1 Monday, 16 January 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.33 p.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we deal with a few housekeeping issues before
6 we start.
7 First of all, there is a point that I would like to raise with the
8 parties relating to the agreed facts. In the agreed facts mentioned in
9 the opening statement of Mr. Milan Martic on the 13th of December, there
10 are a few things -- one thing that he mentioned that seemed to be the same
11 as what is mentioned in the indictment and yet that fact has not been
12 admitted. I just want to find out what the parties have to say about it.
13 First of all, paragraph 67 of the amended indictment mentions both
14 a referendum held in Croatia on the 19th of May, 1991, and declarations of
15 independence by Croatia and Slovenia on the 25th of June, 1991. And in
16 his opening statement, the accused clearly referred to declarations of
17 independence by Croatia and Slovenia. Now, I refer here to transcript
18 page 301, paragraph 1.7 to 11. It looks to me that a logical conclusion
19 would be that both parties are not in dispute regarding Croatia and
20 Slovenia's declaration of independence on the 25th of June, 1991.
21 However, the list of agreed facts includes only the 19th of May, 1991
22 referendum in Croatia and does not refer to the 25th of June, 1991
23 declarations of independence where Croatia and Slovenia.
24 Accordingly, it is the view of the Chamber that on this point the
25 parties need to state whether they are agreed or not agreed on this fact.
1 If you look at the agreed facts -- yeah. They said that on the agreed
2 facts it is still that on the 19th of May, 1991 a referendum was held in
3 Croatia except in dominantly Serb areas of the SAO Krajina, concerning
4 independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia. And then the indictment says on
5 the 19th of May, 1991, Croatia held a referendum in which the electorate
6 voted overwhelmingly for independence from the SFRY, and on the 25th of
7 June, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from
8 Yugoslavia. The opening statement says in 1990 and in 1991 in the
9 territories of the former Yugoslavia, there was an eruption of separatist
10 movements in both Croatia and Slovenia. On that very same day, the 25th
11 of June, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia.
12 Is there any -- am I right to say that there seems to be some kind
13 of agreement, although the formal answer was that there is no agreement on
14 that fact.
15 MR. WHITING: I think Your Honour is correct. Obviously the
16 Prosecution agrees with that fact and would be happy to agree -- agree it
17 with the Defence.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Excuse me. Your Honours, with
21 respect to this issue, we have communicated, both in writing and directly,
22 with the Office of the Prosecutor. There is no dispute about the fact
23 that on that date, both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence.
24 What is at issue legally is whether at the time that independence
25 was declared Yugoslavia was a sovereign state or not with its constitution
1 being applied on its entire territory. If this was the case, and in 1991
2 Yugoslavia was a member of the UN and the only internationally recognised
3 state, it is very important to say that this declaration of independence
4 was unconstitutional. The constitution of Yugoslavia did provide for the
5 possibility of secession, but only according to the procedure prescribed
6 by the constitution. The way this was done was unconstitutional, and
7 these two republics had no right to do any such thing without the
8 agreement of all the republics and a referendum held on the entire
9 territory of Yugoslavia. The Defence wishes to say that there is no
10 dispute, that as such a declaration was made on that day, but we wish to
11 point out that this ran counter to international law and the constitution.
12 This is the point at issue, and we feel that this is a very important
13 issue, both factually and legally.
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic. The next
16 point --
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: So for purposes of the proceedings, we then record
19 that the parties are agreed that on that day Croatia and Slovenia did
20 declare independence.
21 As to the constitutionality thereof, I suppose it's a matter that
22 will be dealt with in evidence and in argument. Thank you.
23 The next point is a point of clarification. In the opening
24 statement, the accused described the movement of the Serbs in Croatia to
25 what's now cultural autonomy at an early stage as follows: "The Serbs in
1 Croatia responded to this attitude of Croatian government by showing their
2 support for preservation of Yugoslavia as a federal state with existing
3 federal units. The Serbs demanded to have their own cultural autonomy
4 within the Republic of Croatia. We are talking here about the cultural
5 autonomy. In the case of disintegration of the Yugoslavia state, the
6 Serbs in Krajina wanted the same principle to be applied as the principle
7 used for self-determination of Croats and Slovenes. They wanted the same
8 benefits to apply to them within Croatia. The Serbs in Krajina within
9 their ethnic territory wanted protection for themselves, both territorial
10 and institutional."
11 On the other hand, the relevant part of paragraph 4 of the agreed
12 facts lists -- I beg your pardon. Agreed facts list reads: "Finally the
13 declaration on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbian people stated
14 that if Yugoslavia remained to be a federation, the Serbs in Croatia would
15 demand cultural autonomy, but if Yugoslavia became a federation, they had
16 the right to political and territorial autonomy."
17 Now, this last sentence doesn't make logical sense because they
18 say: "If Yugoslavia remained a federation, the Serbs want cultural
19 autonomy. Again, if it remained a federation, became a federation, they
20 want territorial autonomy. There's no logical sense in that statement,
21 and hence we ask for clarification.
22 Mr. Whiting.
23 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think the Court is correct. There's
24 I think a typographical error. I don't know what the word is there, but
25 it's something different -- in the second part, it's something different
1 than "federation," and we can -- I can get what it's supposed to say at
2 the next break and we can have that for the Court.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: You will do that?
4 MR. WHITING: Yes, I will take care of that.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The next point --
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] By your leave, Your Honour,
9 perhaps I could clarify. From our conversations, it transpires quite
10 clearly that if a federation remained, the Serbs in Croatia wanted
11 cultural autonomy. However, if there was a confederation, and this is
12 evidently where the typographical error crept in, if a confederation was
13 created, in that case the Serbs would demand territorial autonomy.
14 However, if this is still a dispute, of course it's open to discussion.
15 But this is our position as the Defence.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you for that clarification, Mr. Milovancevic.
17 I don't think the issue is one of dispute; it's just a question of
18 clarification. It looks like your opposite number would like to
19 investigate it further, and I hope that during the next break he will
20 probably confer with you. And if you agree, both of you, that your
21 interpretation or your explanation is a correct one, you'll confirm it at
22 the next session.
23 Is that correct so, Mr. Whiting?
24 MR. WHITING: That's correct, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
1 The next issue relates to the examination of expert witnesses. In
2 its decision on the 13th of January, the Trial Chamber considered that the
3 focus of Rules 92 bis (E) and 94 bis is on the expert report and
4 transcripts of previous testimony and not on supporting documents. The
5 Trial Chamber would therefore like to clarify the procedure for examining
6 expert witnesses in light of the fact that the first expert witness will
7 be coming to testify very shortly. (1), once a witness is confirmed as an
8 expert witness, the expert report is the core piece of documentary
9 evidence for this witness. (2), the Prosecution is therefore requested to
10 confine its examination-in-chief to the most relevant conclusions of the
11 expert report, and in particular focus should be on matters which are
12 likely to be controversial or which require further illustration and
13 clarification by the expert. (3), as regards documents that the expert
14 has used to prepare his or her report, the Prosecution is requested to
15 limit its tendering of documents to those which are necessary for the
16 illustrations of the matters referred to in point (2) above. And (4),
17 following the ordinary procedure for cross-examination, the Defence may
18 tender into evidence any documents, including those referred to in the
19 expert report, which the Prosecution has not tendered into evidence.
20 However, the Defence is also asked to confine its tendering of documents
21 to matters of conclusion in paragraph (2) above. And finally, (5), the
22 Trial Chamber will decide on the admissibility of documents which the
23 Defence is subjected to after the testimony of the expert has been
25 Are we happy with that arrangement?
1 MR. WHITING: Well, Your Honour, I actually was prepared to -- and
2 would still like to urge a different course on the Court, and that is what
3 the Prosecution would like to do is to seek the admission of all the
4 documents that the report relies upon into evidence. And I think that we
5 have a good basis for it, and I think it would be an expedient use of the
6 Court's time rather than a waste of the Court's time. And I know it
7 appears as though the Court is going to be buried in documents, but in
8 fact I think it will move things along more quickly.
9 There are approximately 300 documents at issue. And the reason
10 that the -- there are several reasons why the Prosecution would like to
11 take this course, a course which has been adopted in other proceedings.
12 The first is that the Defence -- and this is particularly -- I'm only
13 speaking about the first expert who is going to testify, who crucially is
14 an in-house expert. He is an employee of the Office of the Prosecution.
15 The Defence has already challenged his impartiality. Now, I know that
16 that challenge came in the context of whether the report would be admitted
17 into evidence; the Court rejected that challenge. However, that challenge
18 obviously still exists with respect to the weight that the Court should
19 accord the report and the conclusions drawn by the Court.
20 We think that it's going to be very important for the Court to
21 have available to it the documentation that the expert relied upon in
22 order to rebut this challenge from the Defence as to the impartiality or
23 partiality of this expert. And it's hard to tell which -- right now which
24 documents may become important to the Court's evaluation of the expert,
25 which is why we think the Court should have available to it all of the
1 documentation so it can check to see if the expert has drawn reasonable
2 conclusions from the documentation. That's only the first point.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can the Court respond to that point that you've
4 just made --
5 MR. WHITING: Of course, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- before we go to the next one.
7 What you have just said is precisely what the Court fears, that it
8 be inundated with a whole voluminous bunch of documentation and the
9 Prosecution says, Court, there are the documents. You make a peek, go
10 through them and find out what is relevant and what is not relevant. I
11 think the Prosecution must come to Court with its case well prepared and
12 be able to say: For conclusion A of the expert, the facts supporting that
13 are found in document C, that is an annex, not to say: There are
14 documents C up to Z, and the Court must find which document is relevant
15 for that conclusion.
16 We -- the problem here is if you are going to be filing or
17 tendering 300 documents and you do not -- the Prosecution itself does not
18 even know which of the documents it relies on for the conclusions that the
19 expert comes to and it expects the Court to wade through those documents,
20 then obviously you are getting documents into evidence through the
21 backdoor. I would rather that those documents on which the expert bases
22 his conclusions on be referred to in his evidence in chief, those
23 documents be marked, and those documents be looked at and be admitted into
24 evidence. If you want other documents to be marked for identification,
25 they can be marked for identification, and the admissibility may be argued
2 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, it wasn't my intention for a moment to
3 suggest that we were just going to dump the documents on the Court and let
4 the Court find its way. I think, number one, the report is quite
5 clear in terms of it's very extensively footnoted. It's clear which
6 documents are relied upon for which conclusions. It's also our full
7 intention in the examination-in-chief to focus the Court on the most
8 important, most relevant documents. However, this is precisely the point.
9 We would like in the examination-in-chief to be able to focus on the most
10 relevant documents without having to try to get the full -- go through
11 each document that the report relies on, spend days on end going through
12 each document, supporting each document, how each document supports a
13 particular conclusion, then move to admit that document into evidence
14 until we finally get to 300 documents. We don't want to waste the Court's
15 time that way or the parties' time. We would like to focus in on the
16 discussion on the most important documents.
17 The point I was trying to make is, number one, in the report
18 itself, which -- and we're not going to touch on every conclusion in the
19 report; it's an extensive report. There are footnotes citing documents.
20 It may be that the Court will later on be looking at a particular issue,
21 take an interest in it, want to see if the conclusion is supported by the
22 document, and have that available to it. I'm not suggesting it go any
23 further than that.
24 The second point, Your Honour, is that there are a number of other
25 witnesses who will testify about these documents. And we think that it is
1 expedient to try to get the documents into evidence now and then allow the
2 witnesses to be able to go back and comment on some or all of those
4 The point is the admissibility, the threshold for admissibility,
5 is -- we think should be quite low. These documents have not been
6 challenged. Their authenticity has not been challenged. They were put on
7 our exhibit list. It was contemplated from the beginning that they would
8 be exhibited. They were disclosed to the Defence. They have not been
9 challenged in terms of their authenticity. They should be presumed
10 authentic. They were important. They were relied upon for the report.
11 They should come into evidence.
12 As far as what weight they get or how they ultimately figure at
13 the end, that is a separate matter, and that will depend on what the
14 report says, that will depend on what witnesses say later, that will
15 depend on the conclusions of the Court. And it is our intention to direct
16 the Court, and I'm sure the Defence will do the same, to those matters as
17 we go, both in terms of the examination of the expert but also in the
18 final brief and final arguments. We will direct the Court to relevant
19 documents. We are not going to dump the documents on the Court and hope
20 that the Court finds its way. That's not our intention at all. It just
21 seems to us that getting these documents in in one group, rather than
22 spending time going over each one and having the expert testify about each
23 one in his testimony is the most expedient way to proceed. Bring -- let
24 them come into evidence in a group. He will testify about the most
25 important ones. They will be available to the Court that way, and other
1 witnesses can then testify about them later.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: On the second point that you've raised, let me just
3 ask a question: Why can't those documents that are going to be referred
4 to by other witnesses be tendered into evidence through those witnesses
5 rather than through this witness?
6 MR. WHITING: It could be done that way, Your Honour. I just
7 think it's more -- I'm certainly not disputing that it could be done that
8 way. I just am suggesting that it be more expedient to have these
9 documents in evidence, available to all the parties to be able to argue
10 about, available for witnesses to be able to comment on. We would get
11 that kind of matter out of the way, and I suggest that we could get
12 through the expert's testimony much more quickly if we do it that way then
13 if we have to go through each document through his testimony.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you suggesting that expedience must override
16 MR. WHITING: No. I'm suggesting that expediency is a
17 consideration in procedure.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. -- would you like to say something?
21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is the view of
22 the Defence that the standpoint of the Chamber in this issue is completely
23 in accordance with what the practice should be before this Tribunal. The
24 arguments of the Prosecutor, with all due respect, is something that we
25 feel cannot be accepted. It's a completely separate issue, the issue of
1 the value, content, weight of an expert report, an expert who has
2 knowledge and expertise not otherwise available to the Chamber. It is his
3 task to draw the Chamber's attention to the documents he used. This does
4 not automatically mean that the expert should comment on each and every
5 document; that would be pointless. But he should explain how he came to
6 the conclusions he reached.
7 This looks like an attempt to tender in advance something that
8 should only be done during the cross-examination. The issue of the
9 content of the expert report and its value and weight is a separate issue
10 from the issue of admissibility of documents, the documents referred to by
11 the expert. These are all separate issues. We feel that the Chamber's
12 position is quite correct when it comes to dealing with expert reports.
13 Thank you.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. The Chamber took the
15 opportunity to raise this issue this early with the parties so that the
16 parties can adjust their positions accordingly. We're not going to rule
17 on it right now, if there's any need for ruling at all. The expert
18 witness is not about to be called just now, so I would suggest that the
19 parties think about it and maybe just before they call the first expert
20 witness, state their position to the Court and maybe the Court might make
21 a ruling at that stage, if there's any need for that. For the time being
22 it's just for the parties just to consider.
23 At this stage, in view of what has been reported to the Chamber
24 about the witness who's about to be called, I would like the court to go
25 into private session. Will the court please go into private session,
1 Mr. Registrar.
2 [Private session]
11 Page 333 redacted. Private session.
11 Page 334 redacted. Private session.
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
16 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, at the pre-trial conference and then
17 just before the opening statements in this case back in December, the
18 Chamber raised a number of matters that it asked the parties to try to
19 seek agreement on. And the Court indicated that it would check back with
20 us -- I thought maybe I would take the initiative and report to the Court
21 where we stand on those matters.
22 I'm -- I regret to report that the progress has been exactly zero
23 in reaching agreement in any of those matters. And I think it's not
24 through any failure of trying by the Prosecution.
25 We sent a letter to the Defence on the 2nd of January of this year
1 asking if they would agree to any of the things that the Court raised,
2 specifically -- and then we -- we have received a reply today to our
3 request. Specifically we asked if the -- if the Defence would agree that
4 in fact there was an armed conflict in Croatia during the relevant time,
5 that is, from August of 1991 until August of 1995. The Defence has
6 replied that they are unable to agree to that, which -- well, I'll leave
7 comment aside, but that's what the -- what the response has been back from
8 the Defence.
9 The Court also asked us to see if we could agree with respect to
10 victims in this case, on a list of victims. And from the point of view of
11 the Prosecution, the easiest, most efficient way to do that would be for
12 the parties simply to agree on the testimony of the experts which is about
13 the victims and which identifies the victims from exhumations and so
14 forth. And to that end the Prosecution asks the Defence if they would
15 agree to the testimony of the experts, which of course they -- as the
16 Court is well aware, they have previously specifically not agreed to their
17 reports and their testimony. They continue to adhere to their position,
18 have not agreed to the experts, and want to cross-examine all three of the
19 experts. In the view of the Prosecution, under Rule 94 bis there's no
20 avenue for the Prosecution to move for the admission of those reports and
21 testimony without cross-examination. 94 bis doesn't seem to allow that,
22 and the Court has ruled on this matter, so I don't see any way forward on
23 this issue.
24 The Court also asked if we would agree on what we call the
25 intercept witnesses, MM16, 17, and 18. We asked the Defence if they would
1 agree to the testimony of those intercept witnesses and the admission into
2 evidence of the relevant intercepts, which of course we could argue about
3 later, what they mean and so forth. The Defence has declined to agree to
4 that. Again, I don't think there is an avenue under the Rules for the
5 Prosecution to move for the admission of these witnesses. 92 bis is not
6 really applicable here in our view, so we're going to have to call those
8 The Chamber also asked if the parties would agree -- consider
9 Rule 92 bis for the following witnesses: 28, 64, and 74. The
10 Prosecution's position, after consideration of this suggestion from the
11 Trial Chamber, was that we would in fact agree to Rule 92 bis for witness
12 28. However -- and we asked the Defence if they would agree to that
13 witness to be 92 bis.
14 With respect to 64 and 74, it's the view of the Prosecution that
15 those witnesses are critical and need to be heard live by the Chamber.
16 However, those two witnesses are -- testify about the Zagreb shelling.
17 The Prosecution identified three other witnesses, 68, 72, and 73, on the
18 Zagreb shelling that we do believe could be admitted via 92 bis. We asked
19 the Defence if they would agree to the admission via 92 bis of those
20 witnesses. The Defence at this time declined to agree on any of those
22 Here we do have a way forward from the Prosecution's side, and we
23 will file a motion shortly seeking the admission via Rule 92 bis of those
24 four witnesses. That is 28, 68, 72, and 73. I expect we will file that
25 motion within the next few days.
1 Finally, Your Honours, we have prepared a book of maps that we
2 think would be helpful to the Trial Chamber that we expect a number of
3 witnesses to comment on and to speak about and testify about. This is
4 something that has been done in a number of cases recently for the
5 convenience of the parties. It's been thought helpful to have -- and for
6 the Chamber to have a number of the critical maps contained in one binder,
7 become one exhibit, that everybody can then have a copy of and refer to.
8 And with the Court's permission I'd like to hand up our proposed map book
9 for the Chamber to have a look at. If the usher -- we have it over here,
10 if the usher could -- this, obviously, has been provided to the Defence.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we hand it out, let's just hear what the
12 Defence has to say on it being handed up.
13 Mr. Milovancevic. Just on the map, Mr. Milovancevic.
14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
15 We have received the proposal of the OTP on Friday, as a matter of
16 fact. We looked at this very carefully. These are the documents that are
17 supposed to be used in these proceedings before this highest of legal
18 institutions. We spoke to the Prosecution about this, and if the Trial
19 Chamber is interested, we can voice our objections now, each and every one
20 of them, because they are totally arbitrary, these maps. You cannot make
21 a survey, for example, of certain municipalities in Croatia with a
22 majority Serb population on the basis of the vote in 1990. Please, Your
23 Honours, isn't this an elementary thing that the ethnic make-up of
24 municipalities is ascertained by way of a description, not voting?
25 Of course it was not our intention to deny things per se, but we
1 wanted the names of the maps to be adjusted to what is contained in the
2 maps. We want this to be as precise as possible and to say that the map
3 was from 1991, 1992, 1993, whatever year, with borders from such-and-such
4 a period and so on and so forth. These are very specific objections, and
5 I don't want to tire the Trial Chamber with all of these details, but if
6 the Trial Chamber considers this necessary, I can deal with each and every
7 map individually now. I don't know whether you have these maps in front
8 of you now, but I can give you an example, for instance.
9 We were offered a map of the Western Balkans. There is no such
10 term. Please. And it is a map of the Socialist Federal Republic of
11 Yugoslavia actually and with its specified borders. So what's this all
12 about? If some countries are on a map, then one should say: This is a
13 map with the borders of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, and so on. But if what
14 is denoted are the contours of the former Yugoslavia, the Socialist
15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a member of the UN, then it should
16 say, "the borders of Yugoslavia for 1991." But to say that this is a map
17 of the Western Balkans, that doesn't mean a thing to us, and it leads us
18 to possible inferences and conclusions that can be very delicate in such
20 We tried to deal with these issues very seriously. Perhaps it
21 does not appear to be that serious, but it's a very, very delicate issue,
22 and that is why the Defence presented its position on it very clearly, and
23 we submitted that to the OTP. We also tried to help our colleagues from
24 the OTP, how they should mark these maps so that we could accept them as
25 such. I think that that is quite do-able, especially through a normal
1 conversation. I don't think it's right to cast blame this way, but I hope
2 that we get things going eventually.
3 Thank you, Your Honour.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. We hear what you say, Mr. Milovancevic,
6 about maybe solving the problem by way of a discussion with the
7 Prosecution and trying to re-name the maps properly as being the Federal
8 Republic of Yugoslavia instead of Western Balkans or whatever corrections
9 need to be made.
10 The Chamber will recommend that the parties meet and try to
11 resolve that issue, the naming of the maps and making sure that they are
12 absolutely correct before they are handed up to Court. And if the parties
13 are not able to do that, the Court will have to rule on this issue at a
14 later stage.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] By your leave, Your Honour,
17 just a few words about what our colleagues from the Prosecution said about
18 the other facts.
19 There are facts on which it is possible to agree, and there are
20 others on which it is impossible to agree. As for our disagreement with
21 the definition of the armed conflict that was offered to us, we wrote what
22 we had to write very precisely, trying to be very precise legally and
24 Secondly, as for the victims, the OTP believes that we should
25 agree on the victims on the basis of the findings of their experts. We
1 will be in a position to agree on such matters only once our medical
2 experts complete their work, because we got material from the OTP stating
3 that their reports on the victims, names, et cetera, all of the things
4 that have to do with victims, casualties, there are many mistakes
5 involved. So we don't have to act in haste. We need to double-check all
6 of this with our own experts.
7 Also, the witness statements. May I just note one point, Your
8 Honour. I don't want you to get the wrong picture about what the Defence
9 is doing. We were here on the 12th and 13th last time, and then we
10 returned to Belgrade on the 14th of December. Since then there were many
11 holidays, including the Christmas and new year holidays. The Defence
12 tried to make up for time lost and to pack its office. I'm not referring
13 to shelves and cupboards, but I'm referring to the written materials that
14 have to do with this case. I have to indicate one particular thing, that
15 these materials have been brought to The Hague. It's half a tonne of
16 material, 230 binders. We don't have the technical facilities to set up
17 an office here. Of course we know this is no concern of the Trial
18 Chamber's, but we asked the registry to assist us. We don't want to
19 burden the Trial Chamber with this, but this is an actual fact of life
20 that the -- that should be taken into account because it makes our life
21 difficult. Today we will be able to deal with one witness only, and all
22 the rest of our material is stored. It's in storage, it's locked up. All
23 our things that were brought from Serbia are in storage here.
24 Just one more thing. This is the very beginning of these
25 proceedings. Time and work will show what we can agree upon. Since our
1 client is in detention, we have no reason to obstruct the proceedings or
2 to drag our feet.
3 Thank you.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic.
5 Obviously at this stage of the trial, those points, those four
6 points, that the Trial Chamber had asked that the parties try to reach
7 agreement on have not been agreed upon, and the only way forward at this
8 stage is that the Prosecution must proceed and prove its case as best it
9 can. And if there's any agreement that the parties might reach as the
10 proceedings go -- progress, so be it.
11 Mr. Whiting, your witness.
12 MR. WHITING: We call our first witness, Your Honour.
13 Your Honour, while the witness is being brought in, can I be
14 guided on when the Court intends to take its first break.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated].
16 MR. WHITING: One and a half hours is my understanding.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: One and a half hours. Well, we've just gone beyond
18 an hour -- no, we started at half past, we haven't an hour yet. So we
19 will go for the remainder of the one and a half hours.
20 MR. WHITING: That's fine. Thank you, Your Honour.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may ask the witness to take the solemn
24 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry, Your Honour, in the last court the Judge
25 asked the witness to do that, but I'm happy to do that.
1 Witness, could you read the solemn declaration, please.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
3 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
5 MR. WHITING: You may be seated.
6 May I proceed, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed.
8 WITNESS: VELJKO DZAKULA
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Examined by Mr. Whiting:
11 Q. Sir, are you able to understand me clearly?
12 A. I understand you.
13 Q. If at any time you cannot understand me or you're not getting the
14 translation, please let me know.
15 A. I will.
16 Q. Would you please state your name for the Court.
17 A. My name is Veljko Dzakula.
18 Q. What is your date of birth?
19 A. The 19th of March, 1955.
20 Q. Are you a Serb of Croatian nationality?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you currently live in Croatia?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Before the war, could you tell us what your professional was?
25 A. I have a university degree in forestry, and I ran a forestry
1 company in Croatia.
2 Q. Where did that -- where in Croatia did that company operate?
3 A. In Pakrac, Western Slavonia.
4 Q. And what -- is that the job that you had in 1990/1991?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Until what date did you hold that position?
7 A. I held that position until the 19th of August, 1991.
8 Q. Before the war, were you a member of the League of Communists?
9 A. Yes, I was a member of the League of Communists.
10 Q. Do you recall when the Serbian Democratic Party, known as the SDS,
11 was formed in Croatia?
12 A. In Croatia it was established sometime in February 1990.
13 Q. And where was that? Where was it first formed?
14 A. In Knin.
15 Q. Who were the leaders of the SDS in Knin who first formed the SDS?
16 A. The president of the party of the Jovan Raskovic. Among them were
17 Dusan Zelembaba, Jovan Opacic, Milan Babic, Djoko Vjestica, Macura, and
19 Q. Do you recall when the first multi-party elections were held in
21 A. Well, they were held sometime in the spring of 1990.
22 Q. Do you recall how the SDS performed in those elections?
23 A. Well, the SDS won in the municipalities of Benkovac, Knin, Gracac,
24 and Lopac.
25 Q. Did there come a time when you, yourself, joined the SDS?
1 A. Yes. That was at the end of May 1990.
2 Q. Why did you join the SDS?
3 A. Well, because we saw that the party that we, most of the Serbs,
4 gave our vote to, the SDP, and those moments after the elections did not
5 sufficiently follow the problems that the Serbs were facing. And we
6 thought that it was important for the Serbs to get organised so they could
7 present their interests in a better and easier manner, everything that was
8 relevant to their lives, that is.
9 Q. You referred in your answer to the SDP. What does that stand for?
10 A. The Party of Democratic Change. The League of Communists tried to
11 democratise into a new party, and that's the name of the party to this
12 day, the SDP.
13 Q. You also referred to the problems that the Serbs were facing.
14 Could you tell us what, in your view, those problems were?
15 A. Well, first of all these election rallies where the new
16 iconography appeared that was reminiscent of the recent past of the Second
17 World War. Then Croatian politicians spoke of the over-representation of
18 Serbs in the police and different companies, et cetera. There were quite
19 a few negative connotations in these speeches. Also, the constitution was
20 changed, and this party did not express an interest in the Serbs who built
21 their past together with the Croats, and we realised that they did not
22 sufficiently monitor the problems facing the Serb community.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Dzakula, I would like to go through with you the
24 different positions that you held in the party, in the SDS, and also later
25 in politics. And then -- and also some of the things that happened to you
1 as a result of your positions and then go back over the history again in a
2 little more detail.
3 When you joined the SDS, did you hold a position in the party?
4 A. First I was a member of the Regional Board of the SDS for Western
5 Slavonia, later on the president of the Regional Board, and then I became
6 a member of the Executive Board of the party for the whole of Croatia, due
7 to that position.
8 Q. When did you become a member of the Regional Board of the SDS?
9 When did you first become a member?
10 A. I became a member of the Regional Board as soon as June 1990.
11 Q. And when did you become president of the Regional Board?
12 A. Towards the end of 1990.
13 Q. And when did you become a member of the Executive Board for the
14 whole of Croatia? Was that also at the same time? At the end of 1990?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, initially when the SDS was founded in the area of Western
17 Slavonia, did the SDS in that area cover only Western Slavonia or a larger
19 A. At that time, the party was for the whole of Slavonia and Baranja,
20 stretching from Ilok to Kutina, encompassing 14 or 15 municipalities and
21 cities. Later on there was a division into Western Slavonia and Eastern
22 Slavonia and Baranja.
23 Q. When did that occur, just the date?
24 A. That occurred in 1991. I think it was in May when the national
25 council of eastern -- or rather, of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem
1 was declared. After that, we promulgated Western Slavonia so that we
2 would not be under the competence of that body and Goran Hadzic.
3 Q. We'll get to that in a moment.
4 Do you recall at the end of 1990 the so-called SAO Krajina being
6 A. Yes, I recall that.
7 Q. And who was the president of the SAO Krajina when it was first
9 A. Milan Babic.
10 Q. And it was not until 1991 that the SAO Western Slavonia was
11 formed. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes. This was on the 12th of August, 1991.
13 Q. And before that occurred, was the SAO for Eastern Slavonia,
14 Baranja, and Western Srem formed?
15 A. Yes, it was formed in June 1991.
16 Q. And who was the president of that SAO?
17 A. Goran Hadzic.
18 Q. When the SAO Western Slavonia was formed in August of 1991, who
19 was the president of that entity?
20 A. I was.
21 Q. Could you tell the Court, please, what municipalities were
22 included within the SAO Western Slavonia?
23 A. Pakrac, Daruvar, Grubisno Polje, Podravska Slatina, parts of
24 Orahovica, and Okucani. Until then it had not been a municipality, but it
25 comprised the villages between Nova Gradiska and Novska, and then Okucani
1 was considered a municipality, too.
2 Q. You mentioned Pakrac. Was -- before the SAO Western Slavonia was
3 formed, was Pakrac in another SAO?
4 A. Pakrac municipality on the 18th or 21st of February, 1991, acceded
5 to the SAO Krajina.
6 Q. And when the SAO Western Slavonia was formed, it shifted from the
7 SAO Krajina over to the SAO Western Slavonia?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Could you tell the Court in general terms, just briefly, and
10 obviously we'll have more detail about this later, your -- describe for
11 the Court your political approach that you advocated in 1990 and 1991.
12 A. My political approach, first of all, was that all the issues that
13 had emerged had to be resolved through dialogue. That's why there was a
14 clash with Milan Babic within the party. The members of the Regional
15 Board of the SDS of Western Slavonia maintained contacts with the
16 representatives of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia, and this
17 was held against us by the SDS in Knin. The member of the Regional Board,
18 Professor Vojo Vukicevic, who went to negotiate in Zagreb, was criticised
19 for this and had to leave both the party and Slavonia.
20 Q. Are there other leaders or persons within the SDS and Western
21 Slavonia who you can identify that took your approach?
22 A. Yes, there were quite a few of them. Dusan Ecimovic, Obrad
23 Ivanovic, Veljko Vukic, Milenko Miletic, people from Kutina, Branko
24 Popovic from Grubisno Polje. Zivko Zagorac from Grubisno Polje. I would
25 say they were in the majority, in fact.
1 Q. You made reference to other leaders, and you specified Milan
2 Babic, who took a different approach. How would you describe this
3 different approach?
4 A. They had no wish or desire to negotiate with Zagreb about the
5 various opinions and approaches that had emerged. They wanted to break
6 off all contact with Zagreb and to resolve everything within our own
8 For example, there was an event when Serbs from Vukovar came to a
9 meeting in Knin, and the Serbs in the Knin SDS said they were Ustasha
10 because the checker-board flag was flown in Vukovar. And the
11 difference -- there was a difference that emerged between us and Babic's
12 people from Knin.
13 Q. Who were -- you've mentioned Babic. Who were some of the other
14 leaders who espoused this different approach?
15 A. Bosko Bozanic from Korenica, David Rastovic from Lapac, Djoko
16 Vjestica. I can't recall all the names at present. But people from Knin,
17 Benkovac, Obrovac, Lapac, Korenica, the areas of Dalmatia and Lika.
18 Q. How about Milan Martic. Which approach did he take? Did he tend
19 to take our approach or the approach that you've just described that was
20 taken by leaders in Knin?
21 A. When Milan Martic emerged on the political scene, he was in favour
22 of the same option as Milan Babic, not to negotiate with Zagreb, but to
23 resolve all issues within the Krajina itself.
24 Q. In July of 1991, did you form something called the Serbian
25 Democratic Forum?
1 A. Yes. It was established in early July 1991 in Lipik, which was
2 then part of Pakrac municipality.
3 Q. Could you tell the Court, please, what the purpose of the Serbian
4 Democratic Forum was?
5 A. There was a division within the SDS in Croatia into the SDS of
6 Krajina and the rest of the SDS in the Republic of Croatia. We wanted to
7 strengthen the latter with independent intellectuals from the Republic of
8 Croatia who wanted us to be united about Serbian interests all over
9 Croatia, to articulate them together, to seek solutions through democratic
10 dialogue. One could see that war was in the offing, and we received
11 significant support from the Serbian intellectual elite in Zagreb and
12 other cities. This was the occasion for the meeting. We tried to have a
13 joint platform for dialogue with the Republic of Croatia.
14 Q. I think I understand your answer, but I want to press just a
15 little bit. You said that you -- that one could see that war was in the
16 offing. Was this initiative, the Serbian Democratic Forum, an attempt to
17 avert war or was it an attempt to promote war? What was it?
18 A. Certainly the initiative was to prevent war, and by putting
19 forward our positions and ideas, to let the general public in Croatia,
20 both Serbs and Croats, know that there had to be a peaceful solution and
21 that we had to search for a peaceful solution.
22 Q. What was your role in the founding of the Serbian Democratic
24 A. I was in the steering committee. I was one of the organisers. We
25 couldn't hold a meeting in Banija and Kordun as planned, so we held it in
1 Western Slavonia. I provided all the logistical support, and I went to
2 negotiations both in Zagreb and Belgrade with other members of the board
3 in order to prepare for the founding meeting of the Serb Democratic Forum.
4 Q. Now, Mr. Dzakula, you said you couldn't hold the meeting in Banija
5 and Kordun as planned. Why not?
6 A. A letter arrived. My friends in Zagreb received it from the SDS
7 of Krajina, banning the holding of such a meeting on the territory of the
8 SAO Krajina. It had to be held somewhere else in the Republic of Croatia.
9 Their policy, and as they then said the people of the SAO Krajina did not
10 want this "democratic" meeting to be held in Krajina because they no
11 longer wanted any contacts with fascist Croatia, and if we wished to do
12 so, we should do it elsewhere, not on the territory of Krajina.
13 Q. Mr. Dzakula, did you provide this letter that you've referred to
14 to the Office of the Prosecution two days ago in your witness preparation?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, if I could -- this document has already
17 been provided to the Defence, and I would like to hand up copies and
18 provide a copy to the witness, please.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.
20 MR. WHITING: For the record, the document has been ERNed
21 04666700. Of course, since we received it only on Saturday, it has not
22 been put into the E-court system, so we don't have an opportunity to
23 test-drive that system quite yet.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it being handed in as an exhibit?
25 MR. WHITING: Well, I'm going to tender it as an exhibit once the
1 witness has identified it and looked at it.
2 Q. Mr. Dzakula, is this the letter that you provided to the Office of
3 the Prosecution on Saturday, this last Saturday?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. You said that it was a letter from the Serbian Democratic Party of
6 Krajina, prohibiting the Serbian Democratic Forum from meeting and holding
7 an initiating meeting within the Krajina. The letter is signed by whom?
8 A. The letter was signed by Dr. Ljubica Solaja, president of the SDS
9 of Krajina.
10 Q. And what relationship did that person have with Milan Babic, if
12 A. She was a close associate. She couldn't have been president of
13 the Krajina SDS if she had not been appointed by Milan Babic.
14 Q. Could you just, for the benefit of the Court, read the
15 next-to-last paragraph which starts: "The attributes of that forum,"
16 referring to the Serbian Democratic Forum.
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note they do not have a copy of
18 the document.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The attributes of the forum,
20 Serbian and democratic, do not correspond to its actual role. It is not
21 democratic because it is aimed at rendering null and void the
22 democratically expressed will of the Serbian people not to live in the
23 independent state of Croatia. In our evaluation, for this reason, it is
24 destructively totalitarian and defeatist. It is not Serbian because it is
25 working against the Serbian people."
1 MR. WHITING: Apologies to the interpreters.
2 Q. When did you receive this letter, Mr. Dzakula?
3 A. Is received this letter later on from the first president of the
4 Serbian Democratic Forum. They told me they had received the letter and
5 the prohibition towards the end of June 1991.
6 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I would move this letter into evidence,
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any comments, Mr. Milovancevic?
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. The letter is then admitted into
11 evidence and given exhibit number --
12 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit Number 1, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Exhibit Number 1. Thank you.
14 MR. WHITING:
15 Q. Mr. Dzakula, who were the other participants in the Serbian
16 Democratic Forum?
17 A. Among the founders were Professor Svetozar Livada, Milivoj
18 Pupovac, Nikica Vujnovic, Obrad Ivanovic, Nadezda Gace, Mladen Mirevkovic
19 [phoen], the late Vladimir Ivkovic, Dusan Zelembaba, and Professor Jovan
20 Raskovic was the president of the SDS for all of Croatia. Then there was
21 Dusan Starcevic and Jovo Opacic. And it was very important that we had
22 the president and the leaders of the SDS in Croatia as well as independent
23 intellectuals, and we also had the support of Professor Gajo Petrovic and
24 other influential Serbs in Croatia.
25 Q. Did you try to get support for this initiative either from
1 Croatia -- from the Government of Croatia or from Serbia?
2 A. This group, which was the steering committee, went both to Zagreb,
3 the parliament, and the government of the Republic of Croatia, where we
4 spoke to Mr. Lerotic, President Tudjman's advisors, and we also went to
5 Belgrade where we had talks with Budimir Kosutic, who was the deputy prime
6 minister of the Republika Srpska. They both listened to what we said, but
7 neither side gave us any significant support. And when we issued our
8 communique, there was a media blockade both in Belgrade and in Zagreb. So
9 we did not get the kind of support we expected and hoped for.
10 Q. You mentioned the name of President Tudjman's advisors. Just for
11 the record, I want to be clear on what that name is. If you could repeat
13 A. Lerotic. I cannot remember the name.
14 Q. That's fine. Thank you. Sir, do you know a person by the name of
15 Jovo Vezmar?
16 A. Yes. Yes, I do.
17 Q. In 1991, what was his position?
18 A. He was the chief of police, the most important person in the
19 police in Pakrac municipality. I'm not sure of his exact title.
20 Q. Did there come a time when you had an encounter with him with
21 regard to the Serbian Democratic Forum?
22 A. Yes. This was in July 1991.
23 Q. Could you tell us what happened.
24 A. I received an invitation from his late brother to go to the
25 village of Kraguj, to the village community hall, for a conversation with
1 the citizens there. However, when I arrived there was only Jovo Vezmar
2 there, and he had been absent from the area for several months. We
3 greeted one another briefly, and then he told me -- he said the following:
4 It's your fault and you're responsible for the fact that these five
5 municipalities have become passive and that war has not broken out in
6 them. You have 24 hours to resign from your job in the company, to resign
7 from your political positions, and to leave Pakrac municipality, otherwise
8 you will be killed. I asked him twice whether he knew what he was talking
9 about, and he said he did and he said that that was what I must do.
10 Q. What did you do?
11 A. I obeyed him, yes. On the following morning, I called up my
12 managing director in Bjelovar. I asked him for annual leave; he approved
13 it. And in the afternoon I left Pakrac. But I did not resign from my
14 political positions and I did not give up my job; I only took annual
15 leave. So I only partially obeyed.
16 Q. Where did you go?
17 A. I went to Beograd to report to the president of the SDS, Professor
18 Jovan Raskovic. I told him about this problem, and he told me to hide
19 somewhere in Serbia, to go to a village, until he re-called me to Croatia.
20 Q. Tell me again where you went, what city?
21 A. I went to Vrnjacka Banja in the south of Serbia.
22 Q. No, but first where did you go?
23 A. To Belgrade. To Belgrade.
24 Q. Thank you. How long -- did you eventually return to Croatia?
25 A. Yes, some 10 or 15 days later I returned to Croatia.
1 Q. What happened when you returned?
2 A. When I returned, I saw my friends in the SDS. We analysed the
3 situation. War had already broken out, both in Eastern Slavonia and in
4 Krajina. We held a session for Western Slavonia, a session for the
5 Regional Broad, and we promulgated the SAO of Western Slavonia, this was
6 in August, on the 12th of August, in order to organise and to begin
7 negotiations with the Government of Croatia in order to prevent war.
8 Q. And you became at that time president of the SAO Western Slavonia?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you have a further conversation with Jovo Vezmar?
11 A. Later on I met him again, on the 18th of August, in the evening.
12 I was brought in by two of his fellow fighters. They were armed. They
13 took me to his headquarters, and he told me that in the morning they were
14 setting out to war and that I had to decide whether I was with them or
15 not. And if I tried anything, I would be killed. I was detained until
16 the afternoon of the following day, when the first attack on Pakrac was
17 already over.
18 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, I think this is a convenient time.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Court stands adjourned, 20 minutes -- it's a
20 20-minute adjournment, is it? Thank you.
21 --- Recess taken at 3.58 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 4.22 p.m.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness is reminded that he's still bound by
24 the declaration that he made at the beginning of his testimony. You may
1 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Before I proceed, if I could just update the Court. The
3 Prosecution and the Defence did have a brief discussion about that matter
4 that was raised, the agreed fact, and the need for a clarification. A
5 further discussion is required. I think we'll have an answer by tomorrow.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
7 MR. WHITING:
8 Q. Mr. Dzakula, before we -- before the recess, you had told us about
9 the founding of the Serbian Democratic Forum and the reaction -- some of
10 the reactions to that in 1991. Does the Serbian Democratic Forum still
11 exist today?
12 A. Yes, it still exists. This year we are celebrating our 15th
14 Q. Do you have a position in the Serbian Democratic Forum?
15 A. Yes. I'm president of the Executive Board of the Serb Democratic
17 Q. Could you tell the Court what it does today. What is its function
19 A. The SDF is first and foremost a non-governmental/non-profit
20 organisation. It deals with refugee flows and gives legal aid free of
21 charge. We are engaged in humanitarian activity. We have social welfare
22 programmes for the old and weak, and also we have development programmes
23 helping people to find jobs for themselves and resolve important questions
24 to their livelihood.
25 Q. What relationship does the SDF have with the Croatian government,
1 both at the republic level and at the local level?
2 A. For the past few years we have cooperated well with the various
3 ministries of the government of the Republic of Croatia, first of all, the
4 ministry of reconstruction, then the ministry of welfare and health care,
5 and also at the local level, at county and municipal level, and we also
6 cooperate with international organisations.
7 Q. Like which ones?
8 A. Sorry, I didn't hear you.
9 Q. I'm sorry. I spoke too quickly. Like which international
11 A. First of all, the UNHCR, US Aid, OSCE, the European Commission,
12 through its various projects, and most European embassies.
13 Q. How many offices does SDF have in Croatia?
14 A. We have 18 offices in the Republic of Croatia.
15 Q. And is it one of the biggest NGOs in Croatia?
16 A. Yes, the biggest and the oldest.
17 Q. Let's go back to 1991. At the end of 1991 and the beginning of
18 1992, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, or the RSK, was formed. Did you
19 have a position in that entity?
20 A. Well, when the RSK was formed, this was on the 26th of February, I
21 believe, 1992. I, on behalf of Western Slavonia, became part of the
22 government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, which also included Eastern
23 Slavonia and Krajina. It was one body, and it was the republican
25 Q. And what was your position when you became part of the government?
1 A. I was deputy prime minister in charge of agriculture, and
2 specifically forestry.
3 Q. As deputy prime minister, did you attend sessions of the
4 government of the RSK?
5 A. I attended most sessions.
6 Q. Where were those held?
7 A. Most often they were held in Knin. One, I think, or two perhaps
8 were held in Eastern Slavonia and one was in Western Slavonia sometime
9 towards the end of 1992.
10 Q. We'll come back to that session that was held in Western Slavonia
11 in 1992.
12 Jumping ahead for a moment, did -- in February of 1993, were
13 you -- did you still hold the position of deputy prime minister in the
15 A. In February I was still deputy prime minister of the RSK, 1992.
16 Q. I'm sorry, 1993. February 1993.
17 A. Yes, I'm sorry. I'm the one who's sorry. 1993. Say until March
18 1993, so in February 1993 I still held the position of deputy prime
19 minister of the RSK.
20 Q. In that month, February 1993, did you sign something called the
21 Daruvar Agreement?
22 A. Yes. That was on the 18th of February, 1993. It was signed in
23 Doljani and it was called that Daruvar Agreement because it was in the
24 municipality of Daruvar.
25 Q. Could you tell the Court, please, what that agreement was?
1 A. It was an agreement between the Serb and Croat sides, in which we
2 agreed that by peaceful means and dialogue we would resolve all existing
3 problems, utilities problems, water, electricity, roads, contacts between
4 families at checkpoints.
5 So I think it was on expression of good will, if I can put it that
6 way, to open an dialogue between the Serb and the Croat sides. It was the
7 first agreement of this nature.
8 Q. Who negotiated this agreement on the Serb side?
9 A. Dusan Ecimovic, Mladen Kunic. I can't remember now. There were
10 two other people. My mind seems to have stopped now. There was a total
11 of five people. I am sorry, but really, my mind has stopped. I can't
12 remember their names now.
13 Q. I'll ask you later if you -- if they've come back to your memory.
14 And if you remember them, just please tell us.
15 Were -- on the Croat side, who negotiated the agreement, if you
17 A. Well, on the Croat side there was Ivan Milas, as the
18 representative of the government; then with him Josko Moric, assistant
19 minister, and the mayors of Novska, Pakrac, Daruvar, Grubisno Polje,
20 Slatina, and at this point I cannot remember their names because they were
21 not that well-known to the political public at the time. I think that the
22 last name of one of them was Kos; I seem to remember that.
23 Q. Were the negotiations for this agreement secret or public?
24 A. The preparations for this signing of the agreement were secret,
25 but the agreement itself, as it was to be signed, was public. The
1 president of the Assembly of Western Slavonia and the members of the
2 Regional Board of Slavonia knew about it, and also we went in the middle
3 of the day, we went out to sign it. People knew it.
4 Q. Why were the preparations done in secret?
5 A. Well, we were in a delicate situation then. There was a war going
6 on in Knin around Maslenica. Immediately after that, a few days later,
7 the president of the republic, Goran Hadzic, gave instructions to the
8 commander of the Krajina army, General Novakovic, that we in Western
9 Slavonia should attack Novska and Nova Gradiska. A few times during the
10 course of two or three days, these orders were issued and we as local
11 leaderships opposed that kind of attack, explaining that there was no
12 reason for that. We had to submit this in writing, that we guarantee
13 peace and that there will not be a conflict.
14 At that moment, in order to prevent a possible new outbreak of
15 war, Mr. Gerald Fisher, the head of the sector and the commander of the
16 army in that sector, General Zabala [phoen] proposed to me and to my
17 associates that we should make another step in order to assure our own
18 environment, referring to the Croat side, too, that we should start
19 dialogue and that we should start specific agreements on the normalisation
20 of relations. We thought about this for a long time and -- well, for a
21 long time, one day, but in those circumstances it's a long time. We
22 realised that we ran a risk but we realised that we had to accept that for
23 the safety of our citizens and their lives so there would not be a new
24 war, and this would not guarantee peace to anyone or even life as such. I
25 and my associates supported that and went ahead.
1 Q. If other leaders in the RSK had known about this initiative, the
2 Daruvar initiative, would they have supported it?
3 A. They would not have supported it.
4 Q. And when you give us an answer, which leaders are you speaking of?
5 Which leaders would not have supported it?
6 A. Well, first and foremost, Goran Hadzic, the then-president of the
7 republic, then Zdravko Zekic, the prime minister, also the minister of
8 defence, Spanovic, and the minister of police, Mr. Martic, knowing that
9 General Novakovic was giving us orders, instructions, orders to attack, to
10 wage war. And if they knew of this order and they probably supported it,
11 I doubt that they would have supported our starting of negotiations at
12 that moment.
13 Q. When the Daruvar agreement became public or was publicly signed,
14 did something happen to you with respect to your position in the
16 A. First of all, there was major consternation among the authorities
17 of the Republic of the Serb Krajina, and a few days after that I was
18 suspended from this position of deputy prime minister. And Mr. Dusan
19 Ecimovic, who was minister in the government, was also suspended.
20 Although it was illegal at the time, only the Assembly could have
21 dismissed us, but they acted very quickly in order to prevent the
22 implementation of that agreement.
23 Q. Who suspended you, specifically?
24 A. Well, at that time I had two pieces of information, and they are
25 still valid. Goran Hadzic and Mr. Zecevic. And also I was suspended from
1 the position of the president of the regional council, and Dusan Ecimovic
2 as a member and Mladen Kulic as president of the regional committee for
3 Western Slavonia.
4 Q. Just to be clear, you said you were also suspended from the
5 position of the president of the regional council. That's the regional
6 council of the SDS, I take it?
7 A. No. It was the regional council of the Serb region of Western
8 Slavonia. There was Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia, and this was a
9 small regional body in Slavonia.
10 Q. After you were dismissed from these positions, did you in 1993
11 hold any other political position?
12 A. After that, the Assembly passed a decision that elections could be
13 held in Pakrac and Okucani, those two municipalities. And we availed
14 ourselves of that legal possibility. We carried out elections, and in May
15 1993, by secret ballot, I was elected president of the Municipal Assembly
16 of Pakrac. And I was president until the autumn of 1993.
17 Q. Did something happen to you in September of 1993?
18 A. Yes. On the 21st of September, 1993, in the morning hours I was
19 arrested by the assistant minister of Serb Krajina, Krsta Zarkovic, who
20 brought a group of members of a special unit in Knin. They arrested me
21 and took me to Knin.
22 Q. You described Krsta Zarkovic as an assistant minister. Assistant
23 minister of what?
24 A. He was assistant minister of police.
25 Q. And he was an assistant to whom?
1 A. He was assistant to the then-minister, Milan Martic.
2 Q. Where were you arrested?
3 A. I was arrested in a private house where I lived then in Japaga in
4 Pakrac in Western Slavonia.
5 Q. Do you know why a unit from Knin came to Western Slavonia to
6 arrest you?
7 A. Well, they came because they did not trust the local police to do
8 that, because at that time I had quite a bit of authority in that area.
9 So they brought units from elsewhere that were very well-armed, if I may
10 say so.
11 Q. You said you were taken to Knin -- well, first of all, do you know
12 why you were arrested?
13 A. Well, they didn't tell me a thing then. However, they treated me
14 very harshly. They handcuffed me and took me to Knin. There I was told
15 that I was a spy, that I was breaking up the republic, the state, and I
16 was given a decision that an investigation would start against me.
17 Q. Who signed that decision, if you recall?
18 A. The first paper, the decision, was signed by Aco Draca, who was a
19 high official in the ministry of police. He was the head of the DB,
20 that's what people said. I can't say exactly now whether he was assistant
21 minister or something, but I know that he was the number one man in state
22 security and he's the person who signed the order for arrest and for
23 carrying out a police investigation.
24 Q. Do you know the relationship at that time between Aco Draca and
25 Milan Martic?
1 A. I was not aware of their personal relationship. I can only say
2 that in such a situation a person who did not have the support of the
3 minister, Mr. Milan Martic, could hardly have been in that position.
4 Q. Do you know if Milan Martic was aware of or involved in your
5 arrest at this time?
6 A. He certainly knew of it. And there would not have been an arrest
7 without his approval.
8 Q. On what basis do you say that?
9 A. Well, because none of them would have dared do that because they
10 were aware of my role and position in my region, among my people, and it
11 had to be someone who was in a high position in government. And President
12 Zecevic also, and personally I was on good terms with him, he said that he
13 could not have done anything about it, although he was against it, because
14 it was only up to the minister of police.
15 Q. You said in your -- one of your earlier answers that you were
16 accused of breaking up the republic. First of all, to be clear, which
17 republic are we talking about?
18 A. The Republic of Serb Krajina.
19 Q. And was it ever specified in the communications to you during your
20 arrest or in -- during interrogations why it was thought that you were
21 trying to break up the RSK?
22 A. Well, the inspectors who were interrogating me thought that this
23 document was a crime and that this signed agreement worked in favour of
24 breaking up. They did not read it properly. They did not quote it
25 properly, but they thought that the agreement itself was a crime, speaking
1 of secession. Those were insinuations because there were no words to that
2 effect in the agreement, but that is what they were saying to me and that
3 is what I was suspected of having done.
4 Q. And when you talk about the agreement in your last answer, you're
5 talking about the Daruvar Agreement?
6 A. Yes, precisely. I mean the Daruvar Agreement.
7 Q. Now, you testified that you were taken to Knin. What happened in
9 A. Well, in Knin I was in solitary confinement for four days while
10 the police investigation was going on. I was brought to the inspectors
11 who threatened me with automatic rifles, that it would be better for me to
12 say what -- all the things that they already knew, because otherwise it
13 would be very difficult. After four days I, was taken to Glina to the
14 district prison there, and the court initiated an investigation then.
15 Q. Do you know specifically where you were held in Knin?
16 A. In Knin I was kept in the basement cellar of the police station in
17 town itself, in solitary confinement.
18 Q. How long were you held in Glina?
19 A. They kept me in Glina to the 3rd of December, 1993, with a break
20 of a few hours.
21 Q. What -- tell us what happened during that break. What do you mean
22 by that?
23 A. Well, during the investigation I and Mr. Mladen Kulic invoked our
24 immunity as MPs because we were members of the Assembly of the RSK.
25 Therefore, they did not have the right to arrest us and detain us for as
1 long as we had this immunity, and the investigating judge rendered a
2 decision that we should be set free. This was on the 2nd of October,
3 1993. We went home and changed vehicles, just in case, with our
4 colleagues. Our colleagues who came to visit us were arrested, and as we
5 were crossing the border between the RSK and Bosnia-Herzegovina, we were
6 arrested again in Kostajnica and returned to the police station in
7 Kostajnica, to a solitary cell, that is.
8 After being kept there for a few hours, two policemen in
9 camouflage uniforms came to get us. They handcuffed me and Mladen Kulic,
10 and they drove us to Glina. As we were driving through Petrinja they took
11 us to a forest where they first beat us up physically, stomped on us with
12 their feet, and then they took us to Glina and handed us over to the
13 prison there.
14 So the court has released us, and the police again intercepted us,
15 beat us up, and returned us to prison.
16 Q. The two policemen in camouflage uniforms, do you know anything
17 about them, about what unit they were in or who they were subordinate to?
18 A. I could not find out who they were, but in Glina when I described
19 them, they told me that they belonged to Silt's group, that's what people
20 were saying, and in Banija, in that area, he was a military-active person.
21 I don't know whether that was his last name or his nickname, but I just
22 heard of this person called Silt.
23 Q. Was that group within the police, within the military, what --
24 where did they fit in, if you know?
25 A. The ministry of police. These were special units of the police.
1 Q. And do you know to whom they were subordinated to, if they were
2 special units of the police?
3 A. Well, all police units, including that one, were under the
4 minister of police, Mr. Milan Martic, at the time.
5 Q. When you were taken back to Glina, were you taken back to the same
6 jail you had been in before?
7 A. No, no. Mr. Kulic and I were taken to solitary confinement for a
8 few days and then we were sent back to our cells again.
9 Q. And those cells were in the same jail that you had been in before?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, did -- on Saturday, during your witness preparation, did you
12 provide us with a second document, and this one relating to this -- this
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, this document has also obviously been
16 provided to the Defence, and with the assistance of the usher I would like
17 to hand it up to the Court and a copy to the witness, please. The ERN of
18 this document is 04666768 to 6769.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: What is an ERN?
20 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, it's -- I'm at a loss to remember -- we
21 use the acronym so much, I can't remember what it stands for. Somebody
22 will help me on this. Evidence something number -- evidence registration
23 number. Each document that comes into the building gets an ERN and it is
24 a unique number so that it can be -- this is the only document in the
25 building that has that number.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thanks.
2 MR. WHITING:
3 Q. Mr. Dzakula, do you have the document in front of you?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. Does that document have a date on it?
6 A. Yes, it does, the 18th of October, 1993.
7 Q. What is this document?
8 A. This is a decision extending custody of the kind we received while
9 in prison in Glina. It lasted for 15 days while an investigation was
10 ongoing. This is one of the documents I managed to preserve, and it
11 speaks of the extension of custody pending investigation.
12 Q. I want to turn your attention to the second page of the document,
13 and in the English translation it's also on the second page --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may interrupt, shouldn't it be authenticated
15 first and tendered before you're leading on the contents?
16 MR. WHITING: Yeah, that's fine. I certainly can do that.
17 Q. How did you obtain this document?
18 A. I received this document in court, either on the 18th of October
19 or a day or two before that, and I was told that my detention had been
20 extended until the 18th of November of that year.
21 Q. And who is the document from?
22 A. It was issued by the district court in Glina.
23 Q. And specifically by the Presiding Judge Avdaj Popov?
24 A. He was the president of the Chamber that issued this decision.
25 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I would move this document into
1 evidence, please.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: This document will be admitted into evidence as
3 Exhibit 2.
4 MR. WHITING:
5 Q. Now, sir, could I draw your attention to the second page of the
6 document, and the fourth paragraph. And on the English translation it's
7 the second page, fifth paragraph. And I believe it starts: "According to
8 the Criminal Code." If you could just read that paragraph, please.
9 A. "According to the criminal law, the perpetrators of the crime of
10 threatening the territorial integrity, as in Article 116, paragraph 1, in
11 connection with Article 139, paragraphs 3 and 2 of the Criminal Code, the
12 death penalty may be handed down. As a state of war was declared on the
13 22nd of January, 1993, which is still ongoing, this is the legal
14 qualification of the crime from Article 139, paragraphs 3 and 2 in
15 connection with Article 116, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of
17 Q. Thank you. You can put that document aside.
18 Now, I believe you testified earlier that you were ultimately
19 released on the 3rd of December, 1993. What happened after you were
21 A. On the 3rd of December, when we were released, I was on my way
22 home when I was brought in. This was in Donji Caglic in the Pakrac
23 municipality in Western Slavonia. I was detained for two or three hours
24 and interviewed, and then I was again released and allowed to go home.
25 On the following day, my friends informed me, Ecimovic and Kulic
1 who were in Okucani, that the minister of police, Milan Martic, had issued
2 a warrant for another arrest against us. The two of them managed to
3 escape to Serbia. I did not manage to leave Western Slavonia, and when my
4 friends informed me a little too late, I managed to hide. And for about
5 50 days I was in hiding in Western Slavonia in a private shelter to avoid
6 being re-arrested and detained again.
7 Q. After those 50 days, where did you go?
8 A. Then I came out of hiding and my friends returned from Belgrade,
9 and they told me that we should go together to Belgrade and speak on
10 Studio B, to tell our fellow citizens what was happening. I didn't like
11 this. I said it was too early to speak about this in public, but however
12 at their insistence, I accompanied them to Belgrade. And on the 3rd of
13 February, 1994, I spoke on the independent television station Studio B.
14 This was a late-night show. It went on for about an hour or about an hour
15 and a half, and I spoke about what was happening in the RSK.
16 Q. Before I ask you what -- more specifically what you spoke about,
17 could you tell the Court a little bit more about what Studio B is?
18 A. Studio B I think was the only independent television station in
19 Belgrade at the time. You couldn't receive it all over Serbia because its
20 range was limited, but it gave independent news about events, both inside
21 Serbia and elsewhere, for example, in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It
22 was not state controlled.
23 Q. So when you say "independent," you mean independent of the state?
24 A. Precisely so.
25 Q. Now, you -- you said that you spoke about what was happening in
1 the RSK. Could you be a little more specific about what you talked about?
2 A. We talked about the war; the exodus of the Serbs from Western
3 Slavonia; about the Territorial Defence commanders waging the wars; about
4 the Daruvar Agreement, which was the main topic; what it was; what it was
5 about; and the sanctions we experienced, that is our arrest and detention.
6 I remember I said Krajina could be saved by wisdom, not by weapons, that
7 we should engage in dialogue rather than warfare, and that was the topic
8 of our talk.
9 Q. Did you talk about Milan Martic or Milan Babic?
10 A. Yes. I mentioned Milan Babic and Milan Martic, inter alia, on
11 that television show. I said that they were exclusive, intolerant, that
12 they were not in favour of dialogue and negotiations, that they arrested
13 us, and so on.
14 Q. What do you mean by "exclusive"? That's the translation we got,
15 is "exclusive."
16 A. They liked to listen to themselves. They thought the truth was
17 only what they thought was true. They did not want to negotiate with
18 Croatia. They wanted there to be a state border, and that this was a
19 fait accompli. They thought that anyone who engaged in negotiations with
20 Croatia was a traitor and a spy and they used various other names to refer
21 to such people.
22 Q. You used the word "intolerant" in reference to Milan Babic and
23 Milan Martic. You said that you used that word "intolerant." What did
24 you mean by "intolerant"? How were they intolerant?
25 A. They were impulsive, they were quarrelsome. If they didn't like
1 the opinion of someone else that was contrary to their own, they would
2 enter into a conflict with that person.
3 Q. Did something happen the next day after you spoke on Studio B?
4 A. The next day with Dusan Ecimovic, my friend, I was walking through
5 Belgrade. We were discussing the television broadcast. And near the
6 Yugoslav drama theatre in the centre of Belgrade, we were approached by
7 four large men in civilian clothes. They grabbed me by the arm and they
8 said they had a car parked there and that I should go with them. They did
9 not show me any identification, they did not say who they were, and I
10 refused to enter the car with them.
11 A fight broke out between them and me, which went on for about 10
12 or 15 minutes. They beat me. They tore parts of my clothes off, and then
13 they used the spray and they hit me very hard. We all fell down to the
14 ground. They put handcuffs on my hands. They put my shirt and my sweater
15 over my head. They shoved me into the car, and this was in broad
16 daylight. They took me to a parking lot. I couldn't see exactly where
17 because they put my clothes over my head. And in that parking lot, they
18 beat me with pistol butts.
19 After that, they put me into another car, and there were civilians
20 there as well, but from their conversation I gathered that they were
21 policemen from Eastern Slavonia and that they belonged to the police of
22 the Republic of Serbian Krajina, to the ministry. Along the way they beat
23 me and said: You want to negotiate with Ustasha while we are at war with
24 them. Our brothers are being killed and you want to negotiate. And they
25 took me back to Knin via Bosnia and put me in prison in the basement of
1 the police station. I spent a further four days there. I was alone
2 there, and in the night I heard them beating people in other rooms. I
3 didn't know who these people were, but I could hear the moans and the
4 sounds of beating.
5 The next day, in the morning or at around 1.00, two men in
6 camouflage uniforms came and they took me out the back entrance, put me in
7 a Lada Niva, drove me through a wood into a built-up area, where they left
8 me in the car with an automatic rifle and a bottle of red wine. They went
9 into the house that was nearby and came back about half an hour later.
10 Maybe they thought I would get hold of the rifle.
11 Later on I learned that they had taken me to the village of
12 Nebljuse in Lika on the border with Bosnia near Bihac. Along the way they
13 insulted me, hit me, and when we arrived in Nebljuse, they took me to a
14 house and they spoke to me until the morning, saying that I was a traitor,
15 a spy, that I had to be dealt with, and then they held me in that house in
16 a private prison for about ten days.
17 Q. Were you forced to make a statement when you were being held?
18 A. On the day before the last day, I had bruises on my face. They
19 came to put some make-up on my face and they gave me a list of questions
20 and answers, the answers I was supposed to read out. And they were going
21 to film this and use it as evidence against me. As I saw where I was, and
22 this man Tesla, who was interrogating me for the second time, said only
23 God and I know where you are and where you'll end up. So I read what they
24 had written down because I felt this was the easiest course for me to
25 take. I'd had enough of maltreatment.
1 The next day they took me back to Glina into the district prison
2 by car, and I spent a further ten days or so there.
3 MR. WHITING: If I could just have a moment, Your Honour.
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 MR. WHITING: I'd like to show the witness map 01131342. This is
6 in E-court, but I've been told that with maps it's better to do them on
7 hard copy rather than E-court because it shows up too small in E-court.
8 So if the witness could be provided with a copy of the map and put on the
9 ELMO, and if the Court could be given the map as well. I don't know if
10 Defence counsel need a copy of the map also.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Make them an offer.
12 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry, I missed that, Your Honour
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Make them an offer of a copy.
14 MR. WHITING: Yes, if Defence counsel could be provided a copy,
15 that would be convenient. And I need a copy, too.
16 Now, to see the map on the -- to see the markings that the witness
17 makes on the ELMO, if -- if you switch to computer evidence on the
18 monitor, then you'll be able to see what the witness does on the ELMO.
19 Q. Mr. Dzakula, have you seen this map before?
20 A. Yes. Yes, I have.
21 Q. What does this map show? Specifically what is in -- what is shown
22 in orange on this map?
23 A. The colour orange marks the territory under the control of the
24 Serbian authorities of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
25 Q. Could you take a marker and please mark an "A" on the area that
1 was first known as the SAO Krajina.
2 A. SAO Krajina was around here.
3 MR. WHITING: Yeah, I'm not seeing it. I'm sorry. I mislead you
4 on this one. It's video evidence, not computer evidence. Computer
5 evidence is E-court, when you see the document in E-court. But to see
6 what he's marking on the ELMO, it's video evidence. I apologise.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can he please start with his markings?
8 MR. WHITING: Yes.
9 Q. Could you -- could you show where you have marked "A" for SAO
10 Krajina, please.
11 A. [Marks].
12 Q. Could you mark a "B" on the SAO Western Slavonia, please.
13 A. [Marks].
14 Q. And a "C" on the SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.
15 A. [Marks].
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I might just interrupt your leading. It might
17 perhaps be helpful if he could also draw the boundaries of "A," the
18 boundaries of "B," and the boundaries of "C," just to see what area "A"
19 represents, what area "B" represents, and what area "C" represents.
20 MR. WHITING:
21 Q. Mr. Dzakula, could you do that? Are you able to draw the
22 boundaries of "A," "B," and "C"?
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: As he understands them.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll start with "C." This border
25 here --
1 MR. WHITING:
2 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Dzakula. First of all, the usher will need to move
3 the -- we can't see it on the monitor, so if you could move the "C" to the
4 middle. Thank you.
5 And if you could, Mr. Dzakula, take the pen so we have a record of
6 this and draw around the line there that is "C," the area of Eastern
7 Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, as you knew it.
8 A. The border coincides with this present border here. If need be, I
9 can draw along it. That is more or less the border of the SAO Eastern
10 Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. And then --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just a second. May I just interrupt. It doesn't
12 show an area, it just shows one boundary. I would like to see the
13 perimeter of the area.
14 MR. WHITING:
15 Q. Mr. Dzakula, if you could just finish drawing the boundary and
16 draw the whole perimeter, please.
17 A. [Marks].
18 Q. Now, if you could do the same for the SAO Western Slavonia.
19 A. The SAO Western Slavonia was more or less this ...
20 Q. Now, just to hold you for a moment there and we'll finish this
21 exercise. Now, there's -- within the area that you've just drawn, there's
22 an area that's in orange and then there's an area that has lines on it.
23 Are you aware of any difference or any significance to those two different
25 A. The difference in colour means the following: What is in orange
1 was under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Serbian
2 Krajina. The remaining part, which has lines on it, was an area that was
3 under the control of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia, because
4 in military terms it had fallen.
5 Q. And when did that occur? When did that part fall to Croatia?
6 A. This happened in stages. First on the 15th of October, the area
7 around Grubisno Polje. Then on the 15th of November, Daruvar. And later
8 on, by the 15th of December, the area around Podravska Slatina and Pozega.
9 The area in orange is what remained after the 24th of December, 1991.
10 Q. So all those dates that you gave just now, 15th of October and
11 15th of November, 15th of December, those are all in 1991?
12 A. Yes. They all refer to 1991.
13 Q. And the area that's in orange within the "B" area within Western
14 Slavonia, until when did that remain under the control of the RSK?
15 A. It remained under the control of the RSK until the 24th of May,
17 Q. Thank you. Now, if you could just complete the exercise and draw
18 a boundary around the SAO Krajina.
19 A. These are the borders of the SAO Krajina in August and September,
20 1991, because the border changed. First it was this and then it spread.
21 So now I'm drawing the final border, the SAO Krajina as far as I am able
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, if I might interrupt, Mr. Whiting, I'm sorry
24 to do this to you. I think we are going to need to have all of this on
25 E-court system so that the witness's markings can be inserted and be part
1 of the record. This is just a document that he's doing there and it's not
2 going to appear on the record.
3 MR. WHITING: Well, I was going to move this document into
4 evidence, and then I think what can happen is it can then be put into
5 E-court, the document that's been marked. It doesn't need to be re-marked
6 on to E-court.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you remember that.
8 MR. WHITING: Oh, I certainly will. Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Q. Now, I know this version of this map is quite small and is very
10 hard to read, but could you take maybe a thinner -- I don't know if you
11 have available a thinner pen. Are you able to find -- I just want to mark
12 a few of the cities or towns or villages that you've been speaking about.
13 Can you find Knin, first of all, on this map?
14 A. This.
15 Q. Could you put a number 1 next to that circle that you've drawn?
16 A. [Marks].
17 Q. Are you able to find Pakrac?
18 A. [Marks].
19 Q. Coiled you draw a number 2 next to Pakrac.
20 A. [Marks].
21 Q. Are you able to find Glina.
22 A. [Marks].
23 Q. Could you draw a 3 next to that.
24 A. [Marks].
25 Q. Now, this one might be more difficult, Nebljuse, are you able to
1 find where it is or approximately where it is?
2 A. It's about here.
3 Q. Could you draw a number 4 next to that?
4 A. [Marks].
5 Q. Finally you referred to Kostajnica and being held there. Are you
6 able to find that?
7 A. [Marks].
8 Q. Could you draw a number 5, please?
9 A. [Marks].
10 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, first of all, there is a bigger version
11 of this map which we'll be able to make available which will be more
12 readable, but I think the markings, nonetheless, will be clear and well
13 identified on this map. I'm now finished with the map with the witness
14 and I'm prepared to tender it into evidence, unless the Court has further
15 questions about locations or information on the map.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The Court doesn't have any questions at this stage
18 on the map.
19 MR. WHITING: Okay. Thank you. Then I would move it into
20 evidence, please.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, the map will be admitted into evidence as
22 Exhibit 3.
23 MR. WHITING: It can be taken off the ELMO. Thank you.
24 Now, as I understand it, just to be clear about the procedures,
25 this will now -- the document that he has marked, the version that he has
1 marked, will now be scanned into evidence and will be available as an
2 exhibit in evidence, so will be available to the Court and to the parties
3 and so forth.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could you please remember to mark it Exhibit 3, the
5 scanned copy.
6 MR. WHITING: It's already been marked Exhibit 3, and that
7 procedure --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: That will be --
9 MR. WHITING: It will be taken care of.
10 Q. Mr. Dzakula, in -- moving ahead now to May of 1995, you made
11 reference to a date in May of 1995 when the SAO Western Slavonia fell to
12 Croatian forces. That was a result of what operation on the part of the
14 A. First of all, a small correction. It was not the SAO Western
15 Slavonia. It was a region. And the action started on the 1st of May,
16 2005 -- sorry, 1 -- in 1995, rather. It was preceded by blocking --
17 closing the highway, then there was shelling. The Pakrac district where I
18 was remained surrounded for another three days, and then the last attack
19 was carried out on the 4th of August -- sorry, oh my goodness. The 4th of
20 May and -- 1995, and then that was in the hands of the Croatian army and
21 police, Okucani, already on the first day.
22 Q. And that operation in May of 1995, do you know what it was called,
23 what its name was?
24 A. Yes. It is Operation Flash, very well-known, and it lasted four
1 Q. And when you quite properly corrected me in the way I had phrased
2 the question, you said that it was not the SAO Western Slavonia but it was
3 a region. Is it fair to say that it was -- the region that was once known
4 as the SAO Western Slavonia but was in 1995 part of the --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Whiting, I think you're putting words into the
6 mouth of the witness. Why don't you just ask him what -- region of what
7 was it.
8 MR. WHITING: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I thought I was trying
9 to -- I was just trying to clarify his answer. But could you --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let him clarify it.
11 MR. WHITING: That's fine, Your Honour.
12 Q. Could you clarify, Mr. Dzakula, why it is -- why you said it is a
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Of what was it a region.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was the region of Western
16 Slavonia within the Republic of Serb Krajina. The region of Western
17 Slavonia was taken over from the former SAO Western Slavonia when the
18 three SAO united in a state which was called the Serb Krajina.
19 Then "autonomous" was dropped from the name. It wasn't the Serb
20 autonomous region, but the Serb region within the SAO Krajina.
21 MR. WHITING:
22 Q. Thank you. Now, as a part of Operation Flash did something happen
23 to you?
24 A. I shared the fate of another 1500 men who were arrested after that
25 action and taken to different prisons. There were several prisons
1 involved because not everybody could fit into one. I was taken to the
2 police station in Pakrac, and the next day I was taken to Bjelovar for
4 Q. Who arrested you?
5 A. The Croatian police arrested me and drove me in an APC to the
6 police station.
7 Q. Were you told why you were arrested?
8 A. Well, to my surprise, on that occasion the police commander,
9 Mr. Nikola Jukanec, with whom I negotiated during Flash, and that's when I
10 met him. It went on for four days. During the arrest he said: I'm
11 sorry, but these are my orders from Zagreb to put handcuffs on you and to
12 arrest you. That's what he did. And he took me to the police station.
13 Q. Do you know why he said he was sorry?
14 A. I think that he did not agree with this kind of task because he
15 was aware of my role throughout, and he knew that during our negotiations,
16 during Flash, we saved many lives, people were not killed. Had such an
17 arrangement not been made, then many more people would have lost their
18 lives, and I don't think that any normal person would be willing to accept
19 that kind of reality.
20 Q. How long were you held?
21 A. 24 hours.
22 Q. And then what happened?
23 A. And then I was driven back to Pakrac, to the police station, where
24 my friends were waiting for me, Obrad Ivanovic and Miroslav Grozdanic, and
25 there were a few ministers from the government of the Republic of Serb
1 Krajina and We squabbled about how all of this had been done. We
2 protested quite a bit, especially I, because many men were arrested and
3 taken to prison, and for some we didn't know where they were detained.
4 And then sometime in the evening, about 10.00 in the evening, the three of
5 us were taken away by a police patrol at the command of the commander
6 Josko Moric and they took us up to an elevation there and they left us
7 alone. And then three -- from three directions vehicles were moving.
8 We didn't know what was going on. The first one that reached us
9 was a UN APC, and the soldiers were throwing themselves at us to protect
10 us. We didn't know what was going on, but later on we realised that from
11 the other two directions there were Croats. We didn't know whether it was
12 the special police or the army, they were asking for us to be handed over.
13 They were screaming, yelling, for all three of us, especially me, and they
14 were asking for us to be handed over.
15 However, Jusuf Aralfi, head of the UN sector who had brought these
16 soldiers took us back to the police station and told me: The three of you
17 have to spend the night at the police station tonight, otherwise these
18 people are going to liquidate you because they don't want to see you in
19 this setting again. They provided us with security for a few days, both
20 the UN troops, and also they ordered the Croatian police to be there, to
21 be nearby, so that their extremists would not come and do something.
22 Q. What happened after that?
23 A. Then we stayed in Pakrac. We continued negotiating on the
24 normalisation of relations. That evening we went to my friend's home.
25 There were guards there. We had contacts with our own countrymen and also
1 with international representatives, so that people who wanted to stay
2 could have some kind of security, safety of movement, freedom of movement,
3 and they could get their documents. On the other hand, those who wanted
4 to leave should be allowed to leave, convoys should be organised, and all
5 of this was done by the UNHCR.
6 Q. Now, I want to go back in time, back to 1990. In the summer of
7 1990, did something happen in Srb?
8 A. Yes. There was a big gathering of Serbs from a large part of the
9 Republic of Croatia. Some people estimate that there were even 250.000 to
10 300.000 people there. I was there, too. It was a very impressive
11 gathering. Jovo Raskovic, Milan Babic, Dusan Zelembaba and others spoke,
12 and cultural autonomy of the Serbs was proclaimed then. The Serb National
13 Council was elected then, Dr. Milan Babic at the proposal of Jovo
14 Raskovic. There wasn't a proper vote there. It was done by acclamation.
15 A lot of people accepted that Milan Babic should be president of the Serb
16 council. Jovan Raskovic was president of the party and he didn't like to
17 hold too many positions, so he wanted to share office with other people.
18 Q. Was there later a conflict between Milan Babic and Jovan Raskovic?
19 A. Well, they went their separate ways and there was a conflict, too.
20 Jovan Raskovic was being called too soft, not tough enough, and Milan
21 Babic, of course, was no competition for Jovan Raskovic, but then he split
22 the SDS into the SDS Krajina, too. And the rest of the SDS, which was a
23 majority, a vast majority, was the SDS of the Republic of Croatia. So
24 Milan Babic succeeded and created the SDS SAO Krajina. Although, from
25 that area when he proclaimed the SDS SAO Krajina, there were many members.
1 I think even more the people from there stayed with Jovan Raskovic, the
2 SDS of Jovan Raskovic at the time.
3 Q. And when did that split occur between Milan Babic and Jovan
5 A. Well, I can say that it was right after what happened in Srb,
6 because obviously Milan Babic started feeling very important and powerful
7 and then Jovan Raskovic bothered him because he needed the position of the
8 president of the council. Jovan Raskovic did not have time for personal
9 conflicts like this. He wanted to organise the party properly, he wanted
10 to have as many reasonable, normal people around him as much as possible,
11 so he didn't really want to waste time on him.
12 Q. Could you tell us when you first heard about Milan Martic.
13 A. Well, as for the name of Milan Martic, I first heard of it
14 sometime in August 1990 when the first barricades were placed in the area
15 of Knin. Very soon it was heard in the public that a police inspector, a
16 police commander, I don't know exactly what position he held at the time,
17 had ordered that or organised the placing of these barricades, these
18 roadblocks. And in that area through the media, he was felt to be a new
19 hero of the Serbs who had the strength and power to oppose, first of all,
20 the institutions of the Republic of Croatia that could no longer function
21 in that area where they were.
22 Q. Did he, himself, appear in the media?
23 A. Yes, it was on television, too. I remember his statement that
24 this police that he headed no longer obeyed the Zagreb police, that this
25 was the people's police, that they had nothing to do with them, and he,
1 Milan Martic, confirmed that. He was quite clear on that, quite
3 Q. When he was talking about the people's police that no longer
4 obeyed Zagreb, do you know what area he was talking about, referring to?
5 The police in what area?
6 A. Well, I think that at that time it was these five or six
7 municipalities, Benkovac, Knin, Lapac, Gracac, Korenica. That was the
8 beginning, and later on it spread.
9 Q. And what was the -- what was the purpose or what did the
10 barricades do? What did you know about the barricades?
11 A. Well, the point was to place roadblocks so that Croat forces could
12 not enter, Croat forces that would want to restore control, and also all
13 those who were considered unwelcome, who had intentions that were
14 unwelcome at the time with some other ideas. I don't know what else. But
15 primarily it was against the police of the Republic of Croatia, so that
16 they would not come, replace different people, and restore their control.
17 Q. And what area did the barricades blockade?
18 A. Well, I think that at that time it was the municipality of Knin,
19 Benkovac, Gracac, Lapac, Korenica, I don't know whether it was Obrovac,
20 too; I cannot remember. That was the beginning. Later on it spread to
21 Banija and Kordun.
22 Q. Now, you've spoken about the media, both in terms of how the media
23 portrayed Milan Martic and also about Milan Martic appearing himself in
24 the media. What media are you talking about? Where is this media from?
25 A. Well, the media were from Belgrade and Zagreb. If they were from
1 Zagreb, then they presented as terrorists. The Serbs were then also
2 called the Chetnik gangs. And when Belgrade reported on it, they said:
3 The Serb heroes who dared, who were courageous. So it depended on the
4 media, how they portrayed it. The Belgrade spoke of it in a favourable
5 sense, the Zagreb media in an unfavourable sense.
6 [Prosecution counsel confer]
7 MR. WHITING:
8 Q. Mr. Dzakula, I'm going to show you a clip, and for this we're
9 going to need to switch to the Sanction. And it's a clip it's V000-3862.
10 Rather, it's a clip from that video exhibit, and I'm going to -- before
11 the clip is shown, I'm going to distribute a translation of the clip,
12 which will also appear on the screen in synchronised fashion to the
13 speaking. This is a clip that was used in the opening statement of the
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said we are going to switch over to?
16 MR. WHITING: We are going to switch over to Sanction which is --
17 and this is for the audio-visual booth. They switch the video evidence to
18 Sanction. So if you put on video evidence -- sorry, I'm told it's
19 computer evidence. This is new to us, too, this -- having these different
20 elements. So it's computer evidence. If we switch to computer evidence,
21 this tape will be played and hopefully it will be coordinated and it will
23 [Videotape played]
24 MR. WHITING:
25 Q. Mr. Dzakula, were you able to watch and understand that entire
1 clip or do I need to play it again?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you recognise who was speaking in the beginning of the clip?
4 A. I recognised the voice, and later on I recognised the face of
5 Mr. Milan Martic.
6 Q. Was this clip similar to media broadcasts of Mr. Martic that you
7 described earlier for the Court that were occurring at this time in August
8 1990/September 1990?
9 A. Yes.
10 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I would move this clip into evidence,
11 please. And I suppose what I would do is move into evidence the
12 transcript and the clip which is being handed to the usher and to the
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. What is that called, DVD or CD-ROM? What is
15 that called? We cannot admit "clip," I want to admit that piece of --
16 MR. WHITING: I don't know if it's a DVD or a CD.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: CD is an audio, DVD would also show pictures.
18 MR. WHITING: Okay, then it's a DVD.
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm told it's just called a video clip. Okay. The
21 video clip is then admitted into evidence. Now --
22 MR. WHITING: Along - I'm sorry - with the transcript.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Together with the transcript. It being an object
24 where my experience is that then it would be Exhibit A and not 4. Is that
25 not how you do things here?
1 MR. WHITING: No. Ordinarily it would just be given the next
2 exhibit number, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: There's no distinction between objects and
5 MR. WHITING: No.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, then the disk with the clip will be admitted
8 into evidence as Exhibit number 4; and the translation, the English
9 translation, will be admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 5.
10 MR. WHITING: Thank you. That's fine, Your Honour.
11 Q. Now, you've identified in your testimony a number of Serb leaders
12 in Croatia who took a different position from you, from your positions,
13 during 1990. After August of 1990 and into 1991, did these leaders talk
14 about being threatened by Croatia?
15 A. Well, yes, they did talk about that. They used every rally where
16 something bad would be said about the Serbs, and bad things were said,
17 that they were over-represented in the police or as managers, that the
18 Serbs should not be a political factor. And also they took advantage of
19 the iconography at these rallies. And all of this made them think of the
20 independent state of Croatia from the Second World War, and they were
21 saying that what lay in store for the Serbs yet again was what happened in
22 1941, 1942, and 1943. That is why they avoided all contacts and stopped
23 all contacts with the government of Croatia.
24 Q. Who were some of the leaders that spoke this way during 1990 and
25 into 1991?
1 A. Well, first and foremost it was Milan Babic, Djoko Vjestica,
2 Stipovac, Marko Dobrijevic. And then there was Dali Djurastovic [phoen]
3 from Lapac, Bosko Bozanic from Korenica. They figured most prominently as
4 far as such speech was concerned.
5 It's not Stipovac, it's Stikovac. I see what was typed out here.
6 Q. Thank you for that correction.
7 Did -- in your view, were these threats from Croatia that were
8 being described by these Serb leaders accurate or were they being
10 A. Well, it was exaggerated, because there weren't any concrete
11 threats that there would be killings or massacres. The iconography that
12 was present at rallies was resorted to. If there would be 300 to 500
13 people, there would be among them people with Ustasha iconography. This
14 is how people were intimidated because this was shown on television and so
16 Q. When you say it was shown on television, which television are you
17 talking about? You've already described how there were two sides to the
18 television. Which one are you talking about here?
19 A. Now we're talking about the Serbian television, Belgrade
20 television, that portrayed HDZ rallies and other gatherings in Croatia.
21 And when a few people like that would appear, or several such persons, I
22 don't know how many, would appear with that kind of iconography, they
23 would focus on that. So one would get the impression that this was
24 predominant at such a gathering. And then they would also use statements
25 made by Tudjman, that he was proud of the fact that his wife was not a
1 Serb or a Jew, and that was rather offensive. And they interpreted that
2 sentence of his as a bad message being sent out to Serbia.
3 Q. And what effect -- were you able to tell if these statements that
4 were being made by politicians about the threats and that were being made
5 by the Serbian media, were you able to tell if that had any effect on the
6 Serb population?
7 A. Well, it caused quite a bit of anxiety and fear among the Serb
8 population because people additionally felt that the former independent
9 state of Croatia was coming back.
10 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think this is probably a convenient
11 time. It's almost an hour and a half.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. By the time we come back -- I'm told we've
13 got to take a break of at least 30 minutes. By the time we come --
14 quarter past 6.00, okay.
15 Court adjourned. We will come back at quarter past 6.00.
16 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 --- Recess taken at 5.48 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 6.17 p.m.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Once again you're reminded that you're still bound
20 by the declaration, Mr. Dzakula.
21 MR. WHITING:
22 Q. Mr. Dzakula, in 1990 did you attend a meeting in Belgrade with
23 Jovic and Milosevic?
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. Do you recall when that was in 1990?
1 A. I think it was in November or December, towards the end of the
2 year. There was a rally of Serbs from Croatia. They went to meet with
3 Jovic and Milosevic. It was a meeting, rather, not a rally.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
5 MR. WHITING:
6 Q. Who -- who went to that meeting from the -- which Serbs from
7 Croatia went to that meeting?
8 A. Serbs from Knin, Gracac, Benkovac, Lika, a few from Banija, and
9 some from Western Slavonia -- or rather, only Veljko Vukic and I were from
10 Western Slavonia.
11 Q. How many Serbs went to this meeting?
12 A. There were some 30 or so of us.
13 Q. And who was -- why were these people allowed to go to this meeting
14 and why were they selected to go to this meeting?
15 A. I don't know who called the meeting or selected the people, but I
16 was informed by Veljko Vukic, who was a member of the regional SDS board
17 of Western Slavonia -- or rather, of Slavonia at the time about this
18 meeting. And when he told me about it, I decided to go there to see what
19 it was about. And I was told that it would be a good idea to present our
20 experiences and the problems facing us.
21 Q. What was the meeting about? What was the purpose of the meeting?
22 A. When I arrived, I saw that the aim of those who spoke at the
23 meeting was to present their views on what was happening in Croatia. A
24 man called Mlinar from Benkovac spoke, as he did at every such meeting. He
25 had been in an incident in Benkovac. And then Djoko Vjestica
1 from Gracac spoke. Some other people who I didn't know. They spoke in
2 very strong terms, speaking about women crying and children being afraid.
3 I saw that what they were saying did not quite correspond to the truth, at
4 least not in the area they were from. These areas were inhabited by
5 Serbs, and the situation they were in was not the way they described it.
6 At one point I managed to take the floor, and this was difficult
7 because everybody wanted to speak, and I said I did not quite agree with
8 what they had said because if it was difficult to be a Serb in Knin, Srb,
9 or Gracac, what must it like to be a Serb in Zagreb, or Kutina, or Novska,
10 where there were fewer Serbs or where they are in the minority. I said if
11 that were so they would need an armoured vehicle to go to work. And I
12 said there was no need to be so euphoric, to exaggerate in this way. When
13 I was criticised for saying this, I said I only wanted to present the
14 situation as it was and not to make a big fuss about it. However, I was
15 not successful in my attempts.
16 Q. You said that some of these people, Djoko Vjestica and others,
17 spoke about women crying and children being afraid. Could you elaborate
18 just a little bit more about what kinds of things they talked about and
19 what did they say they were afraid of.
20 A. For example, Mlinar came there. This had to do with a well-known
21 incident. He had a scar on his neck. And the media and he, himself, said
22 that Croatian extremists had attempted to cut his throat. I think that
23 later it was proved that he, himself, fabricated this in order to draw
24 attention to himself. I'm not saying that there weren't any incidents of
25 that sort, but they were probably just threats, not attempts to cut
1 someone's throat. They said they were afraid of being killed, of being
2 expelled, that they were seeking protection, that they couldn't stay there
3 like that. That was the gist of what they were trying to say.
4 Q. And these were Serbs who were afraid?
5 A. Yes. Yes. They were Serbs who were afraid.
6 Q. And to be clear, they were afraid of whom?
7 A. They were afraid of the new Croatian politics, the Croatian
8 police, and the Croatian army, and of course I responded. Because I
9 couldn't accept that people in Srb, Knin, Gracac, Lapac, Korenica, where
10 they were in the majority, 80 or 90 per cent, would feel more threatened
11 than Serbs in Zagreb, Knin or Karlovac who certainly had to be facing
12 bigger problems than they -- than they were. So I thought that this was
13 something these individuals were saying. I would have understood it if
14 these Serbs had been from an area where the HDZ was in power, but what
15 these people were saying was something that they saw perhaps as a way of
16 gaining some advantage for themselves. I thought that if people were
17 afraid, then we should try to talk to people, not just raise tensions.
18 Q. Now, was Milan Babic at this meeting?
19 A. No, he wasn't. He liked to be on his own and to be someone
20 important. He wouldn't have attended a meeting like that, but his
21 associates were there.
22 Q. Was there -- after the meeting with Jovic, was there also a
23 meeting with Milosevic or was that the same meeting?
24 A. What I said is something I said when we met with Milosevic --
25 actually, I was speaking of both meetings. When we came to see Milosevic,
1 that was when I spoke and took the floor.
2 Q. Now, in 1990, after August of 1990, and into 1991, what was the
3 relationship between Milan Babic and Milan Martic, to your knowledge?
4 A. From what I heard, they got on well. They were not against one
5 another. I think they didn't interfere with each other's work. Babic was
6 politically active and Martic had his own activities. However, I never
7 saw the two of them together. I would meet with Babic but not with
9 Q. Before 1990, before the events in 1990, how -- can you explain
10 how -- to your knowledge, how the police was organised.
11 A. It had its active-duty composition, its reserve composition. It
12 was organised by municipality. There were no counties then, but
13 communities of interest or something like that. They had a secretariat,
14 not a ministry, at republican level, and then lower down at municipal
15 level. So there were the active-duty police and the reserve police force.
16 Q. Now, after -- or let's say around August 1990 and thereafter, do
17 you know how Milan Martic started to organise the police in the areas
18 where --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Once again, Mr. Whiting, the witness hasn't told us
20 about any organisation by Mr. Martic. You are now suggesting to him that
21 Mr. Martic organised something.
22 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I was following on the answer earlier
23 about the people's police in the municipalities of Benkovac, Obrovac,
24 Lapac. But I can phrase the question differently, that's fine.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do, because you hadn't linked it to that
2 MR. WHITING:
3 Q. Mr. Dzakula, you told us earlier about the people's police and the
4 statements of Milan Martic after August of 1990. Do you recall testifying
5 about that?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And I asked you which municipalities he -- Milan Martic was
8 referring to when he was referring to the people's police.
9 A. I think he was referring to these four or five municipalities such
10 as Knin, Benkovac, Gracac, Lapac, and Korenica.
11 Q. And do you know what was happening with respect to the police in
12 those municipalities at that time?
13 A. The only thing I know is that they had some form of mobilisation
14 and that barricades had been set up. I heard that some people left the
15 police force, and then of course others were recruited to bring it up to
16 manpower levels. However, I was not familiar with the details because I
17 had no access to what was happening; I just heard about it.
18 Q. Did you hear about what left and who joined the police in those
19 areas, in those municipalities we're talking about?
20 A. Later on I heard from Mirko Raskovic that he was among those who
21 left the police force. He said that he had parted ways with Martic, but I
22 also heard that Croats left the police force and that Serbs were recruited
23 to bring it up to manpower level.
24 Q. And do you know if Milan Martic had any role in what was happening
25 with those police forces in those municipalities at that time, after
1 August 1990?
2 A. From what I heard and not from direct knowledge, I heard that he
3 had absolute authority in the police when it came to appointing policemen.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry to do this to you, Mr. Whiting. The
5 witness has been telling us about what he heard and not what he
6 observed -- he's not taking from direct information and direct knowledge,
7 rather. And now he's talking specifically about the accused. And once
8 again, he says clearly -- I'm sorry: "From what I heard and not from
9 direct knowledge, I heard that he had absolute authority in the police."
10 Are you going to call this person he heard from and who that
11 person is, and can you tell us who that person is he heard from?
12 MR. WHITING: I was going to follow up, Your Honour, to find out
13 from what sources he heard this from. And of course there will be other
14 witnesses who will testify about these matters.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you will, please, because for almost a page he's
16 been talking about what I heard and what I didn't hear, and nothing from
17 direct knowledge, which makes this testimony very difficult to deal
19 MR. WHITING: I understand, Your Honour.
20 Q. Mr. Dzakula, no doubt you heard the intervention of the Chamber,
21 and with respect to what you've been testifying about what you heard about
22 Milan Martic in 1991, could you tell us where you heard this from?
23 A. One heard on the media that people were leaving, that others were
24 recruited, that the reserve force was being mobilised. The media spoke
25 about this. I also heard it from some individuals when I was in Belgrade,
1 who spoke to me about the police of the SAO Krajina being formed and who
2 were from the area.
3 Q. Do you -- what can you tell us about these individuals that you
4 spoke to in Belgrade?
5 A. These were people who disagreed with the policy of Milan Babic and
6 Milan Martic. For example, Zdravko Zecevic, who was a dissident at the
7 time, but who then embraced that option and became the prime minister.
8 Sergej Veselinovic was another such person who was with him, and later on
9 they changed their standpoints a little.
10 Q. These two people who you've just identified, Zecevic and Zelenovic
11 [sic], what was their relationship to the Krajina? That is, were they --
12 did they have a relationship with the Krajina? What was the source of
13 their information?
14 A. Zecevic from Benkovac and Sergej Veselinovic from Obrovac. They
15 were in the SDS together with Jovan Raskovic, and they were not in the
16 SAO SDS of Milan Babic. This belonged to the SAO of Krajina as territory,
17 but their viewpoints were closer to those of the SDS of Jovan Raskovic
18 rather than the SDS of Milan Babic.
19 Q. But did the views of those two individuals later change?
20 A. Yes. Later they changed. This began sometime in 1992.
21 Q. Now, you testified specifically that you heard that he, Milan
22 Martic, had absolute authority in the police when it came to appointing
23 policemen. Do you remember where you heard that from?
24 A. If you're referring to the year 1991, the two men I mentioned; if
25 you mean later on, I saw it when we had the government session.
1 Q. Tell us about that, what you saw later on.
2 A. Later on, at government sessions when we spoke of staffing and
3 appointing people in the police, from the assistant minister to chiefs of
4 the police in the municipalities, nothing could be done without the
5 proposal and agreement of Martic. Krsta Zarkovic was appointed assistant
6 minister for Western Slavonia at his initiative. He was the main person
7 in charge of staffing in the ministry of police.
8 Q. When you say that you saw this in the government sessions, what
9 period of time are you talking about?
10 A. This was in 1992 to February 1993. From February 1992 to February
11 1993, that year.
12 Q. And did you ever witness Milan Martic talking to subordinates?
13 A. Yes. On one occasion I attended a government session, and I don't
14 know who it was who came, but you could see that he was a person who had
15 authority, who was obeyed, whose orders were complied with. And if
16 someone failed to comply with an order of his, he could be quite rough.
17 He could be angry. He could threaten that they would be replaced, and so
19 Q. When was that that you saw that at the government session, that
20 one occasion that you've just referred to?
21 A. This was in the course of 1992. I know that there were problems
22 with the police in Eastern Slavonia. I don't know what the name was that
23 was discussed, but in the lower part of Lika and Dalmatia because some
24 people probably wanted to appoint their own man as chief of police, and he
25 would not allow it.
1 Q. Going back again to 1991, was there anything in the media about --
2 that talked about Martic's role in the police in the municipalities that
3 we were talking about, in the area that we were talking about?
4 A. Both in the Croatian and the Serbian media, his name was often
5 mentioned, the name of Milan Martic. Martic's police here and Martic's
6 police there. It was mentioned very often.
7 Q. And was there anything -- do you recall -- are you able to recall
8 today anything specifically mentioned about what his role was in that
10 A. You mean 1991?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I think military war operations in the area of Dalmatia were
13 mentioned, that it was mentioned that the police of SAO Krajina and the
14 army had committed a crime in Skabrnja. It was also said that this had
15 also happened in Kostajnica and other places in Banija and in Dalmatia. I
16 don't recall all the villages right now, but I know that this was shown on
17 the Croatian media as actions of the police of the SAO Krajina and the
18 army, the JNA, which was called the Serbo-Chetnik army, the Jugo-Communist
19 army, and other names like that.
20 Q. I'll ask you some more questions in a moment about what you heard
21 about crimes in 1991, but I want to go back to my question because I don't
22 think you've answered my question yet, which is: Did you hear in the
23 media in 1991 about -- that described in some way what Martic's role was
24 in the municipalities around Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, those
1 A. Only that he organised the police of the SAO Krajina, that he
2 formed and organised it. When I say "he," I'm referring to Mr. Martic.
3 Q. And was that in the Serbian media, the Croatian media, or both?
4 A. In both. The Croatian media spoke of it in unfavourable terms,
5 and the Serbian media represented it as a brave action by a responsible
6 person, who was a hero. Very favourable things were written about him
7 because he was standing up to the Croatian police. The Croatian media
8 showed it in an unfavourable light. They were renegades, rebels, and
10 Q. Do you know if Milan Babic -- do you know if Milan Babic ever had
11 control over the police in the -- in the SAO Krajina?
12 A. From what I heard, no; and knowing Milan Martic as I knew him, I
13 think Babic was unable to have any kind of control over that. Babic dealt
14 with politics and Martic with the police.
15 Q. And since this is important, if you could just elaborate on what
16 you're saying. "Knowing Milan Martic as I knew him." What did you know
17 about him that leads you to say what you've just told us?
18 A. As far as I was able to get to know him at the government
19 sessions, Mr. Martic never allowed anyone to interfere in his job. He
20 felt that he was able and competent to organise and order his own ministry
21 in the way he knew. He chose his own associates and formed the police
22 like that. He would not allow any politician to interfere or to make
23 suggestions to him.
24 Later on I saw that in Western Slavonia he replaced people. He
25 brought a man called Veselinovic from Knin there. And this only went to
1 show that he had absolute authority. He didn't ask anyone in Western
2 Slavonia who should be appointed, but he brought a man called Veselinovic
3 from the other area.
4 Q. When you say that you got to know him at the government sessions,
5 that's which government, in which time period?
6 A. At the government sessions of the Republic of Serbian Krajina from
7 February 1992 to February 1993.
8 Q. And -- and the incident that you just told us about when he
9 brought a man called Veselinovic into Western Slavonia, when did that
11 A. That happened later. That was in 1995, I think. Vaso Ostolucanin
12 was replaced who was in the police there, and Veselinovic was brought in.
13 I heard that personally from Vaso Ostolucanin because we were friends and
14 we knew each other well. He was close to our policy and our views, and he
15 probably did not suit the then-policy of the Republic of Serb Krajina, so
16 he was replaced.
17 Q. Several times when you've referred to your seeing things at the
18 government sessions you talk about this year period from February 1992 to
19 February 1993. Again, was there something happened around February 1993
20 that changed your participation in the government sessions? You've
21 testified about this already, but I just want to make it clear on the
23 A. In 1993, in February, that was just before I was replaced, the
24 Daruvar Agreement had been concluded, I can't remember anything else right
25 this moment.
1 Q. But did you stop attending the government sessions at that time?
2 A. I stopped attending after February 1993.
3 Q. Okay. What were you able to -- what was -- in your observation,
4 what was Milan Martic's reputation? You've told us a little bit about
5 him, but could you talk about his reputation?
6 A. He was a highly appreciated person on the government and also
7 among the Serbs in that area. After the corridor was made in Posavina,
8 his reputation skyrocketed. He was promoted on account of that. He was
9 celebrated in Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina. And after
10 that, I think he had absolute authority in government, especially gained
11 during the course of 1992. And everybody listened to what he had to say,
12 from the prime minister to the president of the republic, let alone
13 ministers and assistant ministers.
14 Q. During 1991 and 1992, and you can -- I invite you to specify more
15 exactly in your answer, what did you observe about Milan Martic's attitude
16 about Croatia?
17 A. His view was very set. He did not consider Croatia his country
18 any longer. It was a Serb Krajina, and he was not in favour of any kind
19 of talks with such a state and such a policy, that we were supposed to
20 work for recognition and joining the association of Serb lands,
21 Republika Srpska, and Serbia. Those were his own landmarks.
22 Q. And when did you observe him to espouse those views?
23 A. Well, from when I met him, and I met him in February 1992, from
24 then onwards, that's what was being said at government sessions. And
25 usually the first item would be the political and security situation, and
1 that's when I realised what the views concerning Croatia were and
2 generally what kind of behaviour should be espoused in various activities.
3 Q. Do you know if Milan Martic saw a place for Croats living in the
4 Serb areas in the Krajina?
5 A. Well, I think he did not have any understanding for that because
6 when we had a government session concerning the return of refugees, our
7 views differed and we talked about the process of demilitarisation and the
8 Vance plan. Martic was against demilitarisation, which was a
9 pre-condition for the return of refugees, and he was also -- or rather, he
10 had no understanding for the return of refugees, and that was the opinion
11 of most of the members of government, and that is why we had a government
12 session in 1992, the end of 1992. It was in Western Slavonia, and it was
13 devoted to that particular subject to see how to make it possible for the
14 Croats to return. The Croats were leaving the area from Benkovac,
15 Obrovac. I think that there were some Croats remaining only in Knin. And
16 during 1992 -- well, the war was in 1991 and some were killed and some
17 left, and during 1992 they were leaving Krajina and going to Croatia.
18 That's when the exchanges took place, too, through the UN checkpoints.
19 Q. I want to ask you some more precise questions about this topic.
20 First of all, you've made a reference to the Vance plan. What is
21 the Vance plan?
22 A. Well, the Vance plan was an agreement that was signed on the
23 2nd of January, 1992. It implied a cease-fire and deployment of UN forces
24 in the war-afflicted areas. We adopted it during the month of March and
25 April 1992 at the Assembly of RSK, and it was accepted there. And it was
1 supposed to be carried out.
2 One of the very important points was the demilitarisation of the
3 area, which meant that long rifles and heavy weaponry should be put in
4 warehouses with two keys. The keys would be held by the UN and the police
5 and army of the RSK, and that only short-barrelled guns could be carried,
6 that is to say, only the police could have their guns, wear them on their
7 belts, and that is a major -- that is what led to a major clash.
8 Mr. Martic was the mainstay of this, and he was supported by the
9 president of the republic, that is to say, not to respect
10 demilitarisation. So people still carried large weapons in SAO Krajina
11 and in large part of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Only we in Western
12 Slavonia carried out demilitarisation during the course of 1992. And on
13 the 2nd of September, 1992, Marrack Goulding, under-secretary of the UN,
14 came to Okucani to congratulate us and to pay tribute to us. And other
15 parts of the SAO Krajina, that is to say, Eastern Slavonia and SAO Krajina
16 namely, I'm sorry, never carried out demilitarisation because Mr. Martic
17 and people who worked with him in the Ministry of Defence thought that it
18 was only with weapons that Krajina could be safeguarded and defended and
19 that demilitarisation could not be carried out.
20 Q. Mr. Dzakula, let me ask you a few follow-up questions about the
21 subject of demilitarisation. First of all, under the Vance plan, what
22 area was going to be demilitarised?
23 A. The entire area that was afflicted by war from behind Zadar, what
24 I drew on the map for you, and it was to be like an inkblot. And that is
25 where UN forces were to be deployed, in Eastern Slavonia, Western
1 Slavonia, and this part of Krajina, which was part of the RSK.
2 Q. And as part of this demilitarisation, was something going to
3 happen with the army, the Yugoslav army, that was known then as the JNA?
4 A. Yes, yes. The JNA, or rather, the army of the RSK had to be fully
5 disarmed. Heavy weaponry, cannons, tanks, Howitzers, I'm not very
6 knowledgeable about this, had to be in these warehouses as agreed, and how
7 far away they had to be from the line of conflict. The army had to wear
8 civilian clothing, and only the police could be in uniform, and they could
9 only have short-barrelled weapons. That was only carried out in Western
10 Slavonia, where the army was wearing civilian clothes and where they had
11 disarmed, whereas the heavy weapons were locked.
12 Q. And did the Vance plan also have any provisions relating to
14 A. The next point was the refugee -- the return of refugees. Since
15 we carried out the demilitarisation of Western Slavonia, we were bringing
16 pressure to bear in order to have the refugee returns start. And we
17 agreed that in Pakrac and an area near Pakrac the flow of -- the Croats
18 who fled should return, and there was another part of Pakrac that was
19 under Croat military control, and Serbs were supposed to be returned
20 there. That was our plan. However, it was not carried out and this was
21 never achieved.
22 Q. Okay. Now you referred to this special session of the government
23 that was held at the end of 1992. Where was that session held?
24 A. The session was held in Vrbovljani, a village near Okucani. The
25 agenda was the return of refugees, due to this pressure that we from
1 Western Slavonia made, and that's why this government session was held
2 there. The prime minister, most members of the government, came to
3 Okucani first. That's where they had talks. And the information I
4 received was that they had already agreed that our proposal should not be
5 adopted, that is to say, that refugees should not be returned. There was
6 a very heated debate at the government meeting.
7 Q. I'm sorry. I'm just going to interrupt you for a moment there,
8 Mr. Dzakula. How did you receive that information that the proposal
9 should not be adopted, that had already been agreed?
10 A. That's what Stevo Bogic from Eastern Slavonia, the deputy prime
11 minister told me. We were close. And he was sorry that I did not receive
12 support, and he said to me: You will remain on your own. You will not
13 have support for the return of your Serbs in Western Slavonia. As far as
14 I can, I will help you, but you will not receive support. That was in
15 Okucani, and that's the information that he brought he five minutes before
16 the government session actually started.
17 Q. I'm going to ask you some more questions about what happened at
18 the government session, but --
19 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think we are at the hour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: We are at the hour. Okay. The matter will then
21 stand adjourned to tomorrow at quarter past 2.00.
22 Court adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of
25 January, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.