed later that that

    15 film, something had happened to it during the

    16 development process; is that correct?

    17 A. That is correct.

    18 Q. Now, let me focus your attention back, then,

    19 to the next set of events in which you were engaged,

    20 and that is the request to escort buses. Could you

    21 tell the Judges, did you receive that order and what

    22 did you do in response to it?

    23 A. During the day I got an order to -- from my

    24 company commander to escort the last buses that were

    25 leaving the enclave. We prepared for it, my driver and

  47. 1 I, to get some gear and a jeep, and prepared and placed

    2 the jeep next to the entrance to wait until the last

    3 refugees had gone.

    4 Q. When you say you placed your vehicles next to

    5 the entrance, you mean the entrance to the UN compound?

    6 A. Yes, I mean the entrance to the UN compound.

    7 Q. Now, while you were waiting to escort buses,

    8 did you have an occasion to return to the White House?

    9 A. As we waited for the last buses to leave, I

    10 told my driver, "It's good to let you see what is

    11 happening in the White House," to get as many witnesses

    12 as possible of the things that were happening over

    13 there. He went with me. We walked around the house.

    14 At that time there was at the entrance a huge pack of

    15 belongings of the refugees. Also many more IDs and

    16 passports were laying on the ground. We went to the

    17 side that was empty that morning, that same morning.

    18 That side there were two Bosnian Serb soldiers on the

    19 staircase. On the staircase itself was filled up with

    20 Muslim men. The moment I came around the corner of the

    21 house, they looked at me and they had a weapon on the

    22 Muslims and the Muslims were handing out to the Bosnian

    23 Serb soldiers Deutschemarks, which they had with them

    24 at that time.

    25 They stopped at the moment that I came, and I

  48. 1 walked around the house. In front of the house, there

    2 was a balcony that was totally filled up with refugees,

    3 all men, and boys in fact. We went to the other side

    4 of the house. We couldn't get in then. There were

    5 more Bosnian Serb soldiers around, and I think that at

    6 that moment almost 300 men were in the house itself and

    7 on the balcony. It was completely filled up.

    8 Q. Can you describe the condition of those men?

    9 A. As we were to the place that I told you

    10 before, near the staircase, you could see the total

    11 fear, and I never thought that it really existed, but

    12 you could even smell death there because it was total

    13 fear, what you saw on the faces of the men and the

    14 young boys. And that was the thing that I wanted to

    15 show to my driver too.

    16 Then we went around to have a quick look, and

    17 seeing that so many refugees were in the house, we said

    18 to each other, "They have to go out here. It's no way

    19 to stay here." And I talked to the two Dutch soldiers

    20 that were still in place in front of the White House,

    21 and they said too, "The house is completely filled

    22 up."

    23 Then we went back to the entrance and I spoke

    24 to some -- one is a Dutch major and a Warrant Officer

    25 Rave that was also of the battalion, and we said "Why

  49. 1 can't the men go from the house? Because we have to do

    2 something at least to get them out of the house,"

    3 because there was no way they could stay there. "You

    4 have to speak to the Bosnian Serbs over there and see

    5 whether you could get them into a bus or whatever,

    6 because staying there is no use for them."

    7 Finally Rave and Major Kingori went to the

    8 White House and spoke to the Bosnian Serbs, and some

    9 time later, a bus came to get some of the men out, and

    10 later on more buses came to get them out again. And

    11 they also drove away and we couldn't escort them

    12 because we had to wait until the last buses -- yeah, we

    13 had to escort the last buses out, so we had to wait.

    14 And no one else could escort them because all of the

    15 jeeps and soldiers that were escorting the convoys of

    16 buses were either thrown out of the buses or pushed

    17 out, and the jeeps were hijacked by the Bosnian Serbs.

    18 So if we continued the process of escorting the buses,

    19 we had no jeeps left. So more or less it was no use to

    20 escort them when you lose all your materiel and are

    21 brought back half an hour back to the compound, or a

    22 day later. And, yeah, the escort hadn't succeeded at

    23 all.

    24 Q. Now, let me ask you, Captain Rutten, when you

    25 said you came around the corner of the White House and

  50. 1 you saw Bosnian Serb soldiers relieving Muslims of

    2 their Deutschemarks, how were those soldiers dressed?

    3 A. Those were soldiers dressed in the green

    4 camouflage uniform of the Bosnian Serb army.

    5 MR. HARMON: Now, can I have Prosecutor's

    6 Exhibit 28/8.1 placed on the ELMO, please.

    7 Q. You've seen this photograph before, Captain

    8 Rutten. Let me ask you to -- as soon as it's placed on

    9 the ELMO. Let me ask you, during your second visit

    10 when you were at the White House, did you see a man who

    11 you see in Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1 at the White

    12 House?

    13 A. It was this man I saw at the White House

    14 [indicates].

    15 MR. HARMON: Indicating, for the record, the

    16 man in the brown T-shirt on the left-hand side of

    17 Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1.

    18 Q. Now, what did you observe him doing?

    19 A. He was talking to the soldiers of the Bosnian

    20 Serb army. To me he looked not like a plain soldier,

    21 because he spoke to everyone who was around. He spoke

    22 not only to the Bosnian Serb soldiers but all men of

    23 the Bosnian Serbs that came in front of the house, and

    24 I mean also private cars that came along containing

    25 also some soldiers but in different uniforms, and by

  51. 1 "different uniforms," I mean black uniforms, and spoke

    2 to them. Some of the cars were coming out of

    3 Srebrenica itself and stopped in front of the White

    4 House, he spoke with, and some of them came out of the

    5 direction of Potocari, stopped in front of the White

    6 House, spoke to each other, spoke to the man here on

    7 the photograph, and then leave again with the car,

    8 again to Srebrenica.

    9 Q. Now, did you ever see the men in the black

    10 uniforms go into the White House?

    11 A. No, they didn't go into the White House.

    12 Q. Describe the people, the soldiers, and how

    13 they were dressed, specifically the ones who went into

    14 the White House and who were in and around the White

    15 House.

    16 A. The ones who were in and around the White

    17 House were all soldiers, the Bosnian Serb army, wearing

    18 green camouflage uniforms.

    19 Q. Now, at some point in time -- let me ask you

    20 this question: How long did you observe the man who

    21 was in Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/8.1 at the White House?

    22 A. Well, sometime it's difficult to say, but he

    23 spoke somewhere between 15 to 20 minutes, he was around

    24 there.

    25 Q. At some point in time, Captain Rutten, did

  52. 1 you leave the area of the White House and did you start

    2 your escort duties?

    3 A. Yes, later on, when it was clear that the

    4 last buses were filled up. The first bus started

    5 driving. At that time the battalion had said -- we

    6 stopped escorting because it was no use anymore. I

    7 asked at my company ops room whether I could go and

    8 escort the last to make an attempt to escort the last

    9 buses. I got an okay and I drove quickly to the head

    10 of the convoy. The first buses were driving. As we

    11 got in front of the convoy, we saw in our back mirror,

    12 at least the driver saw it at first, that a car, a

    13 private car, had come behind us and in the car were

    14 three Bosnian Serb soldiers. I instructed my driver, I

    15 did it before but I did it again in the car, "The

    16 moment we get blocked or whatever or they try to hijack

    17 us or whatever, turn the car and drive back because

    18 it's no use then to escort the bus or to have an

    19 attempt to escort the bus."

    20 Q. Captain Rutten, how far had you travelled --

    21 first of all, did you travel in the direction of

    22 Bratunac with those buses?

    23 A. No, I didn't reach Bratunac.

    24 Q. Were you travelling, however, in the

    25 direction of Bratunac, from Potocari?

  53. 1 A. I was travelling in the direction -- and also

    2 in the direction of the entrance of the enclave, more

    3 or less, and that was with OP Papa.

    4 Q. Where did this private car come from?

    5 A. One of the small dirt roads between the

    6 meadows, along the street, the car drove up, the one

    7 behind us.

    8 Q. Can you identify or can you describe the

    9 people who were in it?

    10 A. They were all Bosnian Serb soldiers, wearing

    11 also the green camouflage uniform.

    12 Q. Okay. And what happened next?

    13 A. What next happened was that another car came

    14 also from the side of the road and blocked our road.

    15 There were two soldiers in it. So we couldn't go much

    16 further. And they pointed at us with weapons. At that

    17 moment, I gave my driver the sign to make a u-turn and

    18 to go back. We hovered more or less along the road,

    19 along the side of the road, and got back along the

    20 buses that were driving up to OP Papa, and we went back

    21 because it was no use getting your car hijacked and not

    22 getting your mission completed, more or less.

    23 Q. Can you describe the soldiers in the vehicle

    24 that blocked your escort vehicle from the front?

    25 A. Those were also Bosnian Serb soldiers.

  54. 1 Q. Now, as a result of making that u-turn, was

    2 there any escort for that bus convoy?

    3 A. No, there wasn't any escort left at the

    4 time.

    5 Q. Do you know what happened to that particular

    6 convoy?

    7 A. I'm not sure. It went on the route to

    8 Kladanj, but I didn't know if it ever reached it.

    9 Q. How far away from Potocari was it that this

    10 series of events that you've just described took place?

    11 A. About a kilometre, a kilometre and a half.

    12 Q. Had you reached the location of OP Papa yet?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. Captain Rutten, did it appear to you that

    15 what was happening to you was organised?

    16 A. I think that it was well organised, because

    17 having no one on the buses, having no UN car around, it

    18 was impossible for us to secure the road to Kladanj and

    19 impossible for us to see what happened to the refugees

    20 which were on the buses.

    21 Q. Now, I take it you returned to the UN

    22 compound after that.

    23 A. Yes, I returned. And the moment I came to

    24 the entrance, the major of the staff guard told me that

    25 I had to go with a truck and some medical personnel, to

  55. 1 go into Srebrenica and to pick up the last elderly

    2 people that were left behind or along the road, or

    3 whatever, and to get them also on the remaining buses

    4 and trucks that were standing along the road, waiting

    5 for the last few refugees.

    6 Q. Did you follow that order?

    7 A. Yes, I followed the order and I went in with

    8 the truck, on the road to Srebrenica.

    9 Q. What were you driving?

    10 A. I was driving a Mercedes jeep.

    11 Q. What happened?

    12 A. In a turn, at first I saw on a hill some

    13 soldiers. We stopped. There were two soldiers next to

    14 the road. I spoke to them. They were BiH soldiers.

    15 They had no weapons on them, but certainly they were in

    16 the house that was on the hill, where the rest of the

    17 soldiers were. I think there were at least ten men.

    18 Q. Were these men that you had become acquainted

    19 with on your patrols?

    20 A. Yes, I saw some of them, yes.

    21 Q. All right.

    22 A. And I stepped out of the car, spoke to them.

    23 I said, "It's not good to go to either Srebrenica," and

    24 they shouldn't go to Potocari, because it's an enormous

    25 risk to go to Potocari. I said, "It would be better to

  56. 1 leave the enclave, and the most possible road then is

    2 the Bulijen [phoen] area, which is a very wooded area,

    3 so you have a real chance to reach the Muslim

    4 territory."

    5 Then --

    6 Q. What happened then?

    7 A. Then we got in the car again. First I

    8 grabbed out of the car a few food parcels. I gave them

    9 the few food parcels we had left because I -- yeah,

    10 it's quite a long distance out of the enclave, through

    11 the Bulijen area, to Kladanj itself, so they had to

    12 travel for a while.

    13 Then we went on, and a few hundred metres

    14 further on the road, in a bend, I got stopped by the

    15 Bosnian Serb army soldiers again, and they pointed at

    16 me with weapons. It all got very hasty. They pulled

    17 out the driver and they also said that I had to step

    18 out. The sergeant that was in the back of the jeep

    19 made the last communication message and turned on the

    20 switch to another channel, and that was it, because

    21 they hijacked our jeep and we -- they said that we had

    22 to go further on the road and complete our mission, or

    23 whatever we were doing with the truck. I had to

    24 explain that we were going to pick up some elderly

    25 people, and so on.

  57. 1 Q. Did you continue on in the direction of

    2 Srebrenica in the truck?

    3 A. Yes, we went on to Srebrenica with the

    4 truck.

    5 Q. Did you see anything unusual as you were

    6 driving in the direction of Srebrenica?

    7 A. It was a total mess along the road. But

    8 along the football field, I saw next to the hill, and

    9 that's quite a distance, I saw some Bosnian Serb

    10 soldiers in camouflage uniforms and some civilian

    11 people. But there were also some Bosnian Serb soldiers

    12 along the road, and they gave me the sign to drive

    13 through and not to stop over there.

    14 Q. Did you eventually arrive at UN Bravo Company

    15 base?

    16 A. Yes. We got stopped on the road several

    17 times. They all were men that were asking for all

    18 kinds of things from us, and finally we reached the

    19 Bravo compound. It was more or less destroyed as a

    20 compound itself. The fences were down. There were all

    21 Bosnian Serb soldiers looting and stealing the compound

    22 of the UN possessions that were around there and Dutch

    23 possessions that were around there. They were even

    24 driving in Dutch APCs. They were totally filled up

    25 with everything that they had stolen. They cleared out

  58. 1 the weapon collection point where the materiel was of

    2 the BiH that was in the enclave. They drove with a

    3 T-54 or 55 tank that they also had picked up out of the

    4 weapon collection point on the B Company compound.

    5 I spoke to a Bosnian Serb soldier. He looked

    6 to me like someone that has any rank whatsoever. I

    7 asked him if there were men or women around, Muslim

    8 people that were sick or whatever, that I could pick

    9 up. They said, "There's one man," and he escorted me

    10 on the compound. And as we reached the place where the

    11 men could have lain, you could see that they could have

    12 had someone laying on a ground. There was a blanket

    13 but that was it. There was no man around anymore.

    14 So we left. The moment we left, there was

    15 also a Bosnian Serb in a black uniform and said, "In

    16 the houses are much more people. You have to pick up

    17 that people." You know, "We don't go into houses. We

    18 just pick up the people that are outside." We found a

    19 few people along the road to Srebrenica, elderly

    20 people. The medical personnel treated them and laid

    21 them in the truck. Some were very old, and they

    22 wouldn't leave the enclave anymore because it's no use

    23 for them, they said, to leave the enclave.

    24 As we drove around in Srebrenica, we saw two

    25 dead bodies in the streets. They were completely

  59. 1 swollen, probably from the warmth. They were shot

    2 earlier, I think.

    3 We couldn't stop at all places. At some

    4 places I did stop. In front of the great bazaar or

    5 supermarket that was in Srebrenica there were some

    6 Bosnian Serb men. I spoke to them and they told me,

    7 "Don't worry. In a week you'll be in Holland again

    8 and you'll forget all about this."

    9 Q. Thank you, Captain Rutten.

    10 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I've concluded my

    11 direct examination of Captain Rutten.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

    13 Captain Rutten, you will now be questioned by

    14 the Defence counsel, and I give the floor -- which one

    15 of you both will deal with our witness?

    16 Mr. Visnjic.

    17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your

    18 Honours.

    19 Cross-examined by Mr. Visnjic:

    20 Q. Captain Rutten, you said, during your

    21 examination-in-chief, that you recognised the

    22 individual shown on a photograph, Exhibit 28/4.

    23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher

    24 please place the photograph on the ELMO.

    25 Q. Could you tell us where and when did you see

  60. 1 that individual?

    2 A. Yes. I saw the man, he was accompanying

    3 Mr. Mladic when he was in front of the compound, on

    4 Thursday, the 13th of July, 1995.

    5 Q. Thank you. Captain Rutten, have you ever

    6 seen before General Krstic, who is in the courtroom

    7 with us today?

    8 A. I have seen him before but not when I was in

    9 the enclave.

    10 Q. Thank you.

    11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Before I ask

    12 you my next question, I should like to tell the Chamber

    13 that Mr. Harmon has informed me that the report on

    14 Srebrenica, that is, the report on the debriefing of

    15 Srebrenica, is a public document, and I shall,

    16 therefore, take the liberty of using it in my

    17 cross-examination of the witness.

    18 MR. HARMON: Yes. I was going to raise that

    19 issue at the conclusion of the examination, but Defence

    20 Exhibit D1 was the exhibit that was tendered by the

    21 Defence, and the acceptance of that as a public

    22 document was deferred until I could ascertain whether,

    23 in fact, it was a public document. I can tell the

    24 Chamber now that it is a public document, and we have

    25 no objection to Defence Exhibit D1 being removed from

  61. 1 the protection of the seal.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

    3 Then you can proceed.

    4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

    5 from that document, from the same report, I should like

    6 to use several fragments during my cross-examination,

    7 and I should like to ask the usher to help me.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: He will.

    9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Much to our

    10 regret, we have the translation only into

    11 Serbo-Croatian. But I gave the interpreters the

    12 document in the advance, so that I hope there will be

    13 no difficulties in this regard.

    14 Q. Captain, while you were on duty in the

    15 enclave between January and June 1995, did you ever

    16 assess the respective strength of the Bosnian Muslim

    17 forces and the Bosnian Serb forces who surrounded the

    18 enclave at the time?

    19 A. I was aware that there was one Bosnian Serb

    20 brigade in the north, the Bratunac Brigade, and one --

    21 Q. Could you just tell me yes or no now. Answer

    22 with yes or no, and then later on we may belabour this

    23 point further.

    24 So did you make such an assessment of the

    25 Bosnian Muslim forces and Bosnian Serb forces?

  62. 1 A. Yes, we made some assessments.

    2 Q. Thank you. Now I shall read to you passage

    3 2.34 of the report on the debriefing, and I shall then

    4 invite you to comment on it. "The ABiH forces in the

    5 enclave were divided into four brigades with the

    6 overall strength of 3.000 to 4.000 men. Their armament

    7 comprised almost exclusively light weapons,

    8 complemented with inter alia a limited number of heavy

    9 machine-guns, anti-tank armourment, and mortars.

    10 Although the DutchBat, in compliance with this mission,

    11 did all in its power to disarm the ABiH, the battalion

    12 succeeded in this only in part. Regular ABiH troops

    13 were reinforced by the local police. Their operations

    14 were fairly unpredictable because those units had

    15 received practically no training and were rather

    16 undisciplined. The ABiH forces conducted systematic

    17 actions from the enclave, and after that, they would

    18 withdraw into the territory protected by the United

    19 Nations."

    20 Captain Rutten, is this correct, what the

    21 passage in the report says, passage 2.34?

    22 A. It's partly correct because there were that

    23 amount of soldiers probably, but you couldn't call them

    24 real soldiers because they were refugees, more or less,

    25 placed in duty by a man called -- as you speak of the

  63. 1 ABiH soldiers, placed in a sort of a brigade system by

    2 Mr. Oric. And you can't speak really of any army, real

    3 army structure, but more or less about a permanent

    4 group of a few hundred men and the rest were all more

    5 or less people, refugees, that were ordered into the

    6 army, ABiH army, as you could call it like that, by

    7 Mr. Oric, more or less forced.

    8 The estimation -- sorry?

    9 Q. I'm sorry.

    10 A. The estimation of the Bosnian Serbs was

    11 difficult for us to make because we couldn't see at the

    12 other side of the boundary of the enclave --

    13 Q. Captain Rutten, I will come to that later

    14 on. I'm sorry for interrupting you, but I should like

    15 us to keep, for the moment, this subject in mind, that

    16 is, your assessment of the strength of the Muslim

    17 forces.

    18 The last sentence in this passage of the

    19 report of the Ministry of Defence says: "The forces of

    20 the army of BH conducted systematic actions from the

    21 enclave, after which they would withdraw into the

    22 territory protected by the United Nations."

    23 Is that true?

    24 A. I can't say whether that was true or not. We

    25 weren't aware of it. We heard some of the stories by

  64. 1 the earlier called Major Nikolic, told by our local

    2 negotiation team. But we ourselves haven't checked any

    3 such information that the ABiH army was having raids

    4 outside of the enclave. For us, the ABiH was partly

    5 disarmed and the armament was in the weapon collection

    6 point, and partly we didn't succeed in disarming the

    7 BiH. But what I have seen of the BiH was that they

    8 only had small armaments partly and light mortars --

    9 that was the only thing I've ever seen by the BiH --

    10 and some RPGs, that is, an anti-tank weapon, and that's

    11 it. And they had almost no ammunition. Because I

    12 spoke to several BiH leaders of the northern part, and

    13 I was regularly on patrol, and I never, during my whole

    14 period, saw a large amount of ammunition or weapons of

    15 the BiH army.

    16 Q. Thank you. I should now like to move on to

    17 another area, another passage.

    18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Will the usher

    19 please help.

    20 Q. The passage is 2.35, from the same document,

    21 that is, the official report of the Dutch Ministry of

    22 Defence, based on the debriefing in Srebrenica.

    23 Passage 2.35 addresses the strength of the

    24 Bosnian Serb forces and says: "The army of the

    25 Republika Srpska had until and ending with June had

  65. 1 between three and four battalions belonging to three

    2 brigades of the Drina Corps deployed around the

    3 enclave. The average strength of the battalion was

    4 250 men. The units were well-equipped and had tanks,

    5 armoured caterpillar vehicles, artillery, and mortars.

    6 Men in the units were mostly made of Bosnian Serb

    7 refugees who had lived in the enclave before. One

    8 cannot exclude the possibility that the regular units

    9 of the VRS had been reinforced by radical police. The

    10 area along the southern boundary of the enclave was not

    11 occupied by the VRS, and it was manned instead by

    12 combat patrols. The only road in that area was blocked

    13 by mines. The VRS used infantry, several offensives of

    14 lesser importance because of the structural shortage of

    15 manpower. The strength of the VRS was in the use of

    16 heavy weaponry. The operations conducted by VRS forces

    17 were adjusted to the maintenance of the status quo and

    18 of the protection of the Bosnian Serb population in the

    19 enclave against the army of BH, carried out, launched,

    20 from the enclave."

    21 MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, may I -- I have a

    22 copy of the English translation of this, and if counsel

    23 is going to ask the witness questions about this

    24 particular exhibit that's in B/C/S, may I provide to

    25 the witness the English translation of that so he may

  66. 1 refer to it?

    2 JUDGE RIAD: I believe that that would be

    3 very appropriate. Thank you.

    4 MR. HARMON: And then if it can be returned

    5 to me, I can later file a copy or give a copy of the

    6 English translation to counsel.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: You will have to see to that.

    8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very

    9 much, Mr. Harmon, for the assistance.

    10 Q. Captain Rutten, is it correct what this

    11 report of the Dutch Ministry of Defence says, in

    12 passage 2.35? Is that correct?

    13 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

    14 Q. Thank you.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Can you read this passage to us,

    16 please?

    17 A. You mean passage 235?

    18 JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

    19 A. "Happening up to and including June, the BSA

    20 had between three and four battalions belonging to

    21 three brigades of the Drina Corps positioned around the

    22 enclave. The average strength of the battalions was

    23 250 men. The units were well-equipped and had tanks,

    24 tracked armoured vehicles, artillery, and mortars. The

    25 units were manned chiefly by Bosnian Serb refugees who

  67. 1 had formerly lived in the enclave. It should not be

    2 precluded that the regular BSA units were reinforced by

    3 radical militia. The area along the southern boundary

    4 of the enclave was not occupied by the BSA but was

    5 guarded by means of combat patrol. The through-road in

    6 the area was sealed off by mines. A structural

    7 shortage of infantry men meant that the BSA launched

    8 what amounted to minor offensive on foot. The BSA

    9 strength lay in use of the heavy weapons. Operations

    10 by the BSA troops around the enclave were geared to

    11 maintaining the status quo and protecting the Bosnian

    12 Serb population in the enclave from offences by BiH

    13 from within the enclave."

    14 Reading it again, the things that I have saw

    15 myself, in regard to the report, is that it is right

    16 that there are -- there were some Bosnian Serb people

    17 that lived around the enclave and in the enclave

    18 itself, formerly, that we saw on the hills and around

    19 the enclave. But by the end of June, we saw, from the

    20 OPs, regularly movement of regular BSA army; and then I

    21 mean well-equipped soldiers as meant in the report, and

    22 not poorly equipped. And there were more infantry men

    23 than we saw here in this report. And we saw, at the

    24 end of the month of June, more tanks and more artillery

    25 placed on the hills around the enclave.

  68. 1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

    2 Q. In other words, Captain Rutten, the Serb

    3 forces began to receive reinforcements sometime in

    4 June, in early June, if I understand you well.

    5 A. Yes, that was what we noticed. By the

    6 beginning of June to the end of June, we saw a build-up

    7 of forces.

    8 Q. Captain Rutten, if you could, will you please

    9 comment on the last sentence in this passage, 2.35? I

    10 mean, operations conducted by the forces of the Army of

    11 Republika Srpska, right up to the eve of the attack on

    12 the enclave. The sentence is: "The operations

    13 conducted by VRS forces were adjusted to maintaining

    14 the status quo and protecting the Bosnian Serb

    15 population in the enclave against the offensives of the

    16 Army of BH launched from within the enclave."

    17 Could you tell us something more about that?

    18 A. This happened all in the south, and what I

    19 know of this is, as an intelligence man of the company,

    20 was that I was placed in the north, and I only read the

    21 reports during the morning sessions of the battalion.

    22 What I know is that there was a build-up of BSA forces

    23 not only patrolling in the last phase before the

    24 enclave fell, but also really entering the enclave, and

    25 we did not know at that time that the BiH was launching

  69. 1 raids outside of the enclave. So what I mean to say

    2 is, what we saw were BiH soldiers defending in the last

    3 phase, trying to defend the enclave, and trying to get

    4 us helping the BiH. But we couldn't help them, because

    5 we were, as UN soldiers, had to be impartial. And we

    6 saw a strong build-up by the BiH, and rolling up, more

    7 or less, our OPs in the southern part of the enclave,

    8 starting with OP Echo.

    9 Q. Captain Rutten, my question related to the

    10 period before the build-up of the Serb forces. Did you

    11 receive any information prior to that about these

    12 attacks which the Army of BH launched from the enclave,

    13 after which the ABiH men would go back to the enclave?

    14 I'm therefore referring to, say, early June 1995.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. In the transcript,

    16 you mentioned the build-up by the BiH. Is that what

    17 you said: The build-up by the BiH, the strong build-up

    18 by the BiH?

    19 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: You said, from something like

    21 the seventh line from the bottom, "And we saw a strong

    22 build-up by the BiH and rolling up our OPs in the south

    23 of the enclave, starting with OP Echo."

    24 THE WITNESS: No, no, no, no. That isn't not

    25 correct. We saw a strong build-up of the BSA.

  70. 1 JUDGE RIAD: BSA.

    2 THE WITNESS: And rolling -- and the BSA was

    3 starting to rolling up our OPs. Sorry.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: I think there is a slight

    5 difference between --

    6 THE WITNESS: Yes, there is.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

    9 Q. I don't think you answered my question.

    10 A. I think that I answered your question in

    11 regard of the build-up. In early June there was no

    12 real knowledge to us at that moment that the BiH was

    13 launching raids from out of the enclave on the BSA

    14 villages around the enclave.

    15 Q. Captain Rutten, to your knowledge, did anyone

    16 else, except your battalion, somebody else from the

    17 Dutch army, could acquire such information without

    18 being a member of your battalion, or being in one way

    19 or another -- having to do with your battalion, being

    20 linked to your battalion?

    21 A. We couldn't go over the boundary of the

    22 enclave. We could only see with our binoculars what

    23 happened. And we didn't hear about raids, about the

    24 BiH throughout the enclave, on Serb villages around the

    25 enclave. And I don't know -- at least to me it is not

  71. 1 known if there anyone was that had such information.

    2 Q. I'm asking you because this is part of the

    3 report of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. But let me

    4 move on to another question.

    5 Captain Rutten, you mentioned humanitarian

    6 convoys arriving through the Serb territory. Did you

    7 know that weapons had been found in these convoys? Did

    8 you ever receive information to that effect, about

    9 weapons and ammunition?

    10 A. At the moment the humanitarian convoy came

    11 in, the trucks were driven by mostly UN personnel. We

    12 escorted the convoys from OP Papa to the warehouse in

    13 Srebrenica. At OP Papa I saw several times that the

    14 convoys were being checked by the Bosnian Serb army,

    15 and the times that I was there, there had never been a

    16 weapon found on the UNHCR convoys.

    17 Q. You said at the time that you were there.

    18 But did you perhaps hear from some other members of

    19 Dutch forces that something had been found at some

    20 other time?

    21 A. To my knowledge, and the other soldiers from

    22 other patrols that accompanied UNHCR convoys, I never

    23 heard that there were weapons found. It could be, but

    24 it's not to my knowledge.

    25 Q. Thank you. Captain Rutten, did you know that

  72. 1 what we call the Bosnian Muslim army, or the BH army,

    2 was being armed by receiving weapons from outside the

    3 enclave, and that those weapons were getting into the

    4 enclave? Did you receive that kind of information?

    5 A. Yes, we got some information that there were

    6 some routes that came in from the southern part and

    7 that the BH army was getting supplies from those

    8 routes. And we saw also that there were some new

    9 uniforms coming in for the BH army.

    10 Q. Captain Rutten, are you aware that part of

    11 those armaments arrived by helicopter, and have you

    12 heard anything about that?

    13 A. There were some reports of our OPs that

    14 mentioned that they had seen a helicopter fly over the

    15 enclave, but they didn't actually see that the

    16 helicopter landed and got unloaded. So no one of the

    17 UN personnel, of the battalion, saw really those

    18 helicopters unload equipment for the BH army. We saw

    19 what I earlier mentioned, that there came some in, but

    20 what we saw were mostly uniforms, because they were

    21 brand new and, yeah, appeared to us that some materiel

    22 was coming in, but not in a large amount.

    23 Q. Thank you.

    24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I should now

    25 like to ask the usher -- Your Honour, I won't test your

  73. 1 patience much longer. I only have another fragment

    2 from this report. The passages I'm referring to are

    3 4.13 and 4.14.

    4 Q. Captain Rutten, I shall read out to you the

    5 passage numbered 4.13, and will you please just confirm

    6 whether you knew about the event which you described in

    7 it. "Soldiers of the army of BH, fully dressed and

    8 wearing blue berets or blue caps, arrived within 50

    9 metres from one of the observation posts. Operating as

    10 UN personnel, they opened fire from that position in

    11 the direction of the VRS front line so it seemed that

    12 the UN had opened fire. In this manner they tried to

    13 draw the fire of the army of Republika Srpska to the

    14 observation post and thus embroil the DutchBat combat

    15 in operations."

    16 Captain Rutten, did you know about this

    17 incident?

    18 MR. HARMON: I apologise for interrupting my

    19 colleague in his examination, but again I have the

    20 English translations of that, and if those could be

    21 furnished to the witness, it might assist him in

    22 answering the question.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: That would be very good, thank

    24 you, and it would assist the Judges too.

    25 MR. HARMON: Perhaps 4.13 and 4.14, which are

  74. 1 the excerpts that counsel is referring to could be the

    2 only ones shown on the ELMO, since the previous

    3 paragraph is not one that has been introduced by my

    4 colleague. And I think it would be appropriate, if he

    5 wants to introduce it, if we want to introduce it, we

    6 make the introduction of that separately. So if the

    7 ELMO could only show 4.13 and 4.14, that's the

    8 appropriate paragraph.

    9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

    10 Q. Captain Rutten, were you aware of the

    11 incident which is described in passage 4.13?

    12 A. No, not this kind of incident. What I see

    13 here is -- yeah, there is no location, real location

    14 mentioned in the enclave. So, yeah, it's kind of a

    15 vague statement, what's standing here. The only thing

    16 I can say about our UN equipment was that every time we

    17 missed something at our compound, that had gone or

    18 whatever, we had an immediate search action that could

    19 bring up the last of the uniforms or berets. So this

    20 is a very vague statement to me, and you have to give

    21 me a location so that we -- so that I can see where it

    22 happened.

    23 Q. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defence says

    24 only what it says, I mean, using these broad terms, so

    25 evidently we shall have to investigate it further.

  75. 1 But Captain Rutten, I should like to seize

    2 this opportunity, while we have this English

    3 translation available to us, to read also passage

    4 4.14. "It also transpired that the BH soldiers were

    5 not always recognisable as military personnel. Men who

    6 had previously been seen in uniforms fighting in the

    7 southern part of the enclave, recognised by members of

    8 the DutchBat when they mingled, dressed in civilian

    9 clothes with refugees moving from Srebrenica to

    10 Potocari, or when they were observed in the Potocari

    11 compound. Local women who were known to be members of

    12 the ABiH were subsequently also seen in civilian

    13 clothes."

    14 Captain Rutten, do you know anything about

    15 this?

    16 MR. HARMON: May I ask that the English

    17 translation be provided to the witness so he can review

    18 that. That was a rather fast translation, and I'm not

    19 sure whether he got it all.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: Let's do that, yes.

    21 MR. HARMON: If the item on the ELMO could be

    22 placed in front of the Captain, he can read it and then

    23 perhaps he could answer it.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Whenever there is an English

    25 translation, we'd appreciate having it. Thank you.

  76. 1 A. I earlier mentioned that I saw a soldier in a

    2 wheelbarrow this morning, and it was also a BiH soldier

    3 wearing civilian clothes. The same thing I find here

    4 now on paper, also that women had been members of the

    5 BiH army. Some of them were, really. But in spite of

    6 the situation, I would add something.

    7 If you know that every BSA soldier looked at

    8 the man and makes signs like I made this morning to the

    9 throats and had a kind of terror look, and looking

    10 through the history, what had earlier happened, about

    11 the Bosnian Serb army now facing a problem of leaving

    12 the enclave, I myself also would dress up in civilian

    13 clothes and leave the army, because what is your

    14 chance, really? I would ask the question to you: What

    15 is the chance, really, to leave the enclave if you know

    16 that you have been shot or will be detained in a house

    17 in which you are not being held as a prisoner of war

    18 but merely being held up and put on buses and driven

    19 out of the enclave?

    20 So knowing that, and they also got some

    21 intelligence, but knowing that, I would also dress up

    22 in civilian clothes and leave the enclave. And what

    23 here is on paper, yes, I think that I was in such a

    24 situation, I would do the same.

    25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

  77. 1 Q. Thank you. So you are confirming that this,

    2 indeed, happened.

    3 Captain Rutten, another thing. You described

    4 the place where you found nine bodies. I do not want

    5 us to go back to photographs and a map. But could you

    6 tell us roughly how far from the place where you found

    7 those nine bodies and where Lieutenant Oosterveen also

    8 found nine bodies, could you also tell us the distances

    9 between those places?

    10 A. If I know my way there, and I do, it's more

    11 or less 150 metres, maybe some less even, between the

    12 places of the bodies. Yes.

    13 Q. Thank you.

    14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I

    15 have no further questions.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

    17 I think we can continue. I will ask Judge

    18 Wald. Would you like to have a break? I would like to

    19 ask the interpreters, who are very valuable to us.

    20 Would you like to have a rest, or can we continue?

    21 I'll suggest a 20-minute break. Thank you.

    22 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

    23 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you have the floor.

    25 MR. HARMON: I have no questions.

  78. 1 JUDGE RIAD: You have no questions. Thank

    2 you.

    3 I would now like to ask my colleague, Judge

    4 Wald, if she would like to ask some questions.

    5 Questioned by the Court:

    6 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.

    7 Captain Rutten, in the beginning of your

    8 testimony, you talked about the fact that there was a

    9 gradual restriction in the number of humanitarian

    10 convoys that were allowed into Srebrenica during some

    11 of those early months that preceded the attack.

    12 My question to you is: Was that decrease

    13 raised with the Serbian liaisons, and what if any

    14 justification or excuse did they give for adopting a

    15 tougher policy on letting the convoys in?

    16 A. Mostly that information didn't come to us,

    17 but what I heard of the battalion was that the Serbs

    18 were decreasing the number of convoys by simply not

    19 giving them permission to go into the enclave.

    20 JUDGE WALD: Yes. But was this raised by

    21 your forces, DutchBat forces, or anybody with the

    22 Serbs, with a demand for some explanation?

    23 A. What I know of is that our negotiation team

    24 did discuss that with Major Nikolic and the post next

    25 to OP Papa.

  79. 1 JUDGE WALD: But you don't know what the

    2 reason or the answer that the Serbian liaison people

    3 gave?

    4 A. No, I don't really know.

    5 JUDGE WALD: Okay. When the UN trucks --

    6 when some UN trucks carried some of the refugees from

    7 the Srebrenica proper up to Potocari, and we saw

    8 earlier film clips of people on those trucks, do you

    9 know where they took them? Did they take them right

    10 inside the compound or did they leave them on the

    11 outskirts of the compound?

    12 A. The trucks? The UN trucks?

    13 JUDGE WALD: Right.

    14 A. The Dutch trucks drove up to Srebrenica, near

    15 the Bravo compound, picked up there the refugees, and

    16 they didn't need to pick them up, really, because they

    17 more or less stormed the trucks. They got on the

    18 trucks, got even inside the trucks, but up the trucks.

    19 The driver couldn't even see where he drove. So they

    20 were completely filled up. And then they came to

    21 Potocari, and they drove into the factory almost to

    22 give them the security that we could guarantee them.

    23 JUDGE WALD: Okay. So they were, to your

    24 knowledge, mostly taken at least into the factory

    25 compound.

  80. 1 A. Yes.

    2 JUDGE WALD: At another point in your

    3 testimony, you said that you -- I think it was maybe

    4 the first night, the second night, were told to secure

    5 the refugees on the outside of the UN compound in

    6 Potocari. What did "secure" mean? Did it mean simply

    7 what you told us about, that you got tapes and tried to

    8 tape off the area to at least alert the Serbians that

    9 that's where the refugees were, or did "secure" mean

    10 something different, that you were supposed to patrol

    11 it, to try and make sure that they were not molested?

    12 A. With "secure" I meant, and I'll give you an

    13 estimate of the total situation, in the south of the

    14 bus remise were still remains of the B Company that was

    15 securing the south side. At the other side, there were

    16 the three groups that I earlier mentioned, the three

    17 groups of ten men.

    18 JUDGE WALD: Right.

    19 A. We patrolled the site that we spoke about.

    20 We spoke with the people, we helped them. My team had

    21 a doctor, so to give them the first medical aid during

    22 the whole night. And more or less we secured them not

    23 only by the red/white tape, but just by being there and

    24 walking around, and looking up into the hills, that

    25 there was no one coming down. And on my side, that

  81. 1 night, no one came down.

    2 JUDGE WALD: All right. Thank you. At

    3 another point in your testimony you told us about being

    4 actually detained for several hours by the Serb

    5 soldiers before you were allowed to go back to the

    6 compound, and that was during one of the days when the

    7 busing was actually taking place; correct? Now, when

    8 you got back from the period of detention, were most of

    9 the buses gone by that time, or did the busing continue

    10 for a long period after that?

    11 A. The day that you speak about is the 12th, and

    12 then during -- in the early evening, the buses stopped

    13 coming and there were no buses around anymore. The

    14 next day, very early, new buses came and the drivers

    15 had to wait for the instructions from the Bosnian Serb

    16 army.

    17 JUDGE WALD: Okay. You also told us that one

    18 of the pictures that you took, or you almost took, in

    19 this case you didn't take it, you thought would have

    20 not portrayed a, I think you said, good scene because

    21 it would have looked as though the UN people, the UN

    22 soldiers were actively participating in the separation,

    23 in the evacuation. Can you tell us a little bit more

    24 about what that scene was, and what was the reality? I

    25 mean, what was the reality of the UN soldiers taking

  82. 1 any active part in the actual separation and evacuation

    2 of the refugees?

    3 A. I did make some pictures. I did that first

    4 because it was difficult because around the APCs there

    5 were also the Bosnian Serbs around. The situation was

    6 that they had taped an area in which you could place

    7 more or less 60 to 70 people, and that was the UN, the

    8 Dutch UN personnel that did that. Then they came in,

    9 60 until 70 people. They were more or less shown the

    10 way to the buses, or directed to the buses. And

    11 between another line there was standing all the people

    12 that were waiting, and in spite of the heat, many

    13 people were falling down. Dutch soldiers helped them,

    14 stood them up, gave them water, helped women with

    15 children, to hand out water and to cool them. So that

    16 was the situation at the place.

    17 And that didn't give a good estimate of the

    18 situation, because what I saw through the camera, and

    19 actually I made some pictures, was that the Bosnian

    20 Serb army was sitting along the road on all kinds of

    21 things, with their weapons in front of them, and we

    22 were actually at work there, so more or less helping

    23 with the deportation. And I found that not a good way

    24 to do that, in spite of the things that I heard from my

    25 commander and my other colleagues. Because it looked

  83. 1 like we were not an impartial party anymore, and as we

    2 had our blue caps on, our blue berets on, we had to be

    3 an impartial party.

    4 So I told that to my colleague, and that was

    5 Lieutenant van Duijn, and, okay, he did see that from a

    6 different point of view, but I did discuss that with

    7 him. But it went on like this.

    8 JUDGE WALD: Were UN soldiers working with

    9 the refugees at the point where the men were being

    10 separated from the women?

    11 A. No. At that point, that was at the other

    12 side of the line of the buses, and there were some

    13 Bosnian Serb soldiers instructing that the men are --

    14 had to be separated from the rest of the family.

    15 JUDGE WALD: So there were no UN personnel

    16 around that particular operation.

    17 A. Right.

    18 JUDGE WALD: When you visited the White House

    19 on the various times, did you ever see any signs in

    20 there of violence, torture, in the sense of -- we've

    21 heard in other locations of blood, tissue, anything

    22 like that.

    23 A. No, we couldn't see any. We tried to avoid

    24 that more or less by placing some UN soldiers around.

    25 JUDGE WALD: You also identified a man with a

  84. 1 moustache in one of the Prosecutor's exhibits as

    2 somebody who appeared to be, at least at one point in

    3 time, in charge, or of a higher echelon, appeared to be

    4 engaging with anybody who came in and possibly giving

    5 orders. Was that the only person that you had any

    6 information, either from your own observation or from

    7 hearing, that was in charge of the operations at the

    8 White House, of all the men coming in, later on going

    9 out in the buses, et cetera? Was he the only one that

    10 you could identify during that whole period as having

    11 some position of authority as to what went on in the

    12 White House?

    13 A. There were some more people that I

    14 identified. For instance, the so-called Captain Mane

    15 that I spoke earlier off, he was at the blockade but

    16 not actually with the White House itself. I couldn't

    17 recognise any specific leader that I've shown here on

    18 the photographs or on maps or whatever.

    19 JUDGE WALD: Two more questions is all I

    20 have. As the buses went off, the early buses that had

    21 the women and children on them, and went off to

    22 Kladanj, did you later on get any reports back from the

    23 other side that those buses had actually gotten to

    24 their destination and the women and children had

    25 actually crossed over into Muslim territory? So that

  85. 1 you knew that at least the women and children were --

    2 those buses were going to where they said they were

    3 going?

    4 A. We had -- some information came in from other

    5 colleagues that were brought back, that were on the

    6 route escorting some buses. Two days later, some of

    7 the -- for instance, Lieutenant Egbers came back, told

    8 us about the situation, what had happened there, and

    9 also I can refer to our Dutch television, two days

    10 later, that we saw actually -- yeah, it's more or less

    11 an incident. A woman that we helped, that had

    12 something -- a fragment of a grenade in her leg, and

    13 she was in a pink training suit. That same woman I saw

    14 on television two days later, near Tuzla, and telling

    15 that Dutch soldiers had done nothing. So we helped her

    16 two days earlier, and she said that nothing had been

    17 done. So we knew that the women mostly and the

    18 children got to Tuzla airfield. That was more or less

    19 two days later.

    20 JUDGE WALD: But while the evacuation was

    21 going on, in the two days when the buses were leaving

    22 Potocari, did you at that point know that the women and

    23 children were mostly being allowed to go across the

    24 border, or were you still in the dark as to what

    25 happened to them?

  86. 1 A. We were still in the dark, as you called it.

    2 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question has to

    3 do with the two excerpts from the Dutch Ministry

    4 debriefing, because I had a little trouble. I think

    5 you, in the main, agreed with these, but I had a little

    6 trouble understanding how they came together.

    7 In one of those, it was said, I believe,

    8 although I don't have the English translation here,

    9 that sometimes the Muslims inside the enclave, inside

    10 the Srebrenica enclave, were helped by the local

    11 police.

    12 And then the second part of my question is:

    13 Later on, in the second excerpt that Mr. Visnjic read,

    14 it said that some parts of the VRS were, in fact the

    15 soldiers, were supplemented by something called the

    16 radical police. What I'm trying to get at is, in your

    17 observations in Srebrenica, were the local police

    18 allied with one side or the other, and if so which

    19 side?

    20 A. The local police that were still in

    21 Srebrenica, in the enclave itself, consisted only of

    22 Muslim people. So there must be some ties there

    23 because I can't conclude any other.

    24 JUDGE WALD: Okay. So when the second

    25 excerpt talked about the Serb army being supplemented

  87. 1 by the radical police, that's something different, in

    2 your view?

    3 A. Yes, that's something different.

    4 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you very much.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Judge Wald.

    6 Captain Rutten, I also have some questions to

    7 ask you, after listening to your very clear testimony.

    8 I would like to make sure that I understood the main

    9 lines of your testimony.

    10 First, in your answer to the Defence counsel,

    11 Mr. Visnjic, you told him that the BiH army, you cannot

    12 speak of a real army structure. It was refugees

    13 collected by Mr. Oric with small arms.

    14 Now, I'm going to ask you the same question

    15 concerning the Bosnian Serb army. What would you say?

    16 A. I would say totally different. They were

    17 well structured. As I tried to say before to the

    18 Defence, in the northern part, there was the Bratunac

    19 Brigade, for instance; in the south, the Milici

    20 Brigade, all parts of the Drina Corps. We had some

    21 information about that, but not all that specific. But

    22 you could see during the whole operation that -- and by

    23 that I meant the things that I really saw myself --

    24 that everything was well prepared and a well preplanned

    25 machinery that you could see from the moment of the

  88. 1 arrival, and the time before you could also see that.

    2 Everything was well planned, was well overthought. You

    3 could see that everything and every man knew exactly

    4 what to do.

    5 They even had signs at their -- like me, to

    6 show that I'm a captain or whatever. Everyone knew who

    7 the other was. In fact, that is the perfect way to

    8 work with each other and also is a perfect way that

    9 your opponent, or an impartial party, can never

    10 recognise any of your people at all, because they all

    11 told us all kinds of nicknames. So as I refer to this

    12 so-called Mr. Mane. Mr. Mane is a well-known nickname

    13 with the Serbs. So you see all kinds of things with

    14 the structure, and thinking about it, it's almost like,

    15 yeah, that it was all well prepared and preplanned.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Good. Well planned. And what

    17 about the chain of command or orders, was it, in your

    18 assessment as a military man, conformed to the military

    19 rules, obeying the superior and orders going down in a

    20 chain?

    21 A. The things that I saw were that the ones that

    22 were in command only have to say things once, and

    23 everyone understood what he meant or what the senior

    24 commander meant. So you could easily tell then who was

    25 in control. So it was well-structured, as I said

  89. 1 before.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: According to your testimony, you

    3 went through -- I mean, this is really the thrust of

    4 your testimony -- you went through two main difficult

    5 experiences. The one is concerning the UN, or the

    6 DutchBat, the UN representative soldiers, and I noted

    7 sometime some of your descriptions, you said that your

    8 soldiers were used as shields sometimes. I'll take

    9 them in order. Were any of them killed or touched as

    10 shields?

    11 A. Not at that moment that I described.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: But they were used later. They

    13 were touched later.

    14 A. Yes.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: And some were hurt?

    16 A. No. No one got hurt at that time.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: But they were used?

    18 A. They were used, yes.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: The UN soldiers representing the

    20 International Community.

    21 A. Yes.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: And I'm now going gradually.

    23 You were laughed at when you always interfered and

    24 wanted just to put things in order or to request

    25 something, you were just laughed at and ridiculed.

  90. 1 A. Yes.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: And then going further, you were

    3 looted.

    4 A. Yes, that's also right, sir.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Your jeeps were hijacked.

    6 A. That's also right.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: And to go further, you sometimes

    8 had a pistol at your neck.

    9 A. Yes, also my neck, my mouth, everywhere.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: And do you think that was

    11 serious, or they were just joking with you? How did

    12 you take it then?

    13 A. I think that it was serious. Walking around

    14 for some time and trying to get some information, as I

    15 did, they knew exactly who they had to send away, and

    16 some of them they couldn't send away easily just by

    17 telling them, so they had to be more specific, if I can

    18 call it like that, by placing, for instance, a weapon

    19 in their face. And it was serious -- it was serious

    20 threats.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: Did you consider that your life

    22 could be in danger --

    23 A. Yes.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: -- if you did your job?

    25 A. Yes.

  91. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Now, did you raise the matter to

    2 the superiors? And whom did you raise it to?

    3 A. The moment that our things at the bus remise

    4 were looted, sometime afterward, there was a Dutch

    5 Captain Melchers who accompanied this so-called Mr.

    6 Nikolic. I said that we were not only looted, but also

    7 being threatened by the BSA, and he said, "No, we don't

    8 do that, and if you all keep quiet, nothing is going to

    9 happen." So more or less he said also the same thing

    10 as the other soldiers and the other commanders, that,

    11 yeah, he ridiculed it, more or less.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: And after your complaints, the

    13 same thing was repeated?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: It did not stop?

    16 A. It did not stop.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: And in other places.

    18 A. Yes. It did not stop as well.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: So you felt that there was a

    20 general attitude systematically applied.

    21 A. Yes, it was systematically, yes.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: In spite of the complaints.

    23 A. In spite of the complaints, Your Honour.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Now, I just wanted to make sure

    25 that you were not falling into the hands of some

  92. 1 undisciplined soldiers who did not know who you were

    2 and whom you represented.

    3 A. They knew exactly who I was, they even asked

    4 me for my rank, and they knew exactly who was in

    5 charge. They could see that. They easily -- they

    6 didn't speak to the soldiers. They more or less

    7 addressed always the lieutenants that were around. So

    8 they knew exactly what they were doing.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: The second line, of course, of

    10 your experience was the fate of the Muslims of

    11 Srebrenica. You were an eyewitness of nine corpses,

    12 nine dead people.

    13 A. Yes, yes.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: Apparently freshly killed. And

    15 you saw in the White House what you called the smell of

    16 death, and you saw children of 13 years old. So they

    17 reached that age of 13 years old, the children?

    18 A. My estimation at that time was 12, 13, some

    19 maybe 14, but not all of them. They were also in the

    20 house with the older men, yes, that's right.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: And you did not know what was

    22 their fate afterwards?

    23 A. Later on I heard, but not at that moment.

    24 But seeing the whole structure of it, when you're

    25 standing at the fence in front of the house seeing the

  93. 1 steps, one after each other, by throwing off their

    2 rucksacks, throwing down on the ground their

    3 belongings, and as I said earlier, it's no -- it was

    4 very clear that there needn't be any identification on

    5 the persons. There just was a point where they

    6 collected all men together, and at that point they

    7 tried to get them on the buses to anywhere, I don't

    8 know.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: But on the face of it, they were

    10 supposed to be checked to know -- I mean, apparently

    11 they went to the White House for inquiry.

    12 A. Yes, that was the story, but this morning I

    13 also told that when you do a proper inquiry, you always

    14 leave the ID with the person or you mark envelopes or

    15 whatever, just to get a system in it, to recognise

    16 who's who in the house. And if you only throw back the

    17 stuff on the ground and go into the house, then you

    18 never can be sure who's in the house or to interrogate

    19 or whatever.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: So it was indiscriminate, in

    21 your opinion.

    22 A. Yes.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Completely.

    24 A. Completely.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: It was just because they were

  94. 1 men.

    2 A. Yes, I think that just -- that was the main

    3 reason, and you could see it at the beginning of the

    4 line of the buses, the immediate separation of the

    5 soldiers -- of the men by Bosnian Serb soldiers, the

    6 dividing of the families almost immediately at the

    7 moment that they got walking to the buses, to the White

    8 House. That was a well-planned and well -- almost, I

    9 would almost say well-rehearsed is the word for it.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: But the women were left out.

    11 A. Women were left out. Women, very old men,

    12 and --

    13 JUDGE RIAD: And the children?

    14 A. -- and the children.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Children under 13.

    16 A. Yes, and very young children, yes.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: Now, about women, you happen to

    18 have seen yourself a woman running, chased by a Serb

    19 soldier. Was she running out of her house? Was he

    20 dragging her out of her house? What exactly was the

    21 scene?

    22 A. The scene was that the woman ran out,

    23 probably out of her house, I don't know really, but she

    24 ran out of the house, and shortly after, almost

    25 directly, a Serb soldier came after her, in a

  95. 1 camouflage uniform, and chased her around the house.

    2 And that was what I saw at an instant. And then we had

    3 some shots on the spot where we were taking

    4 photographs, so I saw nothing more of it.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: That was for looting for rape or

    6 for what?

    7 A. I couldn't make out of that situation what

    8 was really happening. Just a woman being chased by a

    9 Bosnian Serb soldier.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Was that the only case you saw

    11 during your stay there, the only case where women were

    12 chased?

    13 A. Yes, that was the only case that I saw that,

    14 yes.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Or heard of?

    16 A. I heard about some more things, but I can't

    17 state them, really, here now.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: Perhaps my last question. Of

    19 course, you could not follow at all the buses which

    20 were taking the refugees, and at a certain moment they

    21 would hijack your jeeps. Did you know afterwards where

    22 these buses went and what happened to them?

    23 A. We were told that all buses were going on the

    24 route to Kladanj, but we did never know, because it

    25 wasn't a secure route and the men that were on the

  96. 1 route of our battalion were held in houses, so we never

    2 were really sure what happened with the refugees in the

    3 buses because it wasn't a UN-secured road. It was

    4 under the surveillance of the Bosnian Serb army. So we

    5 had to wait and see who was coming in near Kladanj.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: And was there anything? Later

    7 was anything found?

    8 A. There was -- as we saw later and heard later,

    9 there were people coming in finally at Tuzla airbase,

    10 and they were all refugees from the Srebrenica

    11 enclave.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Men or women or old people?

    13 A. Only women, children, small children, and

    14 some very old men.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: But the other men, nothing in

    16 sight?

    17 A. No. There were -- in the first -- one of the

    18 first convoys, you can call them like that, there were

    19 two Dutch officers with it, and it was Major Boering

    20 and a Captain Voerman, and they saw many refugees

    21 coming in at Tuzla airbase, and that was only the

    22 women, very old men, and children.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Nothing discovered concerning

    24 the men who were taken apart?

    25 A. No, they didn't discover anything because

  97. 1 they were also held at the convoy route and then at

    2 Tuzla airbase, so they couldn't see anything else, just

    3 the bus they were riding with.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Captain

    5 Rutten.

    6 I think this ends our witness, and he can

    7 walk out.

    8 [Trial Chamber confers]

    9 MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I would move into

    10 evidence Prosecutor's Exhibits 82 through 85 and

    11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3C.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Visnjic, do you have any


    14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

    15 no objections, but I would like to use the opportunity

    16 also to tender three exhibits which we have offered, as

    17 Defence Exhibits 11, 12, and 13.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon?

    19 MR. HARMON: We have no objection.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: Then we'll accept all these

    21 exhibits. Thank you.

    22 I would like to thank you again, Captain

    23 Rutten, for your help to the Tribunal.

    24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

    25 [The witness withdrew]

  98. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Whom shall we have now?

    2 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, our next witness is

    3 Captain Vincentius Egbers. And while we're waiting for

    4 Captain Egbers, may I tender into evidence Prosecutor's

    5 Exhibit 1/E/1. It is an exhibit which is a smaller

    6 version of this map, Prosecutor's 1E, minus the various

    7 relevant sites that are attached, and I'm tendering

    8 this for purposes of convenience for the Court, if the

    9 Court may wish to use this exhibit and counsel may wish

    10 to use this exhibit for whatever purpose.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

    12 Mr. Visnjic, you agree?

    13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes,

    14 Mr. President.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Good. So we'll tender it into

    16 evidence.

    17 Would you like to call the next witness.

    18 MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I believe that the

    19 usher has gone to collect Captain Egbers.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, perhaps we can have

    21 a break at twenty to two for ten minutes.

    22 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    24 [The witness entered court]

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Yes. Go ahead.

  99. 1 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    3 truth.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: Please be seated. Thank you.

    5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to thank you for

    7 coming to testify and to contribute to justice being

    8 done. Our Prosecutor, Mr. Harmon, will ask you some

    9 questions before the Defence counsel will also take

    10 over. Thank you.

    11 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Judge Riad.


    13 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

    14 Q. Captain Egbers, could you spell your last

    15 name for the record?

    16 A. E-g-b-e-r-s.

    17 Q. You are currently serving in the Netherlands

    18 Air Force; is that correct?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. And you have the rank of captain?

    21 A. That's correct.

    22 Q. From 1988 to 1998, were you serving in the

    23 Royal Dutch Army?

    24 A. I was, sir.

    25 Q. And did you deploy to Srebrenica with

  100. 1 DutchBat III in January of 1995, and did you remain in

    2 the enclave of Srebrenica until July the 21st, 1995?

    3 A. I did, sir.

    4 Q. Could you tell the Judges what were your

    5 duties and responsibilities within the enclave?

    6 A. In the enclave I was a platoon commander.

    7 Q. And what did you do as a platoon commander?

    8 A. As a platoon commander, I was responsible for

    9 a piece of -- the section of our company's terrain.

    10 MR. HARMON: Could I have placed on the ELMO

    11 Prosecutor's Exhibit 89, please. Mr. Usher, I'm

    12 particularly interested in having just the area of the

    13 Srebrenica enclave appear on the ELMO; the rest is not

    14 relevant for the purposes of the testimony, at this

    15 point in time.

    16 Q. Captain Egbers, this is an exhibit that I

    17 prepared after talking to you. Can you explain this

    18 exhibit to the Judges, please.

    19 A. You see at the north of the enclave, this was

    20 the terrain of the Charlie Company [indicates]; the

    21 south of the enclave was the terrain of the Bravo

    22 Company, over here [indicates]. My company commander

    23 divided his terrain into three sections; the section

    24 for the 1st Platoon [indicates], the 2nd Platoon

    25 [indicates], and for the 3rd Platoon [indicates], and

  101. 1 it was my job to man Observation Post Alpha in the west

    2 and to patrol with my platoon in the section of this

    3 area. So I was the platoon commander of the 3rd

    4 Platoon.

    5 Q. And the 3rd Platoon is in the area in which

    6 you patrolled with -- the 3rd Platoon is the area

    7 marked in yellow on Prosecutor's Exhibit 89?

    8 A. Yes, that's marked in yellow. This is the

    9 terrain, sir [indicates].

    10 Q. And when you say OP Alpha, that's the spot

    11 indicated with the letter "A" next to it; is that

    12 correct?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. And the spot marked with "M", was that also

    15 in your area of responsibility?

    16 A. It was, until the last month of July.

    17 Q. And is that OP Mike?

    18 A. OP Mike was a non-permanent observation post

    19 until June 1995.

    20 Q. So your principal responsibilities then,

    21 Captain Egbers, were in the yellow, pie-shaped area.

    22 A. Yes, sir, it was.

    23 Q. In addition, were you also part of a reserve

    24 platoon or a reserve unit of the DutchBat?

    25 A. Starting in April 1995, we've had a lot of

  102. 1 shortage of gasoline, diesel, and we had a big problem

    2 with our soldiers who were at leave. The Bosnian Serbs

    3 didn't allow them to come back to the enclave. So we

    4 were -- my platoon wasn't 30 persons big, but it was a

    5 lot smaller. All the platoons had a shortage of men.

    6 They were in Zagreb waiting for clearance to come back

    7 to the enclave.

    8 Q. Just so we're clear, a platoon is normally

    9 30 people; is that correct?

    10 A. That's correct, sir.

    11 Q. And what happened? Why was your platoon

    12 reduced in size?

    13 A. Well, the Bosnian Serbs had to clearance

    14 every transport of troops out of the enclave, and of

    15 course clearance them back then. And soldiers were

    16 allowed to leave the enclave, but from April 1995, they

    17 were not allowed to come back to the enclave. So they

    18 were waiting at Zagreb for a clearance to come back.

    19 Q. And as a result of the lack of clearance by

    20 the Bosnian Serbs, the size of your platoon

    21 diminished.

    22 A. It did, sir, and that's why the officers of

    23 the northern part of the Charlie Company were at the

    24 main base at Potocari, and the officers had to form

    25 with a few soldiers a so-called battalion reserve, four

  103. 1 APCs who were under my command.

    2 Q. Did those reserve members, including

    3 yourself, then deploy to other areas in the Srebrenica

    4 enclave in order to fill the gap that was left by the

    5 inability to fully man your units?

    6 A. That's correct.

    7 Q. Okay. Now, what was the effect of the

    8 dilution, if you will, in the number of your soldiers

    9 on the ability of DutchBat to perform its mandate?

    10 A. It's clear that when you've lost one-third of

    11 the platoon, it's very hard to man observation posts

    12 and patrol in the area, and so that's why we had a lot

    13 of pressure on the men who were still in the enclave.

    14 And we had to form this battalion reserve and try to

    15 support the Bravo Company, who was in the south of the

    16 enclave.

    17 Q. Were you able to patrol using your vehicles,

    18 or is there some reason why you couldn't do that?

    19 A. We couldn't patrol with our vehicles because

    20 of the lack of fuel. And, for instance, when we had to

    21 bring water and food to my soldiers in the west of the

    22 enclave, we used some local horses. So we would walk

    23 all the way up from Potocari to OP Alpha, which is one

    24 day going to OP Alpha and coming back again. So we had

    25 some fuel, but we had to keep that in case something

  104. 1 happened and the APCs had to drive. So from April,

    2 there was a lot of -- we were very short of diesel.

    3 Q. Were you short other supplies also as a

    4 result of the actions of the Bosnian Serbs?

    5 A. Yes, sir. We were very short of food. We

    6 only had some rice and some fresh packages left. It

    7 was not very good for the morale of the soldiers.

    8 Q. What about medicines?

    9 A. Well, I don't know anything about medicines,

    10 sorry.

    11 Q. All right. Now, in the time that you were in

    12 the enclave, were you able to make an assessment of the

    13 Muslim military forces within the enclave?

    14 A. During the first six months of my stay in the

    15 enclave, the Muslim soldiers, whether you can call them

    16 soldiers or not, the Muslims didn't carry their weapons

    17 openly. Only until OP Echo fell and we had some

    18 threatening in the south, the Bosnian Muslims carried

    19 their weapons openly, and I saw them carrying some

    20 AK-47s and some machine-guns in the south of the

    21 enclave.

    22 Q. Now, when did OP Echo fall?

    23 A. I don't know the exact date, but it was at

    24 the end of June or beginning of July.

    25 Q. How would you assess the organisation of the

  105. 1 Muslim armed forces within the enclave?

    2 A. Well, they were not very well-organised.

    3 They were badly dressed. They had no uniforms -- a few

    4 uniforms, yes. They had only a few weapons. They had

    5 no communications, a bad structure. They told us they

    6 had a few brigades, but we only saw refugees. And in

    7 the end of the month of June, we saw some weapons but

    8 not very much.

    9 Q. Now, was there a weapons storage depot at

    10 UN Bravo Company, and did that location have Muslim

    11 heavy weapons?

    12 A. Yes, it had.

    13 Q. Now, I'm going to get a little bit ahead of

    14 the sequence of events, but did you ever see an

    15 artillery piece in your entire stay in the Srebrenica

    16 enclave?

    17 A. I did, sir.

    18 Q. And without going into details of the

    19 circumstances, can you tell us when you saw that

    20 artillery piece?

    21 A. I saw that piece of artillery -- that was the

    22 second day when I took up the blocking position in

    23 the -- near the Srebrenica town.

    24 Q. Was that during the invasion of the enclave

    25 by the Bosnian Serb army?

  106. 1 A. It was during the invasion of the south of

    2 the enclave that I saw a piece of artillery called a

    3 Mike 48.

    4 Q. Is that a heavy piece of artillery?

    5 A. No, it's just a small piece of artillery.

    6 Q. Can you tell the Judges the circumstances,

    7 just briefly, about what you know about that particular

    8 piece of artillery?

    9 A. They had the piece of artillery for a few

    10 years in the surrounding of my blocking position,

    11 Bravo 1, and they've only had a few shells. I thought

    12 they told me about four or five. And there was a

    13 commander of this piece of artillery with a few

    14 soldiers, and they communicate by writing notes to

    15 their bosses.

    16 Q. Did you ever see that piece of artillery

    17 fired?

    18 A. No, sir, I did not.

    19 Q. At the time you saw that piece of artillery,

    20 were Bosnian Serb army forces advancing into the

    21 enclave?

    22 A. They were.

    23 Q. Now, let me ask you, as a professional

    24 officer, your overall assessment of the military forces

    25 of the Muslims within the enclave as you saw them and

  107. 1 experienced them.

    2 A. I think it was badly organised, badly

    3 weaponed, a group of refugees who had to be soldiers.

    4 No training, no weapons. I didn't think of them as an

    5 army as well.

    6 Q. Turning your attention to the Bosnian Serb

    7 forces, can you give me your assessment of the Bosnian

    8 Serb forces, as you experienced them and as you saw

    9 them in operation?

    10 A. Well, I certainly left the enclave in

    11 July 1995 with the buses of refugees, and then I saw

    12 the military strength of the Bosnian Serb army. They

    13 had anti-aircraft missiles, heavy machine-guns, a lot

    14 of AK-47s, anti-tank weapons, grenades. They were

    15 heavily armed, well-structured. They had communication

    16 lines. There were commanders, there were lieutenants

    17 who were in charge of a platoon. There was a military

    18 structure. That's what I saw of the Bosnian Serb

    19 army.

    20 Q. Did you see any tanks?

    21 A. I did, sir. I saw tanks, ambulances. I saw

    22 troop transport trucks. They had it all.

    23 Q. Did the army, the Bosnian Serb army that you

    24 saw, can you give us your assessment of how it appeared

    25 to you to function?

  108. 1 A. Well, we learned that tanks won't operate by

    2 itself, but tanks would mostly go in with four tanks

    3 and support each other. But the Bosnian Serb tanks

    4 entered the enclave by itself, they raised their

    5 barrels and fired like a piece of artillery on the town

    6 of Srebrenica.

    7 Q. Did the various components of the Bosnian

    8 Serb army that you saw appear to be functioning in a

    9 coordinated fashion?

    10 A. Yes, it did so.

    11 Q. Overall, how would you make an assessment

    12 then of the Bosnian Serb army, the elements that you

    13 saw?

    14 A. Well, they were well-trained, they were

    15 structured, they were well-armed. They were more like

    16 an army to me.

    17 Q. Do you believe or are you able to make a

    18 comparison of the two?

    19 A. Well, I think the Bosnian Serb army was a

    20 real army, like we know armies, and the Muslims, they

    21 were just refugees who were carrying weapons.

    22 Q. Do you believe that the armed elements of the

    23 Muslims within the Srebrenica enclave posed a credible

    24 military threat to the Bosnian Serb army that

    25 surrounded the enclave?

  109. 1 A. I don't know, sir. No.

    2 MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, would this be an

    3 appropriate time to take a break for ten minutes?

    4 JUDGE RIAD: If it's good for you, it will be

    5 good for us.

    6 MR. HARMON: All right. Thank you. This is

    7 an appropriate time for me.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: Just ten minutes.

    9 --- Recess taken at 1.40 p.m.

    10 --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you can proceed.

    12 MR. HARMON: If I could ask the usher to

    13 place Prosecutor's Exhibit 90 on the ELMO, please.

    14 Q. Captain Egbers, I'd like to draw your

    15 attention to the 9th of July and ask you if, as part of

    16 the unit of DutchBat, you took up a blocking position

    17 somewhere in the south of the enclave.

    18 A. Yes, sir, I did.

    19 Q. Could you tell the Judges, first of all,

    20 could you indicate where, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 90,

    21 you took up the blocking position? If you mark it with

    22 a highlighter, it might be more effective, and use a

    23 green highlighter for the purposes of the record.

    24 A. You see the road going to the west

    25 [indicates], this is the road. It makes two angles of

  110. 1 180 degrees. I was on this angle here, above the "V".

    2 Q. Okay. Now, what I'm interested in, Captain

    3 Egbers, is first of all can you tell the Judges the

    4 circumstances under which you took up that blocking

    5 position, what the purpose of the blocking position

    6 was?

    7 A. The circumstances were the following: We had

    8 to take a blocking position so we could be seen by the

    9 Bosnian Serb army with our white vehicles, and we had

    10 to draw a line, a line that couldn't be passed by the

    11 Bosnian Serb army. It was approximately this line

    12 [indicates], there was a blocking position on this

    13 line. So the Bosnian Serbs knew that we were on that

    14 line and they can't cross that line.

    15 MR. HARMON: So the record is clear, Captain

    16 Egbers has indicated a line that appears to be a line

    17 that goes from the right-hand side of this exhibit to

    18 the left-hand side of the exhibit, and it is the dark

    19 line that appears under the word "Srebrenica".

    20 A. It is. So these were blocking positions, not

    21 as we were taught green, hidden, but now on top of a

    22 hill, with white vehicles and blue helmets, so we could

    23 be seen by both parties as being a line they couldn't

    24 cross.

    25 And from this point, I had a good view to the

  111. 1 south, because my commander, who was in Srebrenica, on

    2 the compound of the Bravo Company, he couldn't see

    3 anything in the south of the enclave. His observation

    4 post couldn't see a thing, so the blocking positions

    5 had to watch the south with their binoculars.

    6 Q. At this point in time, the 9th of July, was

    7 the invasion of the enclave by the Bosnian Serb army

    8 well under way?

    9 A. It was, sir.

    10 Q. Was the purpose of your blocking position to

    11 at least deter the invasion of the enclave beyond the

    12 line you've indicated?

    13 A. It was. We had to search the terrain for any

    14 tanks or Bosnian Serb artillery that were there, and we

    15 had to report it.

    16 Q. How long did you remain at that blocking

    17 position?

    18 A. We stayed there three days.

    19 Q. What did you see on the 9th of July?

    20 A. I saw a Bosnian Serb tank entering the

    21 enclave, firing at Srebrenica, and going back again.

    22 And I town called Pusmulici, it's marked yellow here,

    23 it's approximately three kilometres away from my

    24 blocking position, and with my binoculars I could see

    25 Bosnian Serb infantry entering houses, setting them on

  112. 1 fire, and stealing stuff out of the houses.

    2 Q. Now, you said also that you could see some

    3 tanks coming and firing.

    4 A. I could, sir.

    5 Q. Do you know the direction of their fire?

    6 A. Yes, sir, I could. They fired into the town

    7 of Srebrenica.

    8 Q. Were there any military targets, as far as

    9 you were aware, in the town of Srebrenica?

    10 A. No, sir. Just refugees and a UN base.

    11 Q. Did you have an opinion then as to the

    12 purpose of the firing of the tank rounds into the town

    13 of Srebrenica?

    14 A. I think they wanted to scare the refugees who

    15 were in the city of Srebrenica so that they would go

    16 north to Potocari and they could enter the town. They

    17 were scaring them, and of course they were wounding

    18 them, killing them.

    19 Q. Now, was it at this particular location where

    20 you saw the artillery piece that was the subject of

    21 your previous testimony?

    22 A. Yes, this was the location. Mike 48 from

    23 the -- stood and watched south. Just the group of

    24 soldiers stood by the piece of artillery, didn't fire

    25 it, and was just there in case they had to fire it.

  113. 1 Q. How many Bosnian Serb soldiers did you see

    2 advancing into the enclave from your particular

    3 blocking position on the 9th of July?

    4 A. Well, at first I just saw tanks coming into

    5 the enclave, firing, and going back again, but at the

    6 end of the day I saw infantry entering the enclave as

    7 well.

    8 Q. How were they entering the enclave?

    9 A. They were coming with a transportation, an

    10 ambulance going after them as well, and they were

    11 walking one by one.

    12 Q. So walking single file, then?

    13 A. You can call it single file, sir, yes.

    14 Q. How were they dressed?

    15 A. They were in green camouflage.

    16 Q. Could you tell from your location how they

    17 were armed?

    18 A. They were armed with AK-47s and just rifles,

    19 so to me it appeared to be one or two infantry platoons

    20 heading for the town of Srebrenica.

    21 Q. You may have mentioned earlier, but what were

    22 you making your observations with? What kind of an

    23 optical device were you using?

    24 A. We had several binoculars, but we had one

    25 special one which could go onto 60 times.

  114. 1 Q. Sixty power.

    2 A. Sixty power, yes, you could call it that

    3 way. So we could see very clearly in the south, and

    4 that's what we reported. When we reported that the

    5 infantry was heading for the town of Srebrenica, we

    6 were ordered to accompany the four APCs that were on

    7 the marketplace already.

    8 Q. So you then returned to the town of

    9 Srebrenica.

    10 A. We did, sir.

    11 Q. What did you see in the town of Srebrenica

    12 when you returned?

    13 A. When I arrived at the marketplace, I saw

    14 thousands of women, children, men. And I saw the men

    15 carrying anti-tank weapons. I saw machine-guns and

    16 AK-47s. And there was a total chaos at the time

    17 because they knew the Bosnian Serbs were entering the

    18 town, the south of the town. They were very scared.

    19 They were asking me what to do and they were pointing

    20 their RPGs on my vehicle. They wanted me to join the

    21 other four APCs who were in the south of the town.

    22 Q. When you say "they," are you referring to

    23 Muslim men who were armed?

    24 A. Yes, sir, I am.

    25 Q. Okay. Now, had you ever seen so many Muslim

  115. 1 men with arms prior to this date?

    2 A. I saw prior to this date a few Muslims

    3 carrying weapons openly in the south of the enclave.

    4 After OP Echo fell, we had two mobile OPs in the south

    5 called Sierra and Uniform, so I saw Muslims carrying

    6 openly their weapons.

    7 Q. Now, did you redeploy to a different

    8 location?

    9 A. I did, sir. I did enter the marketplace and

    10 I joined the other four APCs, and then I went back to

    11 cover the APCs and stood there all night.

    12 Q. Now, at some point in time, while you were at

    13 that location or near that location, were you aware

    14 that close air support was being summoned?

    15 A. In the early morning, my forward air

    16 controller, who was in my APC, had to go back to

    17 position Bravo 1 because at 0700 there would be a

    18 gunship firing at all the targets, the tanks,

    19 artillery, in the south of the enclave.

    20 Q. Do you know what results occurred as a result

    21 of any close air support that you received?

    22 A. Later on that evening -- that afternoon,

    23 there were Dutch F-16 fighters who were attacking one

    24 or two tanks that were in my neighbour, that were

    25 threatening me, and they carried out well. The tanks

  116. 1 disappeared; I don't know whether they were hit. But I

    2 could go back to the city of Srebrenica to help Captain

    3 Groen with his Bravo Company. So there was a close air

    4 support with two F-16s in the afternoon, instead of a

    5 gunship promised by us in the morning, the early

    6 morning.

    7 Q. When you say "the afternoon," do you know

    8 which date that was?

    9 A. What's the date? Sorry?

    10 Q. Which date?

    11 A. It was the 11th.

    12 Q. Now, you said you returned to Srebrenica

    13 town. What did you see and what did you do then?

    14 A. Well, there were thousands of people looking

    15 at you and asking -- they asked me, "What should I do?"

    16 and we tried to move all those people to Potocari

    17 because we were certain that the Bosnian Serbs would

    18 attack the town real soon. And that's when I told my

    19 soldiers to leave the APC, and I got as many wounded

    20 and mentally ill people as possible on my APC, and I

    21 drove in front of them towards Potocari.

    22 Q. When you say you drove in front of "them,"

    23 who are you referring to?

    24 A. I'm referring to the refugees. I'm not in

    25 front of them, I'm driving between them. They are

  117. 1 coming with me towards Potocari.

    2 Q. Where were you in relation to the column of

    3 refugees that were going from Srebrenica to Potocari?

    4 What was your position?

    5 A. About one kilometre behind them. So I'm not

    6 at the front but I'm nearly at the front.

    7 Q. Were you the first of the UN armoured

    8 vehicles in that column?

    9 A. One of the first, sir.

    10 Q. When you were advancing toward Potocari with

    11 a column, did you see or hear any artillery fire in and

    12 around the advancing column toward Potocari?

    13 A. I did. I saw some Bosnian Serb artillery to

    14 the left and right of the road. All the refugees took

    15 to Potocari. I thought they wanted to scare them and

    16 wanted to impress them. They didn't hit the road but

    17 nearby the road.

    18 Q. I'm reminded by my colleague that we have to

    19 slow down. So since we speak the same language, if you

    20 would pause after I ask a question and I will pause

    21 after you answer a question before I give you my next

    22 question, then the interpreters would be greatly

    23 assisted in their job. We've talked about this

    24 before. Let me return to the examination, then.

    25 Where was the shelling hitting in respect of

  118. 1 the column? And could you tell the type of artillery

    2 or weapons used in the shelling?

    3 A. I saw some detonations about 100 metres from

    4 the road the refugees took. I couldn't see whether it

    5 was mortar fire or if it was artillery, but it

    6 definitely was one of those two.

    7 Q. Okay. What result did that firing of the

    8 artillery have on the people in the column of refugees?

    9 A. The refugees were very scared, of course.

    10 And they saw two F-16s coming over the town to support

    11 them, support us, and when they saw the Bosnian Serbs

    12 shelling them again, in the nearance [sic] of the road,

    13 they were very, very scared, of course.

    14 Q. Now, did you eventually succeed in getting to

    15 Potocari on the 11th of July?

    16 A. I did, sir.

    17 Q. What did you do that night?

    18 A. When I arrived at Potocari, I took care of

    19 all the ill people who were in my APC, and then after

    20 four days of blocking position, I took 12 hours off. I

    21 slept.

    22 Q. So you had been up for four days, the

    23 previous four days; is that correct?

    24 A. Correct, sir.

    25 Q. Okay. Let me turn your attention, then, to

  119. 1 the next day after you woke up, which would be the 12th

    2 of July. Did you receive any orders from Major Franken

    3 that morning?

    4 A. I did.

    5 Q. What were those orders?

    6 A. I had to assemble 12 soldiers and meet him at

    7 a conference room.

    8 Q. And what were your orders then?

    9 A. My orders then were to escort the buses who

    10 were appearing nearby the main gate, and take some

    11 food, take some water, take a sleeping bag. "We don't

    12 know where the buses are going to; we don't know where

    13 you're going to. Stay by the buses and try to radio

    14 everything you see on your way." That was my order.

    15 Q. And who was in the buses?

    16 A. In the buses were the women and children, the

    17 refugees, the Muslims, who were gathered by the HQ of

    18 DutchBat.

    19 Q. Did any other Dutch officers accompany you on

    20 your escort duty on this occasion?

    21 A. I escorted the first convoy of the

    22 deportation, and in front of this row of buses there

    23 was another UN vehicle, with Major Boering and a

    24 captain, and I was at the end of the convoy.

    25 Q. Now, I'd like you to describe your journey on

  120. 1 that first convoy that left Potocari, and I would like

    2 you to, first of all, tell the Judges about what you

    3 observed in the town of Bratunac.

    4 A. When you leave OP Papa, it's the northern

    5 part of the enclave, soon you will be on a road going

    6 through Bratunac, and there were Bosnian Serbs,

    7 hundreds of them, standing on both sides of the road,

    8 partying, celebrating, shouting, throwing things at the

    9 buses. I was very, very scared. It reminded me of a

    10 video movie we saw a few weeks before called

    11 "Schindler's List", and you see there the Jews walking

    12 towards trains and a lot of other people standing

    13 nearby the road and shouting at them as well. It was

    14 the same picture.

    15 Q. Did you succeed in -- you succeeded

    16 eventually in getting through Bratunac, did you not?

    17 A. Yes, I did, sir.

    18 Q. Did something happen to one of the buses in

    19 the convoy that you were escorting?

    20 A. One of the buses, the engine caught on fire.

    21 It stopped on the right side of the road. And all the

    22 other buses passed this bus and were following the

    23 leading bus towards Kladanj. And I stopped nearby this

    24 road, I stopped with this bus.

    25 Q. What happened?

  121. 1 A. There were several Bosnian Serbs coming

    2 towards the refugees who were in the bus. I ordered

    3 them all out of the bus. I wanted them to be safe

    4 because there was a fire in the engine. At that time I

    5 handed them over all my food, all my medicine, and all

    6 the water I had, because they were very thirsty, very

    7 hungry, and very scared, with a lot of headaches of

    8 course. Then I ordered them -- I allowed them to go to

    9 a river nearby and drink, and I saw a lot of Bosnian

    10 Serbs coming towards this group of people, just

    11 standing there looking at them.

    12 Then a few Bosnian Serb soldiers approached

    13 with a photo camera, with some cans of lemonade, and

    14 they were giving them to the children and taking

    15 pictures of it, for propaganda use.

    16 Q. Did the bus eventually -- was it eventually

    17 repaired and could it continue on its journey?

    18 A. It could not continue.

    19 Q. Was another bus brought to bring those

    20 refugees on their route?

    21 A. The bus driver asked to borrow my Mercedes,

    22 UN, to get another bus, but I told him to solve -- to

    23 let himself solve this problem. And he managed to get

    24 another bus. So there was another bus that the

    25 refugees got in, and I followed that bus.

  122. 1 Q. Which direction did you take? Could you use

    2 Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E, which is to your right, and

    3 take the pointer and just indicate on this large

    4 exhibit the route which you travelled with that bus.

    5 A. I'll talk louder. This is the city of

    6 Bratunac [indicates]. So we left from Potocari to

    7 Bratunac, towards Konjevic Polje. Here [indicates] we

    8 go to the south, crossing Nova Kasaba, Milici, Lazenica

    9 [phoen], and heading for Kladanj.

    10 Q. Now, can you point -- use your pointer and as

    11 best as you can recall, where did that bus break down?

    12 A. The bus broke down in this location here

    13 [indicates].

    14 MR. HARMON: For the record, the witness has

    15 indicated the area on the right and the left side of

    16 the town of Glogova.

    17 Q. Now, as you -- you can have a seat, Captain

    18 Egbers. Thank you.

    19 Captain Egbers, as you advanced, then, on

    20 your journey, what did you see?

    21 A. I saw a lot of infantry -- Bosnian Serb

    22 infantry on the road, facing the woods, facing the

    23 enclave, and firing at the woods. And they told me

    24 there were Muslim fighters in the woods and they would

    25 fire on them. So they stopped me -- they would fire an

  123. 1 anti-aircraft gun at the woods with great rockets, and

    2 then when they got finished, the bus and I could go

    3 through.

    4 Q. Did you hear any return fire from the woods

    5 in the direction of the Bosnian Serbs?

    6 A. No, sir, I did not.

    7 Q. How many soldiers would you estimate you saw

    8 in the stretch between, say, Sandici and Nova Kasaba?

    9 A. Well, I saw hundreds of them grouping with,

    10 let's say, five or six together, and then 20 metres on,

    11 another group, always facing the woods, nearby --

    12 between Sandici, Nova Kasaba, and Milici.

    13 Q. How were they dressed?

    14 A. They were dressed in green. They were

    15 Bosnian Serb infantry. They were well-armed with

    16 AK-47s, with machine-guns, and they had vehicles with

    17 anti-aircraft guns on it, with four barrels, firing at

    18 the woods.

    19 Q. Did you have an occasion to pass a football

    20 field near Nova Kasaba on your journey toward the

    21 drop-off point with that bus?

    22 A. Yes, sir, I did.

    23 Q. Let me show you Prosecutor's -- I'm going to

    24 show you two exhibits.

    25 MR. HARMON: So if the usher can be given two

  124. 1 exhibits, Prosecutor's Exhibit 12/4, which I should

    2 like placed on the ELMO first, and then Prosecutor's

    3 Exhibit 12/2. So, Mr. Usher, if we could start by

    4 placing 12/4 on the ELMO.

    5 Q. Have you seen this picture before, Captain

    6 Egbers?

    7 A. This is the football field nearby Nova

    8 Kasaba.

    9 Q. Now, could you describe to the Judges what

    10 you saw at that location on the 12th of July?

    11 A. When you drive the car over the road, you

    12 see -- you can look through the trees, and I saw this

    13 field covered with men, sitting on their knees with

    14 their hands on their necks. There was a table on which

    15 there were some soldiers, and there were some soldiers

    16 around the football field.

    17 Q. How many people were there on their knees,

    18 with their hands behind their neck?

    19 A. Almost the entire football field was covered

    20 with men.

    21 Q. Now let me show you Prosecutor's Exhibit

    22 12/2. Now, this is an aerial image, Captain Egbers,

    23 and it is dated the 13th of July, 1995, at

    24 approximately 1400 hours. And you will see indicated

    25 on the football pitch two ovals and some dark markings

  125. 1 within those ovals, which those have been identified as

    2 groups of prisoners.

    3 Were there more prisoners that you saw on the

    4 football pitch than are indicated in Prosecutor's

    5 Exhibit 12/2?

    6 A. Yes, sir. I saw the entire football field

    7 covered with men.

    8 Q. All right. Thank you.

    9 A. There must have been hundreds of them.

    10 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. Usher.

    11 Q. Did you see any -- let me withdraw that

    12 question. Were you able to ascertain who those men

    13 were?

    14 A. Well, when I drove over this road, towards

    15 Nova Kasaba, I saw some groups of Muslims walking

    16 towards the football field with their hands on their

    17 necks, and those were the Muslim men who were taken

    18 from the woods.

    19 Q. Now, eventually, Captain Egbers, did you

    20 arrive at a destination where the bus stopped and

    21 people on the buses were discharged?

    22 A. I did, sir.

    23 Q. Do you know where that location was?

    24 A. It was in the nearance [sic] of Kladanj, near

    25 the confrontation line.

  126. 1 Q. Did anything unusual happen there, at that

    2 location, at that time?

    3 A. It was well organised. The buses stopped

    4 there. The women and children saw me and they made

    5 this sign [indicates] to me, so they were sure they

    6 would be killed, because it was in the middle of the

    7 woods and all those buses stopped over there.

    8 Q. When you say "this sign," you indicated, for

    9 the record, your finger went from your right shoulder

    10 to your left shoulder, across your neck.

    11 A. That's right, sir. They were certain that

    12 the journey stopped there for them and that they would

    13 be slaughtered.

    14 Then I saw three of those buses drive through

    15 a point where they could debark, the refugees could get

    16 out of the bus, and had to walk towards the road,

    17 towards central Bosnia. And when those three buses

    18 were empty, another three buses had to drive on. So it

    19 was well organised, and in the first convoy, a lot of

    20 women and children walked a few miles towards central

    21 Bosnia.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. I just want to know

    23 what he means by "central Bosnia". To the woods? To

    24 the city? What?

    25 MR. HARMON:

  127. 1 Q. What do you mean by "central Bosnia"? In

    2 which direction were they walking?

    3 A. They were walking in a western direction,

    4 near the confrontation line, in the direction of

    5 Kladanj. We were stopped not nearby by the city, but

    6 in between -- in the woods. So there was a lot of wood

    7 on the left and right of the road, so that's why the

    8 women thought that their lives would end there.

    9 Q. Now, you returned to Potocari after that

    10 debarkation was concluded?

    11 A. I did, sir.

    12 Q. Did you pass that football field that you

    13 previously testified about, that is, the football field

    14 near Nova Kasaba?

    15 A. I did, sir.

    16 Q. What did you see at the football field when

    17 you returned?

    18 A. I saw that it was covered with a hundreds of

    19 men with their hands still on their necks, on their

    20 knees.

    21 Q. So a scene that was very much similar to what

    22 you had seen when you passed by the first time?

    23 A. It was, sir.

    24 Q. Now, let me focus your attention to the 13th

    25 of July. You have returned to Potocari. Did you

  128. 1 receive an assignment on the 13th of July?

    2 A. There was a captain who ordered me to report

    3 at 0600 to escort another convoy, but my convoy, it was

    4 convoy number 4, it wouldn't leave until 11.00. So

    5 between 6.00 and 11.00, I was in the surrounding of the

    6 main gate.

    7 Q. Did you have an occasion to see anything

    8 occurring at a location known as the White House?

    9 A. I saw -- yes, I did, sir. I saw and I heard

    10 a woman screaming for help, and I reacted on that.

    11 Q. Why was she screaming?

    12 A. She was screaming because she had to enter

    13 the buses, and her man or the male had to stay in the

    14 White House. He was brought there by Bosnian Serb

    15 infantry soldiers.

    16 Q. Let me just very quickly have you identify

    17 the White House.

    18 MR. HARMON: And if I could Prosecutor's

    19 Exhibit 5/17 placed on the ELMO.

    20 Q. I'm going to ask you if you can identify this

    21 structure in this exhibit as the White House. Do you

    22 see Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 that's been placed on the

    23 ELMO?

    24 A. I can see it sir. That's the same house.

    25 Q. That's the White House that's in the centre,

  129. 1 off to the right of this particular exhibit; is that

    2 right, sir?

    3 A. That's correct.

    4 Q. After you heard the screaming of the woman,

    5 what did you do?

    6 A. I contacted two corporals who was standing

    7 near the White House and I asked them what was going

    8 on. They told me they didn't know because they were

    9 not allowed to enter the White House. When I asked

    10 them, "Why aren't you allowed?" Well, the Bosnian

    11 Serbs wouldn't let them. That's when I approached

    12 these Bosnian Serb soldiers and I told them that I was

    13 a First Lieutenant and that I wanted to inspect the

    14 White House, and I went in.

    15 Q. How were the Bosnian Serb soldiers who were

    16 around the White House dressed; do you remember?

    17 A. They were dressed in green, green camouflage,

    18 infantry uniforms.

    19 Q. What happened when you went?

    20 A. I saw men sitting in different rooms, just

    21 waiting for things to happen.

    22 Q. Did you have a conversation with any of the

    23 Bosnian Serb soldiers who were there?

    24 A. I did. I asked them, "Why would you separate

    25 the men from the women," and he pointed at a lot of

  130. 1 knives, just pocket knives that were lying there and

    2 said, "Well, you see, they are all armed with knives

    3 and we don't want them to attack one of our bus

    4 drivers."

    5 Q. Did they say anything else?

    6 A. They told me later on that they would bring

    7 them to Kladanj.

    8 Q. So the Bosnian Serb soldiers told you they

    9 would bring them to Kladanj.

    10 A. They did, sir, yes.

    11 Q. Did you see anything else in addition to the

    12 pocket knives?

    13 A. I saw some money from former Yugoslavia. I

    14 saw some pictures of families. A lot of luggage left

    15 there by the men.

    16 Q. Where did you see the photos of the families,

    17 the luggage, and the money?

    18 A. In the garden of the town -- of the house.

    19 Q. In front of the White House? On the side of

    20 the White House?

    21 A. In front and -- in front of the White House.

    22 Q. All right. Now, did you see any buses with

    23 men from the White House -- I'm sorry. Did you see any

    24 men from the White House board buses?

    25 A. I did, sir. There were three buses loaded

  131. 1 with men, and it had a number 3. It was escorted by my

    2 colleague who had to escort number 3, I had to escort

    3 number 4. I was there and I told them that the Bosnian

    4 Serbs would bring them to Kladanj, but the men told me

    5 otherwise. They said no, and they made the same signal

    6 I just described, the same signal. "They will kill

    7 them," that's what they said, and they offered me some

    8 German marks.

    9 Q. Could you just demonstrate for the Chamber

    10 the signal that was made to you by at least one or

    11 maybe more of the Muslim men you saw within the White

    12 House?

    13 A. It was this signal, sir [indicates].

    14 MR. HARMON: Again, the record should reflect

    15 the finger crossing the neck from the left shoulder to

    16 the right shoulder.

    17 Q. Now, you say they offered you some

    18 Deutschemarks. Who offered you the Deutschemarks?

    19 A. The Muslim men, because they said that it was

    20 useless to them. I then believed that they would go to

    21 Kladanj, they would be escorted. And I said, "No, keep

    22 the money. It's your money. I don't want it."

    23 Q. How many men did you see get into the buses,

    24 or approximately how many men did you see?

    25 A. Nearly 200.

  132. 1 Q. How did those men look when they were getting

    2 on those buses?

    3 A. They were very scared. They were mostly

    4 elder men. Scared, very scared, yes.

    5 Q. We have to slow down once again, I believe,

    6 I'm reminded by my colleague.

    7 Did you ever see any Muslim men walking in

    8 the direction of the White House under Bosnian Serb

    9 army escort?

    10 A. I saw one man with his hands on his neck,

    11 being taken to the White House by a Bosnian Serb.

    12 Q. Now, is there anything else you can tell us

    13 about the White House that you recall, or have you told

    14 us everything you know about the White House, as you

    15 remember it today?

    16 A. Everything, sir.

    17 Q. All right. Do you know what happened to the

    18 convoy of three buses that you saw leave with the men?

    19 A. I left with convoy number 4 later on, but

    20 some days later, I've been told, those three buses

    21 never left Bratunac. They went to Bratunac and the

    22 escort was stopped there by the Bosnian Serbs.

    23 Q. Let me ask you, then, you proceeded then with

    24 your convoy; is that correct?

    25 A. That's correct, sir.

  133. 1 Q. Did you take the same route that you had

    2 taken the day before?

    3 A. I did, sir.

    4 Q. How many buses were -- approximately how many

    5 buses were in the convoy that you were escorting?

    6 A. About 14 or 15.

    7 Q. Now, what did you see that struck you as

    8 significant while you were making your journey toward

    9 your ultimate destination, near Kladanj?

    10 A. We were stopped several times. There were

    11 AK-47s pointed at our heads, and we had to hand over

    12 our armoured vest, our helmets, and everything they

    13 wanted from the car. It happened about seven times

    14 that journey.

    15 Q. Did you refuse -- apparently you must have

    16 refused about six times; is that correct?

    17 A. I did. I pointed at my rank and I translated

    18 that into their language and told the Bosnian Serbs

    19 that I was a First Lieutenant and that I needed it

    20 myself, and we drove on.

    21 Q. Ultimately did you relinquish your body

    22 armour, and did your driver as well relinquish his body

    23 armour and his helmet?

    24 A. Yes, sir, but that was when there was an

    25 AK-47 at our heads.

  134. 1 Q. So the items that you relinquished were

    2 relinquished under force.

    3 A. They were, sir.

    4 Q. Okay. Now, could you describe -- did you see

    5 any soldiers in the area as you were proceeding toward

    6 Kladanj, Bosnian Serb soldiers?

    7 A. I saw, from Sandici until Nova Kasaba, every

    8 three metres, a few soldiers. So there were a lot more

    9 soldiers. They were dressed in green, not as

    10 disciplined as the troops who were there the first

    11 day. They were heavily armed, firing at the woods

    12 where the Muslim men were supposed to be. And they

    13 were regular soldiers but not as disciplined.

    14 Q. Now, at least on this part of the journey,

    15 did you hear any firing coming out of the woods in the

    16 direction of those soldiers?

    17 A. No, sir, I did not.

    18 Q. Did you pass the football pitch again at Nova

    19 Kasaba?

    20 A. Yes, I did.

    21 Q. And the same field that you've identified

    22 earlier in an exhibit; is that correct?

    23 A. It's the same field.

    24 Q. What did you see at that football field, on

    25 the 13th of July, as you made your way toward Kladanj?

  135. 1 A. It was still covered with men, sitting on

    2 their knees, with their hands on their neck.

    3 Q. Were there fewer men on their knees? Were

    4 there the same amount of men? Were there more? How

    5 would you describe the number of men on their knees

    6 that you saw at Nova Kasaba football field?

    7 A. The same amount.

    8 Q. Did these appear to be Bosnian Muslim men who

    9 had been taken from the woods?

    10 A. Yes, sir, because there were groups of

    11 Muslims walking, with their hands on their neck,

    12 towards the football field.

    13 Q. Who was surrounding these men at the football

    14 pitch?

    15 A. I'm not sure. But I saw a truck with a white

    16 wolf's head painted on the doors of the truck. It was

    17 a crying wolf. And later on the Bosnian Serbs told me

    18 that it was a truck of the Drina Wolves.

    19 Q. Now, perhaps --

    20 MR. HARMON: Are we going to conclude, Judge

    21 Riad, at 2.30?

    22 JUDGE RIAD: How long do you have to go?

    23 MR. HARMON: I have a considerable time to

    24 go.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: So if you have to finish one

  136. 1 question, we can conclude after that.

    2 MR. HARMON:

    3 Q. Well, did you proceed, then, on your journey

    4 to Kladanj, after you passed the football pitch?

    5 A. I did.

    6 MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I have a number --

    7 Captain Egbers has a number of other observations on

    8 this particular leg of his journey that he will be

    9 describing in his testimony, but this would be an

    10 appropriate place to stop.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: If it is appropriate for you, it

    12 is appropriate for us. Thank you very much.

    13 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: Captain Egbers, we will request

    15 you coming tomorrow, at 9.30.

    16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: So we'll adjourn until tomorrow,

    18 at 9.30. Thank you.

    19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    20 2.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    21 the 6th day of April, 2000, at 9.30 a.m.