1 Friday, 14 July 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Jarcevic, good morning.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I take once again the opportunity to remind you

9 that you are bound by the declaration you made on the first day you came

10 to give evidence, to make -- to tell the truth, the whole truth and

11 nothing else but the truth.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Believe me, I have been abiding by

13 that so far.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

15 WITNESS: SLOBODAN JARCEVIC [Resumed]

16 [Witness answered through interpreter]

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Whiting.

18 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Cross-examination by Mr. Whiting: [Continued]

20 Q. Good morning, sir.

21 A. Good morning, Mr. Whiting.

22 Q. Sir, in your testimony yesterday, and I believe even the day

23 before, you testified that the JNA was comprised of individuals from all

24 different ethnic groups, that it was a multi-ethnic army and not a Serb

25 army. Isn't it true, though, that by September of 1991, that had changed

1 and that all of the military district and operational group commanders

2 were in fact Serb?

3 A. As far as I remember, Mr. Whiting, the fighting around Vukovar

4 continued even after the date you mention. The commander of the first

5 army was still General Spirkovski, a Macedonian. The commander of the air

6 force was a Croat, Zvonko Jurjevic, and the period you're referring to is

7 subsequent to the date you mentioned. My friend told me, for instance,

8 that the entire artillery battery at Vukovar was composed of Croats from

9 Dalmatia.

10 Q. Well, you mentioned Aleksandar Spirkovski. In fact, he was -- he

11 was replaced as the first military district commander in September of 1991

12 and he was replaced by Zivota Panic in September of 1991 and Mr. Panic is

13 a Serb; isn't that correct?

14 A. It is correct. He is Serb, but the Prime Minister was a Croat and

15 he probably made an influence over these changes. He had an influence

16 over these changes.

17 Q. That wasn't responsive to the question, sir. The -- isn't it true

18 that in September of 1991, Mr. Spirkovski was replaced and Zivota Panic,

19 who you can -- say was a Serb, replaced him, isn't that true, in September

20 of 1991?

21 A. Believe me, I can't tell whether this was in September. I do

22 believe you but I told you that Zivota Panic is a Serb.

23 Q. And the other commanders in Vukovar, Mile Mrksic, Andrija

24 Biorcevic were also Serbs, isn't that true? Certainly after September

25 1991, if not before, or do you not know?

1 A. Let me tell you, I don't know whether Andrija is a Serb. I can't

2 tell. The other two you mentioned, I know are Serbs but these were people

3 holding junior commanding positions.

4 Q. But they were commanders in Vukovar; isn't that correct?

5 A. Well, I have agreed with you. I said that the only point that I

6 wanted to make was that they were lower-ranking compared to the other ones

7 we were mentioning.

8 Q. Now, yesterday, you also testified about -- you said that there

9 were a number of cease-fire violations that were committed by the Croatian

10 side. It's true, isn't it, that cease-fire violations were also committed

11 by the Serb side during the time that you were Foreign Minister and

12 afterwards, isn't that also -- isn't that correct, sir?

13 A. Mr. Whiting, at government meetings, we issued strict

14 instructions to the effect that the peace process should not be

15 interrupted, that Croats should not be attacked. However we received

16 information that every time that there had been shooting at the border or

17 one of the sides opening fire, it was always the Croats. I told you that

18 this was stage-managed by them in order to convince the journalists or

19 diplomats, whoever they brought over there, that it was the Serbs who

20 started the violations of cease-fires first. However, in the UN Security

21 Council's documents, the situation reflected there was not the accurate

22 one. The documents produced by Nambiar because they wanted to present the

23 situation in a different manner. The Croats wanted to present it in the

24 way it suited them.

25 Q. So --

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Jarcevic, would you please now answer the

2 question. We are thankful for the speech you made. Can you please now

3 answer the question. Do you want to be reminded of the question?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you please repeat the

5 question?

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it true that there were also cease-fire

7 violations committed by Serbs? Yes or no. We've heard your speech.

8 Answer the question.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: While you were Foreign Minister.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether someone on the

12 Serb side had gone against the government instructions. It may have

13 happened locally. However, the army and the police of the RSK had never --

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I interrupt you? Thank you for that speech.

15 Please answer the question. Is it true that while you were Foreign

16 Minister, Serbs also violated cease-fire agreements?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was clear about that. I don't

18 know that.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

20 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. But going back to the -- something you said earlier, I just want

22 to see if I understand what you said clearly. Did you state that largely

23 it was the Croatian side that violated the cease-fire agreements and that

24 if the internationals who were present say otherwise, it was because they

25 were tricked by the Croatians? You talked about it being stage-managed

1 and is that -- is that your position?

2 A. There were such cases, too.

3 Q. Well, I'm not clear on what the answer you've just given. I had

4 understood your answer earlier to be that it was the Croatian side, as you

5 knew, it was the Croatian side that was violating the cease-fire

6 agreements but that the international representatives were deceived into

7 believing that it was the Serbs. Did I understand what you said

8 correctly?

9 A. No. You didn't understand me correctly. I spoke of two different

10 situations. They didn't bring over UNPROFOR officers to deceive them but

11 diplomats, representatives of international organisations, and they wanted

12 to show them that allegedly it was the Serb who is were the first ones to

13 violate the cease-fire agreement.

14 Secondly, as far as UNPROFOR representatives are concerned, I said

15 clearly that before leaving for India, General Nambiar told me,

16 hesitatingly, although probably he felt compelled to say that, that none

17 of the unfavourable documents for Croats were able to enter Croatia so the

18 documents you have are actually only partly accurate because they conceal

19 the evil that the Croats committed on their part. I've been repeating

20 this several times, and I hope that this Trial Chamber will be satisfied

21 of that as the Defence will be leading documents here proving that.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Mr. Jarcevic, before you proceed with answering

23 the next question for Mr. Whiting, I thought that you were also saying

24 that Croats within the JNA were responsible for certain infractions and

25 these were being put forward as having been committed by Serbs. Is that

1 also your evidence or did I misunderstand you?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I don't understand

3 your question fully. If we are discussing the JNA and officers of the

4 JNA, we have to know the time period we are referring to. Of course, that

5 there was a certain point in time when all the Croats had left the JNA

6 except for some honourable exceptions.

7 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: The period that was being referred to was whilst

8 you were the Foreign Minister. Are you saying at that time that all

9 Croats would have left the JNA?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Madam, when I became Foreign

11 Minister, and that was in October 1992, all of the Yugoslav army was in

12 the territory of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. It

13 could not be discussed any longer in terms of being in the territory of

14 the RSK. It had already withdrawn from Bosnia after having been attacked

15 and after the JNA soldiers and officers had been massacred.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: We leave it at that for the time being, thank

17 you.

18 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour. I think I will also leave

19 this topic.

20 Q. Sir, I want to ask you some questions about the negotiations that

21 you spoke about. You testified on the first day of your evidence that you

22 went to New York for negotiations in January of 1993. And we saw at the

23 beginning of the cross-examination --

24 A. In February.

25 Q. I'm sorry, in February of 1993. And we saw in the beginning of

1 your -- the cross-examination, the statements that were made by your

2 delegation before leaving for New York or made on behalf of your 4

3 delegation. You also testified and this is at page 43 of the first day of

4 your testimony, that nothing was accomplished --

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could I interrupt you? Mr. Jarcevic, are you well?

6 Are you okay? Are you okay, sir?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Believe me, I am. I feel well. I

8 explained to you yesterday that I'm a bit upset about the fact that 20

9 years later, the world still fails to understand what happened in the

10 former Yugoslavia. I'm sensitive person, I'm one of the few people who

11 survived in the area I hail from. 270 of my fellow peers were killed.

12 Therefore, I am upset. But believe me, I am in good health.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: That may be so, sir. You see, the fact that you

14 told us yesterday doesn't mean we shouldn't find out today when you show

15 signs that make us suspicious that you are not well. So every time you

16 behave the way you've been behaving, I will have to ask you the question,

17 are you well, just to reassure myself that we are not subjecting you to

18 conditions that you are not able to operate under.

19 I'm sorry to have interrupted your question, Mr. Whiting, but I

20 had to check if the witness is okay.

21 MR. WHITING: No. Thank you, Your Honour. I appreciate it.

22 Q. Sir, you testified, did you not, that there was no -- nothing was

23 accomplished at the negotiations in New York, right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And you testified that you went to Geneva in March and that you

1 met with the Croat side again in April and May of 1993 but you said -- you

2 testified, and this is at page 44 of the first day, that no agreement was

3 reached on those occasions. Is that your testimony, sir?

4 A. Yes. The assembly of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina was also

5 involved in the decision making process.

6 Q. Did I understand your testimony in your direct examination

7 correctly that there was no agreement reached until the 15th of July 1993,

8 which you described as the Erdut Agreement? Is that your testimony?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In fact, sir, wasn't an agreement reached on the 6th of April 1993

11 but the Serb side refused to endorse it? Isn't that what happened?

12 A. You didn't fully understand. The initials I placed on one of the

13 documents on the 6th of April in Geneva. I said the decision about that

14 document was taken by the assembly of the RSK and this is the point

15 clarifying the entire situation.

16 Q. You didn't tell us anything about this agreement in your direct

17 examination, did you? You're telling about this for the first time now.

18 A. I talked of a series of or several rounds of negotiations we had

19 during that month in Geneva. I wasn't over the three months in Geneva. I

20 didn't really talk about it because you didn't ask me about it. If you

21 wish me to, I will talk about it.

22 Q. Well, no, sir, that's not right, is it? In fact on the first day

23 of your testimony, you were asked about this time period and about

24 agreements and you testified, and I can read it to you if you like, it's

25 on page 44. You testified that we met again in April and May. "However

1 no agreement was reached on either occasion." That was your testimony in

2 direct examination.

3 A. I stand by this answer of mine today.

4 Q. Well, no agreement was reached because the Serb side refused to

5 endorse an agreement that you had accepted during the negotiations, isn't

6 that right?

7 A. I didn't accept it. I promised Mr. Owen that we would recommend

8 it to the assembly because we did not have the powers inherent with the

9 assembly to accept such an agreement. Should the assembly prove to be in

10 agreement with the paper, then the initials I placed on the agreement

11 would signify that the RSK had accepted it.

12 Q. And the RSK assembly did not accept the agreement, isn't that

13 correct? This was a cease-fire agreement. And the RSK assembly did not

14 accept it, right?

15 A. The RSK assembly, as a legislative body, did not accept the

16 agreement and we informed Lord David Owen accordingly. Now, with your

17 permission, if I can explain what --

18 Q. You've answered the question, if I could ask my next question,

19 which is that -- when you testified, then, in your direct examination that

20 "the government did not reject a single proposal made by international

21 mediators, we accepted all their proposals and negotiated with Croats,"

22 that was not true, was it? You've just now told us that the Serb side did

23 not accept this agreement.

24 A. All the proposals for negotiations were accepted by us. You are

25 misinterpreting my statement.

1 Q. Oh, I see. So now what you're telling us is not that you accepted

2 every proposal but that you accepted to negotiate on every occasion. Is

3 that now your testimony?

4 A. Yes. We accepted all proposals for negotiations and we always sat

5 down at the negotiating table.

6 Q. I see. If we could look at another document, and I think you'll

7 be particularly interested in this document because you've made reference

8 to it in your testimony, 00313329, and this is a report of the

9 Secretary-General dated the 15th of May 1993.

10 And this is a document that if we could look at paragraph 10, this

11 is a document that you referred to with the reference to -- that contains

12 the reference to Serbs being displaced from territories of Croatia. It's

13 on page 3, paragraph 10. It says, at the bottom there, it

14 says, "According to UNHCR figures dated 19 March 1993 the number of Serb

15 refugees and displaced persons who have fled from Croatia to Serbia and

16 the UNPAs approximately 251.000, now exceeds the number of Croats who were

17 displaced from the UNPAs to Croatia."

18 That's the reference from the Secretary-General that you were

19 referring to in your direct examination; isn't that correct?

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me what paragraph are you looking at?

21 MR. WHITING: It's paragraph 10. It jumps from page 3 to page 4

22 so it's -- at the end of paragraph 10 appears at the top of the screen

23 there.

24 Q. That's the document that you were referring to, isn't it,

25 Mr. Jarcevic? You nodded your head but that doesn't get recorded on the

1 transcript so you have to answer yes or no.

2 A. This is the document which presented a partial truth about the

3 expulsion of Serbs by Croats.

4 Q. Now, let's go back and look at paragraph 8 of this document. And

5 this is a reference to the negotiations and the provisional agreement that

6 we were speaking about. It says, "As regards resolution 802,

7 representatives of the co-chairman in New York, Geneva and elsewhere have

8 negotiated at great length with both parties to secure an agreement to

9 implement the cease-fire and related provisions. On 6 April 1993, a

10 provisional agreement was signed which required the endorsement of both

11 sides. Although UNPROFOR held three lengthy meetings with the local Serb

12 authorities to explain how it would implement the agreement operationally,

13 and to clarify other related matters, no such endorsement had been

14 forthcoming from the Serb side as of 10 May 1993." And that's true, isn't

15 it, what's written there? I'm sorry, I didn't hear an answer. Is that

16 true, sir, what's written in that paragraph?

17 A. This is true. I testified a moment ago precisely along these

18 lines. Of course, here --

19 Q. Thank you, you've answered the question. Let's look at paragraph

20 4, please, of this document. It's on page -- that's on page 2. And --

21 yeah, thank you. At the end of paragraph 4 it says, "During the

22 negotiation of the peacekeeping plan, however, it was repeatedly

23 emphasised to the local Serb leadership in what were to become the UNPAs

24 that in practice the only basis for a settlement was their acceptance of

25 Croatian sovereignty in return for guarantees of their minority rights.

1 They never accepted this position or concealed their determination to

2 press for independence from Croatia."

3 And that's true, too, isn't it, Mr. Jarcevic? The Serb side never

4 accepted Croatian sovereignty in return for guarantees of their minority

5 rights.

6 A. May I answer?

7 Q. Please.

8 A. Mr. Whiting, we were never a minority in Croatia. We were a

9 constituent nation on an equal footing with Croats, and here it never says

10 why this was taken away from us. Who was the right to deprive the English

11 of their sovereignty in Great Britain?

12 Q. Okay. Now, if you could answer the question, the Serb side never

13 accepted Croatian sovereignty in return for guarantees of their minority

14 rights. And let's take minority here in being in numerical terms because

15 you accept, do you not, that the Serbs were a numerical minority in

16 Croatia in terms of population?

17 A. When the Croatian state killed more than a million Serbs over four

18 years, then we found ourselves in quite a numerical minority compared to

19 Croats but does anyone have the right to commit genocide in order to seize

20 territory? Look at the UN charter and you will see that it says there

21 that no one has that right.

22 Q. Thank you for that speech, sir. Now, could you please answer the

23 question? The question is the Serb side never accepted Croatian

24 sovereignty in exchange for guarantees of their minority rights. That's

25 true, isn't it?

1 A. We didn't want to become a minority. This isn't a speech. These

2 are facts.

3 Q. You could not accept that the -- the Serb side could not accept

4 being a minority population, being a minority within the Croatian state,

5 isn't that true? And therefore insisted again and again and again until

6 the very end for its own state. Isn't that correct, sir?

7 A. Yes. What Croatia took away from them on the 25th of December

8 1995 -- sorry, 1990, by amending its constitution. It was an illegal,

9 unlawful change to the constitution because it shouldn't have been amended

10 without the participation and consent of the Serbs in the assembly. The

11 Serbs representing a state forming nation in Croatia.

12 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this document be admitted into

13 evidence and given a number, please?

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

15 please be given an exhibit number.

16 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit number 866, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

18 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. Sir, since you were the Foreign Minister in February of 1993, you

20 certainly must have been aware that Veljko Dzakula negotiated what was

21 called the Daruvar agreement with the Croatian government, and the

22 agreement was an agreement that by peaceful means and dialogue, existing

23 problems, certainly in Western Slavonia, would be resolved including

24 utilities problems, water, electricity, roads, contacts between families.

25 You're aware of that Daruvar agreement, aren't you, sir?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You're aware also, aren't you, that as a result of negotiating

3 that agreement, Mr. Dzakula was suspended from his position as Deputy

4 Prime Minister in the RSK government and later in the fall of 1993 he was

5 arrested and detained by that government. You know that, don't you, sir?

6 A. Yes. And there is a reason for that.

7 Q. Yes. The reason for that was that he had made agreement with the

8 Croatian side, isn't that the reason, sir?

9 A. He did not conclude agreement with the Croat side and you another

10 got to mention that he was a minister in the cabinet of the Republic of

11 Serbian Krajina.

12 Q. No, I think I did mention that. And he -- he reached a -- the

13 Daruvar agreement with the Croatian side and that is why he was suspended

14 from his position of minister in the cabinet, isn't that true, sir?

15 A. Yes. Because he did not have authorisation to negotiate

16 independently. What he did, he did as a private person.

17 Q. Sir, can you tell us what authorisation you had to negotiate when

18 you were sent to -- you say you were sent to London in June of 1994 by

19 Milan Martic and you were no longer Foreign Minister, you were just an

20 adviser to the president, but yet you went to London to negotiate. Did

21 you --

22 A. It's not only the Foreign Minister who goes to attend

23 negotiations. Remember, Averell Harriman from the history books.

24 Q. The point is that when you did that, when you went to London, you

25 were not -- you were not dismissed from your position as an adviser. You

1 were not arrested and detained, were you?

2 A. Certainly, the head of state and the government of the Republic of

3 Serbian Krajina approved my travel. Nobody approved anything for

4 Mr. Dzakula. We didn't even know that he was going to negotiate and it is

5 important for the Trial Chamber to know that Croats had promised him

6 secret negotiations and then, by chance, they published it in all the

7 media. They wanted thus to create a rift in the government of the Serbian

8 Krajina and that's what they achieved. It was not enough for them that in

9 the area about which Dzakula negotiated, there was not a single settlement

10 left standing. 130 villages were destroyed together with all the

11 infrastructures, and the Croats used the area to dump radioactive material

12 and waste there.

13 Q. So your testimony is that the only reason that Mr. Dzakula lost

14 his position and was later arrested and detained was because he was

15 unauthorised to conduct these negotiations, not because he dared to reach

16 agreement with the Croatian side?

17 A. I think the British government would replace each and every

18 minister who would go anywhere to negotiate without prior approval of the

19 government.

20 Q. Let's talk about the Erdut agreement which you testified about,

21 and you described the agreement -- this was the agreement that was reached

22 on the 15th of July 1993. You described it in your testimony as follows:

23 This is --

24 A. No, no, no.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Jarcevic, what are you saying no to?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The interpreter said January and was

2 in July.

3 MR. WHITING:

4 Q. I'm sorry, that was evidently a misinterpretation because I said

5 July so --

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: And the record says July also.

7 MR. WHITING: Right, but no doubt in B/C/S he -- it must have been

8 misinterpreted by accident.

9 Q. It's July 15th, 1993, the Erdut agreement, right? You've nodded

10 your head.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. You described it in your testimony as follows: There is at page

13 46 and 47 of the transcript of the first day of your testimony. "The

14 contents of the agreement was as follows. Its main feature was that after

15 the agreement was signed, both governments would settle up commissions for

16 cooperation in all areas. Those commissions were supposed to bring both

17 sides to a state of two cantons like the one that would begin to exist in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Accords. But first the commissions

19 were to work on reuniting transport, trade, economy, culture, education,

20 et cetera."

21 Now, isn't it true, sir, that the Erdut agreement had nothing to

22 do with setting up cantons or reuniting or commissions to reunite on

23 transport or trade? It was strictly an agreement involving the movement

24 and withdrawal of armed forces in certain areas along the confrontation

25 line? Isn't that true, sir?

1 A. That's not true. And representatives of the two superpowers would

2 never have come to Erdut for such a trifle.

3 Q. Well, why don't we look at the agreement. It's 01749241. And if

4 you could just scroll down, please. This version of the agreement is

5 signed just by one side but -- if necessary, I have one that's signed by

6 both sides. Here, that -- is that your signature, sir, S Jarcevic, 15th

7 of July 1993?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Now if we could look at the agreement, in paragraph 1, it says no

10 Croatian armed forces or police in the areas specified on the attached

11 map, paragraph 2, talks about UNPROFOR. Paragraph 3, talks about who will

12 be present in certain villages. Paragraph 4 withdrawal of Croatian armed

13 forces and police from certain areas. And then paragraph 5, is the only

14 paragraph that even remotely approaches anything like what you talked

15 about. It says "Both sides agree to intensify their efforts to reach a

16 negotiated solution to all problems existing between them starting with a

17 cease-fire agreement to be negotiated by UNPROFOR." That's the Erdut

18 agreement, isn't it, sir? It has nothing to do with cantons or

19 commissions to resolve trade or commerce or anything. Isn't that correct,

20 sir?

21 A. It's correct that item 5 is related to all that I have said. I

22 didn't say that the term canton was written anywhere, but the purpose of

23 the agreement was to bring about that situation in practice, that Krajina

24 and Croatia should be united in a way that was later implemented in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We discussed that with representatives of the United

1 States and Russia. You miss represented this agreement, though. You said

2 that it is solely about borders and the deployment of forces. Please,

3 this was supposed to remove the consequences of the Croatian aggression of

4 the 22nd of January 1993. You see how large an area was occupied, the

5 Croat side.

6 Q. I'm going to interrupt you. I submit to you and I put to you that

7 I did not misrepresent the agreement. You did in your testimony.

8 A. No, I did not, sir, because commissions were supposed to work and

9 they did start to work. They were ready.

10 Q. Sir, the commissions that you are referring to were strictly to

11 enforce this agreement, this cease-fire agreement. They had nothing to do

12 with creating cantons or anything like that. Isn't that correct, sir?

13 A. It is true that international representatives were hoping that one

14 single state would emerge with two cantons, with two state forming nations

15 like it was before 1991. That was done in verbal discussion. It was not

16 reflected in the text. I said yesterday that this was just a framework

17 paper, a framework agreement. I said that before and I'm repeating it

18 now, Mr. Whiting. And may I just add nothing thing? There is a report --

19 Q. Sir I think you've answered the question. Thank you.

20 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this document be admitted into

21 evidence and given a number, please.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

23 please be given an exhibit number.

24 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit number 867, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

1 MR. WHITING:

2 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, I'd like to look at an interview with Goran Hadzic

3 shortly after the Erdut agreement. This is R 0330574. No? It's not? It

4 has a -- it should have that number and then redacted at the end, RED,

5 because the top part is redacted. You have it? Okay. We have a hard copy

6 if it can't be pulled up.

7 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think there is some difficulty with

8 the e-court if we could just put this on the ELMO.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's understandable.

10 MR. WHITING:

11 Q. Now, this is a -- it's an interview dated the 24th to the 25th of

12 July 1993 in Belgrade Borba with Goran Hadzic. And I'd like to look,

13 please, at the second page of the document. And about halfway down the

14 page, it says, "The aim is for us to create a Serbian state, and this

15 already exists and is even partially recognised because you see the Croats

16 are now talking to us."

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry?

18 MR. WHITING: It's on the screen, it's about halfway down. Though

19 it's on the -- on the document it's actually about a quarter of the way

20 down. I don't know if the usher can see where it is. Yeah.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.

22 MR. WHITING:

23 Q. What Mr. Hadzic said there is true, isn't it, that the aim was to

24 create a Serbian state, right, Mr. Jarcevic?

25 A. Mr. Whiting, I will answer with just a small addition. Yes, and

1 it was confirmed by 28 MPs of the Council of Europe several months ago,

2 including a MP in the lower house of the British parliament. It was said

3 that Croatia had to be set up as a two-nation state and so on and so

4 forth. So Goran Hadzic was pursuing the interests of the Serb people

5 based on their ethnic and historic rights. I believe that the Republic of

6 Serbian Krajina has to be restored as a state, be it within the

7 framework of Croatia as until 1990 or independently.

8 Q. Sir, I think you fully answered that question after the word yes.

9 So I'd ask you again, please to focus?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And answer as briefly as possible. Now, a little further down, it

12 says, "Before --" and I don't know if this is on the screen here. Okay.

13 It's at the bottom of the screen. It says, "Before the beginning of the

14 armed struggle, I thought we would achieve our aims without calling the

15 people to arms but when I saw that this was not possible, we embarked on a

16 military struggle which we won."

17 And that's true also, isn't it, sir? That the Serb side embarked

18 on a military struggle to achieve its aims of a Serbian state?

19 A. In order to defend itself and create its state, yes.

20 Q. If we could go to the next page?

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we have the registrar to help on the ELMO?

22 MR. WHITING: Is it on e-court now? Okay. Thank you.

23 Q. Just had to find my place here. If we could scroll down a little

24 bit, please, there we go. And at the bottom there, if you see it

25 says, "As for the Serbs who have remained in Croatia," if we could focus

1 in on the sort of 10, 15 sentences after that. Right there where the

2 arrow, perfect. Now if we could zoom in on those sentences after that.

3 Or maybe that's not possible. Yeah. There we go. Yeah, okay.

4 It says, "As for the Serbs who remained -- this is what Mr. Hadzic

5 is saying, as for the Serbs who have remained in Croatia these are Serbs

6 or rather the former leadership of the communist party of which there are

7 very few. The other Serbs who live in Croatia are Serbian fascists who

8 support Tudjman. They are loyal to his authority and it is best that they

9 remain there. An example of the former is Dusan Dragosevic [phoen] and of

10 the latter is Milan Djukic. There are a total of 50.000 such Serbs in

11 Croatia. We do not need to cooperate with such so-called Serbs."

12 This reflects the attitude of the RSK leadership towards Serbs who

13 remained in Croatia, does it not, that they were essentially traitors to

14 the Serb cause, isn't that right, sir?

15 A. Completely correct. 400.000 Serbs were expelled. I say that once

16 again.

17 Q. But you agree with what I said in my question, which is that Serbs

18 who remained in Croatia were considered by the RSK leadership to be

19 traitors to the Serb cause?

20 A. With the leave of the Trial Chamber I would like to explain why

21 Mr. Hadzic mentioned communists.

22 Q. Could you first answer my question? You agree that the attitude

23 of the RSK leadership is that Serbs who remained in Croatia were traitors

24 to the Serb cause?

25 A. They were open traitors and that's whom Mr. Hadzic meant. I had

1 the same opinion about traitors and I believe you do too.

2 Q. Sir, I'd ask you please not to speculate on what I believe. Just

3 answer my questions. Now, I want you to look at one other passage from

4 this article and it's about something we were talking about earlier.

5 And I just need to find the place. Okay. It's on the screen. Mr. Hadzic

6 is asked this question -- I'm sorry, sir, what is it?

7 A. I cannot hear the interpreter very well any more. I don't know

8 what happened with my reception.

9 Q. Thank you for telling us.

10 A. It's excellent now. Thank you very much.

11 Q. Mr. Hadzic is asked this question: You have broken with some

12 close associates, why? And the answer he gives was, the difference was

13 obvious. For example with some Serbs from Western Slavonia, an example is

14 Veljko Dzakula who sometimes secretly negotiates with the Croats. He was

15 in the government but our concepts of the struggle were different from the

16 beginning. He and his supporters are no longer any kind of political

17 force. They wanted to go for cohabitation with the Croats and we wanted

18 to be neighbours only. When it comes to Zdravko Zivkovic [phoen] a former

19 government member, he is an honest Serb but at one point he could not find

20 a solution. For us, cohabitation with the Croats is treachery. We will

21 never agree to this even if a new war begins.

22 Does this accurately reflect the attitude of the RSK

23 leadership towards Mr. Dzakula's positions?

24 A. If we know what coexistence in Croatia is, then it's clearly yes.

25 This coexistence implies expulsion of Serbs.

1 Q. Finally I want to look at one more quote from this, and if we

2 could just scroll down just a little bit on the text, there, just a tiny

3 bit more, there. Finally he says, Mr. Lajic says, "Our aim is well known

4 and there is a unified Serbian state regardless of where its capital will

5 be. I want to move freely around the Serbian lands."

6 Now, that's a reference to all of the Serbian lands in the former

7 Yugoslavia, is it not?

8 A. Yes. And that was our platform.

9 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this document be admitted into

10 evidence and given a number, please?

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

12 please be given an exhibit number.

13 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit number 868, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

15 MR. WHITING:

16 Q. Now, sir, I want to turn to 1994, please. You testified about the

17 Zagreb agreement that was reached in March of 1994. Isn't it true that

18 after that agreement was reached, the Serb side obstructed and delayed at

19 every opportunity in negotiating the economic agreement which was finally

20 concluded in December of 1994?

21 A. No. Krajina did not obstruct a single agreement.

22 Q. In fact, it took so long to achieve the economic agreement that

23 the political agreement which was later referred to as the Z-4 plan was

24 accelerated because the economic agreement was taking so long, isn't that

25 true?

1 A. Here we are not talking about the structure of negotiations If we

2 were I could tell you where Croats were not right, where Serbs were not

3 right. They all probably had their positions, that depended on

4 circumstances.

5 Q. But the point is, isn't it, that the Serb side delayed and

6 obstructed the negotiations concerning the economic agreement?

7 A. Mr. Whiting, one of the reasons was that resolution 815, if I'm

8 not mistaken banned the vehicles in Republika Srpska from moving about. We

9 had asked the Security Council to remove that particular provision which

10 was never done and that was the reason for the delay.

11 Q. Let's talk about the Z-4 plan. You constantly referred to the

12 fact that it was an insult because it covered only two districts, which

13 you said included 11 municipalities. In fact, it covered nearly the

14 entire territory of sectors north and south, isn't that right?

15 A. That's not right.

16 Q. Isn't it correct that it covered all the territories in sectors

17 north and south where the Serbs were a majority before 1991? Isn't that

18 true, sir?

19 A. Only 11 municipalities, sir. List them all and you'll see which

20 ones are left out. Most of the Krajina population lived in the Western

21 Slavonia which was practically cleansed, in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and

22 Western Srem. These areas.

23 Q. You didn't answer my question. First of all do you know how many

24 municipalities were included in sectors north and south?

25 A. All in all, Krajina had 28 municipalities, but the municipalities

1 mentioned in Z-4 are not these RSK municipalities, but the municipalities

2 in Croatia which were much smaller than was customary in Yugoslavia. Some

3 local communes were even transformed into municipalities.

4 Q. Let's go back -- because perhaps talking about municipalities is

5 confusing, let's go back to my original question. The Z-4 plan would have

6 applied to all of the territory within sectors north and south where Serbs

7 were a majority before 1991. Isn't that true, sir?

8 A. Mr. Whiting, that's not true. Were it true, then the Z-4 would

9 have mentioned north and south, and that wasn't mentioned.

10 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, could we have Exhibit 381 in evidence,

11 please?

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we please have Exhibit 381 on the screen.

13 MR. WHITING:

14 Q. Sir, this is the Z-4 plan, and if we could go to page 5, please,

15 of the document -- I'm sorry, that's page 3. It might be page 5 on the

16 e-court but -- now, at the very beginning of the agreement, it talks about

17 where this -- what area is contained, and if we could scroll down it says,

18 it talks about boundaries, it says, there shall be an established the

19 autonomous Serbian Krajina to consist of the territory indicated on map

20 one in annex A, and then there is a footnote and if we could go back down

21 to the bottom, it describes the territory. It says this territory will be

22 a single, continuous territory comprising the Serb majority areas the

23 United Nations protected areas sectors north and south as defined in the

24 1991 census with due consideration to geographic and economic factors.

25 So, in fact, the agreement applied, as I stated, to sector --

1 those areas of sectors north and south where the Serbs were a majority in

2 the 1991 census. Do you accept that now, sir?

3 A. Yes. It says clearly here within the area sectors north and

4 south, within them, not all the entire sectors.

5 Q. Thank you. Now, you claimed in your testimony that Milan Martic

6 rejected this agreement because the UNPROFOR mandate had not been

7 extended. But in fact, isn't it true that he rejected it for the same

8 reason that you say this is insulting because it did not give statehood

9 and it only gave autonomy? Isn't that really the reason that Milan Martic

10 rejected it?

11 A. That's not the real reason, counsel. Apologies?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor misinterpreted the

13 witness's evidence. The witness spoke of the fact that Mr. Martic did not

14 take into consideration the plan because he asked Ambassador Galbraith to

15 first solve the status of UNPROFOR. Therefore, it wasn't that he rejected

16 the plan, as the witness's evidence was presented here.

17 MR. WHITING: I can put the question slightly differently.

18 Q. Isn't it true that the reason he refused even to accept the plan,

19 to take a copy of it from the international negotiators, is that -- and

20 I'm going to give two reasons now: Number one, that the plan did not

21 offer statehood; and secondly because Mr. Milosevic told him to reject it?

22 Isn't that true, sir?

23 A. The latter remark you make was widely exploited in the media,

24 namely that it was Milosevic who ordered the RSK president to reject it.

25 I don't know anything about that and Mr. Martic had never told me that

1 something of the sort happened. I told you that I was in Belgrade at the

2 time the plan was taken to Knin and I said that the main reason was that

3 there were hints along the lines that the RSK would no longer be a United

4 Nations protected area. This was what caused concern with the president,

5 and he wanted to appeal to Ambassador Galbraith to use his offices not to

6 have the status of the international forces in Krajina changed but there

7 wasn't a single body that would accept the plan that had been offered for

8 four times. Why was its name changed? Why was it that the US authority

9 was used to try and push this agreement through four or five times? It's

10 as if these international factors were playing funny games or having fun.

11 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, isn't it true that the Z-4 plan offered to the Serbs

12 in Croatia a degree of autonomy that went far beyond anything that had

13 been offered before?

14 A. It didn't offer that. You could have offered a four storey

15 building in Croatia but this didn't apply to the entire Serb population.

16 I even wonder at you putting this question to me.

17 Q. Sir, you're confusing two issues, I would submit. I -- I am not

18 talking about the area applied to. What I'm talking about

19 is the degree of autonomy that was offered and you would accept, would you

20 not, that that went far beyond anything that had been offered before.

21 Isn't that correct, sir?

22 A. You can't commend this as a good offer if it applies to 60.000

23 people and there were about 1 million Serbs in Croatia.

24 Q. You've not answered my question, sir. Please listen to my

25 question and answer my question. My question is: The degree of autonomy

1 that was offered in the agreement went far beyond anything that had been

2 offered to the Serb side before; isn't that true?

3 A. The Serb side wasn't offered anything from the Croat side. This

4 was not operational, as it was.

5 Q. Sir, I put the question to you now three or four times and I would

6 submit you've refused to answer it and the Trial Chamber will have to draw

7 its own conclusions from that.

8 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I think it's an appropriate time for a

9 break.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is indeed. We will take a short adjournment

11 and come back at quarter to 11.00.

12 Court adjourned.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.15 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you proceed, Mr. Whiting, there is an urgent

16 housekeeping matter that needs to be attended to, and for that purpose,

17 may we please move into private session?

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18 [Open session]

19 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

21 Mr. Whiting, you may proceed.

22 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, in your direct examination, you claimed that

24 Mr. Martic -- with respect to the renewing of UNPROFOR in 1995, you said

25 that Mr. Martic did not get what he wanted because when UNPROFOR was

1 renewed, it was no longer a protection force and this is -- I'll quote the

2 transcript from page 76 to 77. You said, "Mr. Milovancevic, I think you

3 made a slip. Mr. Martic's request had not been granted. The forces were

4 given a different role. They were no longer a protection force."

5 You recall that testimony?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But that's false, isn't it, sir? In fact, the protection force

8 was given a different name. It was called UNCRO but it continued to have

9 the role of -- the same role that it had had before with respect to

10 protecting not just the Serbs but all communities. Isn't that true?

11 A. That's not true. It was obvious that it didn't protect because

12 the Serbs from Krajina were expelled and the Croatian officials were happy

13 about this. They said there is a protection area no more.

14 Q. Sir, please listen to my question and answer my question. When

15 UNPROFOR, the mandate was renewed in March of 1995 and a new name was

16 given to it, it had the same task with respect to protecting the

17 communities as it had had before. That did not change. Isn't that true?

18 A. Formally, the -- it was changed.

19 Q. Well, let's look at the text of the resolution. This is 04247568.

20 This is resolution 981, dated 31 March 1995. And this is the resolution

21 which extended the mandate of UNPROFOR and gave it a new name called

22 UNCRO. And if we could look at the third page, please?

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I interrupt you, Mr. Whiting? I have a problem

24 with my headphone. When you are speaking there are people talking over my

25 head here. It only becomes clear when there is interpretation.

1 I have no problem when the witness is speaking. It's when you

2 speak that people talk over my head and I have a problem trying to

3 disregard them to had hear what you are saying.

4 MR. WHITING: Okay. Well, I'll try again and see what happens

5 because I think they are trying to fix it.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: They are still there.

7 MR. WHITING: I think maybe it's hearing the interpretation into

8 B/C/S.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.

10 MR. WHITING: Somehow that's being picked up.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah. It is the interpretation into B/C/S that I

12 hear.

13 MR. WHITING: Right, right.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I think the interpreters are trying to say

15 something to us in the middle booth.

16 THE INTERPRETER: I believe you are picking it up through the

17 microphone of the witness.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: We are picking it up through the microphone of

19 the witness. I do notice in my case that it's connected to the middle

20 booth. Whenever the lady on the right seems to be speaking then I can

21 normally hear that background noise.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Let's give it a try.

23 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Q. Now, in we could zoom in on paragraph 5 of this resolution,

25 paragraph 5 says that -- decides that "UNCRO shall be an interim

1 arrangement to create the conditions that will facilitate a negotiated

2 settlement consistent with the territorial integrity of the Republic of

3 Croatia" - and here is the important part - "and which guarantees the

4 security and rights of all communities living in a particular area of the

5 Republic of Croatia irrespective of whether they constitute in this area a

6 majority or a minority."

7 So that -- they -- that was no change from before, was it? The

8 UNCRO would continue to guarantee protection for all communities in the

9 region; isn't that right, sir?

10 A. Sir, that's not right. This does not reflect the situation at

11 all. If you recall, the Vance Plan guaranteed all the parties that a

12 political settlement would not be prejudiced, and item 5 which you've just

13 read out prejudges that precisely and shows that there was reason for us

14 to be dissatisfied. If our territory.

15 Q. I'm going to interrupt you because you're focusing on something

16 different than what I'm asking you about. I'm not asking you about that.

17 You testified in your examination-in-chief that when the mandate was

18 extended, it was no longer a protection force. Now, you would agree,

19 would you not, that now that you see the mandate, the extension of the

20 mandate, here, in paragraph 5, it is in fact a protection force. Isn't

21 that correct? It states it right there.

22 A. No. That's not true. That's not what is written. It's written

23 that the Republic of Serbian Krajina is Croatia, which means both the army

24 and the police are able to enter. Para 5 gives them the right to.

25 Whereas in the Vance Plan that was formulated in a completely different

1 way.

2 Q. Well, the -- the fact that the United Nations recognised the

3 territorial integrity of Croatia, that had in fact occurred several years

4 before. That's nothing new. That had occurred back in -- as early as

5 1993. Isn't that true? That's not new to this resolution.

6 A. But we always notified the Security Council that we do not accept

7 those provisions contained in their resolutions.

8 Q. But that cannot -- since that was in existence for several years,

9 the United Nations had been saying that for several years, that cannot be

10 a reason why Mr. Martic was refusing to engage in the Z-4 process and

11 that's not what you said in your direct examination. What you said in

12 your direct examination is that it was no longer a protection force. Will

13 you accept, having read paragraph 5 of the resolution, that in fact it was

14 a protection force and the same -- it had the same role as it had had

15 before in that regard? Will you accept that or not?

16 A. I do not accept that because it's not written anywhere that they

17 are a protection force. Could you read it for me?

18 Q. "Which guarantees the security and rights of all communities

19 living in a particular area of the Republic of Croatia irrespective of

20 whether they constitute in this area a majority or a minority.

21 A. The Vance Plan was signed by the Republic of Serbian Krajina. It

22 is not a -- it does not appear in para 5. Why was it deleted?

23 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, could this document be admitted into

24 evidence and given a number, please.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it

1 please be given an exhibit number.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document will become Exhibit

3 869.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

5 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Sir, you agree, do you not, that after this resolution was passed

7 on the 31st of March 1995, Mr. Martic never made any attempt whatsoever to

8 engage the international negotiators in the Z-4 process, correct?

9 A. It's not correct. Mr. Martic, as president of the state, did

10 indeed participate in negotiations at the proposal of the new officials

11 who were no longer part of the protection force but part of UNCRO and you

12 know what transpired, but Croatia reneged on everything, even the opening

13 of the motor way.

14 Q. Well, that's a different subject, sir. What I'm talking about is

15 the Z-4 process. Mr. Martic -- after the 31st of March, 1995, Mr. Martic

16 never picked up the phone to call any of the negotiators, any of the

17 representatives of the Z-4 process, did he? You agree with that?

18 A. Z-4 was never on the agenda again but you know that we first

19 rejected it in 1992. You are reminding me of what happened three years

20 previously, and now I'll remind you, it was humiliated both on the part of

21 Croatia and on the part of the international community.

22 Q. Sir, again, I'll suggest that you fully answered the question

23 after you said the Z-4 was never on the agenda again.

24 I'm going to move on to another topic now. You testified about

25 information that you had received about what happened in the Posavina

1 corridor in 1992 and you testified about the death of some babies that had

2 occurred there. When, to your information, about that occur? When in

3 1992, what month, if you know?

4 A. That happened before I became minister. I really cannot recall

5 the month and it's quite natural that one does not keep track of various

6 dates, including in state affairs.

7 Q. It's true, isn't it, that the embargo that applied to Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina territories did not apply to humanitarian aid or medical aid,

9 isn't that true, the embargo that was imposed by UN resolution 757 on the

10 30th of May 1992?

11 A. The embargo applied to traffic, whereas oxygen was only able to

12 arrive by some means of transportation, certainly not by radar.

13 Q. You haven't answered my question. It did not apply to

14 humanitarian aid and medical supplies, true?

15 A. That was formally true.

16 Q. And the ban on flights, the no-flight -- the ban on flights which

17 was imposed on the 9th of October 1992, so well after these events that

18 you have described, also did not apply to humanitarian flights, isn't that

19 true? This was a ban that was imposed by resolution 781 on the 9th of

20 October 1992. You agree that it did not apply to humanitarian flights,

21 true?

22 A. It's formally true.

23 Q. You testified about incursions that occurred in the Medak pocket,

24 Maslenica bridge, Miljevac plateau. Those territories were all largely

25 within the -- what were known as the pink zones, isn't that true?

1 A. That's true.

2 Q. And the pink zones were territories that were supposed to revert

3 to Croatian control, isn't that true? They were the first territories

4 that were supposed to, under the UN plan, they were supposed to revert to

5 Croatian control, isn't that true?

6 A. On one condition.

7 Q. Which was?

8 A. Once the Serb people gained confidence in the Croatian state.

9 Q. That was a condition imposed by the Serb side, isn't it?

10 A. No. It's written in a document of the United Nations.

11 Q. In fact, the Serb side, the representatives from the RSK,

12 consistently and constantly impeded the return of the pink zone

13 territories to Croatian control, isn't that true, sir?

14 A. No. That's not true. Mr. Thornberry who was in charge always

15 kept telling us there is still no confidence in the Croatian authorities

16 because they kept crossing the border and killing civilians.

17 Q. You testified in your direct examination that you remained the

18 assistant for foreign affairs to President Martic until the 26th of

19 February 1996. Does that mean that Mr. Martic considered himself the

20 president of the RSK until that date?

21 A. The current government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina treats

22 him as their president.

23 Q. And when you say the current government, you're referring to the

24 government that exists in exile, isn't that true?

25 A. Yes. The government in exile that has opened its representative

1 office in Paris under the decision of the Foreign Minister of France.

2 Q. Are you a member of that government in exile?

3 A. I am just an adviser of that government in exile.

4 Q. And Mr. Martic continues to be the president of that government in

5 exile, even to this day?

6 A. And he will until we are able to hold new elections for the

7 president of Republic of Serbian Krajina, and he may win those elections.

8 Q. Did you have -- continue to have contact with Mr. Martic after the

9 26th of February 1996?

10 A. We are on friendly terms. However, the government of Yugoslavia

11 banned the representatives and authorities of the Republic of Serbian

12 Krajina from working, from operating.

13 MR. WHITING: Your Honours, I have no further questions, thank

14 you.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Whiting.

16 Mr. Milovancevic?

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Re-examination by Mr. Milovancevic:

19 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, I will ask you a couple of questions that emanate

20 from the cross-examination.

21 One of the first points put to you by the Prosecutor yesterday was

22 your letter to Aleksa Buha. As far as I remember the date was the 11th of

23 September 1993. Do you remember it?

24 A. Yes. I do. We saw it on the screen.

25 Q. Could we please see that letter again on the monitor? It's

1 Exhibit 861. Before it appears on our screens, can you explain to us what

2 was the reason why you wrote that letter? What were the circumstances?

3 A. It was under the circumstances when the Croatian authorities were

4 shooting an and violating the cease-fire on our borders whereas leaders in

5 Republika Srpska meaning Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina had quarrelled

6 amongst themselves, and the media were writing only about those quarrels

7 in Banja Luka and in Pale and nobody paid any attention to the danger

8 coming from the Croatian side against the Republic of Serbian Krajina and

9 I was begging them in that letter to stop fighting amongst themselves,

10 that we were facing a grave danger, expecting an offensive from Croatia

11 and that all Serbs should help defend those borders there because I said

12 yesterday, and allow me to explain it, that schooling and education in

13 Croatia was directed precisely at fostering hatred towards Serbs. In

14 Croatian textbooks, in addition to the sentence I quoted, said Serbs

15 should be killed with an ax. I had to say that this was producing

16 criminals and it does. It's like including Hitler's ideas in German

17 textbooks.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jarcevic. Do you remember which date the operation

19 Medak pocket took place?

20 A. I said it was on the 8th of September 1993.

21 Q. This letter you wrote is dated the 11th September, 1993; is that

22 correct?

23 A. Of course. That's why I wrote it because attention needed to be

24 paid to strategic matters to the fate of the people and the state.

25 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

1 Look at the very beginning of that text, which is right in front

2 of you. The first sentence after the introduction distinguished Mr. Buha

3 reads, "The Croatian army has attacked all points of our border." What

4 did you mean?

5 A. There was -- there were skirmishes in other locations in order to

6 divert attention from the main strike in Lika where 11 Serb villages were

7 raised to the ground.

8 Q. Thank you. Just a little down below, three sentences below, you

9 say, "I'm writing this to you so that you could say to officers and

10 soldiers in Banja Luka that the Serbian people is facing possible defeat."

11 Do you see that sentence?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Based on this sentence, can one draw the conclusion that you are

14 making an appeal and pointing to what was going on; rather, I'll rephrase

15 my question to avoid objection?

16 MR. WHITING: I think the -- I think Mr. Milovancevic anticipated

17 my objection which is that it was leading.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The appropriate question --

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Honour. I'll

20 rephrase my question.

21 Q. You have already answered in part. Was the political situation in

22 Bosnia the reason why you wrote this?

23 A. Yes.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're still leading, Mr. Milovancevic. This

25 witness is your witness. Ask him why he wrote the letter. He will tell

1 you. Don't suggest to him why he wrote the letter. You're not

2 cross-examining.

3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, the letter is dated 11 September 1993. Why did you

5 write this to Mr. Buha?

6 A. Well, that was three days after a horrible massacre in the Serbian

7 Krajina. That is the third day into the massacre. With something like

8 that going on, how could they be quarrelling about dividing positions or

9 offices, ranks, in Banja Luka? I proceeded from the assumption that every

10 Serb should be engaged to defend every yard of Serbian ground. In this

11 case, two Serbian states west of Drina had to have the same policy. That

12 was my appeal. And that's the oath that our heads of state and the

13 parliaments of both governments had taken.

14 Q. Thank you. Now, the Prosecutor asked you, when you were invoking

15 the Second World War in this letter, or rather, in the answers you gave to

16 the Prosecutor concerning the Second World War, were you appealing to

17 Serbs to be afraid of Croats? This letter that you wrote, did it have

18 that meaning?

19 A. The meaning of that letter was that Serbs should be afraid of the

20 Croatian state. I was never in favour of condemning a whole nation for

21 the evil committed by their state.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, please don't suggest answers to

23 the witness.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am an independent person.

25 Council.

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I will take care, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Jarcevic, when I'm talking to counsel, it is

3 not for you to comment. I've never commented on your independence or the

4 lack of it. Just don't answer me.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. I will obey

6 from now on. I did break the rule once. I'm sorry.

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, yesterday and today, our learned friend from the

9 Prosecution showed you several documents of the United Nations, reports by

10 the Secretary-General and resolutions. What are those documents in terms

11 of their contents?

12 A. Not objective.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 My next question: There are documents which may be legal, social

15 or rather sociological, economic, or political in nature. In which

16 category would you place these documents of the Security Council?

17 A. I cannot say they are political documents because they do not

18 represent a single state, they represent -- or they are on behalf of the

19 international community. However, the Croatian platform and the Croatian

20 propaganda was full of quotations from these texts and I repeat to you

21 what General Nambiar said to me: Croatian crimes and evils against Serbs

22 are no where written about. That was sealed.

23 Q. Thank you. Do you remember the Prosecutor put to you a report by

24 General Nambiar yesterday where his position on the militia or the police

25 of the Serbian Krajina is expressed or rather the weapons they carried.

1 Do you remember it?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Do you remember that that letter was dated sometime in end July

4 1992?

5 A. I don't remember the date but I take your word for it.

6 Q. Can we please see this document on our screens? It's a letter

7 written to Mr. Goulding on behalf of the UNPROFOR and General Nambiar in

8 particular. Let me just find the number.

9 MR. WHITING: It's Exhibit 574.

10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Did I

11 hear you correctly, 574? The Registry heard the number?

12 Q. This letter shown to you by the Prosecutor yesterday, is it from

13 General Nambiar?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you see the date?

16 A. 30th, and after that it's not legible.

17 Q. It should be July, 1992.

18 Q. Do you remember the time of the Miljevacki plateau?

19 A. It was a month before July, I think.

20 Q. At that time, were the troops in the UNPA, the international

21 troops?

22 A. Yes, and they were a protection force.

23 Q. Was General Nambiar the force commander?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did you say several times during your testimony that Croatian

1 forces on that occasion travestied the agreement and killed 40 per cents

2 [as interpreted] of Serb ethnicity?

3 A. Yes, the offices of General Nambiar.

4 MR. WHITING: I'm going to object. It's either a leading question

5 or it's asked and answered. If he's just repeating what he said in his

6 testimony it's on the transcript there is no need to ask it again but I

7 would suggest it's also just a leading question.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic?

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I was really trying,

10 Your Honour, to keep this as short as possible and maybe I broke a rule.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You ask your own witness leading questions and if

12 you're asking him something that he has already talked about, there is no

13 need for you to ask that question because it's already on the transcript.

14 Now, please try not to ask leading questions. The objection is upheld.

15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, what was the position of General Nambiar on the long

17 barrels carried by the Krajina Police that he mentions in this letter?

18 A. He and all his successors constantly raised the issue because it

19 was part of the Vance Plan, and when we asked those gentlemen about other

20 clauses of the Vance Plan, they never had anything to say.

21 Q. During the activities of the Croatian army on the Miljevac

22 plateau, did the UNPROFOR play its role as defined in the Vance Plan and

23 that is to protect all the population from armed attack?

24 A. Never. Not in the least. I don't think anything was done against

25 Croatia because sometimes it even happened that UN troops were killed.

1 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, you spoke about the Maslenica operation. Can you

2 remind us of the date?

3 A. 22nd January 1993.

4 Q. Was General Nambiar still the force commander?

5 A. I can't remember. I think he had gone back to India by then.

6 Q. Was the UNPROFOR in that area where aggression occurred?

7 A. Yes. And their number was not reduced and most of them were

8 precisely in Dalmatia where the Croatian army struck. It was also the

9 Kenyan Battalion that was there and I believe several Kenyan soldiers were

10 killed.

11 Q. Even after such operations of the Croatian army, was it still

12 demanded from the Serb side to take long barrels away from their police?

13 A. Yes. That demand was constantly made. It continued.

14 Q. Could we see on our screens another document, a report of the

15 general secretary, 24600? Exhibit 75.

16 Do you remember that in connection with these reports of the

17 Secretary-General of the United Nations, my colleague from the Prosecution

18 asked you yesterday inter alia about the situation on the ground in view

19 of the special police and the fact that they had weapons?

20 A. Yes, I remember.

21 Q. When he put this document to you, that is now in front of us, do

22 you see it?

23 A. Just the title.

24 Q. Yes. What follows is the report of the UN Secretary-General. Can

25 we just see the date, 28th September 1992. Regarding this document, the

1 Prosecutor put to you paragraph 34, that indicates that violations of the

2 Vance Plan, and this is the substance of the paragraph, led to a state

3 close to anarchy in which ethnic cleansing was committed and this was

4 all -- this violation was practically the Serb police. Do you remember

5 that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Can we look at paragraph 3 of this report, S 24/600. This

8 paragraph 3 is in chapter 1. It's entitled, "Violations of the

9 cease-fire."

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. We have subparagraphs A, B, C and D, and that's an enumeration of

12 the major incidents that create tensions in that area, and it reads, in

13 subparagraph A, on 7th August, 1992, fighting erupted in an area adjacent

14 to the southeastern portion of Sector West. Apparently due to attempts by

15 armed elements from the Croatian side to cross the Sava River and attack

16 Bosnian Serb elements south of the river. It goes on to describe that

17 heavy weaponry was used and nine dead bodies were left lined. Do you see

18 this?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. In subpara B, do you see where it reads that on the 13th of August

21 1992, a group of Serbs, villagers in Sector East, were attempting to

22 harvest maize. On that occasion they were attacked by the Croatian army,

23 four were killed, and 19 taken prisoners, or hostages. Does it say so

24 here?

25 A. Yes, that's one of the 700 incursions across the border of Serbian

1 Krajina that I've been talking about for two days.

2 Q. In C we see that on the 21st of August three Serbs so-called

3 border militia personnel were shot dead in the vicinity of the

4 confrontation line in Sector East and in D it says that in the last week

5 in August a large group tried to infiltrate through Sector North into the

6 Bihac/Cazin area. It was intercepted by the local Serb police and the

7 UNPROFOR established they had been mobilised and trained by the Croatian

8 army in certain areas in Croatia, and they had been infiltrated in small

9 groups into Bosnia and Herzegovina to join fighting there. This was

10 raised with President Tudjman on the 31st of August, 1992, by

11 undersecretary Marek Goulding and President Tudjman promised it would

12 never happen again?

13 A. Yes, those Croats went to assist one of the warring Bosnian

14 groups. There were two such groups that we discussed the already and one

15 of them had been expelled or exiled into the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we look at paragraph 8? It says on the 4th of

17 September, undersecretary Goulding, Marrack Goulding, reached agreement

18 with Serb authorities about demobilisation of those forces in two stages,

19 the first to start on the 11th September, another one later on the 20th

20 September or rather the second one was to start on the 15th of October.

21 Now, could the counsel read more slowly, please?

22 I'd like to know?

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, the interpreters are asking that

24 you read a little more slowly and we also realise that you probably have a

25 hard copy of the document before we get it on the screen you're already

1 reading paragraph 8 and you left us all behind. Quite apart from reading

2 slowly you just -- your pace of dealing with the issues is just too fast.

3 You may proceed.

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for this warning,

5 Your Honour. I was not aware of that.

6 Q. Were you able to see paragraph 8 on the screen, which speaks of

7 the agreement with Marrack Goulding with these police forces?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. At the time this report was written, which was the 28th of

10 September 1992, you were still not a minister?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. You came in later on and you were able to familiarise yourself

13 with the situation from government documents; is that right?

14 A. Yes. This was also covered by the media.

15 Q. Do you believe that the conclusions based on a document thus

16 presented corresponded to the situation on the ground or even to what was

17 contained in other documents?

18 A. You see, once such crimes are recorded in a document, Security

19 Council organs do not take any actions against Croatia and Croatia could

20 carry out 700 more such attacks without any repercussions whereas the

21 Serbs were always the ones to be disarmed.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Jarcevic, thanks once again for the speech.

23 Please answer the question that was put to you now. Do you believe that

24 the conclusions based on a document thus presented correspond to the

25 situation and the ground or even to what was contained in other documents?

1 That was the question put to you.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The events happened this way, yes.

3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, I asked you whether the conclusions could the effect

5 that the Serbs and the special police were responsible for such a

6 situation on the ground, do they correspond to the situation on the

7 ground?

8 A. I was trying to explain this and I'm sorry that it was interpreted

9 as a speech. I don't think I need to repeat what I said.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You don't have to repeat what you said,

11 Mr. Jarcevic, because, indeed, it was a speech. A simple answer to that

12 question is "yes, I believe" or "no, I don't believe," or "no, I have no

13 opinion on the matter."

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation].

16 Q. Yesterday, both in the course of the examination-in-chief and

17 cross-examination, it was mentioned that you, as the Foreign Minister of

18 the RSK, had an office in Belgrade. Can you tell us where your office

19 premises were located and who they were owned by?

20 A. They were in the very centre of town and I believe or rather I'm

21 sure that they belonged to the municipality of Belgrade. The address was

22 Terazija, number 3, on the ground floor.

23 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jarcevic. Perhaps I wasn't precise

24 enough. You gave us the location of these premises. I wanted to know

25 whether these office premises were someone's ownership, whether you rented

1 them out, who rented them out?

2 A. They were rented out by the government of the RSK.

3 Q. Was this in fact then a representation office of the RSK

4 government?

5 A. Partly that, yes, but the representation office was in an adjacent

6 street, Mosa Pijade number 8.

7 Q. In connection with the document entitled, "Erdut agreement," my

8 learned friend from the Prosecution showed you the text of the agreement

9 today dated 15 July 1993. Do you recall that it was a brief text

10 containing, I believe, five paragraphs? You were commenting on it and the

11 document bears your signature; is that right?

12 A. Yes. I wanted to explain something concerning article 4 but the

13 Prosecutor told me that I did not need to.

14 Q. Could we please look at Exhibit 867, which is the text of the

15 Erdut Agreement? Is this the text we talked a moment ago about, Mr.

16 Jarcevic?

17 A. Yes. I wanted to add the following, if I may.

18 Q. Please.

19 A. In Article 4, the main motor way was supposed to be open for

20 traffic, and I said that the commissions should discuss other branches of

21 the economy in a similar way.

22 Q. In presenting this document to you, the Prosecutor said that this

23 document concerned a cease-fire agreement and some technical matters. I'd

24 like to know the following: Did Mr. Tudjman accept this document?

25 A. As I said, he rejected it publicly stating that this was out of

1 force, null and void.

2 MR. WHITING: I'm going to object. I don't think this arises out

3 of my questions. My questions were the content of the agreement. I did

4 not go into whether Mr. Tudjman had accepted it or not.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic? Does that arise out of the

6 cross-examination?

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wanted to know

8 who the signatory tri of the Croatian side on the Croatian side was

9 because Mr. Jarcevic signed the document, and the Prosecutor asked him

10 whether he had accepted the document on behalf of the Serb side.

11 Mr. Jarcevic answered in the affirmative. I only wanted to inquire about

12 the Croat side. That was the gist of it.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Does that arise out of the cross-examination,

14 Mr. Milovancevic? If I remember well, Mr. Whiting indicated that there is

15 a version that is signed by both parties, if that is required, but that's

16 about all he said.

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I only wanted to

18 put a brief question to Mr. Jarcevic as to the fate of this document.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that but does that arise out of cross

20 examination? The purpose of re-examination is to clarify issues that came

21 out during cross-examination, that are not clear. The cross-examination

22 related to the content of this agreement. The question is, does -- is

23 your question as a result of the cross-examination? Are you challenging

24 the authenticity of the document because it's not signed by the opposite

25 side, which was not the issue also during cross-examination.

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will withdraw

2 this question. The witness gave his answer during the

3 examination-in-chief and I will not insist on it any further.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. In fact, if you had got the

5 answer during examination-in-chief, then there is no point in raising it

6 again in re-examination. You just are burdening the record unnecessarily.

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Jarcevic, the Prosecutor presented you with a portion of the

9 interview by Mr. Hadzic, the president of the RSK. He showed you a text

10 where Mr. Hadzic states that -- or as he says, our objective is to unify,

11 to unite into a Serbian state, regardless of where the capital is. Do you

12 remember that?

13 A. Yes. That was our main goal.

14 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Jarcevic, the Republic of Serbia and the

15 Republic of Yugoslavia, did they ever accept this goal of yours?

16 A. Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, kept rejecting our plan.

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I have no further

18 questions, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic.

20 Judge?

21 Questioned by the Court:

22 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Mr. Jarcevic, I have one question concerning your

23 function, your work as a minister in Belgrade, with your office in

24 Belgrade. You explained to us that within the technical and other

25 assistance to other countries, and especially to the RSK, Yugoslavia also

1 paid you and the offices of your ministry. Therefore, you said, there

2 were particularly close contacts with Yugoslavia maintained, and you

3 explained yesterday you used to listen to their opinion, and on the other

4 hand you mentioned an occasion where you were not completely informed by

5 them but there was apparently a close communication. And so my question

6 would be how did you maintain this communication? Who was forwarding --

7 who was communicating to whom? Was this in a diplomatic way or in a

8 direct way, with you personally? In other words, did you have a

9 ambassador who conveyed information to you, or -- and if yes, who was

10 that?

11 A. I will tell you how this was done from the Ministry of Foreign

12 Affairs. All the documents coming out of the foreign ministry, a copy of

13 them was forwarded to the foreign ministry of Yugoslavia to the foreign

14 ministry of Republika Srpska and often times to the Montenegrin government

15 in -- at Podgorica. The communication between the RSK foreign ministry

16 and these offices was irregular or did not happen regularly. A moment ago

17 when I answered the question as to whether Yugoslavia, Serbia and

18 Montenegro, were supporting our idea of forming a unified Serb state, I

19 said no. This was the strategic orientation of Serbia and Yugoslavia. I

20 can confirm this by telling you that the assembly of Yugoslavia in 1991

21 rejected the proposal for the unification of Yugoslavia and the Republic

22 of Serbian Krajina. This was a great disappointment to us. We were

23 unable to understand this. But we adapted ourselves to the situation. We

24 maintained such relations with Yugoslavia as were possible and as were

25 allowed by Yugoslavia.

1 For instance, I asked the federal government of Yugoslavia and the

2 foreign ministry of Yugoslavia to place at our disposal the Yugoslav

3 diplomacy world wide in order for us to distribute our documents and which

4 would collect information for us and contact the United Nations agencies

5 on our behalf. This was rejected by the Yugoslav foreign ministry.

6 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Were you telling me examples of communication but

7 my real question was how this communication was working and do I

8 understand you correctly that this was in direct way, it was not on a

9 diplomatic way, there was no embassy to Yugoslavia or an embassy -- a

10 Yugoslavian ambassador to -- or whose jurisdiction covered the RSK and who

11 then conveyed this. This was a direct -- was such a close communication

12 that it was directly being done, like a person from the ministry of

13 Yugoslavia would call you on the telephone directly, for example? Did

14 that happen regularly? Or write a letter to you? Or meet you?

15 A. No. This did not happen regularly. There was no customary

16 practice. I said yesterday and today that we would receive some documents

17 accidentally because some of their ministry officials would realise that

18 we needed to have them. Even some of the resolutions that the Prosecutor

19 was presenting me with, we did not receive directly. Some we did. But

20 some reached us with a delay. We wanted to open our embassies in Serbia

21 and Montenegro but both governments refused to do that. We even published

22 that information in the papers. We meant it as a joke but it was not well

23 received.

24 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. Did you have diplomatic relations with

25 other countries outside the former Yugoslavia?

1 A. Nobody wanted to have diplomatic relations with us. In some

2 letters, we were addressed as the foreign ministry, as a state, but that

3 was only the representation office of Japan and Nigeria. I believe you

4 will receive these documents. In their communication with us, they

5 addressed us properly as the foreign Ministry of the Republic of the

6 Serbian Krajina. When responding to any proposals we put forth or any

7 such communication. The only official recognition that we received was --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat from whom he --

9 they received recognition?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was kind of recognition we

11 never had from Yugoslavia or Serbia.

12 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Could you please repeat from whom did you

13 receive -- could you please repeat from whom you received recognition?

14 A. Let me tell you, we had a mutual recognition with a small republic

15 that is to be found between Ukraine and Moldova which came into being with

16 the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Secondly, the Japanese and Nigerian

17 embassies sent memos to us in the form that they sent to other countries

18 with our full title and without inverted commas. Other embassies, if you

19 want to know, normally sent over their own people and --

20 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you. You can finish this sentence, please,

21 but then could you add what republic between Ukraine and was it between

22 Ukraine and Moldova.

23 A. Moldova. Pridnestrovaskai republic. Transdniestria republic. We

24 call it Pridnestrovaskai republic and it exist today. However, if you

25 want --

1 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Did you want to add something in your last

2 sentence?

3 A. Yes. We have been negotiating with some other governments in

4 exile, possible mutual recognition.

5 JUDGE HOEPFEL: Thank you, that's fine. That was my question.

6 I'm finished.

7 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: You had been asked in examination-in-chief about

8 the circumstances under which you came to be a minister in 1992, I

9 believe, and you said you heard about a planned massacre in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina of Serbs. How did you learn of this planned massacre?

11 A. I cannot tell you who the man was who brought it over to Belgrade

12 to us but I can tell you that it was a colonel, Stanislav Nikic, my fellow

13 countryman who obtained the information, urgently placed a call to me, and

14 I in turn called the Portuguese Ambassador to intervene.

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Very well. Now, you also spoke about the number

16 of Serbs who had been expelled and you said that Germany was the only

17 country that allowed Serb refugees to go to Germany. How many Serb

18 refugees were there in Germany, to your knowledge, can you say?

19 A. Madam, that is not precisely the way I put it. There were

20 refugees in all countries but the government of the Federal Republic of

21 Germany publicly -- made a public statement about the refugees and said

22 that they would be returned to Croatia. We in turn informed Germany that

23 these people were deprived of their collective citizenship which had not

24 been recorded in history ever and that if they are sent back to Croatia,

25 they would be expelled just as they were the first time. We also informed

1 them that their private properties and flats were confiscated. Germany

2 did not respond to us officially but it was a Mr. Ahrends who told us and

3 gave us assurance that is these people would not be sent back to Croatia.

4 Germany did not want to take up so many people. It was Austria,

5 Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, all these countries received

6 refugees, so what we know is that there was the total of 251.000 people

7 who left but some of them also left for Yugoslavia, and for the Republika

8 Srpska. Yet Ahrends complained about the fact that the Germany was

9 bearing the brunt of the financial burden stemming from the refugees

10 coming from Croatia.

11 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you. It's really numbers that I had

12 wanted to get from you. And one final question: You were asked by

13 counsel, Mr. Milovancevic, if either yourself or Milan Martic did anything

14 in any way to obstruct the return of displaced Croats to the RSK. Now you

15 only answered in respect of yourself but you didn't give an answer in

16 respect of Mr. Milan Martic. So could you now answer that question,

17 please?

18 A. The position of the head of state, Mr. Martic -- our position was

19 as follows: If that is placed on the agenda.

20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: [Previous translation continues] ... we are

21 dealing with Mr. Martic's response and did he do anything to obstruct the

22 return of displaced Croats to the territory of RSK? You've already

23 answered. This is what I wanted to stress to you. Learned counsel sell

24 was trying to get it from you on the record, you answered in respect of

25 yourself. Deal specifically with Mr. Martic.

1 A. Mr. Martic shared my position, which was that Serbs and Croats

2 should be allowed to return, and that the policy should not be that only

3 care should be taken of Croats and their return and not of Serbs as well.

4 Which is still the case today.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And he therefore, did he do nothing to obstruct

6 their return, then?

7 A. No.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you. No further questions, thank you.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, I don't understand "no" in the context.

10 Does it mean no he didn't do -- did he do nothing to -- he didn't do

11 nothing so he did something.

12 A. He did not prevent or forbid their return.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. We will take a short break.

14 We will come back at half past 12.00. Court adjourned.

15 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I've got one question for you, Mr. Jarcevic. What,

18 in your view, constitutes a state?

19 A. People, territory, and legislation.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. That concludes the --

21 A. Maybe --

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe?

23 A. With your leave, I would like to offer to you a brochure about a

24 short history of Krajina people, to all of you present here.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. It will not be necessary.

1 Thanks nonetheless.

2 Mr. Milovancevic, any questions arising from the questions by the

3 Bench?

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, thank you.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Mr. Whiting?

6 MR. WHITING: Yes, thank you, Your Honour, very briefly.

7 Further cross-examination by Mr. Whiting:

8 Q. Following on from the questions of Judge Nosworthy, sir, isn't it

9 true that at the end of 1992, there was a special session of the RSK

10 assembly and a proposal was made to allow for the return of both Serb and

11 Croatian refugees to Western Slavonia and Mr. Martic and others opposed

12 that proposal saying that the conditions were not right at the time?

13 A. Quite sincerely, I don't remember that session or its conclusions.

14 If you repeat which month it was?

15 Q. It was at the end of 1992. If you do not know anything about it

16 or if you do not remember, that's fine. Just tell us.

17 A. Thank you.

18 Q. Do I take that to understand that you do not remember or you do

19 not know anything about it?

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness had said quite sincerely I don't

21 remember that session or its conclusions.

22 MR. WHITING: I'm content to leave it at that. I do have one

23 other question.

24 Q. Are you aware -- and this occurred before you became foreign

25 minister so perhaps you're not aware of it, but are you aware that on the

1 26th of September 1992, Mr. Martic wrote a letter -- this is in evidence

2 as Exhibit number 232, wrote a letter to the commander of UNPROFOR stating

3 that the RSK government would prevent or resist by force any forced

4 immigration of refugees into the RSK? Are you aware of that letter?

5 A. That position of the authorities of the Republic of Serbian

6 Krajina is familiar to me, but I didn't know that that letter was written

7 by the Minister of the Interior. I reiterate that there was no

8 reciprocity and that had to be our reaction.

9 Q. And finally, sir, isn't it true that all during the time that

10 Mr. Martic was Minister of the Interior of the RSK and later as president

11 of the RSK, isn't it true that his position was always that conditions

12 were not right for the return of refugees to the RSK? Wasn't that always

13 his position?

14 A. Whenever there was no reciprocity, that was the position.

15 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honours. I have no further

16 questions.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.

18 Mr. Jarcevic, this brings us to the end of your testimony. The

19 Chamber takes this opportunity to thank you very much for coming to

20 testify in the Tribunal and we hope that you have a safe trip back home

21 and thank you very much once again. You play stand down. You're now

22 excused.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any housekeeping matters.

1 MR. WHITING: Yes, Your Honour.

2 You'll recall that Your Honours, on the 7th of July last week,

3 2006, it's at transcript 5998, and this was after hearing the request for

4 an extension from the Defence counsel, ordered the Defence to provide

5 detailed 65 ter summaries by today. And I would note that these were 65

6 ter summaries that should have been provided on the 5th of July. They

7 were not. And the Defence counseled is for a week. It was granted and it

8 was ordered that they be provided today. We have been informed that this

9 is not going to occur today, that they will not be provided until Monday

10 or Tuesday. And I think this is something that, since it's an order of

11 the Court, should be addressed by the Trial Chamber. Secondly -- and our

12 position on that would be that whatever ones have been completed by today

13 should certainly be provided to and then perhaps, we would assent to the

14 remainder being provided by Monday.

15 Secondly, the Court ordered earlier in the week, and this is at

16 6102, that the Defence provide to the Prosecution all of the documents

17 that were mentioned in the opening statement, and this was after the

18 Defence counsel indicated this could be done by the end of the week.

19 We've also been informed that this will not occur today. And that it will

20 occur as soon as possible with no specific date mentioned. Again, it's an

21 order -- it was ordered by the Trial Chamber so I think it's something

22 that has to be taken up by the Trial Chamber if it's not going to be met

23 today. On that our position is we would certainly assent to those being

24 provided also by Monday of next week.

25 I guess a third point is just I wonder if we could get an

1 indication from the Defence about when -- that we have been told who the

2 first witness will be after the recess. If we could get an indication of

3 when we'll be told of who the witnesses will be after that. It certainly

4 would be of great assistance and preparation and help to ensure that there

5 is no unnecessary delay if we know sooner rather than later which

6 witnesses will be coming first. Even if it's, for example, a list of the

7 first ten witnesses, not necessarily in order but some indication, we have

8 a list of 53 witnesses and it would be very helpful to know, and only a

9 few weeks, it would be very helpful to know where we should start and how

10 to start preparing.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, any response to those three

12 issues raised by the Prosecution?

13 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

14 We are working at full bore to fulfil the order of the Trial

15 Chamber to submit a new list of witnesses and witness statements that are

16 now shorter than initially envisaged. We had to go through investigators'

17 notes and it's a very large job of work, and I reckon that we will finish

18 by Monday and I kindly request the Trial Chamber to appreciate the

19 situation. Things stand much the same with the documents and the

20 photograph which is part of those documents. We will submit that.

21 As for witnesses, Your Honour, I wanted to present the position of

22 the Defence in principle. After several months or after a longer time,

23 now when we come to Belgrade, we'll have our first opportunity to talk to

24 the witnesses and I would like to ask the Trial Chamber to give us the

25 opportunity to see whether all of them will remain on the list, whether

1 some of them will testify through 92 bis and we'll submit that list at

2 least a week before resumption of the trial so that you can make your

3 decision on the continuation of the trial. Or rather not the continuation

4 of the trial but the time allowed for the Defence case, I'm sorry for the

5 slip of the tongue. So on this occasion, I do undertake that what we

6 haven't submitted so far we will submit on Monday. I believe that's a

7 deadline that we should be able to comply with. And after talking to the

8 witnesses, we would submit the witness list as I have explained.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, this is clearly not acceptable.

10 I mean, how do you expect your opposite number to work? They must now go

11 and read all 53 witness statements. In fact, even the statements -- you

12 have not even supplied them with the summaries so you are saying they must

13 spend this whole four weeks of recess doing nothing and then they must be

14 ready to start work when we come back. Surely you can give -- Mr. Whiting

15 is saying at least give them a list of your first ten witnesses. You have

16 the list. You know who your witnesses are. You know the order in which

17 you want to call them. Whether you have spoken to them or not, at least

18 you can tell him now who are those witnesses that you intend calling. I

19 don't see why that must wait until just a week before we start.

20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we can do that

21 maybe even within the next week, but it's the position of the Defence that

22 we don't want to submit a witness list that is still subject to change

23 because now, in this time which is very short for us, we want to come to

24 arrive at a witness list which would be final. And in this situation, we

25 would like to review the list that the Prosecution has once again to see

1 if some of them can go through 92 bis and some can be eliminated. Of

2 course, we can submit the list of the first ten witnesses before we do the

3 final one; I agree with that but we need some shorter time, at least a

4 week, please, Your Honour. Because that job is waiting for us too. We

5 have to work and work very hard during this holiday and we are in the same

6 situation as our colleagues from the Prosecution.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, you know what? The Chamber

8 appreciates that in a trial, things don't always go according to plan.

9 You might think or decide that you're going to call a certain witness on a

10 certain day, and for completely different reasons beyond your control that

11 witness might not be available but still, this does not mean that you are

12 not in a position to give an indication that, all things going well, I

13 intend calling these witnesses. Okay? There may still be changes.

14 Number 3 might end up being number 6 and number 6 might end up being

15 number 1, but at least you've given a group of witnesses whose statements

16 they can concentrate on during the recess. I'm sure you should be able to

17 do that now. Subject to whatever changes that might come. It happened to

18 them also during the Prosecution case. They used to continuously

19 say, "This is the list. Things might change, but if they don't change

20 that's the list." That's all they are asking for. Can you do that today,

21 ten witnesses?

22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, we can, Your Honour.

23 Thank you. That's what we'll do.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

25 Now, the documents mentioned in the opening statement, I'm not

1 quite sure I understood your specific answer on that. Now, why is it that

2 you are not able to give them by today? And by when exactly do you think

3 you can give them?

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, all the documents

5 that I mentioned in my opening statement are not on the list of exhibits,

6 the 65 ter list. They are not indicated there as individual documents but

7 they are included in the documents we enumerated as part of some other

8 documents. That's one.

9 So certain documents include the resolution such and such number

10 that I invoked. So in fact, we did submit these documents to the

11 Prosecution. We just need to extract them as individual documents and

12 submit them again. Our most urgent task is to submit those witness

13 statements and that consumes so much of our time that we simply didn't

14 have enough. That's the only reason. And maybe we could provide that on

15 Monday, if you agree.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's see if we can reduce the work for you. You

17 say you did submit those documents but they are part of other documents.

18 Is that -- do I understand you correctly? Okay.

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: If that is the case, is it possible for you to say

21 to the Prosecution, "The documents that we mentioned in our opening

22 statements have been delivered to you, they are part of the following

23 documents. If you go to such and such a bunch of documents at page so and

24 so you'll find this document; at page so and so, you'll find the other

25 document," because it doesn't make sense to give them in duplicate. If

1 you've already given them there is no need for you to give them again but

2 tell them where they are.

3 And I'm sure you would agree with that, Mr. Whiting.

4 MR. WHITING: Yes, certainly, Your Honour. If I may, I think it

5 may be the case with respect to some of the documents but I don't believe

6 it's the case with respect to all the documents.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, I'm giving Mr. Milovancevic the benefit of

8 the doubt that at least those documents that you have given to the

9 Prosecution, just tell them at what pages they are, and you don't have to

10 give extra copies of the same documents. Then they can go and find them

11 there. Can you do that?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Honour. I agree.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: How soon can you do that?

14 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we do that on Monday,

15 together with the witness statements, to provide it in one package? It's

16 Friday today. End of working hours. On Monday, by the end of working

17 hours, we will submit that. We ourselves want to abide by that deadline.

18 It would mean a lot to us.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The deadline was for today. Okay. Before I put

20 your proposition to the Prosecution, when you say by Monday, are you

21 saying, all outstanding documents -- when I say outstanding documents, I

22 mean any documents that you mentioned in your opening statement which are

23 not already with the Prosecution will be given by Monday. And the 65 ter

24 summaries? Also by Monday? The detailed --

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour, correct.

1 That would mean a lot to us to have that time.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Whiting?

3 MR. WHITING: I have no difficulty with that. I would assent to

4 that, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. In that event, then the orders that were

6 given earlier to say you must file those documents by today are hereby

7 varied by extending the deadline from today to Monday the 17th of July.

8 Now, Mr. Milovancevic, please ensure that by Monday, those

9 detailed summaries are filed and delivered to the Prosecution and that any

10 documents that you mentioned in your opening which are not already part of

11 any disclosures you have made are provided to the Prosecution, and any

12 documents that you mentioned in your opening which are part of previous

13 disclosures, you indicate the pages where they can be found. Those are

14 the three things. Okay? And then the final thing is by Monday, can you

15 please provide the Prosecution with a list of at least ten witnesses that

16 you intend calling as we come back from recess.

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, and I thank

18 you for your understanding.

19 MR. WHITING: I am just not sure I understand because I thought

20 that had been ordered for today and Defence counsel had agreed.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I beg your pardon. That one you have agreed to, to

22 do that today, Mr. Milovancevic. If you can do that today, that would be

23 helpful. Is that okay? Sorry. Are you done with your housekeeping.

24 MR. WHITING: Yes, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for your

2 understanding, Your Honours.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, while you're on your feet are

4 there any housekeeping matters that you would like to raise?

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. Thank you.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. As we go out on recess the

7 Bench just wants to say you have a pleasant what -- are you going to have

8 a holiday, if not a holiday, have a pleasant working time during that

9 period and let's come back refreshed and ready to proceed with the case as

10 expeditiously as we possibly can when we come back on the 14th of August.

11 Court adjourned. May I place it on the transcript, court is

12 adjourned to the 14th of August, in Courtroom II, I'm being advised, at

13 1415.

14 Court adjourned.

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.55 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 14th day of August,

17 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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