1 Tuesday, 5 December 2000
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and
7 gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth and interpreters. Good
8 morning to the Office of the Prosecutor; I see that you're all there. The
9 Defence counsel and the Judges are here, too.
10 Good morning, Professor. Good morning, Witness. We shall be
11 taking up your testimony where we left off. Let me remind you that you
12 will be continuing under oath in answering questions put to you by
13 Mr. Visnjic.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Visnjic. Your witness.
15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
16 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 Examined by Mr. Visnjic: [Continued]
19 Q. [Interpretation] General Radinovic, we're going to continue from
20 where we left off.
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And to do that, I should like to ask
22 the usher to give us Defence Exhibit 426, and to prepare documents -- 425,
23 and to prepare documents 426 and 427. So the next exhibit is Exhibit 425.
24 Could the usher turn to page -- to paragraph 4, which is page 6 on
25 the Serbo-Croatian version.
1 Q. General Radinovic, yesterday you talked to us about a large number
2 of operations which are mentioned in the directives and many of which were
3 not actually implemented. On the basis of this decision of the Supreme
4 Commander, can you -- of the army of Republika Srpska, can you explain to
5 the Trial Chamber what this -- how this applies to document 7?
6 A. In point 4, according to doctrine, this conceptual part, the
7 concept of a decision, and as I said, in point 4 in the documents for
8 command, the basic idea or concept is set out by -- that is to say, the
9 command document sets this out.
10 In paragraph 4 of the directive of the Supreme Commander, the
11 operations to be carried out are implemented -- are noted, and they are in
12 this section here. They are set out in this paragraph here. They mention
13 the strategic operation in 1995, Prozor, Spreca, and so on. That is an
14 operation at the operational level. But none of those operations listed
15 here were carried out. They were not planned, and they were not executed.
16 Q. I should now like to ask you to look at page 8 of the directive,
17 the section which refers to the Drina Corps. Have you found it? That is
18 the English version.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please find that
20 part of the document and place it on the ELMO. It is page 10 of the
21 English version, and page 11 as well later on. Page 10 now and page 11
23 A. Yes, I've found it. This section relating to the Drina Corps --
24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could you turn the page over,
1 A. On the following page within the directive which relates to the
2 Drina Corps, we see all the points that -- that is to say, operations that
3 could come under that Corps and operations such as Spreca, Zvijezda 95,
4 Spreca 95 are mentioned. None of those operations were in fact planned or
6 As I said yesterday, in documents of this kind which provide a
7 conceptual plan and indicate the possible activities in the ensuing period
8 or in the coming year, and they therefore provide an analysis of the
9 strategic situation, they assess the intentions of the two parties -- of
10 the parties, and they set out a sort of reliable forecasting, as far as
11 that is possible, for the coming year.
12 Having set out -- having drafted documents of principle of this
13 kind, the Supreme Command in stages, in a concrete -- for a concrete
14 period of time, in keeping with the conditions prevailing on the theatre
15 of operation, they order the execution of individual operations. That
16 comes later. And as I studied the documents for the Krivaja 95 operation,
17 I have become convinced that Krivaja 95 was not founded upon documents of
18 this kind; that is to say, it was not -- it did not directly emerge from
19 these documents. Of course, this directive was conceived in such a way
20 and devised in such a way to be an overall framework for most of the
21 activities taking place in the theatre of operation, and that is why it is
22 not a concrete document and cannot be a direct operative link to Operation
23 Krivaja 95. And when I myself tried to find an answer to the question of
24 what was the basis and foundation for the execution of that particular
25 operation -- because, of course, the Corps Commander cannot decide himself
1 to plan an operation. Operations must be tied into a uniform, strategic
2 system on the battleground under the control of the Supreme Command, which
3 means the civilian and state political powers that be.
4 In the preamble to this directive, we -- that is to say, in the
5 preamble of the order of the Drina Corps commander for active action,
6 there is a sentence which might lead us to an answer to this question,
7 that is to say, what served as the basis and foundation and groundwork for
8 the execution of this particular operation, and I hope we'll come to that
9 in due course. But I think that it is quite certain that the operation
10 was executed on the basis of the concrete situation, the prevailing
11 situation at that time, and the concrete situation related to the Drina
12 Corps was that the -- where the activities of the Muslim forces from the
13 enclaves within the framework of the sabotage operation named Skakavac or
15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Would the usher now place on the
16 ELMO Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit 426. We need page 3.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just have an additional document
18 here, not the main one. I just have the attachment to the basic
19 document. I haven't got the basic document, if it is directive 7/1 that
20 we're talking about.
21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The exhibit number was 426. It is directive 7/1, issued by the
23 Main Staff of the VRS. I haven't got a copy myself now, but could you
24 find the section which refers to the Drina Corps. I think it is on page 3
25 or 4.
1 A. It is page 3.4, which relates to the conceptual part and where the
2 Supreme Command decides what actions should be taken.
3 Q. Could you wait for it to be placed on the ELMO, please. Thank
5 A. In this point, point 4, for the Drina Corps, it is expressly --
6 the following is expressly stated: The forces of the East Bosnian Corps
7 and the Drina Corps, with reinforcements from the Herzegovina and
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps - and I stress - should, as soon as possible,
9 realise the tasks from the Spreca operation, Operation Spreca 95, cut off
10 and destroy enemy forces east of the Vis-Stolica line, and in this way
11 create conditions for continuing the attack towards Tuzla and Zivinice,
12 that is to say, completely outside the zone of responsibility and any of
13 the enclaves. It is that point up there, north-west of Zvornik.
14 So there's no mention made at all in this directive, in directive
15 7/1, which should be the concretisation of the directive from the Supreme
16 Commander, and with tasks specified, and the tasks that should be
17 considered operative. However, as we see in this directive, there is
18 nothing at all which could lead us to the Krivaja 95 operation.
19 Q. Could you now look at a separate paragraph which relates to the
20 Drina Corps itself.
21 A. We come to the tasks of the units and the Drina Corps, one of
22 them. It is point 5.3, paragraph 5.3. And it is the task of the Drina
23 Corps under paragraph 5.3 to defend and exert active combat activity in
24 the north-western part of the battlefield and to prevent the breakthrough
25 of the enemy on the tactical axes, and demonstratively and with the
1 application of measures, operative measures, that is to say, active forms,
2 to link up forces. And this is defence, not offence; a defensive action
3 and not an offensive action.
4 And with the IBK or East Bosnian Corps to realise the tasks from
5 the Spreca 95 operation as soon as possible. And this is not an operation
6 that I know of. It was never executed, nor do we know what it applied to,
7 what it actually meant. Perhaps those who -- I'm sure that those who
8 devised this did know, but I myself did not learn what this meant because
9 the operation was not planned and not executed.
10 So in the first stage of that operation, the aim was to break
11 through to the Vis-Kalesija line, that is, towards Tuzla, and then to
12 regroup forces. And then in the second and third phases of the operation
13 by an appropriate manoeuvre, infiltrating strong groups into the enemy
14 rear and introducing strong-armoured mechanised forces to execute an
15 attack in the direction of Kalesija-Tuzla, that is to say, quite outside
16 the context in which Operation Krivaja 95 was positioned and everything
17 that occurred in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps from the
18 beginning of July up until the end.
19 Q. General Radinovic, in the previous document, directive 7, there is
20 a sentence which mentions -- which makes mention of the enclaves. It is
21 the portion where the Drina Corps comes. However, in directive 7/1, in
22 the portion which relates to the Drina Corps, the enclaves are no longer
24 Bearing in mind the relationship of the directives, and you said
25 that 7/1 should be an elaboration of directive 7, how do you explain that?
1 A. Well, I explain that in -- I have several explanations. First,
2 what I stressed yesterday when I was talking about the organisational
3 structure of the VRS and about Supreme Command and commanding, and if you
4 recall, I said yesterday that the positioning of the Main Staff as a
5 parallel Supreme Command by giving it command responsibility - not staff
6 and professional responsibility which is the practice in all armies of the
7 world - this in a certain sense and in a certain way and under certain
8 conditions and in certain situations can give birth to certain forms of
9 dual authority and parallel Supreme Command. For example, these two
10 directives clearly bear that out. They clearly confirm that.
11 So, and let's see how it reflects on the Drina Corps, the most
12 important thing for the operative situation in the zone of responsibility
13 of the Drina Corps is the conduct of the armed forces of the BiH army in
14 the enclaves and their activity vis-a-vis the VRS. In directive number 7
15 issued by the Supreme Commander, that is to say, the president of the
16 Republika Srpska, there is one sentence which refers to the enclaves. Of
17 course, I would not have written it. I would not have written it, and I
18 do not think that he should have written it either. But there is not a
19 single letter in directive 7/1 referring to that sentence, the sentence
20 which referred to the Drina Corps. Therefore, the commander of the Main
21 Staff of the VRS and the military system considered that there is -- that
22 they were not -- that the realisation of this idea contained in that
23 sentence need not be realised, and in directive 7/1 that sentence, indeed,
24 does not exist. It is not there. I personally as an officer am very
25 pleased to see that that sentence does not exist here.
1 Second, and this is another important point, the directive of the
2 president, or rather, the Supreme Commander of the civilian head of state
3 is a more generalised directive, and the directive of a -- of the Main
4 Staff commander must be more precise with respect to the subordinates who
5 are to carry it out. And this directive issued by the commander of the
6 Main Staff, directive 7/1, is indeed shorter. It is an abridged version,
7 a more concise, precise version, without the descriptions that exist in
8 the previous one. There is no assessment and analysis, but goes straight
9 to the essential points, points which could be essential.
10 Therefore, if we want to take the order of realisation in turn,
11 the commander of the Drina Corps realises the tasks sent to him by the
12 commander of the Main Staff. The commander of the Main Staff is
13 responsible to the Supreme Commander for his own conduct and for the
14 conduct of his army. And when we spoke about at the very beginning of my
15 testimony yesterday of how orders are carried out, then we said that they
16 are not -- orders are not carried out which imply a violation of law or
17 violation of the principles of humanitarian law, and the commander of the
18 Main Staff in his own directive did not take over a text which could imply
19 that kind of behaviour.
20 Q. General Radinovic, how long -- how much time is necessary for an
21 operation to be well planned and organised?
22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And I should like to ask the usher
23 to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 427 in the meantime.
24 A. In answer to that question, I can say the following, that is to
25 say, I would say the same thing that General Dannatt said in his expert
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 report, and I completely agree that for this level of operation, for an
2 operation of this level, it is -- 72 hours would be quite sufficient for
3 its planning.
4 According to our standards, the time given for timely preparation
5 and all-around -- for preparing an operation well is three to five days,
6 depending on whether the command system is in charge of the situation, is
7 in control of the situation in the area where the operation is to take
8 place, or whether you are planning to send forces to a terrain which is
9 not well known to you, and where you have an operational situation which
10 is not well known. And this occurs in in-depth manoeuvres when the
11 activities are to take place outside the zone of responsibility.
12 In this concrete case, we're talking about the zone of
13 responsibility which the command system of the Drina Corps is well
14 acquainted with. I would say that it is quite enough to have three to
15 five days for the preparation of that kind of operation.
16 Q. General Radinovic, you have before you Prosecution Exhibit 427.
17 It is a preparatory order number one dated the 2nd of July, 1995. In the
18 context of the time necessary for planning, which is otherwise stated in
19 the last paragraph of this order, how can you comment, the time which was
20 spent for the planning and preparation of Operation Krivaja 95?
21 A. In the last paragraph of this document, the last point on page 2,
22 and that's this here, this last paragraph, the commander of the Corps
23 orders that all the forthcoming activities with regard to the planning of
24 combat activities in all variations, and the drawing up of all necessary
25 combat documents be completed by the 3rd of July, 1995, and the documents
1 to be delivered to the units performing active operations should be done
2 only following his orders.
3 If we go back to page 1 of this document, when the document was
4 dated, that is to say, in the upper left-hand corner, the date is the 2nd
5 of July, 1995. That means that for all the preparations necessary and
6 planning necessary for the organisation necessary, bringing in the units,
7 reconnaissance work, and so on and so forth, that was -- only one day was
8 allowed by the Corps Commander for all that to be done.
9 It is my personal view that that is an extremely short space of
10 time and insufficient for any serious planning of the operation to be done
11 within it. So that I myself would say that this operation, Operation
12 Krivaja 95, with only that fact, bearing that fact in mind, I would rank
13 it among the groups -- that is to say, with the groups of operations which
14 are speedily, hastily prepared, and they hasty -- extorted, if I can use
15 that term, operation. And you know that anything done in haste is not
16 done very well, and you can -- there can be many things that are not
17 well-thought out in the haste given.
18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] May the witness now be given
19 Prosecution Exhibit 428 to look at.
20 Q. General Radinovic, what are the objectives of the Operation
21 Krivaja 95, that is, the objective of the order for combat action?
22 A. I'm sorry, I don't have the document.
23 Q. Let us wait for the document, then.
24 A. Yes. May I? On page 2, this is the B/C/S version, in paragraph
25 4, we have the same conceptual part of the decision, that is, the concept
1 which was made by the commander whereby he decided to use the main force,
2 and I stress that, the main force of the Drina Corps, that they should
3 continue a resolute and active defence, and only to separate the enclaves
4 of Zepa/Srebrenica with the part of the free forces. So there is no
5 mention of that in the conceptual part of the decision. No mention is
6 made of the takeover of Srebrenica in the conceptual part.
7 Operations have their stages, according to the military doctrine,
8 and tactical activities have immediate and long-term tasks, long-term
9 tasks not having to be necessarily completed. So the immediate task was
10 to reach out the line, which I will have to indicate on the map if that
11 hasn't been indicated so far in the proceedings.
12 Q. I believe it has. The Chamber is familiar with the geography.
13 A. So the line in question was Predol, Divljakinja, Banja Guber,
14 Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak. So that was the immediate task. And the
15 next task was to reach the line going along Bojna and Siljato Brdo.
16 So no mention is made in this part, which refers to the objectives
17 of the operation by the Drina Corps commander, of the attack on the town
18 itself. What is stated here is that they should reach certain features,
19 certain lines, which will, militarily speaking, deactivate the enclave and
20 which will enable them to prevent all military activities which were being
21 launched from the Muslim army from the enclave of Srebrenica throughout
22 the period when the area functioned as a protected area, which was
23 especially -- which became especially obvious during the Grasshopper
25 The objective is further on articulated in paragraph 3, where it
1 is stated as follows: "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in
2 size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves." That is, not to take them over
3 but to reduce them in size. And further on: "To improve the tactical
4 position of the forces in the depth of the area and to create conditions
5 for the elimination of the enclaves."
6 I should like to comment on this portion of the text, if I may.
7 The very fact that the task was to reach and to take control of the
8 features stated in this portion of the order, so by this fact the
9 commander enabled -- wanted to enable strategical and tactical conditions
10 for the elimination of the enclaves, in military terms, if that should
11 become necessary. However, the sentence that is stated here, that you can
12 read here, cannot be interpreted as an attack on urban areas of the town.
13 It merely refers to the creation of appropriate conditions to eliminate
14 the enclaves should the development of the military situation require so.
15 In this manner, the scope of the Operation Krivaja 95 is finished; that
16 is, the objective of the operation is accomplished once those features are
17 taken possession of.
18 There are other elements of the order here but which are not
19 particularly relevant for our case here.
20 Q. So we have talked about the main concept and the plan for the
21 Krivaja 95 operation.
22 General, let me ask my question. I would like to know which
23 planning documents, which supporting documents you came across during your
24 studies, during your analysis.
25 A. Well, I found this planning document which is called the
1 preparatory order for combat activities. This is something very common
2 when one should move over to the following stage. If the stage involving
3 active operations should be started, then this document of this kind is
4 drafted, and this is what I had. And I also had the order of the Corps
5 Commander for active combat and certain elements of the plan for
6 communications support. I didn't have the actual plan for communications
7 which would indicate the communications between the command post and other
8 participants in the overall command and control of the operation. I just
9 had access to certain planning documents concerning radio links. So those
10 are two documents which I had access to.
11 There is a whole range of documents which are lacking. For
12 example, there is no plan for -- explicit plan for artillery support, for
13 logistics support, for quartermaster support, and so on and so forth.
14 Q. What can you -- what is the conclusion that you can make on the
15 basis of that?
16 A. Well, this is the consequence of the fact, which is beyond dispute
17 for me, that this operation was extorted by the Grasshopper operation, so
18 an operation which was not a result of a long-term planning but an
19 operation which was an immediate response to the situation and the
20 developments that were taking place in the spring of 1995, and that is why
21 they were allocated only one day for planning that operation. So they
22 were not able to make a quality overall plan for the operation,
23 which -- the fact which must have affected the operation itself.
24 Q. Bearing in mind what we have discussed so far, could you tell us
25 what were the specific events that actually provoked, that entailed the
1 planning of the Krivaja 95 operation.
2 A. I believe I have already answered that question in part when I
3 said that the events were numerous, the events that were taking place
4 during the last ten days of the month of June; namely, the terrorist
5 activities and the incursions of Muslim forces into the rear of the VRS, a
6 huge amount of losses inflicted to the VRS, according to the documents and
7 testimonies from the Muslim side. On the 15th and the 16th of June, for
8 example, a whole brigade was infiltrated into the rear of the 1st Podrinje
9 Brigade, which resulted in the killing of 40 troops.
10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please prepare D67
11 for the witness, please.
12 A. May I continue, please?
13 Q. Please do, General.
14 A. So if you link that with the events which were taking place in the
15 immediate vicinity of the enclave of Srebrenica, and from the enclave of
16 Srebrenica, one can conclude that the Operation Krivaja 95 was planned as
17 a response to such events and that the objective was to prevent such
18 incidents from reoccurring.
19 In this document here we can see a report of the commander of the
20 28th Division, which was addressed to the commander of the 2nd Corps. The
21 report was written on the 30th of June, 1995. In this report the
22 commander of the 28th Division is informing his commander of the
23 activities of his units and formations in the immediate vicinity, that is,
24 in the rear of the Serbian positions around the enclave.
25 Q. General Radinovic, the Trial Chamber is familiar with the contents
1 of this document because it was entered into evidence some time ago. My
2 question in relation to this document would be as follows: In this
3 document, in a document like this, D67, can we find a brief overview of
4 all of the activities of the 28th Division outside the boundaries of the
5 protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa?
6 A. Yes. This is precisely such a document. It speaks about that.
7 Q. I should now like you to link this document with the orders, if
8 you can remember, issued by the VRS, and which we discussed yesterday, D88
9 and D153, orders of the Drina Corps, signed by General Zivanovic,
10 concerning the inspection of troops and the order issued to the Milici
11 Brigade, and so on and so forth.
12 A. Yes, I remember that document. In his order, to achieve better
13 quality control over the area, General Zivanovic orders visits of all of
14 the units and he orders the responsible individuals to report to them by
15 the 25th of June. In his document he makes mention of an incident
16 involving an incursion of the brigade, of a Muslim brigade, into the rear
17 of the 1st Podrinje and the 5th Podrinje Brigade. And he requests his
18 commanders to carry out an inspection of their troops, inspection of the
19 positions, and to see if the line is properly fortified and so on, and to
20 report to him about such visits by the 25th of June. And indeed, he was
21 briefed about what has been accomplished to that effect by the 24th of
22 June, by one of his commanders, and the same was probably done by other
23 commanders, but that was the kind of report that I had access to.
24 Q. During -- while you were preparing your analysis, did you come
25 across any indications that active combat operations were being prepared
1 by the end of June 1995 concerning the enclave of Srebrenica? Was there
2 any mention made, any indications, any documents, any signs which would
3 indicate that such activities were undergoing preparations by the VRS,
4 that is, the preparation of offensive combat activities prior to the 1st
5 of July, 1995?
6 A. You should bear in mind one particular fact which is of the
7 essence for every single army in the world. Every army, by definition,
8 are in the best state of preparation when they carry out offensive
9 activities. Nobody likes defensive activities, because it implies
10 relinquishing the initiative to the enemy, and this does not -- nobody
11 likes that.
12 But I must say that I haven't come across any single piece of
13 evidence, any single indication, neither in the documents nor through the
14 conversations with the people who were involved in one way or the other in
15 this operation, which would indicate that by the end of June 1995, anybody
16 had any thoughts about executing such an operation. There were no
17 conditions whatsoever to launch an operation of that kind. The situation
18 at the front line was very difficult, and especially in the area of
19 responsibility of the Drina Corps. So there was no talk whatsoever about
20 the possibility of launching such an offensive.
21 JUDGE RIAD: General, you just -- if I understood rightly, you
22 said there was no way, neither in the documents, there was nothing
23 indicated -- I'm sorry, I want to read it, that by the end of June 1993 --
24 1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing an operation of that kind
25 by one -- from one way or -- with the people who were involved in one way
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 or the other. "Involved in one way or the other," do you mean the two,
2 the two fighting sides? You mean the VRS and the Muslims, one way or the
3 other, people involved in one way or the other? Who are they?
4 A. I'm afraid I have been misinterpreted. My response was to the
5 question whether throughout my preparations for this testimony and while I
6 was studying this matter, whether I had come across any indication to the
7 effect that the VRS, that is, the Drina Corps, was preparing an offensive
8 operation around the enclaves. That was the question that I was
9 responding to. And I said, that was part of my answer, that the nature of
10 every army is to be offensive, not to wait, because armies like to have
11 initiative. Soldiers do not like defensive approach. However, in the
12 month of June, 1995, the VRS was in a defensive position, and I didn't
13 come across any single document which would indicate that offensive combat
14 activities were being prepared.
15 Second, I said that neither in the conversations with people who
16 were involved in the operation did I come across such indication. And
17 yesterday I told you that I had spoken with the people who had been
18 involved in the operation on the Serb side, unfortunately. I did not have
19 an opportunity to discuss it with the people who were involved in the
20 operation on the other side, but that was not possible, unfortunately. So
21 from the conversations with those individuals I made a very firm
22 conclusion that there was no talk at the time about launching an operation
23 of that kind.
24 So that was the essence of my answer. I don't know whether it has
25 come across this time.
1 JUDGE RIAD: So you're speaking only of the -- you're speaking
2 only of the VRS when you say one people --
3 A. Yes.
4 JUDGE RIAD: -- involved [Realtime transcript read in error
5 "going"] in one way or the other, only of the VRS? Thank you.
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General Radinovic, I don't know whether you have exhibit number
9 P428, the order for combat activities.
10 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, I want to correct the transcript of what I
11 said. I didn't say "going" one way or the other; I said, "people involved
12 in one way or the other." Thank you.
13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, in the order for active combat activities, a provision
15 was made for a forward command post?
16 A. If you will allow me before you proceed with your question,
17 because I didn't fully answer your previous question regarding objectives.
18 In paragraph 5 of the order issued by the commander when setting
19 out the objectives, he said the objective of the units which -- involving
20 the separation of the enclaves and the shrinking of the territory of the
21 enclaves. So you have this specific mention made in the title, that is,
22 the reduction, to reduce the territory, to reduce them in size. So that
23 is something that should be taken into account while assessing the
24 objectives of the operation.
25 Q. Mention is made of the forward command post at Pribicevac in this
1 order. What is the customary role of a forward command post in the
2 execution of an operation? How do you divide them? How do you take
3 possession of them? What kind of protection do they require?
4 A. Command posts refer both to the actual space, the actual location,
5 and the facility from which command and control is executed over the units
6 involved in combat operations. These facilities include facilities for
7 work, for rest and recuperation, and some support buildings, as well as
8 facilities intended to provide protection for the command post.
9 Command posts can be divided into the basic command post, the rear
10 command post, the forward command post, and reserve command posts. The
11 command post in itself is the most developed one in the sense of the
12 quality of the facilities that it has. It has to be on such a location in
13 terms of space and have such conditions to be able to provide quality and
14 relatively comfortable conditions for work of the command on the execution
15 of their tasks. So that is the basic idea of a command post.
16 In order to accomplish that task, groups of commanding officers
17 are assigned to a specific command post. We have the command group, the
18 support group, and then the protection unit, and other necessary elements.
19 Of course, the command group is the most important one. It also includes
20 the operational part, that is, the operation room, where all the necessary
21 information is being gathered and collated, where the creative part of the
22 operation is taking place, where necessary supporting orders are being
23 drafted, and all other activities undertaken that have to ensure a good
24 execution of an operation.
25 We have the commander there, assistant commander for intelligence,
1 for security, and the Chief of Staff of course, and the basic staff which
2 provide relevant assistance to the commander. And we also have service
3 chiefs, and there has to be someone from the logistics branch as part of
4 the command group as well.
5 As regards the rear command post, it is used for the purposes of
6 conducting logistical work, logistical support, and forward [as
7 interpreted] command posts are determined -- are realised when one cannot
8 conduct military operations from the basic command post. So it should be
9 situated on an appropriate location from where one can have adequate
10 insight into what is going on in the field and from which adequate
11 communication with the units in the field can be ensured, in a timely
12 fashion, of course.
13 As regards the Drina Corps in particular, and VRS corps in
14 general, we have something that is perhaps contrary to some basic
15 doctrinary principles when it comes to command posts; that is to say,
16 corps have their appropriate areas of responsibility. In their areas of
17 responsibility they have their headquarters, the corps headquarters, where
18 the command is located. In the case of the Drina Corps, this was in
20 When it comes to the communicational aspect of command, the Drina
21 Corps designated Vlasenica as its command post, which would mean that that
22 was their basic command post. However, the basic command post is always
23 determined for operations. However, there are peacetime command posts,
24 and there are also command posts where commands are relocated in cases of
25 combat activities.
1 In this case, the location was renamed a basic command post, that
2 is, the location in Vlasenica was the basic command post for the Drina
3 Corps. So this was somehow contrary to the military doctrine, but the
4 reason for that was the fact that the Drina Corps had a relatively
5 permanent area of responsibility, and it was possible to ensure proper
6 functioning of basic command and functions from the headquarters in
8 The Corps command availed themselves of the possibility of
9 creating forward command posts for certain military activities, and it did
10 so in the case of the Operation Srebrenica when they relocated their
11 command post at Pribicevac, and also in the case of Zepa where they had
12 their forward command post in the place called Krivace.
13 The Corps Commander goes to the forward command post together with
14 his Chief of Staff and the necessary number of staff officers who have to
15 be there, who are required to be there. There are no very strict
16 regulations for that; however, there is a very strict requirement that the
17 commander should be located at the forward command post because that is
18 the very reason why the command is being relocated because it is so that
19 the commander can have a more efficient control over his troops from the
20 forward command post.
21 Q. Which parts of the command of the Drina Corps were at the forward
22 command post of Pribicevac?
23 A. You mean the command? The command of the Drina Corps, you mean.
24 At the forward command post of the Drina Corps, there was the
25 Corps Commander; the Chief of Staff of the Corps; the assistant for the
1 Chief of Staff for operative affairs; the assistant for intelligence, but
2 he wasn't there all the time, he would go back to the basic command post
3 from time to time; the head of communications, which is always there. So
4 those are the organs that I was interested in. I didn't focus on the
5 others, but that is quite enough for the effective functioning of a
6 forward command post.
7 Q. Did the commander of the Drina Corps during the Krivaja operation,
8 was he at the forward command post all the time?
9 A. I did not study that problem for the simple reason that it is up
10 to the personal assessment of a commander whether he's going to spend all
11 his time at the forward command post or whether he's going to make
12 periodical tours of the units in combat, to the logistics portion, or
13 whether he's going to be at the basic command post or in the region of the
14 units who are the main forces of the Corps to carry out defensive
15 operations towards Tuzla and Kladanj.
16 So the Corps Commander need not be at the forward command post all
17 the time, but what is most important is that the command functions. And
18 when the commander isn't on the spot, he has his Chief of Staff who
19 replaces him, and this is an automatic mechanism. When the commander is
20 absent, the Chief of Staff de facto takes over the command so there are no
21 breaks or pauses in the system of command, regardless of whether the
22 command is at the forward command post or is absent from it. It is
23 important to know that the forward command post is the spot from which the
24 units are commanded, the units in the operation are being commanded, for
25 which the forward command post was established in the first place.
1 Q. General Radinovic, what portion of the overall forces were
2 engaged - and I'm thinking of the Drina Corps, the overall Drina
3 Corps - how many of their men were engaged in the Krivaja 95 operation,
4 involved there?
5 A. In the order of the commander, in point 4 of that order, the
6 conceptual part that we commented in response to your previous question,
7 is it explicitly says that the main forces of the corps should continue to
8 exert defensive action at the outer areas of the zone of responsibility
9 towards Tuzla and Kladanj, and those are the main forces, the bulk of the
10 troops. And only part of the free forces should execute the Krivaja 95
11 operation, and not even all those free forces, but a portion of them.
12 In the order we saw that it was explicitly stated which these
13 forces were. It was a combat group from the Zvornik Brigade, in fact,
14 which went along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica axis and was active there.
15 It is the combat group from the 2nd Romanija and Bratunac Brigades as
16 well, and the Milici Brigade. And the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici
17 Brigade link up forces but don't actually take part in the operation, so
18 they link up the forces and engage forces of the 28th Division.
19 So in the Krivaja 95, to all practical terms, it was forces below
20 the number of a brigade, which means two and a half battalions perhaps,
21 two and a half battalions took part. The equivalent would be about three
22 battalions, which is far below the equivalent of a serious brigade.
23 So in answer to your question, I can say, in summing up, that they
24 were very restricted forces, just part of the free forces and in our
25 doctrine these are called auxiliary forces.
1 Q. What was the operative position of the forces engaged in the
2 Krivaja 95 operation, both on the Muslim side and the -- that is to say,
3 the BH army side and the VRS side?
4 A. Well, the forces of the 28th Division, at their positions, at the
5 positions they were at, were there for a long time. They held those
6 positions for a long time, that is to say, from May 1993 -- of course,
7 those forces -- not all the forces were there in 1993 that were there in
8 1995. They grew in number. But they were there from 1993, to all
9 practical purposes, so they were there for two whole years in those
10 positions, regardless of whether they were there throughout or whether
11 they came later on.
12 But we can say quite certainly that they had enough time to
13 prepare their defence positions very well. That means to become
14 entrenched, a high degree of fortification and protection; to protect the
15 facilities, the existing facilities, and adapt them as protection against
16 fire power. They had enough time to do all the reconnoitring they needed,
17 to study the methods and dynamics of defence, to study all these things.
18 They had enough time to do this very well, if they wanted to, of course.
19 Whether they did so or did not, I don't know, but with regard to the
20 persistence that they defended Srebrenica, I do not think they did avail
21 themselves of all that.
22 They were engaged in their defence in a circular system. They
23 were in an encirclement, which is an unfavourable indicator of their
24 condition, this encirclement. The fact that they were in an encirclement
25 means that they were at a disadvantageous position.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 The presence of UNPROFOR, or rather the Dutch Battalion, was a
2 positive factor in the operational position of the forces of the 28th
3 Division. Constant activity on the part of the units of the 2nd Corps,
4 the Muslim army, on the external axes from Kladanj and Tuzla, and constant
5 pressure that was exerted on the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps
6 made it binding on the forces of the corps to hold their main forces at
7 defensive positions and defensive deployment towards the external
8 boundaries of the zone of responsibility. And that was an additional
9 factor advantageous to the position of the forces in the enclave, although
10 let me repeat once again: When forces are found in an encirclement, taken
11 as a whole their position is considered to be disadvantageous.
12 As far as the position of the Drina Corps forces is concerned, I
13 would like to stress -- of course, we can stress some positive elements,
14 but there are negative ones as well. The positive ones was that the
15 forces were on the external edges of the enclave and held the forces of
16 the 28th Division in an encirclement. The space between the enclaves was
17 not controlled by the VRS, and that was a disadvantageous fact for the
18 operational position of the Drina Corps forces which held the enclaves.
19 Another unfavourable fact for the VRS was that it did not -- that
20 is to say, the Drina Corps was, quite simply -- it did not have any free
21 forces for manoeuvring and for taking over offensive actions. All the
22 forces were engaged in defending the external reaches.
23 Q. What would be the overall ratio of forces between the BH army and
24 the 28th Division on the one side and the others taking part in the
25 Krivaja 95 operation?
1 A. I analysed the ratio of forces in Srebrenica. I have analysed
2 that. And if we take -- although the numerical situation, as borne out by
3 the documents, they vary; the numbers vary from one document to another.
4 Some documents say that the 28th Division had about 8.000 men; other
5 documents quote different figures. These are assessments rather than
6 precise data, precise facts and figures as to how many troops there were.
7 There is intelligence information which was used in the system of
8 communication in the Drina Corps as well, for example, and you can draw
9 conclusions from Muslim documents which speak of four organisational
10 formations in Srebrenica from the autumn of 1993 up to the middle of 1995,
11 or rather April 1995. And if I weigh all those facts and figures up, then
12 it would appear that the 28th Division in Srebrenica had about 10.000 men,
13 in formation terms, and perhaps 8.000 armed men. So those were forces
14 which far surpassed, numerically far surpassed the numbers of men in the
15 units engaged around Srebrenica.
16 And if we talk about the directly confronted parties on the two
17 sides, the two sides in Srebrenica in the Krivaja 95 operation, then my
18 calculations would be as follows: The ratio of forces was 2.8:1 to the
19 advantage of the 28th Division, 2.8:1 to the advantage of the 28th
20 Division, which meant that they were numerically superior.
21 You must, of course, relativise that ratio in the sense that the
22 VRS was better equipped, better armed, it had better fire power support,
23 whereas the Muslim forces were weaker in that respect. But at any rate,
24 that ratio of forces would still be to the advantage of the Muslim side,
25 regardless of that.
1 Q. Do any standards exist in military theory with respect to the
2 ratio of forces in attacks on settlements, inhabited areas, and attacks on
3 positions outside inhabited areas?
4 A. Yes, there are standards. They exist generally in war doctrine,
5 and we have a doctrine about that too. In latter-day doctrine, attacks on
6 inhabited areas are to be avoided, for two reasons: First, because
7 settlements are prepared for long-term defence and they rely on buildings
8 and basements and cellars, which can be well adapted to provide defence
9 and protection. So populated areas are resistance points of the first
10 order, and in principle they are not attacked.
11 Let me remind you of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in 1982.
12 Israel blocked Beirut but did not attack Beirut. Of course, not only for
13 those reasons, but it never entered anybody's mind to attack Beirut.
14 So in principle, towns are not attacked, and latter-day doctrine
15 states this, because they are very strong fortification and can be used
16 for long-term resistance. That is the first reason.
17 The second more important reason is that by attacking towns with
18 highly destructive systems and weaponry, there would be heavy losses
19 sustained in human lives on the side of the defenders, and this could
20 never be justified through the principle of military effectiveness.
21 So that is one serious reason why towns are not attacked. But if
22 towns were to come under attack, then the ratio of forces between the
23 attacker, they must be -- the attacker must be more superior, 7 to 10
24 times more -- 7 to 10 times stronger, because it is very difficult to take
25 control of a town, so you would have to be far stronger. Well-fortified
1 defence positions outside inhabited areas on open ground, in open space,
2 if we're talking about what we call manoeuvring territory, where the
3 defenders do not have facilities and features which are dominant and which
4 rise up above the area of attack, then the ratio of forces is usually 3:1
5 or 5:1 on the attacker's side. But for a well-prepared defence on a
6 difficult terrain, inaccessible terrain, which enables the defender to
7 organise a firm defence, then the ratio of forces goes up to 7:1, to the
8 advantage of the attacker. Without that numerical superiority, they would
9 have no chance of gaining control of the area.
10 Q. And this brings me to my last question before the break. The
11 existing ratio of forces, did it guarantee success of the attack on
12 Srebrenica or was the takeover of Srebrenica planned at all, in view of
13 the existing ratio of forces?
14 A. In the existing ratio of forces, it was absolutely not realistic
15 to plan the takeover of Srebrenica. Nobody in the command system of the
16 Drina Corps could have had this, may I use the term, "mad plan" of taking
17 over Srebrenica. No, it would have not entered anybody's mind because an
18 attack on Srebrenica was absolutely not feasible in view of the forces
19 that existed on the 6th of July, 1995.
20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I suggest a break
21 at this point?
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, that is a good proposal.
23 We shall reconvene at 11.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.
25 --- Upon resuming at 11.01 a.m.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, let us continue,
2 and I think we should be working until 10 minutes past 12.
3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. General Radinovic, could you give us just a brief description,
5 because the Chamber has heard a lot of evidence to that effect, of the
6 main course of the events and the developments during the Operation
7 Krivaja 95, bearing in mind the internal structure of the combat
8 activities; and also if you can give us your definition of the operation
9 in question.
10 A. Pursuant to the order of the Drina Corps Commander, the main axis
11 of attack was along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica line, so that was the main
12 axis of combat operation. The main feature that needed to be taken
13 possession of was Zivkovo Brdo, which was on the route of advance of the
14 2nd Combat Group from the 2nd Romanija and Birac Brigades. In response to
15 one of your questions I said Bratunac Brigade. No, they were from the
16 Birac Brigade. The main feature that had to be occupied was Alibegovac,
17 and also the Kak feature which was also on the route of advance of those
19 The attack started in the morning hours of the 6th, and the
20 weather conditions were very bad. It was raining all the time, so
21 practically speaking there were no specific actions. Some reconnaissance
22 work was still being done on certain locations, some regrouping of
24 My apologies to the interpreters. I tend to get carried away.
25 So one can say that the dynamics, that the rhythm of advance was
1 very slow indeed on the first day; that is, on the 6th of July they didn't
2 make any significant gains at all. But it is important to give an
3 assessment of the situation here rather than to engage into detailed
4 description of the events themselves.
5 As early as on the 9th, objectively speaking, the units of the
6 Drina Corps accomplished the objectives of the operation between the 9th
7 and the 10th of July. By reaching the Kak and Zivkovo Brdo features, the
8 main objective of the operation was achieved. The enclave was reduced in
9 size, and it was made impossible for any military communication to be
10 conducted between the two enclaves, and that objective was accomplished in
11 the night between the 9th and the 10th of July.
12 As regards further developments concerning the Operation
13 Srebrenica, pursuant to the order of the Corps Commander, the actual
14 operation came to an end. That was the end of it at that time. Whatever
15 happened later on happened pursuant to the decision to enter the town of
16 Srebrenica for which the Corps Commander needed a new mandate from his
17 superior command.
18 As regards the intensity of the activities, I would place this
19 operation in the group of operations with very low intensity. On the
20 basis of what? Well, I can make that conclusion on the basis of the
21 dynamics of advancing because we are talking about several kilometres per
22 day. That is a very slow rate of advance.
23 Second, there were very few losses, very few casualties on both
24 sides. In the documents that I had a chance to study, I didn't come
25 across any such data, any data to the effect that there would be any
1 serious losses on both warring sides, talking about the Operation
3 Third, there was very little destruction throughout that time
4 which speaks to the fact that the fire support and the equipment used to
5 provide fire support was very limited, very restricted. It is obvious
6 that the Corps artillery did not take part in the activities. Had the
7 Drina Corps had the intention to capture the town of Srebrenica, they
8 would have used the Corps artillery support. However, this artillery was
9 not present here, and their support was not used.
10 I came across various data concerning the number of rounds that
11 were fired as part of the fire support to the operation. Some sources
12 claim that over 200 artillery shells were falling every day. If we were
13 to talk about, really talk about 200 artillery shells per day, the
14 destruction would be quite serious and quite extensive.
15 On the video footage showing the entry of the VRS units into the
16 town of Srebrenica I was not able to notice, to observe, such a level of
17 destruction which would justify the number of rounds fired. But I must
18 say that these are the data that I read in the documents and the reports
19 which were sent by the UN military observers. They were probably located
20 inside their facilities; they didn't go out into the field. They were not
21 able to verify for themselves that information, so they probably received
22 that data from the local Muslim population which was, of course, afraid,
23 and which led them to exaggerate the number. Again, the destruction would
24 be far more extensive if that number of rounds were fired.
25 The reports of the Dutch Battalion are more accurate, and the
1 number that they give, the number of shells that were fired during the
2 operation, was much lower. In view of the structure of the operation, one
3 can say that we are talking about an operation with restricted objective
4 and a low intensity operation.
5 Certain elements which characterise each operation are lacking
6 here. When preparing for an attack on a fortified position, and one can
7 expect that the positions of the 28th Division were very well fortified,
8 because they had two years to prepare themselves, and in such conditions
9 the preparation for fire support for the operation usually takes longer.
10 That element of the operation Krivaja 95 is lacking here. Of
11 course, there were some -- there was a certain amount of support, but I
12 think that that support was provided by the battalion forces who were
13 actually taking part in the combat activities, and probably the support
14 given by tanks. But I don't think that there can be any talk about large
15 artillery -- large-calibre artillery. So this element of serious
16 artillery preparation is lacking. Not a single offensive operation can be
17 carried out with any serious objective in mind without extensive artillery
19 Furthermore, there were no major clashes along the confrontation
20 line. There were no deep advances, there were no flank attacks. So there
21 is a certain dynamics which is lacking in this particular operation, and
22 such dynamics is always characteristic for major military operations, and
23 that leads me to conclude that the operation in question was one with a
24 restricted objective, and, structurally speaking, it was a simplified
25 operation in view of the elements that it contained.
1 Q. General Radinovic, if we compare the attack on Srebrenica, that
2 is, the attack of the VRS which took place in 1993, when the objective was
3 to take over Srebrenica and the Krivaja 95 operation, what kind of
4 conclusion can we draw from that comparison?
5 A. Well, the only conclusion that one can draw is the one which would
6 confirm what I have just said about the scope and the intensity of the
7 operation. In the Srebrenica Operation 1995, the forces that were
8 committed were below the level of a brigade, whereas in 1993 the forces
9 that were deployed were those of the strength of four brigades.
10 Let me just remind you that there were two guard brigades at that
11 time: The 1st Guards Brigade from Bijeljina, with the code-name Mauzer,
12 and one of the Protection Regiment, forces of the Milici Brigade. All
13 those forces were deployed for the purposes of that operation, and they
14 can -- they were in the strength of four brigades at that time. That
15 number of troops was necessary in order for the town of Srebrenica to be
16 occupied, and that is the ratio of the forces that I spoke about,
17 7 to 10:1.
18 Srebrenica was the objective of the attack in 1993. The VRS had
19 the intention to take control of the town of Srebrenica, thereby gaining
20 the control of the overall area of central Podrinje. Yesterday we spoke
21 about the reasons why that operation was never completed, and in response
22 to your question here, I can just say that those forces were such that it
23 was possible for them to take possession of the town, whereas the forces
24 that were committed for the purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation were not
25 such as to guarantee the success of the takeover of the town. And from
1 that perspective, the only conclusion I can draw was that there was no
2 intention whatsoever to take control of the town, and such conclusion can
3 be made also on the basis of the documents which were drafted for the
4 purposes of this operation, in particular, the order for combat
6 Q. General Radinovic, the 28th Division, how persistent was it in its
7 defence of the town of Srebrenica?
8 A. Well, that's a different story. I don't think that they were very
9 persistent in their defence. There were, I think, operational and
10 tactical possibilities for the town of Srebrenica to be fiercely
11 defended. I am familiar with certain relevant testimonies to that effect,
12 and I am familiar with the document issued by the UN Secretary-General
13 where he stated that the forces of the 28th Division were not able to put
14 up a fierce defence of the town of Srebrenica for a long time period. I
15 cannot agree with that, and I have a number of data which can support my
16 conclusion. I know that the Secretary-General based himself on the report
17 submitted to him by his soldiers, but when I spoke about the ways a town
18 can defend itself, I wanted to say that Srebrenica was able to prepare
19 adequate defence with its forces despite the fact that the area was
20 restricted and despite the fact that their combat readiness was not at the
21 highest level.
22 For the purposes for the defence of town of Srebrenica, it was
23 quite enough -- what the 28th Division had at their disposal was quite
24 enough, including mine and ordnance equipment, adequate ammunition and
25 weapons, because such operations were low-intensity operations, without
1 air support or artillery support. We're talking about minor clashes which
2 are of very low intensity, with the use of -- with the restricted use of
3 equipment. And I'm quite sure that the resources of the 28th Division
4 were such that it was able to defend the town of Srebrenica so long as the
5 forces of the International Community didn't meddle in the defence, that
6 is, the forces of the United Nations, which would prevent any further
7 exacerbation of the conflict.
8 And if I may at this point, I have to address a certain amount of
9 blame for what happened there to the system of command of Srebrenica. Had
10 they put up a more persistent defence in the town of Srebrenica, I'm sure
11 that the members of UNPROFOR would have intervened and they would have
12 helped them. But I think the way things were happening, it was a fait
14 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I make an objection?
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Cayley.
16 MR. CAYLEY: I make this objection before we get on to matters
17 which are really more germane, more material to the case. The General is
18 making very sweeping, broad statements about matters. He's giving his
19 opinion. And he makes statements in such a fashion - I'll give you an
20 example in a moment - without any specific basis for that opinion.
21 He said to us earlier on, I think yesterday in his testimony, that
22 he's relied on documents and speaking to a number of people and
23 Prosecution exhibits; but a statement that he's just made where he states
24 the 28th Division had sufficient equipment, sufficient ammunition to
25 defend the enclave, could he identify for the Prosecution how he actually
1 comes to that conclusion - here is Exhibit D57, here is Prosecutor's
2 Exhibit such - rather than just making these very sweeping statements with
3 some kind of broad bases of which we have absolutely know idea about at
4 all. Because unless he was there and he actually counted all the
5 ammunition and the weapons that the Muslims had, I really don't see how he
6 could make these kind of comments. That would be my point.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, you have heard this
8 request for clarification. I should also like you to try and streamline
9 the answers of your witness and to have him tell us the sources for his
10 conclusions, and tell us if he reached his conclusions after the events.
11 It is very easy to draw conclusions later on, post facto; however, we have
12 to try and place ourselves in the relevant situation in space and time.
13 We need to hear very clear opinions of this witness, including the
14 foundations for his answers, because after all, he is an expert witness,
15 and we have to know what the bases for his answers is.
16 I hope that I was clear enough, Mr. Visnjic, and the witness has
17 also heard me, I hope.
18 Is that all, Mr. Cayley, that you wanted to object to?
19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. I think you've been very clear.
20 It's just a specific basis for what the witness is saying, as Mr. Butler
21 did. He would come forward to you with a conclusion, and then he would
22 produce a document to actually support his conclusion. So that's all I'm
23 asking for, thank you.
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead, Mr. Visnjic.
25 Please continue.
1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if you will allow me
2 just a brief response to my learned colleague Mr. Cayley.
3 I cannot answer instead of the witness. I know that the Defence
4 has provided the witness with a number of documents which speak about the
5 army -- of the arming of the BiH army inside the protected area of
6 Srebrenica, so I assume that those documents are one of the sources and
7 bases for his conclusions. On the other hand, I know that at the time the
8 General was preparing his report, we had a number of difficulties because
9 we had to work parallelly on certain documents that were already tendered
10 here into evidence, and the General had some other documents at his
11 disposal. So that is perhaps the reason for this misunderstanding.
12 As regards the issue of arming, one portion of the relevant
13 documents hasn't yet been tendered into evidence. It has been handed
14 over, but it is still not in evidence, and those are the documents that
15 the witness used during the preparation of his report, and I think he will
16 mention them in due time.
17 Q. General Radinovic, did the forces and positions of UNPROFOR, were
18 they the object of an attack target? No, I withdraw that question.
19 Could you tell us more specifically the sources which allowed you
20 to make the conclusions you have been making about the weapons and fire
21 power of the forces of the 28th Division?
22 A. Well, first, I did not -- let me say that I did not base my
23 conclusions only on the documents that I studied for this particular
24 occasion alone. There is something that we call a standard when an army
25 is being established. We know the standards. We know what a detachment,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 a platoon, a company, a battalion, a brigade, a division has, how many men
2 and so on, and what type of weaponry, and what units have what kind of
3 weapons at their disposal if somebody, a soldier, under arms, that is to
4 say, carrying arms, in the armed formations.
5 Then it is quite certain that these armed soldiers have their own
6 personal weapons which means that they have rifles. Whether it is an M-48
7 rifle or an automatic rifle or semi-automatic rifle, that is another
8 matter. That is the subject for additional analysis. But they would have
9 had a rifle.
10 It is quite certain that a brigade in the organisational and
11 formational sense has fire support. It had its brigade firing groups. It
12 had mortars of the lowest calibre. So that materiel, coupled with mines
13 and explosives because they had that too, and I say that had they only
14 used that basic equipment, the basic equipment that each soldier has and
15 the mines and explosives, Srebrenica could have been defended in the
16 encirclement for as long as it took the International Community to
17 interfere and bring the conflict to an end.
18 The testimony on the basis of that document does not have any
19 great specific weight, but in the book about Srebrenica, and I quote it in
20 my expert report, there is a photograph from which we can see the type of
21 uniform and type of weapons carried and worn by the Muslim soldiers in
22 Srebrenica. And believe me when I say that not even the VRS had weapons
23 of that kind. They were modern automatic rifles and special flack jackets
24 and so on. I don't say all these soldiers in Srebrenica were equipped in
25 this way, but it does tend to show that they were a force to be reckoned
1 with, to inspire confidence.
2 Q. Were the forces of UNPROFOR targets of the VRS?
3 A. No, they were not. And in the documents that I have had occasion
4 to study and see and consult for this expert opinion, the positions -- the
5 UNPROFOR positions were not the target of attack. And the documents of
6 the superior command with the Drina Corps, it is explicitly stated that
7 the UNPROFOR forces must not be the target of attack. And that they were
8 not the target of attack, indeed, is borne out by the fact that most of
9 the UNPROFOR forces passed through the front lines of the Drina Corps and
10 behind them -- they were behind them in the rear, and losses were
11 prevented in this way.
12 And we know that a member of the Dutch Battalion unfortunately was
13 killed by the Muslims in Srebrenica, unhappily. But luckily, we do not
14 have any data, and I think that is true, that we did not sustain any --
15 that the Dutch Battalion did not sustain any casualties from the Serbian
17 Q. How do you assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNPROFOR
18 with respect to the combat activities in and around Srebrenica?
19 A. UNPROFOR did not have any combat, did not undertake any combat
20 activities. That is a fact, and there is no need to go into that. It did
21 not act against the forces of the Drina Corps which attacked towards
22 Srebrenica. However, I think that we must stress the fact at this point
23 that the other UNPROFOR forces were not active either, in the sense of
24 preventing - I say preventing - a serious operational crisis around
1 I personally feel that the UNPROFOR system should have reacted
2 when it came to the Krivaja 95 operation and its execution, and they
3 should have at all costs prevented its further advance; that is to say, it
4 should have unleashed the mechanism which it had at its disposal and
5 compel the belligerents to respect the safe area, both the Serb side and
6 the Muslim side. But that is a story apart; that is post festum, as the
7 President has so aptly said. It is an assessment made after the fact,
8 after the events, but I think that UNPROFOR did have the necessary
9 materiel at its disposal to be able to prevent that operation, and it
10 would have had to have done so.
11 Q. What was the relationship of the BiH army towards UNPROFOR, that
12 is to say, what were the -- what was the 28th Division's relationship
13 towards UNPROFOR, its attitude towards UNPROFOR?
14 A. Well, it had a dual attitude, twofold. First of all, whether
15 rightly or not, they expected UNPROFOR to protect them fully, completely,
16 and they were not concerned about the fact that they themselves were
17 launching sabotage and divisionary action in the rear of the Drina Corps
18 forces which directly led to the Krivaja 95 operation as a response. It
19 was the direct consequence of the sabotage and diversionary groups from
20 the enclave and their activities. Had that not happened, the operation
21 would have not happened because all the documents point to the fact that
22 that was the main reason, and that unleashed the idea of having the
24 Second, when the activities had been undertaken, then the Muslim
25 forces of the 28th Division expected the arms controlled in the hands of
1 UNPROFOR to be handed over to them, probably. In assessing the
2 relationship between the Muslim forces and UNPROFOR, the attitude they had
3 towards UNPROFOR, we must bear in mind the fact that those forces expected
4 more from UNPROFOR than UNPROFOR was able to give and that this led to a
5 certain amount of frustration on the Muslim side.
6 I wish to believe that that was the consequence and that it was
7 due to this force of circumstances which led to the death of one member of
8 the Dutch Battalion, but it also indicates the negative attitude of the
9 28th Division vis-a-vis UNPROFOR. There are indications of that, and
10 there are documents which state that the Muslims seized weapons from the
11 Dutch Battalion as well.
12 So in a word, we could say in summing up that the attitude of the
13 28th Division towards UNPROFOR, that their relationships were not as might
14 have been expected in this safe area, protected area. Nor did the members
15 of the 28th Division respect the regime; neither did UNPROFOR compel them
16 to respect it on its part.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Cayley.
18 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to interrupt. I think you
19 know the objection I'm going to make.
20 Here the witness is talking about the relationship between the
21 Dutch and the 28th Division. He's saying that the Muslims expected to be
22 protected, and that the relationship was not what it should have been.
23 Could he please identify what is his foundation for saying that? Can he
24 identify the testimony that's been heard by the Court, the documents, the
25 specific documents that indicate this.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Professor Radinovic, we
2 are now at a different level of analysis and conclusion. A conclusion
3 supposes an analysis behind it. So could you specify, please, what
4 documents, what facts, or what results of your observations or
5 conversations that you have had allow you to draw those conclusions.
6 A. The killing of the member of the Dutch Battalion is a fact which
7 testifies and speaks of the unacceptable relationship of the 28th Division
8 towards members of the Dutch Battalion, for example. That is a fact which
9 illustrates that most directly. I don't know what else would be stronger,
10 which argument would be stronger than the death of an innocent soldier who
11 was there to protect the safe area and not there to lose his life or to
12 put his life in jeopardy.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness, but the bad
14 relationships that you spoke about between the 28th Division and the
15 UNPROFOR forces existed before the death of that soldier. Did they -- was
16 it because of those relations that the soldier lost his life or was it
17 because of the soldier's loss of life that the relationships were poor?
18 You must see this line of reasoning. So in order to say that relations
19 were bad between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR, or if you say that they
20 weren't good, at any rate, you must have reasons for saying so, reasons to
21 back this up, and that is what Mr. Cayley is asking you: What is the
22 foundation for you to make that conclusion? The death of that particular
23 soldier, as I have demonstrated, does not show that, because your answer
24 does not establish a relationship before the killing and after the
25 killing, cause and effect.
1 Mr. Cayley is still on his feet, I see, so please proceed,
2 Mr. Cayley. Any more objections?
3 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you've actually articulated my
4 thoughts, so I have nothing to add.
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I'm so sorry. [Interpretation] I do apologise
6 for doing your work for you.
7 Witness, you have heard the line our discussion has taken. What
8 do you have to say in response?
9 A. It is the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, as a
10 part of the UNPROFOR mechanism, to ensure the regime of a safe area in
11 Srebrenica. The principal responsibility of the 28th Division was to
12 respect that regime. The 28th Division, as we have seen on the basis of a
13 series of documents, did not respect that regime, and for me that is the
14 most important pointer to unacceptable behaviour on the part of the 28th
15 Division and the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, which
16 was to ensure that the safe area be respected. That is to say that from
17 the safe area, from Srebrenica, no combat activities were allowed towards
18 the VRS. So that is the main indicator. Whether they had any emotional
19 relationship towards the Dutch Battalion, that is not a subject of
20 discussion here; it is not important for what we're discussing. But their
21 conduct was not proper. They did not respect the regime of the safe area,
22 which they signed in the agreement of April and May 1993 and pledged
23 themselves to do so.
24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I shall now attempt
25 to help the witness respond to that question with a few documents, and
1 later on I should like to give a brief explanation to the Trial Chamber.
2 Q. One of the documents, General Radinovic, that you based your
3 report on, was it the report based on debriefing in Srebrenica of the
4 Dutch Defence Ministry? Was that one of your basic documents?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Now, in that document, and I have the Serbian version -- that is
7 to say, does the document speak of the relationship of the BH army towards
8 the Dutch Battalion, if you happen to remember?
9 A. Yes, it does.
10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can quote from the
11 document which has already been introduced into evidence as a Prosecution
12 Exhibit. Just by way of example of what Mr. Cayley is asking
13 Mr. Radinovic to do: Mr. Butler was a very good witness in that respect.
14 He had a lot of facts and figures in his head. I talked to General
15 Radinovic in preparation for his testimony, and there are two reasons for
16 which he cannot fulfil Mr. Cayley's demands. The first is that he does
17 not have all the sources with him at the moment, all the sources he used.
18 And the second reason is that he can't remember; relying on his memory, he
19 can't sometimes remember all those documents. Now, if the Prosecution
20 insists upon having each assertion backed up by its source and foundation,
21 I propose that we do this later on in writing, and then the assertions
22 could be supported by these written materials or it can remain open as an
23 assertion without the corresponding foundation or support, if I can use
24 that term.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I would like to open up
1 this -- I don't want to open up a full discussion, but I would like to ask
2 Mr. Cayley's position on this point: That is to say, if the witness
3 expresses his opinion and then tells us the steps which he took to make
4 that conclusion, and next we will have the cross-examination by the
5 Prosecution, which will take up more time elucidating those points. But
6 at any rate, I would like to hear Mr. Cayley's response to the proposal
7 just made by Defence counsel.
8 MR. CAYLEY: I've had the opportunity, Mr. President, of
9 consulting with Mr. Harmon, so the Prosecution speaks with one voice. The
10 reason that I ask this is not to be difficult but is simply, as I think
11 you already understand, to facilitate an efficient cross-examination of
12 the witness. Because unless we are aware of the foundation on which the
13 witness bases his opinion, it makes it exceptionally hard to cross-examine
14 him, because we simply have to kind of look up into the sky to try to
15 fathom out how he's come to a particular conclusion.
16 Our view would be that that is not an acceptable way of presenting
17 this kind of evidence, that the witness comes here, he testifies, he's
18 cross-examined, and then subsequently the Defence produce some kind of
19 written document which supports every written assertion he makes by
20 reference to a particular document. That is what he should be doing here
21 and now as a witness, otherwise it makes the whole process ridiculous; it
22 doesn't make it a proper kind of examination and cross-examination at all.
23 JUDGE WALD: I would like to just add to this. I think we have to
24 allow a certain amount of flexibility in expert opinion. As you know, in
25 some jurisdictions, including our own, the expert does not always have to
1 specify and give the exact line of his reasoning or all his documents
2 behind it. Certainly I understand your position that you need to have
3 some notion of where it's coming from in order to conduct the
4 cross-examination, but as I recall, and I have to do this from memory,
5 even Mr. Butler and others, they sometimes gave opinions in which they
6 didn't give a source. I can remember a specific instance or two, because
7 we asked them a question and they gave an opinion without saying, "I am
8 basing this on this document." It was their opinion based upon the
9 overall investigation that they had done. And certainly Mr. Ruez did a
10 certain amount of that in his testimony.
11 So while I sympathise with your general notion, I do think that we
12 have to allow an amount of flexibility, and I think the credibility of the
13 expert's opinion will be assessed by us to some degree on the amount of
14 specification he can give to pass it up, to follow it up, and that I know
15 you will bring out adeptly on cross-examination. So I'm finding it just a
16 little bit -- I won't use the word "irritating," but I'm finding it a
17 little bit disconcerting to have the notion that every time he says a
18 sentence, given that we do have his report and we know what it's based on,
19 that he's expected to produce the exact document. I would like to,
20 frankly, hear the narrative and get on with this expert opinion on this.
21 I think we gave you a fair amount of flexibility with some of the
22 Prosecution's expert witnesses in this regard.
23 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, can I add, can I add some -- perhaps what
24 Judge Wald said. Of course, sweeping statements have got their weight
25 before this Court or anywhere, and they are worth what they are worth, and
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 it might be difficult for you to cross-examine a sweeping statement except
2 by a sweeping statement. But if then we might need support of the
3 sweeping statement if it's not available now. It's in the interests of
4 justice to have it. In that case you are entitled, in fact, since you
5 have not been able to cross-examine it, you are entitled to ask that the
6 witness comes back to be examined on this if you are really challenging
7 the supporting material, if that suits you.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could respond to what Her
9 Honour --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Rodrigues, please.
11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I apologise. I was saying that
12 you spoke the same language and the interpreters have difficulties
13 following you. If you don't make pauses between your interventions, we
14 will have problems. I apologise, Mr. Cayley, for this interruption.
15 Please continue.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 If I could respond, Your Honour, to the comments that you made.
18 I'm not suggesting for one moment that every single assertion that he
19 makes has to be supported by a particular document or by reference to oral
20 testimony, but I think - and I'm objecting now before we get on to matters
21 which we all know are going to be really material to this case - that
22 where he does come out with assertions, with propositions which go right
23 to the heart of the indictment, I think it's not unreasonable for him in
24 those particular instances to actually give evidential support for that
25 particular statement.
1 Moreover, in respect of the report itself, Your Honour, there are,
2 I think, in total about 30 footnotes, and I think if you look at
3 Mr. Butler's report, there are literally hundreds and hundreds and
4 hundreds of footnotes actually supporting assertions that he makes. So
5 whilst I don't wish to irritate anybody in the courtroom by making these
6 objections, I do believe and I do maintain my position that for
7 fundamental assertions which are important to this case, the witness has
8 to give some kind of foundation. Otherwise he can simply say, "I am
9 making an inference." If he's not basing it on something specific he can
10 say, "I'm making an inference." And in fact, when he was questioned about
11 the 28th Division relationship, it was apparent that it was an inference
12 based on one single fact, that he made a global statement about the
13 relationship between the 28th Division and the Dutch Battalion.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think that we have just heard
15 a very important argument from Mr. Cayley. I think that we are now coming
16 to the core of this issue. So far we have been discussing the framework.
17 We have to make a distinction: Either the witness is giving his personal
18 opinion or his opinion as an expert. He has to tell us about the
19 documents that he saw, and he has to tell us specifically on the basis of
20 which documents he has come to that conclusion, the conclusion that he
21 makes as an expert witness, otherwise I think that we will be allowing the
22 Prosecutor to interrupt the Defence constantly. This is the basic
23 requirement for his cross-examination. He needs to have some sources on
24 the basis of which he can conduct his examination.
25 I don't want the witness to think that we are now discussing his
1 credibility. This is just a technical aspect of the hearing of evidence.
2 It is not a personal question. It has nothing to do with you personally.
3 Mr. Visnjic, I think that we can see certain similarities here
4 with the issue of leading questions. It is possible to lead the witness
5 towards certain aspects which are not really at the heart of the matter,
6 but we cannot do that when we are discussing core issues. I should like
7 to appeal to Mr. Visnjic to lead to a certain extent his witness in the
8 extent that he should go to the important questions, really pertinent
9 questions, and streamline him in his answers. Because if you let him
10 speak at length, then the witness will be tempted to give his personal
11 opinions without quoting sources which he used as the basis for his
12 conclusions. So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to intervene a little
13 more, once we have reached the heart of the matter, and you can also ask
14 the witness specific questions as regards his sources, the documents on
15 which he based himself, and in that way we will avoid very frequent
17 And Mr. Cayley, your objections, let me tell you, are never
18 irritating; on the other hand, they are quite welcome.
19 So Mr. Visnjic, if you can bear this guideline in mind and lead
20 your witness a little more in his testimony.
21 JUDGE WALD: I feel compelled to add one thing more. I think we
22 have to keep in mind the difference between a fact witness and an expert
23 witness. A fact witness gives you a lot of documentation. An expert
24 witness is called as an expert witness precisely because he is thought to
25 have the experience and the academic training which allow him to give a
1 particular lens or a particular viewpoint to it. I agree, he has to let
2 you know if that's happened, but suppose, just suppose he were to say,
3 "Based upon the events which happened in Srebrenica prior to the takeover
4 in Srebrenica, just based upon those events, it is my expert opinion,
5 having studied the military organisations and battles of the world, that
6 that signifies a bad relationship between them." We might not agree with
7 him, but I think that would be a perfectly credible statement or a
8 perfectly legitimate statement for an expert witness to have rather than
9 to have to put in ten documents showing us.
10 MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you.
11 JUDGE WALD: Okay.
12 MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you on that.
13 JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to draw that -- I'm not irritated, but
14 I wanted to draw that distinction so we keep it in mind.
15 MR. CAYLEY: That is exactly what -- I'm sorry, because the
16 interpretation has got to catch up.
17 Your Honour, what is exactly the point that I make, and if the
18 witness had said that, I would never have jumped to my feet and caused all
19 this delay. If he says, "I'm a Lieutenant General. Based on all my
20 experience over the years, I can't point to any particular document, but I
21 can tell you as a professional soldier, this is my opinion" that's all I
22 ask for.
23 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, I would like to reassure you that -- to
24 trust the good judgement of the Bench, and when certain things are just an
25 inference, we know it's an inference. When he says, for instance, the
1 28th Division was hostile to the DutchBat because one DutchBat soldier was
2 killed, we know what it means. We know that it's an inference, as you
3 know -- draw the same thing. So let him do the inferences, and leave the
4 other job to us.
5 MR. CAYLEY: I apologise, Your Honour, if you think I'm doing your
6 job, but that fact was actually drawn out by the President. The actual
7 fact of the death of the soldier was brought out by the President on the
8 questioning of the witness. Prior to that it was based on apparently
9 nothing at all.
10 JUDGE RIAD: We can draw the same conclusions, so don't you worry.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if you will allow me
13 to -- in reply to this issue that was broached by Mr. Cayley very briefly.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, we have to bear in
15 mind that we are in front of an expert witness, what my colleague Judge
16 Wald has just pointed out, and the objective of this testimony is not fact
17 but the evaluation of the facts made by this witness, which is implied by
18 the very concept of expert witnesses. Very often it is very difficult to
19 speak about evaluations without having adequate facts attached to it.
20 I think we can find a compromise solution here. Once we get to
21 the most important aspects of the case, we have to know if there are -- if
22 the opinion in question is a personal opinion or if it's an expert
23 opinion. Since we are here to judge the facts, one has to support those
24 facts with evaluations and opinions.
25 So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to bear that in mind while
1 examining his witness. I think we have about ten minutes to see if it is
2 going to work.
3 Mr. Visnjic, please continue.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. But
5 if you will allow me to expose a very brief aspect that I think is
6 important and should be taken into account while assessing the value of
7 testimony of Mr. Radinovic. I'm glad that Mr. Cayley mentioned a
8 comparison of this testimony with the testimony of Mr. Butler and
9 Mr. Dannatt, although Mr. Dannatt's testimony was not as detailed as
10 Mr. Butler's.
11 It was allowed for the witness to have 60 hours to deal with this
12 issue, but believe me, in view of the quantity of documentation and in
13 view of the nature of -- I'm sorry, my colleague has just corrected me:
14 80 hours. In view of the quality of the documents and in view of the pace
15 with which the documents -- the witness received the documents, this
16 precise analysis which was carried out by Mr. Dannatt and Mr. Butler, we
17 would need an additional two or three months in order to comply with the
18 requests of the Prosecutor.
19 Bearing in mind our very restricted resources -- and I must say
20 that I do understand the situation of my learned colleagues from the
21 Prosecution, but they also have to put themselves in our shoes. Bearing
22 in mind our restricted resources, the very little amount of time, and the
23 nature of the subject matter, it is my opinion that this witness has put a
24 huge amount of effort in order to comply with the conditions and
25 requirements which were posed by the Chamber in respect to his testimony.
1 I do not wish to discuss his capacity, his ability to provide you
2 instantly with his sources, and that was precisely the reason for my
3 proposal. If something is really very important and very relevant, and if
4 we cannot have the relevant source right away, we will make additional
5 effort to provide the Chamber and the Prosecution with the relevant
6 sources in due time.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, I really think we
8 need a break at this point. It is 12.00. It is high noon, and we're
9 going to have a break now, and when we come back we will take up the issue
10 once again.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, can you
12 just allow me two sentences?
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] After the break, General. After
14 the break.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe it would be more useful for
16 you to hear it now, if you will allow me.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No, I'm sorry, General. After
18 the break.
19 We will come back at 1.00.
20 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Professor Radinovic, you wanted
23 to say a few words. I apologise for not allowing you to do so before the
24 pause, but I had some urgent business to attend to. I agree that for
25 purposes of economy, that might have been better, but would you like to
1 add anything to the discussion we were having before the break?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. To avoid
3 repetition of situations of this kind, may I explain how I have understood
4 my role in this trial to be, what I have understood it to be like? And
5 perhaps this explanation would be useful.
6 I'm a military expert dealing in military strategic synthesis. Of
7 course, I do not do this arbitrarily. I do not devise strategic synthesis
8 arbitrarily but on the basis of analyses, comparative analyses, study of
9 documents, but of course also basing it on my experience and the great
10 knowledge and experience that I have gained in the many years that I have
11 worked in the field, in my professional field.
12 I am not the type of witness of Mr. Butler. I have enormous
13 respect for Mr. Butler and the enormous effort that he made in writing his
14 expert report, but I am not that type of analytical witness. I am a
15 witness of the type of General Dannatt, and that is how I understood my
16 role. So for all of my assertions, I, of course, do have arguments to
17 back them up as foundation, but in the kind of synthesis that I make, it
18 is absolutely not possible to say each and every time which source I base
19 my assertion on.
20 I have been -- I have said here that I gained the impression that
21 the relationships between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica
22 were not good relations. I assumed that that was sufficient -- that it
23 was sufficient to illustrate that. And I, of course, have arguments to
24 back my opinion up. I have the plan of attack, the document of the plan
25 of attack on the UNPROFOR camp devised by the Muslim command in November
2 Furthermore, I have the whole chapter on debriefing, which speaks
3 about the poor relations that existed between the 28th Division and the
4 Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR.
5 I also have the testimonies of the Dutch officers themselves about
6 the fact that they did not know which forces existed in Srebrenica, what
7 their structure was, what the command composition was, what kind of
8 weaponry they had. And when there are two armies on the same territory,
9 in the same region, you don't know what they have by way of materiel and
10 equipment, then the conclusion is clear. It means that they have not
11 exchanged information of that kind, which means that their relations are
13 So I want to tell you of the way in which I draw my conclusions
14 and make my assertions and what they are founded upon. The method of
15 work, the methodology of my work, is different from what it was with some
16 of the other participants in these legal proceedings, and so -- and I
17 would not have accepted -- I do not accept Mr. Visnjic's defence. I did
18 not -- I am not lacking -- I did not lack -- not do something because of
19 the -- I didn't have enough hours at any disposal. I don't accept that
20 defence. Even if I had two hours, I would have made my expert -- given my
21 expert opinion with all validity. So the problem was not that I didn't
22 have enough hours at my disposal, as Mr. Visnjic implied; it was quite
23 something else, that I did my best with all the knowledge and experience
24 that I have as a professional and expert.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Professor Radinovic, thank you
1 for your explanations. We have heard them and we'll try to function in
2 accordance with what you have presented. Yes, it is true that you did not
3 have as much time as you might have liked and the Registry did not pay you
4 for all the time that you did invest.
5 But Mr. Visnjic, was there something that --
6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, perhaps we did
7 not understand each other. It wasn't a question of payment or
9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let us move forward. What is
10 the problem now? If it wasn't a problem of reimbursement, then let's move
11 on. I was just trying to -- right, you say that it wasn't a matter of
12 payment. Very well, very well.
13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, that is not what
14 I meant. The remark was with respect to the time necessary. That was how
15 I understood the problem, but the General put me right there. He knows
16 what he meant, so he presented his view.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, what we're going to
18 do now is the following: You are going to continue your examination of
19 the witness, your examination-in-chief of this witness. Try to explain to
20 us the foundation for his opinions, and do not lose from sight that the
21 object of the testimony is for the Trial Chamber to assess matters, and
22 the Prosecution will be able to cross-examine on the basis of the
23 foundation presented. But for the Prosecution to be able to do that and
24 to have the minimum -- the minimum must be furnished so that the
25 Prosecution knows where it stands and can use that information during the
2 JUDGE RIAD: I have a comment, Mr. President.
3 General Radinovic, you are a professor, and you can apply, of
4 course, the method -- I'm going to say it's not anything you don't apply.
5 When we listen to you, we'd like to know, to make things easier for us, to
6 differentiate between facts and between your personal inferences.
7 For instance, you can say -- tell us that the 28th Division was
8 well armed. You know it's a fact; you know about it. When you told us,
9 for instance, that the 28th Division was hostile to the UNPROFOR, I took
10 it as a fact. Then when Mr. Visnjic asked you to develop it and to give
11 the reason, you said because they killed one man. That's not fact any
12 more, it is your own inference. I accept it, too, but if you just tell
13 us, "This is my inference," we don't even need to ask you why. That's
14 your conclusion, and then you can proceed and know what is your conclusion
15 as an expert, but -- and what are the facts which don't require -- the way
16 you do when you teach. Thank you.
17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General Radinovic, when did the forces of the Drina Corps succeed
19 in their planned targets?
20 A. The Drina Corps forces achieved the goals of their Operation
21 Krivaja 95 when they reached the line Kak-Alibegovac-Zivkovo Brdo, when
22 they took possession of those dominant heights above the enclave. And
23 that I say on the basis of the documents and what happened between the 9th
24 and 10th of July.
25 Q. When was the decision taken to extend -- expand the objectives of
1 the operation, that is to say, to launch a new operation for taking
2 control of Srebrenica? And who made that decision?
3 A. That decision was made by the sole person authorised to do so,
4 that is to say, the Supreme Commander, the president of Republika Srpska
5 in his role as Supreme Commander.
6 Q. On the basis of what?
7 A. On the basis of documents, documents which at the command post of
8 the Drina Corps were sent by one of the assistants of the Main Staff of
9 the VRS informing them that the president of the republic agreed, was in
10 agreement, that the activities continue, and that they enter Srebrenica.
11 That is the document dated the 9th of July, the evening of the 9th of
12 July, and it came from the Main Staff and was dispatched to the Drina
13 Corps command. Do you want me to produce the document?
14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] It is Prosecution Exhibit 423 for
15 the benefit of my learned colleagues for the Prosecution.
16 Q. General Radinovic, what forces of the VRS entered Srebrenica? How
17 many troops, and what do you know about that?
18 A. I was not able to ascertain exactly how many soldiers entered
19 Srebrenica; however, I did have occasion to see a videotape when the
20 commander of the Main Staff, together with some of his commanding
21 officers, entered Srebrenica. There was a very limited number of soldiers
22 there, and quite simply, you can't see soldiers moving in file. You don't
23 see the combat weapons; combat formation isn't seen. And as I don't know
24 these facts, I can conclude that there were not many soldiers. Several
1 I read the book of the Commander-in-Chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
2 General Sefer Halilovic, who reacted. This was in reaction to the
3 situation in Srebrenica, and he made the assessment. What he said was
4 that there were less -- less Serbian soldiers entered Srebrenica than
5 there were in the security of -- providing security for General Delic at
6 the seminar or congress of the SDA party in Tuzla, and he said that not
7 even 200 soldiers entered. That is a statement from General Halilovic, a
8 quotation from him, and I assume that he would be well placed to know
9 those things.
10 Q. Who did the forces of the Drina Corps encounter when they entered
12 A. From that document, that is to say the videotape which I saw, I
13 was able to conclude that they did not come across anyone in Srebrenica,
14 that is to say that Srebrenica was empty.
15 Q. Where was the civilian population at that time, and where was the
16 28th Infantry Division; do you know about that?
17 A. The civilian population had been gathering in the Potocari
18 UNPROFOR base, and the members of the 28th Division in the region of these
19 villages of Susnjari and Jaglici, and that is in this region here. May I
20 get up to indicate it on the map? [Indicates].
21 Q. The withdrawal and grouping and formation of the retreating
22 members of the 28th Infantry Division, that is to say, what was the nature
23 of that withdrawal? I'm thinking of them going to the village of
24 Susnjari, and on what do you base your assessment?
25 A. I can conclude that the withdrawal of the forces of the 28th
1 Division from Srebrenica began much earlier than the 11th when they
2 appeared in the Susnjari and Jaglici region, which is where the blue
3 circle is and the arrow on the map. How do I -- what do I base that on?
4 The Trial Chamber and the Prosecution must believe me when I say
5 that I have studied things of this kind my whole life, and I know how this
6 is usually done. The confronting parties, for them to be separated and to
7 avoid the enemy continuing an attack from the rear and take control of
8 their own combat positions, they must organise lines of collection and
9 reception in the rear and so lose this combat contact and confrontation
10 line, and create conditions for them to become separated and to move
11 towards Susnjari and Jaglici. And this is an ongoing process. It lasts;
12 it has its duration. That is one fact.
13 The second relevant fact is that it is an area which from the
14 confrontation line up to Susnjari is about 10 kilometres. The contact
15 line from Susnjari is 10 kilometres away, at a distance of 10 kilometres.
16 It wasn't individual withdrawal, but units had to be established.
17 Furthermore, they were coming from different directions, from a
18 circular area, an encirclement, so they had to be gathered together and
19 collected up.
20 And another important fact for my assessment in saying that it
21 probably took place much earlier on was that no member of the 28th
22 Division was captured. Their members weren't captured around Srebrenica
23 or in Srebrenica. That means that the 28th Division spent one day or one
24 and a half days -- they started their withdrawal one and a half days
25 before. So quite certainly on the 10th -- they started withdrawing on the
1 10th. That is certain.
2 And there's another fact that leads me to draw that conclusion,
3 and I think it is an important fact; it is significant. On the 9th of
4 July we had the -- saw the first initiative on the part of the civilian
5 representatives of the population in Srebrenica, who sought contacts with
6 the VRS, the army of Republika Srpska, with regard to the departure of the
7 population. I don't think that the representatives of the civilian
8 authorities in Srebrenica would ask for having contact with the VRS if the
9 28th Division were in combat preparedness, full combat preparedness, and
10 had -- if they had persisted in the defence of the approaches to
12 Those are the facts on the basis of which I draw my conclusion.
13 Q. This withdrawal, could that have taken place on the day Srebrenica
14 was taken control of itself?
15 A. No, that couldn't have occurred on that same day, quite simply
16 because from that large circle and encirclement, had there not been within
17 the organisation of the 28th Division, had this not been agreed, then what
18 would have happened was that some portions of the 28th Division, that is
19 to say, the forces who were in the direct contact line, they would have
20 been encircled and captured or destroyed. As that did not happen, I
21 assume that this action of withdrawal was done in a planned fashion, in a
22 timely fashion, which means that it took place during the 10th.
23 So those are my analytical assessments on the basis of which I can
24 conclude that this whole withdrawal process lasted for a day to a day and
25 a half.
1 Q. General Radinovic, let us move on to a new area, still, of course,
2 following the chronology of the events. From the moment when the Drina
3 Corps units entered the town of Srebrenica, several operational
4 problems -- the parties were faced with several operational problems.
5 Could you tell us something about those operational problems that both
6 sides had at that moment?
7 A. For the Muslim side, the main problem was the pull-out of the
8 forces of the troops of the 28th Division, their regrouping; that is to
9 say, the troops had to be gathered at certain holding points, see what the
10 situation was, what kind of problems they were facing, and try to see what
11 they can do next, what would be their next step. The commanding officers
12 had to gather at one particular location where they were supposed to agree
13 on what to do next.
14 Now, whether it was possible to make an overall plan to that
15 effect, that remains unclear. However, there must have been a kind of
16 contact between the commander or whoever was in command at the time with
17 the subordinate brigade commanders, and the brigade commanders had to
18 contact their subordinates in turn in order to agree on the route that
19 needed to be taken and the kind of formation that would follow that route
20 for the purposes of the pull-out. So that was the main problem that the
21 Muslim side had to resolve after the entry of the Serb forces into the
22 town of Srebrenica.
23 There was an even more serious problem with which they were faced
24 at the time, and that was what to do with the civilian population that had
25 gathered around the UN base in Potocari or inside the base itself,
1 including all the humanitarian problems that are implied and the problems
2 which such an action would imply.
3 As regards the Serb side, their problem was, acting in accordance
4 with the requests of the representatives of the civilian authorities in
5 Srebrenica, how to organise and ensure the transfer of the population,
6 because such initiative was taken not only by the civilian population but
7 also by the representatives of the International Community. We have a
8 document by Mr. Akashi, a telegram which he sent to the United Nations
9 headquarters on the 11th and which concerns the problem of the pull-out of
10 the civilian population from Srebrenica. Likewise, the commander of the
11 Dutch Battalion, during the meeting which took place at the Fontana Hotel,
12 requested for the members -- for the representatives of the VRS for that
13 measure to be ensured. So that was one of the problems that they had,
14 that is, the civilian population, and what to do with them.
15 The second problem was, of course, the whereabouts of the 28th
16 Division and what the obligation of the Drina Corps was in respect of
17 those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, with whom they had
18 obviously lost contact.
19 Q. General Radinovic, the transfer of the population, was it
20 something that could be realistically expected in that operation?
21 A. In view of my insight of the situation, the moving out of the
22 population was not something that could be expected.
23 Q. Did it constitute a desirable military objective of the VRS?
24 A. No. The moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica
25 could by no means constitute a desirable objective of the VRS. Now, what
1 do I base my conclusion on? Every army, if they want to behave in a
2 rational way, would try to ensure with all accepted means to restrict the
3 demographic potential of the enemy, of the opposing side. That is to say,
4 the VRS didn't like the idea to have a new 10.000 combatants appearing on
5 the front lines. That was a more unrealistic situation for them. So the
6 most logical step for the VRS would be for the local population, for the
7 civilian population to remain in Srebrenica, but for them, for the
8 civilian population not to be active in the military sense. So the area
9 had to be deactivated in the military sense of the word. That was the
10 objective of the VRS.
11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have 404, footnote 73,
12 presented to the witness, and can we also prepare Prosecution Exhibits 39A
13 and B.
14 Q. General Radinovic, to your knowledge, who first had the initiative
15 to move out the civilian population from the UN base in Potocari? Who was
16 the first person who came up with such an idea?
17 A. According to what I know, I think that the initiative for the
18 moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica came from the
19 president of the presidency, Osman Suljic, who signed a document to that
20 effect, that is, the presidency of the Srebrenica municipality. The
21 document in question is dated the 9th of July, 1995, and it was issued in
22 1900 hours.
23 President of the presidency, Mr. Osman Suljic, addresses
24 himself -- I'll try to paraphrase the document. "Since the aggressor
25 enemy entered the town of Srebrenica at 1800 hours from the direction of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Zeleni Jadar, and since our military command is dissolving and the members
2 of the 28th Division are no longer able to do anything to prevent
3 aggressive forces from entering the town, chaos and panic prevail and the
4 civilian authorities are left with the least unpopular step to save the
5 population. And it is also stressed at the meeting at the level of the
6 state and military organs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with
7 the Serbian aggressors side, that a meeting should be organised as soon as
8 possible with the aim of finding the possibility to open a corridor for
9 the population to move to the nearest free territory of the Republic of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of international factors. We
11 need an urgent reply, at the latest by 2400 hours."
12 This document was signed by the president of the presidency of the
13 Srebrenica municipality.
14 Q. If we place this document in the context of the time, that is at
15 the time where the order was expanded to the effect that Srebrenica should
16 be attacked.
17 A. Yes, this document was issued before that, obviously, before it
18 was ordered for the troops to actually enter the town of Srebrenica.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please give to the
20 witness the Prosecution Exhibit 39, and to put the page 9 - I believe it
21 is the same page in both versions - on the ELMO.
22 Your Honours, the document in question is a transcript of a video
23 clip which we have seen on a number of occasions here during this trial.
24 It is a video footage of the first meeting between General Mladic and
25 Colonel Karremans.
1 Q. General Radinovic, I have just asked the usher to turn to page 9
2 of this document. We have a combined translation here, English and
3 Serbian. Page 9 or 8.
4 Could you give us a brief description of this conversation?
5 A. This conversation was conducted between Colonel Karremans and
6 General Mladic. Colonel Karremans speaks through an interpreter, and he
7 says that there is a lot of weapons. There's a huge amount of weapons in
8 the enclave, and that the weapons had been smuggled from outside of the
9 enclave. He goes further on to state that he had put that many times in
10 the information to the higher military authorities and nationals in Tuzla
11 and Sarajevo. The reason for that, says he, is because the Dutch
12 Battalion didn't -- was not able to defend the enclave and to have a full
13 control over its territory.
14 It's difficult for me to follow this because there are both
15 versions of the text here.
16 He refers at one point to a request which was made on behalf of
17 the civilian population, because he was not in a position to demand
18 anything. He says that the command in Sarajevo had said that the enclave
19 had been lost, which we can link up with this request for the moving out
20 of the civilian population that we have just seen, and Colonel Karremans
21 is asking for this to be ensured.
22 Q. General Radinovic, have you come across any document of the VRS,
23 or before the 11th of July did you come across any indication that the
24 moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica had been planned,
25 anything that would speak to that effect?
1 A. No. I have never come across any such document, anything that
2 would indicate that anyone from the Drina Corps command or the VRS command
3 would expect that the population would be moved out.
4 Q. Had that been planned, would certain documents have surfaced to
5 that effect, the documents that were actually part of the overall planning
6 of the Krivaja 95 operation?
7 A. I fully agree with General Dannatt on this issue. This issue is
8 discussed in the portion of his report when he says that the moving out of
9 the civilian population is a very complex step to take, and that an
10 overall plan is necessary which would include provisions for the
11 accommodation and so on and so forth. So there should have been a number
12 of such documents, and I fully agree with his claim to that effect.
13 However, I must add one more thing. Such a comprehensive plan
14 could not be articulated or submitted to the Drina Corps for execution
15 without at least something of those documents being exposed to the
16 public. I don't think that such a document could be drafted without
17 necessarily making it public because it would involve a great number of
18 participants, and such a plan would not -- it wouldn't be possible to
19 conceal such a plan because there would have been a number of individuals
20 who would have to be familiar with such a plan.
21 So as regards the planning documents for the Krivaja 95 operation,
22 there should have been something which would speak to that effect, on
23 condition that such a plan had indeed existed. I didn't find anything of
24 that kind, and on the basis of that, I can conclude that those who were
25 involved in the planning of the Krivaja 95 operation, that is to say, the
1 Drina Corps command, did not envisage that consequence.
2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I should like the usher to prepare
3 Defence Exhibit 154, OTP Exhibit 404, footnote 125, 126, and 127, and 128.
4 Q. General Radinovic, when was the first contact made, that is to
5 say, the first actions, the first steps that were taken to that respect,
6 that is, for the purposes of the moving out of the civilian population
7 from Potocari?
8 A. In view of what I had at my disposal, I first came across such
9 indicators in the documents which date from the evening hours of the 11th
10 of July, that is, the documents originating from the meeting that took
11 place in the Fontana Hotel between the representatives of the VRS and the
12 Dutch Battalion.
13 On the 12th of July, we see many more of such documents, and I'm
14 referring to the request of the Drina Corps Commander, for means of
15 transportation, for vehicles.
16 Q. I believe that the usher has just prepared some documents for you.
17 A. Yes. The Drina Corps command on the 12th of July, 1995, addresses
18 itself to its subordinate brigades - the 1st Zvornik, the 1st Bratunac
19 Brigades, the Romanija Motorised Brigade, the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry
20 Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade -
21 whereby it requests or, rather, orders that all available buses and vans
22 in ownership -- which are property of the VRS units, that they should be
23 placed at the disposal of the Drina Corps command on the 12th of July,
25 The said buses are to be forwarded to Bratunac, the sports
1 stadium, on the 12th of July, 1995, not later than 1630. The buses
2 passing through Vlasenica were supposed to be filled up at the petrol
3 station in Vlasenica.
4 Q. I don't think we need to discuss the details of this document,
5 General Radinovic. The document 154 is actually the same document as
6 Prosecution Exhibit 404, footnote 125; it's just that it has come to us
7 from a different source.
8 As regards 404 and footnotes 125, 126, 127, and 128, it is
9 actually a range of documents which speak about the same issue, and I
10 should like to hear your very brief comment on that.
11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And if we can have just one of those
12 documents placed on the ELMO so that we can see by way of illustration
13 what we are talking about.
14 A. I believe I have already read this document. This is the same
15 document. Yes, Major-General Zivanovic for the 12th of July. This is
16 exactly the same document.
17 Q. Can we just hear your comments of the remaining three documents,
18 OTP 404, footnotes 126, 127, and 128.
19 A. Secretariat for Defence in Zvornik, on the basis of a request
20 issued by the general staff of the VRS on the 12th of July for the
21 purposes of mobilising a certain number of buses, they request for such
22 buses to be placed at their disposal -- all of the buses from the
23 municipality, Zvornik, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Milici, and Bratunac and, if
24 necessary, from other municipalities as well. A request is being made
25 here that the vehicles, that is to say, the drivers of the vehicles should
1 immediately report at the stadium.
2 So this is a similar request. We have a request which was made by
3 the Drina Corps Commander and addressed to the commanders of his brigades,
4 that is for the buses which are property of the army to be placed at their
5 disposal. Then we have this same similar request issued to the municipal
6 authorities, and also we see that the mention is made of the general
7 request made by the general staff of the VRS.
8 So we can see that in the space of one day or one morning, a
9 request, an urgent request is made for buses and other vehicles to be
10 placed at their disposal for the purposes of moving out of the civilian
11 population as it had been agreed upon.
12 Q. When did that start, and how long did that operation last?
13 A. In accordance with the documents sent by General Zivanovic and the
14 Ministry of Defence, one can conclude that the moving out of the
15 population started on the 12th, in the afternoon hours of the 12th of
16 July, and on the basis of the documents that I had an opportunity to
17 study, the operation was completed on the 13th of July by half-past seven
19 Q. What were the mechanisms that were employed to that effect, the
20 mechanisms of the United Nations, and what was their situation?
21 A. Well, the Dutch Battalion was in a very difficult situation
22 because they had received this very high number of people there. And in
23 view of the fact that its mission was to ensure protection of the safe
24 area, they had a very weighty responsibility to bear. I'm not going to
25 make any assessment as to how successful they were in accomplishing that
1 mission; I just want to stress that I know how difficult their position
2 was. However, I must say that they acted irresponsibly once they found
3 themselves in such a situation and faced with such a difficult problem. I
4 personally think that a mere telegram should not have sufficed, the
5 telegram that Mr. Akashi sent to the Security Council in New York. He had
6 to find means and transport himself to the location, well, if not
7 personally, then to send someone, his personal envoy, his personal
8 representative, to act pursuant to his instructions and to be there in
10 Furthermore, I think that Mr. Bildt also should have been there at
11 the scene. The same applies to the UNPROFOR BH commander, General Smith.
12 I just cannot explain to myself why they never showed up, why the
13 commander never showed up at the location. Had the whole commanding
14 mechanism of UNPROFOR been actively involved in the situation, I believe
15 that the whole procedure, the whole operation, would have been carried out
16 without adverse consequences. At least, I believe that it would have been
17 carried out in a more orderly fashion and with much less serious
19 Q. In the documentation that you studied, which relates to the period
20 immediately after the moving out of the population, did you come across
21 certain parts which stressed the irregularity of the moving out of the
22 population? And here I mean the documents of the United Nations or some
23 of its organs.
24 A. Yes, I did encounter some. In the Secretary-General's report it
25 talks about that, the UN Secretary-General's report, that there were
1 irregularities. And in the expert opinions they also speak about that,
2 the witnesses, Prosecution expert witnesses. And in all the studies that
3 I read through and studied for Srebrenica, the authors are Muslims, that
4 is to say, members of the Muslim nation. These authors speak about the
5 fact that there were irregularities, and I have no reason not to believe
7 Q. General Radinovic, do you know of any other example where the
8 population moved out in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Apart from
9 this instance in Srebrenica, was there any other example and occasion?
10 A. Well, unfortunately there were instances when the population moved
11 out, and this was something that was continuously apparent as the result
12 of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As soon as an army, one army or
13 the other had established control in certain parts of the territory, all
14 those who did not consider that army to belong to them, they left the
15 area; they moved out. So this moving out of the population is a regular
16 occurrence of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Let me give you some examples which confirm my thesis. For
18 example, the Neretva River Valley, including Mostar. Mostar is a large
19 town compared to the size of the former Yugoslavia. All the Serb
20 population left, from Capljina to Konjic; they all moved out. The Croats
21 from Central Bosnia, they were moved out and escorted by the VRS army, and
22 this moving out of Central Bosnia was the result of the Muslim activities
23 there, not the Serb activities. The Serb army helped the population to
24 shift and move out, without any serious repercussions.
25 There was an instance of moving out of the Muslim population in
1 1993 as well from Srebrenica. On that occasion 10.000 Muslims moved out.
2 As you know full well, from Sarajevo, at the end of the war, all the Serb
3 population, all the Serb inhabitants, left Sarajevo. So we can say and
4 make the conclusion that the moving out of the civilian population from
5 areas taken over by war is no specific feature of Srebrenica; it is
6 something that always accompanies civil wars. I repeat: Civil wars,
7 civil wars of the kind that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 Q. And finally, General Radinovic, how would you assess the moving
9 out that took place on the 12th and the 13th of July, 1995 in Srebrenica?
10 How would you characterise it: as a planned operation, an operation
11 planned in advance, or as an ad hoc operation?
12 A. Looking at the initiatives that were taken to move the population
13 out, and when I look at the documents that I had at my disposal for
14 assessing this action, this occurrence - and all documents indicate that
15 the problem should be resolved and that this referred to the 12th, before
16 noon - I am adamant in my conclusion that it was an ad hoc problem which
17 occurred on the spur of the moment, completely an unplanned consequence of
18 the Operation Krivaja 95, an unplanned consequence of the Krivaja 95
19 operation, and that is why it could not have been planned in advance,
20 planned beforehand, elaborated beforehand, and agreed upon beforehand, and
21 all the necessary things secured for it to be implemented, precisely
22 because it was an ad hoc operation. It was carried out with serious
23 negative features which led to the consequences that are talked about in
24 the documents.
25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in view of our
1 timetable yesterday, perhaps this would be a good moment for a break.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. We're going to split up
3 our afternoon work in two halves. We're going to have a 15-minute break
5 --- Recess taken at 1.55 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 2.11 p.m.
7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, please proceed.
8 You have until 3.00.
9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. General Radinovic, before this Trial Chamber we have heard
11 numerous testimony, exhibits, videotapes, and other evidential material
12 speaking about the separation of military-abled men in Potocari on the
13 12th and 13th of July, 1995. Do you consider it legitimate to test the
14 identity of the military-abled men?
15 A. Yes, I do consider it legitimate to check up the identity of the
16 males, of the men. Now, why do I say that? Because in Srebrenica, the
17 28th Infantry Division was positioned at the BiH army, was based there,
18 and like any other army, it engaged in warfare.
19 Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until the
20 time of the Srebrenica operation, the VRS had data on a number of members
21 of the 28th Division who had committed crimes. The command of the
22 Bratunac Brigade had a list, had in its possession a list of people, that
23 is to say, members of the 28th Division, who had been suspected of
24 committing war crimes, and this list was handed over to the Main Staff,
25 the headquarters, that is to say, the command of the Drina Corps.
1 It was quite normal, therefore, to check out the people and to see
2 whether these members were not among the civilian population in Potocari
3 or around Potocari, to see whether any of those from that list of war
4 criminals were amongst the population and had mingled with the population.
5 Q. The representatives of UNPROFOR were informed about this on both
6 meetings, on the 11th and on the 12th. No, I'm sorry, on the 12th, the
7 evening of the 12th, and the following day.
8 A. Yes. The commander of the Main Staff at the meeting directly
9 imparted this information to the commander of the UNPROFOR battalion.
10 Q. General Radinovic, let us move on to another area now, and that is
11 the pulling out and withdrawal of the 28th Division and the breakthrough.
12 You said that the forces of the 28th Division had collected up in the
13 village of Susnjari, and the Trial Chamber has sufficient other evidence
14 about that, that this was on the 11th of July.
15 When these forces appeared on the periphery of the enclave, when
16 did that happen? When did they appear on the periphery of the enclave?
17 A. There are two facts which are relevant in establishing when they
18 appeared. On the 11th, it is incontestable that those forces were
19 concentrated in that area and that they were preparing for a breakthrough.
20 From the report of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade who sat in
21 for the brigade commander who was at Zepa, that report was dated the 13th
22 of July, the 13th of July, which means that on the 13th of July, the Chief
23 of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, assuming the role of commander, sent to
24 the command of the Drina Corps a report in which he clearly states that he
25 knows that the column has started moving towards his zone of
1 responsibility. And that means, and from that document I'm able to
2 conclude, that for him to be able to send this, dispatch this report out
3 on the 13th, he must have known about it on the 12th. So the first
4 contacts were quite certainly on that day, and already on the 13th we have
5 combat contact.
6 Q. Do you have any information as to which forces of the 28th
7 Division were there, how long the column was, what kind of weapons they
8 had, and the composition of the column itself?
9 A. This differs from one source to another. Serb sources assess
10 this -- Serb sources say that the number is between 10.000 and 15.000 and
11 that a third were armed. In the testimony of Mr. Butler, the number of
12 armed persons was lower. But I don't think that we need say specific
13 numbers. The column was a numerous one and there was quite a considerable
14 number of armed men. According to my analysis, if you look at the overall
15 men that the 28th Division had, if we know that they were not captured or
16 did not surrender, then it would be quite certain that in that column
17 there would be between 7.000 and 10.000 members of the 28th Division.
18 Q. What operative formation were the forces of the 28th Division
19 moving in, and what, according to military doctrine, is that action they
20 took called? How do you refer to it? What is the term used to denote it?
21 A. According to some information and certain data that I found in the
22 documents of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and his reports to
23 the command of the Drina Corps of the 13th and 14th - and he stresses that
24 the first combat contacts with the members of the 28th Division took place
25 here, where you see the blue arrows, on the 13th - the bulk of the column
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 from the Susnjari and Potocari region could not have, in such a short
2 space of time, crossed such a large area.
3 I now conclude, on the basis of that, that most probably the
4 command of the 28th Division had formed a forerunner, an advanced group
5 which started out earlier on. And in view of the fact that in the reports
6 and later documents I failed to find that any of the commanders had -- or
7 leaders of the units had fallen, had been casualties, except one, Major
8 Golic, Ejub Golic, I therefore conclude that in this advanced group or
9 party, that the whole commanding cadre of the 28th Division was in that
10 advanced group and that that advanced group pulled out before the main
11 fighting began in the zone of responsibility in the Drina Corps against
12 the forces of the 28th Division.
13 So this operative formation for withdrawal, for pulling out, had
14 an advanced group, it had the main column, without enough operative links
15 between the advanced group and the main column, and it would appear that
16 it was not the goal of the advanced column to allow the column to be able
17 to pull out but to reach the area controlled by the Muslims as fast as
19 Now, this action that the 28th Division performed, according to
20 military theory and doctrine, is called a breakthrough out of an
21 encirclement, that is to say, to break out of the encirclement. This
22 action also contains within itself elements of a military action which is
23 called a desist march, which implies a certain formation and order, which
24 means that they must be led by the -- for detachments which enter into
25 combat action with forces preventing the withdrawal, they break through
1 those ambushes and obstacles in order to prevent their withdrawal. They
2 expand this area, place security on their flanks, and the columns march
3 through these openings in their withdrawal. And this occurs at all of the
4 spots where positions are organised to prevent this from taking place, to
5 prevent this pulling out.
6 It is obvious that the command of the 28th Division did not do
7 that. It did not do that for the simple reason that according to data and
8 information and a portion of the testimony of Mr. Ruez, what happened was
9 that at individual places, the Muslim forces in retreat suffered heavy
11 Q. The VRS also took certain action prescribed in military doctrine
12 with respect to the combat formations of the 28th Division. What were
13 those actions?
14 A. The expected combat actions in situations of this kind is to
15 pursue the enemy. It is called "pursuing the enemy." And after losing
16 combat contact with the enemy, forces are established for pursuing,
17 pursuing forces. Pursuing columns, pursuing forces, pursuing detachments,
18 various pursuing formations are established and put into effect in
19 situations of that kind.
20 Now, what is the characteristic feature here? For this process
21 and for an assessment of this entire complex of activities, that is to
22 say, the withdrawal of the 28th Division and all the consequences that
23 arose from that, it is highly unusual that the command of the Drina Corps
24 did not organise the pursuing of the enemy, pursuit of the enemy. Why he
25 didn't do that, I cannot say. All I know is that he did not. Probably
1 because in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, the forces
2 existed which were able to apply another method of preventing the forces
3 of the 28th Division from moving out of the zone of responsibility under
4 the Drina Corps, and the main reason was that immediately after the end of
5 the operation for Srebrenica, the Drina Corps was ordered to continue with
6 the Zepa operation.
7 It is not natural to begin a second operation until you have
8 completed, fully completed the first, with all the consequences that that
9 entailed, the consequences of the previous operation. But it is the right
10 of command to do so, and we have seen that, in fact, it was an operative
11 error that that was so.
12 Had it turned out that the Drina Corps after completing the
13 Srebrenica operation had gone in pursuit of the enemy which was
14 withdrawing, it is quite certain that the consequences to the 28th
15 Division would have been much more serious than they actually were.
16 Q. When was the first combat contact established of the 28th Division
17 and the VRS in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps? When did
18 this -- where did this happen, what were the conflicting, combatting
19 parties, and what were the consequences for the VRS and, of course, for
20 the 28th Division?
21 A. I will adhere to the testimony of Mr. Ruez here. At the tip of
22 this first arrow there is a place called Bare, and Mr. Ruez claims that on
23 the 13th of July, that that was where the first serious settling of
24 accounts took place between the force -- with the forces of the 28th
25 Division who were in retreat and the forces that were in control of that
2 According to Ruez's testimony, there were about 600 members of the
3 28th Division who were killed on the occasion. I personally think that
4 such heavy losses could have been expected in view of the fact -- in view
5 of the situation that the 28th Division found itself in, and bearing in
6 mind first and foremost the fact that it was not capacitated for such a
7 complicated and risky operation, this operation of retreat and
8 breakthrough, the encirclement in enemy territory which was more than a
9 hundred kilometres in depth. And if we know that it is not a straight
10 line, then they weren't moving in a straight line. And if we bear in mind
11 the fact that along that axis of movement, there had to have been
12 resistance and retreat through three or four -- through four or five lines
13 or positions.
14 Q. Let me give some additional information. It was Mr. Ruez's
15 testimony of the 14th of March, page 594 and 595, where he says that in
16 the zone that you yourself mentioned in 1996, about 600 bodies were found
17 when -- in the course of an operation conducted by, I think it was the
18 Finnish experts, not linked to the Prosecution's activities. So in that
19 zone, about 500 bodies were uncovered. It is assumed that they are Muslim
20 soldiers and that they died in battle because there were no other
22 General Radinovic, could you tell the Trial Chamber what the depth
23 of the area was that the 28th Division had to overcome, and what time they
24 needed for that under the prevailing operative conditions?
25 A. In my reply to your previous question, towards the end of it when
1 I explained it was a risky business, it was a risky undertaking for these
2 forces to decide to break through, I said that the depth -- because it was
3 not linear movement, they weren't proper roads, they were paths, winding
4 paths, that this was between 80 and 100 kilometres in depth.
5 Now, during the fighting in combat, it is a route and a distance
6 which it is difficult to cross in less than eight to ten days, but the
7 28th Division did so in a shorter space of time, that is to say, quicker;
8 probably partially because the units along its path, along their path,
9 failed to do what they should have done in a situation of that kind and
10 had they put a stop to this retreat in the way that that should have been
12 Q. General Radinovic, in response to my question you told and
13 explained to the Trial Chamber what the VRS failed to do and what it
14 should have done in pursuit of the enemy, but I think my question was what
15 action did the VRS take. Not what action it did not take, but what action
16 did it take. How did it deal with the 28th Division?
17 A. The army of Republika Srpska applied a method which was available
18 to it at the time, which was open to it -- in view of the fact that the
19 Drina Corps immediately after the Srebrenica operation received an
20 assignment to launch another operation for Zepa, they applied the method
21 of ambushes, ambushes at these lines, and they used the forces that were
22 available to them in the area.
23 So these ambushes and obstacles were placed immediately after the
24 ring around Srebrenica. The next one was positioned at the
25 Kasaba-Konjevic Polje road, the following one is at Snagovo where the
1 arrows are, the two arrows, and the fourth was in the zone of
2 responsibility of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Where it says
3 the 16th of July, that position there.
4 So that unit in retreat had to overcome several successive
5 ambushes and obstacles that the forces had placed in the zone of
6 responsibility of the Drina Corps.
7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to ask the usher to prepare
8 Prosecution Exhibit 540 and 550, Exhibits 540 and 550.
9 Q. General Radinovic, in retreating from the zone of responsibility
10 from the Srebrenica zone, the 28th Division established combat contact
11 with part of the forces belonging to the Drina Corps, and they were the
12 forces of the Zvornik Brigade. What operative problems did the Chief of
13 Staff of the Zvornik Brigade have to solve from the 13th of July, and how
14 did he endeavour to solve the problems that arose?
15 A. I have a document that I've already mentioned dated the 13th of
16 July. It is the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade in the role of
17 commander, sending --
18 Q. I apologise, just one moment. It is Exhibit 540.
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please place Exhibit
20 540 on the ELMO so as to facilitate the work of the Trial Chamber.
21 A. On the 13th, therefore, the command of the Zvornik Brigade, and
22 the Chief of Staff acting as commander, informs the command of the Drina
23 Corps that with the aim of blocking the groups retreating towards Tuzla
24 and -- from Srebrenica and Tuzla, and that the following measures were
25 undertaken: that a platoon of the military police had organised an ambush
1 at Dzafin Kamen, and that is here. That is this location here, Dzafin
2 Kamen. That was where the military police platoon was. And some
3 intervention platoons from the 5th Battalion and the 6th Battalion, they
4 organised an ambush here in this part. And it is the Snagovo region,
6 Now, what am I able to deduce from that? I am able to deduce from
7 that that the commander - the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade acting
8 as commander, actually - did not assess the situation seriously enough,
9 nor was he conscious of the forces that he had to face, until he came face
10 to face with them in this area here. Only then, when he came up against
11 those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, and when they were able to
12 break the ambush that was set up, and when they moved -- started moving
13 towards Zvornik, from that time on, that is to say, from the 14th of July,
14 in actual fact, the Chief of Staff was -- asked the command of the brigade
15 to return - he was panic-stricken, if I can use that term - and parts of
16 the brigade at Zepa to deal with this serious operational situation which
17 occurred in the zone of responsibility of that brigade. And as a result
18 of his demands, the commander, the Corps Commander, orders the Zvornik
19 Brigade to return to the zone of responsibility. And already on the 15th
20 of July the commander of the Zvornik Brigade reached the zone of
21 responsibility with the men he had brought from Zepa, and that is when a
22 very serious settling of accounts began with the 28th Division. And that
23 was a life-and-death -- they fought to the death. It was a life-and-death
25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] May we have Prosecution Exhibit 550
1 placed on the ELMO now, please. It is a daily combat report, that is to
2 say, an extraordinary report of the Zvornik Brigade, an interim report, an
3 interim report which illustrates the position that the Zvornik Brigade
4 found itself in.
5 Q. General Radinovic, when did the commander of the Zvornik Brigade
6 return to his area of responsibility and what kind of steps did he take in
7 order to improve the situation in his area of responsibility?
8 A. This report also comes from the Chief of Staff acting as
9 commander. It is dated the 14th of July, 1995 and it is a consequence of
10 an ambush which took place in his area of responsibility. He is informing
11 the Drina Corps command that a group -- that is, that the column of
12 Muslims is 3 kilometres long and that he is expecting that they should
13 attempt to have contact with the forces of his brigade. He further on
14 states: "Try to find some means of bringing in more intervention forces
15 early in the morning," otherwise he would be unable to defend his area of
17 This is an appeal issued by the brigade commander, and the Drina
18 Corps command replied to his request by pulling out the forces of the
19 Zvornik Brigade from the Zepa area and sending those forces back to the
20 area of responsibility of that brigade. And the commander in question is
21 beginning to deal with the situation in his area of responsibility. This
22 turned out not to be enough, and what ensued was a very complex
23 operational situation which might have led to the separation -- to the
24 splitting of the area of responsibility of that brigade in two parts.
25 Q. How do you assess the situation in the area of the Zvornik Brigade
1 and what kind of consequences could be expected from the intensity of the
2 combat activities?
3 A. The intensity of the combat activities in the area of the Zvornik
4 Brigade from the 14th of July, then going on to the 15th, the 16th, and
5 the 17th of July, is something that I can qualify as very high intensity.
6 So the highest level of intensity took place in the area where we can read
7 the date, the 16th of July, 1995, at the tip of the arrow there, in that
8 particular area. Those activities were taking place at such an intensity
9 that it was -- it could be expected that the 28th Division would suffer
10 great losses. During those activities the Zvornik Brigade suffered losses
11 amongst their members. They had 39 killed in combat, 5 missing, who were
12 also probably killed, and over 200 men were placed en ordre de combat.
13 Let me give you an illustration to try to describe for you how
14 intense the attack was. It was the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade
15 who found itself in the most difficult situation, where this arrow is on
16 the map. The forces of the 28th Division managed to pierce through the
17 positions of the 4th Battalion and to take up control of three trenches
18 and to capture a Howitzer battery and three mortars, and practically
19 speaking they were faced with the possibility of being wiped out from that
20 particular area, the members of the 4th Battalion.
21 The brigade commander did something unusual. He opened up the
22 corridor for the members of the 28th Division to pass, and until the main
23 forces of the column had passed through, the corridor was not closed
24 again. The corridor would be closed again only on the 17th of July. And
25 one can say that by the 17th of July, the main forces of the 28th Division
1 left the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and managed to reach
2 the area of Nezuk, which was their objective, that is, the territory which
3 was under the control of the forces of the 2nd Corps -- 2nd Tuzla Corps of
4 the BH army.
5 Q. General Radinovic, do you have any information as to the type of
6 losses of the 28th Division in the area of responsibility of the Zvornik
7 Brigade at that time?
8 A. From the documents that I had access to, from the material that I
9 studied, I was not able to establish the exact number of individuals
10 killed in action. However, in view of the intensity of activities and the
11 depth of the territory and the situation in which the members of the 28th
12 Division found themselves, it is perfectly realistic to expect such losses
13 to be very high. I would measure them in thousands, not in hundreds. But
14 I cannot refer you to any specific document to that effect.
15 As regards the books that I studied and the testimony of the
16 witnesses that took part in that pull-out, mention is made of very high
17 casualties at at least two locations: the village of Bare and also at the
18 location just above Snagovo, where you can again read this date, the 16th
19 of July, 1995. So at those two locations, according to what I was able to
20 see from the documents that I studied, the 28th Division suffered greatest
22 Q. General Radinovic, as regards the issuing of the order to break
23 through, what could the command of the 28th Division realistically expect
24 if there had been such a decision, that is, the decision to attempt a
25 breakthrough? What could they realistically expect?
1 A. Well, I think you would be best assisted in your question if I
2 tell you that it all depended on the individual who made such a decision,
3 and practically speaking I think that he sacrificed the 28th Division by
4 making such a decision. We have had numerous examples in history of
5 warfare of that kind. The Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the valley of
6 the Sutjeska River in 1943 sacrificed their 7th Banja Division in order to
7 defend themselves from -- in order to protect 4.000 wounded combatants
8 from the German troops. Practically speaking, that division was
9 destroyed. I don't know what were the objectives of the Supreme Command
10 of the BH army concerning the 28th Division. Why would they sacrifice
11 them? That was an operation that had been ordered by them to the 28th
12 Division, and in view of the conditions and circumstances for the
13 execution of such an operation, the objective was, practically speaking,
14 unrealistic and unfathomable. It is hard to imagine for a command who was
15 aware of the consequences that could ensue from such an operation to
16 actually order the execution of it.
17 Once again, I have to repeat that had the forces of the Drina
18 Corps had carried out a proper pursuit, there would be no members of the
19 28th Division any more, and they did not engage in that pursuit because
20 they were busy with the Zepa operations.
21 I cannot believe that the officers of the supreme command of the
22 BiH army were unable to foresee the consequences of their steps. They are
23 professional officers; they went to the same schools as I did; and they
24 were, in my opinion, perfectly aware of the consequences. As to why they
25 still went ahead with the decision, I really don't know.
1 Q. After the pullout of the members of the 28th Division, there was a
2 lot of discussion regarding the composition of that division, and members
3 who went across and managed to reach the territory under the BiH army
4 control. Could you tell us something about that?
5 A. I had an opportunity to read what General Sefer Halilovic said
6 about it who was the Commander-in-Chief before General Delic. I think
7 that he was actually right when he spoke about the behaviour and the
8 conduct of the commander of the 2nd Corps and the Supreme Command of the
9 BiH army.
10 The only permissible action when the 28th Division was ordered to
11 attempt a breakthrough, and actually the only justified and possible
12 method and approach was to find free forces and to have them launch an
13 attack from the area, from the direction of Tuzla, and to start moving
14 towards the forces of the 28th Division.
15 I know quite a few things about that matter, and I can say that if
16 that had not been ordered, and if the 28th Division had indeed been
17 ordered to attempt a breakthrough, the only thing that I can conclude is
18 that they were actually sacrificed. And it was -- they were lucky to the
19 extent that the Drina Corps forces were busy with the Zepa operation;
20 otherwise, had that not been the case, the consequences would be far
21 worse. They would be annihilated.
22 Q. General Radinovic, you already told us that it was impossible to
23 establish the accurate number of Muslim combatants who were killed during
24 the breakthrough. What happened with the terrain afterwards? Was a
25 proper clearing operation of the battlefield taken up? What is your
1 knowledge to that effect, and what can you tell us about that?
2 A. Well, I have to be very critical about the conduct of the forces
3 of the VRS and the units of the Drina Corps in that respect. There is an
4 obligation which is incumbent on the commanders of the local units which
5 consists of proper searches of the terrain with the objective to locate
6 and find the remaining groups of the enemy forces, and also for the
7 purposes of discovering all kinds of obstacles that can be expected in the
8 theatre of operations.
9 As part of that action, the searching of the terrain, there is
10 something that we call clearing up the battlefield. It is an action which
11 is designed to restore the terrain in question and to bring it back into
12 its former state. It also includes the location of bodies, first of all
13 bodies of people, and then corpses of cattle, and then it includes
14 subsequent burial of those bodies. Whether it was done or not I don't
15 know. I believe it was.
16 However, and this is quite important, that there is no -- there
17 are no documents, there are no reports which would with a certain amount
18 of certainty tell us something about that particular activity. I haven't
19 crossed -- I haven't come across any single report which would contain
20 data about the number of bodies collected and buried as a part of the
21 clearing up of the battlefield.
22 So that is a very serious obstacle when it comes to the need to
23 establish what happened in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps,
24 in particular, in that part of the terrain where the members of the 28th
25 Division attempted a breakthrough.
1 Q. General Radinovic, while studying these materials, you have
2 probably come across a number of documents which indicate that during the
3 breakthrough of the 28th Division through the territory of the area of
4 responsibility of the Drina Corps, that there was a certain number of
5 Muslim prisoners of war at that time in that particular area.
6 A. I had an opportunity to study an interim combat report of the
7 commander of the Zvornik Brigade which was dated the 15th of July.
8 Q. We will spend some more time discussing this particular document,
9 if you can be brief and just tell me whether you know about it.
10 A. Yes, I know about the document, and I studied it.
11 Q. Could you tell us if it was in the interest of the VRS to
12 liquidate as many war prisoners as possible?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Why?
15 A. That would be completely contrary to the interests of the VRS.
16 I'm now not talking about humanitarian and legal considerations which are
17 self-implied and understood; I'm talking about the operational aspect of
18 the operation.
19 At the time of the capture of the members of the 28th Division,
20 the VRS had a number of prisoners at the Muslim side, prisoners of their
21 own. So the only factor which would force the Muslim side to accept an
22 exchange was the fact that there were as many war prisoners as possible on
23 the other side, so they needed to have enough people for an exchange.
24 So that would have been the main interest of the VRS, to have as
25 many of prisoners of war as possible for the purposes of an exchange and
1 not to liquidate all of them. Once again, I'm not talking about the legal
2 aspects of the -- that particular portion of the operation. That goes
3 without saying.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think that this
5 would be the convenient moment to adjourn for the day.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, Mr. Visnjic. We
7 will call it a day, but I have to ask you before we finish how much time
8 do you think you will still need to complete the examination-in-chief?
9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm running a little
10 late, but I hope that we will be able to finish the examination-in-chief
11 tomorrow. At this point, I cannot tell you whether we'll be able to wind
12 up by 1.00 or 2.00, but we will do our best to complete, to finish the
13 examination-in-chief tomorrow.
14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We will see. Are you sure that
15 we will be able to finish this tomorrow this week, because if the
16 Prosecutor is going to dedicate the same amount of time as the Defence, I
17 don't think that we will be able to finish with this testimony by the end
18 of the week, but we will see about that tomorrow.
19 Mr. Cayley, do you have any ideas as regards to time that you
20 think you will need for your cross-examination?
21 MR. CAYLEY: Well, I have to say, Your Honour, based on practice,
22 at least as much time as the Defence has taken; but I hope to try and move
23 to some of the more fundamental issues that the witness has spoken about
24 rather than spending a lot of time on the periphery, but probably at least
25 three days.
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, because we have one more
2 witness for this week that was supposed to be heard on Monday, the one who
3 was supposed to arrive on Monday. Is he still travelling?
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe that
5 Mr. Petrusic has more information about that.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you. You know that we
7 always try to make a programme and not to be caught by surprise at the end
8 of the week.
9 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the witness who was
10 supposed to arrive last week did not arrive on time because the flight was
11 cancelled; however, yesterday afternoon I was informed that even that
12 flight, due to weather conditions, had to be cancelled for today. So it
13 will be only tonight that I will have information as to when he will
15 We will discuss the issue with the Prosecution. I don't know how
16 long they intend to cross-examine this witness and the following witness.
17 I don't know whether we should -- whether the whole matter will be -- will
18 go over, will spill over next week, but I'm afraid that I will be able
19 only tomorrow afternoon to inform you on the situation.
20 If we have only that witness next week, if he's the only witness
21 that we would have for next week, maybe it would be a better idea to bring
22 it back in January, but please allow me some time to try and find the
23 reasonable solution together with my colleagues from the Prosecution this
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, the reason I asked that
1 question was because I was hoping that we would be able to finish, and if
2 necessary, that we could sit tomorrow afternoon if we can hear both
3 witnesses. If that is not possible, we can, I don't know, call him in
4 January or perhaps on Monday. But I have imparted to you our concerns,
5 and I hope that you will be able to give us some information tomorrow.
6 We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.20. The hearing is
7 adjourned for the day.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3:02 p.m., to
9 be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day of December,
10 2000, at 9:20 a.m.