1 Friday, 6 April 2001

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 9.28 a.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and

6 gentlemen; good morning to the technicians, the interpreters; good

7 morning, members of the registry, counsel for the Prosecution, Defence;

8 good morning, General Krstic.

9 We are now going to resume our work by bringing in our witness.

10 [The witness entered court]

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, General

12 Hadzihasanovic. Let me remind you that you're still under an oath. You

13 may be seated. We are now going to continue with your testimony.

14 General, we were still at the narrative part of your testimony. I

15 hope that the documents were properly marked for identification yesterday

16 and that that problem has been taken care of. So I think that you may

17 continue.

18 WITNESS: ENVER HADZIHASANOVIC [Resumed]

19 [Witness answered through interpreter]

20 Questioned by the Court: [Continued]

21 A. Good morning to you, Your Honours. Yesterday in my statement I

22 wanted to give you an idea of what the 28th Division looked like, what its

23 strength was, its weaponry, and its combat readiness. So I don't think

24 there's anything particular to add to what I stated yesterday concerning

25 that issue, unless you have certain questions. But I think that you asked

1 me yesterday two questions, that is, what I knew about the attack against

2 Srebrenica and the structure of the column that was moving after the

3 attack towards Tuzla. So if I understand Your Honour's questions

4 correctly, I should like to begin with answering them.

5 I personally was not a participant in those events in Srebrenica.

6 I was not present there and I was not in the column which was moving out

7 of it, so my testimony about it is based on what I was able to learn as a

8 member who was -- as a Chief of Staff of the BH army, whether I learnt it

9 through written documentation or through my contacts with the people.

10 On the 6th of July, 1995, I was actually there on the spot when

11 the column moved out, so I was able to have contact with those people.

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is not sure about the date?

13 A. Because I had a task, with a group of other people, to receive the

14 members of the column and to see what had happened with the members of the

15 28th Division. According to my knowledge, the attack, the intense attack

16 on Srebrenica started on the 6th of July from the southern side of

17 Srebrenica, from the direction of Zeleni Jadar, Pribicevac, Zalazje and

18 Zvijezda villages. I also know that it was there that the Serb forces

19 started their first offensive activities towards Srebrenica; that is, they

20 started moving towards north.

21 The front line was pierced there, and the division command

22 requested the UN forces to try and inform all relevant factors of those

23 attacks, and also, of course, to try and prevent them. That was done in

24 various ways, through a certain period of time, and I cannot give you any

25 detailed information about that, but I know that there were negotiations

1 to that effect. And I know that initially, at the first time of the

2 attack, the UN forces had to abandon some of their observation posts. On

3 the 6th of July, they abandoned the first of their observations posts.

4 And finally, I think that they had to withdraw from a total of three OPs.

5 So the command of the 28th Division was informed that the UN

6 forces stationed in Srebrenica had asked for assistance and also had asked

7 for NATO strikes, that is, that the southern part of the enclave had to be

8 abandoned by the BH army because of the attacks. They were actually told

9 that the targets would not be selected in order to try and stop the

10 attack, and that is why the BH army abandoned those positions. But as

11 they were expecting those strikes, and I believe there was only one such

12 strike by air force, nothing of any significance happened, and the Serb

13 forces continued their attack towards Srebrenica.

14 The BH army units withdrew to the hills around Srebrenica, and on

15 about the 10th of July, they started gathering, the population started

16 gathering in the villages north of Srebrenica and also the elements of the

17 army started assembling there. I know that on the 11th of July, almost

18 all members of the army gathered in the village of Susnjari.

19 In addition to the military, as far as I know and according to the

20 information that I have, there were about 7.000 civilians in that

21 village. There was a very small number of women there, not more than ten,

22 I think. So on the 11th of July, in the evening, the division command,

23 together with the municipal authorities, on their own initiative decided

24 to move in a column and try and leave the area of the protected zone in

25 the direction of the free territory around Tuzla. I think that that

1 decision was taken around 2200 hours on the 11th of July.

2 According to the statement by the late Chief of Staff with whom I

3 had an opportunity to talk, Mr. Becirovic, I think that was his name, the

4 column consisted between 12.000 and 15.000 people and almost the complete

5 composition, the complete division was there, that is, 5.500 to 6.000

6 troops.

7 It was decided that the column should go along the axis Konjevic

8 Polje-Bratunac moving along the ridges west of that axis, and that the

9 asphalt road be crossed over in the area between Konjevic Polje and Nova

10 Kasaba and that they should continue towards Tuzla after crossing the

11 tarmac on that spot. The length of the column, according to the

12 information that I have, was between 12 and 15 kilometres, and the time

13 span was about two and a half hours from the head and the tail of the

14 column. They started on the 11th of July around midnight.

15 As far as I could note, it was structured as follows: The head of

16 the column consisted of elements of the 284th Brigade who were followed by

17 the 280th Brigade and I know that the Chief of Staff told me that he was

18 amongst the members of that unit. Then followed civilians together with

19 the military, and the last element of the column was the independent

20 battalion which was also part of the 28th Division.

21 Before they reached the asphalt road at Konjevic Polje towards

22 Vlasenica, an artillery attack was launched against the second half of the

23 column. Fire was opened from various kinds of artillery weapons on the

24 tail of the column, and the head of the column realised that there was

25 nobody on the tarmac road. They had started crossing the road on that

1 spot, not knowing that the second half of the column was, in the meantime,

2 exposed to a fierce attack, artillery attack. That was on the 12th of

3 July. I think that about 80 or 100 people managed to cross the tarmac

4 road, that is one-third of the column.

5 After that, some APCs and a tank, I believe, arrived and the Serb

6 forces pierced the column on that spot. So the first third of the column

7 managed to cross the asphalt road, and they were waiting to see what would

8 happen with the rest of the column. However, throughout that day, the

9 second half of the column was exposed to heavy shooting and shelling, and

10 during the night, they probably thought that other members of the column

11 would also cross the road, but nobody did so they decided to move on. I

12 know that because the Chief of Staff who told me about this was with that

13 portion of the column.

14 They continued towards the Udrc mount where they assembled, and at

15 that point in time they sent a group of people back to the asphalt road to

16 wait and see whether anybody else would cross over, but they had to return

17 because no one was crossing the road any more. So on the 13th of July,

18 they continued on their way across the Udrc mount in the direction of

19 Kalesija that is towards the Kalesija-Zvornik asphalt road.

20 On that part of the road, they were ambushed on several

21 occasions. There were fatalities and casualties there, and on the 14th of

22 July or the 15th, they reached the area of the village of Medzedza, that

23 is the area of Crni Vrh, which is a hill near Kalesija.

24 On the 15th of July, they tried to leave the area of Crni Vrh and

25 the wider area is called Parlog. They tried to move closer to the front

1 lines but they were ambushed again so they had to go back and they spent

2 the night there. In the afternoon hours of the 15th of July, they

3 selected a large group of people who then fought with the Serbs at one

4 point in time, but they were unable to do anything. So on the 15th of

5 July in the evening hours, they went back to the same spot to spend the

6 night.

7 On the 16th of July, in a similar way with a group of people, they

8 attempted once again a breakthrough and at that point in time, the

9 communication was established with the front line through a walkie-talkie

10 so the Corps Command, at that time, was already familiar with the spot

11 where they could be expected to come out. In the early morning hours of

12 the 16th of July, the front line was finally pierced by the elements of

13 the 24th Division and the 212th Brigade.

14 As for the other side, they were moving from the rear of the front

15 and they managed to pierce the line along the distance of one and a half

16 kilometres, and the civilians and the military which was with that group

17 started entering the free area at that spot. However, as regards the

18 asphalt road between Konjevic Polje and Vlasenica, in that area, there

19 were very few people left, only an individual here and there who managed

20 to go through.

21 Later on, people who survived and who managed to come out told us

22 that it was like a manhunt in that area near the asphalt road coming from

23 Srebrenica going towards Kravica, Konjevic Polje, and then further on from

24 Konjevic Polje towards Vlasenica near Kasaba. So that region was the

25 theatre of a fierce manhunt, and I know that they were collecting people

1 at three locations. One of them was the stadium near Nova Kasaba. The

2 second one was a farm, agricultural farm in the village of Kravica. The

3 third location was an elementary school or part of a factory in Kravica.

4 And from those locations, according to what people said, they were

5 taken towards Zvornik, and nothing was ever heard of them after that.

6 After the 28th Division managed to pull out, elements of it, that

7 is, we received them in the area of Tuzla. I know for sure that they were

8 received on the following localities. After they had come out of the

9 front line, the division command was received in the old mining institute

10 in Tuzla. The 281st Brigade was assembled in the elementary school in the

11 village of Basigovci. The 222nd Brigade was also assembled in the

12 elementary school in the Vukovije village. The 223rd Brigade and the

13 Independent Battalion was assembled in the village of Zivinice in the

14 elementary school, and the 284th Brigade was assembled in the area of

15 Ciljuge, where there were some hangars belonging to the former JNA. So

16 that was their point of assembly.

17 As regards other people from Srebrenica, I know that when the

18 decision was reached on the 11th of July to leave the area of Srebrenica

19 and to go towards Tuzla, that all other civilians - women, children, and

20 the elderly - that on that same evening, and perhaps several days prior to

21 that, that they were assembling in the UN base in Potocari. According to

22 that information, there were about 30.000 people gathered in that area.

23 The first information about these events in Srebrenica reached us

24 only when the first trucks carrying women and children appeared in the

25 area of Kladanj, the people who were transported from Potocari. They told

1 us that there were cases of mistreatment and killing in the immediate

2 vicinity of Potocari, and I believe that the Court has heard evidence of

3 the eyewitnesses to those events. I don't want to go into those details,

4 but I know that such incidents were common there at that time.

5 The first review of troops took place on the 25th of July, 1995,

6 and after that review, we managed to establish that 2.080 members of the

7 28th Division managed to pierce the front lines, and it was our assumption

8 that there were probably several other members of the 28th Division who

9 had gone to the village of Ciljuge, where there was a very big settlement

10 organised for the civilian population who managed to get out. Those

11 members of the division had probably gone to Tuzla to look for the members

12 of their family.

13 So we continued collating the information, to the extent it was

14 possible, and on the 4th of August, 1995, or thereabouts, we managed to

15 establish the accurate number of the members of the 28th Division who

16 managed to get through. The number was 3.175. We also established that

17 the number of individuals who were killed in the column was between 8.300

18 and 9.722. At that time the information we received was not consistent,

19 but that was the approximate figure that we managed to establish. One can

20 claim for certainty that 2.628 members, both soldiers and commanding

21 officers, members of the 28th Division, were killed.

22 When the decision was made for a breakthrough, we lost all

23 connection with the column and the command of the division. They just

24 told us, "We are starting. We're on the move towards Tuzla." And

25 "towards Tuzla" is a very broad area, so we didn't know the actual

1 direction. That is when our links with the 28th Division were severed,

2 and we were to establish contact on the 15th, in the afternoon hours, and

3 on the morning of the 16th, when they were near the front line at Crni

4 Vrh.

5 As to the structure of the column and the way in which they broke

6 through, that is what I know, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, General Hadzihasanovic. I

8 think that you passed -- that you covered the points that we're interested

9 in. I am now going to give the floor to the two parties; that is to say,

10 I'm going to ask them if they want to take the floor.

11 Mr. Harmon, do you have any questions for your part?

12 MR. HARMON: I do, Mr. President. Good morning. Good morning,

13 Your Honours, counsel.

14 General Hadzihasanovic, good morning. If the witness could be

15 provided with Prosecution Exhibits 898 through 904.

16 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

17 Q. General, we're going to start with an exhibit that is marked

18 Prosecutor's Exhibit 904, and as soon as you get it, I'm going to ask you

19 to read it, to take a look at it to see if you're familiar with it, and

20 then I'm going to ask you for your comments about it.

21 MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, are we starting with 904? Could you place

22 the English version on the ELMO.

23 Q. General, the reason I ask you about this particular document is

24 you touched upon the materiel that was available and the manpower that was

25 available to the 28th Division within the enclave. And I'd like you to

1 first of all take a look at this document, which is a situation report

2 from the 28th Division command, dated the 30th of June, 1995. It has been

3 authored by Major Ramiz Becirovic, who was standing in for the commander

4 and the Chief of Staff.

5 A. This is a document of the 28th Division sent to the command of the

6 2nd Corps, as far as I can see.

7 Q. That's correct.

8 A. And I can see that it was indeed signed by Ramiz Becirovic. I

9 have not seen this document before. Quite obviously, it was not sent to

10 the headquarters of the Supreme Command. But may I take a few moments to

11 read through the document?

12 Yes, this is a report, a situation report, dealing with some

13 activities of the 28th Division, and it is sending out information where

14 and when events occurred, as far as I can see from this document.

15 Q. Now, could you comment, General, about the contents of this

16 document to the extent that you could touch upon, briefly, any activities

17 that were of a nature where the 28th Division troops were going into

18 territory that was occupied by the VRS in conducting operations. I don't

19 want a long exposition on it, but can you touch briefly on that subject,

20 to the extent that you're familiar with it.

21 A. I don't know why the army of the 28th Division would undertake any

22 combat activities, because everything that we did in these parts, and the

23 instructions we gave to the 2nd Corps, for the most part referred to the

24 other units and did not apply to Srebrenica and Zepa. Therefore, the

25 instructions -- we did not send out instructions from the Main Staff for

1 things of this kind to be undertaken. Possibly it was something of a

2 local character, an order issued locally perhaps, but we never defined

3 precisely that if the 2nd Corps were to undertake any activities, that it

4 should be done in Srebrenica and Zepa.

5 Q. All right. Now --

6 A. At least, as far as I'm aware of.

7 Q. Now, General, just based on this document, is there any reason to

8 dispute the content and the substance of this document?

9 A. The contents of the document I cannot dispute because the document

10 was written by the Chief of Staff and signed. So I suppose he wrote the

11 truth. I personally do not know about these details.

12 Q. Let me turn my attention now to another set of documents,

13 General.

14 MR. HARMON: And if the witness could be provided with the

15 remaining documents, please. That would be Prosecutor's Exhibit 898

16 through Prosecutor's Exhibit 903.

17 Q. And while these documents are being distributed, General, the

18 Court has heard evidence about a document. It is Prosecutor's Exhibit

19 425. I'm sure you have not seen this document, but -- so I will acquaint

20 you with parts of this document. It is a directive for further

21 operations, Operation 7. It is dated March 8th, 1995, from the Supreme

22 Command of the VRS. It is a lengthy document and it is signed by the

23 Supreme Commander, Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

24 I'm not going to have you review it, I'm just going to summarise

25 it for you. I'm going to read a part of -- two parts of this document.

1 The first dealt with combat operations, and a part of the document that

2 was directed to the Drina Corps includes the following sentence, "By

3 planned and well thought out combat operations create an unbearable

4 situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for

5 the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

6 Now, document in a later section under a title, "Support for

7 Command Operations," a subpart entitled "Moral and Psychological Support,"

8 I'll read you a paragraph from this particular document. "The relevant

9 state and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and

10 humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and unobtrusively

11 restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of

12 UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the

13 Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill while, at the

14 same time, avoiding condemnation of the International Community and

15 international public opinion."

16 Now, General, this is a document that's dated the 8th of March

17 1995. I raise this because, in your testimony yesterday, you said

18 something to this effect: "By the end of 1994, the situation for the

19 people was complex. All humanitarian aid or all humanitarian convoys had

20 been blocked."

21 Now, do you remember that testimony?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Let me show you, if I could, and if we could put Prosecutor's

24 Exhibit 898 on the ELMO and, General, do you have the B/C/S version 898 in

25 front of you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, this -- I'm going to show you 898 through Prosecutor's

3 Exhibit 903, which are a succession of documents that were issued by the

4 28th Division. They are situation reports. They have all been authored

5 by Ramiz Becirovic, and let me direct your attention, in this particular

6 document, at this time, to the section dealing with humanitarian

7 situation. Could you read that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, this is a document that, in this particular document it says,

10 that the humanitarian situation is extremely hard, and Ramiz Becirovic is

11 requesting that constant efforts be made to deblock the humanitarian

12 corridor to Srebrenica and enable the regular distribution of food,

13 supplies to the local population.

14 Now, could you turn to the next document, Prosecutor's Exhibit

15 899, and I'd like to direct your attention, General, to the last

16 paragraph, number 4, entitled "The Humanitarian Situation." And this is a

17 document 899, I'm sorry, that's dated the 6th of July. Let me read you

18 this part of the document, General: "The situation continues to be

19 extremely difficult. The food convoy announced for today has not

20 arrived. Elderly and weak persons are in an exceptionally difficult

21 situation due to starvation. The first people to die of hunger in

22 Srebrenica after the demilitarisation were registered today. I request

23 that every effort be made to deliver food to our area."

24 Now, General, I'm just going to take you through these series of

25 documents. If we could turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 900, which is the

1 next document dated the 7th of July, again a document from the 28th

2 Division and, again, from Major Ramiz Becirovic. I'd like to direct your

3 attention to the last part of the document, dealing with the humanitarian

4 situation.

5 Let me read from this: "The humanitarian situation is worrying.

6 Today more civilians have been registered as having died from hunger, and

7 if significant quantities of food are not quickly brought in swiftly to

8 the area, the course of events in the entire safe area is extremely

9 uncertain." I won't read the rest of that particular document.

10 If we could turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 901, which is another

11 document issued by Ramiz Becirovic, this day, the following day, the 8th

12 of July. And if we could turn to the last section of the document,

13 General, "Humanitarian Situation," and I'll read parts of it. "This

14 situation is also dramatic and practically hopeless. The civilian

15 population is dying of hunger, and in a few days time the army will not

16 have any food on the front lines." It goes on to say: "Even if we

17 succeed in withstanding the military pressure we will very soon be forced

18 to abandon this area because of a lack of food."

19 Let me, General, turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 902, another report

20 prepared by Ramiz Becirovic, this time dated the 9th of July. I'm going

21 to read to you the report sent, a portion of that report sent by

22 Mr. Becirovic dealing with the humanitarian situation. "The humanitarian

23 situation is catastrophic. The population and soldiers have no food

24 reserves and from tomorrow it will not be possible to supply the defence

25 lines with food articles." And he pleads then for an effort to get the

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1 International Community engaged.

2 Now, General, in respect of these documents that I have read to

3 you, and in respect of your testimony yesterday that by the end of 1994,

4 the situation for the people was complex, and in light of the document

5 that I read to you from Dr. Karadzic from March of 1995, can you comment

6 on these documents that I have shown you and informed you about?

7 A. I can. But, Mr. President, I would do this in the following way;

8 what I am going to say now I was going to say at the end of my

9 presentation, at the end, but never mind, I can say it now.

10 May I use a piece of paper that I have prepared in order to give

11 an answer to the question that has been posed?

12 MR. HARMON: I have no objection to that.

13 A. I can say the following: Srebrenica was the final act of an

14 overall scenario when it came to the Podrinje area and the task of the

15 Drina Corps. I say this because it emerges from the following: The way

16 in which that final act was realised, was implemented of this scenario, is

17 the kind that you have read out. Because the ultimate goal was to do away

18 with all the non-Serb population in the Drina River belt and that the

19 non-Serbian population must disappear from those parts so that the Drina

20 should no longer be a border between the states, the Serb states.

21 I say this because I know that the assembly of Republika Srpska on

22 the 12th or the 15th of May, I'm not quite sure, 1992, adopted its

23 strategic goals where that was stated. That goal, under point 3, was

24 implemented by the Drina Corps.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, I know what your

1 objection is going to be, but go ahead.

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, unfortunately, I

3 must say that the witness is overstepping the frameworks of the question

4 and the topic that we are discussing today. And as I can see, he has a

5 prepared document and is using it for that purpose. So my objection is to

6 his answer, first of all, and, secondly, the use of any prepared document

7 in doing so.

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon.

9 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, the circumstances why this column left

10 is important. I asked the witness questions about events and

11 circumstances that led up to their departure. He commented on this in his

12 direct examination, or his examination, his statement to the Chamber.

13 I'm not aware of any documents that this witness may have or has

14 prepared. I don't know what it is. It may be documents that are already

15 in evidence, as far as I know. Until I can see what the document is, I'm

16 not in a position to comment on whether he should or shouldn't show it or

17 whether he can discuss it.

18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think that we spent a lot of

19 time discussing the importance of the region of Podrinje, and I'm sure you

20 will recall that General Radinovic spoke at length about that issue. I

21 think it is important for us to be able to gain a full understanding and

22 it is precisely because of that that the Chamber summoned this witness to

23 gain an overall view of the occurrences around Srebrenica.

24 With respect to the document the General used, we said previously,

25 we heard previously that the General was using notes. If he has a

1 prepared document, he can place it on the ELMO, of course, and we can all

2 see it. But if it's just a sort of aide-memoire for him, notes that he

3 has compiled himself, it is legitimate for him to use them unless the

4 parties would like to take a look at those documents.

5 General, the document that you are reading from, is it an

6 aide-memoire or is it a pre-compiled declaration?

7 A. This is not an official document. This is a piece of paper on

8 which I jotted down some things so as not to make a mistake. I quoted --

9 I wrote down the exact words and sentences of a document which is an

10 original document, and that is the piece of paper that I'm now using. I

11 have written down the exact words of that other document.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I see Mr. Visnjic on his feet.

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] As far as I understood, the witness

14 wishes to read out a note he has made but which, in fact, is the text of

15 another document. Then we have a problem again.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General Hadzihasanovic, to avoid

17 any speculation, would you try to answer the questions put to you by the

18 Prosecutor directly, please. Then we will have no need to debate this

19 point. I'm going to ask Mr. Harmon to rephrase his question or state his

20 question again.

21 MR. HARMON:

22 Q. General, I had asked you to comment on the materials that I had

23 shown, and you were going to comment on that using some notes that you had

24 prepared, and I take it you wanted to reference certain events or certain

25 details that would support your comments. Am I correct in that?

1 A. Of course you are correct, yes. I did not bring a document with

2 me for me to say precisely what is written down in a document, without

3 saying it in my own words. I made a note of that, and that is what I

4 prepared. But if you don't wish me to read it out, if that is a point

5 that is being contested, then I can paraphrase it, say it in my own words.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, General. Tell us in your

7 own words. I think that if we can avoid -- we will be able to avoid

8 difficulties if you say it in your own words, please, General.

9 A. Yes, of course. I wish to assist the Trial Chamber, and that is

10 what I'm going to do.

11 You asked me the question about the methodology of work in that

12 area, in those parts, and the orders that were issued to the Drina

13 Corps - amongst others, the prevention of humanitarian aid - all methods

14 were resorted to for the Drina Corps to be able to complete the assignment

15 it had been given.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, can we hear the end

17 of what the General is saying? But go ahead, as you're on your feet.

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, as far as I

19 understood, the General says that he was asked a question. I don't see

20 that Mr. Harmon has actually asked him that question. He seems to be

21 answering another question now, a different one.

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think that the question asked

23 by Mr. Harmon - and Mr. Harmon will put me right if I'm wrong - is, to my

24 mind, that he showed the General a whole series of documents speaking

25 about humanitarian aid. As you know, the General was the Chief of Staff

1 of the Main Staff of the Bosnian army, and Mr. Harmon asked to hear a

2 comment. He asked for his comment with respect to the humanitarian

3 situation. He was asked to give his opinion and his point of view.

4 Is that correct, Mr. Harmon?

5 MR. HARMON: That's correct, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Therefore, General -- there,

7 Mr. Visnjic, the General was answering that question. I think he grasped

8 the meaning of the question and undertook to answer it.

9 General, please proceed.

10 A. I did understand the question. Let me begin again. In view of

11 the task assigned to the Drina Corps, and I know about that task, that

12 assignment. The assignment was to eliminate the Drina River as a border

13 between the Serb states, and the whole belt along the Drina River valley,

14 and all the corps of the army of Republika Srpska had the task of making a

15 delineation with respect to the other two peoples. So in addition to

16 military activity, they resorted to other ways and means as well, amongst

17 others, to prevent humanitarian aid and assistance, and this was confirmed

18 in the document of General Mladic. That would be my answer.

19 MR. HARMON:

20 Q. Let me turn to another subject, and that is the testimonies that

21 this Chamber has heard in respect of the shelling of the town of

22 Srebrenica in civilian areas. I'm going to first of all read to you two

23 testimonies of Defence witnesses in this trial. The first is a testimony

24 of a Witness DC, a protected witness, and my colleague, Mr. Petrusic,

25 asked the following question, and I'll only read part of it, part of the

1 question. It's found at page 7441. I'm quoting from line 19 and I'm

2 going over to the following page, line 5. My colleague, Mr. Petrusic,

3 asked the following question of Witness DC:

4 Q. And since you said that you yourself were in the town of

5 Srebrenica --

6 And I will now stop. This is referring to the 11th of July. Let

7 me start again.

8 Q. And since you said that you yourself were in the town of

9 Srebrenica, tell us, please, whether the town of Srebrenica

10 was damaged; and generally, during your stay in the area,

11 did you hear or see artillery weapons being fired?

12 A. There was some fire from artillery weapons, but very

13 little. The fire was targeted at fortified Muslim

14 positions. There was no need to do that. The town of

15 Srebrenica was not shelled at all. Not a single shell fell

16 on the urban part of the town. Not a single building was

17 damaged when we entered the town on the 11th of July.

18 Q. We have heard here that within a span of several hours, 200

19 shells were fired. Would you agree with that?

20 A. No. No. I said there was some artillery fire, but of a

21 very limited extent, and it was mostly targeted at Muslim

22 bunkers.

23 Now, let me read the testimony of a witness who testified in this

24 proceeding. His name was Zeljko Borovcanin. He testified in open

25 session. And Mr. Borovcanin was asked, and I'm referring to the

1 transcript starting at page 7020 and going over - I'm sorry - 7018 and

2 going over to 7020. And in respect of shelling, what Mr. Borovcanin said,

3 and I quote, on page 7018, lines 10 through 12, his answer to a question

4 was:

5 A. As I said, until the 9th, my unit did not move from a

6 starting position. Every day we heard occasional

7 detonations, but these were occasional; they were not

8 numerous.

9 Now, Witness, I'm going to draw your attention back to some

10 exhibits that we've previously discussed. If I could turn your attention,

11 and with the assistance of the usher, if we could have 899 placed on the

12 ELMO and the B/C/S version given to the General. What I'm going to do,

13 General, is I'm going to read to you parts of the report from

14 Mr. Borovcanin - I'm sorry - Mr. Becirovic's combat reports, and I'm going

15 to ask you at the end to comment on the contents of the comment -- of the

16 reports from Mr. Becirovic and the testimony that I've just read to you by

17 two Defence witnesses. If I could direct your attention, first of all, to

18 Prosecutor's Exhibit 899, under the section, the first section, dealing

19 with the aggressor. I would like to read from a portion of this, about

20 two-thirds of the way down:

21 "Hundreds of shells were fallen on the lines of defence and

22 civilian targets. As the day progresses, the aggressor's attacks seems to

23 intensify, so that artillery shells are even now practically raining down

24 on our defenders along all the lines of defence."

25 It goes on to say in this report: "So far, over 20 shells were

1 fallen on the town."

2 Now, if we could turn to the next Exhibit, Mr. Usher, Prosecutor's

3 Exhibit 900. This is a report again that was prepared by Mr. Becirovic on

4 the 7th of July, and I'm quoting from the first paragraph, starting at the

5 second sentence:

6 "The aggressor has subjected the line of defence held by all units

7 of the 28th Division of the Ground Forces to strong sniping and fire from

8 anti-aircraft weapons throughout the day, and has frequently engaged in

9 random tank-artillery fire against both the line of defence and civilian

10 targets, practically covering the entire zone of Srebrenica with the

11 shelling. In the course of the day, the very city centre of Srebrenica

12 has frequently been the target of the aggressor's artillery fire, which is

13 coming from a T-55 tank positioned above the town at Kula."

14 General, if we could turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 901, which is

15 Mr. Becirovic's report from Srebrenica on the 8th of July. And let me

16 read you from the first paragraph of this, starting at the second

17 sentence:

18 "An enemy tank from the Kula is destroying the centre of

19 Srebrenica on a daily basis, and at 1300 hours the enemy fired three

20 guided missiles from that position on the town centre, causing enormous

21 material damage."

22 General, let's turn to the next exhibit, Exhibit 902, which is

23 Mr. Becirovic's report dated the 9th of July. And I'll direct your

24 attention to the first paragraph, starting to read from the second

25 sentence:

1 "The aggressor is conducting an infantry attack from the

2 directions of Skelani and Podravanje, and the whole safe area came under

3 fierce fire from artillery of all calibre. The town centre itself is

4 being constantly shelled. Big concentration of aggressor's troops and

5 armoured motorised forces have been observed today again. Four aggressor

6 tanks are firing at the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica road, and up to the time

7 of this report, thousands of projectiles of various types have been

8 fired."

9 Let me turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 903, General, which is

10 Mr. Becirovic's report from the 10th of July, starting again with the

11 first paragraph, and I'm starting at the third sentence:

12 "Infantry attacks are coming in waves and are being supported with

13 four tanks operating from the direction of Ljubisavic, one tank from

14 Pribicevac and all types and calibres of artillery pieces. At the same

15 time, the whole zone of responsibility of the 28th Division of the KoV has

16 come under attack, as well as civilian targets in the area."

17 The last sentence of that first paragraph reads:

18 "The centre of town is being continuously ravaged by artillery

19 fire of the heaviest calibre."

20 Now, General, I have a couple of questions. The first is: Is the

21 information that is contained in Mr. Becirovic's report consistent with

22 information that you or the army received about the shelling of the town

23 of Srebrenica, the quantity of shells that were being fired into

24 Srebrenica, and the intended targets, including civilians?

25 A. I'm sorry, but we don't have any documents of the 2nd Corps

1 because the command of the 2nd Corps did report to the headquarters about

2 all this. I have no doubt regarding the accuracy because -- of these

3 statements because they were given by people who were there. And it is

4 true that Srebrenica was attacked from those directions and that the town

5 was shelled; that is also correct.

6 Q. And what do you say about the two testimonies that I have read to

7 you from Witness DC who was a member of the VRS, and Zeljko Borovcanin,

8 both of whom say there was little shelling on the city of Srebrenica? Do

9 you have any comments on that?

10 A. I do. If the town of Srebrenica was demilitarised and if there

11 were no military targets in it, the town should not have been shelled at

12 all, not even slightly. It should not have been shelled at all. In town,

13 there were civilians. I don't know what justification they had to target

14 the city centre regardless of how many shells fell.

15 MR. HARMON: General, I have no additional questions. Thank you

16 very much. No additional questions, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

18 Mr. Harmon.

19 Perhaps we shall begin with the questions from the Defence now.

20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Or would you prefer a break,

22 Mr. Visnjic?

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] We will be using some exhibits, so

24 we would use the break to prepare the documents with the registry's

25 assistance.

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, then. Let's have a

2 20-minute break. I'm going to ask the usher to accompany the General out,

3 please.

4 So we are going to have our 20-minute break now.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] You may be seated, General. You

8 are now going to answer questions which Mr. Visnjic is going to put to

9 you.

10 Mr. Visnjic, your witness.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I should

12 like to ask the usher to give the witness Exhibit C2.

13 Examined by Mr. Visnjic:

14 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, yesterday, you told Their Honours and the

15 parties about a number of tables regarding statistics.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Before we consider this exhibit, would you be kind enough to see

18 the attached document on the basis of which I assume these tables were

19 made. There is the organisational structure of the command, these three

20 binders. My question has to do with the division command organisational

21 structure. The department for intelligence affairs is directly

22 subordinated to the commander. It is not part of the staff, am I right,

23 of the headquarters staff?

24 A. Just a moment, please. Let me have a look at the table. It is

25 Table 1.

1 Q. Yes, I gave you document C2 to prepare but my question does not

2 relate to it just now.

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, would you please

4 also help us find our way with the document so we can identify the

5 document you're talking about.

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I received from the

7 registry yesterday the attachments that the General used to explain the

8 role and position of the 28th Division. So it is binder number one, if I

9 can call it that, and the first document in it which is the organisational

10 structure of the division command.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. We have it now. It

12 is a set of documents marked BR1, and then it is page two of that

13 document; is that right?

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, then.

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, to facilitate things

17 as the document is only in the Serbian language, in the left-hand corner,

18 the third line from the top, you find the Department for Intelligence

19 Affairs, that is the first box to the left, which, according to this

20 table, is directly subordinated to the commander.

21 Q. During the testimony of expert witnesses, both of the Defence and

22 the Prosecution, we heard that the department for intelligence affairs

23 mostly comes under the headquarters supreme command. I was wondering

24 whether this same structure was accepted in the BH army?

25 A. The one that is presented here?

1 Q. Yes. So it differs from the structure that was established in the

2 former JNA which you are also familiar with?

3 A. Yes, you are right.

4 Q. Could you now consider Exhibit C2, please. General

5 Hadzihasanovic, could you tell Their Honours on the basis of which data

6 did you prepare the total number of weaponry in Srebrenica and when that

7 weaponry was reviewed? I'm mainly talking about the right-hand side of

8 this table.

9 A. On the basis of the situation in the 2nd Corps immediately prior

10 to this, because there were periodic reports on effectives in the unit.

11 Unfortunately, I didn't bring that document with me.

12 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, let me now quote from an interview

13 published in the newspaper Oslobodjenje on the 28th of August, 1996, and

14 it is a conversation between Naser Oric, General Halilovic, and a third

15 person, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic. Yesterday's witness confirmed the

16 authenticity of this document, so I would like to draw your attention to a

17 particular point made during that interview:

18 "Naser was ordered to surrender the faulty and useless weapons,

19 and that is how he acted. Three to four thousand rifles remained in our

20 hands, not counting the Zepa Brigade. Let us round it off. About 3.500

21 men under arms, and we also had most of the heavy weaponry, and what was

22 handed over to UNPROFOR was also accessible to them."

23 General, does Naser Oric have any interest in mentioning a larger

24 number of rifles in the hands of the 28th Division, or rather, the forces

25 in Srebrenica, than they had?

1 A. I'm sorry, but this must be my answer, Mr. Visnjic: You should

2 ask Naser that. I don't know. Secondly, I did not participate in those

3 conversations, and what I have provided, I state with full responsibility

4 that the data are correct. What someone may have said, I don't know on

5 the basis of what they made such a statement. I'm really sorry. I didn't

6 bring that document with me, so that you see that I didn't make it up.

7 Q. General, are you quite convinced that you had complete

8 documentation regarding the state of weaponry of the 28th Division or the

9 state in Srebrenica on that particular date?

10 A. I believe that I did, because I used a document which was for me

11 an official document, which reached the 2nd Corps from the 28th Division.

12 Whether somebody provided accurate data or not, I don't know, but I used

13 that document.

14 Q. General --

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the usher to give the

16 witness Defence Exhibit D52, please.

17 Q. General, we will remain with this pattern, with this table, until

18 this exhibit reaches you. I should like to draw your attention to the

19 column referring to the M57 hand-held launcher. Again I'm talking about

20 the second half of the table and the situation regarding armaments in

21 Srebrenica.

22 Could you please look at the document of the command of the 28th

23 Division of the 2nd of June, 1995. Have you seen this document before?

24 A. No.

25 Q. General, do you know a person called Semsudin Salihovic, or

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13 and English transcripts.

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1 Semso? Do you know him or have you heard of him?

2 A. I have heard of him.

3 Q. General, was he a captain by rank at the time?

4 A. I'm afraid I couldn't tell you for sure. I knew the ranks, names,

5 and surnames of the commanders and chiefs of staff; however, I was not

6 familiar with the other members of the command.

7 Q. Do you perhaps remember that he was responsible for logistics?

8 A. Probably, since he signed such a document.

9 Q. General --

10 A. I don't know him, however.

11 Q. From this document, General, it can be seen that an oral order was

12 given by the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division on the completion of

13 combat sets, and within the framework of this order I wish to draw your

14 attention to the mention of shells for the hand-held rocket launcher M57.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Would you agree with me, General, if I say that on the 2nd of

17 June, 1995, units of the 28th Division were given a total of 45 shells for

18 the hand-held rocket launcher M57, on that day alone?

19 A. I see 45, if I've added them up correctly. That is evident from

20 this document.

21 Q. General, if 45 shells were distributed in just a single day, and

22 if we assume that there wasn't a single such mine for the hand-held rocket

23 launcher M57 there before the 2nd of June, doesn't this number already

24 call in question the document that you don't have with you now? Because

25 you said that the total number was 39; however, here we see that in a

1 single day 45 were distributed.

2 A. I repeat: I used the document of the command of the 2nd

3 Corps - I'm sorry I didn't bring it - and that is the figure that I got

4 from that document.

5 Q. General, could --

6 A. The difference is six shells.

7 Q. Yes, General. The difference is six shells, on condition that the

8 units didn't have a single mine on the 2nd of June, 1995. According to

9 this, the difference is six shells.

10 A. Yes, I agree with you, but without any condition.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the usher to give the

12 witness Defence Exhibit D47, please.

13 Q. General, you told Their Honours yesterday that part of the

14 materiel of the 28th Division were distributed by helicopter. Did I

15 understand you right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. General, this is a document dated the 7th of February, 1995. It

18 is Exhibit D47. Is this a document which you yourself sent to the 8th

19 Operative Group and the Zepa Brigade?

20 A. The 7th of February, 1995? My signature is not on it. There were

21 documents that I sent, but they're signed by me, so I don't know how this

22 document was compiled. I did send documents, but each of my documents is

23 signed.

24 Q. General, did you send documents by electronic means to the command

25 of the 28th Division?

1 A. I did.

2 Q. General, the document shown to you by the Prosecutor a moment ago,

3 wasn't that also a document that was not signed by Mr. Becirovic and that

4 was sent in a similar format?

5 A. Yes, that is why I said that those were documents sent by

6 Becirovic to the command of the 2nd Corps and not by me.

7 Q. General, did you, in the night between the 6th and 7th of February

8 1995, send to the territory of the enclaves a certain delivery of weapons,

9 a certain consignment of weapons?

10 A. Let me give you a complete answer so as not to waste any time. I

11 did dispatch a helicopter on the 31st of December, that was the first

12 one. I dispatched a second one on the 10th of January; a third on the 6th

13 of February; a fourth on the 11th of February; the fifth on the 16th of

14 February; the sixth on the 22nd of February; the seventh on the 19th of

15 April; the eighth on the 21st of April; the ninth on the 30th of April and

16 the tenth on the 7th of May. And that is correct. That is true.

17 Q. Yes, General.

18 A. I said yesterday that I had dispatched some helicopters.

19 Q. In this consignment, was there about 90.000 rounds, of which

20 66.150 were intended for Srebrenica?

21 A. Do you want me to read out this?

22 Q. No.

23 A. Only rounds of 762 millimetres.

24 Q. Which ones?

25 A. I sent two kinds.

1 Q. Yes. Times 39?

2 A. Srebrenica received 354,658 and Zepa, 173.600 rounds. This

3 calibre, this times 39.

4 Q. General, in the consignment of the 18th of January, was there a

5 total of 147.000 rounds?

6 A. On the 18th of January? On the 18th of January, there were no

7 deliveries.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can I ask the usher to give the

9 witness a document dated the 18th of January 1995. I apologise, it's my

10 mistake.

11 Q. General, what is a nitroglycerin rifle?

12 A. The word speaks for itself. A rifle that has a drum with room for

13 six or eight bullets, and the bullets contain nitroglycerin, as far as I

14 am familiar with the technical properties, but the simplest way is to take

15 the manufacturer's instructions and see in detail.

16 Q. What is the purpose of that rifle? Does it increase its lethal

17 effect?

18 A. No, it -- that is a particular type of weapon. It isn't increased

19 or decreased. That is how it is. Is it permitted by Geneva Conventions?

20 I think it is. Other armies have it also.

21 Q. General, did you, in this document of the 18th of January 1995,

22 intimate about 150.000 rounds for Srebrenica?

23 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we're referring to a new document.

24 The copy I have does not have an exhibit number for purposes of

25 reference. I think it should be given one.

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I had just noticed that. It's a

2 new document, Mr. Visnjic, so perhaps it needs to be marked for

3 identification.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the document is

5 D179.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Madam registrar.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that is the number that I have given to this

8 document.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Please continue.

10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, I should like to draw your attention to the third

12 sentence from the bottom on this document. It says: "Please keep this

13 confidential in relation to everyone, and especially in relation to

14 UNPROFOR." What does this mean, General?

15 A. We had information that at times certain matters were disclosed

16 through UNPROFOR, and the secret that this was arriving was no secret.

17 UNPROFOR saw the helicopters. They saw them in Tuzla as well. It was no

18 secret for them or this document. The document is dated the 18th of

19 January as an announcement, but because of weather conditions, we probably

20 waited until the 6th of February when the helicopter was actually

21 dispatched.

22 Q. General, in one of the explanations you provided yesterday with

23 regard to the needs that the 28th Division would have needed to break

24 through the encirclement, you said that the 28th Division would have

25 needed to have had 502 tonnes of cargo to carry with it; am I right?

1 A. Mr. President, may I get that copy?

2 Q. Yes, of course, but it's your document.

3 A. Yes, but I should look for my own copy or could you give it to

4 me. I don't have it in front of me.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, you may consult your

6 documents.

7 A. May I take it out of my bag?

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] C5. This is a document which has

10 not been marked for identification so could we mark it as C5, please.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No, Mr. Visnjic, because we

12 already have a C5. If this is a new document ...

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Then it has already been marked, I

14 assume.

15 THE REGISTRAR: It was already marked C5.

16 A. Could you please repeat your question?

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. I'm referring to the minimal needs of the 28th Division for its

19 breakthrough from the encirclement, and the weight in tonnes as the total

20 at the bottom, it says 502 tonnes of cargo which the 28th Division would

21 have needed to carry with it during the breakthrough; am I right?

22 A. I think you misunderstood. Allow me to explain.

23 Q. Yes, please do.

24 A. For the 28th Division to have all the weaponry that it was

25 lacking, according to these books, and in order to have five combat sets,

1 which is a standard for offensive operations, we would have needed to

2 transfer to them 502 tonnes of weaponry plus five combat ammunition sets.

3 This is what we should have sent them to Srebrenica.

4 Q. Can I go on from there?

5 A. Which means that when a division embarks upon an offensive or a

6 breakthrough, it needs all of that, but a soldier carries his weapon and

7 one combat set. When a battalion is being transported, according to

8 transport, in the transport vehicles, there should be another combat set

9 -- I'm sorry, two combat sets. And in the brigade transport, another

10 two -- I'm sorry, one, and in the division transport one, which makes it a

11 total of five.

12 As soon as a soldier has used his set, he gets it from the

13 battalion, the battalion from the brigade, the brigade from the division,

14 and the division asks a high-level command to provide it with extra

15 ammunition to be able to continue the offensive.

16 Q. Do I understand your answer correctly, hypothetically speaking,

17 when the 28th Division embarked upon its breakthrough, it would have had

18 to have logistics support which could have carried 502 tonnes of cargo to

19 be able to use it up as they went along?

20 A. I don't know what you mean when you say "to carry with it." I

21 have just explained.

22 Q. My understanding is if the division is on the move, then at least

23 the combat set belonging to the division must also move with the division?

24 A. This weight indicated includes the weight of side arms, personal

25 weapons, ammunition, communications devices, and at least one canvas, one

1 food rations, and at least five combat sets in the way I have described.

2 To make a division capable of an offensive, it was our duty to provide it

3 with this amount of cargo as there was no other way of delivering that

4 cargo except by air. I made the calculations and gave you the figures as

5 to what we should have done.

6 Finally to wind up, I hope you understood my testimony yesterday

7 when I said that the division, armed as it was and with the ammunition it

8 had, was no obstacle or danger to anyone because it was, in combat terms,

9 useless in view of the ammunition and weapons that were 50 per cent of the

10 standard requirement; and every commander would be held responsible if he

11 were to order such a unit to engage in combat without being properly

12 equipped. That is the explanation that goes with these tables.

13 Q. General, can we agree -- I think we can agree that the 28th

14 Division did not constitute any particular danger. However, if we take it

15 in a context, together with the activity of the 2nd Corps, wouldn't it

16 constitute a danger for any kind of division if they have a unit of 5.000

17 men behind them, armed men?

18 A. They were not armed, first of all. Then the second thing is that

19 the status of the division was known. It was located in a protected area,

20 and the town itself was a demilitarised town, and it did not have any

21 weapons or equipment in it. So it did not constitute a danger.

22 Q. Yesterday, on page 954 [as interpreted] of the transcript, you

23 stated that the helicopter sorties were probably a signal for the Bosnian

24 Serb army that something was brewing and that they might expect some

25 combat operations to take place. However, you stated that with full

1 responsibility, that that was not your objective. Did I understand

2 correctly your testimony?

3 A. It is only perfectly normal that I stated that, and I have to tell

4 you why.

5 Q. General, could you please tell us, first of all, if you said that

6 or not?

7 A. Yes, I did, but I would like to give you an explanation.

8 Q. Let me first ask you a question, General. The 28th Division, that

9 is, the Serb forces, were they ever officially informed by the BH army

10 that the BH army was arming the 28th Division?

11 A. Why would they inform them of that fact?

12 Q. General, the weapon delivery and helicopter sorties, were they

13 coordinated with some other activities that the general staff of the BH

14 army was conducting in relation to the overall objectives of the BH army

15 concerning the enclaves and in the Podrinje area?

16 A. I don't know what kind of objectives you are talking about.

17 Helicopter sorties had nothing to do with that.

18 Our objective was to try to alleviate the catastrophic situation

19 in Srebrenica amongst the military and the population as well. We had to

20 do something to calm them down and to provide our division with the

21 minimal needs in case they are in a position to defend themselves. That

22 cannot be prohibited by anyone.

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can I have Exhibit D42 and 43,

24 please, prepared for the witness.

25 Q. General, what is the Grasshopper operation?

1 A. I explained to you what kind of communication devices we had and

2 how we attempted to get them through to Srebrenica. Our first attempt was

3 to do it on foot. We had a number of people who carried those

4 communication devices to a certain location, and people from Srebrenica

5 would come to that location to take it over, those communication devices,

6 and that is why the operation was named Operation Grasshopper. So during

7 that operation, we managed to send through some communication devices.

8 Q. General, could you have a look at the Exhibit D42, which is in

9 front of you.

10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, do we have an

11 English or a French version of the document? I would prefer a French

12 one.

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, unfortunately, I

14 prepared the documents in B/C/S for myself. I don't know whether my

15 learned friend from the Prosecution has them.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon?

17 MR. HARMON: We have an English version, and I will submit this to

18 the usher to put on the ELMO.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] If you can help us with it,

20 please, yes, so that we can follow. Thank you.

21 A. What is your question?

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General, is this a document which was issued by you?

24 A. I have to clarify something here. Sometimes, because of the

25 selection of things that we could send through the usual communication

1 devices, we would always put my name on the document, meaning that the

2 document could be sent through the usual means of communication.

3 Sometimes I personally would not sign the document, but the person who

4 officially represented me at the time. I could give you a precise answer

5 if I had the precise -- the exact document, and I can tell you if I myself

6 signed it or not.

7 In this period of time, in the month of December 1994, there were

8 conflicts and attacks in the area of Zepa, so these instructions were

9 issued so that a frontal conflict would not be accepted and so that direct

10 conflicts would be avoided and an all-out fight be avoided in the area of

11 Zepa.

12 As regards the signature itself, if you had the original of the

13 document, I could tell you exactly whether I signed it or not, whether I

14 issued it or not.

15 Q. General, Exhibit D43, could you place it in the same context as

16 this one?

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, I'm sorry to go

18 back to the Exhibit D42 for a second. I should like to see the signature

19 of General Hadzihasanovic on the document.

20 Could we see it on the ELMO, please. The signature, that is, the

21 place where we can see the final part of the document D42, the end of the

22 document itself. I don't see it on the ELMO. I can't see it on the

23 ELMO. Can you hear me? No, the English version, please. D42, the second

24 page. Yes, that's the one. Thank you.

25 General Hadzihasanovic, what does "Deputy Commander" and "Chief of

1 Staff of Supreme Command" mean?

2 A. The meaning is as follows --

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Did you have both functions at

4 the same time? Can you explain this to us? You were deputy commander and

5 chief of SVK?

6 A. This concerned this particular period of time. When General Delic

7 was present in the area, I didn't have that function. When he was absent

8 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, until his return, I was fulfilling the

9 function of the deputy commander. There is an organogram of the structure

10 of the staff of Supreme Command, and that's what the situation was at that

11 time.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] General Hadzihasanovic, when the

13 commander was present, were you Chief of Staff? That is, when he was

14 absent -- and when he was absent, you were the deputy commander; was that

15 the case?

16 A. Yes. And I dealt with only certain urgent matters that could not

17 wait. But everything that could wait for the commander would, of course,

18 wait for his return.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So when the commander was

20 present, you were an assistant, like other assistants, or was there any

21 difference?

22 A. I was in charge of the staff itself. I was the Chief of Staff,

23 that is, of a group of people, a group of military professionals.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you, General.

25 A. And the staff had its own structure. If you have a look at the

1 organogram, it would be clear to you what the position of the staff was.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, General

3 Hadzihasanovic.

4 Mr. Visnjic, please continue.

5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, let us stick with this document D42 for a

7 while, but I should first like you to have a look at D43, because I have a

8 few questions concerning that document.

9 A. I have 62 written on my document. 43B?

10 Q. Yes, and the previous document, 42, which is still on the desk.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, could you tell the Judges what the

13 strategic objectives of the BH army were concerning the area of the

14 enclave.

15 A. We did not have any strategic objectives, properly speaking. We

16 had a directive issued every year which contained the description of what

17 was to be achieved in that year and what kind of preconditions have to be

18 met for those specific objectives to be implemented, those objectives

19 which we usually defined in that instruction, directive.

20 Q. I will now read you something about what General Sead Delic said.

21 He was the commander of the corps at the time of the fall of the enclave.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. General Delic gave a statement to the Dani magazine on the 17th of

24 March:

25 "As a man from Podrinje, General Hadzihasanovic was in charge of

1 organising things --"

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have not been provided with a

3 copy of the text.

4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, you know why you

5 have to slow down. Would you please be more careful.

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

7 "As a man from the Podrinje area, General Hadzihasanovic was, on

8 behalf of the General Staff, in charge of helping this area, so the

9 overall coordination of the delivery of weapons and equipment was

10 organised through him."

11 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, is this correct?

12 A. This is a statement made by General Delic. I did not have any

13 specific obligation as a native from the Podrinje area - please let me

14 finish - except for my personal duty that I felt I had. My duty was to

15 provide organised helicopter sorties and the supply of equipment, because

16 the corps did not have their own helicopters. They could not organise

17 helicopter sorties, and it was my duty, my task, to coordinate that type

18 of work. As to why he mentioned me as a native from the Podrinje area, I

19 don't know. You should ask him.

20 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, did you issue an order for the sabotage

21 incursions into the area around Srebrenica in 1994 and 1995?

22 A. You mean if I ordered such activities?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. No, I don't remember that.

25 Q. Could you please have a look at D42B, which you still have in

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1 front of you, and read paragraph 3 of that document.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. General, in paragraph 3 of this order:

4 "Organise sabotage activities in other parts by setting up

5 ambushes along supply and evacuation routes of enemy forces primarily in

6 the direction of Han Pijesak. Note: Do not carry out activities --"

7 THE INTERPRETER: We didn't see the end of the text.

8 A. I'm sorry, but you have misunderstood this document. If you want

9 me to provide you with my explanation, I will be happy to do it. This

10 document concerns a previous document which mentioned the Grasshopper

11 operation. The name of the operation was changed into Ciko Kale. It

12 concerns the dispatch of people from the direction of Tuzla, and also from

13 Srebrenica to a specified locality, and also from Zepa to a locality which

14 was specified in the document. The man who was in charge of leading the

15 group from Tuzla was called Cikaric, and that's why we have the name of

16 the operation Ciko. And the man from Srebrenica was nicknamed Kale, hence

17 the name of the operation, which indicates how it all went.

18 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, after these two orders were issued, D42

19 and 43, which you have in front of you, did first helicopter sorties --

20 were first helicopter sorties organised on the 31st of December, 1994?

21 A. The movement along the ground and helicopter sorties were the only

22 means of providing the area with the necessary equipment, because that's

23 what these two operations were all about, Grasshopper and Ciko Kale. When

24 we made our calculation as to how much equipment we needed, we decided, we

25 found out, that it was not wise to send 10 to 30 or 40 people to carry out

1 that job involving such heavy cargo. That's why we organised these first

2 transports by helicopters, which carried medical supplies and the most

3 urgent material, and it is correct that the first sortie was organised on

4 the 31st of December.

5 Q. General Hadzihasanovic, if it is correct that the Operation

6 Grasshopper concerns what you have just told us, why, then, in D42, in

7 paragraph 4, do you say the following:

8 "We indicated how to treat UNPROFOR in letter, strictly

9 confidential, 02-1/1597-1, but they must not be allowed to withdraw; and

10 in case you cannot prevent them from doing so, take from them the weapons

11 that we surrendered to them for safekeeping."

12 A. I'm sorry I haven't found the text.

13 Q. D42, paragraph 4.

14 A. The way I understand -- I mean I would understand this paragraph

15 if I had the document that's mentioned here.

16 Q. General, is it possible for UNPROFOR to have any reason whatsoever

17 to withdraw from that situation concerning Srebrenica and Zepa in case you

18 were transporting medical supplies, computers, and other equipment?

19 A. There is a specific mention of what helicopters were carrying in

20 relevant documents. Second, as to UNPROFOR, reasons whether to pull out

21 or not, I don't know whether they had to do it or not. Our goal was to

22 have UNPROFOR remain in Srebrenica and observe for themselves what was

23 happening.

24 Q. I agree with you, General, but we are talking about the document

25 issued before the first helicopter sortie, the 31st of December.

1 A. Paragraph 4 makes specific mention of a document whose contents

2 I'm not familiar with. If you have the document, I'll be happy to answer

3 your question.

4 Q. General, I will show you another document, D39. I will read for

5 the record while you are looking at the document only the first part of

6 the document. "To disarm UNPROFOR in the Vasionica camp, Srebrenica. The

7 plan provides for seizing all materiel and technical equipment in UNPROFOR

8 hands, infantry weapons, ammunition, communication equipment, clothing,

9 footwear and other which can significantly benefit the BH army in the

10 course of defending and liberating the Republic of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina."

12 General, this document was issued by the army of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, 283rd Light Brigade?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Which was sent to the command of the 8th Operative Group. Did you

16 ever see this document?

17 A. No, I did not.

18 Q. General, could you give us your comment on this document in light

19 of what we have just discussed in relation to document D42, that is, the

20 treatment of UNPROFOR?

21 A. I haven't read everything, just the first paragraph which I can

22 comment, if we have enough time. But if you will allow me, I will read

23 the whole document and give you my overall comment.

24 I've read it.

25 I don't know when, what, and how the people in Srebrenica were

1 thinking, how their thoughts went. This is probably one of the ways in

2 which their thinking went. If some things began to happen, how could they

3 defend themselves? I don't know. I'm seeing this document for the first

4 time, but that is my assumption.

5 I said yesterday that I had information that at the end of 1994,

6 in the Srebrenica enclave, that the situation was very bad with respect to

7 humanitarian aid, the food for the people, and life in general there. It

8 was very bad. And people wanted to leave regardless.

9 We sought ways and means to calm the situation down there and one

10 of the ways that the -- one thing that the army did was to bring the

11 division in order to equip it, to arm it, so that the population could see

12 this and have trust, put their faith in the army, that they were able to

13 see that the army would be able to defend themselves. But this was

14 probably the commander of the brigade thinking along those lines. I have

15 no other comment but to say that.

16 Q. General, an operative equivalent to the logistics forces, the

17 forces in the rear with respect to the forces in the front, in other

18 words, you as an experienced staff officer, how do you assess the ratio of

19 forces when you infiltrate your forces into the enemy's rear? What effect

20 would this have on the enemy's forces? Could you give us a rough idea, a

21 ratio of forces?

22 A. It depends how many men you engage, what you wish to aim at. You

23 have to have a criteria, a standard. It all depends. You are asking me a

24 general question.

25 Q. How many divisions into the rear of the enemy, how many men can

1 they engage of the enemy forces?

2 A. That division was not infiltrated into the rear.

3 Q. General, I'm asking you a hypothetical question. General, as a

4 staff officer, how many divisions would it require infiltrated into the

5 rear of the enemy to engage enemy forces? Would the ratio be 1:1, 1:3,

6 1:5?

7 A. You can't do it that way, that is, just off the bat. You have to

8 have a specific situation where the division is supposed to go, what the

9 terrain is like, what the area is like, where the other forces are that

10 can intervene, how much time they need, and so on and so forth. You have

11 to know all this data of -- in a concrete situation.

12 Q. General, so far, you have been giving us generalised observations,

13 how many combat ammunition sets or combat sets necessary and so on. That

14 was an all-embracing, comprehensive, general assertion.

15 A. I spoke of minimum quantities, the minimum quantity required. But

16 if you want to analyse each specific situation, then you will have to do

17 that and, according to that, to determine how much you need. To defend

18 yourself for two or three days, you would have to have a minimum of one

19 combat set. For a unit to go out at the level of a division, it must have

20 five combat sets just to start out on an assignment. And how it can be

21 supplied with materiel later on is another problem.

22 Q. General, that same staff school and the teachings of that school,

23 does it say that the operative equivalent in the enemy rear is in the

24 ratio of 1:3?

25 A. What do you mean?

1 Q. I mean the same type of doctrine that stipulates five combat

2 sets.

3 A. I'm afraid I don't understand your question.

4 Q. General, do the same military principles apply on the basis of

5 which you have claimed that a division needs five combat sets in order to

6 break through an encirclement?

7 A. I didn't say five.

8 Q. You said a minimum of five.

9 A. For a division to be assigned this task, it must have that number

10 of combat sets. Now, as to the particular assignment, we would have to

11 calculate what is necessary for an assignment, additional materiel for the

12 assignment to be carried out. For example, if the division doesn't do

13 anything in peace time, it would have to have that kind of -- those kinds

14 of sets as a standard, basic set.

15 Q. General, operative standards of the forces in the enemy's rear, to

16 get back to my question. How many enemy forces can your unit engage?

17 A. If you are alluding to the 28th Division --

18 Q. No, I am not alluding to anything. I'm asking you a hypothetical

19 and theoretical question.

20 A. I have given an answer to your hypothetical and theoretical

21 question, and I have said that you have to have basic data where the unit

22 is being sent to, what depth, what area, what its assignment is, what the

23 encirclement is.

24 Q. But General, is there a minimum? You mentioned five combat sets

25 without which an order of this kind cannot be given. So I am asking you

1 for a minimum now. Give us a minimum.

2 A. The existence of a unit and the -- its equipment is a standard.

3 Now, if you want to infiltrate them into the enemy rear, this is a combat

4 operation for which statistics, mathematical assessment will have to be

5 made. So there is no particular standard. You can't quote a standard.

6 Q. General, breaking through an encirclement, is that a combat

7 operation?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. General, would you agree with me that the equivalent of the forces

10 in the rear as to engage in the enemy forces is in the ratio of 1:3?

11 A. I cannot agree with you there because, for me, that is a

12 generalised specification. I would have to know the actual concrete

13 situation.

14 THE INTERPRETER: A little slower, please, counsel.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, did you compile a plan and even draw a relief for the

17 liberation of Podrinje as is claimed in the article of the 17th of March

18 2000, as General Sead Delic said in the article published on the 17th of

19 March 2000?

20 A. I don't know what Sead Delic said. There was a relief specifying

21 the front lines throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only in

22 Srebrenica. It was a visual image, and people who were authorised to do

23 the planning or the decision makers were able to see the situation as it

24 was in the field. And amongst others, on this relief, they had Srebrenica

25 as well, but it was overall relief for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It had

1 Sarajevo and other parts as well.

2 Q. General, the 2nd Corps of the BH army, did it issue at the

3 beginning of the summer, end of June, beginning of June, that is, an order

4 to the 28th Division to organise sabotage incursions into Serbian

5 territory around the enclaves?

6 A. I don't know. You said the 2nd Corps?

7 Q. Yes, I did.

8 A. I don't know. I have no proof.

9 Q. General, did you, yourself, issue an order to the 28th Division

10 for incursion into Serb territory in the environs of the enclave and for

11 carrying out sabotage action?

12 A. I did not issue to the 28th Division, except that I should bring

13 it up to combat readiness. I issued no other orders apart from that order

14 to the 28th Division.

15 Q. General, did you, at any time, issue orders to the 28th Division

16 bypassing the command of the Drina Corps?

17 A. What Drina Corps?

18 Q. Oh, I apologise, the 2nd Corps. Did you issue orders to the 28th

19 Division avoiding or sidestepping the command of -- the chain of command

20 of the 2nd Corps?

21 A. With respect to helicopter flights and equipping the divisions, I

22 did send down orders of this kind, but the command of the 2nd Corps, from

23 the very beginning, knew of that undertaking and I explained why, because

24 the 2nd Corps did not have authority over the helicopters. I had to

25 communicate directly and to send what was in the helicopters because the

1 2nd Corps didn't know what was in the helicopters. And in a previous

2 agreement, the 2nd Corps knew what was going to happen when transport of

3 this kind was undertaken.

4 Q. General, I'm going to read a part of a statement made by Sead

5 Delic in answer to a question that was asked him. The journalist asks,

6 "The Chief of Staff, General Hadzihasanovic, issued an order for sabotage

7 incursions into Serb-held territory in the environs of Srebrenica without

8 reinforcing the defence lines on the basis of which data and information

9 was that order issued? That is my question for you." No, I'm reading.

10 And General Delic answers, "As far as I know, it was an order which the

11 2nd Corps received, but it was not linked unless it reached them in the

12 line towards Zepa and Srebrenica."

13 A. No. No orders went out from the headquarters like that. You are

14 reading from a newspaper article. If I had a document, I would be able to

15 comment.

16 Q. General, I will continue the quotation. "In that aim, an order

17 arrived which specified that, wherever possible, sabotage and other

18 operations were to be undertaken in order to engage the enemy, in order to

19 inflict casualties to the enemy, and to stop him from introducing units

20 into the area. I don't know whether an order of this kind went to

21 Srebrenica and Zepa, but it was a period when we intensified our sabotage

22 incursions and smaller attacks on individual features which means that the

23 order did exist."

24 A. This is within the context of a conversation between a journalist

25 and the gentleman in question. I would be able to give a comment if this

1 were founded on a document, then I would be able to say yes, that it is so

2 or it is not so, and it is a comment of those two people.

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, General Krstic has

4 asked for a break, if possible, and I have 15 more minutes of

5 questioning.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. For the reasons you

7 have specified, we are going to take a break. Perhaps we shall take a

8 lunch break at this point. Let us take advantage of this opportunity and

9 have a lunch break and then see how we stand, how much more we need for

10 today. I shall first ask the usher to accompany General Hadzihasanovic

11 out of the courtroom before we adjourn for lunch.

12 We are now going to adjourn for a 50-minute lunch break.

13 --- Break taken at 12.05 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. You may

16 continue, please.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

18 May I ask the usher to give the witness Exhibit D36 and to prepare

19 for the witness also Defence Exhibit D67, please.

20 Q. General, while you're reviewing that document, allow me to remind

21 you that yesterday you spoke about your efforts to reorganise the army of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly the units in the area of the

23 enclaves.

24 General, this document, issued by the command of the 8th Operative

25 Group, does it in content correspond to the situation in which the BH army

1 found itself regarding the reorganisation of its units at that time?

2 A. As far as I am able to understand this document, Mr. Attorney,

3 there are several questions here addressed by the command of Operative

4 Group 8 regarding the reorganisation; for instance, how to register people

5 who are not from the area, who are from other municipalities and do not

6 know their speciality from the former JNA, et cetera.

7 Q. General, there's no need to go into details. Let me ask you

8 whether this content corresponds, more or less, to what you were

9 endeavouring to achieve through your bodies, with the aim of improving the

10 organisation of the 8th Operative Group, and does this document reflect

11 the problems that the 8th Operative Group at the time was encountering?

12 A. Our order existed regarding the reorganisation of the army, and

13 one of those orders was probably addressed to the command of the 2nd

14 Corps. What kind of explanations the corps gave to the Operative Group, I

15 don't know. Clearly, from this document, the Operative Group is asking

16 for explanations of certain points, and there's nothing doubtful about

17 that.

18 Q. But the time frame corresponds. General, let me ask you about the

19 last sentence of this document on page 2. In the English version, it is

20 all on one page. The last sentence reads:

21 "Could you therefore, because of the combat activities planned to

22 link up the 8th Operative Group and the 2nd Corps, complete the

23 implementation of this order by the end of the planned activities and

24 inform us of this a little before."

25 General, my question is: What are those planned combat activities

1 to link up the 8th Operative Group and the 2nd Corps?

2 A. I don't know. There were probably some thoughts given to it, but

3 I'm not aware of any plan.

4 Q. Thank you, General. Let me read to you once again a part of a

5 statement made by General Sead Delic in his interview of the 17th of

6 March, 2000, relating to plans for the liberation of Podrinje, that Sead

7 Delic in his previous statement claims that you were the author of those

8 plans. And then he goes on to say:

9 "One plan was the deblocking of Sarajevo, the second of Podrinje.

10 Because of the political situation at the time, the preference was given

11 to the deblocking of Sarajevo. Also, from the General Staff, plans of

12 activities were requested which would be undertaken in the case of

13 offensive activities against Podrinje. As for offensive operations linked

14 to the deblocking of Sarajevo, it was our conclusion that the safe areas,

15 in accordance with international law, enjoy a special status. No combat

16 operations, no attacks, even though, from the military point of view, they

17 were the most sensitive places in our overall deployments, that is, the

18 enclaves."

19 General, would you agree with that statement made by General Sead

20 Delic?

21 A. I don't know why you keep asking me about what somebody else

22 said. His thoughts and his positions I can neither share or criticise or

23 comment on them. All I can say is that that was his personal affair, what

24 he said. As for the General Staff and plans related to Srebrenica and

25 deblocking it, no such plan existed. There is no dilemma over that, but

1 we kept sinking over what should be done with the enclaves if something

2 should happen to them.

3 There were such reflections, assessments, thoughts, what to be

4 done, and one of those conclusions was to set up this unit to appease the

5 situation at the end of 1994, and I do know of that objective.

6 Q. The execution of sabotage activities behind the lines of the Serb

7 forces was one -- was it a part of the plans to liberate Srebrenica?

8 A. In the General Staff, there were no such plans.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

10 D67, please.

11 Q. General, while you are reviewing this document, for the record, I

12 will read a part of it, paragraph 1 and a part of paragraph 2 of this

13 document. "The soldiers of the 28th Division of the ground forces located

14 in the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, although burdened with serious

15 problems with food and the obligation to preserve in their zone of

16 responsibility the free territories that they hold, decided to make as

17 large a contribution as possible to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina's

18 struggle against the aggressor, and to that end, strengthened their

19 activity in the depth of the aggressor's temporarily occupied territory.

20 While carrying out reconnaissance, sabotage groups of the 28th Division of

21 the ground forces encountered aggressor reconnaissance sabotage groups

22 several times and opened fire. In this reconnaissance period, the

23 following results were achieved..." And then those results are

24 enumerated.

25 Let me also read the first sentence from the second paragraph,

1 which says: "In order to prevent enemy forces from sending additional

2 troops from the areas around Srebrenica and Zepa to the Sarajevo front,

3 two sabotage actions were carried out in the vicinity of Srebrenica, one

4 on the 23rd of June 1995 in Osmace, and another on the 23rd of June 1995

5 in Bijelo Stijenje near Koprivna with the following results being

6 achieved..."

7 In continuation of this document, General, there is a description

8 of further activities by the reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the

9 28th Division of the ground forces and, as reflected by this document, it

10 is stated that, "According to our estimates, more than 40 Chetniks have

11 been liquidated though we have unconfirmed reports that the aggressor's

12 losses amount to 71 soldiers."

13 General, this report was addressed to the command of the 2nd

14 Corps. Are you familiar with this report?

15 A. I see this report for the first time. If it was sent, then

16 somebody should be held responsible for its accuracy. I see this report

17 for the first time.

18 Q. The 28th Division, General, according to this report, at least in

19 two places, makes mention in paragraphs 2 and 3 and then also in paragraph

20 4, mentions the reason for these operations, and that is to prevent

21 additional forces being sent to the Sarajevo front or, rather, engaging

22 the forces of Republika Srpska within the enclaves.

23 General, what is stated in this document, does that fit into the

24 plan for the deblocking of Sarajevo which the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

25 had?

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1 A. Probably.

2 Q. General, what was the control implemented by high level commands

3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina over their forces?

4 A. The control was effected in the force of orders, suggestions,

5 instructions, but we couldn't have physical control over them, a team of

6 the General Staff or the command of the 2nd Corps to go physically to

7 Srebrenica and check the situation there. That was not possible.

8 Everything went through papers, documents. And what was ordered

9 undertaken, we did not have the chance to physically check.

10 Q. General, but you did regularly receive reports from the 28th

11 Division, 2nd Corps?

12 A. Here and there.

13 Q. General, did you control the work of the 2nd Corps?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. General, the 28th Division is a rather large unit. Is it possible

16 for their commanders to undertake certain actions arbitrarily?

17 A. Whether they did or not, I don't know. They shouldn't have.

18 Q. General, is it possible that this document reflects an order

19 received by the 28th Division to strengthen activities, intensify

20 activities, in order to assist the BH army in deblocking Sarajevo?

21 A. Within the context of the deblocking of Sarajevo, we did send an

22 order to other fronts to intensify activities, and to other corps, which

23 is only normal to facilitate this part of our task. But I know exactly

24 that in that order regarding Srebrenica and Zepa, nothing specific was

25 stated. Whether the command of the 2nd Corps sent anything like that, I

1 really don't know.

2 Q. And the command of the 2nd Corps, did they inform you that they

3 had sent anything to Srebrenica and Zepa?

4 A. No.

5 Q. General, do you know where the command of the 28th Division in

6 Srebrenica was stationed?

7 A. According to communications, near Igrisnik, south-west, as far as

8 I know. And it probably changed its locations because of the conditions.

9 The command of the 2nd Corps must know that exactly.

10 Q. And where was the command of the Protective Battalion?

11 A. Which protective battalion?

12 Q. Excuse me. Let us move on to another topic.

13 General, I will read to you again a passage from a statement by

14 General Delic, so I'll read a part of the statement -- no, I won't be

15 reading from General Delic, but part of a statement of Naser Oric, in an

16 interview on the 28th of August, 1996, regarding the humanitarian

17 situation in the enclave:

18 [As read] "Smuggling, there was some. Do you know or not? There

19 were six or seven thousand inhabitants of Zepa, and they reported three

20 times as many, and that is how they had food. Then they would sell the

21 surplus. From the Dutch, you couldn't buy anything, not a gramme of

22 salt. But the Ukrainians were such that they would sell everything. They

23 would only keep their slippers if necessary."

24 General, and another portion of another statement, again by

25 General Sead Delic in his interview of the 17th of March, when he says, I

1 quote:

2 "There are some statements and indicators that humanitarian aid

3 was distributed exclusively under the wing of the military and not through

4 civilian authorities, and that it was distributed in the way individuals

5 thought fit."

6 General, the report sent from the enclaves, did they exaggerate

7 the humanitarian problems for the reasons given here by Mr. Naser Oric?

8 A. I really don't know why you are asking me questions about other

9 people's statements. To give you an exact reply as to whether they were

10 exaggerated or not, one would have to check it out physically, which was

11 not possible. I just know that from the command of the 2nd Corps, we

12 received reports that the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica was

13 disastrous. That's as much as I know.

14 Q. General, as a Superior Command, did you know that humanitarian aid

15 in the Srebrenica enclave was being distributed exclusively under the

16 authority of the military?

17 A. I couldn't know that.

18 Q. General, did anyone, ever, through intelligence or some other

19 reports, inform you about this? You were the Chief of Staff, and I assume

20 that the entire intelligence reports reached you.

21 A. That is your assumption, but it is not true. Only the

22 intelligence reports that were necessary for taking stock of the military

23 situation on the ground, the movement of units by the aggressor, the

24 situation, where which unit was, what their intentions were. But I didn't

25 engage in these other matters.

1 Q. Does that mean that you are not familiar with the humanitarian

2 situation in detail?

3 A. Not in detail, but I knew that in the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves

4 the humanitarian situation was bad. As for the details, I was not

5 familiar with them.

6 Q. So General, you did receive certain reports about the humanitarian

7 situation in your staff headquarters.

8 A. What do you mean, "humanitarian situation"?

9 Q. I'm looking at the transcript. You did, after all, receive some

10 reports on the humanitarian situation, and not only on the military

11 situation on the ground.

12 A. If you consider information that the people in the enclave and the

13 military are hungry, that people haven't got enough to eat, as

14 humanitarian reports, then I did receive them.

15 Q. And that is all you received about the situation there?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Thank you, General.

18 A. You're welcome.

19 Q. General, in a report shown to you by the Prosecution, it is stated

20 that the humanitarian situation is such that the population has nothing to

21 eat and that the army, in a day or two, would run out of supplies, if I am

22 paraphrasing correctly. Does that mean that the army, in terms of food

23 supplies, was better supplied than the civilian population?

24 A. No.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let us go on to another

1 topic now.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, excuse me for

3 interrupting you. Before the break, you told us that you needed a quarter

4 of an hour. You've already used twice as much. Do you need a third

5 quarter of an hour or are you going to finish soon, so that we have some

6 idea?

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think I need

8 another five to seven minutes, on the outside.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Please proceed.

10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown OTP

11 Exhibit 614, please.

12 Q. And General, when did the Main Staff of the BH army learn of the

13 start-off of the column from Susnjari towards free territory, or, better

14 still, according to your information, on the 12th, or rather, the 11th, at

15 midnight, or a few minutes after midnight, that is, on the 12th, early in

16 the morning, did the Chief of Staff report that he was heading out towards

17 Udrc Baljkovica, and that at 0220 hours the command of the 2nd Corps had

18 forwarded urgently this information to the Main Staff of the BH army? I'm

19 talking about the 12th of July, 1995.

20 A. I know that the staff and the commander cautioned and were not in

21 favour of the 28th Division abandoning the safe area, and they did not

22 have an order or permission from the headquarters to go anywhere. On the

23 11th, in the evening, in the village of Susnjari, the division command,

24 and I think some people from the political authorities, made that

25 decision.

1 Q. That is not disputed that a decision was taken. What I'm

2 interested in is --

3 A. When they started out, we lost contact with them, and we didn't

4 communicate with them until the 15th, in the evening.

5 Q. Did the Main Staff of the BH army at 0220 hours receive an urgent

6 telegram or cable or in some other way a report from the command of the

7 2nd Corps, informing them that they were moving along the Udrc-Baljkovica

8 road?

9 A. Probably. Because, as I say, the last contact that we had was

10 that night.

11 Q. General, the determination of the axis Udrc-Baljkovica, was that

12 the axis of withdrawal towards Tuzla?

13 A. What do you mean "axis"?

14 Q. The Udrc-Baljkovica route, is that, in fact, the route along which

15 the units withdrew?

16 A. As far as I know, I can show you from my notebook the exact

17 sequence of the villages towards Crni Vrh, crossing the asphalt road from

18 Kalesija to Zvornik, that is that direction.

19 Q. And that is where you met the units?

20 A. Yes, at the very exit in the early morning. I had already arrived

21 because I wasn't at headquarters at the time. I was somewhere else.

22 Q. General, did the Main Staff of the BH army and the 2nd Corps, did

23 they already on the 12th at 0220 hours know the route upon which the

24 column was withdrawing?

25 A. On the 12th?

1 Q. Yes, on the 12th at 0220?

2 A. I think not. On the 12th, the first reports reached us, I can't

3 remember the details now, were brought by the women and children who

4 arrived in the area of Kladanj. So the first information as to where

5 they might go and what was happening in Srebrenica reached us like that.

6 Officially, from the 28th Division, we received nothing.

7 Q. On the 11th at midnight, the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division,

8 did he report to the staff for the last time, and after that the

9 communication was interrupted?

10 A. Yes. He was in contact with us on the 11th in the evening, and

11 after that, we don't know.

12 Q. The Main Staff, was it informed urgently from the command of the

13 28th Division at 0220 in the morning about it?

14 A. Yes, probably, but I don't know exactly because I was not there at

15 the time; I was close to Sarajevo.

16 Q. Thank you, General. Can we see the Exhibit 614.

17 General, let me draw your attention to paragraph 3 of this

18 document and I will have only one question in respect of that. General,

19 as the Chief of Staff of the BH army, did you know that the VRS had

20 established a corridor, had opened a corridor for the passage of the

21 members of the 28th Division through their lines and positions?

22 A. No, they did not open a corridor.

23 Q. General, did you know at the time that Colonel Vinko -- Lieutenant

24 Colonel at the time, actually, Vinko Pandurevic, was negotiating with

25 Semso Muminovic, one of the officers, concerning that issue?

1 A. After the breakthrough in the Poljanje region, yes, there was

2 communication between him and Pandurevic. Actually I don't know that man,

3 but he did communicate with someone, and he said that, "You should let the

4 men get out of the area. You have done enough harm."

5 As to what "getting out" meant, the front line was pierced at one

6 particular point, but the people were still coming in from the rear. So

7 he was asking him to let the others go through the lines and leave the

8 area.

9 Q. General, did that actually happen in the way it is described

10 here?

11 A. All I know was that the Zvornik Brigade was in Srebrenica but that

12 certain elements of the Zvornik Brigade were also there, and according to

13 the people who were there, the Zvornik Brigade, in that area, did not have

14 many troops and that the passage simply went through. The people went

15 through the lines. It was not a show of goodwill of their commanders

16 because they simply didn't have enough troops for that area.

17 Q. General, I now realise that you actually knew where the Zvornik

18 Brigade was, but at that point in time, you didn't know where your units

19 were; am I right?

20 A. I don't know what you mean when you say "your units."

21 Q. I'm referring to the units of the 28th Division.

22 A. Yes. If we are talking about the units of the 28th Division, I

23 said that we were not in contact with them at the time, and we did not

24 have precise information as to their whereabouts. The forward command of

25 the 2nd Corps heard them on the 15th of July in the evening through

1 Motorola, and they established contact with them on the 16th of July when

2 they reached Crni Vrh.

3 Q. General, would it refresh your memory if I told you that the

4 Zvornik Brigade returned as early as the 15th of July in its area of

5 responsibility?

6 A. I don't know that. You're referring to the Zvornik Brigade of the

7 VRS?

8 Q. Yes. Yes.

9 A. No, I don't know that.

10 Q. General, if you didn't know the whereabouts of the elements of the

11 28th Division but you knew about the direction they had taken, could you

12 not assume, theoretically speaking, as to the point -- as to the location

13 they would finally emerge and reach the lines held by the BH army and were

14 any offensive activities undertaken with the purpose of joining, reuniting

15 with the units of the 28th Division?

16 A. We learned about it only on the 16th of July, in the morning hours

17 of the 16th of July, not on the 15th of July. If we had done anything

18 prior to that point in time, we would have, perhaps, made a mistake. We

19 would have attempted to do something on a different location and they

20 would have come through at another spot along the front line.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have no further

22 questions for the witness. Thank you very much, General.

23 A. You're welcome.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.

25 General Hadzihasanovic, we will have a few questions for you from

1 the bench. Judge Fouad Riad has the floor.

2 Questioned by the Court:

3 JUDGE RIAD: General Hadzihasanovic, good afternoon. Can you hear

4 me?

5 A. Good afternoon. Yes, I can, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE RIAD: Perhaps you can shed some light on a few of your

7 assertions whether in your testimony or in the -- what you called I think

8 here the information you gave, written on the 24th of January.

9 First, concerning the column you mentioned which was formed on the

10 11th of July. Apparently, you said it was leaving to the free territory

11 and it contained the 28th Division command and municipal authorities. How

12 many civilians were there, and why did the civilians join it?

13 A. I apologise, just a second. I would like to find that piece of

14 information. It is true that the command of the division was there

15 together with some commanding officers, members of the staff, in the

16 village of Susnjari where the command of the division was located. And in

17 the course of the 11th of July, in that area, members of the division

18 assembled together with, according to the information I have from what I

19 could learn from the statement of the members of the staff and others,

20 around 6.000 to 7.000 civilians in the area of Susnjari. That is, the

21 military and the civilians were together.

22 The civilians in question were people who were men of military

23 age, able-bodied men, and they did not trust in the impartiality of anyone

24 in terms of surrender. Only women, children, and elderly went to the

25 UNPROFOR base. There was justified suspicion that every civilian,

1 able-bodied man, could be harmed simply of the fact that he was of the

2 military age, and that is why the reason why they all assembled there.

3 They wanted to follow the military wherever they would go.

4 JUDGE RIAD: You said it was a justified fear. Why was it

5 justified?

6 A. Yes, the fear was justified because in the course of previous

7 years, in 1992 and 1993 in particular, because of the events that took

8 place in that area and, in particular, in the municipalities of the

9 Zvornik, Bratunac, and Vlasenica, and also after the fall of the Cerska,

10 Kamenica, and Konjevic Polje enclaves, people knew, in view of those

11 events, what could happen to them and they were simply afraid that such

12 things might happen again.

13 As they were fleeing the area Cerska - Konjevic Polje - Bratunac,

14 those people finally ended up in the Srebrenica enclave, so they had

15 justified fears as to what might happen to them again.

16 JUDGE RIAD: So you said there were 7.000 civilians, so how much

17 would be their percentage in the column?

18 A. More than 50 per cent.

19 JUDGE RIAD: Now, you said when they were -- you just mentioned

20 the people who managed to come out from the column were manhunted easily

21 in the way from Srebrenica to Vlasenica. What did you mean by "manhunt?"

22 Fighting, fighting with the soldiers, the Muslim -- Serb soldiers, or

23 chased just indiscriminately?

24 A. The second part of the column, which was initially between 12 and

25 15 kilometres long, when that second part of the column was shelled, the

1 civilians which were mainly members of that portion of the column were

2 hit. Regardless of the fact that those people were not armed, they were

3 targeted and they were subsequently captured; at least, that is what the

4 people who managed to get out told us. They described it as manhunt, the

5 people I had an opportunity to talk to.

6 JUDGE RIAD: And it was indiscriminate, indiscriminate, according

7 to what was, in your opinion, established or told to you, old and young

8 and resisting or non-resisting?

9 A. Correct.

10 JUDGE RIAD: You spoke about the -- you said, exactly, that the

11 28th Division was useless in combat terms and not capable to engage in

12 combat, and hence did not constitute any danger to the other party. And

13 you also spoke with the Defence counsel of the helicopters which were

14 sent, I think it was from December 31st to mid-May. In spite of these

15 helicopters, the 28th Division was completely out of combat and useless,

16 or did these helicopters give it some, let us say, power to fight?

17 A. Whatever was transported in helicopters was in such a small

18 percentage for the division to be made useful. All the data that I have

19 supplied you with in the documents that I have brought with myself is

20 contained in that number, and the percentages that are given in these

21 documents indicate the strength of the division. It is all included in

22 the figures that you have in this document.

23 JUDGE RIAD: And in your opinion, it was out of -- the division

24 was completely useless for combat, adequately?

25 A. The division was not useful in combat terms. Its capability,

1 generally speaking, was not more than 30 to 40 per cent. As I say,

2 generally speaking, if we take into account all kinds of weapons and

3 ammunition, in some departments they were armed 50 per cent of the full

4 capacity; and in certain other departments, zero. So it was useless.

5 JUDGE RIAD: You mentioned your report and so on. In fact, I

6 detected that you were speaking about the quantity of weapons, rifles, and

7 you also said that -- you gave the number, as you said, and you said they

8 represented no threat to the Serbian forces. Did the Serbian forces know

9 that?

10 A. They should have known that.

11 JUDGE RIAD: I mean, would they be expecting an enemy of calibre,

12 who could be of great resistance, or were there indications that there

13 were no weapons? Was there some kind of checking? Did UNPROFOR check the

14 demilitarisation? Was there any understanding about that?

15 A. UNPROFOR was to -- was supposed to supervise the weapons that had

16 been handed over to them, and they were supposed to observe the movements

17 of troops on the boundaries of the safe area, so I know -- I think that

18 the UNPROFOR must have known about the quantities of weapons of various

19 units deployed in the area.

20 JUDGE RIAD: And they would communicate that to the other party?

21 A. I cannot say anything to that effect, but it is my assumption that

22 it was possible for them to convey such conversation.

23 JUDGE RIAD: Did you receive any - not you, but I mean the 28th

24 Division - receive any protests from the UNPROFOR that did not respect the

25 demilitarisation and that they had weapons?

1 A. No. As far as the issue of demilitarisation is concerned, the way

2 I understand the relevant document, it referred to the urban area of the

3 Srebrenica town, whereas the term "safe area" concerns a wider territory.

4 JUDGE RIAD: And concerning the urban area of Srebrenica, it

5 received shelling?

6 A. Yes.

7 JUDGE RIAD: It did. And was the shelling also indiscriminate, or

8 in a way they wanted to have a target, military targets?

9 A. There were no military targets in the town itself. As far as I

10 know, at the time the agreement on demilitarisation was signed, one of the

11 reasons -- one of the ways of avoiding the shelling of the town was to

12 sign that there were no military targets in the town. A soldier could

13 not -- was not allowed to walk around the town with a rifle; however, a

14 soldier could go to the town and visit his family without his weapon, if

15 he had any family living in the town.

16 JUDGE RIAD: In your information or submission of 24th of January,

17 you mentioned that 172.000 non-Serbs in the zone were ethnically

18 cleansed. Can you just have some more specification what you mean by

19 "ethnically cleansed"? What did it cover?

20 A. Before the establishment of the Srebrenica enclave in the area of

21 the Zvornik and Bratunac and Visegrad, Vlasenica, Han Pijesak

22 municipalities, as well as the municipality of Rogatica, Sokolac, and

23 Pale, which was, according to our estimates, the area of responsibility of

24 the Drina Corps, from those areas, ethnically -- there was no population

25 there. The area was ethnically cleansed, either through detention or

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1 persecution. And when the -- I think that about 150.000 non-Serbs lived

2 there before that. The number increased after the fall of Srebrenica, of

3 course, but it only concerned the territory of the Srebrenica

4 municipality. So as regards the territory of the municipalities that I

5 have indicated, 170.000 non-Serbs were missing from that area in that

6 period of time.

7 JUDGE RIAD: And after that, did they find out how much remained

8 in the area, or come back, or that's too -- or killed?

9 A. What I'm trying to say is that those people are no longer there in

10 that area. Some were killed, some were detained in camps, some were

11 evicted from the area. They are simply no longer there. Some of them

12 eventually found themselves in the area of Tuzla, Kladanj, Sarajevo,

13 Central Bosnia, some ended up in third countries, the final result being

14 that they were no longer in that area. It was only after the signing of

15 the Dayton Accords and sometime later that those people started coming

16 back to the area. At the time of the Srebrenica events, that number of

17 people was no longer in the area that I described.

18 JUDGE RIAD: And perhaps a last question concerning the report of

19 Major Becirovic on the humanitarian situation, when he said, on the

20 6th -- I think it was the 6th of July, 7th of July: "More civilians have

21 been registered as having died from hunger and asking for quantities of

22 food." What was done about that? Were you able to send him food or was

23 the food prevented from reaching?

24 A. The passage of food was interrupted, because the last convoy

25 carrying the food did not reach its destination, the UNHCR convoy. I

1 remember that.

2 JUDGE RIAD: And why?

3 A. Because the VRS army didn't allow it to go through. In those

4 days, they even prevented the relief of UN units who were stationed in

5 Srebrenica, and immediately prior to the fall of Srebrenica, as far as I

6 know, soldiers from the UN observation posts were being captured. Access

7 to Srebrenica was not allowed, simply speaking.

8 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, General. Thank you.

9 A. You're welcome, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, we're trying to

11 finish with this witness. Would General Krstic like a break? Could you

12 speak to him, please, or can we continue? Could you speak to the General,

13 please.

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] We can continue, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] All right. Thank you very

16 much.

17 Thank you, Judge Riad.

18 Madam Judge Wald, please.

19 JUDGE WALD: General, you've given us a very detailed account of

20 the deficiencies in equipment and manpower of the 28th Division on the eve

21 of the fall in Srebrenica. I wonder if you can give us, very briefly,

22 bottom line, as it were, a comparative analysis of what your impression

23 was of the strength of the Serb forces in the area. In other words, if

24 the 28th Division was only 50 per cent up to par on equipment or -- and I

25 think you said 30 or 40 per cent in other categories, would you say that

1 the Drina Corps forces in the area of the enclave were twice as well

2 equipped, twice as -- just a rough estimate of the comparative adequacy.

3 A. I can go broader than that but I shall be very brief. They were

4 not only twofold, they were more than that as far as ammunition is

5 concerned. As for rifles and other equipment, they had sufficient

6 quantities.

7 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you.

8 I believe you said that once the column got moving and had

9 reported to the superior commands of the 2nd Corps, that they were on

10 their way to Tuzla, the superior commands lost communication with the

11 column and had no further communication until later on with the forefront

12 of the column which was getting ready to break through. You also said,

13 though, that the first inkling that the superior commands in the army had

14 as to what had happened at Srebrenica or Potocari came when the women and

15 children reached the free territory from the buses.

16 I was wondering how would you find out from the women and children

17 who were evacuated on the buses from Potocari what had happened to the

18 column? I mean, because they didn't actually have any contact with the

19 column. How much were you able to find out from the women and children,

20 and when did you find out about the fact that the column had been cut off

21 and what, if anything, had happened to them vis-à-vis the manhunt that you

22 talked about?

23 A. The first refugees that reached the region of Kladanj that were

24 transported there, between Kladanj and Vlasenica about midway, there is a

25 tunnel. Prior to that tunnel, they got off, and they arrived on foot.

1 And in Kladanj, we also had a brigade that was on the front line.

2 When the people appeared, people were running up to them to help

3 them. Among others, officers from that brigade collected the first

4 information from them, and the civilians were then transferred to Tuzla

5 where a tent settlement was being prepared for them to -- where they could

6 rest, and eat, and so on. So that was the first information that we got

7 from -- on what was happening in Potocari and that the army was on its

8 way.

9 JUDGE WALD: Did those women and children or the people who got

10 off the buses, did they tell you or did they tell the people there about

11 the separation of the men and their fears or ignorance of what had

12 happened to the men in Potocari? Not the men in the column, but the men

13 that had been separated in Potocari?

14 Is that the first time that superiors in the army learned about

15 the fact that the men were not arriving on buses any time near the women;

16 they had been deflected off someplace else?

17 A. Yes.

18 JUDGE WALD: You gave us some figures or estimates of a range

19 between 8.300 and 9.700 people who were killed or -- this is my question,

20 or missing, 2.600 of whom were from the 28th Division. I was wondering

21 whether or not those estimates of people killed are estimates of people

22 missing, we simply don't know what happened to them. Or if they are of

23 estimates of people killed, are they divided between people killed in

24 combat and people killed by the executions? In other words, are those

25 figures broken down?

1 A. I said that 2.628 soldiers of the division that we can say with

2 relative accuracy, that that is the number. Why we say that is that we

3 had a list of members of the division, and then we checked those who were

4 there, and those who were missing. Their destiny, those of the missing

5 ones, probably differed. Some may have been hit by a shell, some having

6 surrendered his weapons, rounded up, in various ways.

7 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you.

8 Now, when you heard later on, and I understand this was, as it

9 were, after the fact, when you found out what had happened in terms of the

10 people who were captured in the second part of the column, who were

11 captured, some of whom were detained, as we know, many of whom, a large

12 portion of whom were subsequently killed, did you receive information at

13 that point as to who it was that was taking custody of these people? I

14 mean who it was that was capturing them and who it was that was taking

15 them off to the areas of detention, and even who it was that was

16 subsequently executing them?

17 Were your informants as to what had happened to them able to

18 inform you of any of those facts and, if so, what were they?

19 A. I can answer in general terms that it was the army of Republika

20 Srpska and members of the MUP of Republika Srpska.

21 JUDGE WALD: Both, is that right? This has been talked about a

22 great deal in the trial, that's why I asked you the question. But your

23 information is that both members of the MUP and members of the VRS were

24 engaged in the capture of these people.

25 A. Yes.

1 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Now, at what point did the army, the 2nd Corps

2 or your headquarters, first obtain information that people had been

3 executed; not just captured, taken away, but actually executed?

4 A. I was saying that the first information was received both by

5 civilians and the army when those first women left Kladanj and arrived in

6 Tuzla, because there were executions in the immediate vicinity of the UN

7 Compound in Potocari. And the separation --

8 JUDGE WALD: I'm sorry. There weren't mass executions in the

9 immediate area of the Potocari. There may have been random killings, but

10 the mass executions, as I understand from all the evidence we've received,

11 were started around the 13th, but they were some distance away. So that

12 was my basic question: How do the women and children know about the

13 executions?

14 A. Because as the vehicles passed through certain areas, they saw

15 them by the road, saw dead men.

16 JUDGE WALD: Okay. Did they -- did these informants have

17 information to relay about who was involved in carrying out the

18 executions?

19 A. Yes, they, too, claimed that it was done by the army.

20 JUDGE WALD: Okay. I just have three more questions.

21 In the information which you were able, at the time, but maybe

22 primarily later to find out from the people, the army people who actually

23 made it across, the civilians who made it across, and some of the

24 survivors later on who made it across, were you or the superior officers

25 able to gain any impression of who was, in effect, running the show as far

1 as the capturing and the executions? Which particular Generals of the VRS

2 seemed to be in charge, seemed to be giving the orders, seemed to be

3 running the operation? The operation I'm now talking about being the

4 capture, detention, and subsequent execution?

5 A. We knew that the command of the Drina Corps was present in the

6 area of Srebrenica, but we also knew that General Mladic was there too.

7 JUDGE WALD: Right. Were you able to get any impression from your

8 informants as to who was, again, kind of in charge of the operation, the

9 manhunt, the killings part of the operation?

10 A. In view of the fact that the command staff of this command was

11 there and General Mladic, I assume it was them, because we couldn't hear

12 it or feel it. The distance between the column and those who were

13 shooting was quite considerable. You couldn't see or hear it. But since

14 they were there, they were probably informed about it. I have no hard

15 evidence about that, but they were their units.

16 JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question is one directed to your

17 knowledge of the -- all of the operations that were going around in that

18 area, not then, but previously that you've referred to before.

19 I'm interested in your views as to what factors you think -- I

20 realise you don't know, none of us know, but what factors you think would

21 have led the VRS, the MUP, whoever did it in this instance, to execute

22 these thousands of Muslim men following the fall of Srebrenica as opposed

23 to taking them, putting them in camps, putting them as prisoner exchanges,

24 the kinds of things that were more typical of the other operations that

25 we've seen.

1 What do you think led to this vast scope of immediate executions

2 in such a short period of time, just dealing with the fall and the

3 aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica?

4 A. To this day, I cannot explain or answer that question myself to

5 myself. What occurred to those people in the army of Republika Srpska, in

6 MUP, to simply go and kill those people who were innocent, believe me, I

7 have not given myself an answer to that question yet as a human being.

8 JUDGE WALD: Okay. And this is my very last one, it's a

9 hypothetical, but let me ask you, based on your military experience: If,

10 and it is a hypothetical, if a commander whose area of responsibility

11 encompasses a particular geographical area, if that commander should learn

12 - this is a hypothetical - if that commander should learn that, in fact,

13 his own superior, his own superior was using some of the forces under his

14 command to commit war crimes in that area, if he learned that, what do you

15 think his responsibility militarily would be?

16 A. First of all, he would have to demand an explanation for it.

17 Secondly, if he disagreed with those procedures, he would have to give up

18 his position.

19 JUDGE WALD: Thank you very much, General.

20 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Judge

21 Wald.

22 General Hadzihasanovic, I, too, have a few questions for you.

23 Perhaps they are small ones as I am the last. There is one thing that I

24 would particularly like to understand properly. As far as I have been

25 able to understand, the 28th Division was created more or less the 15th of

1 March 1995, then came the 8th Operational Group; is that right?

2 A. Yes, because in the structure of the 2nd Corps, there was the 8th

3 Operative Group which, due to the reorganisation, was restructured in

4 personnel and equipment on the 15th of March 1995. And from then on, it

5 was called the 28th Division officially.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] My question is: Why was this

7 division created for a particular area which was or should have been

8 demilitarised? You gave us some reasons such as quite appeasing the

9 population of Srebrenica, but are there any other reasons for creating at

10 such a late date especially for a demilitarised zone?

11 A. We completed the first reorganisation for Sarajevo in 1992. In

12 Tuzla, it wasn't done in 1992, it was done in 1993 and during 1993. It

13 depended on the area. Because of the inability to communicate with

14 Srebrenica, this dragged on until such a late date, but the main reason

15 was that there was no means by which we could send them the documents on

16 the basis of which they would reorganise.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well, General.

18 Another aspect that I should like to mention: A witness in this

19 courtroom said that 18 officers based in Srebrenica left for training in

20 Zenica. Are you aware of this fact?

21 A. I am.

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could you tell us what was the

23 justification for this departure, and specifically whether their departure

24 had anything to do with the attack on Srebrenica?

25 A. No, allow me to explain. We had a wartime officer school in

1 Zenica; that was its precise name. And from other parts of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and from all other units, even from Gorazde, we had

3 people undergoing training there.

4 On one occasion, there was a complaint from Srebrenica through the

5 command of the 2nd Corps as to how come no one could undergo training from

6 Srebrenica. It's as if they had been written off, that is how they put

7 it, as if nobody was taking care of them at all. Probably their turn

8 would have come anyway, but we speeded up the process because of this

9 suggestion, if I may call it that, on the part of the command and their

10 feeling of being neglected.

11 So this number of men were transferred to Zenica to graduate from

12 the school and then turned back. So they have -- it has nothing to do

13 with the combat operations there.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] These 18 officers, did they go

15 back to Srebrenica or did they stay outside the enclave?

16 A. They were returned to Srebrenica.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question, General: Was

18 there any parallel between the operations in Tuzla and the column? That

19 is, when the Bosnian authorities learned of the difficulties of the

20 column, did they organise a coordinated operation to help the people to

21 leave? Was there any movement of that kind and in that direction?

22 A. The 2nd Corps had prepared units to assist the breakthrough. The

23 only problem was where they would emerge, what particular part of the

24 front line so that we wouldn't make a mistake. And on the 16th in the

25 morning, it was known exactly where they might emerge, and that is where

1 they were assisted. The 212th Brigade of the 2nd Corps made a break

2 through the front lines there.

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Why did people choose Tuzla and

4 not Zepa, for instance? Do you have any indication of that? I mean the

5 column.

6 A. Probably they estimated that even if they went to Zepa sometime in

7 the future, they would suffer the same fate.

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So one might say that their

9 choice was linked to the reasons that led them to leave.

10 A. Yes.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question which we have

12 already touched upon to a certain extent is: After the fall of

13 Srebrenica, were there any contacts with the Serb forces, and

14 specifically, with General Mladic? We know already that during the

15 movement of the column there were some negotiations, specifically with

16 Vinko Pandurevic. I'm saying after all these things, were there any

17 contacts, military contacts, between the Serbs and the Bosniaks?

18 A. As far as I can recollect, no.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Another question: In your

20 opinion, or rather, as far as you know -- no. Let me rephrase that. Do

21 you know when General Krstic took over command of the Drina Corps? Do you

22 have any information on the part of the BH army?

23 A. I personally must say that I do know General Krstic. We graduated

24 from the Command Staff Academy in Belgrade. We are of the same

25 generation. That he became commander, I heard for the first time in a

1 statement made by Mr. Karadzic on television, when he said he was -- he

2 was commenting, making comments about General Mladic, and then he said,

3 "We have some other highly qualified commanders as well. For instance,

4 General Krstic is now in the Srebrenica operation. I approved his plan.

5 He is a capable Corps Commander," words to that effect. I'm

6 paraphrasing. And since that statement was broadcast on the television of

7 Republika Srpska, reception of TV programmes in Sarajevo was possible.

8 Until then, we had information that General Krstic was the Chief of Staff

9 in the Drina Corps.

10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Do you have any idea when that

11 was, the date of the statement made by Karadzic?

12 A. This could have been just before Srebrenica or during Srebrenica,

13 during the events in Srebrenica.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Just before the events in

15 Srebrenica?

16 A. I don't have a document or anything else on the basis of which I

17 could say with precision when that was.

18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but you are saying that

19 this statement was made, in your view, by President Karadzic just before

20 or even in the course of the events of Srebrenica.

21 A. Immediately afterwards, very close to the fall of Srebrenica. It

22 must have been around about then. Maybe five or ten days after that. I

23 really can't remember. But I do remember him saying this.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] To try to be slightly more

25 precise, can you pinpoint in time? When you say "the fall of Srebrenica,"

1 what date do you have in mind? What particular date?

2 A. According to our records, it is the 11th, the 11th, when the army

3 of Republika Srpska entered the town of Srebrenica. It has been recorded

4 as that date.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So how many days before or after

6 the 11th of July are you talking about that you heard the statement by

7 President Karadzic?

8 A. I'm talking about his statement, but I don't know the exact date

9 when he made that statement. I really can't remember it. I didn't take

10 note of it anywhere, so I wouldn't like to say something that is not

11 accurate. But he did say that.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. But in his words, if

13 you know, did President Karadzic say that he was going to appoint him or

14 that he had already been appointed; that he was going to appoint General

15 Krstic as Corps Commander or whether he was saying that he had already

16 been appointed?

17 A. As far as I can remember, this is what he said, and I'm

18 paraphrasing. General Mladic is being repeatedly mentioned, and he said,

19 "We do need people of authority, but we also have other good

20 commanders." That is literally what he said. "For instance, there's

21 General Krstic. He planned, and I approved those plans for him, the plans

22 for the Srebrenica operation." And he also added, "Of course, the General

23 Staff also assisted, but General Krstic did it." That is what he said.

24 There must be a recording somewhere so that this can be checked.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but General Hadzihasanovic,

1 why did you pay so much attention to that statement?

2 A. I said that I know General Krstic, and it was a surprise for me.

3 All those events were a surprise for me. Secondly, I knew that he had

4 been Chief of Staff, and then I registered the statement of Mr. Karadzic

5 saying that he was the commander.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. I understand that you were

7 interested, because you were following his career, you were friends, you

8 knew him well. But did that impression stay with you that President

9 Karadzic had named Krstic by means of television? Wouldn't it be

10 necessary to have a paper, a formal decision, a document?

11 A. It was my impression that he was the commander because that is

12 what Karadzic said.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Okay. Very well. Yes. Another

14 small question for you: Following the documents regarding humanitarian

15 aid that Mr. Harmon showed you, you answered, I think on page 19, line 12

16 of the LiveNote, you said something like this, and I quote: "And this was

17 confirmed in the document of General Mladic." Do you remember saying that

18 regarding humanitarian aid?

19 A. Yes, I do, because I thought the directive had been read which was

20 signed by General Mladic. Maybe I misunderstood.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] What document are you referring

22 to?

23 A. I'm referring to the directive of General Mladic.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Okay. You also said, and I'm

25 referring to page 27 of the LiveNote, line 20, regarding these reports,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French

13 and English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 that: "If somebody had provided reliable information or not, I don't

2 know, but I used these documents."

3 Do you -- how do you evaluate the reliability of documents which

4 several subordinates send to the Chief of Staff, for instance? Do you

5 have confidence in that document or are there any reasons that may lead

6 you not to accept it as reliable?

7 A. With respect to documents, the organ sending information has a

8 certain number of people who are responsible for those things, and their

9 information is relevant. If that piece of information is being used by

10 somebody writing about the morale of the fighters, they can use that

11 information in various ways - descriptively, this way, or another - so

12 then the information has a different purpose, or for the purpose of

13 information, for instance. But what is sent by operations officers, those

14 are relevant and we consider them to be reliable.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But it's a question that has

16 already been asked: Would it be possible that people suffering from

17 hunger could exaggerate the situation to receive humanitarian aid or maybe

18 provide a description that was a faithful description of the situation?

19 A. In the situation such as it was in Srebrenica, it's quite possible

20 that somebody may have added a little or detracted. Anything is

21 possible. I couldn't say with certainty that it is a hundred per cent

22 accurate when it comes to humanitarian aid and the humanitarian situation.

23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] In response to a question by

24 Judge Wald, you spoke about what you heard regarding the executions in

25 Potocari. What did you hear being said by people who arrived as to what

1 they saw and observed of executions in Potocari?

2 A. I remember a detail, when people coming from Srebrenica were

3 referring to an area where the hospital was, that somebody had entered

4 that part of the hospital, mistreating some people there. I don't know

5 whether they killed them. I can't remember exactly. It was a long time

6 ago. But I remember a small wood being mentioned near the UNPROFOR camp

7 where shooting was heard and where people were taken. I remember this

8 being said by the people who were in the compound, the women and the

9 elderly, because I visited, after the fall of Srebrenica, in that time

10 period, the people who were staying in tents near the Tuzla airport. I

11 spoke to them. And then the stories that I heard, I still remember some

12 of them.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Do you remember what was the

14 physical and mental condition of those people who managed to get through?

15 A. Mr. President, it is difficult to describe, because they were

16 really ranging from those who were irritable or crying to those who were

17 dumbfounded; they had no words to express their feelings. There were

18 different reactions. But as a whole, they were terrified, they were

19 suffering, they were full of pain and sorrow, because each one of those

20 persons in the tents knew that they had lost someone close.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you, General. We have no

22 further questions for you, I think. You have answered our questions, and

23 therefore I thank you very much for coming. I do so on behalf of my

24 colleagues in the Chamber, and I think also on the part of the parties,

25 who had a chance to put questions to you. So we thank you very much and

1 we wish you a safe journey to your country. Thank you very much. I am

2 going to ask the usher to accompany you out.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.

4 [The witness withdrew]

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] There is a practical matter that

6 needs to be addressed at this point, I think, a number of exhibits which

7 need to be tendered and discussed. I have information that the parties

8 have managed to get together and negotiate, if I may use the word, in

9 order to reach an agreement concerning this issue. So we could perhaps

10 have a 15-minute break at this point so that once again we can organise

11 ourselves, all of us, and then come back to the courtroom and to continue

12 working as long as it is necessary. But I think that there is a limit. I

13 don't think we can work for longer than half an hour at this point. But

14 let me first hear the opinion of the parties, Mr. Harmon first and then

15 later Mr. Petrusic or Mr. Visnjic.

16 Mr. Harmon.

17 MR. HARMON: We are certainly happy for a break, Mr. President.

18 We have had extensive negotiations and discussions on these items. I

19 think we have resolved most of our issues. I would like to, at this time,

20 since the witness has just left, move for the introduction of the exhibits

21 that were introduced by the Prosecutor's office through him and address

22 the remaining exhibits when we come back. The exhibits that I had shown

23 to General Hadzihasanovic were Prosecutor's Exhibits 898 through 904, and

24 I would move for their admission into evidence at this point.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, you also have

1 exhibits to tender, I assume. Let us hear you on the Prosecution exhibits

2 and also your exhibits.

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we do not object to

4 any of the exhibits tendered by Mr. Harmon. We should like to tender D179

5 as Defence exhibit. I also have to express certain reservation regarding

6 the documents that have been offered through the witness that we have just

7 heard, in particular, as regards C2 in respect of which the Defence has

8 managed to establish, despite the brevity of time, that at least two

9 pieces of information contained therein are incorrect and, since the

10 witness did not have the source of the document, we would like to object

11 to the admission of this exhibit since the information sought is precise

12 in nature, but the witness failed to provide adequate explanation for

13 that.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon, your response

15 concerning D179 and also if you wish to say something concerning C2.

16 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we have no objection to D179 being

17 admitted into evidence and we have no comment on C2.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The Chamber therefore admits

20 into evidence Prosecution exhibits and Defence exhibits that have just

21 been tendered. As for Exhibit C2, the Chamber believes that the witness

22 has authentified [as interpreted] the document and that he has provided

23 adequate explanation to that effect because of the general character of

24 the information sought. So the Chamber admits that document as well whose

25 probative value will be evaluated during the deliberations of the Judges.

1 The same goes for C1 through C5. All of those documents have been

2 admitted.

3 We will have a 15-minute break at this point and come back in

4 order to take stock of the situation regarding exhibits which are still

5 pending and in dispute.

6 --- Break taken at 2.40 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 3.07 p.m.

8 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So let us resume but with a

9 somewhat different agenda in mind.

10 We have this parcel here that needs to be addressed. We have 30

11 minutes at our disposal, and we have to see what we can do in those 30

12 minutes. I think that the most efficient way to proceed would be to hear

13 the parties, who will give us a general idea of what their main concerns

14 are. We will therefore receive information from them first, and then we

15 will come back to discuss the issue or we will decide to make a ruling in

16 writing, depending on what the parties are going to tell us. If you tell

17 us that you have reached an agreement, we will have a sound basis for our

18 decision. If not, we will make a different ruling. So this is just a

19 general idea on how things are as regards the documents that are still

20 pending.

21 Let me first give the floor to Mr. Harmon, and then I will hear

22 the Defence. Is there anything that you can tell us after this break,

23 anything new?

24 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, we have prepared lists

25 of documents that are outstanding, and we have reached agreements on some

1 and others remain contested. We're prepared to inform Your Honours of

2 which ones are still contested and which ones we have reached agreement

3 on. And I think that's, in response to your question, all I have to say

4 at the moment.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] What about the Defence?

6 Mr. Visnjic or Mr. Petrusic.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we don't have

8 anything to add to what Mr. Harmon has just said.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Can we therefore hear Mr. Harmon

10 about the results of your talks and a possible agreement? Okay.

11 Mr. Harmon, let us hear you once again.

12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, there should be lists in

13 front of you. Unfortunately, the list I'm working off of is slightly

14 different from the ones that you have in front of you, but I will identify

15 the exhibits for which there is no objection, and those would be

16 Prosecutor's Exhibits 65 --

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon, I'm sorry to

18 interrupt you. You don't think it is possible to use this list that has

19 been submitted to the Chamber? If not, we will just take notes.

20 MR. HARMON: You can use this list, Mr. President. I just have a

21 list that's not in sync, in terms of numerical sequence, with the list

22 that's before you. But I can give you the exhibit number and then give

23 you time to turn to the list, that item, and then you can --

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. I just wanted to

25 know whether we're talking about the same things, otherwise we would be

1 talking at cross-purposes. So we can use the list that you have given

2 us. Please continue, Mr. Harmon.

3 MR. HARMON: Prosecutor's Exhibit 65, there is no objection,

4 Prosecutor's Exhibit 221, Prosecutor's Exhibit 399. The Prosecution

5 withdraws Exhibit 790. Prosecutor's --

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I don't see 790 on

7 the list.

8 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry. I have been informed that has been

9 removed from the list, so --

10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.

11 MR. HARMON: Prosecutor's Exhibit 136, Prosecutor's Exhibit 228.

12 228, Your Honours, is being offered under seal, as is 228A bis, 228B bis

13 and 228C bis. Prosecutor's Exhibit 359/A bis also is being offered under

14 seal. Prosecutor's Exhibit 399/A bis and B bis, Prosecutor's Exhibit 69

15 bis, Prosecutor's Exhibit 823/A bis, Prosecutor's Exhibit 830/A bis,

16 Prosecutor's Exhibit 222/A, and 223/A, 228C bis, and that exhibit is being

17 offered under seal. Prosecutor --

18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Sorry once again to interrupt

19 you. I cannot see 222C bis [In English] 228C bis. [Interpretation] You

20 have already mentioned this one, and in your list I cannot see "under

21 seal" remark next to that exhibit. [In English] It's a revised French

22 translation of full interview?

23 MR. HARMON: Yes. That should be under seal.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Okay. But we have not here. Good. Go on,

25 please.

1 MR. HARMON: Yes. Prosecutor's Exhibit 32C bis, Prosecutor's

2 Exhibit 127, Prosecutor's Exhibit 792. One additional comment on one

3 additional exhibit is Prosecutor's Exhibit 882. It was admitted, I

4 believe it was yesterday, or this week, on the condition that the

5 Prosecutor show to the Defence the original notebook. Your Honours, we

6 have met with Defence counsel and we have shown them the original

7 notebook, and they're satisfied and can confirm that fact. Those are the

8 exhibits --

9 JUDGE WALD: We only have 792A and B on my list. You mentioned

10 792. Is that the same as 792A and B?

11 MR. HARMON: Yes.

12 JUDGE WALD: Okay.

13 MR. HARMON: And that concludes the exhibits for which there will

14 be no objection by the Defence.

15 MR. HARMON: The remaining exhibits are contested.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, but the Exhibit 882 is not

17 included in the list.

18 MR. HARMON: As I said, Your Honour, it's already been admitted.

19 Your Honour posed a condition on that that we show to the Defence the copy

20 of the notebook. We have done that to satisfy that condition.

21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. Before I

22 give the floor to Mr. Visnjic, I think that this list needs to be admitted

23 as an exhibit so that we can work on the basis of that, Mr. Harmon. What

24 do you think? Because -- but maybe not. Maybe it's not necessary.

25 MR. HARMON: This document was prepared as an aid, not as an

1 exhibit, and I'm not sure we're confident enough in the details in it to

2 have it as an exhibit, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Okay. No. Really, it's not

4 necessary.

5 Mr. Visnjic, can you confirm that all the exhibits that Mr. Harmon

6 has just mentioned have not been objected to by the Defence? Can you

7 confirm that?

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I can, Mr. President.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Have you finished,

10 Mr. Visnjic?

11 Mr. Harmon, I see you are on your feet.

12 MR. HARMON: One exhibit should be also included as an exhibit

13 that is for admission. It's Exhibit 28, which is a booklet with

14 approximately 13 or 15 tabs with photographs of individuals, and we are

15 moving for the admission of that particular document but we are moving to

16 withdraw one of the tabbed sections in there.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Maybe I could be of assistance,

18 Mr. President. It is number 15, 28/15.

19 MR. HARMON: That's correct, it is the photograph in that exhibit

20 28 that purports to be Colonel Beara. It is the photograph that's marked

21 on the back 28/15, and so we are moving to withdraw that part of Exhibit

22 28 and move the remaining part of the exhibit into evidence.

23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I shall try to be

25 brief, and if it is not clear enough for the record, will try again,

1 namely the group of Defence exhibits from 27 through to 71 were disputed.

2 With the Prosecution, we have reached agreement that all these documents

3 with the exception of document 38 have been made undisputed. Similarly,

4 there was also an objection to Exhibit D74, and I understand from the

5 Prosecution that that exhibit, too, is not being challenged now.

6 With respect to Exhibit D165, we have given the Prosecution

7 certain information about the source, that is how the Defence gained

8 possession of that document, and the response we received was that they

9 were satisfied with that information on condition that we present them

10 here for the record for which purpose I would request that we briefly go

11 into private session.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, let us go briefly into

13 private session.

14 [Private session]

15 [redacted]

16 [redacted]

17 [redacted]

18 [redacted]

19 [redacted]

20 [redacted]

21 [redacted]

22 [redacted]

23 [redacted]

24 [redacted]

25 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

2 [redacted]

3 [redacted]

4 [redacted]

5 [redacted]

6 [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 [redacted]

9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]

11 [redacted]

12 [Open session]

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We are in open session,

14 Mr. Visnjic.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I should also like

16 to notify the Trial Chamber that the Defence has supplied sufficient

17 number of copies of the expert report of Mr. Stankovic and Mr. Simic, and

18 they are Exhibits D171 and D172 in both versions, that is in both the

19 Serbian and the English version.

20 That would be all, Mr. President, with respect to the agreement

21 reached with the Prosecution.

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So Mr. Visnjic, does that mean

23 that you are asking these two reports to be admitted into evidence?

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have already made

25 such a request. The only thing that we still had to do was provide

1 sufficient copies for the members of the Trial Chamber and the parties.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Harmon, with respect to

3 these two reports, have you any remarks to make?

4 MR. HARMON: In respect of D171 and D172, the two reports, we have

5 no objection, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

7 Mr. Harmon.

8 MR. HARMON: May we have a moment to confer, just between us.

9 [Prosecution and Defence counsel confer]

10 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there is another

12 Defence exhibit outstanding that we left out, and that is 53 and 46, which

13 were withdrawn earlier on. I just wish to confirm this for the record.

14 D53 and D46 are being withdrawn by the Defence counsel.

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Is that all, Mr. Visnjic?

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] That is all, Mr. President,

17 regarding the agreements that we have reached with the Prosecution. Of

18 course there is the disputed part that remains.

19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let's see now, perhaps we can

20 already rule on the following: The Exhibit 790 of the Prosecution and

21 Exhibits 53 and 46 of the Defence have been withdrawn by the parties

22 concerned.

23 I have already made a checklist with the registrar, and we have

24 agreed to admit all the documents which were mentioned and noted as not

25 being in dispute and with no objections being made by either party.

1 So to avoid repeating all the exhibits - I think the transcript is

2 clear - so that is our general ruling. We also need to add to the

3 withdrawn exhibits the Prosecution Exhibit 28/15, tab 15. And I think

4 that's all for today.

5 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, may I just clarify one thing. Exhibit

6 28, it should be 28/15 and not tab 15, because they're multiple

7 photographs in a tab, and if you eliminate tab 15, you'll be withdrawing

8 the wrong photograph. It's a confusing exhibit, but on the back of each

9 photograph there is a number, and it is the photograph 1, the section with

10 Colonel Beara, and the photograph that purports to be Colonel Beara has on

11 its back 28/15, and it is that particular exhibit we're moving to

12 withdraw.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much,

14 Mr. Harmon, for this clarification, so we will note the exhibits along the

15 lines you have just explained. I think that now we need to ask the

16 parties whether all the other exhibits, is the Chamber going to take them

17 and rule on their admission or do you have any other suggestions to make

18 to the Chamber? In other words, you have done what you could with respect

19 to all the exhibits, and it is up to the Chamber to do the rest, or do you

20 have any other possibilities in mind?

21 MR. HARMON: Obviously, I have some additional comments on certain

22 of these exhibits, and then it's up to the Chamber to make decisions on

23 these. I haven't addressed any of those comments as to those particular

24 exhibits at this point because I was waiting until the opportunity arose.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think perhaps that the time

1 has come, because of time constraints, so you can make those comments.

2 Or, if you prefer, you could do so in writing, and we will make our ruling

3 in writing too. Maybe that's another possibility, for practical reasons,

4 in view of the time.

5 MR. HARMON: I'm at your disposal, Mr. President. We're at the

6 end of the case. We have some very important exhibits here that I think

7 have to be discussed with the Chamber. The reasons set forth why we

8 believe they are admissible and why my colleagues think they are

9 objectionable should be put on the record in some form, and it's incumbent

10 on us to offer these into evidence so the Court can make a ruling. I say

11 that because there are yet some additional issues that are still before

12 this Court that need to be addressed before we conclude these

13 proceedings.

14 For example, in respect of Prosecution Exhibit 833, the Defence

15 has filed a motion. We haven't had an opportunity to be heard on our

16 views on our particular motion. We simply haven't had time to prepare a

17 written answer. I'm prepared to address those remarks orally or I'm

18 prepared to submit our remarks in writing, depending on what the Chamber

19 wishes to do.

20 In addition, Mr. President, there was a protected witness, Witness

21 II. There are certain factors about the timing of that witness which may

22 be in dispute at some point, and I think it's important and I would like

23 the opportunity to insert into the record the factors that relate to the

24 timing of the Prosecution's discovery of that evidence that I think have a

25 bearing on other objections that have been made in this case and have a

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1 bearing on other exhibits that also have been tendered by us.

2 Lastly, Mr. President, I would need to insert into the record just

3 a fact about some revised translations and some language service efforts

4 to clarify at least some of the terminology in at least two exhibits. One

5 was at the request of Judge Riad. There has been a clarification by the

6 Language Service Section.

7 So there's a number of issues that we still need to address before

8 we conclude this, and if we have only a matter of a few minutes, I don't

9 think it's sufficient time to do that, and I'm at your disposal how you

10 would like us to do that. But at the end of this trial, I want to ensure

11 that Prosecutor's exhibits that have been tendered, one, are formally

12 tendered; and two, the reasons why we believe they are relevant. And we

13 can anticipate the Defence objections, why we think the Defence objections

14 are ill-founded, we would like that inserted into the record as well. So

15 I'm at your disposal, Mr. President, how you would like to address that.

16 JUDGE WALD: Mr. Harmon, roughly how many, just roughly, how many

17 exhibits are disputed?

18 MR. HARMON: I'd say, Judge Wald --

19 JUDGE WALD: Just rough.

20 MR. HARMON: -- every exhibit that we offered in rebuttal is

21 disputed.

22 JUDGE WALD: Yes. I -- that's a kind of one big issue.

23 MR. HARMON: So there are all of those exhibits. I don't have the

24 number, but I would say probably 25 exhibits are disputed. That's --

25 JUDGE WALD: Okay.

1 MR. HARMON: I can be more precise. If you give me a minute, I

2 can count them.

3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Could you give me a few minutes

4 now. I wish to confer with my colleagues.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] The Chamber has a proposition to

7 make to the parties. I think there are several interests involved here.

8 One is to review the whole documentation, and especially and in

9 particular, the exhibits which are in dispute. As Mr. Harmon has said, we

10 need to hear the arguments of the parties: Why, what are the points of

11 view of each party.

12 Therefore, I think that in order to organise each exhibit and the

13 arguments of the parties, one could give the parties the opportunity to do

14 so in writing. That is a way for each of the parties to review the

15 evidence and organise itself. After that, we would come to the courtroom

16 for a summary presentation of the reasons that were already conveyed to

17 the Chamber. In that way, we will all have the material and all the

18 information we need. Perhaps that would be a better organised manner and

19 a fairer one to address the issue, and also an efficient one in terms of

20 the ruling. Do you agree?

21 Also, we have to see when the parties are available to come to the

22 courtroom, knowing that next week we are sitting only for two working days

23 because there is the plenary on Thursday, and after that -- Judge Wald is

24 telling me that we have a holiday. I don't think that's the right word,

25 but never mind.

1 What do you think about it, Mr. Harmon and, after that,

2 Mr. Visnjic?

3 MR. HARMON: We have a trial brief to prepare and we need to know,

4 obviously, when evidence is in and when evidence is out to prepare this

5 adequately. So certainly our interests are to get resolution as soon as

6 possible on these issues. If it's a question of preparing something in

7 writing, we have no objection to that. I think we could get through this

8 in 20 minutes. I think the objections of the Defence are uniform. They

9 could -- but either way, we are prepared to proceed as long as we can get

10 a quick resolution of the issues so we could prepare our trial brief

11 which, as you know, is a project that is ongoing.

12 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] How about Wednesday for you,

13 Mr. Harmon? Wednesday afternoon at the end of the afternoon.

14 MR. HARMON: Wednesday is fine. I was planning to go fishing, but

15 Wednesday is fine, Mr. President. I will be here and we can do that on

16 Wednesday.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] But you are going to fish for

18 exhibits.

19 MR. HARMON: We will do that, Mr. President. Wednesday afternoon

20 is fine. Does Your Honour have a suggestion as to when you'd like

21 something in writing or is that the date for the written submission?

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Excuse me, as you know, there is

23 a slight delay with the interpretation so I apologise.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So fine. I think that we have

1 reached a decision. I think it is better for each party, we will come

2 here on Wednesday, perhaps around 4.00, and the parties can bring, in

3 writing, their arguments as concisely as possible because with respect to

4 the exhibits, because with regard to those presented during the rebuttal

5 and rejoinder, we had a lot of discussion. It is always a good idea to

6 have concise arguments and this also applies to the other disputed

7 exhibits. So Wednesday around 4.00. I apologise for upsetting your

8 fishing.

9 MR. HARMON: The fish don't -- thank you. They never get caught

10 anyway, Mr. President.

11 Mr. President, I'm happy to abide by that schedule. That, again,

12 leaves the issue of the argument on the motion for a continuance, that

13 will also be the same date, I take it. And if I could either now or on

14 that date put in the record the facts I'd like to about Witness II. If I

15 could reserve that until Wednesday as well, I would appreciate it.

16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. All the questions

17 that are outstanding, we need to finish with them on Wednesday, not only

18 the exhibit but all the other matters.

19 What about the Defence? Are you agreeable with this procedure?

20 You're not going fishing, Mr. Visnjic.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, but my colleague

22 Mr. Petrusic will not be here next week, so if the Trial Chamber does not

23 mind, we would like to ask your leave for me alone to be present for that

24 hearing.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. As you know, we appreciate

1 very much the presence of Mr. Petrusic, but it is up to you to organise

2 yourselves. The courtroom is happy to have you present, but if you agree

3 on that procedure, we have no problem with this.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Okay, then. I think that we

6 have come to a way out of this situation. So we will meet again on

7 Wednesday at 4.00 to address the remaining issues. So have a good weekend

8 and success in your work.

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

10 at 3.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,

11 the 11th day of April, 2001, at

12 4.00 p.m.

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