1 Wednesday, 11 July 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.15 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps the usher could already try to find the
7 Meanwhile, Madam Registrar, could you call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 Mr. Groome.
12 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I can make use of this time. First,
13 I would like to introduce the Trial Chamber to a member of the trial
14 team, Ms. Julia Lee, who is here with me in court. And the second thing,
15 Your Honour, is that I'm prepared at the end of my examination to make
16 rather detailed submissions about the associated exhibits. I would just
17 ask the Chamber to consider whether it might be a more efficient use of
18 time to postpone that until after the next witness who is here and ready
19 to begin testimony, but I'll be guided by the Chamber. They're somewhat
20 detailed because of their implications for the entire case, but I ask the
21 Chamber to consider when the best time to have those would be.
22 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that you have put them on paper.
23 Knowing you, Mr. Groome, you usually are well prepared. Is there any way
24 as to have them sent already perhaps to the Defence and to the Chamber
25 what you intend to say and see whether there would be any dispute about
2 MR. GROOME: I can't do that right now, but at the first
3 opportunity I will do that.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, no, it's just a suggestion.
5 MR. GROOME: I'm happy to do that, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then let me check with my colleagues whether they
7 would agree with such a procedure as well.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Apologies, Mr. Harland, for not paying proper
11 attention to you entering the courtroom. Please be seated.
12 I would, first of all, like to remind you that you're still bound
13 by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your
15 WITNESS: DAVID HARLAND [Resumed]
16 JUDGE ORIE: And Mr. Groome will now continue his
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Harland.
20 THE WITNESS: I had a small question about the guidance you gave
21 me last night and I was wondering if now would be a good time to put that
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please.
24 THE WITNESS: Last -- today, as you know, is the anniversary of
25 the fall of Srebrenica and I was contacted last night by a media
1 organisation that asked me after this afternoon whether I'd be willing to
2 give an interview. And they sent three questions and they're actually
3 about Srebrenica as it applies to Syria. And mindful of your guidance, I
4 didn't give a committal reply either way, as I'm not sure whether my
5 testimony will be completed by then. Obviously I hope so, but I seek
6 your guidance on that matter.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let me, first of all, check with my colleagues.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber instructs you, Mr. Harland, and
10 clarifies its instruction to you that you should not speak with anyone
11 about any matter what is subject of your testimony; subject of your
12 testimony being everything that's found in your statement. So therefore,
13 perhaps it would be wiser at this moment -- although I do understand it
14 cause you some difficulties, but perhaps under the present circumstances
15 that the integrity of these proceedings must prevail above what is
16 perhaps proper attention paying to what has happened in the past.
17 THE WITNESS: Understood.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 THE WITNESS: Understood.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
21 Then, Mr. Groome.
22 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Examination by Mr. Groome: [Continued]
24 Q. Good morning --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one more thing. I notice that
1 conversations within teams sometimes go at a certain volume which even
2 goes through my earphones, and that is very likely caused by the fact
3 that if the one speaking is wearing earphones himself at that moment that
4 usually the volume goes up considerably. So could I invite the - and I'm
5 especially at this moment addressing the Defence - could I invite you
6 that if you want to speak to each other that you do it at such a volume
7 level that it does not disturb the proceedings.
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Harland.
10 THE WITNESS: Sorry, I apologise. One more thing. I also had
11 a -- this morning a further reflection on the two questions you put to
12 me, one about cadastral records and the other about water. Neither I
13 think is probably central to the case, and I'm certainly happy to let it
14 pass on but if you're interested I had a further reflection on them.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Let's first see whether any of the parties wants to
16 re-visit that matter. It could be that further questions are asked in
17 cross-examination. I wouldn't like to anticipate on that. At the end we
18 could still consider whether or not to give you an opportunity to
19 complete your answers in that respect.
20 THE WITNESS: Understood.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
22 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Harland, if I could begin my questions to you today by
24 drawing your attention to the anti-sniping agreement of the 14th of
25 August, 1994. You discuss it in your statement and the Prosecution will
1 be tendering the document itself, 65 ter 10030. My question to you
2 simply is: Is once that agreement was in place, was there a noticeable
3 diminution of sniping activity into Sarajevo?
4 A. Yes, immediately.
5 Q. And for approximately how long did that state last, if you're
7 A. For several weeks, but I cannot be more precise after almost
8 20 years.
9 MR. GROOME: Could I ask now that the court officer bring to our
10 screens 65 ter 10240. And I would ask that we begin by looking at the
11 first page of the document and I will be tendering this document.
12 Q. My first question to you, Mr. Harland, when you are able to see
13 the document is can you describe the type of document that we are looking
14 at on our screens?
15 A. That is an UNPROFOR daily sitrep from UNPROFOR headquarters to
16 New York.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, this document contains a description of a
18 shelling which occurred on this day and which is charged as G(18) in the
19 indictment as well as a summary of all military activity in Sarajevo
20 during this day and the Chamber will be able to read that for themselves.
21 But there is something I want you to clarify which they may have a
22 question about. And if I can draw your attention to the subject line
23 that we can see on the first page and can I ask for your assistance in
24 interpreting the series of numbers and the description that we see in the
25 subject line.
1 A. Yeah, so it's United Nations peace force headquarters daily
2 situation report, 28 August 1995 from 0001 hour bravo time, which is
3 local time, to 28th of August, 2359 bravo time, which local time one
4 minute before midnight. So it's the 24-hour period of the
5 28th of August, 1995.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. GROOME: Now, now could I ask that 65 ter 05356 be brought to
8 our screens. It is a document dated the 15th of July, 1995, and authored
9 by Mr. Harland it is entitled: "Sector Sarajevo Weekly Situation
10 Report." And the Prosecution will be tendering this document.
11 Q. Mr. Harland, once again, when the document is visible on the
12 screen before you, can you please tell us if you recognise it and if you
13 had an opportunity to review it just before testifying?
14 A. Yes, this one is by me and yes I had an opportunity to review it.
15 MR. GROOME: Could we please advance to page 4 of the original
16 and the middle of page 3 in the translation.
17 Q. In the second paragraph on this page you describe sporadic
18 bombardment of Sarajevo, and you say:
19 "Apparently in an effort to terrorise the population."
20 And you go on to say that during this period 25 civilians were
21 killed and 98 were wounded. My question to you is: What, if anything,
22 military hostilities were taking place in this week in Sarajevo?
23 A. This is after the Bosnian spring offensive, so it was actually
24 relatively quiet period on the confrontation line but there was
25 significant pressure on the civilian population. So limited conventional
1 military activity around Sarajevo during this week, as I remember.
2 MR. GROOME: Can we please advance to the last paragraph of
3 page 5 of the original and the last paragraph on page 4 of the
5 Q. In the last paragraph on this page you write:
6 "The morale of citizens in Bosnia's capital is low. The number
7 of people attempting to desert from the army and to flee the country all
8 together seems to be increasing. There is a general air of fear and
9 disillusionment. Many of UNPROFOR local employees are talking of trying
10 to get out. People talk openly of not being able to stand a fourth
11 winter under siege."
12 My question is the following: Are you able to assist the Chamber
13 in understanding how much of this low morale among the citizens of
14 Sarajevo is due to the eight levers that you describe in your statement
15 and how much is related to other factors unrelated to those eight levers?
16 A. It's a difficult question. Obviously there was a cumulative
17 sense of privation and suffering. Even people who had deliberately
18 decided to stay in the city for the first few years were not willing or
19 not able psychologically to cope with the idea of another winter, perhaps
20 without electricity or gas or sufficient amounts of water or food. And
21 the people we interacted -- with us told us that. But clearly it wasn't
22 the only factor. In fact - although General Mladic will be able to
23 clarify more - our assessment was that, in fact, all three sides, the
24 Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croats, had for different reasons concluded
25 that they should try to end the war in 1995.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, would you refrain from telling us who
2 else, including the accused, could give us the information because it's
3 for the parties to decide who they will call as witnesses and for what
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. GROOME:
8 Q. Mr. Harland, throughout your statement you talk in some detail
9 about negotiations that you attended in UNPROFOR and different UN
10 officials attended. Did your office ever arrange negotiations directly
11 between the parties; that is to say, between a member of the Bosnian army
12 and the Bosnian Serb army?
13 A. Yes, all the time.
14 Q. And is there one in particular in relation to Mr. Palic that you
15 personally arranged?
16 A. Yes, you refer to Colonel Avdo Palic of Zepa.
17 Q. And can you describe what you did to arrange a negotiation with
18 respect to him?
19 A. Colonel Avdo Palic was the military commander of the Bosnian
20 enclave of Zepa. After Srebrenica fell, the Serb forces began an assault
21 on Zepa. In order to try to minimise the suffering of the civilians,
22 Palic contacted us and said that he would be willing to discuss with the
23 Serbs directly an evacuation of the civilian population of Zepa so that
24 when it came to a final assault on the enclave the civilian casualties
25 would be less. We -- actually, it was not me personally. I sent a
1 colleague of mine, Ed Joseph, to convey that message to the Serb forces
2 assaulting Zepa at that point, and he passed the message to the Serb
3 commander he found, which I believe was General Tolimir.
4 Q. And was -- did your office provide transportation to realise that
6 A. Yes, General Tolimir said he would welcome that and Colonel Palic
7 should join him at a Serb position immediately above the canyon of Zepa.
8 And so my office put Colonel Palic in one of our vehicles and took him up
9 the winding road to the forward Serb command positions.
10 Q. Now, Mr. Harland, the Chamber in its recent decision regarding
11 your evidence reminded the Prosecution of the necessity of exploring with
12 you some of the conclusions and opinions in your statement. In
13 paragraph 258 of your statement, you make an assertion that is
14 unequivocal - I don't want to ask you about it. The first sentence of
15 the paragraph, 258, reads as follows:
16 "There was never any doubt whether Mladic had command and control
17 of his military."
18 Are you able to set out in clear, concrete terms for the Chamber
19 the factual basis for such a statement?
20 A. Yes. I would make two comments. First is about General Mladic's
21 interaction with all the personnel around him. We saw him all the time
22 in the company of General Gvero, General Tolimir, the other,
23 General Milovanovic, and all the more junior officers and the corps
24 commanders, and there was no doubt that they deferred to him on
25 everything and treated him, in fact, with great, extreme respect. More
1 importantly, though, I think our assessment - it wasn't just my
2 assessment, it was a commonly held view among those of us who interacted
3 with him - was that there was a direct connection between
4 General Mladic's statements and results and effects and actions on the
5 ground, down to quite -- from very large matters to quite small matters.
6 So a very trivial thing such as, you know, I myself getting stopped at
7 the Rogatica check-point could eventually be passed all the way up and
8 somebody would say, no, they couldn't allow me or others through or a
9 convoy through until they had personal authorisation from General Mladic
10 to -- and then when it came it would immediately be possible. But, more
11 importantly, large-scale things he could make happen. So you've already
12 asked me at the beginning of this -- yesterday's session about
13 Mount Igman. General Mladic went through in great detail in my presence
14 exactly which positions the Serb forces would be willing to redeploy from
15 from Mount Igman, at exactly what time, to exactly which direction, and
16 they were serious about it because they thought they were going to be
17 bombed by NATO, which they said. And when he ordered it, it happened.
18 He even took several of my colleagues around. He flew in his little
19 small helicopter to the top of Bjelasnica and you could see it happening.
20 Similarly, we also discussed the total exclusion zone that emerged from
21 the cease-fire of February 1994, again when they thought they were going
22 to be bombed by NATO, he gave orders and he told us what the orders were,
23 and our UNMOs in realtime could see the tanks moving, the heavy weapons
24 coming into the collection zones. There was never any doubt in our mind
25 that here was an officer in total command and control of the forces
1 subordinate to him.
2 Q. You were there in Sarajevo from 1993 until the end of the war.
3 Was there any period during the time you were there that you believed
4 something other than what you've just described?
5 A. I believe there were periods of tension between the civilian
6 leadership led by Dr. Karadzic and the military structures under the
7 command and control of General Mladic. I never had any doubt that the
8 military structures were effectively under General Mladic's control, but
9 I think there definitely were periods of tension, yes, between the
10 military and the civilian leadership in Pale; particularly, for example,
11 right at the end of the war, July, August, September, October of 1995,
12 for example.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have no further questions at this
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome.
16 Very practically about your detailed submissions of the
17 associated exhibits, when will we -- when -- I would say especially when
18 will the Defence receive them so they can orient themselves on them?
19 MR. GROOME: During the first break, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: During the first break.
21 Mr. Lukic, is that then -- you have announced again and again
22 which ones you would want to tender. That means that you should keep in
23 the back of your mind, Mr. Lukic, that they are potentially admitted.
24 And are you ready to start your cross-examination?
25 MR. LUKIC: I am ready, Your Honour, but probably I should
1 receive some guidance regarding the time. I'm interested in how much
2 time do we need for this witness, or we should just go?
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, there is a lengthy statement of this
5 witness and it comprises a lot; therefore, the Chamber is not intending
6 at this moment to put specific time-limits. Nevertheless, it invites you
7 to be as focused and as efficient as possible and always try to find such
8 a line of questioning that the Chamber understands in which direction
9 we're moving. But could you give us an indication as to how much time
10 you would need?
11 MR. LUKIC: We calculated and I think nine hours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Nine hours is a lot, but again --
13 MR. LUKIC: I'll try to make it shorter as much as possible.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will, first of all, observe how you
15 conduct your cross-examination and would advise you to start with the
16 most salient points and not -- of course we leave the cross-examination
17 in your hands, but if at a certain moment we would consider that it has
18 not been of such efficiency that you should be given more time than as
19 you at that point in time say you would need, then at least you've dealt
20 with the most important parts. So try to prioritise as well the matters
21 you would like to raise with the witness.
22 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, you will now be cross-examined by
1 Mr. Lukic. Mr. Lukic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Harland.
4 A. Good morning.
5 Q. I would like to start from paragraphs 3 and 4 of your statement.
6 Do you have the statement in front of you?
7 A. Not yet.
8 MR. LUKIC: Can somebody help us so Mr. Harland has a statement
9 with him.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is there a hard copy available to Mr. Harland?
11 Mr. Harland, you will find major portions, I don't know whether
12 you're aware of that, blackened out --
13 THE WITNESS: I saw that.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Paragraphs 3 and 4, they are not crossed out. We can talk about
17 them. In these paragraphs you talk about your education, and I would
18 like to ask you the following about that: You don't have any military
19 education, training; is that correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And you don't have any ballistics training; is that correct?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. You have no medical training?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Lukic, may I ask you to give the number of
2 the document? I assume it's P1. We would like to have that displayed on
3 the screen and put the number on the record.
4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll do so.
5 Madam Registrar, can you help us. Is this P1? This gentleman's
6 statement is P1? Can it be put on the ELMO, please -- or actually on the
7 e-court. Sorry.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Would you be so kind and tell us what were your
9 tasks specifically in Sarajevo at UNPROFOR?
10 A. I -- for the first period of the war, I was a civil affairs
11 officer in BH command, which was the Sarajevo headquarters of UNPROFOR.
12 And my job was as a political officer to aggregate information from
13 different sources, from contacts with the parties, from our own military
14 contingents and UNMOs and from humanitarian sources and to make analyses
15 and presentations for the UNPROFOR leadership and to participate in
16 organised meetings with the warring factions, both the military and
17 political and humanitarian elements within them and to participate in
18 these and to organise any follow-up to them that might occur.
19 In the final part of the war, I was the head of the civil affairs
20 section for Sector Sarajevo; and then in the very last month or two of
21 the war, I was the political advisor to General Smith, who was the
22 commander of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia.
23 Q. In your statement you said that your duties revolved around the
24 political strategy. What did this political strategy encompass, briefly
25 if you can, please?
1 A. Well, for example, during 1995 there -- after the collapse of the
2 Contact Group plan in 1994 there was an effort, first, to understand what
3 were the war aims of the three major belligerents plus other surrounding
4 states; and to advise the UNPROFOR leadership on how UNPROFOR might best
5 position itself in order to be able to carry out its mandate, either
6 narrowly to assist with delivery of humanitarian aid or, more broadly, to
7 try and bring the conflict to an end.
8 Q. Did this include proposals for bombing?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. And now if we can look at paragraph 14, please.
11 There you say that you ensured freedom of movement for civilians. Could
12 civilians freely leave Sarajevo?
13 A. No, they could not.
14 Q. In the area where you lived in Sarajevo, did you see if any Serbs
15 also lived there?
16 A. Yes, in considerable numbers.
17 Q. And were you informed, since you were a civil affairs officer,
18 that Serbs were killed in Sarajevo, Serb civilians?
19 A. Yes, certainly.
20 Q. Thank you. Did you find out, did you investigate, who killed
21 them, when, and where, and did you report about this?
22 A. Yes. We -- when there were casualties, we did attempt to
23 disaggregate the casualty data by the ethnicity of the victims, if
24 possible; and we did attempt to determine the cause of death.
25 Q. And in these investigations, what did you find? What did you
1 conclude? How many Serbs were killed in Sarajevo during the war, are you
2 able to tell us?
3 A. We -- first of all, we certainly did not investigate the death of
4 everybody killed during the period that I was there. It was only a sort
5 of representative sample or we had access to some of the broader data
6 which didn't give particular levels of detail. I think our conclusion
7 was that during the siege roughly 10.000 people were killed all together
8 and roughly 10 per cent of those were Serbs, which was roughly
9 proportional to their share of the population in the area controlled by
10 the Bosnian government.
11 Q. So then you would not agree with me if I were to tell you that
12 more than 5.000 Serbs were killed in Sarajevo?
13 A. I never saw any evidence that affects -- in fact, I would
14 disagree with that, yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask whether you are talking about the same
16 Sarajevo. You're talking about Sarajevo.
17 You're talking about the government-controlled area of Sarajevo.
18 Are we talking about the same?
19 Are you putting to this witness that whether he disagrees with
20 the fact that 5.000 people, Serbs, were killed within the area controlled
21 by the government --
22 MR. LUKIC: Yes, that's what I'm --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So there may be more even in the area outside
24 of the --
25 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we have verified that. Thank you.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Did you have information that Serbs in Sarajevo were taken to the
5 front lines to dig trenches?
6 A. Yes, we did.
7 Q. And as UNPROFOR, did you do anything about this?
8 A. Yes, it was one of the issues we protested to the Bosnian army.
9 Q. Thank you. Other than protests, did you suggest perhaps any kind
10 of punishment to the Bosnian government -- I would rather refer to them
11 as the Bosniak government. Did you ask for any kind of punitive action
12 against the government?
13 A. We asked -- when there were cases that came to our attention that
14 Serbs had been put into dangerous positions to dig trenches, also we had
15 examples of when Serbs were forced to clear mines by hand from very
16 dangerous areas, such as Stup and Zuc, we lodged a formal protest and we
17 advised them that they were potentially committing war crimes. I
18 remember personally I did this both to General Karavelic and to
19 General Hajrulahovic.
20 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 19(C) you say:
21 "I was the point of contact with other international and
22 non-governmental organisations operating in Sarajevo, such as UNHCR and
23 the International Committee of the Red Cross."
24 My question is this: Did you receive information from the ICRC
25 about Serb victims, especially for the area that was under the control of
1 the Bosniak government?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Based on this information, you concluded that it was only 1.000
4 Serbs who were killed in Sarajevo?
5 A. I would not say that was the only source of information, no, but
6 that was one of the sources that we would want to consult with.
7 Q. Thank you. I would now like to look at paragraph 25, please, and
8 there you say:
9 "When I arrived in Sarajevo, the city had been under siege for
10 about a year."
11 The centre of Sarajevo that was held by the Bosniak government at
12 the time, were there Serb settlements around that centre, area?
13 A. In general, the population of Serb ethnicity was distributed
14 throughout the area. There was some areas which had higher
15 concentrations of Serbs and there is some like, you know, the old town
16 which had lower concentrations of Serbs. But, in general, they were
17 dispersed throughout the area controlled by the government.
18 Q. And do you know that the settlements or neighbourhoods around
19 Sarajevo that were under the control of the Serbs were actually Serb
21 A. Yes, that's correct, yeah.
22 Q. Thank you. The centre of Sarajevo that was under the control of
23 the Bosniaks had a land connection with other areas that were under
24 Bosniak control across from Butmir airport; is that right? And through
25 the tunnel?
1 A. Yes -- right. The airport was controlled by the United Nations,
2 and then from early 1993 the Bosniaks had completed a tunnel underneath
3 it, so more or less, yes, sir.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you know about the tunnel?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you know that weapons were being brought into the city
7 through the tunnel?
8 A. Yes, and taken out.
9 Q. Thank you. Now if you would kindly look at paragraph 27. You
10 saw a map of Sarajevo yesterday that the Prosecution showed us where
11 lines were marked in red and blue, do you remember?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can we conclude then that fighting was conducted throughout
14 Sarajevo and that the line of separation lay all around Sarajevo?
15 A. Do you mean that there was fighting around -- along the whole
16 length of the confrontation line?
17 Q. [In English] Yes.
18 A. Yes. Some parts of it were traditionally much more active and
19 some parts were much more quiet, but your general statement is correct,
21 Q. [Interpretation] Now, we saw on the map that this line of
22 separation was there. Was it 100 metres? Was it 200 metres between the
23 units of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Bosnia and
25 A. It varied. In some places that I visited with the French forces,
1 the distance was less than the distance between you and me. So there was
2 a building we called the red building in Grbavica, where one part of the
3 building was controlled by Serb forces and one part of the building was
4 controlled by Bosnian forces. But there were some areas, I would say in
5 the north-east of the city, which were more rural, beyond the city
6 limits, where the distance between the forward positions of the sides
7 might be much greater.
8 Q. Thank you. There was fighting in the centre as well, for
9 instance, around Skenderija; isn't that right?
10 A. Not in Skenderija itself when I was there. When I was there,
11 Skenderija was well under government control, but there was certainly
12 fighting immediately south of Skenderija, yes.
13 Q. Grbavica, Vrace, Ilijas?
14 A. Well, Grbavica and Vrace were areas of very intense fighting.
15 Ilijas was outside of the main Sarajevo area and was not a major area of
17 Q. Also, there was a separation line running through all of Dobrinja
18 and around the airport; isn't that right?
19 A. That's correct, a very active line.
20 Q. Nedzarici as well, north of the airport, that was under the
21 control of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps while the
22 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina held three sides Alipasino Polje, Mojmilo and
23 Stup, respectively; is that right?
24 A. Yes, a very active part of the confrontation line.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I explore, Mr. Lukic. Is there any dispute
1 about what has been the testimony of this witness for the last, well,
2 let's say two pages, that confrontation lines went through these areas,
3 that there was a tunnel, that weapons passed through the tunnel. Is
4 there any dispute about these matters, Mr. Groome?
5 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.
6 MR. LUKIC: But it hasn't been established, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: No, therefore I am a bit surprised that after eight
8 or nine months of negotiations of what could be agreed facts, that there
9 seems to be no problem about it. So therefore we've listened to
10 testimony for at least two pages, if not more, which is apparently not in
11 dispute. The Chamber would very much like the parties to focus on
12 matters which are in dispute. Please proceed.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
14 Q. [Interpretation] I'm just going to continue with this very
15 briefly because we need this in order to move on, that is to say to one
16 of the essential parts of your testimony. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
17 held Lukavica, that is, 5 to 6 kilometres away from Ilidza, whereas the
18 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in full control in these positions of the
19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from Mount Igman; isn't that right?
20 A. I'm sorry?
21 Q. I'm reminding you of your testimony on the 15th of January, 2007,
22 transcript page 371. This is what you said:
23 "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps held Lukavica, that is, 5 to
24 6 kilometres east of Ilidza, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 controlled these positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from
1 Mount Igman."
2 A. I don't think I would have used the English word "control." I
3 mean, Lukavica and Ilidza were areas under Serb control. I might have
4 suggested that these areas can be fired upon from Bosnian-held high
5 ground on Mount Igman. But the two places you mentioned, Lukavica and
6 Ilidza, were places firmly and safely under the control of Serb forces.
7 But I think there might be an issue with the word "control."
8 Q. [In English] Maybe it's lost in translation.
9 A. Okay, maybe.
10 Q. [Interpretation] Just one more question in relation to this. To
11 the north-west Sokolj hill, Vogosca, Ilijas, the hill of Zuc, the hill of
12 Hum, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina held under its control the hill of
13 Zuc that was above Vogosca; is that right?
14 A. That's correct, yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to move on to paragraph 28. This is
16 what you say:
17 "The entire city was regularly exposed to gun-fire or shelling."
18 That is going to be in dispute here. Who fired at who and from
19 where? That is why I'd like to ask you the following: From the centre
20 of town, that is to say the area that was controlled by the
21 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was fire opened at Serb positions?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You had electronic equipment monitoring the shooting and could
24 you establish the direction from which the firing had come?
25 A. In most cases, yes.
1 Q. For example, if an anti-aircraft gun was fired and it can fire up
2 to 30 rounds in a very short period of time and also it can be used in
3 infantry fighting, would that be registered as 30 shells or rounds?
4 A. There was a protocol from the agreed among the military observers
5 that multi-fire weapons, rapid-fire weapons, which included those Praga
6 guns and so on, anti-aircraft fire, they would count one burst as one
7 detonation, but one burst might include multiple rounds.
8 Q. But they can also explode once they hit the target; right?
9 A. Yes. The maps which UNPROFOR used each morning to show where
10 heavy rounds had impacted, I believe that they counted from 60-millimetre
11 mortars and above. So Praga gun, anti-aircraft guns, multi-fire weapons
12 were generally excluded; but, you're right, they were in a sort of middle
13 category between light weapons and heavier area weapons.
14 Q. When there were casualties in the area that was under control of
15 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you assumed that the fire had come
16 from the side that was held by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; right? That
17 is what you said in your testimony on page 406 from January 2007.
18 A. We didn't and didn't have the capacity to investigate every
19 firing incident, of course, on every victim, but when it was possible to
20 confirm, either from the UNMOs or my military colleagues or directly
21 seeing who was shooting or from mortar detecting radar, then, yes, the
22 overwhelming majority of impacts that landed in the government-controlled
23 part of the city came from the Serb-controlled part of the city.
24 Q. In paragraph 29 you speak about the predictable regimen of water
25 collection, food collection, and also limited movement. Yesterday you
1 told us - and I'm going to go back to that as well - you spoke about
2 barriers. Is it correct that all of this pertained both to the parts of
3 town that were held by the Bosniak government and army as well as those
4 parts that were held by the Army of Republika Srpska?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Since you're not an explosives expert or a military
7 expert for that matter, I am not going to torment you for very long with
8 paragraph 30 [as interpreted], where you said that about 1.000 shells
9 fell every day on the area of the inner city of Sarajevo. Shall we agree
10 that you are not a person that we should discuss this with in detail, a
11 person who kept ledgers, registers, who reported this. You only heard
12 about this at briefings, right? You never went out to see for yourself
13 what had happened except for the individual cases you refer to in your
15 A. It's true. My job was to aggregate information. Of course all
16 around me the shells were firing, so -- were landing, so I was aware of
17 them to that extent. And when one was particularly interesting, I would
18 go with the UNMO or the battalion teams. But your general
19 characterisation is correct.
20 Q. Thank you. And now paragraph 37, please. You speak about Serb
21 pressure, which meant -- which is shorthand for ratcheting up terror, as
22 you say here. Also, you say that the pressure goes up once peace plans
23 collapse --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, just for the Chamber to being fully able
25 to follow, you said in your question, page 23, line 23:
1 "I'm not going to torment you very long with paragraph 30, where
2 you said that about 30 shells fell every day -- 1.000."
3 MR. LUKIC: 1.000, yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Reading paragraph 30, I do not see that as a
5 statement of the witness, so we are a bit puzzled by --
6 MR. LUKIC: 34.
7 JUDGE ORIE: 3-4.
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, that's clear. Thank you. Please proceed.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thanks.
11 Q. [Interpretation] Did you witness offensives launched by the
12 Bosniak army, offensives that were launched from Sarajevo; and if so, how
13 many did you see for yourself out of the 28?
14 A. Yes, I would sometimes see a part of them. I would see people
15 going to the front line or units being moved or weapons, mortars being
16 moved, or -- because the city was so small, just a few kilometres across,
17 you would also hear and sometimes see the weapons being fired. So, yes,
18 and some of them, you know, like those in the spring of 1995 were
19 basically visible to all residents of the city.
20 Q. When you speak about Igman in this regard on the
21 15th of January, 2007, transcript page 340, you say that the
22 demilitarised zone in Igman was de facto under the control of the
23 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the moment when the demilitarised
24 area was created all the way up until the end of the conflict. And also
25 that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a matter of fact established
1 points of control even behind that. My question: Were offensives often
2 launched against Serb positions from these high altitudes and Serb
3 positions were below?
4 A. If I remember correctly, the Bosnian army did not station heavy
5 weapons that we observed in the demilitarised zone, but it is certainly
6 true that they used it and transited it and launched attacks through it.
7 That is correct.
8 Q. Could we agree then that such a demilitarised zone was a
9 legitimate military objective?
10 A. That's probably a better question for you as a lawyer to answer,
11 but I think we can agree that de facto it was not really demilitarised.
12 Q. Thank you. Now that we're discussing the Army of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina, tell us what your knowledge is. How many members did the
14 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina have within the city of
16 A. I --
17 Q. Perhaps I can jog your memory. On the 16th of January, 2007, on
18 page 459 you said that the 1st Corps had 30- to 40.000 soldiers within
19 Sarajevo; is that correct?
20 A. I would say it varied over time. I -- it -- during the earlier
21 part of my time, I would guess it had fewer than that and didn't have
22 weapons for all its members. I knew people who shared weapons. It grew
23 over time, but then also over time mobility grew. So they would rotate
24 quite large units out of Sarajevo, for example, in 1995 for combat, for
25 example, in the area of 3rd Corps or even 2nd Corps in the far north. So
1 I'm not sure that I should give a single -- try to give a single number
2 that covers the whole three years that I was there, but some low tens of
4 Q. Also, could we agree that the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina had an advantage in terms of personnel levels when compared
6 to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?
7 A. Yes, I think that's almost certainly correct.
8 Q. Is it also correct that the weapons of the
9 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were of medium quality, both in terms of quality,
10 maintenance, and replenishment?
11 A. You promised not to torment me on military issues too much, but
12 that was certainly my amateur assessment that the tanks and the heavy
13 weapons available to the Serb forces were of medium quality and
14 readiness, yes.
15 Q. Also, I'd just like to remind you of your testimony on the
16 16th of January, 2007, the transcript page is 415, and you say there that
17 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina received equipment and weaponry at the end
18 of 1994 and beginning of 1995, and that at that point in time the Army of
19 Republika Srpska was the weaker side in that area?
20 A. Yes, it is certainly true that the Bosnian army received weapons
21 and uniforms and some training during that 1994 /1995 period. We saw
22 that and we felt a slow shift in the relative balance of power, yes.
23 Q. At that time, the end of 1994, due to the offensives launched by
24 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you ask for military force to be used
25 against that military component in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
1 A. No, I don't think we did.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, if you want to communicate with counsel,
4 seek an appropriate way rather than talking at a distance. So if you
5 want to address anyone, then -- Mr. Lukic, then apparently Mr. Mladic
6 wants to have a break already -- is that, Mr. Mladic, which -- or you
7 want to consult with counsel.
8 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, I don't know maybe -- how much time do
9 we have?
10 JUDGE ORIE: We started late, but we usually have a break at
11 10.30, so if you think this an appropriate moment for a break, then we
12 will take a break.
13 MR. LUKIC: Maybe it would be clever to consult with my
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
16 MR. GROOME: Before we take a break, there is just one brief
17 issue I would like to address to the Chamber.
18 JUDGE ORIE: In the presence of the witness?
19 MR. GROOME: It has nothing to do with the witness.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing to do with the witness. Then I -- and would
21 that not take up much time?
22 [The witness stands down]
23 MR. GROOME: I think less than a minute, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Less than a minute. Then I suggest we take that.
25 Could you already follow the usher, Mr. Harland.
1 And then, Mr. Groome, please address the Chamber.
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, when the Prosecution issued or gave
3 notice of the witnesses it would call, it invited some input from the
4 Defence regarding the approximate time it would think it would to
5 cross-examine the witnesses, and it did not receive any. So I would just
6 renew the request that I think that if Mr. Lukic can provide some
7 estimate, and I accept that it's an estimate and cannot be terribly
8 precise until he hears the witness's testimony, I think we could avoid
9 some unnecessary inconvenience to the witness and also unnecessary
10 expense to the witness. I will go up and speak with the next witness who
11 is here in the building. I would appreciate if there is any guidance the
12 Chamber can give me when it thinks it would want to have him here to
13 receive his evidence so that he can make appropriate plan for the rest of
14 the day or how he uses his time today.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I think the more important question
17 would be whether he would start his testimony tomorrow, that's -- so for
18 today there's no chance that any next witness would start giving
20 MR. GROOME: Well, Your Honour, if he -- it looks like he won't
21 start his testimony tomorrow. I think he may wish to return home today
22 to take care of some business.
23 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider that and perhaps you -- perhaps also
24 use the break and sit with Mr. Lukic, for example, that Mr. Lukic say: I
25 want to raise the existence of a tunnel, any dispute about it? No. Then
1 after the break we'll hear that the parties agree that there was a tunnel
2 under the Butmir airport. That any problem with weapons smuggled through
3 it? No dispute. Okay. That tunnel was used for importing and exporting
4 weapons. Then the next question would perhaps be the size of the troops
5 in Sarajevo and whether there was any change. I think that that would --
6 Mr. Lukic, these apparently are all facts which are not raised by the
7 Prosecution, most likely because they will not rely on it. But you'll
8 neither confirm, not deny spontaneously because it's -- apparently may
9 not be relevant for your case. But at the same time, if Mr. Lukic
10 apparently wants to raise some issues as the existence of a tunnel,
11 you're not there to deny that that tunnel existed. So, therefore, that
12 can save a lot of time and when I was talking about a focused
13 cross-examination and an efficient cross-examination, I also had in the
14 back of my mind that you try to find out mutually what is in dispute and
15 what is not. I mean, to have a long trial dealing with a lot of matters
16 which apparently are not in dispute between the parties seems not to be
17 the best way of using our time.
18 We take a break, Mr. -- unless there's anything else, we take a
19 break and we resume at five minutes to 11.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be brought into the courtroom.
24 Meanwhile, any discussions between Mr. Lukic and Mr. Groome, any
25 result as far as timing for cross-examination is concerned to be
2 MR. LUKIC: Unfortunately not regarding this cross-examination,
3 Your Honour. We did discuss, but we didn't have time to finalise
4 anything of course.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 Under the present circumstances as far as the next witness is
7 concerned, Mr. Groome, it seems to be unrealistic to expect that he could
8 start his testimony any earlier than Friday and I think if that message
9 can be sent to him. I take it that the time at which we'll start on
10 Friday remains the same still, influenced by travel arrangements?
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I just spoke with the witness. He's
12 willing to take the first plane available so we're looking at that option
13 now. Next week he was fully committed to other things, but he is willing
14 if the Chamber were to be able to say that he would -- his evidence would
15 continue on Monday, he will endeavour in the next hour to rearrange his
16 schedule on Monday and be here for Monday as well.
17 JUDGE ORIE: That would be highly appreciated.
18 MR. GROOME: I will pass that on as well, Your Honour, thanks.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, please be seated. The Chamber received
21 a message that it's still a bit unclear what our instructions are in
22 relation to the interview you were asked for.
23 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Let me try to explain the following: Your testimony
25 is mainly about Sarajevo but not exclusively about Sarajevo. Yesterday
1 questions were asked about matters which were far beyond Sarajevo, so
2 everything that could possibly touch upon what is in your testimony - and
3 that would also be eastern enclaves - you talked about that yesterday -
4 or gas lines - or we do not even know what further in cross-examination
5 could appear, everything that could be linked in any way related -- to be
6 in any way to the subject matter of your testimony in the widest, the
7 broadest sense, you're not allowed to speak about that let alone in
8 public. The Chamber of course therefore asks itself what then remains to
9 be interviewed about. If it is about several years in Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina and not limited to Sarajevo, at the same time if someone
11 wants to interview about and says Syria, were you ever in the
12 Middle East, of course you can answer that question. But if anyone asks
13 you: Syria, do you see any -- could you compare that with the situation
14 in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Then it would immediately stop there because
15 the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid -- in the
16 early/mid-1990s is part of your testimony. So we are not the ones who
17 say you could give an interview, yes or no, but we try to clearly explain
18 to you what the instructions are and that is: Do not speak with anyone,
19 either in private or in public, on any matter which could be linked in
20 any way to your testimony or testimony still to be given, which is a
21 rather wide area. What then remains, I leave that in your hands and of
22 the journalist's, but I hope that the instructions are clearer now that
23 we are not in a position to say you shouldn't give an interview. We only
24 can say what you should not talk about.
25 THE WITNESS: Understood, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
2 Now, Mr. Lukic, are you ready to continue?
3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, I am.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please do.
5 Oh, yes, and one more question for you, Mr. Lukic. If you refer
6 to testimony in another case, of course the transcripts are not in
7 evidence for us, would you always refer to the name of the case so that
8 we don't have to find out on what date in what year which case was heard,
9 we know more or less what the point of reference is.
10 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. LUKIC: Previous transcripts I referred to were from
13 Krajisnik case, 2007.
14 JUDGE ORIE: 2007, let me go back in my memory. We'll think
15 about whether that could be correct, yes or no.
16 MR. LUKIC: I'll check it but -- I will check it.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Groome --
18 MR. GROOME: I believe you've already identified. It's my
19 understanding that he did not testify in the Krajisnik case.
20 THE WITNESS: Maybe Dragomir Milosevic.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's try to avoid to guess on answers of
22 questions, but let's try to stick to the facts. It's an instruction for
23 the future rather than a comment on the past. Please proceed.
24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Paragraph 38, please, where you say, among other
1 things, "I came to believe ..." This is your conclusion. It's not the
2 official UNPROFOR position; is that right?
3 A. I'm not sure UNPROFOR had a position on it. It was relatively
4 widely shared.
5 Q. When you say that there were eight main levers that Karadzic
6 could use in order to increase the pressure, and then under 2 and 3 you
7 refer to the bombardment of the civilian population and directing sniper
8 fire against the civilian population, did you know at the time the
9 deployment of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the deployment of its
10 cannon, tanks, mortars, snipers in the city in order to be able to say
11 that civilians were fired at?
12 A. Yes, in general we had much better knowledge of where Bosnian
13 government personnel and weapons were because we were also there in the
15 Q. Is it true that they would move?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. I'm going to ask you now about gas, water, electricity cuts only
18 in relation to Sarajevo. Are you familiar of -- with cases when the
19 Muslims knocked these systems out themselves in order to receive
20 international assistance?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And would we agree -- you say that it was a form of pressure. Is
23 that a form of sanctions in order to achieve a political goal?
24 A. I'm sorry?
25 Q. You say that this constituted terror. Could it also be a
1 sanction at the same time imposed upon the other warring party in order
2 to weaken its strength?
3 A. It may have had an effect on the military party. I was focusing
4 mainly on its effect on the civilian population.
5 Q. Was there an electricity shortage in Republika Srpska also at
6 that time?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And there was no gas. There were no neighbourhoods that had a
9 gas system, other than the Dobrinja area of Sarajevo?
10 A. Right, just a small part under Serb control had gas.
11 Q. Was it necessary to pay for this gas? It was Russian gas, right,
12 not Serbian gas?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. You said yesterday that it was shut off in Mali Zvornik. This is
15 in Serbia, isn't it?
16 A. That's right. Sometimes it was shut off in different places, but
17 you're correct, it was sometimes shut off in Mali Zvornik.
18 Q. If Serbia was instructed, due to unpaid bills, by Russia to shut
19 off the gas -- I mean, would UNPROFOR then sometimes pay for this gas?
20 A. No, but I believe some Western countries agreed to pay Russia for
21 the debt on arrears owed on gas to be delivered to Bosnia but not
23 Q. Do you know when this amount was paid?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. And is it correct that the Serbs could have taken
1 Sarajevo militarily?
2 A. I am not sure as a non-military person I should give my view on
4 Q. In paragraph 40 of the statement that we have in front of us you
6 "The Serbs could have applied much greater military pressure than
7 they actually did."
8 Had they done that and had they used their military capacity to
9 its full extent and actually directed it against military objectives,
10 they might well have caused the defence of the city to collapse. Would
11 you want to say something different today?
12 A. No, I don't think I would say anything different today.
13 Q. In your view, what is a more drastic action, the military capture
14 of a city or the imposition of some form of sanction?
15 A. You mean in the abstract?
16 Q. [In English] In the abstract, yes.
17 A. Well, if they behave according to the laws and customs of war,
18 then I think they -- the capture of the military objectives and the
19 respect of the population would be less drastic.
20 Q. [Interpretation] This is a very interesting position, but thank
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, perhaps not without reasons you commented
23 on opinion evidence which was elicited -- was sought to be elicited by
24 the Prosecution, but the Chamber always clearly said: Please, facts,
25 facts, facts, and then we can see whether that opinion would be an
1 opinion which the Chamber could form itself as well on the basis of the
2 factual evidence. I noticed that on legal opinion, on military opinion,
3 and now even again on what is more drastic and -- for you, of course, the
4 same applies as for the Prosecution, that the Chamber is not that much
5 interested in opinion if it has not the facts available and then see
6 whether these facts justify for any of the opinion. That applies to you
7 as well. I would like to remind you of that position of the Chamber, and
8 rightly instigated by you, in relation to this testimony. Please
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. [Interpretation] In paragraph 41, the next one, you say that the
12 conflict could best be characterised not as a mid-level conflict but as
13 high-level -- high-intensity gangsterism. This is also an opinion, isn't
15 A. It's a characterisation, yes.
16 Q. And is that your characterisation?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 42, you speak about sniper fire. I would
19 just like to ask you to tell us what was the basis for the difference
20 between sniper fire or just regular rifle fire? How could you know just
21 by the shots that a rifle doesn't have an optical sight?
22 A. Not easily. If you were shot at close range, it would not always
23 be obvious.
24 Q. On the confrontation line which we more or less partially
25 clarified today, there was firing, as you say, in some areas that was
1 more intense and less intense in other areas. How could you tell the
2 difference if the firing occurred at the front line and that this fire
3 was directed at civilians?
4 A. The closer you were to the confrontation line, the more difficult
5 it would be to make a -- to make a distinction. If somebody was, you
6 know, by themselves at some distance from the confrontation line and
7 there was a single shot not in the context of a larger exchange, then
8 that would seem to be more likely to be a sniper incident. But you are
9 correct, when it's close it's not always easy to tell.
10 Q. Thank you. In mid-1993 you came to Sarajevo; is that correct?
11 Do you remember the exact date?
12 A. No, no.
13 Q. All right. Very well. At the time, there was a conflict that
14 broke out between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 around the time that you arrived in Bosnia?
16 A. It broke out almost exactly at the time I arrived, yes.
17 Q. The fighting between Muslims and Croats were primarily conducted
18 in order to capture territory; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. At the same time that they were fighting against the Croats, the
21 Muslims were also carrying out offensives in order to join up the
22 Sarajevo-Zenica-Tuzla-and Podrinje areas. Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. [In English] Remember and -- that's correct or you just remember?
25 A. That was certainly an ambition they had.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Okay. Thank you. And in mid-1993 was there
2 already an assessment then that the Muslims had a sufficient quantity of
3 weapons and ammunition at their disposal to be able to launch a
4 successful offensive against the Croats and the Serbs at the same time?
5 A. No. It was our view that the Croats who were a much smaller
6 force were surprised by the military capacity of the Bosnian army and
7 that the Bosnian army would not have been able to enjoy the success they
8 did against the Croats, had there also been sustained pressure from the
9 Serb side. And I think, for example, the fighting around Vares and
10 Bugojno was done with Bosnian troops who were actually taken from lines
11 that had been facing the Serbs. So the Bosnians were able to do one or
12 the other, but I think they found it difficult to do both at the same
14 Q. So we can then conclude that at the time the Serbs were not
15 carrying out any offensive actions; is that right?
16 A. With the exception of the Igman offensive, which I think took
17 place during the period of the Bosnian government's fight with the HVO.
18 I don't think there were major Serb offensive military actions.
19 Q. Thank you. And now paragraph 48 --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, same comments: Opinion, interpretations
21 of facts which have not been presented --
22 MR. LUKIC: This gentleman should know the fact if Serb were
23 launching any offensives at that time --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not asking whether the gentleman should know any
25 facts, present the Chamber with facts. The whole issue about so we
1 can -- let me see, whether "they had a sufficient quantity of weapons and
2 ammunition at their disposal to be able to launch a successful offensive
3 against the Croats and the Serbs at the same time." And then we get a
4 lot of an assessment of the military capacity and what they could do, and
5 if they would have done this, that would have been the consequences; all
6 without a factual basis.
7 MR. LUKIC: The whole statement is flooded with data like this.
8 I have to go through the statement. If you want to exclude the
9 statement, I would be happy to sit down.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Point to me where we find the facts which support
11 the opinion which you've asked for. Tell me where we find them.
12 MR. LUKIC: The gentleman refused my question. He said: No, the
13 army wasn't able at that time, the Army of B&H. So obviously he knew
14 that that army wasn't able at that time.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we do not know whether he was right or not.
16 That is his opinion, isn't it?
17 MR. LUKIC: That is his opinion.
18 JUDGE ORIE: His opinion. I mean, what would make us believe
19 that his opinion, not being a military expert --
20 MR. LUKIC: Be --
21 JUDGE ORIE: -- and not supported by facts, whether that would --
22 that's exactly -- you criticised the Prosecution for it. I think we have
23 been very clear: Provide us with the facts rather than with opinion. We
24 do not strike it yet, but more or less ignore it if no underlying facts
25 are presented. The same applies to you. I said it in relation to the
1 previous question. I say it in relation to this question. Again,
2 Mr. Groome is on his feet.
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, simply to note that it seems that we
4 are concluding upon -- the witness is based as purely on opinion. I ask
5 that he be asked what he based it upon. I believe he does have some
6 information of a concrete nature he could provide the Chamber.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether he has or not. He certainly
8 has not been asked about it, and that is exactly what we want to prevent
9 to happen. You may proceed, Mr. Lukic. If you want to --
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour --
11 JUDGE ORIE: -- elicit further --
12 MR. LUKIC: I just wanted to show the gentleman the document, but
13 you cut me short. That is the first document I wanted to show him.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. LUKIC: It's number 19198, 65 ter number document.
16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, did you see this document while you
17 were preparing to testify? It was on the list?
18 A. I don't recall it.
19 Q. All right. You don't recall that. Since this directive talks
20 about what I have just asked you about -- but if you haven't seen the
21 directive I'm not really going to dwell on it then. You don't recall
22 seeing this document before, do you?
23 A. No.
24 Q. All right. We will move on. In paragraph 48 --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I just that the witness doesn't speak
2 to this document in his statement. It seems that -- I think the more
3 prudent way to proceed, that if Mr. Lukic would like the witness to look
4 at lengthy documents, it would be fairer to give an opportunity to see
5 them during the break so he can really give an informed decision or
6 informed answer with respect to whether he's seen the document before.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I think the question was - but let me check that -
8 whether he saw it recently during proofing. But, "Did you see this
9 document while you were preparing to testify?" And then he says, "I
10 don't recall that." Therefore I do not know what questions Mr. Lukic is
11 about to ask, if they are limited portions then perhaps we could --
12 MR. LUKIC: Yeah, that's only the last sentence on the first
14 JUDGE ORIE: So if the witness could -- if the witness could
15 orient himself what kind of document he's looking at at this moment and
16 then you take him to the portion you would like to ask questions about,
17 Mr. Lukic.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I'm going to read to you the bit that I wanted to ask you about.
20 It's at the bottom of the page. The sentence begins:
21 [In English] "The Muslim leadership is trying to preserve
22 continuous predominance over Central Bosnia and, if possible, ensure a
23 passage to the sea, the Neretva river delta and to the Sava River the
24 general area of Brcko in this context through offensive operations
25 against both HVO and our forces. They are trying to link up the Tuzla,
1 Zenica, and Sarajevo areas into a whole."
2 [Interpretation] I asked you if you recalled whether this would
3 happen in the field in late June 1993. Perhaps you don't remember if you
4 arrived around that time.
5 [In English] Do you remember or not?
6 A. Yes, I remember the events.
7 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. I would briefly like to look at
8 paragraph 48. I've been trying to get to it already, several attempts.
9 You talk about the Serbian intention to capture as much territory as
10 possible. Did you see during the time that you were in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina in the field that the other two belligerents, the
12 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, also tried to capture as much
13 territory as possible in combat?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Can you now please look at paragraphs 50, 51, and 52.
16 There you say that the Serbs intended to capture as much territory as
17 possible and then to return them, and you're talking about Igman here.
18 Did you ever see in practice that the Muslims or the Croats captured
19 something and then subsequently would return it?
20 A. No.
21 Q. The Serbs were attacking Igman primarily because there were
22 firing points there, firing positions, of the Muslim army; is that
23 correct? I think that we already agreed opposite that?
24 A. No, I don't think that's why they took it. I think they took it
25 because it helped them to separate Sarajevo from the main body of Bosnian
1 government-held territory in Eastern Bosnia and they even said that,
2 Dr. Karadzic said that.
3 Q. All right. Very well. Can we now look at document 20884. On
4 the first page here, 3 in the English, at the bottom of the page --
5 THE REGISTRAR: There's no English version in e-court.
6 No translation in e-court.
7 MR. LUKIC: Then I'll try to read because I do have translation.
8 It's ERN number --
9 THE REGISTRAR: I believe it's not released.
10 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, can I read one sentence from this
11 document and I will quote the ERN number.
12 JUDGE ORIE: If there is a -- if you quote the ERN number and if
13 there is a document to be -- a translation to be released, you may
14 proceed at this moment as you suggest.
15 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. The ERN number of this
16 document is 0401-0692, and the same -- since it's one page it's the same.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And could you then indicate to the witness what kind
18 of a document you are quoting from.
19 MR. LUKIC: This is obviously some kind of intercept, I guess.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that you're supposed to know what you're
21 quoting from, isn't it?
22 MR. LUKIC: There is no title. It looks like intercepted
23 conversation between --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but --
25 MR. LUKIC: I received this from the Prosecution. It's not
1 something we had.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, anything -- because if we put to the
3 witness a quoted from a document then he's entitled to know what that
4 document purports to be.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's an intercepted conversation
6 provided by the Government of Croatia.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. It was -- on top of a
10 document it says that it was a conversation between Karadzic and
11 General Milovanovic conducted at 1645 hours on August the 4th, and it was
12 mentioned that Karadzic said:
13 "Please, you shouldn't be in between the hammer and the nail. I
14 am the supreme commander and I am ordering them to withdraw, and tell
15 Mladic to report to me from the airport."
16 Q. [Interpretation] According to you could Mladic refuse an order
17 like this?
18 A. As I said earlier, there were certainly periods of tension
19 between them, and this was one of them. They argued like this, in fact,
20 in front of us at the Hotel Panorama, but eventually they both agreed on
21 the redeployment of Igman.
22 Q. According to you, would there have been air-strikes had the Serbs
23 not withdrawn from Bjelasnica?
24 A. Probably.
25 Q. The agreement was that after the withdrawal of the VRS, these
1 positions should be under UNPROFOR control; right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. There was no agreement to the effect that UNPROFOR would hand
4 these positions over to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Muslim forces, nevertheless, took these positions; isn't that
8 A. Correct -- or, let me clarify. They certainly dominated. They
9 transited, they put weapons through them, they launched attacks from
10 them. They didn't directly base people there, so -- but your point is
11 generally correct, yes.
12 Q. What did UNPROFOR do to prevent these actions of the
13 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14 A. Well, we certainly tried to make it logistically difficult and
15 ensure they didn't establish a presence there; and we vigorously
16 protested it, both on the political chain and military chain; and we
17 tried to collect evidence of Bosnian troops crossing the zone, which I
18 saw myself and which I was present at meetings with President Izetbegovic
19 when we showed him the photographs of armed units.
20 Q. We know that there were no air-strikes that were carried out
21 against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, was this considered
22 as an option because of this violation of the agreement?
23 A. I think the subject did not come up -- it came up in 1994 briefly
24 but was dismissed as not plausible later. So it -- in this case it did
25 not come up.
1 Q. Is it correct that at that time it was only the Serbs who were
2 threatened with air-strikes?
3 A. Yes, that's right.
4 Q. I would now kindly ask that the following document be shown to
5 you, 09986. It has to do with paragraph 66 of your statement. In
6 paragraph 66 you mention this document. You say that you attended that
8 A. Yes, yeah.
9 Q. Now I'm going to ask you a bit about what it was that had been
10 discussed at the meeting.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] First of all, could we please have
12 page 3 on our screens. We will need the lower part of the page, BH
13 snipers, that part.
14 Q. I see that you compiled this document and this is what you say in
15 the document:
16 "BH snipers have been firing on UN personnel around UNPROFOR's
17 forward headquarters. Two Bosnian snipers have been firing not only at
18 UN personnel but also at local pedestrians in the vicinity."
19 Is this the only recorded incident of this nature or could you
20 see for yourselves on other occasions as well that members of the
21 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina acted in this way?
22 A. Yes, there were other cases. I only reported this one in the
23 weekly summary because I happened to speak to the two French anti-sniping
24 personnel who were shooting back at the snipers. So I was able to
25 directly confirm it, and in fact I saw the Bosnian snipers firing.
1 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph, this is what it says:
2 "There is more evidence that the BH is gradually moving away from
3 its stated principle of representing BH people of all three communities."
4 Also it says that it is obvious that:
5 "More and more senior BH officials seem to be interested in
6 advancing the interests of the Muslim community."
7 Upon your arrival, when was it that you understood that political
8 representatives in Sarajevo represent only or almost exclusively the
9 interests of the Muslims?
10 A. It increased with time. When I first arrived, there were
11 certainly non-Bosniaks in relatively responsible positions in the Bosnian
12 army and in relatively serious positions in the government. It reduced
13 over time. One of the turning points I remember was, I think, late
14 October 1993, which might be the period we're talking about. There was a
15 reshuffle of the government and that followed, you know, a
16 marginalisation of some of the non-Bosniak members of the Bosnian armed
17 forces and government.
18 Q. Thank you. Then you say that it is symptomatic that small
19 exchange of populations took place near Sarajevo: 314 Serbs left
20 BH-controlled territory and 50 Muslims moved in the other direction.
21 Also you say that this had been discussed, that there was a dilemma as to
22 whether to allow freedom of movement or, in your view, possibly be a
23 participant in ethnic cleansing. Was it your impression that people who
24 had gone over to the other side had had that kind of dilemma, or did they
25 whole-heartedly want to go to the side that was controlled by the army
1 that belonged to their own ethnic community?
2 A. I think most of the people I talked to were afraid when they were
3 not in territory controlled by the forces of the same nationality in all
4 three areas.
5 Q. Was it this fear that compelled people to leave the place where
6 they had lived?
7 A. I think among the people I spoke to in Sarajevo, it was a general
8 fear of getting killed that made people want to leave. So people of all
9 communities, Bosniak, Serb, Croat, others, mixed, civilians, wanted to
10 leave Sarajevo but were generally not allowed to. In the case of Serbs,
11 they generally wanted to go to Serbia or to Serb-controlled parts of
12 Bosnia; Croats to Croatia; and Bosniaks also wanted to leave but usually
13 to go further away.
14 Q. And now just one more thing in relation to this. You say on
15 page 4 - we need page 4 now, the upper half. There is a reference to
16 Central Bosnia, Vitez, Zenica, and this is what it says:
17 "Croat authorities insist that organised exchanges of population,
18 of people and property, is the only logical solution at this point, since
19 Croats, Muslims, and Serbs are no longer able to live together."
20 In actual fact, would the answer be the same, people wanted to go
21 to a part of the territory that was under the control of their army?
22 A. It varied a lot where -- in Sarajevo, during my time there,
23 intercommunal relations were relatively good. There -- people didn't
24 even always know who was Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. They came to know
25 more and more, but their main motivation for fleeing, as they said to us,
1 was simply to be away from the Serb siege. Where they wanted to go was
2 usually determined by where they had relatives. The part of the document
3 you're referring to refers to the Central Bosnia and smaller towns and
4 rural areas. In general, people I spoke to in the smaller communities
5 were much -- intercommunal relations were much worse and they generally
6 wanted very strongly to live in areas controlled by their community.
7 Q. Thank you for that observation. Also the situation varied in
8 different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, on page 5, around
9 the middle of the page, the first bullet point from the top. This is
10 what it says:
11 [In English] "The upsurge of B&H-HVO fighting in Vares does not
12 appear to be affecting good relations between the B&H and the HVO just to
13 the north in Tuzla. There, the two forces continue to fight together
14 against the Serbs."
15 [Interpretation] So the situation was not the same throughout
16 Bosnia, the enemy was not the same, and also the allies were not the
18 A. Certainly in Central Bosnia I personally saw Mujahedin units and
19 7th Muslim Brigade units directly burning out Croat civilians from their
20 homes, so relations were extremely bad, whereas when I went to the
21 northern part, Tuzla and further north, I saw relatively good relations.
22 So it did seem to vary considerably from place to place.
23 Q. Thank you. Also on page 6 of this same document, at the top of
24 the page, that is, there is a reference to a cease-fire between the
25 secessionists, as you call them, Abdic's secessionists, and the
1 pro-Sarajevo 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it correct
2 that both were Muslims, on both sides there were Muslims fighting against
3 each other?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Thank you. We'll just go back to the first page now. This is
6 what you say here -- actually, you can see it for yourself.
7 "It seems that the hard-liners won the power struggle in
8 Sarajevo. Prime Minister Silajdzic had announced a new cabinet, more
9 powerful, more Muslim, and even more hard-lined than its predecessor.
10 The BH position on the war seems to be clear."
11 When you say "BH" here, you are referring to the Bosniak part,
12 aren't you?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. "The BH position on the war seems to be clear. There can be no
15 peace settlement until the Muslims get back all the areas that were
16 predominantly Muslim on the eve of the war. The war is therefore almost
17 certain to continue at least through to the end of the winter."
18 This is in accordance with your other observations when you say
19 the Muslims were the ones who rejected peace initiatives and efforts;
21 A. Opinion varied within the Bosniak community, but certainly during
22 this period this view grew consistently. President Izetbegovic had --
23 who I talked to about it had a somewhat different view on which
24 territories would need to be secured for a peace agreement, but generally
25 that characterisation is correct, yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Now let us please look at paragraph 71 of your
2 statement. You say that Serbs do not want to take any territory but that
3 the artillery is busy against Sarajevo. On the 27th of October, almost
4 500 shells fell on Sarajevo within one hour in response to BH mortar
5 fire. Did you report how many shells were fired by the
6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in which report could we find that
8 A. No, there are -- this does not say it. There are -- in fact, all
9 this information comes from two sets of documents which I assume are
10 available here. The one is the UNMO daily sitrep which plots all the
11 heavy weapons impacts, and the other is the battalion reports which also
12 gives geographical quantified information on impacts.
13 Q. Did they collect information as to how many shells were fired
14 from the centre of Sarajevo at Serb positions?
15 A. Yes, yeah, both.
16 Q. However, you did not record that here; right?
17 A. I only recorded exceptional incidents, and these shells -- it's
18 not throughout the whole area of Sarajevo. I only recorded it here
19 because it's 500 shells within a short period in one part of the town, in
20 the old town, which is one district. The normal background shelling I
21 didn't comment on.
22 Q. Were there situations when the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina opened
23 fire from areas around hospitals and from the centre of town itself?
24 A. Yeah, certainly. I saw that.
25 Q. Thank you. Now paragraph 80, please. You say:
1 "Many of the Serb weapons were in fact moved out of Sarajevo and
2 used elsewhere in the theatre."
3 And you also speak about the agreement and weapon collection
4 points. Was that in contravention of the agreement, this removal of
6 A. No, that was required under the agreement. They either had to be
7 in --
8 Q. [In English] Collected --
9 A. -- collected or removed.
10 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Now paragraph 81, please.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, paragraph 81 in my report is blackened
12 out --
13 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The Prosecution does not rely on it.
15 MR. LUKIC: Yes, yes, I'm sorry. I missed that because --
16 JUDGE ORIE: But if there's anything in 81 --
17 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: -- originally which you would like to ask the
19 witness about, of course you are free to do so, if it is in support of
20 your case.
21 MR. LUKIC: Bear with me for one second, Your Honour.
22 [Defence counsel confer]
23 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Now I have the name of the case, since I want
24 to quote from one of the transcripts.
25 Q. [Interpretation] In the Dragomir Milosevic trial on the
1 15th of January, 2007, on page 26945 up to page 26946 that is, this is
2 what you say, "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or the Army of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not abide by the TEZ," that is to say the totally
4 exclusion zone and this pertained to heavy weaponry.
5 Is that correct? Do you stand by this statement today as well?
6 A. Yeah, that's correct.
7 Q. Also in that same trial you said that the
8 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina often violated the cease-fire between the
9 10th of February and the 28th of April, 1994. Would you say the same
10 thing today?
11 A. That's correct.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have the
13 following document in e-court, R0029530. The 65 ter number is 10012.
14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, while that document is being called up,
15 could I ask Mr. Lukic to please re-check the transcript reference in the
16 Dragomir Milosevic case. It appears that Mr. Harland was the first
17 witness, so it seems that it's unlikely that the number would be that
18 high and we cannot find it under that number.
19 MR. LUKIC: That's the number I have before -- but I'll check it.
20 If necessary, I'll inform Your Honours.
21 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the problem appears to be that that was
22 his testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, not the Dragomir Milosevic
23 case. It is the correct transcript reference for the Slobodan Milosevic
24 case and the date of the testimony was the 18th of September, 2003.
25 JUDGE ORIE: The matter being resolved, please proceed,
1 Mr. Lukic.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you for this help.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, can we proceed now. We see a
4 document here that you had created as well. In the first paragraph, in
5 the introduction, that is, you say:
6 "NATO's threat to use air-strikes against heavy weapons around
7 Sarajevo is shaping the behaviour of all three sides."
8 Does that mean that the BH army also had heavy weapons around
10 A. Yes. I counted about a hundred and something that they put into
11 the cantonment areas in Tito barracks and then there were a certain
12 amount, I don't know the exact number, that they did not hand over in
13 violation of the agreement but which we knew were there because we could
14 hear them when they continued to fire.
15 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph states:
16 "The mainly Muslim Bosnian government, riding a wave of
17 international support, is taking a harder line at the peace
19 Who is it that is providing support to the government in Sarajevo
20 so that it felt stronger so that it could take a harder line?
21 A. At this point they felt and they told us, they told me, that they
22 felt that the increased likelihood of NATO air-strikes against the Serbs
23 strengthened their relative bargaining position, made it more possible
24 for them to continue the fight and to hold for a better -- a better
25 negotiated result.
1 Q. So any proposal to bomb Serbian positions, whether that took
2 place or not, strengthened the position of the Bosniak government in
3 Sarajevo; is this correct?
4 A. Yes, absolutely.
5 Q. Thank you. And now on the following page, page 2 of the same
6 document, you talk about the situation when the international attention
7 was focused elsewhere. The Croats were on the offensive in
8 Central Bosnia, and despite them receiving new weapons from Croatia the
9 HVO captured quite a small amount of territory. Did you know - and you
10 probably knew about it since you reported it - that weapons were coming
11 in from Croatia for the Croatian forces in Bosnia?
12 A. Yes, I -- in Mostar they -- would see not only Croatian weapons
13 but actually Croatian units and of course enormous financial resources.
14 Q. And did the UNPROFOR react in any way?
15 A. I can't now recall.
16 Q. But in any event you did not threaten them with air-strikes; is
17 that correct?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at page 3, please.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the record, the question was, "But in any
21 event you did not threaten them with air-strikes; is that correct?" The
22 answer was "No." Apparently the witness intended to say, that at least
23 that's how I understood him that there was no threat with air-strikes.
24 Because if you say, It is correct, and you say, No it's not correct, then
25 that would be misunderstood.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you for your help, Your Honour.
3 Q. [Interpretation] The third asterisk where it says that:
4 "The circumstances surrounding the massacre at the Sarajevo
5 marketplace on the 5th of February 1994 remain unclear, UNPROFOR has
6 conducted a second and more thorough investigation into the incident.
7 The result of the investigation remains that it is not possible to
8 determine from which side of the confrontation line the bomb was fired."
9 Is this correctly -- is this a correct representation of what the
10 UNPROFOR knew at that time?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. And now at the bottom of the page you talk about the
13 rump Bosnia and Herzegovina. You say that the negotiators returned to
14 Sarajevo from Geneva and that finally the Bosnian government has clearly
15 expressed its vision and that they had put forward two options.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to the following
17 page, please.
18 Q. We don't need to read both 1 and 2 paragraphs, but the first
19 version was that if the union of Bosnia and Herzegovina is preserved,
20 they asked for 33 per cent of Bosnian territory; and if the unity of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina is not preserved, if the Serbs secede and join
22 Serbia, the Croats secede and join Croatia, then they were asking for 37.
23 Why didn't these negotiations continue? This was along the lines of what
24 the Croats in Bosnia wanted, what the Serbs in Bosnia wanted, and now we
25 see that this is also something that the Muslims in Bosnia wanted. Do
1 you know today who exerted pressure on whom not to achieve this but to --
2 and not to halt the war already at this stage?
3 A. This was reported from confidential meetings with
4 President Izetbegovic, and at that time he told -- I think this was the
5 so-called HMS invincible plan. And at that time he told us that they
6 would accept it if they got a bit more land. That is the same time that
7 they entered into some discussions about the possible exchange of certain
8 territories in Eastern Bosnia for territory around Sarajevo. So they --
9 it was a matter of whether -- they felt it was a matter of whether they
10 had got the maximum amount of territory they thought they could get.
11 And, indeed, this -- this is the origin of the 51/49 split of Bosnia.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock. It's close to
13 the time for a break.
14 MR. LUKIC: This is a good time for us.
15 JUDGE ORIE: It is a good time for you. Then we take a break and
16 we resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
21 If Mr. Mladic would -- the Chamber to be addressed, then,
22 Mr. Lukic, you take care of it.
23 MR. LUKIC: We'll just continue, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Harland.
2 Mr. Lukic --
3 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- you may proceed.
5 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, we're looking at the document. If
7 we can just look at page 6, please -- I'm sorry, let's stay on page 4.
8 We need the lower half of the document. The second asterisk from the
9 bottom or from the top where it states:
10 "The ethnic cleansing of Muslims in areas controlled by the
11 Croats is continuing and has even quickened."
12 Was this an isolated incident or was this something that
13 constituted a practice, during the war of course, the conflict between
14 the Croatian and the Muslim armies?
15 A. In general, the areas controlled or taken by the HVO were the
16 ones that were the most aggressively ethnically cleansed.
17 Q. On page 5 of the document, second paragraph from the top, you
18 talk about the flow of humanitarian aid improving, but that a British aid
19 worker was killed and that prompted the Zenica authorities to keep a
20 closer check on the Mujahedin. Was the Zenica area known for the large
21 presence of Mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
22 A. Yes, both foreign Mujahedin and local Islamists.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 7, please.
24 Q. We just have a note here where it says "The Bosnian Croats," and
25 you noted that:
1 "The Government of Croatia, after having insisted that there are
2 no Croatian army troops, HV troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, now admits
3 it does have troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they will remain
4 there unless the UN provides security guarantees for the Croat enclaves
5 in Central Bosnia."
6 You told us that you did see Croatian troops of the state of
7 Croatia in Mostar, and here you note that they were also present in
8 Central Bosnia?
9 A. I'm not sure that's true. Can I just see --
10 Q. [In English] Please.
11 A. I -- as I recall it, I never saw regular Croatian army troops in
12 Central Bosnia. I saw regular Croatian army troops in western
13 Herzegovina and Mostar, but I never saw them in Central Bosnia.
14 Q. Then I misunderstood this portion of your document. Thank you
15 for clarifications.
16 [Interpretation] The last paragraph on the same page is where you
17 state that:
18 "Despite the demands of the UN Security Council and the
19 European Union, Croatian Army forces show no sign of leaving Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina at this stage."
21 And then you say that Croatian troops had never before been seen
22 so far from the Croatian border, and one source inside the HVO says that
23 there are 2.000 HV troops in the Kiseljak pocket alone.
24 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, before answer. I can see my friend.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Just before you answer the question.
1 Mr. Groome.
2 MR. GROOME: Just an objection as to relevance.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Lukic, I had just consulted with my
4 colleagues and we were wondering about relevance. So we're not saying
5 it's irrelevant, but if you could assist us in better understanding what
6 the relevance of your questions is, that would be highly appreciated.
7 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I would like Mr. Harland -- it depends how you
8 consider Central Bosnia, but --
9 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
10 MR. LUKIC: -- is Kiseljak in Central Bosnia?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 MR. LUKIC: That's what I wanted to say, that even in
13 Central Bosnia you had troops from Croatia, not only Herzegovina.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Which does not fully resolve inquiry into the
15 relevance. I mean, I understand what you wanted to establish on the --
16 MR. LUKIC: I'm --
17 JUDGE ORIE: -- by that answer.
18 MR. LUKIC: I'm coming to that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, then please do that. Come to your point as
20 soon as possible.
21 MR. LUKIC: I can do that in the next question.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well ...
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Harland, did the UNPROFOR demand that the Croatian troops
25 that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina be fired at, that air-strikes be
1 conducted against them?
2 A. There was certainly no -- there was no proposal to launch
3 air-strikes against Government of Croatia troops inside Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina, and I can't even say with absolute certainty how it was
5 protested because in general all things related to Government of Croatia
6 were handled out of UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb; whereas I worked in
7 Sarajevo, where we dealt with Bosnian government and the Serbs.
8 Q. [In English] Thank you.
9 [Interpretation] And on the last page, page 8, you say that:
10 "The Croatian authorities say that if the international community
11 increases pressure on Zagreb to withdraw its troops from B&H, then it
12 will expel all of the 257.000 Muslim refugees from Croat-controlled
14 What was achieved then in further negotiations with Croatia? I
15 don't see what you wrote about after this, but probably about the
16 territories in Bosnia that were under Croat control?
17 A. Actually, to be honest, I can't remember and -- because dealing
18 with the Government of Croatia was actually the thing I did least in my
19 years in Bosnia.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 6 of this
22 document and then we will finish with it.
23 Q. We've seen from this document alone that there were various
24 violations by all the parties; however, here, under the heading "The
25 Bosnian Serbs" we can see that only they were threatened with NATO
1 air-strikes and they were the only ones to undertake commitments. Is it
2 correct, Mr. Harland, that the other two sides were never asked for any
3 concessions and that if they did not make them and did not sign them,
4 they were never told that they would be bombed?
5 A. The question is in two parts, of course. So they were asked --
6 they were asked to honour certain commitments. They were also entered
7 into obligations, but it is true they were never threatened with air
9 Q. Would you agree with me that UNPROFOR was not objective in Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina, that it had placed itself on the side of the Muslims
11 primarily, and that it was opposed to the Serbs for the most part, or
12 rather, to the Army of Republika Srpska?
13 A. No. That I would not agree with. There were, in fact, quite a
14 lot of people in UNPROFOR and quite a lot of the governments that
15 supported it, including I would say Britain and France, that were
16 relatively hostile to the Bosnian government in Sarajevo.
17 Q. But not hostile to such an extent that they would be treated in
18 the same way as they treated the Serbs, so that they would also include
19 Rapid Reaction Force actions against them and include NATO air-strikes
20 against them; is that correct?
21 A. My observation of the decision-making process is that the threats
22 for air-strikes emerged from the campaign of terror waged by the Serb
23 army against the Bosnian civilian population. If that had happened on a
24 comparable scale, the other way around, I think frankly there would have
25 been an eagerness to do it among some governments.
1 Q. We heard today and we discussed how many soldiers there were
2 approximately inside Sarajevo, how they were armed. At the same time,
3 Sarajevo was declared a safe area. As far as I understand the term "safe
4 area" according to international documents, not only are you permitted
5 [as interpreted] to have weapons within the area, but you are not allowed
6 to wear uniforms, there can be no military facilities within that area,
7 no military training can be conducted in that area --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you would read with me the transcript,
9 page 63, the beginning of your last question, where you said, "not only
10 are you...," and then may I take it the word "not" is missing: Not only
11 are you not permitted to have weapons within the area.
12 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
13 Q. [Interpretation] What did the UNPROFOR do in Sarajevo to really
14 make that safe area into a safe area, to really demilitarise it? Or can
15 we agree that nothing was done?
16 A. I do not believe that the resolutions that established the safe
17 areas of Sarajevo and elsewhere which I think were Resolutions 817, 824,
18 and 836, I don't believe they required the Bosnian army to put down its
19 weapons or to stop fighting. I think the intention of the
20 Security Council was that the defenders should be able to keep their
21 weapons, otherwise there was a real risk of a slaughter, which, in fact,
22 happened, as, you know, in Srebrenica and elsewhere.
23 Q. We're talking about Sarajevo. You, yourself, said that the Serbs
24 didn't intend to capture the city, and we also established that there
25 were numerous Muslim offensives from Sarajevo. Would you agree with me
1 that UNPROFOR should have made the decision whether this was a safe zone,
2 a demilitarised area, or not? And then the other question here would
3 be -- perhaps you can answer this first and then we will move to the
4 other question.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
6 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, objection as to whether the witness has
7 the competency to answer what UNPROFOR should have done. It's a
8 Security Council Resolution that created the safe areas and not UNPROFOR.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're asking the witness whether he
10 would agree with you that UNPROFOR should have made a certain decision.
11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Earlier you referred - although in a rather vague
13 way - to international text instruments. I think you mentioned. Are you
14 asking for an opinion or asking --
15 MR. LUKIC: No, I want to ask --
16 JUDGE ORIE: If you're not asking for an opinion, then please
17 rephrase your question such a way that it is clear what you're exactly
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Was it discussed in the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and outside of
21 UNPROFOR with other international players that a demilitarised zone
22 should be a demilitarised zone?
23 A. The safe areas were not declared by the Security Council to be
24 demilitarised zones. If I remember as a fact --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, the question was whether
1 it was discussed. Apparently what Mr. Lukic is seeking is to establish
2 the fact whether there was any discussion about, if I understood you
3 well, Mr. Lukic, the interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions
4 by which safe areas were established.
5 Is that what you had on your mind?
6 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: So was that discussed? That's the first question.
8 THE WITNESS: But his question starts with a statement of fact
9 about what is a demilitarised zone and he assumes that Sarajevo was a
10 demilitarised zone and actually it's a false assumption.
11 JUDGE ORIE: No, that was his previous question where I asked him
12 to rephrase it, and then the question was:
13 "Was it discussed in the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and outside
14 UNPROFOR with other international players that a demilitarised zone
15 should be a demilitarised zone."
16 Okay. Was that a subject matter that was discussed?
17 THE WITNESS: But it wasn't a demilitarised zone. It was a safe
19 JUDGE ORIE: That may be a good reason not to discuss it or to
20 discuss it for that same reason. Was it discussed, yes or no, and I try
21 to more precisely interpret the question: Was the interpretation of the
22 Security Council Resolutions in which safe areas were established, was
23 the interpretation of those Security Council Resolutions discussed, yes
24 or no?
25 THE WITNESS: Understood. There was a discussion as to whether
1 or not it would be possible to reach an agreement to -- between the
2 parties to demilitarise Sarajevo by agreement because it was not imposed
3 by the Security Council.
4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour for helping.
5 Q. [Interpretation] My next question is this: Was it the mandate of
6 UNPROFOR precisely to demilitarise safe zones?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Very well. Thank you, if that is your position.
9 Now let us move on to paragraph 88, please.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Have you done with this subject, Mr. --
11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: So if I understand you well, Mr. Harland, your
13 testimony is that the Security Council dealing with Sarajevo as a safe
14 area did not include an obligation for the parties to demilitarise it;
15 and that was the reason why you tried to add that, if I could say so, by
16 a voluntarily agreement on demilitarisation by the parties in that area.
17 THE WITNESS: Although it's almost 20 years ago, my memory of the
18 824 and 836 is that it says that the forces except those of the Bosnian
19 government should withdraw and UNPROFOR's mandate would be to deter
20 attacks on them, and those attacks were coming from the Serbs.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Your answers given until now, do they cover
22 Sarajevo or any other safe areas?
23 THE WITNESS: All six.
24 JUDGE ORIE: All six. Thank you.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, now I'd like us to move away. Let
3 us proceed to paragraph 88 of your statement. You are saying that
4 sometimes the Bosnians themselves stepped up the pressure and that there
5 were Bosnian leaders who felt that worse is better in order to increase
6 the chances of a Western military intervention against the Serbs. You
7 say that you witnessed the Bosnians refusing to switch on gas, that they
8 intentionally cut power off, and even fired at repairmen on transmission
9 lines, high-voltage transmission lines at that.
10 This is my question: Do you have any information today as to
11 whether they were members of the 1st Corps or some group of armed persons
12 from Sarajevo? Do you have any clear-cut information on that?
13 A. Different positions which made the life of the people of Sarajevo
14 worse, which some people on the Bosnian side thought would help them by
15 bringing about a Western military intervention were taken and carried out
16 by different people. So, for example, President Izetbegovic himself told
17 me when I put a direct question that it was his decision that the
18 civilian population should not be allowed out of Sarajevo. So that was
19 one dimension of it. The shooting at the repairmen of the electricity
20 lines or the repeater or the insulators even on the high-voltage
21 electricity line were in my presence sometimes shot at by sniper
22 positions from with inside the Bosnian confrontation line. And French
23 experts I was with in my presence as I was going there would point it
24 out, but we weren't in a capacity to say whether they were under the
25 control of 1st Corps or not. And on water and the -- and gas, the
1 decisions were normally not taken by military officers, so 1st Corps
2 wouldn't have been involved.
3 Q. You, yourself, mentioned Izetbegovic. I'd just like to ask you
4 this - this was my next question - you said that in UN archives that
5 document does exist. Do you have the document with you or do you have
6 the number of the document? Because we'd like to have it.
7 A. Yes -- no, I don't but I sought -- in 1999 I was tasked to write
8 a report for the UN Secretary-General on the massacre at Srebrenica, and
9 I was given access to the UNHCR archives. And there I found the letter
10 where UNHCR proposed evacuating civilian population I think April 1993
11 from Srebrenica, and they even began to do it and they were stopped by
12 the Bosnian government. And there is a letter from Izetbegovic to that
13 effect. And then when I was writing that report, I interviewed
14 President Izetbegovic and he confirmed it; but I don't have the letter in
15 my possession and I never have.
16 Q. [In English] Thank you. [Interpretation] I'm afraid I'll be
17 making a mistake again in relation to the transcript, but I think that
18 this is the Slobodan Milosevic trial because the page number is 28634 and
20 You spoke about figures and you said that before the war 150.000
21 Serbs lived in Sarajevo; is that true?
22 A. I forget now. Something like that.
23 Q. Do you remember that in Sarajevo at that time there were 40- to
24 60.000 Serbs left between the lines of confrontation?
25 A. It reduced over time. I think when I arrived we estimated it as
1 something like that and then I think it reduced over time.
2 Q. You were in Bosnia in 1999. Do you know how many Serbs were in
3 Sarajevo in 1999?
4 A. I could guess, you know, maybe 5 per cent or something. I don't
5 know the numbers, I guess.
6 Q. [In English] Something -- [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek clarification.
8 In Sarajevo at the time 40- to 60.000 Serbs left between the
9 lines of confrontation on a total of 150, which means anything between 28
10 to 40 per cent it reduced. Earlier you told us it was approximately
11 10 per cent. Do I understand you well that it reduced -- was reduced
12 from 28 up to 40 per cent down to 10 per cent?
13 THE WITNESS: Within the confrontation lines, at the moment of my
14 arrival I would guess that 20 per cent was a maximum and it steadily
15 declined over time, so by the end of war was probably less than
16 10 per cent and in the years after the war became even less than that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I must admit that I misread the quote and am reading
18 it now better. It was a reference to Serbs living before the war,
19 150.000 in Sarajevo.
20 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, "before the war," do you mean before the
22 war in the area which later was within the confrontation lines or the
23 wider Sarajevo?
24 MR. LUKIC: Before the Bosnian war.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would that --
1 MR. LUKIC: May --
2 JUDGE ORIE: -- but, I mean, if you use that number -- yes,
3 but --
4 MR. LUKIC: Before May 1992.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would that be the portion we're talking
6 about at a later stage, that is, within the confrontation lines or was it
7 the wider Sarajevo? I mean, otherwise of course it's very difficult to
8 use the [overlapping speakers] --
9 MR. LUKIC: Can Mr. Harland answer that so I don't give the
11 JUDGE ORIE: We could -- yes, apparently you had an understanding
12 because you quoted him in the question.
13 Could you tell us the 150.000 which apparently were mentioned as
14 Serbs living in Sarajevo, was that within the limit of the confrontation
15 lines as they developed later or was that Sarajevo in its wider --
16 THE WITNESS: No, the question is well put. I think the 150.000,
17 if that's the number, includes the Serbs who would have lived in Ilidza
18 and Lukavica and Grabovica, and Vogosca and Ilijas, which were Serb
19 majority or Serb preponderant populated areas prior to the war. The
20 actual area that was enclosed by the confrontation line probably never
21 had, I don't know, more than 60- or 70.000 Serbs.
22 JUDGE ORIE: So when we are using the one number or using later
23 the other numbers, we are talking about different geographical areas?
24 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
3 [Interpretation] Could we now please see document 65 ter [In
4 English] 10015.
5 Q. [Interpretation] You see the first page. You know what this is
6 all about, don't you? It's the 1st of March, 1994. It's your report.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. On the second page now, the second paragraph, there's something
9 interesting here. It says that the Bosnian government forces have
10 been digging a tunnel towards the Serb positions and this is not a tunnel
11 under the airport; isn't that right?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. So they're digging a tunnel in a different direction, and
14 Mr. Karadzic protested before the Security Council in this regard.
15 [In English] It says:
16 "The digging has led to a strong protest to the Security Council
17 from Serb leader Karadzic."
18 A. It must have been a letter.
19 Q. [Interpretation] Obviously you knew about this because you wrote
20 this down. Did you try to prevent things like this? Because obviously,
21 just as you said, they're a provocation that is aimed at getting a Serb
23 A. In general, if there was a cease-fire in effect and there was a
24 violation of the terms of the cease-fire, we would protest it to
25 whichever side was responsible and there was certainly a period in which
1 there was tactical tunnelling, not like the tunnel under the airport
2 which was for logistical purposes, but to plant explosives and to put
3 troops in behind enemy lines. So this was a different type of activity.
4 Q. Thank you. On page 4 in paragraph 3 from the top we see that the
5 war between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO had been going on
6 for over six months in Central Bosnia. Also, that HVO forces are gaining
8 Do you know at the time whether there were clashes between the
9 HVO and the Army of Republika Srpska, or had there been a cessation of
10 hostilities at the time?
11 A. If I remember correctly, which I am not a hundred per cent clear,
12 it varied from place to place. There were areas where there was a degree
13 of Serb-Croat co-operation and there were areas where there were
15 Q. Do you remember how long the conflicts lasted between the Croat
16 and Bosniak armies?
17 A. It began about when I arrived, May of 1993, and then I was
18 involved in the final agreements to end it in Gornji Vakuf, must have
19 been February of 1994 or around then.
20 Q. Thank you. I'd just like to ask you something else now. Is it
21 correct that nine or ten months into the conflict between the Croat and
22 Serb [as interpreted] sides they came to peace due to the pressure
23 exerted by the United States?
24 A. Yes, yes, that's absolutely true. I was there at some of the
25 meetings where the US representative Redman and others would be putting a
1 lot of pressure on those parties.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I interrupt you?
3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, sorry, sir.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Earlier you were talking of conflict between the
5 Bosniaks and the Croats. Now here you're saying, "Is it correct that
6 nine or ten months into the conflict between the Croat and Serbs," Serb
7 army sides. So is it Serb --
8 MR. LUKIC: Either I misspoke, but I meant Croat and Bosniaks.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
11 Q. [Interpretation] My next question, Mr. Harland: Is it correct
12 that at the same time the United States of America did not allow a
13 reconciliation between the Muslims and the Serbs and that through their
14 own actions they deepened the conflict between these two ethnic
15 communities or these two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 A. I -- the Americans I met wanted a settlement on more generous
17 terms for the Bosniaks and many of them didn't think there would be a way
18 to do that other than through military assistance to the Bosnian
19 government or some sort of military intervention on its behalf.
20 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 93, it deals with sincerity, and towards
21 the end of the paragraph you say:
22 "Serb leaders were not -- were disingenuous with internationals."
23 What is your position? You were involved in UNPROFOR work. Were
24 internationals sincere with the Serbs?
25 A. It -- in my experience it was wrong to see the internationals as
1 a single block of opinion with any unity. It -- I can say when UNPROFOR
2 representatives spoke to the parties, they generally spoke the truth.
3 They didn't always speak were coherently, but they generally spoke the
5 Q. Did they approach the Serb side with good intentions in these
6 talks or did they side with the other side, increasingly so as the end of
7 the war was getting nearer?
8 A. There were certainly members of UNPROFOR - and I was one of
9 them - who came to believe that the war could not be settled without some
10 form of military intervention against the Serbs.
11 Q. Thank you, and thank you for your sincerity. Now I will get to
12 the following position, and when you are speaking you probably have this
13 in mind as well when you advised General Smith, to deceive the Serbs to
14 the effect that there would be air-strikes. And you speak about that in
15 paragraph 233 of your statement. Can we agree that on that occasion you
16 and General Smith did not act sincerely towards the Serbs?
17 A. I advised General Smith on that one occasion to be a little
18 unclear about what we knew about the point of origin of the mortar shell
19 that landed on the Markale market-place in order to give us time, give
20 UNPROFOR time, to get UNPROFOR and UN people off Serb territory so they
21 couldn't be harmed or captured when General Smith turned the key to
22 authorise air-strikes against the Serbs. That is true. That was less
23 than fully honest.
24 Q. Thank you. The next document I'd like to show to you is also a
25 report of yours. The date is the 9th of April, 1994. The 65 ter number
1 is 23773. This is a report that you wrote up; right?
2 A. Yes, seems to be.
3 Q. So there's no problem.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.
5 Q. On page 2 of your report you say that General Mladic stated and
6 announced that he was uninterested in signing anything other than a total
7 agreement for the cessation of hostilities. And then in number 7 you say
8 the Serb proposal was very similar to our own, except that the idea of an
9 interim cease-fire was elaborated into a full agreement for the permanent
10 cessation of hostilities and all mention of Gorazde and safe areas was
11 dropped. Later on we will move on to paragraph 10 that speaks of the
12 other side in the conflict. Now that we're talking about General Mladic
13 and the Serb side, bearing in mind your statement, I believe that you
14 will agree with me that the Serb side insisted all the time that there be
15 a full cessation of hostilities.
16 A. The Serbs used to tell us all the time that they would like to
17 freeze the confrontation lines with some form of agreement where they
18 were because they controlled 70 per cent of the country, and the other
19 side for the same reasons but from the opposite direction never wanted
20 what would just be a permanent freezing of the confrontation lines.
21 Q. So irrespective of the reasons involved, the Serb side wanted
22 lasting peace. The other side did not want lasting peace. Can we
23 conclude that, irrespective of the reasons involved?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
25 MR. GROOME: I think that's an improper question to put to this
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please rephrase your question.
3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
4 Q. [Interpretation] While writing your reports, very often you
5 reported on the following and we read some of these things out today
6 along the following lines, namely, that the Army of Republika Srpska and
7 the politicians of Republika Srpska were proposing a lasting peace. Did
8 that happen on several occasions?
9 A. The Serbs supported, while I was there, some of the peace
10 agreements, supported at the international level. I think the
11 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, for example; and while I was there they rejected
12 others, like the Vance-Owen Plan and the Contact Group Plan. They
13 accepted some cease-fires but you're right, their position was always --
14 or until the very end when it was not in their interest. They generally
15 proposed anything that would permanently freeze the current cease-fire
16 lines in place until Dayton, when that didn't work in their interest
18 Q. Thank you. Then in paragraph 10 you say:
19 "After the meeting, Ambassador Redman, General Rose, and" you
20 "were invited to the Bosnian Presidency" -- actually Bosniak Presidency,
21 I'd prefer that wording "where" you "met with ... Izetbegovic and
22 Prime Minister Silajdzic."
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you choose your own language you of
24 course use the language you prefer. If you're quoting from a document
25 then let's leave it to what the document says. Please proceed.
1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] And you say that:
3 " ... the Bosnian side agreed to a 'cessation of hostilities,'
4 though not for any 'permanent' arrangement."
5 So this is along the lines of what we've been discussing just
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. [In English] Thank you, sir. [Interpretation] At the time, the
9 time that this document covers, the Muslims held 18 per cent of the
10 territory. At the end of the war they gained much more. What force was
11 on their side that enabled them to have such a gain in the percentage of
12 the territory? Was it just the United States or was anyone else there
13 helping the Muslim side to gain a larger percentage of the territory?
14 What sort of information did you acquire about that when you were working
15 for the UNPROFOR?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the question itself seems to assume a
18 fact that the witness hasn't been asked yet, namely: Was it just the
19 United States seems to assume -- I mean the question should be: What was
20 the role of the United States.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, there is a lot of suggestion in the question,
22 but then at the very end it comes down to facts again; that is, what sort
23 of information did you acquire about that. And what "that" is is what
24 was apparently suggested to you as being, at least in Mr. Lukic's view,
25 an accurate reflection of what he thinks has happened. The question
1 mainly focuses on getting larger percentage of the territory after the
2 negotiations and what forces may have helped the Muslims to achieve that
3 and whether you received any information about that, because that's what
4 the question is about.
5 Mr. Lukic, if I understood you well?
6 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
8 Could you answer the question.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 There were a number of factors in -- particularly 1995 which
11 served to greatly weaken the Bosnian Serb side. The first was the
12 offensive of the Government of Croatia, so-called Operation Storm; the
13 second was the continuing, ongoing sanctions that Serbia had been induced
14 to put on the Bosnian Serbs by Western countries; the third was the
15 success that the Bosnian army had had in strengthening itself with the
16 support of Western and Islamic countries; and the fifth [sic], perhaps,
17 was the direct actions of UNPROFOR's Rapid Reaction Force artillery and
18 the actions of authorising NATO air attacks. And, combined, all these
19 factors led to a significant weakening of the Bosnian Serb position,
20 which I think would possibly have weakened much more if they hadn't gone
21 to Dayton and been given a lot of the territory back.
22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Thank you. Can we look at paragraph 102 now, please. Here we're
24 talking about Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, and other areas being declared
25 safe zones, protected areas.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. We also talked about whether that area should have been
3 demilitarised or not. Are you aware that at the time there was a
4 detachment in Srebrenica which after that grew into a division. Can we
5 agree that not only were the safe areas not demilitarised but they were
6 additionally armed and additional manpower was obtained?
7 A. Yes. President Izetbegovic himself told me that he had expended
8 considerable resources, including helicopter assets, in deploying weapons
9 to Srebrenica, including I think Chinese Red Arrow anti-tank weapons.
10 And they confirmed the existence of the -- I think it was the
11 28th Division of the Bosnian army for that territory, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. When you mentioned helicopters, I would like to know
13 who owned it, who controlled the skies above Srebrenica and Zepa? Is it
14 correct that it was NATO and UNPROFOR?
15 A. Well, in theory, yes. There was a -- by mandate of the
16 United Nations Security Council, there was a no-fly zone. And so when
17 the warring parties flew aircraft and particularly rotary-wing aircraft,
18 which they all did, they were subject to interception and destruction.
19 But, in fact, it was not normally a problem. They could evade detection.
20 General Mladic even sometimes used to fly in his little helicopter in
21 front of us.
22 Q. Did you know at the time, you and other members of UNPROFOR, that
23 members of the 28th Division of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 stationed in Srebrenica and Zepa carried out attacks against Serb
25 civilian settlements and against the Army of Republika Srpska?
1 A. We were informed of that and we were asked to investigate, and we
2 came to the conclusion that it was vastly exaggerated, but there had been
3 an incident, for example, at Kravica on Orthodox Christmas of 1993, if I
4 remember correctly.
5 Q. When you say "exaggerated," how do you mean? In what sense?
6 A. We would be told by the Serb leadership that there were major
7 attacks taking place out of Srebrenica and that large numbers of
8 civilians, hundreds of civilians had been killed. But when we asked for
9 names or ICRC tracing requests, we couldn't be given them. And when we
10 asked for access to the site to make our own investigation, it was
11 denied. So we came to the conclusion that it was more of a pretext.
12 Q. But when you say that it was exaggerated you never established
13 whether it was exaggerated, in fact, or not?
14 A. We were finally given access to this little village of Kravica,
15 which is somewhere near Srebrenica, and where they said there had been
16 attack out. And, in the end, I think that our investigators were able to
17 confirm there had been an attack and that four or five people had been
18 killed that we could confirm. I later went there myself and, actually,
19 by coincidence it was a place where many, many hundreds of unarmed
20 Bosniaks were killed. But the evidence of deaths of Serbs were extremely
21 limited. But you're correct that there were some attacks out by those
22 forces, particularly Srebrenica.
23 Q. And what did the UNPROFOR do about this? How did it react in the
24 communication with the Bosniak side?
25 A. We certainly protested the status of Srebrenica. Srebrenica,
1 unlike all the other five so-called safe areas, actually was governed by
2 a mutually agreed demilitarisation agreement. It was a separate case.
3 And when there was a violation of that agreement, we would protest it.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic --
5 MR. LUKIC: Okay.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- I am looking at the clock. Could you in one or
7 two minutes, not more --
8 MR. LUKIC: One more question and I am done.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. When you say "protested," what does that mean?
12 A. Normally we would go to the relevant local commander, the
13 relevant corps commander, or, if it was serious, to General Delic or to
14 President Izetbegovic to formally state that they were in violation and
15 that it would be reported to New York and the Security Council for any
16 appropriate action.
17 Q. Thank you for today, Mr. Harland.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
19 Mr. Lukic, could you give us already an indication whether there
20 is any adjustment of your initial assessment, and that's important for
21 Mr. Harland to know as well, I take it.
22 MR. LUKIC: I will take the whole day tomorrow for sure. I hope
23 I can finish by the end of the day, but I cannot promise.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll consider how to proceed.
25 Then before we adjourn, I already would like to invite you,
1 Mr. Harland, to come back to us tomorrow morning at 9.00 in the same
2 courtroom. And I give you the same instructions -- well, I don't have to
3 explain them anymore, isn't it, that you should not speak or communicate
4 in any way with whomever about -- and I would say not only your testimony
5 but the subject matter of your testimony either given already or perhaps
6 still to be given. And we'd like to see you back tomorrow. Could you
7 follow the usher.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll adjourn for the day and we'll resume
11 tomorrow, the 11th of July, at 9.00 in the morning in this same
12 courtroom, I -- 12th. I do apologise. The 12th of July.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 12th day of
15 July, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.