1. 1 Tuesday, 19th January, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 (The accused entered court)

    4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

    6 Case number IT-95-16-T, the Prosecutor versus Zoran

    7 Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago

    8 Josipovic, Dragan Papic, and Vladimir Santic.

    9 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. Good morning.

    10 Counsel Radovic?

    11 MR. RADOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. I

    12 just wish to notify the Trial Chamber that we have

    13 submitted a motion to the Appeals Chamber and submitted

    14 an appeal regarding the ruling of the Trial Chamber

    15 that the examination-in-chief of common witnesses

    16 should be carried out by only one Defence counsel, for

    17 it is our view that in the case of joint witnesses

    18 proposed by all Defence counsel, that each individual

    19 Defence counsel is entitled to examine that witness.

    20 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes. You mean your appeal is

    21 about the question of re-examination by the various

    22 Defence counsel.

    23 JUDGE MAY: Examination-in-chief.

    24 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes, examination-in-chief,

    25 but I think you mainly wish to focus on the question of

  2. 1 whether or not various Defence counsel can re-examine

    2 one witness because, of course, you have been allowed

    3 to cross-examine a witness who has been examined in

    4 chief by one Defence counsel.

    5 All right. Thank you. Thank you for

    6 notifying the Trial Chamber of your appeal. Thank you

    7 so much.

    8 Before we bring in the next witness, I would

    9 like to ask Defence counsel whether they could be so

    10 kind as to submit, maybe by next Monday, a consolidated

    11 list of witnesses so that we can have a clear picture

    12 of how many witnesses are being called for, say, Count

    13 1, and then for each Defence counsel. Count 1 is a

    14 count of persecution, of course, involves quite a few

    15 Defence counsel and all accused, so we could have just

    16 one list for that particular count, and then each

    17 Defence counsel could establish his own or her own

    18 list, so that we have, as I say, a complete list of

    19 witnesses.

    20 Good. I think we may now proceed. I wonder

    21 whether the next witness could be brought in, Mr. Vlado

    22 Alilovic, I think, and there are no protective measures

    23 envisaged for this particular witness.

    24 (The witness entered court)

    25 JUDGE CASSESE: On reflection, I think it

  3. 1 would probably be appropriate, in view of the motion

    2 for appeal which has been filed by Counsel Radovic, for

    3 the Trial Chamber to issue a written decision on this

    4 matter so that the ruling is supported by reasons, and

    5 this would probably facilitate the Appeals Chamber in

    6 either upholding the appeal or dismissing the appeal.

    7 I think it is just for the sake of better proceedings.

    8 Yes, Counsel Radovic?

    9 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. President, I would agree

    10 with you, but we know roughly what your reasoning will

    11 be, as you have already explained that to us, so if you

    12 will write a written ruling, we have already submitted

    13 our appeal, and in any event, this will facilitate the

    14 work of the Appeals Chamber.

    15 JUDGE CASSESE: Very good. Thank you so

    16 much.

    17 Good morning, Mr. Alilovic. Could you please

    18 make the solemn declaration?

    19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    20 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    21 truth.

    22 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. You may be

    23 seated.

    24 Counsel Slokovic-Glumac, are you going

    25 to examine in chief?

  4. 1 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: No. Counsel Susak.

    2 JUDGE CASSESE: Oh, sorry. Yes, Counsel

    3 Susak. I apologise.

    4 MR. SUSAK: Thank you, Mr. President.


    6 Examined by Mr. Susak:

    7 Q. Good morning, Mr. Alilovic.

    8 A. Good morning.

    9 Q. Is this your first appearance in court?

    10 A. Yes, it is.

    11 Q. I will be asking you some questions today,

    12 and I expect you to answer them. So can we begin?

    13 A. Yes, we can begin. Let me just have some

    14 water, please.

    15 Q. Will you please tell us when you were born

    16 and where?

    17 A. I was born in 1948 in Donja Rovna, Busovaca

    18 municipality.

    19 Q. When did you come to live in Vitez?

    20 A. I arrived in 1976 and I have been living and

    21 working there since.

    22 Q. And what is your occupation?

    23 A. My occupation is an economist and especially

    24 for internal trade, I specialise in internal trade.

    25 Q. What did you do before the war and during the

  5. 1 war?

    2 A. I worked in my field, the field I have been

    3 trained for.

    4 Q. Were you a military man during the war?

    5 A. No, I was not in the military during the war.

    6 Q. So you lived in Vitez?

    7 A. Yes, I lived in Vitez since 1976, as I have

    8 already said.

    9 Q. In view of the fact that you were in Vitez,

    10 could you tell us the relationship between the Muslims

    11 and Croats there, before the elections and after the

    12 elections, so we can make a difference?

    13 A. The relationships between the Muslims and

    14 Croats before the elections were good, relatively good,

    15 for at least as far as I know, nothing ever surfaced

    16 that could indicate poor relations.

    17 Q. May I just ask you, Mr. Alilovic, could speak

    18 more slowly so that the interpreters can follow?

    19 And after the elections ...

    20 A. I would say that relations between Muslims

    21 and Croats during the elections were also good. One

    22 could even say that they may have been better than

    23 before the elections for the simple reason that both

    24 ethnic groups, aspiring towards democratic changes,

    25 used the same methods in the election campaign and very

  6. 1 frequently sought jointly to win over as many voters as

    2 possible in order to achieve their goal, and that was

    3 to get more votes so as to be able to carry out

    4 democratic changes.

    5 Q. Now, we've said what relations were like

    6 before and during the elections. Could you tell us now

    7 what they were like before the conflict and after the

    8 conflict and whether they deteriorated?

    9 A. Those relations, after the elections, were

    10 good for quite some time. In fact, they were good

    11 until, after some time, quite opposing views emerged as

    12 regards the developments in Yugoslavia or in Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina; that is, until positions were taken

    14 regarding the concentration of vast forces of the

    15 Yugoslav People's Army, both in manpower and equipment,

    16 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their use for the

    17 aggression against Croatia.

    18 Q. Thank you. What about the relationships

    19 between the SDA and the HDZ parties?

    20 A. I have already said that the relations

    21 between the parties during the elections were good and

    22 also for a long time after the elections; in fact, all

    23 the time I would say that those relations were quite

    24 good because party representatives were often in touch

    25 with one another.

  7. 1 Q. Before we discuss the elections themselves,

    2 could you tell us how the population was composed in

    3 Vitez municipality?

    4 A. According to the 1991 census, the population

    5 of Vitez was 27.679 inhabitants, out of which 12.679

    6 Croats or 45.7 per cent, Muslims numbered 11.471 or

    7 41.4 per cent, Serbs 1.502 or 5.4 per cent, Yugoslavs

    8 1.362 or 4.9 per cent, others 714 or 2.6 per cent.

    9 Among the others, there were some Montenegrins, a few

    10 Slovenes, and some Romanies or Gypsies.

    11 Q. Tell us now what the election results were.

    12 A. The elections were held at the end of 1990

    13 and the results were as follows: the Former League of

    14 Communists or the SDP won 18.6 per cent of the votes or

    15 2.711 votes; the SDA won 4.470 votes or 30.7 per cent;

    16 the HDZ, 5.849 or 40.2 per cent; the SDS, 476 or 3.3

    17 per cent; the Reformist forces, 564 or 3.9 per cent;

    18 and the League of Socialist Youth, 306 or 2.1

    19 per cent. There were more than 14.000 voters who

    20 participated in the polls.

    21 Q. After the elections, how were the authorities

    22 composed and how did they function and the bodies of

    23 government?

    24 A. I apologise, but it seems to me that I can't

    25 hear the interpreter too well.

  8. 1 Q. Well, increase the volume. You have a button

    2 for the volume, plus/minus. Can you hear better now?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Could you tell us how the authorities

    5 functioned after the elections?

    6 A. I know that after the elections, that is the

    7 HDZ party won the mandate to form a government, that

    8 the government was successfully constituted, and, at

    9 the beginning of 1991, it started functioning normally.

    10 Q. How were the various government departments

    11 formed, if you know?

    12 A. I know that the two most important positions

    13 were divided so that Mr. Ivan Santic became president

    14 of the municipality, as a representative of the HDZ,

    15 and that the president of the executive body was

    16 Mr. Fuad Kaknjo, whereas the other positions were

    17 shared out to correspond to the results in the

    18 elections, and I think that there were no serious

    19 problems in that area. On the contrary.

    20 Q. Are you aware of village guards and the

    21 Territorial Defence and how it operated at the time?

    22 A. As far as I know, the village guards began to

    23 be formed after the attack on the village of Ravno at

    24 the end of 1991 or, rather, at the end of the month of

    25 October. In some villages, those guards were at first

  9. 1 joint guards because the population in most villages of

    2 Vitez municipality was mixed, and those guards, as far

    3 as I know, remained operative until the conflict.

    4 Q. At first, they were joint?

    5 A. Yes, they were jointly composed for some

    6 time.

    7 Q. Fine. So we come to the point when a split

    8 occurred. Could you tell us when and how relations

    9 between the Muslims and Croats deteriorated and why?

    10 A. A deterioration of relations between the

    11 Croats and the Muslims occurred, as I have already

    12 briefly mentioned in my testimony, when quite opposing

    13 views were taken regarding the aggression on Croatia.

    14 The Croatian side thought that after the aggression

    15 against Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina would become the

    16 target of aggression. The official authorities of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or at least the high-level leaders,

    18 upheld the view that that was not Bosnia's war and that

    19 they were not interested in it but, rather, that this

    20 was a war exclusively between Serbs and Croats.

    21 When those forces were amassed in large

    22 numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in terms of troops

    23 and equipment, the official authorities of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a decision to remain

    25 neutral. As for relationships in Vitez itself, they

  10. 1 continued to be maintained at what I would call a

    2 satisfactory level.

    3 Q. Very well. Tell us, immediately prior to the

    4 outbreak of hostilities, how was arming carried out, or

    5 perhaps you could tell us what were the causes that

    6 prompted the formation of the Croatian Defence Council,

    7 the HVO?

    8 A. The causes behind the formation of the

    9 Croatian Defence Council were the differences in the

    10 approach to defence between the Croats and Muslims and

    11 the assessment that, in view of the current military

    12 and political situation, something should be done to

    13 prepare for defence against the Serbian aggression, and

    14 towards the end of 1991 already, people started

    15 seriously thinking about preparations for defence, and

    16 they acquired the means in various ways.

    17 Q. Will you tell us how they were armed, and let

    18 me refresh your memory, could you tell us what you know

    19 about Slimena and the Busovaca barracks?

    20 A. We were talking about village guards a moment

    21 ago, and they were armed with their own personal

    22 sidearms, hunting weapons, and some weapons that they

    23 managed to get hold of in various ways, most often on

    24 the black market. But by the beginning of 1992

    25 already, because of the overall military and political

  11. 1 situation, serious thought was given to the need for

    2 acquiring larger quantities of weapons, and the only

    3 possibility was to regain control of the equipment of

    4 the Territorial Defence, which had been placed under

    5 the control of the Yugoslav People's Army, and also

    6 possibly to capture one of the barracks of the Yugoslav

    7 People's Army.

    8 It was along those lines that activities were

    9 undertaken to try and negotiate the surrender of the

    10 Busovaca barracks and the capture of the military depot

    11 in ^ Slimena that you have mentioned.

    12 Q. Who provided the initiative for taking the

    13 weapons in ^ Slimena? I am referring to both Croats

    14 and Muslims now.

    15 A. The initiative came from the Croatian side,

    16 that is sure, and that was how preparations were made

    17 to capture it. This happened sometime in mid April

    18 1992.

    19 Q. When this happened, how were those weapons

    20 shared out? Were the Muslims given an equal share or

    21 not?

    22 A. I know that in that barracks, the entire

    23 equipment for the Territorial Defence of Central Bosnia

    24 were stored there, which means a very large quantity of

    25 weapons. Immediately after the capture of that depot,

  12. 1 negotiations started between the Croats and Muslims,

    2 and the Muslims insisted on the weapons being shared,

    3 and eventually an agreement to that effect was

    4 reached. Some of those weapons were certainly

    5 destroyed, but the remainder was shared out 50/50.

    6 This was done more or less with the weapons that were

    7 captured in Busovaca.

    8 Q. That was just what I was going to say. Were

    9 those weapons shared out 50/50 as well?

    10 A. Yes, as far as I know.

    11 Q. What could you tell us about the civilian

    12 authority? Were there parallel organisations of the

    13 Muslims and the Croats, because we already said that

    14 after the elections the authorities were formed

    15 jointly. Later on a separation occurred, so tell us

    16 how that happened. Did this happen by municipalities,

    17 did it take place gradually?

    18 A. After the depot and the barracks were seized

    19 and the weapons captured, the people certainly felt

    20 safer should the Serbs decide to commit aggression.

    21 Already in April Kupres had been captured and

    22 the Yugoslav People's Army forces were already on the

    23 slopes of Mount Vlasic. And on the south eastern side

    24 and the southwestern, and virtually from all sides,

    25 Central Bosnia, in the broadest sense, was closed in,

  13. 1 or, in a sense, under blockade, or at least that was

    2 the expectation, that it would be blocked.

    3 Due to the capture of Kupres and the only

    4 road leading out to the world, and the only road that

    5 could be used for supply, both supplies of good and

    6 other necessities, the Croatian side started thinking

    7 how it could address the problem of communication and

    8 lift the blockade so as to open the way towards Bosnia

    9 and Croatia.

    10 The Muslim side, it at the time, adopted a

    11 rather passive attitude toward the problem and was

    12 inert, and that is why the Croatian people, as a whole,

    13 thought about forming the Croatian Defence Council and

    14 the highest body for the preparations of the defence

    15 and as the highest executive power, and that is how the

    16 HVO was formed at the municipality level. This

    17 occurred on the 10th of July already.

    18 Q. And who was the first president of the HVO?

    19 A. So the official authorities were renamed to

    20 become the Croatian Defence Council.

    21 Q. When these municipal governments were formed

    22 at the HVO level, how did the Muslims behave? What did

    23 they do?

    24 A. On the 10th of July in '92, in Vitez, the

    25 Croatian Defence Council was formed as a civil

  14. 1 authority in order to carry out preparations in the

    2 best possible way for defence from aggression and

    3 preparations for the winter in that sense, and this

    4 was, in fact, an executive authority.

    5 The Muslims were offered the option to join

    6 the authority in accordance with the proportional votes

    7 from the elections, and these negotiations lasted about

    8 a month, even longer than that, but they refused to

    9 join this government and they formed a parallel

    10 government. These governments were operating in the

    11 same building for about a month, and then after that

    12 they withdrew and separated and went to a different

    13 location.

    14 Q. In Mahala you want to say?

    15 A. Yes, in Mahala.

    16 Q. When the government separated did the police

    17 separate as well?

    18 A. You asked me before that who the President

    19 was of the Croatian Defence Council. The first

    20 president was the same president, former president of

    21 the municipality, Mr. Ivan Santic. And his deputy, as

    22 far as the organisation went, was Mr. Pero Skopljak.

    23 Q. Could you please tell us -- answer what I

    24 asked you about the police? Was there a division among

    25 the police as well between the two sides?

  15. 1 A. No, there was no division right away but

    2 after a certain time, yes, the police divided too.

    3 Q. How many kinds of police were there?

    4 A. At that time already there were four kinds of

    5 police, military police within the HVO, civil police

    6 within HVO, and then military police within the BH

    7 army, the Muslim side, and the civilian police.

    8 Q. So two civilian police forces and two

    9 military police forces?

    10 A. Yes, that's right.

    11 Q. When we are talking about this, could we talk

    12 about the health centre? Was there a health centre

    13 in -- health clinic in Vitez, and was this an

    14 institution for both Muslims and for Croats or was

    15 there a separation there as well?

    16 A. There was a health clinic in Vitez. It was

    17 of quite a considerable size. It was an institution

    18 that was a joint institution for both Croats and

    19 Muslims until serious conflicts started.

    20 Q. What was the economy like at that time after

    21 the authorities were formed? What was the financial

    22 make-up?

    23 A. The Croatian Defence Council, when it was

    24 formed, the situation within the economic sector was

    25 serious already, and in that sense the government of

  16. 1 the Croatian Defence Council determined priorities at

    2 that time, as a priority how to resolve and stabilise

    3 the situation in the economy.

    4 First of all, given the political and

    5 military circumstances, how to resolve the key problems

    6 such as the problem of provision for the supplies for

    7 the population. And in order to resolve this problem

    8 of supplying the citizens, which was a very important

    9 problem, it was essential to resolve on a priority

    10 basis the completion of certain communications through

    11 which the required quantities of food and other

    12 necessities could be delivered. So we were working on

    13 this link, this communication. We invested a lot of

    14 funds and efforts in that, and we called it the

    15 'Saviour's Path.'

    16 So the construction of the path of salvation

    17 was begun in order to provide enough food and other

    18 essential things that were, first of all, primarily

    19 required for defence from aggression.

    20 This -- it was reported by the media that the

    21 Serb forces were seriously thinking about joining their

    22 forces from Vlasic, through the Lasva Valley, with the

    23 forces which were already in Kobiljaca in front of

    24 Sarajevo. So in such circumstances, the situation, the

    25 spirit among the people, the mood among the people was

  17. 1 exceptionally bad. Panic was among the people. The

    2 situation on the market was already such that it looked

    3 like anything but like a normal situation.

    4 The Croatia Defence Council, through its

    5 supply unit, was thinking about ways to resolve this

    6 problem, including, of course, engaging other

    7 departments, such as the Department of the Economy, and

    8 others to resolve some problems within their

    9 jurisdiction.

    10 Q. Before we discuss the make-up of the HVO

    11 government for the Court to have a better view, what

    12 were the duties -- what were your duties at the time in

    13 the HVO government?

    14 A. I was a representative from the -- I was head

    15 of the supply division in the HVO government, and it

    16 was logical for this department to be within the

    17 economical department, but HVO government felt that the

    18 supply problem deserved serious thought and that it

    19 should be formed as a special separate department. So

    20 I was in charge of this supply department.

    21 Q. Did you perform any other duties except for

    22 the ones related to supply? Can you tell us anything

    23 about humanitarian aid and what were your duties

    24 regarding that?

    25 A. Within the HVO government there was a

  18. 1 department for refugees and displaced persons, and we

    2 accepted and distributed humanitarian aid in our

    3 department. So it was my job to try to resolve the

    4 problem of supply.

    5 As far as humanitarian aid is concerned, at

    6 that time I did not have complete data, but I know that

    7 very little aid actually arrived in order to meet the

    8 needs of the population and the growing number of

    9 refugees at that time. For that reason I would like to

    10 go back again to the duties -- to my duties.

    11 The HVO government entrusted me with finding

    12 ways of how to resolve the problem of the growing

    13 requirements for supply. In view of the overall

    14 military and political situation was the way I

    15 mentioned before, and the fact that the HVO government

    16 did not have a lot of funds at its disposal, together

    17 with the chief of the economics department, I proposed

    18 ways on -- to resolve the problem of supply.

    19 We decided to offer a sort of winter package

    20 of the most necessary winter goods in order to bridge

    21 this period until springtime, and in order to bridge

    22 the longest possible period. So the HVO government

    23 offered a package of the most important provisions and

    24 was looking for the most favourable offers, and

    25 announced to the public that it would guarantee the

  19. 1 delivery of these provisions and that the citizens

    2 would need to pay in advance for this. This was the

    3 only realistic option to ensure the greatest amounts of

    4 provisions in the shortest possible time to satisfy the

    5 needs of the citizens and to resolve the problems that

    6 I discussed.

    7 So in a very brief time, thanks to the fact

    8 that there were a lot of private businessmen in Vitez

    9 who were successful traders, we asked for bids for

    10 these goods. And when I talk about strategic goods I

    11 mean flour, oil, salt, potatoes. So in a month we

    12 managed to receive enough bids so that we could offer

    13 the citizens these goods with the guarantee of the HVO

    14 that the provisions would be delivered before the onset

    15 of winter. So we had to work very quickly, because it

    16 is well-known that the communications already in

    17 October and November could become impassable.

    18 So based on some 7.700 households in Vitez,

    19 we estimated that we needed to ensure 1.5 million

    20 kilogrammes of goods for winter provisions. Before

    21 that, the economics department recommended that maximum

    22 number quantities of these goods should be ensured for

    23 their workers, for their employees, so that in

    24 September the situation was much different regarding

    25 the provision of citizens.

  20. 1 The winter provision was carried out quite

    2 successfully, so that the majority of citizens in Vitez

    3 had sufficient quantities of goods and could safely

    4 await the winter.

    5 Q. Mr. Alilovic, when you talk about provisions,

    6 were Muslims and Croats equally supplied with these

    7 goods?

    8 A. Absolutely. The policy of the HVO government

    9 was to supply all the citizens of Vitez, because only

    10 in that way could it be counted on good interethnic

    11 relations that peace could be preserved, and in that

    12 sense the President of the HVO government, Mr. Santic,

    13 and myself had the need and the task to carry out this

    14 work to mutual satisfaction. And this job was carried

    15 out for all the citizens of Vitez, and I think that the

    16 participation in this winter provision -- there was a

    17 little less supply that went to the Muslims than it did

    18 to the Croats, because the number of Muslims who had

    19 applied was less than the number of Croats, but they

    20 did accept this with a certain amount of doubt, but it

    21 started off successfully and this number grew so there

    22 was -- there was no problem on that side to accept

    23 these supplies.

    24 Q. We have already mentioned the question of

    25 humanitarian aid. As far as you know, did humanitarian

  21. 1 organisations such as Caritas and Merhamet, were they

    2 active in Vitez?

    3 A. Yes, of course they operated. The first

    4 humanitarian organisation that was active in Vitez was

    5 the municipal, the county Caritas organisation, and it

    6 started its activities very early. It was the only

    7 organisation to be active in Vitez right until '92.

    8 Then in '92 Merhamet was formed, at the time

    9 when a lot of expelled Muslims arrived in Vitez. So

    10 Merhamet was formed as an organisation. There was a

    11 need for them to have their own humanitarian

    12 organisation which would meet the growing needs of the

    13 expelled persons, whose number was growing daily.

    14 In the beginning, I know that Caritas also

    15 provided for both the needs of the Muslims and the

    16 Croats as much as it was possible. In '92, in the

    17 second half of '92, other humanitarian organisations

    18 appeared, such as the High Commissioner and the Red

    19 Cross, and they were active in that region, but this

    20 was, as I said, insufficient in order to provide for

    21 the needs of the citizens and to reduce tensions and

    22 the fears about approaching winter and how to live

    23 through the period of winter in view of the fact that

    24 the overall military and political situation was very

    25 serious.

  22. 1 Q. We spoke here about the relations between

    2 Muslims and Croats and aid. Did you know that after

    3 the formation of the HVO authorities there was a

    4 coordinating committee for the protection of Muslims?

    5 A. Yes. I know about that. It was formed maybe

    6 about a month after the formation of the HVO, this

    7 body, the coordinating committee for the protection of

    8 the interests of Muslims was formed.

    9 Q. What was the objective of that committee?

    10 What does it mean, the protection of Muslims? What's

    11 the intention?

    12 A. I think this was a way to achieve or

    13 implement parallel power, at least that's how I

    14 understood it, because it did happen that parallel

    15 authorities were being formed.

    16 Q. You said that there were a lot of refugees in

    17 Vitez and this humanitarian organisation Merhamet was

    18 formed. Were there more refugees in Vitez? Were there

    19 more Muslim or Croat refugees in Vitez?

    20 A. As far as refugees are concerned in Vitez,

    21 this can be viewed or should be viewed according to the

    22 different periods. At the beginning of '92, after the

    23 fall of Kupres and other parts of Bosnia such as Kotor

    24 Varos, the number of refugees was more or less the

    25 same, but as time went on, as we went on later into '92

  23. 1 in Vitez and particularly after the fall of Jajce, the

    2 opposite situation occurred in Vitez, there was a much

    3 greater number of Muslim refugees in Vitez, and this

    4 can also apply to the whole of Central Bosnia. Already

    5 by November, after the fall of Jajce, the situation was

    6 obvious, that a large number of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    7 was occupied, the greatest part was practically

    8 cleansed of Croats and Serbs, and then in this period,

    9 from the second half of '92 until the end of '92, the

    10 greatest number of refugees of Muslim nationality came

    11 to Central Bosnia and then, in large numbers, they also

    12 came to Vitez.

    13 It was estimated at that time that there were

    14 about 4.500 to 5.000 refugees of Muslim nationality and

    15 about 1.000 to 1.500 Croatian refugees.

    16 Q. I would like to ask you, among the refugees

    17 who came to Central Bosnia, especially to Vitez, were

    18 there any able-bodied men, especially among the Muslim

    19 refugees, men fit for military duty?

    20 A. Yes, of course, there were able-bodied men

    21 fit for military duty. It's estimated that only in

    22 Central Bosnia there were about 80.000 Muslims from --

    23 were estimated to have arrived in Central Bosnia, about

    24 80.000 Muslims, and this was a greater number than the

    25 total number of Croats in Central Bosnia. So it is

  24. 1 certain that amongst such a large number of refugees,

    2 there were a lot of able-bodied men and also a large

    3 number of armed persons.

    4 Looking at it from a broader aspect, the

    5 largest number of Muslim refugees were in Central

    6 Bosnia. There was a smaller number of Croats. I know

    7 that in Jajce, all the Croats had left and all the

    8 Muslims had stayed.

    9 Q. So all the Croats had left and all the

    10 Muslims had stayed in Vitez?

    11 A. Yes. This was the situation for Zenica,

    12 Busovaca, Travnik, but also for Vitez.

    13 Q. Now we will go back to the composition of the

    14 government. So if you could please tell us about the

    15 composition of the HVO?

    16 A. The government was organised, as I mentioned

    17 in the beginning, it was organised in departments.

    18 There were several departments, and the key departments

    19 at that time were the department for economy,

    20 department for supply, as I said, then department for

    21 national defence, civil police affairs, department for

    22 the land books, legal questions, social affairs, and

    23 also the general administration department. So there

    24 were about nine or ten departments. There was a

    25 department for displaced persons, for refugees.

  25. 1 Q. Could you tell us where that government was

    2 based?

    3 A. The seat of the government was in the

    4 municipal building where the government was organised.

    5 Q. Is that where the government was permanently?

    6 A. Yes, the government was there until the

    7 outbreak of hostilities, and then it was transferred to

    8 a different location because the building was shelled

    9 and there were no conditions there for normal

    10 operation.

    11 Q. Who was the president of the government then

    12 and -- you already mentioned Ivan Santic and Pero

    13 Skopljak.

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Was the government permanently in session?

    16 Were all the members of the government present at their

    17 meetings?

    18 A. The government had meetings or was in session

    19 frequently in view of the fact that there were a lot of

    20 problems. I most frequently attended these government

    21 meetings, but it happened sometimes that because of my

    22 other duties, I would miss meetings. So it was in

    23 session. They passed around information about the

    24 current problems, the ways to resolve them, and so on.

    25 Q. Did the government make decisions?

  26. 1 A. Yes, they made decisions at the level of the

    2 government.

    3 Q. At what other levels were decisions made?

    4 A. The decisions were made, decisions,

    5 conclusions, recommendations were made at the

    6 government level, but most often recommendations were

    7 made at the level of the department because the

    8 departments were quite independent in carrying out

    9 their duties, and there was a need occasionally to

    10 exchange information and to provide information to the

    11 government about what has been carried out.

    12 Q. You said the president was Ivan Santic.

    13 A. Yes, Ivan Santic was president of the HVO

    14 government all the time.

    15 Q. Was he president of the crisis committee as

    16 well?

    17 A. Yes. Mr. Santic, according to his post, was

    18 also president of the crisis committee.

    19 Q. Did he ever make decisions on his own without

    20 the government?

    21 A. Yes, he did have that option, and he probably

    22 did make the decisions alone.

    23 Q. We mentioned here the department for

    24 defence. What was the task, the duty, what were the

    25 duties of the Vitez defence department?

  27. 1 A. The duties of the Vitez defence department

    2 were to organise all the documentation pertaining to

    3 military conscripts, also according to need to carry

    4 out mobilisation. I think that it also contacted the

    5 village guards initially and then later to organise the

    6 military conscripts, maintain lists of military

    7 conscripts.

    8 Q. So the role of the department was

    9 mobilisation?

    10 A. Yes, that was its role.

    11 Q. So the mobilisation was carried out by

    12 filling in the ranks?

    13 A. Yes, that's what the job is.

    14 Q. What were you doing as a member of the

    15 government regarding mobilisation? What was your

    16 task? In the government, you said you did not deal

    17 with the military questions but your duties had to do

    18 with the supply.

    19 A. Yes, my duties throughout that period were

    20 regarding the problems of supplies. I did not have

    21 anything to do with military questions except sometimes

    22 I had the opportunity to hear some information about

    23 the situation in the other departments. So my tasks

    24 from the very beginning, right until the cease-fire

    25 with the Muslims, was always the same, all the way

  28. 1 until the Dayton accords, and if I may add, at the

    2 beginning of the war, besides supplies, my duties also

    3 included the coordination of humanitarian aid at the

    4 beginning of the conflict.

    5 Q. Now we will go back. Do you remember the

    6 first conflict on the 20th of October in '92?

    7 A. Yes, I remember.

    8 Q. How did that happen?

    9 A. I had the opportunity to receive information

    10 at an HVO government meeting that at a road between

    11 Vitez and Busovaca, barricades were put up by certain

    12 armed groups of Muslims. An attempt was made to have

    13 the roadblock removed by peaceful means, but these

    14 talks were not successful and the roadblock was removed

    15 by force.

    16 Q. Were any houses destroyed and was anyone

    17 killed?

    18 A. A serious resistance was put up. There was

    19 an exchange of fire and, as a result, several houses

    20 were damaged.

    21 Q. Was an agreement on reconciliation reached

    22 and an agreement to repair the houses?

    23 A. Yes. After the barricade was removed, I

    24 think that during the working hours of that same day, a

    25 truce was agreed on, and the proposal was made or,

  29. 1 rather, an agreement was reached that every effort be

    2 made to repair the damaged houses as soon as possible

    3 so that they can be used again, and I think that this

    4 was successfully resolved a few days later.

    5 Q. We will proceed now immediately to the

    6 conflict of the 16th of April, '93, but before then,

    7 could you list the incidents that occurred in the

    8 meantime, if you could, the incidents between the

    9 Croats and Muslims?

    10 A. Before the roadblock, I know that, on the

    11 17th or the 18th, a roadblock was put up on the road

    12 between Travnik and Novi Travnik and that this

    13 roadblock was put there by the Muslims, and during

    14 attempts to have it removed, again there was fire

    15 exchanged, and I think that an assistant commander of

    16 the HVO in Travnik was killed and another person who

    17 was there during attempts to agree to appease the

    18 situation and remove the barricade.

    19 I also know that there were a number of

    20 incidents in Novi Travnik or, rather, that -- but these

    21 were successfully overcome, and also I think it was on

    22 the 19th or maybe the 18th, a conflict of broader

    23 proportions occurred in Novi Travnik. Actually, a

    24 shelling occurred and exchange of heavy gunfire, and

    25 this went on for some time, even after the roadblock

  30. 1 was removed between Vitez and Busovaca.

    2 I also know that the military police in

    3 Travnik was attacked, it was housed in the music

    4 school, and before that, maybe -- some time before

    5 that, there was an incident in Kiseljak and so on.

    6 Q. So that brings us to the 16th of April,

    7 1993. Where were you on the 15th of April?

    8 A. On the 15th of April, I was at work.

    9 Q. What can you tell us about the 16th of April,

    10 '93? How did you learn that a conflict had occurred?

    11 A. I learnt about it because I was awakened by

    12 the sound of fire.

    13 Q. What time was this?

    14 A. This was about 6.00 in the morning.

    15 Q. Since you were a member of the HVO

    16 government, what was your duty after that?

    17 A. In the course of the day, I was called in by

    18 the president of the HVO, Mr. Santic, to try to come to

    19 work so that we could discuss the question of

    20 organisation of supply, but I answered that I would not

    21 be able to come unless there was a lull in the

    22 fighting, and, in fact, I managed to get there on the

    23 17th, and I was given my regular assignment there to

    24 organise the supply of both citizens and the soldiers,

    25 if the conflict should continue.

  31. 1 Therefore, I couldn't go immediately when I

    2 was called in, but I did manage to get there the next

    3 day and to meet with Mr. Santic who gave me this

    4 assignment to try and organise supply in spite of the

    5 circumstances and to try and organise the collection of

    6 potatoes that had arrived for planting, and we

    7 discussed all these matters very briefly. He simply

    8 gave me the task to try and organise all questions

    9 related to supply despite the circumstances and, if the

    10 conflict should continue, to find a way to deal with

    11 it.

    12 Q. As you were unable to get there, how did you

    13 communicate with him?

    14 A. I communicated by telephone.

    15 Q. Do you know whether Ivan Santic spoke to

    16 other employees and did he give them other assignments

    17 on that day?

    18 A. Yes. The telephone lines were functioning.

    19 He informed me that it was nothing abnormal, that I had

    20 to try and continue doing my work because each of the

    21 members of the government had their responsibilities to

    22 perform.

    23 Q. Did Ivica Santic inform you whether he had

    24 informed other members of the government of their

    25 assignments?

  32. 1 A. I was afraid then, but he said, "Don't be

    2 afraid. The situation is such as it is, and all the

    3 heads of departments are duty-bound to organise the

    4 activities within their department," and that meant

    5 myself as well.

    6 Q. Did you know that a conflict would occur on

    7 the 16th of April, 1993?

    8 A. No, I didn't know.

    9 Q. Yes. You just said that you were awakened by

    10 the sound of shooting.

    11 We have a few more questions relating to the

    12 16th of April. Do you know the casualty figure for

    13 Ahmici? Were you informed about it?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Let me assist you. There's a list of the

    16 dead, but you said that this was not in your domain.

    17 But let me ask you something else: Do you know how

    18 Civil Defence functioned before the 16th of April and

    19 after the 16th of April?

    20 A. As far as Civil Defence is concerned, it was

    21 frequently a topic of discussion at meetings of the

    22 HVO, and I know that, even at the end of '91 and '92,

    23 it was relatively well-organised so that there were

    24 Civil Defence representatives in each village, and, if

    25 necessary, in fact, there were several representatives

  33. 1 in the same village, depending on the size of the

    2 village.

    3 Q. Do you know whether men were recruited to the

    4 Civil Defence and what exactly they did on the 16th of

    5 April, 1993? Did anyone inform you as a member of the

    6 government?

    7 A. Of course, I was informed that the Civil

    8 Defence had been given its own assignments, just like

    9 any other department, and its assignment was certainly

    10 to organise itself. How it did so, I really couldn't

    11 tell you.

    12 Q. What was the task of the Civil Defence on the

    13 16th of April?

    14 A. Well, the normal task of Civil Defence was to

    15 take care of civilians, women, children, and to do

    16 rehabilitation and rebuilding if necessary.

    17 Q. You said that the HVO government was the

    18 decision-maker. Did any one of the accused participate

    19 in that decision-making process?

    20 A. Who are you referring to?

    21 Q. The accused here present. Did any one of

    22 them participate in the decision-making of the HVO

    23 government?

    24 A. Of course not. Not any one of the accused

    25 could have, nor did they participate in the

  34. 1 decision-making at the level of the HVO government.

    2 Q. Did they participate in the negotiations

    3 between the Croats and Muslims on important issues such

    4 as exchange of prisoners, removal of barricades and the

    5 like?

    6 A. Personally, I think that they did not,

    7 because simply they didn't hold any such positions. As

    8 for their participation in the work of the HVO

    9 government or any influence on the government, I really

    10 don't know, or, rather, I don't think they could have

    11 had any influence.

    12 Q. And who did make those decision?

    13 A. What decisions are you referring to?

    14 Q. At the level of the HVO government, and who

    15 among the Croats took part in the negotiations on the

    16 major issues with the Muslims?

    17 A. Whenever important issues were discussed, the

    18 President of the Crisis Staff would participate, that

    19 is Mr. Santic, frequently the Deputy President

    20 Mr. Skopljak. Depending on the nature of the question

    21 discussed. If we were working on a relaxation of

    22 tensions, then some representative of the military

    23 would take part as well.

    24 Q. After the Muslims and Croats would reach an

    25 agreement, would the Croats observe those decisions?

  35. 1 I'm thinking of the decisions signed by HVO

    2 representatives.

    3 A. Yes, most frequently they would observe those

    4 decisions.

    5 Q. What about Muslims?

    6 A. There were cases when agreements were not

    7 carried through. Even after the 20th of October, for

    8 instance, in spite of the fact that the situation was

    9 successfully overcome, there were a number of

    10 incidents, but on both sides attempts were made to calm

    11 the situation down, and in most cases successfully.

    12 Q. Croats were also among the casualties of the

    13 war. Could you tell us where the Croats were victims,

    14 if you know?

    15 A. Do you mean in Vitez?

    16 Q. Yes, and in the surroundings, and perhaps in

    17 the direction of Busovaca. Do you know where Buhine

    18 Kuce is?

    19 A. Yes. The second most serious incident was

    20 the killing, with a shell, of six or seven children.

    21 In fact, two were wounded and, in fact, they died. So

    22 the total number of victims was eight children.

    23 Then there was the casualty figure in Buhine

    24 Kuce or Krizancevo Selo, where a total of 66 people

    25 were affected, out of which 34 were captured, but they

  36. 1 were also exchanged, some of them were killed. Then in

    2 Buhine Kuce again there were five or six casualties

    3 again, some of them killed.

    4 The first incident involving casualties in

    5 Central Bosnia occurred in the municipality of Dusina

    6 in Busovaca when the Muslim forces attacked Busovaca.

    7 I think some 15 or 16 civilians were killed.

    8 Q. Do you know whether Muslims and Croats were

    9 exchanged between Zenica and Vitez?

    10 A. I know that there were attempts to carry out

    11 exchanges at the beginning of the war -- or, rather the

    12 conflict. At least that was the information I received

    13 at one of the government meetings, that this attempt

    14 ended in such a way that all the Muslims who in the

    15 initial stages of the conflict were released home and

    16 were given the freedom to go where they wanted, whereas

    17 the agreement reached at the UNPROFOR base in Stari

    18 Bila, no Muslims came from Zenica as a result of that

    19 agreement.

    20 Q. And who participated in those talks on the

    21 Croatian side?

    22 A. In the first round the talks, as far as I

    23 know it was Mr. Skopljak and the commander of the Vitez

    24 Brigade, Mr. Mario Cerkez. That was in the UNPROFOR

    25 base, the first round of talks.

  37. 1 Mr. Skopljak, several days after the

    2 conflict, was dealing with the questions of exchange

    3 not only at the level of Vitez, but at the level of the

    4 whole of Central Bosnia.

    5 Q. Mr. Santic (sic), you were a member of the

    6 government. Perhaps you could tell us why the conflict

    7 between the Muslims and the Croats actually occurred,

    8 and could you please give us the causes of that

    9 conflict?

    10 A. In my opinion, the war -- or, rather, the

    11 conflict occurred for a number of reasons. I have

    12 mentioned some of them, and let me repeat it.

    13 First of all, the inertia on behalf of the

    14 Muslims, and the official policy in relation to the

    15 aggression against Croatia. President Izetbegovic, at

    16 the time, said that it wasn't our war, that it was a

    17 war between the Serbs and the Croats.

    18 Then there was the decision taken by the

    19 official authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina on their

    20 neutrality regarding the aggression.

    21 Then the military/political developments

    22 in'92, and the actual aggression against

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the influx of a large number of

    24 displaced persons to Central Bosnia, including Vitez.

    25 The presence of two armies, one might call

  38. 1 them, relatively well armed on a relatively small

    2 space. The balance between the Muslims and the Croats

    3 in the total population was roughly seven to one. It

    4 is estimated that in the period from the beginning of

    5 1993, there was a large influx of Muslim displaced

    6 persons, among whom many came relatively well armed.

    7 So that the ratio, the population ratio, certainly

    8 affected and contributed to the conflict.

    9 In my personal view, the position of the top

    10 level military leadership was that the Croats could

    11 very simply be subdued, because judging by many

    12 incidents that occurred in Vitez or within the Lasva

    13 River Valley as a whole, it was visible that activities

    14 were being coordinated from the highest level.

    15 Q. What do you mean when you said that the

    16 Croats could be easily subdued? Are you referring to

    17 the large number of well-armed displaced persons and

    18 able-bodied Muslims?

    19 A. I already said that the ratio was roughly

    20 seven to one in favour of the Muslims, and this in

    21 itself was an important factor, in my personal

    22 opinion. So in the broader region of Central Bosnia,

    23 they were quite well organised and quite well armed,

    24 and that this option was a viable one.

    25 Q. We have seen that the BH army did not capture

  39. 1 Vitez, but it did capture Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf and

    2 Fojnica. Could you tell us why that was so, bearing in

    3 mind that Bugojno is linked to Kupres, which is of

    4 major military significance for this area?

    5 A. The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not

    6 capture Vitez, as you said, but it did capture most of

    7 Vitez. But the HVO, after the truce was agreed with

    8 the Muslims, controlled about 35 per cent only, and

    9 this could roughly be said for other municipalities

    10 like Novi Travnik, where they held about 40 per cent,

    11 as far as I know. Also in Busovaca. But only 15 per

    12 cent of Travnik remained under HVO control. Therefore,

    13 the BH army did control most of Central Bosnia, pushing

    14 the Croats into small limited areas.

    15 Q. You didn't mention Kiseljak, which is also

    16 populated mostly by Croats.

    17 A. As far as I know, the situation in Kiseljak

    18 was more or less the same, but at the beginning the

    19 conflict in Busovaca, sometime in January, I know that

    20 Busovaca was virtually divided into two parts, the

    21 dividing line going through Kacuni. That is how the

    22 forces were divided too, along a length of some 10 to

    23 12 kilometres, maybe 13.

    24 Q. I wanted to ask you to explain how it was

    25 that Vitez found itself surrounded, and what did the

  40. 1 Muslims intend to do with Vitez in view of the fact

    2 that Bugojno had fell and that it had been captured by

    3 the Muslims? What was their intention? Because we

    4 know how Bugojno fell, Gornji Vakuf and Fojnica.

    5 A. Since I said that the highest military

    6 leadership felt that this would be relatively easy prey

    7 and they tried to capture it, and they were more or

    8 less successful, not only in Vitez, the Lasva Valley,

    9 but throughout Central Bosnia.

    10 My personal view is that an area of

    11 several -- if there had been a passage of a few

    12 kilometres through which people could have left, then

    13 they would have achieved their goal.

    14 Q. You have told us what their intention was.

    15 In other words, to achieve the same as they did in

    16 Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf and Fojnica. Could you tell us

    17 whether the Croats were chased out of these three

    18 towns?

    19 A. Yes. The Croats from Bugojno -- you asked

    20 me, "How did you explain" -- "How would you explain

    21 that Bugojno fell?"

    22 Q. Yes, because it is linked to Kupres and it

    23 has a better position than Vitez.

    24 A. It is rather difficult to explain, but

    25 clearly Bugojno, at least as far as I know, judging

  41. 1 from meetings of the HVO, Bugojno was relatively well

    2 armed, but it was defeated by the BH army even though

    3 it has Croatian enclaves behind it.

    4 Q. So you were saying that you were surrounded

    5 and you had no other choice but to fight until the end?

    6 A. Yes. Already in May, as far as I can

    7 remember, we were totally surrounded and there was

    8 absolutely no way out of Vitez. The only solution was

    9 to defend ourselves and fight for survival.

    10 Q. Would you tell us whether the Muslims wanted

    11 to put you under even greater strain by cutting off the

    12 main road?

    13 A. Yes, absolutely so. This was a very narrow

    14 area, and the strategy was to try and separate the

    15 forces between Busovaca and Vitez, and that was the

    16 gist of the strategy applied. I believe that if they

    17 had succeeded in cutting off Busovaca and Vitez, or

    18 dividing Vitez into two, there would have -- probably

    19 the forces would have had to surrender. However,

    20 thanks to the factory that we had and the amount of

    21 ammunition available to us that we could use for

    22 defence, as far as I have been informed, we managed

    23 successfully to resist attack.

    24 Q. You mentioned a moment ago the 16th of

    25 April. Do you know whether any Croats were killed in

  42. 1 Ahmici, or did you know any of the dead?

    2 A. Yes. I know that on the first day --

    3 actually, I learned several days after the conflict

    4 that five people were killed, and I know one of the men

    5 killed, Mirjan Santic, and I know a very young man who

    6 was killed from Rijeka.

    7 Q. And what were they?

    8 A. I don't know about the young man from Rijeka,

    9 but I know that Mirjan Santic was in the military

    10 police. I don't know the names of the others who were

    11 killed.

    12 Q. When you were listing the reasons of the war,

    13 you referred to a statement made by Alija Izetbegovic

    14 and the others. Were there any arrests of Croats in

    15 the period preceding the 16th of April, 1993?

    16 A. Yes, I did manage that some incidents

    17 occurred. There was tension. A group was intercepted

    18 in Kruscica, and they were taken into custody and

    19 beaten up, but nevertheless these difficulties were

    20 overcome.

    21 Q. You're referring to the period prior to the

    22 conflict?

    23 A. Yes, prior to the conflict.

    24 Q. Do you know of the case of Zivko Totic?

    25 A. Yes, I know that Mr. Zivko Totic, on the

  43. 1 15th -- or, rather, that he was a HVO commander in

    2 Zenica, and on the 15th he was intercepted by Muslim

    3 forces, and that all the members of his escort were

    4 killed and he was arrested.

    5 Q. Were there negotiations for him to be

    6 released?

    7 A. Yes. These were conducted by Mr. Pero

    8 Skopljak, and I know there was an exchange but I

    9 couldn't tell you when nor whom he was exchanged for.

    10 MR. SUSAK: Mr. President, as it is time for

    11 the break, with your permission I would suggest we take

    12 a break now because I will have another ten minutes of

    13 questioning, or shall I continue with the witness?

    14 JUDGE CASSESE: No, no. Let's take a break,

    15 a 30-minute break.

    16 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

    17 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

    18 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Susak?

    19 MR. SUSAK: Thank you, Mr. President.

    20 Q. Mr. Alilovic, we left off at Zivko Totic

    21 before the break, so could you please tell us whether

    22 he was released and returned to the HVO?

    23 A. Yes. I know that after the initial stage of

    24 the conflict, this was done. I don't know exactly

    25 when, maybe 15 or 20 days, maybe longer.

  44. 1 Q. Before, when you were responding to my

    2 questions, and since you were the head of the supply

    3 department, perhaps it would be a good thing if you

    4 explained to us the taxation system while you were a

    5 member of the government.

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Go ahead.

    8 A. Since, in the period when the HVO government

    9 was formed, the financial organisation that was in

    10 force then completely fell apart, and other

    11 organisations also fell apart, the economy and

    12 everything else, the municipality was practically in

    13 the situation of trying to resolve the taxation system

    14 on its own in order to get some funds. So the Croatian

    15 Defence Council, the finance department in fact, issued

    16 recommendations on the way to resolve this issue,

    17 meaning how to tax products.

    18 I remember that these taxes were much lower

    19 than in normal circumstances in view of the fact that

    20 the social situation of the population and all the

    21 other conditions were very serious.

    22 Q. You said that your work had to do with trade

    23 as a profession, and then you were in the supply

    24 department.

    25 A. Yes. For a while, I worked in the commerce

  45. 1 department, for three years, and then from 1979 until

    2 the end of the elections, I worked in my company, which

    3 was actually dealing with the supply of the citizens of

    4 Vitez, which it did before the war as well. In a

    5 municipality the size of Vitez, this would be one

    6 company whose job would be to supply the citizens in

    7 wholesale and retail. So in this sense, I worked in

    8 the retail department and then I worked in the

    9 wholesale department in the basic organisation of

    10 associated labour whose job it was to deal with

    11 wholesale. I worked in a company which was based in

    12 Zenica, but the unit of that company was in Vitez. So

    13 I worked in this job before I took on the other duties.

    14 Q. When you were a member of the HVO, you said

    15 that the government had frequent sessions. Did you

    16 always attend these important meetings?

    17 A. I did not attend the meetings always. It

    18 depends on which period we are talking about. When I

    19 was dealing with the problem of supply that I discussed

    20 earlier, and this would be the period of August,

    21 September, and October, and when I was busy with that,

    22 I did not always attend the meetings because I had a

    23 lot to do trying to fulfil the obligations that I had,

    24 and I tried to do that in the way that I thought best.

    25 Q. Did you submit reports to the government on

  46. 1 this issue, on supplying of the population in this

    2 region?

    3 A. Yes, of course. The frequent topic of

    4 discussion was the problem of supply that I talked

    5 about, so I did submit reports on a number of

    6 occasions, particularly in the period that we were

    7 actively dealing with the problem of supplying the

    8 population in order to go through the winter of '92-'93

    9 as best as possible.

    10 Q. Since you were head of the supply department,

    11 did you coordinate, did you provide logistics to the

    12 HVO or the Vitez Brigade? Was that one of your duties,

    13 you know, when mobilisation is going on, and then did

    14 you have anything to do regarding the logistics?

    15 A. Well, the government had that task, to assure

    16 certain supplies for the military units. At the start

    17 of the conflict, as I said before, since the conflict

    18 did not stop, I was entrusted with the job of providing

    19 certain quantities of food for the needs of logistics

    20 besides supplying the population, so it was my job to

    21 obtain certain quantities and deliver them to the units

    22 or to the brigade, and that's where my duties ended.

    23 Q. You said that you did not attend all the

    24 meetings. Did you work out on the ground, and what

    25 were your duties if you were out on the ground?

  47. 1 A. I was out on the ground a lot, and when we

    2 were actively dealing with the problem to provide

    3 winter supplies, I did tour a number of villages,

    4 explaining what was being offered in the package, what

    5 strategic goods were being offered to the citizens, the

    6 terms; and on several occasions, I also visited Muslim

    7 villages, explaining in the same way the offer, so that

    8 we would gain the trust and the confidence, and we got

    9 that pretty quickly because the first delivery was

    10 successfully carried out. So I did go out on the

    11 ground to make the offer and also when distribution was

    12 being carried out, and then during the war, I went out

    13 on the ground to organise the sowing, and also I bought

    14 certain agricultural products and cattle, and I would

    15 deliver that to the logistics unit for the needs of the

    16 military units. Of course, I did not do this myself.

    17 My department had a number of employees.

    18 Q. You said that you obtained these goods.

    19 Could you please tell us where you obtained the goods

    20 from, from which regions? Did you obtain the goods

    21 from outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    22 A. Yes. You could only get the goods, at the

    23 stage that I was talking about, exclusively from

    24 outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because at that

    25 stage, in May, June, July and the months after that,

  48. 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina was very badly supplied on the

    2 whole, and except in parts of Herzegovina, you could

    3 not obtain goods, so the goods were mainly obtained

    4 from Croatia, sometimes imported but mostly from

    5 Croatia.

    6 Q. If you obtained the goods from Croatia, how

    7 did you ensure safe passage of those goods?

    8 A. Already at that time, in October and

    9 November, regarding the security situation, it wasn't

    10 very safe, but this was nevertheless being organised.

    11 Q. Could you please tell us how this was

    12 organised?

    13 A. Goods were obtained -- as I said, in Vitez,

    14 we had a number of companies who were able to obtain

    15 the required quantities pretty efficiently. This is

    16 confirmed by the fact that in the period from March to

    17 October '92, a period when we were efficiently and

    18 actively organising the supply of winter goods through

    19 the companies, and we managed to cut in half the prices

    20 of strategic goods on the market. So that the price of

    21 flour, for example, in March or April, was 1.20 German

    22 marks, but in our package, it was offered at

    23 55 pfennigs, and we did ensure the required quantities,

    24 stabilised the market, and ensured sufficient

    25 quantities so that they could be bought in retail at a

  49. 1 price of 60 pfennig. To my surprise, when I look at

    2 that from today's point of view, prices are now higher

    3 than they were in September-October '92. Of course,

    4 during the conflict itself, as it went on, there were

    5 shortages of goods; then the situation was worse than

    6 it was in '92, at the beginning.

    7 Q. Were Muslims and Croats able to buy these

    8 goods in the same way, meaning at the same prices?

    9 A. Yes. I said that we made the offer for all

    10 citizens of Vitez, including, of course, all

    11 nationalities, and Muslims among them.

    12 Q. Did you want to say something else?

    13 A. So this was something that was done for all

    14 the citizens of Vitez, as I have already said.

    15 MR. SUSAK: I would like the usher -- we are

    16 going to move to another question now, so I would like

    17 to ask the usher to show you document D32/2.

    18 I would like the usher to give the witness

    19 the translation of the document. The witness doesn't

    20 speak English.

    21 THE REGISTRAR: He has the B/C/S version in

    22 front of him.

    23 MR. SUSAK:

    24 Q. Mr. Alilovic, this is a report, an

    25 announcement, as you can see. Have you seen this

  50. 1 announcement before?

    2 A. Yes, some of this I am familiar with. I see

    3 here the representatives of the UNHCR, UNPROFOR,

    4 representatives of the religious communities,

    5 commanders of the armed forces of the B and H army,

    6 representatives of the HVO, Ivo Santic and Mr. Pero

    7 Skopljak and Mario Cerkez.

    8 Q. Pero Skopljak and Ivan Santic, who were they

    9 representing?

    10 A. Pero Skopljak and Ivan Santic were

    11 representing the Croatian Defence Council, and most

    12 frequently they took part in the meetings of this kind.

    13 Q. Besides them, who else participated on the

    14 Croatian side?

    15 A. Most often a representative of the armed

    16 forces.

    17 Q. As I see here, Mario Cerkez in this

    18 particular case.

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Did Ivan Santic and Pero Skopljak always take

    21 part in the negotiations with the Muslim side in such

    22 situations and similar situations?

    23 A. Yes. Mostly it was Mr. Santic, frequently

    24 Mr. Skopljak, these people that we see on this document

    25 now, in announcements about agreements to calm the

  51. 1 situation regarding the barricades on the road between

    2 Vitez and Busovaca and regarding the overall situation

    3 at that time between the two sides. In this case, I

    4 see Friar Anto Tomas here, I don't know him that much,

    5 and Mr. Omer Efendija Mestrovac, representative of the

    6 Muslim community of the Islamic community. I don't

    7 know that they participated in meetings often, but on

    8 this occasion, I see that they did, because this was

    9 probably a more serious situation and an attempt to

    10 engage representatives of all the important sides,

    11 including representatives of the religious communities.

    12 Q. Did these talks and agreements happen often?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Thinking from the 16th of October, '92, to

    15 April 16th, '93.

    16 A. Yes, these contacts were frequent, after any

    17 kind of incident occurred, and this is also confirmed

    18 by the fact that relatively tolerable relations were

    19 maintained up until the 16th of April in '93.

    20 Q. In view of the announcements and the meetings

    21 and the negotiations, do you understand this, that from

    22 the conflict in Busovaca, all the way until the 16th of

    23 April, '93, there were no serious clashes?

    24 A. Yes. This attests to the fact that there

    25 were people in Vitez from both sides who managed to

  52. 1 maintain relatively tolerable relations, even after the

    2 conflict in Busovaca in January, even though it went on

    3 for two or three months, thanks to the correct

    4 approach, the attitude of both sides, which managed to

    5 maintain such relations.

    6 Q. You said that Pero Skopljak frequently took

    7 part in the talks and negotiations. What were his

    8 duties in the government?

    9 A. He was the vice-president of the Croatian

    10 Defence Council and he maintained contacts in

    11 situations when this was not required, besides

    12 Mr. Santic, who was mostly present at all negotiations

    13 when this was called for.

    14 Q. Besides Ivan Santic and Pero Skopljak, in

    15 talks while reaching -- did other people who were not

    16 members of the government, with the exception of

    17 members of the religious community or the military

    18 community, did these persons also participate in the

    19 decision-making process?

    20 A. Nobody took a part in the decision-making

    21 process other than representatives of the HVO

    22 government, especially not representatives of the

    23 religious community. When we're talking about

    24 decisions of any kind, they were made within the HVO

    25 government.

  53. 1 Q. These decisions made by the HVO government,

    2 were they observed? Were they observed and were they

    3 observed -- these decisions, were they observed also by

    4 the Muslims?

    5 A. The majority of the decisions by the HVO

    6 government, particularly in the period since it was

    7 formed and on, were mostly observed. They were

    8 frequently observed with a certain degree of respect by

    9 the Muslims. But when we talked about the tolerable

    10 relations which we maintained until April 16th, this

    11 was done thanks to the president of the HVO government

    12 as well as other members, depending on the area that we

    13 are talking about.

    14 Q. If the HVO government made decisions and

    15 reached agreements with the Muslim side and say there

    16 was a problem in one of the villages of the Vitez

    17 municipality, were these decisions binding on all

    18 sides, the village and in the town?

    19 A. Absolutely, decisions by the HVO government

    20 were binding on all the citizens of Vitez, including

    21 all the regions of Vitez, so in this sense, including

    22 the villages and the hamlets.

    23 Q. So the decisions of the HVO government were

    24 observed?

    25 A. As far as I understand.

  54. 1 Q. Would the usher give the witness document

    2 339, D339?

    3 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Susak, do you mean

    4 D39/2?

    5 MR. SUSAK: I think it's marked D339. I may

    6 have written it down, but it could be --

    7 JUDGE CASSESE: It's a Prosecution Exhibit.

    8 MR. SUSAK: I think it's P. I apologise,

    9 Your Honour. Yes, it's P339.

    10 Q. Can you see, Mr. Alilovic, what is this

    11 about?

    12 A. Yes, I can see.

    13 Q. Could you tell us, please, who signed this

    14 joint statement?

    15 A. This joint statement was signed by Mr. Santic

    16 on behalf of Croatian community. This was a joint

    17 statement by representatives of the Croats and Muslims

    18 in the municipality of Vitez. At that time Mr. Muhamed

    19 Mujezinovic, before the conflict as far as I know, was,

    20 on the Muslims' side, one of the persons in the

    21 government body. In any case this was a statement that

    22 I had the opportunity to hear either on the radio or

    23 see on the local television.

    24 Q. What was Mujezinovic by profession?

    25 A. Mujezinovic was a doctor, and I know him very

  55. 1 well.

    2 Q. Could you tell us something about him, about

    3 his activities at that time and his authority within

    4 the Muslim community?

    5 A. I would like to say first that we went to

    6 elementary school together, that we studied in Sarajevo

    7 at the same time, and Mr. Mujezinovic, I don't know

    8 exactly what year, but after completing his studies he

    9 didn't immediately start working in Vitez. He came to

    10 Vitez, and as a doctor, a general practitioner, he

    11 worked there first. Then in occupational medicine he

    12 was working in a factory for industrial explosives, and

    13 he was known all over the community. He had the

    14 authority and enjoyed a good reputation among the

    15 Muslim people at the stage when this was called for.

    16 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to item 5 of

    17 the joint statement, where reference is made to the

    18 civilian bodies of government at the highest level,

    19 which are required immediately to establish an ongoing

    20 political dialogue until the establishment of peace and

    21 the establishment of authority in the provinces and in

    22 the municipalities.

    23 Was that a suggestion or was it a

    24 recommendation? How would you describe it? Was it an

    25 order, because the term "It is requested," is used?

  56. 1 How was this decision implemented?

    2 A. I personally think that this was a

    3 recommendation expressing the wish to make another

    4 attempt, and I think that the wish was sincere on the

    5 part of both to try to halt the hostilities through the

    6 mediation of the civilian and military authorities so

    7 that the conflict would not continue, because both of

    8 these people must have been fully aware of the

    9 consequences. Therefore, I think that they were

    10 prompted by the sincere wish to try and do everything

    11 possible to end the hostilities.

    12 Q. Mr. Santic (sic), under item 5, will you tell

    13 us in what capacity did Ivan Santic sign this

    14 statement, because no title is given here?

    15 A. He signed it as a representative -- as the

    16 president of the Crisis Staff and the president of the

    17 HVO. As for Muhamed, as the representative of the

    18 wartime government of the Muslims.

    19 Q. Mr. Alilovic, let me ask you: When this

    20 joint statement was drafted, did Ivan Santic ask for

    21 permission from the HVO government to sign this

    22 statement?

    23 A. No, I don't know that. As I said, I heard

    24 the statement read out on our local television. As far

    25 as I can recall, both of them spoke on television, and

  57. 1 this programme could be seen by most of the citizens of

    2 both Croat and Muslim ethnicity.

    3 Q. Ivan Santic, as the president of the

    4 municipality and the head of the Crisis Staff, did he

    5 have any authority, without the support of the

    6 government, to pass important decisions?

    7 A. Yes, absolutely. He had the authority, and,

    8 in fact, I think he did take decisions that I am not

    9 aware of.

    10 Q. Were similar decisions made by his deputy,

    11 Mr. Pero Skopljak?

    12 A. Yes, of course. He too had certain

    13 competencies in that respect to make decisions.

    14 Q. And in what area?

    15 A. Primarily in the area of exchange. He acted

    16 independently at the time. At least as far as I know,

    17 he was the person in charge of exchanges, not only for

    18 the municipality of Vitez but for the whole area of

    19 Central Bosnia, and he was authorised to negotiate

    20 independently and also to take decisions

    21 independently.

    22 Q. Did he take such decisions on his own when

    23 exchanges were carried out, exchanges of civilians, and

    24 even exchanges of the dead, because we know that there

    25 were, unfortunately, even exchanges of bodies. Was he

  58. 1 independent in making decisions in both these areas?

    2 A. Yes. As far as I know, he would consult with

    3 the president, but in the final stage and in the course

    4 of the negotiations he would decide on his own.

    5 Q. About exchanges?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Could I ask the usher to show the witness

    8 document P335, please?

    9 Mr. Santic --

    10 A. Alilovic.

    11 Q. I'm sorry, I keep making the same mistake.

    12 You have the Croatian original?

    13 A. Yes, I have the document.

    14 Q. This is a report of the defence department of

    15 Vitez, or the defence office.

    16 A. Yes, I can see that.

    17 Q. Are you aware of the formation of the Vitez

    18 Brigade? But I should like to focus on item 3 of this

    19 report, where it is stated that in the period from the

    20 16th of April, up to and including the 28th of April,

    21 1993, a total of 498 conscripts were mobilised who were

    22 actively included in HVO units, in addition to the

    23 regular personnel of the Viteska Brigade.

    24 Let me ask you, what is the regular -- who

    25 were the regular members and who were the mobile or

  59. 1 reservists? The regular or active duty, whichever you

    2 prefer.

    3 A. The active duty members of the brigade, as

    4 far as I know, our brigade had about 300 such active

    5 duty members. All the others were actually reservists,

    6 and as can be seen from this report, they were

    7 mobilised in the period of the 16th up until the 28th

    8 of April, and we have the figure there.

    9 Q. Mr. Alilovic, what does that mean, "From the

    10 16th of April up to and including the 28th of April,

    11 1993"? When was this mobilisation? On what date was

    12 it carried out?

    13 A. It means that the mobilisation was carried

    14 out not only on the 16th but from the 16th until the

    15 28th, as the conflict escalated and it couldn't be

    16 stopped, which meant -- this actually means that the

    17 mobilisation started on the 16th of April.

    18 Q. And will you tell us who comprises the active

    19 duty members of the Viteska Brigade?

    20 A. I already said that as far as I know, the

    21 active duty men were those who signed certain

    22 contracts, terms of employment with the brigade.

    23 In formal and legal terms it was a brigade,

    24 but in fact, as far as I know, its strength was about

    25 300, because that was the number of men who signed a

  60. 1 contract with the brigade on full-time employment.

    2 Q. So we're talking about professionals. Who

    3 were these professional units? Who do they consist

    4 of?

    5 A. They are people who signed such contracts of

    6 employment, including the military police. They were

    7 part of this active duty personnel.

    8 Q. Could all these people have been mobilised on

    9 one day or did this happen gradually? Is it possible

    10 for a figure of, shall we say, 300 men, or 350 as we

    11 see on a list here, is it possible for 350 men to be

    12 mobilised on the same day?

    13 A. I think not.

    14 Q. Could you explain how this was done

    15 gradually?

    16 A. This gradual recruitment can be seen from

    17 this text. Of course, we don't see it broken up by

    18 days, but we see reference made to the period from the

    19 16th to the 28th, which means over a period of 12 days

    20 498 men were mobilised.

    21 Q. How much on which day?

    22 A. I really couldn't tell you, but it's obvious

    23 that this is a 12-day period that is involved. On what

    24 day, how many men were mobilised, I really don't know.

    25 Since the conflict was not contained, as we heard a

  61. 1 moment ago, even after 15 days, then this mobilisation

    2 continued.

    3 Q. You mean gradually?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. I'm still focusing on item 3, second

    6 sentence. Let me read it to you: "The majority of

    7 conscripts mobilised on the day of the outbreak of

    8 hostilities were directly included in the first line of

    9 defence."

    10 So my question is: Who were the people to be

    11 sent to the frontlines first? Were they active duty

    12 personnel?

    13 A. Actually, that is what it says here. You can

    14 read on, that they are being used as replacements on

    15 the frontlines after the first assault. That is they

    16 are gradually included as replacements for the active

    17 duty personnel.

    18 Q. So according to you, the active duty

    19 personnel are the first to go to the frontline?

    20 A. Yes, absolutely so. That is only logical.

    21 Q. Will you please turn to the next page? Let

    22 me read it for you: "The Civil Defence units, in

    23 addition to personnel mobilised up to now, that is

    24 mobilised before the outbreak of hostilities, for

    25 various duties, a total of ten conscripts were

  62. 1 mobilised for the needs of rehabilitation upon orders

    2 of the commander of the Civil Defence, as well as four

    3 military conscripts of advanced age to coordinate Civil

    4 Defence affairs."

    5 You said already that the Civil Defence was

    6 well organised.

    7 A. Yes. Actually, as we have already elaborated

    8 on a few points, I had occasion to hear at meetings of

    9 the HVO government what the capacities of the Civil

    10 Defence were. I think the Civil Defence was relatively

    11 well organised already at the beginning of 1992 and

    12 until the end of 1992, that is during the conflict. I

    13 know that it was organised in such a way that there

    14 were representatives in each village, and, if

    15 necessary, more than one.

    16 Q. In the case of Civil Defence, were there any

    17 oral orders that would be given?

    18 A. Yes, there were oral orders. At least for as

    19 long as the telephones were running, certain

    20 recommendations, conclusions were made and instructions

    21 given by telephone.

    22 Q. On the 16th and the 17th of April, was the

    23 Civil Defence active in caring for civilians, women and

    24 children and the wounded?

    25 A. I know that it was tasked to do that, or,

  63. 1 rather, the head of the Civil Defence Department was

    2 given such an assignment, roughly the same as my own

    3 assignment in my field of action, and it was supposed

    4 to be active. Whether they actually did on the very

    5 first day and to what an extent I really am unable to

    6 say, but in any event, it was organised.

    7 Q. Mr. Alilovic, I do beg your pardon for using

    8 the wrong name. I only have a few more questions for

    9 you, very briefly.

    10 You said that you spoke with Ivica Santic by

    11 telephone?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. What did he tell you? Did he tell you that

    14 he had given assignments to the head of the civil

    15 department or not?

    16 A. Yes. I came on the second day and I spoke

    17 with Mr. Santic in that sense, since we were located in

    18 one place, in the basement of the post office and in

    19 the hall of the post office. I remember very well that

    20 the desk of the head of the Civil Defence department

    21 was in the hall, and I could see that he was already

    22 present, that he was operating, while I was discussing

    23 how we should organise supplies, and I heard them

    24 receiving instructions and information, and that they

    25 were active.

  64. 1 Q. Were supplies provided for the facilities

    2 where the wounded, and women and children were

    3 accommodated?

    4 A. I didn't quite understand.

    5 Q. Did you provide supplies for women and

    6 children, or, rather, did the Civil Defence take care

    7 of that?

    8 A. Yes, certainly, it did, and that is what it

    9 did.

    10 Q. And to close, you gave us an overview of

    11 events and spoke in particular detail about the causes

    12 that provoked the conflict between the Muslims and the

    13 Croats. You said that Vitez was, in fact, an oasis

    14 with attempt being made to cut it off. Will you tell

    15 us, is it true that the Muslims could go from Travnik

    16 to Mostar, passing through territory under their

    17 control?

    18 A. Yes. Let me present the situation briefly as

    19 it was after the truce or, rather, after the Dayton

    20 Agreement, and let me present briefly the situation on

    21 the ground or, rather, the areas controlled by either

    22 side. It is true that the Muslims can go from Travnik

    23 as far as Mostar, passing through territory under their

    24 control all the time, and that this area is, in fact,

    25 under their control, of course after the Dayton

  65. 1 Agreement.

    2 Q. What about the Croats?

    3 A. As far as the Lasva Valley is concerned, it

    4 has been cut into two or, rather, the whole of Central

    5 Bosnia. I said that during the war, there were

    6 attempts to cut it up in several places.

    7 As for control of this area, the situation

    8 remains roughly as it was during the war.

    9 Q. So as far as I understand, the territory is

    10 controlled by the Muslims at the expense of the Croats?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. When the war ended, what was the ratio

    13 between the Muslim and Croat dead during the conflict?

    14 A. As far as I know, between 600 and 700 Croats

    15 in Vitez were killed in the conflict. How many Muslims

    16 were killed, I don't know. I have heard one report

    17 immediately after the truce and in a talk attended by

    18 Dr. Mujezinovic, when attempts were being made to

    19 provide the population with fuel wood for the winter of

    20 '93-'94, and I heard the figure of 395 Muslims having

    21 been killed. Whether they're all from Vitez or not, I

    22 don't know.

    23 Q. One further question. What about the ratio

    24 of Muslim and Croatian displaced persons?

    25 A. I have already said that during the conflict

  66. 1 or immediately prior to the conflict, the ratio of the

    2 displaced was certainly close to 4 to 1 in favour of

    3 the Muslims.

    4 Q. Could you give us a number for us to be able

    5 to grasp it?

    6 A. I could tell you roughly, though this was not

    7 my field, there were about 6.000 to 7.000 displaced

    8 persons in Vitez, out of which 4.500 to 5.000 were

    9 Muslims and the rest were Croats. But the situation in

    10 the conflict, as it developed, changed because, on the

    11 fringes of Vitez, these areas were abandoned by the

    12 Croats so that the number of displaced persons kept

    13 increasing as the conflict intensified.

    14 Q. So we come to the end of the war. Could you

    15 tell us how many people were disabled in Vitez, how

    16 many widows and how many orphans?

    17 A. I know, as I said -- I gave you the figure

    18 between 600 and 700 people, probably more, but people

    19 who were not from Vitez, people who were engaged to

    20 defend certain parts of the frontline in Vitez on

    21 occasion, but I don't know that figure. I do know that

    22 there were a large number of wounded. I think more

    23 than 1.000. I also know that there were more than 500

    24 men with a certain level of disability, ranging between

    25 20 to 100 per cent disability. Then I also know that

  67. 1 there are close to 400 widows and about 500 children

    2 without one or both parents. Did you ask me anything

    3 else?

    4 Q. No, I asked you for the number of disabled,

    5 the widows, and the children without parents.

    6 Let me ask you, finally: Do you know Drago

    7 Josipovic?

    8 A. Yes, I do.

    9 Q. What do you know about Drago Josipovic?

    10 Where did he work and do you know any details about

    11 that person?

    12 A. I do know Drago Josipovic because we were

    13 neighbours with a certain distance between us. I lived

    14 in Busovaca and he lived in Vitez, until I moved to

    15 Vitez. But still, the distance is not very high

    16 because these were adjoining municipalities. As the

    17 crow flies, the distance was not important, and in view

    18 of his age, I know him rather well. I know that he was

    19 a craftsman, that he worked in the factory, I know him

    20 as a quiet person, a hard-working one, and I know that

    21 he was not politically committed.

    22 Q. You mean that -- did he participate in

    23 military or political decision-making?

    24 A. I think he couldn't have, nor do I know that

    25 he did.

  68. 1 Q. You said that he was not a member of the

    2 government or the authorities. Do you know whether he

    3 was a member of any party?

    4 A. I am not aware of that. I don't know. But I

    5 know that he was not politically active, so probably he

    6 wasn't a member of any party.

    7 MR. SUSAK: Thank you, Mr. Alilovic.

    8 Mr. President, I have no further questions

    9 for this witness.

    10 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Susak.

    11 Counsel Radovic -- may I ask if there is any

    12 cross-examination by other counsel? Just Counsel

    13 Radovic, or other counsel as well? Counsel Pavkovic?

    14 MR. RADOVIC: I have asked for the floor, not

    15 to announce my intention to cross-examine but to make

    16 another suggestion.

    17 Your Honours, in view of the fact that this

    18 procedure is disputed as to whether the other Defence

    19 counsel are entitled to direct examination or only

    20 cross-examination and also the question of

    21 re-examination after the examination by the

    22 Prosecution, the Defence counsel feel that their rights

    23 have been impaired, especially because they were not

    24 allowed to re-examine Witness Zvonimir Cilic. This is

    25 something that is irreparable and cannot be compensated

  69. 1 by examining this witness, and for the Exhibit P335,

    2 that is now before this witness, is of decisive

    3 importance virtually for all the accused because it

    4 clearly says when the mobilisation started and it also

    5 indicates who, on the Croatian side, was involved in

    6 the first military operations, because that document

    7 says that the first combat operations were carried out

    8 by professionals, and this is something that we

    9 couldn't obtain from Mr. Cilic.

    10 We cannot make up for that by questioning

    11 this witness because Mr. Cilic was a member of the

    12 staff of the Vitez Brigade and he could clearly explain

    13 exactly what we were interested in regarding the

    14 professional composition of the Vitez Brigade and what

    15 they were doing on the 16th of April and about the

    16 question of when reservists began joining up. In

    17 addition, he should have explained why reference is

    18 made to many problems regarding manning of the Vitez

    19 Brigade, filling up the Vitez Brigade with reservists.

    20 Our submission is that the ruling of the

    21 Court that only one counsel can do the

    22 examination-in-chief is directly contrary to Rule 82(A)

    23 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and this has

    24 prompted us to lodge an appeal.

    25 If we were to continue the examination

  70. 1 according to the old system and if the Appeals Chamber

    2 would admit our appeal, then the whole case would find

    3 itself in a situation that a witness may be examined in

    4 an inappropriate way according to the finding of the

    5 Appeals Chamber.

    6 Simultaneously with our request to file an

    7 appeal, we have filed an appeal, and so we would

    8 suggest that we suspend the case until we have the

    9 ruling of the Appeals Chamber, which we hope will come

    10 very soon.

    11 That would be the suggestion of all the

    12 Defence counsel. Thank you.

    13 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. Judge May?

    14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Radovic, let me try to

    15 understand what you are saying.

    16 What is it that you want to put to this

    17 witness which you cannot put to the witness if you say

    18 you can't conduct an examination-in-chief?

    19 All that is happening is that one counsel is

    20 calling the witness, and I am leaving aside all

    21 questions of re-examination for the moment, one counsel

    22 calls the witness. The others have the right to

    23 cross-examine. If you want to put something to this

    24 witness, you can do so. There is nothing to prevent

    25 you.

  71. 1 As I say, this has nothing to do with

    2 re-examination. It has to do with the way, the orderly

    3 way, in which evidence is presented.

    4 Now, is there anything which you wish to put

    5 to this witness which, in some way, you say you are

    6 prevented from doing?

    7 MR. RADOVIC: Your Honours, the main problem

    8 is the fact that the right to the examination-in-chief

    9 also gives you the right to re-examine after the

    10 questioning by the Prosecution, so we would like to

    11 preserve our right that each of the counsel for the

    12 Defence can individually question each witness, and

    13 this is in accordance with Rule 82(A) of the Rules of

    14 Procedure, where it explicitly says that in cases of

    15 joint trials, each accused and their Defence counsel

    16 shall be accorded the same rights as if such accused

    17 were being tried separately. This is stated explicitly

    18 in the Rules. So we can use this right, exercise this

    19 right -- if we think that all the questions have been

    20 asked, we don't have to exercise it. But we can never

    21 know what the Prosecution will ask, which documents

    22 will be submitted, which names will come up, so that it

    23 is essential for us to be able to re-examine after the

    24 Prosecution.

    25 As far as the witness here is concerned,

  72. 1 outside of the examination-in-chief but within it, I

    2 would like to ask the witness, with the Prosecutor's

    3 document P335, to look at the list of the names

    4 mobilised.

    5 JUDGE CASSESE: Wait a minute on this matter.

    6 First of all, if I may step in? Counsel Radovic, I

    7 think that you have to interpret Rule 82(A) in

    8 conjunction with 85(B), which states that "the party

    9 calling a witness to examine such witness in chief"

    10 and, as a consequence, to re-examine after

    11 cross-examination. So if this particular witness is

    12 called by one Defence counsel, only that Defence

    13 counsel has a right to examine that particular witness

    14 in chief. It is very clear from Rule 85(B). So

    15 therefore, I don't see why the rights of the Defence

    16 have been impaired. Not at all.

    17 In addition, if other Defence counsel want to

    18 ask questions they were not allowed to ask

    19 in re-examination about that particular document,

    20 I saw from your list of witnesses that you are going to

    21 call quite a few witnesses who were part of the

    22 military structure in Vitez and probably are more

    23 familiar than Mr. Cilic with that particular list of

    24 conscripts, so you will have ample opportunity to ask

    25 questions concerning that particular document.

  73. 1 Let me now consult with my colleagues about

    2 your proposal that we should suspend our proceedings

    3 until the Appeals Chamber delivers its decision because

    4 this would mean really to put off again our proceedings

    5 for quite a while because, first of all, there are

    6 delays, six days, and then, plus, the Bench of three

    7 members of the Appeals Chamber would need to decide on

    8 whether or not to grant leave and then there would be

    9 an appeal, so this would be put off for months.

    10 MR. RADOVIC: Excuse me. You said that I

    11 could finish my thought.

    12 We know the Rule that the

    13 examination-in-chief was done by the Defence counsel

    14 who called the witness, but there are witnesses who

    15 were proposed by all of the Defence counsel jointly so

    16 that we don't repeat names from case to case by lists

    17 of individual Defence counsel. Witness Cilic and this

    18 witness were on that list. So these are not individual

    19 witnesses but these are witnesses called by all of the

    20 Defence counsel.

    21 JUDGE CASSESE: Let me, first of all, ask the

    22 Prosecution whether they have any comments.

    23 MR. TERRIER: Mr. President, regarding the

    24 request of the Defence to suspend the proceedings until

    25 the Appeals Chamber has made its decision, the

  74. 1 Prosecution is very emphatically opposed to this

    2 because it seems to me that your Trial Chamber has

    3 taken a ruling and the Appeals Chamber could perhaps

    4 make a decision quickly, but we should continue the

    5 proceedings and not interrupt the course of justice.

    6 Regarding the substance of the problem raised

    7 by Mr. Radovic, I am glad to present our position and

    8 we will do so, but this appeal has been made to the

    9 Appeals Chamber, so I don't consider it useful for us

    10 to discuss it in this courtroom.

    11 If your Trial Chamber wishes us to do so

    12 nevertheless, I would respectfully ask the Trial

    13 Chamber to possibility give us an opportunity to confer

    14 within the Office of the Prosecutor because this is an

    15 important issue that may be raised in other proceedings

    16 and which is of interest to other members of the Office

    17 of the Prosecutor, and therefore, I would be grateful

    18 if you would give us a chance to consult amongst

    19 ourselves.

    20 JUDGE CASSESE: Nevertheless, in the

    21 meantime, we have to continue with this witness who is

    22 here present, so what is the procedure that we should

    23 adopt? Have you any comments to make regarding this

    24 particular witness and the manner in which we can

    25 proceed; that is, should we give the chance to the

  75. 1 other Defence counsel to not only cross-examine but

    2 also to have a second round of examination?

    3 MR. TERRIER: My first reaction,

    4 Mr. President, would be that we should proceed in the

    5 way decided by the Trial Chamber last week, that is, in

    6 the same way that we proceeded with the previous

    7 witness, Mr. Cilic.

    8 I must say that within the framework of this

    9 trial, if a problem arises with respect to Mr. Cilic

    10 and if other difficulties of the same kind occur in the

    11 case of other testimonies, it is only due to the fact

    12 that we are not informed properly as to what the

    13 witness is going to say. We have spoken about this,

    14 your Trial Chamber has taken a decision about it, and

    15 you agreed that the Prosecution was poorly informed

    16 about what the witness is going to say.

    17 The written document that we received about

    18 Mr. Cilic and what Mr. Cilic actually said here in the

    19 courtroom, there is a very considerable discrepancy.

    20 Mr. Cilic said many more things than was envisaged in

    21 the written document. There was uncertainty as to who

    22 Mr. Cilic actually was, in fact. We didn't know

    23 whether he was a representative of the armed wing of

    24 the HVO and what his position was. During the

    25 examination-in-chief, we didn't know not only what he

  76. 1 was going to say and what he was exactly, and we had no

    2 idea as to the documents that could be submitted to

    3 this witness to identify, and in my view, these

    4 difficulties stem from this, all the witnesses that are

    5 going to come later and all that we are told is that

    6 they are going to say what they know, and this doesn't

    7 give us any idea what exactly they're going to say,

    8 nor what we could introduce as evidence in the

    9 framework of that testimony. So I think that is the

    10 core of the problem.

    11 Another difficulty that occurred when

    12 Mr. Alilovic was testifying, and I understand

    13 Mr. Radovic, because we obviously have the same

    14 reflections, that there is an attempt to mix certain

    15 notions of civil law and common-law. In the civil law

    16 system he's a witness of the Court, and the Defence is

    17 the last to ask questions and prosecution is the

    18 first. Regardless of whether the witness is a witness

    19 of the Prosecution or a witness called by the Defence,

    20 he becomes a witness of the Court and this is the order

    21 in which we proceed. Of course, the Trial Chamber

    22 knows much more than me about this.

    23 That is not the situation we are here in

    24 because we have three types of witnesses, witnesses of

    25 the Prosecution, of the Defence and the Court, and

  77. 1 Article 85 and 90 refers to this.

    2 Anyway, I think we've come to a point when a

    3 decision has been taken. It seems to me in conformity

    4 with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and I support

    5 the Trial Chamber. That decision has been appealed.

    6 The appeal does not provoke a suspension of

    7 proceedings. There is nothing to that effect in the

    8 Rules of Procedure, so we cannot suspend the

    9 proceedings and we should continue in the same

    10 direction that we have started along.

    11 JUDGE CASSESE: We will issue a majority

    12 ruling. Judge May dissenting, will set out his dissent

    13 after this ruling is delivered.

    14 We consider first of all that the problem is

    15 less serious -- Counsel Radovic?

    16 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. Zoran Kupreskic needs to

    17 leave the courtroom, needs to be excused.

    18 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes. Thank you.

    19 The ruling is, first of all, we note that the

    20 problem is less serious as anticipated or set out by

    21 Defence counsel. In light of what we ruled last week

    22 about the duty of the Prosecutor to provide in advance

    23 to Defence counsel any document the Prosecutor intends

    24 to present in court, this would allow any Defence

    25 counsel, even if Defence counsel confine themselves to

  78. 1 cross-examine the witness, to address the attention of

    2 the witness to a particular document or to ask

    3 questions about that document. So, therefore, in a

    4 way, I think, the problem, as raised by Defence

    5 counsel, is less serious than one might think, also,

    6 from a practical viewpoint and what is more important

    7 from the viewpoint of the fundamental rights of the

    8 Defence.

    9 I think the principle of equality of arms is

    10 fully respected, and, I think, therefore, we should

    11 stick to our ruling.

    12 However, as the Romans would say, ex abundante

    13 cautela, just for the sake of being extremely prudent

    14 and cautious, and to speed up the pace of our

    15 proceedings, we, by majority vote, decide that we will

    16 now provisionally, only provisionally, pending a

    17 decision by the Appeal Chamber and until a decision is

    18 given by the Appeal Chamber, we will comply with the

    19 request of Defence counsel and allow those Defence

    20 counsel who cross-examine a witness to proceed to the

    21 re-examination of the witness.

    22 As I said, it is only a provisional ruling,

    23 so that no possible impairment is introduced in case of

    24 a decision by the Appeal Chamber of overturning our

    25 ruling. This is for the sake of not wasting time, and,

  79. 1 as I say, reassuring the Defence that their rights

    2 are being safeguarded. However, we strongly feel that

    3 our previous ruling is sound, legally sound, and fully

    4 in keeping with the basic principles which govern our

    5 proceedings.

    6 Counsel Radovic, you -- before you take the

    7 floor, I think it's only proper for Judge May to set

    8 out his dissent.

    9 JUDGE MAY: I merely want to add this: I

    10 agree entirely with the ruling that there should be no

    11 further delays in this trial and the matter should

    12 proceed. Regretfully, I do not agree that we should

    13 allow all Defence counsel who examine or cross-examine,

    14 as they do, to re-examine. The Rules are clear and

    15 fair; that is, that a witness is called by one party,

    16 the other Defence counsel have the benefit, if they

    17 wish, or the right, to cross-examine so they could put

    18 what points they want to the witness. The Prosecution

    19 then cross-examine, and re-examination is restricted to

    20 the counsel who called the witness.

    21 The reason for this is to ensure the orderly

    22 presentation of the evidence. These are not trials in

    23 which counsel can examine witnesses at will. There is

    24 an order in which this is done, and we have ruled, and

    25 for that reason I myself would not have allowed all

  80. 1 Defence counsel to re-examine.

    2 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. Counsel Radovic?

    3 MR. RADOVIC: We thank the Trial Chamber, in

    4 any case, regardless of the dissenting opinion, which

    5 will enable us -- for the trial to proceed, and for the

    6 Defence not to be disadvantaged and for this to go on

    7 until the Appeals Chamber rules on this matter. Thank

    8 you.

    9 JUDGE CASSESE: Before we take a break, may I

    10 ask Counsel Pavkovic to tell us how many Defence

    11 counsel intend to cross-examine the present witness?

    12 MR. PAVKOVIC: Your Honours, the following

    13 Defence counsel would like to question this witness:

    14 Co-counsel Zelimir Par, I have a few questions, my

    15 learned colleague Mr. Radovic, Mr. Puliselic, and

    16 Ms. Jadranka Slokovic-Glumac. Thank you.

    17 JUDGE CASSESE: Five Defence counsel. All

    18 right. So we will take now a 15-minute break.

    19 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.

    20 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

    21 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Par?

    22 MR. PAR: Thank you, Your Honours.

    23 Cross-examined by Mr. Par:

    24 Q. Mr. Alilovic I would like to ask you several

    25 questions regarding the accused Vlatko Kupreskic.

  81. 1 At the beginning could you tell me, do you

    2 know Vlatko Kupreskic?

    3 A. Yes, I know Vlatko Kupreskic.

    4 Q. Do you see him in this courtroom?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Can you please tell us where you see him and

    7 describe to us what he's wearing?

    8 A. Mr. Vlatko Kupreskic is the first person that

    9 I see from the right. He's wearing a suit and tie.

    10 Q. What's the colour of the suit?

    11 A. I don't see Mr. Josipovic from here. His

    12 suit is blue, navy blue, as far as I can see.

    13 Q. I think that we can state that the witness

    14 has recognised Vlatko Kupreskic.

    15 Mr. Alilovic, at the time you were performing

    16 your duties at the supply department in Vitez, did you

    17 have business with the companies Stefani-Bosnia and

    18 Sutra?

    19 A. Yes. We had dealings with those companies,

    20 Sutra. I know it as Sutra, but it was also

    21 additionally called Stefani-Bosnia.

    22 Q. Who represented those companies?

    23 A. Mr. Vlatko Kupreskic represented those

    24 companies.

    25 Q. Who was the owner?

  82. 1 A. His cousin Mr. Ivica Kupreskic was the

    2 owner.

    3 Q. Which duties did Vlatko do in those

    4 companies? Did you have contact with him?

    5 A. I mostly had contacts with Mr. Vlatko,

    6 because he was carrying out all of the duties in that

    7 company or on behalf of that company.

    8 Q. Do you know in what period did Vlatko

    9 Kupreskic do those commercial activities? Was it

    10 before the war, I mean, before the 16th of April,

    11 during the war?

    12 A. This company, or Mr. Vlatko, I think he

    13 started to carry out those duties shortly after the

    14 elections, and in the course of the period until the

    15 war, and also during the war as much as conditions

    16 would allow, and after the war he performed the same

    17 duties. This company exists to this day, the two

    18 companies are separate. I think Mr. Vlatko Kupreskic

    19 now has a separate company.

    20 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, please, before

    21 the conflict on April 16, 1993, was it necessary for

    22 commercial companies to receive some kind of permit for

    23 operation from your department and what was the reason

    24 for this?

    25 A. Yes. Before the conflict, at the time when

  83. 1 the HVO government was formed and onwards, it was

    2 necessary for companies to receive permits in order to

    3 carry out their work and in order that taxes could be

    4 collected, and so that it could have an easier way of

    5 its affairs in view of the difficult political,

    6 economic and military situation.

    7 Q. Did the Sutra company receive such a permit?

    8 A. Yes, it did. All the companies which were in

    9 the supply business, and first of all, those which were

    10 more successful in this than others received such

    11 permits, but I think generally all of the companies

    12 received such permits.

    13 Q. I will now show you a document, and you will

    14 please tell us whether this is such a permit.

    15 Would the usher please take this document and

    16 present it to all the parties in the procedure?

    17 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

    18 D10/3.

    19 MR. PAR:

    20 Q. Could you look at this permit and read it,

    21 and then tell me who issued it, when was it issued, who

    22 signed it, what is the seal, the stamp, what was the

    23 purpose of its issue?

    24 A. You can see from this document that this is a

    25 permit issued by my department. I think that such

  84. 1 permits -- I think Mr. Vlatko must have had such a

    2 permit much earlier, and this is just a permit that he

    3 requested after the incidents and the conflicts that

    4 were frequent and the problem of supply became

    5 topical. So he asked -- requested a fresh permit,

    6 which I signed on behalf of the department, as well as

    7 the secretary of the HVO government on behalf of

    8 Mr. Ivan Santic.

    9 Q. What does this permit refer to? What does it

    10 allow the Sutra company?

    11 A. This permit allows or permits the performance

    12 of the duties of the company so that he could move much

    13 more easily for the purposes of carrying out his job,

    14 and also for the purpose of taxation after the job is

    15 done.

    16 Q. You mentioned the possibility of free

    17 passage. Was there a special permit for the safe

    18 passage that was issued by somebody? Were there

    19 permits for free passage?

    20 A. Yes. I think this was issued by the

    21 Department of Finances, or the revenue -- the Municipal

    22 Revenue Department.

    23 Q. I will show you another document.

    24 Would the usher please show this document to

    25 the witness, the Trial Chamber and the parties to the

  85. 1 procedure?

    2 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D11/3.

    3 MR. PAR:

    4 Q. Regarding this document, will you please look

    5 at it carefully and tell us the date, the signature,

    6 the seal, and then tell us whether this was the permit

    7 that was usually issued for free passage?

    8 A. Yes, this is the document, permit that was

    9 issued for free passage or for the movement of persons

    10 and the transport of goods, and Mr. Ivan Santic signed

    11 this permit, the President of the Croatian Defence

    12 Council.

    13 Q. Did you see from this permit the purpose of

    14 it, where it's being issued, where is it going, what is

    15 the purpose of it? Can you see the purpose, why is

    16 this permit being issued?

    17 A. Yes. Yes. You can see that he is leaving

    18 with a truck to obtain food.

    19 Q. When you say "he" you mean the Vlatko

    20 Kupreskic?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. And you can see data that is relevant for tax

    23 purposes here.

    24 A. This permit, in fact, allows the tax

    25 authorities to see precisely what you have said.

  86. 1 Q. Now, regarding this movement and transport,

    2 can you please tell us whether you personally know

    3 whether, at that time, Vlatko Kupreskic was mobilised,

    4 whether he was a member of some military unit at that

    5 time?

    6 A. No, I don't know whether he was or not, but

    7 since I saw him very often and had contacts with him, I

    8 believe that he wasn't.

    9 Q. He wasn't mobilised?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. Did you see him at that time ever in uniform

    12 and with weapons?

    13 A. No, I never saw Mr. Vlatko in uniform, not

    14 even during the conflicts. I had the opportunity to

    15 meet with him, and I didn't see him in uniform then. I

    16 know that he drove a sanitation vehicle for a while, an

    17 ambulance.

    18 Q. You said earlier that there was no difference

    19 in the way supplies were organised among members of

    20 different nationalities. Do you know that Vlatko

    21 Kupreskic, in October '92, supplied, with winter foods,

    22 the population of the neighbouring villages by directly

    23 delivering to Muslims and Croats, goods to their

    24 houses?

    25 A. Yes, I know about that. Mr. Vlatko, even

  87. 1 before October, his company that he represented was one

    2 of the companies that was elected, chosen, with the

    3 best bids. The purpose was to supply the citizens of

    4 Vitez, implying all the citizens of Vitez, so in that

    5 sense, Mr. Vlatko carried out a part of these tasks.

    6 In my assessment, he did it quite successfully. He

    7 provided quite large quantities.

    8 Q. The point of my question was that, do you

    9 know whether at that time he directly entered Muslim

    10 houses in the neighbouring villages and brought them

    11 winter supplies?

    12 A. At that time, they all went in, including

    13 Vlatko.

    14 Q. Regarding this issue, could you tell us about

    15 the reputation that Vlatko had as a tradesman?

    16 A. Since Vlatko, before representing this

    17 company, held prominent positions in the company for

    18 industrial explosives and also, in another factory, on

    19 financial duties, he was already a face that was

    20 recognised in Vitez; and working in the Sutra company,

    21 which was quite successful, I believe that he had quite

    22 a good reputation, at least I understood it that way,

    23 and I had the opportunity to see the way he was

    24 carrying out his duties and his attitude at that

    25 crucial time when he was supplying the population of

  88. 1 Vitez.

    2 Q. So personally, from your position, what was

    3 your opinion of him?

    4 A. I thought he was good in those circumstances.

    5 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to ask you

    6 another question from another aspect. Could you tell

    7 us, if you know, whether after the war, at the level of

    8 the Vitez municipality, there was a commission to

    9 estimate war damages?

    10 A. Yes, I know that shortly after the truce with

    11 the Muslims, a commission was founded which made a

    12 general estimate of the war damage, and then after

    13 normal circumstances returned, a commission was

    14 established to estimate the damage, and this is its

    15 task up until today.

    16 Q. What was the purpose of these commissions?

    17 What did they do out on the ground? What was the

    18 reason that they were formed?

    19 A. The purpose of these commissions now and then

    20 was to individually estimate the damage caused in war

    21 operations.

    22 Q. Now I will show you a document, if you can

    23 please look at it? Would the usher please show this

    24 document to the witness, to the Trial Chamber, and the

    25 parties in the proceedings?

  89. 1 THE REGISTRAR: Document D12/3.

    2 MR. PAR:

    3 Q. So would you please look at this document and

    4 tell me whether you've seen such records before? If

    5 you can look at the names of the members of the

    6 commissions, the signatures, the stamps? Could you

    7 please tell us whether this report properly indicates

    8 the way these commissions operated?

    9 A. Yes, I think this form of the report to

    10 determine damage is used today.

    11 Q. When you look at the names of the members of

    12 the commission, do you know any of these people?

    13 A. Yes, I know these persons. This commission

    14 is still working today. I don't know if it's been

    15 expanded, but I haven't, since 1995, I haven't been in

    16 the commercial sector, but I know most of the members.

    17 Q. Can we read their names for the record?

    18 A. Vesna Djumic, Ruzica Martinovic, Dragica

    19 Strukar.

    20 Q. So you know that these persons worked in

    21 these commissions?

    22 A. Yes, they're still working there now, and the

    23 chairman of the commission is now Vesna.

    24 Q. So everything that is stated in the heading

    25 and then in the form of the document is something that

  90. 1 you are familiar with?

    2 A. Yes, and I think that the form is the same

    3 today.

    4 Q. Now I will show you a photograph. Would the

    5 usher please put the photograph on the ELMO?

    6 This is Prosecution evidence P32 that the

    7 Prosecution presented in the session of 20th of August,

    8 1998.

    9 This was taken in '97, but I would like you

    10 to answer: Do you know whose house this is?

    11 A. Yes, I know. This is Mr. Vlatko Kupreskic's

    12 house. I see not just the house but there are some

    13 barns close to it, storage buildings.

    14 Q. So you know this building and you recognise

    15 it?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. But now it's been renovated?

    18 A. Yes. This was taken in 1997.

    19 Q. Would you please look at this report again

    20 that you have in front of you of the commission? Do

    21 you see from this report whose house was damaged?

    22 A. Yes, you can see that. This is the house of

    23 Ljubica Kupreskic.

    24 Q. Who was Ljubica Kupreskic; do you know?

    25 A. Ljubica Kupreskic is the wife of Mr. Vlatko

  91. 1 Kupreskic. I know her personally. Not much, but I

    2 know her.

    3 Q. Do you see from the record what the size of

    4 the house is that's entered in the report?

    5 A. Yes. It's 9.5 by 10.5 metres.

    6 Q. Do you see how many floors this house has?

    7 A. Yes, you can see that it has ground floor,

    8 first floor, and the attic.

    9 Q. What does it say in paragraph 2?

    10 A. It says ground floor plus the first floor

    11 plus the attic.

    12 Q. So abbreviations for that indicate --

    13 PR indicates ground floor, K indicates first floor, and

    14 PT indicates attic.

    15 Can you please tell us, the information from

    16 the report you have in front of you, is this

    17 information that relates to the house in the

    18 photograph?

    19 A. (No audible answer)

    20 Q. Could we look at item 3 of this report, the

    21 description and the extent of the damage? Can you

    22 please tell us what was found as damage to this house?

    23 A. This house was found to have been

    24 considerably damaged. It also states that this

    25 facility was also -- some things were taken from there

  92. 1 for the needs of the military.

    2 Q. What would that mean, when it says "taken for

    3 the needs of the military"? Could you explain that?

    4 A. Since Vlatko, next to the house, has quite a

    5 large warehouse and he had certain goods in stock, I

    6 assume that in the first days of the conflict, a part

    7 of those stocks were taken by the units who happened to

    8 be on the ground there.

    9 Q. Could you turn to page 2 of this record and

    10 tell us whether you can see what kind of goods were

    11 appropriated?

    12 A. It doesn't say explicitly, but certain

    13 documents are listed on the basis of which those goods

    14 were issued or, rather, which relate to those goods,

    15 and then the total value of those goods can be seen.

    16 Q. On top, in the heading, can we see that it is

    17 a question of appropriated? It says "destroyed and

    18 appropriated, food, money, and valuables?"

    19 A. The total value I assume of goods, but it may

    20 be other property, as well is estimated at 18.000

    21 something Deutschemarks.

    22 Q. Can we see from this record whether there was

    23 any damage on the front door and the windows of this

    24 house?

    25 A. Yes. Under item 4, the most urgent repair

  93. 1 work required, and under point 2 it says, "purchase and

    2 assembly of the solid wood front door." And then under

    3 1 it says "building in of windows together with panes."

    4 Q. Does this mean that, among other things, this

    5 commission had established damage to the door and the

    6 windows and it therefore proposed their repair or

    7 substitution?

    8 A. (No audible answer)

    9 Q. I only have one additional question for you.

    10 Could you tell us whether you know a person called

    11 Stipo Zigonjic, and if you do know him, could you tell

    12 us what he was doing in the '92-'93 period?

    13 A. Yes, I do know Mr. Zigonjic, and in the

    14 period '92-'93, he worked in the Defence department, I

    15 think in the Territorial Defence. Actually, he's still

    16 today working in the Defence department attached to the

    17 Defence Ministry. During the war, he was working on

    18 the mobilisation. I think that was his most important

    19 duty.

    20 MR. PAR: Thank you, Mr. Alilovic. I have no

    21 further questions for you, and I would ask the Trial

    22 Chamber to admit into evidence the Exhibits D10, D11,

    23 and D12/3 that were presented in court today.

    24 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. No objections?

    25 MR. BLAXILL: No.

  94. 1 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. So they are

    2 admitted into evidence. Thank you. Counsel Pavkovic?

    3 Cross-examined by Mr. Pavkovic:

    4 Q. Mr. Alilovic, I am Attorney Petar Pavkovic.

    5 I have a few points of clarification to discuss with

    6 you.

    7 You spoke about the national or ethnic

    8 composition of the population in the area of Vitez.

    9 Among other things, you said that about 45 per cent of

    10 the population were Croat and about 41 Bosniak or

    11 Muslim. Could you explain to me and the Trial Chamber

    12 whether this ethnic composition of the population

    13 applies to Vitez municipality or to the town of Vitez

    14 only, if you know?

    15 A. I gave you the figures for the national

    16 composition on the basis of the last census, and that

    17 was in '91, so this is the ethnic composition of the

    18 Vitez municipality as a whole and not just the city

    19 centre. So these figures apply to the whole

    20 municipality.

    21 Q. Thank you. My second question: When

    22 speaking about displaced persons that arrived in

    23 Central Bosnia, Vitez, the Lasva River Valley in large

    24 numbers, I think you mentioned the figure of about

    25 5.000 Muslims, Bosniak Muslims, and that among them,

  95. 1 there were able-bodied displaced persons. Later on,

    2 you also said that they were armed.

    3 A. Yes, yes. I gave a rough number of Croatian

    4 and Muslim displaced persons, but I said that there

    5 were about 5.000 Muslim displaced persons in Vitez

    6 itself. I am absolutely convinced that among those

    7 refugees there were able-bodied people and men with

    8 arms.

    9 Q. Were you aware of any of those armed and

    10 able-bodied men joining in the activities of the BH

    11 army units in the territory of Vitez?

    12 A. I couldn't say that, whether certain

    13 individuals by name were mobilised and when, but I am

    14 confident that they did participate. And why do I say

    15 that? Most of the killed during the conflict, among

    16 the killed, there were many refugees and not people

    17 from Vitez itself, even during the first few days of

    18 the conflict.

    19 Q. When you mentioned the humanitarian

    20 organisations, among others, you said a few words about

    21 Merhamet. Could we say to whom that organisation

    22 belongs, an organisation that cared for the population?

    23 A. Merhamet is a humanitarian or charitable

    24 organisation of the Muslim people, and it was organised

    25 in Vitez I think in the second half of '92, precisely

  96. 1 when larger numbers of displaced persons reached and

    2 arrived in Vitez.

    3 Q. So this organisation was based in Vitez?

    4 A. Yes, close to the parish Caritas.

    5 Q. Are you familiar with the way in which this

    6 organisation functioned? As far as I remember, you

    7 said that Caritas supplied the whole population,

    8 regardless of ethnicity. Do you know anything about

    9 the work of this organisation founded by the Bosniaks,

    10 the Muslims? Did it have the same criteria in the

    11 distribution of food, clothing, and so on?

    12 A. I know that Caritas was organised very early

    13 on. It was organised in the very first phase of the

    14 arrival of displaced persons from Kotor Varos, that is,

    15 at the beginning of 1992, and taking on these displaced

    16 persons, it offered aid to all of them regardless of

    17 ethnicity, and, of course, to those in need who were

    18 fewer than later on in time.

    19 Merhamet was organised when the influx of

    20 refugees climaxed, and as far as I know, it worked

    21 exclusively for the needs of the Muslims. But I must

    22 say that from that time on, Caritas also cared for

    23 fewer Muslims than it did until then.

    24 Q. You mentioned the conflict of the 20th of

    25 October, 1991, and you said that on that occasion, some

  97. 1 houses were damaged, and that you, as the Croatian

    2 Defence Council, the civilian part of the HVO,

    3 discussed the need for repairing those houses. Whose

    4 houses were damaged on that occasion?

    5 A. Yes, I know that several houses were

    6 damaged. I think they were mostly Muslim houses

    7 because they were right next to the road. There was a

    8 discussion about this because several house owners, I

    9 even know some of them personally, had addressed the

    10 authorities, and that the reaction was a positive one.

    11 Those houses were repaired in a couple of days and the

    12 owners moved back into them.

    13 Q. You said that you knew some of them. Could

    14 you give us some names?

    15 A. I know personally Mehmed Ahmic. We are

    16 roughly of the same age, we know each other from our

    17 early youth, and we were friends. I hope we will

    18 continue to be friends.

    19 Q. Mr. Alilovic, when you spoke about the

    20 possible causes of the conflict as you see them, the

    21 conflict in Central Bosnia, you referred, among other

    22 things, to the balance of forces. From what you said,

    23 one could conclude what the balance of forces was

    24 like. You mentioned the ratio 7 to 1, but you never

    25 explicitly stated in whose favour this ratio was, so

  98. 1 could you please tell us explicitly?

    2 A. I think it was clear that it was in favour of

    3 the Muslims. I think that I said at one point that

    4 there were about 80.000 people who came to Central

    5 Bosnia from Krajina alone, and that figure is higher

    6 than the population, than the Croatian population, of

    7 the whole of Central Bosnia. When talking about the

    8 balance of military forces, of able-bodied men, then I

    9 think it would be 7 to 1 even more in favour of the

    10 Muslims. That is what I meant.

    11 Q. My last question, Mr. Alilovic: As a person

    12 who headed the supply department, you were certainly

    13 familiar with the supply and the logistics situation in

    14 Central Bosnia as a whole. You said, among other

    15 things, that you procured goods also from Croatia so as

    16 to avoid any misunderstanding. Could you tell us

    17 whether it was possible at that time for you to procure

    18 goods from any other area, or was Croatia, in those

    19 days, the only logistics base from which both Croats

    20 and Muslims were supplied?

    21 A. I was confident that that was clear.

    22 Actually, Croatia was the only possible source, with

    23 the exception of a part of Herzegovina, from which

    24 certain quantities could be obtained from wholesale

    25 companies, but the source of goods, whether we are

  99. 1 talking about imported goods or goods manufactured in

    2 Croatia, the only source we had at our disposal was

    3 Croatia.

    4 Q. Did I understand you well, were the Bosniaks,

    5 the Muslims being supplied from the same source?

    6 A. Yes, definitely. The suppliers that we

    7 selected provided goods mostly from Croatia, and they

    8 were used to supply the citizens of Vitez. When I say

    9 "citizens," I mean members of all ethnic groups in

    10 Vitez.

    11 MR. PAVKOVIC: Thank you, Mr. Alilovic. I

    12 have no further questions. Thank you, Your Honours.

    13 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Pavkovic.

    14 I wonder whether Counsel Radovic has many questions.

    15 Do you think we can finish by 1.30?

    16 MR. RADOVIC: That will be rather difficult

    17 in 15 minutes. Shall I begin?

    18 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes, please.

    19 Cross-examined by Mr. Radovic:

    20 Q. In your testimony, you said that after the

    21 first free elections the government emanating from

    22 those elections started to operate successfully.

    23 However, you didn't explain what you meant by this

    24 successful constitution of the government. Could you

    25 explain that?

  100. 1 A. When I was talking about the successful

    2 constitution of the government after the elections, I

    3 meant that the leading political parties relatively

    4 easily came to an agreement regarding the key posts in

    5 the government, and distributed those key posts to

    6 reflect the election results.

    7 Q. What did you mean when you said that the

    8 government or the authorities started operating

    9 successfully?

    10 A. I meant that they agreed on the key positions

    11 and on the way in which they would continue to

    12 operate.

    13 Q. So they agreed how to operate. Now, what did

    14 you mean when you said that they successfully

    15 operated?

    16 A. When you examine this in hindsight, maybe in

    17 spite of goodwill that was in evidence on both sides,

    18 due to the overall political developments occurring in

    19 the period ever since 1990, and due to difficulties of

    20 a military, political, economic, financial, social and

    21 every other nature, the success deteriorated from one

    22 day to the next in spite of the presence of a high

    23 level -- I would say frequently the high presence of a

    24 high level of goodwill.

    25 Q. You then went on to say that the village

  101. 1 guards were formed after the attack on the village of

    2 Ravno, but you need to explain who it was that attacked

    3 the village of Ravno, who the inhabitants, the majority

    4 of the inhabitants of that village were, and what was

    5 the significance of that village, the village of Ravno?

    6 A. The village of Ravno is the place to be

    7 attacked first by members of the JNA. It is situated

    8 in the municipality of Trebinje. I think that this

    9 occurred in October. It was attacked by the members of

    10 the Yugoslav People's Army and it was virtually razed

    11 to the ground. That was, in fact, the first attack by

    12 the Yugoslav People's Army against one of the

    13 localities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its population

    14 consisted exclusively of Croats.

    15 Q. And what happened to those Croats? Did they

    16 stay on to live in that village?

    17 A. I said that the village was razed to the

    18 ground. Of course, they didn't stay on to live there

    19 because there were -- this was not possible.

    20 Q. Then you went on to stay, but I think this

    21 must have been an error, that at one point in time the

    22 greatest part of Bosnia-Herzegovina was cleansed of

    23 Croats and Serbs?

    24 A. Then I must have made an error.

    25 Q. Who was it cleansed of?

  102. 1 A. In the period from the fall of Kupres, which

    2 occurred in April --

    3 Q. You must give us the year.

    4 A. April, 1992 until the end of 1992 -- or,

    5 rather, the end of October when Jajce fell, I wanted to

    6 say that most of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    7 was cleansed of Croats and Muslims by the JNA; that is,

    8 by the Serbs.

    9 Q. We have to be very precise here. Let us now

    10 go on to the territory of Vitez municipality.

    11 In your testimony, you referred a couple of

    12 times to the Crisis Staff and the HVO government. What

    13 is the Crisis Staff if there was a HVO government?

    14 A. The HVO government, as far as I understood

    15 the organisation, was, in effect, the Crisis Staff.

    16 Q. Why then is it sometimes referred to as the

    17 Crisis Staff and sometimes as the HVO government?

    18 A. The head of the Crisis Staff was Mr. Ivan

    19 Santic, as president of the HVO.

    20 Q. Did the composition of the two bodies differ,

    21 that is, the staff and the HVO government?

    22 A. Yes, the Crisis Staff was narrowed down. The

    23 members were fewer than the members of the government,

    24 because the representatives of all departments were not

    25 in the Crisis Staff.

  103. 1 Q. So the government and the Crisis Staff are

    2 executive bodies, as far as I am able to understand,

    3 that implement certain political decisions; is that

    4 correct?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Who gives the political guidelines for the

    7 government and the Crisis Staff as to the way in which

    8 they should operate?

    9 A. For the HVO government, if they received any

    10 guidelines, then they would have received them from the

    11 HVO for the whole Croatian nation or corpus, that is,

    12 from Mostar, from the HVO.

    13 Q. But you're talking about the government, but

    14 then there is also the ruling party.

    15 A. Yes, and an important influence was exerted

    16 by the political party, that is, the HDZ or the

    17 Croatian democratic community.

    18 Q. Crucial political decisions for the territory

    19 of Vitez, were they taken by the Crisis Staff or the --

    20 that is the HVO government, or perhaps by any local

    21 bodies, and, generally, who took those decisive

    22 decisions?

    23 A. Those decisions were always taken by the HVO

    24 government, that is, the Crisis Staff.

    25 Q. On the basis of certain guidelines?

  104. 1 A. No. They provided the guidelines as well.

    2 Q. From the political structures?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Did any one of the accused, and I, in

    5 particular, am interested in Zoran Kupreskic, and I

    6 will include Mirjan Kupreskic, with my colleague's

    7 permission, were they in any one of the bodies that

    8 took political decisions?

    9 A. I am not aware of that, but they were not,

    10 I'm sure.

    11 Q. You were a member of the HVO so you must have

    12 known.

    13 A. They did not participate in any kind of

    14 political decision-making.

    15 Q. And in the party, did they hold positions

    16 where they could have taken decisions?

    17 A. They didn't hold any particular positions,

    18 but they -- I know that they did not hold any

    19 positions, so they couldn't have taken any decisions.

    20 Q. That brings me to the issue of active duty

    21 personnel in the territory of Vitez.

    22 Which units do you consider to be active

    23 duty, and let us be precise and limit this to the

    24 period from January 1939 on. Which were the active

    25 units, active duty units or mobile units? We see them

  105. 1 called different names in the documents.

    2 A. I already said that the Vitez Brigade, which

    3 in formal or legal terms, if I may put it that way, was

    4 formed at the beginning of 1993, there were about 300

    5 members of active duty personnel people who signed a

    6 contract to that effect.

    7 Q. In addition to active duty members of the

    8 Vitez Brigade, were there any other active units?

    9 A. There were, but they were not part of the

    10 HVO.

    11 Q. They were Special Purpose Units?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Actually, I'm aware of the Special Purpose

    14 Units called Vitezovi. Were they active duty too?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. What about the military police, which was not

    17 the brigade military police, were they active duty?

    18 A. The military police was, in fact, within the

    19 brigade a part of the active duty.

    20 Q. Yes, but you're talking about the brigade

    21 military police. Was there an unit outside the

    22 brigade?

    23 A. I do not know that.

    24 MR. RADOVIC: Fine. Mr. President, I have

    25 questions for another 15 minutes, so perhaps with your

  106. 1 permission we could break now. Thank you.

    2 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes. All right. So you can

    3 continue tomorrow. Before we adjourn, let me ask the

    4 Prosecution whether they could kindly provide us any

    5 comments on the proposal filed by the Defence Counsel

    6 Slokovic-Glumac and Radovic concerning the summoning of

    7 a witness by the Court. It has been filed today, so

    8 maybe tomorrow you could let us know what your comments

    9 are so we may decide.

    10 So we adjourn now until tomorrow at 9.00.

    11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

    12 at 1.27 p.m., to be reconvened on

    13 Wednesday, the 20th day of January,

    14 1999, at 9.00 a.m.