1 Thursday, 26 February 2009
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
7 number IT-05-87-T, the Prosecutor versus Milan Milutinovic et al.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: May we have the appearances for the parties,
9 please. Mr. Hannis.
10 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I'm Tom Hannis on behalf
11 of the Office of the Prosecutor, joined today by our case manager, Iain
12 Reid, Chester
13 Silvia D'Ascoli, Priya Gopalan, and Mathias Marcussen.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 Mr. O'Sullivan.
16 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Good afternoon. I'm Eugene O'Sullivan, along
17 with Slobodan Zecevic, appearing on behalf of Mr. Milutinovic.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
19 Mr. Fila.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. Toma
21 Fila appearing together with Mr. Vladimir Petrovic and Mr. Mrkic for the
22 Defence of Nikola Sainovic. Thank you.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 Mr. Visnjic.
25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. For
1 Ojdanic team, Tomislav Visnjic and Norman Sepenuk are counsel, and Mr.
2 Stevanovic and Mr. Hopkins, legal assistants.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
4 Mr. Ackerman.
5 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, John Ackerman for General Pavkovic
6 along with Aleksander Aleksic, Aleksander Vujic and Cathy MacDaid.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 Mr. Cepic.
9 MR. CEPIC: Good afternoon, Your Honour. I'm Djuro Cepic,
10 Defence counsel for General Lazarevic. Appearing with me, Mr. Milan
11 Petrovic. Thank you.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 Mr. Lukic.
14 MR. LUKIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Branko Lukic along
15 with Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Zorko and Mr. Ogrizovic for General Sreten Lukic.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 The Trial Chamber is sitting today to deliver its judgement in
18 the case of Prosecutor versus Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic,
19 Dragoljub Ojdanic, Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir Lazarevic, and Sreten
20 Lukic. What I am about to read is a summary of the Chamber's findings in
21 that judgement; however, the authoritative account of those findings is
22 contained in the written judgement, which will be made available after
23 this hearing.
24 At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to
25 counsel, the Registry staff, the interpreters and court reporters, the
1 Chamber's own staff, and all others who have contributed to the smooth
2 and efficient conduct of this trial.
3 The judgement is a lengthy document, reflecting the size and
4 complexity of the case. The trial proceedings began on 10th July, 2006,
5 and concluded on 27th August, 2008. During their course, the Chamber
6 heard oral testimony from a total of 235 witnesses and admitted over 4300
8 The length of the trial and volume of evidence as well as the
9 size of the judgement are in a large part a consequence of the number and
10 nature of the charges in the indictment. The accused are charged under
11 every form of responsibility set out in Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the
12 Statute of the Tribunal for their alleged role in crimes said to have
13 been committed between 1st January and 20th June, 1999, in Kosovo by
14 forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia
15 referred to as the forces of the FRY and Serbia. Specifically, the
16 accused are alleged to be responsible for deportation, a crime against
17 humanity, that's Count 1; forcible transfer as other inhumane acts, a
18 crime against humanity, that is Count 2; murder, a crime against
19 humanity, and a violation of the laws or customs of war, Counts 3 and 4;
20 and persecution, a crime against humanity, that is, Count 5.
21 According to the indictment, the accused participated along with
22 others in a joint criminal enterprise to modify the ethnic balance in
23 Kosovo in order to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian
24 authorities over the province. The Prosecution further alleges that the
25 purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was to be achieved through a
1 widespread or systematic campaign of terror or violence against the
2 Kosovo Albanian population, including the various crimes specified in
3 each of the counts of the indictment.
4 Under Count 1, the indictment sets out how the deportation of
5 Kosovo Albanians was carried out in early 1999 from 13 municipalities
6 across Kosovo and particular towns and villages in those municipalities.
7 It should be noted that these descriptions also contain information about
8 killings, property destruction, theft, sexual assaults, beatings, and
9 other forms of violence, which the Prosecution alleges contributed to an
10 atmosphere of fear and oppression created by the FRY and Serbian forces
11 to facilitate the expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population. Under
12 Counts 3 and 4, a number of killings are alleged in various locations in
13 Kosovo. Finally, under the fifth count, the indictment avers that the
14 forces of the FRY and Serbia
15 the Kosovo Albanian population, including by way of murder, sexual
16 assault, and wanton destruction or damage of religious sites. However,
17 the specific acts of deportation and forcible transfer described under
18 Counts 1 and 2 are not included in Count 5 as forms of persecution, as
19 the Chamber has pointed out to the parties during the course of the trial
21 At the time of the alleged crimes, Milan Milutinovic was the
22 president of the Republic of Serbia
23 minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or FRY; Dragoljub Ojdanic
24 was the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army, known as the VJ;
25 Nebojsa Pavkovic was the commander of the VJ 3rd Army; Vladimir Lazarevic
1 was the commander of the VJ Pristina Corps; and Sreten Lukic was the head
2 of the Serbian Ministry of interior staff for Kosovo, referred to as the
3 MUP staff. The indictment alleges that each of the accused participated
4 in the joint criminal enterprise, and that in these roles they exercised
5 command authority and/or effective control over VJ and MUP forces
6 involved in the commission of the alleged crimes. They are also said to
7 have planned, instigated, ordered, or otherwise to have aided and abetted
8 these crimes.
9 Following the Pre-Trial Conference held on 7th July, 2006, the
10 Chamber issued an order pursuant to Rule 73 bis of the Tribunal's Rules
11 of Procedure and Evidence, which had the effect of preventing the
12 Prosecution from leading evidence with regard to three of the crime sites
13 alleged in the indictment. The parties are ordered at the end of the
14 judgement to make appropriate submissions in writing within two weeks,
15 regarding how to proceed in relation to these charges.
16 The judgement is divided into four volumes. The first volume
17 sets out the law applicable to the case and the Chamber's findings upon
18 the political and constitutional structures of the FRY and Serbia
19 armed conflict that is the subject of the indictment, and the various
20 forces involved, and the diplomatic efforts to resolve that conflict. In
21 volume 2, the Chamber sets forth its findings in relation to the crimes
22 alleged to have been committed from March to June 1999 in Kosovo by
23 forces of the FRY and Serbia
24 to the individual criminal responsibility of the six accused. Volume 4
25 contains annexes to the judgement including an analysis of the evidence
1 in relation to the more than 800 named murder victims listed in schedules
2 to the indictment.
3 I will start by discussing the Chamber's findings in relation to
4 the commission of the crimes alleged by forces of the FRY and Serbia
5 note that in the judgement the Chamber refers to place names in Kosovo
6 both in their Serbian and Albanian versions; however, I will only use the
7 Serbian version while reading this summary.
8 The Chamber finds that a political crisis developed in Kosovo in
9 the late 1980s and through the 1990s, culminating in an armed conflict
10 involving forces of the FRY and Serbia
11 Liberation Army, or KLA, from mid-1998. During that armed conflict,
12 there were incidents where excessive and indiscriminate force was used by
13 the VJ and MUP, resulting in damage to civilian property, population
14 displacement, and civilian deaths. Despite efforts to bring the crisis
15 to an end, which included the introduction into Kosovo of an
16 international verification mission, the conflict continued through to and
17 beyond 24th March, 1999
18 campaign against targets in the FRY. That campaign ended on 10th June,
19 1999, and the forces of the FRY and Serbia
20 Sections of the judgement analyse the evidence in relation to the
21 ostensible efforts to negotiate between the Kosovo Albanians and the FRY
22 and Serbian authorities in 1998 and 1999, various international
23 agreements concluded in October 1998, and the situation as it developed
24 thereafter, as well as the involvement of international interlocutors to
25 resolve the crisis which led to a conference in Rambouillet, France
1 February 1999.
2 It is largely uncontested that significant numbers of people from
3 Kosovo left their homes during the NATO bombing, many of whom crossed the
4 borders into Albania
5 brought by both the Prosecution and Defence confirmed this swift
6 movement, primarily of Kosovo Albanians. For example, a series of
7 reports sent by the MUP staff to the MUP headquarters in Belgrade
8 24th March to 1st May, 1999, record the numbers of Kosovo Albanians
9 crossing the borders in that period. According to these reports, in the
10 first week of the NATO bombing, over 300.000 Kosovo Albanians crossed
11 into Albania
12 1st May, it had reached 715.158.
13 The Prosecution case is that these hundreds of thousands of
14 Kosovo Albanians fled the province because of the violent and coercive
15 actions of the forces of the FRY and Serbia
16 of terror and violence against the Kosovo Albanian population in order to
17 expel them from their homes and force them across the borders. This case
18 was supported by the consistent evidence of many Kosovo Albanian
19 witnesses, along with some of the former VJ and MUP personnel brought by
20 the Prosecution. However, witnesses brought by the Defence consistently
21 denied that there was any organised expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from
22 their homes, and many of them gave other reasons for the mass movement of
23 Kosovo Albanians across the borders into Albania and Macedonia
24 the NATO bombing itself and the actions of the KLA.
25 The Trial Chamber is mindful of the fact that in some parts of
1 Kosovo, both within the 13 municipalities discussed in this judgement and
2 elsewhere, people may have left their homes for different reasons, such
3 as instructions from the KLA, the desire to avoid being present while
4 combat between the KLA and forces of the FRY and Serbia was taking place,
5 or, indeed, the fact that NATO was bombing targets close to where they
6 lived. However, despite the arguments by the Defence that these were the
7 primary reasons for the massive movement of people within Kosovo and
8 across the borders with Albania
9 Albanian witnesses who testified cited the NATO bombing as among the
10 reasons for their departure. And in only one area of Vucitrn
11 municipality and another area of Suva Reka municipality did the Chamber
12 find that people were moving as a consequence of the actions of the KLA.
13 The Kosovo Albanian witnesses who testified about their own expulsion and
14 that of many others came from a broad cross-section of that community,
15 generally with no connection to one another beyond their victimisation,
16 and it is inconceivable that they could or would all have concocted such
17 detailed and consistent accounts of the events that they experienced and
19 Furthermore, NATO bombs struck targets across the FRY, with
21 commander of the VJ air force and air defence, and yet people did not
22 leave Belgrade
23 fled Kosovo. The Chamber finds, therefore, that the NATO bombing was not
24 the reason for the mass displacement of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo.
25 While there was a continuing armed conflict between the KLA and
1 the forces of the FRY and Serbia
2 campaign, the Chamber also does not consider that this conflict was the
3 cause of the flight of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from
4 late March to early June 1999. The conflict between the KLA and the VJ
5 and MUP commenced in mid-1998 and intensified through July, August, and
6 September of that year. While many Kosovo Albanians were displaced at
7 that time, most stayed within the boundaries of Kosovo, and there was not
8 the massive flood of people across the borders that began on 24th March
9 1999. The Chamber further recalls that, while the KLA was, at various
10 times and in various locations, a force to be reckoned with, its numbers
11 were small in comparison to the quantity of VJ and MUP personnel deployed
12 to Kosovo in March to June 1999, nor did it have the kinds of heavy
13 equipment that the state forces had access to.
14 The Kosovo Albanian witnesses who testified both about their own
15 experiences and that of their families, friends, and neighbours in the
16 few weeks between 24th March and the beginning of June 1999, gave a
17 broadly consistent account of the fear that reigned in towns and villages
18 across Kosovo, not because of the NATO bombing, but, rather, because of
19 the actions of the VJ and MUP and associated forces that accompanied it.
20 In all of the 13 municipalities specified in the indictment as sites of
21 deportation and forcible transfer, the Chamber finds that forces of the
22 FRY and Serbia
23 either by ordering them to leave or by creating an atmosphere of terror
24 in order to effect their departure. As these people left their homes and
25 moved either within Kosovo or towards and across its borders, many of
1 them continued to be threatened, robbed, mistreated, and otherwise
2 abused. In numerous places, men were separated from women and children;
3 their vehicles were stolen or destroyed; their houses were deliberately
4 set on fire; money was extorted from them; and they were forced to
5 relinquish their personal identity documents.
6 The Trial Chamber therefore finds that there was a broad campaign
7 of violence directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population
8 during the course of the NATO air-strikes, conducted by forces under the
9 control of the FRY and Serbian authorities, during which there were
10 incidents of killing, sexual assault, and the intentional destruction of
11 mosques. It was the deliberate actions of these forces during this
12 campaign that caused the departure of at least 700.000 Kosovo Albanians
13 from Kosovo in the short period of time between the end of March and
14 beginning of June 1999. Efforts by the MUP to conceal the killing of
15 Kosovo Albanians, by transporting the bodies to other areas of Serbia
16 discussed in detail in the judgement, also suggest that such killings
17 were criminal in nature.
18 I will briefly mention some of the Chamber's factual findings in
19 relation to the various crime sites. At the end of March 1999, an
20 extremely threatening and violent environment was created in Pec in
21 western Kosovo - by that, I mean Pec town in western Kosovo - by police
22 and military forces burning houses, firing weapons, and abusing the local
23 Kosovo Albanian population. A significant number of the town's residents
24 thus fled or were ordered out of their homes, some of them being directed
25 to go to Montenegro
1 they were put on buses and driven to the Albanian border. When these
2 Kosovo Albanians returned to Pec after the conflict, they found that many
3 of their houses had been burned, although the houses belonging to Serb
4 residents of the town were undamaged.
5 In Decani municipality, immediately to the south of Pec, similar
6 events transpired in the village of Beleg
7 There, the Kosovo Albanian residents were rounded up by police and VJ
8 personnel, including reservists, in the course of which some men were
9 killed. A large group of predominantly Kosovo Albanian women and
10 children were detained and mistreated. Some of the women were sexually
11 assaulted, and some men were physically abused. The next day, most of
12 the people from the group were ordered to go to Albania, and those who
13 remained have not been heard from since.
14 South of Decani in Djakovica town, a prevailing atmosphere of
15 terror was created by police and VJ forces from the commencement of the
16 NATO bombing campaign. These forces engaged in the selective looting and
17 burning of buildings, and MUP forces killed Kosovo Albanian residents of
18 the town, including a group of 20 women and children in a basement in
19 Milos Gilic Street at the beginning of April. As a consequence, a large
20 number of Kosovo Albanians fled the town and travelled to and across the
21 Albanian border. During their journey, their personal identity documents
22 were taken from them by VJ and MUP forces. Kosovo Albanian residents of
23 villages in Djakovica municipality were also expelled from their homes by
24 army and police forces in April 1999, in particular during a joint
25 operation in the area known as the Reka or Caragoj valley at the end of
1 the month. In the course of that operation, a number of Kosovo Albanians
2 were killed by members of the police and VJ, and the bodies of at least
3 287 people who went missing from Meja and the surrounding area at that
4 time were subsequently found in mass graves at Batajnica close to
6 It is uncontested that a broad operation was conducted by the VJ
7 and MUP at the end of March 1999 in an area covering parts of Prizren,
8 Suva Reka, and Orahovac municipalities in south-western Kosovo. During
9 the course of that operation, on 25th March, 1999, Kosovo Albanian
10 villagers from Pirane, in Prizren municipality, fled their homes as a
11 consequence of the shelling of the village and the torching of houses by
12 VJ and MUP forces. The same day, MUP and VJ forces attacked the village
13 of Celina in Orahovac municipality, looting and setting the majority of
14 houses on fire. These forces terrorised the inhabitants of the village,
15 killing a number of people. People from Celina who had fled their homes
16 and taken shelter in nearby woods were later rounded up and robbed of
17 their valuables and identity documents. Some of them were physically
18 abused, and they were sent towards the Albanian border. MUP personnel
19 also deliberately destroyed the local mosque on 28th March, 1999, a
20 Muslim holiday.
21 The same day as Celina and Pirane were attacked, nearby
22 Bela Crkva in Orahovac municipality was also attacked -- sorry, was also
23 targeted by VJ and MUP forces, which shelled the village and burned
24 houses, causing the inhabitants to flee. During the course of this
25 attack, police forces brutally killed a number of men, women, and
1 children who were hiding in groups in a river-bed. The village of
2 Mala Krusa to the south of Celina and Bela Crkva and to the north of
3 Pirane was also surrounded by VJ and MUP forces on 25th March, 1999, and
4 the MUP then entered the village, looting and setting houses on fire with
5 the assistance of some local Serbs. The Kosovo Albanian residents of the
6 village went to hide in a wooded area and were later rounded up, the
7 women and children being told to go to Albania. More than 110 men were
8 robbed of their valuables and identity documents, mistreated, and then
9 shut in a barn and shot by local members of the police, after which the
10 barn was set on fire. Only eight of them survived.
11 Around the same time, the residents of Dusanovo, a neighbourhood
12 of Prizren town, were expelled from their homes, beaten, threatened, and
13 robbed, and directed towards Albania
14 had been displaced from Pirane during the operation and who were
15 sheltering in nearby Srbica were also ordered to leave the village and go
16 to Albania
17 In the course of the operation at the end of March 1999, special
18 police forces were engaged in and around Suva Reka town. On 26th March,
19 local MUP personnel targeted members of the Berisha family in the town,
20 killing 45 men, women, and children near their homes, as they fled past a
21 bus station, and after they had taken shelter inside a local pizzeria.
22 The bodies of the majority of these people were also later found in a
23 mass grave in Batajnica near Belgrade
24 killings, the Suva Reka mosque was damaged, and many of the remaining
25 Kosovo Albanian residents of the town left their homes as the police set
1 fire to houses, stole money and valuables, and ordered them to go to
3 Kosovo Albanian civilians were forcibly displaced from villages
4 in Srbica municipality in central Kosovo, at the end of March and in
5 April 1999. On 26th March, Turicevac village was shelled and its
6 inhabitants formed a convoy and left in the direction of Tusilje to the
7 east. MUP and VJ forces then arrived in Tusilje, and another convoy was
8 formed, which started moving towards Klina. Around this time, a large
9 number of displaced people gathered in a field on the outskirts of the
10 village of Izbica. Police forces surrounded the group, ordering the
11 women and children to go to Albania
12 lined up and shot the men in two groups, killing at least 89 of them.
13 Around mid-April, a group of women held by VJ or MUP forces in the
14 killing of Kozica after it had been shelled was taken to Cirez. At least
15 four of these women were sexually assaulted, and eight of them were then
16 killed by being thrown into three wells. At the end of April, another
17 offensive took place near Baks close to Cirez. In the course of this
18 attack, a large group of Kosovo Albanian men were detained and
20 As soon as the NATO campaign began, prominent Kosovo Albanians in
21 Kosovska Mitrovica town in the north of the province were targeted and
22 some killed by the police. Kosovo Albanian houses were also burned by
23 the police, and a large number of Kosovo Albanians were expelled from
24 parts of the town. Some subsequently returned to the town and then left
25 again at the beginning of April, travelling on buses to Montenegro. In
1 mid-April 1999, many Kosovo Albanians living or temporarily sheltering in
2 Zabare and other nearby villages were forced to form convoys and leave
3 Kosovo by MUP and VJ forces, which began to burn houses in the villages.
4 Many of these people had to make their way on foot across Kosovo and
5 south to the Albanian border, and they were robbed and further mistreated
6 along the way.
7 On 27th March, 1999
8 one mosque in Vucitrn town and expelled Kosovo Albanian residents from
9 the town. MUP forces also robbed and mistreated Kosovo Albanians in a
10 large convoy moving from villages in Vucitrn municipality towards the
11 south. On the night of 2nd May, 1999
12 people in the convoy, which was then directed to some nearby buildings,
13 where its members were held overnight. The following day, one other
14 person from the group was killed, and the MUP directed the women,
15 children, and elderly people to continue on to Albania. They detained
16 and mistreated the Kosovo Albanian men of military age for approximately
17 three weeks in Smrekovnica prison before forcing them to cross the border
18 into Albania
19 In Pristina town, the administrative centre of Kosovo, the
20 pattern of expulsion of Kosovo Albanians was repeated. Many people were
21 directly evicted from their homes, while others fled out of fear of the
22 violence around them caused by the forces of the FRY and Serbia. The
23 expulsion from Pristina was carried out in an organised manner, with
24 hundreds of Kosovo Albanians channelled to the train station and onto
25 overcrowded trains that took them to the Macedonian border. In the
1 course of this operation, at least three Kosovo Albanian women were
2 sexually assaulted by VJ and MUP personnel.
3 Villagers and Zegra and Prilepnica in Gnjilane municipality were
4 also forcibly removed from their homes. In Zegra, the VJ, MUP, and other
5 irregular forces, including local Serb civilians, drove out the Kosovo
6 Albanian residents by way of threats, beatings, and killings at the end
7 of March 1999. Many of the displaced people made their way to Macedonia
8 When they returned to their homes at the end of the conflict, they found
9 that most of the Kosovo Albanian houses in the village had been burned
10 and damaged to some degree, whereas the houses of the Serb residents
11 remained untouched. Around the same time, the mosque in nearby Vlastica
12 was burned down by the VJ and local MUP reservists, while in Vladovo,
13 houses were looted and burned, and its residents also fled and travelled
14 to Macedonia
15 were ordered to leave the village, first on 6th April and again on 13th
16 April, 1999.
17 In Urosevac municipality, south-west of Gnjilane, villages were
18 also attacked in late March and during April 1999. In Sojevo, VJ,
19 police, and other armed individuals working together with them burned
20 houses and killed several people, while the local residents were forced
21 to travel in convoys towards Urosevac town. Some of these people
22 continued on by bus to the Macedonian border. At the beginning of April,
23 approximately 1.000 displaced people arrived in Mirosavlje. When
24 military forces then approached Mirosavlje, its inhabitants and others
25 sheltering there formed convoys and travelled towards Urosevac by bus and
1 travelled south to and across the Macedonian border. Also at the
2 beginning of April, the village of Staro Selo was occupied by VJ forces,
3 who stayed for a few days and then left, burning houses as they departed.
4 Shortly thereafter, a group of VJ volunteers arrived in the village and
5 ordered local men to dig trenches, confiscated vehicles, and extorted
6 money from the inhabitants. The villagers left their homes out of fear
7 and walked to Urosevac town. Many later boarded trains that took them to
8 the Macedonian border.
9 Finally in Kacanik municipality in the south of Kosovo bordering
11 villages from the beginning of the NATO air campaign. VJ and MUP forces
12 attacked Kotlina on 24th March, sending the local women and children by
13 truck and on foot towards Kacanik town. Other villagers who escaped
14 detection fled towards Macedonia
15 later, VJ and MUP forces entered Kacanik town and fired towards some
16 houses from positions in a local factory. The following day, the
17 residents of this part of the town decided to leave their homes out of
18 fear of the MUP forces and travelled on foot to Macedonia. In April
19 1999, VJ and MUP units entered the village of Vata
20 there. On 21st May, 1999
21 25th May, Dubrava. The residents of Dubrava decided to go to Macedonia
22 because they knew and feared what had happened in other villages. The
23 women, old men, and children formed a convoy, while the younger men hid
24 in the woods nearby. Several people were shot near Reka close to Dubrava
25 at the time of this attack, including a girl who died and a 12-year-old
1 boy who was seriously injured. In addition to the evidence pertaining to
2 the specific crime sites set out in the indictment, the Chamber heard
3 evidence going to the broad pattern of violence and intimidation of the
4 Kosovo Albanian population from witnesses who were members of the VJ and
5 MUP forces in Kosovo at that time. For example, three former members of
6 the VJ who testified under protective measures admitted that they were
7 involved in the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians from their homes during the
8 NATO campaign. Other witnesses from the VJ and MUP described their own
9 participation in the killing of Kosovo Albanian civilians and other
10 criminal acts.
11 Applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in the
12 indictment to the facts found proved in relation to each of the 13
13 municipalities, the Trial Chamber finds that the crimes of deportation, a
14 crime against humanity; other inhumane acts, forcible transfer, a crime
15 against humanity; murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war and a
16 crime against humanity; and murder, sexual assault, and wanton
17 destruction of or damage to religious property, as forms of persecution
18 on ethnic grounds, were committed by VJ and MUP forces in many of the
19 locations alleged in the indictment. However, there were a number of
20 allegations that were not proved on the facts or did not satisfy one or
21 more of the requisite legal elements, such as the execution of at least
22 17 people in Kotlina on or about 24th March, 1999; and the deliberate
23 destruction of several mosques, and these charges are dismissed.
24 The Chamber also notes that for some crime sites where there was
25 a large number of murder charges and the indictment listed the alleged
1 victims by name in a schedule, the Prosecution did not provide convincing
2 evidence that all the particular named victims were in fact among the
3 dead, although the Chamber was satisfied that the killing of a
4 significant group of people by the VJ and/or MUP forces took place as
6 I will now briefly set out the Chamber's findings in respect of
7 each of the accused.
8 Milan Milutinovic was the president of Serbia throughout 1998 and
9 1999, and much of the evidence brought by the Prosecution and his Defence
10 concerned the nature and extent of his powers in that position. The
11 judgement sets out the Chamber's analysis of the pertinent provisions of
12 the Serbian Constitution and other relevant legislation, as well as the
13 witness testimony in relation to those provisions. The Chamber finds
14 that as president of Serbia
15 control over the VJ, a federal institution. His formal role in relation
16 to the VJ was as an ex officio member of the Supreme Defence Council, or
18 presidents of Serbia
19 with respect to the VJ. However, analysis of the records of SDC sessions
20 in evidence does not indicate the formulation or implementation of the
21 common plan alleged in the indictment. Moreover, there is no direct
22 evidence of SDC
23 NATO air campaign; although the Chamber is convinced that Milutinovic and
24 FRY President Milosevic continued to meet during the NATO campaign and
25 retained formal command over the VJ through the SDC or a similar body
1 known as the Supreme Command. The evidence does not indicate, however,
2 that Milutinovic took part in the exercise of command over the VJ after
3 23rd March, 1999
4 Milosevic, sometimes termed the supreme commander, who exercised actual
5 command authority over the VJ during the NATO campaign.
6 In 1998 and early 1999, Milutinovic was involved in the
7 negotiations involving representatives of the Kosovo Albanian community,
8 and those brokered by the international community, to seek to resolve the
9 Kosovo crisis. Having analysed the voluminous evidence in relation to
10 all these negotiations, the Chamber is not satisfied that that evidence
11 establishes that Milutinovic had an obstructive attitude aimed at
12 ensuring their failure, as submitted by the Prosecution. The evidence
13 led by the Prosecution also did not convince the Chamber that Milutinovic
14 had a close personal or professional relationship with Milosevic or that
15 he held a position of significant influence in the Socialist Party of
17 among several made by the Prosecution about Milutinovic's involvement in
18 events that have not been proved.
19 Milutinovic attended a number of meetings in 1998 and early 1999,
20 during which the situation in Kosovo was discussed, some of them in
21 Kosovo itself. The Chamber finds that he was relatively well informed
22 about that situation and that he was aware that criminal acts had been
23 committed by VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo both in 1998 and early 1999,
24 mainly through his dealings with foreign diplomats, negotiators, and
25 observers. However, he was also told by state officials that any crimes
1 that had been committed in Kosovo were dealt with or were being dealt
3 The Chamber finds that as the president of Serbia, Milutinovic
4 had powers that could potentially allow for significant oversight of the
5 work of the Serbian government ministries, most importantly, the Ministry
6 of the Interior, but the evidence does not establish extensive
7 interaction between Milutinovic and the MUP in the relevant period, and
8 his de facto powers over the MUP were not significant. He issued several
9 decrees during the state of emergency that came into force on
10 23rd March, 1999
11 judgement, the Chamber is unable to draw any inferences adverse to him
12 from the evidence surrounding these decrees.
13 In addition to being a deputy prime minister of the FRY, Nikola
14 Sainovic was the chairman of the FRY Commission for Cooperation with the
15 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, a body set up following the various
16 agreements concluded in October 1998 by the FRY and Serbian authorities
17 and the international community. The indictment alleges that he was FRY
18 President Milosevic's personal representative for Kosovo and that he was
19 the head of a body called the Joint Command, which had authority over the
20 VJ and MUP forces deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and early 1999 until the end
21 of the NATO air campaign.
22 A significant amount of time during the trial proceedings was
23 devoted by the Prosecution and the Sainovic Defence to the issue of the
24 existence, powers, and functioning of the Joint Command. This evidence
25 is detailed in volume 1 of the judgement. The Chamber finds that a body
1 known by some as the Joint Command did come into existence in mid-1998 in
2 order to coordinate the activities of the VJ and MUP and other state
3 bodies involved in the Kosovo conflict. Notes of meetings of the Joint
4 Command held between July and October 1998 taken by one of the
5 participants were entered into evidence and gave insight into the nature
6 of the body. These notes reveal that Sainovic was an active participant
7 in Joint Command meetings, as were the accused Pavkovic and Lukic, and,
8 on occasion, Lazarevic. Indeed, Sainovic issued instructions at the
9 meetings, including in relation to matters concerning the activities of
10 the VJ and MUP. There is direct evidence of only one Joint Command
11 meeting in 1999 in June, but military orders were issued with a Joint
12 Command heading in order to ensure the cooperation and coordination of
13 MUP forces with the VJ.
14 Sainovic also attended a number of other high-level meetings
15 concerning the situation in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and was often present
16 in Kosovo, both in 1998 and during the NATO air campaign. The FRY
17 president was instrumental in sending him to Kosovo from the summer of
18 1998 and in his appointment as the chairman of the Commission for
19 Cooperation with the Kosovo Verification Mission in October 1998, which
20 enabled him to continue liaising with VJ and MUP personnel in Kosovo as
21 well as the international observers there. His dealings with and
22 influence over the accused Pavkovic, from the VJ, and Lukic, from the
23 MUP, therefore continued without interruption.
24 Sainovic met with Milosevic frequently during 1998 and early
25 1999, as well as speaking with him by telephone, and a number of
1 witnesses gave evidence about the nature of the relationship between the
2 two men. On the basis of this evidence, the Chamber finds that Sainovic
3 was one of the closest and most trusted associates of Milosevic, which
4 led to him taking a leading role in both the Joint Command and the
5 Commission for Cooperation with the KVM. He was a powerful official in
6 the FRY government, who not only relayed information to Milosevic and
7 conveyed Milosevic's instructions to those in Kosovo, but also had a
8 great deal of influence over events in the province and was empowered to
9 make decisions.
10 Sainovic met with former Kosovo Albanian political leader Ibrahim
11 Rugova during the NATO air-strikes in a period when Rugova was
12 effectively being held under house arrest. The Chamber does not consider
13 these meetings to have been a genuine attempt to negotiate a solution to
14 the Kosovo situation, but, rather, a campaign which involved threats to
15 the personal safety of Rugova and his associates, designed to show that
16 the FRY and Serbian authorities were meeting with Kosovo Albanians, in
17 the hope that this would lead to cessation of the NATO bombing. Sainovic
18 knowingly and wilfully participated in this campaign.
19 The Chamber also finds that Sainovic was very well informed about
20 events in Kosovo, both in 1998 and 1999, and that he was aware that
21 criminal acts had been committed by VJ and MUP forces in Kosovo both in
22 1998 and 1999, including during the NATO air-strikes. Sainovic failed to
23 use his extensive authority in Kosovo and his own initiative to ensure
24 the cessation of such criminal conduct.
25 Dragoljub Ojdanic became the Chief of the General Staff, the
1 highest position within the VJ at the end of 1998, replacing Momcilo
2 Perisic, who was removed by Milosevic. Prior to this elevation, he had
3 been the deputy Chief of the General Staff. As Chief of the General
4 Staff, Ojdanic was only subordinate to the civilian authorities in which
5 overall command of the VJ was vested, namely the Supreme Defence Council.
6 The Chamber is convinced that, as Chief of the General Staff, Ojdanic
7 exercised command and control over all units and organs of the VJ. He
8 worked closely with the FRY president before and during the NATO air
9 campaign, and exercised de facto as well as de jure authority over the
10 VJ. He did not, however, have direct control over MUP forces engaged in
11 Kosovo, despite orders for the resubordination of the MUP to the VJ
12 issued in April 1999.
13 As Chief of the General Staff, Ojdanic attended SDC meetings and
14 was an active participant in the discussions held. The evidence does not
15 establish that he participated in the body known as the Joint Command,
16 but he was aware of it and accepted its operation. The Chamber finds
17 that Ojdanic was aware and approved of the breaches of the October
18 Agreements that occurred in late 1998 and early 1999. In addition, he
19 was aware of VJ involvement in the arming of the non-Albanian civilian
20 population in Kosovo. He also supported the appointment of VJ personnel
21 to high-level posts, who either supported the activities of the VJ in
22 Kosovo, such as the accused Pavkovic, or else simply raised no objection
23 thereto, and was aware of the removal of high-level VJ officers who
24 objected to the use being made of the VJ in Kosovo.
25 Leading up to and during the NATO air campaign, Ojdanic issued
1 orders for the VJ to carry out operations throughout Kosovo, including in
2 support of the MUP. He also mobilised extra VJ units for deployment in
3 Kosovo during the time-period when the majority of crimes found by the
4 Chamber to have been committed took place.
5 Through the VJ reporting system, Ojdanic was kept well-informed
6 on a daily basis of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, both before
7 and during the NATO air-strikes. Specific information about the use of
8 excessive or indiscriminate force by VJ and MUP units was conveyed to him
9 in 1998 and 1999. He was also aware that volunteers incorporated into
10 the ranks of the VJ during the NATO bombing had been involved in the
11 commission of criminal acts. He did take some action in response to the
12 reports that he was receiving, such as issuing orders for adherence to
13 international humanitarian law, mobilising the military justice system,
14 and dispatching senior officers from the security administration to
15 investigate. Nonetheless, he continued to order the VJ to participate in
16 military operations with the MUP in Kosovo.
17 In 1998, Nebojsa Pavkovic was the commander of the VJ Pristina
18 Corps, which had responsibility for the territory of Kosovo
19 of that year, he was made commander of the 3rd Army, which encompassed
20 both the Pristina Corps and the Nis
21 de jure and de facto control over the units subordinated to him and a
22 central role in the planning and implementation of the activities of the
23 VJ in Kosovo in coordination with the MUP. Indeed, the Chamber heard
24 convincing evidence that in 1998 he advocated a greater role for the VJ
25 in Kosovo and took the lead in proposing specific activities by the VJ
1 and MUP. He had direct access to FRY President Milosevic, who supported
2 and adopted his proposals, despite protestations from others in the VJ.
3 When he was commander of the Pristina Corps, Pavkovic clashed with his
4 direct superior, the then-commander of the 3rd Army, and clearly had his
5 differences with the then-Chief of the General Staff over the use of the
6 VJ in Kosovo, both of whom were later removed from their positions and
7 Pavkovic made 3rd Army commander.
8 The Chamber finds that in 1998, Pavkovic was involved in the
9 arming of the non-Albanian civilian population in Kosovo, and
10 simultaneous disarming of the Kosovo Albanians, despite his knowledge of
11 the divisions and animosity in Kosovo along ethnic lines.
12 As commander of the Pristina Corps in 1998, Pavkovic issued
13 numerous orders for the deployment of VJ units, often in joint operations
14 with the MUP. He was informed of allegations of excessive or
15 indiscriminate force by the VJ and MUP in Kosovo, including through his
16 frequent participation in Joint Command meetings where the situation in
17 Kosovo was discussed in detail, and yet he continued to engage his units.
18 The Chamber also finds that as Pristina Corps commander and then
19 commander of the 3rd Army, Pavkovic was directly involved in breaching
20 the October Agreements at the end of 1998 and into early 1999. Once
21 commander of the 3rd Army, he brought extra units into Kosovo to augment
22 the VJ, despite these agreements, and sent one particular brigade into
23 the interior of Kosovo in the face of a direct instruction from Ojdanic
24 not to.
25 In the lead-up to and during the NATO bombing, Pavkovic continued
1 to issue orders, as 3rd Army commander, for the engagement of VJ units in
2 Kosovo, including in areas where the Chamber has found that crimes were
3 committed by VJ and MUP forces. He also continued to work closely with
4 the FRY president in this period. He did not, however, have direct
5 control over MUP forces engaged in Kosovo, despite orders for the
6 resubordination of the MUP to the VJ issued in April 1999.
7 In 1998 and 1999, Pavkovic was present in Kosovo the majority of
8 the time. Through his presence in Joint Command and other meetings in
9 1998, the regular VJ reporting system, and his tours of VJ units deployed
10 across Kosovo, he had a detailed knowledge and understanding of the
11 situation on the ground and the activities of his and the MUP forces.
12 This knowledge extended to the commission of crimes by both the VJ and
13 MUP, including the forcible displacement of Kosovo Albanians, murder, and
14 sexual assaults. Indeed, the Chamber finds that while Pavkovic knew
15 about criminal acts committed by VJ members in Kosovo, he sometimes
16 under-reported and minimised the serious criminal wrongdoing in his
17 reports sent up to the Supreme Command Staff. Although he issued some
18 orders calling for adherence to international humanitarian law in the
19 course of these operations, the Chamber does not consider these to have
20 been genuine measures to limit the commission of crimes in Kosovo.
21 When Pavkovic became the 3rd Army commander at the end of 1998,
22 his former Chief of Staff in the Pristina Corps, Vladimir Lazarevic, was
23 appointed to replace him as commander of the Pristina Corps. While he
24 held these positions, Lazarevic was based in Kosovo, first in Djakovica
25 and later in and around Pristina. One of his duties when Chief of Staff
1 of the Pristina Corps was monitoring the state border between Kosovo and
3 operations in that area in the second half of 1998.
4 The Chamber finds that in 1998, Lazarevic was aware of the fact
5 that criminal acts were being committed against civilians and civilian
6 property during VJ and MUP operations in Kosovo. He also knew that this
7 had resulted in the displacement of a significant number of civilians.
8 Following his appointment to the position of commander of the
9 Pristina Corps, Lazarevic had de jure and de facto control over the units
10 subordinated to him, including regular VJ units, and from early April
11 1999, military territorial detachments. He did not have direct control
12 over MUP units engaged in Kosovo. The evidence proves that Lazarevic
13 significantly participated in the planning and execution of joint VJ and
14 MUP operations conducted from March to June 1999 in Kosovo, including in
15 places where the Chamber has found that crimes were committed. He
16 continued to do so, despite his knowledge of the commission of such
17 crimes. However, unlike Pavkovic, Lazarevic was not involved in or
18 necessarily aware of all the political decision-making that generally
19 took place in Belgrade
21 The central issue of contention during the trial concerning the
22 alleged criminal responsibility of Sreten Lukic related to the nature and
23 powers of the body called the MUP staff for Kosovo, of which Lukic was
24 the head. The Lukic Defence brought a number of witnesses who testified
25 that the MUP staff was a body with logistical functions and no real power
1 or authority over MUP forces deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. This
2 evidence starkly contrasted both the content of the decisions
3 establishing the body which set out its tasks and many other documents in
4 evidence which revealed the role played by the MUP staff in 1998 and the
5 first half of 1999. Some witnesses also ascribed a greater degree of
6 responsibility for the various MUP forces in Kosovo to the MUP staff and
7 to Lukic as its head than was suggested by the Lukic Defence.
8 In the judgement the Chamber sets out in detail its analysis of
9 all the evidence pertaining to the MUP staff and finds that it indeed had
10 a significant role in the planning, organising, controlling, and
11 direction of actions by various MUP forces in Kosovo. The Chamber is
12 convinced that the MUP staff was a key body in both 1998 and 1999, with
13 substantial authority over units falling under the MUP public security
14 department, including special police units when they were deployed to
15 Kosovo, although it did not replace the chains of command within the
16 various MUP units and secretariats. The MUP liaised with the VJ to
17 ensure full coordination of MUP and VJ activities in Kosovo and had an
18 important role in the planning of joint VJ and MUP operations. It also
19 provided a link to the MUP headquarters in Belgrade to which it regularly
21 The Chamber is satisfied that as head of the MUP staff, Lukic was
22 endowed with significant authority over the MUP forces answering to the
23 MUP staff. Indeed, he was understood to be the commander of MUP forces
24 in Kosovo by the foreign diplomats and observers with whom he interacted
25 in Kosovo, and he attended meetings with them on behalf of the MUP staff.
1 He also regularly attended and participated in meetings of the Joint
2 Command and other high-level meetings including in Belgrade. The Chamber
3 finds, therefore, that Lukic was a de facto commander of MUP forces in
4 Kosovo from mid-1998 to mid-1999, as well as being the bridge between the
5 actions of the MUP on the ground in Kosovo and the overarching plans and
6 policies decided in Belgrade
7 detailed knowledge of events in Kosovo as they developed, as well as
8 being informed of allegations of criminal conduct by MUP personnel there.
9 However, the Chamber is not convinced by the evidence brought that Lukic
10 was involved in the concealment of these crimes through the clandestine
11 transportation of civilian bodies from Kosovo to other parts of Serbia
12 Having briefly described the Chamber's conclusions concerning
13 each of the accused, I shall now turn to our findings in relation to the
14 joint criminal enterprise set out in the indictment and the accused's
15 alleged participation therein.
16 The most compelling evidence in support of the allegation that
17 there was a common purpose to modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo in
18 order to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over
19 the province is the evidence establishing the widespread campaign of
20 violence that was directed against the Kosovo Albanian population between
21 March and June 1999 and the resulting massive displacement of that
22 population. The campaign was conducted in an organised manner, utilising
23 significant state resources, and the Chamber heard evidence from numerous
24 witnesses about the fact that they were directed to leave Kosovo for
1 personal identity documents, either as they began their departure,
2 en route, or at the border. These documents were never returned to them.
3 Other factors which the Chamber has taken into account in
4 reaching the conclusion that there was indeed a common purpose to use
5 violence and terror to force a significant number of Kosovo Albanians
6 from their homes and across the borders in order for the state
7 authorities to maintain control over Kosovo are these: The events
8 leading up to the conflict, the arming of non-Albanian civilians in
9 Kosovo and simultaneous disarming of Kosovo Albanians; the breakdown of
10 negotiations to end the Kosovo crisis at the same time as the October
11 Agreements were being breached by the FRY and Serbian authorities; and
12 the concealment of bodies of Kosovo Albanians killed by VJ and MUP
14 The Chamber is not, however, convinced that murder, sexual
15 assault, or the destruction or damage of religious property was within
16 the common purpose, and only considers whether these crimes were
17 reasonably foreseeable in the execution of the common purpose when
18 addressing each of the accused.
19 Being satisfied that there was such a common purpose among
20 high-level officials in the FRY and Serbia
21 execute it through the various forces under their control, the Chamber
22 has analysed whether or not each of the accused participated voluntarily
23 in the joint criminal enterprise, made a significant contribution to it,
24 and shared the intent to commit the crimes or underlying offences that
25 were the object of the enterprise.
1 The Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Milan
2 Milutinovic made a significant contribution to the joint criminal
3 enterprise. The Chamber does not accept that Milutinovic had a legal
4 duty to act to prevent the events that transpired in Kosovo, arising from
5 his oath of office alone in the absence of significant de jure and de
6 facto powers. In addition, it is not prepared to accept that his
7 contribution by omission was significant, given Milutinovic's lack of
8 authority over the forces that were committing the crimes in question.
9 Moreover, the Chamber is unconvinced that Milutinovic shared the intent
10 to use criminal means, namely, deportation and forcible transfer, to
11 retain control over Kosovo by the state authorities.
12 The Chamber is satisfied that Nikola Sainovic had substantial de
13 facto powers over both the MUP and the VJ operating in Kosovo and that he
14 was the political coordinator of these forces. It is convinced that he
15 made a significant contribution to the joint criminal enterprise and
16 that, indeed, he was one of the most crucial members of that common
17 enterprise. From all the evidence, the Chamber finds that it is the only
18 reasonable inference that Sainovic had the intent to forcibly displace
19 part of the Kosovo Albanian population, both within and without Kosovo,
20 and thereby to change the ethnic balance in the province and to ensure
21 continued control by the state authorities over it. The Chamber also
22 finds that the murder of Kosovo Albanian civilians by VJ and MUP forces
23 executing the common criminal plan was reasonably foreseeable to
24 Sainovic, as was the destruction of or damage to religious property,
25 namely mosques. However, by majority, the Chamber does not find that the
1 commission of sexual assault was foreseeable to him.
2 The Chamber finds that, although there is considerable evidence
3 supporting the Prosecution's allegation that Dragoljub Ojdanic was
4 supportive of the commission of crimes throughout Kosovo by VJ and MUP
5 forces in a widespread and systematic attack targeting Kosovo Albanians,
6 it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he shared the intent
7 to ensure continued state control over the province by way of deportation
8 and forcible transfer of a significant proportion of the Kosovo Albanian
9 population. However, by his continued actions in command of the VJ
10 forces subordinated to him, the Chamber finds that Ojdanic provided
11 practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to members of the
12 VJ who he knew intended to commit deportation and forcible transfer. His
13 conduct had a substantial effect on the actual commission of these crimes
14 by VJ forces in some of the locations charged in the indictment.
15 However, the Chamber finds that Ojdanic did not have knowledge that VJ
16 forces had the intent to kill or sexually assault Kosovo Albanian
17 civilians or to damage or destroy religious property.
18 The Chamber has found that Nebojsa Pavkovic had substantial
19 de jure and de facto command authority over VJ forces in Kosovo in 1998
20 and 1999, and that he was in a position of influence, including through
21 his participation in the Joint Command. There is no doubt that his
22 contribution to the joint criminal enterprise was significant, as he
23 utilised the VJ forces at his disposal to terrorise and violently expel
24 Kosovo Albanian civilians from their homes. The Chamber also finds that
25 the only reasonable inference from all the evidence is that Pavkovic had
1 the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian population in order
2 to ensure continued control by the state authorities over the province.
3 Moreover, the Chamber considers that in the circumstances, the commission
4 of murder, sexual assault, and the deliberate destruction of or damage to
5 mosques by the VJ and MUP forces executing his orders, were reasonably
6 foreseeable to Pavkovic.
7 The Chamber finds that, although there is considerable evidence
8 supporting the Prosecution's allegation that Vladimir Lazarevic was
9 supportive of the commission of crimes throughout Kosovo by VJ and MUP
10 forces in a widespread and systematic attack targeting Kosovo Albanians,
11 it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that he shared the intent
12 to ensure continued state control over the province by way of deportation
13 and forcible transfer of a significant proportion of the Kosovo Albanian
14 population. However, by his continued actions in command of the VJ
15 forces subordinated to him, the Chamber finds that Lazarevic provided
16 practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to members of the
17 VJ who he knew intended to commit deportation and forcible transfer. His
18 conduct had a substantial effect on the actual commission of these crimes
19 by VJ forces in some of the locations charged in the indictment.
20 However, the Chamber finds that Lazarevic did not have knowledge that VJ
21 forces had the intent to kill or sexually assault Kosovo Albanian
22 civilians or to damage or destroy religious property.
23 The Chamber has found that Sreten Lukic had substantial authority
24 over MUP units deployed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 and that he was
25 responsible for planning, organising, controlling, and directing the
1 activities of the MUP in the province. He also worked closely with the
2 leadership of the VJ and other state bodies and participated in
3 high-level meetings to discuss the situation in Kosovo. On the basis of
4 all of the evidence, the Chamber finds that Lukic was indeed an important
5 participant in the joint criminal enterprise and made a significant
6 contribution through his control of the MUP forces involved in its
7 execution. The Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference is
8 that Lukic shared the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian
9 population to ensure continued control over the province by the state
10 authorities. It further finds that the murder of Kosovo Albanian
11 civilians by VJ and MUP forces executing the common plan was reasonably
12 foreseeable to Lukic, as was the destruction of or damage to religious
13 property, namely mosques. However, by majority, the Chamber does not
14 find that the commission of sexual assault was foreseeable to him.
15 I have now twice referred to the issue of majority. Judge
16 Chowhan has dissented on the issue of the foreseeability of sexual
17 assault to both Sainovic and Lukic.
18 In determining sentences to be imposed on the accused in this
19 case, the Trial Chamber has taken account of all material before it,
20 including material submitted to it in the course of this week.
21 Will the accused Milutinovic please rise.
22 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
23 you, Milan Milutinovic, to be not guilty pursuant to Articles 7(1) and
24 7(3) of the Statute of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment. Pursuant to Rule
25 99(A) of the Rules, the Chamber ordered that you be released from the
1 United Nations Detention Unit immediately upon the completion of the
2 necessary modalities, without prejudice to any further proceedings that
3 may follow Trial Chamber III
4 the judgement in relation to the three outstanding crime sites in the
6 Please be seated.
7 Will the accused Sainovic please rise.
8 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
9 you, Nikola Sainovic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment by
10 commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise pursuant to
11 Article 7(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a
12 single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment. You will receive credit for
13 the time that you have already served in detention. Pursuant to
14 Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you shall remain in the custody of the
15 Tribunal, pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to
16 the state where you shall serve your sentence.
17 Please be seated.
18 Will the accused Ojdanic please rise.
19 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
20 you, Dragoljub Ojdanic, to be guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment,
21 by aiding and abetting, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, and not
22 guilty of Counts 3 to 5 of the indictment, pursuant to Articles 7(1) and
23 7(3) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single
24 sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. You will receive credit for the
25 time you have already served in detention. Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of
1 the Rules, you will remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the
2 finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you
3 will serve your sentence.
4 Please be seated.
5 Will the accused Pavkovic please rise.
6 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
7 you, Nebojsa Pavkovic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment,
8 by commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise, pursuant to
9 Article 7(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a
10 single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment. You will receive credit for
11 the time you have already served in detention. Pursuant to Rule 103(C)
12 of the Rules, you shall remain in custody of the Tribunal pending the
13 finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you
14 will serve your sentence.
15 Please be seated.
16 Will the accused Lazarevic please rise.
17 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
18 you, Vladimir Lazarevic, to be guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the
19 indictment, by aiding and abetting, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the
20 Statute, and not guilty of Counts 3 to 5 of the indictment, pursuant to
21 Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber hereby
22 sentences you to a single sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. You will
23 receive credit for the time you have already served in detention.
24 Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, you will remain in the custody of
25 the Tribunal pending the finalisation of arrangements for your transfer
1 to the state where you will serve your sentence.
2 Please be seated.
3 Will the accused Lukic please rise.
4 For all the reasons I have summarised, the Trial Chamber finds
5 you, Sreten Lukic, to be guilty of Counts 1 to 5 of the indictment, by
6 commission as a member of a joint criminal enterprise, pursuant to
7 Article 7(1) of the Statute. The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a
8 single sentence of 22 years of imprisonment. You will receive credit for
9 the time you have already served in detention. Pursuant to Rule 103(C)
10 of the Rules, you will remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the
11 finalisation of arrangements for your transfer to the state where you
12 will serve your sentence.
13 Please be seated.
14 This hearing is now adjourned.
15 --- Whereupon the judgement adjourned at 3.48 p.m.