120711IT

Page 728

1 Mr. Lukic. Mr. Lukic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

2 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Harland.

4 A. Good morning.

5 Q. I would like to start from paragraphs 3 and 4 of your statement.

6 Do you have the statement in front of you?

7 A. Not yet.

8 MR. LUKIC: Can somebody help us so Mr. Harland has a statement

9 with him.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Is there a hard copy available to Mr. Harland?

11 Mr. Harland, you will find major portions, I don't know whether

12 you're aware of that, blackened out --

13 THE WITNESS: I saw that.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Paragraphs 3 and 4, they are not crossed out. We can talk about

17 them. In these paragraphs you talk about your education, and I would

18 like to ask you the following about that: You don't have any military

19 education, training; is that correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. And you don't have any ballistics training; is that correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. You have no medical training?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 729

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Lukic, may I ask you to give the number of

2 the document? I assume it's P1. We would like to have that displayed on

3 the screen and put the number on the record.

4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll do so.

5 Madam Registrar, can you help us. Is this P1? This gentleman's

6 statement is P1? Can it be put on the ELMO, please -- or actually on the

7 e-court. Sorry.

8 Q. [Interpretation] Would you be so kind and tell us what were your

9 tasks specifically in Sarajevo at UNPROFOR?

10 A. I -- for the first period of the war, I was a civil affairs

11 officer in BH command, which was the Sarajevo headquarters of UNPROFOR.

12 And my job was as a political officer to aggregate information from

13 different sources, from contacts with the parties, from our own military

14 contingents and UNMOs and from humanitarian sources and to make analyses

15 and presentations for the UNPROFOR leadership and to participate in

16 organised meetings with the warring factions, both the military and

17 political and humanitarian elements within them and to participate in

18 these and to organise any follow-up to them that might occur.

19 In the final part of the war, I was the head of the civil affairs

20 section for Sector Sarajevo; and then in the very last month or two of

21 the war, I was the political advisor to General Smith, who was the

22 commander of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia.

23 Q. In your statement you said that your duties revolved around the

24 political strategy. What did this political strategy encompass, briefly

25 if you can, please?

Page 730

1 A. Well, for example, during 1995 there -- after the collapse of the

2 Contact Group plan in 1994 there was an effort, first, to understand what

3 were the war aims of the three major belligerents plus other surrounding

4 states; and to advise the UNPROFOR leadership on how UNPROFOR might best

5 position itself in order to be able to carry out its mandate, either

6 narrowly to assist with delivery of humanitarian aid or, more broadly, to

7 try and bring the conflict to an end.

8 Q. Did this include proposals for bombing?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Thank you. And now if we can look at paragraph 14, please.

11 There you say that you ensured freedom of movement for civilians. Could

12 civilians freely leave Sarajevo?

13 A. No, they could not.

14 Q. In the area where you lived in Sarajevo, did you see if any Serbs

15 also lived there?

16 A. Yes, in considerable numbers.

17 Q. And were you informed, since you were a civil affairs officer,

18 that Serbs were killed in Sarajevo, Serb civilians?

19 A. Yes, certainly.

20 Q. Thank you. Did you find out, did you investigate, who killed

21 them, when, and where, and did you report about this?

22 A. Yes. We -- when there were casualties, we did attempt to

23 disaggregate the casualty data by the ethnicity of the victims, if

24 possible; and we did attempt to determine the cause of death.

25 Q. And in these investigations, what did you find? What did you

Page 731

1 conclude? How many Serbs were killed in Sarajevo during the war, are you

2 able to tell us?

3 A. We -- first of all, we certainly did not investigate the death of

4 everybody killed during the period that I was there. It was only a sort

5 of representative sample or we had access to some of the broader data

6 which didn't give particular levels of detail. I think our conclusion

7 was that during the siege roughly 10.000 people were killed all together

8 and roughly 10 per cent of those were Serbs, which was roughly

9 proportional to their share of the population in the area controlled by

10 the Bosnian government.

11 Q. So then you would not agree with me if I were to tell you that

12 more than 5.000 Serbs were killed in Sarajevo?

13 A. I never saw any evidence that affects -- in fact, I would

14 disagree with that, yes.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask whether you are talking about the same

16 Sarajevo. You're talking about Sarajevo.

17 You're talking about the government-controlled area of Sarajevo.

18 Are we talking about the same?

19 Are you putting to this witness that whether he disagrees with

20 the fact that 5.000 people, Serbs, were killed within the area controlled

21 by the government --

22 MR. LUKIC: Yes, that's what I'm --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So there may be more even in the area outside

24 of the --

25 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

Page 732

1 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we have verified that. Thank you.

2 Please proceed.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Did you have information that Serbs in Sarajevo were taken to the

5 front lines to dig trenches?

6 A. Yes, we did.

7 Q. And as UNPROFOR, did you do anything about this?

8 A. Yes, it was one of the issues we protested to the Bosnian army.

9 Q. Thank you. Other than protests, did you suggest perhaps any kind

10 of punishment to the Bosnian government -- I would rather refer to them

11 as the Bosniak government. Did you ask for any kind of punitive action

12 against the government?

13 A. We asked -- when there were cases that came to our attention that

14 Serbs had been put into dangerous positions to dig trenches, also we had

15 examples of when Serbs were forced to clear mines by hand from very

16 dangerous areas, such as Stup and Zuc, we lodged a formal protest and we

17 advised them that they were potentially committing war crimes. I

18 remember personally I did this both to General Karavelic and to

19 General Hajrulahovic.

20 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 19(C) you say:

21 "I was the point of contact with other international and

22 non-governmental organisations operating in Sarajevo, such as UNHCR and

23 the International Committee of the Red Cross."

24 My question is this: Did you receive information from the ICRC

25 about Serb victims, especially for the area that was under the control of

Page 733

1 the Bosniak government?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Based on this information, you concluded that it was only 1.000

4 Serbs who were killed in Sarajevo?

5 A. I would not say that was the only source of information, no, but

6 that was one of the sources that we would want to consult with.

7 Q. Thank you. I would now like to look at paragraph 25, please, and

8 there you say:

9 "When I arrived in Sarajevo, the city had been under siege for

10 about a year."

11 The centre of Sarajevo that was held by the Bosniak government at

12 the time, were there Serb settlements around that centre, area?

13 A. In general, the population of Serb ethnicity was distributed

14 throughout the area. There was some areas which had higher

15 concentrations of Serbs and there is some like, you know, the old town

16 which had lower concentrations of Serbs. But, in general, they were

17 dispersed throughout the area controlled by the government.

18 Q. And do you know that the settlements or neighbourhoods around

19 Sarajevo that were under the control of the Serbs were actually Serb

20 settlements?

21 A. Yes, that's correct, yeah.

22 Q. Thank you. The centre of Sarajevo that was under the control of

23 the Bosniaks had a land connection with other areas that were under

24 Bosniak control across from Butmir airport; is that right? And through

25 the tunnel?

Page 734

1 A. Yes -- right. The airport was controlled by the United Nations,

2 and then from early 1993 the Bosniaks had completed a tunnel underneath

3 it, so more or less, yes, sir.

4 Q. Thank you. Did you know about the tunnel?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you know that weapons were being brought into the city

7 through the tunnel?

8 A. Yes, and taken out.

9 Q. Thank you. Now if you would kindly look at paragraph 27. You

10 saw a map of Sarajevo yesterday that the Prosecution showed us where

11 lines were marked in red and blue, do you remember?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can we conclude then that fighting was conducted throughout

14 Sarajevo and that the line of separation lay all around Sarajevo?

15 A. Do you mean that there was fighting around -- along the whole

16 length of the confrontation line?

17 Q. [In English] Yes.

18 A. Yes. Some parts of it were traditionally much more active and

19 some parts were much more quiet, but your general statement is correct,

20 yes.

21 Q. [Interpretation] Now, we saw on the map that this line of

22 separation was there. Was it 100 metres? Was it 200 metres between the

23 units of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina?

25 A. It varied. In some places that I visited with the French forces,

Page 735

1 the distance was less than the distance between you and me. So there was

2 a building we called the red building in Grbavica, where one part of the

3 building was controlled by Serb forces and one part of the building was

4 controlled by Bosnian forces. But there were some areas, I would say in

5 the north-east of the city, which were more rural, beyond the city

6 limits, where the distance between the forward positions of the sides

7 might be much greater.

8 Q. Thank you. There was fighting in the centre as well, for

9 instance, around Skenderija; isn't that right?

10 A. Not in Skenderija itself when I was there. When I was there,

11 Skenderija was well under government control, but there was certainly

12 fighting immediately south of Skenderija, yes.

13 Q. Grbavica, Vrace, Ilijas?

14 A. Well, Grbavica and Vrace were areas of very intense fighting.

15 Ilijas was outside of the main Sarajevo area and was not a major area of

16 conflict.

17 Q. Also, there was a separation line running through all of Dobrinja

18 and around the airport; isn't that right?

19 A. That's correct, a very active line.

20 Q. Nedzarici as well, north of the airport, that was under the

21 control of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps while the

22 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina held three sides Alipasino Polje, Mojmilo and

23 Stup, respectively; is that right?

24 A. Yes, a very active part of the confrontation line.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I explore, Mr. Lukic. Is there any dispute

Page 736

1 about what has been the testimony of this witness for the last, well,

2 let's say two pages, that confrontation lines went through these areas,

3 that there was a tunnel, that weapons passed through the tunnel. Is

4 there any dispute about these matters, Mr. Groome?

5 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.

6 MR. LUKIC: But it hasn't been established, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE ORIE: No, therefore I am a bit surprised that after eight

8 or nine months of negotiations of what could be agreed facts, that there

9 seems to be no problem about it. So therefore we've listened to

10 testimony for at least two pages, if not more, which is apparently not in

11 dispute. The Chamber would very much like the parties to focus on

12 matters which are in dispute. Please proceed.

13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

14 Q. [Interpretation] I'm just going to continue with this very

15 briefly because we need this in order to move on, that is to say to one

16 of the essential parts of your testimony. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

17 held Lukavica, that is, 5 to 6 kilometres away from Ilidza, whereas the

18 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in full control in these positions of the

19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from Mount Igman; isn't that right?

20 A. I'm sorry?

21 Q. I'm reminding you of your testimony on the 15th of January, 2007,

22 transcript page 371. This is what you said:

23 "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps held Lukavica, that is, 5 to

24 6 kilometres east of Ilidza, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

25 controlled these positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from

Page 737

1 Mount Igman."

2 A. I don't think I would have used the English word "control." I

3 mean, Lukavica and Ilidza were areas under Serb control. I might have

4 suggested that these areas can be fired upon from Bosnian-held high

5 ground on Mount Igman. But the two places you mentioned, Lukavica and

6 Ilidza, were places firmly and safely under the control of Serb forces.

7 But I think there might be an issue with the word "control."

8 Q. [In English] Maybe it's lost in translation.

9 A. Okay, maybe.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Just one more question in relation to this. To

11 the north-west Sokolj hill, Vogosca, Ilijas, the hill of Zuc, the hill of

12 Hum, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina held under its control the hill of

13 Zuc that was above Vogosca; is that right?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to move on to paragraph 28. This is

16 what you say:

17 "The entire city was regularly exposed to gun-fire or shelling."

18 That is going to be in dispute here. Who fired at who and from

19 where? That is why I'd like to ask you the following: From the centre

20 of town, that is to say the area that was controlled by the

21 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was fire opened at Serb positions?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You had electronic equipment monitoring the shooting and could

24 you establish the direction from which the firing had come?

25 A. In most cases, yes.

Page 738

1 Q. For example, if an anti-aircraft gun was fired and it can fire up

2 to 30 rounds in a very short period of time and also it can be used in

3 infantry fighting, would that be registered as 30 shells or rounds?

4 A. There was a protocol from the agreed among the military observers

5 that multi-fire weapons, rapid-fire weapons, which included those Praga

6 guns and so on, anti-aircraft fire, they would count one burst as one

7 detonation, but one burst might include multiple rounds.

8 Q. But they can also explode once they hit the target; right?

9 A. Yes. The maps which UNPROFOR used each morning to show where

10 heavy rounds had impacted, I believe that they counted from 60-millimetre

11 mortars and above. So Praga gun, anti-aircraft guns, multi-fire weapons

12 were generally excluded; but, you're right, they were in a sort of middle

13 category between light weapons and heavier area weapons.

14 Q. When there were casualties in the area that was under control of

15 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you assumed that the fire had come

16 from the side that was held by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; right? That

17 is what you said in your testimony on page 406 from January 2007.

18 A. We didn't and didn't have the capacity to investigate every

19 firing incident, of course, on every victim, but when it was possible to

20 confirm, either from the UNMOs or my military colleagues or directly

21 seeing who was shooting or from mortar detecting radar, then, yes, the

22 overwhelming majority of impacts that landed in the government-controlled

23 part of the city came from the Serb-controlled part of the city.

24 Q. In paragraph 29 you speak about the predictable regimen of water

25 collection, food collection, and also limited movement. Yesterday you

Page 739

1 told us - and I'm going to go back to that as well - you spoke about

2 barriers. Is it correct that all of this pertained both to the parts of

3 town that were held by the Bosniak government and army as well as those

4 parts that were held by the Army of Republika Srpska?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. Since you're not an explosives expert or a military

7 expert for that matter, I am not going to torment you for very long with

8 paragraph 30 [as interpreted], where you said that about 1.000 shells

9 fell every day on the area of the inner city of Sarajevo. Shall we agree

10 that you are not a person that we should discuss this with in detail, a

11 person who kept ledgers, registers, who reported this. You only heard

12 about this at briefings, right? You never went out to see for yourself

13 what had happened except for the individual cases you refer to in your

14 statement?

15 A. It's true. My job was to aggregate information. Of course all

16 around me the shells were firing, so -- were landing, so I was aware of

17 them to that extent. And when one was particularly interesting, I would

18 go with the UNMO or the battalion teams. But your general

19 characterisation is correct.

20 Q. Thank you. And now paragraph 37, please. You speak about Serb

21 pressure, which meant -- which is shorthand for ratcheting up terror, as

22 you say here. Also, you say that the pressure goes up once peace plans

23 collapse --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, just for the Chamber to being fully able

25 to follow, you said in your question, page 23, line 23:

Page 740

1 "I'm not going to torment you very long with paragraph 30, where

2 you said that about 30 shells fell every day -- 1.000."

3 MR. LUKIC: 1.000, yes.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Reading paragraph 30, I do not see that as a

5 statement of the witness, so we are a bit puzzled by --

6 MR. LUKIC: 34.

7 JUDGE ORIE: 3-4.

8 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, that's clear. Thank you. Please proceed.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thanks.

11 Q. [Interpretation] Did you witness offensives launched by the

12 Bosniak army, offensives that were launched from Sarajevo; and if so, how

13 many did you see for yourself out of the 28?

14 A. Yes, I would sometimes see a part of them. I would see people

15 going to the front line or units being moved or weapons, mortars being

16 moved, or -- because the city was so small, just a few kilometres across,

17 you would also hear and sometimes see the weapons being fired. So, yes,

18 and some of them, you know, like those in the spring of 1995 were

19 basically visible to all residents of the city.

20 Q. When you speak about Igman in this regard on the

21 15th of January, 2007, transcript page 340, you say that the

22 demilitarised zone in Igman was de facto under the control of the

23 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the moment when the demilitarised

24 area was created all the way up until the end of the conflict. And also

25 that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a matter of fact established

Page 741

1 points of control even behind that. My question: Were offensives often

2 launched against Serb positions from these high altitudes and Serb

3 positions were below?

4 A. If I remember correctly, the Bosnian army did not station heavy

5 weapons that we observed in the demilitarised zone, but it is certainly

6 true that they used it and transited it and launched attacks through it.

7 That is correct.

8 Q. Could we agree then that such a demilitarised zone was a

9 legitimate military objective?

10 A. That's probably a better question for you as a lawyer to answer,

11 but I think we can agree that de facto it was not really demilitarised.

12 Q. Thank you. Now that we're discussing the Army of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina, tell us what your knowledge is. How many members did the

14 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina have within the city of

15 Sarajevo?

16 A. I --

17 Q. Perhaps I can jog your memory. On the 16th of January, 2007, on

18 page 459 you said that the 1st Corps had 30- to 40.000 soldiers within

19 Sarajevo; is that correct?

20 A. I would say it varied over time. I -- it -- during the earlier

21 part of my time, I would guess it had fewer than that and didn't have

22 weapons for all its members. I knew people who shared weapons. It grew

23 over time, but then also over time mobility grew. So they would rotate

24 quite large units out of Sarajevo, for example, in 1995 for combat, for

25 example, in the area of 3rd Corps or even 2nd Corps in the far north. So

Page 742

1 I'm not sure that I should give a single -- try to give a single number

2 that covers the whole three years that I was there, but some low tens of

3 thousands.

4 Q. Also, could we agree that the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina had an advantage in terms of personnel levels when compared

6 to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

7 A. Yes, I think that's almost certainly correct.

8 Q. Is it also correct that the weapons of the

9 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were of medium quality, both in terms of quality,

10 maintenance, and replenishment?

11 A. You promised not to torment me on military issues too much, but

12 that was certainly my amateur assessment that the tanks and the heavy

13 weapons available to the Serb forces were of medium quality and

14 readiness, yes.

15 Q. Also, I'd just like to remind you of your testimony on the

16 16th of January, 2007, the transcript page is 415, and you say there that

17 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina received equipment and weaponry at the end

18 of 1994 and beginning of 1995, and that at that point in time the Army of

19 Republika Srpska was the weaker side in that area?

20 A. Yes, it is certainly true that the Bosnian army received weapons

21 and uniforms and some training during that 1994 /1995 period. We saw

22 that and we felt a slow shift in the relative balance of power, yes.

23 Q. At that time, the end of 1994, due to the offensives launched by

24 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you ask for military force to be used

25 against that military component in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 743

1 A. No, I don't think we did.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, if you want to communicate with counsel,

4 seek an appropriate way rather than talking at a distance. So if you

5 want to address anyone, then -- Mr. Lukic, then apparently Mr. Mladic

6 wants to have a break already -- is that, Mr. Mladic, which -- or you

7 want to consult with counsel.

8 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour, I don't know maybe -- how much time do

9 we have?

10 JUDGE ORIE: We started late, but we usually have a break at

11 10.30, so if you think this an appropriate moment for a break, then we

12 will take a break.

13 MR. LUKIC: Maybe it would be clever to consult with my

14 colleague.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

16 MR. GROOME: Before we take a break, there is just one brief

17 issue I would like to address to the Chamber.

18 JUDGE ORIE: In the presence of the witness?

19 MR. GROOME: It has nothing to do with the witness.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing to do with the witness. Then I -- and would

21 that not take up much time?

22 [The witness stands down]

23 MR. GROOME: I think less than a minute, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Less than a minute. Then I suggest we take that.

25 Could you already follow the usher, Mr. Harland.

Page 748

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.

2 Now, Mr. Lukic, are you ready to continue?

3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, I am.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Please do.

5 Oh, yes, and one more question for you, Mr. Lukic. If you refer

6 to testimony in another case, of course the transcripts are not in

7 evidence for us, would you always refer to the name of the case so that

8 we don't have to find out on what date in what year which case was heard,

9 we know more or less what the point of reference is.

10 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

12 MR. LUKIC: Previous transcripts I referred to were from

13 Krajisnik case, 2007.

14 JUDGE ORIE: 2007, let me go back in my memory. We'll think

15 about whether that could be correct, yes or no.

16 MR. LUKIC: I'll check it but -- I will check it.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Groome --

18 MR. GROOME: I believe you've already identified. It's my

19 understanding that he did not testify in the Krajisnik case.

20 THE WITNESS: Maybe Dragomir Milosevic.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's try to avoid to guess on answers of

22 questions, but let's try to stick to the facts. It's an instruction for

23 the future rather than a comment on the past. Please proceed.

24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. [Interpretation] Paragraph 38, please, where you say, among other

Page 749

1 things, "I came to believe ..." This is your conclusion. It's not the

2 official UNPROFOR position; is that right?

3 A. I'm not sure UNPROFOR had a position on it. It was relatively

4 widely shared.

5 Q. When you say that there were eight main levers that Karadzic

6 could use in order to increase the pressure, and then under 2 and 3 you

7 refer to the bombardment of the civilian population and directing sniper

8 fire against the civilian population, did you know at the time the

9 deployment of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the deployment of its

10 cannon, tanks, mortars, snipers in the city in order to be able to say

11 that civilians were fired at?

12 A. Yes, in general we had much better knowledge of where Bosnian

13 government personnel and weapons were because we were also there in the

14 city.

15 Q. Is it true that they would move?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. I'm going to ask you now about gas, water, electricity cuts only

18 in relation to Sarajevo. Are you familiar of -- with cases when the

19 Muslims knocked these systems out themselves in order to receive

20 international assistance?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And would we agree -- you say that it was a form of pressure. Is

23 that a form of sanctions in order to achieve a political goal?

24 A. I'm sorry?

25 Q. You say that this constituted terror. Could it also be a

Page 750

1 sanction at the same time imposed upon the other warring party in order

2 to weaken its strength?

3 A. It may have had an effect on the military party. I was focusing

4 mainly on its effect on the civilian population.

5 Q. Was there an electricity shortage in Republika Srpska also at

6 that time?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And there was no gas. There were no neighbourhoods that had a

9 gas system, other than the Dobrinja area of Sarajevo?

10 A. Right, just a small part under Serb control had gas.

11 Q. Was it necessary to pay for this gas? It was Russian gas, right,

12 not Serbian gas?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. You said yesterday that it was shut off in Mali Zvornik. This is

15 in Serbia, isn't it?

16 A. That's right. Sometimes it was shut off in different places, but

17 you're correct, it was sometimes shut off in Mali Zvornik.

18 Q. If Serbia was instructed, due to unpaid bills, by Russia to shut

19 off the gas -- I mean, would UNPROFOR then sometimes pay for this gas?

20 A. No, but I believe some Western countries agreed to pay Russia for

21 the debt on arrears owed on gas to be delivered to Bosnia but not

22 UNPROFOR.

23 Q. Do you know when this amount was paid?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Thank you. And is it correct that the Serbs could have taken

Page 751

1 Sarajevo militarily?

2 A. I am not sure as a non-military person I should give my view on

3 that.

4 Q. In paragraph 40 of the statement that we have in front of us you

5 say:

6 "The Serbs could have applied much greater military pressure than

7 they actually did."

8 Had they done that and had they used their military capacity to

9 its full extent and actually directed it against military objectives,

10 they might well have caused the defence of the city to collapse. Would

11 you want to say something different today?

12 A. No, I don't think I would say anything different today.

13 Q. In your view, what is a more drastic action, the military capture

14 of a city or the imposition of some form of sanction?

15 A. You mean in the abstract?

16 Q. [In English] In the abstract, yes.

17 A. Well, if they behave according to the laws and customs of war,

18 then I think they -- the capture of the military objectives and the

19 respect of the population would be less drastic.

20 Q. [Interpretation] This is a very interesting position, but thank

21 you.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, perhaps not without reasons you commented

23 on opinion evidence which was elicited -- was sought to be elicited by

24 the Prosecution, but the Chamber always clearly said: Please, facts,

25 facts, facts, and then we can see whether that opinion would be an

Page 752

1 opinion which the Chamber could form itself as well on the basis of the

2 factual evidence. I noticed that on legal opinion, on military opinion,

3 and now even again on what is more drastic and -- for you, of course, the

4 same applies as for the Prosecution, that the Chamber is not that much

5 interested in opinion if it has not the facts available and then see

6 whether these facts justify for any of the opinion. That applies to you

7 as well. I would like to remind you of that position of the Chamber, and

8 rightly instigated by you, in relation to this testimony. Please

9 proceed.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. [Interpretation] In paragraph 41, the next one, you say that the

12 conflict could best be characterised not as a mid-level conflict but as

13 high-level -- high-intensity gangsterism. This is also an opinion, isn't

14 it?

15 A. It's a characterisation, yes.

16 Q. And is that your characterisation?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 42, you speak about sniper fire. I would

19 just like to ask you to tell us what was the basis for the difference

20 between sniper fire or just regular rifle fire? How could you know just

21 by the shots that a rifle doesn't have an optical sight?

22 A. Not easily. If you were shot at close range, it would not always

23 be obvious.

24 Q. On the confrontation line which we more or less partially

25 clarified today, there was firing, as you say, in some areas that was

Page 753

1 more intense and less intense in other areas. How could you tell the

2 difference if the firing occurred at the front line and that this fire

3 was directed at civilians?

4 A. The closer you were to the confrontation line, the more difficult

5 it would be to make a -- to make a distinction. If somebody was, you

6 know, by themselves at some distance from the confrontation line and

7 there was a single shot not in the context of a larger exchange, then

8 that would seem to be more likely to be a sniper incident. But you are

9 correct, when it's close it's not always easy to tell.

10 Q. Thank you. In mid-1993 you came to Sarajevo; is that correct?

11 Do you remember the exact date?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. All right. Very well. At the time, there was a conflict that

14 broke out between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina

15 around the time that you arrived in Bosnia?

16 A. It broke out almost exactly at the time I arrived, yes.

17 Q. The fighting between Muslims and Croats were primarily conducted

18 in order to capture territory; is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. At the same time that they were fighting against the Croats, the

21 Muslims were also carrying out offensives in order to join up the

22 Sarajevo-Zenica-Tuzla-and Podrinje areas. Do you remember that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. [In English] Remember and -- that's correct or you just remember?

25 A. That was certainly an ambition they had.

Page 754

1 Q. [Interpretation] Okay. Thank you. And in mid-1993 was there

2 already an assessment then that the Muslims had a sufficient quantity of

3 weapons and ammunition at their disposal to be able to launch a

4 successful offensive against the Croats and the Serbs at the same time?

5 A. No. It was our view that the Croats who were a much smaller

6 force were surprised by the military capacity of the Bosnian army and

7 that the Bosnian army would not have been able to enjoy the success they

8 did against the Croats, had there also been sustained pressure from the

9 Serb side. And I think, for example, the fighting around Vares and

10 Bugojno was done with Bosnian troops who were actually taken from lines

11 that had been facing the Serbs. So the Bosnians were able to do one or

12 the other, but I think they found it difficult to do both at the same

13 time.

14 Q. So we can then conclude that at the time the Serbs were not

15 carrying out any offensive actions; is that right?

16 A. With the exception of the Igman offensive, which I think took

17 place during the period of the Bosnian government's fight with the HVO.

18 I don't think there were major Serb offensive military actions.

19 Q. Thank you. And now paragraph 48 --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, same comments: Opinion, interpretations

21 of facts which have not been presented --

22 MR. LUKIC: This gentleman should know the fact if Serb were

23 launching any offensives at that time --

24 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not asking whether the gentleman should know any

25 facts, present the Chamber with facts. The whole issue about so we

Page 755

1 can -- let me see, whether "they had a sufficient quantity of weapons and

2 ammunition at their disposal to be able to launch a successful offensive

3 against the Croats and the Serbs at the same time." And then we get a

4 lot of an assessment of the military capacity and what they could do, and

5 if they would have done this, that would have been the consequences; all

6 without a factual basis.

7 MR. LUKIC: The whole statement is flooded with data like this.

8 I have to go through the statement. If you want to exclude the

9 statement, I would be happy to sit down.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Point to me where we find the facts which support

11 the opinion which you've asked for. Tell me where we find them.

12 MR. LUKIC: The gentleman refused my question. He said: No, the

13 army wasn't able at that time, the Army of B&H. So obviously he knew

14 that that army wasn't able at that time.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we do not know whether he was right or not.

16 That is his opinion, isn't it?

17 MR. LUKIC: That is his opinion.

18 JUDGE ORIE: His opinion. I mean, what would make us believe

19 that his opinion, not being a military expert --

20 MR. LUKIC: Be --

21 JUDGE ORIE: -- and not supported by facts, whether that would --

22 that's exactly -- you criticised the Prosecution for it. I think we have

23 been very clear: Provide us with the facts rather than with opinion. We

24 do not strike it yet, but more or less ignore it if no underlying facts

25 are presented. The same applies to you. I said it in relation to the

Page 756

1 previous question. I say it in relation to this question. Again,

2 Mr. Groome is on his feet.

3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, simply to note that it seems that we

4 are concluding upon -- the witness is based as purely on opinion. I ask

5 that he be asked what he based it upon. I believe he does have some

6 information of a concrete nature he could provide the Chamber.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether he has or not. He certainly

8 has not been asked about it, and that is exactly what we want to prevent

9 to happen. You may proceed, Mr. Lukic. If you want to --

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour --

11 JUDGE ORIE: -- elicit further --

12 MR. LUKIC: I just wanted to show the gentleman the document, but

13 you cut me short. That is the first document I wanted to show him.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 MR. LUKIC: It's number 19198, 65 ter number document.

16 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, did you see this document while you

17 were preparing to testify? It was on the list?

18 A. I don't recall it.

19 Q. All right. You don't recall that. Since this directive talks

20 about what I have just asked you about -- but if you haven't seen the

21 directive I'm not really going to dwell on it then. You don't recall

22 seeing this document before, do you?

23 A. No.

24 Q. All right. We will move on. In paragraph 48 --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

Page 757

1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I just that the witness doesn't speak

2 to this document in his statement. It seems that -- I think the more

3 prudent way to proceed, that if Mr. Lukic would like the witness to look

4 at lengthy documents, it would be fairer to give an opportunity to see

5 them during the break so he can really give an informed decision or

6 informed answer with respect to whether he's seen the document before.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I think the question was - but let me check that -

8 whether he saw it recently during proofing. But, "Did you see this

9 document while you were preparing to testify?" And then he says, "I

10 don't recall that." Therefore I do not know what questions Mr. Lukic is

11 about to ask, if they are limited portions then perhaps we could --

12 MR. LUKIC: Yeah, that's only the last sentence on the first

13 page.

14 JUDGE ORIE: So if the witness could -- if the witness could

15 orient himself what kind of document he's looking at at this moment and

16 then you take him to the portion you would like to ask questions about,

17 Mr. Lukic.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I'm going to read to you the bit that I wanted to ask you about.

20 It's at the bottom of the page. The sentence begins:

21 [In English] "The Muslim leadership is trying to preserve

22 continuous predominance over Central Bosnia and, if possible, ensure a

23 passage to the sea, the Neretva river delta and to the Sava River the

24 general area of Brcko in this context through offensive operations

25 against both HVO and our forces. They are trying to link up the Tuzla,

Page 758

1 Zenica, and Sarajevo areas into a whole."

2 [Interpretation] I asked you if you recalled whether this would

3 happen in the field in late June 1993. Perhaps you don't remember if you

4 arrived around that time.

5 [In English] Do you remember or not?

6 A. Yes, I remember the events.

7 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. I would briefly like to look at

8 paragraph 48. I've been trying to get to it already, several attempts.

9 You talk about the Serbian intention to capture as much territory as

10 possible. Did you see during the time that you were in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina in the field that the other two belligerents, the

12 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, also tried to capture as much

13 territory as possible in combat?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. Can you now please look at paragraphs 50, 51, and 52.

16 There you say that the Serbs intended to capture as much territory as

17 possible and then to return them, and you're talking about Igman here.

18 Did you ever see in practice that the Muslims or the Croats captured

19 something and then subsequently would return it?

20 A. No.

21 Q. The Serbs were attacking Igman primarily because there were

22 firing points there, firing positions, of the Muslim army; is that

23 correct? I think that we already agreed opposite that?

24 A. No, I don't think that's why they took it. I think they took it

25 because it helped them to separate Sarajevo from the main body of Bosnian

Page 759

1 government-held territory in Eastern Bosnia and they even said that,

2 Dr. Karadzic said that.

3 Q. All right. Very well. Can we now look at document 20884. On

4 the first page here, 3 in the English, at the bottom of the page --

5 THE REGISTRAR: There's no English version in e-court.

6 No translation in e-court.

7 MR. LUKIC: Then I'll try to read because I do have translation.

8 It's ERN number --

9 THE REGISTRAR: I believe it's not released.

10 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, can I read one sentence from this

11 document and I will quote the ERN number.

12 JUDGE ORIE: If there is a -- if you quote the ERN number and if

13 there is a document to be -- a translation to be released, you may

14 proceed at this moment as you suggest.

15 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. The ERN number of this

16 document is 0401-0692, and the same -- since it's one page it's the same.

17 JUDGE ORIE: And could you then indicate to the witness what kind

18 of a document you are quoting from.

19 MR. LUKIC: This is obviously some kind of intercept, I guess.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that you're supposed to know what you're

21 quoting from, isn't it?

22 MR. LUKIC: There is no title. It looks like intercepted

23 conversation between --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but --

25 MR. LUKIC: I received this from the Prosecution. It's not

Page 760

1 something we had.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, anything -- because if we put to the

3 witness a quoted from a document then he's entitled to know what that

4 document purports to be.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's an intercepted conversation

6 provided by the Government of Croatia.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

8 Please proceed.

9 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. It was -- on top of a

10 document it says that it was a conversation between Karadzic and

11 General Milovanovic conducted at 1645 hours on August the 4th, and it was

12 mentioned that Karadzic said:

13 "Please, you shouldn't be in between the hammer and the nail. I

14 am the supreme commander and I am ordering them to withdraw, and tell

15 Mladic to report to me from the airport."

16 Q. [Interpretation] According to you could Mladic refuse an order

17 like this?

18 A. As I said earlier, there were certainly periods of tension

19 between them, and this was one of them. They argued like this, in fact,

20 in front of us at the Hotel Panorama, but eventually they both agreed on

21 the redeployment of Igman.

22 Q. According to you, would there have been air-strikes had the Serbs

23 not withdrawn from Bjelasnica?

24 A. Probably.

25 Q. The agreement was that after the withdrawal of the VRS, these

Page 761

1 positions should be under UNPROFOR control; right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. There was no agreement to the effect that UNPROFOR would hand

4 these positions over to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Muslim forces, nevertheless, took these positions; isn't that

7 right?

8 A. Correct -- or, let me clarify. They certainly dominated. They

9 transited, they put weapons through them, they launched attacks from

10 them. They didn't directly base people there, so -- but your point is

11 generally correct, yes.

12 Q. What did UNPROFOR do to prevent these actions of the

13 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

14 A. Well, we certainly tried to make it logistically difficult and

15 ensure they didn't establish a presence there; and we vigorously

16 protested it, both on the political chain and military chain; and we

17 tried to collect evidence of Bosnian troops crossing the zone, which I

18 saw myself and which I was present at meetings with President Izetbegovic

19 when we showed him the photographs of armed units.

20 Q. We know that there were no air-strikes that were carried out

21 against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, was this considered

22 as an option because of this violation of the agreement?

23 A. I think the subject did not come up -- it came up in 1994 briefly

24 but was dismissed as not plausible later. So it -- in this case it did

25 not come up.

Page 762

1 Q. Is it correct that at that time it was only the Serbs who were

2 threatened with air-strikes?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. I would now kindly ask that the following document be shown to

5 you, 09986. It has to do with paragraph 66 of your statement. In

6 paragraph 66 you mention this document. You say that you attended that

7 meeting?

8 A. Yes, yeah.

9 Q. Now I'm going to ask you a bit about what it was that had been

10 discussed at the meeting.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] First of all, could we please have

12 page 3 on our screens. We will need the lower part of the page, BH

13 snipers, that part.

14 Q. I see that you compiled this document and this is what you say in

15 the document:

16 "BH snipers have been firing on UN personnel around UNPROFOR's

17 forward headquarters. Two Bosnian snipers have been firing not only at

18 UN personnel but also at local pedestrians in the vicinity."

19 Is this the only recorded incident of this nature or could you

20 see for yourselves on other occasions as well that members of the

21 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina acted in this way?

22 A. Yes, there were other cases. I only reported this one in the

23 weekly summary because I happened to speak to the two French anti-sniping

24 personnel who were shooting back at the snipers. So I was able to

25 directly confirm it, and in fact I saw the Bosnian snipers firing.

Page 763

1 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph, this is what it says:

2 "There is more evidence that the BH is gradually moving away from

3 its stated principle of representing BH people of all three communities."

4 Also it says that it is obvious that:

5 "More and more senior BH officials seem to be interested in

6 advancing the interests of the Muslim community."

7 Upon your arrival, when was it that you understood that political

8 representatives in Sarajevo represent only or almost exclusively the

9 interests of the Muslims?

10 A. It increased with time. When I first arrived, there were

11 certainly non-Bosniaks in relatively responsible positions in the Bosnian

12 army and in relatively serious positions in the government. It reduced

13 over time. One of the turning points I remember was, I think, late

14 October 1993, which might be the period we're talking about. There was a

15 reshuffle of the government and that followed, you know, a

16 marginalisation of some of the non-Bosniak members of the Bosnian armed

17 forces and government.

18 Q. Thank you. Then you say that it is symptomatic that small

19 exchange of populations took place near Sarajevo: 314 Serbs left

20 BH-controlled territory and 50 Muslims moved in the other direction.

21 Also you say that this had been discussed, that there was a dilemma as to

22 whether to allow freedom of movement or, in your view, possibly be a

23 participant in ethnic cleansing. Was it your impression that people who

24 had gone over to the other side had had that kind of dilemma, or did they

25 whole-heartedly want to go to the side that was controlled by the army

Page 764

1 that belonged to their own ethnic community?

2 A. I think most of the people I talked to were afraid when they were

3 not in territory controlled by the forces of the same nationality in all

4 three areas.

5 Q. Was it this fear that compelled people to leave the place where

6 they had lived?

7 A. I think among the people I spoke to in Sarajevo, it was a general

8 fear of getting killed that made people want to leave. So people of all

9 communities, Bosniak, Serb, Croat, others, mixed, civilians, wanted to

10 leave Sarajevo but were generally not allowed to. In the case of Serbs,

11 they generally wanted to go to Serbia or to Serb-controlled parts of

12 Bosnia; Croats to Croatia; and Bosniaks also wanted to leave but usually

13 to go further away.

14 Q. And now just one more thing in relation to this. You say on

15 page 4 - we need page 4 now, the upper half. There is a reference to

16 Central Bosnia, Vitez, Zenica, and this is what it says:

17 "Croat authorities insist that organised exchanges of population,

18 of people and property, is the only logical solution at this point, since

19 Croats, Muslims, and Serbs are no longer able to live together."

20 In actual fact, would the answer be the same, people wanted to go

21 to a part of the territory that was under the control of their army?

22 A. It varied a lot where -- in Sarajevo, during my time there,

23 intercommunal relations were relatively good. There -- people didn't

24 even always know who was Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. They came to know

25 more and more, but their main motivation for fleeing, as they said to us,

Page 765

1 was simply to be away from the Serb siege. Where they wanted to go was

2 usually determined by where they had relatives. The part of the document

3 you're referring to refers to the Central Bosnia and smaller towns and

4 rural areas. In general, people I spoke to in the smaller communities

5 were much -- intercommunal relations were much worse and they generally

6 wanted very strongly to live in areas controlled by their community.

7 Q. Thank you for that observation. Also the situation varied in

8 different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For instance, on page 5, around

9 the middle of the page, the first bullet point from the top. This is

10 what it says:

11 [In English] "The upsurge of B&H-HVO fighting in Vares does not

12 appear to be affecting good relations between the B&H and the HVO just to

13 the north in Tuzla. There, the two forces continue to fight together

14 against the Serbs."

15 [Interpretation] So the situation was not the same throughout

16 Bosnia, the enemy was not the same, and also the allies were not the

17 same?

18 A. Certainly in Central Bosnia I personally saw Mujahedin units and

19 7th Muslim Brigade units directly burning out Croat civilians from their

20 homes, so relations were extremely bad, whereas when I went to the

21 northern part, Tuzla and further north, I saw relatively good relations.

22 So it did seem to vary considerably from place to place.

23 Q. Thank you. Also on page 6 of this same document, at the top of

24 the page, that is, there is a reference to a cease-fire between the

25 secessionists, as you call them, Abdic's secessionists, and the

Page 766

1 pro-Sarajevo 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it correct

2 that both were Muslims, on both sides there were Muslims fighting against

3 each other?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Thank you. We'll just go back to the first page now. This is

6 what you say here -- actually, you can see it for yourself.

7 "It seems that the hard-liners won the power struggle in

8 Sarajevo. Prime Minister Silajdzic had announced a new cabinet, more

9 powerful, more Muslim, and even more hard-lined than its predecessor.

10 The BH position on the war seems to be clear."

11 When you say "BH" here, you are referring to the Bosniak part,

12 aren't you?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. "The BH position on the war seems to be clear. There can be no

15 peace settlement until the Muslims get back all the areas that were

16 predominantly Muslim on the eve of the war. The war is therefore almost

17 certain to continue at least through to the end of the winter."

18 This is in accordance with your other observations when you say

19 the Muslims were the ones who rejected peace initiatives and efforts;

20 right?

21 A. Opinion varied within the Bosniak community, but certainly during

22 this period this view grew consistently. President Izetbegovic had --

23 who I talked to about it had a somewhat different view on which

24 territories would need to be secured for a peace agreement, but generally

25 that characterisation is correct, yes.

Page 767

1 Q. Thank you. Now let us please look at paragraph 71 of your

2 statement. You say that Serbs do not want to take any territory but that

3 the artillery is busy against Sarajevo. On the 27th of October, almost

4 500 shells fell on Sarajevo within one hour in response to BH mortar

5 fire. Did you report how many shells were fired by the

6 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in which report could we find that

7 actually?

8 A. No, there are -- this does not say it. There are -- in fact, all

9 this information comes from two sets of documents which I assume are

10 available here. The one is the UNMO daily sitrep which plots all the

11 heavy weapons impacts, and the other is the battalion reports which also

12 gives geographical quantified information on impacts.

13 Q. Did they collect information as to how many shells were fired

14 from the centre of Sarajevo at Serb positions?

15 A. Yes, yeah, both.

16 Q. However, you did not record that here; right?

17 A. I only recorded exceptional incidents, and these shells -- it's

18 not throughout the whole area of Sarajevo. I only recorded it here

19 because it's 500 shells within a short period in one part of the town, in

20 the old town, which is one district. The normal background shelling I

21 didn't comment on.

22 Q. Were there situations when the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina opened

23 fire from areas around hospitals and from the centre of town itself?

24 A. Yeah, certainly. I saw that.

25 Q. Thank you. Now paragraph 80, please. You say:

Page 768

1 "Many of the Serb weapons were in fact moved out of Sarajevo and

2 used elsewhere in the theatre."

3 And you also speak about the agreement and weapon collection

4 points. Was that in contravention of the agreement, this removal of

5 weaponry?

6 A. No, that was required under the agreement. They either had to be

7 in --

8 Q. [In English] Collected --

9 A. -- collected or removed.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Now paragraph 81, please.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, paragraph 81 in my report is blackened

12 out --

13 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry.

14 JUDGE ORIE: The Prosecution does not rely on it.

15 MR. LUKIC: Yes, yes, I'm sorry. I missed that because --

16 JUDGE ORIE: But if there's anything in 81 --

17 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers]

18 JUDGE ORIE: -- originally which you would like to ask the

19 witness about, of course you are free to do so, if it is in support of

20 your case.

21 MR. LUKIC: Bear with me for one second, Your Honour.

22 [Defence counsel confer]

23 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Now I have the name of the case, since I want

24 to quote from one of the transcripts.

25 Q. [Interpretation] In the Dragomir Milosevic trial on the

Page 769

1 15th of January, 2007, on page 26945 up to page 26946 that is, this is

2 what you say, "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or the Army of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not abide by the TEZ," that is to say the totally

4 exclusion zone and this pertained to heavy weaponry.

5 Is that correct? Do you stand by this statement today as well?

6 A. Yeah, that's correct.

7 Q. Also in that same trial you said that the

8 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina often violated the cease-fire between the

9 10th of February and the 28th of April, 1994. Would you say the same

10 thing today?

11 A. That's correct.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have the

13 following document in e-court, R0029530. The 65 ter number is 10012.

14 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, while that document is being called up,

15 could I ask Mr. Lukic to please re-check the transcript reference in the

16 Dragomir Milosevic case. It appears that Mr. Harland was the first

17 witness, so it seems that it's unlikely that the number would be that

18 high and we cannot find it under that number.

19 MR. LUKIC: That's the number I have before -- but I'll check it.

20 If necessary, I'll inform Your Honours.

21 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the problem appears to be that that was

22 his testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, not the Dragomir Milosevic

23 case. It is the correct transcript reference for the Slobodan Milosevic

24 case and the date of the testimony was the 18th of September, 2003.

25 JUDGE ORIE: The matter being resolved, please proceed,

Page 770

1 Mr. Lukic.

2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you for this help.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, can we proceed now. We see a

4 document here that you had created as well. In the first paragraph, in

5 the introduction, that is, you say:

6 "NATO's threat to use air-strikes against heavy weapons around

7 Sarajevo is shaping the behaviour of all three sides."

8 Does that mean that the BH army also had heavy weapons around

9 Sarajevo?

10 A. Yes. I counted about a hundred and something that they put into

11 the cantonment areas in Tito barracks and then there were a certain

12 amount, I don't know the exact number, that they did not hand over in

13 violation of the agreement but which we knew were there because we could

14 hear them when they continued to fire.

15 Q. Thank you. The next paragraph states:

16 "The mainly Muslim Bosnian government, riding a wave of

17 international support, is taking a harder line at the peace

18 negotiations."

19 Who is it that is providing support to the government in Sarajevo

20 so that it felt stronger so that it could take a harder line?

21 A. At this point they felt and they told us, they told me, that they

22 felt that the increased likelihood of NATO air-strikes against the Serbs

23 strengthened their relative bargaining position, made it more possible

24 for them to continue the fight and to hold for a better -- a better

25 negotiated result.

Page 771

1 Q. So any proposal to bomb Serbian positions, whether that took

2 place or not, strengthened the position of the Bosniak government in

3 Sarajevo; is this correct?

4 A. Yes, absolutely.

5 Q. Thank you. And now on the following page, page 2 of the same

6 document, you talk about the situation when the international attention

7 was focused elsewhere. The Croats were on the offensive in

8 Central Bosnia, and despite them receiving new weapons from Croatia the

9 HVO captured quite a small amount of territory. Did you know - and you

10 probably knew about it since you reported it - that weapons were coming

11 in from Croatia for the Croatian forces in Bosnia?

12 A. Yes, I -- in Mostar they -- would see not only Croatian weapons

13 but actually Croatian units and of course enormous financial resources.

14 Q. And did the UNPROFOR react in any way?

15 A. I can't now recall.

16 Q. But in any event you did not threaten them with air-strikes; is

17 that correct?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at page 3, please.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the record, the question was, "But in any

21 event you did not threaten them with air-strikes; is that correct?" The

22 answer was "No." Apparently the witness intended to say, that at least

23 that's how I understood him that there was no threat with air-strikes.

24 Because if you say, It is correct, and you say, No it's not correct, then

25 that would be misunderstood.

Page 772

1 Please proceed.

2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you for your help, Your Honour.

3 Q. [Interpretation] The third asterisk where it says that:

4 "The circumstances surrounding the massacre at the Sarajevo

5 marketplace on the 5th of February 1994 remain unclear, UNPROFOR has

6 conducted a second and more thorough investigation into the incident.

7 The result of the investigation remains that it is not possible to

8 determine from which side of the confrontation line the bomb was fired."

9 Is this correctly -- is this a correct representation of what the

10 UNPROFOR knew at that time?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you. And now at the bottom of the page you talk about the

13 rump Bosnia and Herzegovina. You say that the negotiators returned to

14 Sarajevo from Geneva and that finally the Bosnian government has clearly

15 expressed its vision and that they had put forward two options.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to the following

17 page, please.

18 Q. We don't need to read both 1 and 2 paragraphs, but the first

19 version was that if the union of Bosnia and Herzegovina is preserved,

20 they asked for 33 per cent of Bosnian territory; and if the unity of

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina is not preserved, if the Serbs secede and join

22 Serbia, the Croats secede and join Croatia, then they were asking for 37.

23 Why didn't these negotiations continue? This was along the lines of what

24 the Croats in Bosnia wanted, what the Serbs in Bosnia wanted, and now we

25 see that this is also something that the Muslims in Bosnia wanted. Do

Page 773

1 you know today who exerted pressure on whom not to achieve this but to --

2 and not to halt the war already at this stage?

3 A. This was reported from confidential meetings with

4 President Izetbegovic, and at that time he told -- I think this was the

5 so-called HMS invincible plan. And at that time he told us that they

6 would accept it if they got a bit more land. That is the same time that

7 they entered into some discussions about the possible exchange of certain

8 territories in Eastern Bosnia for territory around Sarajevo. So they --

9 it was a matter of whether -- they felt it was a matter of whether they

10 had got the maximum amount of territory they thought they could get.

11 And, indeed, this -- this is the origin of the 51/49 split of Bosnia.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock. It's close to

13 the time for a break.

14 MR. LUKIC: This is a good time for us.

15 JUDGE ORIE: It is a good time for you. Then we take a break and

16 we resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

21 If Mr. Mladic would -- the Chamber to be addressed, then,

22 Mr. Lukic, you take care of it.

23 MR. LUKIC: We'll just continue, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

25 [The witness takes the stand]

Page 774

1 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Harland.

2 Mr. Lukic --

3 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: -- you may proceed.

5 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, we're looking at the document. If

7 we can just look at page 6, please -- I'm sorry, let's stay on page 4.

8 We need the lower half of the document. The second asterisk from the

9 bottom or from the top where it states:

10 "The ethnic cleansing of Muslims in areas controlled by the

11 Croats is continuing and has even quickened."

12 Was this an isolated incident or was this something that

13 constituted a practice, during the war of course, the conflict between

14 the Croatian and the Muslim armies?

15 A. In general, the areas controlled or taken by the HVO were the

16 ones that were the most aggressively ethnically cleansed.

17 Q. On page 5 of the document, second paragraph from the top, you

18 talk about the flow of humanitarian aid improving, but that a British aid

19 worker was killed and that prompted the Zenica authorities to keep a

20 closer check on the Mujahedin. Was the Zenica area known for the large

21 presence of Mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22 A. Yes, both foreign Mujahedin and local Islamists.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 7, please.

24 Q. We just have a note here where it says "The Bosnian Croats," and

25 you noted that:

Page 775

1 "The Government of Croatia, after having insisted that there are

2 no Croatian army troops, HV troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, now admits

3 it does have troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they will remain

4 there unless the UN provides security guarantees for the Croat enclaves

5 in Central Bosnia."

6 You told us that you did see Croatian troops of the state of

7 Croatia in Mostar, and here you note that they were also present in

8 Central Bosnia?

9 A. I'm not sure that's true. Can I just see --

10 Q. [In English] Please.

11 A. I -- as I recall it, I never saw regular Croatian army troops in

12 Central Bosnia. I saw regular Croatian army troops in western

13 Herzegovina and Mostar, but I never saw them in Central Bosnia.

14 Q. Then I misunderstood this portion of your document. Thank you

15 for clarifications.

16 [Interpretation] The last paragraph on the same page is where you

17 state that:

18 "Despite the demands of the UN Security Council and the

19 European Union, Croatian Army forces show no sign of leaving Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina at this stage."

21 And then you say that Croatian troops had never before been seen

22 so far from the Croatian border, and one source inside the HVO says that

23 there are 2.000 HV troops in the Kiseljak pocket alone.

24 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, before answer. I can see my friend.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Just before you answer the question.

Page 776

1 Mr. Groome.

2 MR. GROOME: Just an objection as to relevance.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Lukic, I had just consulted with my

4 colleagues and we were wondering about relevance. So we're not saying

5 it's irrelevant, but if you could assist us in better understanding what

6 the relevance of your questions is, that would be highly appreciated.

7 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I would like Mr. Harland -- it depends how you

8 consider Central Bosnia, but --

9 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

10 MR. LUKIC: -- is Kiseljak in Central Bosnia?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 MR. LUKIC: That's what I wanted to say, that even in

13 Central Bosnia you had troops from Croatia, not only Herzegovina.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Which does not fully resolve inquiry into the

15 relevance. I mean, I understand what you wanted to establish on the --

16 MR. LUKIC: I'm --

17 JUDGE ORIE: -- by that answer.

18 MR. LUKIC: I'm coming to that.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay, then please do that. Come to your point as

20 soon as possible.

21 MR. LUKIC: I can do that in the next question.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well ...

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Harland, did the UNPROFOR demand that the Croatian troops

25 that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina be fired at, that air-strikes be

Page 777

1 conducted against them?

2 A. There was certainly no -- there was no proposal to launch

3 air-strikes against Government of Croatia troops inside Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, and I can't even say with absolute certainty how it was

5 protested because in general all things related to Government of Croatia

6 were handled out of UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb; whereas I worked in

7 Sarajevo, where we dealt with Bosnian government and the Serbs.

8 Q. [In English] Thank you.

9 [Interpretation] And on the last page, page 8, you say that:

10 "The Croatian authorities say that if the international community

11 increases pressure on Zagreb to withdraw its troops from B&H, then it

12 will expel all of the 257.000 Muslim refugees from Croat-controlled

13 territory."

14 What was achieved then in further negotiations with Croatia? I

15 don't see what you wrote about after this, but probably about the

16 territories in Bosnia that were under Croat control?

17 A. Actually, to be honest, I can't remember and -- because dealing

18 with the Government of Croatia was actually the thing I did least in my

19 years in Bosnia.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 6 of this

22 document and then we will finish with it.

23 Q. We've seen from this document alone that there were various

24 violations by all the parties; however, here, under the heading "The

25 Bosnian Serbs" we can see that only they were threatened with NATO

Page 778

1 air-strikes and they were the only ones to undertake commitments. Is it

2 correct, Mr. Harland, that the other two sides were never asked for any

3 concessions and that if they did not make them and did not sign them,

4 they were never told that they would be bombed?

5 A. The question is in two parts, of course. So they were asked --

6 they were asked to honour certain commitments. They were also entered

7 into obligations, but it is true they were never threatened with air

8 attacks.

9 Q. Would you agree with me that UNPROFOR was not objective in Bosnia

10 and Herzegovina, that it had placed itself on the side of the Muslims

11 primarily, and that it was opposed to the Serbs for the most part, or

12 rather, to the Army of Republika Srpska?

13 A. No. That I would not agree with. There were, in fact, quite a

14 lot of people in UNPROFOR and quite a lot of the governments that

15 supported it, including I would say Britain and France, that were

16 relatively hostile to the Bosnian government in Sarajevo.

17 Q. But not hostile to such an extent that they would be treated in

18 the same way as they treated the Serbs, so that they would also include

19 Rapid Reaction Force actions against them and include NATO air-strikes

20 against them; is that correct?

21 A. My observation of the decision-making process is that the threats

22 for air-strikes emerged from the campaign of terror waged by the Serb

23 army against the Bosnian civilian population. If that had happened on a

24 comparable scale, the other way around, I think frankly there would have

25 been an eagerness to do it among some governments.

Page 779

1 Q. We heard today and we discussed how many soldiers there were

2 approximately inside Sarajevo, how they were armed. At the same time,

3 Sarajevo was declared a safe area. As far as I understand the term "safe

4 area" according to international documents, not only are you permitted

5 [as interpreted] to have weapons within the area, but you are not allowed

6 to wear uniforms, there can be no military facilities within that area,

7 no military training can be conducted in that area --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you would read with me the transcript,

9 page 63, the beginning of your last question, where you said, "not only

10 are you...," and then may I take it the word "not" is missing: Not only

11 are you not permitted to have weapons within the area.

12 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

13 Q. [Interpretation] What did the UNPROFOR do in Sarajevo to really

14 make that safe area into a safe area, to really demilitarise it? Or can

15 we agree that nothing was done?

16 A. I do not believe that the resolutions that established the safe

17 areas of Sarajevo and elsewhere which I think were Resolutions 817, 824,

18 and 836, I don't believe they required the Bosnian army to put down its

19 weapons or to stop fighting. I think the intention of the

20 Security Council was that the defenders should be able to keep their

21 weapons, otherwise there was a real risk of a slaughter, which, in fact,

22 happened, as, you know, in Srebrenica and elsewhere.

23 Q. We're talking about Sarajevo. You, yourself, said that the Serbs

24 didn't intend to capture the city, and we also established that there

25 were numerous Muslim offensives from Sarajevo. Would you agree with me

Page 780

1 that UNPROFOR should have made the decision whether this was a safe zone,

2 a demilitarised area, or not? And then the other question here would

3 be -- perhaps you can answer this first and then we will move to the

4 other question.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

6 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, objection as to whether the witness has

7 the competency to answer what UNPROFOR should have done. It's a

8 Security Council Resolution that created the safe areas and not UNPROFOR.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you're asking the witness whether he

10 would agree with you that UNPROFOR should have made a certain decision.

11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Earlier you referred - although in a rather vague

13 way - to international text instruments. I think you mentioned. Are you

14 asking for an opinion or asking --

15 MR. LUKIC: No, I want to ask --

16 JUDGE ORIE: If you're not asking for an opinion, then please

17 rephrase your question such a way that it is clear what you're exactly

18 asking.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Was it discussed in the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and outside of

21 UNPROFOR with other international players that a demilitarised zone

22 should be a demilitarised zone?

23 A. The safe areas were not declared by the Security Council to be

24 demilitarised zones. If I remember as a fact --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harland, Mr. Harland, the question was whether

Page 781

1 it was discussed. Apparently what Mr. Lukic is seeking is to establish

2 the fact whether there was any discussion about, if I understood you

3 well, Mr. Lukic, the interpretation of the Security Council Resolutions

4 by which safe areas were established.

5 Is that what you had on your mind?

6 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

7 JUDGE ORIE: So was that discussed? That's the first question.

8 THE WITNESS: But his question starts with a statement of fact

9 about what is a demilitarised zone and he assumes that Sarajevo was a

10 demilitarised zone and actually it's a false assumption.

11 JUDGE ORIE: No, that was his previous question where I asked him

12 to rephrase it, and then the question was:

13 "Was it discussed in the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and outside

14 UNPROFOR with other international players that a demilitarised zone

15 should be a demilitarised zone."

16 Okay. Was that a subject matter that was discussed?

17 THE WITNESS: But it wasn't a demilitarised zone. It was a safe

18 area.

19 JUDGE ORIE: That may be a good reason not to discuss it or to

20 discuss it for that same reason. Was it discussed, yes or no, and I try

21 to more precisely interpret the question: Was the interpretation of the

22 Security Council Resolutions in which safe areas were established, was

23 the interpretation of those Security Council Resolutions discussed, yes

24 or no?

25 THE WITNESS: Understood. There was a discussion as to whether

Page 782

1 or not it would be possible to reach an agreement to -- between the

2 parties to demilitarise Sarajevo by agreement because it was not imposed

3 by the Security Council.

4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour for helping.

5 Q. [Interpretation] My next question is this: Was it the mandate of

6 UNPROFOR precisely to demilitarise safe zones?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Very well. Thank you, if that is your position.

9 Now let us move on to paragraph 88, please.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Have you done with this subject, Mr. --

11 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: So if I understand you well, Mr. Harland, your

13 testimony is that the Security Council dealing with Sarajevo as a safe

14 area did not include an obligation for the parties to demilitarise it;

15 and that was the reason why you tried to add that, if I could say so, by

16 a voluntarily agreement on demilitarisation by the parties in that area.

17 THE WITNESS: Although it's almost 20 years ago, my memory of the

18 824 and 836 is that it says that the forces except those of the Bosnian

19 government should withdraw and UNPROFOR's mandate would be to deter

20 attacks on them, and those attacks were coming from the Serbs.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Your answers given until now, do they cover

22 Sarajevo or any other safe areas?

23 THE WITNESS: All six.

24 JUDGE ORIE: All six. Thank you.

25 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

Page 783

1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, now I'd like us to move away. Let

3 us proceed to paragraph 88 of your statement. You are saying that

4 sometimes the Bosnians themselves stepped up the pressure and that there

5 were Bosnian leaders who felt that worse is better in order to increase

6 the chances of a Western military intervention against the Serbs. You

7 say that you witnessed the Bosnians refusing to switch on gas, that they

8 intentionally cut power off, and even fired at repairmen on transmission

9 lines, high-voltage transmission lines at that.

10 This is my question: Do you have any information today as to

11 whether they were members of the 1st Corps or some group of armed persons

12 from Sarajevo? Do you have any clear-cut information on that?

13 A. Different positions which made the life of the people of Sarajevo

14 worse, which some people on the Bosnian side thought would help them by

15 bringing about a Western military intervention were taken and carried out

16 by different people. So, for example, President Izetbegovic himself told

17 me when I put a direct question that it was his decision that the

18 civilian population should not be allowed out of Sarajevo. So that was

19 one dimension of it. The shooting at the repairmen of the electricity

20 lines or the repeater or the insulators even on the high-voltage

21 electricity line were in my presence sometimes shot at by sniper

22 positions from with inside the Bosnian confrontation line. And French

23 experts I was with in my presence as I was going there would point it

24 out, but we weren't in a capacity to say whether they were under the

25 control of 1st Corps or not. And on water and the -- and gas, the

Page 784

1 decisions were normally not taken by military officers, so 1st Corps

2 wouldn't have been involved.

3 Q. You, yourself, mentioned Izetbegovic. I'd just like to ask you

4 this - this was my next question - you said that in UN archives that

5 document does exist. Do you have the document with you or do you have

6 the number of the document? Because we'd like to have it.

7 A. Yes -- no, I don't but I sought -- in 1999 I was tasked to write

8 a report for the UN Secretary-General on the massacre at Srebrenica, and

9 I was given access to the UNHCR archives. And there I found the letter

10 where UNHCR proposed evacuating civilian population I think April 1993

11 from Srebrenica, and they even began to do it and they were stopped by

12 the Bosnian government. And there is a letter from Izetbegovic to that

13 effect. And then when I was writing that report, I interviewed

14 President Izetbegovic and he confirmed it; but I don't have the letter in

15 my possession and I never have.

16 Q. [In English] Thank you. [Interpretation] I'm afraid I'll be

17 making a mistake again in relation to the transcript, but I think that

18 this is the Slobodan Milosevic trial because the page number is 28634 and

19 28635.

20 You spoke about figures and you said that before the war 150.000

21 Serbs lived in Sarajevo; is that true?

22 A. I forget now. Something like that.

23 Q. Do you remember that in Sarajevo at that time there were 40- to

24 60.000 Serbs left between the lines of confrontation?

25 A. It reduced over time. I think when I arrived we estimated it as

Page 785

1 something like that and then I think it reduced over time.

2 Q. You were in Bosnia in 1999. Do you know how many Serbs were in

3 Sarajevo in 1999?

4 A. I could guess, you know, maybe 5 per cent or something. I don't

5 know the numbers, I guess.

6 Q. [In English] Something -- [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek clarification.

8 In Sarajevo at the time 40- to 60.000 Serbs left between the

9 lines of confrontation on a total of 150, which means anything between 28

10 to 40 per cent it reduced. Earlier you told us it was approximately

11 10 per cent. Do I understand you well that it reduced -- was reduced

12 from 28 up to 40 per cent down to 10 per cent?

13 THE WITNESS: Within the confrontation lines, at the moment of my

14 arrival I would guess that 20 per cent was a maximum and it steadily

15 declined over time, so by the end of war was probably less than

16 10 per cent and in the years after the war became even less than that.

17 JUDGE ORIE: I must admit that I misread the quote and am reading

18 it now better. It was a reference to Serbs living before the war,

19 150.000 in Sarajevo.

20 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, "before the war," do you mean before the

22 war in the area which later was within the confrontation lines or the

23 wider Sarajevo?

24 MR. LUKIC: Before the Bosnian war.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would that --

Page 786

1 MR. LUKIC: May --

2 JUDGE ORIE: -- but, I mean, if you use that number -- yes,

3 but --

4 MR. LUKIC: Before May 1992.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would that be the portion we're talking

6 about at a later stage, that is, within the confrontation lines or was it

7 the wider Sarajevo? I mean, otherwise of course it's very difficult to

8 use the [overlapping speakers] --

9 MR. LUKIC: Can Mr. Harland answer that so I don't give the

10 testimony.

11 JUDGE ORIE: We could -- yes, apparently you had an understanding

12 because you quoted him in the question.

13 Could you tell us the 150.000 which apparently were mentioned as

14 Serbs living in Sarajevo, was that within the limit of the confrontation

15 lines as they developed later or was that Sarajevo in its wider --

16 THE WITNESS: No, the question is well put. I think the 150.000,

17 if that's the number, includes the Serbs who would have lived in Ilidza

18 and Lukavica and Grabovica, and Vogosca and Ilijas, which were Serb

19 majority or Serb preponderant populated areas prior to the war. The

20 actual area that was enclosed by the confrontation line probably never

21 had, I don't know, more than 60- or 70.000 Serbs.

22 JUDGE ORIE: So when we are using the one number or using later

23 the other numbers, we are talking about different geographical areas?

24 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

Page 787

1 Please proceed.

2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

3 [Interpretation] Could we now please see document 65 ter [In

4 English] 10015.

5 Q. [Interpretation] You see the first page. You know what this is

6 all about, don't you? It's the 1st of March, 1994. It's your report.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. On the second page now, the second paragraph, there's something

9 interesting here. It says that the Bosnian government forces have

10 been digging a tunnel towards the Serb positions and this is not a tunnel

11 under the airport; isn't that right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. So they're digging a tunnel in a different direction, and

14 Mr. Karadzic protested before the Security Council in this regard.

15 [In English] It says:

16 "The digging has led to a strong protest to the Security Council

17 from Serb leader Karadzic."

18 A. It must have been a letter.

19 Q. [Interpretation] Obviously you knew about this because you wrote

20 this down. Did you try to prevent things like this? Because obviously,

21 just as you said, they're a provocation that is aimed at getting a Serb

22 response.

23 A. In general, if there was a cease-fire in effect and there was a

24 violation of the terms of the cease-fire, we would protest it to

25 whichever side was responsible and there was certainly a period in which

Page 788

1 there was tactical tunnelling, not like the tunnel under the airport

2 which was for logistical purposes, but to plant explosives and to put

3 troops in behind enemy lines. So this was a different type of activity.

4 Q. Thank you. On page 4 in paragraph 3 from the top we see that the

5 war between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO had been going on

6 for over six months in Central Bosnia. Also, that HVO forces are gaining

7 territory.

8 Do you know at the time whether there were clashes between the

9 HVO and the Army of Republika Srpska, or had there been a cessation of

10 hostilities at the time?

11 A. If I remember correctly, which I am not a hundred per cent clear,

12 it varied from place to place. There were areas where there was a degree

13 of Serb-Croat co-operation and there were areas where there were

14 hostilities.

15 Q. Do you remember how long the conflicts lasted between the Croat

16 and Bosniak armies?

17 A. It began about when I arrived, May of 1993, and then I was

18 involved in the final agreements to end it in Gornji Vakuf, must have

19 been February of 1994 or around then.

20 Q. Thank you. I'd just like to ask you something else now. Is it

21 correct that nine or ten months into the conflict between the Croat and

22 Serb [as interpreted] sides they came to peace due to the pressure

23 exerted by the United States?

24 A. Yes, yes, that's absolutely true. I was there at some of the

25 meetings where the US representative Redman and others would be putting a

Page 789

1 lot of pressure on those parties.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I interrupt you?

3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, sorry, sir.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Earlier you were talking of conflict between the

5 Bosniaks and the Croats. Now here you're saying, "Is it correct that

6 nine or ten months into the conflict between the Croat and Serbs," Serb

7 army sides. So is it Serb --

8 MR. LUKIC: Either I misspoke, but I meant Croat and Bosniaks.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

11 Q. [Interpretation] My next question, Mr. Harland: Is it correct

12 that at the same time the United States of America did not allow a

13 reconciliation between the Muslims and the Serbs and that through their

14 own actions they deepened the conflict between these two ethnic

15 communities or these two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. I -- the Americans I met wanted a settlement on more generous

17 terms for the Bosniaks and many of them didn't think there would be a way

18 to do that other than through military assistance to the Bosnian

19 government or some sort of military intervention on its behalf.

20 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 93, it deals with sincerity, and towards

21 the end of the paragraph you say:

22 "Serb leaders were not -- were disingenuous with internationals."

23 What is your position? You were involved in UNPROFOR work. Were

24 internationals sincere with the Serbs?

25 A. It -- in my experience it was wrong to see the internationals as

Page 790

1 a single block of opinion with any unity. It -- I can say when UNPROFOR

2 representatives spoke to the parties, they generally spoke the truth.

3 They didn't always speak were coherently, but they generally spoke the

4 truth.

5 Q. Did they approach the Serb side with good intentions in these

6 talks or did they side with the other side, increasingly so as the end of

7 the war was getting nearer?

8 A. There were certainly members of UNPROFOR - and I was one of

9 them - who came to believe that the war could not be settled without some

10 form of military intervention against the Serbs.

11 Q. Thank you, and thank you for your sincerity. Now I will get to

12 the following position, and when you are speaking you probably have this

13 in mind as well when you advised General Smith, to deceive the Serbs to

14 the effect that there would be air-strikes. And you speak about that in

15 paragraph 233 of your statement. Can we agree that on that occasion you

16 and General Smith did not act sincerely towards the Serbs?

17 A. I advised General Smith on that one occasion to be a little

18 unclear about what we knew about the point of origin of the mortar shell

19 that landed on the Markale market-place in order to give us time, give

20 UNPROFOR time, to get UNPROFOR and UN people off Serb territory so they

21 couldn't be harmed or captured when General Smith turned the key to

22 authorise air-strikes against the Serbs. That is true. That was less

23 than fully honest.

24 Q. Thank you. The next document I'd like to show to you is also a

25 report of yours. The date is the 9th of April, 1994. The 65 ter number

Page 791

1 is 23773. This is a report that you wrote up; right?

2 A. Yes, seems to be.

3 Q. So there's no problem.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.

5 Q. On page 2 of your report you say that General Mladic stated and

6 announced that he was uninterested in signing anything other than a total

7 agreement for the cessation of hostilities. And then in number 7 you say

8 the Serb proposal was very similar to our own, except that the idea of an

9 interim cease-fire was elaborated into a full agreement for the permanent

10 cessation of hostilities and all mention of Gorazde and safe areas was

11 dropped. Later on we will move on to paragraph 10 that speaks of the

12 other side in the conflict. Now that we're talking about General Mladic

13 and the Serb side, bearing in mind your statement, I believe that you

14 will agree with me that the Serb side insisted all the time that there be

15 a full cessation of hostilities.

16 A. The Serbs used to tell us all the time that they would like to

17 freeze the confrontation lines with some form of agreement where they

18 were because they controlled 70 per cent of the country, and the other

19 side for the same reasons but from the opposite direction never wanted

20 what would just be a permanent freezing of the confrontation lines.

21 Q. So irrespective of the reasons involved, the Serb side wanted

22 lasting peace. The other side did not want lasting peace. Can we

23 conclude that, irrespective of the reasons involved?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

25 MR. GROOME: I think that's an improper question to put to this

Page 792

1 witness.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please rephrase your question.

3 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.

4 Q. [Interpretation] While writing your reports, very often you

5 reported on the following and we read some of these things out today

6 along the following lines, namely, that the Army of Republika Srpska and

7 the politicians of Republika Srpska were proposing a lasting peace. Did

8 that happen on several occasions?

9 A. The Serbs supported, while I was there, some of the peace

10 agreements, supported at the international level. I think the

11 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, for example; and while I was there they rejected

12 others, like the Vance-Owen Plan and the Contact Group Plan. They

13 accepted some cease-fires but you're right, their position was always --

14 or until the very end when it was not in their interest. They generally

15 proposed anything that would permanently freeze the current cease-fire

16 lines in place until Dayton, when that didn't work in their interest

17 anymore.

18 Q. Thank you. Then in paragraph 10 you say:

19 "After the meeting, Ambassador Redman, General Rose, and" you

20 "were invited to the Bosnian Presidency" -- actually Bosniak Presidency,

21 I'd prefer that wording "where" you "met with ... Izetbegovic and

22 Prime Minister Silajdzic."

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you choose your own language you of

24 course use the language you prefer. If you're quoting from a document

25 then let's leave it to what the document says. Please proceed.

Page 793

1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] And you say that:

3 " ... the Bosnian side agreed to a 'cessation of hostilities,'

4 though not for any 'permanent' arrangement."

5 So this is along the lines of what we've been discussing just

6 now?

7 A. Absolutely.

8 Q. [In English] Thank you, sir. [Interpretation] At the time, the

9 time that this document covers, the Muslims held 18 per cent of the

10 territory. At the end of the war they gained much more. What force was

11 on their side that enabled them to have such a gain in the percentage of

12 the territory? Was it just the United States or was anyone else there

13 helping the Muslim side to gain a larger percentage of the territory?

14 What sort of information did you acquire about that when you were working

15 for the UNPROFOR?

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.

17 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the question itself seems to assume a

18 fact that the witness hasn't been asked yet, namely: Was it just the

19 United States seems to assume -- I mean the question should be: What was

20 the role of the United States.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, there is a lot of suggestion in the question,

22 but then at the very end it comes down to facts again; that is, what sort

23 of information did you acquire about that. And what "that" is is what

24 was apparently suggested to you as being, at least in Mr. Lukic's view,

25 an accurate reflection of what he thinks has happened. The question

Page 794

1 mainly focuses on getting larger percentage of the territory after the

2 negotiations and what forces may have helped the Muslims to achieve that

3 and whether you received any information about that, because that's what

4 the question is about.

5 Mr. Lukic, if I understood you well?

6 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

8 Could you answer the question.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes.

10 There were a number of factors in -- particularly 1995 which

11 served to greatly weaken the Bosnian Serb side. The first was the

12 offensive of the Government of Croatia, so-called Operation Storm; the

13 second was the continuing, ongoing sanctions that Serbia had been induced

14 to put on the Bosnian Serbs by Western countries; the third was the

15 success that the Bosnian army had had in strengthening itself with the

16 support of Western and Islamic countries; and the fifth [sic], perhaps,

17 was the direct actions of UNPROFOR's Rapid Reaction Force artillery and

18 the actions of authorising NATO air attacks. And, combined, all these

19 factors led to a significant weakening of the Bosnian Serb position,

20 which I think would possibly have weakened much more if they hadn't gone

21 to Dayton and been given a lot of the territory back.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you. Can we look at paragraph 102 now, please. Here we're

24 talking about Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, and other areas being declared

25 safe zones, protected areas.

Page 795

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. We also talked about whether that area should have been

3 demilitarised or not. Are you aware that at the time there was a

4 detachment in Srebrenica which after that grew into a division. Can we

5 agree that not only were the safe areas not demilitarised but they were

6 additionally armed and additional manpower was obtained?

7 A. Yes. President Izetbegovic himself told me that he had expended

8 considerable resources, including helicopter assets, in deploying weapons

9 to Srebrenica, including I think Chinese Red Arrow anti-tank weapons.

10 And they confirmed the existence of the -- I think it was the

11 28th Division of the Bosnian army for that territory, yes.

12 Q. Thank you. When you mentioned helicopters, I would like to know

13 who owned it, who controlled the skies above Srebrenica and Zepa? Is it

14 correct that it was NATO and UNPROFOR?

15 A. Well, in theory, yes. There was a -- by mandate of the

16 United Nations Security Council, there was a no-fly zone. And so when

17 the warring parties flew aircraft and particularly rotary-wing aircraft,

18 which they all did, they were subject to interception and destruction.

19 But, in fact, it was not normally a problem. They could evade detection.

20 General Mladic even sometimes used to fly in his little helicopter in

21 front of us.

22 Q. Did you know at the time, you and other members of UNPROFOR, that

23 members of the 28th Division of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

24 stationed in Srebrenica and Zepa carried out attacks against Serb

25 civilian settlements and against the Army of Republika Srpska?

Page 796

1 A. We were informed of that and we were asked to investigate, and we

2 came to the conclusion that it was vastly exaggerated, but there had been

3 an incident, for example, at Kravica on Orthodox Christmas of 1993, if I

4 remember correctly.

5 Q. When you say "exaggerated," how do you mean? In what sense?

6 A. We would be told by the Serb leadership that there were major

7 attacks taking place out of Srebrenica and that large numbers of

8 civilians, hundreds of civilians had been killed. But when we asked for

9 names or ICRC tracing requests, we couldn't be given them. And when we

10 asked for access to the site to make our own investigation, it was

11 denied. So we came to the conclusion that it was more of a pretext.

12 Q. But when you say that it was exaggerated you never established

13 whether it was exaggerated, in fact, or not?

14 A. We were finally given access to this little village of Kravica,

15 which is somewhere near Srebrenica, and where they said there had been

16 attack out. And, in the end, I think that our investigators were able to

17 confirm there had been an attack and that four or five people had been

18 killed that we could confirm. I later went there myself and, actually,

19 by coincidence it was a place where many, many hundreds of unarmed

20 Bosniaks were killed. But the evidence of deaths of Serbs were extremely

21 limited. But you're correct that there were some attacks out by those

22 forces, particularly Srebrenica.

23 Q. And what did the UNPROFOR do about this? How did it react in the

24 communication with the Bosniak side?

25 A. We certainly protested the status of Srebrenica. Srebrenica,

Page 797

1 unlike all the other five so-called safe areas, actually was governed by

2 a mutually agreed demilitarisation agreement. It was a separate case.

3 And when there was a violation of that agreement, we would protest it.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic --

5 MR. LUKIC: Okay.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- I am looking at the clock. Could you in one or

7 two minutes, not more --

8 MR. LUKIC: One more question and I am done.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. When you say "protested," what does that mean?

12 A. Normally we would go to the relevant local commander, the

13 relevant corps commander, or, if it was serious, to General Delic or to

14 President Izetbegovic to formally state that they were in violation and

15 that it would be reported to New York and the Security Council for any

16 appropriate action.

17 Q. Thank you for today, Mr. Harland.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

19 Mr. Lukic, could you give us already an indication whether there

20 is any adjustment of your initial assessment, and that's important for

21 Mr. Harland to know as well, I take it.

22 MR. LUKIC: I will take the whole day tomorrow for sure. I hope

23 I can finish by the end of the day, but I cannot promise.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll consider how to proceed.

25 Then before we adjourn, I already would like to invite you,