1 Wednesday, 7 February 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The Accused Pavkovic not present in court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.21 a.m.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning everyone. Judge Chowhan is unwell

7 this morning. He may be with us later, but we've decided to proceed on

8 the basis of Rule 15 bis for the moment. I'm sorry we're starting late,

9 but that was the result, apparently, of a delay in the earlier case which

10 sat to a point where we had also to be delayed.

11 We said we would deal with the objections to the evidence of K79.

12 There was an objection in that case at the outset to the evidence on its

13 entirety on the ground of relevance and lack of notice. We said that we

14 would determine the ultimate admissibility of the evidence at the end of

15 the examination; and over the three days that the witness was here, the

16 Chamber received several objections to portions of the witness's evidence

17 which it decided to rule upon at the close of that evidence.

18 I think they came exclusively from Mr. Lukic. I'm not -- I can't

19 remember for sure that there wasn't one from someone else, and it may be

20 at the outset Mr. Ackerman did ultimately associate himself with the

21 general objection to admitting the evidence at all.

22 The Chamber is conscious of the relevance of its decision on

23 Witness K82 in this area. In that decision issued on the 3rd of October,

24 we held that the evidence was in fact admissible pursuant to Rules 89 and

25 93, but we then exercised our distress to exclude it for reasons which are

1 set out in the decision, largely on the basis that the evidence went to

2 alleged crimes committed in Kosovo that were not mentioned in the

3 indictment, which the Prosecution had had in relation to that witness

4 ample time to deal with because they had known about him for a period of

5 years.

6 But for the reasons that we decided that in theory at least that

7 evidence was admissible in terms of Rule 89 and 93, we have come to the

8 conclusion that K79's evidence is also admissible in theory. When it

9 comes to the exercise of our discretion to decide whether to actually

10 admit it or not, there are a number of distinguishing factors in relation

11 to K79. The evidence he gave is relevant to inter alia the events at Suva

12 Reka and in that area that are charged in the indictment, as well as to

13 incidents in 1998 that are relevant to the existence of a joint criminal

14 enterprise as alleged in paragraph 95. And the evidence is also relevant

15 to certain other localities mentioned in the indictment.

16 So it does appear to us that this evidence is relevant and of

17 probative value. There are other issues, of course, to take account of in

18 exercising discretion. For example, the length of time that the

19 Prosecution have been aware of the evidence and the notice that they gave

20 to the Defence, and also we have to be satisfied that in all the

21 circumstances admitting this evidence would not cause unfair prejudice to

22 the Defence.

23 In contrast to K82, the evidence of K79 came to the attention of

24 the Prosecution only shortly before the start of the trial. It was

25 intimated as quickly as appears reasonable in all the circumstances; and

1 although it did not lead to an amendment of the indictment or specific

2 attention being drawn to it in the pre-trial brief, the Rule 65 ter list

3 made clear the issues that would be dealt with by that evidence because

4 the notice stated clearly that all matters raised in the witness's

5 statement would be the subject of evidence in court, and that statement

6 was disclosed because of the delayed disclosure regime on the 31st of

7 July.

8 So the issues upon which the witness gave evidence were adequately

9 heralded in the indictment, the Rule 65 ter summary, and his statement.

10 We've concluded that it would not cause unfair prejudice to the Defence to

11 admit the evidence. In all the circumstances, therefore, we have decided

12 to admit the evidence of K79. What weight to give that evidence, of

13 course, is for the Trial Chamber to determine in due course, and indeed we

14 might give it quite different weight in relation to some issues than we

15 will in relation to others which are much more marginal and less clearly

16 the subject of issues in the indictment.

17 We also take this opportunity, again, to remind the Prosecution to

18 focus the adducement of evidence on the most important issues in the case;

19 namely, the alleged crimes in paragraph 72 and 75 of the indictment and

20 issues going to the individual criminal responsibility of the accused.

21 For the avoidance of doubt, I make it clear that the evidence of K79 is

22 admitted pursuant to Rules 54, 89, and 93.

23 It's come to our attention that a witness scheduled for next week

24 is K54 and that similar issues may arise in relation to the evidence of

25 that witness. It would be helpful to us, I think, if these issues were

1 focused sooner rather than later. If there is going to be objection to

2 that witness in his entirety or to specific segments of the evidence, then

3 it would be helpful to have written notification of that soon so that we

4 can address the issue rather than be faced with it on the morning and

5 spend valuable in-court time looking at issues which we can consider

6 outwith court.

7 It's plain that there is a possibility of some disruption in the

8 court schedule because of the availability of witnesses. There are two

9 matters that we wish to draw to the attention of the Prosecution in that

10 regard. Number one is that a witness who appears to us readily available

11 to fill gaps would be Mr. Coo, and it may even be that his evidence could

12 be slotted in at an appropriate stage where, otherwise, time would be

13 lost. However, if that's going to be done, we need to be clear about how

14 his evidence is to be presented.

15 And since the Chamber has decided not to hear him as an expert but

16 exclusively as a witness of fact, then it's for the Prosecution to make a

17 submission to us about how that impacts upon the report he prepared. The

18 report may still be a useful way of presenting evidence of fact, but it

19 will contain passages which are clearly -- which clearly purport to be

20 expert evidence which should not be the subject of his evidence. So that

21 has to be resolved.

22 We said we'd have a hearing on this, but that hearing has to be

23 triggered, I think, by the Prosecution telling us how they see our

24 decision as having impacted on the way they propose to present the

25 evidence. Now, it would be helpful if that could be addressed quickly so

1 that he is available should the situation deteriorate to the point where

2 there's a significant gap in the schedule.

3 The second matter is that we did indicate there were significant

4 objections to some experts that had yet to be resolved. Now, it may be

5 that we ought to make our position a bit clearer on that. I will review

6 that with my colleagues in the next two days, and if more guidance can be

7 given then it will be, but there are, I think, two or three experts in

8 respect of whom final decisions have to be taken.

9 Obviously, Kristan could be affected by the Chamber's view of the

10 propriety of expert evidence on at least some of the matters to which he

11 will be asked to speak. There's an outstanding issue in relation to the

12 rape expert. On the other hand, there are other experts in respect of

13 whom I doubt there is an issue. So it may be that we should identify it.

14 Are you clear on the point, Mr. Hannis?

15 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I would ask you to delay taking

16 any action with regard to that because we have been going through our

17 remaining witness list and making some decisions about who we're going to

18 call and not call, and we have drafted a filing to alert you to by our

19 count we may have only something like 17 witnesses remaining.

20 And we made some decisions -- or for practical circumstances, we

21 may not call some of those witnesses because of problems they have and our

22 decision that there is enough evidence for us to make the arguments we

23 need to make to professional Judges that we don't need to call them. And

24 we plan to file that later today, Your Honour, then you'll see who is left

25 and whether you need to address issues regarding any of those experts, and

1 also you will see our difficulties regarding scheduling.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That's very helpful, Mr. Hannis, thank you. I look

3 forward to seeing that.

4 Mr. Ivetic, I gather you have something you wish to raise, or

5 Mr. Ackerman rather?

6 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I want to start with the proposition

7 that my client is not here today, in case you hadn't noticed.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it he's content that we proceed in his

9 absence.

10 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I don't have any official word from him

11 except through one of his co-accused. He is apparently quite ill and not

12 able to be here today and has indicated that he's comfortable with the

13 proceedings going forward as long as his counsel is not required to

14 conduct any cross-examination in his absence, and I think we have arranged

15 the schedule so that's not going to happen today. And, hopefully, he'll

16 be able to be here tomorrow and I would hope we'll have a written waiver

17 that can be filed sometime during the day, but that's as much information

18 as I can give you right now.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there another matter, Mr. Ackerman?

20 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, it has to do the witness, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

22 MR. ACKERMAN: This witness is, of course, being called as a fact

23 witness, and I do object to any paragraph of his 92 ter statement that

24 sets out his opinions and conclusions, but specifically paragraph 73,

25 which refers to three exhibits. And I object to the admission of P1967,

1 P1968, and P1969.

2 These are exhibits that he had not seen before this statement and

3 he's basically just giving his opinion about -- about what they mean, and

4 I think that's inappropriate for a fact witness. They're not exhibits

5 that he can shed any light on in any other way and, therefore, I'd ask

6 that those be excluded and paragraph 73 be removed.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

8 MS. CARTER: As it appears, we're taking up these matters prior to

9 the witness coming into the Court. I do want to point out to the Court

10 that P1967 is an admitted exhibit. It was admitted on January 19, 2007.

11 P01968 was also an admitted exhibit and that was admitted on November 23rd

12 of 2006.

13 This witness is not intended to submit these exhibits before the

14 Court as if they're his own documents. We do anticipate drawing some

15 testimony on the issues that he saw in Kosovo when he was there on the

16 ground and how the -- what he saw interrelates with the documents that are

17 at issue. So there will be a number of submissions on that account.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. I think, Mr. Ackerman, in the

19 circumstances, you will need to formulate the objection as we get to that

20 stage.

21 MR. ACKERMAN: Yeah, I can do that, Your Honour, but these --

22 these exhibits deal with 22, 24, and 28 March, and he was not there on the

23 ground at that time as Ms. Carter has just suggested do you. He can't

24 give anything about what he saw on the ground on those days because he

25 wasn't there.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll deal with it and the particular questions as

2 they raise in the line of examination that's raised at that stage.

3 Mr. Fila.

4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I am sorry to go back to what you spoke

5 of at the very beginning, but it has to do with Witness Philip Coo. We

6 are snowed under with lots of material, we as the Defence. His comments,

7 what he wrote, and so on and so forth, and that is a bit confusing. What

8 I wish to say is that if Philip Coo appears on that list of Mr. Hannis's

9 later on, we are not going to accept his expertise as his statement and

10 then part is used and part is not used.

11 I wish to say on time to the Prosecutors that if they want to

12 submit a statement along with the testimony of Mr. Coo, let them do what

13 the Court ordered, how he can be heard. Really, we are encumbered by lots

14 of material. The gentlemen know that. I don't want you to hold it

15 against me for not having spoken on time. Thank you.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we note what you say, Mr. Fila. There will

17 be another opportunity to deal with that depending on how the Prosecution

18 approach the issue. Thank you.

19 Mr. Ivetic.

20 MR. IVETIC: I'll be brief, Your Honours. I have a similar

21 documents as does Mr. Ackerman relating to paragraph 14 and two exhibits

22 which I will bring up as Your Honours suggested if they are brought in in

23 direct. I also have an issue with several paragraphs within the

24 indictment -- pardon me, within the statement. The objections take two

25 forms.

1 There are incidents that have been removed from the indictment

2 that we -- we submit should not be led through this witness, therefore,

3 that would be paragraph 67 which deals with Racak, and then we have a

4 separate category for paragraph 39 which to me appears to be a bear legal

5 conclusion stating that something is widespread and systematic, which I

6 this I is improper to be led through any witness in that form. I think

7 that's a provenance of the Trial Chamber to make that type of

8 determination. So I move for paragraph 39 of the statement to be excluded

9 for that ground.

10 And then there are a whole slew of paragraphs that deal with the

11 events that are either in 1998 or early 1999 that I would argue are,

12 again, items that are not charged in the indictment or that the paragraphs

13 of the statement themselves are so generic and general that they can't

14 actually be tied to anything that's specifically alleged and charged in

15 the indictment; and for those grounds, I would ask for paragraphs 5, 15,

16 19, 21, 29, 34, 40 through 43, and 50 through 52 to be excluded, because I

17 submit that they do deal with alleged actions, alleged incidents, and even

18 alleged crimes that are not charged in the indictment and are, therefore,

19 outside of the scope of the indictment.

20 Again, that is something that we could raise by, you know, making

21 objections for the record during the course of the examination so we can

22 deal with them specifically. But I do believe that that part of the

23 statement dealing with Racak and the bear legal conclusion at paragraph

24 39, so paragraph 67 and 39 I believe, can be ruled upon at this stage and

25 ought to be excluded when the witness's statement is tendered pursuant to

1 Rule 92 ter to the Trial Chamber for admission into evidence. Thank you.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

3 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, it again appears that I am

4 needing to respond to objections before a document's even tendered, but I

5 do want to point out to the Court, specifically as to paragraph 67. This

6 court has repeatedly allowed evidence in regards to the command and

7 control structure that was in place in January of 1999 as that relates to

8 Racak, thus I do not feel that the paragraph is outside of the scope of

9 what the Court has made allowable. As to paragraph, excuse me, that was

10 paragraph 67.

11 As to paragraph 59 [sic] and widespread and systematic --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: 39, I think.

13 MS. CARTER: Excuse me. Yes, Your Honour. With regards to

14 paragraph 39, again, the term "widespread and systematic" is used and that

15 does have a legal meaning; but as to this witness, he is referring to the

16 incidents that he relates throughout this account. Several paragraphs

17 later, he indicates that he sees 2 to 300 villages levelled to the ground.

18 Throughout the statement, he talks about the burning of crops, the killing

19 of livestock, the complete decimation of this country. I think it is a

20 fair statement to him -- for him to use "widespread and systematic," to

21 his knowledge. We do not believe that the Court is bound by the

22 description of this witness. However, we do not find that his use of

23 those terms is inappropriate as it relates to paragraph 39.

24 With regards to the other incidents that are occurring throughout

25 1998 as well as to early part of 1999, this case -- one of the fundamental

1 aspects of this case is that the defendants were on notice that there has

2 been a campaign in place that began actually in 1998 in order to -- and

3 also that this witness has gone to and has explained to, for example,

4 Mr. Ojdanic and has explained to him he what was going on with the troops

5 in 1998 and carrying on through the indictment period. Thus the

6 extraction of those paragraphs would be inappropriate at this time.

7 1998 is certainly a consideration this Court has to make because

8 these witnesses -- excuse me, this witness was in Kosovo for three years.

9 He has intimate relationships with a number of military and policemen

10 throughout the area of Kosovo. He has exclusive knowledge. These are not

11 things that he's heard of. These are things that he witnessed and those

12 are the things that he brought to the foot of the defendants in this case.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The paragraph that causes us greatest concern in

15 this objection is paragraph 34, because the indictment deals with the

16 situation in February, I think it deals with March, then it jumps to July.

17 We see an argument for including all of the other paragraphs, with the

18 exception of the words "widespread and systematic." We don't think

19 they -- we will delete them on the basis that you can amplify that

20 paragraph with the words of the witness himself that are more atuned to

21 factual evidence of what he was seeing on the ground. But could you help

22 us on why something like paragraph 34 isn't heralded anywhere?

23 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour. I would argue that statement

24 paragraph number 34 is actually linked to the pre-trial brief at paragraph

25 91, where the witness states the international observers travel the road

1 between Pec and Malisevo, and on many other occasions saw widespread

2 damages to villages, including the burning of every village and continued

3 shelling by Serb forces.

4 The witness is also able to describe the various ribbons worn by

5 the MUP to avoid blue-on-blue fire. So while it is not expressly listed

6 within the indictment itself, we do believe that it can be related back to

7 the pre-trial brief.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: The place mentioned then falls within that

9 description, does it? Ponosevac is where you have just described.

10 MS. CARTER: No. I'm sorry. I listed Pec and Malisevo and I

11 would also point out --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Is Ponosevac between Pec and Malisevo?

13 MS. CARTER: I'm sorry. My map skills are not --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: You've got to tell us if you're referring to the

15 pre-trial brief, then you need to be able to tell us if this falls within

16 the areas mentioned in the brief.

17 MS. CARTER: I have indication, Your Honour, that it does, and we

18 would also point out that it relates to paragraph 96 that indicates -- of

19 the indictment. From approximately February 1998 until May of 1998,

20 approximately 15.000 Kosovo Albanians fled to northern Albania, thus we --

21 it is -- has temporal relevance.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I think that last point removed any lingering

23 doubts that this evidence should be admitted. We will admit it. The

24 question of weight, again, is a quite different matter, and the only

25 deletion will be the one we mentioned. So far as the initial two point --

1 the other initial point made about Racak is concerned, it does seem to us

2 that -- that the evidence in paragraph 67 goes to the question of command

3 and control rather than the specific circumstances within the village of

4 Racak.

5 Now, does that deal with all preliminary matters? Very well. Can

6 we now have the witness, please. Sorry, we need to be in closed session

7 while he comes into the courtroom.

8 [Closed session]

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]

8 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

10 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Examination by Ms. Carter:

12 Q. Colonel Crosland, as of October 31st of 2006, you gave a statement

13 to the Office of the Prosecutor; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

15 MS. CARTER: And I would ask the exhibit P02645 to be brought up

16 on e-court, as well as the hard copy that I delivered to the Registry

17 earlier to the witness.

18 Q. As of yesterday's date, did you have an opportunity to re-review

19 this document and note there were a few changes that were necessary to

20 this 92 ter statement?

21 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

22 Q. Okay. And those changes would indicate in paragraph number 14,

23 the exhibit number was misidentified as P02166, and that exhibit should

24 have read P01990; is that correct?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Thank you.

3 Q. In paragraph 35, the exhibit number for R 063-6199-R063-6202 would

4 be Exhibit number P02552; is that correct?

5 A. That is also correct, yes.

6 Q. As to paragraph 50, Exhibit number for R063-6194-R063-6295 is

7 Exhibit number P02553; is that correct?

8 A. That is also correct, yes, ma'am.

9 Q. There is also a substantive change with regards to paragraphs 50

10 and 51. You indicated that those paragraphs had been inappropriately

11 merged; is that correct?

12 A. That is also correct, ma'am, yes.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Please pause between question and answer for the

14 sake of interpreters, thank you.

15 MS. CARTER:

16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... of the evidence. The first

17 sentence of paragraph 51 should actually be moved to the top of paragraph

18 50 so that it reads:

19 "On 26 through 27 September, 1998, I showed Ojdanic photographic

20 evidence of the VJ shelling Suva Reka at 27 August 1998. His reaction was

21 that force would be met with appropriate force following through with the

22 paragraph as it remained in my report of August 28 and following

23 throughout is accurate." Is that correct?

24 A. That is correct, ma'am, yes.

25 Q. As to Lord Paddy Ashdown, paragraph 51 should now read, in order

1 to lift the conversations that he was not present for as well as to make

2 that paragraph grammatically correct, you would indicate that,.

3 "On approximately 28 September, 1998, Lord Ashdown also went to

4 see Mr. Milosevic directly after his visit to Kosovo on one occasion, and

5 I believe made comments to Mr. Milosevic regarding the shelling West of

6 Suva Reka and other incidents as referenced in the paragraph above." Is

7 that correct?

8 A. That's also correct, ma'am, yes.

9 Q. And just for clarification for the Court, you're indicating that

10 Lord Paddy Ashdown was not with you when you presented your evidence to

11 Ojdanic; is that correct?

12 A. That is also correct, yes.

13 Q. In regards to paragraph 61, you've indicated that Exhibit number

14 for R063-6192-R063-6293 is Exhibit number P02554; is that correct?

15 A. Yes. And that is also correct, ma'am, yes.

16 Q. Again, a substantive change should go to paragraph 69. Almost to

17 the very end, there is a correction being made to the 3rd Brigade that's

18 noted. Thus the paragraph should read, .

19 "There were two extra VJ brigades, 211 Brigade from Nis and 1st

20 Armoured Brigade from Belgrade not seen before deployed in the area of

21 Kursumlija." The change begins here and should read, "and an armoured

22 brigade at Raska, possibly the 37th Motorised Brigade," and that is the

23 only change; is that correct?

24 A. That's also correct, ma'am, yes.

25 Q. And that's because when drafting, the drafter, myself, had

1 indicated and put a "1." As opposed to "an additional brigade," it was

2 being noted again as the "1st Brigade;" is that correct?

3 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

4 Q. Once these changes are made to the 92 ter statement, do you attest

5 today that the statement, as amended, is true and accurate; and if asked

6 the same questions here today, you would give the same answers?

7 A. Yes, ma'am.

8 Q. Your Honour, in regards to administration, within that exhibit,

9 there are a number of additional exhibits that are noted within and upon

10 the entrance of the exhibit would come in with it. There is Exhibit

11 number P00760. Those were three photographs attached to the OTP statement

12 of John Crosland. There's P01990 which was admitted by this Court on

13 December 7 of 2006. They are the February 17th, 1999, minutes from the

14 meeting at the Pristina MUP headquarters. P00 --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Just hold on. You're beginning to -- well, you've

16 already lost me, and I'll go back over what needs to be clarified in a

17 moment, but where is P1990 referred to in the statement?

18 MS. CARTER: Paragraph 14, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you've dealt with that already, so what's the

20 next one?

21 MS. CARTER: The next one would be P00687 as referenced in

22 paragraph 35: Confidential Kosovo sitrep from the UK military

23 representative of May 28, 1998.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, the number is 687?

25 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

2 MS. CARTER: There's P00688, at paragraph 34, again a situation

3 report from the UK military representative dated 13 May.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

5 MS. CARTER: P02552, at paragraph 34, a situation report of June

6 5th of 1998.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, there's only one referred to in paragraph 34,

8 and you've now given us two exhibit numbers.

9 MS. CARTER: I do apologise. That would go to paragraph 35, Your

10 Honour. I'm sorry.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: We've already got two numbers for 35.

12 MS. CARTER: I apologise. 687, actually referenced 35. 688 is in

13 paragraph -- no, I'm sorry. I'm transposing numbers again.

14 687 is in reference to paragraph --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: We have it in 35, according to what you've told us

16 so far.

17 MS. CARTER: 688 is in 34.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I've got that.

19 MS. CARTER: And then 2552 is in 35.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: That's clear now.

21 MS. CARTER: Okay. P00685, as referenced in paragraph 37,

22 situation report of the UK military representative.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

24 MS. CARTER: P00687 [sic], at paragraph 38, situation report from

25 the UK military representative. Your Honour, it appears that the

1 transcript is unclear. It was P00686 at paragraph 38.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, that particular one is referred to as in the

3 same report. Where is the earlier reference to it? Oh, it's -- no, where

4 is the earlier reference?

5 MS. CARTER: Paragraph 38, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: If you look at the last sentence, it says, "in this

7 same report," and you've told us that's P687. Now, where is the earlier

8 reference to P687?

9 MS. CARTER: I apologise. That reference to P686 should actually

10 be -- it's written in the statement in relation to paragraph 38. It

11 should be in relation to 39.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: So it's P686, not 687, that should go there, is it?

13 MS. CARTER: 687 is in paragraph 35.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

15 MS. CARTER: There was a mistake, Your Honour, at the transcript

16 on page 18 at line 8, where it referenced 687 being in 38, and it was

17 corrected a few lines below.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So just rewind and tell me what the exhibit number

19 for paragraph 38 is, P686, is it?

20 MS. CARTER: 686, yes, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, you'll see that in the last sentence, it

22 says, "In the same report, I describe widespread damage and burning in

23 many different locations." So where is the earlier reference to that

24 report?

25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, that appears to be surplusage. That is

1 inaccurate. There is not a prior reference. That actual exhibit should

2 relate below to paragraph 39.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So that would be in our report. All right. Any

4 more?

5 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. P02553, at paragraph 50, a

6 situation report.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. We've had that one already.

8 MS. CARTER: P00683, at paragraph 52.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that it?

10 MS. CARTER: P00684, at paragraph 56.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

12 MS. CARTER: P02166, at paragraph 60, which was previously

13 admitted by this Court on 19 January 2007.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

15 MS. CARTER: Shall I continue?

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

17 MS. CARTER: P02554, at paragraph 61, a Kosovo situation report.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: We have that one already.

19 MS. CARTER: P01967, at paragraph 73, which was previously

20 admitted on 19 January of 2007.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: We have three there. 1967, 8, and 9.

22 MS. CARTER: Correct, Your Honour. 67 and 68 have previously been

23 admitted by this Court. We're also seeking admission of P01969 under the

24 same basis of the reliability.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll need to deal with that when you come to that

1 stage of your examination.

2 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, actually that will be presented from the

3 bar table, but I will certainly handle that when it comes up in the

4 evidence.

5 P00682, as referenced in paragraph 74. And that completes the

6 documents that are listed within his statement and at this time we would

7 tender it in full.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Experience has taught us now that we will or should

9 reserve any decision about admitting statements of that nature until we've

10 heard the evidence.

11 MS. CARTER: Certainly, your Honor.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: You should remind us at the end of your

13 examination.

14 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. And I would also note that any of

15 the exhibits that came from the Ministry of Defence, specifically the

16 situation reports, those would have to be tendered under seal, as well as

17 the statement itself.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Why is that?

19 MS. CARTER: At the request of the Rule 70 provider due to

20 confidentiality concerns. They have been redact you, had but they are

21 still requesting that the admission be under seal as was done in the Limaj

22 case.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're suggesting this statement should be held

24 under seal. Is there a reason, a good reason for that?

25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the provider simply states that due to

1 confidentiality reasons, they would request that it be tendered under seal

2 based on the material that is found within it. This is the same --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give me an example of what might justify

4 that?

5 MS. CARTER: This -- this witness, while is certainly giving

6 testimony live, was in a unique position to see a number of -- excuse me,

7 giving testimony in open session, was in a unique position to see and be a

8 part of conversations taking place in Kosovo. This is it the procedure

9 that was filed -- followed with regards to Exhibit 92 in the Limaj case,

10 and they're just seeking the same consideration.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Time is moving on constantly. These events in some

12 instances are more than eight years ago now. There's no suggestion that

13 methods are being compromised by divulging the material. At the moment,

14 it's very difficult to see why Rule 70's being applied to this, and we

15 would urge you to take that matter up with the provider and endeavour to

16 resolve the issue of making this an open, public evidence, including the

17 reports. Unless there is some identifiable prejudice, after this length

18 of time, one would have thought that this could be public.

19 MS. CARTER: I'll certainly take that up with the provider, Your

20 Honour.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: We have no option but to hold it under seal, I

22 assume, because you tell us that there is a Rule 70 requirement.

23 Mr. Ackerman.

24 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I don't know if this will be of

25 assistance or not. In the Limaj case, there is almost a virtual waver, I

1 would suggest. What they did in the Limaj case, because they were under

2 seal, the Prosecutor Mr. Cayley just read them into the record in open

3 court so that the content of them is all sitting in the transcript, even

4 though the document itself is under seal which seems silly to think, and I

5 agree with the Court that time has passed over. That makes no sense any

6 more.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Nevertheless, there are wider issues associated

8 with the application of Rule 70, which makes it inappropriate for us to

9 run roughshod over a requirement like this. We are -- we are bound to

10 adhere to that requirement at the moment. All we can do is express the

11 view that the Prosecution should take the matter up with the provider with

12 a view to having this out in the open.

13 It, on the face of it, does more harm than good to keep

14 unnecessary secrets and that's a general proposition. Whether it applies

15 in this case, is for the provider obviously to judge, but hopefully you'll

16 persuade the provider to allow publication of anything that the provider

17 can't offer a good reason for retaining in secret after this lapse of

18 time.

19 MS. CARTER: I'll certainly make that application to the provider,

20 Your Honour.

21 Q. I would now direct the witness beginning at paragraph 7 where's

22 discussing the forces of Serbia. In it you're giving many descriptions of

23 the MUP as well as their special units and the VJ. Can you -- and you

24 make some assessments with regard to the professional demeanour and the

25 training of these individuals.

1 Can you please describe for the Court what is it that you saw

2 there on the ground in Kosovo which gave you the ability to differentiate

3 between the training and the demeanour of these individual units?

4 A. Your Honour, during my time in Kosovo, which was nearly three

5 years, I saw the build-up of this incident in Kosovo and obviously

6 monitored very carefully the deployment of Serbian security forces

7 throughout the length and breadth of Kosovo.

8 It became very clear to me that there were certain units being

9 deployed within the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior, the police, and

10 also within the standing 52 Pristina Corps, which was already stationed at

11 Vojska Jugoslavije within Kosovo itself. As regards the MUP, there were

12 the normal what one might call policemen dressed in their normal milicija

13 dress, and then it became evident there were other elements that were

14 being used in different and discreet ways to achieve or attempt to achieve

15 a military situation or solution within Kosovo itself.

16 Initially, the Serbian security forces made it very easy by these

17 units identifying themselves by various patches, as I described in

18 paragraph 7 the PJP and also the ancillary equipment that these men and

19 formations carried. Hence, it was relatively easy in the early stages to

20 identify very clearly the various elements concerned and to put unit

21 nominations to them.

22 I would respectfully remind the Court that having been working in

23 BRIXMIS, where we monitored the then Soviet forces in East Germany, this

24 was part of my background and, therefore, one was fairly capable, I would

25 suggest, of identifying which forces we were dealing with and at which

1 level these forces were -- were used throughout the operations in Kosovo.

2 Q. Did you determine some sort of hierarchy or specialities of these

3 individual units; and if so, can you describe them?

4 A. In general terms initially there were the -- the ordinary what I

5 would call the village MUP who were carrying out duties as normal

6 policemen do throughout the world, and these personnel soon found

7 themselves in a very difficult situation. In order to continue operations

8 as the situation deteriorated, the MUP then brought in what I would call

9 the light infantry, which is the PJP, who were better armed and equipped

10 and better trained to both hold ground and to take ground as required in a

11 more aggressive stance as the situation, as I said, deteriorated.

12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

14 MR. IVETIC: I would object to evidence being led as to training,

15 without any foundation of how this witness knows of any specific training

16 of any MUP units for that matter, not just the PJP.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you help us, Mr. Crosland, on how you -- can

18 you help us, Mr. Crosland, on how you could conclude that the PJP were

19 better trained?

20 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, in -- as I've attempted to make clear

21 to the Court, there were operations of different natures which started at

22 a very low level and then soon rapidly increased; and in order to carry

23 out these more complicated military operations, it was quite clear that

24 the normal MUP were not being involved.

25 And we very quickly found out, as I said because these people were

1 wearing PJP and Cyrillic on their uniforms, these were the people

2 initially dealing with the situation. There were then other more

3 specialised units like the SAJ and the JSO who were used, as I have said,

4 for the direct assault onto various objectives.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: So what you're saying is the PJP were better able

6 to act in a more aggressive way than the MUP. Is that -- is that what it

7 comes to?

8 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour. And also we saw these

9 personnel actually carrying out operations dressed as PJP, and I believe

10 there is photographic evidence of that in -- in one of the many reports

11 that I made.

12 MS. CARTER:

13 Q. To follow up on Judge Bonomy's inquiry in regards to the PJP being

14 better able to act in a more aggressive way, can you please describe what

15 it was about them, either in stature or armaments, that made them more

16 available for these aggressive-type movements?

17 A. Yes, ma'am. The normal MUP regularly carried side arms and

18 occasionally long arms, and carries out normal what I would call policing

19 duties. When the situation deteriorated then we saw that instead of the

20 MUP, the PJP were brought in in various formations to deal with, as I've

21 described, more complex military manoeuvres.

22 And the PJP, as I have described, would be what I would call the

23 light infantry and then allowing the more specialised units to concentrate

24 on the objectives in hand which would be dealt with by the SAJ and the

25 JSO.

1 Q. What did you witness the SAJ and the JSO doing within Kosovo?

2 A. As I have reported within this, I met them on several occasions,

3 primarily when they were about to assault one of the KLA headquarters in

4 Malisevo. And at other times, we saw them on protection duties,

5 particularly around the Drenica and the Jablanica areas, and also holding

6 positions all the way down the western road from Pec in the north through

7 Decani down to Djakovica.

8 Q. Can you describe in layman's terms what you mean by the SAJ and

9 the JSO were able to concentrate on the objectives in hand?

10 A. As I said, the PJP would have -- would secure the area and

11 initiate the initial contact, and then the specialist forces would move in

12 to assault whatever objectives they were planning to assault. As I

13 indicated, I met a combined force at Lapusnik and Kijevo on the main

14 Pec-Pristina road prior to their assault onto Malisevo.

15 Q. You use the term, in regards to the PJP, that they would "initiate

16 the initial contact." What type of contact are you referring to?

17 A. This varied considerably from a surrounding an area and possibly

18 intimidating the inhabitants to move out, to artillery firing shells into

19 the area as a warning to move out prior to a more major operation,

20 cleaning operation.

21 Q. You indicated --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Is a reference in the statement to the attack

23 that's been mentioned on Malisevo?

24 THE WITNESS: It is, Your Honour, yes.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Which paragraph is that?

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone. Microphone for counsel, please.

2 MS. CARTER: [Microphone not activated] I would point out at

3 paragraph 37, which it indicates there was an operation within the

4 Malisevo area which resulted in 30.000 missing.

5 THE WITNESS: And also, Your Honour, in paragraph 38 specifically.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: You've -- you were asked a question there about how

7 the PJP would initially make the initial contact, and you went on to say

8 "that varied considerably from surrounding an area, possibly intimidating

9 the inhabitants to move out, to artillery firing shells into the area as

10 warning." Are you suggesting the PJP were using artillery?

11 THE WITNESS: No, I'm not, Your Honour. This was a combined MUP

12 and VJ operation.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. And, Ms. Carter, something you could perhaps

14 help me with. We've just had evidence from a member of the PJP, as you

15 know. My recollection, but perhaps you can correct me, was that

16 essentially he carried the same weapons as an ordinary policeman and wore

17 the same uniform up until March 1999. Now, is that wrong?

18 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I can recall firsthand the evidence of

19 K86, who indicated that at different times there were up to three uniforms

20 that were used. And in regards to the PJP versus the MUP, there were

21 separate uniforms; however, the PJP members possessed both of them.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, is that consistent with your

23 recollection?

24 MR. IVETIC: With that witness, I believe the one you're referring

25 to was the parade uniform, which I doubt was being used in the field, and

1 I think that's what the witness also testified to. The witness we had

2 other week, just last week I believe testified they had the same weapons

3 and same uniforms as Your Honour indicated. That's what my notes --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: They had supplementary weapons; but when it came to

5 the arms they are carrying, at least the arms he was carrying --

6 MR. IVETIC: The personal weapons. Correct, that's my

7 recollection.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you. Ms. Carter.

9 MS. CARTER:

10 Q. As we've now moved on to the armaments available to the individual

11 units, can you please describe for the Court what the individual MUP units

12 had in their possession, as well as what the VJ had in its possession on

13 average?

14 A. Yes, ma'am. In -- within paragraphs 7, 8, and 9, I've laid out as

15 clearly as I can the differences between the various units concerned. The

16 Vojska Jugoslavije had obviously small arms and long arms and then had the

17 normal assignment of heavy -- heavier weapons from T-55s [Realtime

18 transcript read in error "P-55s"] or T-84s at times, the tanks, as well as

19 armoured personnel carriers and M-80s, and the BOV-3s as well.

20 What became obvious, as I mentioned in one of the paragraphs, was

21 that some of these equipments were transferred by painting them from

22 green, which are the VJ's colour, to blue and being used by the MUP and

23 its entirety on various operations. The more specialised units like the

24 SAJ and the JSO had much more up-to-date weapons, as I've indicated, the

25 Heckler Koch, smaller weapons, as well as much more distinctive vehicles,

1 to wit, land cruisers. And their uniforms were of a much more modern

2 appearance.

3 I also respectfully remind the Court that as a soldier of some 37

4 years, you do have an inkling for seeing people and how they behave and

5 their demeanour as to what state of training they've had.

6 Q. You indicated a number of items such as tanks by the name of -- in

7 the record, it indicates P-55. Are you indicated P as in Paul or T as in.

8 Tom 55?

9 A. It's a T-55.

10 Q. And for those of us who are not familiar with heavy armaments, can

11 you please describe for the Court what is the use and the nature of the

12 individual items that you have described, such as the T-55, the T-84, the

13 M-80, and the BOV-3s? Including their range.

14 A. The -- the ground in Kosovo is not particularly suitable for

15 counter-insurgency operations from an insurgent's points of view because

16 it's rolling open countryside in the majority of areas. There are wooded

17 and hilly areas which provide a much better arena to -- to stage a

18 counter-insurgency operation.

19 The -- therefore, the ranges of the T-55 and the T-84, M-84, the

20 tanks, I would suggest are hardly the weapons to use in a

21 counter-insurgency operation, because they obviously do an immense amount

22 of damage and can terrify the population fairly easily by their immense

23 firepower and bulk.

24 The other equipment, the armoured personnel carriers, the M-80s

25 and BOV-3s, the BOV-3 is a tripled-barrelled anti-aircraft weapon of

1 various calibres between 20, 30, and 40-millimetre. As I have made quite

2 clear in this report, on many occasions, I witnessed the use of this --

3 these anti-aircraft weapons in destroying houses and assaulting villages.

4 I think I'm right in saying that within the Geneva Convention, it

5 is not allowed to use these weapons in that -- in that way.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Excuse me for trying to clarify something, and it's

7 possibly my lack of understanding of this, but you say the ground in

8 Kosovo is not particularly suitable for counter-insurgency operations from

9 and insurgent's points of view, because it's open countryside. What you

10 do mean by that.

11 THE WITNESS: What I mean by that, Your Honour, is that the

12 insurgents if they -- if they chose to stand and fight against either the

13 Vojska Jugoslavije or the MUP were very soon outranged by superior

14 weaponry and then left in a difficult situation to try and withdraw to

15 fight another day, and this was -- happened at the -- one of the first

16 instance in Likoshani, Donji Prekaz when the Jashari family with taken

17 down.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So what you're saying is it's good for

19 counter-insurgency and bad for the insurgents.

20 THE WITNESS: That's correct sir.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. I followed that.

22 MS. CARTER: You indicated that there's quite a bit of damage that

23 can be accomplished by the use of the T-55 and the T-84. What type of

24 range, accuracy, and destruction are available by these tanks?

25 A. I'm not an armour expert. I'm an infantry and special forces

1 soldier --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Just old on, please.

3 Mr. Cepic.

4 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, with your leave, I believe that this

5 witness is a fact witness, not an expert witness. And I believe that this

6 question is not appropriate for this witness.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think he's going to tell us the extent to

8 which he is qualified to answer it. But with 37 years in the army,

9 there's just a chance that he might know the damage that would be caused

10 by certain tanks from a general experience point of view without having to

11 be specifically set up as an expert. So let's hear the basis on which

12 he's going to answer the question and then judge the answer according to

13 the basis that he gives us, the foundation he gives us for his answer.

14 Mr. Crosland.

15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. As I was about to say, I'm

16 not a tank officer, an armoured officer. I'm an infantry and a special

17 forces officer. However, I've had considerable experience in -- in

18 dealing with unconventional warfare throughout the world and the various

19 damages that can be inflicted by weapon systems.

20 Both the T-55 and the M-84 will be accurate up to a range of about

21 one and a half miles or 3.000 metres. They will deliver a shell 120

22 millimetre, which is about six or seven inches across, which will quite

23 comfortably destroy a house on impact. Throughout my report I described,

24 on the many times that I was down there with some 70 reports plus other

25 conversations that I had direct back to London and other places, the

1 immense destruction that was carried out by the Serbian security forces

2 throughout the province of Kosovo.

3 Not all of this was done by tank fire. The village of Prilep, for

4 instance, was reduced to about three to four inches height throughout, and

5 that was done by bulldozers and various other bits and pieces. I think

6 the point I'm making or attempting to make is that disproportionate force

7 was used throughout this campaign. The BOV-3, the anti-aircraft weapon

8 with its triple barrelled and many calibres, is also a very fearsome

9 weapon when used against primarily civilian targets. And, again, there

10 was ample evidence of empty shell cases again scattered throughout the

11 entire province of Kosovo during the 18 months that I was there. I hope

12 that clears up the issue for you, sir.

13 Q. Thank you, Colonel Crosland. You also have indicated within your

14 statement that you saw the presence of paramilitaries within Kosovo.

15 MS. CARTER: And I would just bring -- or offer from the bar table

16 Exhibit number P927, the collegium minutes of 29 June, 1998. They were

17 received pursuant the same type of RFA's that the other collegium minutes

18 that were entered by this Court on January 22nd of 2007. We would hold

19 out to the Court that they maintain the same indicia of reliability, and

20 we would offer them from the bar table now.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Can that be brought up on the screen for us or not?

22 MS. CARTER: I would ask the Court to bring up P927, specifically

23 at page 5, referencing the third full paragraph as it relates to this

24 witness's statement with regards to the paramilitaries at paragraph 15.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you identify the paragraph?

1 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. We're looking to page 5, third

2 full paragraph.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: The paragraph beginning after the mobilisation.

4 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honour, the paragraph beginning the

5 check-points, if you look to that paragraph and the last three lines.

6 I'm offering this at this time, Your Honour, as it indicates both

7 the indicia of reliability within the witness's statement in regards to

8 what he saw paramilitaries engaged in Kosovo --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: These are --

10 MS. CARTER: Collegium minutes.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: This is the VJ collegium, is it?.

12 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour, where the VJ is indicating that

13 Arkan's Tigers, which were viewed reviewed by this witness, were present

14 in Kosovo.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, that's -- with all respect,

16 that's not what that indicates at all. You have to read it in context.

17 If you go back to page 4, General Perisic is offering to report what data

18 NATO is reporting regarding units, and they ask him to go ahead and tell

19 him what NATO is reporting and then he tells him that NATO is reporting

20 the presence of these paramilitary formations. I believe that's the

21 context in which this is. I don't think he's telling him what units are

22 there. He's telling him what NATO is saying are there, if you read

23 starting at paragraph 4.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Go back to page 4 then to look at this.

25 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, it's got, "General, sir, if you

1 consider it necessary, I can report on what data NATO has on the army on

2 the 52nd Corps," and then goes on to report,"I believe what NATO is

3 saying is going on..."

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman's suggesting that what we're getting

5 here is a report from Major-General Milovanovic of what NATO were -- or at

6 least what the view of NATO was of the factual position.

7 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that correct.

9 MS. CARTER: It is a reference into what NATO was reporting, but

10 what you will not find is a correction indicating that these forces were

11 in fact not engaged in Kosovo and that NATO is reporting wrongly.

12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, that's a stretch, if I've ever heard

13 one.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's a matter for debate later. What --

15 where we are at the moment is that we have minutes of the VJ collegium.

16 It's not being suggested that they are not the minutes of the VJ collegium

17 or they are in some way inaccurate, and the Prosecution offer them for

18 later interpretation, as I understand the position. And on that basis,

19 these will be admitted. We have a context here to assess their relevance,

20 and we will admit them for that purpose.

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I try and help the Court on this

22 basis in that intelligence reports from NATO were based on the NATO

23 defence attaches like myself who reported direct back to their individual

24 Ministry of Defence or Department of Defence, and therefore the statement

25 has got that authority.

1 I personally had other signal intelligence that indicated quite

2 clearly that elements of the paramilitaries were based in Zvecin [phoen]

3 just north of Kosovska Mitrovica.

4 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I have a new objection then, because it

5 hardly can be offered as evidence that corroborates the witness when it's

6 based on the witness's reports. I think that's quite a circular argument.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But it's again a matter of weight, Mr. Ivetic. In

8 due course you will be able to make the point that he may be a source --

9 in fact, for all we know, Colonel Crosland is the particular source of

10 this report, and you'll be able to make that submission when you invite us

11 to evaluate the evidence.

12 Ms. Carter.

13 MS. CARTER:

14 Q. Sir, where did you see paramilitaries within Kosovo, and can you

15 please describe them?

16 A. As I said stated in paragraph 15, it was quite clear that there

17 were other forces outside both the MUP and the VJ operating within the

18 whole of Kosovo, and as I've made clear here by the licence plates they

19 had come from all over the place, including Skopje and Macedonia and Novi

20 Sad and Belgrade. And these personnel, as I've described, were fit, were

21 young, and were extremely confident of their ability to influence the

22 situation in many ways.

23 Q. Based on your years of experience within the military as well as

24 your years and experience with insurgency forces throughout the world, why

25 would you bring in a paramilitary unit such as these?

1 A. I think it's been made clear in the NATO report that these

2 personnel had had experience in Bosnia. And, therefore, as part of the

3 overall armory of the Serbian security forces, if you wish to call it

4 that, these personnel would be used in operations as they had been done --

5 had been used throughout the Bosnia war.

6 Q. Were these paramilitary units out in the open so that the -- it

7 appeared that the MUP and VJ would be aware of their presence?

8 A. They -- they were relatively secret about the way that they moved

9 about. When they did come out, I think it was a deliberate policy of

10 influencing the civilian population that if they didn't comply with what

11 was going on, then there would be trouble, as has been proved on many

12 occasions within the Bosnia war.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: In which paragraph was the reference to Prilep?

14 THE WITNESS: One minute, Your Honour, please.

15 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, it is 1046. I don't know if right now

16 would be a good time for the break, but in the break I could locate the

17 paragraph reference.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I would like to clarify this, if we can, before we

19 break.

20 MS. CARTER: I have indication of paragraph 41.

21 THE WITNESS: 41, sir.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: So when you talk about seeing Prilep razed to the

23 ground, that was during that visit referred to in paragraph 41.

24 THE WITNESS: That's not quite correct, Your Honour. We were --

25 we were taken on this particular occasion towards a place called Glodjane,

1 where the Serbian forces said there had been a massacre of some six to

2 eight persons. I think the point of this paragraph, if I may say so, is

3 that we were being driven there by the MUP.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, when was it you've -- you saw the state that

5 Prilep was left in?

6 THE WITNESS: During the whole of the summer, Prilep came under

7 bombardment on a name of occasions. It was on a junction that was close

8 to an MUP vehicle check-point; in other words, a stationary position. And

9 I would readily --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: If you look at paragraph 42, in fact, you deal with

11 a specific point that you made in your evidence just now, and I just

12 wondered when it was you saw it in that condition.

13 THE WITNESS: Well, it was like that condition so throughout most

14 of the summer of 1998. And I think in one of my reports, it may not be

15 attested here, there were photographs showing the -- the amount of damage

16 concerned. And paragraph 43 refers to more damage in Decani, Pec, and

17 Djakovica, the Albanian areas in particular being burnt out.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we need to break at this stage, and the usher

19 will show you where to wait. During the break, we'll go into closed

20 session while you leave the courtroom.

21 [Closed session]

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 [Open session]

5 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

7 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. Colonel Crosland, I'd like to direct your attention to paragraph

9 29 of your statement where you were further discussions of paramilitaries,

10 and I believe it's indicating the concept of the paramilitaries starting

11 something for the other forces to then follow up on.

12 Can you please develop that a bit further?

13 A. This paragraph 29, Your Honours, we had indication that there were

14 paramilitaries. We were based in Pec at the time and we saw fairly large

15 convoys of -- of 4-by-4 vehicles associated with the paramilitaries; and

16 we then followed them back over the border into Baranja or Ivangrad in

17 Montenegro, Crna Gora, and that is where we found quite a few cars. I

18 can't remember exactly how many of them from this distance.

19 And it was quite clear that they were being corralled in

20 Montenegro prior to being deployed into Kosovo, and we then came across

21 them in various places throughout the time I spent in Kosovo, which

22 indicated that they were part and parcel of the -- the Serbian security

23 force armory to contain this situation in Kosovo.

24 Q. When you indicate in that paragraph that their --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

1 MS. CARTER:

2 Q. You indicate in your statement that their job was to stir up

3 trouble so that the MUP would step in and sort out the participants. Can

4 you give some examples of this stirring up of trouble and what happened on

5 behalf of the MUP?

6 A. As I indicated in paragraph 29, there was an incident which we

7 specifically detailed in Pristina in 1998 where six to eight persons beat

8 up an ITN journalist. There were other instances of this around -- around

9 the area, and it was generally known that they were being used as a unit

10 to impress upon the civilian population that they should heed what was

11 going on.

12 Q. In paragraph --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: What does that phrase mean, "to impress upon the

14 civilian population they should heed what was going on?" That doesn't

15 mean anything to me at the moment.

16 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, thank you. What I'm -- what I mean is

17 that, as I say, it was all part of the Serbian security force armory to

18 get across to the Kosovo Albanians that if they didn't behave or if they

19 supported the KLA, they would be the object of attention by both the

20 paramilitaries and the rest of the Serbian security forces. It was all a

21 question of -- of a tactic of fear to instil in the local population which

22 is primarily Albanian.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

24 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. You indicate that the Serbian forces were trying to get across a

1 point to those who supported the KLA or were in the KLA. Is that an

2 exclusive list of who the ire of the Serb forces was directed upon, or did

3 the general civilian population fall into that group as well?

4 A. I'd been visiting Kosovo since probably the first trip in

5 September 1996 and, therefore, had seen that contrary to what had been

6 reported before that the majority of population was Kosovo Albanian.

7 Therefore, the main -- in a lot of areas, it was Kosovo Albanian entirely.

8 And really, the goldfish in the bowl, if I can use that expression, was

9 actually the -- the remnant Serb population, and I will put it at

10 approximately 2 million Albanians to about 400.000 Serbs. And this

11 population, prior to 1998, had lived in relative harmony throughout the

12 entire area.

13 When the Kosovo Liberation Army appeared late -- I suppose the

14 first [Realtime transcript read in error "International Red Cross"]

15 instance was 1997 and then the more serious instance started in 1998, the

16 Serbian security forces de facto realised that the majority of the

17 population being Kosovo Albanian could possibly support, and I stress

18 could, the KLA or the Kosovo Liberation Army.

19 Now, many of the Kosovo Albanians, in my opinion, really didn't

20 want either the Serbian security forces there or the KLA. Kosovo was a

21 potentially and is today a fertile and rich area, and most of them had

22 come from Albania, which was left in a dreadful state by Enver Hodzic and

23 other people. And they saw Kosovo as a place to go to make their money

24 and do their business which the Kosovo Albanians are actually capable of

25 doing.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

3 MR. ACKERMAN: Somehow in page 40, line 11, the words

4 "International Red Cross" have crept in there, and he didn't say anything

5 about the International Red Cross. And I'd also suggest that the answer

6 was really not responsive to the question.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: I think it was a reference to the initial instance

8 was 1997 and the most serious instance started in 1998. You may take note

9 of what Mr. Ackerman said because although information was provided, this

10 sort of conclusion that the question was seeking was not at the end of it.

11 MS. CARTER:

12 Q. In your answer, you indicate that most of the people within Kosovo

13 just wanted to be left alone. What do you mean by that?

14 A. I have maintained that the hard-core element of the Kosovo

15 Liberation Army was in the low hundreds, about 400, throughout most of the

16 campaign. This increased obviously towards the end of the campaign when

17 it became clear that NATO was intervening and the pressure was on the

18 Serbian security forces.

19 What I would say is that the -- the rest of the Kosovo Albanian

20 population, as I have indicated, wished to -- to be perfectly friendly,

21 perfectly fair, and in the majority of cases got on with their Serbian

22 neighbours with whom they had lived for in many cases for hundreds of

23 years.

24 Q. So when you were making reference to the paramilitaries starting

25 trouble and then the MUP sorting it out, did these people who did not have

1 any desire or any support of the KLA, did they face the same ire of the

2 MUP or were they spared?

3 A. I think you have touched, if I may say so, on the key, the key

4 point that everyone recognised the -- the Serbian security forces and the

5 former Republic of Yugoslavia, as it then was, was facing a

6 counter-terrorist movement in the shape of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

7 What did not help the situation was the way that the Serbian

8 security forces in their entirety, from paramilitary through the MUP and

9 the Vojska Jugoslavije, reacted with total over -- overforce and

10 aggression in destroying villages, businesses, and the -- the whole way of

11 life of most of the -- the Kosovo Albanians within the province of Kosovo.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by saying that the Serb security

13 force as it then was "was facing a counter-terrorist movement in the shape

14 of the Kosovo Liberation Army?" That's not what I would understand by

15 counter-terrorism.

16 THE WITNESS: They were facing an insurgency, Your Honour, in the

17 shape of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Is counter-terrorism not what you do to fight

19 terrorism.

20 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: So do you really mean to say a terrorist movement

22 in the shape of --

23 THE WITNESS: They were facing a terrorist movement in the shape

24 of the Kosovo Liberation Army or, if you may wish, an insurgency movement.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: No. I understand the sensitivities of using the

1 expression terrorist, but I just want to be clear what your answer amounts

2 to.

3 Ms. Carter.

4 MS. CARTER:

5 Q. Colonel Crosland, just to clarify, because you've given a number

6 of statements over the years to the Office of the Prosecution, in your

7 assessment was the Kosovo Liberation Army a terrorist movement?

8 A. As I have stated quite clearly, the Kosovo Liberation Army was a

9 terrorist organisation. It began as a fledgling organisation in the late

10 19 -- probably late 1997, it first came to our -- our notice, and then

11 the -- the fledgling organisation gradually developed throughout 1998 to

12 when in -- in the late autumn of 1998, it was a fairly well-organised and

13 supplied organisation.

14 Q. And when you're discussing the counter-terrorism problem that you

15 believe the Serbian side was facing, was it narrowed to the 400 people

16 that you would actually consider KLA members, or did the civilian

17 population also pay a price?

18 A. Sadly, with -- despite many conversations with both General

19 Perisic and General Dimitrijevic and latterly with senior personnel within

20 the Pristina Corps, the actions of the Serbian security forces, which were

21 extremely heavy handed in a lot of cases, eventually managed, I would

22 suggest, to drive a lot of the Kosovo Albanians against the Serbian

23 security forces.

24 Q. And to round out what made up the entirety of the Serbian security

25 forces, in paragraph 19, you begin making some reference to Serb villages

1 and their village defence forces. Can you flesh that out a bit more?

2 What are we dealing with when you're referring to these civilian defence

3 forces?

4 A. I think throughout Kosovo I probably came across about eight or

5 nine villages that had local Serbian defence forces. I would suggest they

6 are, in the region of local home defence, a bit like dad's army in English

7 during World War II. But within the whole scope of having in excess of

8 13.000 Vojska Jugoslavije already stationed within Pristina -- or within

9 Kosovo, sorry, and up to 10.000 MUP, the added firepower, if you will, of

10 these very small contingents was pretty insignificant.

11 But their job was to defend their -- their isolated settlements in

12 many cases, and one can understand entirely why they were doing it.

13 Q. Did you ever personally encounter these village defence forces?

14 A. Yes, I did. As I said, I visited, I think, about eight villages;

15 Obilic being one and Kijevo on the main Pec-Pristina road being a

16 particular flashpoint area because it was surrounded by Kosovo Albanian

17 villages and, therefore, the object of quite a good measure of treatment

18 from the KLA.

19 Q. When you have encountered these village defence forces, have they

20 ever served any aggression upon you, such as not allowing access or any

21 other more caustic measure?

22 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I object to that as a leading

23 question.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

25 MS. CARTER: I can rephrase if the Court would prefer.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Please do so.

2 MS. CARTER:

3 Q. In your times with these village defence forces, were you treated

4 amicably or were there times where there was a level aggressiveness?

5 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, that remains leading. If she wants to

6 ask the question in a non-leading way, how -- how did he encounter these

7 people, what happened.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, how did they treat you, which is --

9 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, they treated us very reasonably. I

10 speak Serbian, and we were treated as friendly people. If -- the only

11 people who really tried to stop us were actually the KLA who wouldn't

12 actually accept the licna karta, our diplomatic identity card, because

13 this was now the province of Kosovo Albania run by the KLA, which I'm

14 afraid I did not agree with at all.

15 And these villages were, as I said, very isolated, some of them

16 quite poor; and therefore in a humanitarian way, one was trying to

17 maintain a firm and fair view of what was going on throughout the entire

18 province of Kosovo.

19 Q. I'd like to pull up now paragraph -- I'm sorry, P number 687.

20 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, it just was brought to my attention as

21 these items are to go under seal, at least as we are today, we would ask

22 the -- they not be broadcast to the public.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

24 MS. CARTER: Does that mean hard copies need to be provided to the

25 witness, or can he see it? Thank you.

1 Q. Within this situation report, not only do you indicate the

2 vehicles that you viewed being painted from green to blue, you also

3 indicate that the VJ exercises are used to cover observation tasks. What

4 do you mean by that?

5 A. I'm sorry, Ms. Carter, where exactly are you speaking from?

6 Q. It should be, I believe, page 4.

7 A. I -- I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't -- I haven't got that yet.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have it now, I think.

9 THE WITNESS: I do so, I think. Thank you.

10 MS. CARTER:

11 Q. In the bottom, you indicated that you believe the VJ is giving

12 materiel support, and you go on from there. Can you please expand upon

13 that?

14 A. We had cover the positions about various vehicles being repainted

15 and reallocated, which were not within the original order of battle of

16 the -- of the MUP, and this concerned the M-80 APCs, the BOV-3

17 anti-aircraft vehicles as, I indicated earlier in my statement.

18 As regards the tasks of the Vojska Jugoslavije, when I joined as

19 defence attache in 1996, we were briefed by the Foreign Liaison Service of

20 the role of the Vojska Jugoslavije in the then-Federal Republic of --

21 former Republic of Yugoslavia. And, in essence, that was an international

22 border security task which roamed from about 500 metres to two kilometres,

23 depending on the situation.

24 It became clear, as the insurgency grew in 1998, that the Vojska

25 Jugoslavije had additional tasks, and this was made clear by General

1 Ojdanic in August, I think, at a briefing to the Belgrade Attache

2 Association that four extra tasks had been given to the Vojska

3 Jugoslavije, again, in support of the MUP that had had primacy in dealing

4 with an internal situation as was ongoing within the province of Kosovo.

5 The additional task for the Vojska Jugoslavije were the -- that

6 they should guard the lines of communication through -- through Kosovo,

7 various deployment areas that were historically areas they had deployed to

8 and exercise areas, as well as the security border scenario that by then

9 had reached probably ten in some cases 15 kilometres in width. So this

10 meant that there had been a fundamental change in the constitutional

11 deployment of the Vojska Jugoslavije, which the defence council had

12 initiated, as I said, because the worsening situation within Kosovo

13 itself.

14 Q. You indicate that there was expansion of the -- the use of the VJ.

15 Did you have discussions with General Ojdanic with regards to this

16 expansion?

17 A. Yes, I did, in that it was quite clear that despite constant

18 reference to General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, who I met on a

19 fairly regular basis, that I had firsthand evidence and photographic

20 evidence of the VJ being involved in joint MUP and Vojska Jugoslavije

21 operations. General Ojdanic, as Chief of the General Staff -- or, sorry,

22 Colonel of the General Staff at that time and then chief the General Staff

23 afterwards, chose to ignore this.

24 And it was not until his briefing to the Belgrade Attache

25 Association, which I think is referred to in this report on the 28th or

1 27th of August, that I then handed him video evidence that I had seen and

2 witnessed at firsthand over four hours of shelling by multi-rocket

3 launchers, artillery, and tank fire in direct support of combined joint

4 MUP and VJ operations.

5 Q. If Ojdanic is acknowledging it in August, had there been an open

6 communication about it throughout all the other times that you had seen

7 the VJ and MUP acting in accordance with one another throughout 1998?

8 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, that is leading again, I

9 believe.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's go back slightly here. Your discussions with

11 Ojdanic were when?

12 THE WITNESS: During the -- the month of August, Your Honour, when

13 he was asked to give an update to the Belgrade Attache Association, of

14 which I was the president, because of the general concern that the

15 situation in Kosovo was serious, as I've indicated already --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: We can come do that. I'm just interested in the

17 time, and is that what you're referring to in paragraph 42?

18 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: You talk about a video. Do we still have the

20 video?

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I don't know, because this was -- was

22 given across to the foreign liaison service in Beograd, and I don't have

23 any idea whether it's still in evidence or not, sir.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: You didn't make a copy at the time?

25 THE WITNESS: I'm sure there was a copy. I know there was a copy

1 sent to my Ministry of Defence and other allied Ministry of Defence.

2 Where that copy is now, I -- I don't know, sir.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Now, the next question to which

4 objection was taken was whether there had been any earlier communication

5 or indeed later in 1998, communication with General Ojdanic about similar

6 matters. What's the position on that?

7 THE WITNESS: There was -- Your Honour, there was ongoing

8 communication with the foreign liaison service, which was the -- the

9 entree to the Vojska Jugoslavije General Staff, through either personal

10 interviews with General Dimitrijevic or General Perisic.

11 Now, I would presume that that was passed on to -- to General

12 Ojdanic, as then as the -- the Chief of Staff, and he was then summoned --

13 I beg your pardon, sir.

14 He was then summoned to give a briefing to the Attache Association

15 to try and allay the alarm that was being raised by the excessive use of

16 force of all the Serbian forces within -- within Kosovo.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that the only occasion you met General Ojdanic?

18 THE WITNESS: I think I met him about three times, sir, yes,

19 partly as my duties as president of the Belgrade Attache Association.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

21 MS. CARTER:

22 Q. On what occasions did you meet with General Ojdanic?

23 A. The -- the occasion is here stated, ma'am, on the 28th of August

24 was really, as I've said to the Court, was really to confirm that we were

25 not prepared, having got firsthand evidence and witnessed it myself, that

1 there were combined operations between the VJ and the MUP and that

2 excessive force was being used in what was meant to be a

3 counter-insurgency operation. And I would suggest that to use tanks,

4 heavy armoured vehicles --

5 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour.

6 THE WITNESS: -- defence weapons --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

8 MR. SEPENUK: The question was on what occasion did you meet with

9 General Ojdanic. So far, he said August 28, and I think we're waiting for

10 the other allegedly two occasions. All this other stuff is advocacy, not

11 testimony, Your Honour, as Your Honours well know.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the answer so far has been dealing with the

13 28th of August, if you see the beginning of it, Mr. Sepenuk.

14 If you can tell us roughly the other occasions, Mr. Crosland, then

15 Ms. Carter can ask further questions about these if she wishes.

16 THE WITNESS: The specific dates, Your Honour -- I mean, we're

17 talking nearly ten years ago.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

19 THE WITNESS: As I said to the Court, in my duty as the Belgrade

20 Attache Association, one would meet socially with General Ojdanic at

21 various receptions and so on.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: It is the simple answer that these other occasions

23 didn't involve notifying him of the excessive use of force by a

24 combination of the VJ and the MUP?

25 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour. This occasion was

1 used --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: This is the one that matters, from your point of

3 view.

4 THE WITNESS: From my point of view and from the point of view of

5 the other NATO attaches is this is where we were making the point.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, in your -- in your written statement, you say

7 that major or key people like General Ojdanic did not seem to want to hear

8 this information, and -- and that could cover a number of things referred

9 to there, which I think can be divided into two main subjects. One is the

10 extent of the devastation, and the other is the combined nature of the

11 operations. Now, what was it they didn't want to hear?

12 THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, both. Bearing in mind that

13 I'd also escorted around through the area during the -- the summer of 1998

14 the G8, five or six ambassadors with Ambassador Donnelly, my ambassador.

15 So not only was it a military viewpoint but also a political viewpoint

16 that had been seen by a considerable number of people.

17 And I will make the point, if I may, that having travelled in

18 Kosovo since 1996, one had seen it in its peaceful condition and then to

19 see it during 1998 gradually being rumbled was pretty devastating.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: But the distinction is important here. I can

21 understand the point you're making that -- that you were trying to alert

22 senior personnel to the degree of damage being done; but on the other

23 matter, the combined nature of the operations, are you saying that there

24 was an element of denial about that?

25 THE WITNESS: There was considerable denial right up until the

1 27th, 28th of August when we presented this video and my own statement

2 that I had witnessed fire; and, again, when Lord Ashdown was with us in

3 August, he and the BBC had also seen ongoing firing within the Suva Reka

4 area.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I got the impression from earlier answers you

6 gave here that on the 28th of August there was some change, but that's not

7 reflected in your statement, I don't think. So what is the situation once

8 the video has been handed over and viewed?

9 You then have a meeting of the defence attache's association at

10 which General Ojdanic is present. Is that the correct order of events?

11 THE WITNESS: No. General -- Your Honour, General Ojdanic was

12 asked, presumably from pressure within the Vojska Jugoslavije and

13 ourselves, to brief the Belgrade Attache Association on the situation

14 within Kosovo.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Was that after he had viewed your video?

16 THE WITNESS: Probably, he had viewed it. I couldn't be certain,

17 but he -- in that briefing, he continued to deny that there had been any

18 combined operations until I specifically said that I had seen four hours

19 of shelling and so on, on several occasions.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And what was his reaction to that?

21 THE WITNESS: I think as I've said in the report, sir, that he was

22 fairly phlegmatic about it and that force would be met with force.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, I recollect such a reference, but where is

24 that in the statement?

25 MS. CARTER: Paragraph 50 and 51, I believe, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, paragraph 50 and 51.

2 MS. CARTER: Yep -- yes, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: But there you say that General Ojdanic had accepted

4 your observations.

5 THE WITNESS: He had accepted them in so much as he couldn't

6 refute them. Whether he -- he wished to actually acknowledge them, I

7 would suggest by his answer that it was not -- it was a negative.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

9 MS. CARTER:

10 Q. Just to be clear on the time line, prior to you handing the video

11 over to Ojdanic and saying, "Look, this is a joint operation," what was

12 the party line in regards to whether the MUP and VJ were acting separately

13 or together?

14 A. The party line on the whole was that there was -- there was no

15 collusion between the VJ and the MUP. We have the -- the start here of a

16 break within the Vojska Jugoslavije where General Perisic and General

17 Dimitrijevic, as I indicated, that they were outside the chain of command

18 that was going direct from President Milosevic down to General Pavkovic;

19 and that General Pavkovic could see that this was an opportunity for him

20 to produce a result for his -- for President Milosevic and, therefore, the

21 chain of command was starting to fragment within the Vojska Jugoslavije.

22 Q. So the party line maintains that MUP and VJ are separate, with the

23 exception of the two gentlemen, Perisic and Dimitrijevic; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

25 Q. Okay. At the point you then hand the video to Ojdanic and put it

1 to his face, is that when the party line changes and there's

2 acknowledgement on behalf of the VJ as a whole that there are joint

3 operations?

4 A. I think there was -- no, I don't think there was. There was a --

5 a resignation that they had been given factual evidence that was correct

6 and difficult to refute, but they didn't wish to acknowledge that evidence

7 per se.

8 Q. And when Ojdanic replies, "force will be met with force," what

9 type of force was the KLA inflicting upon the VJ after you saw -- or

10 during the time of this four hours of direct and indirect firing upon this

11 village?

12 A. The KLA had no answer to the heavier weapons that both the tanks,

13 the multi-rocket launcher systems, and the artillery that was deployed

14 against various positions primarily in the area of Junik and from a firing

15 position at Blace over to Suva Reka and other villages that came under

16 attack.

17 Q. The --

18 A. I beg your pardon. The KLA did not have any weapons that could

19 match these at all.

20 Q. And to go back to your previous testimony, we're dealing 400 KLA

21 versus how many combined MUP and VJ are at issue in August of 1998?

22 A. As I've stated here, ma'am, the estimate was about 12 to 13.000

23 Vojska Jugoslavije, which were stationed within Kosovo within the Pristina

24 Corps and at major times between 8 to 10.000 MUP that were brought in

25 to -- to the province of Kosovo.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: If you could look for a moment again at paragraph

2 51 - maybe I haven't noted the changes you were making to that properly -

3 you say that on the 26th and 27th of September, you and Ashdown showed

4 Ojdanic photographic evidence of VJ shelling in Suva Reka.

5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that was, with respect, was pointed out

6 as being incorrect when we started the session.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that what that was changed to on approximately

8 the 28th of August?

9 THE WITNESS: No. Lord Ashdown did not show Ojdanic photographic

10 evidence. He went to see President Milosevic, I think on the 28th of

11 September. That has been, in my opinion, the two dates, 26th, 27th of

12 September and August have been muddled up in the -- when this brief was

13 put together; and that, as I say, was pointed out by -- by Ms. Carter at

14 the beginning of this session, sir.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not how I noted it. It must be my mistake.

16 I know the sentence was moved to the beginning of paragraph 50. Did you

17 also change these dates at that time?

18 MS. CARTER: I did, Your Honour. Number 51 should have read,"On

19 approximately 28 September 1998, Lord Ashdown also went to see Milosevic."

20 So 51 is in relation to Lord Ashdown and a September date. Everything

21 with relation to August, it should be in paragraph 50 in relation to the

22 conversation between this witness and Ojdanic.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I've got that. That's the last part of

24 paragraph 51. I've got that. But what change did you make to the first

25 sentence of paragraph 51, when you moved it to the beginning of paragraph

1 50?

2 MS. CARTER: I moved it up and changed, "On 26 to 27 August, 1998,

3 I showed Ojdanic photographic evidence of the shelling of Suva Reka."

4 JUDGE BONOMY: So September gets changed to August.

5 MS. CARTER: Correct.

6 MR. SEPENUK: No, no. I don't think you have that right,

7 Ms. Carter.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry.

9 MR. SEPENUK: I don't think Ms. Carter has that right at all. If

10 she's reading from the supplemental information sheet, the supplemental

11 information sheet says, Your Honour, that paragraph 50, the first sentence

12 should read, "On 26, 27 September 1998, I showed Ojdanic..."

13 JUDGE BONOMY: That's what I've noted you doing this morning in

14 the changes you made.

15 MS. CARTER: Then I apologise, Your Honour. I'm looking off of my

16 notes to the statement itself. It is a failing on my part.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's get back to the witness then. There's

18 no point in relaying this through you. Let's get it clear.

19 Could you have in front of you, please, paragraph 51 of your

20 statement.

21 THE WITNESS: I do, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And we were invited to remove the first two

23 sentences from there and put them at the beginning of paragraph 50. Now,

24 tell me, are there any other changes to be made to these two sentences?

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, as I understand it, paragraph 51, from

1 my position, should read,"On the 28th of September, Lord Ashdown had a

2 meeting with Milosevic directly after his visit to Kosovo."

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But that's the last -- you'll see that's

4 there in the last sentence.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: And, in fact, it should be on approximately the

7 28th of September, is it?

8 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: He went to see Milosevic.

10 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: And made comments to Milosevic you believe about

12 the shelling. But look at the beginning of that where you're talking

13 about what you showed -- ignore Ashdown, because I think we were told to

14 delete the reference to him. But there was a date at the beginning of 51,

15 and then it said, "I showed Ojdanic photographic evidence of the VJ

16 shelling Suva Reka on the 27th of August. His reaction was that force

17 would be met with appropriate force."

18 Now, what date did you show him that evidence?

19 THE WITNESS: That was either on the -- that was either on the

20 27th or the 28th of August, Your Honour, which is when he gave the

21 briefing to the Belgrade Attache Association.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And that's the video.

23 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

24 MR. SEPENUK: Yes. This is very confusing in the extreme, Your

25 Honour, because I have in front of me the supplemental information sheet.

1 And it's specifically stated here, Your Honours, that paragraph 50, the

2 first sentence should now read, and I quote: "On 26, 27 September 1998, I

3 showed Ojdanic photographic evidence of the VJ shelling Suva Reka on 27

4 August 1998." That's the way it reads, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: We've now got the organ grinder here and we can ask

6 him directly, and he's told us that his recollection is it was the 27th or

7 28th of August and that that is separate from the period to which the

8 contact between Ashdown and Milosevic relates.

9 Can I be clear about one other thing. On the 27th of August, when

10 you observed events at Suva Reka, was Ashdown there?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. He was there with the BBC crew

12 and Ambassador Donnelly.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: And he made a second visit in September?

14 THE WITNESS: He made a second visit, Your Honour. Exactly when,

15 I can't be sure without looking at specific information, sir.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: But you will see, in fact, that the last sentence

17 of 51 talks about seeing Milosevic after his first visit. So we have a

18 rather messy couple of paragraphs here which I think if you really want to

19 rely on this as significant evidence, you better start between and go

20 through this and find out what the witness's best recollection of the

21 events covered by these two paragraphs is and delete the paragraphs from

22 your statement.

23 MS. CARTER: [Microphone not activated] as of now on paragraphs --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I would actually seek an amendment as

1 opposed to redaction of those two paragraphs because --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: No. We're not getting into the situation we got

3 into with an earlier witness where we start cutting and pasting. This is

4 a result of the technological age that isn't in keeping with presenting

5 evidence in its most reliable form to the Court, no matter how it might

6 suit technology today. So let's hear what the witness has to say about

7 these events from his recollection.

8 MS. CARTER:

9 Q. Sir, when was the shelling of Suva Reka in which you watched four

10 hours of direct and indirect fire?

11 A. I think, ma'am, the report was --

12 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

14 MR. SEPENUK: I believe she's asked for his recollection. I

15 believe he's reading from a report now. I'm not sure that's proper.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's a statement he has already made. No

17 doubt you'll be confronting him with it if he departs substantially from

18 it in any event. I think it's unrealistic, I think, in the environment

19 where you're not dealing with a jury to take away the document that --

20 that was the basis on which this confusion arose. So --

21 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: -- we'll allow the witness to do his best with all

23 the material available to him to give us his recollection of these events.

24 MS. CARTER: If the witness is to have all material available,

25 there actually is a situation report at P02553 in which the meeting with

1 the defence attaches by Ojdanic is referenced.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge. Microphone,

3 please.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: You're now presenting this as oral evidence live

5 from the witness, so you decide how you want to lead it.

6 MS. CARTER:

7 Q. Sir, based on your recollection, approximately when was the four

8 hours of direct and indirect fire that the BBC reported?

9 A. That was during the visit of Lord Ashdown and the Ambassador Brian

10 Donnelly on their -- on their visit.

11 Q. Do you have dates --

12 A. And I think that was about -- about the 27th of September

13 [Realtime transcript read in error "accept"], because Lord Ashdown had

14 carried out a week's long tour of Kosovo with myself and then went back on

15 I think its Monday, the 28th to speak to President Milosevic about the

16 situation in Kosovo.

17 Q. The transcript is unclear in regards to what month you're

18 references. It's saying the 27th of "accept." Can you please clarify

19 what month that is?

20 A. In my recollection, it's September.

21 Q. So in September --

22 A. I think, if I may interject, Your Honour, the problem is between

23 the dates being virtually the same and the months, and that's where these

24 paragraphs have been muddled up when they've been put together, in my

25 humble opinion.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: There appears to be a situation report of the 28th

2 of August, though, which is P2553, and we should perhaps have that on the

3 screen as well so that you can refresh your memory of that. It's your own

4 report as I understand it.

5 If it's that one, it seems to be dated differently. Is that 2553?

6 THE WITNESS: I doesn't think so, Your Honour, no.

7 MS. CARTER: Exhibit 2554, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: What we're looking for is 2553.

9 MS. CARTER: I --

10 MR. ACKERMAN: 2553 is on the screen today.

11 MS. CARTER: -- My administration is terrible today. I do

12 apologise. P02554.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry. I noted it as 3.

14 MS. CARTER: Given today, it's probably because I said that. I

15 apologise, Your Honour. [Microphone not activated] and at the discretion

16 of the Court, Your Honour --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

18 MS. CARTER: The Ojdanic team was able to solicit and receive

19 actually much less redacted copy of this document. I have listed it as an

20 attachment to this if it -- if it helps the Court at all. It's much less

21 scratched.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, does that help at all in identifying when the

23 video evidence was handed over?

24 THE WITNESS: In my recollection, Your Honour, the brief on the

25 Kosovo situation by Colonel-General Ojdanic to the BAA was on the 27th of

1 August, 1998, as stated in this report. And it was at that briefing that

2 I confronted him with the evidence to make it quite certain that we were

3 no longer accepting the view from the Vojska Jugoslavije that they were

4 not involved in joint military operation with the MUP.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: So what did that video actually show?

6 THE WITNESS: It showed a series, if I remember rightly, sir, a

7 series of shots from -- again, if I remember correctly, many instances of

8 where we had -- we had seen and heard firsthand indirect and direct fire,

9 i.e., artillery and tank fire, being used on villages throughout Kosovo.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Who shot the video?

11 THE WITNESS: We did.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: You personally?

13 THE WITNESS: No, my assistant, sir.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: And did it include evidence of artillery fire

15 actually ongoing or was it film of the resultant damage.

16 THE WITNESS: It showed artillery fire -- I mean, you have to

17 appreciate that you can't get that close to artillery positions for

18 obvious reasons. Having been under artillery fire myself and directed it

19 on many occasions in operations and during this particular occasion, the

20 fire was coming from a battery position in Blace, and it was firing onto

21 villages east -- sorry, west of Suva Reka, which was viewed by Lord

22 Ashdown and Ambassador Donnelly with a BBC team. And you could physically

23 see and hear the shell-fire landing in and amongst the villages.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm -- I'm confused again, because you dated

25 the visit when Ashdown was in the company of Donnelly as the end of

1 September.

2 THE WITNESS: Lord Ashdown made two visits, sir.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I understand that.

4 THE WITNESS: The exact -- I beg your pardon, sir. The exact

5 dates, without referring to documents, I can't be totally certain of.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Was he with Donnelly on both occasions?

7 THE WITNESS: In -- in some parts, because they went to view the

8 humanitarian situation in the Pagarusa valley concerned with the UNHCR

9 concern over IDPs.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: But the second time he's there, it's the BBC that

11 are doing the filming. The first time he's there, your assistant is doing

12 the filming.

13 THE WITNESS: That's -- that's correct, sir.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Ms. Carter, that exhausts what I intend ask

15 at the moment. It's a matter for you how you decide to amplify and

16 clarify this evidence. I remain unclear about the content of what was

17 handed to General Ojdanic, if that's of any assistance to you.

18 MS. CARTER:

19 Q. Sir, you indicate that there was a videotape taken by you and your

20 people in regards to the shelling of Suva Reka; is that correct?

21 A. There -- there was film taken which was done on this -- on that

22 occasion, if I remember correctly, by the BBC.

23 Q. Okay. Is the BBC the only group who took video evidence, that

24 you're aware of, of the shelling of Suva Reka?

25 A. I -- I can't answer that. I think we were the only people in the

1 area at the time because of the tense situation in -- within Kosovo

2 itself.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I can't categorically say we were the only people to see it,

5 but I would suggest we probably were, yes.

6 Q. Who was the videographer of the video that you produced to

7 Ojdanic?

8 A. That was my -- my assistant.

9 Q. Okay. Is your assistant part of the BBC or is that two separate

10 events?

11 A. No, no, no. My assistant is a warrant officer in the British

12 Army.

13 Q. Okay. Let's start on August 28 of 1998, approximately. What, if

14 anything, occurred on that date?

15 A. As I said, this was when General Ojdanic gave the brief to the

16 Belgrade Attache Association on the 27th, as stated in this report, and I

17 then refuted some of the claims that he made on behalf of the Vojska

18 Jugoslavije that they were not engaged in joint operations with the MUP.

19 And this was based on what I had seen not just on this occasion, and I

20 think that's perhaps where we're getting some -- some muddling of the

21 facts.

22 But throughout the period of the -- the early summer, June, July

23 and August where I had seen several occasions, including Suva Reka, Blace,

24 in the area of Junik, in the area of Ponosevac on the border, throughout

25 the province I had witness the joint operations. And I was making the

1 point to General Ojdanic that the United Kingdom and other countries were

2 not prepared to accept that they were not carrying out very aggressive

3 action in a joint fashion.

4 Q. On August 28 of 1998, did you produce a tape to Ojdanic at that

5 time?

6 A. That is my recollection, ma'am.

7 Q. Okay. So if the -- was the tape made that day or was it made

8 sometime prior to August 28, 1998?

9 A. No, that was -- I'm sorry, ma'am. That was a correlation of

10 several events in the attempt to persuade the Vojska Jugoslavije General

11 Staff that what they were saying to us was not correct.

12 Q. Okay. And during this persuasion, when is it that you produced a

13 videotape?

14 A. I think it was at the end of the meeting, ma'am, when Colonel --

15 or General Ojdanic had finished with what as I have described here as a

16 very wooden briefing, and really there was from the Vojska Jugoslavije

17 points of view no change in the situation despite being shown evidence to

18 the contrary.

19 Q. Okay. So on August 28 of 1998, you produced to Ojdanic a

20 videotape of shelling of Suva Reka; is that correct?

21 A. Of both Suva Reka, ma'am, and of other areas as I indicated.

22 Q. Okay. And who was the videographer of the footage of Suva Reka

23 and other areas in which it was viewed the VJ and the MUP acting together?

24 A. The correlation of evidence was produced by my warrant officer.

25 Q. Could you sponsor and say that you had witnessed personally all of

1 the clips that were produced to General Ojdanic?

2 A. Yes, I could, ma'am.

3 Q. Okay. So when you presented on August 28 of 1998 a package to

4 Ojdanic, it was not solely to Suva Reka, but it was to Suva Reka and many

5 other villages; is that correct?

6 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

7 Q. And the footage showed joint operations in what fashion?

8 A. It showed the -- the joint operations between the Vojska

9 Jugoslavije and the MUP formations.

10 Q. Okay. And when you showed a video of joint operations between the

11 MUP and the VJ on August 28 of 1998, how did Ojdanic react?

12 A. As I've stated in paragraph 50, the general agreed with my

13 operations, but made the comment that "force would be met with force."

14 Q. At some other point in time, Lord Ashdown has similar

15 conversations with Milosevic. Is this correct?

16 A. I was not present at these conversations, so I cannot say that

17 under oath. As I understood from Lord Ashdown, he was going back from

18 Kosovo direct to the residency; and then on, I think, the 28th of

19 September, he had a meeting with President Milosevic and discussed these

20 areas, but I was not present at that occasion.

21 Q. But you have had indication directly from Lord Ashdown himself

22 that sometime after you met with Ojdanic, he met with Milosevic on the

23 same matters; is that correct?

24 A. That is what I understand to be correct, ma'am, yes.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, the briefing that Ojdanic gave

2 related to VJ and MUP action anyway. That was the subject of it; is that

3 right?

4 THE WITNESS: General Ojdanic's briefing, Your Honour, was to try

5 and explain why the -- the members of the association who had been down

6 there, and there weren't that many of them, had seen combined operations,

7 excuse me, because the situation had deteriorated, and as I have reported

8 in several of my reports, the Serbian security forces were facing an

9 insurgency problem. And I have no -- I have no problem with -- with

10 recognising that, and I have said so in many reports.

11 General Ojdanic then said that the -- the degree to which the

12 Vojska Jugoslavije was now involved was commensurate with the situation

13 within Kosovo itself; and from a military point of view, one can

14 understand that heavier involvement. The issue or the issue I have

15 highlighted with respect to the Court is the way that this excessive force

16 was used.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: He, though, was giving a reason, was he not, for --

18 for the VJ and the MUP acting together?

19 THE WITNESS: He -- yes, sir. He was explaining --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: And what was the reason?

21 THE WITNESS: Because, basically, the MUP could not hold the

22 situation together with the forces that they had available.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: In your statement, it was put more specifically as

24 being to protect the lines of communication.

25 THE WITNESS: Correct, sir.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that how he put it, or did he put it the way you

2 just put it that the MUP couldn't hold the situation together.

3 THE WITNESS: He would not admit to that, for obvious reasons. As

4 I mentioned earlier to you, Your Honour, that there were four further

5 tasks that had been given to the Vojska Jugoslavije; one of which was

6 protecting the lines of communication within Kosovo; secondly, the defence

7 of their barracks where the Pristina Corps were -- were living; thirdly,

8 deployment areas; and I think fourthly, reacting to insurgent activity.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: And which of these involved joint actions with the

10 MUP?

11 THE WITNESS: Certainly the lines of communication where they

12 would -- they would hold key geographical features to ensure the safety of

13 convoys, and also the -- the attacks on various places that I've

14 indicated, like Junik, Ponosevac, and Suva Reka.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, the last part of what was paragraph 50 of your

16 statement explained that you pointed out observing four hours of fire.

17 Now, were you four hours in the one spot observing activity?

18 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour, yes.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: And that, according to this, involved fire on

20 Junik, Prilep, Rznic, and Glodjane.

21 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: And you would be able, in the one spot, to observe

23 the spread of fire over these areas, were you?

24 THE WITNESS: I was able to observe that, yes, sir.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Now, were you able to say anything to

1 Ojdanic about the results of that action?

2 THE WITNESS: I think we made a verbal -- when he disclosed that

3 Vojska Jugoslavije now had four additional tasks, we said, "Fine, we

4 accept that. We understand it from a military standpoint of view. What

5 we don't accept is the massive destruction that has gone on throughout the

6 province of Kosovo during the summer months."

7 And this was surely not in the best interests of trying to solve

8 the -- the insurgent terrorist problem within Kosovo itself.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: When you say "additional tasks," is ensuring the

10 security of their own barracks not an obvious task for the army.

11 THE WITNESS: It's a very obvious task, Your Honour. But respect

12 to the Vojska Jugoslavije, we're dealing with people who -- with an army

13 that has very specific tasks in mind. And it was the constitutional

14 endeavour that they would have obviously defence of their barracks as

15 their prime task, the primary of operations within an internal situation

16 was given to the MUP. The Vojska Jugoslavije was primarily for

17 international boundary security for the sovereign state of the former

18 Yugoslavia.

19 So that -- that is where a fundamental change had come in to

20 deploying across the area, which makes perfect military sense. I don't

21 have a problem with it. We just wanted an understanding that this was

22 also leading to -- or had led to joint operations with huge damage,

23 collateral damage, on the civilian population.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: But one of the tasks you mentioned before was that

25 they would protect VJ installations. Now, what do you mean by "VJ

1 installations"?

2 THE WITNESS: Within the province of Kosovo, Your Honour, there is

3 the 52 Corps, Pristina Corps which had several barrack complexes, which

4 were well known both to ourselves and anyone else. And these, obviously,

5 required protection should the KLA wish to attack these installations.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, in your army, who protects the barracks?

7 THE WITNESS: We -- within inside the Ministry of Defence or

8 within the UK, we have primacy within our barracks. Directly outside that

9 primacy is passed to whatever police force the barrack is inside.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: But do you have a section of your own army which is

11 assigned the duty of ensuring security of the premises with -- from the

12 perimeter?

13 THE WITNESS: Being specific, Your Honour, we have the Ministry of

14 Defence police that are deployed around several installations.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

16 Ms. Carter.

17 MS. CARTER:

18 Q. In regard to this use of force that was joint between the MUP and

19 the VJ, what was a standard tactic used?

20 A. As I made clear within this report, ma'am, very often indirect

21 fire would, i.e., fire from artillery or direct fire from tanks, would go

22 into an area in order to warn the local population to move out. Now,

23 whether there was communication between the local population and the

24 security forces as a whole, I can't say.

25 But on most occasions, thankfully, very little human life was lost

1 on this initial frightening of the population, which would then be

2 followed by an assault that in most occasions landed up as a demolition

3 process of businesses and houses and burning of crops and the shooting of

4 farm animals.

5 Q. Okay. Starting with the beginning of your description, you

6 indicated that there was direct and indirect fire, and you said one comes

7 from artillery and the other from tank. But could you further describe

8 what that means?

9 A. There are two ways of bringing -- bringing fire on a potential

10 objective. One is by using the direct fire, either you see line of sight

11 to put it simply from a tank onto a building or objective area, so you can

12 actually see where you're firing at. If the terrain is -- and the

13 terrain, as I've already mentioned, in Kosovo does give you a -- a vision

14 of three to five kilometres and more in certain areas.

15 In other areas, in the more mountainous areas, one of the ways of

16 getting fire into an area is to use indirect, which is either mortars or

17 artillery where there is -- or there should be someone who is looking at

18 the objective and directing the fire into the area that you require it.

19 Q. Is the destruction the same, be it direct or indirect fire?

20 A. As I said, most, most of this fire initially was to frighten the

21 inhabitants out of the area, and then there would be direct fire as the

22 forces closed in on villages; for instance, like Malisevo that was

23 completely razed to the ground by a joint MUP/VJ force.

24 I had just driven from Malisevo and met them on the Pec-Pristina

25 road, as I made clear in this report in one of the paragraphs. So I had

1 actually driven from Malisevo and met the force that was about to assault

2 this KLA headquarters.

3 Q. If it was a KLA headquarter, wouldn't it be a viable option to

4 level it?

5 A. Yes. I don't have a particular problem with that. But when you

6 start leveling the entire market square -- the headquarters, I know

7 exactly where it was, that is in my humble opinion a genuine target. But

8 then to go and raze the entire village, burn all the shop stalls, wreck

9 all the petrol stations, burn all the crops, and drive all the inhabitants

10 out of it, I would submit that is not the way to win the hearts and minds

11 campaign of the current inhabitants of Malisevo in this particular case.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter, where is that referred to in the

13 report?

14 MS. CARTER: Where is which?

15 JUDGE BONOMY: In the statement, rather.

16 MS. CARTER: Are you referring to Malisevo, Your Honour?

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

18 MS. CARTER: One moment.

19 THE WITNESS: It's, Your Honour, paragraph 38, and --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: When was this?

21 THE WITNESS: -- and 37, Your Honour. This is in the middle of

22 July. In paragraph 37, in the middle, if I may draw your attention to,

23 "Met assault force of SAJ, PJP, and VJ at Cijevo. Ongoing operations in

24 Blace, firing all day... under artillery, tank, and mortar fire from 1.00

25 onwards. Unanswered question, where is the civilian population from

1 Orahovac." These are --"Malisevo, approximately 30.000 missing." We then

2 found them in the Pagarusa valley."

3 So that is indication of a population being driven out prior to

4 assault.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: You saw the force amassing, you say, to attack the

6 KLA headquarters in Malisevo. Did you also see the results of this

7 attack?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, Your Honour. I then took, if I remember

9 correctly, the G8 ambassadors down to Malisevo fairly directly after this,

10 to show these senior gentleman the results of such a heavy-handed action.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

12 MS. CARTER:

13 Q. You indicated that from this assault 30.000 Albanians were on the

14 move and had gone to the Pagarusa valley. What type of living conditions

15 did these people have once they had their homes levelled?

16 A. In the majority of cases, ma'am, they were living under polythane.

17 Some had cars, some had carts, and they were really just tucked under

18 hedge rows a bit like -- with respect to the people concerned, a bit like

19 tramps. They were living in the open air.

20 In the middle of summer, there's not too much of a problem because

21 the temperatures are reasonable, quite hot in fact. But later on in the

22 year, there was concern with the UNHCR that disease and cold could affect

23 the civilian population that was still without proper homes as the weather

24 got colder.

25 Q. And as these people were living like tramps under hedgerows, what

1 type of food sources or comforts did they have?

2 A. They had relatively little food, although the amount of food that

3 the Albanians consume is not perhaps as great as what we in the Western

4 world have. So the hardship, and I don't wish to belittle it, they were

5 probably used to a harsher regime than many of us here in this court.

6 Q. Outside of the 30.000 that you found in the Pagarusa valley, were

7 there any other large pockets of Albanian civilians that you found without

8 homes living in similar circumstances?

9 A. The Pagarusa valley was probably the major conglomeration in

10 Kosovo. The UNHCR can give you far better detail than I can, but we had

11 indications that there were over 50.000 in Montenegro and other people had

12 gone to Albania and to Macedonia as well.

13 So there was at one stage, I think I'm correct in saying that

14 there were over a million to a million and a half people on the move

15 throughout Kosovo. There was also a collection in the Rogovo -- Rogovo

16 Pass to the west near Pec prior to moving into Montenegro over extremely

17 difficult country, mountainous country.

18 Q. Throughout your statement you make you make reference to any

19 number of villages multiple times on different dates and assaults against

20 the villages. If they had been levelled, why were the Serbian forces

21 returning?

22 A. Yes, ma'am. I can't answer that question because the villagers

23 would come back to salvage what they could from the devastated areas; and

24 then on -- on several occasions talking to people, they had been moved out

25 by various contingents whether paramilitary, VJ, or MUP is very difficult

1 to tell because the villagers are extremely frightened. And it was very

2 easy to put into their mouths that they'd been faced by paramilitaries

3 when they could have been faced by people wearing bandannas as an

4 identification between friend and foe with the MUP, et cetera.

5 Q. When you were in Kosovo, did the Serb forces ever bring to your

6 attention atrocities committed upon them?

7 A. Yes, ma'am. There was -- and that's a paragraph within this

8 report. When we were staying, as we used to do on many occasions both in

9 Pec and in Djakovica overnight, and we also had a house in Pristina, we

10 were -- we were summoned by the local MUP in Djakovica to go towards a

11 small village area called Glodjane. And that is identified in one of

12 these paragraphs, which might help the Court if we found that first.

13 Q. I point you to paragraph 41, if it assists.

14 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes. We had -- we had been out and stayed

15 in the hotel, the Pastrik hotel in Djakovica quite openly. I had actually

16 a red armoured defender in maroon with union jack, so it was clear who I

17 was. There was no subterfuge at all. We were then asked to accompany the

18 MUP to go down to an area in a village called -- a small village called

19 Glodjane, where when we got there we were shown six to eight bodies in a

20 drain, concrete drain. There were bullet scratches on the far bank that

21 indicated that some firing had taken place, and the bodies were in the

22 water.

23 Now, I'm not a pathologist and we were not allowed to closely

24 inspect these bodies, but my advice to the MUP was that they should get

25 proper forensic information so that this incident could be clarified as a

1 war crime for future reference. Now, whether the -- the Serbian

2 authorities did that, I do not know. So I can't say for certain that

3 these bodies were Serb. There were just six to eight bodies in various

4 states of decomposition in this concrete water flow.

5 Q. As you're seeing six to eight bodies that are alleged by the

6 Serbian forces to be Serbian, did you see anything else more concerning

7 during that trip?

8 A. Yes, ma'am. What was disturbing was that despite the fact that

9 we'd been escorted in in our own vehicles, this was both the American

10 defence attache and myself, we came across troops, as I indicate in

11 paragraph 41, that were still in the business of burning and looting and

12 razing the villages en route to Glodjane and were perfectly unconcerned

13 that they were doing it in front of two defence attaches.

14 Q. These villages on the way to Glodjane, were they KLA Wasp nests,

15 or what viable reason could there have been to level these villages?

16 A. This area was a known KLA stronghold under the command of Ramush

17 Haradinaj and had caused and continued to cause the Serbian security

18 forces considerable problems; that's sniping and ambushing against the

19 main Pec-Decani-Pristina -- sorry, Djakovica road that was a main supply

20 route for the western side of the element and the Serbian forces

21 concerned.

22 Q. Can you approximate for the Court how many KLA soldiers were at

23 issue under Ramush Haradinaj's regimen?

24 A. That's a difficult question to be precise. I visited his

25 headquarters in and around this area I think twice, and I saw between 20

1 and 30 personnel who wearing a uniform of some description. Whether that

2 means that they were actually hard-core KLA UCK, I think is open to

3 debate.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, could you find a suitable place to interrupt,

5 please, Ms. Carter.

6 MS. CARTER: I'll ask one final question, Your Honour.

7 Q. So you have 30 veteran Haradinaj's KLA force. Can you approximate

8 for the Court how many civilians were damaged in the course of this

9 action?

10 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, unless there's a foundation for it, I

11 think this is cause for speculation, and it also misstates the testimony.

12 He said there were 30 personnel wearing a uniform. He did not say they

13 were veteran Haradinaj's KLA.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems a very general question for a start, but

15 it must be very difficult for the witness to answer.

16 MS. CARTER:

17 Q. Can you answer it?

18 A. Within the Ramush's area when we went to visit - and would I say

19 this as -- as a general application throughout Kosovo whenever we went to

20 various KLA headquarters, and if there were important people coming like

21 an ambassador or Deputy Head of Mission or whatever - inevitably there

22 would be more "KLA personnel" turning up to give, in my opinion, an

23 overstated version of how many KLA were within the combat, if you will,

24 the insurgent area.

25 And that's why I make it quite clear there may have been 20 or 30

1 there in uniform, but purely or possibly for show. There were definitely

2 ten to 15 who were armed and who were providing some kind of perimeter

3 defence around Haradinaj's headquarters.

4 Q. I think the implication that was being made by Mr. Lukic is there

5 could have been more un-uniformed personnel in that area. Is that likely?

6 A. I'm sure that's a reasonable statement, but we're getting into

7 surmising [Realtime transcript read in error "surprising"], if I may be so

8 bold, as to the numbers. I have made a comment, Your Honour, on what I --

9 what I reckon to be what I have called the hard-core element.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: We've also departed from the question which caused

11 the controversy, and that's probably just as well. If you do intend to

12 pursue that line, you need to establish a foundation for it.

13 So we'll --

14 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, 77, line 21 he said "surmising" and

15 not "surprising," and I think that's an important difference.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it was "surmising."

17 THE WITNESS: Correct, Your Honour, yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll need to break again, so we'll go into

19 closed session for you to leave the courtroom.

20 [Closed session]

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 [Open session]

5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

7 MS. CARTER:

8 Q. Colonel Crosland, I had alike to move on to the part of your

9 statement which involves deals command issues beginning at paragraph 47.

10 In it you indicate that there must have been a coordination centre,

11 presumably in Pristina. Can you elaborate a bit further on why you

12 believe that must have been the case?

13 A. I think on the -- based on my experience around the world in

14 counter-insurgency operations, I would have find it very difficult not to

15 have thought there would be a coordination centre between the various

16 elements of the forces deployed in Kosovo and in this case the VJ and the

17 MUP, to prevent, as I said in the paragraph, what is now called

18 blue-on-blue operations, forces firing on one another by mistake, and

19 other areas of issues.

20 Q. In your time within Kosovo, did you ever encounter any sort of

21 blue-on-blue activity?

22 A. I'm not aware that we did, ma'am, no.

23 Q. Okay. Given that you had military police, reservists,

24 paramilitaries, and civilians active at different times within Kosovo

25 during 1998 and 1999, what would you have expected to have seen without a

1 coordination centre?

2 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I'm going to object to that. I don't

3 think he's -- I don't think she laid down a foundation for his knowledge

4 in 1999, in particularly relevant portions thereof, since we know the

5 witness was not stationed on the ground there during that time period. So

6 without that foundation, I think this question is bordering on being

7 improper.

8 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, his statement very clearly

9 states that he was in Kosovo almost until the bombing campaign began in

10 March of 1999, so can clearly speak at least to the first quarter.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: There is a foundation for the witness to answer

12 that question, both in his experience within Kosovo itself during 1998 and

13 1999 and also his general experience of counter-insurgency.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. If -- if there had not been

15 a coordination centre within Pristina, then I would have expected serious

16 coordination issues between the various forces concerned. The fact

17 that -- as far as I know, there was no clashes between the forces,

18 although you must understand that some of these attacks took place when I

19 was not present in the area.

20 So whether there were blue-on-blue, I can't answer that question.

21 But I would very surprised to hear that there had not been a coordination

22 centre from purely a command and control purpose from the - I beg your

23 pardon, madam - from the field commander back to his military and

24 political commanders back in Belgrade.

25 MS. CARTER:

1 Q. And when you say "a coordination centre," what are you imagining

2 with that term?

3 A. In my opinion, it would have been a mixed headquarters with

4 representation from all the forces deployed within Kosovo and with a --

5 both a political and military mix to ensure that the political will was

6 being followed by the military.

7 Q. Based on what you were seeing within Kosovo as well as your

8 interactions with some of the high-level personalities within Kosovo in

9 1998 and 1999, what do you believe was the -- the level of order? Who --

10 did all of these branches exist equally, or do you feel that there was

11 some sort of pecking order?

12 A. I would expect that the -- the MUP, who had primacy for an

13 internal situation as this insurgency, was would presumably be running it,

14 maybe in a dual capacity with the various Vojska Jugoslavije generals

15 within the Pristina Corps and 3rd Army based in Nis.

16 Q. What about what you saw in Kosovo led you to this conclusion?

17 A. Well, as I said, I would have found it very unusual not to have

18 had a -- a mixed or a dual coordination centre within Kosovo to prevent

19 unnecessary casualties between their own forces and to ensure presumably

20 some kind of continuity in the -- in the various actions that took place,

21 and that would have both a political and a military -- a military side

22 depending on how the -- the politicians wished to -- the military to act.

23 Q. Okay. You also indicated in one of your previous answers that you

24 believe --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. I have no

2 intention of interfering with Ms. Carter's way of examining. When you say

3 whether it was in 1998 or 1999, I wanted to warn you against a couple of

4 things. We have to make a distinction. In 1999, there was the peacetime,

5 the peaceful period, and the period of NATO invention; then in 1998, which

6 is very familiar to the witness, it seems, there was a part of it as well

7 as a part in 1999 when the witness was absent.

8 Therefore, please could you ask specific questions referencing to

9 a specific period and area. Otherwise, if we merge all of those together,

10 it doesn't amount to the same thing.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I have no doubt that Ms. Carter is conscious

12 of the need to confine the witness's answers to the periods that he has

13 experience of, and indeed he's been conscious of that himself in the

14 answers he's given by pointing out that certain events took place when he

15 wasn't present. So we are alert to the point. Thank you, Mr. Fila.

16 Ms. Carter.

17 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. When do you believe such a coordination centre would have been

19 established?

20 A. I can only --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That, I think, leads to my intervention. I was

22 going to intervene earlier. The questions that you are addressing just

23 now, appear to me to be matters of expertise that you would expect to be

24 asked of an expert witness who might draw conclusions from a whole series

25 of factors.

1 Insofar as this witness is concerned, then what you're asking for

2 is speculation, and you've already had a measure of speculation in his

3 answer. That's no fault -- that's no criticism of the witness. He's been

4 forced into that situation. But he's not a person who has prepared

5 himself to come here to give expert evidence based on a full study of all

6 the materials relating to events in Kosovo that might point to a

7 coordination body.

8 MS. CARTER:

9 Q. Then I'll move along to paragraph 54 of your statement and as well

10 as a comment that you had made earlier in regard to General Pavkovic's

11 involvement in Kosovo.

12 What has led you to believe that General Pavkovic has been acting

13 outside the chain of command?

14 A. I've stated in paragraph 54 of this report, we had a meeting with

15 General Dimitrijevic with whom I'd met on several occasions during the --

16 the whole of the year of 1998; and on this particular one, on the 5th of

17 November, as is stated here, he said he was extremely worried about the

18 situation within Kosovo and that General Pavkovic appeared to be working

19 outside the loop of command.

20 He made statements to me then, and I think at other times as well,

21 that he and General Perisic were no longer now within the chain of

22 command.

23 Q. Based on what you were viewing in the field and based on your

24 relationships with these two individuals, how much credence did you put in

25 their concerns?

1 A. I placed a great deal of credence within it, because both of

2 them. General Perisic was the Chief of the General Staff and had been for

3 a number of years, and General Dimitrijevic was Chief for

4 Counter-intelligence and therefore I would -- I would entertain that he

5 was a key player within the overall command and control and coordination

6 of operations against an insurgency. I mean, head of -- head of a

7 counter-intelligence should be leading in the intelligence evaluation

8 against an insurgency as was happening in Kosovo.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, it appears the witness has only

10 answered half of the question. He was also asked to say what it was based

11 on his -- what he was viewing in the field that gave him credence to this,

12 and he didn't respond to that part, and I think he should. I would like

13 to know what he was viewing in the field that made him believe there was

14 credence in those statements.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, can you deal with that?

16 THE WITNESS: I can only repeat, Your Honour, that when these

17 interviews took place with General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, these

18 were what they stated to me. I don't -- I cannot collaborate that any

19 further than that. I just find it very strange that the head of the --

20 Chief of the General Staff, the head of the Vojska Jugoslavije, and the

21 Chief of Counter-intelligence should tell a defence attache that they're

22 not in the chain of command.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: I think that's absolutely clear, and it's clear

24 from your statement that you were told that. You've now confirmed what I

25 don't think I was aware of before, that you actually spoke to Perisic

1 about this. Was that on more than one occasion?

2 THE WITNESS: As far as I recall, Your Honour, that was on about a

3 couple of occasions, and the same with General Dimitrijevic.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: But I've made the same note myself in reading your

5 statement before, as has now been raised both by Ms. Carter and

6 Mr. Ackerman. Were there any signs you can identify on the ground

7 independently of what you had been told that would confirm that somehow or

8 other the chain of command that should be observed was not being observed?

9 THE WITNESS: Apart from the -- the personal meetings between

10 myself and these very two very senior generals, and they them -- they

11 themselves stating that the situation appeared to be getting out of -- of

12 control in Kosovo and that General Pavkovic was in name was reporting

13 direct to Mr. Milosevic, no, I can't specifically say other than that.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well --

15 THE WITNESS: And I think the fact that we were raising -- sorry,

16 if I may, Your Honour. We were raising concern about the level of

17 violence being dished out by the VJ and the MUP and these two officers,

18 General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, were concerned but were unable

19 to do anything about it.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Counsel would be accused of asking a leading

21 question if they said what I am about to say, but is that not an answer to

22 the question, in fact, that things that you observed were getting out of

23 hand?

24 THE WITNESS: That is -- in my opinion, that is correct, Your

25 Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

2 MS. CARTER:

3 Q. Beginning in January of 1998 and progressing through the year,

4 what specifically was becoming more egregious that you would indicate that

5 it was "getting out of hand"?

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, are you asking for something that we haven't

7 already heard? Or have we not spent the morning listening to that? If

8 Mr. Crosland thinks he can supplement rather than repeat what he has said

9 already, fine.

10 THE WITNESS: With respect, Your Honour, I think if Ms. Carter is

11 referring to the Racak incident, then that was probably a fundamental

12 moment when the -- the Racak incident in mid-January --

13 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, can I interrupt? That's

14 certainly -- that's certainly not responsive to the question, because the

15 question is about January 1998 and progressing through the year; in other

16 words, 1998. Racak was in 1999. So she wasn't asking about that, and I

17 don't think the witness should simply volunteer testimony that he thinks

18 might be interesting.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: That does seem a fair comment. Ms. Carter.

20 MS. CARTER:

21 Q. Actually, going more towards the end of 1998, I'll direct you to

22 December of 1998 and some of the actions that were taking place then.

23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I wanted to wait until you've concluded

24 with paragraph 54, but then I wanted to warn you against something which

25 is unclear. It begins with, "On the day of the 5th of October," whereas

1 in the transcript we have the 5th of November. That should be corrected.

2 I wanted to wait for Ms. Carter to finish to intervene. Thank you.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Where is the error in the transcript, Mr. Fila,

4 which line?

5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] 54. It says the 5th of November,

6 whereas, the transcript says the 5th of October.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Which page in the transcript though?

8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] We've passed that point because I

9 waited for Ms. Carter to finish so as not to interrupt. I wanted to be

10 gentlemanly.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Can somebody help me with the page and line?

12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I think --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: 83. Yes. If you look at paragraph 54 of your

14 statement, you'll see there's a date at the beginning. When you were

15 dealing with that, you referred to that date as the 5th of November. Can

16 you tell us which is correct? It says "October" in the statement, and you

17 said "November" in your evidence.

18 THE WITNESS: I presume that is a type error, Your Honour, I'm

19 afraid. I can't -- I can't say without looking at the original documents.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, which are you suggesting is the type error?

21 The one in the statement?

22 THE WITNESS: I think the one in the statement, Your Honour, yes.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: So that should be November.

24 Ms. Carter.

25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'd like to bring up the collegium

1 minutes of 25 February 1999, which is at P00941, specifically to page 24.

2 I'm looking to paragraph 4. Your Honour, the Prosecution will be making a

3 submission from the bar table with respect to this document. This is

4 another of the collegium minutes that was tendered on 22 January 2007. It

5 was received pursuant to an RAF in the same fashion as those that have

6 already been admitted, and we're seeking to admit it from the bar table

7 now. I'm looking to page 24, paragraph 4, and specifically in the middle

8 of the page.

9 Q. Sir, could you please review the paragraph that begins, "I can see

10 that we're still settling into a routine," and let me know when you're

11 complete. Are you finished?

12 A. Yes, ma'am. Mm-hmm.

13 Q. Thank you. Sir, are you aware of who the commander of the 3rd

14 Army was in February 25th of 1999?

15 A. Yes, it was General Pavkovic.

16 Q. And I -- if I were to hold out to you that the author of this

17 statement is Ojdanic, and Ojdanic is indicating that engagements are

18 taking place within the field of which he had not approved, what does that

19 indicate to you with regards to the command and control structure at that

20 time?

21 A. Well, this appears to be very, very fragmented if the Chief of the

22 General Staff and the army commander are -- are do two different things,

23 and generally that doesn't lead to very good communication and cooperation

24 between the staff concerned. So I would -- I would be worried with this

25 statement.

1 Q. Why would you be worried?

2 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, I'm going to object to this line of

3 questioning. You've ruled when General Vasiljevic was here that it was

4 not appropriate for a witness who is not present at a meeting where

5 minutes are taken, is not aware of the context in which it's taken to

6 offer comment on it, and that exactly what's happening here. This witness

7 cannot comment on a lengthy document which are the minutes of a VJ

8 collegium where he was not present, and he does not know what preceded or

9 followed this one paragraph we're talking about.

10 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, this paragraph lies

11 squarely within the witness's previous testimony. He's indicating that

12 Pavkovic is going out of the chain of command, that there are already

13 issues that he was noting, were having conversations with between Perisic

14 and Dimitrijevic.

15 This is squarely relevant with what he was understanding beginning

16 in 1998 that there is a fracture chain of command, Pavkovic is going

17 outside of the appropriate chain of command, and is making decisions that

18 are not his to make.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, in the first place, what he understood

20 was --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's have a little order here at the moment. I'm

22 aware you're on your feet, Mr. Ackerman, but just hold on for a moment.

23 Now, Ms. Carter, you are asking, "What does that indicate to you

24 with regards to the command and control structure?" That sounds like a

25 question for an expert.

1 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, Colonel Crosland had

2 ongoing communications with General Dimitrijevic. General Dimitrijevic is

3 the person who was making the objection here in the VJ collegium minutes.

4 There has become a question here today in regards to what was happening

5 within Kosovo, as if the statements that Dimitrijevic are making to

6 Colonel Crosland are unfounded or unsupported.

7 And I would argue to the Court that this document and this type of

8 document shows that what Colonel Crosland was learning from the

9 individuals who are privy to these meetings was in fact accurate, and that

10 does place significantly into who is going to be responsible in the field

11 of operation going into 1999.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: But what this -- this says to any reader that

13 General Ojdanic was taking a decision because he didn't like what had

14 happened. He decided this unit must be used as a whole?

15 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, if the document is taken

16 as a whole, there become -- it becomes much clearer that there are two

17 concerns that are being articulated within these collegium minutes. One

18 is the use of this brigade inside of Kosovo as opposed to --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on. We're dealing with one question you have

20 asked in relation to one paragraph. You're not taking it in context.

21 You're asking the witness a question exclusively out of context. So let's

22 deal with that.

23 MS. CARTER: Okay. Certainly, Your Honour. And what I'm

24 anticipating -- or what I'm trying to elicit is that --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't tell the witness what you're about

1 to -- should I ask him to leave if you really find this very important,

2 because perhaps he should. What you're telling me is that I can't read

3 this and make -- and properly understand it and I need his expertise.

4 Now, he's not here as an expert witness. He's here to tell us what he

5 experienced, isn't he?

6 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, based on your previous

7 rulings with regard to these specific documents, you indicated that while

8 you felt that the documents were authentic and they were appropriate for

9 admittance, what you were concerned was how much weight that you to give

10 to them. What I'm trying to elicit from this witness is what he is

11 learning in Kosovo at the time is cooperating --

12 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, once again, I wish she wouldn't say in

13 front of the witness what it is she would trying to elicit. You just told

14 her not to do it, and now she is doing it.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll need to leave the courtroom while we deal

16 with this, so we'll go into closed session to enable you to do that.

17 [Closed session]

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 [Open session]

24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter, your question is confined to something

1 the witness can glean from this paragraph.

2 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, what the Prosecution is

3 attempting to do --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.

5 MS. CARTER: What the Prosecution is attempting to do is merely

6 show what weight can be given to these documents, that these documents are

7 not taken in isolation, that there are other witnesses that can

8 corroborate these type of meetings and these type of concerns. Colonel

9 Crosland has been very clear that he indicated there was a chain of

10 command that was being circumvented that was going from General Pavkovic

11 through Milosevic to Sainovic.

12 What this document shows is exactly what was being -- what the

13 concern was by Dimitrijevic, that Pavkovic is not taking order along the

14 chain of command but, rather, going outside of that chain of command and

15 making decisions on his own. So the attempt isn't to make -- have the

16 witness necessarily contribute in regards to being able to say that there

17 is -- that he can speak any further to the chain of command itself but,

18 rather, that the Court can have weight to these documents.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: So in an ideal world, what's the answer to the

20 question you've asked?

21 MS. CARTER: All the -- the only thing I'm expecting the witness

22 to answer is that Dimitrijevic told him beginning in 1998 that Pavkovic

23 was circumventing the chain of command, and that this is showing in

24 February of 1999 indicates that that is precisely what's happening, that

25 what he's learning from Dimitrijevic is supported within the VJ collegium

1 minutes. Nothing more.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: And is that not obvious from the document?

3 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, the Prosecution is

4 merely -- is merely attempting to follow the order of the Court. The

5 Court was very clear when admitting the previous documents on the 22nd

6 that it wanted weight, that it somehow wanted corroboration; and that --

7 that is what we're attempting to do is merely support the documents as

8 opposed to the document necessarily supporting --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give me page reference for this expression

10 of will on the part of the Trial Chamber?

11 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. One moment.

12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] In the meantime --

13 MS. CARTER: The argument is broken in two. It starts on page

14 8807 where the Court originally admits the documents; then there is a

15 series of arguments on behalf of Mr. Petrovic with regards to these

16 documents. I do apologise.

17 The paragraph where it's -- I was having that reading from the

18 Court indicates from you these two documents are also including the

19 statement --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Which page? Or 8809; right? Yes, on you go.

21 MS. CARTER: Yes. Yes, 8809, beginning at 01, that there -- it

22 appears that you're only accepting the documents to the extent that they

23 are being addressed in evidence. There are some other statements that are

24 going to be made throughout Mr. Vasiljevic's testimony, such as --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: But Mr. Vasiljevic was being used, and I probably

1 offensively at one stage described him as a puppet. That was no criticism

2 of him; it was criticism of what the Prosecution were doing. They were

3 using him to read something out.

4 That's not what you're doing here. You're doing something

5 different, which I you may be entitled to do. I don't think

6 Mr. O'Sullivan is right to compare the two situations. You're asking a man

7 with personal experiences on the ground to say is consistent with a

8 document.

9 Let's hear what the other objections are.

10 Mr. Ackerman.

11 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I've been trying to think of a term

12 that might describe this, and I think I'll use grasping at straws. The

13 Chamber will recall that everything that everything that this witness has

14 said about Pavkovic going outside the complain of command was information

15 that came from Perisic and Dimitrijevic in 1998. There's nothing in the

16 record that says that Pavkovic was going outside the chain of command in

17 1999. It all has to do with 1998. This witness has no knowledge of what

18 was going on in 1999, at least from a personal standpoint.

19 You'll also remember, Your Honours, that it is the theory of the

20 Prosecution that Perisic was replaced because he would not do the bidding

21 of the Milosevic people and was replaced with Ojdanic, who would. And now

22 they're saying that you should also look at this to show that -- that

23 Pavkovic was also continuing to go outside the chain of command even after

24 these replacements had been made that were supposed to solve that problem.

25 And finally, and I think most importantly in some ways, the

1 question that she asked is the second one I know for sure today that is

2 extraordinarily misleading. She says,"If I were to hold out to you that

3 author of this statement is Ojdanic, and Ojdanic is indicating that

4 engagements are taking place within the field of which he has not

5 approved." That is not in there. There is nothing about engagements

6 taking place in the field that he has not approved. And the engagements

7 take place in the field all the time, and this witness will tell you this,

8 that aren't approved by the chief of General Staff.

9 The Chief of the General Staff is not a micro-manager, and so

10 engagements go on all the time in the field that he doesn't approve of.

11 The local commander has a great deal of authority to deal with issues as

12 they come up within the general orders that he has. So that -- that

13 question is misleading. It misled the witness, I suspect, and she should

14 not be asking misleading questions. She can say to the witness, "Please

15 read that and tell us if you have any conclusions about it," if the

16 witness is an expert witness, which he isn't.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, do you have something to add?

18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I just wanted to point to the fact that

19 Ms. Carter said that the witness mentioned that General Pavkovic through

20 Milosevic reported to Sainovic; and in his testimony, the witness has

21 never mentioned the name Sainovic so far. And I'm talking about line 91,

22 page -- sorry, page 91, line 21. That exists in the statement, but it was

23 not mentioned in the testimony, and he didn't say it in the way Mr. -- Ms.

24 Carter put it. Pavkovic reported to Milosevic and Milosevic reported to

25 Sainovic. That's not the way it was.

1 Look at the line 20, 21 on page 91. He never mentioned Sainovic

2 at all. He -- and he has to be asked whether he wants to mention this

3 particular name or not.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE BONOMY: We agree with Mr. Ackerman's submission that this

6 question proceeds on a false premise, an inaccurate statement of the

7 evidence on which it purports to be based. However, we don't accept that

8 the witness can't relate events in 1999 to his own experience earlier, and

9 we do not see any reason why the Prosecution should not present him with a

10 set of circumstances, for example, what's said in the paragraph referred

11 to, and ask him how that compares with what he had been told by

12 Dimitrijevic was actually happening. That's a matter of clarification of

13 the factual evidence that he's actually giving.

14 Now, let's have the witness back, please. We need closed session

15 for that.

16 [Closed session]

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 [Open session]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Crosland, we've sustained the objection that

22 that question so you will not answer it, but we are trusting Ms. Carter to

23 ask another question which will keep everyone in the courtroom firmly

24 stuck to their seats.

25 Ms. Carter.

1 MS. CARTER:

2 Q. Sir, in reference to the paragraph that you've just reviewed, how

3 does that compare to what you have been told by Dimitrijevic in regards to

4 what was actually happening?

5 A. When I was down in Kosovo in March 1999 on very nearly my last

6 tour into the area, I found two units, probably the 211 from Nis and

7 possibly the 37. The Nis one was in Kursumlija Banja, which is a forward

8 deployment area for 3rd Army, along with 1st Armoured Brigade from

9 Belgrade. I also found another unit which may well be the 37th - I did

10 not identify it at the time in Raska - which seemed to me to indicate that

11 this is a huge amount of force to bring into an area that already had

12 13.000 troops and about 10.000 MUP.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: That I don't think is an answer to the question

14 that was asked, because that could have happened because General Ojdanic

15 ordered it for all we know, or approved it. But the question you're being

16 asked is how the information you were getting from Dimitrijevic about

17 orders passing out with the normal chain of command compares with or how

18 it matches up to the events that are disclosed in the paragraph that you

19 read in this minute.

20 THE WITNESS: I think, Your Honour, it -- it reinforces and

21 confirms what General Dimitrijevic said to me that the chain of command

22 had -- had been fractured and Pavkovic was reporting direct to Milosevic,

23 bypassing the then chief of the General staff and the Chief of

24 Counter-intelligence. I can't comment any further on that. They made

25 that statement to me. I put it into a report that is submitted under

1 oath. I don't think I can add anything further to it, sir.

2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

4 MR. ACKERMAN: I just have one further objection that I need to

5 make. If -- if the Chamber doesn't know, the Chamber will know very soon

6 that it was -- it was in early January, I think around the 12th of

7 January, that General Pavkovic became commander of the 3rd Army. This has

8 no date as to when it was that the proposal came from the commander of the

9 3rd Army, and it could have come before that change, it could have come

10 after. But until there is a date known regarding that proposal, I don't

11 think General Pavkovic can be put into that mix because it may have come

12 from General Samardzic instead.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Ms. Carter.

14 MS. CARTER: I now ask to bring up P2166, beginning of the second

15 page.

16 Q. Sir, in regards to paragraph 60 of your statement, you had

17 reviewed this document during your interview session in October of 2006.

18 You began taking issue with it within paragraph 60, but we would ask you

19 to further explain what is your concern with regards to the numbers being

20 depicted as well as the actions being provided for?

21 A. In essence, the numbers depicted here appear extremely high to me,

22 and the suggestion that many, many Albanians are being killed, I would ask

23 well, where are these bodies and what proof have we got of this? And I

24 think that the -- the estimate of 12.000 terrorists and 8.000 manoeuvre

25 terrorists I find extraordinary; and the strongest terrorist forces in

1 paragraph 2, again I find it extraordinary these figures are being

2 produced. Based on what evidence?

3 Q. You have indicated previously to the Court that you believe there

4 were approximately 400 hard-core fighters, but that seems to leave room

5 for some other qualifications to be named within the KLA. What -- what

6 are the total numbers, fighters, supports, the people that you believe are

7 actually assisting the KLA in 1998?

8 A. Well, I would -- I would stick with the low hundreds of actual

9 hard-core fighters, because the situation was getting quite serious in

10 1998 as the Serbs were building up a head of steam in their

11 counter-insurgency operations. To try and answer the question as say how

12 many people were actively supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army, I think

13 that's very difficult to put an accurate figure at. It could number a

14 couple of -- 3.000 depending on -- and that may be well out of fear to

15 support the KLA because the KLA were based in or around their villages or

16 their areas of responsibility.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me, Ms. Carter, what was the figure the

18 Chief of Staff of the KLA gave us? 17.000, was it?

19 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, Your Honour, 17.000.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: The Prosecution has presented a witness from the

21 KLA here, and they haven't challenged. They have presented as their

22 witness, with 17.000 men in the KLA, not the -- not the people running

23 food back and forward for them and supporting them with shelter and so

24 forth. Now, what we're getting not just from you but from others in not

25 dissimilar positions to you is a completely different picture.

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand, Your Honour, entirely. And I

2 would stick by my number of the low hundreds -- sorry, are we going --

3 based on what one so in the area.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: I can understand the KLA pretending at the time

5 that they had very large numbers, but there seems little point now in a

6 witness coming here and telling us that they had these numbers at that

7 time, if it's -- if it's quite untrue.

8 THE WITNESS: Well, it -- and the only people who can really

9 answer that, Your Honour, is the KLA themselves, but --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that was the KLA.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes. But as the successful conclusion to this

12 campaign drew to a close, then more and more people appeared on the KLA

13 side for very obvious reasons. Because if you weren't part of the force

14 that fought for Kosovo, I would suggest you were going to lose out in the

15 future of -- of this province. But whether that means these people were

16 hard-core terrorists, I would -- I would doubt, myself. But you're quite

17 right, sir, there was a huge increase in numbers. But I don't think at

18 this level at this time. That is my opinion.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: It's then much more like a freedom fighting army,

20 of course, than a terrorist organisation, if it's given these numbers and

21 a rather militaristic complexion.

22 THE WITNESS: Well, as you are well aware, Your Honour, it changed

23 the Kosovo Protection Corps very quickly after we came back in with the

24 ACE Rapid Reaction Corps in 1999, and I was part of that ACE Rapid

25 Reaction Corps that came back in. And so there were an awful lot more KLA

1 on the ground then that there ever had been in my experience prior to

2 then.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

4 MS. CARTER:

5 Q. I would now move to page 4, both in the numeral 5 at the top of

6 the page as well as numeral 7 in regard to the bottom of the page.

7 What comments do you have on the Serbian assistance to the

8 thousands of people that you saw in places like the Pagarusa valley? Was

9 this assistance actually being found by the -- the victims?

10 A. No. The -- the shelter and provision was done by the various

11 non-governmental organisations primarily led by UNHCR and other

12 organisations which may or may not have had -- I mean, there were some

13 Serbian non-governmental organisations involved. I think Mother Teresa

14 was one. But the majority were external organisations that came in to

15 try -- to try and provide shelter for the many thousands of people who

16 were out in displaced areas.

17 Q. I would now move to page 5, specifically this seventh portion in

18 regards to the combat operations. You expressed some concern previously

19 in regards to those numbers as well. Can you explain to the Court why?

20 A. Your Honours, in paragraph -- on the seventh paragraph in saying

21 the plan was implemented, the terrorist forces losses from various reasons

22 were 32.594; and terrorists up to 36, 30th of September. I don't

23 understand that.

24 In the course of conducting combat operations, 3.500 terrorists

25 were killed, 5 to 6.000 were wounded, eight and half to nine and a half

1 were put out of action. I don't know understand what means.

2 Four to 5.000 fled Kosovo and Metohija. That's fair enough.

3 Six to 6.500 threw down their weapons, 560 were liquidated by the

4 State Security Service. I would suggest that someone needs to answer.

5 "Liquidation" is a pretty final statement.

6 And then in the following paragraph, a total of 1.344 terrorists

7 were put out of action. I don't understand that what means.

8 It then breaks it down, I suppose. Six hundred and sixty-six

9 liquidated. Again, who is responsible for that.

10 Eight hundred and fifty-six wounded, 822 captured. Where are

11 these people?

12 And pack animals were liquidated in the same area.

13 I think there are a lot of questions in there that need to be

14 answered by the responsible people in charge of operations, and that's the

15 RDB and the VJ and the MUP who were presumably controlling these

16 operations. But we certainly didn't see anywhere near or find the bodies

17 to provide a body count of these proportions.

18 Q. With regards to those who were captured, were you ever privy to

19 any sort of prisons or any of these captured fighters?

20 A. There -- there were instances early on in the Drenica at

21 Ferronikli plant at Gllogoc, which we attempted to approach fairly in, I

22 think in March, April time. We were physically prevented by security

23 forces going there. I went into the prison at Istok after the war and

24 found two KLA fighters in there and a whole load of documents that were

25 "licna kartas" that appeared to have written on it "To be killed." Now,

1 whether this was carried out or not, I don't know. There were indications

2 within --

3 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour.

4 THE WITNESS: -- the building that was also bombed by NATO.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on. Mr. Ivetic.

6 MR. IVETIC: We are yet again expanding this indictment going into

7 areas that this Trial Chamber has ruled do not apply to these proceedings.

8 I think it's improper, and it causes a great hardship for the Defence.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: The question that's been asked though relates to

10 whether the witness had encountered any prisoners.

11 MR. IVETIC: And this part of his answer is non-responsive to his

12 question, and it's bringing us into an area where we're going to have to

13 reopen a whole bunch of areas that we had thought we wouldn't have to and

14 that will affect preparations for the Defence cases.

15 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, without tipping my hand to

16 the witness in regards to what the follow-up question is going to be, I

17 certainly don't want to delve into the Dubrava prison issues per se, but

18 there is --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you're now at the stage where you should pose

20 the next question, and we'll hear if there is an objection to it.

21 MS. CARTER: Certainly.

22 Q. So when you see this number who have been captured yet you are

23 not-- you're not locating persons that -- that meet those numbers and you

24 also are seeing a number of people "liquidated," under normal

25 counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism tactics, is that an appropriate

1 action to take even against KLA fighters?

2 A. In my opinion, no.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, do not answer that question. I actually

4 don't understand the question you are asking.

5 MR. IVETIC: I don't either.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: There is an objection to it.

7 MR. IVETIC: I'm not sure I understand, but the part I did

8 understand sure sounded like she was asking for this witness to become an

9 expert again.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems that way to me, Ms. Carter.

11 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the Court had indicated on page 31 at

12 line 10 that this -- this witness, because of his long 37 years of

13 counter-insurgency experience all over the world, has become somewhat of a

14 quasi-expert. He can certainly indicate what the protocol has been in the

15 field of operations as he's been involved in with regards to

16 counter-insurgency, and so we would just urge the Court to it allow the

17 answer.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: No. This is a matter of expertise. This is not

19 the appropriate witness to deal with this.

20 MS. CARTER: I'll move along, Your Honour.

21 Q. Sir, when -- I'm going to direct you now to page 7, number 4 in

22 the middle of the page, which is making reference to 12.500 reservists

23 already being called up in 1998. How does that fit into the number of

24 forces that you saw in Kosovo and what would be appropriate for the level

25 of the KLA problem in Kosovo?

1 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Bear in mind that this is a question of police

3 reservists, is that something you had personal knowledge of?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, we had, because we made an

5 assessment starting from very early on in 1988.

6 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I still have an objection though,

7 because the first part of the question I think is okay. The second part

8 is again asking for an opinion and for him to opine on the level of an

9 expert, which I think improper for him to say what level would be

10 appropriate for the KLA problem in Kosovo. That's asking for an expert

11 opinion.

12 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, one has to take the

13 numbers into account. The witness has already articulated the number of

14 VJ forces, the number of MUP forces versus the 400 KLA fighters. I'm just

15 trying to elicit what does 12.500 additional forces of the FRY and Serbia

16 do to that figure.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: That's the first part -- that's the first part of

18 your question which Mr. Ivetic concedes is okay. It's the second part.

19 MR. IVETIC: And, Your Honour, may I add that this document

20 purports to talk about training, not utilisation in the field.

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I may.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: No. No, just hold on, please. So you should break

23 this down. You can ask the first part. I find it difficult to see really

24 what the second part is aiming at, but bearing in mind that there were

25 agreements about the level of troops that should be present in the area

1 anyway.

2 MS. CARTER: Okay.

3 Q. Sir, with regards to the 12.500 reservists that are listed within

4 this document, how does that fit into the number of forces that you saw in

5 Kosovo?

6 A. During the entire period, there were -- the MUP numbers fluctuated

7 between 8 and 10 to 12.000 depending on the activities that were going on.

8 It would be quite natural towards the end of an operation that started

9 early March for reservists to be called up in order for these units to

10 have what we call "reauxmont" [phoen] and to have time off to go back to

11 their families and have a normal life. So I don't see the figure as being

12 out of the way as such.

13 Q. And, lastly, I'd move to page 10, the middle of the page where it

14 indicates that approximately 48.000 guns were distributed to the local

15 population. Again, how does that fit in with the figures that you were

16 seeing on the ground in Kosovo in 1998?

17 A. Again, bearing in mind that the Balkans is a gun-carrying culture,

18 there are plenty of weapons flying around which came out of Albania when

19 Albania went bust in 1977 -- 1997, rather, I wouldn't necessarily disagree

20 with that figure. It maybe little high, but there were plenty of these

21 weapons about.

22 Q. All right. Now moving within your statement to the period

23 preceding pre-NATO bombing, that begins at paragraph 68.

24 You indicated that there are three brigades that entered Kosovo

25 during the lead-up into the NATO bombing in 1999. How did three brigades

1 enter Kosovo without the internationals noticing?

2 A. I believe the Serbian security forces had learnt quite a lot of

3 lessons and that with the possible onset of the NATO bombing that had been

4 made quite clearly plain in the ACTORD issued by General Clark from

5 SACEUR, from NATO, that they had started to move in in small packets units

6 into the operational area. And I would give them 10 out of 10 for doing

7 this in a clear and opportune way, because they probably realised that

8 there was an inevitability that NATO would eventually end up bombing

9 Kosovo.

10 Q. So once you add these three additional brigades, what are the

11 forces we're looking at in Kosovo in 1999 during the bombing?

12 A. We're looking at -- at approximately with the forces already in

13 Kosovo of 12.000 with an extra three brigades something up to about 15.000

14 I would suggest.

15 MS. CARTER: Okay. I would ask the Court to pull up P940, the

16 collegium minutes of 21 February, 1999, looking to page 4.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: What would you expect additional troops to be able

18 to do to combat NATO bombing?

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's a very good question. And the

20 reason I -- I believe that the Serbian security forces moved in extra

21 troops is because their method of operation or method of operandus was

22 static, as opposed to mobile defence. And what they would do was to drive

23 tanks and other vehicles into houses that would then settle around them.

24 The tanks would go cold and it is extremely difficult to pick out any

25 vehicles as NATO found out during its bombing campaign.

1 Therefore, the Serbs were quite rightly playing to their strength

2 because they were not, and realized knew they could not, outfight NATO if

3 it came to a mobile battle. So it was good strategic sense to have moved

4 in, in small packets, these forces, to allow them to get settled in and to

5 go quiet before NATO's, as I said, more inevitably the bombing came

6 closer. So I think this is --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that in anticipation of a ground invasion later?

8 THE WITNESS: Quite possibly, yes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, why else would it be? This is actually quite

10 an important issue, I think here.

11 THE WITNESS: Well, as I've -- I've just indicated, Your Honour,

12 that the Serbian -- the Vojska Jugoslavije, primarily, was not designed to

13 fight a mobile battle. It not have the command and control structures

14 that NATO would have had and the firepower from air that NATO could have

15 deployed against it with helicopters, armed helicopters, and the -- the

16 vast array of NATO Air Forces that were, in fact, used in the bombing

17 campaign against Kosovo and Serbia itself.

18 Therefore, they were putting in position static defence, which did

19 not rely on a lot of resupply because they resupplied locally. And I

20 think, if I may suggest, we have to understand that the Serbian Vojska

21 Jugoslavije was not as sophisticated, and I don't mean that as a slur on

22 them. I mean that as a genuine comment that they would be able to

23 maintain themselves in positions far better than more sophisticated forces

24 that require replenishment.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Am I right in thinking that your mind is turning to

1 fighting an invading force rather than a bombing force.

2 THE WITNESS: Initially, I think they were looking at both

3 options. They couldn't do anything about the bombing, because they had --

4 they had then excellent air defence assets which also went cold. And they

5 went cold for the quite simple reason is that they could not strike top

6 grade aircraft at 60.000 feet. All you did was give a signal as to where

7 to fire a missile down the beam to that air defence position.

8 Therefore, they were playing to their strengths and forcing NATO,

9 if it had to, to have fought mobile battle which inevitably would have

10 meant a lot more casualties on both sides. So I think, in my opinion, it

11 was good planning on behalf of the Vojska Jugoslavije.

12 MS. CARTER:

13 Q. I'd like to follow up a bit, actually moving you through your

14 statement to paragraphs 72 through 74 in which you indicate that you

15 believe there was a design for a mass movement of the Albanians out of

16 Kosovo. How does your belief that there was a plan, in fact, to eject the

17 Albanians from Kosovo play into the mass numbers that were already in

18 place in these three additional brigades, if at all?

19 A. I think with respect the only people that can answer that is

20 probably the Vojska Jugoslavije. But having identified three extra

21 brigade units in an area that already had a surplus of troops, I -- one

22 could only draw the conclusion that there was speculation that -- that a

23 clearance or cleansing operation was about to commit, and bearing in mind

24 that we're -- we're right on the date that NATO bombing started. So I

25 think these additional forces were asked for in order to possibly carry

1 out a cleansing operation.

2 Q. Why do you believe there's a cleansing operation at issue?

3 A. Because I don't -- I don't actually understand why you need

4 another three brigades when you've already got more than adequate troops

5 to do the job.

6 Q. Outside of them bringing --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you move on, I'm puzzled now that you

8 didn't answer my question this way. It was good strategic sense, you say,

9 to have moved in in small packs these forces to allow them to get settled

10 in and go quiet before NATO, as I said more inevitably the bombing came

11 closer.

12 So that suggested, I understood from your answers to me, that you

13 were commending them for military wisdom in what they had done. And as I

14 was trying to understand that, and I was I have to say having difficulty

15 understanding it, unless it was to repel an invading force.

16 THE WITNESS: I think --

17 JUDGE BONOMY: But now you're giving a different answer.

18 THE WITNESS: With respect, Your Honour, I think the fact that

19 these forces had been moved down in small packets and had -- and had

20 defeated NATO surveillance, that is commendable on the Serbian -- on the

21 VJ's part. The fact that they needed or they thought they needed more

22 troops in Kosovo, perhaps they feared a NATO land invasion. I don't know.

23 I was not the NATO planner, obviously; therefore, if they wish to put the

24 numbers higher in order to perhaps convince NATO that a land operation was

25 not the correct operation to carry out.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: But I'm now understanding you to be saying that the

2 real reason for these extra brigades was to carry out an ethnic cleansing

3 operation?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I don't know. It might have been.

5 There was indications from various signal intelligence that this was one

6 of the factors that could come into play.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Carter.

8 MS. CARTER: I would like to pull up P01968.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, this document I understand has not

10 been admitted, and therefore not been authenticated. It has no

11 signatures, and --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: We were told earlier this one has been admitted.

13 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. It was admitted on 23 November,

14 2006.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: That's what the document indicates, Your Honour.

16 I'm sorry.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: But the one that hadn't been was 1969, which

18 perhaps we've yet to come to.

19 MS. CARTER:

20 Q. Sir, you've reviewed this Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija

21 order to supply support to MUP in the Drenica sector. I point you to the

22 first page in regards to who the enemy is or is claimed to be on March 24,

23 1999. Does this meet with what you were viewing in Kosovo shortly before

24 this bombing, four days before this bombing?

25 A. The -- the Drenica was a continual battle area through 1998 and

1 1999 and was considered one of the -- the premier KLA operational areas

2 just west of Kosovo. So, again, the figures, I can't -- or as stated

3 there, they seem high to me, but that's what presumably some intelligence

4 has put together. The villages that they're referring to are all

5 well-known KLA villages.

6 Q. Okay. And I'll move you to the second page to the bottom where

7 it's the task of the Pristina Corps, where it indicates, "The Pristina

8 Corps with reinforcements and the armed non-Siptar population in KIM shall

9 support MUP forces in defeating and destroys the STS in the zone of

10 responsibility."

11 Based on your indications previously that you had intelligence

12 that there was a concern for the Albanians in this area, what does it

13 indicate to you when you're seeing an order tasking the armed non-Siptar

14 population?

15 A. I presume they mean by this the civilian Serbs who were armed, but

16 as I said already these people were armed fairly lightly. But it makes

17 very little difference in the amount of MUP and VJ that was already

18 available to -- to do a clearing operation of this type. But the wording

19 is -- is pretty drastic.

20 Q. If the purpose of bringing in the three extra brigades and other

21 activities of the forces of FRY and Serbia leading up to the bombing

22 campaign is to deal with the concerns of a NATO bombing strike or a future

23 possibility that there's going to be a ground invasion, why would you

24 start making differentiations between the Albanian population and the

25 Serbian population?

1 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, I object to that -- that question.

2 The premise is -- doesn't follow from the evidence we've heard. It's

3 calling for absolute speculation and conjecture on this witness's part.

4 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, the witness in his

5 statement, beginning at paragraph 72, begins indicating that there are the

6 belief the international community at the time that there were plans for

7 the VJ and the MUP to start serious moves against the population of Kosovo

8 and specifically the Albanian population, when their -- when the

9 non-Siptar population is being tasked but leaving the Albanians to hang.

10 I think -- I believe, Your Honour, this witness can comment to that.

11 MR. IVETIC: I think she's now led the witness with what she wants

12 him to say.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you aware, Mr. Crosland, of the extent to which

14 the authorities could count on Kosovo Albanians standing up and swearing

15 an oath of allegiance to Serbia and fighting in the Serbian forces? Is

16 that something within your knowledge?

17 THE WITNESS: I don't think by now you would have of got many

18 Kosovo Albanians doing that, no.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: No. I mean, it's one of these questions that

20 unless you're bringing an expert to tell us about this, Mr. Crosland's no

21 better placed to answer it than I am, Ms. Carter.

22 THE WITNESS: All I would say, Your Honour, if you may permit me,

23 is there was concern that there be some kind cleansing operation, and this

24 was from signal intelligence during the period before the NATO bombing.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but that becomes a

1 self-fulfilling prophecy. If your intelligence says that there is a going

2 to be an ethnic cleansing operation against Albanians and then someone

3 says we're arming the non-Siptar population, then it's easy to put two and

4 two together. On the other hand, there might be an equally good reason

5 for not even dreaming about arming the Albanian population which is quite

6 unrelated to ethnic cleansing.

7 And all I'm saying is you're probably not in any better position

8 than most of us, from what we've heard, to judge that. You're not coming

9 here as an expert who has carried out a survey of Albanian loyalty to the

10 Yugoslav army at that time. So I find that any answer you give would not

11 assist me at all in trying to reach any conclusions here.

12 MS. CARTER:

13 Q. So with your -- with your involvement with the Serbian leadership,

14 had you ever had conversations in regards to whether their actions were

15 deemed offensive or defensive?

16 A. I don't see how the -- the amount of damage and destruction that

17 was caused throughout Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 can deem -- can be deemed

18 otherwise than destructive.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it, Mr. Ackerman, that the question is a

21 prelude to seeking specific information, because it otherwise doesn't help

22 us either.

23 Are you going to go to specific occasions when that -- that

24 subject was discussed?

25 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. And there is an exhibit based on

1 some of the answers I may show this witness.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, you're still on your feet.

3 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I -- you may have responded to my objection

4 already. The -- the question asks for conversations he had with the

5 leadership, and he hasn't answered whether he had any such conversations

6 or not.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we know there have been some, but I was

8 hoping that this was going to lead to specific evidence of exchanges which

9 might indicate the transfer of specific information. Is that where we're

10 going?

11 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. I hope.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's see.

13 MS. CARTER:

14 Q. Sir, I want to direct you initially to the conversation that you

15 indicated you had with Ojdanic in regards to his concept of force would be

16 met with force. You've certainly explored your belief that there was a

17 disproportionate force, but have you had any other conversations with any

18 of the Serb leadership or privy to any intelligence with regards to the

19 Serb leadership in regards to how they viewed their use of force?

20 A. I think throughout the 1998 and 1999, in various conversations

21 with particularly General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic, one

22 continually raised the point that whilst accepting there was an insurgency

23 or terrorist movement in Kosovo and Metohija, the appropriate force was

24 not being used or the disproportionate was being used in order to -- to

25 clear this problem. And that is down in many reports.

1 The damage that was done throughout the Kosovo -- the province of

2 Kosovo to both normal villages, towns, marketplaces in both Pec, Decani,

3 Djakovica, Urosevac, the hundreds of villages I've indicated that were

4 wrecked, burnt, crops that were left in flames, and livestock that was

5 wantonly shot. I think all of that implies that a huge amount of

6 disproportionate force was -- was created in an attempt to halt, as I've

7 said, an insurgency that was a -- a thorn in the side of the Serbians.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: And are these many reports, Ms. Carter, exhibits in

9 the case?

10 MS. CARTER: Not as such.

11 Q. Sir --

12 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, it's beginning to look like Ms. Carter

13 is trying to figure out how many different ways she can ask a question

14 that will elicit exactly the same answer. The answer we just got to that

15 question was an answer we've had about six times today, and you indicated

16 to her that you expect she was going to talk about conversations about the

17 Serb view of things. And she said that's where she was going, and we get

18 to this again and this is like the sixth time now.

19 MS. CARTER: Respectfully, Your Honour, that is the question I've

20 asked and I would like to re-urge.

21 Q. What from the Serbian perspective did you have any conversations

22 in regards to their belief of the activities? Were they offensive or

23 defensive?

24 A. Their initial reaction was that these were defensive actions until

25 we proved that they were offensive by the amount of damage that had been

1 done, but that was not accepted by General Ojdanic until he was shown

2 video footage of various actions being carried out.

3 Q. Did the rules of engagement of the Serb forces after you

4 confronted Ojdanic change?

5 A. I don't know what the rules of engagement for the Serbian forces

6 were. I can't answer that question, I'm afraid.

7 Q. Either while you were in Kosovo or later on, did you have any

8 indication of how the Serbs reported alleged terrorist attacks?

9 A. In the early days, there were situation maps produced through the

10 Foreign Liaison Service, which was the service to which all defence

11 attaches were accredited, which was a branch of the General Staff, and

12 they attempted to portray every single instant that they thought was a

13 terrorist action.

14 I would suggest that this was a slightly a way of blowing up every

15 incident into a major incident, rather than some of them which were some

16 were clearly very minor incidents. But it was a question of numbers that

17 were important rather than, you know, hard facts of what terrorists

18 incidents were actually happening.

19 Q. If the numbers were being -- actually, let me bring up Exhibit 938

20 at page 21, middle of the page.

21 Sir, with regards to the way attacks are reported, terrorist

22 attacks are reported by the Serbian side, did you find the numbers

23 accurate?

24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, I have to object to that, again.

25 The previous question was whether he was -- whether he knew how attacks

1 were reported, then he said that defence liaison service would receive --

2 or was shown situation maps. That's the answer to the question. He has

3 no way of evaluating numbers or as to whether they're accurate or

4 inaccurate. There is no foundation for this question.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: You need to establish a foundation, first of all,

6 Ms. Carter.

7 MS. CARTER:

8 Q. You had indicated in one of your previous answers that the

9 reporting was being blown up with regards to how they were qualifying what

10 is a terrorist attack and what is not a terrorist attack. Can you expand

11 on that answer a little bit?

12 A. I think it's a factor of Serbian life that things are put down

13 in -- in numerical order, and the higher the numbers the more important

14 the case may be. And, as I said, I think this muddles the issue as to

15 what were genuine terrorist incidents and worthy of report and what were

16 just minor incursions or whatever, which just add to the general

17 intelligence build-up.

18 One needs to stick to -- to hard facts as to what was a terrorist

19 incidents as opposed to what was reported to be a terrorist incident,

20 which I think General Dimitrijevic is indicating in this particular

21 statement,"that I commend that yesterday's two were conducted by us that

22 we were not attacked, in other words we did not launch an operation

23 following an attack on our unit by terrorists." So it's rather like

24 claiming two points in tennis when you haven't actually played the ball.

25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I pass the witness.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Before doing that, can you clarify for us the

2 exhibits over which there may be remain a question mark? You have

3 mentioned P1969 as one which you would seek to have admitted; is that

4 right?

5 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. It's contained within the

6 statement. He makes comment on it within the statement.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But we haven't actually seen the exhibit, have we?

8 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honour. Based on the comments of the Court

9 I --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And it's an operational order?

11 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour it's a Joint Command order, similar

12 to the pun at P01968.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are there any other exhibits referred to in the

14 statement which have not yet been exhibited?

15 MS. CARTER: Which have not been exhibited, no.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's the only own one, is it?

17 MR. IVETIC: P1990, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Which paragraph is it?

19 MR. IVETIC: 14, I believe, Your Honour. The counsel said they

20 are going to elicit some further factors, and I reserved my objections for

21 the questions to be raised and no questions have been raised. So I would

22 ask for that document -- for that portion of the statement then to be

23 excluded, because again he's commenting about something and speculating

24 about what a document might mean, and the document couldn't purport to

25 reflect what his recollections are as set forth in paragraph 14. And

1 we've heard nothing in his live testimony that would -- that would

2 otherwise expand on this.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you challenging this document as -- as

4 un-authentic?.

5 MR. IVETIC: I think it's already been admitted Your Honour, to

6 another witness..

7 JUDGE BONOMY: It's been admitted.

8 MR. IVETIC: Yes.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't see anything wrong with the statement

10 there. The witness is saying what his experience is, and all he's saying

11 is it's very similar to the one that Mr. O'Sullivan and indeed others

12 objected to earlier. He's saying, well, that's consistent with what I

13 actually saw, so that's quite different from what Vasiljevic was doing.

14 MR. IVETIC: I agree, Your Honour. But this document was shown to

15 a witness who was actually present in the meeting, and that wasn't asked

16 many him. So I find it very interesting how the Prosecution -- what

17 picture they try to paint with documents and with witnesses who have a

18 tangential relation to the documents, if any.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's something we will hear in due course.

20 MR. IVETIC: I agree that's arguments.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: It's really a matter of weight, and I take it

22 there's no suggestion that there's anything wrong with 1969, which is the

23 other one or the one that so far hasn't been admitted. Well, we shall

24 note that there are no specific challenges. We haven't taken a decision

25 on admitting the statement as yet, until we hear the rest of the

1 evidence.

2 Mr. Cepic.

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I expected other

4 colleagues to raise the same objection, but it is one of principle on

5 part. First of all, in relation to this document, this witness cannot

6 have a foundation in terms of authenticity, and he cannot give us any

7 information with regard to a particular exhibit.

8 So this is my objection in principle, and it has to do with P1969.

9 And the same objection was made when Mr. Drewienkiewicz testified, and the

10 Trial Chamber sustained that objection by Mr. Petrovic, that is.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: That objection to that document you mean?

12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Well, that was the document that was

13 shown to Mr. Drewienkiewicz, together with the 1967, 1968, and 1966, yes.

14 And Mr. Petrovic pointed out the same thing. He said exactly what I

15 repeated just now. And if I remember correctly, the Trial Chamber decided

16 what it decided; that is to say, they refused to admit these documents.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you suggesting that P1969 is not an authentic

18 document?

19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Neither the witness nor I can judge

20 whether it's an authentic document. It's not signed, so there is no

21 signature. Since there is not a signature at the end of the document, we

22 don't even know what it's about.

23 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, we're urging admission --

24 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] We don't know who issued it and --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I see that document, please, on the screen.

1 1969.

2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, for the record, I think I should point

3 out when it came up the last time, we objected to it on behalf of General

4 Pavkovic, and I believe the objection was sustained at that point.

5 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, we -- the Prosecution is re-urging the

6 same arguments that have been made for the other documents that have been

7 admitted. This was received pursuant to an RFA from the forces of the FRY

8 and Serbia, that it by its nature that is an indicia of reliability,

9 certainly as taken together with the other orders in the same series, that

10 it has this -- within the four corners of it, they are quite similar, and

11 that one has already been admitted which would lead that the other one is

12 equally reliable. And we would just re-urge the arguments that we made

13 with the submissions of the Prosecution on January 29th in writing.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll deal with that issue tomorrow, Mr. Ackerman.

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the -- the one last thing before we

16 have to break, there is a report from UNDU regarding General Pavkovic that

17 indicates that his medical situation may continue for a period of about

18 three days. We're going to look into that immediately upon adjourning

19 today and try to find out exactly what the situation is with him because I

20 think he will not waive appearance during the cross-examination of this

21 witness, and so we're hoping that he can recover and be here tomorrow and

22 we'll find out as soon as we can and then let the Chamber know.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you indicating the plan is actually to complete

24 the cross-examination tomorrow all being well?

25 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm only talking about my own cross-examination.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: You will complete yours tomorrow.

2 MR. ACKERMAN: It depends on my colleagues who are going ahead of

3 me, Your Honour It may not complete tomorrow.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that there is waiver in the knowledge

5 that the illness might last three days.

6 MR. ACKERMAN: I think there is a waiver for today only, Your

7 Honour. That's my understanding.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it --

9 MR. ACKERMAN: The doctor's comment is that it might last for

10 three days, but I think the waiver is for today.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Well, what I would suggest you give thought

12 to, Mr. Ackerman, is that there is no particular prejudice to Mr. Pavkovic

13 having the cross-examination conducted in his absence, as long as a video

14 is made available to him if he's fit to view it and the witness is not

15 released until he's had the chance to review it and make sure that there

16 is nothing he would have drawn your attention to or at least has an

17 opportunity to draw your attention to anything he identifies by viewing

18 it.

19 Now, that depends on a measure of fitness. I appreciate that.

20 But I ask you to give thought to that. It's a major problem in a case of

21 this magnitude where there are so many accused that inevitably from time

22 to time there will be a breakdown because of illness, and we have to be

23 imaginative I think if we can in the circumstances to deal with it. But I

24 appreciate that there could be a more serious situation which wouldn't

25 allow us to do that.

1 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, you have -- you have hit the

2 exact issue, and that is that -- that he would want to be able to

3 communicate with me regarding matters during the examination that he

4 thinks I should cross-examine about, and if it can be done by video and we

5 can get there before the witness is released, I have no problem with doing

6 it that way. I don't want to delay these proceedings unnecessarily in any

7 way.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. We have to stop there for today, Mr.

9 Crosland. Your evidence will continue tomorrow with cross-examination.

10 You'll have been told this before, that overnight it is vital that you

11 have no communication with anyone at all about your evidence. That's

12 either the evidence you've given or the evidence you may yet give. You

13 can talk to anyone you like about any subject other than the evidence in

14 this case. We'll go into closed session now so that you can leave the

15 courtroom.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And we resume at 9.00 tomorrow.

18 [Closed session]

19 (redacted)

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.34 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day

22 of February, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

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