Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7942

1 Wednesday, 6 December 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Please bring the witness in.

7 [The witness entered court]

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Drewienkiewicz.

9 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, sir.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Your cross-examination by Mr. Cepic will now

11 continue.

12 Mr. Cepic.

13 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.


15 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic: [Continued]

16 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Drewienkiewicz.

17 A. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Cepic.

18 Q. [In English] Thank you. [Interpretation] Mr. Drewienkiewicz, in

19 your statement in paragraph 111 you stated that on the 31st of December,

20 1988 -- 1998, you learned that the KLA had declared the year 1999 the year

21 of independence of Kosovo.

22 A. [In English] I recall that, yes.

23 Q. When you heard such an announcement, I suppose that you took some

24 steps in order to defuse the tensions and the threats which such an

25 announcement on the part of the KLA actually entailed, did you not?

Page 7943

1 A. What I did was treat it with extreme skepticism because I've heard

2 of these years of liberation before and it didn't work either this time,

3 did it?

4 Q. Would you be so kind as to explain this to me. You were unable to

5 take any measures vis-a-vis the KLA, even by -- in the sense of just

6 warning them in relation to announcements of this kind.

7 A. As I recall it, it appeared in the media. As such, I noted it and

8 that was really it. I certainly didn't run out on my own account to issue

9 press statements. I treated it with the skepticism that it deserved.

10 Q. I understand your answer, but my question was: Did you try at all

11 to get in touch, to establish any contact with KLA representatives in

12 relation to that particular matter?

13 A. No. I wasn't in charge of the media policy for the OSCE Kosovo

14 Verification Mission. It was one of the few things I wasn't in charge of.

15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz, for your answer. When you were

16 giving testimony, the Prosecutor exhibited Exhibit P634 -- actually, asked

17 for it to be admitted and that is a chronology of the most important

18 developments in the period in which your mission was active in Kosovo and

19 Metohija and under serial number 116 in that document it is noted that 15

20 companies of the Army of Yugoslavia were observed in the barracks. Do you

21 know perhaps where these 15 companies were?

22 A. The word is they were noted as being out of barracks, which was

23 the significance of the entry because under the Clark agreement there were

24 only three positions out of barracks where companies were allowed to be,

25 and three companies would broadly be about 400 soldiers. And that

Page 7944

1 shorthand of 15 VJ companies out of barracks was shorthand for us -- my

2 people having observed something between 1500 and 2.000 VJ soldiers out of

3 barracks in positions in the countryside, which equated to about 15

4 companies' worth. And so about 12 companies' worth more than were allowed

5 for under the Clark agreement. That's the point of -- that's the meaning

6 behind that shorthand statement.

7 Q. But do you know perhaps where these 12 companies were located?

8 A. Well, as I say, it was about 12 companies' worth of people, so it

9 wasn't necessarily 12 locations, I think it was more like 20. But now,

10 eight years later, certainly not. I do know that my verifiers, of whom by

11 this stage there were 1200 scattered all over Kosovo, had brought in --

12 had reported what they had seen; and when that was all added up, it came

13 to that number.

14 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. Would you please be so

15 kind as to give me briefer answers, and I shall try to be more to the

16 point and more specific when I put my questions to you.

17 What would you say if I told you that nine companies in this

18 period, which is the end of February/the beginning of March 1999, they

19 were performing depth security of the border, of the state border, because

20 of the frequent incidents which occurred. That was not a breach of the

21 agreement because this was the border belt.

22 A. Well, first of all, the border belt wasn't defined, but it was

23 generally accepted by then as being 5 kilometres, and around about that

24 time there was a decision taken in Belgrade to widen the border to 10

25 kilometres without any consultation with us. If you're telling me that

Page 7945

1 you're now, on behalf of the people at the time, making a report that

2 because of the situation on the border you are contemplating increasing

3 the security up there, that's precisely the sort of report I'd have quite

4 liked to have got at the time. It's a bit late, thank you.

5 Q. Yes, we do agree, General, sir, that it is a bit too late now. It

6 is way too late for many things now. So these nine companies that are

7 performing depth security of the border and three companies which were in

8 regular training, Batlava the position near Prizren which you toured with

9 Colonel Delic and another location, another position, near Prizren

10 actually amount to this number of 15 -- 15 companies out of barracks,

11 which is according to the spirit of the agreement. Do you perhaps now --

12 can you perhaps now recall these locations when I tell them where they

13 were actually?

14 A. No, I would want to go to a map and I would want to go through all

15 my reports. But it doesn't matter whether now -- or to me it doesn't

16 matter because at the time this was not made clear. If there had been a

17 properly argued case made that because of the situation on the border it

18 was necessary to move units out of barracks, that would have been a

19 perfectly reasonable discussion to have had, and we would have reported it

20 back to the OSCE, who would probably have discussed it with NATO and the

21 decision would have been made one way or the other. That's precisely the

22 thing that could have happened in an ideal situation, but unfortunately it

23 didn't. It was all unilateral action that we only found out about by

24 chance after the event which was not in the spirit of the agreement.

25 Thank you.

Page 7946

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Will the registrar please show us

3 Prosecutor's Exhibit P2536. Thank you.

4 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, we can see your notes and annotations, talking

5 points for Belgrade meeting on the 27th of November, 1998. And the third

6 paragraph you know that the FRY, especially VJ units, have established a

7 record of good implementation of Article 4 of the arms control agreement.

8 We know that for this to be the case steps had to be taken to ensure that

9 units throughout the VJ were informed of the obligations of Article 4 of

10 the agreement. And this actually refers to the Naumann-Clark agreement of

11 the 25th of October, 1998. Is that correct?

12 A. No. The Article 4 arms control agreement is a reference to an

13 OSCE arms control agreement, which is a subregional agreement. My point

14 in making this was to attempt to make the meeting as positive as possible

15 by indicating areas where it was possible for -- for FRY to meet

16 obligations and to try to build on that common ground to move -- to move

17 the situation forward. But it was nothing -- that third bullet was

18 nothing to do with the Naumann-Clark agreement.

19 Q. You added here by hand "use Naumann-Clark," so a paragraph above,

20 above the text which I read out.

21 A. Yes, that's right. And if -- my note to myself is to the effect

22 that I propose that we use the Naumann-Clark agreement as the basis,

23 although if you, General, feel there's a better way than I'm very

24 interested to hear of it. In other words, let's talk about this, let's

25 have a discussion, and let's agree a way forward.

Page 7947

1 Q. This article which I quoted, the tense which is used is the past

2 tense, namely that the Army of Yugoslavia, the FRY, had already

3 established a record of good implementation of Article 4. So it is not

4 something which was to be, but something that had already been done.

5 A. Yes. There was a group of officers in Vienna whose only job it

6 was to run the Article 4 arms control agreement. And I was simply making

7 the point that it's perfectly possible to -- to carry out a series of

8 inspections. I was drawing his attention to the -- a protocol that

9 existed that everyone was familiar with that we could take as a start

10 point.

11 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the KDOM mission had previously

12 performed over 30 armament verifications in Kosovo, which all went

13 smoothly without a single objection?

14 A. Not specifically, no. And again, I draw your attention to the

15 fact that the KDOM mission wasn't one KDOM mission. It was a number of

16 missions reporting independently to their embassies in Belgrade, which

17 very loosely coordinated with one another and certainly didn't share

18 reports.

19 Q. I'm talking about their official report, and Mr. Ciaglinski also

20 confirmed that he had partly examined the file where it is -- where the

21 confirmation of these verifications, of these inspections, is actually

22 noted. Do you have knowledge of that, Mr. Drewienkiewicz?

23 A. Not specifically, no. I'm at a loss to know which file that was

24 because Mr. Ciaglinski only arrived in early December. I mean, if he told

25 you, I don't dispute it.

Page 7948

1 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. You also said that in

2 December you were unable to inspect, to tour, the barracks in Pristina.

3 That is in paragraph 80 of your statement. Later you did visit a number

4 of installations, a number of facilities, did you not, Mr. Drewienkiewicz?

5 A. Yes. I visited or my people visited the deployed locations. We

6 were not ever allowed into the Pristina barracks until, I think, about

7 mid-March for a meeting and we went into the Prizren barracks for a

8 meeting which should have been an inspection of the barracks but which

9 wasn't allowed by the commander on the ground. So I went into two

10 barracks, but not to perform the inspections that I had wished to carry

11 out.

12 Q. Do you know that your verifiers had a large number of

13 verifications of facilities, barracks, and positions of the Army of

14 Yugoslavia?

15 A. I don't think they were ever allowed into barracks in order to

16 carry out proper inspections, no. It would have been reported to me very

17 quickly.

18 Q. Do you know that a large number of meetings were held between

19 representatives of the Pristina Corps and your mission's verifiers,

20 whereby cooperation between the two parties was significantly promoted?

21 A. Yes, yes. I mean, that was our intention at every time.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: When you said a moment ago that you got access to

24 the Pristina barracks in mid-March, was that for a proper inspection?

25 THE WITNESS: No, sir. We were summoned into the barracks and

Page 7949

1 were introduced to another -- another group of liaison -- liaison officers

2 from the Yugoslav army, who were to replace the ones that we had spent a

3 considerable amount of time building up a relationship with.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

5 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, did you ever submit a written request to the

7 effect that you wanted to inspect, to visit, the barracks in Pristina?

8 A. It was either written or it was delivered verbally to

9 General Loncar. It was certainly the meeting -- the specific purpose of a

10 meeting with General Loncar, and I do actually now recall that it was --

11 it was mentioned in a letter as well. So the answer is yes to both.

12 Q. Do you know that your verifiers and representatives of the army

13 worked together on a procedure for the touring of units, so they worked

14 together to establish a procedure for the inspection of units and that

15 they did together?

16 A. Correct. Yes, that was to go around the deployed locations, the

17 locations out of barracks.

18 Q. Thank you. And you are aware of the fact that not a single of

19 those positions that were barracks could not be seen without liaison

20 officer, an army liaison officer, as well as a liaison officer of the KVM.

21 Was that not so, Mr. Drewienkiewicz?

22 A. Sorry, could you --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

24 MR. MARCUSSEN: I think this is -- maybe it's the translation but

25 the question is unclear. I mean, the witness has said that what could be

Page 7950

1 visited were deployments outside the barracks. And then there's a-- yeah,

2 the question reads strangely, I think. We need to clarify whether we're

3 talking about access to barracks or units outside the barracks.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the English translation is unclear, so could

5 you ask that again, please, Mr. Cepic.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

7 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

8 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, do you know that access to any unit of the

9 Army of Yugoslavia was possible only if there was a liaison officer there,

10 both liaison officer of the Yugoslav army as well as a liaison officer

11 representing the Kosovo Verification Mission?

12 A. Well, that was -- that was what we wanted, yes, that each liaison

13 officer from the Yugoslav side would have an -- a counterpart on the KVM

14 side. And we had no difficulty meeting that person and saying, Okay,

15 let's go and look at a unit. We didn't have any problem with that at all.

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. That was one of the reasons why

17 new officers had been brought to Pristina, those who could speak English

18 and to whom you delivered a lecture, if I'm not wrong, on the 16th of

19 March, 1999, in order to establish easier communication between the units

20 of the army on the one hand and representatives of the Kosovo Verification

21 Mission on the other.

22 A. Well, this is the first time that I've ever been told that the

23 reason these officers were given to us was -- was because they could speak

24 English, and I certainly don't recall them making that clear at the time.

25 Q. Would you agree with me that it was a very short time for that to

Page 7951

1 become clear, because four days later, on the 20th, you actually left

2 Kosovo, Mr. Drewienkiewicz, did you not?

3 A. Yes, but I would say it takes about eight seconds to say, Hello, I

4 speak English, how nice to see you, and I don't recall that happening. I

5 recall interpreters being used for translation throughout, as it always

6 had been. The reason we were given -- the reason we were given for these

7 new officers was because the previous liaison officers had become too

8 cooperative with us. Let's be quite clear on this. This was not a

9 huggy-feely sort of relationship. By this stage, an extremely -- a

10 relationship that was full of tension, this was mid-March. We were about

11 to be ordered out because of the safety to our people. So I would not

12 want this meeting to be misrepresented.

13 Q. How did you know on the 16th of March that you were to leave

14 Kosovo soon, shortly, Mr. Drewienkiewicz?

15 A. Because it was a topic of almost minute-by-minute discussion

16 with -- with the people in Vienna and with our NATO counterparts. And if

17 it had been left to them, they would have ordered us out about two weeks

18 earlier, and we were hanging on by -- at our request because we felt we

19 could still be of use. But if it had been left to Vienna, they would have

20 certainly have ordered us out on about the 5th of March, I think.

21 Q. Whose decision was it for you to leave Kosovo? Was it a

22 decision from Vienna or from your headquarters in Pristina?

23 A. It was an order from the chairman in office in Vienna, who was the

24 foreign minister of Norway, Knut Vollebaek.

25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, is your assertion that there was

Page 7952

1 an occasional excessive use of force, was it based on the number of

2 soldiers on one side and on the other side? Was that the basis for such

3 an assertion on your part? Just briefly, please.

4 A. The excessive use of force was -- the words I used were

5 disproportionate, and what I meant was using heavy weapons to deal with

6 snipers and the like.

7 Q. But actually you did not know what the real number of soldiers on

8 the other side was in these operations, right?

9 A. Not specifically, no.

10 Q. General Loncar also testified before this Tribunal, and he

11 actually refuted the allegations that there had been excessive use of

12 force. He stressed that you had raised such an objection -- that you

13 would raise such an objection, even when one or two policemen were used in

14 actions on the part of the police forces of Serbia, and that you never

15 clearly specified in what instances and on what locations and why such an

16 excessive use of force was resorted to, and that was Mr. Loncar's

17 testimony before this Court, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. Mr. Ciaglinski also

18 testified before this Court, and the few operations that the army

19 undertook in Kosovo were, in his view, in accordance with all standards.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

21 MR. MARCUSSEN: I don't think a question has been asked.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Probably -- possibly because you interrupted.

23 MR. MARCUSSEN: I apologise to Mr. Cepic, and we're waiting in

24 excitement.

25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you, colleague

Page 7953

1 Marcussen.

2 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, in view of the fact that I was interrupted as

3 I was about to ask my question, you heard me what I said. Could you give

4 me please your comment?

5 A. Certainly.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

7 MR. MARCUSSEN: Now a question has not been asked. There has been

8 a long monologue of a lot of propositions stated by my colleague and no

9 question.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: I disagree. A question is clear to

11 Mr. Drewienkiewicz. If he cannot answer because he's unclear about what's

12 being asked, he'll tell us.

13 THE WITNESS: I'm happy to comment.

14 The discussion about disproportionate use of force was a perpetual

15 topic of conversation between General Loncar and myself, and I think at

16 almost every meeting I would deliver a short statement or tirade or

17 lecture about it. The sort of thing I drew attention to at the time was

18 the use of tank main armament being fired into villages when there had

19 been one or two rifle shots fired out of it. And my point time and time

20 again was that it's not a very good way -- it's not a very efficient way

21 of dealing with the problem because you're going to create more problems

22 than you solve, because these heavy weapons don't just kill the person

23 they're aimed at even if they hit them at the time; they kill a lot of

24 other bystanders and it gets you in trouble. This is why a

25 disproportionate use of force is such a bad idea. I can assure you -- and

Page 7954

1 if we go to my various notebooks and the records that were made of the

2 various conversations with General Loncar by his people and by my people,

3 we will find it was a persistent area of discussion. Thank you.

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation].

5 Q. I invested a great deal of effort to try and locate a single

6 report on the part of the mission which would mention excessive use of

7 force, and I wasn't successful. Can you assist me in telling me whether

8 there is a report in existence of excessive use of force.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Mr. Cepic has been

10 using "excessive" throughout rather than "disproportionate."

11 THE WITNESS: I can -- I am sure if we go back through the reports

12 we will find statements made at the time making the point about excessive

13 or disproportionate use of force against particularly villages, built-up

14 areas where there were civilians who were not identified as being members

15 of the KLA. I can personally recall moments when I was present when tank

16 main armament was fired into villages, and I was rather closer to it than

17 I meant to be at the time, to be honest. But yes, I can recall those --

18 such moments.

19 So I do not believe that this is an issue. I think if we take the

20 trouble to go back, then we'll find plenty of examples of it. Thank you.

21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Thank you. Perhaps one of such examples could be cited now.

23 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the registrar to

24 put P621 up on e-court, page 1.

25 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, we have a letter sent by you to the Federal

Page 7955

1 Commission to General Loncar on February 3rd, 1999. Inter alia you

2 mentioned on page 1, paragraph 1, that on the 21st of January, 1999, the

3 village of Planeja was shelled and subsequently looted. I believe you

4 gained this information from your associates. I presume you did not

5 attend the scene yourself, did you?

6 A. That would be correct, yes.

7 Q. Thank you. In assessment by the regional centres of the KVM, or

8 rather, concerning their assessments, you stated that the regional centre

9 in Prizren was the best of all the regional centres. Do you still stand

10 by your statement?

11 A. Yes, it produced the best reports.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Try to get to the question, Mr. Cepic, please.

13 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the registrar to

14 show us P673, page 2.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it that's it on the screen. Is there a

16 question?

17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I am grateful.

18 Q. Paragraph 2 starting with Planeja. This is the report of the

19 Prizren regional centre we've just mentioned. In that paragraph we see

20 the following: "A report received by CC2," CC being control centre, "on

21 27 January, 1999, that the villagers of Planeja had informed the VJ that

22 they would have to vacate their homes," as read out by Mr. Cepic, "was to

23 be investigated by a CC2 patrol today. CS21," I believe it stands for

24 call signal, "dispatched to Planeja. They report that the village was

25 quiet and there was no VJ check-point or presence outside or inside the

Page 7956

1 village. The only shooting that the villagers reported was a shooting

2 incident between 1800 and 1830 hours on 24 January 1999 with no casualties

3 reported. The villagers did not hear any shooting during the night of the

4 27th January 1999. "On the way out of the village, CS21 met a bus full of

5 people heading into Planeja" --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: What is the question? We can read this if

7 necessary. What is the question you want the witness to address?

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. This will

9 also be my last question with your leave.

10 Q. Mr. Drewienkiewicz, doesn't this differ quite significantly, I

11 mean the difference between the report you received and the report drafted

12 by the regional centre of the verification mission, that actually there

13 were no incidents in the village of Planeja as a matter of fact. Isn't

14 that so, Mr. Drewienkiewicz?

15 A. No, I disagree. You've shown me two reports. It would not just

16 have been that report. I'm not sure the dates tally, but even if they do

17 there would have been a number of reports. I would not have put an

18 allegation into a letter to General Loncar that was not supported by fact

19 or by report. And so there would have been reports, and you can -- you

20 could see from the -- from my original letter to General Loncar that if it

21 was unconfirmed, I said it was unconfirmed. The point at that stage was

22 actually producing chapter and verse about the allegations of looting,

23 which was a moment when General Loncar expressed complete incredulity and

24 said that he couldn't believe such a thing and would I please produce

25 chapter and verse, and so off we went and we produced chapter and verse.

Page 7957

1 So each of these statements would have been supported at the time by -- by

2 reports. I had -- you know, I had quite a lot of people working for me to

3 do precisely this.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you --

5 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen, what's the issue?

8 MR. MARCUSSEN: Unless I'm mistaken I think that the first

9 document that was shown concerned looting --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I was just about to ask to see the other

11 document again because I hadn't followed the point, it was so convoluted.

12 And I just wanted to see what the first document actually said. Can we

13 see it again, please, so that we can compare them.

14 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] P621, 621. [In English] Thank you,

15 Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what is the comparable statement in this

17 document that you say is inconsistent with the statement in P673?

18 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave in the

19 first report it is stated that the village had been shelled and looted.

20 In the second report a few days later, a patrol of the KVM established all

21 that and they inquired of the villagers whether there was any shooting,

22 and they only said that the -- on the 27th there was some shooting between

23 6.00 and 6.30 p.m. without casualties and that the villagers did not hear

24 any --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I remember what was said in it, but you'll see that

Page 7958

1 this one is dealing with the 21st and the 24th. And the 24th is the one

2 day to which -- on which it said in the later report that -- or at least

3 in P673 that shooting took place. Now, what's the inconsistency you say?

4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your leave, in my

5 humble opinion, I believe the villagers would have reported any damage

6 following shelling or looting. Instead, they only reported a far more

7 significant incident with a shooting. On the 24th, the only incident was

8 the shooting where there were no casualties. If that seems more important

9 than looting and shelling, well, it seems illogical. The only thing --

10 the only incident reported was this, otherwise the villagers must have --

11 or would have reported any looting or shooting. They were actually able

12 to specify the exact time of this incident. This is my position.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic, for that explanation. Thank

14 you very much. That completes your cross-examination?

15 MR. CEPIC: Exactly, Your Honour. Thank you, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. [In English] This is the

18 last question. I haven't gotten any questions.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Drewienkiewicz. Just to reply in English because

20 you said "Dobar dan" in Serbian language. Thank you.

21 A. [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Drewienkiewicz, I saw for the first time, I

23 think after your evidence began, a reference to tanks using blank

24 ammunition, something hadn't particularly crossed my mind. It may not be

25 in your evidence, but there is a reference certainly somewhere in the

Page 7959

1 evidence we have in this case. Did that actually happen that tanks would

2 use blanks?

3 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of it, certainly, sir. The ones I saw

4 weren't blanks, and the ones that were -- I can't ever remember someone

5 saying that tanks used blanks. They were jolly good blanks if they were

6 because they were synchronised with explosions at the other end.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: We've had a number of witnesses make allegations of

8 apparently endless shelling of their village by heavy weaponry, but then

9 be unable to specify what damage was done and it's something that we're --

10 at least I, speaking for myself, have been having some difficulty with.

11 Could you help me to understand that concept that a village can be shelled

12 all day and no damage done.

13 THE WITNESS: Well, it takes a lot of shells to knock down a house

14 because that's not the purpose of the weapons is. The purpose of the

15 weapons is to go through the armour of another tank, obviously. And the

16 tank rounds aren't necessarily best designed for use on buildings, which

17 are obviously more soft-skinned. So it's quite possible in some cases

18 that the tank round goes through and out the other side and all you've got

19 is a hole the one side and a hole the other side and if we're lucky

20 nobody's standing in the middle. So we did go to villages, we did see the

21 results. Artillery was more effective than tank fire in terms of

22 producing noticeable damage.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: There may also be a problem created by translation,

24 of course. The commonplace use of the expression "shelling" may not be an

25 accurate description of what was actually happening.

Page 7960

1 THE WITNESS: Well, there was certainly moments when, you know,

2 groups of artillery -- artillery guns of six at a time, which would be

3 their normal -- four or six would be their normal tactical grouping were

4 seen lined up alongside the road firing. Now, the range of those guns is

5 often several kilometres, so it's quite difficult to see them firing and

6 be at the other end on the impact at the same time. And I wasn't very

7 keen for my people to be where they impacted either.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: But these are weapons you define different from

9 tanks. These are smaller artillery --

10 THE WITNESS: These would be towed artillery pieces.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Would they damage a house in a different way from a

12 shell?


14 JUDGE BONOMY: What damage would they do to a house?

15 THE WITNESS: They are high trajectory so they would come in from

16 above and typically would come in through the roof, whereas a tank

17 fires -- it fires its shell much faster and so it goes in a straight line.

18 So tank -- tank fire tends to be line of sight, whereas artillery is an

19 area weapon directed several kilometres away not necessarily at something

20 you can see.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for assisting us with that diversion.

22 Mr. Ivetic.

23 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

25 Q. General Drewienkiewicz, I am Dan Ivetic and I am representing

Page 7961

1 Mr. Sreten Lukic and I have some questions for you. I would like you to

2 clear up an area that caused us confusion and consternation yesterday

3 concerning the KDOMs and the establishment of a base-line number for the

4 forces in Kosovo-Metohija. First of all, sir, am I correct that prior to

5 the Kosovo Verifiers Mission being up and running in Kosovo, the various

6 KDOMs under the unofficial leadership of the US-KDOM initially handled the

7 verification tasks required under the agreements, and in fact negotiated

8 the -- what has been called the Burns-Djordjevic agreement which is an

9 annex to the KVM agreement?

10 A. They operated in a pretty loose coordination. They did do

11 whatever verification they did because they were the people that had been

12 asked to do it and they did produce the Burns-Djordjevic agreement which

13 was about MUP check-points, yes.

14 Q. Now, you also testified that you had contact with Mr. Sean Burns,

15 who was the head of the US-KDOM. And in the course of your -- I'd like to

16 ask you, in the course of your contact and communications with

17 Mr. Sean Burns, did you ever hear or become aware of the fact that the

18 Serbian MUP provided detailed tables and documents to KDOM, identifying

19 all force levels needed to establish a base-line already in October,

20 specifically 29 October 1998?

21 A. No, absolutely not.

22 Q. I take it then that you would be surprised, that is to say that

23 during the several months you were in Kosovo you never heard of the fact

24 that the US-KDOM issued a written report in Pristina on the 27th of

25 December [Realtime transcript read in error "September"], 1998,

Page 7962

1 establishing the base-line of permitted MUP personnel in Kosovo at 10.021

2 persons. Is that --

3 A. I never ever saw or heard of that document, and I can

4 categorically state that I don't think I ever received one piece of paper

5 from the US-KDOM.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, did you say 27th September?

7 MR. IVETIC: December.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I thought you did. It's September in the

9 transcript. It should be December. Thank you.

10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. Sir, did you ever hear this number, 10.021 personnel?

12 A. No, no. It's such a specific number that I would have remembered

13 it.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel and witness are kindly reminded to pause

15 between question and answer for the sake of interpreters and the court

16 reporter, thank you.


18 Q. I presume you got the same message I did so we should both try and

19 be a little bit more appreciative of the interpreters in this case. Did

20 you know from your presence in Kosovo of KDOM personnel physically

21 counting Serbian forces and Yugoslav forces that were withdrawing from

22 Kosovo in the last few months of 1998?

23 A. No, I don't think -- you're talking I think, so we don't get

24 confusing each other, you're talking about the end of October 1998 when

25 some MUP and quite a lot of FRY military, FRY army, withdrew from Kosovo.

Page 7963

1 I don't think you're talking about the situation after the end of October.

2 Q. You're correct.

3 A. Right. I know that they were there on the ground to do it, and I

4 know that there were then reports that were then taken as adequate. I

5 didn't ever see them.

6 Q. At that time was the KVM up and running as an operational organ in

7 Kosovo-Metohija?

8 A. No, it was brought into being at the -- in the middle of October,

9 and it was simply a gleam in somebody's eye. There were no people for it,

10 nobody had been asked to provide people. There was no equipment, no

11 vehicles. God Almighty himself could not have produced 12 apostles in

12 that time.

13 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, I would like to move back briefly to some

14 questions relating to your background. I think we'll be going through

15 these rather quickly. I've seen from your various information provided

16 with your statement that you have a military career. Am I correct that

17 your professional career does not include any experience working as a

18 civilian police officer in any capacity, or a policeman I should say?

19 A. Not as a policeman but in my time in Bosnia, I worked closely with

20 the people that were dealing with the police.

21 Q. Okay. And am I correct that you did not have any specific or

22 formal police training with respect to your appointment to the OSCE-KVM?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Okay. And when it comes to technical details about the operation

25 structure and functioning of the Serbian MUP police, in all fairness you

Page 7964

1 would not consider yourself an expert and would have to defer to someone

2 with more knowledge. Would you agree with that?

3 A. No, I would say that as a result of my time in Bosnia which was 20

4 months very recently before this, I was fairly familiar with the way

5 police operated in this area.

6 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the MUP in the Republic of Bosnia,

7 that is to say at both the Federation level and the Republika Srpska, are

8 structured differently than the MUP of the Republic of Serbia?

9 A. I'm sure there are differences in structure. I'm talking about

10 the way they behaved.

11 Q. Okay. Now, within the OS-KVM mission there were dedicated police

12 observers and verifiers. Isn't that correct?

13 A. A few, yes.

14 Q. Do you recall who had initially been put forth as deputy head of

15 the KVM specifically for police and judicial matters, whose appointment

16 Mr. Walker rejected?

17 A. I recall that a name was put forward and that there was some

18 concern in the OSCE in Vienna, which was more than just Walker. It was

19 general concern, and as a result of that the country concerned withdrew

20 his name and provided a more suitable candidate, yeah.

21 Q. And the more suitable candidate, I presume, is Judge Kessler from

22 Italy?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to Judge Kessler who was appointed to the

25 KVM as the deputy head for police and judicial matters, do you know what

Page 7965

1 his duties and activities were relative to the police?

2 A. Do you mean prior to his arriving?

3 Q. I mean during the course of the KVM mission. We have not heard

4 anything about him in your testimony so I would like to find out how much,

5 if anything, you know about his activities in relation to the police in

6 Kosovo-Metohija?

7 A. Well, he arrived in, I think, very late January and at that point

8 I gave everything I -- everything I could to him on policing matters

9 because clearly it was his portfolio, not mine. We were very short of

10 ex-policemen or seconded policemen. We had hardly any at the start.

11 Q. And -- I apologise, sir. I'm slowing down for purposes of the

12 translators, who I hear are still speaking with respect to our previous

13 discussion.

14 Am I correct, sir, that indeed you had asked for additional police

15 verifiers to be assigned, but in fact that you were unsuccessful in that

16 endeavour?

17 A. Yes. It was one of my constant refrains that we needed police as

18 many as we could, as quickly as we could, and we were not very successful

19 in getting them.

20 Q. Now, sir, flowing from that am I correct that there was an issue

21 within the KVM because some of the verifiers that were on the ground were

22 not properly trained and inexperienced, particularly on the police side,

23 because they had not had the requisite training that would be required for

24 that field?

25 A. Absolutely. What they were supposed to do is sort of sit in

Page 7966

1 Vienna for about six months until they were ready. We were doing the best

2 we could with the people we had.

3 Q. As a result of the foregoing, did you become aware of situations

4 where events were misreported because certain verifiers did not go to

5 verify things first-hand but relied upon second-hand information?

6 A. Not specifically. I was always concerned that people should go as

7 far forward as possible, and they sometimes had to be nudged gently to go

8 further forward.

9 Q. You've testified about the confusion and problem caused by the

10 continued existence of a separate US-KDOM operation. I'd like to ask you

11 now about the components of the US-KDOM that were absorbed into the KVM.

12 Did there at any point in time appear to be US-KDOM personnel operating at

13 odds with the rest of the KVM mission, as if working on a separate agenda?

14 A. Well, some of the -- first of all, there was a very high turnover

15 of the US-KDOM in -- between mid-November and the end of December. And so

16 they had almost nobody left who had been there in the summer. At that

17 stage, we were given about two-thirds of the US-KDOM people, and the

18 remainder remained as a separate entity, as I understand it providing

19 support to Ambassador Chris Hill, who of course continued to come into the

20 country.

21 Q. Okay. Now, as a result of having a -- of not having enough

22 verifiers, having some verifiers that were lacking experience or training,

23 and having this huge turnover of US-KDOM personnel, am I correct that at

24 some point in time during the mission you concluded that you were

25 receiving incorrect and biased field reports in favour of the Albanian or

Page 7967

1 KLA side, and thereafter assigned specific trusted personnel to go into

2 the field to verify certain of the reports you had received. Is that

3 correct?

4 A. I wouldn't put it as specifically as that. I would say that there

5 were moments when I was concerned about the accuracy, and I had always

6 kept a couple of patrols that I used as my reserve to go out to -- to

7 areas that seemed particularly difficult.

8 Q. And --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a slightly different point, I think.

10 MR. IVETIC: It is.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: What's being asked is whether you were conscious of

12 bias.

13 THE WITNESS: There was bias in -- yes, I mean, there was bias

14 throughout the report because everybody comes from somewhere. And so some

15 of the people that came from -- from some countries thought that the KLA

16 had more right on their side, and some thought that the Serb authorities

17 had more right on their side. That was a fact. And it was our job to try

18 to steer a course between them. This was not an entirely one-way street.


20 Q. Okay. And do you recall at some point in time during the

21 existence of your mission on -- in Kosovo-Metohija that you asked or

22 assigned Christopher John Clark, a warrant officer in the British Army

23 seconded to the KVM to go out in the field and to double-check or verify

24 certain of the reports that you had received that you felt may be biased?

25 A. I remember him and I certainly used him. He was an explosive

Page 7968

1 ordnance disposal expert and where there were reports of particular

2 devices, he had the technical expertise to know the difference between a

3 hand-grenade and a satchel bomb. That was the sort of thing I used him

4 for.

5 Q. Sir --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's try to be clear. So the answer to the

7 question is no, really, is it? That he wasn't somebody you used to

8 investigate cases where you suspected bias?

9 THE WITNESS: That's correct, yes, sir.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.


12 Q. Sir, I'd like to move on. I've got approximately six or so

13 questions relating to Racak that I'd like to just touch on a few points

14 about. First of all, am I correct that based upon the information

15 available to the OSCE-KVM, there was in fact a KLA presence in Racak

16 itself and a KLA base a mere 1.5 kilometres from Racak in the village of

17 Topola?

18 A. We came -- when I went into Racak for the first time on the

19 Saturday, there were no KLA present. In the course of my time in that

20 village that afternoon, KLA appeared in uniform. So they were present. I

21 personally noted a trenchline dug within 500 metres of the village, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Now, prior to undertaking their operation in Racak to

23 arrest elements of the KLA, the local police officials in Stimlje and

24 Urosevac not only gave notice of their operation to the KVM but engaged in

25 lengthy discussions with the local KVM personnel regarding the same.

Page 7969

1 Isn't that correct?

2 A. I think that may be correct, but I was not aware of that at the

3 time and it was certainly not reported to us. The -- I think the

4 individual had just arrived and was not acting as he should have done.

5 And I don't think he spoke English very well and I don't think he

6 understood what he was being told.

7 Q. Well, do you recall whether Warrant Officer Clark and David Meyer

8 of the KVM may have had any discussions with personnel regarding the

9 upcoming Racak investigation with the Serb authorities?

10 A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.

11 Q. Okay. Would -- you -- would you be surprised to find that

12 Warrant Officer Clark gave a statement, a sworn statement, to the Office

13 of the Prosecutor, it's Exhibit 6D106 that we've utilised previously in

14 this case, in which he specifically said that the commander of the Stimlje

15 police station had lengthy discussions with David Meyer regarding the

16 situation, that it was a known planned event that the MUP were going to

17 Racak, and notice was given to KVM officially and indeed that notice was

18 given the day before the Racak operation actually took place, and that the

19 KVM personnel had instructed two KVM vehicles to accompany the police

20 patrol, but that those KVM vehicles disobeyed their instructions and

21 stayed at the Stimlje police station. Do you recall any of those events,

22 sir?

23 A. No, no. What's your question?

24 Q. Well, you just answered my question, whether you recall any of

25 those events.

Page 7970

1 A. Well, can you tell me, please, what the MUP said they were going

2 to do in Racak? Presumably they were going to do a bit of community

3 policing.

4 Q. No, they were going to go in and arrest the KLA, sir.

5 A. Well, if only they had.

6 Q. Now the KLA attacked and prevented the investigating judge from

7 reaching the scene to perform an on-site investigation. Isn't it correct

8 that the KVM was in the area and indeed, Ambassador Walker was still

9 present?

10 A. You're now on to Saturday, you're on to Saturday afternoon.

11 Walker and myself are in the village. Walker is in the mosque discussing

12 what to do next with the elders, and while that is going on the judge

13 apparently attempts to come into the village. I was not aware that that

14 was going on until gun-fire erupted.

15 Q. After that, though, you did not try to convince the KLA to permit

16 the investigation to take place, is that correct, so that no investigation

17 by the investigating judge was able to proceed at the site in Racak?

18 A. How would I have known that it was the investigating judge or

19 anybody else who was coming in? I'm sitting in a village with high walls

20 and I hear gun-fire, and I'm supposed to work out that that is heralding

21 the arrival of a judge whom I should now run out into the middle of a

22 fire-fight to welcome. No, thanks.

23 Q. I said thereafter, sir, wasn't it the job of the KVM to liaise

24 with the Serb authorities and to liaise with the KLA. Are you telling us

25 that even with the deputy head of mission and the head of mission in a

Page 7971

1 location, that you were unable to control or have any impact upon the KLA,

2 so as to permit a lawful investigation of the scene?

3 A. The first time that I was aware --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on, please. Hold on, please.

5 Mr. Marcussen.

6 MR. MARCUSSEN: I think the witness just said that he did not know

7 that there was an investigation being carried out and therefore putting to

8 him that he should have somehow -- repeating essentially that he should

9 have done something to allow the inspection to go on, I don't think will

10 take us anywhere and I think the witness has explained why he couldn't do

11 that.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I think this is a different approach that the

13 witness can perfectly, competently deal with, and therefore I will repel

14 that objection.

15 Please answer the question.

16 THE WITNESS: When I became aware that the judge wanted to go into

17 Racak, it was the next morning. And I then spent two and a half hours

18 with the judge discussing how we could help her to get into the village

19 without re-igniting the fighting. And I made offers to facilitate her

20 going in so that she could do her job, which I fully acknowledged she

21 needed to be able to do, in a way that was safe for everybody and it was

22 going to be done with my verifiers who were a neutral force in this area.

23 She completely refused to do that.


25 Q. Your verifiers were unarmed, weren't they, sir?

Page 7972

1 A. Absolutely.

2 Q. Would you be at all surprised that a civilian judge who had just

3 been shot at would be hesitant to go back to the location with unarmed

4 OSCE verifiers who themselves, I believe, a couple days thereafter had

5 been -- were shot at but had been shot at previously by the KLA as well?

6 A. That wasn't the way the conversation went. The way the

7 conversation went was that she absolutely refused to go anywhere without a

8 MUP escort; and if she was shot at, then the MUP would shoot back. And if

9 that started World War III I could have a nice day. That was more or less

10 the upshot of it. We have a transcript of it.

11 Q. All right. I'd like to also clear up a couple of points relating

12 to the incident at Rogovo in the Djakovica municipality. Now, first of

13 all, sir, you -- although you did not mention it in your direct testimony

14 I don't believe, am I correct that the information available to the KVM,

15 indeed it's something that you have referenced in your annexure DZ1 to

16 your statement, that in fact the Rogovo site was believed to be a KLA safe

17 house?

18 A. Yes, we found that out later.

19 Q. Okay. Now, you testified in your statement that you arrived at

20 the Rogovo scene at approximately 1320 hours on the day of the incident.

21 Isn't it a fact that the incident itself occurred at around 6.30 in the

22 morning, almost seven hours before you arrived?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And isn't it also true that prior to your arrival there were other

25 KVM staff present who followed the events that were unfolding and would --

Page 7973

1 who would thus be better able to describe and ascertain the investigative

2 efforts that were underway?

3 A. Yes, and they made written statements to me.

4 Q. Okay. I'm told we again have to slow down for the interpreters,

5 so I apologise for my pause.

6 Now, you described -- sorry, we're still waiting for the

7 translation to catch up.

8 Sir, you described -- okay.

9 You describe what you termed as "special police in grey boiler

10 suits or overalls." Isn't it a fact that these persons in these grey

11 boiler suits were collecting the bodies after the conclusion of the scene

12 investigation and were wearing plastic gloves along with their grey

13 overalls?

14 A. No.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the paragraph number, Mr. Ivetic?

16 MR. IVETIC: Paragraph number for the grey suits, one moment,

17 Your Honour. I know that's something that had come up in questions

18 Your Honour had asked as to what was a overall. I believe it's 165,

19 Your Honour, I'm going to turn to there right now.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I know it's part of the qualifications for this job

21 to be out of touch, but I --

22 MR. IVETIC: 166.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: But I do know what an overall is.

24 MR. IVETIC: 166. You had asked for him to describe them. That's

25 how he described them. It's paragraph 166 of the marked Drewienkiewicz

Page 7974

1 statement.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.


4 Q. Now -- now, sir, do you recall, in fact, that these individuals in

5 these overalls, coveralls, or boiler suits, whatever we call them, were,

6 in fact, wearing these over regular clothing or uniforms so as not to

7 allow them to become soiled while performing the arduous task of clearing

8 the terrain of dead bodies?

9 A. No. And one of the reasons -- A, they looked very like special

10 forces to me; but B, the -- one of them who had been killed in the

11 fire-fight was also wearing his grey boiler suit when I viewed his body,

12 when I was shown his body. So you're not suggesting they arrived in their

13 cleaning-up gear before they went over the wall, I'm sure.

14 Q. Well, there's a videotape that we'll be going through with another

15 witness, so we'll see where that ends up at that point in time. Now, with

16 respect to Rogovo, am I correct that the KVM received a detailed briefing

17 from both the MUP liaison and from General Loncar regarding the incident,

18 as per the compliance with the KVM agreement?

19 A. We received a briefing. I was briefed by General Loncar. We had

20 a discussion about it, yes. I wouldn't say it was a particularly detailed

21 briefing.

22 Q. Would it be safe to say that since you were not dealing with the

23 police verifier aspect of the mission, that the -- you are not aware of

24 what briefings were given to the actual MUP liaison officers within the

25 KVM?

Page 7975

1 A. Well, I know that -- they in turn reported, and we -- I saw all

2 the reports, and I wouldn't say that they were full briefings. They were

3 briefings. They were -- I can recall them in some detail, but they

4 weren't particularly informative.

5 Q. All right. Now I'd like to just ask a couple of questions to

6 clarify the issue relating to some of your testimony relating to the use

7 of ambulances, in particular I think we're talking about the incident --

8 well, let me ask you this way.

9 You described that as a result of the Serbs not permitting you the

10 use of a medevac helicopter you had to utilise ground ambulances and when

11 your KVM personnel were wounded on duty they would be driven, wounded, to

12 the border and the Serbs would force them to walk themselves across the

13 border. (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 Q. Is it your sworn testimony that they were shot and were taken from

20 the scene of the shooting in a KVM ambulance directly to the border where

21 they suffered and endured the treatment you described in your direct the

22 other day?

23 A. That's how I understood it, yes.

24 Q. Would you therefore be --

25 MR. IVETIC: I see Mr. Marcussen on his feet.

Page 7976

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

2 MR. MARCUSSEN: This comes a little late but I was scrambling to

3 find the right rule. I should have known this by heart. It appears

4 Mr. Ivetic intends to use a video to show that the witness was wrong with

5 respect to these people in boiler suits. It would be my submission that

6 if he's intending to impeach the witness on this he would have to show

7 this piece of evidence to the witness this under Rule 90(H)(ii).

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE BONOMY: We don't accept the submission for the Prosecution.

10 We consider that the Rule has been complied with.

11 THE WITNESS: Can I make a point please?

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Not on this you can't, no.

13 THE WITNESS: No, not on that, on what was said before.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: On the evidence. On this matter? Yes.

15 THE WITNESS: I'd like to talk to you in private now about

16 something that's just been said because I have a real concern on it.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll briefly go into private session.

18 [Private session]

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7977











11 Pages 7977-7981 redacted. Private session















Page 7982

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

7 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. Now, general, with regards to the wounded OSCE personnel, would

9 you be surprised to find out that, in fact, these individuals were

10 actually evacuated from the scene of the shooting where they had been shot

11 at by the KLA and were taken to Pristina hospital, where in fact they were

12 treated --

13 A. And moved on to Macedonia.

14 Q. Is that your testimony?

15 A. That's how it was told to me, yes.

16 Q. Okay. And on the way to Macedonia they were also escorted and

17 assisted by the MUP personnel?

18 A. They may have had a police escort, yes.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I can see anxiety about the transcript, but if you

20 pay attention to LiveNote, you'll be able to follow the transcript there

21 until the matter is resolved. We can carry on with the evidence

22 meanwhile.

23 MR. IVETIC: Okay.

24 Q. And in fact, these individuals one had a glass cut on the arm and

25 one had a slight indirect gun-shot wound to the shoulder. Is that

Page 7983

1 correct?

2 A. The gun-shot wound to the shoulder was not life-threatening but it

3 was more than a slight wound. You wouldn't like one like that.

4 Q. I wouldn't like any type of gun-shot wound. But the point is the

5 incident was not as you implied the other day wherein they were taken from

6 the scene directly to the border and while they were -- well, in the

7 manner you described the other day, is it?

8 A. The main medical assistance they were given was in the ambulances

9 by the --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, please, Mr. Marcussen is on his

11 feet.

12 MR. MARCUSSEN: I mean, I don't recall the evidence being that the

13 victims -- the wounded were taken straight from the place where the

14 incident had taken place to the border. I don't think that had been --

15 MR. IVETIC: He testified to that verbatim here today just before

16 I had asked him if it would surprise him -- just before we went to closed

17 session we asked if that's what his testimony was. You can check the

18 transcript.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Please just carry on. We'll be able to sort it out

20 in due course.

21 THE WITNESS: If I may, my recollection was they were put into the

22 ambulances in which there were paramedics and they were treated

23 immediately as they drove from the Decani area to Pristina. I know that

24 they stopped in Pristina for a moment or two because I know that the head

25 of mission spoke to them both at that stage and wanted to and because

Page 7984

1 their injuries were not life threatening that was perfectly okay. They

2 then went on to the border. If they had a police escorted, then I'm

3 delighted. I wasn't made aware of that but I'm not surprised -- okay.


5 Q. The point is, sir, what you described the other day, the wounded

6 men having to walk by themselves across the border and being subjected to

7 this, that never actually happened, did it?

8 A. That was how it was relayed to me, yes, it was, that the

9 paramedics were not allowed to go over the border in the vehicles with the

10 wounded men because were they to do that, their passport, their visas,

11 which were one-way, one entry visas would have been stamped and they

12 wouldn't be allowed back in and we would have lost a significant part of

13 our medical cover.

14 Q. Thank you. I want to move on to a meeting you discussed with

15 General Lukic and in discussing your meeting, you made reference to P2544

16 which memorialises this meeting which occurred on or about the 24th of

17 December, 1998. In reading this exhibit it seems to indicate that you

18 started off the meeting complaining that, in fact, you had not been

19 invited previously by General Lukic for an earlier meeting. Is that

20 really how you started this meeting, complaining about not receiving an

21 invitation to meet with General Lukic?

22 A. I think it says that I stated we should have met earlier. Is that

23 a -- that's not a complaint.

24 Q. Well, if we can --

25 A. That's a statement.

Page 7985

1 Q. If we look at the next sentence, he stated that "the reason they

2 had not was due to an absence of an invitation from General L which

3 exemplified the lack of cooperation that was about to be discussed." It

4 sure sounds like a complaint.

5 A. Okay. It was not one of my huggy-feely meetings.

6 Q. All right. Now, under the auspices of the KVM agreement, there

7 were General Loncar and others from his commission available to you,

8 specifically Colonel Mijatovic, the MUP liaison, as well as local area and

9 local-level MUP liaisons at each of the various RCs. Now, Mr. Lukic was

10 not part of Loncar's commission, was he?

11 A. No, he wasn't.

12 Q. Article 9 of the general agreement about the KVM stipulates that

13 contact is to be through liaison officials that are to be assigned.

14 Mr. Lukic was not, in fact, a liaison official, was he?

15 A. That was why the meeting had not taken place until then, and had

16 the arrangements that had been set in place been adequate, then the

17 meeting might not have been needed.

18 Q. Is it a fact that every meeting that was sought by you with

19 General Lukic was, indeed, granted?

20 A. Eventually, yes.

21 Q. Okay. Now, one of the themes that was discussed at this meeting

22 was the issue of Malisevo, and you've identified that in your -- in your

23 witness statement. I'd like to address some of the testimony that you

24 have in there. Isn't it correct that the Burns-Djordjevic agreement, that

25 is to say, the agreement between the KDOM and the MUP, that that

Page 7986

1 particular agreement specifies that forces -- that the Serbian MUP police

2 is to withdraw its forces from various villages and to localise them in

3 the village or town of Malisevo so that the concentration of MUP personnel

4 in Malisevo was foreseen and not limited by the Burns agreement?

5 A. As I recall the Burns agreement, it allowed for -- it named 27

6 locations, of which nine could be occupied.

7 Q. Well, sir, I believe we're mixing apples and oranges here.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. If we could have Exhibit P394 up on the screen, that way you can

10 convince yourself that the parts that I'm reading are accurate. But

11 section 3 of the Burns agreement says: "The police will withdraw its

12 stationary forces from Dragobil, Ostrozub, Opterusa, Dobrodelan,

13 Studencan, Samodreza, Pecane and Klecka and will keep them in Malisevo,

14 Orahovac, Zociste, Restane, Suva Reka, and Dulje. So I ask you again,

15 sir, isn't it a fact that the Burns agreement specifically foresaw and did

16 not call for a reduction or a withdrawal of the police presence in the

17 town of Malisevo?

18 A. Yeah, that's paragraph 3. Yeah, I read that, yeah.

19 Q. Okay. Now that we're on the same page, isn't it therefore correct

20 that what you were seeking, that is to say, reduction of the police in

21 Malisevo, was actually seeking a modification of this Burns-Djordjevic

22 agreement?

23 A. Where in the Burns-Djordjevic agreement does it say what the force

24 level is in Malisevo, then, please?

25 Q. I'm asking you, sir, whether in fact your request to ask for a

Page 7987

1 reduction of the police in Malisevo was something that would have to cause

2 for the Burns agreement and the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement to be amended

3 and modified?

4 A. No.

5 Q. That's your understanding?

6 A. That's my understanding because we weren't talking about

7 withdrawing, we were talking about reducing.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: This exchange started on the basis of a question

9 that suggested the forces had to be withdrawn from certain villages and to

10 go instead to Malisevo. This agreement says something rather different

11 from that.

12 MR. IVETIC: That they could keep them in Malisevo, Orahovac --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Not the ones from the other villages but the ones

14 that were already there.

15 MR. IVETIC: Already there.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's rather different from the first question you

17 posed.

18 MR. IVETIC: I think I might have misspoken. That was my

19 intention -- understanding.

20 Q. Now, we heard testimony from General Loncar that in fact the issue

21 of reducing the police in Malisevo had been forwarded to the entire

22 Federal Commission for their consideration in Belgrade, whether they would

23 have to amend the agreements to make this happen. Do you know that, sir?

24 A. I can't ever recall anyone suggesting that these agreements were

25 going to need to be amended, no, never ever.

Page 7988

1 Q. Well, if the evidence shows that other persons within the KVM did

2 know that and did seek to have it amended by going through the Federal

3 Commission, would knowledge of that fact that you don't know change your

4 appraisal of General Lukic's abilities with respect to Malisevo, as set

5 out in your statement?

6 A. No, because General Lukic was the head of the police in Kosovo, so

7 one had this wild irrational idea that he was in charge of the police.

8 Tell me if I am wrong.

9 Q. You are, sir. You don't, in fact, have any knowledge of the

10 structure and the operation of the police forces in the Republic of

11 Serbia, the various divisions, the various structures in place, and how

12 the police operates, do you?

13 A. If General Lukic had not had the ability to make a decision about

14 the actual level of policing inside Malisevo, then I assume he would have

15 told me that and he didn't.

16 Q. So you're basing everything on an assumption. Is that correct?

17 A. I didn't have the benefit of as many lawyers as we have in this

18 courtroom. I was having to make it up as I went along; you're absolutely

19 right.

20 Q. Now, we've also had sworn testimony from a commander Zyrapi of the

21 KLA that in fact Malisevo was the main KLA route for smuggling of weapons

22 into Kosovo from across the border. Do you have knowledge of that?

23 A. I wouldn't have said it was the main route; I would have said it

24 was one of the routes.

25 Q. All right. As one of the routes, sir, wouldn't that justify a

Page 7989

1 police presence in that locale to try and limit this illegal activity?

2 A. Yeah, and I think we've all agreed by looking at paragraph 3 that

3 that's entirely legitimate and allowed. My conversation, I keep coming

4 back to it wasn't whether or not there was a police presence, it was how

5 oppressive it was, how big it was, how in your face it was, and we were

6 attempting to reduce it in order to calm the situation and we were

7 offering to put verifiers into the village in order to help with that

8 situation, and that we eventually did.

9 Q. I'm waiting for the translation again. Now, sir, in -- now, sir,

10 in your statement you talk about the patrols that were undertaken and the

11 fact that armoured personnel carriers or APCs were utilised. Isn't it

12 correct that paragraph 2 of the Burns-Djordjevic agreement actually

13 authorised the MUP to utilise patrols, even employing APCs and armaments

14 of up to 7.9 millimetre machine-guns?

15 A. Which would be used exclusively in self-defence and with

16 restraint.

17 Q. Correct. Is that correct, sir?

18 A. That is what it says.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I'm observing that there was a condition.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. And I think the reason there was a condition was that there had

23 been armoured vehicles used with machine-guns that had not been used in

24 self-defence and had not been used with restraint, and that's why it was

25 so specific.

Page 7990

1 Q. All right. And these patrols in question were accompanied by your

2 verifiers in their vehicles, as another witness testified here,

3 specifically with respect to this area, since at that time Malisevo was in

4 the -- within the confines of the Suva Reka municipality. Isn't it

5 correct that the KVM vehicles escorted the police patrols on a daily

6 basis?

7 A. We accompanied them in some cases, not exclusively. On a

8 case-by-case basis as best we could.

9 Q. Okay. You talk about the stops that were undertaken by the police

10 in Malisevo to check IDs, et cetera, and to stop vehicles. Are you aware

11 of the fact that Article 3, section 3 of the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement

12 explicitly authorises trafficking crime stops and excludes such --

13 excludes a review of such activities from the purview of the KVM mission

14 that you were a part of?

15 A. And how were we to distinguish between a police roadblock that

16 stopped people in order to attempt to deal with organised crime and one

17 that was stopping them to shake them down for their pocket money without

18 being prior informed, please?

19 Q. Utilising properly trained police verifiers instead of military

20 verifiers would be one way, wouldn't it?

21 A. Or being psychic, maybe.

22 Q. Would you answer my question, sir.

23 A. As soon as we got police verifiers we used them, of course we did;

24 until then, we used the people we had. And where we had people who had a

25 military police background, we used them in preference to people who

Page 7991

1 didn't have a military police background. I was not able to conjure

2 policemen out of mid-air, and it's a well-known phenomenon of

3 international operations that the police take a very long time to arrive

4 in any force.

5 Q. All right. Now, if we can turn specifically to some of the staff

6 that you had on hand. Am I correct that Mr. Guy Sands,

7 Mr. Richard Heaslip and Mr. Viktor Ravishenko [phoen] who I believe

8 preceded Guy Sands as the MUP liaison, these men were all three of them,

9 all were of a military background. Is that correct?

10 A. Yes, but I think the -- I think it was the Ukrainian had a

11 military police background to the best of my knowledge, but yes, these

12 were military people essentially.

13 Q. All right. And these three named persons -- these above-named

14 persons as well as the other MUP liaisons met with the individuals and

15 some met with Mr. Lukic. For instance, General Heaslip met with Mr. Lukic

16 on multiple occasions. Would you say that he met with Mr. Lukic more than

17 you did?

18 A. Yes, because Heaslip worked for me.

19 Q. You would have to defer to these individuals that had daily

20 interaction with the MUP with respect to appraisals of what the

21 information was that the MUP provided to them. Isn't that correct?

22 A. It would depend on the context and what you're about to invite me

23 to sign up to. I don't think I would blanket accept that, no.

24 Q. I'm not asking you to sign up for anything; I'm asking questions.

25 A. I relied on, in particular, Heaslip to be my liaison with the MUP

Page 7992

1 because he was assigned to it almost exclusively, and it needed someone to

2 be assigned to it exclusively. I didn't have the time to do any one thing

3 exclusively.

4 Q. Now, as far as the MUP observation points are concerned, am I

5 correct there was one grand inspection of all the MUP observation points

6 conducted, I believe, on the 5th of January, or thereabouts 1999?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Okay. Colonel Ciaglinski in his testimony claimed that on that

9 inspection almost 40 observation points, instead of 27, were found and

10 that they were all manned. That is not, in fact, what the findings of the

11 inspection revealed, is it?

12 A. What I do -- I wasn't actually in Kosovo at the time. This

13 happened while I was back on a few days' leave. But my -- my instructions

14 while I was away was to check every one of the 27 to make sure that no

15 more than nine were occupied, as per the Burns agreement. And the message

16 that I got when I got back was that they had indeed been inspected and

17 that more than nine were occupied.

18 Q. All right. But there was no discussion of 40. Let's clear that

19 up first.

20 A. I don't recall 40 because that number --

21 Q. Doesn't make sense, right?

22 A. -- isn't relevant. If it was more than nine, it was

23 noncompliance.

24 Q. And that's your opinion that that would be noncompliance. Is that

25 correct?

Page 7993

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Well, sir, the Burns agreement that you have referenced states

3 that the overview of the observation points will be completed by

4 October 29th, 1998. Do you know what happened on October 29th, 1998, when

5 Mr. Burns met with General Djordjevic of the MUP and re-evaluated how many

6 of these observation points were actually going to be manned?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Don't you think that since your mission was there to verify this

9 agreement, it would be a crucial point to find out what the final

10 understanding and final agreement of the parties was with respect to how

11 many observation points could be manned?

12 A. Well, if you're telling me that the Burns-Djordjevic agreement

13 that we have on the screen and which was well-known to every member of the

14 KVM was somehow changed by a private deal, yeah, you're amazing me. And

15 how would we have known of this private deal anyway? And if that had been

16 the case, it would have been a really spiffing idea for someone to have

17 told us that, not least someone on the MUP side. And they never did.

18 Q. You also didn't have knowledge of the communications between KDOM

19 and the MUP with respect to the base level of forces. So could this be

20 another area that no one asked KDOM or KDOM didn't provide the proper

21 information?

22 A. I don't think KDOM are in the dock here.

23 Q. All right. Now, I'd like to turn to another matter that

24 Colonel Ciaglinski testified about, and I think you also -- you also

25 testified regarding your return to Pristina following the Kumanovo

Page 7994

1 agreement and that you found a burning heap of documents which

2 coincidentally Colonel Ciaglinski said he examined alone with his

3 interpreter. But in any event you said that you and Colonel Ciaglinski

4 inspected this. Now, am I correct or is Mr. Ciaglinski correct that --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on.

6 Mr. Marcussen.

7 MR. MARCUSSEN: Could we have a reference to Ciaglinski's evidence

8 on this, please.

9 MR. IVETIC: I believe he testified about it multiple times. I

10 don't have a page reference for it. I can remove the reference to

11 Mr. Ciaglinski and just say am I correct if that would move things along.

12 Q. General, am I correct that the documents that were in this burning

13 heap included completed application forms for both passports and ID

14 documents as well as ID documents?

15 A. Well, that's quite possible. I mean, let me --

16 Q. You were there. Did you see those?

17 A. Please let me put this in context. First of all, I was with

18 Ciaglinski. He and I were a team together at this stage because we were

19 attached to NATO. I was no longer chief of operations of the OSCE

20 mission. I was attached to NATO KFOR as a liaison officer and Ciaglinski

21 was there with me and that was it; we were a team of two. He drew my

22 attention to the burning heap of documents, and therefore I assume he

23 would have got there first, seen it, and then said, You need to come and

24 see this. So I went there. So it's perfectly possible that he saw it

25 first on his own and then he went and got me. I think that's probably

Page 7995

1 what happened.

2 Q. My question is: Did that heap of documents include completed

3 application forms for passports and ID documents?

4 A. It may have done; it may have included shopping lists. But it did

5 include some identity papers.

6 Q. All right. Now, Colonel Ciaglinski testified that he removed some

7 exemplars of these documents and safe-guarded them, and then gave them to

8 you for further safekeeping. Is that true; and if so, where are these

9 documents and why have they not been turned over to the Tribunal?

10 A. Because the Tribunal didn't exist in its current form in June

11 1999. I turned them over to the security detachment of the headquarters

12 Ace Rapid Reaction Corps, which was KFOR, which was the appropriate

13 authority in the chain of command I was in at the time, and you would need

14 to ask them.

15 Q. I take it you don't know what happened thereafter to them?

16 A. No, I haven't a clue.

17 Q. Okay. Now, did you have occasion, either from your own

18 observations or through the translator, to determine whether in fact the

19 identification documents you examined from the pile, what time period they

20 were from. Were they current? Were they old? Expired?

21 A. It's my recollection that the ones we looked at that had dates of

22 birth on them had dates of birth around the 1950s. That was as much

23 examination as we did.

24 Q. Did they have anything on the cover? Did they say SFR Yugoslavia

25 in Cyrillic and Latin script?

Page 7996

1 A. I cannot remember. Most of the script was Cyrillic I seem to

2 remember, but I cannot remember the exact details and these papers were

3 pretty charred. We didn't go through the whole thing. We looked at it,

4 realised what we believed them to be, and reported it to those who were in

5 a better position to do something about it.

6 Q. All right. I've just one more area to ask you about, and I think

7 I can probably condense it to one question. General, upon the withdrawal

8 of the KVM from Kosovo-Metohija, I understand that on March the 27th,

9 1999, at one of the locations within Djakovica, where the KVM had been

10 billeted and based, among the equipment left behind radio locators were

11 discovered with radio locator antennas. Now, it is my understanding that

12 these devices are used to mark targets, that is to say, they are left by

13 targets, and then at some point in time later they are activated so as to

14 guide missiles and bombs and other ordnance to the target. What was the

15 KVM using these devices for, if you know?

16 A. I have not got the foggiest notion.

17 Q. Thank you, general, for your time.

18 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I am finished with this witness.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

20 Mr. O'Sullivan.

21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: No questions.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

23 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Re-examination by Mr. Marcussen:

25 Q. General Drewienkiewicz, I just have some few questions to clarify

Page 7997

1 some matters that have come up during cross-examination. Maybe I should

2 start with some of the things that have been discussed today. Now, did

3 the KVM request a base-line from the MUP?

4 A. Yes, I'm sure we did.

5 Q. Did you receive one?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did you try through other means to then establish the information

8 you felt was needed for you to get a replacement for a base-line sent

9 through?

10 A. Yes, by going out and looking, but it was much more difficult with

11 MUP than with military because they go around in ones and twos or threes

12 and fours, not in formed units. So they were a much more difficult set of

13 people to track. And you heard I had hardly any policemen to do it with.

14 Q. What kind of information would you have expected -- what kind of

15 information should there have been in the MUP base-line so that it could

16 serve its purpose in your view?

17 A. Well, what we would have very much liked to have been given would

18 have been a list -- first of all, a schematic of the chain of command so

19 that we knew who was in charge at every location; what the locations were;

20 what their state of manning was; and what, if any, were the heavy weapons

21 that were at each of those locations, and we didn't receive any of that.

22 And, indeed, also the details of rotation of police in and out of Kosovo,

23 because that was going on, we were aware that people in some cases came

24 into Kosovo for about three weeks on detached duty from the

25 rest of Serbia and then returned to Serbia.

Page 7998

1 Q. And just to clarify, were you ever told that the KDOM had received

2 any information about the MUP that would serve as a base-line?

3 A. No. We were told, Oh, that has all been handed over, and I would

4 say, So to whom? Oh, it's all been handed over. That was the detail we

5 were given.

6 Q. Even if you had been told that there were 10.021 MUP personnel in

7 Kosovo, would that have been a base-line?

8 A. No, we would have wanted to know which locations they were

9 operating out of in -- in what strength. And we would want to know, as I

10 mentioned, what the rotation was so that it was not possible to add or

11 subtract hundreds of policemen to or from this figure, simply by driving

12 extra people in. We would expect to have known that when there was a

13 rotation that 40 -- a bus load was going out and a bus load were coming in

14 and that was the sort of information we never got. So it may have been a

15 1.021 but it could have been 1.121 a week later for all we knew.

16 Q. Were efforts made by -- to your knowledge, were efforts made by

17 the KVM to establish, for example, how many police stations there were in

18 Kosovo and their location?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Could you explain how that determination -- how you tried to reach

21 a determination of this issue?

22 A. Well, by driving around and observing from the outside, because I

23 must also make the point that police stations were another place where we

24 weren't allowed in routinely.

25 Q. Now, I'd like to -- if you would have a look at Exhibit P667,

Page 7999

1 please, if you can call that up.

2 Are you able to see this document?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Now, is this a --

5 MR. MARCUSSEN: If we can go down to see who signed the document.

6 Q. Do you know the gentleman who signed the -- this document?

7 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic --

9 THE WITNESS: Not specifically. I know he was on the

10 distribution --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you hold on, please.

12 MR. IVETIC: I don't know if this document was used in direct or

13 cross. I'm a little surprised it's being used in re-direct now.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

15 MR. MARCUSSEN: I would submit, one, that it was one of the

16 documents that I undertook to make submissions on the relevancy of later

17 on. I think it was that we would -- yeah, I would make written

18 submissions on the relevancy. The reason I'm putting it to the witness

19 now is there's been an issue whether or not the MUP assisted KVM,

20 providing information. What this document shows is that KVM was trying to

21 get information about the number of police stations in a certain area;

22 that information was forthcoming, and then it turned out when the KVM went

23 out in a certain area to see what the situation was on the ground they

24 found additional police stations. So I think it's relevant to the issue

25 of cooperation that has been raised by --

Page 8000

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you've now told the witness what you expect

2 him to tell us.

3 MR. MARCUSSEN: Well, I think it follows from the document really.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: -- Which isn't ideal.

5 MR. MARCUSSEN: I apologise for that.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: On the other hand, the approach that you're taking

7 seems perfectly legitimate, and you should be allowed to follow this line

8 since it arises out of a matter in cross-examination.

9 THE WITNESS: I think the date is significant, if we look at the

10 date. If you scroll up to see the date.


12 Q. The 16th of March.

13 A. Yes. So what you're seeing from this is that as late as the 16th

14 of March, we were still trying to find out what the base-line was. We

15 evacuated four days later, so if this is to be shown as a shining example

16 of MUP cooperation, I would say it came a little late, sir.

17 Q. What I was --

18 MR. MARCUSSEN: Can we scroll down to the bottom again so we can

19 see the signature block and the distribution list. Could we go -- at

20 least on my copy we cannot see the left part of -- thank you.

21 Q. Now, who is Kessler?

22 A. Kessler is the deputy head of mission who was responsible for

23 policing, to whom I handed over as many of my policing responsibilities

24 or -- of the responsibilities that I'd taken on over policing as quickly

25 as I could as soon as he arrived, which was late January or maybe early

Page 8001

1 February. I was extremely pleased to see him.

2 Q. And we already talked about who Heaslip was. Now, in the two

3 paragraphs, there's one paragraph that begins with in regional centre --

4 well, in RC-5, and there's a description of reporting on a number of

5 police stations. And then in the next -- in the next paragraph there's a

6 description of the KVM finding some additional police stations upon an

7 inspection.

8 Now, to your recollection, is -- does this reflect the way you

9 carried out your operations at the time in order to try to establish a

10 base-line? You would go to a place and be given information and then you

11 would go out and inspect for yourself?

12 A. That was how we ended up having to do it. The ideal would have

13 been to have received this from someone in the chain of command, higher up

14 in the chain of command, which we could have distributed. This is an

15 extremely labour-intensive way of doing it.

16 Q. Now, are you satisfied that this document is a correct description

17 of -- would be a correct description of what happened at the time?

18 A. Well, I do have to say I hadn't seen the document before. I do

19 recall a conversation in which extra police stations were described as

20 popping up, but I didn't focus on it at the time.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, I'd like to move over to another thing which is

22 related to an exhibit which is not on -- which hasn't been used in direct

23 and hasn't been used in cross-examination.

24 MR. MARCUSSEN: So maybe before I get into that I should inform

25 the Court why I'm doing this. An issue has been raised about the

Page 8002

1 gentleman that the witness said he saw wearing these grey all covers or

2 whatever the term was and I would like to show -- ask the witness first

3 whether or not he remembers these gentlemen had -- were wearing any

4 insignia or patches.

5 THE WITNESS: I remember noting that they were wearing sewn-on

6 patches on to their -- on to their coveralls, and these patches, I recall,

7 had the usual colours of red, white, and blue and either wings or daggers

8 on them.


10 Q. If I were to show you some patches, do you think you might be able

11 to recognise the patch if you see it?

12 A. I'll have a go.

13 MR. MARCUSSEN: Could we see Exhibit P1323, please. Okay.

14 Q. Did the patch you see resemble any of these?

15 A. I don't think it did, no.

16 MR. MARCUSSEN: Can we see the -- that's interesting. I thought

17 there would have been a second page to this exhibit; that's obviously

18 wrong.

19 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.

20 MR. MARCUSSEN: There is another one.

21 Q. Did the patch resemble any of these ones?

22 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, why don't we have an exhibit with the

23 colour of the uniforms since that's what was discussed in direct and in

24 cross. I think that this type of fishing expedition is a little bit

25 improper.

Page 8003

1 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by an exhibit with the colour of

2 the uniforms?

3 MR. IVETIC: The witness testified that he saw uniforms of a

4 specific colour and a specific appearance.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: He also has mentioned in response to questions just

6 now patches and there's no reason why this cannot be pursued.

7 MR. IVETIC: All right. That's fine.

8 THE WITNESS: The only one it resembles, to the best of my

9 recollection, is the bottom right-hand one, the one marked 13.


11 Q. The one marked 13, but you're not able to say whether this is

12 actually the one?

13 A. No.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, is the film that you were going to

15 present in the system?

16 MR. IVETIC: It is not, Your Honour, that is why I couldn't

17 present it.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I was about to ask for it to be shown to the

19 witness. It would be very helpful to us if that were to happen so we're

20 not left in a state of --

21 MR. IVETIC: I intend to use it with Maisonneuve who's coming.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll appreciate that the point will undoubtedly

23 be devalued if this witness has not had an opportunity to look at it.

24 MR. IVETIC: It is a video that was utilised in the opening

25 statements that I was not able to track down. I've found a web link last

Page 8004

1 night that had it on the internet but I do not have a copy that I would be

2 able to use today.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Something I don't like about the procedure here is

4 that the Defence don't have any obligations to intimate their lists of

5 witnesses or exhibits prior to the conclusion of the Prosecution case, and

6 that's what gives rise to this situation which is a very unfortunate

7 situation. Exhibits of this nature should be -- in an ideal situation,

8 would be available for the Prosecution and the Judges to put to the

9 witness to help with clarification of the point. So it's a matter for you

10 because the Rules don't oblige you to do it, but it would greatly assist

11 us if material of this nature that's going to be referred to later was in

12 the system when the witness being challenged is giving evidence. If the

13 Defence don't want to put it then they're not obliged to either, but it

14 would help the party -- the Judges to be able to do it themselves.

15 Mr. Marcussen.

16 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'd just like a clarification at page 61, line

17 6. I thought I had heard the witness answer not the one marked 13 but the

18 transcript shows him saying the one marked 13.

19 THE WITNESS: I said the one marked 13.


21 THE WITNESS: The bottom right-hand one.

22 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Very well.

23 THE WITNESS: Sorry.


25 Q. Sorry, General, I'm going back to the base-line just for one

Page 8005

1 question. You were asked at page 25, line 6, today whether you were aware

2 of any mistakes being made in the reporting regarding the MUP because of

3 the lack of experienced policemen among your verifiers. The kind of

4 information you needed for the base-line that you explained, so a list of

5 equipment, locations, these sort of things, would that kind of information

6 be something that somebody with a military background could also take in

7 your view?

8 A. Well, in my view, yes, because it was about chains of command and

9 equipment and numbers and those sort of aspects are common to all of these

10 sort of organisations.

11 Q. Now, I'll now move back to some issues that arise from the

12 evidence yesterday. My learned friend Mr. Sepenuk asked you some

13 questions that I'd like to seek some clarification on. At paragraph -- at

14 page 7924, lines 3 through 17, you were being asked about the meeting that

15 occurred on the 27th of November with Ojdanic. And I'll read out a

16 question for you. What was being said there was: "During your briefing

17 or the proofing that you had with Mr. Marcussen and others, in that

18 supplemental statement little paragraph E you said: 'During the meeting

19 on 25th November,' it's actually I think a mistake. I think it means the

20 27th November. Let's assume that during the meeting of 27th of December

21 [sic] General Ojdanic did not say no to KVM inspectors and you left the

22 meeting with him saying that the next meeting would be with the Pristina

23 Corps to implement further details regarding inspections to establish a

24 base-line, but you did not receive the information you wanted because it

25 turned out that there was a difference of interpretation between the OSCE

Page 8006

1 and the Serbian political leadership as to what was required under the

2 agreement. Do you recall that?"

3 And you answered: "Yes."

4 Now, just to clarify for your sake, what is referred to as a

5 supplemental statement is -- well, we call it a supplemental information

6 sheet, but it's not an actual statement so I don't think that was being

7 suggested. But we have tried to give the Defence a record of some issues

8 that have come up during proofing. Now, in the operational part of this

9 supplemental information sheet it actually reads as follows: "During the

10 meeting on 25th," that should be 27th, "but during the meeting on the 25th

11 of November, 1998, see paragraph 63, General Ojdanic did not say no to KVM

12 inspections. General Drewienkiewicz left the meeting with General Ojdanic

13 thinking that the next meeting would be with the Pristina Corps to

14 implement further details" --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Would you kindly slow down for the sake of

16 interpreters.

17 MR. MARCUSSEN: My apologies. "General Drewienkiewicz left the

18 meeting with General Ojdanic, thinking that the next meeting would be with

19 the Pristina Corps to implement further details regarding the inspections

20 to establish a base-line. At the meeting on 9th December 1998, see

21 paragraph 81, however, Sainovic refused to allow KVM to carry out

22 inspections."

23 Q. So now my question is this: The difference between the two

24 summaries you say in proofing is whether or not there was a -- you have

25 knowledge of a difference of interpretation between the OSCE and the

Page 8007

1 political leadership or whether you simply came to the meeting on the 9th

2 and found out that Sainovic was refusing the KVM to carry out inspections.

3 So --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you have information that -- is it your evidence that the

6 dispute was between the OSCE and the Serbian political leadership

7 exclusively?

8 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

10 MR. SEPENUK: I really think he answered that question. He said

11 yes. That was the question. He answered it yes. And I don't know where

12 the confusion is. I don't think this is proper re-direct examination.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --

14 MR. MARCUSSEN: There were --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Anything else?

16 MR. SEPENUK: That's all, Your Honour.

17 MR. MARCUSSEN: With respect, Your Honour, the -- something was

18 being put to the witness as being his statement, which included things

19 that -- I mean might be flowing from the summary of his statement but

20 isn't from the statement. I'm trying to clarify what the witness's

21 evidence is on this point.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I admire the witness's mental agility if he's

23 still with you. Why couldn't you just ask the question at line 8 which

24 you've asked without going over all this?

25 MR. MARCUSSEN: I'll ask --

Page 8008

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that not the point that you want answered and

2 with respect to Mr. Sepenuk's objection I repel that because I think the

3 question is admissible.


5 Q. General -- well, maybe we should go about it in a different way.

6 General, do you know who decided that you could not - and "you" meaning

7 the KVM - could not carry out inspections as you wished to do them?

8 A. The information was given to the head of mission with me there by

9 Mr. Sainovic who, as far as we were aware, and we had certainly been led

10 to believe, represented the Serbian government. So he was there as the

11 representative of the Serbian government and he said, No inspections,

12 among other things. He didn't talk about interpretations; he said: No

13 inspections. There will be no inspections.

14 Q. And do you know whether anybody from the military was against

15 inspections or not?

16 A. At that meeting, by his body language, I got the firm impression

17 that General Loncar was as surprised as we were. I was later told, I

18 think by General Loncar, that the message had come from the General Staff

19 in Belgrade but I never attempted to verify that.

20 Q. Would it be a fair interpretation of that answer to say you don't

21 know what the position of General Ojdanic was on this issue or

22 General Pavkovic?

23 A. Yes, I think -- I have no direct evidence, nobody -- neither of

24 them ever said those things to me, no.

25 Q. Now, following this question from Mr. Sepenuk, you were asked

Page 8009

1 about paragraph 65 and 66 of your statement, and maybe you would want to

2 just remind yourself of what's in those paragraphs. If you -- do you

3 still have the statement?

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. It is about the --

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. -- noted issue. You said that you didn't fully recollect these

8 things and would need to consult your notes. Did you bring your notes

9 with you to The Hague?

10 A. I didn't. I had a look to see -- I looked through what I have for

11 December with me, and I only brought about 10 kilos with me this time and

12 I didn't bring my notebooks with me and I think it's in my notebooks.

13 Q. What I would like -- the thing is that we have actually as a

14 Defence exhibit these notebooks. It is D -- sorry, it's 3D412. It's a

15 rather big exhibit, but the relevant parts -- I've excerpted part of this

16 which is pages 310 to pages 324.

17 MR. MARCUSSEN: Maybe the usher would be kind enough to assist and

18 give the witness a copy of this.

19 Q. General, what I'd -- is this one of your notebooks?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, the entry -- we have the first page of the notebook, book 3.

22 And if you go to the second page there's an entry -- I think it's from the

23 24th of November. I see we actually have it in e-court as well.

24 A. Yeah.

25 MR. MARCUSSEN: If we could go to the next page, please, sorry,

Page 8010

1 in -- for e-court. I think we'll -- in e-court I think we got to a wrong

2 page.

3 THE WITNESS: I think this -- the one I've --


5 Q. You have something different --

6 A. I've got something completely different. I'm blessed if I know

7 what that one's from.

8 Q. I think we can deal with it -- this in a different way. Could you

9 look through the pages that I have provided to you.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. And tell me whether those pages are your notes covering before the

12 meeting on the 27th, of the 27th, and after the 27th, so basically these

13 are the notes from the relevant period in time.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, am I correct that there are no notes that you made during the

16 meetings in your handwriting from the meeting there are no notes?

17 A. If you go to R0161462, you can see that there's typed stuff that

18 was there when I went in, then there is some heavy handwritten stuff that

19 I'm pretty sure I wrote before we went in and then there's some other

20 stuff that I was writing at the time as we had the meeting. So there's

21 bits of -- there's different bits of it, I'm afraid.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 MR. MARCUSSEN: I should just explain to the Court that's looking

24 on something that looks rather mystical I think on the screen right now

25 that I think there's been an error in the way this exhibit was scanned in

Page 8011

1 the Defence. We have forwarded some clean pages of this which actually

2 have the proper text on it. So we will have -- if the Defence agrees to

3 update this particular exhibit in e-court we will have a proper copy later

4 on in the system.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: What is your question?


7 Q. My question is this: I think it was being suggested that because

8 there was no records -- well, I'm getting to the question now.

9 General, I think the point that was made yesterday is that it

10 doesn't say "noted" anywhere on this.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. I take it that apart from the things you have written in your

13 handwriting during the meeting, there was a lot of other things being said

14 at the meeting that is not noted down here?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, when you made your statement in 2000, you said that

17 General Ojdanic had said that these issues were noted, were you making the

18 statement on the basis of your memory of the meeting rather than on the

19 basis of your notes. Is that possible?

20 A. Yes, but I'm pretty sure that he said "noted" because --

21 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I'm going to object to this.

22 Yesterday he clearly said that this paragraph -- I put the whole paragraph

23 to him and he said: Yes, this is one of the few instances -- at least I

24 said this is one of the few instances where you may have gotten it wrong,

25 sir. And he said: Yes, I may have gotten it wrong. And I'm not sure of

Page 8012

1 the purpose of the questioning now, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk, the fact that the matter may come out

3 differently in re-examination is not a cause for not admitting the

4 evidence. What is your objection?

5 MR. SEPENUK: That he's testified to this and I don't -- and I

6 don't see the point of re-direct examination. I don't think it's proper

7 under these circumstances.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: That is the whole point of re-direct on points that

9 he's testified on to clarify them if there's a legitimate point to be

10 clarified. On the face of it this is one now that we see the state of the

11 notebook, at least the copy that's been scanned into --

12 MR. SEPENUK: Which has very resemblance to what we have, I might

13 say. The chicken scratchings there and what not is --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: And indeed, in fairness the witness has the

15 original in front of him.

16 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: So it may be clearer for him.

18 MR. MARCUSSEN: I think it is --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: However, just before we move on, I can't see that

20 this is objectionable; it's a matter that can be resolved by comment in

21 due course when we come to review the evidence. It is important,

22 Mr. Marcussen, that you ask open questions. That's the only observation I

23 have to make.

24 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Please let's get this -- let's get to the point

Page 8013

1 quickly.

2 MR. MARCUSSEN: No -- well, I think we are at a point where I can

3 simply ask the question.

4 Q. Is it your recollection, after having actually been shown your

5 notes from the relevant periods, and maybe having thought about it

6 overnight --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: That sounds like a leading question coming. Let's

8 interrupt it before you make it such.


10 Q. General, paragraph 65 of your statement, does that correctly

11 reflect your memory --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a leading question. If you want an answer

13 to something that you seek to use in contradiction of evidence given in

14 cross-examination, you will have to ask an open question.

15 [Prosecution counsel confer]


17 Q. If you remember, what did Ojdanic say at the meeting when you put

18 forward the request to be able to verify -- carry out inspections in

19 barracks and in other locations?

20 A. Well, he didn't say yes and he didn't say no; and frankly, I

21 wouldn't have expected him to. He said -- I mean, the word "noted" is

22 shorthand for, you know, let's look at it. He didn't say "no." I didn't

23 come out of that meeting feeling that I had had a completely hopeless

24 meeting. It -- my impression of it at the time was that it gave me the --

25 the green light to go to the next level in his chain of command and open

Page 8014

1 discussions with them, which was really the whole purpose of -- of the

2 meeting. And because he'd only just taken over, I didn't expect him to be

3 as forthcoming as perhaps his predecessor might have been, who had been in

4 the job for quite a while.

5 Q. Thank you. And the next passage of cross-examination yesterday

6 concerned the next paragraph in your statement. Do you remember what

7 General Ojdanic said about the rotation of VJ in and out of Kosovo?

8 A. He -- he made the point that they did do rotations, that it was

9 normal business, it was part of being a conscript army, and that we were

10 welcome to monitor those change-overs, to make sure that everybody

11 understood that a certain number were coming in and a certain number were

12 going out, and there was no net difference. Now, that was a proposal -- I

13 think that was as far as we probably got with that one at the time. And I

14 think my paragraph 66 I don't think is completely accurate at this stage,

15 looking back on it. I think it was relayed to me that it had been refused

16 later, and I think I said that yesterday.

17 Q. Yeah. Thank you.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't recollect you saying that yesterday, but

19 perhaps you'd -- I mean my note is quite clear that Mr. Ojdanic did

20 indicate a willingness to look at this issue at the time, which is quite

21 different from what is said in the statement. But I don't recollect you

22 saying that you later heard it had been refused. Now, have I missed that

23 yesterday, do you think?

24 THE WITNESS: With huge respect, I think you may have done so.


Page 8015

1 MR. SEPENUK: If I may, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please, Mr. Sepenuk.

3 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, that was clarified by the General yesterday

4 that it was not General Ojdanic who gave any comment. The comment that it

5 was refused by General Ojdanic is simply not so. The General testified

6 yesterday that that message was relayed to him by General Loncar as coming

7 from General Ojdanic.

8 THE WITNESS: I think that's right.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That does complete the picture for me.

10 MR. MARCUSSEN: It is at page 7926, lines 5 to 25.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 Now, do you have other issues to explore?

13 MR. MARCUSSEN: I have a few. Maybe it's time for a break?

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it is time. We have to break again for

16 reasons which, no doubt, have been explained to you. So could you leave

17 the courtroom again, but we're going to restrict this break to 20 minutes

18 since we had a longer one earlier.

19 THE WITNESS: Thanks.

20 [The witness stands down]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll resume at just after ten minutes to.

22 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.

24 [The witness takes the stand]

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

Page 8016

1 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you.

2 Q. General, yesterday Mr. Ackerman discussed with you how you

3 conduct -- rather, how terrorists sometimes operate and he mentioned -- or

4 he asked you whether it was a common tactic that they would operate from,

5 he called it, civilian enclaves and then leave and then go out and then

6 claim that there had been an attack on civilians. He asked: Is that a

7 common tactic; and you said: Yes. My question is, as we have been

8 discussing tactics and you might offer some insight on this: What kind of

9 tactics do you employ as being the law enforcement side of this kind of a

10 conflict to avoid these sort of claims by the insurgent side?

11 A. Well, you --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on, please. Again we have an objection.

13 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

15 MR. IVETIC: I believe that the witness testified in

16 cross-examination that he did not have any kind of training in police

17 work. I believe that is what is law enforcement, so I don't know how you

18 can ask him for what kind of tactics one would employ if the gentleman is

19 not trained in that area and said that he did not have any personal

20 experience in that area. So I think that it's an improper question. It's

21 an area that calls for speculation.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I have to say I don't understand the

23 question. Can you clarify what it is you're actually trying to ask.

24 MR. MARCUSSEN: Maybe I can clarify it.

25 Q. General, as -- how would the authorities of a sovereign state

Page 8017

1 conduct operations so as to avoid or minimise allegations by civilian --

2 by the insurgent forces that they had been attacking civilians?

3 A. First of all, I would say that I do feel that I can answer this

4 because this isn't police work necessarily, it's work that armies do get

5 called in to do in aid of the civil power. In those circumstances, the --

6 the principles you use are minimum necessary force and operating within

7 the law. And as, perhaps, an illustration. In the time that the British

8 Army has been in Northern Ireland since 1969, I'm not aware that we have

9 ever used artillery. We've never used aircraft, launched weapons, nor

10 have we ever used tank main armament in any of these circumstances.

11 They've always been long-barrelled weapons, rifles, that have been used or

12 at -- at best, a machine-gun. But generally, when someone fires a lethal

13 weapon, every round is recorded, and you have to account for every round.

14 And so it's a much more constrained sort of operation than the sort of

15 operations that we witnessed -- that I witnessed.

16 Q. Thank you. Another issue we have touched upon - and I think that

17 was both yesterday and today - is the extension of the border zone from

18 500 metres to 5 kilometres and then to 10 kilometres. From a military

19 perspective -- from a military perspective does it make a difference

20 whether the border zone is 5 or 10 kilometres?

21 A. Yes, it makes life easier for the people trying to police the

22 border because if you have the bigger border zone you have, you can enact

23 legislation so that people have to have a reason to be in that border

24 zone. So it's a great help to the forces of law and order. But if you go

25 out 10 kilometres from the border in Kosovo, you're up against some quite

Page 8018

1 substantial settlements that would need to be subject to that regime as

2 well. So it would have been very difficult to operate it. I think there

3 are areas where the main Prizren to Pec, the north-south road in that

4 area, I think that runs within 10 kilometres of the border on occasion.

5 So it would cut that. So it would be a very difficult one to enforce, but

6 it would make the life of the people trying to police the border quite a

7 lot easier, yes.

8 Q. If your concern were a NATO force ground invasion, would it make a

9 difference?

10 A. Yes, yes, because you could -- I mean, you could in theory move

11 everybody out of that border exclusion zone who lived in it. There is no

12 end to the things you could do in an exclusion zone once you've declared

13 it.

14 Q. Did -- how did the extension of the border zone affect the KVM?

15 A. Well, we learned of it through I think Bo Pellnas in Belgrade who

16 obtained a copy of the relevant Official Gazette, but we were very

17 surprised that no one had formally discussed it with us because clearly it

18 was going to make a big impact on the way we did our business. And one

19 would have thought -- would certainly have required discussion if not

20 amendment to the various agreements.

21 Q. But what was the impact, if any, on the way you conducted or could

22 conduct your operations?

23 A. Well, we -- we discussed it and we agreed that since we hadn't

24 been consulted we weren't going to obey it. So we just got on with it.

25 Q. And were you, indeed, allowed to get on with it?

Page 8019

1 A. No, we were stopped much more in that border zone and harassed a

2 lot more. So life became a lot more difficult in trying to work out what

3 was happening inside that border zone -- yeah.

4 Q. To the extent that you were able to move in the border zone, did

5 you notice whether the extension of the border zone had any impact on the

6 population in the area?

7 A. We didn't see people formally being moved out from villages to the

8 best of my recollection.

9 Q. Okay. Now, my last few questions concern something that came up

10 during Mr. Cepic's cross-examination. You were asked about Podujevo and

11 there was an exchange which related to whether or not the KLA had ever

12 taken Podujevo itself, and you said to your knowledge that had never

13 happened. And then you said - and just for the reference it is at page

14 7938, lines 18 to 22 - you said: "What was happening in February and

15 March was not what was happening in November/December. We were not trying

16 to verify" -- sorry. "We were not trying to verify an agreement of

17 October anymore. We were trying to hang on to the situation and stop it

18 erupting into a full-scale war, so it was a quite different situation."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, first, are you talking here about the time around Rambouillet

21 and Paris talks? Is that around the time?

22 A. While Rambouillet was going on, certainly at the start the level

23 of violence did reduce substantially, and we noted that. Yes. And then

24 from let us say the end of the third week of February, it started to stoke

25 up again. And the situation then got considerably more exciting.

Page 8020

1 Q. So that would have been after the end of Rambouillet?

2 A. Well, Rambouillet sort of droned on and on. It stopped and they

3 agreed to reconvene, and I would need to check but the main negotiations

4 stalled after about ten days. There was then an agreement to meet again,

5 and that happened I think in about the first week of March but I would --

6 I could easily be wrong by several days on either side. But once the main

7 talks at Rambouillet had stalled, things got -- things hotted up again.

8 Q. And in paragraph 87 of your statement -- sorry, 187, you discuss

9 this issue of leaving feet on the ground and we get into this 15 companies

10 issue. Was that around this time as well or was it at a different time?

11 A. No it was earlier. I would say that that was -- I would say that

12 was around mid-January where I think I sort of wrote down somewhere we

13 seem to be detecting a pattern which is that something happens, there is a

14 large army and police force detached to wherever the place is, it deals

15 with it, but not all people go back to barracks, they leave a foot on the

16 ground. And these feet on the ground became the force that I described as

17 15 companies.

18 Q. Now, going back to what I quoted before: "We were not trying to

19 verify an agreement of October anymore. We were trying to hang on to the

20 situation and stop it erupting into a full-scale war." What was that war

21 between?

22 A. Between the -- the Yugoslav forces and the KLA.

23 Q. Was there also a concern -- was there -- was it also a concern

24 that that would lead to the involvement of NATO?

25 A. Yes.

Page 8021

1 Q. So what did you do in practical terms to try to avoid this

2 eruption of war?

3 A. Well, I would say that my statement about hanging on to the

4 situation really reflects our attitude from -- from early January or even

5 mid-December onwards. We were conscious that if we could continue to be

6 present, that we were, to the greatest degree possible, a group that were

7 able to damp down the situations and act as an interlocutor between the

8 two sides. And we felt if we could buy the time for negotiation then it

9 was still possible to come to a settlement through diplomatic means and we

10 were all very passionate about wanting that and not letting small

11 incidents escalate to the degree that NATO, which of course still had its

12 activation order still uncancelled, did not -- did not get to a point

13 where it felt the need to intervene through its activation order. And

14 there were certainly sabre-rattling sounds from NATO on occasion that we

15 hoped by being there we could avoid this thing becoming a shooting war.

16 Q. Would I be interpreting this correctly to say that at this point

17 in time the KVM was trying to do its best to avoid a conflict between the

18 forces of the FRY and Serbia and NATO? Was that one aspect of what was

19 going on?

20 A. Yes, to avoid situations arising which could be interpreted in a

21 way that NATO felt its mandate allowed it to intervene.

22 Q. Did you tell any of your contacts on the Serbian side of these

23 attempts and of your concerns?

24 A. I think so. I think I did, but I obviously had to be fairly

25 circumspect about the extent to which I was criticising another

Page 8022

1 international organisation.

2 Q. Do you think that the efforts of the KVM did actually succeed

3 in -- in delaying the escalation?

4 A. Yes, I think we bought time.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I have no further questions for the

7 witness.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Marcussen.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Drewienkiewicz, that completes your evidence to

11 us. Thank you for coming again to the Tribunal to give evidence and to

12 help our investigations. You're now free to leave.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

14 [The witness withdrew]

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.

16 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honour, while we're waiting for the next

17 witness to be coming on --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, don't bring any witness in until I say that

19 that's appropriate. If you have something to deal with, we'll deal with

20 it quite separately.

21 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you.

22 Simply, at page 5174 Mr. Petrovic raised a concern about the

23 translation of Exhibit P1335. All I want to say is we have gotten a new

24 translation of this document, which has been uploaded into e-court. And

25 the issue that Mr. Petrovic pointed out -- sorry, we are going to put it

Page 8023

1 up into the system. We're going to leave the two translations there, but

2 we want to avoid creating two separate exhibits. So there are going to be

3 two English translations of this document in e-court. I'm saying this on

4 record so that when one searches for this particular exhibit, this

5 explanation is going to come up. I don't think I need to belabour the

6 point anymore and waste time on it.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, which one are we supposed to have regard to?

8 MR. MARCUSSEN: In the first translation there was a -- between

9 two slashes, there was an explanation of what something meant, whether an

10 authority was to act on behalf of a Crisis Staff, and the issue was

11 whether or not this document actually was an authority to -- a bank-type

12 document giving authority to a person to access a bank account. That is

13 actually what the document is. I can read -- it's just one paragraph.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: No -- well, it's completely out of context here.

15 It's a matter that parties should try to resolve themselves, and if there

16 is an issue here which can't be resolved then you'll need to make a filing

17 or, alternatively, tell us quite simply which translation you're advancing

18 as the correct one. It's for you to deal with these matters and put your

19 position to us and now's not the time for that. There are mechanisms for

20 dealing with these things. If they can be dealt with by discussion and

21 e-mail, fine; if they can't be that way, you'll have to make a filing to

22 deal with it.

23 MR. MARCUSSEN: There is no issue, it's just so the record is

24 clear that there are two translations but point taken. Thank you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: So who is the next witness? Mr. Stamp.

Page 8024

1 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President, Your Honours, the

2 next witness is K64 for whom I'd like to start by making an application

3 for the withdrawal of protective measures which had been granted before.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that all protective measures including the --

5 MR. STAMP: All of them.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry?

7 MR. STAMP: All of them.


9 MR. STAMP: Voice distortion, image distortion, and a pseudonym.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So the name of the witness is?

11 MR. STAMP: Ljubinko Cvetic.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you spell the last name?

13 MR. STAMP: C-v-e-t-i-c with a half diacritic on the last C.

14 MR. VISNJIC: Your Honour, I think we are in public session.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there any problem over that in the

16 circumstances?

17 Mr. Fila.

18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before the witness enters

19 court I should like to raise a problem before the Chamber. I have

20 consulted others as well when this problem is raised the witness should

21 not be present. This concerns Exhibit P1468.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Please carry on.

23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] This is a Prosecution exhibit, a

24 Prosecution exhibit 1468. In the break I tried to ask Mr. Stamp, I,

25 Mr. Petrovic, did whether they would be using it or not. At the time he

Page 8025

1 didn't know so I don't know now. If he wants to use it, I have a series

2 of objections to raise in regard to the usability of this document. If

3 you took a good look these are some notes --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]...

5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Frankly speaking I haven't got a clue.

6 It says meetings of the joint command but the author is -- you can't see

7 the source of the document, the page numbers. I have -- I don't know

8 whether this is an entire document, who prepared it, nothing is indicated,

9 and then I can see that the witness who is coming has not attended any of

10 these meetings. That means that there is some other documents, perhaps,

11 that have not been signed which Mr. Stamp wants to exhibit but they are

12 printed and you can see these details. This cropped up from I don't know

13 where. This is somebody's handwriting. I don't know whether all the

14 pages are there, whether it is a document in its entirety. You cannot

15 just bring any old manuscripts here and say this is an exhibit. In

16 particular you cannot present it to a witness who was never there. So

17 this is my concern because in that way you can present anything you want

18 so that is my objection to the usability of this exhibit. If he wants to

19 use it will he please inform us what it really is.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.

21 MR. STAMP: It is my understanding that the objection might be a

22 little premature. I could indicate that we have no present intention of

23 using this document, having spoken to the witness recently.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Let's bring the witness in.

25 MR. STAMP: Just to be absolutely clear no intention of using the

Page 8026

1 document with this witness.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes, yes, indeed. And while the usher is

3 bringing the witness, I confirm that the various protective measures

4 granted in this case are revoked, in particular, the pseudonym and the

5 voice and image distortion.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 [The witness entered court]

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Good evening, Mr. Cvetic.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Will you please make the solemn declaration to

11 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be placed

12 before you.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

14 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

16 Mr. Cvetic, the various counsel here -- please feel free to adjust

17 these headphones yourself. If they are uncomfortable, just try to adjust

18 them to make them comfortable. Various counsel here have questions for

19 you, and the first person to ask questions will be on behalf of the

20 Prosecution, and that is Mr. Stamp.

21 Mr. Stamp.

22 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Mr. President.


24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

25 Examination by Mr. Stamp:

Page 8027

1 Q. Mr. Cvetic, could you please tell us your full name and state your

2 occupation, please.

3 A. My name is Ljubinko Cvetic, and currently I am a pensioner.

4 Q. Now, I understand, Mr. Cvetic, that in 1990 you were appointed the

5 head of the SUP for the jurisdiction of Kragujevac. Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Just tell us what does the acronym "SUP" stand for.

8 A. Secretariat of the Interior.

9 Q. And can you tell us when you retired from the police.

10 A. On the 30th of March this year.

11 Q. Now, do I understand it to be correct that you were the head of

12 the SUP of Kosovska Mitrovica from January 1997 until the 28th of April,

13 1999?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. Thank you. Now, before we look at the time when you were the head

16 of the SUP of Kosovska Mitrovica, can I just take you back to the period

17 when you were head of the SUP of Kragujevac. Can you recall initiating an

18 investigation into an incident in March of 1993 involving a senior member

19 of the MUP?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Who was that member, if you could just tell us the name, please.

22 A. Mr. Vlastimir Djordjevic.

23 Q. And the investigation was in respect to what possible charge?

24 A. The Kragujevac police caught him poaching with a colleague of his

25 from Kragujevac.

Page 8028

1 Q. Now, was the investigation brought to any court proceedings or was

2 it eventually stopped?

3 A. It was stopped.

4 Q. Thank you. I'm going to ask you a question which I just want

5 answered in one way or another. As a result of these investigations that

6 were initiated, do you believe that they had a good or a bad effect on

7 your career in the MUP of Serbia?

8 A. I think that it actually affected my career adversely.

9 Q. If you need to be asked any more questions about that we will.

10 But can I now move on to your post b --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this just going to hang there or is it going to

12 somehow or other get linked to something important?

13 MR. STAMP: This is in some information by way of background. I

14 just raise it in examination-in-chief because it is possible that there

15 might be issues raised in cross-examination in respect to any --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cvetic, what position do you think you would

17 have reached in the SUP if this hadn't intervened?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, after that incident, the

19 then-deputy head of the public security service, Radovan Stojicic, a.k.a.

20 Badza, called me and my deputy, Zivko Petrovic. Him, he relieved of

21 office and sent him to be the head of the Prizren SUP and he was killed in

22 a traffic accident in Kosovo.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you now like to answer my question, which

24 was: What position do you think you would have reached in the MUP if this

25 hadn't happened?

Page 8029

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the very least I would have

2 remained the head of the Kragujevac SUP.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: And are you saying that movement -- your movement

4 to Kosovska Mitrovica was demotion in some way?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

7 Mr. Stamp.


9 Q. So you arrived at the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP in January 1997. I

10 take it that you met with your subunit commanders, who were working within

11 that SUP?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you tell us briefly, if you can, what was the security

14 situation in your SUP area or your SUP jurisdiction in 1997 when you

15 arrived there?

16 A. On the basis of the reports of the heads of police stations and

17 the commanders of the police units, the security situation was very

18 difficult and very complex, and this particularly concerned the terrorist

19 activities that had been stepped up at the time.

20 Q. Did this situation continue into 1998?

21 A. Yes, and the terrorist activities were, in fact, even more

22 intensive then.

23 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you about the structure of the MUP in Kosovo

24 in 1998/1999 --

25 MR. STAMP: And before I do could we put 25 -- Exhibit P2555 on

Page 8030

1 the screen, please?

2 Q. And while we're doing that can I ask you: In 1999 was anybody in

3 particular appointed the head of the MUP in Kosovo -- sorry, 1998?

4 A. Yes, heading the staff of the MUP in Kosovo.

5 Q. Who was that? Who was appointed to head the staff of the MUP in

6 Kosovo?

7 A. The head of the staff of the MUP for Kosovo and Metohija, Mr. --

8 To that post was appointed Mr. Sreten Lukic on the 11th of June, 1998.

9 Q. Now, do you remember who were the other senior members of the MUP

10 staff for Kosovo from 1998 to 1999?

11 A. Are you referring to the members of the staff?

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. In the staff there were a number of persons who were in charge of

14 different fields, very narrowly specialised fields. The staff had its

15 deputy chief, deputy head, and a certain number of persons in charge of

16 different areas for crime, for economic crimes, for general crimes, for

17 traffic, for commercial matters, for security, and logistics, and similar.

18 There were a total of 14 persons on the staff.

19 Q. I'll just ask you about two in particular. Who was in charge of

20 the crime unit on the staff, do you remember?

21 A. There existed two types of crime that we had, that was general

22 crime, crime generally speaking, and economic crimes, commercial crime.

23 In charge of the commercial crime department was a person from the city

24 SUP, and for the general crime department, a person from the SUP of

25 Vranje.

Page 8031

1 Q. For the general crime unit, who was the person -- can you name the

2 person in charge of that unit?

3 A. I believe that this was a person from the SUP of Vranje by the

4 name of Novica Zdravkovic.

5 Q. Could you have a look at the document on the screen, Mr. Cvetic,

6 that is Exhibit P2555 --

7 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.

9 MR. LUKIC: I think that we have not been notified about the use

10 of this document, so if my learned friend can explain why this has been

11 changed.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Have we not seen this document in the case already?

13 MR. STAMP: I think the document was used --

14 MR. LUKIC: I don't think so.

15 MR. STAMP: I think the document was used during the opening

16 statements.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you notify this as one of the exhibits to which

18 the witness would be referred?

19 MR. STAMP: As soon as the witness was able to confirm it, as soon

20 as he arrived here and was able to confirm it, we sent notification to the

21 Defence, but this document is merely a chart which confirms what was in

22 the statement. It's demonstrative.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: But Mr. Lukic is saying he hasn't had notification.

24 MR. LUKIC: That's right, Your Honour, I haven't seen one. We

25 have a 65 ter notification. I have it -- one with me, and it's not on the

Page 8032

1 list.

2 MR. STAMP: The notification in respect to this particular

3 document was sent yesterday. The witness arrived yesterday or the day

4 before yesterday and was [indiscernible] to confirm this document

5 yesterday.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Lukic --

7 MR. LUKIC: Still we don't have that document on the list they

8 sent regarding the court but not this document.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Just cutting through that for the moment is there

10 some prejudice to you caused by the use of this document?

11 MR. LUKIC: We don't know and --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't you know --

13 MR. LUKIC: I saw many charts regarding the MUP structure, and I

14 don't -- I don't know who composed this one and why is this composed in

15 this manner. We have different charts given by the Prosecutor, and the

16 structure has been completely differently depicted.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it doesn't prove anything. It's merely

18 indicative of apparently what's in the statement. We remain concerned, as

19 always, about the late intimation of material in this case, but it's not a

20 change of front or anything of that nature that appears to have occurred.

21 And therefore, I can see no prejudice in this being utilised to try to

22 clarify points in the witness's evidence. Plainly, on its own, it is not

23 evidence, and therefore it's difficult to see that it can cause you any

24 prejudice so we will allow questions to be -- sorry.

25 MR. LUKIC: Maybe if the witness can repeat this order then there

Page 8033

1 is no need for him to see this chart because I can see really something

2 illogical on this chart -- not something, many things.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll have plenty of time to cross-examine on

4 that.

5 MR. LUKIC: Okay.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: And in any event all the questions the witness has

7 been asked so far don't bear any relation to what is on the chart, in

8 spite of the fact that Mr. Stamp may have been seeking answers related to

9 the chart. In any event we shall allow it to be used in the

10 circumstances.

11 Mr. Stamp.

12 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Q. Mr. Cvetic, you see the chart in front of you. Were you shown a

14 chart yesterday?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And does it fairly depict the organisational structure of the MUP

17 in Kosovo?

18 A. This chart here depicts the ministry with two lines of work,

19 namely the state security department and the public security department.

20 As part of the ministries, also the secretariat of the ministry. And here

21 it is attached to the public security department as far as I can see.

22 It's the -- and the MUP staff for Kosovo has been shown as an intercommand

23 between the MUP and the secretariat or the administration in Kosovo. As

24 regards the secretariats in Kosovo, that is okay. These are the

25 secretariats that were there. Now, special anti-terrorist units are

Page 8034

1 linked to the MUP, whereas here they are linked to the MUP staff. That

2 means that this is not a fair depiction. The operational groups, that is

3 all right. Special police units, these were part of the Ministry of the

4 Interior, the PJPs, that is the, or they were part of the individual

5 secretariats. But when they were engaged in the area of Kosovo and

6 Metohija, they were manoeuvreing forces and would be under the command of

7 the MUP staff. The special operations unit was part of the state security

8 department, as indeed shown here. The MUP staff, as far as I know, did

9 not have command responsibility over the special operations unit.

10 Q. Very well. I think we'll just take them one by one.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Who compiled this diagram?

12 MR. STAMP: This was compiled by an internal OTP department

13 military analyst team on the basis of the information at our disposal

14 including -- well, I've quite -- a broad spectrum of information.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. LUKIC: If I can assist Your Honour.


18 MR. LUKIC: It's compiled by a military analyst, Philip Coo, but

19 not a police analyst.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.


22 Q. There existed operationally in Kosovo while you were there a

23 special operations unit called the JSO?

24 A. In Kosovo during 1998 and 1999, there was a special operations

25 unit.

Page 8035

1 Q. And this unit was attached to the state security department, RDB?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Which department --

4 A. It was attached to the state security sector.

5 Q. The state security sector is also known as RDB?

6 A. No. These are two separate sectors or departments within the

7 Ministry of the Interior.

8 Q. Well, could you just please describe or just tell us which

9 department was the special operations unit, the JSO, subordinate to?

10 A. Special operations units were subordinated to the RDB, to the

11 state security department.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I hope it's translation that's the problem, because

13 we've come full circle.


15 Q. Now, in 1999, the special operations unit, the JSO, was engaged

16 occasionally in operations in Kosovo. Is that correct?

17 A. You are using the plural, JSOs, whereas there was only one.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder if some of the Serb speakers here can

19 assist. It looks as though there is a failure to translate much of this

20 accurately. Can anyone identify whether there's a particular problem?

21 Mr. Fila.

22 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it will be easily dealt

23 with. You see that Mr. Coo put the names here of people heading each of

24 the departments. If you ask the witness what the name of the commander of

25 the RDB was, perhaps he can clarify.

Page 8036

1 JUDGE BONOMY: But that's not the point I'm asking you, Mr. Fila,

2 because --

3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Then we'll get the translation. That

4 was the issue and a way to avoid it.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm trying to find out what's happened so far,

6 because the word "department" was denied, as the superior body, and then

7 later it was stated by the witness that it was the superior body. The

8 real answer here is probably for Mr. Stamp not to ask leading questions,

9 and then the witness will be able to give his own answers, which will be

10 much more helpful. But for the start of this I'm concerned about the

11 translation and the latest one that's caused me to raise this is that

12 plainly in English he used the singular and yet the witness cops back and

13 says the difficulty is he's using the plural. Now, how did that happen,

14 can you tell me? Did you get a plural translation instead of a singular

15 of JSO?

16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The plural was introduced by Mr. Stamp.

17 He mentioned several units, whereas there was one. Otherwise, it was

18 interpretation, but one unit.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: He used that -- well, anyway, if you can't assist,

20 then that's fine. We'll move on.

21 Mr. Stamp, with this witness in view of what's happened so far,

22 please ask questions that are not leading questions and please let him

23 give us the evidence, otherwise we'll be here forever.


25 Q. Mr. Cvetic, apart from regular police units, were there special

Page 8037

1 police units that operated in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?

2 A. Yes. In Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, there was one special operations

3 unit which was subordinated to the state security department. The head of

4 the RDB in 1998 was Jovica Stanisic up until the 5th of November, 1999; on

5 that day, he was replaced by Mr. Radomir Markovic as the head of the RDB.

6 Q. In its operations in Kosovo, did this unit receive tasks or

7 instructions from the MUP staff for Kosovo?

8 A. I have no such knowledge.

9 Q. Now, apart from that unit, were there other special units created

10 to fight the -- what was known as the KLA that were subordinated to the

11 MUP staff of Kosovo?

12 A. There were the regular special anti-terrorist units within the

13 city SUP of Belgrade, the SUP of Novi Sad, and the SUP of Pristina. Those

14 units were sent to intervene in 1998 and 1999, or rather, they took part

15 in the anti-terrorist operations undertaken in Kosovo.

16 Q. How were the SUP organised in Kosovo?

17 A. Do you mean an individual SUP or as the umbrella organisation or

18 the various SUPs covering the territory of Kosovo?

19 Q. Well, let's start with your SUP --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you move on to that, you gave us a date

21 for the changeover from Stanisic to Markovic. Could you give me the date

22 again, please.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During 1998 until the 5th of

24 November, 1998, the head of the RDB was Jovica Stanisic. As of the 5th of

25 November 1998 onwards, the RDB was headed by Radomir Markovic.

Page 8038

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Please excuse me for asking you that, but the

2 translation we originally got was November 1999. So thank you for

3 clarifying that.

4 Mr. Stamp.

5 MR. STAMP: Thank you.

6 Q. May I return to the special anti-terrorist unit briefly. Was

7 there one unit or more than one unit organised in relation to Kosovo?

8 A. The special anti-terrorist units were not set up specifically for

9 Kosovo. These are peacetime units which fall under the aforementioned

10 secretariats of Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Pristina. However, during the

11 anti-terrorist operations and in times of immediate threat of war, they

12 were engaged in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.

13 Q. Were there other groups engaged in Kosovo in 1999 known as

14 operational sweep group?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Which organ or body was this group subordinated to?

17 MR. LUKIC: Objection.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic. Yes?

19 MR. LUKIC: Where's the base for this claim that these groups were

20 groups sweep -- operational sweep groups?

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the witness has given his answer and you'll

22 have a chance to cross-examine. That's not a matter that we can

23 resolve -- but you can assist us to resolve it by the questions you ask in

24 due course. Thank you.

25 Mr. Stamp.

Page 8039


2 Q. No, I was just asking you to which body or organ was this group

3 subordinated to?

4 A. In Kosovo in end 1998 - or to be more precise - in December, there

5 were so-called operational sweep or pursuit groups, which comprised people

6 from the special police units. Each of the SUPs gave a number of people,

7 up to ten, and those units were then trained especially to address

8 terrorism. They were better trained and better equipped than the PJP.

9 Q. Do you remember who was the head of this group?

10 A. There was several groups. There was one group in each of the

11 secretariats; however, the head of all the groups was Mr. Radosavljevic,

12 a.k.a. Guri. Goran Radosavljevic, a.k.a. Guri.

13 Q. You also mentioned that there were also special police units.

14 Were these units known as the PJP?

15 A. The PJP were not special police units. The special units of the

16 police -- well, that name could only be borne by the special

17 anti-terrorist units within the state security department and the only

18 other one could have been the JSO, which fell under the RDB.

19 Q. Was there a police unit known as the PJP?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What was its role and function?

22 A. The PJP units were formed in early 1992 to cover the area of the

23 secretariat as a whole. They were formed in Belgrade. There was one

24 detachment there, another one in Novi Sad, a third one in Kragujevac as

25 well as Nis and Pristina. They were 450 to 500 men strong each.

Page 8040

1 Q. You said --

2 A. I apologise. These were manned from the regular police units, but

3 they were better trained and equipped than the regular units.

4 Q. You say they were formed in 1992 -- the units were formed in 1992.

5 Is that correct?

6 A. Yes. Those were separate militia units within the secretariats.

7 They comprised men from several secretariats, however their seat or their

8 command -- commands were in the aforementioned cities.

9 Q. Now, what were their roles and functions in Kosovo in 1998 and

10 1999, that is the PJP units?

11 A. The PJP units were engaged in Kosovo and Metohija during 1998 and

12 1999 solely to fight terrorism.

13 Q. To which organ or body were they subordinate, that is those that

14 operated in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?

15 A. These were manoeuvreing units commanded by the MUP headquarters or

16 MUP staff in Pristina.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, could you find a suitable place to

18 interrupt.

19 MR. STAMP: This would be a suitable time.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 Mr. Cvetic, we have to stop there for today, and your evidence

22 will continue tomorrow; that will be at 2.15 tomorrow afternoon, and we

23 shall then be in a different courtroom, in Courtroom III in this building.

24 So you need to be there, ready to continue your evidence, at 2.15

25 tomorrow. Meanwhile it's very important that overnight you have no

Page 8041

1 discussion with anyone about your evidence. You can meet with and talk to

2 anyone you wish as long as you do not at any stage discuss the evidence in

3 the case, that's either the evidence you have given or the evidence you

4 may yet give in the case. Could you now please leave the courtroom with

5 the usher, and we shall see you again tomorrow at 2.15.

6 [The witness stands down]

7 JUDGE BONOMY: The court is now adjourned.

8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,

9 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day of

10 December, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.