1 Tuesday, 8 March 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.24 p.m.

5 JUDGE PARKER: The delay is due largely to me. I must apologise.

6 A meeting I was in went longer and everything was pushed back.

7 I understand there may be some short matter to be raised. Mr.

8 Powles.

9 MR. POWLES: Yes, I'm very grateful.

10 JUDGE PARKER: We haven't heard from you for a week.

11 MR. POWLES: Yes, Your Honours, it's that time.

12 Your Honours may be aware that the joint Defence response to the

13 Prosecution's motion on the admission of Ramadan Behluli's prior

14 statement was due yesterday after a kind extension of time to yesterday.

15 Your Honour, there is work underway in terms of agreeing a joint

16 Defence position to present to the Trial Chamber so the Trial Chamber

17 only have to deal with one document as opposed to three separate

18 documents and three different teams. That would take approximately one

19 more week to complete. I've spoken to my learned friend Mr. Whiting from

20 the Prosecution who has indicated that from their point of view they

21 would have not concerns about an extension of one week of time to the

22 Defence, and my application now is for a further week to prepare such a

23 document.

24 JUDGE PARKER: You have the week, Mr. Powles.

25 MR. POWLES: I'm very grateful, Your Honour. Thank you.

1 JUDGE PARKER: The witness.

2 MR. WHITING: That a week from today or a week from yesterday?

3 JUDGE PARKER: A week from when it was spoken would be the

4 normal, would it not?

5 MR. WHITING: That's fine.

6 JUDGE PARKER: That's and extra day that's being cribbed. I

7 recognise your own point, Mr. Whiting: It means you're owed one. Is

8 that it?

9 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry, I missed it.

10 JUDGE PARKER: You're owed one?

11 MR. WHITING: That's right. I'm just trying to bank the credit

12 for future use.

13 JUDGE PARKER: It has been mentioned to me that there is some

14 occasion to mark the International Women's Day and that it would be

15 perhaps convenient if people were able to attend that. I do not know

16 whether it will prove practical in the flow of the evidence today for

17 that to occur, but it will be kept in our mind.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 MR. WHITING: That's at what time, Your Honour, if I may, that

20 event?

21 JUDGE PARKER: The registry officer knows exactly. I think it

22 was 5.30. Would that be confirmed? That can be confirmed during the

23 course of the afternoon.

24 Mr. Buja, good afternoon. If I could remind you of the

25 affirmation you took at the beginning of your evidence which still

1 applies.

2 Mr. Whiting.

3 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 WITNESS: SHUKRI BUJA [Resumed]

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 Examined by Mr. Whiting: [Continued]

7 Q. Mr. Buja, are you able to hear and understand me clearly?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Sir, I want to carry on from an answer that you gave at the end

10 of the day yesterday in response to a question that I put to you about

11 the diagram that you drew in the interview that you had with the Office

12 of the Prosecutor in 2003. And what you said is, and I'm going to just

13 read it from the transcript, you said -- you said: "I'm saying that

14 through Jakup Krasniqi we were conveyed orders by the General Staff. He

15 was the only member of the General Staff that we knew and through which

16 we could take orders of the General Staff."

17 Now, what I'm going to suggest to you through my questions, Mr.

18 Buja, is that what you have done is you have changed your story and you

19 have inserted Jakup Krasniqi here in the place where you previously had

20 Fatmir Limaj. And what I'm going to do is I'm going to go to the first

21 part of your interview with the Office of the Prosecutor where you began

22 the story with your arrival with Fatmir Limaj in Drenica in March of

23 1998, and I'm going to show to you parts of the transcript about those

24 matters.

25 MR. WHITING: And if the transcript could be provided to the

1 witness.

2 And for the record the diagram -- the diagram that was being

3 referenced yesterday is U003-3675 is also being put before the witness.

4 I would draw the witness's attention to page 22 of the Albanian and in

5 the English it's page 23 of the transcript.

6 Q. Mr. Buja, at the bottom -- at the bottom of page 22 of the

7 Albanian, do you see the question: "When you arrived in Drenica, were

8 you still together as a group of 30 people until the moment when you

9 arrived in Drenica?"

10 Do you see that question? It's the last question. Do you see

11 that, sir, that question at the bottom of the page?

12 A. Yes, Your Honour, even though before that in -- during the

13 proofing I already explained that I cannot come up with a statement that

14 I'm seeing for the first time here and that I suspected that

15 manipulations were made. I suspected about the veracity of the

16 translation, and especially it seemed to me kind of blackmail on the part

17 of Ole Lehtinen when he didn't enable me to see it, knowing that the

18 statements are usually translated, as the case was in the Milosevic trial

19 when I had to meet three times with the Prosecutors and amend -- improve

20 the statement three times because of the mistakes made by the

21 translators. This is why I demanded that this statement be given to me

22 so that I make the necessary improvements. Now that I see the statement

23 it doesn't make any sense to me because I see many mistakes, many

24 misinterpretations which might be due to poor translation.

25 So I would ask this Trial Chamber to interrupt this procedure of

1 facing me -- of putting me the statement which I do not consider valid.

2 Q. Mr. Buja, first of all I want to explain to you that the

3 transcript that you have before you is the -- the Albanian words that you

4 -- that were put to you during the interview and the Albanian words that

5 you spoke during the interview. So there is no issue about translation,

6 and the rest of us have a translation of the words in Albanian that were

7 put to you and the words in Albanian that you spoke.

8 Now, if you could just simply answer my questions and you'll have

9 an opportunity to explain these parts of the interview. And I'm -- so

10 that there's no question about the translation or the circumstances of --

11 circumstances of the interview or the questions, I'm going to play the

12 interview for you. Now, starting at this page at the bottom of page 22,

13 I'm going to play this portion of the interview.

14 [Videotape played]

15 "O.L.: When you arrived in Drenica, the group of 30 persons were

16 still together. Is that correct?

17 "S.B.: Yes, the group was -- there was 30 members of the group,

18 'til the arrival in Drenica. Yeah, in Drenica, we were assigned to

19 private houses. On our arrival there we were assigned to private houses.

20 Yeah, we've spent days there. I don't know how many days, but we stayed

21 definitely for several days. And then an order was issued that we had to

22 go to this area, including Malisheve, Suhareke" --

23 THE INTERPRETER: And the other named places. I can't --

24 "S.B.: So it was about the area outside Drenica.

25 "O.L.: During the time in Drenica, were you informed about the

1 organisation and division of the KLA at that time?

2 "S.B.: We only -- we had no possibility to get informed. At

3 that time UCK had very limited scope of activity, but it's -- I'm by

4 nature not curious. As a person being in prison, I knew from my

5 experience that.

6 "O.L.: Who was the one giving the order for you to go to this

7 area?

8 "S.B.: Well, I don't know who is the person who issued the

9 orders, but who conveyed this order to me was Hashim Thaqi.

10 "O.L.: Okay. And did Hashim Thaqi tell you that Fatmir Limaj is

11 the one who is going to be the commander of this unit going to the area?

12 "S.B.: Well, no, but we knew that Fatmir Limaj -- we knew Fatmir

13 Limaj was a more competent person in terms that he knew -- he knew -- he

14 knew the terrain better than the others. Fatmir Limaj was assigned to

15 coordinate the things in -- with the general headquarters. And my task

16 was to coordinate things with Fatmir.

17 "Right, it was -- it was a sort of -- if the -- if -- the moment

18 would come of starting setting up units or other forms of military

19 organisations, I would relate to Fatmir and then Fatmir to the general

20 headquarters, and then back to -- this way back."

21 MR. WHITING:

22 Q. Mr. Buja, I want to go through point by point that part of the

23 interview. You said at the beginning that when you arrived in Drenica

24 you were still together, a group of 30 people. That's correct, isn't it?

25 You were approximately 30 people when you arrived in Drenica?

1 A. Yes, I have said this and I'm saying this again to the Trial

2 Chamber that we were about 30 persons.

3 Q. And you -- the next thing you say is that you spread out among

4 the houses, and that's also correct, isn't it?

5 A. Yes, we spread out among the houses in the villages that I

6 mentioned to this Trial Chamber.

7 Q. And you were there for several days, and that's correct, isn't

8 it?

9 A. Yes, this is accurate.

10 Q. And you were given an order to leave and organise in areas of

11 Suhareke, Malisevo, Lipjan, Stimlje, Prizren, Kacanik, and that's also

12 correct, isn't it?

13 A. No, it cannot be correct because the term "order" has been

14 wrongly used, as you already mentioned to me because at that time we

15 didn't get orders from anyone. I --

16 Q. Sir, you used the word "order" in the transcript -- in the

17 interview, didn't you? You said: "We were given the order." Isn't that

18 right?

19 A. This is why I'm saying -- I mean the mistakes that I might have

20 made during the interviewing. I demanded that the fair procedure, the

21 normal procedure, be used in my case, that is I should be given the

22 transcript just for me to go over it and see what mistakes I may have

23 made. I had to recollect events which have taken place five, six years

24 ago. It was a hard task for me to recollect all those things in the form

25 they happened at that time. It was later that I realised that -- the

1 words that I -- were conveyed to me by the General Staff, I interpreted

2 them as orders, but in fact they were not orders.

3 Q. Mr. Buja, between yesterday and today, have you talked with

4 anybody about your testimony here today, about your testimony here at the

5 Tribunal between yesterday and today?

6 A. I have talked about the testimony, but I didn't go into details

7 as what exactly we talked here. I called my family, my brother, and my

8 wife telling that I am okay and the trial is going on. That's it.

9 Q. Did anybody tell you to come in here and say that you wanted to

10 have your transcript and go over it and make changes, the way you have

11 suggested today? Did anybody say that to you between yesterday and

12 today?

13 A. I have constantly demanded to be given the transcript by Ole

14 Lehtinen so that I could correct the mistakes. You know very well that

15 even during proofing I was not given the transcript. We only talked

16 briefly together and that I have already pointed out that -- with an

17 interview recorded which -- whose text I didn't see, to find out any

18 possible mistakes I cannot sit here and tell the truth as I am supposed

19 to do under oath. I am here under oath and I have to say as they truly

20 were. This has tormented me for a long time, that is to recollect events

21 as they truly were and not as they were after the war.

22 Q. Well, you're going to -- I'm going to give you an opportunity

23 here to go through important parts of your transcript and if you have

24 explanations or want to correct mistakes, you can do that.

25 So you have said that you were not given an order in fact. Can

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1 you explain to me how it is that you said during the interview that you

2 were given an order to organise these various areas. Can you explain how

3 you made that mistake, if it was a mistake.

4 A. Yes, of course. I can explain it. I spoke, as many others do,

5 in interviews on the basis of what we found out later, that is on the

6 basis of the people whom we knew later whose words we took for orders by

7 the General Staff. At that time I didn't know that Hashim Thaqi was a

8 member of the General Staff. It was later during the war and especially

9 after the war that I knew him to be a member of the General Staff. So

10 this is where the mistake may have occurred. This explained why I

11 perceived it as an order instead of putting it in the context of the time

12 and the circumstances of the time.

13 Q. So what you're saying is that at the time you didn't think it was

14 an order but later you realised that it was an order. Is that your

15 testimony?

16 A. Later I interpreted it as an order, even though at the time it

17 was given it was not given to us in the form of an order. It was not --

18 we were not told that Hashim Thaqi is a member of the General Staff; it

19 is said that he is a man who has links, connections, with the General

20 Staff. You have to understand that in the period we are talking about

21 and even at a later time the members of the General Staff were in

22 profound illegality. No one knew who the members of the General Staff

23 were.

24 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, may I raise --

25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mansfield.

1 MR. MANSFIELD: May I raise a matter. I'm obliged. I think

2 we're very concerned about what the witness is saying concerning his

3 request to have a copy of the transcript of the interview which took

4 place some time ago now, 2003, about events that took place even longer

5 ago than that. It is a matter of course that was part of the submissions

6 that we made to Your Honour, and I don't know of --

7 JUDGE PARKER: If you're thinking of putting it again, we've

8 considered it and it is our view that the course of the examination and

9 cross-examination will -- in the ordinary way deal adequately with that

10 issue.

11 MR. MANSFIELD: It's a slight, if I may put it, refinement on

12 that, because --

13 JUDGE PARKER: It had better be a markedly different refinement.

14 MR. MANSFIELD: It's merely a question of fairness that in most

15 cases in fact --

16 JUDGE PARKER: We're very conscious of fairness and we've thought

17 about this quite a time.

18 MR. MANSFIELD: And it is -- normally a witness will have had a

19 copy -- whoever they are, they will have had a copy before they give

20 their evidence.

21 JUDGE PARKER: The problem is not that the witness doesn't

22 remember or is confused about that; the issue is whether he used words or

23 not, whether they were put to him by others rather than himself and so

24 on. And we think what is being manifested here is one that is not going

25 to be assisted by an opportunity to go through the statement and identify

1 errors on his own. If there are errors, they will be identified in the

2 course of those matters being put to him.

3 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, Your Honour, I can't take the matter

4 further.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

6 Mr. Whiting.

7 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. So your testimony is that you did not know at the time that

9 Hashim Thaqi was a member of the General Staff. Right?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. But Hashim Thaqi told you to go and organise those areas, Suva

12 Reka, Malisevo, Lipjan, Shtime, and so forth. Isn't that right?

13 A. We were told that we had to go to these places where there were

14 not yet guerrilla units, as I mentioned Suhareke, Malisheve, Stimlje,

15 Prizren, and Kacanik. And I have already explained even earlier that I

16 had demanded to be posted in areas of Shtime and Lipjan, whose territory

17 I knew very well.

18 Q. And you say this was communicated by Hashim Thaqi. You say that

19 in the interview, and that's correct, right? And then you say -- you

20 say:

21 "Fatmir Limaj was assigned the task of coordinating work with the

22 General Staff while I had to coordinate with Fatmir. That is in fact how

23 the organisation would work, because there had not been any organisation

24 for some time, that is any organisation of units. An information had to

25 be brought to Fatmir, and then from Fatmir to the General Staff and they

1 -- we -- could then come back to us with what we had to do next."

2 And that is what happened, isn't it? Fatmir --

3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me. At this time I'm going to object to

4 any question because it's compound. He already has asked for an answer

5 with regard to receiving information from Hashim Thaqi; he has not

6 received an answer to that question. We are now moving on. Because of

7 the delicate nature of what we're dealing with I think it's important

8 that we get answers to any question asked and we do not have more than

9 one question compounded at any one time to this witness.

10 JUDGE PARKER: It's entirely a sensible proposition, Mr.

11 Guy-Smith. There may be occasions when it appears to the questioner at

12 the end of a question that what he said isn't clear and he goes on to

13 make it more clear, and I think you have been very skilful in managing to

14 incorrect any imperfections in your first question that way. If that

15 occurs, it would not be a problem.

16 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Whiting.

18 MR. WHITING:

19 Q. Let me break this up a little bit. You have told us that this

20 was communicated -- the instruction to go organise those areas was

21 communicated by Hashim Thaqi, and that's right, isn't it?

22 A. Can you repeat it, please.

23 Q. Certainly. The -- you have already told us that Hashim Thaqi was

24 the one who communicated to you the instruction -- who told you to go

25 organise those areas. Right? Suva Reka, Lipjan, Malisevo, that came

1 from Hashim Thaqi. Right?

2 A. The instructions were given to me to go to Lipjan and Shtime. In

3 the case of Malisheve he asked Fatmir Limaj to go. In the case of

4 Suhareke it was thought that Kumanova should go. For Kacanik it was Agim

5 Bajrami who went.

6 Q. When you say "he," this is Hashim Thaqi that we're talking about.

7 Right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then you say in the interview, you say, and I will read it

10 and then I will ask you questions. You say: "Fatmir Limaj was assigned

11 the task of coordinating work with the General Staff, while I had to

12 coordinate with Fatmir. That is in fact how the organisation would work

13 because there had not been any organisation for some time, that is any

14 organisation of units, an information had to be brought from Fatmir and

15 then from Fatmir to the General Staff and they -- we -- could then come

16 back to us with what we had to do next."

17 Now, it's true, isn't it, that Fatmir Limaj was assigned the task

18 of coordinating work with the General Staff. That's true, isn't it?

19 A. This is a very major mistake because in fact Fatmir Limaj wasn't

20 given the task to coordinate the work with the General Staff as it is

21 said here. Fatmir Limaj had to coordinate my trips and I had to

22 coordinate Agim Bajrami's trip to the General Staff. It was this

23 coordination that we had to do to arrive in Drenica where we had met

24 Hashim Thaqi even earlier. This was a form of organisation then, until

25 May, when I undertook to coordinate the unit -- the operation of units in

1 Kacanik, Lipjan, Shtime.

2 Q. Mr. Buja, can you explain -- these are your words from the

3 interview. This is you speaking when you say: "Fatmir Limaj was

4 assigned the task of coordinating work with the General Staff." Can you

5 explain how you made that mistake when you were being interviewed?

6 A. I made this mistake because I thought that the word "coordinate"

7 covered actions that had to have been carried out by Fatmir Limaj in the

8 -- because the territory where he was located was closer to Drenica

9 compared to the place where we were. And the territory where I operated

10 was closer compared to that where Agim Bajrami was operating. So in

11 order to coordinate the work with the General Staff, Agim Bajrami had to

12 come to me and I was -- took measures to ensure his trip to Fatmir and

13 then Fatmir would take care of the part of the trip to Drenice. So the

14 word "coordinate" or "coordination" meant this, that is the form of

15 escort. But this is why it has been misunderstood probably.

16 Q. But, Mr. Buja, that's not what you say when you explain your

17 answer because what you say is: "This is how the organisation would

18 work: Information had to be brought to Fatmir and from Fatmir to the

19 General Staff, and they would come back with what we had to do next."

20 So what you say is information was transmitted to the General

21 Staff through Fatmir Limaj and instructions on what you had to do next

22 would be transmitted from the General Staff back through -- through

23 Fatmir Limaj to you. That's what you say, isn't it?

24 A. Yes, I see that this is written so.

25 Q. Can you explain to me, sir, how you made that mistake. If that's

1 a mistake, how is it possible that you said that? Can you explain why

2 you said that if it's not in fact the truth?

3 A. As a piece of information, I cannot explain to you why I gave it.

4 Because even at the time of the interview I was studying journalism, and

5 the way I understood the meaning of the word "information" is a simple

6 piece of information. And I don't understand why it's been used in this

7 way. What I know is I recollect events very well and I clearly underline

8 the form of coordination of events of operations among us. And I want to

9 explain to you that I'm telling the truth and I'm giving you an example

10 that I was appointed commander of the subzone.

11 If Fatmir Limaj was at a higher level as you are claiming here,

12 how can it be that he wouldn't be appointed at least commander of a

13 subzone? It means as if I was the commander of my commander; it doesn't

14 make sense, this form of organisation you are claiming has existed then,

15 as if Fatmir Limaj was my superior. Even during proofing I explained

16 that Fatmir Limaj has never been my superior.

17 Q. Sir, we're talking about a period in March and April and May and

18 June before you were appointed to the command of the subzone of

19 Nerodimlje. Now, you -- when you gave this interview to the OTP, you had

20 already testified in this courtroom in another case, hadn't you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you have told us now that you recollect events very well and

23 that you were studying journalism at the time you gave this interview

24 with the OTP. That's correct, right?

25 A. Yes, I think it is.

1 Q. And is it your testimony that you have no explanation -- you

2 cannot give us an explanation for why it is you said here that that is

3 how the organisation would work: Information would be brought to Fatmir

4 and passed to the General Staff and then instructions on what you should

5 do would come from the General Staff through Fatmir back to you? Are you

6 saying you cannot now give us an explanation for why you said that?

7 A. Sir, before this trial I explained clearly the form of

8 organisation we had. I have explained up to what time, and that is until

9 the end of April it wasn't possible for me to contact Fatmir Limaj. And

10 the form of organisation that is described here could not have existed

11 because it was impossible for me to go to Fatmir Limaj until April, end

12 of April 1998, and my contact with Fatmir Limaj at that time, the purpose

13 of this meeting was not to contact the General Staff but to contact

14 Hashim Thaqi who I thought was in Drenica, could be found in Drenica --

15 Q. Mr. Buja, I'm going to interrupt your answer because I think

16 you're repeating what you said before and you're not answering my

17 question. My question is: If this is not in fact the truth, what you

18 describe here in your OTP interview about the structure, then why did you

19 say it?

20 A. I don't understand why it was said in this way, simply because

21 for some time I had to think about this. At the time when I gave this

22 interview I thought a little about those events hoping that we will have

23 the chance to check these documents and make the corrections, the

24 necessary corrections in these documents. I hoped that after my meeting

25 with the investigator in Milosevic's case when I was told that I will be

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1 given the opportunity to correct -- to make the necessary corrections,

2 and simply without paying much attention I gave an interview thinking

3 that I will have a chance to make corrections. Now you are using this in

4 order to put me in a not very desirable situation. I am clearly stating

5 here in this trial the form of organisation we had.

6 Q. Mr. Buja, it's not a very desirable situation because what you

7 said in your OTP interview is the truth, isn't it? Isn't that why it's

8 not a very desirable situation?

9 A. I was not in a situation to say until today to the Office of the

10 Prosecutor whether it was true or not true because I didn't have this

11 statement. And here I am telling the truth because I am under oath, and

12 I made it clear to you without seeing this statement beforehand, it isn't

13 possible for me to claim whether it is true or not.

14 Q. Mr. Buja, in this interview that was recorded over several hours,

15 did you ever ask for the opportunity to review the transcript or ever

16 indicate that you had not -- were not clear about your answers or you

17 wanted to correct mistakes? Did you ever say that during the interview?

18 A. During the interview, I clearly told you that some things were

19 made clear but not everything and that additional clearing is necessary

20 because it had been some time since those events had happened. I

21 believed in the honesty of the OTP after the contact I had with the

22 investigator Ole Lehtinen and the investigator in Milosevic's case, who

23 explained to me that the procedure will be the same. I believed that

24 this was the procedure that was going to be applied in this case. After

25 my meeting with Ole Lehtinen, I asked for the transcript because I

1 thought that mistakes could have happened. I asked for this transcript

2 even later when I contacted again Ole Lehtinen.

3 Q. Since you've brought up your meetings with Ole Lehtinen, isn't it

4 the case that when Ole Lehtinen later contacted you to be a witness in

5 the trial, you refused to be a witness? You refused to come and testify?

6 Isn't that true?

7 A. This is completely true because I could not come to this trial

8 and testify about something that I hadn't seen beforehand. Therefore, I

9 asked Ole Lehtinen to give me the transcript, but it wasn't given to me.

10 I suspected that my interview could have misused by this investigator [as

11 interpreted]. I surely wanted to contact the Defence to clarify the

12 possible misinterpretations.

13 Ole Lehtinen clearly told me on the phone when I phoned him --

14 actually, he phoned me in order to schedule a contact. I told him that

15 it would be possible to meet the next day. After ten minutes of this

16 conversation, he called me again and asked for an urgent meeting because

17 I was going to meet the Defence. I told him clearly -- I told Mr.

18 Lehtinen clearly that I am giving a statement, a voluntary statement, and

19 I don't have to render account to anyone. He told me that I should not

20 go to this meeting. The next day he called and he apologised because he

21 said it was a -- something -- a misinterpretation by the interpreter. I

22 then conveyed my criticism to him for in a way ordering me by phone not

23 to go and give a statement to the Defence; therefore, I refused to become

24 a witness for the Prosecution.

25 Q. Mr. Buja, isn't it in fact the case that you came to the ICTY

1 office in Pristina and told Mr. Lehtinen that you did not want to be a

2 witness in this trial because you were afraid? Isn't that in fact what

3 happened?

4 A. This was not the meeting we had with Mr. Lehtinen, but it was a

5 meeting that we had with Ole Lehtinen and you, Mr. Prosecutor, where I

6 clearly put it before you that I do not want to become a Prosecution

7 witness and I didn't want to be misunderstood from my own population.

8 Because the statement might be misinterpreted by the population, and

9 therefore I didn't want to be part here as part of the Prosecution.

10 I did in fact respect the subpoena and came here because as Ole

11 Lehtinen said, if I did not obey and respect this subpoena I could be

12 arrested and punished. I told you that I was not concerned about the

13 consequences for me as an individual, regardless of the punishment

14 because these would be individual consequences and -- that would not

15 involve my family and the entire Kosovo. This is what I said clearly

16 during that meeting where you attended as well.

17 Q. And isn't it in fact true that Mr. Lehtinen never told you not to

18 go to an interview with the Defence? He never said that to you, did he?

19 A. Through the phone, meaning through the interpreter who translated

20 Mr. Lehtinen's words, I was told that we should meet and not to go and

21 give a statement or interview to the Defence. This is true and I can

22 testify about this. The Defence, when I went to see them, I explained to

23 them clearly the way I was told by the phone [as interpreted] through the

24 interpreter who was interpreting Mr. Lehtinen's words.

25 Q. Mr. Buja, you went to an interview with the Defence?

1 A. Yes, of course I did go.

2 Q. During the interview with the Defence, did you review your

3 transcript of your interview with the OTP?

4 A. I was in contact with the Defence, and they explained my

5 interview and they said that if I gave a statement for the Defence, that

6 statement would be recorded and then would be given to me so that I could

7 check possible mistakes. And after reviewing the statement, then I would

8 be able to sign it. This is a form of interview that was -- that I was

9 familiar with even during my experience with the OTP. Therefore --

10 Q. Mr. Buja -- Mr. Buja, I'm going to interrupt you. My question

11 is: During your interview with the Defence, did you review your

12 transcript of your interview with the OTP?

13 A. During the interview with the Defence, I did not have the

14 opportunity to see this transcript, the OTP transcript.

15 Q. Did you see any transcript of your interview with the OTP?

16 A. After the meeting the following day, meaning after the meeting

17 with the Defence, when I met with the OTP and after my remarks that I

18 presented to Mr. Ole Lehtinen, he brought me five CDs which I was never

19 able to open. I even attempted to open these CDs by the help of experts,

20 computer experts.

21 Q. These CDs contained the transcript of your interview with the

22 OTP, didn't they?

23 A. I had requested the transcripts, both from my statement in

24 Milosevic case and this one. I wanted to have all the recordings and all

25 the transcripts, so I was given five disks. I tried to open the five of

1 them and I did not manage, even by the help of some experts who were my

2 soldiers in the past.

3 Q. Now, Mr. Buja, did you ever contact Mr. Lehtinen to tell him that

4 you were unable to open those disks?

5 A. I did not contact Mr. Lehtinen because I thought at that time and

6 I am convinced even today that the attention was to manipulate with my

7 statement and therefore I did not want to contact Mr. Lehtinen because of

8 these reasons.

9 Other reasons for me not to contact the OTP are: In March last

10 year I was arrested for the March events under an indictment where it is

11 stated that I violated 1244 Resolution and that although there wasn't any

12 base for that. During this detention I was visited by the Prosecution,

13 who explained to me that a letter had been sent by the Prosecution to the

14 commander, a KFOR commander, in which it said that I was sincere and I

15 had given a statement in Milosevic trial and that I was going to testify

16 for crimes committed by Albanians. I had never said such a thing and I

17 did not have this conviction that Albanians committed any crimes. This

18 letter which arrived 15 days after my detention, two days after it was

19 received I was released and I interpreted as a way how the OTP had force

20 in power in Kosovo, and I interpreted it as a blackmail.

21 Q. After you -- after you were released was when you told the OTP

22 that in fact you would not be a witness in the Prosecution -- in the

23 trial, isn't it? You told the Prosecution that you would not be a

24 witness. Isn't that true?

25 A. I don't understand your question, sorry.

1 Q. You said that in the March events you were arrested and held for

2 a certain time by KFOR, and my question is: Wasn't it after you were

3 released that you told the Prosecution you would not in fact be a witness

4 in the trial? Isn't that true? In the fall of last year you told the

5 Prosecution you would not be a witness.

6 A. I said that this happened in March last year, this letter, and

7 the meeting with Ole Lehtinen took place later. And the phone call from

8 Ole Lehtinen of course made me even more suspicious in the OTP intentions

9 to misuse my interpret -- my interview.

10 After the call when Ole Lehtinen told me that I would receive

11 this transcript and the intention to accuse these people who I know that

12 did not commit any crime and that are not guilty, during that time that

13 we had this meeting I made it clear that I have a high esteem for these

14 sons here and I am convinced that they did not commit any crimes.

15 I consider the KLA warfare as a very fair one and a clear one, a

16 pure one. I made it clear through the entire time of my interview that

17 the KLA did not commit crimes. And you later -- or sorry, Ole Lehtinen

18 later insisted that I should admit that mistakes might have happened.

19 And my answer was clear, that mistakes might have happened and even

20 mistakes might have happened on behalf of NATO during the bombing

21 campaign. I was not given an opportunity to correct any possible

22 mistakes.

23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, by virtue of the witness's answer, I

24 don't know whether or not such a letter is in the possession of the

25 Office of the Prosecutor; however, I would request on the behalf of the

1 Defence that we receive a copy of any letters that may exist in this

2 regard. I also would request at this time that we receive any notes,

3 memorandum, or any memorialisations that exist with regard to any

4 conversations or contact Mr. Lehtinen had with this particular witness

5 during this particular time.

6 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, with respect to the letter, I believe

7 it's been disclosed, but if it hasn't I can certainly make sure that it

8 has been. I can check if there are any notes --

9 JUDGE PARKER: If you could let Mr. Guy-Smith know in due course.

10 MR. WHITING: I will certainly, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 MR. WHITING:

13 Q. Mr. Buja, I'm going to take you -- since you have said - you have

14 said repeatedly - how you thought the interview would work and that you

15 wanted to have an interview to review it, I'm going to take you to the

16 end of the interview and see what you say at the end of the interview.

17 In your version it's on page 104 in Albanian and in English it's page 86.

18 It starts -- on page 104 it starts about a third of the way down and I'm

19 going to play it for you.

20 [Videotape played]

21 "A.W.: This time period, the spring and summer 1998, about this

22 area, about Lapusnik. You've told us what you do know; you've told us

23 things that you don't know. Is there anything else that you think is

24 important about the things that we've talked about that we should know or

25 have we covered everything?

1 "S.B.: I believe most of the -- we've covered most of the

2 issues, although I might -- I might -- it's pretty hard to understand --

3 to understand that period. It's hard to have a comprehensive view about

4 the form of organisations about -- because of the mess at that time --

5 well, some things are beginning to sorted out -- to be clear -- well, I

6 can say that generally speaking you must have -- you must have a clear

7 view or -- about things now -- by now. Yeah, if there's something

8 unclear to you, then I'll -- I'm always available at any time you need to

9 get in touch with me to clarify the point or the issue that's unclear to

10 you.

11 "A.W.: Okay. That actually leads to my next question which is:

12 If you were called to be a witness in The Hague, would you be willing to

13 tell the Court everything you've told us today?

14 "S.B.: The position of a witness is a bit sensitive --

15 difficult, but what I've declared here today so I would declare them

16 openly and with no hesitation, publicly. But you must understand what's

17 also my position. So I wouldn't prefer to be put in a difficult

18 position. Yeah, well, on the fact of being called as a witness to

19 testify in a case against my former comrades-in-arms puts me into a very

20 difficult position, but I'm willing at any moment because I've made up my

21 mind to be as transparent as possible, as open as possible, and I don't

22 think it will be a big problem for me to come -- to come over there and

23 to testify what I've testified today to you."

24 MR. WHITING:

25 Q. Mr. Buja, do you see there at the end of the interview that you

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1 said: "In general things have been clarified." Do you see that you said

2 that?

3 A. I'm saying that in general it was clarified but not everything

4 was clarified. There was space for possible mistake because here the OTP

5 will -- stuck on a word. Let's say as I earlier said about that

6 information and therefore we needed to correct these mistakes. I said

7 that I was ready to testify although the position of a witness, the very

8 presence here even without talking before the comrades-in-arms who I

9 believe are innocent -- I say it again here that things in general have

10 been clarified but still there have been things that were not clear. And

11 it is -- it can be clearly seen during this interview now that we played.

12 And as I said, I believed we would have the possibility to make the

13 necessary corrections and I expected this to happen, but it never

14 happened.

15 Q. Mr. Buja, you have stated that many, many times; I don't think

16 you need to say it again. But isn't the reason that you are changing

17 your story here not -- isn't it -- it's not because there were mistakes

18 or misunderstandings; it's because you believe these men to be innocent

19 and it is difficult to come here to give evidence against the men you

20 fought with. Is that why -- isn't that the reason you are giving a

21 different account here today about the structure?

22 A. It's not a different story, and this Chamber can investigate this

23 statement even by means of other witnesses who I have mentioned in this

24 interview. My difficulty was to be a Prosecution witness and the most

25 difficult part was at that time and even today I was convinced that these

1 boys are innocent and I cannot act and state things that were not true of

2 that time. I stated clearly that I cannot be a person who through this

3 statement given without thinking twice about the events that happened in

4 April, May, and June.

5 As for these events they were all like a story in themselves, and

6 it is a pity that they're misinterpreted and put in a different form.

7 And it's a pity that there was not a possibility for them to be

8 clarified. I said that I was ready to give a statement when I would be

9 able to correct that statement, make clear things that were not clear,

10 and come as such before this trial.

11 Q. Well, let's continue and see if we can get some further

12 clarification. I'm going to ask you to turn to page 33 in the Albanian

13 of the transcript, and I'm going to submit to you, sir, that it's not a

14 matter of a word or a matter of misunderstanding but in fact, as I stated

15 at the beginning of your testimony today, you have changed your account

16 of the structure and you have now put Jakup Krasniqi in the place where

17 you previously put Fatmir Limaj.

18 And it's page 33 in the English at the top of the page and on the

19 Albanian it's about a third of the way down the page on 33.

20 And I'm going to play this portion of the tape which pertains --

21 you talking about May and June of 1998 when you're in the area -- you're

22 working in the area of Kacanik, Ferizaj, and Stimlje.

23 [Videotape played]

24 "O.L.: To collect weapons?

25 "S.B.: These sort of activities were conducted in the period of

1 May/June. It was during that time that a corridor was created from

2 Albania to Kosovo. At that time my position consisted in being a

3 coordinator for the area covering Kacanik, Ferizaj, Shtime. So I would

4 coordinate -- I was coordinating things in connection with Limaj, who was

5 placed in Klecka at that time."

6 MR. WHITING:

7 Q. Now, you've already said in the interview, and we've spent some

8 time on it, you've said that the -- that -- that Fatmir Limaj when you

9 left -- when you arrived in Drenica that Fatmir Limaj was -- in March,

10 that Fatmir Limaj was assigned to be the point between you and the

11 General Staff, that you would send information up to the General Staff

12 and instructions would come back down. Now, here you're talking about

13 how things worked in May and June of 1998 when you were a coordinator of

14 activity in the area of Kacanik. And you say that "my coordination was

15 with Fatmir Limaj who was established in Klecka."

16 Do you see that? Do you see where you say that?

17 A. Yes, I see it.

18 Q. And that was true, wasn't it? When you were coordinating those

19 activities in the area of Kacanik, Ferizaj, and Stimlje, you were

20 coordinating with Fatmir Limaj, who was established in Klecka. Isn't

21 that true?

22 A. In June I already explained that the spokesperson of the KLA

23 appeared in public as a member of the General Staff. It seems illogical

24 at that time when I could contact Jakup Krasniqi to contact instead

25 Fatmir Limaj. Why should I? The public appearance of Krasniqi as a

1 member of the General Staff made it possible not only for me but for all

2 the guerrilla units to contact the General Staff.

3 Q. But, sir -- sir, let's talk about before that happened, before

4 the 14th of June, 1998. Here you're talking about May and June when

5 you're in Kacanik, Ferizaj, and Stimlje. And it says you coordinated

6 with Fatmir Limaj, and that's true, isn't it, that you coordinated with

7 Fatmir Limaj?

8 A. I have explained this issue much earlier. It was in May 1998

9 that I was appointed by Hashim Thaqi to coordinate the operations of

10 units in Kacanik, Ferizaj, Shtime, and Lipjan. This was an extra

11 supplementary task given to me apart from the duty I had to coordinate

12 the work for the supply line. It was at the end of May when I returned

13 to Kroimire when the first unit was formed. Right after that I went back

14 to Kacanik. Given the great need for armaments and supply in June, I

15 didn't have any need at all after my return to contact Fatmir Limaj in

16 the sense of organisation that you put me here. In June I contacted only

17 Jakup Krasniqi. And my contacts with Fatmir Limaj in May and early June

18 couldn't be possible because at that time I was in Kacanik and Ferizaj

19 area.

20 Q. If that is true, then can you explain for us, please, why it is

21 that you said in the interview that you -- your coordination was with

22 Fatmir Limaj who was established in Klecka. You weren't -- that wasn't

23 put to you; you said it yourself. Can you explain why you said that?

24 A. The meaning of the word "coordination," I think I explained it

25 earlier. By this word "coordination" I understood the action to contact

1 the General Staff and that Fatmir Limaj was supposed to make this contact

2 possible. In June it wasn't necessary for Fatmir Limaj to do that, to

3 escort me to the General Staff because by that time I could contact the

4 member of the General Staff himself, who had just given a public

5 interview in Klecka.

6 Q. And Fatmir Limaj's job when he was coordinating was not simply to

7 show you the way to Drenica, but it was to be the -- a contact point with

8 the General Staff. You could give information to the General Staff

9 through Fatmir Limaj and get instructions from the General Staff through

10 Fatmir Limaj. Isn't that right?

11 A. I already explained that this was not so because coordination had

12 another meaning, not the meaning of hierarchy but the meaning of the

13 operation, that is for me to contact the General Staff, as Agim Bajrami

14 did, too. But my contacts with the General Staff were established in

15 June when I returned from Kacanik, that is with Jakup Krasniqi. I am

16 repeating here --

17 Q. So -- and there's no need to repeat, sir. But is it your

18 testimony then when you -- then that when you said here in the interview

19 that: "My coordination was with Fatmir Limaj who was established at

20 Klecka," is that what you are trying to say there is that -- is that

21 Fatmir Limaj's role was to show you the way to Drenica if you wanted to

22 meet with Hashim Thaqi? Is that what you're saying? Is that your

23 testimony?

24 A. I'm putting it to you that the task of Fatmir Limaj at that time

25 vis-a-vis myself was that from Klecka he should show me the way to

1 Drenica, should accompany me to Drenica because that was an area that he

2 knew well. It was the area he was born in. That's why we did -- this

3 action was done; that is, I had to pass through this territory to Drenica

4 where I always hoped to contact the members of the General Staff even

5 though this never happened, because I didn't go to Drenica either in

6 April, May, or June. But in June I managed to contact Jakup Krasniqi who

7 was a public figure then.

8 Q. So -- in fact what you're saying here today now is that when you

9 were organising in the area of Kacanik, Ferizaj, and Stimlje, you did not

10 coordinate with Fatmir Limaj? That's your testimony now, isn't it?

11 A. I did not coordinate with Fatmir Limaj because most of this time,

12 that is March, April, I spent in Mullapolc. After my first attempt to

13 contact with the members of the General Staff which failed, I returned

14 again to Mullapolc to organise together with Imri Ilazi the unit in

15 Ferizaj -- in order to enable me to go to Agim Bajrami and for Agim

16 Bajrami to come to me. That period was the period when we didn't this

17 form of have organisation.

18 Q. And if the truth is that you did not coordinate with Fatmir

19 Limaj, then I'm going to ask you again: Why did you say in the interview

20 that you did coordinate with Fatmir Limaj? "My coordination was with

21 Fatmir Limaj." Can you explain that?

22 A. I explained even earlier that the form of coordination was in the

23 sense of coordination of the efforts to go to Drenice. This is why I

24 mentioned the word "coordination"; this is what I had in mind, not

25 something else.

1 Q. Did you say that at the time in the interview? Did you say that

2 that's what you meant?

3 A. During the interview I didn't make any necessary explanations in

4 the hope that things could be clarified at a later stage.

5 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'm not sure what the schedule is

6 for --

7 JUDGE PARKER: That's a convenient time, I take it?

8 MR. WHITING: It is, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume at 5 minutes past 4.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.

11 [The witness stands down]

12 --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.

13 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, just quickly before the witness is

14 brought in, I would just like to put on the record that the Prosecution

15 located and disclosed notice of investigator Ole Lehtinen pertaining to

16 meetings with Shukri Buja, as requested by the Defence.

17 The letter that was referenced certainly exists; I thought it had

18 been disclosed. We can't seem to put our hands on it at the moment, but

19 we're working on it.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

21 MR. TOPOLSKI: Your Honour, I wonder if I could just ask, forgive

22 me, whether the document that has just been handed over which is headed

23 "Investigator's Note" purports to be a contemporary document or one that

24 has been helpfully but more recently compiled from other material.

25 MR. WHITING: It's -- I'm almost certain, it was prepared in the

1 last day or two and I think it's a contemporary document, prepared within

2 days of the events described in the document, but that is also something

3 I'll confirm.

4 JUDGE PARKER: The witness, please.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Whiting.

7 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. Mr. Buja, I've had an opportunity to get some notes pertaining to

9 your meetings with Mr. Lehtinen. I want to ask you a few further

10 questions about those matters, if I may.

11 Isn't it the case that after your meeting with the Defence --

12 your interview with the Defence that you met with Mr. Lehtinen and you

13 discussed with him what he had told you before the meeting with the

14 Defence and you agreed with him that there had been a misunderstanding,

15 that he had not in fact told you not to meet with the Defence but that

16 there had been a misunderstanding on that subject? Isn't that what

17 happened?

18 A. He told me that there was a misunderstanding and a

19 misinterpretation by the interpreter, and that day that interpreter was

20 not present at the meeting with Ole Lehtinen.

21 Q. And isn't it true that you could not remember what had been said

22 to you, the exact wording of what had been said to you?

23 A. I remembered how the interpreter put it, but it seemed to me as

24 an imperative form of saying "don't go." But on the insistence of Ole

25 Lehtinen, I agreed that was a misunderstanding and I said, Okay, it is a

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13 English transcripts.

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1 misunderstanding. I -- in the meantime I put my critical remarks of the

2 way the interview was conducted and I insisted on having the interview

3 transcript, because without that I couldn't do anything.

4 Q. And in fact you asked for -- you had your meeting with the

5 Defence on the 17th of June, 2004. And the following day you asked Mr.

6 Lehtinen for your transcript of your OTP interview. Isn't that right?

7 It was the day of your interview with the Defence. On the 18th of June,

8 2004, you asked for your transcript. Right?

9 A. It is a rather long question, so I don't understand -- I don't

10 seem to recollect the date.

11 Q. Well, let me just put it -- does it sound right to you that it --

12 it was -- your interview with the Defence was on the 17th of June, 2004?

13 Does that date sound right to you?

14 A. It may be that date, although I don't remember the exact date.

15 Q. And was it the day after your interview when you asked -- you met

16 with Mr. Lehtinen and you complained about not having your -- the

17 transcript of your interview and you asked him for it? Was it the day

18 after your interview with the Defence?

19 A. Yes, it was on the next day when I made known my remarks about

20 the way of the contacts we were having with Ole Lehtinen and the absence

21 of the transcripts.

22 Q. And isn't it the case that four days later you were -- Mr.

23 Lehtinen gave you the five CDs that contained your recorded interview and

24 your prior testimony in the Milosevic case? Didn't that happen just four

25 days later on the 22nd of June, 2004?

1 A. I don't remember the date. It may have been two, three, or four

2 days, I can't be accurate, when -- after that when I received those five

3 diskettes that were alleged to be the transcript of my statement in the

4 Milosevic case.

5 Q. And, sir, you've already told us -- it was your transcript in the

6 Milosevic case and also it was your transcript of your OTP interview;

7 that's what you were told, isn't it?

8 A. Yes. This is what Mr. Lehtinen told me.

9 Q. And you've already told us that you never went back to Mr.

10 Lehtinen to tell him that you were unable to open those CDs. Isn't that

11 true?

12 A. I didn't try to open them immediately, but after some time, a

13 rather long time, I tried to open them but it was impossible for me to

14 open them. I didn't try to do that right away because I wasn't that keen

15 on doing that immediately, thinking that the trial wouldn't start very

16 soon.

17 Q. And you've already testified before the break that when you were

18 unable to open the CDs, you did not go back to Mr. Lehtinen to tell him

19 that you were unable to open them and to ask again for your transcript.

20 Isn't that right?

21 A. That is right, because I began to create the impression that a

22 game was being played with these transcripts and I didn't go back to Mr.

23 Lehtinen about this.

24 Q. Let's continue, if we could, with the -- your interview with the

25 OTP. I'm going to ask you to turn, please, to page 34 of the Albanian

1 and it's 34 also of the English. On the English it's towards the bottom

2 third of the page -- no, I'm sorry. It's at the top of the page. And on

3 the Albanian on page 34 it's in the middle of the page, and I'm going to

4 play this portion of the interview for you.

5 [Videotape played]

6 "O.L.: But fighting or not, I'm saying that there have to be a

7 certain kind of structure in the area. I know that already in April 1998

8 there was regularly weekly meetings in Klecka. Did you join these

9 meetings?

10 "S.B.: Because -- no, because I was not part of the command

11 structure in Klecka. There was occasional -- I would occasionally take

12 part in these meetings, for example in May. So for the most -- the most

13 period -- sorry, the most time during the May I spent staying in Kacanik

14 and Ferizaj. It was due to the fact that I was -- I was engaged in

15 coordinating the whole work with Agim Bajrami, commander Agim Bajrami.

16 My specific task was to -- was to -- was as far as weapons supply was

17 concerned. Right. When I would happen to be there, in Kroimire I'm

18 talking, I would help in things like these bunkers or trenches -- I would

19 rather put it point in Kroimire rather than call it company or battalion

20 or things like that. At that time I -- well, I thought Fatmir Limaj was

21 -- must have -- was a member of General Staff at that time, I thought.

22 But at the end of 1998 I realised that he hadn't been the member of

23 General Staff. Yes. So I was free to put suggestions as to whom, for

24 example, to assign to Petrastica, to deal with Petrastica. Of course my

25 proposals were not always taken into consideration, but I had enough -- I

1 had enough -- let's say contacts with Fatmir. So you'd be -- so as to be

2 free to put forward proposals. And the same way that I thought about

3 Fatmir or allegedly being a member of General Staff, most of the people I

4 know thought the same about me, that I probably was a member of General

5 Staff.

6 "A.W.: Can I" --

7 MR. WHITING:

8 Q. Mr. Buja, in April and May of 1998 you thought that Fatmir Limaj

9 was a member of the General Staff, didn't you?

10 A. I have made it clear here that in April and May I was in Kacanik

11 in the other part of the operations and it's something else what I might

12 have thought, after a meeting I had with Fatmir in the April of 1998

13 during which we discussed political issues. And at that time he left me

14 a good impression of a man with intellectual potential and political

15 expertise. That's why I created impression of him being a member of the

16 General Staff, but that was just my impression; it was not a fact.

17 I explained that I realised later that he became a member of the

18 General Staff at the end. I think it was November/December of 1998 when

19 my brother too became a member of the General Staff.

20 Q. Mr. Buja, isn't it true that you thought he was a member of the

21 General Staff because during this time period he was the person through

22 whom you would communicate with the General Staff?

23 A. No. I don't think that was the reason why I created that

24 impression; it was because of his abilities, I think. Because if we were

25 to look at the reality as you are saying, how could I have thought of my

1 own brother as such when he did become a member of the General Staff? It

2 often happened that we thought of each other or of some third person of

3 being in some position when in fact he was not, just because we knew him

4 to be a member of the Presidency of the LPK or General Council of the

5 LPK. So positions were different from reality. And I understood that

6 Fatmir Limaj became a member either in November or in December of 1998.

7 I explained here how people believed that I, too, was a member of

8 the General Staff but in fact they were simple -- merely suppositions of

9 soldiers or some superior.

10 Q. And people thought that you were a member of the General Staff

11 because you were exercising a coordinating role in the area that you were

12 organising, as you say here in the interview. Isn't that true?

13 A. People may have created the impression which I cannot account

14 for, but I have believed and thought when people have asked me whether I

15 was a member of the General Staff when in fact I was not. Maybe because

16 of the -- of my duty as responsible for the supply of arms and for the

17 actual shipment of these arms or because of the political or military

18 talks I gave to people; maybe this is why they created that impression.

19 Q. Mr. Buja, do you see here in this portion of the interview where

20 you say: "We had not even defined companies or battalions but only

21 posts"? This is -- you're speaking about the time you were in Kroimire.

22 Do you see where you say that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And that's true, isn't it, that at that time there were -- there

25 were posts in different villages. Isn't that true?

1 A. I have already explained I think this -- the use of the word

2 "point," why I used that word. And I am explaining again. In fact it

3 was the unit of Pjetershtice. If it was called "point" I don't know what

4 it's meaning would be when in fact the unit in Pjetershtice was operating

5 along this Carraleve-Belince line and covered two villages. Today I

6 cannot describe to the Trial Chamber as a point because the form of

7 organisation that existed then was the guerrilla unit which operated in a

8 village or a town and it operated in a horizontal line in its positions.

9 That was the form of organisation then. But the other organisation that

10 is claimed to be as battalion -- in the form of battalions and companies

11 was not in existence at that time.

12 Q. I think you told us earlier that in your mind the word "point"

13 has a special military meaning. Can you explain to us what you

14 understood the word point to mean.

15 A. Not a special military significance. The word point is

16 translation from a foreign language which I never wanted to accept as

17 authentic expression to be used in my own language. In fact, it was

18 borrowed by the Serb expression, "policijski punkt," something which I

19 never wanted to use because the word point implies a limited existence as

20 a military expression. And as an expression of the Albanian language,

21 which describes better the time when the units operated in a frontal

22 line, is in fact a "frontal line." This is why I never wanted to refer

23 to them as points because at that time the form of organisation

24 irrespective of the interpretations didn't seem to me as points but only

25 as guerrilla units. I already explained that the strategy of the General

1 Staff was the horizontal spread of the guerrilla units.

2 Q. And is it still your testimony that the reason you used the word

3 point in your interview here is because of propaganda that you had heard?

4 Is that still your testimony?

5 A. Yes, of course it is because the description of this period has

6 been constantly done using the word point and this word has affected also

7 me. That's why I have used the word point. It's the fact of the

8 propaganda and agitation then by the war waged of the KLA and which has

9 often accounted for not given a truthful description of its real

10 organisation. This is the reason why.

11 Q. And here when you say you that had support -- when you were

12 surveying positions, bunkers, and other things, you had support from

13 Fatmir. You're talking about your time in Kroimire. You had support

14 from Fatmir. Can you tell us what kind of support you had from Fatmir?

15 A. Of course I can. The positions, the trenches, and the bunkers

16 began to be dug sometime in the middle of June and were continued

17 constantly. When I mentioned the support of Fatmir I meant both,

18 materielly and observing, supervising, these positions, whether

19 everything was okay, whether the trench was dug properly. I meant that

20 we talked about these issues. We helped each other as co-fighters.

21 I have also pointed out the support we got from the General Staff

22 to operate in this regard, that is to dig trenches and to build bunkers.

23 I have already I think clearly explained that that was a combined war, a

24 war that was unprecedented until then. It was a war waged through

25 guerrilla units positions, something which had never happened until then.

1 The General Staff supported this kind of warfare.

2 Q. Mr. Buja, you're aware that there was fighting in Carraleve

3 starting on the 14th of June, 1998. Isn't that right?

4 A. I don't remember the exact date of the fighting this Carraleve,

5 but I know that there was fighting in June.

6 Q. Approximately in the middle of June. Isn't that right?

7 A. You could say mid-June.

8 Q. And the trenches were already dug by then, weren't they?

9 A. No. There were fighting going on even before the trenches were

10 dug up.

11 Q. But by mid-June when there were serious fights with the Serbs in

12 Carraleve, the trenches were already dug, weren't they?

13 A. The trenches could not be dug within a day. These trenches

14 required a continuous work, a work that continued in June and July. Some

15 trenches were open in the beginning, in Pjetershtice, as the first

16 frontal -- front line. Later on we opened the canal and the bunker. I

17 cannot say when the positions were ready for a fight to defend Carraleve.

18 What I can say is there was work going on in June and July regarding the

19 opening of trenches.

20 Q. And did Fatmir Limaj come to Kroimire or Petrastica or Carraleve

21 to super -- to observe, supervise, the positions and see if everything

22 was okay?

23 A. I don't remember that Fatmir Limaj was at the bunkers and

24 trenches at that time, but I know that Fatmir Limaj visited me especially

25 in July in Kroimire. There was a visit that we paid together in the

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1 Blinaje National Park. Simply, in July I had frequent contacts with

2 Fatmir Limaj.

3 Q. Well, you've testified that when you -- what you meant by support

4 from Fatmir when you were doing the trenches and bunkers in Kroimire was

5 that -- you said "I meant both materielly and observing, supervising

6 these positions, whether everything was okay, whether the trench was dug

7 properly."

8 And my question is: Did he come to Kroimire in order to do that,

9 to give that kind of support?

10 A. In the form you're putting it, it wasn't so. He came on a visit

11 in Blinaje, as I said earlier, and during this visit of course we went

12 out to the positions lying along the Magura-Shale road above Laletic

13 village, and up to the village which name I cannot remember at the

14 moment. So it was Laletic, Blinaje, and I don't remember the name but

15 there is a village nearby. These are the villages where our positions

16 were. If he had any remarks, he would tell me what would be a better

17 solution and it was up to me to decide whether to accept or not to accept

18 his advice.

19 Q. And when was this? Was this in July?

20 A. This was in late June/beginning of July. It is very difficult

21 for me to remember these issues correctly.

22 Q. Was it before or after you were appointed to the Nerodimlje zone,

23 to this -- to the subzone of Nerodimlje, to be the commander of the

24 subzone of Nerodimlje, was it before or after?

25 A. I don't remember whether it was before or after, but surely it

1 was within the same period of time when I had received instructions to

2 operate from the General Staff concretely from Jakup Krasniqi to

3 coordinate the units in Lipjan municipality. More frequent contacts we

4 had after July when I was appointed the commander of the zone.

5 Q. And is it your testimony now that Fatmir Limaj didn't give you

6 any support with respect to trenches and bunkers in -- being built in

7 Kroimire or Petrastica or Carraleve?

8 A. Sir, I -- we did not open trenches in Kroimire but the trenches

9 were mainly along Carraleve. They were in Zborce and in the front line

10 of Blinaje. Fatmir helped me with his advice, and of course he helped me

11 in materials which were required by the soldiers and which I didn't have.

12 I mean here pickses [as interpreted] and spades. So he would advise me

13 what would be the better solution; this is what we discussed. You should

14 bear in mind that there were two ways of opening trenches. Some

15 preferred zigzag trenches and some trenches in a straight line. So these

16 were our discussions, what would be the better way to open the trenches,

17 whether in a zigzag or in a straight line. So I took his advice and I

18 acted the way I thought it was for the best.

19 Q. But did he give you any support for the trenches in Carraleve?

20 That's my question.

21 A. I don't think that Fatmir was in Carraleve when the trenches and

22 bunkers were opened. I know that he came for a visit in Kroimire and I

23 know that we visited together the national park in Blinaje because he

24 wanted to see this park that he hadn't seen before.

25 Q. And then you say that -- you say that -- that you were able to

1 say that a person should be established, for example, at Petrastica who

2 would command that post, a person who should be set up. And you said --

3 and then you say: "Often they did not -- they did not accept my proposal

4 but I made the proposals."

5 And my question is: Who did you make the proposals to?

6 A. Of course I made these proposals to the unit that was there and I

7 thought that I knew better the acts of soldiers who were members of that

8 unit. In Petrastica this opportunity was taken away from me and -- my

9 proposal as well, as was the case with Zborce.

10 Q. I'm going to move on in the transcript because there's further

11 discussion about these issues and the structure. And it's -- on the

12 Albanian it's page 35; on the English it's -- continues on page 34 where

13 the last one left off. And on page 35 it's -- on the Albanian transcript

14 it's in -- it's in the middle of the page.

15 MR. WHITING: I think we need to switch to the Sanction.

16 I'm not getting any sound --

17 [Videotape played]

18 "A.C.: End of April" --

19 [Videotape played]

20 "A.C.: Approximately?

21 "THE INTERPRETER: End of April?

22 "A.C.: End of April 1998?

23 "S.B.: I don't know whether it was end of April or beginning of

24 May. It must have been a unit made up of eight or ten people in

25 Kroimire.

1 "A.C.: And you were the commander in Kroimire at that time, the

2 organiser?

3 "S.B.: Yeah -- well, I don't know whether it was -- as I said

4 end of April or beginning of May, I was in Kacanik at that time. And on

5 my return from Kacanik I brought along also weapons. So we were placed

6 in Kroimire. So I found their soldiers coming from abroad. There were

7 three or four soldiers coming from abroad. There were people from

8 Kroimire as well. So these people would distribute weapons to the

9 persons they considered suitable to do the job. And as a matter of -- as

10 a course of a normal procedure, I got in touch with Fatmir. So I asked

11 Fatmir what our job was supposed to be in Kroimire and where to -- how to

12 proceed.

13 "A.C.: So who's in charge in Kroimire at this time? You are?

14 "S.B.: There were two persons in charge at that time, so I

15 wouldn't -- I wouldn't know how -- who was number one.

16 "A.C.: So who was it? You and who else?

17 "S.B.: It was me and Luan, Ramiz Qeriqi.

18 "A.C.: So you and Luan were in charge in Kroimire at the end of

19 April 1998?

20 "S.B.: Well, end of April or beginning of May.

21 "A.C.: And Fatmir Limaj dealt directly either with you or Luan

22 at that time?

23 "S.B.: Well, I want also to clarify something here. I wasn't

24 able to take as many decisions as possible because I didn't know people."

25 "A.C.: Sorry, I wasn't actually asking that. Fatmir Limaj dealt

1 either with you or Luan at the end of April, beginning of May 1998?

2 "S.B.: Yes.

3 "A.C.: And Fatmir Limaj was dealing with the KLA Main Staff,

4 wherever that was?

5 "S.B.: Yes, he was a coordinator of this job.

6 "A.C.: So here we have a structure. We have the KLA Main Staff

7 at the top, Fatmir Limaj underneath, and you and Luan underneath Fatmir

8 Limaj. Correct?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Shall I ask him once again to clarify to

10 explain him better how did you put it?

11 "A.C.: What I want to just say is what you've outlined to me is

12 the basic structure: KLA Main Staff at the top; underneath, Fatmir Limaj

13 in Klecka; and then underneath you and Luan in Kroimire. That's what you

14 just said. Correct?

15 "S.B.: It was a different -- it was a different nature of things

16 that I and Luan used to deal with, so we were different in what we were

17 doing. Me and Luan.

18 "A.C.: Yeah, but let's go back to the question. I'm not

19 interested in what you and Luan were doing. I just want you to confirm

20 that at this time, at the end of April of 1998, there was a rudimentary

21 military structure: KLA Main Staff, Fatmir Limaj taking instructions

22 from them, and then you and Luan in Krajmirovce taking instructions from

23 Fatmir Limaj. Correct?

24 "S.B.: Yeah, that's correct. I just wanted to clarify that.

25 "A.C.: Yeah, that's fine. Thank you.

1 "O.L.: And at this" --

2 MR. WHITING:

3 Q. Mr. Buja, I want to take this passage point by point, the

4 important points. You said at the beginning of this passage in the

5 interview that when you came to Kroimire there were some other soldiers

6 who had come from abroad and who had begun to set up in Kroimire, and

7 that's correct, isn't it?

8 A. [No interpretation]

9 Q. I didn't get an interpretation of what you just said.

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter couldn't hear the witness.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I could go through this passage.

12 MR. WHITING:

13 Q. Please do.

14 A. Could you ask your question again, please.

15 Q. Yes. Partway through this passage at the beginning you say that

16 when you came to Kroimire you found some -- you found some soldiers there

17 who had come from abroad who also belonged to Kroimire. And there you're

18 referring to Ramiz Qeriqi and another soldier. Isn't that right?

19 A. Yes, but the month must have been mistaken because this happened

20 in May and not in April. It was in May when I contacted with these

21 soldiers after my return from Kacanik and when I brought the first

22 weapons supply. I found there three or four soldiers, I'm not quite

23 sure, who were from Kroimire. In the beginning of my testimony here I

24 stated that I knew or that Luan introduced himself to me and another

25 soldier, who was Fadil, and there were other soldiers, as it is said

1 here, who were from the village of Kroimire.

2 Q. And in fact you do say in the interview here that it's at the

3 beginning of May or end of April when you bring the weapons to Kroimire

4 from Kacanik. And you say that you distributed the weapons to the people

5 that they thought would be the best KLA soldiers. And then you say: "I

6 -- usually in contact with Fatmir, that is I asked where we should set up

7 and what operations we should carry out since we were in Kroimire."

8 And then you say: "I asked Fatmir what we should do."

9 That's what happened, isn't it? When you went to Kroimire you

10 would -- you would ask Fatmir what you should do, how you should set up

11 operations there. Right?

12 A. It is difficult for me to answer a question, such a long

13 question, but I'll do my best. Of course this is a false description

14 because it couldn't be that I was in Kroimire in April because in May I

15 left for Kacanik and in end of April and beginning of May I was in Shtime

16 area, where together with Ilaz we went to Kacanik afterwards. I

17 explained that this could not have happened overnight, that this process

18 took several days. If I'm not mistaken it took about -- it was around

19 10th or 12th of May and until the end of May that I moved from Shtime to

20 Kacanik, Ferizaj, that I did this journey, that I went to Gllobocice and

21 after my several-day stay in Kacanik, I returned here. So this

22 description is a false one.

23 Q. Mr. Buja, I don't want you to focus on the date at the moment.

24 You testified already in this courtroom that you brought weapons from

25 Kacanik to Kroimire. Isn't that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And here in your interview you talk about distributing the

3 weapons and -- and then you say: "I usually in contact with Fatmir, that

4 is I asked where we should set up and what operations we should carry out

5 since we were in Kroimire." And then you say: "I asked Fatmir what we

6 should do."

7 Do you see that where you say that in the interview?

8 A. I see it, yes.

9 Q. And that's what happened when you were in Kroimire, you asked

10 Fatmir what you should do. Isn't that true?

11 A. I could have advised or consulted myself with Fatmir, what to do

12 about Kroimire and with the soldiers in Kroimire especially after the

13 problems I faced in the beginning. The description here in a sense of

14 requesting things from Fatmir, it is simply consulting. I wanted his

15 advice what to do simply because Fatmir had created positions in Klecke

16 and was in a better position, an advanced position, as far as

17 organisation was concerned. The Celiku unit was advanced as far as

18 organisation was concerned and our unit was lagging behind. Therefore, I

19 wanted Fatmir to instruct us what to do in Kroimire.

20 I didn't know Ramiz Qeriqi very well. I didn't know the soldiers

21 in Kroimire very well. That's why I saw a need to discuss these matters

22 with these people and I discussed this matter with Ramiz Qeriqi as well.

23 Q. And you did this after you arrived in Kroimire. Right?

24 A. Yes. This was end of May/beginning of June. These three or four

25 days or two or three days, I don't remember exactly, that I stayed in

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1 Kroimire.

2 Q. And you said that -- you were asked if Fatmir Limaj at that time

3 either contacted you or contacted Luan directly and you said: "Yes, with

4 one -- that is another."

5 And you were asked again, "Fatmir Limaj was in contact with

6 either you or Luan?" And you said: "That's right."

7 So when you were in Kroimire, Fatmir Limaj was in contact with

8 you or with Luan. Isn't that right?

9 A. I contacted with Fatmir on those days or in end of May or

10 beginning of June. I contacted Fatmir once. I cannot describe the

11 contacts with Luan, but as Luan said, there were contacts. I simply know

12 of my contact with Fatmir Limaj in June, in beginning of June, and as I

13 said here I did have a contact. I'm not denying that I had any contacts

14 with him. I did have contacts with Fatmir Limaj.

15 Q. And then you're asked if Fatmir Limaj is the person who had

16 direct links in the General Staff and you say: "In fact he was the

17 coordinator of this matter."

18 And he was the coordinator, wasn't he, at that time when you were

19 in Kroimire at the end of May/beginning of June?

20 A. I explained this earlier and I will do it again. I described

21 Fatmir Limaj as coordinator of contacts with General Staff because in

22 June, in the beginning of June, I did attempt to contact members of

23 General Staff because there was a great need, a necessity, for ammunition

24 and weaponry. I will say it again that the coordination of Fatmir Limaj

25 was in a sense of placing contact with the General Staff. I always

1 thought -- although it was difficult to know where the General Staff was

2 positioned, but I always thought that the contact could be made in

3 Drenica.

4 Q. And when you needed ammunition and weaponry at the beginning of

5 June, you tried to make that contact with the General Staff through

6 Fatmir Limaj. Isn't that right?

7 A. I don't remember if I contacted the General Staff in June,

8 although I know that in May I did contact the member of General Staff

9 Hashim Thaqi, who I learned later was a member of General Staff. In June

10 I stayed in Kroimire for three or four days, I don't know exactly, and I

11 returned to Kacanik. Therefore, the meeting with Fatmir Limaj could have

12 taken place in these days, although I don't remember of such a meeting

13 but it is possible that there was one. But I don't remember. As for the

14 contact with General Staff in June, it is quite questionable.

15 Q. And then as the interview proceeds, the structure is -- a

16 structure is proposed to you and the question is: "If we can describe

17 the structure: We have a General Staff that is above everything and in

18 the middle there stands Fatmir Limaj as a coordinating point, and then

19 the transmission is carried out. The other point where Fatmir Limaj

20 conveys it is where you and Luan are. Is that correct?"

21 And you say: "It is correct."

22 And then you go on to explain that you were also entrusted with

23 the area of Kacanik. But you agreed with the structure as it was

24 described to you, didn't you? General Staff at the top; in the middle

25 Fatmir Limaj as a coordinating point; and then you and Luan at the point

1 in Kroimire? You said that is correct. Right?

2 A. The way it's put here I wanted to explain some things, to

3 enlighten some things, which I think were normal for me to do because it

4 seemed to me that this -- there was something wrong with this

5 description, especially when it mentions the month of April when my unit

6 was not even organised then in Shtime or in Lipjan. And such form of

7 description was illogical to me. That's why I thought that it needs to

8 be revised, but --

9 Q. Sir, sir, I don't want to focus too much on the date because it's

10 discussing April and May here. The question is: When the structure was

11 put to you that there was a General Staff, then Fatmir Limaj, then you

12 and Luan at the points, when that structure was put to you, your answer

13 is: "It is correct." Right?

14 A. We cannot talk of a structure without pinpointing the period,

15 defining the period. First we have to agree on the period.

16 Q. Let's agree on the period when you are in Kroimire, whether that

17 was in May or the beginning of June. And that was a period that was

18 being talked about here. At that period when you were in Kroimire, there

19 was this structure that was described to you: The General Staff above

20 everything, Fatmir Limaj as a coordinating point, and you and Luan at

21 Kroimire. Isn't that true?

22 A. No, that is not correct. I'm saying what I already said

23 yesterday, that the way the structure is described is after the public

24 appearance of Jakup Krasniqi as the KLA spokesperson --

25 Q. But, Mr. Buja, Mr. Buja, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but is the

1 -- are you now saying this is the structure that existed after the public

2 appearance of Jakup Krasniqi: General Staff at top, Fatmir Limaj in the

3 coordinating position in the middle, and you and Luan at Kroimire?

4 A. No, sir. I think I explained it very well --

5 Q. Sir, if you can just answer my questions. Did this structure

6 ever exist?

7 A. At this period the coordinator between the General Staff and the

8 units that are described here, in the hierarchic sense of the word didn't

9 exist. I mentioned this several times --

10 Q. Sir, can you explain why in the interview when this was put to

11 you: General Staff above everything, Fatmir Limaj in the coordinating

12 point, and you and Luan in Kroimire, why did you say: "It is correct"?

13 Can you explain that for us, please?

14 A. This is not correct. During the interview I thought I might make

15 some mistakes during the description; that's why I demanded to make some

16 corrections --

17 Q. Sir, if this is a mistake, this description, can you explain to

18 us how you made that mistake?

19 A. Yes, I made the mistake because I wanted to explain the period

20 covered by this description. I wanted to enlighten many issues: The

21 flow of developments of organisation which did not exist at the time I

22 was questioned about. In April, I didn't have a unit at all --

23 Q. But, Mr. Buja, now you're saying this structure never existed.

24 So the mistake couldn't have been that you were talking about a different

25 period because you're saying that this structure never existed. Do you

1 have any other explanation for how you could have made this mistake, if

2 it was a mistake?

3 A. Sir, this structure that is described here may have been

4 described as such after June even though it is rather difficult for me to

5 explain the meaning of the structure as such. Even at that time I wanted

6 to explain these issues, but I thought after revising them I might make

7 the corrections and I went on --

8 Q. But is it your testimony now that this structure may have existed

9 after June? Is that your testimony?

10 A. Sir, the periods are rather short, three, four days. And you

11 could talk of a structure. I'm talking about the time when the

12 spokesperson of the General Staff was in Klecke. It is then that you can

13 describe the structure in these words. But when Jakup Krasniqi

14 instructed me that organisation was underway regarding the subzones and

15 they planned to form a subzone in this area, Lipjan, Stimlje, Ferizaj,

16 Kacanik, it was then that I started to work on an entirely new structure

17 of organisation until I was appointed.

18 Those brief periods of organisation that existed which might be

19 described as some structure, but which were in fact not such, might be

20 mentioned. But the form of the guerrilla unit and the links it had with

21 the General Staff, which we cannot say there was a General Staff [as

22 interpreted], but because of the location of Jakup Krasniqi it was in

23 Klecke. That's why we talk about the links of the units with the General

24 Staff.

25 Q. Mr. Buja, I'm not sure I understand your answer. Are you saying

1 this structure did exist at some time? Did it ever exist, this

2 structure, or no, that you describe in the interview: General Staff,

3 Fatmir Limaj, you and Luan at Kroimire? Did that structure ever exist,

4 yes or no?

5 A. This form of the structure did not exist.

6 Q. Then do you have any other explanation for why you said it did in

7 this interview?

8 A. I said that at that time I didn't -- of the interview I didn't

9 focus much on this. I wanted to explain something but then just ignored

10 it thinking I could go back to it at a later time after I got the

11 transcripts. I just wanted to have that interview done and then later on

12 see how the structuring of the KLA was done because things may be

13 forgotten.

14 Q. Sir, it was put to you a final time in this passage that this

15 structure you -- there was -- Fatmir Limaj -- it's at the end of the

16 passage, it's at the bottom of page 36 on the English:

17 "Fatmir Limaj receives instructions from the central staff and

18 you and Luan in Kroimire receive instructions from Fatmir Limaj. Is this

19 correct?"

20 And your answer is: "That is correct. I wanted to explain

21 something else but it is correct."

22 So now you have said -- in just this passage you have said at

23 least three times that the structure being described is correct. Isn't

24 that right?

25 A. Even here in the transcripts it is written and I am reading:

1 "You and Luan in Kroimire received instructions from Fatmir." And the

2 question is asked of me whether that is correct. And I said Yes, but

3 wanted to explain something else but it's okay. I didn't say accurate,

4 correct. I say Okay, because I wanted to explain something.

5 Q. What you wanted to explain was your relationship with Luan.

6 Right? That's what you wanted to talk about?

7 A. Not the nature -- not about the nature of relations with Luan,

8 but the nature of the description of the structure.

9 Q. And when you are asked by me at the end of the interview and the

10 part that we just -- we played already whether there was anything else

11 that you wanted to explain, did you go back and say: That structure that

12 you described, that wasn't correct? Did you do that at the end of the

13 interview? It's at page 104 of the Albanian, page 86 of the English.

14 A. Which page is it?

15 Q. It's page 104 of the Albanian. You were asked if there was

16 anything else that you wanted to say -- anything else you wanted to

17 explain. Did you say then that the structure that had been -- that you

18 had agreed with several times during the interview was in fact not

19 correct?

20 A. I can read you, sir, from the transcript what I said then. I

21 think most of the issues have been mentioned even though it is difficult

22 to grasp that period, the form of organisation, developments then.

23 However, I think that some have been clarified, that is my point was that

24 some issues were clarified but not the form of organisation. That was

25 not fully clarified. That's why I demanded to have the transcript to

1 correct that, to correct possible mistakes.

2 Q. You -- and you don't say there, do you, that the structure that

3 you had agreed with again and again in the interview was not correct?

4 You don't say that there, do you?

5 A. I say that things not all -- not everything has been clarified.

6 Among the things that have not been clarified is also the structure.

7 Some others were already enlightened. And this is what I had in mind,

8 which I mentioned also here, that is the form of organisation was very

9 difficult to explain. And it's very clear that I have stated some issues

10 have been clarified, implying that there are many others that have not

11 been clarified.

12 Q. Mr. Buja, I want to move on to the subject of who were assigned

13 to the different posts in the area, or units if you prefer to call them

14 that. You knew, didn't you, that at Lapusnik Voglushi, Ymer Alushani, or

15 Qerqiz was in charge of Lapusnik in May, June, and July of 1998? You

16 knew that, right?

17 A. I knew that Voglushi or Qerqizi -- which me seemed more

18 authoritative, Voglushi -- didn't have all of Lapusnik under his command

19 because there were other units there. But there was a unit that Voglushi

20 led; this is what I thought then because officially, even today, I am not

21 clear who the leader of the unit was.

22 Q. But you knew that it was either Voglushi or Qerqizi. Right?

23 A. I knew that Voglushi or Qerqizi was the commander of a unit in

24 Lapusnik.

25 Q. And the unit that they commanded -- either one of them commanded,

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1 one or the other, was the Celiku 3 unit. Right?

2 A. You may say Celiku 3, but I didn't know for sure whether it was

3 Celiku 3 under their command.

4 Q. Well, you knew that it was a Celiku unit under their command,

5 didn't you?

6 A. I knew that in Lapusnik there was a unit by the name of Celiku 3,

7 but as to who commanded that unit, this I don't know.

8 Q. Well, which unit did you think that Voglushi or Qerqiz commanded

9 then?

10 A. I thought that they might be unit commanders, one -- of one and

11 the other of another unit. I couldn't figure that out then, whether one

12 of them was the commander of Celiku 3 or one was a commander of a unit

13 and the other of another unit. What I knew was that when I had business

14 to do, I addressed Ymer Alushani, Voglushi, who was one of the commanders

15 of the units there.

16 Q. And the -- you've already told us that the Guri 3 unit was on the

17 other side of the Pristina-Peja highway. Right?

18 A. I have described what I heard, but I didn't know this myself, how

19 they were stationed.

20 Q. But you heard that the Guri 3 unit was on the other side of the

21 Pristina-Peja highway. Right? That's what you told us at the end of the

22 day yesterday.

23 A. Yes, I had heard, but to speak here accurately I would hesitate

24 to speak on the basis of hearsay because they might have been just

25 misrepresentation of events. I had heard about this form of the

1 positions of the units.

2 Q. And you knew that the Lumi units or unit was in Malisevo. Right?

3 You knew that?

4 A. The Lumi unit in Malisheve? As far as I know there were Lumi

5 units elsewhere in other parts, like Lisi units or other units. I know

6 in the Lapusnik gorge there was a Lumi unit.

7 Q. You think that there was a Lumi unit in Lapusnik gorge?

8 A. Yes, I think that there was one Lumi unit in the Lapusnik gorge.

9 I cannot specify it, but not very certain. I may say that there was. I

10 can't be very accurate and can't say it in full certainty. There were

11 Lumi units either in Lapusnik gorge, which is quite an extensive area, or

12 in Negrovce, or in some other adjoining villages. I can't give you an

13 exactly location. I've mentioned some units that were located or

14 stationed in the Lapusnik gorge.

15 Q. When you say "the Lapusnik gorge," you're talking about an area

16 that is bigger than the village of Lapusnik. Right?

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. Sir, I'm going to ask you to turn to page 43 of the Albanian

19 transcript, and it's page 40 of the English. And on the Albanian it's --

20 it's about at the top of the page 43, and on the English it's two-thirds

21 of the way down on page 43 -- on page 40.

22 MR. WHITING: And if we could have the -- switch to the Sanction,

23 please.

24 [Videotape played]

25 "S.B.: Well, I can -- well, I used to know them mostly by their

1 nicknames.

2 "O.L.: Yeah, nickname is okay.

3 "S.B.: Voglushi or Qerqiz, one of them was for Lapusnik.

4 Voglushi would come -- would often visit Kroimire. So he would come and

5 bring along backup units to help us during the offensive. The soldiers

6 from Lapusnik were stationed here in Fushtice. So it was a sort of

7 competition who would set up more points among the commanders. It was

8 problematic in a way because you had to move soldiers from one point to

9 another point in order to [inaudible] -- so there was a sort of

10 overlapping responsibilities, interference with each other. So it's not

11 -- this is my responsibility now, these are my soldiers, these are your

12 soldiers. Yeah, I can't remember the name of the person in charge there

13 because of this fact.

14 "O.L.: Okay.

15 "S.B.: There's been -- there's been many changes here --

16 "O.L.: Okay.

17 "S.B.: -- meaning this point. Kroimire would serve as a

18 gathering point for soldiers. There was no such thing as a stationed

19 unit in that place. I and Luan used to stay here, so I -- Luan stayed

20 here often. Kumanova used to stay in Klecka.

21 "O.L.: Okay.

22 "S.B.: So Kumanova was thought at least at that time by us as

23 the highest-ranking person in Klecka, and Celiku was considered or was

24 thought to be by us some -- higher up than Kumanova.

25 "THE INTERPRETER: Can I ask again who was the highest-ranking

1 person in Klecka?

2 "O.L.: Yes.

3 "S.B.: According to what we thought, Kumanova was the

4 highest-ranking person in Klecka. Later Kumanova moved with units here

5 and was stationed in Luzhnice and also the other point. And on the other

6 side of the asphalt road in Grejcec. So anybody who tried to stand and

7 to -- to expand and increase the number of these points.

8 "O.L.: Okay.

9 Do you want to do a clarification on that?

10 "A.W.: Yeah. The way I understand what you're saying is that

11 Kumanova has responsibility for Klecka but that Celiku is above him in

12 the structure. That's at least what I've understood you to say. Is that

13 right?

14 "S.B.: So we thought Celiku was above -- was above this

15 structure.

16 "A.W.: But he was also in Klecka?

17 "S.B.: Yes, he was in Klecka. Yeah, it was at that time end of

18 July, July 1998, that there happened to be that other members who were

19 thought to be members of the General Staff used to stay in Klecka, or at

20 least we thought that they were from General Staff, from main

21 headquarters.

22 "A.W.: But also during May, June, and July, all during those

23 months Celiku was in Klecka.

24 "S.B.: Yes, yes, he was there.

25 "O.L.: And I'm still trying to clarify a little bit the role of

1 Kumanova now, him being -- you're saying the highest ranking in Klecka.

2 Did that mean that he -- that he was giving orders to these other points

3 or was he just the leader of the soldiers in Klecka?

4 "S.B.: I can't say because my contacts, my meetings, were with

5 Celiku.

6 "O.L.: Okay.

7 "S.B.: But Kumanova would be -- would happen to be present there

8 as well during my meetings with Celiku. So it was more -- it was more

9 work based on consultations rather than orders. So let's say I was -- I

10 was consulted or I was consulting or I was discussing about the weapons

11 supply --

12 "THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry was a mistake.

13 "S.B.: Weapons supply, yeah, that's correct. So it was -- there

14 were sort of deliberations, so it's better not to do this or do that. If

15 Celiku was not able to give a definite answer to questions that would

16 arise then, he would turn to the general -- to main headquarters to get

17 clear instructions.

18 "A.C.: Can you just draw in above Klecka the linkage of the main

19 headquarters to the KLA, just to complete the diagram.

20 "S.B.: No, well it's -- yeah, I'll put momentarily as a main

21 headquarters. Also I can't say it was the other thing, but let's leave

22 it that way for a moment.

23 "O.L.: Just to" --

24 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'm mindful of the hour and what the

25 Court said earlier about --

1 JUDGE PARKER: Two things. The second matter: Given the

2 progress today and given that I understand the occasion will continue

3 beyond 7.00, I think the most we can hope to do is to conclude our

4 hearing a little earlier than 7.00 but otherwise continue on until then.

5 The second -- other issue is whether this is a convenient time or

6 do you want to ask some questions at this moment?

7 MR. WHITING: I could ask about ten minutes of questions about

8 this passage.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Very well.

10 MR. WHITING:

11 Q. Mr. Buja, did you see in this passage where you said that you

12 considered -- you said: "We considered Celiku that is in fact above our

13 organisation."

14 A. Yes, I saw it and I saw other mistakes as well. Kumanova was the

15 commander of Luzhnice unit, not in Klecke.

16 Q. That's right. He was the commander in Luzhnice. But my question

17 is: What did you mean when you said: "We considered Celiku above our

18 organisation"? What did you mean when you said that?

19 A. What I explained earlier. We supposed that he was in a higher

20 position than we -- than us because of his qualities that I mentioned

21 earlier, political expertise and general background. This is why we

22 thought that this man whom we respected was in a higher position, but

23 these were just suppositions.

24 Q. But then later in the passage that we've just looked at you say:

25 "When Celiku was unable to explain to me, that means in fact that

1 he asked for time to consult with members of the General Staff."

2 And that happened, didn't it? You would go to Celiku with

3 something and if he could not answer it he would ask for time to consult

4 with members of the General Staff. Right?

5 A. No. I explained I think very well. It was not the form of

6 orders; it was a form of consultation. We consulted one another about

7 many things related to our organisation. Of course when we failed to

8 find explanation, Fatmir insisted and I insisted that we clarify these

9 issues with the General Staff. But this doesn't mean that there was a

10 hierarchy and that Fatmir Limaj was asked or was supposed to clarify

11 these issues with the General Staff.

12 Q. And if issues had to be clarified with the General Staff, it was

13 Fatmir Limaj who would do it? He would clarify matters with the General

14 Staff and then get back with you later. Isn't that right?

15 A. In July I too went to the General Staff to meet the spokesperson

16 June/July to clarify things; we could do that. If we were unable to

17 agree on a common view about an issue, we took it up with the General

18 Staff.

19 Q. Mr. Buja, can -- you said in the interview: "He asked for time

20 to consult with members of the General Staff." Did that ever happen,

21 that he would ask for time to consult with members of the General Staff?

22 A. I don't recollect that he has asked for time, but when it came to

23 issues we couldn't resolve we couldn't do that without contacting the

24 General Staff. This might be done through Fatmir or I could do that

25 through contacts with the General Staff.

1 Q. But that's not what you said here. You didn't say: One of us

2 would contact the General Staff; you said: "Celiku would contact the

3 General Staff." Right?

4 A. I keep repeating now and again that numerous mistakes occurred

5 during this interview. Normally during this period, end of

6 June/beginning of July, especially in July, was the commander of subzone

7 [as interpreted]. And didn't need anyone's intervention, or in this case

8 Fatmir Limaj's intervention with the General Staff, because as a

9 commander of a subzone, I kept direct links with the General Staff. As

10 of mid-July, I began to know almost all -- most of the members of the

11 General Staff and especially Jakup Krasniqi. In this period, I didn't

12 require Fatmir Limaj to establish contacts for me with the General Staff.

13 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think it's a convenient time.

14 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume just after 6.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 5.41 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 6.05 p.m.

17 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, if I may again, just for the record.

18 Every break gives us opportunity to make further progress, and I've

19 confirmed that the notes were contemporaneous; they were prepared at the

20 time of the meetings. And secondly, the letter has been found and it

21 will be provided to the Defence counsel.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that, Mr. Whiting.

23 MR. WHITING: Now, I'm wondering if the Court has a sense of when

24 it wishes to stop today.

25 JUDGE PARKER: When you finish or a quarter to 7.00, whichever is

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1 the earlier.

2 MR. WHITING: You've put me in a spot, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.

4 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. Sir, I'm going to ask you to please turn to page 64 of the

6 Albanian transcript; it's page 55 of the English transcript. And on page

7 -- on the Albanian I draw your attention to the middle of the page and if

8 we could have the clip. And on the English it's at the bottom of page

9 55.

10 MR. WHITING: I think we need to have the Sanction on. We'll

11 start it again.

12 [Videotape played]

13 "O.L.: Okay. So once again I want to go back to the period of

14 June and July of 1998 and the area that was under the headquarters of

15 Klecke. So was this organisation that you -- that you've drawn to us on

16 this piece of paper, was this effective during this time period that

17 you're calling the first offensive?

18 "S.B.: Yeah, there were points at the time existent.

19 "O.L.: And this was approximately the organisation in -- under

20 the headquarters of Klecka?"

21 MR. WHITING:

22 Q. Now, Mr. Buja, in that part of the interview you're asked:

23 "You've already drawn the picture, the diagram," and I believe it's still

24 in front of you. If the usher could assist that it's still in front of

25 the witness U003-3675. I believe it's under the binder there.

1 You've already drawn this diagram during the interview and here,

2 at this part of the interview, you're asked if at the time of the first

3 offensive the organisation that you have described in this drawing is

4 effective, that this was approximately the organisation under the

5 authority or under the command of Klecka. And you say: "That's right."

6 And in fact, that is correct, isn't it, that this diagram that

7 you drew of the units under the authority or command of Klecka, this was

8 how it was at the time of the first offensive, wasn't it?

9 A. During the time of the first offensive, a system that functioned

10 and which you know very well, but I was appointed commander of the

11 subzone, operational subzone of Nerodime on the 6th of July, 1998 --

12 Q. Sir, I understand that you were appointed -- you yourself were

13 appointed to the subzone of Nerodimlje at this time; I understand that.

14 What I'm asking is: In the interview, the OTP interview, you say that

15 this structure that you have drawn is effective, that is it's in place at

16 the time of the first offensive. And that's how it was, wasn't it?

17 A. During the time of the offensive in July, the structure was built

18 up on the basis of subzones. There existed the operational subzone of

19 Pastrik and of Nerodime. The Pastrik subzone was on one side of Berisa

20 and the Nerodime on the other. This is how the guerrilla units

21 functioned during the first offensive. In the part where I was appointed

22 commander of subzone, I did my best to coordinate the units and their

23 actions.

24 Q. And in the Pastrik subzone at the time of the first offensive,

25 the structure looked like this: There was Klecka and these units in

1 these various villages. Isn't that right, the structure that you've

2 drawn?

3 A. During the time of the offensive, Klecka was in the Pastrik

4 operational subzone, as was Luznica which belonged to Suhareke

5 municipality. And since it was determined on the basis of

6 municipalities, Drenica was in the municipality of Gllogoc and it

7 belonged to the subzone of Drenica. According to General Staff, the

8 subzones were organised as per municipalities and the units were to act

9 according to the municipalities that they belonged. This was a sort of

10 -- it can be described as three subzones. A restructuring began and the

11 121st Brigade was formed in the beginning of August. This structure, as

12 I said, existed for a short period of time when the guerrilla units

13 coordinated -- were coordinated or led by the General Staff spokesperson.

14 Q. But my question is: This diagram that you drew, and if you could

15 look at the diagram, this diagram. In the interview you said that at the

16 time of the first offensive, this structure that you drew was effective,

17 that it existed.

18 A. These units existed and were operational, but the link with the

19 General Staff was through the subzone commanders. I was the commander of

20 the Nerodime subzone and coordinated for the units that were operational,

21 as was the unit for Zborce, Pjetershtice. And these were the activities

22 that I coordinated with Klecka with General Staff or Jakup Krasniqi, who

23 was for a certain period of time in Klecka.

24 Q. But if that's the case, then why did you say -- can you explain

25 why you said, please, in the interview that at the time of the first

1 offensive, this structure that you've drawn was in place? Can you

2 explain that, why you said that, if that's not the truth?

3 A. I described the structure and I said that these points functioned

4 and I described it as a structure that could have functioned in one

5 period of time of one offensive that occurred sometime in mid-July. This

6 structure could have functioned in relation of General Staff, but there

7 was also a structure that was being formed, the structure of subzones,

8 and the subzone commanders were being appointed. This was in the --

9 early July when we were facing the offensive and were not able to

10 continue with the building of the commanding structure. This was a

11 period where we were not able to coordinate the activities and create a

12 subzone structure but the coordination was done with -- between the units

13 and the General Staff through Jakup Krasniqi whose role was dual and very

14 difficult.

15 Q. So, Mr. Buja, just picking up on the first part of your answer

16 here, are you saying that this structure that you drew could have

17 functioned in mid-July, that this is --

18 A. I am saying that the form of subzone could have functioned. With

19 my appointment as commander of subzone I did my best to coordinate the

20 units. As for this structure, it could have functioned in a period that

21 I cannot determine. Simply, it is a very brief period and I don't know

22 if it is correct as a description because the guerrilla units were not

23 coordinated from the subzone but they coordinated directly from Klecka

24 and Jakup Krasniqi.

25 Q. Sir, are you aware that Jakup Krasniqi has testified in this

1 trial?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And are you aware that he testified that that he did not have an

4 operational role but he was part of the political wing of the KLA?

5 A. Of course I heard him and I know his role, the role of Jakup

6 Krasniqi. I said earlier and even today I remember that Jakup Krasniqi

7 was the only member of General Staff whom we knew because he came out

8 publicly and we tried through him to coordinate our work. This doesn't

9 mean that he dealt with the operations, but through him we communicated

10 with other members of the General Staff and through him we received

11 orders, instructions, and information regarding further activities.

12 Q. But that's an operational role, isn't it? If he's communicating

13 orders from the General Staff, then he's then in an operational role.

14 Right?

15 A. No. He did not have an operational role. He informed us

16 because, realistically, we did not know the structure of the General

17 Staff and we didn't know who were its members. And through Jakup

18 Krasniqi we were informed and even the appointment of the subzone

19 commander of Nerodime was given to me through Jakup Krasniqi. As for the

20 rest of the General Staff members, we were not familiar with them. At

21 that time the General Staff was acting half illegally and the role of

22 Jakup Krasniqi was the one of a mediator. Or -- I don't really know how

23 to call it.

24 Q. Mr. Buja, can you explain why the General Staff would communicate

25 orders through somebody whose function was in the political wing and who

1 was spokesman rather than somebody who was on the operational side of the

2 KLA? Why would the General Staff do that, do you know?

3 A. Of course the reason was their illegality, to remain unknown for

4 us. Because it was a great danger to know a member of the General Staff

5 who dealt with operations because the aim of the occupying forces was to

6 attack and to know the General Staff's commander at that time. The

7 occupying forces would attack them, as was the case with Prekaz with the

8 concentration of Serb forces in Prekaz when the attack on the legendary

9 commander Adem Jashari was launched.

10 Q. Mr. Buja -- Mr. Buja, isn't it the fact that the orders were not

11 communicated through Jakup Krasniqi but they were communicated through

12 Fatmir Limaj, and that's why you thought that he was a member of the

13 General Staff?

14 A. No, no. Fatmir Limaj did not communicate the orders. The

15 orders, the instructions, they came from Jakup Krasniqi. If Jakup

16 Krasniqi was asked about this issue, he would have given explanation. If

17 we were given an order or instruction from the General Staff, that would

18 be conveyed to us through Jakup Krasniqi.

19 Q. Now, sir, I want to turn to a different subject. You have told

20 us that there was --

21 MR. WHITING: But before I do, I would ask, Your Honour, that

22 this diagram U003-3675 be given a number, please.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P159.

25 MR. WHITING:

1 Q. Mr. Buja, you have talked about fighting that occurred in

2 Carraleve in June of 1998. Right?

3 A. Yes, there was fighting in June.

4 Q. And were you present for that fighting?

5 A. Yes, I went to this fighting.

6 Q. Were you engaged in the fighting?

7 A. I went to these fightings and I was involved in them.

8 Q. Were you fighting in Carraleve?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you remember the date that you were fighting?

11 A. As for the dates, it's really difficult for me to remember them

12 but of course it was June, mid-June. I fought in July as well,

13 especially with the Zborce unit which was in a very bad position in July

14 when it was forced to withdraw. And for Carraleve-Belince line, I

15 happened to go there in June and July.

16 Q. In -- the fighting in Zborce in July when the unit was forced to

17 withdraw, was that during -- was that at the end of July?

18 A. This was -- the fighting occurred on the 25th or the 26th of July

19 in this period.

20 Q. Did you give the order to the unit to withdraw?

21 A. The withdrawal of this unit was carried out without an order.

22 And due to the attack of the Serb forces, on this fighting Ruzhdi Salihu

23 was killed and we had two or three injured soldiers, soldiers left with

24 very few weapons and ammunition; they were forced to withdraw.

25 Q. Did you later have problems about this withdrawal? Did that

1 cause you problems later on?

2 A. Yes. This withdrawal caused me problems, not only the problem of

3 the withdrawal of Zborce unit which was positioned on the second front

4 line as we called it. I carried out the withdrawal because on the

5 fightings of 24th of July, if not mistaken, after this there was fighting

6 in Fushtice and there the Fustica unit withdrew as well after an hour or

7 an hour and a half of combat. My going there and my meeting with Isak

8 Musliu, we started an operation to make these positions -- to take

9 possession of these positions again. There was fighting on the front

10 line of Blinaje unit as well, a front line which was quite long and the

11 number of soldiers was very small. On that night through Resinovc

12 village I was forced to leave Fustica and go to Blinaje and there I tried

13 to coordinate the activity of this unit which was at great risk. The

14 following morning there was severe fighting in Zborce as well. My

15 movement was mainly along Blinaje and Zborce, and on the 26th of July

16 when the fighting spread on 26th of July, the Zborce unit withdrew to its

17 second positions and the situation in which the units found themselves

18 forced me to withdraw the units because Komorane and Pjetershtice area

19 was at danger and I thought that the tendency of the Serb army was to

20 join their forces, those in Komorane and in Zborce. This tendency of the

21 Serb forces left an encirclement the Blinaje unit and also put at risk

22 the Pjetershtice unit which was positioned in Carraleve gorge.

23 I sent a soldier to request the withdrawal of Petrastica units in

24 Carraleve where fighting was ongoing, and I faced some problems. The

25 problem that I faced was of a strange nature because orders were not

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1 carried out, proposals were not heard, my proposals were not heard. This

2 unit was mainly under the influence of Ramiz Qeriqi, as was the unit in

3 Zborce. I during the 26th of July even after midnight I was with Blinaje

4 unit and I was forced to withdraw this unit and to seek positioning of

5 units in the defending of the gorge where the population, civilian

6 population, was sheltering.

7 Q. After -- after that happened, after that withdrawal, what kind of

8 problems can you -- can you describe for us what kind of problems you had

9 with regard to that issue?

10 A. After the withdrawal of these units, a propaganda was launched

11 against my personality and it was described as my desertion, as a wrong

12 move which damaged the KLA warfare, and it resembled a special war

13 against me as a war personality. This caused many problems and myself on

14 27th or 28th of July, I was forced to answer this propaganda which was --

15 had its roots in the special warfare waged by the Serbs. I found the

16 base of this propaganda the result of the old maxim divide and rule and

17 this had an impact on my personality and even jeopardised me physically.

18 That's why I withdrew to Javor village to consult Jakup Krasniqi about

19 further actions.

20 Q. And how did you respond to these accusations? What did you do?

21 A. Normally I was a person that did not -- did not refute these

22 allegations directly because I understood the underlying motive of these

23 allegations and the specific target aimed at me. That's why I went to

24 Jakup Krasniqi, explained to him my situation, told him about the

25 propaganda campaign being conducted and the fact that it was targeting me

1 specifically. I told Jakup Krasniqi that I would no longer be performing

2 my duties as subzone commander as a result of this propaganda. I

3 demanded that measures be taken against my if I had acted erroneously or

4 those that were spreading such misinformation should be held accountable.

5 I asked him that for me to continue to be in the position of the

6 commander of the Nerodime subzone, they had to specify my tasks as a

7 commander as well as a commanding structure that I had to organise along

8 with an area of responsibility.

9 Q. And who was it that you expected to either take measures against

10 you or hold accountable those who spread information?

11 A. I expected the General Staff of course as the highest body of the

12 KLA.

13 Q. And when you say that you -- you said that measures should be

14 taken against you if you -- it was found that you acted erroneously, what

15 kind of measures were you talking about?

16 A. I am talking about the measures that could be taken by the

17 General Staff. I thought that I might be discharged from my duty or even

18 be imprisoned if -- even though I didn't know that any superior had been

19 imprisoned until then. But this is what I wanted the General Staff to

20 do, that is to take some actions, some measures because of this, as I

21 said, specific struggle aimed at me which had harmed me.

22 Q. And what did the General Staff do?

23 A. For the moment they didn't do anything specific, but Jakup

24 Krasniqi -- with whom my brother, Rame Buja stayed, he was his advisor at

25 the time -- explained to me they would see the possibility of the

1 re-organisation of the military structure and to try to clarify what I

2 wanted from the General Staff and that they would consider a

3 re-organisation of the military structure there. After some time, not a

4 long time actually, I -- from -- during which I didn't carry out my

5 function as Pastrik subzone -- zone -- subzone, we were discussing the

6 suggestions given by the General Staff about the re-organisation, that is

7 that the units that had created problems - Kroimire, Pjetershtice,

8 Zborce, Blinaje, and Fushtice - should be attached to the Pastrik

9 operational subzone and think of establishing a brigade in that area as a

10 result of the very good territorial ties these units had. And then

11 continue with the organisation of the units. After some time --

12 Q. Mr. Buja, is this at the end of July/beginning of August period?

13 A. It was the time period during which I went to Jakup Krasniqi to

14 inform him of what was happening and to demand these measures from the

15 General Staff was end of July, whereas the answer from the General Staff

16 to go to Albania came to me on the 10th or 15th of August.

17 Q. Did you go to Albania?

18 A. Yes, I did. I went through Malisheve municipality, Suhareke,

19 Prizren, and then I crossed over to Albania.

20 Q. During the time period of June and July of 1998 when there was

21 fighting, for example you've given us the example of fighting at

22 Carraleve, did units from other villages come to assist in the fighting?

23 A. Yes, some units have come to assist us because usually the attack

24 was done against -- one unit was organised against one unit and other

25 units came to assist that unit.

1 Q. And how did that happen? How did -- how did units get sent from

2 one village to assist another unit in another village with fighting?

3 A. Usually the unit helped another unit. It was an easy thing to do

4 because fire shots could be heard from Lapusnik to Carraleve or from

5 Klecka to Blinaje. It was an area from where the sound of fighting could

6 be heard and the unit went -- a unit went to the zone of fighting after

7 hearing the fire shots. Sometimes we have sent a soldier to ask other

8 units to help us.

9 Q. Was this assistance from one unit to another unit ever organised

10 by Klecka?

11 A. I can't say that it was organised by Klecka. I do know, however,

12 that I have organised the passage of one unit to Carraleve when there has

13 been fighting there or a unit in Fushtice, Blinaje, just as I have taken

14 part of the unit from Zborce to fight in Fushtice. There have been

15 instances when from Lapusnik gorge units have come to our rescue in

16 fighting, as the case was on the 24th of July in Fushtice.

17 Q. And when you say you can't say it was organised by Klecka, what

18 do you mean when you say that, that you don't know or that it wasn't?

19 A. I know very well how one unit helped another, at least in the

20 area of my responsibility when I was a commander. Initially I was a

21 coordinator and later the commander of the subzone. I knew very well

22 when this occurred in several instances. When it came to assist other

23 units like Luzhnice, Lapusnik, that was a marginal assistance.

24 Q. But my question is: Did -- was this ever organised by Klecka,

25 this assistance? Did Klecka ever play a role in -- in having a unit come

1 to the assistance of another unit?

2 A. The form of organisation of assistance from one unit to another

3 was not organised by Klecke, but the Klecke unit of course assisted other

4 units. Part of the unit came from Klecke to assist us in fighting.

5 Q. But your testimony is that other than occasions when the Klecka

6 unit itself went to assist other units, then Klecka did not play a role

7 in sending one unit to help another unit. Is that your testimony?

8 A. Yes, more or less this is how it was. I don't know that there

9 was any form of coordination of the units by Klecka, with the exception

10 of some instance when we have been unable to communicate with other units

11 and through radio use that could -- that there was in Klecke, they could

12 call some units to come for assistance.

13 Q. When that happened, would you radio to Klecka and then Klecka

14 would radio to the other units?

15 A. In the period up to when I went to Albania, I didn't have radio

16 communication, radio use, so I wasn't able to communicate by radio. But

17 in Klecka there was radio communication and if they heard that there was

18 fighting, of course Klecka must have invited the units to help.

19 Q. And did that happen? Do you know that that happened?

20 A. I don't know if that has happened, but I do know that the units

21 of -- the unit of Lapusnik headed by Voglushi and the unit of Luznica

22 commanded by Kumanova have come to my rescue.

23 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think that's a convenient time.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We'll adjourn now to resume tomorrow

25 at 2.15 --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Judge, please.

2 JUDGE PARKER: I was off the air. We'll adjourn now and resume

3 tomorrow at 2.15.

4 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, I wonder if I could raise one matter

5 before we rise very quickly.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mansfield.

7 MR. MANSFIELD: I anticipate that we might reach some

8 cross-examination tomorrow. That being so, certainly it would be of

9 assistance to us if it would be possible for us to have the reasons for

10 the decision, because clearly it may reflect on the current testimony. I

11 hope that's not too difficult.

12 JUDGE PARKER: It creates a problem because of other commitments

13 on our time.

14 MR. MANSFIELD: Right.

15 JUDGE PARKER: If it's possible, it will be done but I would not

16 think it likely.

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.45 p.m.,

18 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of

19 March, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.

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