1 Tuesday, 16 October 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: You wish to raise something, Mr. Hannis.

6 MR. HANNIS: I do, Your Honour. It's in connection with a

7 document that was listed as a potential Defence exhibit to be used with

8 this witness during his direct testimony; it was not. I wanted to do --

9 ask some questions about it in cross-examination, also because there was

10 some confusion for me about whether or not this exhibit which is 3D695,

11 whether it is something that was going to be part of the Defence request

12 for documents to be admitted from the bar table. And I have some

13 foundational questions about the document. It's not been translated into

14 English, and actually I will request to go into private session because I

15 understand from Mr. Visnjic he got it from the government under certain

16 restrictions and I think one of those includes not discussing some matters

17 about it in open session.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't know if you've been misinterpreted here,

19 Mr. Hannis, you say that this document was listed as a potential Defence

20 exhibit.

21 MR. HANNIS: To be used with the witness during his direct

22 testimony.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And it wasn't used in --

24 MR. HANNIS: It was not used.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. There's nothing to stop you cross-examining

1 on it, is there?

2 MR. HANNIS: No, no, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So --

4 MR. HANNIS: But Mr. Visnjic advised me that he received this

5 document from the government with certain restrictions --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: So the only issue is private session?

7 MR. HANNIS: Yes.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. I thought it was sounding more complex

9 than that.

10 MR. HANNIS: No, I think that's -- I think that's all.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

12 Mr. Visnjic, is this a document that has to be dealt with only in

13 private session?

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, for the time being,

15 yes. I will explain what the restrictions are and then you can make your

16 decision on the basis of this explanation. But we must do that in private

17 session.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

19 Are you about to deal with the document at this stage, Mr. Hannis?

20 MR. HANNIS: It was one of the first things I was going to ask the

21 witness about. There's some foundational matters I wanted to do with him

22 in the event that upon reading the English translation I find that

23 something that would want the Court to consider.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, before we go into private session for that

25 purpose, I just want to acknowledge the presence of Mr. Ackerman. I know

1 there were some difficulties facing you this morning and we're extremely

2 grateful to you for the effort that's been made to facilitate the court

3 sitting this afternoon.

4 So we'll now go into private session and hear what Mr. Visnjic has

5 to say.

6 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by later order of the Chamber]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a document, it

10 is the war diary of the Supreme Command Staff that we received from the

11 National Council, or rather, the Government of Serbia subject to certain

12 restrictions, that would be the ban on the use of the document in its

13 entirety. There's also the ban and prior notice to them that the document

14 would be used. Unfortunately, I don't have this document with me, the

15 official document, so I'm quoting from memory now. But this is the first

16 thing that came to my mind when Mr. Hannis asked me that. They allowed us

17 to use the document but only in part, not in its entirety. To my mind

18 this restriction is as it is on face, we have to take it at its face

19 value, I can't tell you anything less or more than that. We listed this

20 document for use with some of the witnesses, but when we translated it we

21 decided not to do that. The first reason is that it is a handwritten

22 document, it has not been translated in its entirety, and the witnesses

23 already indicated that this is a document that is much narrower in its

24 scope than the combat operation -- combat reports that we intend to submit

25 to the Court.

1 So to avoid duplicating the documents, we withdrew this document

2 from our list that we -- of the documents that we wanted to use, and this

3 was not in the title. This document was left in the request for the

4 documents that we intended to file from the bar table -- to tender from

5 the bar table, but that was a mistake, this was done by mistake.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, nothing that you've said so far needed to be

7 said in private session. Are you actually unaware of the detail at the

8 moment of the restriction on the use of this document?

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Well, if you give me ten minutes I

10 can find it somewhere in my files, but the only problem is that Mr. Hannis

11 brought this up a minute ago.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Hannis, can we side-step it until

13 Mr. Visnjic gets ahold of what he has? It may be that it doesn't matter

14 because you happen to be aware of it and have it, and that may be the

15 complete answer. But I suspect you would rather try to use it within the

16 confines of the restriction that's been imposed in its handing over.

17 MR. HANNIS: Well, I would rather use it without any restrictions

18 at all.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, yeah, it may come to that, but let's find out

20 what the restriction is first of all. If you can live with the

21 restriction, then there's no point in going beyond that.

22 MR. HANNIS: I agree. I'll set it aside until I finish everything

23 else and ask do come back to it at that time.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Please deal with that as a matter of

25 urgency, Mr. Visnjic, and we'll meanwhile continue with cross-examination

1 of the witness on other matters.

2 MR. VISNJIC: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

3 [Open session].

4 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Pending resolution of an issue outstanding

6 following that discussion we shall continue in open session with the

7 cross-examination of Mr. Curcin.

8 [The witness entered court]

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Curcin.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Bonomy.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Your cross-examination by Mr. Hannis will now

12 continue. Please bear in mind that the solemn declaration to speak the

13 truth which you made at the beginning of your evidence continues to apply

14 to the evidence today until it finishes.

15 Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 WITNESS: DJORDJE CURCIN [Resumed]

18 [Witness answered through interpreter]

19 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

20 Q. Welcome back, General. The first document I wanted to ask you

21 about is Exhibit P1483, and I've got a hard copy I can hand to you. It is

22 dated the 12th of April, 1999, and it's entitled: "A supplement to

23 directive DT number 22-1 of 9 April 1999." Do you recall, sir, that

24 document that this is a supplement to, the directive of the 9th of April?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And the question I have for you on this one is in the next-to-last

2 paragraph it talks about some changes to be made, and one of them -- the

3 first one says: "Paragraph 5 shall be added behind paragraph 4 to

4 read: 'To break and finally expel the aggressor from the Z/O,'" is that

5 the zone of operations? Can you tell me what that abbreviation stands

6 for?

7 A. Well, there's no abbreviation in my version. "In order to expel

8 the aggressor from the zone of responsibility."

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. We have an abbreviation in English.

10 "Subsequent to the development of the situation on the war front,

11 you shall be strengthened by the," and then I have an acronym, "KK, plan

12 its use on time." Can you tell me what KK stands for there?

13 A. The Kragujevac Corps.

14 Q. Okay. Then it goes on: "And paragraph 6 to read: 'Forces of the

15 MUP and civilian defence shall be placed under the command of the 3rd Army

16 during the operation and they shall be used exclusively by your

17 decision.'" So on the 12th of April it was contemplated that the MUP and

18 civilian defences would be under the command of the 3rd Army, correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And this is even -- this is about six days before that order we

21 saw from supreme commander calling for the subordination of the MUP for

22 combat activities, correct? Do you recall that?

23 A. Yes. And if you allow me, one of the tasks of the chief of the

24 Supreme Command Staff, a few days before the 12th of April at the evening

25 collegium meeting when the situation at front was analysed, was to examine

1 the possibility of the resubordination of MUP to the army. So this is

2 something that had been contemplated earlier. This was not something that

3 came to it maturity on the 12th.

4 Q. And I recall you told us and I think we saw in some of the evening

5 briefing notes that there were discussions about that with I think the

6 Ministry of Justice and I think the MUP as well. Can you tell us who else

7 was involved in those discussions? The minister of defence?

8 A. Yes. Not the Ministry of the Interior. A memo was sent from the

9 legal administration in the General Staff to the Ministry of Justice to

10 provide a legal interpretation for the possibility of such a

11 resubordination, but they then returned it to the federal defence ministry

12 because they believed that they were the tactical mainstay and that the

13 justice ministry has no jurisdiction over this issue. The MUP was not

14 consulted about this idea at all as far as I know.

15 Q. Okay. I accept that. As far as you know, the MUP was not

16 consulted. Next I want to ask you some questions regarding your

17 statement, General. This is Exhibit 3D1121, and I have a hard copy I'll

18 ask the usher to hand you. And the first paragraph I want to ask you

19 about is paragraph 9, and in that paragraph you tell us that in your job

20 you studied the combat reports and you paid special attention to the

21 combat reports of the 3rd Army. And you told us that none of those combat

22 reports talked about anyone taking away identity documents or personal

23 documents from the Kosovo Albanians, correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And you also said there were no reports on attacks on the civilian

1 population, and does that include no reports of attacks on the civilian

2 population by MUP personnel or are you referring only to attacks by VJ

3 personnel?

4 A. The combat reports of the 3rd Army command contained information

5 relating to the 3rd Army. So on the part of the 3rd Army personnel, there

6 were no such things. The reports did not go on to describe the MUP

7 actions.

8 Q. Okay. Further on in your statement in paragraph 22 you talk about

9 some other kinds of reports. There's a mention, the English translation

10 mentions a BI report. Can you tell me what the -- those initials BI stand

11 for. Is that a security report?

12 A. No, there's no abbreviation in my text. I assume that this would

13 be combat report, "borbeni izvestaj" that could be the abbreviation BI,

14 yes, it is true. It says here: "There were no reports about any

15 incidents involving those problems in any combat reports." So that would

16 be the abbreviation for combat report.

17 Q. Okay. And likewise it says there were no reports. I want to ask

18 you now if you could take a look at Exhibit P1459. I don't think this is

19 entitled: "Combat report," but it appears to be a report from the 3rd

20 Army command. It's dated the 25th of May, 1999, and this is a report from

21 General Pavkovic in essence complaining about the non-subordination of MUP

22 to the VJ. Have you seen that document before today?

23 A. Yes, Mr. Ackerman showed it to me I believe last time that I

24 testified, and I saw it during the proofing for my evidence here now.

25 Q. Okay. And am I correct that your evidence is that during the time

1 during the war when you were working you never saw this report come into

2 the Supreme Command Staff?

3 A. This report that I see in front of me I did not see during war.

4 Q. Now, is that the kind of report that you would have seen, given

5 your job and the nature of this report?

6 A. I would have seen it and it would have been discussed at the

7 evening briefing so that I really can't understand why, for one, I never

8 saw it and why this was not discussed at any of the evening briefings.

9 Q. Okay.

10 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to page 2 of the English. And I don't

11 know if paragraph 4 is on the bottom of that B/C/S page or if we have to

12 go to the second page of the B/C/S, yes. Yes, could we go to page 2 of

13 the B/C/S as well?

14 Q. General, I want you to look at paragraph 4 and let me read that to

15 you and ask you a question. It says: "It has been established beyond

16 doubt and we have already reported on it in regular combat and other

17 reports, that due to the non-compliance with the resubordination orders

18 some MUP members and to a considerable extent entire smaller units,

19 which 'operate' independently on the ground are committing more serious

20 crimes against the Siptar civilian population in settlements or refugee

21 shelters - murder, rape" et cetera. So here he seems to be saying that

22 the 3rd Army has already reported about this in regular combat and other

23 reports. Now, that's not consistent with what you told us before, that

24 you never saw any combat reports mentioning those kind of crimes being

25 committed against the civilian population. So can you explain that?

1 A. Yes, of course. If you are referring to this report, I did not

2 see it. If you mean to say that this claim is correct, could you please

3 verify that because I state with full responsibility that no report, no

4 combat report from the 3rd Army from the time-period of the war contained

5 such information. There was only one case in Kosovo Polje, three

6 soldiers, conscripts, who were drunk left their unit with their weapons

7 and they killed two Albanians, civilians. They were arrested, they were

8 tried, and convicted. There is a report on that, it is contained in a

9 regular combat report, but apart from that there are no reports about the

10 incidents that are mentioned here in paragraph 4, and it is easy to check

11 that.

12 Q. [Microphone not activated] --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

14 MR. HANNIS:

15 Q. And you saw those reports on a daily basis, correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Let me take you to paragraph 25 through 27 of your statement, and

18 you mention daily operation reports and combat reports were studied. You

19 explained how the operation -- or the duty operations team drew up combat

20 reports every night and by 0600 forward them to General Ojdanic and his

21 deputies and others. You mentioned that those reports were then forwarded

22 by the office of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command to the military

23 office for President Milosevic. Do you know to whom in the military

24 office those reports went?

25 A. The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not President

1 Milosevic. It says in my text president of the Federal Republic of

2 Yugoslavia, that's number one.

3 Q. But that was President Milosevic, correct?

4 A. Well, it doesn't say that here.

5 Q. But he was?

6 A. We're talking about the function, we're not talking about a

7 person, but he was, yes.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you. And --

9 A. So the chef de cabinet of the chief of the Supreme Command Staff

10 sent this to the chef de cabinet of the president of the Federal Republic

11 of Yugoslavia, General Susic, so he received a certain number of combat

12 reports.

13 Q. Do you recall when Susic became a general? I had seen some

14 documents referring to him as a colonel. Do you know when he got promoted

15 from colonel to general?

16 A. He was a colonel-general at the time, so perhaps there may have

17 been an error there at one point, but he became a general a long time

18 before I did, in fact.

19 Q. That may have been my mistake or a mistake on the document I was

20 looking at. Thank you. All right. Let me ask you next about other than

21 the office of the FRY president, did those reports go to anyone outside

22 the VJ?

23 A. Yes. They went to the defence minister, Mr. Bulatovic.

24 Q. And no one else as far as you know?

25 A. Could you please repeat the initial question because I'm no longer

1 sure whether I understood you right. Who received -- well, every combat

2 report, the original, stated on the last page which copy of the combat

3 report went to whom, the first one went to the archive, the second to the

4 Chief of Staff, and so on and so forth. So it may have changed, but

5 whoever a copy was addressed to received that particular copy.

6 Q. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. All right. Now, let me go to some

7 of your testimony when you were here on the 5th of October, and you recall

8 you told us about meeting with General Ojdanic in connection with this --

9 this Joint Command order that we were talking about. And this is Exhibit

10 P1487.

11 MR. HANNIS: If we could have that up for a moment.

12 Q. And correct me if I'm wrong, General, but I think you told us that

13 you first became aware of this on the 17th of April, when you were called

14 in by General Ojdanic; is that correct?

15 A. I learned what, I became aware of the existence of the Joint

16 Command or something else? I'm not sure.

17 Q. You became aware of the existence of this map with a reference to

18 a Joint Command order for operations in the area of Rugovo.

19 A. Yes, yes, now I understand you. Yes, that is correct. That

20 night, on the 17th of April, that was the first time that I saw an excerpt

21 of this map at General Ojdanic's.

22 Q. Okay. I want to go through that with you in a little bit of

23 detail because it's -- this document has been a bit of a mystery for me,

24 and you're the first one who's been able to tell us such specifics about

25 it. You referred just now and I think last time you were here to an

1 excerpt of a map. Can you tell us how big of a map are we talking about?

2 Are we talking about something the size of this paper I have in my hand,

3 A4-sized paper? Are you talking a full 1 metre by 1 metre map that goes

4 on the wall? What kind of size of a map are we talking?

5 A. A3, that would be the size of it.

6 Q. Okay. And you mention it had some writing on it, including a

7 reference to Joint Command order number such and such, correct?

8 A. As far as I can recall, yes.

9 Q. But there was nothing else other than the map, there wasn't a

10 separate order attached to it or any text document. Is that what -- is

11 that how you recall it?

12 A. Yes, precisely. I never saw any orders, commands, or any

13 attachments to that map.

14 Q. And was it only the two of you? Was it just you and General

15 Ojdanic in his office looking at this map and talking about it? Nobody

16 else present?

17 A. Just the two of us.

18 Q. And you told us that General Ojdanic told you that this is

19 something that he had received or gotten from General Pavkovic, right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did -- this seems a little strange to me. You said that Ojdanic

22 told you Pavkovic came in with this map and Pavkovic had sometime shortly

23 before that been to see President Milosevic, correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Didn't that strike you as rather odd, that General Pavkovic, who

1 was a subordinate to General Ojdanic, has gone to see the supreme

2 commander first and then brings this map in to General Ojdanic?

3 A. Yes and no. You know --

4 Q. Please.

5 A. President Milosevic was able to invite directly any one of the

6 commanders and talk to them and issue them with assignments, even

7 bypassing the chief of the Supreme Command Staff. However, it was the

8 practice and the rule that after that the person who had been invited to

9 see the superior goes to the Chief of Staff and report. That was my

10 understanding.

11 Q. Yes. And in paragraph 17 of your statement you talk about that,

12 that you describe General Ojdanic as a principled man who did not breach

13 subordination. He requested the same of his subordinates and you

14 mentioned in such cases you would inform your superior about the

15 assignment or order received or if your immediate superior wasn't

16 available you would tell him when he came back. So this is sort of out of

17 the ordinary chain of command, this kind of event, isn't it?

18 A. You can't put it that way, but I have already tried to explain

19 that it was customary way if one was invited by the superior and the

20 immediate superior is informed of it -- for instance, that evening when

21 this suggestion was written, my superior was not on the command post, he

22 was not easily reachable, so General Ojdanic called me directly. And I

23 later informed him that I had been there, that I had done that, et cetera.

24 Q. And in those circumstances, would General Ojdanic tell your

25 immediate superior that he, Ojdanic, had called you in to assign some task

1 to you, et cetera?

2 A. Yes. The first opportunity he had by telephone or in person, why

3 not.

4 Q. Now, you told us that in connection with this map that

5 General Ojdanic wrote up the suggestions that are in Exhibit P1487, and

6 you explained to us that you were able -- that he was able to do that or

7 the two of you were able to do that without any reference to a written

8 order, correct?

9 A. Yes, absolutely.

10 Q. And you told us that you had it -- you had the telegram prepared,

11 you brought it back to General Ojdanic, who noticed a mistake, and he

12 inserted the missing word in handwritten black ink, correct? You wanted

13 to go back and have it typed up, but --

14 A. Yes, in black pen. You see it right there. This is a signed --

15 this is a photocopy of the original which I had taken to be signed. You

16 see the last line.

17 Q. Okay. And you said that the reason for that was because I

18 guess -- was it General Ojdanic who thought it was too urgent, that this

19 had to be done right away and there wasn't time to go have it typed up

20 again; is that fair?

21 A. Yes, especially because this telegram was going to be encrypted

22 and the encryption would involve that word too as an integral part of the

23 text, so that the recipient, the command of the 3rd Army, would receive

24 the text, including this word, and we were aware of that.

25 Q. And what was the word that was inserted?

1 A. Implement. If you want me to read the whole sentence.

2 Q. Sure.

3 A. "I deem it useful to have our suggestions reviewed comprehensively

4 and that you adjust your position and the disposition of forces in order

5 to prevent a new spill-out and thus implement or achieve your fundamental

6 objective: Destruction."

7 Q. Now, before today have you ever seen the Joint Command order

8 number 455-148 that is referred to in these suggestions? Did anybody show

9 it to you when you prepared for your testimony or did you see it or hear

10 about it when other witnesses testified here?

11 A. I don't recall.

12 MR. HANNIS: Could we have the usher assist me, and I'll hand the

13 witness a hard copy of Exhibit P1878.

14 Q. General, this is the document the Joint Command order 455-148 of

15 15 April 1999. Now, I think Judge Bonomy asked you a question about this,

16 too, regarding your ability to or General Ojdanic's ability to draw up

17 suggestions without seeing anything other than the map and what limited

18 writing was on it. In particular he did ask you about the item number 3

19 in the suggestions which is to delay stand-by for action. Could you look

20 at paragraph number 5 which is: "Task of the units." Do you find that?

21 That's page 3 of the English. I'm not sure what page it is for you. Do

22 you find that? And immediately above that there's a heading

23 called: "Readiness," and --

24 A. Above?

25 Q. And the -- and the second one says: "For breaking up and

1 destroying of the Siptar terrorist forces in the Rugovo sector at 0600

2 hours on 18 April 1999." Do you see that?

3 A. Yes, I see it.

4 Q. There wasn't any information written on the map about what time

5 that operation was scheduled to begin, was there?

6 A. No, I don't remember this, and I believe I said that last time.

7 In response to somebody's question here I said it's possible that below

8 the heading "readiness" might be indicated as well. The practice went

9 that on the map under the text there would be a heading "readiness," such

10 and such a day, such and such an hour. So I thought that perhaps it was

11 written on the map, readiness at 0600 hours on 18th April 1999. You find

12 it on maps.

13 Q. Okay. So are you telling us now you remember that that time of

14 0600 on the 18th of April was written on the map?

15 A. No, I didn't say that the last time either, and I'm not saying it

16 now. I'm just reading what is written in this paragraph, and I believe

17 it's possible, even likely, that it was written on the map then. But I'm

18 not claiming it was because I really don't recall.

19 Q. In answer to some of the questions from Mr. Fila about the map,

20 you indicated that this was strictly a military operation and that there

21 wasn't any involvement of MUP or civilians, correct? Do you recall being

22 asked a question about that and giving that answer?

23 A. I remember I was examined, but I don't remember the exact

24 questions or answers. And in particular I don't think I mentioned

25 civilians nor were they mentioned in the text, in the order, in that

1 context. Maybe you mean something different.

2 Q. Let me take you directly then to the question and your answer. At

3 page 16980, line 9, Mr. Fila said: "To conclude with this document before

4 you, both the map and this document and what General Ojdanic dictated into

5 it," and that's referring to 1487, the suggestions that General Ojdanic

6 wrote up, "to conclude with is it a military operation or some sort of

7 mixed operation? Is there a mention of any civilians or the MUP?"

8 And your answer was: "This was a purely military operation."

9 Do you recall now being asked that question and giving that

10 answer?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. Could you look at paragraph 4 -- no, I'm sorry, first

13 let's go to paragraph 2. Could you look at paragraph 2 of Exhibit 1878,

14 task of the Pristina Corps. Do you find that, General?

15 A. Point 2.

16 Q. Yes. It says: "The Pristina Corps with the reinforced" --

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. "With the reinforced and armed non-Siptar population of Kosovo and

19 Metohija is to support MUP forces in breaking up and destroying the Siptar

20 terrorist forces in the zone of responsibility."

21 So this is a joint operation, isn't it, with both the MUP and the

22 armed non-Siptar population, the civilians, correct?

23 A. No. This refers to the entire of the Pristina Corps, the area of

24 responsibility of the whole Pristina Corps, not this operation in Rugovo.

25 If you allow me, in point 2 we see the assignment, the task, of the

1 Pristina Corps; and later on assignments to units are listed, paragraph 5

2 and further on. So this task was received from the superior command, the

3 command of the 3rd Army, or they formulated it itself. In some places

4 perhaps there were indeed those joint actions involving armed population

5 and unarmed Albanian population, but I haven't yet reached para 6. If you

6 want me to read on, I will.

7 Q. Well, if you could go down two --

8 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, I see Mr. Fila on his feet.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Just to clarify, Your Honour, I neither

11 showed this document nor did I examine the witness on it. So this is

12 leading the witness. I examined the witness on a document

13 entitled "suggestion," something drafted by General Ojdanic. This was not

14 drafted by General Ojdanic. I do not understand this line of questioning.

15 I don't mind the question, but not in my context because I have not even

16 seen it let alone examined on it.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

18 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, the question related to what the

19 operation was, whether it was a joint operation or not. The witness has

20 said it was a purely military operation.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Fila's objection is to your attributing to

22 him the raising of this issue, and he maintains he didn't raise it. He's

23 not objecting to your question.

24 MR. HANNIS: Well, I think the question was raised by the

25 witness's answer, not necessarily Mr. Fila's question, but I pointed to

1 Mr. Fila's question to put it in context for the witness.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, your observations are noted, Mr. Fila. Thank

3 you.

4 Please continue, Mr. Hannis.

5 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

6 Q. General, I think -- let me check the transcript because -- yes,

7 you said at line 5 of page 19 today: "In some places perhaps there were

8 indeed those joint actions involving armed population and unarmed Albanian

9 population ..."

10 Who are you referring to when you talk about the unarmed Albanian

11 population, that's just the civilians, correct?

12 A. I don't remember mentioning unarmed population. It could be an

13 interpretation error or translation error. I mentioned it the way it's

14 here.

15 Q. And here we're talking about --

16 A. Armed non-Siptar population.

17 Q. And that would have been primarily Serbs, correct?

18 A. Yes, primarily, but not only.

19 Q. Okay. Fair. And under item number 2, the tasks of the Pristina

20 Corps, the third paragraph in my English version, the second sentence in

21 that paragraph says: "Engage the armed non-Siptar population to secure

22 military facilities and communication lines and protect and defend the

23 non-Siptar population."

24 Correct?

25 A. Yes, but not in that order. There must be something wrong with

1 the translation.

2 Q. Well, do you want to read the original and we can have it

3 translated here?

4 A. Yes, I can.

5 "Armed non-Siptar population to be engaged to secure military

6 installations and communications, roads, and to protect and defend

7 non-Siptar population."

8 Q. Okay. That sounds pretty much like the same thing. Maybe --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, perhaps the witness -- Mr. Curcin, could you

10 explain how you see that as being any different from what was put to you?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a different word order. That

12 sentence began with: "Engage ..." It seems to me that what I had heard

13 earlier is slightly different to what I have read now.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the sense of this not that it's an instruction

15 to the recipient of the document to take authority over or to act with

16 authority over the armed non-Siptar population?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I must say this question is

18 complicated for me. Could you make it clearer, perhaps, or maybe divide

19 it into two questions. I didn't understand ultimately who has power over

20 whom. It seems to transpire that the Pristina Corps or the army would

21 have powers over the civilian population.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you could read to us the whole of that

23 third section of section 2. It starts with the words: "With part of the

24 forces ..."

25 The sentence before the one you read, read that along with the

1 sentence which you read.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right.

3 "With part of the forces prevent the spilling over and withdrawal

4 of Siptar terrorist forces from the Rugovo area to the Metohija area.

5 Engage the armed non-Siptar population to secure military facilities and

6 communication lines and to protect and defend the non-Siptar population."

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Curcin, that has been translated into

8 English as an instruction to use part of the forces to prevent spilling

9 over and withdrawal of terrorists and to engage the armed non-Siptar

10 population to secure military facilities and communication line. So it

11 sounds in English like an instruction to the recipient of the document to

12 use the Yugoslav Army for part of the job and the armed non-Siptar

13 population for another part of the job.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that sounds like telling the recipient that

16 he's in charge of a combined operation involving both the Yugoslav Army

17 and the armed non-Siptar population, which is something you've so far

18 denied is the import of this document.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I've said I

20 hadn't seen this document before. Last time I was examined on a section

21 of the map and that's the way I answered. As far as armed non-Siptar

22 population is concerned, I firmly believe that it was in fact a part of

23 the Ministry of Defence in the form of civilian defence and civilian

24 protection, personnel whose primary task is to defend themselves.

25 Secondly, to protect and defend more important facilities and

1 installations on that territory and features and roads, communication

2 lines. That was their purpose.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Curcin, I believe we will hear evidence soon

4 that there may have been three lines of command here: The army, the MUP,

5 and the civil protection or civil defence, the way you've described it,

6 commanded through the Ministry of Defence. That's not what we're looking

7 at at the moment. What we're looking at is what this document seems to

8 say, and on the face of it, it seems to be telling the person to whom the

9 order is directed that he has to engage both Yugoslav Army forces and

10 armed non-Siptar population for different parts of a combined operation.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is that a question or an assertion?

12 If it's a question, my answer is yes.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: And I think I would understand you also to be

14 saying that that's not the general position, that the command structure is

15 normally different from that. But what we have to do is work out what

16 this order amounted to.

17 Now, Mr. Hannis will, no doubt, wish to continue.

18 Mr. Hannis.

19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

20 Q. And, General, in fairness to you because you haven't seen this

21 before, let me take you to two other areas where we have some more

22 information about this. Could you go back down to item number 5: "Tasks

23 of units," and you'll see under 5.1 the task: The 125th Motorised

24 Brigade, 2nd Battalion of the 58th light Infantry Brigade are to set up a

25 blockade. And going on to the next paragraph it says: "Task: Support

1 the MUP forces in breaking up and destroying the Siptar terrorist forces

2 along" a certain axis. So doesn't that indicate this a joint operation

3 with the VJ supporting the MUP in their activities of breaking up and

4 destroying the Siptar terrorist forces in that area?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Finally if you could go to item number 13, the last one before the

7 signature block that says: "Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija." Do

8 you find that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And item 13 says: "Organize joint action with MUP forces

11 regarding the preparation and conduct of combat operations before and

12 during the conduct of combat operations."

13 And the next sentence says: "The Joint Command for Kosovo and

14 Metohija shall command all forces from the Pristina sector during the

15 conduct of combat operations."

16 To me that sounds like a joint operation, isn't it?

17 A. Possibly, because I haven't had this document and I had no chance

18 to deal with it at length. I can only accept what you say.

19 Q. Well, based on what parts we read out, do you have any reason to

20 disagree with that viewpoint that it was a joint operation?

21 A. Para 3.1 coordinated action with MUP forces. It's obvious that

22 it's about coordinated action, nobody's subordinated to anyone else. It

23 is only to be accepted that there is a separate chain of command for the

24 army and a separate chain of command for the MUP. Maybe they were

25 together at one point in Pristina, but to me it is obvious that it means

1 they were carrying out a joint operation, adhering to their own respective

2 chains of command and their own forces.

3 Q. Now, the map that General Ojdanic had gotten from

4 General Pavkovic, do you know or did General Ojdanic tell you whether that

5 was the only map he brought with him and he left it behind with

6 General Ojdanic or did he have a separate copy of the same map that he

7 took away with him? How did that work?

8 A. No, no, and I've already said that it was just a section of the

9 map, which means that the map was cut up into sections. It was not a

10 complete map with the border. The scale was 1:50.000, as far as I

11 remember, which means that it was depicting a relatively small area on the

12 ground.

13 Q. But do you know, is that the only copy there was or had

14 General Pavkovic taken away with him a duplicate copy of the same excerpt

15 of a map with the positions of the forces located on it?

16 A. No, I don't know about that. I know that there was only this one

17 map with General Ojdanic.

18 Q. Because if he didn't take away the map, how is he going to know

19 what to do about the suggestions that General Ojdanic made in terms of

20 where forces should be positioned?

21 A. I would have known that very well because he kept the original at

22 the command. He most probably made a sketch as an auxiliary document that

23 he had taken with him to help him explain, but the original stayed at the

24 command.

25 Q. And in the suggestions P1487, number 2 says: "Our forces' main

1 objective should be destruction, which you will have difficulty achieving

2 with your current formations under blockade." I thought you told us when

3 you were here last time that the map only showed positions of VJ units and

4 enemy forces. There weren't any MUP units on the map, there weren't any

5 armed non-Siptar population units or elements on the map, correct?

6 A. Well, nobody asked me about that at the time. I'm certain nobody

7 asked me about either of these things. Armed non-Siptar population could

8 not have been shown on the map and wasn't shown. As far as I remember,

9 there were two or three little patrols of the MUP shown on the map, two or

10 three patrols of unidentified strength drawn in somewhere in the gaps

11 between military units, but certainly not the civilian population.

12 Q. Okay. And the suggestions don't make any mention of what should

13 be done with or how actions should be coordinated with those MUP patrols,

14 does it?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. All right. Based on what we've seen in terms of the number and

17 kinds of documents generated by General Ojdanic as chief of the Supreme

18 Command Staff and the testimony we've heard from several members of the

19 General Staff, of the Supreme Command Staff about the kind of general he

20 was, my impression is that he was a very meticulous, organized,

21 detail-oriented kind of boss. Would you agree with that?

22 A. Completely. This time I agree completely, unlike the previous

23 time.

24 Q. And it just strikes me as extremely odd that General Ojdanic,

25 chief of the Supreme Command Staff, the highest uniformed soldier in the

1 country, when General Pavkovic comes in after having been with

2 President Milosevic, the supreme commander, brings in an excerpt of a map

3 and basically General Ojdanic drops everything else he's doing on the 17th

4 of April in the middle of the war, calls you in, and makes some

5 suggestions for this map so urgent that there's not time to retype the

6 telegram, he makes a handwritten change, and sends it out. It seems to me

7 he's deferring to a subordinate, he's deferring to this Joint Command,

8 which we don't know where that fits into the general scheme of the chain

9 of command for the army. Why is that? Doesn't that strike you as

10 unusual?

11 A. No, no. But there are so many assertions in that question it's

12 difficult for me to respond to all of them properly at once. First of

13 all, that subordinate is the commander of the 3rd Army and he is entitled

14 to carry out operations in his area pursuant to his own decisions, even

15 General Ojdanic, as you said, a principled man in uniform, this is the

16 first time I must confess I had press for General Ojdanic from the

17 Prosecution. Anyway, he didn't want to stop the operation, he didn't want

18 to terminate it, he didn't want to issue an order, he gave suggestions.

19 Why was this urgent? I am beginning to understand this only now. When I

20 saw that the readiness was for the next morning, on the 18th, and only now

21 do I understand why the suggestion said it should be postponed by 24

22 hours, to the 19th. I tried to understand -- to explain last time but you

23 stopped me. The ground is very hostile in that part of the territory,

24 it's the most difficult terrain in Kosovo and Metohija. It takes several

25 hours to move a unit by several kilometres, especially by night. This was

1 night-time. Units were already in position, and that's why it was urgent,

2 he didn't even want to properly change that one word because that document

3 needed to reach the command of the 3rd Army, from there the command of the

4 Pristina Corps, and go up to stop the operation. As far as I recall, that

5 operation was not carried out at all at that time, it was only carried out

6 sometime around the 20th of May, at least I know that one such operation

7 was carried out around the 20th of May. That may be it.

8 So there's nothing unusual about this. This is quite usual and

9 normal in a war, and General Ojdanic certainly must have been glad to see

10 his commander and exchange a few words with him at the command post. He

11 dropped whatever he was doing and talked to him.

12 Q. [Previous translation continues]... There's nothing unusual about

13 this, this is quite usual, how often did something like that happen where

14 General Pavkovic went to see the supreme commander and then came to

15 General Ojdanic and gave him a map and got suggestions from him? This is

16 the only time that happened, is it, or did that happen on a regular basis?

17 A. I don't know that. No, I don't know that.

18 Q. Okay. --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just know about this one

21 particular case.

22 MR. HANNIS:

23 Q. And it was, it was a matter of concern to General Ojdanic what

24 happened with those suggestions, wasn't it, because let's look at Exhibit

25 3D589 --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you move, if you don't mind, Mr. Hannis --

2 MR. HANNIS: Not at all.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: I would like to be clear to your answer to that

4 last question. You say that -- in response to the suggestion that the

5 subordinate was in charge, you said: "That subordinate is the commander

6 of the 3rd Army and he is entitled to carry out operations in his area

7 pursuant to his own decisions."

8 Now, do you mean to say that?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm referring to the commander

10 of the 3rd Army, who has the right in his area of responsibility to carry

11 out combat actions on the basis of his decisions, also the commander of

12 the Pristina Corps in his area of responsibility on the basis of the

13 decisions of the commander of the 3rd Army on the basis of yet his own

14 decisions; and he is held responsible for that. May I just say one more

15 sentence? It won't do us any harm. Not all actions are carried out on

16 the basis of decisions and orders of the Supreme Command Staff; they issue

17 a directive and then the subordinate commanders take action.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: In particular you're saying, if we interpret the

19 order as being authority for commanding the armed non-Siptar population,

20 that General Pavkovic was entitled to decide on his own to engage the

21 armed non-Siptar population; is that correct?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the suggestions there is no

23 mention of the unarmed non-Siptar population as far as I can remember.

24 I'm making these comments outside that context. I'm only talking about

25 the document that I had occasion to see and testify about. This document

1 is one I saw a few moments ago only, and I cannot give you a proper answer

2 in relation to that; that is why I cannot answer your specific question

3 either.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I don't understand that. You know how the

5 army operates, so just forget for the moment that all you've seen is the

6 suggestions document and tell me as a matter of principle whether you

7 meant to say in your answer that the commander of the 3rd Army can carry

8 out operations in his area pursuant to his own decisions, that would

9 include commanding the armed non-Siptar population?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In certain situations for certain

11 tasks, in a certain area in terms of carrying out a concrete operation he

12 could have given them assignments or tasks, or rather, authorise a

13 subordinate to do that. These are specific orders, that is to say

14 securing facilities of particular importance, securing roads,

15 communication lines, even military facilities as well, protecting the

16 population and material goods. As for these specific tasks, that is what

17 they were used for.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: And could that be even without mention of such

19 authority in a directive?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. A commander in his zone of

21 responsibility can bring together all the forces that he has available for

22 carrying out a particular task.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And is that answer confined to combat operations?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, at the time combat operations

25 are being carried out.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 Mr. Hannis.

3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

6 Q. And, General, regarding the apparent urgency of that telegram

7 regarding the suggestions, I would like to hand you a hard copy of Exhibit

8 3D589. These are the briefing notes for the evening briefing on the 18th

9 of April, 1999, the next day. And if you could go to I think the

10 next-to-the-last page at the very bottom and then it carries on to the top

11 of the last page. I've highlighted in green item number 6 in English is

12 translated as: "Lieutenant-General Curcin, find out when the telegram was

13 sent to the 3rd Army command," and then on the next page for you it

14 says: "Ask when the telegram was delivered."

15 This is in reference to that telegram regarding suggestions in

16 connection with that Joint Command order, correct?

17 A. Probably.

18 Q. Now, my last question in connection with that topic has to do with

19 the Joint Command. What -- didn't you have some question about what this

20 Joint Command was that was apparently issuing orders for -- from what you

21 could get from the map, either the 3rd Army or the Pristina Corps? You

22 said you never heard of it before, is that right, or you heard mention of

23 it in some collegium meetings but you didn't think much about it?

24 A. Yes, I said that clearly last time. I heard that at one of the

25 collegium meetings, I think it was the end of January, I heard this

1 mentioned, that question of some kind of Joint Command. I never said, nor

2 will I ever admit, that some kind of Joint Command commanded the 3rd Army.

3 If that was said somewhere and that it was I who allegedly said that, that

4 is not the case.

5 Q. Okay, but my question is: As a soldier and the term command has

6 special meaning. Seeing Joint Command order, apparently for either the

7 3rd Army or the Pristina Corps, didn't that raise some questions in your

8 mind as to what is this Joint Command? Who is it? And what gives it or

9 them the authority to be issuing any kind of orders to some unit within

10 our VJ? That must have raised a question in your mind as a professional

11 soldier.

12 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Fila.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Again, I would kindly ask that if

15 something is put to the witness, it be stated correctly. What is this

16 order of some Joint Command to the 3rd Army, one that I have not seen so

17 far and Mr. Hannis did see it. So could I please have a reference. What

18 is this order of the Joint Command to the 3rd Army that this witness

19 should now explain? You know, Your Honour, that is why it is the right

20 thing to do to give a reference.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]...

22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he only saw a map that referred to the

23 Joint Command. The map was delivered by General Pavkovic, the commander

24 of the 3rd Army, so I think it's not a -- an illogical conclusion to

25 assume that the order must have been for either the 3rd Army or some

1 subordinate element thereof, the Pristina Corps, since it's an operation

2 in the Rugovo area in Kosovo in 1999.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I can only conclude that a

5 hen is a rooster, as you put it once. Look at the question, just look at

6 the question. When did you see the Joint Command issue orders to the 3rd

7 Army? Not saying when Thomas Hannis or the Office of the Prosecutor

8 concluded that such and such a thing happened. I am not sure that this

9 Anglo-Saxon system of yours is the best one because in our system we say

10 the truth; if something is white, then it is white. And if you say

11 something different, then that means you're not saying the truth or

12 misleading the witness. Just show one document where a Joint Command is

13 issuing orders to the 3rd Army or withdraw your question. That's the end

14 of the story. Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: You can deal with this by referring to the map,

16 Mr. Hannis.

17 MR. HANNIS: Well, let me ask it this way then.

18 Q. General, didn't you have a question about who this Joint Command

19 was and for what units it was issuing orders in the VJ? What VJ units it

20 was proposing to command or direct or deploy?

21 A. No, you're not right at all, unfortunately, for several months

22 now, years, if you wish. No Joint Command commanded army units. This was

23 a body that was used for coordinating joint activities that were being

24 carried out in the same area at the same time by army units and MUP units,

25 and that's the only thing it is. So there is no commanding -- well, there

1 is -- but there is no commanding of the military chain of command over MUP

2 units and the other way around. Army units are not commanded by the MUP.

3 Somebody did this, somebody called this colloquially a Joint Command for

4 some reason, and I know this full well and you mentioned it, so I have a

5 reference now to respond to this as an experienced soldier. It does not

6 have the single attribute that a command has. First of all, it does not

7 have a commander, it does not have organizational establishment structure,

8 it doesn't have a stamp, it doesn't have a seal, it doesn't have an

9 office, it doesn't have its registry, it registers documents under 455 in

10 the command of the Pristina Corps, it doesn't have its security, it

11 doesn't have anything of its own, it just has this joint name, that

12 someone due to some circumstances called the Joint Command. Please, let

13 us deal with this delusion that has been harboured by the Prosecution for

14 so long. Let us dispel it because there is no Joint Command. There is a

15 body for coordinating joint activities --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: This is way too fast for

17 interpretation.

18 MR. HANNIS:

19 Q. This is not a prosecutorial delusion we have evidence in this case

20 of Joint Command orders issues saying the Joint Command will command

21 operations. Now, I thought you told us before you didn't know about the

22 Joint Command; now you tell us you know that the Joint Command was a

23 coordinating body. How do you know that?

24 A. Well, I did prepare for giving evidence here. I thought about it,

25 didn't I, I read something in the newspapers, what the Office of the

1 Prosecutor was asking individual witnesses, things like that.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I wondered for a moment, Mr. Curcin, if I had

3 fallen asleep somewhere during your evidence and missed the earlier part

4 where you had told us this, but my recollection is exactly that of

5 Mr. Hannis's, that you gave no indication before of having any knowledge

6 of what the Joint Command actually was. Now you've indicated you know it

7 was some sort of coordinating body. Tell us more about it, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very gladly. This is the first time

9 that I have been put such a direct question about this --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, let's start with the membership. Who were

11 the members of the Joint Command?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. What did it do then, this

14 non-delusional body?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said a few minutes ago

16 to Mr. Hannis that I believe that it actually coordinated action that was

17 being carried out in a particular area at the same time, the army and the

18 police, so that there would not be an exchange of friendly fire. I

19 believe that that was the main job or task and duty.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, can I go back to the question that I started

21 with: Who were the members?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Whoever, I don't know who the

23 members were; however, from the indictment I saw who was being charged

24 with that inter alia.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you're not here to deal with your assessment

1 or tell us about your assessment of the indictment and what you've been

2 reading and what you've been viewing on television or anywhere else.

3 You're here to answer questions that you're asked from your own personal

4 knowledge. You're not even being asked to tell us things based on the

5 preparation or the proofing that you underwent before you came here to

6 give evidence. Your job is simply to tell us what you know, and you have

7 now created the impression that you know what the Joint Command was. So

8 we would like to know what it is that this Joint Command was, according to

9 you from your personal knowledge.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am sorry that that is the

11 impression you got. I really do not have any in-depth knowledge about

12 this.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

14 MR. HANNIS:

15 Q. You've raised some points about the Joint Command that there

16 wasn't on those Joint Command orders a signature and that the numbering

17 system seems to come from the Pristina Corps. Let me ask you something

18 about that. If you're writing orders to VJ units for combat operations

19 and you have a Joint Command - or if you want to refer to it as a joint

20 coordinating body - you have members on that body that include not only

21 army personnel, commanders; police commander; and civilians. Who best

22 knows among those three groups, the police, the army, and the civilians,

23 who knows best how to write up orders to army units on how to carry out

24 combat operations? It's the army, isn't it?

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] This is speculation --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment.

3 Mr. Curcin, would you leave the courtroom very briefly while we

4 hear this objection and deal with it.

5 [The witness stands down]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.

7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, so far the witness when

8 speaking about this command, he knows it, he doesn't know, he talked about

9 the MUP units and the army units. He did not say a single word so far

10 about civilians. And now what is being put to him that this Joint Command

11 has to have the army and the MUP and civilians at that, because that is

12 what the Prosecutor thinks it should be and who is now the most important

13 of the three. When did the man say a single word about civilians? You

14 asked him, Hannis asked him, and he talked about some kind of coordinating

15 body, coordination, to avoid friendly fire between the army and the MUP,

16 and I don't see that the army and the MUP would be firing at this third

17 most important party, the civilians, that was not mentioned so far. Well

18 you cannot really manipulate things that way, you cannot speculate that

19 way as suits you best, that goes a bit beyond allowed limits because

20 civilians were never mentioned.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 Mr. Hannis.

23 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, the witness mentioned hearing about the

24 Joint Command in some of the collegium sessions. I don't have the

25 specific references in front of me, but I recall that in those collegium

1 sessions where there was a mention of that Joint Command or that Joint

2 Command down there, I think in one of those referring to the Podujevo

3 incident in late December of 1998 or early 1999 there was reference to

4 Mr. Sainovic.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, well you would need to, I think, establish

6 from the witness knowledge of the involvement of civilians before you

7 could put the question the way you've actually put it. So you can ask

8 him. I got nowhere when I asked the composition, but if you ask a

9 specific pointed question about the -- whether civilians were there and

10 have something to back it up, if he is unaware of the position then you

11 could then proceed to the next part of the question.

12 MR. HANNIS: Well, I guess let me ask you this, Your Honour, my

13 question I thought was aimed at determining whether or not civilians would

14 be better at writing military combat operation orders for the VJ than VJ

15 or MUP personnel would be, and I think that's a question he can answer

16 without knowing whether civilians were a member of the Joint Command or

17 not.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but you're -- the way you put it, it

19 presupposed there were members on the body who were civilians. Now, I

20 understand that that's not perhaps essential to your question.

21 Mr. Fila, what's being suggested is that the witness can be

22 asked -- can be asked whether a civilian or a soldier would be better at

23 prescribing instructions for the Pristina Corps.

24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] This is the kind of question that: Who

25 flies better, a pilot or me? Well, once -- the witness said that he may

1 have heard once at a collegium in January about a Joint Command. He never

2 said that he heard of Sainovic or of Podujevo, no, no, no, let the

3 Prosecutor show us the record and let me see that. In the month of

4 January the Prosecutor says that he heard -- well, in January 1999. Now,

5 let Mr. Hannis get --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, that's not the question I'm asking you.

7 You may have answered it in the very first point you made just now. Are

8 you saying it's so obvious that a soldier would be better at writing

9 orders for the army than a civilian that that's a stupid question? Is

10 that your point? Because if everyone agrees that we can move on.

11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Precisely, that is what I wanted to

12 say.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Does anyone dissent from that view?

14 Very well. We can move past that question, Mr. Hannis, if you

15 have something specific in addition the combined exercise you can deal

16 with that after the break.

17 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, I think that's fair. This is

18 something I can argue in submissions. Is this a good time for the break?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: It is, but where are we in your cross at the

20 private session stage yet or not?

21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have two more topics, one regarding

22 subordination of the MUP and one related to dealings with telephone

23 communications within the Supreme Command.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah. Well, the usher can take the witness now and

25 we'll see him again at 4.15.

1 Mr. Visnjic, do you know the position in relation to the document?

2 Can we deal with that?

3 MR. VISNJIC: Yes, Your Honour, I already sent e-mail to the

4 Prosecution.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Has the matter --

6 MR. VISNJIC: To Mr. Riaz.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Has the matter been resolved, Mr. Hannis?

8 MR. HANNIS: Well, I have the position, but I think I need to

9 advise you of what it is because I'm not sure I understand what it

10 means --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well, for that we need to be in private

12 session I think.

13 MR. HANNIS: Yeah.

14 [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by later order of the Chamber]

15 THE REGISTRAR: We are in private session, Your Honours.

16 MR. HANNIS: The e-mail I received says: "Restriction imposed by

17 government is in it that document should not be used in whole before ICTY,

18 only the part related to the concrete events and acts can be used."

19 Now, the diary goes I think from the 23rd of March, 1999, through,

20 I don't know, it's -- it's some date late in June, I don't recall the

21 ending date. It's beyond the actual signing of the military and technical

22 agreement, so it's D plus 90 I think instead of D plus 78 or 79. I

23 haven't seen the English, but as far as I know I'm only interested in the

24 dates during the war, but I can't tell from this if that means part

25 related to concrete events and acts.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you're dealing with events recorded in this

2 document, are you?

3 MR. HANNIS: Yes, I haven't seen the English, Your Honour, but

4 this is a contemporaneous document that was done in the Supreme Command

5 and I want to ask him some foundational questions about how it was kept

6 who kept it in case I want to induce it later when I don't have a

7 foundational witness available.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have nothing to add.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: These --

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I submitted the document.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, and there can be no problem with the

13 questions that Mr. Hannis intends to ask in relation to the document. In

14 case there should be trouble ahead, you may wish to have the matter

15 clarified. But on the face of it, it's not even a Rule 70 condition

16 that's been -- that has been imposed.

17 I mistakenly, I think, said 4.15. The break will be a bit

18 shorter. We'll come back at ten past 4.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

20 --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.

21 [Open session]

22 [The witness takes the stand]

23 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, bearing this mind the questions that

25 Mr. Hannis intends to ask about the document, is there any reason why that

1 should be in private session?

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So please continue, Mr. Hannis.

4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

5 Q. General, I want to move to another topic now.

6 MR. HANNIS: And if we could show the witness Exhibit 3D670.

7 Q. General, this is President Milosevic's -- this relates to

8 President Milosevic's order about subordinating the MUP to the VJ for

9 combat operations. And you remember seeing that and talking about that

10 before, yes?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Now, you told us that that never actually was carried out and that

13 the VJ Supreme Command Staff did not have effective control of the MUP,

14 that it did not forward orders to the MUP, and didn't receive reports, and

15 there was no exchange of representatives, that's from paragraph 36 of your

16 statement, correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you aware that there were efforts made at the lower levels, at

19 the 3rd Army command level and the Pristina Corps level, to effectuate

20 that order for subordination of the MUP? Did you see reports back or

21 information back from the Pristina Corps or the 3rd Army about their

22 efforts in that regard?

23 A. No, apart from the one that we discussed of the 25th of May during

24 the first session.

25 Q. Correct. I want to ask you about a couple of others and see if

1 you ever either seen them or seen a summary of their contents in any of

2 the daily reports, operations reports, or combat reports, or otherwise.

3 The first one is Exhibit P1267. I can hand you a hard copy, General. The

4 B/C/S is just one page. And this is an order apparently signed by

5 General Lazarevic dated the 20th April 1999, and it appears to be to his

6 subordinate unit commanders. You'll see it says: "I order," and number

7 one: "Units and organs of the MUP of Serbia in the brigades' zones of

8 responsibility shall be resubordinated to the brigade commands for

9 carrying out combat operations."

10 Do you see that? And he makes reference --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. He makes reference to the Supreme Command Staff order of the 18th

13 of April, right?

14 A. Yes, in the preamble of this order and the order of the army

15 command, or rather, the notice, announcement, of the 3rd Army command of

16 the 20th of April.

17 Q. Now, at the bottom of the page is some delivery information about

18 who all this order went to in a list several subordinate units of the

19 Pristina Corps, some by courier and some in code. And at the very bottom

20 you'll see listed the Pristina MUP staff, correct?

21 A. Yes, and right at the beginning is said purportedly signed. I

22 have to say that this was signed by General Vladimir Lazarevic.

23 Q. But there is some other information at the bottom and it's not

24 clear to me. There's some handwritten information. There's a number 1615

25 which appears to be an hour or a time in connection with some of those

1 listed units. Do you see that?

2 A. Yes, I can see that and I know what this means, if that's what

3 you're asking me.

4 Q. Yeah, what does that mean?

5 A. This means that at 1615 hours the telegram was sent to this unit,

6 so this is where you put the time when the telegram was sent to a certain

7 unit after its encryption, in order to be able to keep track of it and to

8 know when it arrived or perhaps even better that this arrived at 1615 if

9 it is indeed the case that it was sent to everybody at 15 --

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't hear the time that was

11 referenced.

12 MR. HANNIS:

13 Q. The interpreters said they didn't hear the time that was

14 referenced at the end of your answer, I guess.

15 A. Let me repeat everything. In the first square stamp it is

16 indicated when the telegram was processed, that was 1440, and that it was

17 sent at 1510. And then below that where you have the addressees it is

18 indicated 1615, 354th Brigade, and 175 Engineers Battalion. I'm not quite

19 sure whether it was sent to them at that time or that they received it at

20 that time, but this was either the time when the telegram was sent or when

21 it was received.

22 Q. [Microphone not activated]

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

24 MR. HANNIS:

25 Q. Regarding the Pristina MUP staff it appears that's underlined but

1 I also see a note that says: "Remark the tele or fax has not been sent,"

2 and then there's something illegible, perhaps a signature. Do you see

3 that, and can you help us with what that might refer to?

4 A. I can only assume and I have been asked to tell you only things

5 that I know for sure, but if you want me to speculate I'll do so.

6 Q. No, that's all right. Thank you.

7 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to Exhibit 1269, P1269.

8 Q. And I have a hard copy of this one I think that I can hand you.

9 This is a document dated the 8th of May, 1999, from the 3rd Army command

10 signed by General Pavkovic regarding deployment of VJ and MUP forces in

11 combat control of the territory, an order. And handwritten on the first

12 page near the top it says: "Pristina MUP to General Lukic personally."

13 Is that what it says in the handwriting?

14 A. Yes, that's what I says it here.

15 Q. Okay. And under the order number 1 is: "Engage all forces in the

16 Pristina Corps's zone of responsibility to ensure full control of the

17 territory and permanently passable roads."

18 And then, I want to ask you about item number 7. Can you finding

19 that, General?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And it says, does it not: "In accordance with the situation the

22 disposition of MUP and military district forces," or --

23 A. Military territorial detachment.

24 Q. "In the brigades' zones of responsibility may be changed in

25 relation to their current disposition, which I hereby designate as the

1 responsibility of brigade commanders."

2 So it seems that General Pavkovic assumes that he has the

3 authority regarding the disposition of MUP forces and he's delegating that

4 authority to his brigade commanders; is that correct?

5 A. I wasn't able to read the whole telegram, so I can only tell you

6 about paragraph 7. So I don't have the full context, but that's what it

7 says here, just the way you read it out.

8 Q. And number 9, would you read it out to be sure we have the

9 translation correct.

10 A. Paragraph 9 reads: "The command of the Pristina Corps and the

11 staff of the Ministry of the Interior shall issue their orders to regulate

12 other issues related to the engagement of the Army of Yugoslavia, the

13 military territorial units, and the units of the Ministry of the Interior

14 and to ensure consistent implementation of this order."

15 Q. And then number -- sorry.

16 A. Is it -- is it necessary for me to comment or to provide you my

17 opinion or was I just supposed to read it out so that it gets interpreted?

18 Perhaps it might be of interest.

19 Q. Well, please, then, if you want to give me your interpretation.

20 A. If you allow me, I'll be very brief. On the basis of this one way

21 conclude that the command of the Pristina Corps has jurisdiction over its

22 own forces and the MUP staff over its own forces, so they have an

23 additional task to regulate all other issues regarding the engagement with

24 their own orders. This is quite unambiguous. As far as I'm concerned, as

25 a soldier, for me, this is quite unambiguous.

1 Q. Thank you. When -- when at the Supreme Command Staff level did

2 you as a group become aware that there was a problem regarding the order

3 for subordination of the MUP, do you recall? When did you realise that it

4 wasn't happening as it was supposed to?

5 A. If we at the Supreme Command Staff were a group, I want to tell

6 you that we were a well-organized group. We had our organization, the

7 establishment, we did things in a particular sequence; and secondly, I

8 don't remember any special or dramatic developments at the collegium or

9 the evening briefing relating to this issue. It is possible that somebody

10 had more or less knowledge of that, but we as a group, as you termed us,

11 we did not receive special information regarding this. I know that there

12 were some isolated complaints by the commander of the 3rd Army.

13 Q. Okay. Now, when you did -- whenever it was that you became aware

14 that there was some problem about that subordination of the MUP, did the

15 Supreme Command Staff take any steps to try and address it; and if so,

16 what were those?

17 A. I know that the chief of the Supreme Command Staff on at least one

18 occasion in early May informed the supreme commander, President Milosevic,

19 about that one morning. Now, I don't know what was done subsequently.

20 MR. HANNIS: If we could go back to 3D670 for just a minute, this

21 is the original order regarding subordination.

22 Q. And I think you told us when you were here last time at page 16984

23 and 16985 that you had seen this order by President Milosevic, but that

24 the General Staff or the Supreme Command Staff did not send this or any

25 other to Minister Stojiljkovic. No orders were sent to the minister of

1 interior, correct?

2 A. I don't know whether the military cabinet sent it, but the Supreme

3 Command Staff did not send this or any other order to the Ministry of the

4 Interior. I know that for sure because they were not part of our chain of

5 command.

6 Q. But item number 3 in that order says the: "Chief of the Supreme

7 Command Staff will send his request to the civilian government organs and

8 other defence bodies ..."

9 So did the Supreme Command Staff send requests to the Ministry of

10 the Interior or any other government organs in connection with

11 subordinating the MUP, if you know?

12 A. I do know, but your question is not unambiguous. Let me first

13 tell you that the Supreme Command Staff issued several documents to the

14 authorities, the federal defence minister, the government, the finance

15 minister, the justice minister, and others within its purview pursuant to

16 this authorisation in paragraph 3. But no document, as far as I know, was

17 sent to the defence ministry, or rather, to the Ministry of the Interior

18 or the Federal Ministry of the Interior regarding this issue.

19 Q. And why was that? Because the army viewed it did not have the

20 authority to send that to the Ministry of the Interior, because it seems

21 that by not doing so General Ojdanic is disobeying the order of President

22 Milosevic.

23 A. No, that's not true. He complied with the order issued by

24 President Milosevic and he complied with what he was supposed to do as the

25 Chief of Staff and what the army was supposed to do. But apparently

1 somebody else was made responsible for this other system.

2 Q. I don't understand that. Where -- how do you reach that

3 conclusion, somebody else was made responsible for that? Doesn't this

4 direct General Ojdanic to send a request to the government organs and

5 wouldn't that include the Ministry of Interior? Or is that not a civilian

6 government organ?

7 A. Well, we both know that it was a civilian government organ, and we

8 also know that this was the organ of the Republic of Serbia. All the

9 other things were done, so what -- why would the chief of the Supreme

10 Command Staff send a request to the republican ministry or to the prime

11 minister of the Republic of Serbia to do anything with or about MUP? I

12 would expect - and I indeed expected - that this order would be sent,

13 forwarded, to the presidents of Yugoslavia and of Serbia [as interpreted]

14 and to the relevant ministries outside of the military, including the MUP,

15 the part that had to do with MUP.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

17 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, 49, 19, I believe the

18 witness says the president of Yugoslavia and the prime ministers of the

19 federal government and the Government of Serbia, not the presidents of

20 Serbia. It can be checked on the audio as well.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Line 19.

22 MR. ZECEVIC: Line 19. The witness said: To the president of

23 Yugoslavia, the prime minister of the federal government, and the prime

24 minister of Republic of Serbia.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

1 MR. ZECEVIC: Not the president of Serbia.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 MR. HANNIS:

4 Q. I note, General, that you were nodding your head affirmatively to

5 that; that was correct?

6 A. Yes, that is correct, and you understood me. I saw that.

7 Q. But I'm not clear then, if this is all about the MUP being

8 resubordinated or subordinated to the army, isn't the Ministry of the

9 Interior the most important and most pertinent and most likely civilian

10 government organ that needs to know about it?

11 A. I think that you're trying to switch the arguments here. Why

12 would the Supreme Command Staff, the chief of the Supreme Command Staff

13 inform the Ministry of the Interior that the supreme commander had ordered

14 him something? This is not how things are done. This is not the chain of

15 command within an army or in a state.

16 Q. But isn't that what this order directs him to do? Isn't

17 President Milosevic here telling General Ojdanic to send his request - and

18 I take it that would be a request for MUP units to be subordinated to the

19 army for combat operations - isn't that what he's supposed to do pursuant

20 to this document?

21 A. Absolutely not. Why would President Milosevic then make this

22 order and then try to persuade the chief of the Supreme Command to send an

23 order to the Ministry of the Interior or some other organ for its

24 resubordination? That's not how it was, that's not how it is. It's

25 absolutely crystal clear.

1 Q. Well, I must need new glasses. I don't see how that's clear.

2 Isn't that what item 3 says? It doesn't say send an order, it says send a

3 request. I agree with you about that distinction, but General Ojdanic

4 didn't send a request, did he?

5 A. General Ojdanic did send a certain number of requests to other

6 organs --

7 Q. But not to the --

8 A. -- But he decided that they should be sent, not to the MUP, he

9 didn't send any such requests to the MUP.

10 Q. Okay. Do you know -- do you know whether during the war

11 General Ojdanic had communications, either written or face-to-face, or

12 telephonic conversations with the minister of the interior,

13 Mr. Stojiljkovic?

14 A. No. First of all, I don't know whether he had any face-to-face

15 contacts with him, as far as I can remember no. As far as any telephonic

16 contacts, I can't tell you. I don't know whether they had any

17 correspondence, but if yes that was not through the Supreme Command Staff,

18 so I don't know. And I can give you my personal opinion, they did not,

19 they were not in contact, but somebody would know that. General Ojdanic

20 would boast to somebody or other that he had called the minister of the

21 interior and talked to him about something, he would report that to us at

22 the briefing. But that was not the case, and I also know that the

23 minister never called him.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Curcin, have I rightly understood that you

25 regard this order as having nothing to do with either the MUP of the

1 federal republic or the MUP of the Republic of Serbia?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not mention the federal

3 ministry of the interior in the context of paragraph 3, I only mentioned

4 the ministry of the republic in the context of the question that was asked

5 of me by Mr. Hannis. I know that several documents were sent to the

6 Federal Ministry of the Interior during the war and that we received

7 several such documents from them of different nature.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You said earlier that no document as far as you

11 know was sent to the Ministry of the Interior or the Federal Ministry of

12 the Interior regarding this issue.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I mentioned the federal MUP

14 regarding this issue, then that is the case. So in this regard, the Chief

15 of Staff did not get in contact with the MUP. He did on some other

16 issues.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You say that he did contact the federal defence

18 minister -- well, it's difficult to see what he's got to do with units and

19 organs of the interior. He issued it to the finance minister, the justice

20 minister. So what is all this about? What is this document about if

21 these are the people that General Ojdanic sends the request to?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember several such things at

23 the federal level, the federal ministries. For instance, there was this

24 constant problem regarding the procurement of certain things that needed

25 to be procured, lack of foreign exchange --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, let me interrupt you there. The wording of

2 this order - please let's not forget that - is: "Pursuant to Article 17

3 of the Law on Defence units and organs of the interior are to be

4 resubordinated to the Yugoslav Army."

5 Now, what is meant there by "units and organs of the interior"?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are the units of the interior

7 in the area of combat operations that carry out joint combat actions. So

8 we're not talking about public law and order, we're not talking about

9 fire-fighting units, and any other units of the MUP, but just those units

10 that engage in combat or may be used in combat together with the Army of

11 Yugoslavia or under its command in a certain area over a certain period of

12 time.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: So you give this quite a restricted meaning. Now,

14 tell me what units and organs fall within this description.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Units that may engage in combat --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Name them. Tell us what these are.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For instance, the police detachment,

18 police companies, special units, things like that that would be used to

19 carry out a specific task or mission. This is clearly stipulated in

20 Article 7 [as interpreted] of the Law on Defence, how and under which

21 circumstances this can be done, this resubordination can be done, the

22 resubordination of MUP to the Army of Yugoslavia, and the time-period is

23 specified.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

25 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry, the witness said Article 17, 53, 25.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 Now, look at paragraph 3 of this order, Mr. Curcin, which refers

3 to the chief of the Supreme Command Staff sending requests. What do you

4 understand to be meant by requests?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think this is rather broadly

6 termed, it could be the minister of defence, so that civilian defence and

7 civilian protection units can be resubordinated or something else in that

8 area, it could be prime minister --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Curcin, you've just told me that the document

10 doesn't deal with civilian defence. You've given a very restricted

11 interpretation of the police units to which this would refer. I've asked

12 you which units and organs and you've told me. Now, why should the

13 requests not relate to these units and organs?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was very precise. In paragraph 1

15 there is a reference to the units and organs of the interior, of internal

16 affairs, and you told me -- you asked me about paragraph 3, which

17 requests, what kind of requests could be addressed to civilian

18 authorities, and I gave as one example the minister of defence, the

19 minister of finance, the federal prime minister --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Curcin, just bear with me a moment. You

21 specified the units of the interior and you said, for instance, the police

22 detachment, police companies, special units, things like that that could

23 be used to carry out a specific task or mission and this is clearly

24 stipulated in Article 17 of the Law on Defence.

25 Now, is it not reasonable to assume that paragraph 3 which talks

1 about the requests is about requests relating to these units and organs?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there's no way I could

3 understand it this way.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Well, then that's a matter for us then

5 in due course.

6 Mr. Hannis.

7 MR. HANNIS:

8 Q. When you talked about the interior organs that could be used for

9 combat operations, isn't it a fact that in 1999 the only significant MUP

10 combat components were in the MUP of the Republic of Serbia rather than

11 the federal MUP? Federal MUP didn't have any significant number of combat

12 units or personnel, did it, not in 1999?

13 A. Yes, you're right.

14 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ivetic, when you were here last time, asked you

15 whether it was correct that not a single combat report ever reported of

16 problems undertaking any combat action arising out of any refusal of the

17 MUP to obey or undertake VJ orders for that operation, and you said: "Yes,

18 you're right."

19 But you've -- we've seen earlier in Exhibit P1459,

20 General Pavkovic mentioned problems with the MUP until allegedly engaging

21 in crimes against the civilian population, right?

22 A. I don't know what to answer because I've said I hadn't seen this

23 act.

24 Q. Okay. Based on what you said to Mr. Ivetic, would you agree with

25 me, then, there really wasn't any need for formal subordination of the MUP

1 if they were working so well in coordinating with the VJ that there was

2 never a single reported problem regarding combat operations carried out

3 jointly?

4 A. I could not agree with it completely.

5 Q. You mentioned in your statement paragraph 44 that you had known

6 General Ojdanic for a long time, you worked directly with him, and you

7 were in his immediate vicinity all the time. But you weren't with him

8 during times when he went to meet with the supreme commander,

9 President Milosevic, correct? You didn't attend any of their meetings,

10 their daily meetings, did you?

11 A. I did not attend any of his meetings with President Milosevic.

12 Q. And do you know whether or not he met with any other high-ranking

13 civilians in the government during the war time-period, in particular

14 President Milutinovic or Mr. Sainovic? Do you know?

15 A. I don't know.

16 Q. Do you know if General Ojdanic had any standard procedure in his

17 office about transcribing or having transcribed telephone conversations?

18 A. I'm sorry, I don't understand the word "transcribed."

19 Q. Well, for example, either someone sitting in during a conference

20 call and typing up what was said during the conversation or a

21 tape-recording made of the telephone call and then typed up by someone

22 else later. Do you know if he ever did that during the war?

23 A. No, I don't know.

24 Q. Do you know a civilian employee for the VJ, a typist called

25 Biljana Popovic?

1 A. Yes, I know.

2 Q. What office did she work in?

3 A. I don't remember which office, I know it was on the ground floor

4 of the General Staff, but she was not to the best of my recollection at

5 the command post, at least I didn't see her there. But she was not part

6 of his office, and when I went to see him I never saw her.

7 Q. How about an English-language interpreter named Zorica Stosic?

8 A. No, I don't know.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 A. That person. I know Vesna Jankovic, though, the woman Clark also

11 got to meet.

12 Q. All right. General, one last document I want to ask you a few

13 questions about is 3D695. I only have it in the Serbian language and I

14 have a hard copy, I guess I'll give that to you. I just want to ask you a

15 few questions about what this is and what you might know about how it was

16 made.

17 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, because I'm just going to ask

18 foundational questions based on what we discussed before, I think there's

19 no problem in being in open session.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's already been acknowledged by

21 Mr. Visnjic, and as far as I can tell nothing that's been said about this

22 today needed private session, although it was probably wise to do it that

23 way. So I propose that that material from earlier today be simply made

24 part of the public record. There's no aspect of it that was confidential.

25 MR. HANNIS: Perhaps we shouldn't show it on the e-court display,

1 just out of an abundance of caution.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, I think that would satisfy the -- any concern

3 that might be had by the producers of the document.

4 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Thank you.

5 Q. General, that's been described to me as the war diary for the

6 Supreme Command Staff during the war. Now you have had a chance to look

7 at it a little bit, would you -- am I right about that or --

8 A. Yes. It's volume 1, notebook 1, the first of four of the war

9 diary of the Supreme Command Staff.

10 Q. Okay. And from my limited ability to read Cyrillic, it appeared

11 that these were daily entries I think beginning on the 23rd of March

12 through sometime in late June 1999, and the daily entries were usually

13 signed by someone, various generals who we've seen here as members of the

14 Supreme Command Staff. I would direct you to I think what's page number

15 31 in your hard copy. There's an entry with what appears to be your name

16 at the bottom. Is that it on the left?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you recognise that?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. This was signed by the leader of the operations team on duty in

22 the operations room.

23 Q. I just want to ask you what this document is and how was it

24 maintained and how was it kept and where -- where would it have been since

25 the end of the war when it was finalised?

1 A. I can answer the first part of the question. It was kept in

2 keeping with the instructions for the work of commands and staffs

3 stipulating exactly what is entered into a war diary. I designated two

4 officers at the colonel level who made entries based on requests and

5 orders, and what is entered here are all the major orders, developments,

6 and everything that was relevant to the Supreme Command Staff and the Army

7 of Yugoslavia.

8 Q. And how was it -- how was it decided who made the entry for a

9 particular day? Because I see several different names, at least six or

10 seven different names. Was it just a rotating duty among you all?

11 A. You are talking about the signing. I'm talking about both the

12 signing and about making entries, the writing. There were only two

13 colonels who made entries, they were from the first administration and I

14 designated them. The signatures were put by leaders of the operations

15 team on duty that took turns every five or six days.

16 Q. Can you tell us the names of the two colonels who made those

17 entries, if you remember?

18 A. Navy Captain Karlicic, and I believe Colonel Zoran Srbulovic

19 because there were another two colonels whom I designated for other work.

20 I believe these were in charge of the war diary, Navy Captain Karlicic,

21 therefore, and Colonel Zoran Srbulovic, who was in charge of the 2nd Army,

22 who was a clerk for the 3rd Army, that is. And as far as I remember,

23 Colonel Paskas and Colonel Mucibabic were in charge of evening briefings,

24 on making notes for evening briefings.

25 Q. I think we've heard evidence from Mr. Mucibabic about that. Thank

1 you. I don't have any more questions.

2 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

4 Mr. Ackerman.

5 MR. ACKERMAN: A couple of matters came up in the cross that were

6 not totally anticipated that I think I can shed some light on and be

7 helpful to the Chamber.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, that's a novel approach.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I thought I would try a different way, Your

10 Honour.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Tell me what these are.

12 MR. ACKERMAN: One has to do with the 17th April suggestions

13 document of General Pavkovic that was talked about at length; the other

14 has to do with this issue of resubordination that was also talked about at

15 length, both of which have relevance to my client and that's why I want to

16 go into them. There's a couple of documents that I can deal with that I

17 think will shed some light.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Any problem with that, Mr. Hannis?

19 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: We would find it helpful to hear more on both these

21 subjects, so please continue, Mr. Ackerman.

22 Further cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:

23 Q. General, we've noticed of course as we looked at these various

24 orders and documents we look at, frequently you see at the beginning of

25 that document a reference to some other document that it is referred to an

1 order from the Supreme Command or an order from the 3rd Army or it's

2 referring to something. So one of the things I want to do with you is

3 connected a few documents here so that maybe we can understand them just a

4 little bit better. I'd like you first to take a look at 4D220, and that

5 will come up on your screen just a moment. You've been looking today at

6 the order by President Milosevic on resubordination of the MUP. This is

7 an order on the same day signed by General Ojdanic, apparently an effort

8 to implement the order of President Milosevic. Would you agree with that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In fact, it says that right in the first paragraph. It

11 says: "Pursuant to the order of the President of the FRY." And the first

12 thing I want you to notice is where it was sent to, to the commands of the

13 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army and the navy and to the office. What is the

14 office?

15 A. It was the office of the chief of Supreme Command Staff. One copy

16 was delivered to him.

17 Q. All right. And then the other thing I want us to just make a note

18 of, there's a number on this document up at the top, it's 01/2024-1. And

19 as we remember that number, let's go now to 4D420. Now, I think you'll

20 recall that the orders of Milosevic and Ojdanic on MUP resubordination

21 were dated the 18th of April. You're looking now at a document that is

22 dated the 20th of April, and this is a document from General Pavkovic.

23 And what I'm interested in is paragraph 3 of that document right now.

24 And apparently what General Pavkovic says there, first of all, you

25 notice he refers to the Ojdanic document we just looked at 01/2024-1 dated

1 18 April. What General Pavkovic says, if you're really serious about this

2 resubordination business, you should forward this to the minister of the

3 interior, I assume it is, of the Republic of Serbia so that he can

4 undertake the measures within his competence and transmit the order to

5 the, probably, appropriate organs, although the translation is not clear

6 in that regard. Is that pretty much what that says?

7 A. I still haven't got to that part where it says you seriously mean,

8 are you going to refer me to a specific paragraph so we can --

9 Q. Paragraph 3 is what I'm -- I asked you to look at paragraph 3.

10 Are you able to read it?

11 A. Yes, I see it.

12 Q. And what is it that General Pavkovic is suggesting there? He's

13 suggesting that this resubordination needs to be forwarded to some other

14 people, isn't he?

15 A. That's what's written here.

16 Q. The translation is not totally clear, and I don't know if we can

17 get it clear. It says that kindly forward it to the minister, something,

18 of the Republic of Serbia. Can you read it? Which minister does he

19 suggest it be forwarded to?

20 A. Unfortunately, one cannot make out the whole word in my copy, not

21 even the word minister is quite clear, let alone the rest.

22 Q. It looks like it says "i ministru vr" or something like that?

23 MR. ACKERMAN: We just lost the page. If we can make that one

24 bigger that may help.

25 Q. It looks like there's a VR or something like that there. Do you

1 have any idea what that means?

2 A. Unfortunately, not.

3 Q. I take it you can't read it? Some people say it's VP some people

4 say it's RP do any of these make any sense to you?

5 A. No, it doesn't mean anything; if you can help me, I'll be glad.

6 Q. I'm told that UP would stand for internal affairs.

7 A. This is V unlike the first letter after the digit 3 in paragraph

8 3, it's clear that this one is V, and there is a clear difference between

9 the two letters. The U in the -- at the beginning of the first line and

10 the V at the beginning of the fourth line. And the second letter is

11 really illegible.

12 Q. Well, does it make sense to you that what General Pavkovic would

13 be saying here if he's talking about resubordination of units and organs

14 of the Ministry of the Interior, that he would suggest that that ought to

15 be sent to the minister of the interior?

16 A. I have no comment.

17 Q. All right. Let's go on to -- let's go to the first page of this

18 document now. Now, you'll recall that meeting where General Ojdanic

19 suggested that you look into the telegram, that's 3D589, the briefing,

20 paragraph 6, where he suggests that you look into the telegram and you

21 said that was probably the telegram of the 17th of April that you had

22 testified so much about. Did you do that? Did you look into that to find

23 out what had happened with that telegram to see when it was received, when

24 it was sent, things of that nature?

25 A. Do you mean the circumstances that were mentioned by Mr. Hannis in

1 his question, but he just asked me briefly about the beginning and he

2 didn't go on into it any further. Because it's only in that context that

3 I discussed it, when Mr. Hannis mentioned tasks or assignments from the

4 17th of April.

5 Q. Well, Mr. Hannis --

6 THE INTERPRETER: 18th of April, interpreter's correction.

7 MR. ACKERMAN:

8 Q. Yes, he showed you that meeting from the 18th where one of the

9 tasks was for you to find out when that was sent and when it was received.

10 My question is: Did you do that? Did you carry out that task? Did you

11 find out when that telegram was sent and when it was received?

12 A. I must say I tried, I did my very best. I established clearly

13 that it was sent immediately, it was sent on time, and the time is

14 indicated, the time of transmission is indicated. But unfortunately I

15 couldn't accomplish my task fully and report to the chief of the Supreme

16 Command Staff as to when it was delivered because it hasn't -- it hadn't

17 been delivered by that morning. The commander was not at the command post

18 and the telegram just wandered from one place to another among the places

19 where he could be, and he ended up not being delivered by the time that

20 was indicated as commencement of attack. Later on --

21 Q. [Previous translation continues]...

22 A. -- The liaison officer tried to find out.

23 Q. I have a hard copy of this document, 4D420, that will help you.

24 We're going to have to look at some of the language of it here in a

25 minute. Do you remember the number of that 17 April document, the

1 telegram from General Ojdanic with the suggestions as being 01/1965-1, do

2 you remember that being the designation of that document? We can look at

3 it if you don't remember it.

4 A. No, I don't remember it. I don't remember such things.

5 Q. Let's look very quickly at that document then just so we all know

6 that, it's P1487, and then we'll have to bring the other one right back.

7 Okay. There it is, and you see the number is 01/1965-1, right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Now we'll go back to 4D420 again. And now I'll direct your

10 attention to paragraph 2. Now, there's a mystery here which we probably

11 won't solve, but paragraph 2 says: "With respect to the delivery of the

12 telegram strictly confidential number 01/1965-1," which we just

13 saw, "dated 14 April 1999," that is the wrong date, isn't it? One of them

14 is wrong. Either the first one should have been 14 April or this one

15 should have said 17 April, but it does say "suggestions."

16 And then he says: "I report as follows. It arrived at 0025 hours

17 on the 18th of April at Prolom Banja, forwarded at 105 to Prekovce village

18 which is 36 kilometres from Pristina, and finally delivered to the

19 commander of the 3rd Army at 0715 hours on the 19th of April, right?

20 A. Yes, that's what's written.

21 Q. And then the next paragraph talks about the problems with delivery

22 and why it was not possible to get to him immediately because he was

23 moving and communications weren't as perfect as they might have been,

24 right?

25 A. That's what's written here. I don't know if it's right, though.

1 Q. Okay. Now we can go back to paragraph 1 and learn something, I

2 think, about the genesis of this whole proposition. General Pavkovic

3 points out in that paragraph that this whole operation was done at the

4 command of the supreme commander, who on the 12th of April ordered that

5 within the next seven days this operation should be carried out by the JSO

6 and the SAJ of the MUP and that units of the Yugoslav Army were to be

7 engaged basically in a supporting role. He sets that out to explain why

8 he couldn't follow the suggestions of General Ojdanic because it was a MUP

9 operation, planned and organized by MUP and the MUP command, and that the

10 VJ units were there just to carry out some blocking arrangements. You see

11 that in paragraph 1, don't you?

12 A. I see that, but that quite simply is not correct because it's on

13 the 19th of April that he got the telegram and this was supposed to happen

14 on the 18th of April. In paragraph 2, the last bit says that it was

15 delivered at 7.15 on the 19th of April.

16 Q. That's right, he says he didn't get it until after the operation

17 had been carried out, but that it was a MUP operation and he couldn't have

18 done anything about it anyhow, right?

19 A. I don't know. I didn't attend that meeting or that part of the

20 meeting on the 12th of April, 1999.

21 Q. If you go back to paragraph 3 appeared look at the second

22 paragraph in paragraph 3, General Pavkovic says: "It was not possible to

23 have any useful influence on halting Operation Rugovo on this basis."

24 Correct?

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter cannot hear the witness.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: The answer wasn't picked up by the interpreter.

2 Can you answer again, please.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreter please speak into the

4 microphone.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said "correct," although I did not

6 manage to read paragraph 3 again.

7 MR. ACKERMAN:

8 Q. Please take time to read as much as you want because my next

9 question kind of requires that you know the document. I suggest to you

10 that there's nothing in this document talking about any kind of a Joint

11 Command or that this was any kind of a Joint Command operation, is there?

12 A. I never mentioned the words "Joint Command" in relation to this

13 document.

14 Q. And the words aren't in it, are they?

15 A. At first glance, as I skim through the document, I do not

16 see "Joint Command" mentioned at all.

17 Q. In fact, the logical conclusion from reading paragraph 1 is that

18 this was primarily a MUP operation for which the VJ had a very minor

19 supporting role, to prevent a spill over of forces into the territory of

20 Kosovo and Metohija, the 2nd Army was involved in closing off axes leading

21 to the Republic of Montenegro, correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. Thank you.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I'm not sure that

1 I can phrase this any better than Mr. Ackerman already did, so I am going

2 to repeat his words. I think that a question comes from the

3 cross-examination that did not appear in the direct examination, and it

4 has to do with the armed non-Siptar population. I have one question for

5 General Curcin in relation to that, or rather, I am seeking clarification

6 and it is important as far as my client is concerned and for our defence

7 case in general.

8 MR. HANNIS: No objection.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

10 Carry on, please, Mr. Bakrac.

11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all, before I

12 put my question I would like to display on e-court P1878.

13 Further cross-examination by Mr. Bakrac:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Curcin, or rather, General, I beg your

15 pardon. You have already looked at paragraph 2 and commented on it where

16 this unarmed Siptar population is referred to. I would like to ask you

17 when we see the document in Serbian, we would like to have paragraph 5

18 displayed, I think it's page 3, and it is entitled "tasks." We have it in

19 English. Could we please see it in Serbian as well, a page before that.

20 Tasks of units, do you see that?

21 A. Yes, 5.1.

22 Q. Yes. In these tasks do you see anywhere that a specific order is

23 being issued to a unit or structure or component of the unarmed Siptar

24 population?

25 A. Regrettably, I just see 5.1. I do not see what follows.

1 Q. You've seen 5.1.

2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have the second

3 page displayed.

4 [Defence counsel confer]

5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] So we are talking about the unarmed

6 Siptar population -- we are talking about the armed Siptar population, I

7 am sorry, I seem to be changing this.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I think we're talking about the armed non-Siptar

9 population.

10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] My mistake, Your Honour. I seem to

11 have turned it the other way around.

12 Q. Have you had a look at all of paragraph 5?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Before you we heard testimony here that the civil defence amounted

15 to 9.000. We'll see later on during the defence case perhaps there was

16 even more. General Farkas testified about this, when he was in the

17 Ministry of Defence. In this order is there a concrete task issued to any

18 part of a unit, any unit, any part of this armed non-Siptar population and

19 is there a specific determination as to what communication, what facility,

20 and what task they have, what they should do?

21 A. No, this, quite simply, does not exist in this task issued to

22 concrete units.

23 Q. So we can say, we can agree, that this is just something that has

24 nothing to do with the specific tasks issued to a specific unit?

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that question. That's a matter for

1 the Tribunal to determine in due course by analysing all the evidence.

2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. That would

3 be it. I have no further questions.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, anything arising out of any of that

5 further cross?

6 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, thank you.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

8 Mr. Visnjic.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could the witness

10 please be shown 3D670.

11 Re-examination by Mr. Visnjic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] However, before that, General, may I ask you the

13 following. Can you tell me who are the subjects of defence according to

14 the Law on Defence, if you can recall that readily? Or let's have a look.

15 You cannot remember?

16 A. I really hope you could help me because the laws have been

17 changed. I have been in retirement for quite a while.

18 Q. All right. Let's not deal with it at such length.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Let's see 3D -- no, sorry, P985,

20 that is the Law on Defence, Article 2. Articles 1 and 2.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you better repeat the question,

22 Mr. Visnjic.

23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

24 Q. General, General, can you tell us who, according to the Law on

25 Defence, are the subjects of defence? The law is from 1994.

1 A. On the basis of Article 2 of the Law on Defence, it is clear that

2 in addition to the Army of Yugoslavia, the subjects of defence are

3 citizens, federal organs and organizations, local self government, and

4 companies whose activity, or rather, companies that are engaged in certain

5 activity, and other legal entities here and after referred to as citizens,

6 state organs, companies, and other legal entities. They and the Army of

7 Yugoslavia shall exercise their rights and responsibilities in the defence

8 of the country in the times of peace and war in accordance with the law

9 and other federal regulations.

10 Q. Thank you, General.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Now could we have a look at Article

12 17 of the Law on Defence, that is the following page.

13 Q. Tell me then, Article 17 of the Law on Defence, in addition to the

14 units and organs of internal affairs, does it refer to any other organs?

15 A. No. It is clearly stated in this paragraph that this only

16 pertains to organs of the interior, units and organs of the interior, of

17 internal affairs.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at 3D670,

20 please.

21 Q. Now, General, when you read paragraph 3 of this order, can you

22 tell me whether you can link this up with Article 17 of the Law on

23 Defence?

24 A. No, not directly. Actually, what is written here is that the

25 chief of the staff will send his request to the civilian government organs

1 and other defence bodies.

2 Q. And if I'm right, during your examination by Mr. Hannis and the

3 questions put to you by Judge Bonomy, your evidence was that the Chief of

4 General Staff indeed did address requests to other subjects of defence,

5 irrespective of Article 17?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Now could the witness please be

9 shown 3D694.

10 Your Honour, before I move on to that, again I have a document

11 that is not on my list. My -- this submitted through the bar table, but

12 perhaps I should deal with this in writing not to make it too extensive at

13 this point in time, perhaps I should deal with it in writing so it doesn't

14 lead to further re-examination.

15 So could 3D694 be shown to the witness now, please.

16 Q. General, are you aware of that document?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And could you tell us briefly what this document is about?

19 A. After a tour and control towards the end of May, between the 23rd

20 and 26th in the Pristina Corps of the 3rd Army, voluminous notes were made

21 and the late General Ljubisa Velickovic as head of that team compiled this

22 document and submitted it to the chief of the Supreme Command Staff for

23 his signature, and he sent it to the commander of the 3rd Army. It

24 briefly states that a team of the Supreme Command Staff tour the command

25 and several units and establish many positive things, but also noted quite

1 a few problems.

2 Q. Let us not be too extensive. General, is one of the problems

3 referred to in this report the fact that the MUP units were not

4 resubordinated to the Army of Yugoslavia?

5 A. No.

6 [Defence counsel confer]

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions, Your

8 Honour. That would be all.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, what was the other document you were

10 contemplating?

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] 3D1087.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, the suggestion made was that

13 Mr. Visnjic would deal with this in writing to avoid further examination.

14 If this document is going to be presented and then lead to questions on

15 your part, we should deal with it today.

16 MR. HANNIS: I agree, Your Honour. It's on his list on his motion

17 filed today to add exhibits, and I don't know off the top of my head what

18 it is.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: So we just leave it then and deal with it through

20 the written motion?

21 MR. HANNIS: I'm agreeable either way.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We'll leave it as it is. Thank you.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE BONOMY: The weather for your unexpected weekend in The

25 Hague was not too bad, Mr. Curcin. We're sorry, obviously, that you had

1 to delay your return, but that now completes your evidence. We're

2 grateful to you for coming to give evidence, and you may now leave the

3 courtroom. Thank you.

4 [The witness withdrew]

5 JUDGE BONOMY: We shall break now, and I assume we'll resume with

6 Mr. Radinovic at 6.00. Yeah.

7 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 6.01 p.m.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, your next witness.

10 MR. STAMP: May I with your leave before Mr. Visnjic --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, Mr. Stamp.

12 MR. STAMP: -- Raise a preliminary issue in respect to this

13 witness. We had filed an objection to the report and part of the

14 objection was that we were receiving or had not received certain sources

15 that were referred to in the footnotes. Since then, starting from, I

16 think, Friday of last week and continuing until yesterday, we have begun

17 receiving not all but many of these sources, many of them in -- not

18 translated into English. That puts us in a serious difficulty in trying

19 to confirm the accuracy of these citations, and in the circumstances we

20 may be -- we may need, and it seems as if at this point we do need to ask

21 the Court, firstly, if the cross-examination could be postponed for a day.

22 And it is possible, although I don't expect so and I hope not, that we may

23 have to apply for more time.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you give us an example of the sort of problem

25 that you have?

1 MR. STAMP: In respect to no documents provided, at footnote 40,

2 footnote 54, footnote 62, and it goes on and on --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Just say what was the one you referred to?

4 MR. STAMP: Footnote 40.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: 40. And the second one?

6 MR. STAMP: 54.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is that still part of the report?

8 MR. STAMP: Which section? Are you referring to 40 or 52?

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Footnote 54, is that section of the report still

10 included?

11 MR. STAMP: I -- yes, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yeah, it is.

13 Well, 54, you did say 54?

14 MR. STAMP: Yes, 54.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: You have all the collegium minutes that are

16 relevant for this case. What was the third one?

17 MR. STAMP: 54 is a general reference to collegium minutes. That

18 one is the --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed. What's the next one?

20 MR. STAMP: 62.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: 62.

22 It must be a certain specific elements of that that you're talking

23 about; is that right?

24 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour. For example, the 21st of March,

25 1999, presumably is a document, and I think there are two or three others

1 in this footnote.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: So are you saying that each of these footnotes

3 relates to documents that you've asked for and have not received?

4 MR. STAMP: We submitted that the factual parts of the report, the

5 parts that he says he bases his views on should be sourced and -- as we

6 did with the experts that we submitted. And in fairness to the Defence,

7 they sought to do so, but they have not submitted all. And on top of that

8 some that have been submitted are in B/C/S, although we are trying with

9 language assistants to see if we could look over those.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You are right, of course, Mr. Stamp that if

11 something that the expert says depends on a matter of fact, then the fact

12 has to be proved. And if Mr. Visnjic has chosen not to prove it, you

13 might find that that's to your advantage.

14 MR. STAMP: Indeed, Your Honour. I --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: However, what we shall do at this stage at least is

16 proceed to hear the examination-in-chief of Mr. Radinovic, and you can let

17 us know when it comes your turn to cross-examine what the state of play

18 is, and we would expect to be told specifically what is the material that

19 you consider ought to be in your hands and translated at that stage.

20 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Should I answer or should I proceed

23 with the witness?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: You should tell us his full name.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] His full name is Radovan Radinovic.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 [The witness entered court]

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this

4 examination-in-chief will be relatively brief.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good evening, Mr. Radinovic.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good evening.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

8 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to

9 you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

11 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

13 You'll now be asked, I gather, a limited number of questions by

14 Mr. Visnjic on behalf of Mr. Ojdanic.

15 Mr. Visnjic.

16 WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examination by Mr. Visnjic:

19 Q. [Interpretation] Good evening, General.

20 A. Good evening.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before I start with the

22 questions for General Radinovic, I would like to say that his military

23 expert report was admitted into evidence as 3D1116, that his CV is in

24 e-court as 3D1069, both the documents are in e-court.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, they are not admitted into evidence until you

1 ask him to tell us something about them and their accuracy, and then no

2 doubt that hurdle will be overcome.

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Is it correct that in July 2007 you wrote a report with the

5 title: "Military expertise, analysis of the control competence of

6 General Dragoljub Ojdanic in the war in Kosovo and Metohija in 1988

7 [as interpreted] /1999"?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Have you reviewed that report after that and is it the case that

10 you found certain errors in it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Have you specified those errors in a document written yesterday?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is it the case that most of these errors relate to more specific

15 indications that are to be found in footnotes?

16 A. Yes, there are other errors as well, but most of them are as you.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document

18 headed: "Corrigendum to the report" was introduced into e-court under

19 number 3D1123. In order not to repeat every correction into the record, I

20 believe this way of proceeding would be more useful. I also suggest that

21 in addition -- in addition to the report, with your leave of course, this

22 corrigendum be admitted into evidence.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Just give us a moment to look at it --

24 MR. VISNJIC: Yes, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: -- Mr. Visnjic.

1 Should we be substituting the existing footnote with these ones?

2 Is that how it operates?

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Essentially, yes, Your Honours.

4 Because the greatest part of these corrections are in fact a better

5 specification of documents or more precise description of things contained

6 already in previous documents. And some of them are based on similar

7 documents already existing in e-court. We wanted to minimise the number

8 of documents and use primarily those that are already in e-court.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have any objection, Mr. Stamp, to us simply

10 taking the corrigendum as read and making the appropriate substitutions of

11 footnotes in the report?

12 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated]

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can proceed on the basis you've

15 indicated, Mr. Visnjic.

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I just have

17 one addition to make concerning footnote 206. It's a document that

18 Mr. Ackerman used in the courtroom half an hour ago. I did not have the

19 reference then, but I can say now that the document in footnote 206 is

20 document 4D420 in e-court.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Your Honours, the witness has confirmed to me that the military

24 expert report before you is his report, and I have no questions to ask of

25 him. All that the Defence wanted to hear from the witness is stated in

1 the report; therefore, I suggest that his report, his CV, and the

2 corrigendum be admitted into evidence as Defence exhibits for the accused

3 Ojdanic.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

5 Mr. Radinovic, since we concentrated there on the errors rather

6 than the accuracies in this report, can you confirm that subject to the

7 corrigendum or the corrigenda listed, that this is an accurate report of

8 your findings?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

11 Now, are there Defence counsel who intend to cross-examine the

12 witness? None -- oh, there are.

13 Mr. Ivetic.

14 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: You can proceed this afternoon, can you?

16 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think I mentioned in communication

17 with the Chamber that I might have some questions but I wouldn't be ready

18 until tomorrow.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, but at the moment do you know whether you're

20 likely to cross-examine or not?

21 MR. ACKERMAN: Right now I know that I have one question, but by

22 tomorrow I may have 74, who knows.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: And I assume you will have no objection to

24 Mr. Ivetic preceding you.

25 Mr. Ivetic, are you happy about that, since if there's any

1 prejudice arises you know that you'll be given an opportunity to rectify

2 it.

3 MR. IVETIC: I understand that. I was just hoping to be able to

4 shorten some of my questions since I have quite a few.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Give us the short version.

6 MR. IVETIC: I'll try and do it on the go.

7 Can I begin?

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

9 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

10 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

11 Q. General Radinovic, as you know my name is Dan Ivetic and I

12 represent Sreten Lukic. I have a couple of areas that I would like to

13 explore with you relating to items contained in your report, the military

14 expert report that you have just verified with Mr. Visnjic. The first

15 area that I would like to question you on relates to your opinions

16 relating to 1998 activities in Kosovo and Metohija, specifically paragraph

17 90 of your report you state that with respect to anti-terrorist actions

18 undertaken in 1998:

19 "Striving to discharge the mission while avoiding NATO's military

20 engagement, the Serbian and Yugoslav leadership opted for combining police

21 and military action without declaring a state of war or emergency. Such a

22 political decision predetermined that the crucial and leading role of the

23 operation should be played by the police forces and the police

24 leadership."

25 This is your opinion or conclusion from viewing events in 1998 as

1 an outsider with respect to the anti-terrorist actions; is that correct?

2 A. I was not a complete outsider. I was a citizen of that state who

3 followed, to the extent possible, all those events, but I was not an

4 insider either.

5 Q. Just to clarify, you were not among the persons making the

6 decisions about the use of forces in the anti-terrorist actions and you

7 were not involved in the planning of any of the anti-terrorist actions; is

8 that correct?

9 A. You're right.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, for the moment I would like to focus on the role

11 of the police, if we may. Is it your opinion that the use of the MUP of

12 Serbia in anti-terrorist actions in 1998 was essentially a political

13 decision?

14 A. Well, if that's the way I understood your conclusion, then you

15 didn't quite understand. Engagement of defence forces is certainly a

16 political decision because appropriate, competent state authorities make

17 the decision to engage them, that's one. Second, the police forces, that

18 is, security forces, also have to respond to challenges on the spot; that

19 means that whenever there occurred activities of the terrorist forces, the

20 forces of the Ministry of the Interior responded to such actions so that

21 by engaging defence forces in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998 a political

22 decision was made, that political decision was necessary. And all those

23 forces had the only task to provide defence and security for the state

24 territory.

25 Q. You say that those forces had the only task to provide defence and

1 security for the state territory. I'd like to delve into that in some

2 detail. First of all, with respect to the MUP Serbia, based upon your

3 review, research, and preparation of this report, would you agree with me

4 that they are duty-bound not only to protect the territory but to protect,

5 uphold, and enforce the laws of Serbia and Yugoslavia?

6 A. Of course I would agree.

7 Q. And specifically with respect to terrorism, I'm sure you're aware

8 that the act of terrorism is considered a commission of a criminal act by

9 the relevant laws, such as the [B/C/S spoken]. In English that's the

10 criminal code of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 15, section

11 125.

12 A. Is that a question?

13 Q. [Interpretation] Yes, it is a question, General.

14 A. I'm inclined to take your word for it, but I don't have the law

15 before me.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please slow down and not overlap.

17 MR. IVETIC:

18 Q. [In English] Would you then --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you or do you not know whether an act of

20 terrorism is a criminal offence in Yugoslavia or was in 1998?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know it is a criminal offence. I

22 was just not sure which article of the criminal code covers it.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 Mr. Visnjic.

25 MR. IVETIC: I hope you mean myself, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, Mr. Ivetic. Sorry.

2 MR. IVETIC:

3 Q. General, you would then agree with me that you would have to amend

4 your answer to the previous questions that said that they were only

5 duty-bound to protect the territory to include the fact that the MUP of

6 Serbia was duty-bound by the obligations presented by the law to prosecute

7 and to prevent terrorism by means available to it, would you not?

8 A. I don't know how you understood that, but I would not amend my

9 finding for the simple reason that I looked through the prism and focused

10 on anti-terrorist combat and struggle, not the numerous tasks that the

11 security forces had to perform by virtue of their very role. Of course

12 that is implied, that's why I didn't deal with it specifically, but that

13 formed the majority of tasks that every employee of the MUP had to

14 perform.

15 Q. Well, sir, I'm focusing on the act of terrorism, which we've

16 established was against the law, and I'd like to read for you a part of a

17 document that as an expert in these matters I'm sure you have some

18 familiarity with, Article 6 on the Law on Amending and supplementing the

19 law on ministries. [Interpretation] Official Gazette of the Republic of

20 Serbia, issue 44/91. [In English] -- 44/91, particularly section 3 of

21 that act reads as for the duties of the MUP, this will be in B/C/S:

22 [Interpretation] "Preventing and detecting criminal offences, apprehending

23 perpetrators, and taking them into custody of the competent authorities."

24 [In English] Would you agree with me that these duties of the MUP

25 relate to every criminal act including terrorism and that the role of

1 anti-terrorist activities is, in fact, dictated by the law.

2 A. The criminal offence of terrorism is certainly covered by what you

3 said. It's not only about apprehension, though, because terrorists can

4 usually not be apprehended because they offer armed resistance. They

5 impose armed combat with the intention of inflicting losses. It's very

6 difficult to apprehend them. In most cases, they are not apprehended

7 because they can't be. They are neutralised by armed combat, they are

8 broken up, and destroyed. Of course it would have been much better and

9 more efficient if they could be apprehended and brought to trial like the

10 perpetrators of other criminal offences; however, usually it doesn't

11 happen.

12 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to focus on the second part of your

13 proposition in paragraph 90 of your report where you say that such a

14 political decision predetermined that the crucial and leading role in that

15 operation should be played by the police forces and police leadership.

16 Now, in explaining the basis for your opinion in paragraph 91 you cite to

17 the conclusions of the 9 June 1998 meeting of the Supreme Defence Council.

18 Now, that is Exhibit P1574 which I would like to have up on the screen for

19 purposes of allowing you to review the same. And I would ask you, sir:

20 Am I correct that this document does not, in fact, have the conclusion

21 that you state in paragraph 90, but in fact that this is a -- this is your

22 interpretation of what is actually contained in P1574?

23 A. I didn't make that conclusion only on the basis of this, of this

24 document of the Supreme Defence Council. That conclusion of the Supreme

25 Defence Council was in fact the basis for preparing the activities of

1 defence forces. Such a conclusion on the decision not to introduce a

2 state of emergency but do something else is based on many other insights

3 from that time, the documents, and the developments that followed.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, is that document also 4D138?

5 MR. IVETIC: It may very well be, Your Honour. I don't have it

6 noted as such, but --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: We're on paragraph 91, are we?

8 MR. IVETIC: That's a different document that I'm about to get to,

9 Your Honour.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, right, sorry.

11 MR. IVETIC:

12 Q. Indeed, General --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

14 MR. IVETIC:

15 Q. -- At paragraph 91 you also cite to the Grom directive of

16 General Perisic issued in 1998 as being another source for your conclusion

17 on this. Would you agree with me then that General Perisic is an

18 excellent source for describing the role of the various forces involved in

19 anti-terrorist actions in 1998, as someone who actually participated in

20 planning the same?

21 A. I don't understand your question. If you're asking me whether

22 General Perisic is the best person to talk to in terms of planning the

23 role of the army, I agree on that; but as for other forces and other parts

24 of the system, there were other organs that were in control.

25 Q. Well, sir, in support of your assertion in paragraph 90, you only

1 cite to the conclusions of the 5th Session of the VSO and you talk about

2 the directive for engagement of the VJ issued by General Perisic. I take

3 it from that then you consider General Perisic as being a source for your

4 conclusion that the police had a leading role in the operations of the

5 anti-terrorist actions?

6 MR. STAMP: Excuse me, this is not an objection. I'm just trying

7 to clarify where the document being referred to has been cited in

8 paragraph 90 is in fact cited in paragraph 90.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it doesn't seem to be cited in paragraph 90

10 at all.

11 MR. STAMP: I can't find it.

12 MR. IVETIC: In 90 it's not. In 91 it's the Chief of the General

13 Staff, of the Vojska Jugoslavije, General Perisic, pursuant to the

14 conclusions of the fifth session of the VSO of 9 June, 1998, so he's

15 basing in part his conclusion on the Perisic directive which is based on

16 the VSO sessions so--

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And the conclusion is P1574, is it?

18 MR. IVETIC: That's the minutes of the meeting in question,

19 correct.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 MR. IVETIC: So that's how we get to -- from point A to point B.

22 Q. The -- let me just see if the answer's been given.

23 Sir, for the sake of clarity I will repeat the question that I had

24 at page 87, line 10. In support of your assertion in paragraph 90, you

25 only cite to the conclusions of the 5th Session of the VSO and you talk

1 about the directive of the engagement of the VJ issued by General Perisic.

2 I take it from that that you consider General Perisic as being a source

3 for your conclusion that the police had a leading role in the operations

4 of the anti-terrorist actions?

5 A. No. I quoted General Perisic because in my report on -- focused

6 on the role of the army and dealing with that. It goes without saying, if

7 you look at the title of my report, that it pertains to the analysis of

8 the control competence of General Ojdanic. And therefore, I focused on

9 the army and the engagement of the army. As for the engagement of the

10 army, I based that on the conclusions of the session of the Supreme

11 Defence Council and its operational -- operation on General Perisic's

12 decision on the 28th of July, 1998, giving the army the mandate to do that

13 in line with that directive. So it's only that and it doesn't deal with

14 other forces. I dealt with other forces only because there was something

15 in common between that and what General Ojdanic did, the system of command

16 of the army. As these are systems that exist along parallel lines, of

17 course this did affect the functioning of the military. However, I did

18 not go into detail as far as the MUP was concerned or civil protection or

19 civil defence, except to the extent to which I concluded that they

20 constitute a general context for the functioning of the army and

21 General Ojdanic at the head of the army.

22 Q. Can we conclude then, sir, that during your research and

23 preparation for your expert testimony you did not, in fact, come across

24 any order, either written or oral, from either the Serbian or Yugoslav

25 leadership ordering the MUP of Serbia to carry the lead role and command

1 anti-terrorist actions?

2 A. No, I did not come across such an order, but it goes without

3 saying from the role of the MUP in terms of providing security in the

4 state, citizens, property, life in general, et cetera.

5 Q. Now, if we can shift back to the VJ since that's the direction we

6 seem to be going in, with respect to paragraph 90 you state that: "The

7 army focused on securing the state border in-depth and military facilities

8 of special importance and it provided logistic and fire support and

9 assistance to the police forces which were the vehicle of anti-terrorist

10 operations."

11 Now, when you say that the VJ provided logistic and fire support

12 for the police forces, can you be a bit more specific about what you mean,

13 particularly with respect to fire support?

14 A. It is a generally understood thing. At the moment when the police

15 forces are engaged in a blockade and destruction of terrorist strongholds,

16 according to the law and in keeping with the coordination that existed on

17 the ground the army is engaged to the extent to which it is asked to be

18 engaged and to the extent to which it was possible under the

19 circumstances.

20 Q. Okay. Now, I would like to take a moment to look at Exhibit P1427

21 so that we can flush out the operations of these anti-terrorist actions a

22 little bit more. Hopefully when this document comes up you will see that

23 it is an "odluka." The B/C/S is up. I'm just waiting for the English,

24 but I think I can proceed. First of all, sir, I presume that you--.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: For the benefit of those trying to follow the

1 transcript, what is an "odluka"?

2 MR. IVETIC: I was going to ask the --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. No, ask the witness then.

4 MR. IVETIC:

5 Q. First of all, sir, could you describe the significance of an

6 "odluka" in layman's terms? Is it a form of a decision?

7 A. "Odluka", decision, in military terms, in military terminology is

8 used in two senses. It can be a document, so it can be used as a

9 document, and it can also be used as one of the points of an order of a

10 commander for a particular action. And it is usually point 4, paragraph

11 4, of an order where he gives the corps of what he decided upon.

12 So "odluka," decision, can be the fourth paragraph in the order of every

13 commander.

14 Q. I apologise. I'm just waiting for the transcript to catch up with

15 us. Now, looking at this specific document, sir, and by all means, if you

16 need to page through it we can have additional pages of the document shown

17 to you. But would you agree with me that based upon the information

18 presented in this decision or "odluka" the individual who drew up this

19 document decided on the MUP and VJ being utilised in a joint action in

20 August of 1998?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And with respect to section 1 of this document, I would ask you

23 doesn't in fact the text make clear that this is a joint action, not one

24 being led by the MUP?

25 A. Joint action.

1 Q. Thank you. Now, if we can move to section 2 which should be on

2 the first page of both the B/C/S and the English, and also sections 2. --

3 Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 which should still be on that same page relating

4 to fire support specifically. First of all, 2.1 speaks of supporting the

5 attack as follows, and this is in B/C/S: [Interpretation] "BG-52 from the

6 attained line supports the attack of the main forces OD MUP."

7 [In English] Subsection 2.2 it is stated that the army will

8 support the 9th Detachment of the MUP and PJP and SAJ, whereas subsection

9 3 says fire support as requested. Now, it would appear that different

10 roles are being promulgated by this decision. Would you please comment on

11 the tactical and functional differences between providing support for an

12 attack, plane support, and if indeed this is more than just providing fire

13 support, as the document would suggest?

14 A. If you look at 2.1, the tasks of units, the person who made the

15 decision, who decided, gives a task to combat group 52 to support the

16 forces of the 2nd Detachment of the MUP. When he gives an order to

17 support, that means that it is the MUP detachment that has the main task

18 and the other one supports them, so that's auxiliary, otherwise it would

19 be the other way around. He would say combat group 52 has a task and is

20 supported by the MUP. This text leads to the obvious conclusion that it

21 was the MUP that was protagonist of this activity.

22 Q. But, General, you haven't answered my question. Would you agree

23 with me that under 2.1 and 2.2 the forces of the VJ are said to support

24 the MUP, and such support is not limited to fire support. Is it not that

25 they can also be used in manoeuvres with the MUP if the commander finds it

1 necessary?

2 A. There are different aspects of support. There is fire support,

3 manoeuvre support, movement support, demonstration support, logistic

4 support, through reconnaissance information, there can be different kinds

5 of support, and indeed it is a broader concept than fire support on its

6 own. You're right on that. However, as I read this paper that you quoted

7 from here, I'm trying to answer that question of yours, who was the

8 protagonist of the activity involved here, and in this case it was the

9 MUP.

10 Q. We'll get to that question, General, but I would please direct you

11 to answer the questions I ask and you did that I think with this one.

12 Now, we'll go a lot quicker if we stick with the questions themselves

13 because I will examine everything with you, be rest assured of that.

14 Now, with respect to section -- subsection 2.3, which I believe is

15 on the next page in the B/C/S version. It lists a unit there, the 1st mt

16 and looks like a v, HK. Can we conclude that this is a VJ unit that is

17 referenced in 2.3, first of all?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can we also conclude in 2.3 that there's not any MUP unit or organ

20 referenced with respect to this particular task?

21 A. In that paragraph, no.

22 Q. And then am I correct in concluding that with respect to this

23 particular task, in this particular VJ unit is to carry out an independent

24 attack in a particular area without any police involvement?

25 A. Well, at this locality, yes.

1 Q. [Interpretation] Who would be the protagonist of the activity

2 involved then?

3 A. I didn't hear you.

4 Q. Who would then be the protagonist of this activity or action, the

5 one mentioned in 2.3?

6 A. In 2.3 it would be the combat group that is mentioned above.

7 Q. [In English] Now, we've had some discussions, some confusion with

8 other witnesses regarding -- as I hope it will be easy to clear up. Am I

9 correct that according to military doctrine of the VJ it would be

10 inconceivable to have a police officer, irrespective of rank or position,

11 commanding over VJ units; that is to say, only an army officer can command

12 over VJ units?

13 A. Well, a military officer never commands the police and a police

14 officer never commands the military. In the system of coordination, it is

15 established who is the main party in charge and who has an auxiliary role.

16 Then every system gets assignments down their own chain or line. However,

17 coordination spells this out precisely.

18 Q. Now, we need to clear up some more military terminology. If you

19 look at section 2.4, which should be on the next page in the English but

20 on the same page in the B/C/S. If you can help us with simplifying or

21 explaining in detail the meaning of the task for BG-125-3, which in B/C/S

22 says: [Interpretation] "In coordinated action in the 10th MUP Detachment,

23 attacks against the Prilep village - Rznic village and Prilep village -

24 Glodjane village."

25 A. Yes, the third group got the task to attack along that axes and

1 the 30th MUP detachment will act in concert with them, so it is the combat

2 group of the 125th Brigade that is in charge of that action and the MUP

3 acts in a coordinated fashion with them.

4 Q. I think you touched on this earlier in talking about what an

5 "odluka" or decision is and you mentioned the "zapovest" or order of a

6 commander. Now, with respect to combat actions, am I correct that the

7 "zapovest" is a command document delivered in written form covering

8 larger formations of units for terms of combat activities?

9 A. No. "Zapovest," an order, is issued even at the lowest levels,

10 but orally, verbally. For example, a squad order, a company leader, et

11 cetera, issue oral orders, whereas higher command issue orders in writing.

12 Q. That's what I was focusing on. "Zapovesti" for higher command

13 issues, for instance, where multiple units are involved. Now, the

14 issuance --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we're perhaps at cross-purposes. The witness

16 is quite clear that "zapovest" is an oral order. Are you content with

17 that?

18 MR. IVETIC: No, Your Honour, actually he said that it was always

19 in writing when it's a higher command, that was the last part of his

20 answer. Perhaps I can ask him to clear it up.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Just let me read this.

22 MR. IVETIC: That's why I tried to use the Serbian terminology

23 because in the translations things can get confusing because there's

24 multiple terminology for essentially similar actions.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. So it's oral at the lowest level and written

1 at the higher level. Now I follow. Thank you. You don't need to clarify

2 that.

3 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. Now, with respect to the higher level commands that --

5 higher-level orders, excuse me, higher-level "zapovesti" am I correct that

6 the commander drafting the "zapovest" is effectuating his command over the

7 units specified in the "zapovest" as having tasks?

8 A. Well, not necessarily. Namely, that his command powers pertain

9 only to -- to all units, rather, only he directly issues tasks to his

10 subordinate units, his subordinates. He can also mention those with whom

11 he acts in concert, in coordinated action, those who are not directly

12 subordinated to him.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Enemy forces to say where

14 they're located. Let's return to the "odluka" for a second. With respect

15 to the "odluka," the example we saw was in written form. Am I correct

16 that it was the -- within the practice of the VJ for such "odlukas" to

17 also be reproduced on to maps; and if so, would the information from the

18 map "odluka" provide the forces with information on how to carry out their

19 tasks in anti-terrorist actions?

20 A. That cannot be seen on a map. Details cannot be seen on a map,

21 only the idea, the basic idea, can be seen on a map. Any graphic

22 representation on a map is simplification, and only the basic elements of

23 the concept can be seen there and the basic idea. Details cannot be seen;

24 that is why orders are written, otherwise they would not be written out,

25 otherwise they would be done as maps and then the maps would be handed

1 out, whereas written orders give far more detail than a map does.

2 Q. And with respect to the "odlukas," perhaps we should pull up an

3 example so we can have it in front of us as we're talking about it.

4 5D1175 I believe is one that has already been introduced into evidence by

5 one of my colleagues. Once this comes up, sir, we'll take a look at it,

6 but I believe this to be an "odluka" map dealing with the action Voksa

7 from 1998.

8 A. I can't see anything yet.

9 Q. We'll have to wait a moment. There we go. Now, sir, based on

10 your knowledge and experience, can you derive from this "odluka" the basic

11 instructions, the "osovni deja" [phoen] being conveyed by this "odluka"

12 for the stated action? I mean, is it possible to determine the basic

13 location and planned activities of the units?

14 A. On the basis of this document, one can see the position of the

15 units and what units were engaged. And one can see from the symbols

16 representing these units what the basic purpose is, basic intention,

17 attack or defence. That can be distinguished, nothing else. Yes, you can

18 also see here who gives the approval for this decision. There is also a

19 legend, a key, as to what the forces involved are. And then also the

20 commander's signature in the lower right-hand corner. However, only the

21 contours of the deployment of the units can be seen, nothing more than

22 that. That is why the decision always accompanies the order concerned.

23 It spells out the engagement of the unit in carrying out a particular

24 task.

25 Q. Just to clear up one thing related to your last answer. Am I

1 correct that the commander who signs on the lower right-hand corner is the

2 commander charged with creating this map "odluka," for planning the

3 action?

4 A. Not necessarily. It is signed by the person who did this, who

5 drew this graphically, or rather, in whose name it was done. It doesn't

6 have to be the commander in person, it's his team, his staff, but he signs

7 it as his own document. However, it does not necessarily mean that he is

8 the commander in charge of that action.

9 Q. And then the --

10 A. Because -- because, if you allow me, if he were the protagonist of

11 this activity, then he would sign it "commander of such and such for such

12 and such an action." As it says here decision for crushing Siptar

13 terrorist forces in the Voksa region, it is only from the legend that we

14 can see who would be involved.

15 Q. And the upper left-hand corner is the commander who approved this

16 proposed action; is that correct?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Cepic, are you going to let us in on the

19 secret?

20 MR. CEPIC: First to clarify with my learned friend, Mr. Ivetic.

21 With your leave, Your Honour, page 97, line 21, who would be involved, I

22 think that witness said: [Interpretation] Who would be the protagonist of

23 the activity.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

25 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 MR. IVETIC: It's 7.00, Your Honour. I'm not done; I think that's

2 obvious.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: This isn't for the purpose of being restrictive,

4 but for guidance on how we plan the rest of the week. Can you give any

5 indication of how long you might take?

6 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, my previous estimate was in the

7 range of two hours, so I think I've spent approximately half an hour thus

8 far, so we should be an hour and a half remaining tomorrow for my part of

9 it, again if things go as smoothly as they have thus far.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, do you envisage your cross-examination

11 being more than a day?

12 MR. STAMP: Possibly just a little bit more, but I'll try to keep

13 it to a day.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Not with a view to -- again, to being

15 restrictive, but just trying to make sensible use of the week.

16 Mr. Ackerman, is the position about the non-availability of any

17 witnesses this week for your case entirely clear or still in some doubt?

18 MR. ACKERMAN: I think it's very clear, Your Honour, that we can't

19 get anybody here -- we can't actually put a witness on until Monday. We

20 may be able to get somebody here, but we've got problems beyond just

21 getting them here. We're working on them. Mr. Fila has been of

22 assistance to try to get some of those solved. We've planning on the 22nd

23 for a long time, and just when everything breaks so that there's nobody

24 here to talk to, it becomes clear that we might try to get somebody here

25 Friday, and we did try, we went into some great efforts, but I don't think

1 we can get it done -- in fact, I know we can't.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 Would it assist you, Mr. Stamp, if you had a clear indication that

4 you wouldn't be required to cross-examine until Thursday?

5 MR. STAMP: We would be very grateful.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: It may be that that's how it's going to work out

7 anyway, it's not clear, but we may be able to give you that indication.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we can assure Mr. Stamp that he will not be

10 required to cross-examine tomorrow, but it would be very helpful if the

11 Prosecution were in a position to cross-examine on Thursday, bearing in

12 mind there's a possibility of spilling over into Friday, and I suspect

13 that that is inevitable in this situation.

14 Mr. Radinovic, we have to stop for the evening at this point. We

15 will resume tomorrow, and that will be at 9.00 tomorrow morning. It's not

16 clear whether you will be here for the full session or whether we will

17 have to simply stop early and re-commence on Thursday. But I can tell you

18 now that you will be here until at least Thursday and possibly Friday.

19 Overnight it is important that you have no discussion with anyone at all

20 about the evidence in this case. You can talk about whatever you like

21 with whomsoever you choose to speak to, but you must talk about any

22 subject other than the evidence; the evidence is off limits. Could you

23 now please leave the courtroom with the usher, and we shall see you

24 tomorrow morning at 9.00.

25 [The witness stands down]

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

3 October, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

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