1 Tuesday, 27 June 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.36 a.m.

5 [The accused entered court]

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and

7 gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth, to the interpreters, to

8 the legal assistants and court reporters. Good morning, Madam Registrar.

9 Good morning, Mr. Harmon and Mr. Cayley. Good morning, Mr. Petrusic and

10 Mr. Visnjic. Good morning, General Krstic.

11 Good morning, Witness. Can you hear me?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You are now going to read the

14 solemn declaration handed to you by the usher, please.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

16 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17 WITNESS: WITNESS CC

18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Please be seated.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I hope you're comfortable.

22 Approach the microphone, please. Thank you.

23 The usher is going to show you a piece of paper. Please tell us

24 if your name is written on it. Give us a yes or no answer if it is or is

25 not.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you. You will now be

3 answering questions put to you by Mr. Cayley who is the gentleman standing

4 up to your right.

5 Mr. Cayley, your witness.

6 MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,

7 Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic. Thank you.

8 Examined by Mr. Cayley:

9 Q. Witness, during your evidence, in order to ensure that your

10 identity is not revealed to the outside world, I will be referring to you

11 as "Witness CC." I'm going to ask you some preliminary questions to which

12 you can simply answer yes or no.

13 Your nationality is Bosnian; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You are a Muslim by faith; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You did not serve in the JNA, the army of the former Yugoslavia,

18 because you were, I think, too young for military service; is that right?

19 A. Because I had enrolled in the faculty of veterinary studies which

20 meant that I could defer my military service.

21 Q. Did you ever serve in the JNA?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Am I right in saying that you joined the Bosnian army in October

24 of 1992?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, I know you had a number of duties in the army but we won't go

2 into that; the Defence may have some questions for you about that. But am

3 I right in saying that in March of 1995 you went to the listening post at

4 Okresanica?

5 A. Yes, that was in March.

6 Q. You underwent some training for a period of 15 days. What did

7 that training involve?

8 A. At that training we learnt about the various devices and equipment

9 that was used by the JNA at the time, the range of that equipment, how the

10 mobile surveillance centres worked, interference centres, jamming centres,

11 and so on. That means that we learnt about interception devices and

12 surveillance.

13 Q. The equipment and devices that you're speaking of were, in

14 essence, radio or communications equipment; that was the equipment that

15 you were trained upon.

16 A. Yes. After that training, we had to do a test; that is to say, we

17 had our final examinations. But I don't think we actually did those

18 examinations because of some of the operations that were going on at the

19 front.

20 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could get Prosecutor's Exhibit 138

21 for me and place it in front of the witness.

22 Q. Now, Witness, you were in a unit at Okresanica known as a PEB.

23 Was this the PEB of the 21st Division of the Bosnian army?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. What does "PEB" stand for?

1 A. It means anti-electronic warfare.

2 Q. Am I right in saying that the 2nd Corps of the Bosnian army and,

3 indeed, the State Security Service of the Bosnian government had listening

4 posts at the same location, at Okresanica?

5 A. Yes, as far as I remember, that is correct. It did, yes.

6 Q. So there were, in fact, three separate units at Okresanica who

7 were involved in monitoring activities.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Could you just point on Prosecutor's Exhibit 138 to the location

10 Okresanica. Witness, if you look at the top of the map, it is, in fact,

11 marked.

12 A. Up here, yes. Here it is.

13 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has identified

14 the green circle marked "Okresanica" as the location of his place of work

15 at the interception centre of the 21st Division.

16 A. It is on Mount Majevica. This is the mountain, Mount Majevica.

17 Q. Witness, there is another location on that map marked Konjuh. Are

18 you aware that there was also a listening post at Konjuh?

19 A. Yes, I knew that.

20 Q. Now, at Okresanica, which army were you principally listening to?

21 A. The army of Republika Srpska.

22 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that in July of 1995, you were working at

23 Okresanica?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, very, very briefly, because the Judges have now heard this on

1 numerous occasions, can you explain to Their Honours the process that you

2 as an operator went through in intercepting and recording military

3 transmissions of the army of Republika Srpska?

4 A. You mean our method of work, is that what you want to know about?

5 Q. Exactly, Witness.

6 A. Well, we had three work posts or three devices, sets of equipment,

7 that we worked with. When we were on the job, after arriving at our post,

8 we would consult the operator who was working, who was on duty. We'd ask

9 him what he'd been listening in to; we would take a look at his notebook,

10 what he had recorded and what he had made a note of; and the operator

11 would tell me what I should pay attention to in particular, if there was

12 something very important, what I should monitor.

13 Then I would sit down at my work post. I would put my headsets

14 on. The equipment would scan the frequencies and it did this non-stop,

15 all the time, and if I would intercept a conversation, the -- actually,

16 the device which intercepted the conversation would stop of its own. But

17 on occasion, it would not stop automatically. Then we would stop it and

18 go back to that particular frequency. We would then switch on the

19 recording device which we called an Uher tape recorder and record the

20 conversation. So we'd press a button on the Uher so that we could go back

21 to the conversation that had been taped. We would then introduce it into

22 the notebook, transcribe it.

23 After transcribing the conversations, we would hand them over to

24 the unit commander who would then introduce the information into a

25 computer and then would, I think, send it further on to the division.

1 That would briefly be our method of work.

2 Q. Witness, how did you identify the participants within any

3 particular conversation that you were listening to?

4 A. In my case, if the participant introduced himself, there were

5 cases where the participant in the conversation would introduce

6 themselves, and then we knew this, and we would take down their names or

7 nicknames and even the ranks that they held. And if it was a lieutenant,

8 we would put "L" or "P" for Pukovnik. If we did not know who the

9 participants were, we would put an "X" or a "Y".

10 Q. Did you ever come to be so experienced that you recognised voices

11 without the actual participant identifying him or herself on the radionet?

12 A. Yes, yes, I did have experience of that kind. I could recognise

13 certain voices, yes.

14 Q. If there was any part of the conversation which you couldn't

15 clearly hear, what procedure did you adopt if you couldn't transcribe what

16 was being heard on the tape recorder?

17 A. There were parts of conversations or words that were not

18 sufficiently audible. I would then rewind several times and try to

19 discern the words or parts of sentences, but if I failed, I would call the

20 commander and the others who were working there, and we'd go -- wind the

21 tape back 20 or 30 times, sometimes, and listen to it together to try and

22 decipher what the words were that were inaudible. If that failed, then I

23 would place three dots for that segment.

24 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this witness has very few intercepts

25 to actually introduce into evidence, but what I will do now for the sake

1 of Your Honours and for the court is to identify the linkage between the

2 notebook and the individual intercept.

3 The first exhibit, Mr. Usher, is 356, and that is linked to

4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 297 or tab 19; and the second two intercepts are

5 Exhibits 357 and 358, and they are linked to Prosecutor's Exhibit 295 or

6 tab 17.

7 Now, Mr. Usher, you can hand those exhibits out, but first of all

8 I would like you to hand to the witness Prosecutor's Exhibit 297, which is

9 tab 19.

10 Q. Now, Witness, you've previously looked at this book in my office.

11 Do you recognise this book?

12 A. I recognise it.

13 Q. Is this a 21st Division notebook?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. How did you recognise this notebook?

16 A. I recognised it by the lines and this number, and the RRU800 that

17 it says here. And that's open and closed, that's how we did it, the

18 lines, the squares.

19 Q. And indeed, I think this notebook contains your handwriting, does

20 it not?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be shown Prosecutor's

23 Exhibit 356, and it's 356/1C please, Mr. Usher.

24 Q. Now, Witness, don't read this conversation out, nor should it be

25 placed on the ELMO because it identifies you. Is this an intercept that

1 you took down, 356/1C?

2 A. Yes, it is my conversation.

3 Q. And indeed, without stating it, that in fact is your signature, is

4 it not, that can be seen?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. CAYLEY: Now, if we could go to, back to Prosecutor's Exhibit

7 297, and in fact, Mr. Usher, if you could go to page 236, those are the

8 last three digits of the evidence registration number.

9 Q. Do you see the same intercept within the notebook, Prosecutor's

10 Exhibit 297, that you've just identified?

11 A. Yes, I do. I see it.

12 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the court record, the witness has

13 confirmed that Prosecutor's Exhibit 356 is an extract from Prosecutor's

14 Exhibit 297, at page 236.

15 Q. Now, Witness, if you go back to the page before, so back to page

16 235, what is the date at the top of that page?

17 A. The 13th of July, 1995, Thursday.

18 Q. There is only one other intercept prior to your intercept at eight

19 minutes past eight. Your intercept was taken down at 1602, at two minutes

20 past four in the afternoon. Would you agree with me that your intercept

21 was taken down on the 13th of July, 1995?

22 A. Yes. The 13th of July, 1995, that is also my conversation.

23 Q. Thank you, Witness. This is a very brief intercept which I will

24 read into the record. It starts at the top with the frequency:

25 "836.000 (Channel 19) 1602 hrs, Participants: X - Y

1 X: This is mostly it. I called 394. I've got an extension down

2 in Kasaba.

3 Y: Uh-huh.

4 X: Where Malinic's unit is. They said that there are over 1,500

5 gathered at the stadium.

6 Y: What?

7 X: There are 1,500 at the stadium in Kasaba, fuck it. The duty

8 officer down there said that we probably won't let anything

9 get by. There are more ... that hasn't finished ...

10 (interference)"

11 And then it's signed. I won't read the signature into the record

12 because it identifies the witness.

13 MR. CAYLEY: If the Witness could be given Prosecutor's Exhibit

14 295.

15 Q. Witness, could you examine that notebook in front of you very

16 briefly and state whether or not you recognise it.

17 A. I do.

18 Q. Is this a 21st Division notebook?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has confirmed

21 that Prosecutor's Exhibit 295 is identified as a 21st Division notebook.

22 If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 357/1B.

23 I apologise, Mr. President, the French translation is missing so

24 we owe that to the Court.

25 Q. Witness, is this a conversation that you took down?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And you recognise your handwriting.

3 A. I recognise it.

4 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could turn, in Prosecutor's

5 Exhibit 295, to page 639.

6 Q. Witness, do you see this same conversation in the notebook that's

7 in front of you, to the left of you?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record, the witness has

10 confirmed that the extracted conversation, Exhibit 358, is contained

11 within Prosecutor's Exhibit 295, at page 639, 640. I will not read this

12 particular conversation into the record.

13 If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 358.

14 Q. Do you recognise this conversation, Prosecutor's Exhibit 358?

15 A. I recognise it, yes.

16 Q. This is a conversation which you took down.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If you could look at the notebook to the left of you and simply

19 turn one page, do you see the conversation that you've just identified in

20 the notebook?

21 A. Yes, I can see it. Yes.

22 MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness has confirmed

23 that Prosecutor's Exhibit 358 is an extract from Prosecutor's Exhibit 295,

24 at page 642.

25 Q. Now, let's date these two conversations together, Witness, because

1 one follows the other.

2 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Usher, you could turn back to page 638 of

3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 295.

4 Q. Do you see a date on that page, Witness?

5 A. Yes, the 15th of July, 1995, Saturday.

6 Q. Could you turn the page. Do you see the first intercept which you

7 identified, Prosecutor's Exhibit 357, on the next page?

8 A. I see it.

9 Q. On the next page, at 0955, on page 642, do you see Prosecutor's

10 Exhibit 358?

11 A. Yes, I see it.

12 Q. So would it be correct to say that both of these intercepts were

13 taken down on the 15th of July of 1995?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Let's keep turning the pages from 642 to 643. Do you see any

16 dates on 643, 644? In fact, there are no dates on that page, Witness.

17 A. No. No, I can't see that.

18 Q. On 645, 646, there are no dates.

19 A. No, I don't see that.

20 Q. 647, 648?

21 A. No, there aren't any.

22 Q. 649, 650?

23 A. No, none.

24 Q. And then on 651, 652, what date do you see?

25 A. The 16th of July, 1995, Sunday.

1 Q. Thank you, Witness.

2 One last question for you, Witness. When you were working at

3 Okresanica, did you ever think that you would be coming to this court to

4 testify about your work?

5 A. Let me just say that everything we did, we did for the

6 requirements of our army, principally. We did this with the highest

7 responsibility, to the best of our ability, because any serious error

8 would be detrimental to our fighters and our army. I could never even

9 dream -- not in my wildest dreams did I ever think I would be sitting here

10 when I was recording and intercepting the conversations and doing the

11 job.

12 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I have no further questions for the

13 witness so I can offer him for cross-examination.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

15 Mr. Cayley.

16 Witness CC, you are now going to answer questions which

17 Mr. Visnjic is going to put to you.

18 Mr. Visnjic, you have the floor.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20 Cross-examined by Mr. Visnjic:

21 Q. Witness CC, while answering questions put to you by the Prosecutor

22 in the course of the examination-in-chief, you said that you completed

23 training.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How long did the training last?

1 A. Fifteen days.

2 Q. During that training course, were you trained in the procedure for

3 preserving documentation on interception?

4 A. No.

5 Q. In the course of the training, were you familiarised with any

6 rules which govern these activities in anti-aircraft warfare?

7 A. As far as I can remember, no.

8 Q. Later on while you were working, were you informed on rules?

9 A. Yes, there were rules, of course. There were shifts. We knew

10 exactly what had to be done, how many people worked. We worked around the

11 clock. We had to have a serious attitude towards our work. Where the

12 conversations are intercepted, how they are intercepted, whom they are

13 forwarded to. And what happened afterwards with those conversations, I

14 don't know. So those were the rules that applied in the army of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16 Q. How were you informed about those rules?

17 A. As much as I needed to do the job, to that extent.

18 Q. Just a moment, please. Because of the interpretation, we should

19 make pauses in between the questions and answers.

20 The rules that you just described, were they in writing?

21 A. The shifts were written out on the doors so you knew who worked

22 when and for how many hours. That was hung up on the door, and this was

23 written out by the department Commander, or rather the squad Commander.

24 So I knew exactly when I would be on duty and for how long.

25 Q. Did you have written instructions as to the way you should

1 intercept messages, to whom you should give them, and so on?

2 A. No. No, we knew that. This was told to us orally.

3 Q. But who told you?

4 A. The squad Commander.

5 Q. Did the squad Commander inform you about the plan on electronic

6 surveillance?

7 A. Which frequencies were to be monitored, he would tell us. If

8 something was important, then he would tell us precisely which frequency

9 we should monitor, but he told us this orally.

10 Q. Did you have an order for electronic surveillance?

11 A. I don't know.

12 Q. Did you know whom you should listen to?

13 A. Yes, we knew that.

14 Q. In the event you were to capture another conversation, for

15 example, by the HVO or the international forces, what was the procedure?

16 A. As far as I can remember, as far as I'm concerned, I never heard

17 conversations by the HVO or the international forces.

18 Q. How long were your shifts at Okresanica?

19 A. Seven days at Okresanica, seven and seven at home.

20 Q. When there was a change in shift, was there a formal handover of

21 duty?

22 A. Yes, there was a handover of duty.

23 Q. Was this done in writing?

24 A. No, orally.

25 Q. Did each of you while using communications equipment have their

1 own equipment?

2 A. We divided up in the division so that everyone had his own

3 equipment. So, for instance, I spent 90 per cent of my time working on a

4 Kenwood. So mostly we trained on a particular type of equipment so it was

5 easier for each one of us to use it later on.

6 Q. Does that mean that you had had your own complete set that you

7 used?

8 A. Yes. Not all the time, but most of the time I would sit at this

9 Kenwood. I had a tape recorder, a notebook attached to each device, a

10 rotator for the antenna. There was a tape recorder, a rotator, and

11 notebook. Pens, of course.

12 Q. When you mentioned notebooks, did each device have its own

13 notebook?

14 A. Yes, each device had its own notebook.

15 Q. I think that I read or heard that you had three sets of equipment?

16 A. Yes, three.

17 Q. Does that mean that notebooks were used simultaneously for three

18 different devices?

19 A. So each operator sitting at a particular device would write down

20 in his notebook.

21 Q. Tell me, do you know where the notebooks came from, how you were

22 supplied with notebooks?

23 A. No, I don't know.

24 Q. There appears to be a problem with the interpretation, yes.

25 A. I can hear.

1 THE INTERPRETER: There's a constant hum.

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Was each one of you responsible, in a sense, for a certain

4 notebook?

5 A. Yes, yes. The notebook had to be there on the table, and while

6 working, you couldn't move it anywhere else. You couldn't move it away

7 from the table. While you were working, you had the notebook there in

8 front of you, and you were responsible for it.

9 Q. Did you write up anything for these notebooks?

10 A. The commander would write on the notebook when it was issued and

11 the day it was completed. I can't remember exactly. I think some

12 notebooks had stamps. I'm not sure about that, whether all of them had

13 stamps or some of them. I think there was even a stamp, that it was

14 stamped.

15 Q. Do you remember where this stamp appeared?

16 A. No, I can't remember at all. It seems to me there was one, but I

17 can't remember where.

18 Q. Do you perhaps remember in the case of these two notebooks?

19 A. I do not remember.

20 Q. Upon completing your work, what happened with the notebooks?

21 A. The squad commander would take them, and I don't know. I think he

22 sent them to the division, probably. There was a contact between -- from

23 division to division.

24 Q. Tell me, how did you transcribe the conversations in the

25 notebooks?

1 A. First we'd note the frequency, the time of the conversation, and

2 the participants in the conversation. If they introduced themselves, as I

3 said, we'd put the first letter of the name or nickname or rank.

4 Q. When you say that you took down the time, did you transcribe the

5 conversation immediately after intercepting it?

6 A. I would first write down some conversations on a piece of paper,

7 and then write it out nicely in the notebook, but first on an ordinary

8 piece of paper.

9 Q. But you wrote them into the notebook in the order in which you

10 heard them?

11 A. Yes. But when copying them into the notebook, I didn't follow the

12 same order.

13 Q. Does that mean that the conversations written in the notebook are

14 not in time sequence?

15 A. There are cases. For example, it says 9.15, and for the next

16 conversation, 8.15. So that is the explanation. Sometimes I took down

17 the conversations according to my own judgement as to which one was more

18 important, and in consultation with the commander, of course.

19 Q. Did you ask the commander in what order you should write down the

20 conversations in the notebook?

21 A. No, no, only in terms of the importance of the conversation. I

22 asked him, do I have to write them down in order; and I remember him

23 telling me clearly that it wasn't so important to write them down in

24 order. Whether one would be at 8.15 and the next one at 9.15, that wasn't

25 important, but the important thing was that the conversation was recorded

1 on such and such a day, and that we indicate the time in the notebook.

2 Q. When you wrote out the conversations in the notebook, did you

3 write down every word that you heard on tape?

4 A. I wrote down every word I heard starting from "hello" until the

5 last word, except, of course, those that couldn't be heard.

6 Q. And you considered it to be very important that every single word

7 should be noted in the notebook; is that what you are saying?

8 A. Yes, that was, for us, the approach. We considered every word to

9 be important.

10 Q. Did you take care to follow the word order?

11 A. Yes, of course. We did our very best to be faithful to the

12 original word order. That's what we had to do.

13 Q. Tell me, what was the procedure with the tapes once they were

14 filled out?

15 A. I can't tell you. We sometimes turned the tape around and used it

16 again, the same tapes, when we were out of tapes.

17 Q. When a conversation was written out on a piece of paper, do you

18 know how it was sent on to the command?

19 A. No, I don't know that. I can't tell you that.

20 Q. Did you perhaps say earlier on that the conversation was forwarded

21 by telephone?

22 A. I know that there were some urgent messages. I did say that there

23 was this inductor telephone, and then the commander would call up directly

24 the command of the 21st Division and report to them orally what we had

25 captured if something was really extremely urgent and it needed immediate

1 reaction.

2 Q. What was the regular procedure?

3 A. I really don't know. I can't tell you, and what happened

4 afterwards.

5 Q. In your shift there were several soldiers. How many?

6 A. About nine, mostly nine soldiers. But of course, the number

7 varied occasionally, but mostly we were nine. I remember that.

8 Q. How long was your duty working on the device? How long did it

9 last?

10 A. Four hours, sometimes eight.

11 Q. How many operators were working simultaneously in the same room?

12 A. Three operators.

13 Q. Who sent the reports to the command?

14 A. The squad leader, the squad commander, and the platoon commander.

15 He was there, too. I don't know which one of the two of them, but one of

16 the two of them.

17 Q. When handing over your duty during your working day, did you write

18 down anything about the condition of the equipment or things like that?

19 A. No, we did this orally. When I would come on duty, I would review

20 the conversations that were intercepted by my colleague, and then I would

21 ask him whether there were any interferences, and then he would tell me if

22 he had something to tell me regarding things I had to devote particular

23 attention to. This was done orally.

24 Q. Were all the soldiers in your group equally trained for this job?

25 A. No, they were not. Some were less, some were better. For

1 instance, I was less well-trained than people who had been working on the

2 job for five years, ever since 1992, even before. There were people who

3 were radio hams for 20 years.

4 Q. When you say less well-trained, you mean regarding intercepting

5 the signal?

6 A. No, no, regarding certain technical things, knowledge about

7 physics and things like that. But as regards interception, we were more

8 or less the same. I was no poorer than they in capturing conversations,

9 noting them down, and recording them. I knew what I was doing just as

10 well as they.

11 Q. So if we're talking only about the process of interception and

12 transcription, in that respect you were all more or less equally trained;

13 is that what you said?

14 A. Yes, more or less. As regards those particular activities, I can

15 say that we worked more or less equally well, not perhaps time wise. Some

16 needed more time; one was slower in writing than someone else. But we did

17 the job more or less equally well.

18 Q. In answer to questions by my learned friend Mr. Cayley as to

19 whether you can identify a certain conversation, did you actually

20 recognise your handwriting?

21 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely so, I recognised my handwriting.

22 Q. Do you remember the contents of those conversations?

23 A. I remember one.

24 Q. Among those that have been referred to specifically?

25 A. Yes, among those that were referred to specifically.

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1 Q. Do you remember the details, or globally?

2 A. I have a very rough impression of it, yes. In general terms I

3 remember it.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further

5 questions for this witness.

6 Witness CC, thank you.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

8 Mr. Visnjic.

9 Mr. Cayley, any additional questions?

10 MR. CAYLEY: Very few, Mr. President.

11 One thing I did want to note for the record is that I have the two

12 original notebooks here which my learned friend Mr. Visnjic has had the

13 opportunity to review outside the courtroom, and indeed he can look at

14 these again if he wishes. I have just one point of clarification with the

15 witness.

16 Re-examined by Mr. Cayley:

17 Q. Witness, you worked for the PEB unit that was attached or

18 reporting to the 21st Division; is that correct?

19 A. I can't hear the interpretation.

20 Q. You worked for the PEB unit that was reporting to the 21st

21 Division; is that correct?

22 A. Yes. Yes, the 21st Division.

23 Q. You stated in your examination-in-chief that there were two other

24 units, one of which was a unit that was reporting directly to the 2nd

25 Corps of the Bosnian army.

1 A. Yes. Yes.

2 Q. Were you at all familiar with the procedures that were being used

3 in the 2nd Corps PEB, or were you only aware of the procedures that were

4 being used in your own unit, the 21st Division PEB?

5 A. I knew only about the procedure that we used in the 21st

6 Division. I had no contact at all with the 2nd Corps, and I can say that

7 these boys from the 2nd Corps, I didn't know any one of them, actually,

8 until I arrived there. I knew one who came from the same place as I, that

9 he was from Srebrenik, but I didn't know he was working there, because I

10 went to see them only once. I just peeped in. I had no insight into what

11 they were doing and how.

12 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Witness.

13 Mr. President, just for the reference of the Court, I previously

14 made a comment about this, but Your Honours may wish to review

15 Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 334, and 358 together. I anticipate there will

16 be argument about the detail that emerges from those three exhibits at

17 some stage, but you may wish to review those three documents together.

18 Thank you, Mr. President.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much,

20 Mr. Cayley.

21 Judge Fouad Riad, any questions?

22 Madam Judge Wald?

23 Questioned by the Court:

24 JUDGE WALD: I just have one. You didn't put down every day, did

25 you? I mean, the date, July 15th, July 16th, did you do that every day,

1 or maybe some days you didn't do it? Which?

2 A. We did that every day. Every day the date had to be written

3 down. All conversations intercepted on that day were noted down in the

4 notebook under that date.

5 JUDGE WALD: And that's true of Exhibit 295, notebook 2, the

6 notebook that you were asked to identify the exhibits from?

7 A. Yes. Yes, it is.

8 JUDGE WALD: All right. That's all I have.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Witness CC, you said that you

10 believed that there were stamps on the notebooks but you can't remember

11 exactly. When you spoke about these stamps, does it remind you of some

12 official records or something like that?

13 What I'm saying is when you saw the notebook for the first time,

14 when it was absolutely empty, was anything written on it already or not

15 before you started writing into it?

16 A. No. No, the notebooks were completely empty. Completely.

17 Nothing could be written in them. It was not allowed.

18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question. You said that

19 the order of transcribing messages was not important, it was the hour and

20 the date that was important. This brings me back to the question of my

21 eminent colleague Judge Wald. What about the hour? Was the hour always

22 important; the time, in other words?

23 A. Yes, the time was always important.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] And the date? What about the

25 date?

1 A. The time and the date, yes.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Why do you think when you were

3 doing your work that the time and the date was important? Why did you

4 think it was important?

5 A. Well, simply the date had to be known, when the conversations were

6 recorded, so as to avoid any confusion there might be down there in the

7 centre. Wherever they processed these messages, in the division or the

8 corps, they had to know when each conversation was intercepted. And also

9 if the conversation is linked to any operations, they had to know when

10 those operations took place.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Did it happen that the date or

12 the hour was not written down? I'm not thinking of you, I'm thinking of

13 all of you. Could it happen that you forgot to write these things down?

14 A. Probably it's possible. It's possible. It can happen that

15 somebody may forget to write it down.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, Witness. We have no

17 further questions for you.

18 JUDGE WALD: I'm sorry. Maybe if the witness can't, the

19 Prosecution might be able to help me on this. I can't find any notation

20 of July 17th in Exhibit 295. Where have I missed it? I find the 16th and

21 I find the 18th but I can't find the 17th. That's tab 17; the 18th is on

22 688.

23 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, to be completely frank with you, I have

24 actually been through these and I think the 17th of July is missing.

25 JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to make sure that I hadn't omitted

1 that.

2 MR. CAYLEY: You're referring to Prosecutor's Exhibit 295? Yes,

3 it is missing, that date.

4 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, Witness, we have some

6 matters to regulate regarding tendering of exhibits.

7 Mr. Cayley, you have something to say, I think, regarding exhibits

8 and tendering those that you used in your examination-in-chief.

9 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Subject to the Court's existing ruling, I would ask for admission

11 into evidence of Exhibits 295 and 297. In respect of the other three

12 exhibits, I would ask for admission of 356, 357, and 358 into evidence;

13 357 and 356 should be under seal because they identify the witness.

14 Excuse me one moment, Mr. President.

15 [Prosecution counsel confer]

16 MR. CAYLEY: My learned friend Mr. Harmon has reminded me that the

17 notebooks themselves, 295 and 297, should be under seal because they again

18 identify the witness.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, are we still going

20 to wait for your position?

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, our position is

22 almost formed, but because of these three latest exhibits, perhaps we

23 could state our position after the break.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, Madam Registrar, you will

25 take note of these exhibits so we may determine what to do with them

1 afterwards.

2 Is there anything else, Mr. Cayley?

3 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Harmon would like to

4 address the Court, so if I could move out of his way.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well.

6 Mr. Harmon.

7 MR. HARMON: Mr. President and Your Honours, good morning, and

8 good morning to my colleagues.

9 We have one additional exhibit, Prosecutor's Exhibit 348; two

10 binders, 348/1 and 348/2. My colleagues have received these exhibits

11 before I am seeking their introduction into evidence.

12 These exhibits contain copies of various excerpts from notebooks

13 and include typewritten, transcribed intercepted conversations as well.

14 Some of these have been referred to in the next witness' testimony.

15 To orient Your Honours to this exhibit, if Your Honours don't

16 already have a copy of it, perhaps it could be distributed and I can

17 orient you through it so it will be easy to use in the future should it be

18 admitted.

19 I can tell Your Honours, while we're waiting for the distribution,

20 that we're asking that these two exhibits be admitted for the time being

21 under seal. We will come back to the Court and ask that portions of these

22 be removed from the seal.

23 If I may orient Your Honours, then, I'll use the first of the two

24 binders, 348/1, to orient you. At the beginning there is a table of

25 contents and there are four tabs in the exhibit, and it is

1 self-explanatory as to what each of those tabs represent.

2 Under tab 1 there is a brief index and a summary of the

3 intercepted communication that is contained within the notebook; tab 2

4 contains an index of names; tab 3 -- I'm sorry, tab 2 contains an index of

5 code names; tab 3 contains an index of names that are referred to in the

6 intercepts; and tab 4 contains maps with locations that are mentioned in

7 the intercepts. Thereafter, there are a series of tabs in date order

8 containing intercepts, and the same is repeated in the second volume.

9 JUDGE WALD: Mr. Harmon, excuse me. Mine say "Exhibit 364" and

10 the transcript says "348" or "248." Which is it?

11 MR. HARMON: I apologise. I've been given a binder that says 348

12 so it should be --

13 JUDGE WALD: My binder says "364." Just so we know, we can

14 determine what the number is.

15 MR. HARMON: We treat the Judges better than we treat the

16 Prosecutors.

17 JUDGE WALD: So it's 364?

18 MR. HARMON: That's correct.

19 JUDGE WALD: Okay. All right.

20 MR. HARMON: That's all, Your Honours. Thank you.

21 JUDGE WALD: I have one further question.

22 Just so I understand, these transcripts or these excerpts that are

23 contained in these two binders, some of which may come in or be referred

24 to by the next witnesses or a subsequent witness' testimony, these are not

25 the same as any of the ones we've been dealing with in the last week. I

1 just want to make sure I've got that straight. Is that right?

2 MR. HARMON: Some of them are.

3 JUDGE WALD: But some of them aren't, they aren't --

4 MR. HARMON: Some of them are not.

5 JUDGE WALD: So if we keep these two binders during the subsequent

6 witness' testimony, we can take back and put away the earlier intercepts,

7 or will we need reference to the earlier intercepts again? Just because

8 it's getting very crowded up here on the bench.

9 MR. HARMON: It is, it is. And we will stage manage to the best

10 we can, Your Honours. The sets that you're going to receive through the

11 next witness --

12 JUDGE WALD: Okay.

13 MR. HARMON: -- there are voluminous sets of binders, and we will

14 indicate to Your Honours which are going to be used on which day in order

15 to make more space up there.

16 JUDGE WALD: But we can put away the ones we've dealt with this

17 week or not?

18 MR. HARMON: Yes.

19 JUDGE WALD: Thank you.

20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, what is your

21 position, the position of the Defence, with respect to these exhibits?

22 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The Defence has received the

23 folders several days ago, binders, from the Prosecution, but with respect

24 to our comments with regard to the contents, we will do so after the

25 break, if we may, because we feel that we should take them all together

1 because they are intercepted conversations which are already contained in

2 the exhibits presented already.

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Witness, we thank

4 you for coming to the International Tribunal. We wish you bon voyage back

5 to your country and every success in your work, but please stay seated for

6 a few more minutes.

7 We're going to have a break now, a 20-minute recess.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m.

9 [The witness withdrew]

10 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon.

12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we seek admission of all of the

13 documents that we have previously tendered in the last seven days, and I

14 await hearing the position of the Defence, and then I will respond.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Petrusic, let's hear

16 you.

17 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, in

18 accordance with the ruling of the Chamber of the 19th of June, the Defence

19 would like to state its position regarding exhibits tendered since then to

20 the present.

21 The Defence will make a general objection regarding all the

22 exhibits together, and that general objection will apply at the same time

23 to each exhibit individually. The reasons for our objection to those

24 exhibits are as follows: If the notebooks were kept by members of the

25 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and according to the testimony of the

1 witnesses heard they were, or were kept either for the 2nd Corps or for

2 the 21st Division, then those notebooks had to be kept on the basis of

3 unified rules, namely, each notebook issued by the command. For whose

4 needs the witnesses heard here were working, each of those notebooks had

5 to be registered and approved by the stamp of the appropriate command, and

6 the witness we heard today told us, according to his memory, that he saw

7 that stamp. Furthermore, those notebooks had to be paginated, had to have

8 the pages numbered; and at the end of the notebook, a date had to be noted

9 when the notebook was completed and signed by the person responsible for

10 it, as well as the date when it was archived.

11 Only in that case could we speak of a valid system of keeping

12 records or documents. Without any procedure having been established,

13 these notebooks could be considered to be private notebooks kept by

14 individuals who filled them in, regardless of whether they belonged to the

15 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or to the Ministry of the Interior or its State

16 Security Service.

17 Furthermore, if on the basis of the handwriting in the notebooks a

18 text is typed out, then that text, that typewritten text has to be

19 absolutely identical with the handwritten text in the notebook. In the

20 submission of the Defence, the typewritten text would also have to respect

21 a certain format, and that means that the unit has to be indicated which

22 is issuing such a document; then the time has to be indicated when the

23 document was issued or compiled; and as in this case, we are dealing with

24 interception of radio relay communications, the frequency also has to be

25 indicated, and the route of the frequency on which the conversation in

1 question was intercepted. Also, the participants in the conversation have

2 to be indicated and to whom the telegram is addressed. For a document to

3 be valid in form, but in the opinion of the Defence this is not a matter

4 purely of form but also of substance, the document should also have a

5 stamp of registration.

6 Also, bearing in mind that these exhibits do not contain these

7 specified elements, then such notebooks should be considered private

8 notebooks, or possibly raised to the level of an internal document that

9 are used by Witness BB in his statement to the investigator of the

10 Tribunal in May, 1999.

11 In all the notebooks, in the majority of cases, the date is

12 missing in the heading of the noted conversation. The question that

13 arises is, is the method of determining the date a reliable one in the way

14 done by the Prosecutor or explained by the witnesses in their testimony?

15 There are numerous examples in these exhibits confirming this. By

16 way of an example, if the date 13th of July, 1995, is indicated, attached

17 to a particular conversation, and then comes the 16th of July or a later

18 date, by leafing through the notebook and watching the time when various

19 conversations were conducted is a rather unreliable method because one may

20 ask: What if within those two indicated dates, in between those indicated

21 dates, there were no conversations on a particular day, or no

22 conversations were noted down?

23 It should also be noted that the persons operating the computer

24 had the duty to retype a written message and forward it to a higher

25 command, so those individuals were not authorised to make any changes in

1 the contents of the written text. Exhibits 328C and 329B show that

2 changes were made in the text. The differences that occur are also

3 visible in Exhibits 334/2B and 334/1C.

4 There are also cases when a conversation was intercepted by three

5 operators; however, in all three versions there are differences, at least

6 as far as the version in the B/C/S language is concerned. As for versions

7 in English, the Defence objects to the translation.

8 In the case of individual conversations, certain words appear

9 which in another text, taken down by a different operator, those words are

10 missing or were left out, or parts of sentences were left out or

11 individual words. An example of this can be found in Exhibits 328, 329,

12 334, 358.

13 Similarly, there are differences between the handwritten and the

14 typewritten text. One might concede that these were due to punctuation

15 differences only, but if there are words that are different -- or in some

16 cases we have words and names which are not to be found in the handwritten

17 version. This also applies to Exhibits 334/2B and to 334/1C.

18 Also, when it comes to the identification of the participants in

19 the conversation, it is the submission of the Defence that in these

20 exhibits, they were identified in an extremely unreliable manner. If the

21 participants in the conversation introduced themselves, then that is

22 without dispute; however, there are exhibits, such as 303/C, 304/C, 305/B,

23 307/C, 312, 320/C, in which the participants did not introduce themselves

24 in any way whatsoever but were still identified by the operators.

25 We find the position unacceptable that the participants could be

1 recognised by the witnesses heard in court on the basis of the tone or

2 strength or modulation of voice. The Defence will agree that it is

3 possible to identify participants in that way, but such an identification

4 can be done, in the submission of the Defence, only by experts, persons

5 who have special expertise regarding distinctive characteristics of voice,

6 when asked to make an expert opinion. So a reliable manner of identifying

7 the voice of a participant would be one that I have just described. And

8 one of the witnesses, in his statement to the Prosecution, stated that a

9 tape was played for him during his interview with the investigators.

10 Mr. President, the Defence has, since these exhibits were produced

11 to it, in accordance with its daily obligations, invested an extra effort

12 to analyse these exhibits, though I must concede that an analysis of the

13 exhibits themselves is not the subject of this objection. But I cannot

14 avoid mentioning Exhibits 328, 334, and 358, and if we take any given

15 version of those exhibits -- it is a conversation between Krstic and

16 Beara -- if we take any version of that conversation, we see that every

17 subsequent version does not follow the same chronology of syllables,

18 words, and sentences as in the case of the previous operator.

19 I have already mentioned that objections have been made regarding

20 the translation, and we are awaiting an official response from the

21 Registry regarding that.

22 Bearing all this in mind, the Defence, depending on the

23 proceedings that lie ahead and the court sittings that have been planned,

24 will have to request an expert analysis regarding the authenticity of

25 these exhibits, the originals of which are in the possession of the

1 Prosecution. At this stage, and this may not be important for this

2 objection of the Defence, but the Defence would like to give notice to the

3 Chamber that in view of the contents of this objection, that we will be

4 forced to take such steps.

5 Mr. President, those would be the substantive objections of the

6 Defence which apply collectively to all the exhibits, as I said at the

7 beginning, all of them together, and each of the exhibits individually.

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

9 Mr. Petrusic.

10 Mr. Harmon, please.

11 MR. HARMON: Mr. President and Your Honours, we are seeking

12 admission of all of the exhibits that we have tendered that relate to

13 these intercepts.

14 First, the appropriate Rule of Evidence that applies in this case

15 is found in Rule 89(C). "A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which

16 it deems to have probative value." Now, Your Honours, in respect of this

17 evidence, from the content of what Your Honours have heard, the

18 Prosecutors would submit that intercepted communications and conversations

19 between General Krstic and members of his staff and other army members of

20 the VRS, in the time frame from, I believe, the first conversation is

21 approximately the 9th or 10th of July and past, are relevant to the issues

22 that Your Honours will be deciding.

23 Secondly, I think the Court must determine whether the documents

24 that they have seen, the notebooks, the excerpts from the conversations

25 themselves, are reliable.

1 What makes these documents reliable? In the first place, Your

2 Honour, in respect of each of the notebooks, these documents have been

3 authenticated by witnesses who were present either at Okresanica, Konjuh,

4 or the location where the 21st Division was intercepting communications.

5 Each of the original notebooks has been examined by the witnesses from

6 those particular units, as well as the transcribed conversations from the

7 State Security Service. Each has been identified as being true versions

8 of those documents.

9 In respect of the notebooks, the platoon commanders from Konjuh

10 and from Okresanica have identified the notebooks by examining them,

11 identified their own handwriting in them and identifying the handwriting

12 of their colleagues in them. In respect of the notebooks from the 21st

13 Division, we heard a witness today. He's examined those notebooks, the

14 originals, and he has authenticated those notebooks. There was a witness

15 from the State Security Service who has identified the transcripts and has

16 done so on the basis of the header that is located at the top of the

17 document, and either codes which identify the person who intercepted the

18 communication or transmitted the communication, or by names that are

19 located at the bottom of those.

20 So in terms of the authentication of these documents, you've had

21 witnesses, and the Defence has had the opportunity to cross-examine those

22 witnesses, and whether these documents that we have submitted to Your

23 Honours are authenticate.

24 Now we turn to the issue of whether these documents are reliable

25 and can be depended on for what they contain. I think in your analysis,

1 Your Honours, you first of all must examine, what was the purpose of the

2 creation of these documents at the time they were created. Now, these

3 documents weren't created to come to the International Criminal Tribunal

4 for the former Yugoslavia when they were created in 1995. They were

5 created because they were important to military operations that were being

6 conducted in the course of a war. These intercepts, these conversations,

7 were of a military nature. They were the type that -- the type of

8 information in them was the type of information on which the military

9 relied. It was information that could potentially save lives. It was the

10 type of information that could change the tactical situation on the

11 ground, and it was the type of information that was being intercepted that

12 could well, in some cases, even change the course of a war. There was,

13 indeed, a strong motivation on the part of each of these intercept

14 operators to be accurate because indeed, lives depended on it. The course

15 of the war depended on it. These weren't communications that were, as I

16 say, intercepted for future use in a criminal proceeding against General

17 Krstic.

18 The next thing I think Your Honours must examine in determining

19 whether these conversations are reliable, let's take a look at the people

20 who intercepted these conversations, and Your Honours have heard from some

21 of these people, not all of them. These were people who were assigned a

22 specific duty by the army or by the State Security Service, and they had a

23 duty and an obligation to fulfil their task. Their task was to intercept

24 and accurately record the substance of conversations that they had heard.

25 Virtually all of these people had experience in the use of radios. Many

1 of them had been ham radio operators since their early years. Virtually

2 all of these intercept operators, Your Honours, you have heard, started in

3 this process of listening to, capturing, and recording communications

4 since the time the war started in 1992. They had been at it for a

5 considerable period of time by the time the conversations that are at

6 issue in this case, in July of 1995, had been intercepted. They were,

7 indeed, experienced at their jobs.

8 The next thing I think Your Honours should take a look at is, what

9 were the procedures that were used in the course of capturing this

10 information that would suggest that it is reliable. First, they were

11 virtually identical procedures that were used within the three units,

12 within the four -- within the three units. One, the conversation would be

13 listened to. When there was a transmission, immediately the person

14 intercepting the communication would depress a button on the tape

15 recorder, and it would be captured to the extent that it could be

16 recorded. Thereafter, and I say thereafter, there was a handwritten

17 notation, virtually contemporaneous, with the time the conversation was

18 captured on tape.

19 If there was a dispute, if the intercept operator had a question

20 about what was heard, Your Honours have heard testimony that the intercept

21 operator may solicit his colleagues to come and listen to the

22 conversation, and they would attempt to listen over -- indeed the witness

23 today said I think as many as 20 or 30 times they would listen to

24 conversation. Why did they do that? They did that because lives hung in

25 the balance on what was contained in these conversations. It had to be

1 reliable. Now, I think not only did it have to be reliable, but the army

2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of a terrible war depended on this

3 information. The army relied on this information itself.

4 So when you take a look at the procedures and the purposes, I

5 think it's clear that this information, created at the time it was

6 gathered, used for purposes of essentially understanding enemy movements,

7 potentially saving lives, suggests that this is reliable information.

8 I think Your Honours should also take a look at the integrity of

9 these documents themselves. Your Honours have taken a look at the

10 documents, have inspected them. They're available for Your Honours'

11 inspection. We have presented copies, but we have the originals

12 themselves. And you'll see in some cases there are multiple conversations

13 that are captured -- the same conversation, I should say, that are

14 captured from multiple locations. Let's take the example that my

15 colleague Mr. Petrusic described, Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 354, and 358.

16 Prosecutor's Exhibit 328 is a conversation between Colonel Beara

17 and General Krstic. It's both sides of the conversation, and it was

18 captured from Konjuh. 334 is only one side of the conversation, and it

19 was captured from Okresanica. Prosecutor's Exhibit 358 is a partial,

20 two-sided conversation captured by the 21st Division at Okresanica. Three

21 different locations capturing portions of the same conversation at or

22 about the same time on the same frequency.

23 Now, they're different times you'll notice in those exhibits. I

24 don't recall, I think one says 9.57, one says 10.00, but bear in mind

25 there are portions of this conversation that may be missing in one version

1 or the other. But when Your Honours inspect how these conversations are

2 integrated from different locations, that, the Prosecutor submits,

3 suggests reliability as well.

4 So, Your Honours, we believe these documents are relevant,

5 reliable, and trustworthy, and should be admitted.

6 Now, I would like to address specifically some of the points that

7 were made by my colleague, Mr. Petrusic. Mr. Petrusic has stated that the

8 typewritten version must be absolutely identical to the handwritten

9 version in the notebook. The testimony before Your Honours was that the

10 intercept operators never unilaterally changed anything from the

11 notebook. However, there were differences noted between the typed version

12 and the notebook version. And I believe it was Witness BB, who was a

13 transmitter of information and somebody who encrypted and transmitted this

14 information, explained to Your Honours why there may be differences. And

15 he explained to Your Honours that if there was a doubt in reviewing the

16 notebook, bearing in mind he was somebody who also intercepted for many

17 years, he would ask his colleagues to go back and listen to the tapes, and

18 any changes would be typed into the computer and not necessarily noted in

19 the notebook.

20 My colleague also says and objects to the English translations of

21 these documents. Well, we certainly join in any objection if there are

22 errors in the English translations; they should be corrected. We have no

23 objection with that whatsoever. We submit to Your Honours the versions

24 that we get from the Language Services Section and presume that they are

25 accurately translated, but if there are significant differences, they

1 should be retranslated and resubmitted to Your Honours.

2 Now, my colleague also said that the identity of the participants

3 is unreliable in some of these conversations. I merely remind Your

4 Honours of the testimony of the procedures that were used. The

5 conversation, the radio transmission, would be heard by the intercept

6 operator. He would note -- he would depress the button as quickly as he

7 could. In many cases, parts of the conversation from the time it was

8 initially heard to the moment the button was depressed are not and did not

9 appear on the tape, but the intercept operator would note on a piece of

10 scratch paper who it was, the identities of the parties, and would include

11 that, not in a verbatim portion of the intercept because only the tape

12 itself that had been -- the conversation that had been taped was

13 transcribed, but had the intercept operator heard the identities during

14 the time period before the button was depressed, he would note that. The

15 Prosecutor's Office submits, again, that's reliable for the reasons I've

16 previously stated.

17 Now, counsel also says that the voice identification can only be

18 done by experts. The Prosecutor's Office respectfully disagrees with that

19 submission. In our own common experiences, I think I'm not necessarily an

20 expert, but over the years I'm fully capable of understanding and

21 identifying voices. These were people whose job it was seven days a week,

22 every day for many years, rotating in and out of their shifts, to listen

23 to the same channels, and after a while, we would submit that voice

24 identification is indeed likely and proper.

25 Lastly, my colleague submits to Your Honours that they may require

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1 a proper analysis of these exhibits. Certainly these exhibits are at

2 their disposal. Any expert they want, we will make these exhibits

3 available to them for their analysis should there be any problem. That

4 can be raised insofar as their evidence is concerned and should not affect

5 the admissibility of these exhibits.

6 We would submit, Your Honours, that while in some conversations

7 and multiple conversations there may be some minor differences, the

8 substance of these conversations that have been captured from different

9 locations is the same. We would submit, in Prosecutor's Exhibit 328, 334,

10 and 358, a close analysis by Your Honours, as we have done, will reveal

11 distinct similarities between those conversations.

12 Therefore, Mr. President and Your Honours, we would move into

13 evidence all of the exhibits that we have tendered throughout the course

14 of the last seven days that relate to intercepts. Thank you.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

16 Mr. Harmon.

17 Mr. Petrusic, do you have any additional observations to make?

18 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.

19 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Harmon, you said that the substance of the

20 conversations were the same. Now, just for the sake of knowledge, when

21 several people hear the same thing, don't you think also the words should

22 be the same?

23 MR. HARMON: I think if people hear the same thing under optimum

24 conditions, they should be the same; however, as I understand this

25 testimony to be, there could be different interferences and conditions as

1 to what is being heard depending on your location, the orientation of the

2 antenna, and the like. That may well account for the differences in some

3 words or the inability to hear clearly some words.

4 I would agree with Your Honour that those of us in this room who

5 are hearing me speak should hear the same words. But the conditions in

6 this war from the different positions differed, and that may well account

7 for the differences that are found in the text.

8 I would invite the Court to look at the substance of these

9 conversations and consider the substance of these conversations in the

10 context of everything else in the reliability analysis of all of these

11 documents. None of these witnesses who were recording these conversations

12 had any reason whatsoever to make a mistake; they had no reason whatsoever

13 to be false in what they believed they were hearing.

14 JUDGE RIAD: As far as the discrepancy between the handwritten and

15 the typewritten text, if worse comes to worst, are the audio cassettes

16 available?

17 MR. HARMON: Of a limited number of conversations, yes.

18 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE WALD: I have one question which you may be able to help me

20 with. It's probably more a legal question than it is factual as to

21 anything we've heard.

22 In assessing the reliability or the authenticity of these

23 documents, why is it irrelevant, as I assume you must consider it since

24 you didn't put any evidence in this way, why is so-called chain of custody

25 irrelevant? In other words, these people were looking at these notebooks

1 sometimes, I guess -- they may have seen them in your office, but prior to

2 that, they hadn't seen them in five years or so, and none of them appeared

3 to be very clear about where those notebooks were in the meantime. Why

4 don't we have to think about that with relationship to authenticity or

5 reliability?

6 MR. HARMON: It can be considered by Your Honours.

7 JUDGE WALD: But we don't have anything to consider. We don't

8 know. None of the witnesses seem to know.

9 MR. HARMON: The witnesses testify that these were sent back to

10 their high command.

11 JUDGE WALD: To the high command, yes.

12 MR. HARMON: That's correct. The Court can consider it, of

13 course, in --

14 JUDGE WALD: You are here presumably to tell me why we don't have

15 to worry about not knowing.

16 MR. HARMON: Well, I think, first of all, Your Honours, these

17 witnesses have identified the specific notebooks themselves.

18 JUDGE WALD: I understand that. They said, "I know this

19 notebook. That's my handwriting. I was there back in 1995 writing that

20 down."

21 MR. HARMON: Right.

22 JUDGE WALD: But somebody thinking about it really, at least the

23 question goes through your mind, well, you know, where were they in the

24 last five years?

25 MR. HARMON: I understand. The answer to your question is we did

1 not present that evidence to Your Honours; we are in a position to present

2 that evidence to Your Honours. We believe the evidence that we have

3 presented is sufficient for their admission into evidence. Should the

4 Court have a question or desire that kind of evidence, we're perfectly

5 happy to call that evidence.

6 You can see, in terms of the type of evidence this is, that we

7 could be here for months putting in every intercept operator, and

8 therefore we elected to present the evidence in the manner that we did

9 because we believed that we could establish, one, its admissibility, and

10 we could establish its reliability as well.

11 JUDGE WALD: Okay.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Harmon, I have a

13 question for you.

14 Perhaps you examined the entirety of the notebooks. Have you got

15 an idea whether there is an order in all this of registration? If we look

16 at the registration number, at the Commander's number, perhaps there's a

17 sort of order. Some witnesses said yes, there is; others said no, there

18 isn't. Some say that the books were virgin, were empty; others say that

19 there was something. But they all have registration numbers. Now, are

20 you able to establish by examining their entirety whether there is any

21 sequence as to date, and any qualifications of those registration

22 numbers?

23 [Prosecution counsel confer]

24 MR. HARMON: I personally don't know the answer to your question,

25 Mr. President.

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is it possible to have a memo

2 for the Chamber and for the Defence with respect to this question, because

3 I think that it could be important.

4 MR. HARMON: Yes, we can do that.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber will

6 make a ruling.

7 [Trial Chamber deliberates]

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The Chamber is rendering its

9 decision.

10 Having heard the arguments of the parties and taking into account

11 the spirit of the Statute, specifically the fairness of the proceedings,

12 the right of the accused to examine and have examined the witnesses

13 against him; and taking into account the general principles of criminal

14 law, that is, that the essential objective is to establish the truth, and

15 in order to attain that objective, it is important to have an overall view

16 of the evidence; and more specifically, taking into account Rule 89(C),

17 that is, the relevance of the documents and that they have been identified

18 by the authors to clarify the evidence; and taking also into account

19 Rule 85, the Chamber rules to accept the submission of the Prosecutor and

20 to admit into evidence the totality of the exhibits which are the object

21 of this motion.

22 That is the ruling of the Chamber.

23 So now, Mr. Harmon?

24 MR. HARMON: I'm now going to turn over the floor to my colleague,

25 Mr. McCloskey, who will examine the next witness.

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you have the

2 floor.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President, I heard the French, but

4 I didn't have my earphones on so I didn't hear what you just said.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I just gave you the floor,

6 Mr. McCloskey. That's all.

7 [In English] I'm giving you the floor.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 We have, as you probably remember, Mr. Butler from the United

10 States Army who is our military intelligence analyst that will be

11 testifying on some 200, 240 exhibits which are voluminous but, we think,

12 very important for the case.

13 We also have outside a representative of the United States

14 government, Ms. Jessica Holmes, and I think if we invite them both in now,

15 we can get started.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Let us invite them in,

17 please.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I take advantage of the occasion

20 to bid welcome to madam Jessica Holmes and Mr. Richard Butler. Can you

21 hear me well?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You're going to read the solemn

24 declaration that the usher is giving to you, please.

25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

1 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

2 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You may be seated. I think that

4 you are very familiar with our procedures, so there is no need for me to

5 explain to you what is going to take place. As you know, you will be

6 answering questions put to you by Mr. McCloskey.

7 Mr. McCloskey, your witness.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. McCloskey, my

10 colleague Judge Wald has asked me whether it is an open or closed

11 session. This is an open session, isn't it?

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, this is wide open, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You may

14 begin. Please begin.

15 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:

16 Q. Can you tell us your name and spell your last name for the record

17 please?

18 A. My name is Richard Butler, last name B-u-t-l-e-r.

19 Q. And what is your nationality?

20 A. I am a US citizen. I am a military intelligence analyst with the

21 United States Army.

22 Q. And can you provide a brief outline of your career advancement in

23 the army?

24 A. I joined the army in 1981. I was an enlisted analyst from that

25 period until 1984. At that point in time, I became a non-commissioned

1 officer; I was promoted. From 1984 to 1988 I served as that. In 1988 in

2 December I was appointed as a Warrant Officer in the United States Army

3 Intelligence Corps, and I've been a Warrant Officer since then.

4 Q. And can you explain to us what a Warrant Officer is, and how it is

5 different, if it is, from what one would do as a regular officer,

6 lieutenant, major, and up?

7 A. A Warrant Officer, as the career track is designed, is to allow

8 individuals to specialise in specific segments of a career field, in my

9 case, within the intelligence career field. By a warrant to do that and

10 as a Warrant Officer, I'm able to focus my entire career on intelligence

11 and intelligence and analytical-related matters, rather than having a much

12 broader aspect that other army officers are expected to have.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. McCloskey, excuse me for

14 interrupting you. You know you speak the same language, and we have

15 interpreters, and I think it is impossible to have interpreters with

16 instantaneous memory. There's also a delay. So we have to bear that in

17 mind, and I ask you to pay attention, both you and the witness, to make a

18 pause between the beginning of your question and the answer. Perhaps one

19 day we will have interpreters with instantaneous memories, but for the

20 moment, they don't exist.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I appreciate that, and we've

22 been trying to tell each other that, and we always seem to go a little

23 fast, so we'll try and slow it down.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I will remind you by making a

25 sign without interrupting you with words.

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

2 Q. Can you describe your current position as an intelligence analyst?

3 A. In April of 1997 I was seconded to the Officer of the Prosecutor

4 by the United States government, and I have been performing military

5 intelligence analysis-related functions for the Office of the Prosecutor

6 since April of 1997.

7 Q. You've described yourself as an all-source intelligence analyst.

8 Can you tell us what that is and what kind of materials you generally

9 review?

10 A. Well, within the spectrum of intelligence and analysis there are

11 broad categories. Human-related intelligence, which for the most part is

12 the review of statements; it is the review of refugee comments; it is the

13 review of POW interrogations, those types of information that come based

14 from human sources.

15 The next discipline is signals intelligence which is the analysis

16 of information which comes from signals or communications-related

17 intelligence and many aspects. The analysis of intercepted enemy

18 communications, for that matter, how that's done.

19 The next one is the basic category of imaginary intelligence which

20 is the review of all forms of imaginary, aerial imaginary, ground-based

21 imaginary, those types of things to allow intelligence information to be

22 derived from them.

23 The next category is a relatively newish category, it's called

24 open-source intelligence, which is now looking at open-source

25 press-related information and finding and examining and getting

1 intelligence-related information from that material as well.

2 So there's -- the overarching purpose of my function as an

3 all-source intelligence analyst, I'm professionally acquainted with all of

4 those major disciplines and how to take the information that comes out of

5 there and put it into the required product.

6 Q. Which one of those categories would the documents such as orders,

7 internal military memoranda, military documents come under?

8 A. In that case that comes under the broad category of human-based

9 intelligence. The exploitation of captured materials, maps, graphics,

10 orders, the deriving of intelligence from those, those are considered part

11 of the human-based intelligence part.

12 Q. And what's the foundation of how you analyse all this, practically

13 speaking?

14 A. Essentially, it's going through a very detailed and in-depth drill

15 of reviewing all the material, extracting all of the relevant portions,

16 putting it together and, you know, coming up with a detailed analysis of

17 the overall situation. It is a very in-depth process.

18 Q. Can you describe your relevant professional education you've had

19 as part of your army career?

20 A. Initially when I joined the army in 1981, the first level was the

21 basic intelligence analyst's course; as I became a non-commissioned

22 officer, the non-commissioned officer professional course; being appointed

23 a Warrant Officer required additional professional education, both a

24 basic course and I had to pass a technical certification course before I

25 could accept my warrant. And now as a senior Warrant Officer, my last

1 professional series of education was the Warrant Officer advanced course.

2 And all of these tracts of curriculum are specifically designed for

3 military intelligence analysis.

4 Q. How about a college degree?

5 A. I have a Bachelor's degree from the University of Maryland which I

6 earned while I was on active duty, and I've currently enrolled as a

7 Master's candidate in international relations, although it's been a while

8 since I've been able to work on it, obviously.

9 Q. Can you describe for us the three kinds of areas that this subject

10 has been broken down into in your context of intelligence evaluation?

11 A. Military intelligence as a major discipline looks at three broad

12 analytical areas. The first area is what we would call the strategic

13 analysis area, and in that aspect primarily we're looking as military

14 analysts at the strategic ability of nations or states to raise armies to

15 make war. There are a lot of technical factors along the lines of force

16 projection, military industry, mobilisation, those type of broad, basic

17 strategic assets and outlooks.

18 The next level that we look at is the operational level, and what

19 that operational level is, that's that middle level between the

20 component army, the military army function, and how it interacts with the

21 military assets of a corps and the relationships between the two.

22 Essentially, how one takes the strategic vision of what the strategic and

23 the political level want out of a military, and how you then translate

24 that into the executable functions which armies and corps do on the

25 battlefields.

1 The last aspect is the tactical aspects which essentially is the

2 analysis and the work that goes behind examining how those corps elements

3 at the operation level then take what they want to accomplish, and how

4 that works down at the lowest levels from corps to division, in this case

5 with the VRS to brigades to regiment and down to battalion.

6 So while there are three distinct disciplines, they're all very

7 well related to each other, and you have to be comfortable operating in

8 each one in order to get the full programme.

9 Q. In your analysis of the product for this case, have you had an

10 opportunity to review all three of those levels or review the material

11 with reference to all three of those levels?

12 A. Yes, I have. At the strategic level, a lot of that review came

13 about looking at the laws of the Republika Srpska that regulate how the

14 army is formed and how it operates. For the operational level, a lot of

15 that revolved reviewing and examining the former JNA rules and regulations

16 pertaining to corps operations and pertaining to the staff processes and

17 procedures which make those operations happen. And at the tactical level,

18 a lot of it revolved around actually reviewing documents and materials and

19 orders and directives from relevant brigade units.

20 And again, not only did we do that in many senses with the

21 documents, we've been able to interview people as well who have been able

22 to give us insights on how those three areas functioned within the system.

23 Q. So finally, can you give us a brief rundown of your actual field,

24 military field experience, from a broad perspective, obviously?

25 A. Very broadly, my first operational job was in Europe, Germany,

1 doing strategic analysis of the former Warsaw Pact and spent four or five

2 years doing that.

3 From there I went to an armoured cavalry regiment where you might

4 imagine the focus was strictly tactical, working on how to deal with

5 looking at opposing forces at the division and below level.

6 From that aspect I went to look at more along the lines of the

7 operational level of war where I spent two years reviewing Soviet army

8 operations in Afghanistan, and we looked at those operations and tried to

9 determine what lessons we could learn from those, so there was a very

10 detailed analysis.

11 From that position I went back to Germany, and we reviewed again

12 at that level operational and tactical aspects of the Warsaw Pact. Being

13 assigned to an infantry division, that was the focus we were doing.

14 From there back to the United States -- well, actually, before

15 that, from there I went -- I deployed into Iraq as part of the Gulf War

16 and again, that was tactical and operational level of war type analysis,

17 learning how the Iraqi army worked, and again, how we could defeat it on

18 the battlefield.

19 From there back into the United States, I stayed with a Middle

20 Eastern focus and worked at all three levels at that point, the strategic,

21 operational, and tactical level, looking at Iraq and other countries of

22 Southwest Asia.

23 JUDGE RIAD: Perhaps it may be useful to correct in the

24 transcript, "the Warsaw Pact," it is written differently. It's "war so

25 pact." It is the city, Warsaw.

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honour. Yes, we have enough wars

2 in this case as it is.

3 We have Mr. Butler's CV as Exhibit 400 for any further reference,

4 and counsel has had that for a long time.

5 Q. Now, you mentioned briefly when you came to work for the OTP. Can

6 you tell us how it was that a US Army warrant officer could work for the

7 United Nations? What kind of arrangement did you have?

8 A. Initially I was seconded over when that programme still existed

9 within the UN. The UN had requested a professional military analyst to

10 help deal with some of the very technical aspects of these military

11 cases. In 1997 they didn't have a lot of that. I continued in the

12 seconded status until December 1998 when that programme ended.

13 Based on the apprehension of General Krstic in November, the

14 Office of the Prosecutor requested from the US government that I continue

15 to remain available to serve the Office of the Prosecutor in an analytical

16 aspect. The US government agreed to do so. From that period, while

17 specifically now I'm still a member of and work for the US government, I

18 am effectively on loan to the Office of the Prosecutor and will be for the

19 duration of this case.

20 Q. When did you first begin working providing intelligence analysis

21 to the Srebrenica investigative team?

22 A. Arriving here in April of 1997, within two weeks I was starting to

23 already work for primarily Eastern Bosnia, and very shortly after that,

24 within a month I was totally focused on dealing with the aspects of the

25 Srebrenica case. That has been my primary function since then.

1 Q. Can you describe for us the particular tasks and objectives you

2 were assigned by the investigative team? And please mention your two

3 principal areas of study which you have referred to as the command study

4 and the narrative study.

5 A. Well, sitting back and looking at the overall Srebrenica

6 investigation, we always refer to it in many aspects as a three-legged

7 investigation or stool. The primary leg is the actual criminal events and

8 the crime scenes, and the investigative team, as Mr. Ruez is noted,

9 handles that particular aspect.

10 What I was asked to do from a military analytical aspect is to

11 develop the other two legs; one of them being the command and control

12 component, defining what a corps command was, how a corps command

13 operated; more importantly, the roles and responsibilities and authorities

14 of a corps Commander in that aspect. That work is reflected in my first

15 product which is the command responsibility report, which essentially

16 takes in abstract a VRS corps command circa 1995 and lays out the

17 authorities and responsibilities as they are understood and outlined under

18 VRS army laws and under the VRS regulations in effect.

19 The second component of my work dealt with the actual linkage, if

20 we could make such linkage, between the military units of the Drina Corps

21 and the actual crime scenes. That, of course, was the harder portion of

22 the work. It's a much more lengthier product. But that product -- the

23 Srebrenica military narrative is the manifestation of all of that work,

24 the actual linkage of Drina Corps units to the crime scenes.

25 Q. You mentioned that as part of your command study you reviewed JNA,

1 basically former Yugoslav-type documents, regulations and rules, and

2 applied it to the VRS. How were you able to do that? Why would that be

3 valid, if it is?

4 A. One of the first things that we did when trying to examine the

5 regulatory background under which the VRS worked and operated was looked

6 at the former regulations of the JNA. They essentially provide the

7 foundation for that. Most of the professional officers of the

8 VRS were obviously former JNA officers.

9 As we went through and developed that and as we started acquiring

10 more and more military documents from the VRS from various sources, it

11 became quite clear that, in fact, the JNA operating methodologies had been

12 almost completely adopted by the VRS. And then the final component of

13 that was in the interview of many VRS officers, we'd put these regulations

14 to them and they told us flatly that, yes, they did use these JNA

15 operating instructions; they were in the middle of the war and this was

16 all that they had to use.

17 So for almost all aspects, the former operating regulations and

18 instructions of the former JNA are fully applicable to the VRS.

19 Q. For your narrative report, we've touched on it briefly, but can

20 you tell the Court what kind of materials you reviewed for the narrative

21 report?

22 A. A lot of material clearly went into the work on the narrative.

23 The primary document basis, other than the JNA regulations which built out

24 of the core report, were documents we obtained from the VRS pursuant to

25 search warrants.

1 In the period of early 1998, I believe, the Office of the

2 Prosecutor conducted search warrants and we seized the military records of

3 the VRS 1st Corps, which was formerly the 1st Krajina Corps. We seized

4 the records of the 513th Motorised Brigade, which was formerly the Zvornik

5 Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps -- I'm sorry, the 503rd Motorised.

6 Then we also seized the records of the 513th Infantry Brigade, which was

7 formally the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps. So

8 between the three seizures, we're looking at almost 30.000-plus documents

9 from the RS which were relevant to the entire war period. That was the

10 regulatory base from the documents.

11 We also looked at in great detail the intercepts provided by the

12 Bosnian Muslim II Corps which were intercepting the VRS telecommunications

13 network in Eastern Bosnia during that period as well. That also plays a

14 piece in the analysis and also plays a piece in the result of the

15 narrative.

16 Q. So to simplify matters, much of your materials were from what was

17 then called the Zvornik Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade; is that correct?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Was the Drina Corps searched?

20 A. There was not a search conducted on the headquarters of the Drina

21 Corps. Primarily we could never get an accurate location of where their

22 archives were. Historically based, what happened after Dayton was within

23 six months, the Drina Corps headquarters was essentially disbanded and

24 their units were resubordinated to other VRS formations as part of a

25 general demobilisation.

1 Within about eight months, they reformed the Drina Corps, or what

2 they called it as the 5th Corps, and one of the problems is that we've not

3 been able to track the Drina Corps archives so we were never able to

4 effectively get a location of where to seize those.

5 Q. Now, you had access to the information generated by the

6 investigation; is that right?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. For the purposes of your narrative report for trial, have you

9 cited any witness statements that were not from witnesses that testified

10 in court?

11 A. For the purposes of the narrative, the only three instances I used

12 witness statements as opposed to actual witness testimony, two revolved

13 around the fact that they were witnesses who had not yet testified because

14 I got stuck in a production schedule and they hadn't gone yet, and they've

15 since testified. There was only one witness that I used who has not

16 testified who was a survivor of the Orahovac execution site. I needed

17 some information from his report and he was not called because you had

18 heard other survivors from Orahovac.

19 Q. So your reference to his statement in your report adds no new

20 material to what the Court has already heard.

21 A. No, sir, it does not.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, I don't know if you may want to make

23 a break here. It's a good place to break.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you are

25 right.

1 We usually have three 20-minute breaks, but as we've only had one

2 break, let's have two together so that we can have a block of work. Let's

3 have a 40-minute break now; that is to say, we'll resume at 1.08,

4 approximately.

5 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 1.11 p.m.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let us resume the hearing. I

8 should like to ask Mr. Richard Butler, if possible, to speak a little

9 slower, please.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: And Mr. President, if I could just go over some of

13 the paperwork issues before I get into the questioning again.

14 As you've heard, Mr. Butler has a narrative report and a command

15 report, and all the footnotes for both those reports have been put in

16 several binders. The narrative has eight, and the command has five, and

17 those are just the footnote sources, so that's like a library for this

18 material. I don't believe it needs to be overly accessible in the

19 courtroom because, in addition, we've chosen some 240 exhibits that we

20 have in some seven to eight binders, and we hope to get two to three of

21 those a day. It's very difficult to estimate, but those would be the

22 binders of exhibits, those two to three that we hope to get to during a

23 day that would be most important for the Court to have in front of you.

24 There's obviously a lot of duplication in the library source material, but

25 that's why we've given the separate binders for, for his testimonial

1 exhibits.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. I hope

3 you're not going to bring in the libraries of universities here.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, we don't -- we'll not read too many intercepts

5 if we can help it also, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Please continue,

7 having said that. Thank you very much.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would like to just note for the record, we

9 have Exhibit 400-1 which is a declaration of Jan Kruszewski identifying

10 where all the material from the command report came from, and Exhibit 401

11 is the command responsibility report in various languages. And 401/3 is

12 Mr. Kruszewski's list of all the items and where they came from, and we

13 would like 403-3 to be under seal temporarily because we need to redact

14 some information from that.

15 We have the supporting material for the command report which is

16 402 which we can give to the Court in any way you would like it at any

17 time. The military narrative is 403A, and it comes in the various

18 languages. Exhibit 404 is the supporting material to the narrative.

19 And with that, I believe we're ready to get started with

20 Mr. Butler again.

21 Q. Mr. Butler, I want to start with the command report, and if you

22 could briefly summarise for us the structure of the RS government as it

23 relates to military command and control issues, very simply if you could.

24 And if we could start with Exhibit 405 on the ELMO that will help

25 illustrate that structure.

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1 A. In simple terms, as designed under the RS law in the army, the

2 chain of command starts at the top with the president of the Republika

3 Srpska. He exercises that command through the Commander of the Main Staff

4 of the army of the Republika Srpska, General Mladic, and from that point

5 the command is exercised through the six primary ground forces corps as

6 well as other units directly attached to or assigned to the Main Staff.

7 Q. All right. Let's go to Exhibit 406, and I want you to

8 specifically look to Article 369 and tell us about that section.

9 A. Article 369 is highlighted, and is the specific portion of the RS

10 law of the army that defines that the president of the Republika Srpska is

11 the only person who is responsible for the promotion and appointments and

12 transfers of individuals in the rank of General.

13 Q. So where does that fit in just briefly in the facts of the case as

14 you'll be discussing them later on?

15 A. As we get into the facts of the case, one of the key events that

16 occurs during the commission of the crimes and beyond is that there is a

17 corps change of command: the outgoing commander, General Zivanovic, the

18 incoming commander, General Krstic. What this designates is or where this

19 becomes important is the recognition is that in that change of command,

20 those command changes can only be made legally under their system by the

21 president of the republic.

22 Q. Okay. Now, in going to another subject in your command report,

23 the concept of command and control, a term you've already used, if we

24 could go to Exhibit 407 -- but prior to looking at this exhibit, can you,

25 can you tell us a bit about what this concept is of command and control

1 that is discussed under section 1 of chapter 3 of the Rule on Corps of

2 Ground Forces Provisional?

3 A. Again, taking the JNA base documents and regulations pertaining to

4 that, this is just a broad outline of the base function of command and

5 control within the army and how it encompasses all aspects of military

6 operation.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would just note for the Court's attention, in

8 paragraph 63, "Command and control are conscious and organised activities

9 of the Commander of the corps and the bodies of command and," I would add

10 for emphasis, "aimed at engaging and unifying the actions and activities

11 of all units and commands, et cetera.

12 Q. Now let's go to the next exhibit, 408A. First of all, tell us

13 what the provisional service regulations of the army of the Serbian

14 Republic are.

15 A. In May, June, July, and, in this case, in August of 1992, as the

16 army of Republika Srpska was formed and now operating as an independent

17 entity, the army felt a need to publish a set of regulations pertaining to

18 the daily activities, roles and responsibilities, of all the individuals

19 who were members of the army. These provisional service regulations

20 pertain to the daily activities and the daily rules and regulations of the

21 army.

22 Q. So unlike the last documents we looked at, these are actually now

23 Bosnian Serb documents.

24 A. That is correct, sir.

25 Q. I want you to look specifically at section 2, "Relations in the

1 Army." It talks about giving orders. Can you again just

2 briefly synopsise what this piece is about orders?

3 A. Essentially, looking at the three relevant paragraphs, paragraphs

4 16, 17, and 18, paragraph 16 discusses the prospects of when its officer

5 assumes command, along the very general aspect that the senior officer

6 will take command; paragraph 17 deals with the specific issue of members

7 of the army responsible for carrying out orders, particularly in a timely

8 manner without demur and with a full accuracy; paragraph 18 discusses the

9 aspects of the issuing of orders.

10 Q. So going back to paragraph 16, I want to ask you about the second

11 paragraph. "If the unit or institution is suddenly left without a

12 commanding officer, command shall be assumed by his deputy or the highest

13 ranking officer." Will that become relevant in the facts of the case as

14 you have analysed them later on?

15 A. That becomes relevant in so much as, as the Drina Corps Chief of

16 Staff during the period, General Krstic is also the Drina Corps Deputy

17 Commander. Behind General Zivanovic, General Krstic is the senior most

18 ranking officer in the corps.

19 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 409, the Rule of Ground Forces Provisional,

20 again. Now we're getting into the definition of the command roles of a

21 Commander. Can you briefly give us your understanding of the Commander's

22 roles and duties in the VRS?

23 A. Well, again, as defined under this JNA regulation, the Commander's

24 duties, very essentially, are to -- he is legally empowered with the

25 authorities and the responsibilities to command and direct the activities

1 of his, in this case, corps. He's responsible for all of the actions that

2 occur; the planning process, the execution, and the monitoring. Under

3 this system, he is the individual held responsible for all the results.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: I would call the Court's attention specifically to

5 paragraph 65, and one line in that: "He is responsible for harmonising

6 the activities of his command, subordinated commands and headquarters ..."

7 et cetera.

8 Q. This document goes on to say in paragraph 66, it starts talking

9 about the Chief of Staff position. Can you tell us about the Chief of

10 Staff?

11 A. The Chief of Staff in the corps organisation is the primary person

12 who is responsible for planning, organising, and managing the aspects of

13 the corps staff, that organ which essentially, on behalf of the Commander,

14 directs the activities of the entire corps. Again, as it notes here, the

15 Chief of Staff functions also as the corps Deputy Commander.

16 Q. I note that in paragraph 66, in the middle of the paragraph, it

17 says, "He is the only one who, in keeping with the Commander's decision,

18 has the right to give assignments to subordinates." What does that mean?

19 A. Generally, that provision means that while the Chief of Staff, as

20 the Deputy Commander, is empowered to make the decisions for the brigades,

21 he generally has to do so within the frame of reference of the overall

22 guidance of the Commander. So while the Commander in many aspects will

23 make the larger decisions as to the major movements or the major actions

24 of the corps, it's the responsibility of the Chief of Staff to give the

25 series of implementing orders or more specified instructions based on the

1 general guidance and the direction that the Commander wants to go.

2 Q. What role would you expect, based on this definition, the Chief of

3 Staff to take in the planning of military operations?

4 A. The Chief of Staff in the planning of military operations is

5 normally the most knowledgable person about the conduct of the entire

6 operation. It's his responsibility to coordinate all of the planning

7 aspects from all of the various organs of the staff, to include the

8 operations organ, the intelligence organ, the security organs, the rear

9 services organs. Ultimately, all of those planning aspects are managed and

10 coordinated by him.

11 Q. Let's go now to Exhibit 410, which is a JNA document entitled

12 "Regulations on the Responsibilities of the Land Army Corps Command in

13 Peacetime." Can you tell us what this time and what applicability a

14 peacetime document might have for us?

15 A. Under the former JNA system, which again in many aspects was

16 adopted by the VRS, and even under the laws, they envisioned regulations

17 and command of military units operating under three distinct periods: a

18 period of peacetime, a period of immediate threat of war, and a period of

19 a state of war. Those are legal distinctions that the Republika Srpska

20 specifically used to define the legal powers and legal authorisations of

21 various government agencies to include the army.

22 These regulations reflect the peacetime status which was, of

23 course, the normal status, and in the case of the Republika Srpska,

24 despite a conflict going on, it was a declared state of peace for most of

25 the period from 1992 to 1995.

1 Q. Would the definitions in this document be applicable to the

2 wartime situation in RS?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Now if we could turn to what is page 6, entitled "Commander," we

5 get into another detailed definition of the command which I don't want to

6 go over, but I do want to point out, as we can see from the ELMO, the

7 highlighted areas. I notice that the Commander is in charge of, and it

8 lists a number of things and I've highlighted here, "Monitoring and

9 directing the work," et cetera, "Monitoring and studying," et cetera,

10 "Monitoring and assessing." The first three points are monitoring for a

11 Commander. Can you explain the significance and importance of a

12 Commander's duty to monitor the situation, as described?

13 A. In the sense of monitoring, generally, under the definitions given

14 by these JNA regulations, it's not enough for a Commander to issue an

15 order. He has to take the steps -- and a lot of that, again, is the work

16 of the staff -- to ensure that those orders are implemented. That's part

17 of the programme when giving an order: getting feedback as to whether that

18 order was complied with; if it was not complied with, why?

19 Q. Now let's turn the page, and let's go over to page 8, to "Chief of

20 Staff."

21 Again, without getting into a detailed discussion of this, I noted

22 that under this definition, planning plays a significant role: formulating

23 and updating the development plan, compiling and updating the readiness

24 plan, compiling orders for combat training, planning and executing, the

25 organisation planning. Planning is everywhere. Again, as you've stated,

1 planning is an important part of the Chief of Staff's job; is that

2 correct?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Also on the next page, number 10, what's that? It begins:

5 "Managing intelligence support of security organs for intelligence

6 work ..."

7 A. Again, it demonstrates that not only is he responsible as the

8 Chief of Staff for managing the operations aspect, he is also responsible

9 for oversight and managing the activities of the Security Branch. That

10 feeds directly back in to him. A lot of that, again, is part of the

11 coordination role. He is the ultimate coordinator of all of those

12 activities and he is the person who is going to make sure that all aspects

13 of that is in sync.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, to correct the record, and it's

15 probably my fault, there is a reference to page 10 as what we referred to,

16 when in fact it was paragraph 10 on page 9.

17 Q. Mr. Butler, you've mentioned intelligence and security. Can you

18 just briefly describe those two different functions in a corps command so

19 that we can get a feel for where they fit in to the command network.

20 A. In the VRS Corps command structure, intelligence and security are

21 broken down into two. While related, they're still distinct disciplines.

22 The Chief of Intelligence works and falls directly under the operations

23 staff and branch as part of the operative bodies of the corps. The

24 security branch falls under a separate branch, it's considered to be a

25 specialised services branch, and that falls under the control and

1 management of the Assistant Commander for Security.

2 Q. Okay. Now I'd like to go into another area of the rules and

3 regarding the law that governs the duties of commanders to prevent war

4 crimes and punish people involved in war crimes. Has the RS enacted any

5 legislation or any rules or orders related to those subjects?

6 A. The Republika Srpska from May of 1992 on did in fact through a

7 series of presidential decrees, laws, and other forms of regulations

8 fairly adequately delineate out the roles and responsibilities of senior

9 military commanders to prevent those types of things from occurring.

10 Q. And if we can go to Exhibit 411, Mr. Butler, if you could tell us

11 what this is.

12 A. This document is a 13 May, 1992, decree from the -- or order from

13 the president of the -- presidency of the Republika Srpska, or at that

14 time the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, pertaining to the

15 application of rules of international law of war on the army of the

16 Serbian republic.

17 Q. All right. And I will briefly read out the most relevant part,

18 and that would begin with section 2:

19 "Commanders of all units, as well as each member of the army or

20 other armed formation who takes part in combat activities, are responsible

21 for the application of the rules of the international law of war.

22 "It is the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate

23 proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the rules

24 of the international law of war."

25 Would a corps commander, in your view, be such an officer?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Let's go to the next exhibit, 412. That's entitled "The

3 Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War and the Armed

4 Forces of the SFRY." Okay, we're back to a document from the former

5 Yugoslavia. How does this have relevance to the Republika Srpska and the

6 VRS in particular?

7 A. As part of, again, adopting the former operating regulations of

8 the JNA and SFRY, these essentially were adopted and totally used by the

9 army as their operating, regulating guidelines on combat operations

10 pertaining to, to the -- to preventing violations of laws of war. We've

11 been told this by several key officials within the Republika Srpska

12 government that this was, in fact, the applicable document.

13 Q. All right. And, without reading it, I would call the Court to the

14 attention of paragraph 20, "Personal responsibility for violations of laws

15 of war," which describes that each officer is personally responsible; and

16 going on to page 15, we have highlighted the second paragraph, "The

17 perpetrators of such criminal acts may also answer before an international

18 court if such a court has been established."

19 In your view, would that include The Hague, where we are today?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Again, I would call the Court's attention to paragraph 21, "The

22 responsibility for the actions of subordinates," and 22, which I would

23 like to take a moment to read out.

24 "Responsibility for violations of the laws of war committed on

25 orders. A member of the armed forces shall be liable to criminal

1 punishment also for violations of the laws of war committed by following

2 orders resulting in the commission of a war crime or other grave criminal

3 offence --"

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could we ask Mr. McCloskey to slow down, please.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I'm sorry.

6 Q. "-- if he knew that the orders were intended to bring about a

7 violation of the laws of war which constitutes a criminal offence."

8 In your view, would this apply to General Krstic if he received an

9 illegal order from General Mladic?

10 A. Yes, it would.

11 Q. Now, if we could go to OTP Exhibit 413. Mr. Butler, if you could

12 tell us what this opening letter from General Mladic is, and then go

13 through the document and tell us what the rest of it is.

14 A. As I noted earlier, the process of the VRS in early and mid-1992

15 as it was establishing itself as an independent army, what this letter

16 represents and the document behind it is the guidance and the policies

17 that came out of the Main Staff pertaining to the roles and

18 responsibilities of the army commanders for enforcing the former laws of

19 the SFRY and the military regulations of the JNA and their applicability

20 into the VRS.

21 This document specifically deals with three aspects of military

22 law, the first aspect being crimes against the army, the second aspect

23 being crimes related to failure to respond to mobilisation, and the final

24 aspect dealing with crimes against violations of international law.

25 Q. I'm going to ask both of us to slow down. We'll get the hang of

1 it; otherwise, we won't be here. But by tomorrow, I'm sure we'll have

2 rhythms worked out.

3 Now, Mr. Butler, this is a document, 413, by the -- entitled

4 "Guidelines For Determining Criteria for Criminal Prosecution," from the

5 military prosecutor's office of the Main Staff. And I note that on the

6 first page entitled "Guidelines Determining Criteria For Criminal

7 Prosecution," it lists the three areas that it's most -- this particular

8 document is most concerned with, the first being failure to respond to

9 military callup; the second being which willfully absenting one's self

10 from one's post; and the third, what is relevant for us, criminal offences

11 against humanity and international law pursuant to chapter 16 of the

12 Criminal Code.

13 And again, if you could just go over to the next two pages, it's

14 under paragraph 3 entitled "Criminal Offences Against Humanity," but we've

15 highlighted the next page. If you could just give us a synopsis of this

16 and your understanding of it.

17 A. In short, what this series of paragraphs does is establishes a

18 positive preventive duty for senior officers and commanders of the army to

19 proactively deal with the issue of war crimes. First, proactively to take

20 the positive steps to prevent them, and second if they should occur, to

21 take the steps to deal with them. It obligates them further that if they

22 do not take these types of steps, that they themselves become answerable

23 for those same criminal offences.

24 Q. Was this an application at the time, in July of 1995, when General

25 Krstic was the Commander of the Drina Corps?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Would General Krstic have been aware of these rules and these

3 laws, in your opinion?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. How do you know that?

6 A. One of the further, in the scheme of the corps, assistant

7 commanders, one of the assistant commanders is in fact designated the

8 Assistant Commander for Legal, Religious, and Moral Affairs. As part of

9 that there is a subbranch within his staff which is the corps legal

10 officer. That would have been the repository for all of these legal

11 documentations and rules regulating these types of things.

12 Q. All right. Let's go now to Exhibit 414, and can you tell us what

13 this is?

14 A. This document is the 1993 law on military courts, and this is

15 Republika Srpska law.

16 Q. All right. And Article 65, what's the gist of Article 65?

17 A. The essence of Article 65 again reflects around the

18 responsibilities for every superior officer to take the positive steps to

19 prevent the individuals who may have committed crimes from fleeing the

20 scene. It establishes the responsibility of the Commander to take those

21 actions for dealing with criminal offences.

22 Q. And this now is, in fact, a law at this time?

23 A. That is correct, sir.

24 Q. Let's go to OTP Exhibit 415. Is this another Republika Srpska

25 law?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. And what's the gist of Article 1 as we have outlined it?

3 A. In the sense of this article, it's an individual responsibility

4 for anyone, be that military or civilian, who possesses any information

5 pertaining to or evidence of crimes against humanity or international law,

6 to report that to the relevant authorities.

7 Q. All right. And now let's go to 416. Can you tell us what this

8 law is in reference to, as it is relevant to ours? And I would

9 particularly point you and the Court to Article 8 and 9.

10 A. As I noted earlier, again under the three states in which the army

11 legally functions, peacetime, imminent threat of war, and state of war,

12 this article pertains to essentially the expanded legal powers of military

13 officers, particularly corps commanders, during a state of war.

14 In looking at Article 8 and Article 9, these articles set the

15 provision up for the corps Commander, or subordinate brigade commanders

16 with the approval of the corps Commander, for convening what are known as

17 emergency military courts or court marshals where they can, in effect, try

18 their own soldiers for various violations of law.

19 Q. But these special powers don't arise unless there's a particular

20 kind of state of war in existence; is that right?

21 A. These powers to come into effect requires a declared state of war.

22 Q. All right. And on that note, let's go to the next exhibit, 417,

23 and can you tell us what this is?

24 A. This is dated 14 July, 1995, and this is a decision on the

25 proclamation of a state of war in the Srebrenica-Skelani municipality

1 signed by the president of the republic.

2 Q. So on July 14th, the powers that you referred to in the early

3 exhibit would have been in effect in the Drina Corps?

4 A. For the most part within those elements in the Srebrenica-Skelani

5 municipality, yes, sir. What further occurs related to this is by 29

6 July, two weeks later, a state of war is declared for the entire Republika

7 Srpska, and in that effect, from 29 July onwards, those powers would have

8 referred to the entire Drina Corps.

9 Q. Before leaving this subject, what is your understanding of what --

10 let me give you a hypothetical. If General Mladic ordered General Krstic

11 to commit a war crime, what would, in your view, General Krstic's

12 responsibilities and powers be to do regarding General Mladic, his

13 Commander?

14 A. First, within a sense, his individual legal responsibilities of

15 not following the order. Because as the regulations are very explicit,

16 there is no obligation to follow an order that is criminal at face value.

17 In the sense that General Mladic is a superior, General Krstic in

18 and of himself, probably doesn't have the authority to go out and

19 immediately arrest General Mladic; however, he has the positive

20 responsibility to, again, refer that to the superior officer who can deal

21 with that issue. In this case, it would have been the notification of the

22 president of the Republika Srpska.

23 Q. All right. Let's now go to the rules as they are related to the

24 security organs, going to Exhibit 418. In particular, I want to give you

25 a hypothetical involving a corps like the Drina Corps. Can you just

1 briefly describe where the security organ fits into the Drina Corps and

2 the responsibilities of the security officer or the Chief of Security.

3 A. First, dealing with the responsibilities of the Chief of Security,

4 who is also known as the Assistant Commander for Security, his primary

5 function is the security aspect of the corps, mostly in a

6 counterintelligence aspect. His other primary function is to provide, on

7 behalf of the Commander, management and oversight responsibilities for all

8 issues dealing with the military police.

9 Takeing that to the next step pertaining to where the Chief of

10 Staff fits in, again, in coordinating the actions of the Assistant

11 Commander for Security, and again coordinating the actions of the military

12 police battalion, the Chief of Staff is involved in that process to make

13 sure that their activities are fully integrated to not only the corps plan

14 but also the intent of the Commander.

15 Q. So for the corps Chief of Security, who is his boss?

16 A. His boss in the hierarchy is -- when the Chief of Staff is wearing

17 his chief-of-staff hat, so to speak, in that function, his boss goes to

18 the Commander. When the Chief of Staff is functioning as the corps Deputy

19 Commander, it goes through him to the Commander.

20 Q. Calling your attention to paragraph 18, "The security organs of

21 the superior command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces

22 provide specialist administrative services for security organs in

23 subordinate commands, units, institutions, and staffs of the armed forces

24 and provide assistance to these organs and organise, direct, coordinate,

25 and supervise their work."

1 Now, in the hypothetical I gave you, who would be the superior

2 command from the corps that also has a security organ?

3 A. In this instance, the superior command to that would be the main

4 security administration of the Main Staff of the army of Republika

5 Srpska.

6 Q. How does the Main Staff security organ fit in the chain of command

7 to a corps Chief of Security?

8 A. It doesn't fit into the chain of command per se in the functions

9 that the Chief of the Main Security Administration can order the lower

10 Chief of Security Administration to perform functions or tasks of major

11 significance. That Commander, that corps security officer -- corps

12 Assistant Commander for Security works for the corps Commander. It is not

13 an alternative chain of command.

14 Where this chain falls in is what's referred to in the regulations

15 as a technical or management chain; whereas the superior branch organ

16 provides technical advice, technical assistance, in some cases, resources,

17 guidance, and direction for the more technical aspects of security

18 operations. So it's not a command chain, per se; it is very much an

19 advisory and management chain.

20 Q. If we could go to Exhibit 419, back to the JNA Rule Corps of

21 Ground Forces, it speaks briefly on the subject of security at page 23,

22 paragraph 73. How does 73 add to the analysis?

23 A. Again, with respect to the analysis, it again shows that at the

24 corps level, counterintelligence is a primary function, and it again

25 reiterates that the Chief of Security is responsible for managing the

1 corps military police in accordance with the guidance and direction of the

2 Commander; in this case, proposing uses for the military police for the

3 Commander's approval.

4 Q. I'd now like to go to another area of the law, and Exhibit 420.

5 This is a law entitled "The Law on the Implementation of the Law of

6 Internal Affairs During an Imminent Threat of War or a State of War." If

7 you could turn the page to page 12 where we have skipped to the law

8 related to the use of police units in combat operations, under subheading

9 4, can you tell us about what the essence of this law is?

10 A. In short, what this law does is it regulates the command

11 relationship between the Ministry of the Interior police units and the

12 army when those police units are performing functions subordinate to the

13 army. It specifies that when they're conducting operations with the army,

14 that they are, in fact, subordinated to the army for the duration of those

15 operations.

16 The one other additional aspect of this article that is noted of

17 significance is the fact that the Ministry of the Interior police are only

18 obligated to perform those functions which have been previously agreed to

19 between the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, or are

20 designated by the President before they go under army control. So while

21 the Ministry of the Interior units are under army control for many of the

22 aspects, there are, in fact, limitations on what the army commander can do

23 relative to the people and relative to their mission.

24 Q. So would you expect the police units, the MUP police units working

25 together with the army on the same operation without the agreement, as

1 noted in this particular law?

2 A. Unless the functions were agreed to, they wouldn't be working in

3 that function at all.

4 Q. This has particular application to combat operations; is that

5 correct?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. I'd also like to point you to Article 14 and ask you about this

8 particular sentence: "Police units assigned to combat operations by an

9 order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces shall be

10 resubordinated to the Commander of the unit in whose zone of

11 responsibility they are performing combat tasks."

12 What does that mean, " ... the Commander of the unit in whose zone

13 of responsibility they are performing combat tasks"?

14 A. In a broad sense, when you look at the historical pattern of MUP

15 operations with the army, generally, the Ministry of the Interior police

16 forces will be resubordinated first to the corps as the general oversight

17 asset. For practical, logistical, and battlefield coordination issues,

18 they would further be resubordinated down to the applicable brigade in

19 whose zone they were conducting operations.

20 Part of this, again, is a practical aspect of coordination; the

21 other part of it is a practical aspect of supply, logistics, food, those

22 things which are better taken care of by the brigade Commander. But in

23 both aspects, it's a clean, physical resubordination to the corps and then

24 to the subordinate brigade.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I would like to now take us to another

1 area. If you could briefly summarise General Krstic's career up to the

2 start of the assault on the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995, and we have

3 two exhibits that you can refer to when you feel it appropriate, the next

4 one being 421.

5 A. General Krstic or, at the time in November 1992, Colonel Krstic

6 was first the Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, which in

7 November 1992, when the Drina Corps was formed, that brigade went from the

8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps control to the Drina Corps control, physical

9 resubordination of that unit. He was affiliated -- he was, in fact, the

10 Commander of that brigade for two years until August of 1994, when he was

11 appointed to become the Chief of Staff of the VRS Drina Corps.

12 If I can bring up, I believe, Exhibit 422 -- sorry, 421, this is

13 the order from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence pertaining to the

14 appointment of General Radislav Krstic, or then Colonel Krstic, as the

15 Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander.

16 As is generally designated within the JNA organisational

17 documents, the position of Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of a corps

18 is a function that is normally filled by a senior Colonel, somebody

19 awaiting promotion to General. What this document is, in May of 1995, is

20 a request by the corps Commander, General-Major Zivanovic, to the Main

21 Staff for the early promotion of Colonel Krstic to the rank of

22 General-Major; again, noting he holds the position of Chief of Staff and

23 Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps.

24 We don't have his order which pertains to the actual appointment,

25 but we see the public announcement of his promotion to the rank of

1 General-Major in June of 1995.

2 Q. What's the significance of General Zivanovic, in Exhibit 422,

3 recommending an early promotion?

4 A. In a practical sense, there's no reason to assume that he couldn't

5 do the job as well as a senior Colonel as he was as a General-Major, and

6 it's reasonable to believe that General Zivanovic felt strongly enough

7 that he should be promoted before his normal term because of the job that

8 he was performing and because of his capabilities to do that.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, we are now at the stage where I'd

10 like Mr. Butler to just briefly go over some of the personalities involved

11 in the next few days, and it would be helpful if we had the chart of the

12 Drina Corps that is right outside in the next room. We hadn't brought it

13 in before because it blocks the audience, but if we could take a moment to

14 bring that chart in now, that would, I think, help.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Could Mr. Usher assist,

16 please.

17 So the interpreters and the court reporters can make up for the

18 delay now.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: I apologise, Mr. President. We've had a lot of

20 exhibits out there but we don't have the right one. It is Exhibit 28 in

21 the small version so perhaps we can use that.

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We can use the ELMO, can't we?

23 It is easier. In that way, the public can see and are not prevented from

24 seeing what we are seeing. Yes.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: That should be Exhibit 28.

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1 THE WITNESS: If we could zoom out a little bit.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

3 Q. Mr. Butler, if you could take your highlighter, actually, and

4 let's first point out General Krstic, if you could just highlight his

5 position as the Commander.

6 A. [Marks]

7 Q. I think we'll be discussing quite a bit of General Krstic. Let's

8 go down to General Zivanovic and just briefly describe where he fits into

9 this.

10 A. In the case of General-Major Zivanovic -- he, again, is off to the

11 side on this particular chart -- he is the Drina Corps Commander up to the

12 period of 13 July 1995. When the corps was formed in 1992, he was

13 appointed the Commander of corps and was since then.

14 His position is relevant, and we will see him through parts of the

15 operation, the actual capture of Srebrenica. We will see his physical

16 presence at the first meeting between the Dutch and between General

17 Mladic. After that we don't see physical presence of him except for one

18 instance in Potocari on the 12th. We'll continue to hear from him in the

19 form of intercepts from the Bosnian Muslim army on the 13th and on the

20 14th. After the 15th, or on the morning of the 15th, essentially he will

21 tell us he's no longer making any decisions or authorised to do so, and he

22 essentially disappears from all of our information holdings after the

23 morning of the 15th. [Marks].

24 Q. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic?

25 A. Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic is the Assistant Commander or

1 Chief of Security for the VRS Drina Corps. We see his involvement as

2 early as the meetings on 12 -- on 11 July, the meetings with the Dutch,

3 with the VRS, and with Muslim representatives. We see him again on the

4 12th in Potocari, and we see his active involvement with the aspects of

5 the movement of prisoners into the main execution areas in the zone of the

6 Zvornik Brigade. We particularly see his activities on the 16th of July,

7 1995, at the time that the killings are occurring at the Branjevo Military

8 Farm.

9 Q. And Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric?

10 A. Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric is the Chief of Intelligence for the

11 VRS Drina Corps. We see him, his activities, again related to the

12 meetings between the Dutch, the UN, and Muslim representatives on the 11th

13 and 12th of July. We see his involvement with the refugee population in

14 Potocari on 12 July.

15 Q. He's notable because of his balding hair and very large moustache

16 on the videos; is that right?

17 A. That is correct, sir.

18 Q. And who is Major Pavle Golic?

19 A. Major Golic is an intelligence officer of the Drina Corps. We see

20 his involvement, particularly first in the series on the 14th, and later

21 on the 16th at the command of the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica

22 where he's active passing information relating to Colonel Popovic and

23 relating to the procuring of fuel and other requirements during the

24 Branjevo Farm killings.

25 Q. Colonel Lazar Acimovic?

1 A. Colonel Acimovic is the Assistant Commander for Rear Services or

2 Logistics Services of the Drina Corps. We see his function primarily on

3 the 12th and the 13th where both him and members of his staff become very

4 involved in the process of moving the Muslim population from Potocari to

5 Muslim territory outside of Kladanj. He's very involved in those process,

6 and those same buses later are used as part of the movement of Muslim

7 males who have been held in facilities in and around Bratunac to the main

8 execution sites up in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.

9 Q. Colonel Slobodan Cerovic?

10 A. Colonel Cerovic is the Assistant Commander for Legal, Religious,

11 and Moral Affairs of the VRS Drina Corps. We see his presence and we note

12 him at the command post of the Drina Corps with multiple discussions

13 pertaining to the handling of prisoners, and further in several

14 discussions where he notes that General Krstic has been apprised of

15 various reports that are coming out of brigade commanders, specifically

16 the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade.

17 Q. Colonel Ignjat Milanovic?

18 A. Colonel Milanovic is by position the Chief of Anti-Aircraft

19 Defence of the Drina Corps. He's a former Deputy Commander and Chief of

20 Staff of the Bratunac Brigade in early 1992, 1993. We see his primary

21 role during this period on the 13th, we see him involved in discussions

22 pertaining to trying to acquire bulldozers or backhoes, probably related

23 to executions in and around the Srpska Valley or Jadar River area.

24 We further see him again on the 15th of July when, on behalf of

25 the corps Commander, he conducts a very detailed tour of the area from

1 Bratunac through Konjevic Polje through Milici, looking at the military

2 situation there and recommending to the Commander of the Drina Corps steps

3 that should be taken in order to improve the command and control and the

4 military operations relative to the remainder of the Muslim column.

5 Q. Okay. Now that's most, but perhaps not all, of the Drina Corps

6 people that we'll be hearing about. Now let's go to the Drina Corps

7 units, starting with the Bratunac Brigade and Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic.

8 A. He is the Commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade

9 subordinate to the Drina Corps. His personnel are involved in the

10 activities that happen in Potocari on the 11th and -- I'm sorry, on the

11 12th and the 13th. We further see his units involved in some of the

12 combat operations against the column on the 14th; and some of his units, a

13 small element, which deploys toward Zepa. But he remains for the most

14 part in the physical vicinity of his command post in Bratunac until about

15 the 17th or the 18th of July.

16 Q. Now, Major Momir Nikolic?

17 A. Major Momir Nikolic is the Assistant Commander for Intelligence

18 and Security Affairs of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. By

19 organisational function in a light infantry brigade, the roles of security

20 and intelligence are combined. They're not separated out, so he holds

21 both positions.

22 We see his involvement on the outside of the initial meetings on

23 the 11th and 12th with the members of the Dutch, the Muslim population,

24 and the VRS. We also see his involvement with issues dealing -- we see

25 him physically in Potocari and his involvement with issues dealing with

1 Muslim males coming out of the Potocari around the Bratunac area on the

2 12th and the 13th. He's also, he's also further noted in issues dealing

3 with the wounded Muslims who are being held in the military hospital in

4 Bratunac. And I don't have him on this list here, the Drina Corps staff

5 list.

6 Q. Could you tell us that last statement again? I don't think it got

7 translated into French.

8 A. I apologise. He's also involved with the issues pertaining to

9 wounded Muslims who are being held and treated at the Bratunac military --

10 or at the Bratunac medical facility.

11 Q. That being Momir Nikolic?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. Okay. Let's go to the Zvornik Brigade now, and tell us about the

14 Commander, Lieutenant Commander Vinko Pandurevic, but just briefly because

15 the details will come.

16 A. In the case of Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, we see him

17 commanding elements of the Zvornik Brigade which deploy for the actual

18 military operation against Srebrenica. On the evening of the 13th, we see

19 those elements deploy for operations in Zepa. Because of the military

20 operations which occur later from the Muslim column which are attacking

21 primarily the units of his brigade in Zvornik, we see him on the morning

22 of the 15th with those units return back to the Zvornik Brigade area.

23 Once he arrives back in the Zvornik, we see him active in not only the

24 defence, but he also sends a series of reports to the command of the Drina

25 Corps pertaining to issues of Muslims being held in schools in his zone of

1 responsibility.

2 Q. And Major Dragan Obrenovic?

3 A. He is the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Commander of the Zvornik

4 Brigade, and during the absence of Colonel Pandurevic, he is in effect

5 running the day-to-day operations of the Zvornik Brigade. We will see his

6 involvement tracking the movement of the column as it moves from Bratunac

7 north into his zone, in Zvornik zone. He becomes involved in issues of

8 the column and also involved in issues of the handling and holding of

9 prisoners in the schools in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade on the 14th,

10 particularly those that are held at the school at Orahovac.

11 Q. And Lieutenant Miomir Jasikovac?

12 A. Lieutenant Jasikovac is the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade

13 military police company. We see first his involvement, the military

14 police, on various ambush sites on the evening of the 12th, on the evening

15 of the 13th, as the Zvornik Brigade is now mustering all of their

16 remaining reserve units, the military police being one of those that can

17 be used, as the column is coming north.

18 On the 14th -- or on the evening of the 13th, we see elements of

19 the military police pulled out of those ambush positions and redeployed at

20 the school at Orahovac where the Muslim prisoners are arriving.

21 Q. Okay. And were you able to mark the exhibit for Pandurevic and

22 Obrenovic?

23 A. My apologies. They're both on the exhibit.

24 Q. And if you could move that exhibit up a bit. There we go. Major

25 Dragan Jokic?

1 A. Major Dragan Jokic by position is the Chief of Engineering

2 Services of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. On the 14th of July he's also

3 performing the function as the Zvornik Brigade duty officer, in effect,

4 the representative of the Commander at the operations centre.

5 On the 14th, we see his involvement in a series of discussions

6 pertaining to, one, the movement of the column north into their zone as he

7 advises the Drina Corps and other people what the status is. We further

8 see his involvement in the discussion with Colonel Ljubo Beara who is the

9 Chief of the Main Security Administration.

10 Q. Could you provide more detail about the position of duty officer

11 and how it relates to the functions of any command, both brigade, corps,

12 main staff?

13 A. In a sense, the duty officer is the individual who functions on

14 behalf of the Commander in the operations centre. It's generally

15 recognised that one of the functions of command in going out and

16 inspecting the troops or being with the troops, that the Commander himself

17 is not physically going to be in the garrison or headquarters 24 hours a

18 day, yet that is where the information comes in.

19 Particularly in the case of the Zvornik Brigade, Major Obrenovic

20 is out with the soldiers at various ambush locations ensuring they're set

21 up properly, ensuring the resources are used. Major Jokic as the duty

22 officer, his duty position is in the operations centre where it is his

23 function as orders and directives and information comes in from higher or

24 from other units, it is his job to collate that information and then pass

25 it to the Commander, in this case the Deputy Commander, Obrenovic, later,

1 when Colonel Pandurevic returns, to Colonel Pandurevic. But he

2 essentially is the focal point of information in the operations centre,

3 and that functionality goes from the brigade. There's a similar

4 functionality at corps, so it is a fairly seamless thing.

5 Q. Captain Dragan Jeftic?

6 A. Captain Dragan Jeftic is the Commander of the Engineer Company of

7 the Zvornik Brigade. We see backhoes and bucket loaders under command of

8 the engineer company active in burial operations in Orahovac, at the

9 Petkovci dam, and at the Branjevo Military Farm, and at the site of Kozluk

10 on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and in one case the 18th of July. So it is

11 his unit his responsible for burying those who have been killed at those

12 sites.

13 Q. Drago Nikolic?

14 A. Lieutenant Drago Nikolic is the Zvornik Brigade Assistant

15 Commander for Security. In this case, because Zvornik is an infantry

16 brigade and not a light infantry brigade, the functions of intelligence

17 and security have been separated. He is the one -- the Assistant

18 Commander for Security.

19 We see him chronologically on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, primarily

20 at the back end of the operation, where his people, again the military

21 police, are rounding up Muslim stragglers from the column. And in many

22 cases, these people are known to be captured, their names are taken down,

23 some of them are interrogated, and they're later missing.

24 Q. And you meant July? You meant July when you said those dates?

25 A. I'm sorry, July 1995.

1 Q. And Captain Milorad Trbic?

2 A. Captain Milorad Trbic is an intelligence and security officer with

3 the Zvornik Brigade. He, in effect, assists both of the other officers in

4 the performance of their duties. We see him first performing the duty

5 officer function on the 16th of July, 1995, and he's involved in a series

6 of conversations pertaining to the involvement of Colonel Popovic as

7 members of the Drina Corps command and staff are trying to locate him.

8 We further see his involvement several months later as part of the

9 reburial process where, when fuel and resources are allocated to the Drina

10 Corps to perform this reburial process, he is the officer put in charge of

11 the Zvornik Brigade for monitoring the fuel usage to make sure that none

12 of it is illegally or improperly siphoned off from that role.

13 Q. Okay. And the last soldier for today, I would think, Sergeant

14 Gojko Simic.

15 A. Sergeant Gojko Simic is the Commander of the Fire Support or Heavy

16 Weapons Platoon or the 4th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Infantry

17 Brigade. He is identified by one of the survivors of the Orahovac

18 killings as one of the individuals -- or as the individual of the group

19 that's doing the executions. He's in charge of that group.

20 This is on the 14th. Gojko Simic is killed two days later on the

21 16th of July in combat operations defending the 4th Battalion command post

22 which was then later run over by the Muslim column on its way towards

23 Bosnian Muslim held territory.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, that does give us a start on the

25 next few days, but this would probably be a good time to stop.

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. That is a

2 good time to interrupt and adjourn for today. We will meet again tomorrow

3 at 9.30 to continue.

4 You had something to say, Mr. McCloskey? Go on.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, I forgot to mention, I have

6 spoken to Defence counsel, and there is a matter that Defence counsel and

7 the Prosecution need to discuss with the Court very briefly in an informal

8 setting somewhere, either directly after or perhaps prior to tomorrow

9 morning. It shouldn't take very long. There's something we just need to

10 discuss briefly.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If I understood you correctly,

13 Mr. McCloskey, it would be an informal meeting with the Chamber. Perhaps

14 in my office?

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: That would be excellent.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Would 5.00 be convenient for

17 you? I'm going to ask Mr. Petrusic the same question.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, that's perfect.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Petrusic, and for you?

20 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Fine. I will have the pleasure

22 of receiving you in my chambers with my colleagues at 5.00 today. We can

23 save on hearing time by doing that. It is better to do that in that way,

24 then.

25 Very well, I'll see you at 5.00.

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.33 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28^th day of June,

3 2000, at 9.30 a.m.

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