Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3961

 1                           Thursday, 11 October 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.

 6             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 8     IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10             The Chamber is not informed about any preliminaries, therefore

11     could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

12             MS. BOLTON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't seem to be getting

13     sound through my headphones.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  If you push the volume button several times, then

15     slowly you will start hearing my voice.

16             MS. BOLTON:  Could you keep speaking, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, just tell me.  It's not pushing it, but it's

18     pushing it repeatedly.

19             MS. BOLTON:  Yes.  Thank you.

20                           [The witness takes the stand]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Wilson.

22             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Wilson, I'd like to remind you that the solemn

24     declaration you gave yesterday is still binding; that is, that you'll

25     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 3962

 1                           WITNESS:  JOHN WILSON [Resumed]

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Having said this, Ms. Bolton, are you ready to

 3     continue your examination?

 4             MS. BOLTON:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 6                           Examination by Ms. Bolton: [Continued]

 7        Q.   Good morning, General Wilson.

 8        A.   Good morning.

 9             MS. BOLTON:  May I have P326 MFI [sic] up, please.

10        Q.   While that's being brought up, General Wilson, you may remember

11     that yesterday the last document we were discussing was the record of the

12     discussions you had with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic at Lukavica

13     barracks on the 25th of May, 1992.

14        A.   Yes, I recall that.

15        Q.   And I had been asking you some questions yesterday before we

16     looked at that document about the arrangements that had been made for

17     your transportation that day, and you had told me if there had been any

18     firing upon you when you went to the barracks that day that it would have

19     been recorded in the document you created.  And having had an opportunity

20     to review the document that's now before you during proofing, was there

21     any record of your having been shot at en route to Lukavica barracks on

22     the 25th of May, 1992?

23        A.   I haven't re-read the document.

24        Q.   I'll leave that issue then for now.

25             MS. BOLTON:  Could we have 65 ter 20799A, please.

Page 3963

 1             For the record, this is a document that's discussed at

 2     paragraph 75 of the witness's statement.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 4             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, Your Honour, I'm just waiting for the

 5     document to be brought up in English.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I meanwhile take the opportunity to -- well, I

 7     don't know who I'm correcting.  But P326 is admitted into evidence.  It's

 8     not MFI'd.  I'm referring to page 2, line 9.

 9             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

10        Q.   Before you, General Wilson, you should see a transcript of an

11     intercepted conversation dated the 25th of May, 1992, where the speakers

12     have been identified as Ratko Mladic and an unidentified male.

13        A.   Yes, I can see that, yeah.

14        Q.   And if you would look part-way down the page you would notice

15     that there is a quotation from General Mladic which reads as follows:

16             "Be stubborn, observe, and make sure your men have had a good

17     rest.  Put observers.  If a single bullet is fired at you or at

18     'Jusuf Dzonlic' barracks or 'Marsal Tito' barracks or if a single soldier

19     is wounded either at the front or in the barracks, I will retaliate

20     against the town."

21             The other male replies:

22             "Yes, sir."

23             General Mladic states:

24             "Make sure that your soldiers are aware that Sarajevo is going to

25     shake."

Page 3964

 1             The other male says:

 2             "Okay."

 3             And General Mladic is saying:

 4             "Sarajevo will shake, more shells will fall on per second than in

 5     the entire war so far."

 6             Can you tell me how the position that General Mladic is quoted as

 7     taking in this intercept on the 25th of May, 1992, compares with the

 8     position he took during the meeting with you and Mrs. Plavsic that same

 9     day?

10        A.   I would say it accurately reflects the statements that he made at

11     our meeting on the same day.  He was showing some determination to carry

12     out such action unless the barracks were evacuated safely.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MS. BOLTON:  Can I have page 2 of this document, please, in both

15     English and B/C/S.  And if we could scroll down in the -- in both pages,

16     please.

17        Q.   At the very bottom of the second page in English General Mladic

18     is quoted as saying:

19             "We have the means and the bridges with which to cross the river.

20     I have blocked Sarajevo from four corners.  The city is trapped.  There

21     is no way out."

22             How does that statement correspond with the actual state of

23     affairs on the 25th of May, 1992?

24        A.   The reality is on the 25th of May, the city was fully invested by

25     the Serb forces and it was virtually impossible to move in or out of the

Page 3965

 1     city.  Now, that statement there reflects the reality on the ground.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Could I ask that be introduced as the next exhibit

 3     MFI, please.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             Mr. Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter 20799A will be P327 marked

 7     for identification.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  And keeps that status for the time being.

 9             Please proceed.

10             MS. BOLTON:

11        Q.   Yesterday you told us that the second barracks to be evacuated in

12     Sarajevo was the Jusuf Dzonlic barracks.  Do you have any recollection of

13     the date or the approximate date when that occurred?

14        A.   I believe it took place on the 27th of May, 1992.

15        Q.   And could you tell us whether that evacuation went smoothly?

16        A.   No, it was an absolute disaster.

17        Q.   What went wrong?

18        A.   The sides had been negotiating all day -- in fact, some of those

19     negotiations were taking place down at the Presidency.  They arrived back

20     at the PTT building quite late in the day at about 4.30 and announced

21     that it had been agreed the evacuation could take place.  There was no

22     plan.  The barracks commander hadn't really been warned that the barracks

23     were about to be evacuated.  It all seemed rushed and confused.  I

24     counselled both sides at the time, saying it would be better to wait

25     until the next day, and they were determined that it should take place.

Page 3966

 1     So at about 1800, I think, or 6.00 in the evening they went to the

 2     barracks and started to get things organised there and it was mass

 3     confusion.  Trucks had been preloaded with weapons that it was agreed

 4     should be left behind, some of the BH militias got into the barracks and

 5     were searching the vehicles and were looting.  The soldiers and a limited

 6     number of civilians were unaware of what was required.  Once again, at

 7     about 8.00 at night I warned the parties a potential disaster existed and

 8     that they should rethink the plan to evacuate the building that night.

 9     They were determined to continued.

10             Eventually at about 8.30 and in dark they left the barracks, some

11     150-odd vehicles.  The lead vehicle which was or which contained

12     Colonel Cadjo took a wrong turn.  Colonel Cadjo thought that the agreed

13     route would be ambushed as it happened in the very first barracks

14     evacuation.  So he changed the route with General Boskovic's approval,

15     but none of the militias on the ground knew that they were coming so

16     eventually they bumped into a number of different militia positions.

17     Firing took place.  The convoy broke up.  At least one soldier was killed

18     in the firing, a number were wounded.  The vehicles were scattered all

19     over Sarajevo.  Some vehicles got out successfully to Lukavica.  About

20     30 vehicles lost the next day and about 30 people.

21             MS. BOLTON:  May I have 65 ter 10733, please.

22        Q.   And while that's coming up, what role did General Boskovic play

23     in evacuating that barracks?

24        A.   General Boskovic was the senior JNA negotiator, and he was the

25     actual overall co-ordinator for the JNA during the evacuation.  He was

Page 3967

 1     supervising the evacuation.  He travelled in the last vehicle out of the

 2     barracks.  Colonel Cadjo was in the first vehicle out of the barracks.

 3        Q.   And before you, you have -- you should see a document.  Could you

 4     tell us who authored this document?

 5        A.   No, I can't.  It's a lieutenant-colonel.  It might be one of the

 6     staff officers in Sarajevo.

 7        Q.   All right.

 8             MS. BOLTON:  Could we turn to page 2 in both English and B/C/S,

 9     please.

10        Q.   Do you recognise the document that's now before you?

11        A.   I do.  It's a record of a meeting held in the afternoon on the

12     29th of May.

13        Q.   Sorry, the date on the top of the page is the 28th of May.  Does

14     that correspond with your recollection or not?

15        A.   Sorry, it's the 28th of May, the day after the evacuation of the

16     barracks.

17        Q.   And were you present at this meeting?

18        A.   I was.

19        Q.   General Boskovic is quoted on the page before us as saying:

20             "I'd like to say what happened yesterday.  I was with Cadjo, and

21     as the agreement wasn't respected from the Serbian side Cadjo and I went

22     to the Presidency."

23             He goes on to explain later on that page that, at the very

24     bottom:

25             "We had a definite route.  Some people couldn't believe that they

Page 3968

 1     were sure so they changed the route."

 2             MS. BOLTON:  If you could please turn to the next page in both

 3     English and B/C/S.

 4        Q.   The top of the page he goes on to say:

 5             "The convoy was broken on Stup's loop.  We were attacked by

 6     Serbian Territorial Defence (SDT) and Territorial Defence (TOBH) ..."

 7             And he goes on to say if these soldiers were wounded and one was

 8     killed.  Does that correspond with your recollection of events?

 9        A.   It does.

10             MS. BOLTON:  Could that be marked as the next exhibit, please.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  And the exhibit, Ms. Bolton, I see text in the

12     English version which is not English but appears in B/C/S, isn't it?

13     First page -- the first page where you started.

14             MS. BOLTON:  One moment, please.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we go back to the first page.  Unless you

16     could tell me what "werkexemplaar" means.  You are using it, and

17     apparently I take it that you understand what the content is.  It is

18     translated, so the parties -- it's Dutch.  Please look at it for me at

19     this moment and I'm consulting with my colleagues.  There's no reason not

20     to admit it.  But please take care that you don't have third languages in

21     your documents.

22             Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter 10733 shall be assigned

24     Exhibit P328.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

Page 3969

 1             One of the reasons, by the way, Ms. Bolton why I'm even

 2     mentioning it is because there's text under it which I have difficulties

 3     in finding in the original, as a matter of fact.  That is the line in the

 4     original with starts with "broj stranice," and I have no idea whether it

 5     corresponds with the original language.  Is it an explanation of the

 6     Dutch language?  Is it -- I have no idea, but it's -- certainly needs

 7     some additional attention.

 8             MS. BOLTON:  Yes, we'll check the translation, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.  Then I still have to decide on admission.

10             P328 is admitted into evidence.

11             MS. BOLTON:

12        Q.   Yes.  So, General Wilson, we've been discussing then an intercept

13     where General Mladic is quoted as making some threats about making

14     Sarajevo shake, and you've told us about some threats that were made at a

15     meeting that you had with him, that if the barracks weren't evacuated

16     within three days that certain things would happen.  Was the

17     Marsal Tito barracks evacuated by the 28th of May, 1992?

18        A.   No, it wasn't.

19        Q.   Was there shelling the night of the 28th of May, 1992?

20        A.   Yes, it was.

21        Q.   Could you please describe its intensity for us?

22        A.   It, once again, was -- it was probably the biggest night of

23     shelling of the city from April, and it started I think in the evening at

24     about 1700, went through until early morning.  It appeared that the whole

25     city was being engaged, not just particular areas, but there was an

Page 3970

 1     emphasis of fire down in the old city, down in the city centre.  And

 2     there were literally thousands of rounds of all calibres, including

 3     rocket-launchers, being fired into the city and distributed in such a way

 4     that there appeared to be no particular targets involved, just a general

 5     engagement of the city.  And it was certainly -- it was the

 6     second-biggest night I remember of my time down there of the shelling.

 7     It was -- it was a really horrendous experience for the inhabitants of

 8     Sarajevo on that particular night.

 9        Q.   Where was the -- where were the shells falling relative to the

10     confrontation line?

11        A.   There appeared to be no relationship between the shelling and the

12     confrontation line.  The city itself was the target.  There was a lot of

13     firing around the PTT, but the weight of fire seemed to be going into the

14     old city.

15             MS. BOLTON:  Could we have 65 ter 09964, please.

16        Q.   You should see a document before you.  There's a signature on the

17     top of the document.  Do you recognise the signature?

18        A.   It's my signature.

19        Q.   And His Honour was asking a question earlier about the fact that

20     the work "werkexemplaar" appears to have been placed on the document at

21     some point.  Do you know anything about that?

22        A.   We had a Dutch signals company providing communications for us

23     from Sarajevo to the rest of the world.  It may well be a security

24     classification or a priority of handling.  I don't speak Dutch, so I

25     don't know, but it was stamped on there by a Dutch signaller.

Page 3971

 1        Q.   And this document subject matter is:

 2             "Record of conversation with BiH and JNA delegations

 3     29th May, 1992."

 4             Could you tell us who authored the document?

 5        A.   I authored the document.

 6        Q.   At paragraph 76 of your statement you refer to a meeting you

 7     attended on the 29th of May, 1992, with General Boskovic, Colonel Cadjo,

 8     and Lieutenant-Colonel Jankovic.  Is this the meeting you were referring

 9     to at that part of your statement?

10        A.   Yes, it is.

11        Q.   Can you tell us what General Boskovic had to say about the attack

12     the previous night?

13        A.   General Boskovic and, indeed, Colonel Cadjo also wished to

14     dissociate themselves with the attack that was launched upon the city the

15     night before.  They recognised the gravity and the severity of the

16     attack.  They indicated they thought General Mladic was out of control,

17     that pressure had been put on him by JNA authorities to stop the attack,

18     and that he had ignored that approach.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Sorry to interrupt you, but could we on our screens

20     go back to the document rather than to the statement.

21             THE WITNESS:  General Boskovic actually apologised on behalf of

22     the JNA for the conduct of General Mladic and he certainly wanted to have

23     nothing to do with any responsibility for the attack on that night.

24             MS. BOLTON:

25        Q.   Now, the first -- the meeting apparently according to paragraph 1

Page 3972

 1     started at 8.00 a.m. and there's an indication there as to who was

 2     present at that time.  Were you later joined by other participants?

 3        A.   Yes, I believe it was in the afternoon that the representatives

 4     of the Presidency arrived, led by Mr. Doko.

 5             MS. BOLTON:  Could we have page 2 of this document, please.  And

 6     if we could concentrate on paragraph 5 in particular.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Could you tell us, sir, what occurred when the general -- sorry,

 8     not general, Minister Doko and the other representatives from the

 9     Presidency attended?

10        A.   Yes, they brought a tape with them that they said the group would

11     be very interested in listening to.  They subsequently played that tape.

12     It was a recording of General Mladic giving artillery fire commands and

13     orders on the night of the 28th, and you could -- it was given in -- the

14     tape and recording was done in Bosnian -- in Serbo-Croat, which I

15     don't -- or in Serb which I don't speak, so Colonel Cadjo translated for

16     me.  And he said that General Mladic was directing fire at individual

17     target areas.  He was ordering fire at his command; that means that you

18     can't fire unless he says so and you fire when he says so.  And he was

19     orchestrating the calibres of fire that were being used from time to time

20     during the attack.

21             I must say that the group was somewhat dismayed collectively at

22     the contents of the tape, and there was much shaking of heads and dismay.

23        Q.   Can I ask you what General Boskovic's reaction was to the tape?

24        A.   Well, firstly he certainly thought it was General Mladic.  He

25     recognised the voice as did Colonel Cadjo.  And they, once again, wished

Page 3973

 1     to dissociate themselves with the attack that was launched on the city

 2     that night.  He apologised for General Mladic's behaviour.

 3        Q.   Although you don't speak Serbian, did you recognise any voices on

 4     the recording?

 5        A.   No, I can't say I can.

 6        Q.   And you indicated that Colonel Cadjo was providing some

 7     translation to you.  In paragraph 5, halfway through, we have an

 8     indication starts with:

 9             "The tape showed that General Mladic personally directed the

10     artillery attack on the city" and it says "(English transcript to be

11     provide).  He selected targets including the Presidency, town hall,

12     police headquarters and children's embassy and directed fire away from

13     Serb populated areas.  Fire was at his direct command and he directed the

14     cease-fire of light calibre weapons to allow 155 MM artillery and

15     multiple rocket launchers to engage targets."

16             The information there about what was being targeted, what areas

17     were being targeted and what buildings were being targeted, where did

18     that information come from?

19        A.   That came from Colonel Cadjo's translation, his oral translation.

20     I can't recall what happened to the written translation.

21             MS. BOLTON:  Could that document be admitted as the next exhibit,

22     please, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter number 09964 shall be

25     assigned Exhibit P329.

Page 3974

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  P329 is admitted into evidence.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.

 3             Could I please have 65 ter 22234.  Sorry, there should be an

 4     English translation as well.  The Court's indulgence.

 5             Thank you.

 6        Q.   You should now see before you, General Wilson, a series of

 7     transcripts from intercepted conversations, and I'm only going to ask you

 8     about a few of them.  The first is conversation 15 which appears starting

 9     at the bottom of page 1, and I'm just going to ask you if you would read

10     that conversation to yourself.  And when you're at the bottom of the

11     page, please let the court clerk know and he'll change or he'll turn the

12     page for you electronically.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   There appears to be orders to fire at two neighbourhoods in

15     Sarajevo, Velesici and Bascarsija.  And my question is:  As a member of

16     the Australian army, when you receive or issue orders to fire how

17     specifically is the actual target identified in the orders?

18        A.   The target is identified by a map reference, either a six-figure

19     or an eight-figure number which allows you to identify on the ground to

20     an accuracy of either a hundred metres or 10 metres, a hundred metres

21     being the maximum that you would ever give to an artillery unit to fire.

22     So you're being quite precise about where you want the rounds to land.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic.

24             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, although the

25     witness is well into his answer, my objection would be:  Is he talking

Page 3975

 1     now about facts concerning the shelling of Velesici or is he speaking

 2     from the area of his expertise?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, he's telling facts he knows about his own

 4     background; that is, how these matters are done in the Australian army,

 5     how orders would be given there and would be received there.  That's what

 6     I understand the testimony is about.  And those are facts, I take it.

 7     It's not expert opinion about whether it's good what they do in Australia

 8     or whether it's better what they do in Sarajevo.  Yes, again apparently

 9     the objection has been withdrawn.

10             Please proceed.

11             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.

12        Q.   And what is the benefit of targeting or pin-pointing a target

13     with that degree of precision?

14        A.   You're maximising the opportunity for accuracy and minimising the

15     danger of rounds landing where you don't want them to go.

16        Q.   Can you explain what area fire is?

17        A.   From time to time in a military operation you may wish to engage

18     an area as opposed to a specific target.  It might be to keep the enemy's

19     head down while you're manoeuvring.  It might be to inflict damage upon a

20     particular area.  So from time to time, it is normal to engage an area,

21     but for economy of fire the normal practice is to be as accurate as you

22     can with what is essentially an area weapon.

23        Q.   And have you ever issued an order for area fire in an urban

24     environment?

25        A.   No.

Page 3976

 1        Q.   And why is that?

 2        A.   Because there is a great danger of collateral damage and of

 3     civilian casualties, that in urban areas the emphasis is on achieving the

 4     greatest accuracy you can and your selection of weapons is to ensure that

 5     that accuracy is achieved.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Wilson, could I ask you:  Have you ever been in

 7     a situation where you were engaged in combat close to an urban

 8     environment, where you were one of the parties to the conflict?

 9             THE WITNESS:  In a -- close to a village -- well, that's not

10     quite urban, but a rural village, yes, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I was wondering whether you were telling us at

12     this moment what you should do or what you had done and why you didn't do

13     it.  Were you ever at a point that you were considering to fire into an

14     urban or a village area and then refrained from doing it for the reasons

15     you gave.

16             THE WITNESS:  I've been questioned about doctrine under which I

17     was educated, and that's what I'm really responding to rather than

18     experience.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, this of course comes close to expert evidence,

20     Ms. Bolton, and although you introduced the matter by what -- whether

21     this witness had ever done something, but it slipped into opinion rather

22     than that it stayed with the facts you were starting with.

23             MS. BOLTON:  Right.  And to the extent that it has, Your Honour,

24     my respectful submission would be that the jurisprudence of this Tribunal

25     has permitted persons with military expertise to express opinions on

Page 3977

 1     matters of this nature.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  You didn't hear me say that it was totally

 3     inadmissible.  What you heard me say is that you slipped from facts to

 4     something else, and it became unclear whether the witness was testifying

 5     about his experience or about his knowledge on a theoretical level and

 6     that's what I wanted to be put clearly on the record.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.  And do you need me to

 9     explore that any further or is it clear to the Tribunal?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  We leave it to you, but we would have no further

11     need for clarification.

12             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             Could we please have page 3 in both English and B/C/S in this

14     document.  And we'll be looking at conversation 3 which is at the bottom

15     of both pages.

16        Q.   And again, if you could read the conversation and let the clerk

17     know when to turn the page for you, please.

18        A.   I'm sorry, which conversation, 3?

19        Q.   Conversation 3, please.

20        A.   Thank you.  Yes.

21        Q.   Approximately halfway down the page - we're on page 4

22     now - you'll see there's a quote to:

23             "Fire at Velesici and at Pofalici where there aren't many Serb

24     inhabitants ."

25             And I believe the number 1 is ascribed to General Mladic.  How

Page 3978

 1     does that compare with what you were told by Colonel Cadjo was on the

 2     recording that you listened to?

 3        A.   It confirms that General Mladic was identifying specific targets

 4     to be attacked on the night of the 28th of May.  He was personally

 5     identifying specific areas.

 6        Q.   What about the reference to "where there aren't many Serb

 7     inhabitants."  Do you recall whether that was something that

 8     Colonel Cadjo told you about?

 9        A.   No, I don't recall that.

10             MS. BOLTON:  Could I have the -- could we scroll down the same

11     page, please, look at conversation 8.

12        Q.   And here I just have some questions.  There's a reference at

13     line 3 to 155's and multiple rocket launchers.  What are 155's?

14        A.   155 is a medium artillery piece that has a range of about

15     30 kilometres and has a very large explosion when it lands.  If it were

16     to hit a normal suburban concrete house, it would completely destroy it.

17     Rocket launchers fire multiple rockets, perhaps 30 at a time.  They're an

18     area weapon.  They're about 120-millimetre calibre.  When they land, they

19     land as a group and have quite an impressive explosive effect upon the

20     ground.  Once again, they'd be highly destructive in an urban area.

21        Q.   And in your view appropriate to use in an urban environment where

22     there's civilians?

23        A.   No, I don't believe they have the accuracy one would be seeking

24     in an urban area.

25             MS. BOLTON:  Finally, could we have page 5 in English and 5 in

Page 3979

 1     B/C/S.

 2        Q.   I think the entirety of the conversation is visible on page 5 in

 3     the B/C/S, but in the English you're going to have to read conversation

 4     12 and then let, again, the clerk know when you've finished that page and

 5     when he can turn the page for you.

 6        A.   Okay.

 7        Q.   Could we just go back to page 5 in English, please.  Now, in this

 8     conversation, General Wilson, there is a reference by one of the

 9     gentlemen to the runway.  Could you tell us whether there were

10     Bosnian Serb forces in proximity to the airport at that point in time?

11        A.   At that time the Bosnian Serb forces controlled the Sarajevo

12     airport.

13        Q.   And at the very beginning of the conversation the two speakers

14     are talking about multiple rocket launchers firing and 155's, and then

15     Private Cekovic refers to comets, "those comets, you know, comets

16     flashing on all sides."  What do you take that to be a reference to?

17        A.   I believe he's referring to the multiple rocket launchers.  They

18     leave a trail of fire behind them as they move through the air.

19        Q.   And there's also an indication approximately two-thirds of the

20     way down the page that the fire went on -- he says "we caused" -- I'm

21     looking at speaker number 1:

22             "It seems we caused bedlam.  We caused -- you have no idea how

23     long the fire went on for, until 2.00 or 3.00."

24             Does that correspond with your recollection?

25        A.   Yes, it does.

Page 3980

 1        Q.   There's also a reference further down the page --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down for the interpreters, please.

 3     Thank you very much.

 4             MS. BOLTON:  My apologies.

 5        Q.   There is again Private Cekovic quoted as saying part-way through

 6     the paragraph:

 7             "You should have seen the chaos, fuck it, how they fired at them

 8     with Pragas, how they fired at them.  It was chaos."

 9             What is a Pragas?

10        A.   I don't know what a Pragas is.

11        Q.   Could you tell me what the destructive fire is of an

12     anti-aircraft gun?

13        A.   Yes, when it's employed in a ground role, it has a high volume of

14     fire.  It fires typically an explosive round varying between 20 and

15     40 millimetres.  And because it has such a rapid rate of fire and an

16     explosive effect at the other end, it can just tear buildings apart in a

17     very short period of time.  It's a very impressive weapon when used in

18     the ground role.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MS. BOLTON:  Could this document be admitted, please, as the next

21     exhibit marked for identification.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  The number would be, Mr. Registrar ...?

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter 22234 will be P330 marked for

24     identification.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 3981

 1             Please proceed, Ms. Bolton.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Yes.  Could we please bring up Exhibit P00072 which

 3     is part of 65 ter I think 22460 and -- the Court's indulgence.

 4             I'm sorry -- no, that's fine.  And I think it's -- is there a

 5     sub (C) under that exhibit?  If so, that's what we will want.

 6        Q.   In the meantime, I will ask General Wilson, in terms of the

 7     artillery fire that you described from the evening of May 28th into

 8     May 29th, could you tell us what kind of preparations you would have to

 9     take before launching a barrage of this nature?

10        A.   Certainly you would require the ammunition to be there and you

11     would need to pre-plan that.  There was a vast quantity of ammunition

12     consumed on that night that would have require some planning to

13     preposition that ammunition.  I doubt that they would have that sort of

14     on the gun-line on a routine basis.  And then of course if one is being

15     serious about accuracy, one would pre-register targets.  You actually

16     trial firing a few rounds so that you know exactly where they will land

17     and you've got the right data in your gun position so that when they

18     actually fire the target on the night it will be accurate.  Following

19     that you would fire what is called an on-call target, I believe it is,

20     where you just fire into the general area and then adjust your fire as

21     you're going.  But ideally you would have all your targets pre-registered

22     and ready to go.

23        Q.   I'm going to play you a short clip.

24             MS. BOLTON:  I can tell the Court that we're not relying on the

25     audio at all for the clip.  It's just the images that we'll be asking the

Page 3982

 1     witness to comment on.  And the timing is from 14 to 32 seconds.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  But if you do not rely on the text, may I take it

 3     that you also do not want to tender the text in the transcript.

 4             MS. BOLTON:  I do not wish to tender the text in transcript.  I

 5     think it's already in evidence.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  If that's the case, then of course you will

 7     understand that I don't have a recollection of every single piece of

 8     evidence at this moment.

 9             Please proceed.  The video needs to be played only once.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MS. BOLTON:

12        Q.   Could you tell us how the explosions and the fire -- artillery

13     fire that we saw in that clip compared to what you observed on the

14     28th/29th of May, 1992?

15        A.   It's about 30 seconds of what went on in the city all night and

16     generally distributed around the city.  What we could see there were

17     tracer bullets moving through the air.  It's just a snap-shot of a very

18     small part of the city, but does reflect the intensity that was going on

19     really for hours and hours at a time.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             MS. BOLTON:  Could we now have Exhibit D00039, please, and I

22     would be asking for page 5 in both -- sorry, first page 1 in both

23     versions.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Once again, the interpreters are kindly

25     requesting the parties to please slow down and the witness to wait before

Page 3983

 1     he answers - thank you very much - a little bit.  Thanks.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Wilson, you've heard the request to take a short

 3     break between the question and answer.  And Ms. Bolton will do the same

 4     between answer and question.

 5             MS. BOLTON:

 6        Q.   All right, you should see before you now, General Wilson, a

 7     conversation between Ratko Mladic and Potpara that is indicated was

 8     intercepted on the 29th May, 1992.  And could I now have page 5 in both

 9     English and B/C/S, please.  Sorry, I had the wrong page number in B/C/S.

10     It's page 4.  And if we could scroll down to the bottom of the page in

11     both versions.

12             You see very near to the bottom of the page, General Wilson, that

13     General Mladic is quoted as saying:

14             "I agree.  I want the same thing.  If they want peace, they can

15     have it.  I ordered yesterday evening as soon as I arrived, there was

16     that attack not only against the units but also against you.  This

17     shooting, somehow I managed to calm down the men here, to get them under

18     control, to stop them from firing.  This thing they are doing now, they

19     probably have good pantomimes or some good impressionists who probably

20     successfully imitated our voices, mine, yours, everybody's."

21             May I ask you what your response would be to a suggestion that

22     the voice on the radio intercepts that you were played during your

23     meeting with the Presidency was the voice of a mimic?

24        A.   I can only say that the six officers from the JNA and the

25     Presidency who were there had no doubt that the voice in that tape

Page 3984

 1     belonged to General Mladic.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Could I ask, please, to go back to page 1 in both

 3     versions of this document, please.  And could you scroll down in the

 4     English version and the B/C/S, please.

 5        Q.   The very last entry from Ratko Mladic on that page starts with

 6     saying:

 7             "...  for you to know.  First of all, they are listening in on

 8     our conversations ..."

 9             Who do you understand he would be talking about when he says

10     "they are listening in"?

11        A.   I think he's referring to the Presidency military forces, to

12     their radio intercept people.

13             MS. BOLTON:  May I now have 65 ter 09967.

14        Q.   Could I ask you while that document's coming up, what was the

15     Secretary-General of the United Nations reaction to the bombardment of

16     Sarajevo on May 28th/29th?

17        A.   He issued a call for the Serb parties to show restraint and ask

18     that representations be made to the Serb authorities to call for that

19     restraint.  And I was asked by the force commander, General Nambiar, to

20     arrange a meeting with the local Serb political and military leadership

21     to pass the Secretary-General's concern and call for a restrain on.

22        Q.   And do you recognise the document that's before you?

23        A.   I do.

24        Q.   And that appears to be a press release issued by the

25     Secretary-General relating to the bombardment?

Page 3985

 1        A.   Yes, it is.

 2             MS. BOLTON:  Could I ask that be marked as the next exhibit,

 3     please.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 09967 will be Exhibit P331.

 6     Thank you.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 8             MS. BOLTON:  May I have 65 ter 11321, please.

 9        Q.   While that's coming up, you indicated that you received a plea of

10     sorts from the Secretary-General to call for restraint and you were asked

11     to arrange for a meeting.  Did you, in fact, meet with General Mladic?

12        A.   Yes, I met with General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic on the

13     30th of May at Lukavica barracks.  I passed on the appeal and the concern

14     of the Secretary-General at that time.

15        Q.   Do you recognise the document that is before you, General Wilson?

16        A.   I do, it's a cable authored and signed by me.

17        Q.   And when you met with General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992,

18     did he deny that his forces were responsible for the bombardment the

19     evening before?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Did he acknowledge that they were responsible?

22        A.   Yes, he did and his justification was that the standard

23     justification that that was simply defending the Serb people and Serb

24     neighbourhoods in Sarajevo from attack from the Presidency forces.

25        Q.   Had you seen signs that there was an all-out attack by Presidency

Page 3986

 1     forces throughout the city of Sarajevo on the 28th and 29th that they

 2     would have needed to repel against?

 3        A.   No, I -- it was pretty much one-way traffic.  I -- of course

 4     because of the volume of fire that was going on that night, it was

 5     virtually impossible to hear any outgoing fire, but if it was it would

 6     have been minimal in comparison to the incoming fire.

 7        Q.   And at any point during your meeting with General Mladic on the

 8     30th of May, 1992, did he suggest that there was some false propaganda

 9     out there in terms of there being somebody mimicking him on an alleged

10     intercept?

11        A.   No, that point was never raised on the 30th of May nor at any

12     other time by General Mladic with me.

13             MS. BOLTON:  Could that be marked as the next exhibit,

14     Your Honour, and that would be a convenient place for the morning break.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 11321 will be Exhibit P332.

17     Thank you.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  P332 is admitted into evidence.

19             Ms. Bolton, could you give us a time estimate on how much time

20     you would still need.

21             MS. BOLTON:  20 minutes, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll verify how much time you used until now.  I

25     expect that 20 minutes would just keep you within the time estimate you

Page 3987

 1     gave at the beginning.

 2             We first would like to have Mr. -- the witness to be escorted out

 3     of the courtroom, Mr. Wilson.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break of 20 minutes and we'll resume at

 6     ten minutes to 11.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton, please proceed.  You have 20 minutes.

12             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             May we have 65 ter 09966.

14        Q.   And while that's coming up, General Wilson, when I was

15     questioning you earlier about Defence Exhibit 39 which was the intercept

16     where General Mladic was referring to pantomimes or mimics, in that

17     intercept I read you a portion about where he indicated that they may be

18     listening or they are listening to our conversations.  Do you have any

19     knowledge about whether in May of 1992 the opposing forces were able to

20     listen to one another's conversations?

21        A.   No, I didn't know definitively, but any soldier on operations

22     would expect that the opposing side is monitoring your communications.

23     That's normal practice.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now you have before you a document dated

25     30th May 1992, which is a summary of a meeting with President Milosevic.

Page 3988

 1     Do you recognise this document?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.  I've seen it before.

 3        Q.   And were you in attendance at this meeting?

 4        A.   No, I was not.

 5        Q.   Were you briefed as to what occurred at this meeting?

 6        A.   I was.  When Mr. Cedric Thornberry, the chief civil affairs

 7     officer, arrived in Sarajevo on the 2nd of June for the airport

 8     negotiations, he briefed me on this meeting and other meetings which had

 9     taken place which were a preamble to our negotiations on the opening of

10     the airport.

11        Q.   And do you remember very briefly what Mr. Thornberry told you was

12     President Milosevic's position with respect to the bombardment on the

13     28th/29th of May, 1992?

14        A.   In short he in no way supported or condoned it and thought that

15     General Mladic had grossly misbehaved.

16        Q.   And does the contents of this document accord with the briefing

17     you received from Mr. Thornberry?

18        A.   Yes, it does.

19             MS. BOLTON:  Could that be introduced as the next exhibit,

20     please, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Your speed of speech, again, Ms. Bolton, was causing

22     some problems.

23             Yes, the next exhibit -- no, I was focusing on the -- on

24     listening to the other channels in order to find out whether the

25     interpretation was able to keep up.  Therefore, I -- my attention was

Page 3989

 1     distracted for a second.

 2             Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ?

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, 65 ter 09966 will be Exhibit P333.

 4     Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  P333 is admitted into evidence.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Now, I understand from your statement, General Wilson, and this

 8     is -- no need to go to it, but at paragraphs 84 to 92, that you were

 9     involved in negotiations surrounding the opening of the Sarajevo airport

10     in early June 1992.  Could you tell us when relative to those

11     negotiations -- first of all, do you recall the date when those or dates

12     when those negotiations took place?

13        A.   The negotiations started on the 2nd of June when Mr. Thornberry

14     arrived from Belgrade and concluded with the signing of the agreement on

15     the 5th of June.

16        Q.   And when relative to those negotiations did the evacuation of the

17     Marsal Tito barracks take place?

18        A.   Marsal Tito barracks were evacuated during the negotiations.  The

19     exact date I don't recall, but it was either the 3rd or 4th of June.

20        Q.   And I think you've answered this already, what was the state of

21     artillery fire into Sarajevo during those evacuations?

22        A.   There was absolute quiet in the city for the first time in many

23     days on the day that the Tito barracks were evacuated because both sides

24     wanted the cease-fire to work.

25        Q.   And who agreed to the cease-fire?

Page 3990

 1        A.   The Serb political leadership and the Presidency political

 2     leadership signed -- I'm sorry, the barracks?

 3        Q.   Yes.

 4        A.   The JNA were the lead negotiators; that's General Boskovic, and

 5     the BiH military representatives, Mr. Doko may have been replaced by

 6     then.  I'm just not exactly sure.

 7        Q.   And so who was it that indicated there wouldn't be artillery fire

 8     during the evacuation?

 9        A.   All the parties agreed to that requirement, and in particular the

10     JNA and I assume with the agreement of General Mladic who ultimately

11     controlled artillery fire.

12        Q.   And how did the evacuation of that barracks proceed?

13        A.   Very smoothly and without hiccup.

14        Q.   And once the evacuation was complete and the troops were safely

15     out of the barracks, what happened to the barracks?

16        A.   The night that the -- the night of the evacuation, Serb artillery

17     engaged the barracks with white phosphorus incendiary ammunition and

18     basically burnt the barracks down with any of the contents that may have

19     remained at that time, including at least some of the heavy weapons that

20     were left behind.

21        Q.   And can you describe how accurate or inaccurate the fire was by

22     the Serb artillery in respect of engaging the barracks?

23        A.   It was very accurate and very effective.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  No comments, no loud speaking.

25             MS. BOLTON:

Page 3991

 1        Q.   And after in the days following, was there any improvement in

 2     terms of what you have previously described as periods of heavy sustained

 3     shelling of the city of Sarajevo?

 4        A.   Immediately after the signing of the airport agreement on the

 5     5th of June, heavy fighting resumed within the city, in particular around

 6     the airport and the Dobrinja area and later around Grbavica, I think it's

 7     pronounced, which is adjacent to the Marsal Tito barracks.  There was

 8     extremely heavy fighting took place then for a period of about seven days

 9     and basically continued until I left the city on the 23rd of June.

10             MS. BOLTON:  Could I have 65 ter 09380, please.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  And could I ask one question.

12             You said the shelling of the Marsal Tito barracks was very

13     accurate, very, very precise.  Now, it is my understanding that barracks,

14     including the Marsal Tito barracks, cover a certain area which is more

15     than one -- the size of one or two houses but is really a complex of

16     buildings perhaps with some yards.  Now, what did you mean exactly by the

17     accuracy?  Was it that they didn't hit the yard but only the buildings --

18     or, I mean to say it was very accurate?  But if it's, well, let's say a

19     complex say the size of hundreds of metres, then how could you assess the

20     accuracy of the artillery attack?

21             THE WITNESS:  The barracks was too far from the PTT for me to

22     actually observe the fire that night, and in any event we wouldn't be out

23     wandering around the city at night under the conditions that existed at

24     that time.  But I did see the barracks in the couple of days afterwards

25     and I'm assessing that something like 80 per cent, 70, 80 per cent of all

Page 3992

 1     the buildings were completely burnt out.  But the area around had

 2     suffered very little collateral damage and that's why I say it was

 3     accurate and effective.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, there had been shelling all over the city in

 5     the days before, isn't it?  You said the damage was little in terms of

 6     fire or how should I understand you --

 7             THE WITNESS:  You can see that buildings are shattered, broken.

 8     Roofs have been removed, holes blown in walls, litter about the place and

 9     area that has been attacked.  Now, this area was not subjected to

10     artillery fire while the JNA were in there because the Serb forces would

11     have been concerned about collateral damage that may have been caused to

12     the barracks while they were still occupied.  So prior to the evacuation

13     there was not a great deal of artillery directed in that area.  A day or

14     two after the evacuation where there was no longer this concern, there

15     was little damage to the buildings in the area of the barracks, so the

16     fire that had produced the destruction of the barracks had to have been

17     accurate and basically confined largely to the area of the barracks.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, could I just try to imagine what has

19     happened and I now take a scenario which may be unrealistic, but then

20     please tell me.  You fire a couple of incendiary projectiles on the

21     barracks, the fire spreads among the buildings but is limited to the

22     barracks because the distance to the adjacent construction outside the

23     barracks is too big for the fire to spread over there.  Now, I know that

24     this is -- let me see why is my explanation of the situation not correct

25     and why is your explanation, which is a conclusion on the basis of what

Page 3993

 1     you've seen the days after, why is that correct?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, you'll forgive me, it's 20 years ago

 3     so I only have in my mind now an impression that the barracks were

 4     surrounded by an open area, that there were not civilian buildings close

 5     up to the barracks, that there was some distance.  So a fire in the

 6     barracks, in my recollection, is unlikely to have spread outside --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 8             THE WITNESS:  -- to other areas.  So your description is

 9     accurate.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  So that is a possible explanation, apart from the

11     accuracy of the firing you just adopted as an explanation for the

12     situation?

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it is.  But as I say, I could not observe any

14     damage to the buildings around from artillery or any significant damage

15     in comparison to the rest of the city.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not blaming you for what you could see or could

17     not see.  What I'm trying to do is to see to what extent I can follow

18     your conclusions as compelling conclusions on the basis of what you'd

19     seen the day after.  And you say:  Well, my scenario, to say so, could

20     not be excluded.

21             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Ms. Bolton.

23             MS. BOLTON:

24        Q.   Part of the scenario that His Honour just put to you was the

25     suggestion that the fire damage that you saw to 70 or 80 per cent of the

Page 3994

 1     buildings within the barracks compound could have been the result of one

 2     or two shells.  Do you agree with that?

 3        A.   It's possible.  It's more likely that there were multiple

 4     incendiary rounds fired into the barracks to make sure the job was

 5     correctly done.  But as I've indicated, we were not in a position to

 6     observe the fire, only the effect.

 7        Q.   I don't know if you can answer this question 20 years later, but

 8     do you recall how -- what the spacing was like in between buildings

 9     within the barracks compound at that point in time?

10        A.   No, I can't.

11        Q.   Sir, you should now have in front of you 09380, which is --

12     sorry, do you recognise this document?

13        A.   Yes, I do.

14        Q.   What is it?

15        A.   It's a copy of the agreement signed by both the BH Presidency and

16     the -- and Mr. Karadzic for the opening of the Sarajevo airport.

17        Q.   And if you look at paragraph 2 there is a reference to all

18     anti-aircraft weapons systems being withdrawn, and in subparagraph (B) to

19     systems being placed in concentrated areas agreed by UNPROFOR and subject

20     to UNPROFOR observation.  Yesterday you gave evidence about concentration

21     areas for Serb weaponry.  Is this what you were referring to or is this

22     something different?

23        A.   This is what I was referring to.

24             MS. BOLTON:  And if we could go to the final page in both B/C/S

25     and in English, please.

Page 3995

 1        Q.   You'll see that there's a signature and you told us this was an

 2     agreement agreed to by both the Presidency and the Serb side, and I see

 3     only Mr. Karadzic's signature; why is that?

 4        A.   Well, because during 1992 and 1993, to my knowledge at least, the

 5     Bosnian Presidency refused to meet with the Serb political leadership,

 6     nor to sign any documents that they had physically signed.  So it was

 7     necessary to have shuttle diplomacy between the two parties in different

 8     rooms or different physical locations.  And when documents were

 9     presented, to have two copies, one for each party to sign.

10             MS. BOLTON:  Could that be introduced as the next exhibit,

11     please, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter 09380 will be Exhibit P334.

14     Thank you.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

16             MS. BOLTON:  May I have 65 ter 19595, please.

17        Q.   And I'm just going to change to the last subject matter I'm going

18     to ask you about, General Wilson, which is the issue of detention

19     facilities and allegations of ethnic cleansing.  At paragraphs 94 and 95

20     of your statement you indicate that you started to receive reports of

21     ethnic cleansing commencing in March and April of 1992.  Could you tell

22     us in what areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina those reported activities were

23     allegedly occurring?

24        A.   The -- there was a belt across northern Bosnia just south of the

25     Sava River, but basically from Bihac right across to the Serbian border

Page 3996

 1     and also in Drina valley.  They were the main areas that we were

 2     receiving reports about alleged ethnic cleansing.

 3        Q.   And what persons were being ethnically cleansed according to the

 4     reports you were receiving?

 5        A.   Well, at that time the reports that we were receiving were only

 6     Muslim people were being moved on, although later I was aware that really

 7     all three nationalities suffered the same treatment.

 8        Q.   And could you tell us what the sources of your information were

 9     about the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in the areas you've

10     referred to?

11        A.   Primarily through the media but authoritatively through the ECMM

12     who were responsible for monitoring that type of activity and who

13     exchanged with us on a regular basis information and reports.  We were

14     quite well informed about their activities and about their reporting.

15        Q.   And you should see before you a document 19595.  Do you recognise

16     this document?

17        A.   I do.

18        Q.   And what is it?

19        A.   It's a letter from the Presidency to me highlighting concern

20     about ethnic cleansing which had taken place I think in the Prijedor

21     area.

22        Q.   Now, according to your statement, you had the opportunity to

23     visit area of Bijeljina, and at paragraph 97 you also include some

24     observations of paramilitary forces, including Arkan's men and the

25     White Eagles.  And your observation was that the paramilitaries seem to

Page 3997

 1     enjoy freedom of movement.  Were the paramilitary forces armed?

 2        A.   The ones that I physically saw were armed, yes.

 3        Q.   And in areas controlled by what forces or entities did the

 4     paramilitaries seem to enjoy freedom of movement?

 5        A.   I saw them specifically in Knin, in the Krajina, and also in

 6     eastern Slavonia in the area of Vukovar.

 7        Q.   And who controlled those areas?

 8        A.   The Serb political authorities controlled those from a political

 9     point of view, and Mr. -- General Mladic, at least in the area of Knin,

10     had been able to demonstrate his military authority in those areas also.

11        Q.   You also discuss at paragraph 101 of your statement allegations

12     that the Bosnian Serb forces were engaging in a large-scale detention of

13     civilians, and you indicate that you raised this issue at airport talks.

14     And you record in your statement Mrs. Plavsic's reaction.  Could you tell

15     us whether General Mladic participated in the airport talks?

16        A.   He was present during the negotiations, yes.

17        Q.   Can you recall, if at all, his reaction to this issue?

18        A.   On those occasions, no.  He was certainly present and heard the

19     conversations, but they were directed to Mrs. Plavsic.  She represented

20     herself as having some responsibility for humanitarian affairs in the

21     Serbian political leadership.

22        Q.   And what about the issue of allegations of ethnic cleansing, was

23     that brought up at all in the airport talks?

24        A.   Not that I recall.  They were very focused on opening the

25     airport, trying to keep all the distractions out of there as possible.

Page 3998

 1     It was complicated and difficult enough without introducing other

 2     subjects.

 3        Q.   And in your statement you indicate at paragraphs 101 and 113 that

 4     General Mladic sometimes attended meetings - and now this would be later

 5     in time - of the ICFY and that Lord Owen frequently raised the issue of

 6     claims of ethnic cleansing, POWs, and detention centres in those

 7     meetings.  Do you have any recollection of General Mladic's reaction to

 8     any of those discussions?

 9        A.   No, I can't link General Mladic to any warning or discussion

10     involving Lord Owen and ethnic cleansing.  He may or may not have been

11     present.  I can't say he was.

12             MS. BOLTON:  Could I have this document marked as the next

13     exhibit, please.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 19595 will be Exhibit P335.

16     Thank you.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

18             MS. BOLTON:  And, finally, could I have Exhibit P00205, which is

19     a video, and the timing I'm going to be playing in a moment - again, we

20     don't rely on the audio - will be 6 minutes and 42 seconds to 6 minutes

21     and 49 seconds.

22        Q.   And while that's being brought up, General, I'm going to remind

23     you that at paragraph 104 of your statement you gave evidence about

24     discussing a famous photograph of a man in a detention camp with

25     General Mladic.  Do you recall that conversation with General Mladic?

Page 3999

 1        A.   Yes, I do.

 2        Q.   And I'm going to ask that we play this little bit of footage,

 3     please.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             MS. BOLTON:  Will you stop, please.  So we played from 6.42 to

 6     6.47.5 seconds.

 7        Q.   There is an image of a gentleman that is now before you.  Could

 8     you tell me anything about this gentleman?

 9        A.   This was a photograph that was circulating in the media during

10     1992 and was alleged to have been taken of inmates of a concentration --

11     of a -- yes, a concentration camp which was being run by the Serbs to

12     hold prisoners.  And the -- it was -- the media reports associated with

13     this photograph suggested that this was -- this individual was showing

14     signs of the sort of treatment that was dealt out to the inmates of those

15     camps.

16        Q.   And is this an image of the gentleman that you refer to in

17     paragraph 104 of your statement or was that a different photograph?

18        A.   No, that's the same photograph.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MS. BOLTON:  I'm finished with that document and that brings me

21     to the end of my examination-in-chief except for the issue of the

22     associated exhibits that have not been discussed with the witness.  Would

23     you like me to discuss that issue now, Your Honour?

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Perhaps it's best to do that now so the Defence

25     knows during cross-examination where we stand.

Page 4000

 1             MS. BOLTON:  Thank you.  I can indicate that of the exhibits

 2     there are, I believe, eight associated exhibits that I didn't have the

 3     opportunity to discuss with the witness.  Two of those the Prosecution

 4     isn't seeking to introduce.  So the Prosecution is not seeking to

 5     introduce 65 ter 10580 or 11095, as I believe the evidence the witness

 6     has given in court plus his statement accurately covers the subject

 7     matter.  And I am seeking to introduce as associated exhibits the

 8     remaining 65 ter numbers, which are --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, if you would call them one by one.

10             MS. BOLTON:  03287.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives, Mr. Registrar, number ... ?

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P336, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Next one, Ms. Bolton.

14             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, 03707.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives number ... ?

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P337, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Next one.

18             MS. BOLTON:  03905.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives number ... ?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P338, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Next one.

22             MS. BOLTON:  10581.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives number ... ?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P339, Your Honours.

25             MS. BOLTON:  10582.

Page 4001

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives number ... ?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P340, Your Honours.

 3             MS. BOLTON:  10789.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Receives number ... ?

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  [Microphone not activated]

 6             MS. BOLTON:  And Ms. Stewart's records and mine don't accord with

 7     respect to Exhibit 03281.  I thought I discussed that with the witness

 8     and it was already introduced.  Could ...

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That is UNPROFOR cable, summary of meeting between

10     McKenzie, Morillon, and Auger dated 30th of May.  I will consult with my

11     colleagues.

12             MS. BOLTON:  May I just have a moment, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

14             MS. BOLTON:  Yes, if that could be given an exhibit number,

15     please, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours 65 ter 03281 will be Exhibit P342.

18     And for the clarification of transcript, 65 ter 10789 will be

19     Exhibit P341.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber, Ms. Bolton, has considered that the

23     number of associated exhibits which should be limited, the Chamber

24     accepts the number of seven associated exhibits.  P336 up to and

25     including P342 are admitted into evidence.

Page 4002

 1             Mr. Petrusic, are you ready to cross-examine Mr. Wilson?

 2             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  The Defence is

 3     ready to begin with our cross-examination.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Petrusic:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon -- good morning, General.  Sir, I

 6     would like to begin with where you left off, or rather, where the

 7     Prosecutor left off with the examination-in-chief.  You were shown a

 8     photograph and I won't really deal with that, but I would like to ask you

 9     this:  Do you have any information as to what these people looked like,

10     the people shown in this photograph before they entered the camp?

11        A.   No, I don't.

12        Q.   And just an additional question to deal with that:  Do you know

13     whether this photograph of these people, these men, was made from inside

14     the camp or from outside the camp?

15        A.   No, I don't.

16        Q.   General, sir, in paragraph 16 you talk about your mission upon

17     your arrival in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, Zagreb, and then in Sarajevo,

18     and you say that at this time Mr. Thornberry had a leading role and

19     General Nambiar to a lesser extent.  You say also that at the time you

20     were just an actor in the organisational sense.  Now, would you agree

21     with me that irrespective of this position that you state in this

22     paragraph, during your stay there in the first ten months you've actually

23     held a number -- a large number of meetings and had numerous contacts

24     with the two primary warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25        A.   I -- yes, counsellor, that's a true summary of my total time

Page 4003

 1     there.  But that paragraph is really talking about the period from

 2     22 March until 16 or 17 May, when other people were more involved in the

 3     more significant negotiations and I was a relatively junior commander and

 4     staff officer, in that period, March to mid-May.

 5        Q.   After mid-May you had under your command - if I may put it that

 6     way - a number of observers, UN observers?

 7        A.   That's correct.

 8        Q.   Their job - as the name itself indicates - was to compile all

 9     kinds of information relating to any developments within the warring

10     parties.  Is that correctly -- would that be right to say?

11        A.   Counsellor, that was one of their jobs.  They had many other

12     roles and functions, but actually recording information and reporting it

13     was one of their more important roles.

14        Q.   If we can focus just on the information that they gathered

15     relating to whatever was happening on either side of the warring parties,

16     no doubt they would have reported on that; right?  Am I correct?

17        A.   That's a very general question.  They submitted regular reports

18     on what was happening in their area of interest, and they would submit

19     specific reports about individual actions or investigations.

20        Q.   General, sir, your reports, were they drafted also based on the

21     information that you received from these observers when they were

22     submitting their reports?

23        A.   Sometimes that's correct; sometimes my reports were based upon my

24     own experience and observations.  It depends on the circumstances,

25     counsellor.

Page 4004

 1        Q.   You also talk in your statement about meetings that you had with

 2     representatives of UNPROFOR.  The information that you received from --

 3     or, rather, you and UNPROFOR representatives, did you exchange

 4     information between the two of you?

 5        A.   Yes, there was quite a sophisticated system of reporting and

 6     exchange of information that existed within UNPROFOR.  And I was

 7     fortunate enough to be included in the most critical committees and

 8     meetings.  So I was very well informed about what was happening within

 9     UNPROFOR in 1992 and then later in 1993 when I was in Geneva.  I had

10     access to the most sensitive information within UNPROFOR.

11        Q.   The information that you had access to also had to do with the

12     events in Sarajevo; correct?

13        A.   Yes, but Sarajevo was only one area of interest for UNPROFOR.

14     There were many other areas also.

15        Q.   In paragraph 38 you mention that you were absent between the

16     30th of April and the 13th of May, 1992, from the area.  Now, would you

17     agree with me that after your return you were briefed on the developments

18     and the events that had happened in Sarajevo, at least the key events,

19     the key developments, that transpired while you were away?

20        A.   It was a very short briefing from General McKenzie, who on the

21     15th of May when this briefing took place, perhaps it was on the 16th of

22     May, he had many other distractions and concerns so the briefing was

23     confined to essentials and not very detailed.  But my staff who - that's

24     the military observers - did brief me in a bit more detail, but they were

25     not knowledgeable about the evacuation of the first JNA barracks.  So

Page 4005

 1     that's a hole in my information.

 2        Q.   So, General, sir, you're trying to say that you had no

 3     information whatsoever about an attack on a column of privates and

 4     officers that was withdrawing under the agreement from the command of the

 5     2nd Military District, and this happened on the 3rd of May when this

 6     column was attacked, and 42 soldiers and officers were killed on the

 7     occasion; is that what you're saying?

 8        A.   I have only a general knowledge of that unfortunate incident.

 9        Q.   You also said yesterday that you had information about

10     Izetbegovic being taken as a hostage while you were away, and I'm telling

11     you now that it was on the 2nd of May.  Did you have information, or

12     rather, were you -- was it reported to you -- were you told why

13     Mr. Izetbegovic was taken hostage?

14        A.   If I was, I can't recall now.

15        Q.   A few days after the briefing that you had with General McKenzie,

16     were you fully aware of the situation or the extent of the problems that

17     existed while these barracks were being evacuated?  First of all, did you

18     know how many barracks there were in the town?  And then could you also

19     tell me about what you knew about the extent of the problem?

20        A.   I'm aware there were three barracks within the town that remained

21     to be evacuated in mid-May.  There was a fourth barracks somewhere out of

22     town which had some officer cadets in it that I was at no time involved

23     with the evacuation of that barracks.  And I'm aware that the barracks

24     were invested, surrounded, by the BiH force.  And I'm also aware of the

25     difficult circumstances that the JNA faced in extracting their garrisons

Page 4006

 1     out of Croatia during the war there and the very hard lessons they learnt

 2     there.  So I understand the JNA's concern to ensure the safe passage of

 3     their soldiers out of the three Sarajevo garrisons, and in particular

 4     with their experience in the evacuation, the first one, in early May.

 5        Q.   Did you know that in addition to soldiers and officers there were

 6     also members of their families in those barracks, in other words,

 7     civilians?

 8        A.   Yes, I'm fully aware of that.  And that's one of the reasons that

 9     we took every action we possibly could to ensure the safe evacuation of

10     those barracks as a UN force.

11        Q.   So when you arrived on the 14th of May, the situation you found

12     yourself in was that there were hostilities in the town and you described

13     this as happening in the immediate vicinity and sector of Dobrinja.  Now,

14     General, sir, could you tell us who held Dobrinja, or rather, I withdraw

15     this question.  I apologise.

16             Tell us first:  Was Dobrinja a neighbourhood in Sarajevo town

17     itself?

18        A.   Yes, it was.

19        Q.   This is a neighbourhood that was, we could say, close to the

20     airport; correct?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   Do you know what forces held Dobrinja?

23        A.   At the time we thought it was a disputed area which changed from

24     time to time, but it was our belief that it was held by the Serb forces.

25        Q.   But this balance of power, do you know whether it changed

Page 4007

 1     while -- during your stay there?

 2        A.   I never actually went inside Dobrinja after about the

 3     14th of May, but from reports there was very heavy fighting in there,

 4     particularly after the airport agreement.  And while there were no big

 5     changes of territory there, one side or the other was able to dominate by

 6     fire, that's fire-power.  But it was always a disputed area during 1992.

 7        Q.   General, sir, since we are talking about this, could you tell us:

 8     Do you know who started the fighting on the 14th of May?  Who started the

 9     clashes?

10        A.   I don't know the answer to that, counsellor.  The Presidency told

11     me that the Serb forces did, and the Serb authorities told me that the

12     Presidency forces started the fighting.  This is a pretty typical

13     situation when you're trying to investigate circumstances in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.

15        Q.   In the reports that you submitted when you defined the party that

16     was responsible for causing or provoking an attack, did you rely on one

17     source alone, either the Muslim or the Serb source?

18        A.   No, never relied on one source, never stated it was fact unless I

19     could personally verify it with reliable witnesses or having observed

20     myself.  I always found it very useful to ask one side then the other

21     what had happened.  Sometimes one was able to find that the truth lay

22     somewhere in the middle.  But never relied upon one source, counsellor.

23        Q.   General, sir, can you agree with me that there were a lot of

24     sources in the media, a lot of information leaked -- was leaked through

25     the media to shape the public opinion, and the sources for that

Page 4008

 1     information was rather unreliable, or rather, they were biased?

 2        A.   Information -- manipulation of information is one of the weapons

 3     of war, both during the war in Bosnia and virtually every other conflict.

 4     The accuracy of media reports is often questionable and needs to be

 5     verified by reliable means before accepting it as fact, and this is what

 6     we attempted to do.

 7        Q.   General, sir, in the fighting in Dobrinja, could you tell us to

 8     the best of your recollection which forces took part in the fighting on

 9     either side?  Of course we all -- it is generally known that there were

10     Muslim and Serb forces.  But could you define some military units or

11     formations in view of your experience, military experience, and also your

12     knowledge of the ground as it was?

13        A.   Would you like to put a time-frame on that, counsellor, so I can

14     be specific?

15        Q.   Absolutely.  General, sir, I am always referring to the period

16     around the 14th of May, or rather, the fighting in Dobrinja, the conflict

17     in Dobrinja.

18        A.   On the BiH side I've reported earlier in my evidence that there

19     were police involved and people dressed in civilian clothes and did not

20     appear to be very well organised.  It was the early days in the

21     organisation of the BiH army.  I also reported that I saw in Dobrinja on

22     the 14th/15th, thereabouts, of May very well organised Serb forces, so

23     well organised that I believe they're probably remnants of the JNA.  They

24     were very well equipped and organised and were fighting professionally.

25        Q.   When you talk about professional -- no, I withdraw this question.

Page 4009

 1             General, considering that remnants of the JNA stayed behind

 2     blocked in the barracks, do you know that in the territory of the

 3     then-Republika Srpska there had been a mobilisation drive?  All the

 4     military-age able-bodied men were mobilised.

 5        A.   Yes, I've learnt that.

 6        Q.   Do you know also that this military-age population consisted of

 7     men who had done their military service and that's what their entire

 8     military knowledge boiled down to?

 9        A.   I don't fully understand the question, counsellor.

10        Q.   General, all men between 18 and 27 in the former Yugoslavia were

11     subject to the so-called military obligation, meaning that they had to do

12     their military service for 12 or 18 months in the JNA.  When the

13     mobilisation started in Republika Srpska, all these military

14     conscripts - in this case between 18 and 60 --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton.

16             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry to interrupt, but my friend has a bit of a

17     habit of making a statement of a fact without asking the witness to

18     verify or not.  So I think with respect to the "all men between 18 and 27

19     in the former Yugoslavia" being subject to this military obligation and

20     the length of the obligation, that that's not a fact that's in evidence.

21     If he wants the witness to comment on it, he should ask the witness to

22     comment on it.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I think there's reason to intervene for a short

24     moment.  Let me try to understand what is going on at this moment.  It

25     started with you, Mr. Wilson, saying that the Serb forces were well

Page 4010

 1     organised, that you believed that they're probably remnants of the JNA.

 2     That's where it all started.  Did you intend to refer to the troops or to

 3     the officers or the whole of the armed forces or did you have certain

 4     elements in mind?  You talked about equipment.  Did you consider the

 5     equipment to be -- or you believed probably to be JNA equipment.  I see

 6     you're nodding "yes."  That's hereby on the transcript.

 7             As far as the professional way of operating - that's how I

 8     understand - did it give you the impression that all the foot soldiers

 9     were JNA -- former JNA foot soldiers, remnants of the JNA; or did you

10     have in mind the higher-up positions?  Could you please explain what made

11     you believe that this was probably remnants of the JNA?

12             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, a competent military unit requires

13     individual training of the soldiers and the officers, they must be

14     individually competent.  And then they must be collectively able to

15     operate as a unit which is -- requires a great deal of training.  It's

16     not something you acquire overnight.  You don't just put 30 people

17     together and expect them to be able to do it competently.  And then

18     there's the level of equipment they've got.  They should have an array of

19     equipment that allows them to do their job properly.  The people I

20     observed appeared to be that complete package.  They appeared to be

21     operating as individuals very professionally.  The way they were moving,

22     their plan, their manoeuvre, indicated that this was an organisation that

23     had had some collective training together and they also had the array of

24     equipment that you would find in a normal professional organisation.  So

25     if they were militias thrown together, they were very competent for their

Page 4011

 1     level of training.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, do you have any knowledge of whether the

 3     troops, the units, the lower-level military people, whether they were --

 4     they had been in the JNA already for a longer period of time or that they

 5     may have been recruited soon before you saw them perhaps being trained in

 6     the past under their duty to serve in the military?

 7             THE WITNESS:  I don't have definitive knowledge of that, sir.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.

 9             Yes, before I say "please proceed," we need a break first.

10             Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.  We'll have a

11     break of 20 minutes.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break and we'll resume at 17 minutes

14     past 12.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.19 a.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

18             Mr. Petrusic, could you carefully always consider when you put a

19     question to the witness what purpose it serves.  For example, when you

20     asked whether the witness was aware of families being in the barracks as

21     well, that was a question that was put to the witness yesterday and that

22     was -- question was answered, that he was aware that there was family.

23     Similarly, the -- there was no suggestion of any knowledge by this

24     witness on the conditions of the prisoners in Trnopolje or -- he just

25     said a photograph was used.  There was no suggestion.  So I don't think,

Page 4012

 1     as a matter of fact, that without any further examination on that matter

 2     that the Chamber would ever think that the witness would have had any

 3     personal knowledge of them.  So that may have been superfluous questions.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Wilson, Mr. Petrusic was - I forgot to say

 6     that - but you noticed that he was a member of the team of the Defence of

 7     Mr. Mladic will now continue his cross-examination.

 8             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I would like to call up

 9     65 ter 11321.

10        Q.   General, do you recognise your signature on this document?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   You also know what the topic of this meeting was.  It was

13     30th May 1992 and we had occasion to hear earlier today about it.  You

14     were asked some questions about it by the Prosecution.  We can agree,

15     can't we, that the main topic on Mladic's mind at that time was the

16     Marsal Tito barracks.  In that time-period did members of the

17     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina or those who held Sarajevo cut off water

18     and electricity to this and other barracks?

19        A.   I believe they did.  Whether they did it at this time, I can't

20     confirm.  But certainly it was reported that in particular the barracks

21     at Marsal Tito was without electricity and water.

22        Q.   In that time that we are discussing, that is, the month of May,

23     were the supply of water and electricity under the control of the

24     government, that is to say the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25        A.   I can't confirm that, no.

Page 4013

 1        Q.   Could you confirm whether this water and power supply was

 2     released again to the barracks after this meeting?

 3        A.   No, I can't confirm.  I can confirm that the Presidency had the

 4     ability to either provide or deny electricity and water to the barracks,

 5     but when they switched it on and when they switched it off I can't

 6     confirm.

 7        Q.   In paragraph 4 - we have to move to the second page in

 8     English - General Mladic talks about the weapons in that barracks,

 9     Marsal Tito barracks and he says that an agreement has been reached.

10     Now, in view of this meeting and your military experience I should like

11     to ask you:  Was it a justified demand on the part of the commander to

12     ask for these weapons, bearing in mind the fact that they could be used

13     against him the next day?

14        A.   He can certainly adopt the position that he's not prepared to

15     hand over the weapons, but whether that's legitimate or not depends upon

16     what his higher authorities' position was on the matter.  Ultimately, the

17     JNA and Serb political leadership directed that the weapons be handed

18     over.

19        Q.   You also discussed paragraph 5, the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

20     What is your impression - although you've told us a few things about that

21     already - to what extent was General Mladic independent in order to be

22     able to make that decision?

23        A.   What decision are we talking about, please, counsellor?

24        Q.   General, would you please focus on paragraph 5 which deals with

25     the withdrawal of heavy weapons outside of range of Sarajevo.  Can you

Page 4014

 1     see that?

 2        A.   Yes, I can.

 3        Q.   My question is:  To what extent was General Mladic independent in

 4     making the decision to withdraw those weapons?

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton.

 6             MS. BOLTON:  I don't think my friend's laid a basis that would

 7     suggest that this witness would have any knowledge of the matters he's

 8     asking about.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That's one issue.  The other one is that the

10     language of the question - at least as translated - is ambiguous, whether

11     he was independent in making the decision, which leaves it open whether

12     he made that decision or whether he was in a position to make such a

13     decision.

14             But could you tell us anything about your knowledge of the

15     competence of General Mladic at the time to make decisions of the kind as

16     described in paragraph 5?  Do you have any insight in that?

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I believe this is essentially a

18     political decision that General Mladic's political masters were to make.

19     He could certainly advise against such a move as a technical advisor,

20     military advisor, but it's not his -- I suspect it was never -- he never

21     had the authority to make that decision himself.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  And you draw that conclusion on the basis of the

23     character of the subject matter; is that --

24             THE WITNESS:  Well, General Mladic claimed that he was

25     subordinate to the political leadership of Mr. Karadzic.  So this level

Page 4015

 1     of strategic decision would have had to have been made by the political

 2     masters, not by military men.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you say paragraph 5 even expresses that he

 4     would not make that decision, so apart from dependence or independence,

 5     that he would abide by any agreement made and you usually do not use that

 6     language if you are talking about your own decisions?

 7             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, sir.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.

 9             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Look at paragraph 7, please.  General, sir -- I'm sorry, not

11     paragraph 7 of the statement but paragraph 7 of the document on the

12     screen.  Did you at any time after the 30th of May learn that the forces

13     of the Army of Republika Srpska shelled Dubrovnik?

14        A.   After the 30th of May; is that correct?

15        Q.   After that time, did you learn that Serb forces shelled

16     Dubrovnik?

17        A.   I can't remember a specific incident, but I do recall that the

18     JNA did not withdraw from around Dubrovnik until September of 1992.  And

19     there may or may not have been further firing after the 30th of May, but

20     at this meeting as recorded in paragraph 7 I'm raising the issue of a

21     particular event of which fire was directed upon the city from positions

22     recently vacated by the JNA.

23        Q.   Did you have any knowledge that the forces of the

24     Army of Republika Srpska had taken over those positions?

25        A.   As it was stated position of the JNA that they'd withdrawn from

Page 4016

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina with effect about the 20th of May, one presumes any

 2     forces remaining directing fire from that area had to come under the

 3     authority of General Mladic.

 4        Q.   But the military observer only informed you that Dubrovnik was

 5     shelled from positions recently abandoned by the JNA.  Are you aware, do

 6     you have any knowledge, that this was done by forces under the command of

 7     General Mladic?

 8        A.   No, and that is what I'm trying to clarify at this meeting.  And

 9     if he -- if they were forces under his command, to ask for restraint.

10        Q.   At any rate, you are now speculating on this fact -- with this

11     fact.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  What is the speculation exactly?  What -- the

13     witness testified about a document which contains a question about who's

14     responsible for recent shelling of Dubrovnik.  And then in the report it

15     says that the city was shelled from positions that were recently vacated

16     by the JNA without any further speculation of whatever kind.  Now, you

17     asked the witness several times:  Do you know whether this was taken by

18     the Serb forces?  And then the witness says:  Well, that sounds logical

19     but I do not know.  That's at least how I understood your answer now,

20     Mr. Wilson.

21             So who is now speculating?  Where is the speculation,

22     Mr. Petrusic?

23             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Mr. President, but I

24     obviously misheard or didn't hear that part of the answer when the

25     witness said "I don't know."  I really apologise and, if necessary, I'll

Page 4017

 1     apologise to the witness.  And now we will move to another question.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  The witness said "one presumes any forces

 3     remaining," clearing stating that it's a presumption and nothing more

 4     than that.  But that is because you specifically asked him:  After the

 5     time did you learn that Serb forces shelled Dubrovnik?  And then he says:

 6     Can't remember, don't know, but from the position one can presume it was

 7     done by the Serbs, but he doesn't express any clear view on it.  I think

 8     there's no speculation whatsoever in the answer of the witness.  And

 9     please check then whether the translation in B/C/S was accurate.  Please

10     proceed.

11             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this

12     document -- oh, no, it is already an exhibit, 332.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  It is, Mr. Petrusic.  Please proceed.

14             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I now ask for document

15     10789.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, for those looking at the transcript at

17     a later stage, it's preferable if you refer to the exhibit number

18     assigned meanwhile to the document.  10789 has been admitted as P341.

19     Please proceed.

20             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I really apologise,

21     but in this short time I did not manage to re-number the documents under

22     65 ter that have received P numbers.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  You may proceed.  Apparently I'm able to look at it

24     on the basis of the Prosecution's list, but let's not spend time on it.

25             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

Page 4018

 1        Q.   General, this document is also dated 30th May and relates to the

 2     same meeting.  When you were going to Lukavica barracks, did you always

 3     announce your arrival?

 4        A.   At this time, yes, counsellor.

 5        Q.   Was fire ever opened at you or at the UNPROFOR vehicles by the

 6     members of the VRS that controlled that road?

 7        A.   We were fired on on many occasions along that route, including

 8     one occasion my vehicle was hit or two vehicles we were travelling in

 9     convoy, we were hit 32 times and lost six of the eight tires in our

10     vehicle.  Inevitably when we raised this with the two parties they would

11     say it was the other party or we have no control of that area.  We never

12     successfully identified who was responsible for these attacks.

13        Q.   General, in this situation did you have any reason to doubt the

14     sincerity of General Mladic when he said that Dobrinja was under Muslim

15     control and outside the zone of his influence and that it was obvious

16     that his forces had not done the shooting?

17        A.   I had no reason to doubt General McKenzie -- General Mladic's

18     advice on this matter.

19        Q.   General --

20             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I now call up 03287.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  And that, Mr. Petrusic, is - let me just have a

22     look - P336, yes, a fax dated the 3rd of June.

23             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Could I ask you to focus, General, on this meeting of 3rd June,

25     1992, with the Presidency.  Ganic, Sedarovic, and Mr. Somun and the

Page 4019

 1     president himself were present, and also the Serbs, Karadzic, Plavsic,

 2     and General Mladic.  Isn't it the case in this situation as well that

 3     separate meetings were held first with one delegation and then with the

 4     other?

 5        A.   That's true, counsellor, that the paragraph opens with

 6     "meetings," plural, meaning there was more than one meeting and

 7     General Nambiar would have been aware that there were separate meetings.

 8        Q.   Could you tell us what went on at that meeting, because we read

 9     among other things -- it seems that the upcoming evacuation of 1.000

10     persons from Tito barracks could affect the situation, given the

11     emotionality of their situation and the irascibility and tiredness of

12     some of the players.  And then there is a note which says this also has

13     territorial implications.  Could you tell us what this actually means?

14        A.   This cable was drafted by Mr. Thornberry and signed and released

15     by myself.  So the precise wording is attributed to Mr. Thornberry.  This

16     cable records the bargaining position of both parties at a particular

17     point in time of the negotiations.  It's the 3rd of May, there no

18     agreement until the 5th of May.  The positions outlined in this cable

19     remain essentially unchanged over the period of negotiation.  The

20     Presidency are seeking for the withdrawal of heavy weapons, all heavy

21     weapons, from within 30 kilometres of Sarajevo.  The Serb political

22     leadership is seeking a demilitarisation and division of Sarajevo

23     supervised by the United Nations.  The negotiators are trying to open the

24     airport.  That's basically what this cable says.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Wilson, you said it's the 3rd of May, whereas

Page 4020

 1     I --

 2             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, 3rd of June.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Then 5th also of June, I take it.

 4             THE WITNESS:  5th of June, yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could you please take a look at paragraph 4.  The president of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic, on this occasion advocated military

10     intervention.  Do you believe that military intervention was the only way

11     to have the airport opened?

12        A.   No, I don't.  And the airport was opened in the end through

13     negotiation.

14        Q.   Did you have other meetings with Mr. Izetbegovic as well?  I

15     apologise.  During your mandate, during your term there in 1992?

16        A.   We were meeting with President Izetbegovic on a daily basis

17     during these airport negotiations.  And after I left Sarajevo on the

18     23rd of June, I don't believe I saw the president again until Geneva

19     sometime in December 1992.

20        Q.   General, sir, this position on military intervention, was it

21     isolated, as it were, or did Mr. Izetbegovic ask for military

22     intervention several times?

23        A.   Military intervention was a topic in the international media at

24     the time, given the events in Sarajevo.  It was certainly, I believe, the

25     president's wish that he could attract international military

Page 4021

 1     intervention.

 2        Q.   So are you saying that he did advocate military intervention?

 3        A.   Yes, he would have welcomed it.

 4        Q.   One of the issues discussed at this meeting was control of the

 5     airport.  General, sir, were you aware that the Serb side had had the

 6     airport and the area around it under its control?

 7        A.   Yes, I was.

 8        Q.   Finally, we will agree that ultimately the solution was found for

 9     the airport and that the Army of Republika Srpska handed over the runway

10     and -- and -- and all auxiliary facilities, and they were then used by

11     UNPROFOR?

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, is there any dispute about what this

13     all resulted in?  I see Ms. Bolton is nodding "no."  So therefore I

14     wonder why we have to take the time with the witness for these matters

15     which are not in dispute.  Please proceed.

16             But I take it that you do not contradict what was suggested by

17     Mr. Petrusic?

18             THE WITNESS:  Not at all, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

20             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, yesterday you said something about this.  The Muslim

22     forces in town, did they have any artillery?

23        A.   Yes, but very limited quantity.

24        Q.   As for the positions they had outside the inner city, did Muslim

25     forces have artillery units as such?

Page 4022

 1        A.   I don't know.

 2        Q.   Did you ever tour the positions outside the city, those that were

 3     under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Did you ever tour the positions that were controlled by the

 6     Army of Republika Srpska?

 7        A.   Some part of it, about a third of the circle of Sarajevo, yes.

 8        Q.   Also you knew that from these mobile artillery pieces members of

 9     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were targeting the positions of the

10     Army of Republika Srpska.

11        A.   Yes, I'm aware of that.

12        Q.   Were they close to the buildings where your command was, where

13     your headquarters were?

14        A.   As I gave evidence yesterday, counsellor, yes, on one occasion.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton.

16             MS. BOLTON:  My friend, in asking the question of the witness,

17     suggested that the Bosnian forces were targeting the positions of the

18     Army of Republika Srpska from these "mobile artillery pieces," and,

19     first, I'm not sure if he's talking about the mobile mortar or something

20     else; and if he is talking about the mobile mortar, I believe the

21     witness's evidence was that he saw one mobile mortar, not multiple mobile

22     mortars.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  I was just trying to find the -- in yesterday's

24     transcript the source, Mr. Petrusic.  Would you have it for me because

25     there's some challenge to what -- the way in which you presented

Page 4023

 1     yesterday's evidence.

 2             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Sir, I can resolve this -- I can

 3     resolve this with the witness.

 4        Q.   General, you said that this mobile vehicle had been used with a

 5     mobile mortar, that is.  The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it have

 6     several such mobile vehicles, or rather, mortars?

 7        A.   They may have, but I only ever saw one.

 8        Q.   Let us go back to this question of shelling.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, before we continue, if I ask you to

10     give me the source then to say:  I can resolve it with the witness,

11     apparently you can resolve your problem.  You have not resolved my

12     problem.  I instructed you to give me the source.  We'll find it, but

13     would you please next time not ignore my request.

14             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Sir, General, did you know that members of the

16     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were close to your headquarters and were

17     firing at the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska from there?

18        A.   I am aware they did that on one occasion with mortars and one

19     occasion with an anti-aircraft weapon.

20        Q.   Did you lodge any protests with them because of this activity?

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, does my recollection serve me well if

22     I seem to remember that a protest was discussed yesterday in the

23     examination-in-chief by Ms. Bolton and that they had -- after a protest

24     that they had been moved -- I think that is either in your statement or

25     it was discussed yesterday, Mr. Wilson.

Page 4024

 1             THE WITNESS:  That's correct, and that's what happened,

 2     Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 4             Mr. Petrusic, if there are any specifics about the protest you

 5     would like to ask, then please do so.  But if it's just about whether a

 6     protest was made and what was the result of that, then you may move on to

 7     your next subject.

 8             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Did you know, General, that from other locations that were close

10     to civilian buildings, Muslim forces were firing from these mobile

11     mortars?

12        A.   I can only comment only the conduct of one mortar.  I have not

13     received any reports of any other truck-mounted mortars.  I can only

14     comment on one particular situation, not multiple allegations.

15             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have document

16     10582.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Which is P340.

18             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, this is your report that you sent to your government on

20     the 23rd of June, 1992.  In paragraph 1 you say that a certain attack had

21     taken place and that it was supported by tanks and you say that a mortar

22     attack on a crowded old city street on the 22nd of June, 1992, resulted

23     in 14 dead and 35 wounded civilians.  UNPROFOR headquarters building

24     sustained shrapnel damage from proximate artillery fire during the week.

25     General, do you stand by this to this day, that that's the way it was, as

Page 4025

 1     you said in this report of yours?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Is that the situation that was well-known as the shelling of

 4     civilians who were waiting in line for bread?

 5        A.   I believe that's a separate incident.  There were a number of

 6     these incidents over time.  Unless in the drafting of this cable I've got

 7     the wrong date, 22 June, it's referring to a separate incident.  I can't

 8     remember the detail at this range, counsellor.

 9        Q.   In paragraph 61 --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, before you continue could I seek one point of

11     clarification.

12             One of the previous questions put to you, Mr. Wilson, was whether

13     you were aware of mortars being positioned close to civilian structures

14     and you said:  No, I only know about this one incident which was close to

15     the PTT building.  Yesterday you told us to have received reports, as you

16     said, of this happening and the question was about allegations that the

17     Presidency forces may have positioned mortars in proximity to hospitals

18     which in my view are civilian buildings as well.  So I'm a bit confused

19     by you saying only that one incident, whereas yesterday you mentioned

20     another allegation which as you said was reported to you.

21             THE WITNESS:  So the Defence counsel's question started out:  Was

22     I aware of mortars, plural, a number -- use of a number of mortars.  And

23     I said I could only authoritatively talk about one.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

25             THE WITNESS:  And then the interview moved on before I'd

Page 4026

 1     completed that -- the answer to that question of counsel.  If he didn't

 2     want to a follow-up question, that's entirely up to counsel.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Although you do not know whether the mortar position

 4     close to the hospital was the same or a different one.

 5             THE WITNESS:  But I certainly received reports both in Sarajevo

 6     and in other locations.  It was not unusual for the Presidency forces to

 7     position their fire units around sensitive civilian infrastructure.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 9             Please proceed, Mr. Petrusic.

10             MS. BOLTON:  Sorry, Your Honour --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Bolton.

12             MS. BOLTON:  Could I just point out that my friend's question

13     actually at page 63, lines 23 to 25, was specific to Muslim forces firing

14     from mobile mortars.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I see that point but I think that -- I'm not

16     blaming anyone for not having followed the questions.  What I wanted to

17     know was I wanted to clarify whether my impression that it happened only

18     on one occasion that perhaps under slightly different circumstances

19     similar events were reported.  I thought that for myself to be important,

20     to have no doubt as to what the testimony of this witness was about that

21     subject.

22             Please proceed.

23             Mr. Petrusic, whenever I say "please proceed," it's often time

24     for a break so I should avoid doing that.  We take a break of ...

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 4027

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break of 20 minutes and we'll resume --

 3             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Groome.

 5             MR. GROOME:  Could I just take a few moments to ask the Chamber

 6     to consider something over the break.  The Prosecution is requesting an

 7     additional day to file its submissions with respect to the associated

 8     exhibits of Witness Tucker.  The Chamber gave us 24 hours from yesterday.

 9     We're asking for an additional day.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, any objection?

11             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  The request is granted.

13             MR. GROOME:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break and we'll resume at 25 minutes past

15     1.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 1.06 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

19                           [The witness takes the stand]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, you may proceed.

21             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, as for this incident on the 22nd of June, the one

23     that you are referring to in paragraph 1, did you report to your command

24     about that?

25        A.   If you mean my command being UNPROFOR headquarters, I certainly

Page 4028

 1     would have, although I don't have a copy of that report.

 2        Q.   In paragraph 61 of your statement you say that in Sarajevo on the

 3     27th of May, 1992, people in a bread line were attacked.  And you say:  I

 4     saw the incident recorded on Bosnian television.  I saw this to be

 5     another attack on civilians, admittedly a horrendous one, and I assumed

 6     the Serbs to be responsible.

 7             General, sir, you also informed UNPROFOR about that incident and

 8     you say that you do not have any of your original notes relating to the

 9     incident; is that correct?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   On the basis of what did you assume that it was the Serbs who

12     were responsible for this attack?

13        A.   The vast majority of explosions within the city of Sarajevo were

14     the result of artillery and other forms of fire from the Serb forces into

15     the city.  And in that context, it was most likely that the round fired

16     and causing these casualties was fired by the Serbs.

17        Q.   This was a serious incident.  Did it require checking several

18     sources?  Did it require professional expert analysis?

19        A.   At least one of these incidents was investigated by French

20     ballistic experts, and they submitted a report and I've, in my evidence,

21     indicated that they couldn't attribute with any great accuracy where the

22     round had been fired from.  But, counsellor, you -- I have to emphasise

23     that at this time there were thousands of attacks by artillery on a daily

24     basis going on in the city.  It was not possible to investigate all of

25     them and in many cases we couldn't even investigate the serious ones.  We

Page 4029

 1     were very small group of people with very limited mobility, and our

 2     sources of information relied upon advice that both parties gave us.

 3     What we saw and could confirm we reported.  What was reported to us by

 4     the parties, we identified the source.

 5        Q.   But you will agree, General, that where there were civilian

 6     casualties, larger numbers of civilian casualties, that it was necessary

 7     to carry out a more serious investigation?

 8        A.   My answer again, counsellor, is that we just didn't have the

 9     resources or the expertise to do that.

10        Q.   Further on in paragraph 63 you say that this investigation was

11     carried out by French soldiers.  The French soldiers together with

12     Mr. McKenzie, did they have enough resources, including professional

13     resources, to carry out that investigation?

14        A.   Yes, they did, but we're talking about another incident.  This

15     is -- paragraph 62 refers to the 27th of May.  The document on the screen

16     talks about the 22nd of June.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, if you would not have had the

18     resources, you would not have done the investigation, isn't it?  The

19     question in relation to the statement answers itself.

20             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Now I'd like to move on to your report that you sent to your

22     command in Canberra to your own army in order to avoid any kind of

23     misunderstanding, and in paragraph 4 you say that you were being

24     threatened.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Paragraph 4 of what exactly, Mr. Petrusic?

Page 4030

 1             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] I've already said that in your

 2     statement addressed to your government in Canberra, that is to say the

 3     report sent on the 22nd of June, 1992.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and -- yes.  Do we have that -- have you -- one

 5     second -- yes.  Please proceed.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I was threatened on -- we received death

 7     threats on a number of occasions from both the Serb side and also from

 8     the Presidency side.  The Serb side it was associated with the --

 9     associated with the barracks evacuation and the casualties resulting from

10     that.  UNPROFOR was seen to be held as responsible for the casualties

11     that occurred, particularly from the second barracks.  And this was in

12     the background of the failure of the first evacuation back in May.  There

13     was also the use by either the Bosnian Serb army or the JNA of UN-marked

14     vehicles to rescue Serb casualties.  They went to the front and used UN

15     vehicles to remove casualties and this was portrayed to the general

16     population of Sarajevo as UNPROFOR participating and helping the Serbs in

17     the fight, when in fact we had absolutely nothing to do with it.  On the

18     night of the 28th of May, Mr. Doko threatened to have me shot unless I

19     was able to stop General Mladic shelling the city.  General Mladic was

20     equally angry with me because the Bosnian forces were shelling Lukavica.

21     It was just part of the territory of operating there at that time.  But I

22     took them seriously and I took appropriate precautions.

23             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, sir, you will admit that the threats and the anger of

25     General Mladic's could not have the same level of intensity?

Page 4031

 1        A.   Not the same intensity, but the -- there was a certainty about

 2     them.

 3        Q.   General, sir, at the meetings that you attended, either at

 4     Lukavica or at the airport, did you feel safe in the presence of the Serb

 5     side, in the presence of Serb representatives?

 6        A.   Yes, they guaranteed my safety.

 7        Q.   General, sir, after December 1992 you left for Zagreb if I

 8     understood that correctly?

 9        A.   No.  In mid-November 1992 I departed Zagreb and went to Geneva,

10     appearing there in December after short leave in Australia.

11        Q.   And after December 1992?

12        A.   I remained with the peace conference there until December 1993 as

13     military advisor to the co-chairman of ICFY, I-C-F-Y.

14        Q.   Did you have contacts with UNPROFOR representatives, or rather,

15     the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia, General Morillon, at the time -- at

16     that time, in early 1993?

17        A.   No.  My communication was directly with headquarters UNPROFOR

18     just located in Zagreb.  On a number of occasions I had reason to call

19     General Morillon's Chief of Staff, I think a brigadier, Vere Hayes, but

20     generally my contact with UNPROFOR was with the headquarters in Zagreb.

21     I did meet General Morillon on a number of occasions when the co-chairman

22     visited Sarajevo.

23        Q.   In those contacts with General Morillon, did you have any

24     information about the developments or events in Sarajevo?

25        A.   In Geneva I was receiving a stream of routine and special reports

Page 4032

 1     originating out of Sarajevo and General Morillon.  So I was generally

 2     aware of what was happening down there.  And if I needed further

 3     information, I was able to get it through headquarters UNPROFOR in

 4     Zagreb.

 5        Q.   And did you receive information from General Morillon where he

 6     admonishes President Izetbegovic and warns him that he should not -- that

 7     he should stop using civilian buildings as a location from which they

 8     would open fire on Serb positions?

 9        A.   I don't recall such a representation, but it wouldn't surprise me

10     if it, in fact, had taken place.

11        Q.   General, sir, let us briefly turn to the period of the spring

12     1992.  Let's go back to March.  Before the conflict escalated, do you

13     know that the warring parties negotiated and that there was a

14     Cutileiro Plan that was adopted for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

15        A.   I'm broadly aware of the plan but not the detail.

16        Q.   As you sit here, did you have information that that plan that was

17     to deal with the end to the conflict and a resolution to the conflict,

18     that all three parties in Bosnia had accepted the terms of that plan, the

19     Bosnian -- the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats?

20        A.   No, I'm not aware of that and I -- earlier in your

21     cross-examination we established the fact that from 22nd of March until

22     some time in June that I was no longer in a key position of being aware

23     of these higher, more strategic sort of negotiations.

24        Q.   General, sir, were you aware of the London Conference and how

25     that transpired?  And again, this conference was dealing with the

Page 4033

 1     conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's first hear the answer of the witness whether

 3     he was aware of the London Conference, which could be understood only, I

 4     think, in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 5             THE WITNESS:  There are a number of London Conferences.  If

 6     counsel is talking about one in about September or August of 1992, I'm

 7     aware of the outcome of that in detail.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then please put further questions.  And,

 9     Mr. Petrusic, could you be precise on which London Conference your

10     question is focusing.

11             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The London Conference of

12     September, I believe the 20th of September, 1992.

13             THE WITNESS:  I'm aware of that conference and the outcome, yes,

14     counsel.

15             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   One of the items of that agreement was the cessation of

17     hostilities and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the confrontation

18     line.  Was that, indeed, the case, General, sir?

19        A.   Which confrontation line are we talking about?

20        Q.   The confrontation line in Sarajevo.

21        A.   My recollection is that there was an agreement that weapons would

22     be withdrawn from around four towns in the north of Bosnia, including

23     Jajce to be monitored by the UN, that we had prepared people to actually

24     go and perform this monitoring.  But I was never successfully able to get

25     the Bosnian Serb army representative in Bihac to sign off on that

Page 4034

 1     agreement at the military level.  So the mission was never implemented,

 2     and despite the fact that the UN actually sent additional resources to

 3     the former Yugoslavia to perform that task, I was not involved in any

 4     implementation in Sarajevo.  That would have been undertaken by

 5     General Morillon or his successor.

 6        Q.   General, sir, at this time, in September 1992, most of the

 7     territory of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina including the parts around

 8     Sarajevo was under the control of the Bosnian Serb army.  Was that the

 9     case in the field, on the ground?

10        A.   It's true, most of the area was controlled by the Serb army, but

11     there was certainly some hotly disputed areas.

12        Q.   Was it the interest of the Army of the Bosnian Serbs at that

13     point in time to end the hostilities and enter negotiations to end the

14     war?

15        A.   I can't speculate what the interests of the Bosnian Serb army

16     was.

17        Q.   General, sir, were you aware that during the frequent visits of

18     high representatives, both of the UN and the European Union, when they

19     arrived in Sarajevo, combat operations intensified and fire intensified

20     at the hands of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21        A.   It's certainly true that whenever there was an important visitor,

22     there was an increase in the intensity of military activity.  I can't

23     attribute the cause of that.

24        Q.   I did not hear your full answer, but you said ...

25             Well, let me ask you about your impression then.  Did the Muslim

Page 4035

 1     side - as far as you could observe the situation - represent itself as a

 2     greater victim than it actually was?

 3        A.   I can certainly confirm that the Presidency argued that they were

 4     victims.  It's a value judgement as to whether they were exaggerating

 5     that.  I can't comment further on that, counsellor.

 6        Q.   General, sir, I would now like briefly to turn to sniping in

 7     Sarajevo.  Could you tell us, please, what you imply by the term

 8     "sniping" in Sarajevo as far as the information that you have?

 9        A.   I think the word "sniping" was used in Sarajevo in a different

10     way to what I understand to be sniping.  I think in the former Yugoslavia

11     people refer to fire by individual riflemen as sniper fire, when my

12     understanding of sniper fire is a highly trained marksman using

13     specialised equipment, engaging targets at long range.  I think what was

14     happening in Sarajevo that was referred to as sniping was individual

15     riflemen of both sides engaging targets of opportunity in an urban area.

16        Q.   Under this regular sniping or the sniping in the way it was

17     understood there, did that include infantry fire from weapons that were

18     in use there, which is AK-47 automatic rifles?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And just one last question about that.  From your personal

21     military experience, was there a breach -- or rather, no.  Were there any

22     wounds inflicted by sniper fire, or rather, when a person was wounded by

23     rifle fire or by sniper, that would be -- it would be possible to

24     determine that precisely based on expertise, professional expertise;

25     right?

Page 4036

 1        A.   If that expertise existed, yes.

 2        Q.   General, sir, you describe in paragraph 48 of your statement the

 3     deployment of artillery weapons and you say that Serbs had around 200

 4     artillery pieces, artillery and mortars, that they could use to target

 5     the town, the city.  Could you tell us what the source of this

 6     information was?

 7        A.   I believe I did that yesterday, but briefly it was based upon an

 8     estimate on my part, taking into account the fire effect on the ground

 9     and the number of fire units required to achieve that effect.  And,

10     secondly, I had a map that I saw I had access to a map in the Bosnian --

11     in the BiH military headquarters which had plotted on it the Serb fire

12     positions that they had been able to identify, and it amounted to about

13     200 units.  It was -- in summary, it was an estimate.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, again, yesterday the question was put

15     to the witness:  Could you tell us how you came up to that number, about

16     the 200 artillery and mortar barrels.  The witness answered that and the

17     question now today is:  Could you tell us what the source of this

18     information was, which is exactly the same question and fortunately we do

19     get the same answer.  Could you avoid to ask the same questions, and if

20     you wanted to have other details, then you should have phrased your

21     question in a different way.

22             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, sir, if those 200 artillery and mortar weapons that

24     members of the Bosnian Serb army had, as far as you know, were deployed,

25     is it possible that they would have fired some 5- to 10.000 shells?

Page 4037

 1        A.   In a period of eight or 12 hours, which was routine for firing

 2     into the city at that time, it doesn't take very long to -- if you work

 3     out rounds per barrel, you can do that very quickly.  That's why I think

 4     5- to 10.000's actually quite conservative.  Some days it might well have

 5     been more.  I don't know the exact number, but if my estimate is correct

 6     you're only talking about a hundred rounds per gun would achieve a

 7     dramatic effect on the ground, 20.000 rounds.  Now, these guns can fire

 8     two or three rounds a minute.  It doesn't take very long to get through a

 9     hundred rounds.  I think my estimate's quite conservative.

10             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P326, please, on

11     the screens.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Just for me to know, Mr. Petrusic, trying to look at

13     these numbers, 10.000 in 12 hours, which would be - if I'm not

14     mistaken - four projectiles fired per barrel in one hour.  Is it the

15     position that -- of the Defence that with -- that you couldn't fire four

16     or even a little bit more projectiles in one hour from one barrel; is

17     that your position?  I'm just trying understand your question.

18             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] The Defence will deal with this

19     during the Defence case, but the question has to do with the correctness

20     of the information, that there were 200 weapons deployed there,

21     200 artillery pieces.  But if we just look at the math, the arithmetic,

22     that is not in dispute here.  Technically, that is quite feasible and I

23     understand that even as a lay person.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  No loud talking.  Mr. Mladic, no consultations.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 4038

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm just re-reading your question.  Your question

 2     was:

 3             "If those 200 artillery and mortar weapons were deployed ... is

 4     it possible that they would have fired some 5- to 10.000 shells?"

 5             So your question was limited to the capacity, not referring to

 6     any further circumstances.  And, therefore, I was wondering whether you

 7     considered it perhaps to be an impossibility to fire on average four

 8     rounds.  In those circumstances, I think it should -- let's proceed.

 9     You've clarified your position.

10             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, sir, this is your document.  It is a record of

12     discussion with Mrs. Plavsic and General Mladic on the 25th of May.

13     Please take a look at paragraph 2, item 2.  The predominant priority

14     question was that of barracks.  Have you had occasion to read it now?

15        A.   I've read the paragraph.  I just don't understand the question.

16        Q.   The question is:  Did you or the representatives of the Muslim

17     authorities undertake anything by the 28th of May to resolve this

18     situation with the barracks, to enable the soldiers to leave that area?

19        A.   There were negotiations continuing from the 25th of May through

20     the 28th and beyond about the evacuation of the barracks about which

21     General Mladic's view was presented at length.  It was a question of

22     arriving at a plan that was acceptable to both sides.  General Mladic

23     essentially refused to hand over weapons.  The Presidency wouldn't

24     release the JNA from the barracks unless they got the weapons.  The JNA

25     wanted to hand over the weapons.  The barracks were not evacuated by the

Page 4039

 1     28th of May, as General Mladic stated in paragraph 2 here, and he

 2     followed up on his threat, that if they were not evacuated within three

 3     days he would attack the city.

 4        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, was there a precise agreement on

 5     the surrender of the barracks?

 6        A.   It was an oral agreement between the parties.  I don't recall

 7     ever seeing a written agreement.  It was all very ad hoc, and in the case

 8     of the first two barracks I was involved in, not very professional.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. -- General Wilson, but nonetheless it was

10     precise, was it not?

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour?

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Nonetheless, it was precise?  The question was,

13     "was there a precise agreement?"

14             THE WITNESS:  No, I haven't got to that, Your Honour.  There was

15     a great deal of confusion and it was exactly a lack of precision.  That

16     was the problem.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

18             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Was this imprecision due to General Boskovic who was on the side

20     of the JNA as their negotiator with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or

21     rather, the Presidency?

22        A.   I believe he was partly responsible because he was leading the

23     JNA team, but also the Presidency representatives must share some

24     responsibility for agreeing to participate in a plan which was highly

25     risky, poorly thought out, lack of preparation, lack of professionalism.

Page 4040

 1        Q.   You did say something about that earlier today, but before the

 2     evacuation of the Marsal Tito barracks, the Viktor Bubanj barracks was

 3     evacuated and there was another one called Jusuf Dzonlic barracks that

 4     was also evacuated.  And while these negotiations were going on, a

 5     barracks full of recruits was evacuated from Pazarici.  That should not

 6     be in dispute.  You said yourself there were problems with the evacuation

 7     of the use of Dzonlic barracks.  There was skirmishes --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Would you mind to put a question to the witness,

 9     Mr. Petrusic.

10             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, did you know that during the evacuation of the barracks

12     in Tuzla, another column of JNA soldiers came under fire and some were

13     killed?

14        A.   As far as I'm aware, I believe that happened probably in March of

15     1992.

16        Q.   General, sir, if I suggest to you that it was on 15 May and that

17     on that occasion --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Mladic again spoke loud under

19     circumstances.  We've warned him several times.  Mr. Mladic is hereby

20     removed from the courtroom.  Could the curtains be down.  Could we take a

21     brief break.  Yes.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23                           --- Break taken at 2.11 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 2.16 p.m.

25                           [The accused not present]

Page 4041

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  The removal of the accused from the courtroom is for

 2     the duration of the testimony of this witness.

 3             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom again.

 4             Therefore, it is important, since we have no other witness

 5     tomorrow, that if any of the parties would like to raise anything apart

 6     from the examination and cross-examination and re-examination of this

 7     witness, that the Registry should be aware of it so as to give Mr. Mladic

 8     full opportunity to attend the hearing after we've done with this

 9     witness.

10                           [The witness takes the stand]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrusic, it is time to adjourn for the day.

12     Could you inform us and Mr. Wilson would then also know how much time

13     you'll think you'll still need tomorrow.

14             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I will do my best

15     to finish within one session, possibly taking ten minutes or so from the

16     second session, but I'll really do my best.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Which means that as matters stand now that we would

18     finish certainly not later than at the end of the second session.

19             Ms. Bolton, I'm looking at you.

20             MS. BOLTON:  Yes, I'd be very brief for re-examination as things

21     stand.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

23             Then, Mr. Wilson, I'd like to instruct you again - as I did

24     yesterday - that you should not speak or communicate in any other way

25     with whomever about your testimony, whether already given or still to be

Page 4042

 1     given.  We'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in this same

 2     courtroom.  You may follow the usher.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  I have to put something on the record, although we

 6     expected that it would have been cured already, but page 40 of today's

 7     transcript, line 11, and up to 13, the introduction by Ms. Bolton of what

 8     then became P338 is not on the record.  It was 65 ter number 03905, which

 9     was presented by Ms. Bolton.  Let me just check.  Yes, that was the one.

10     That's hereby on the record.

11             We adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow, Friday, the

12     12th of October, at 9.30 in the morning in this same courtroom, I.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.20 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 12th day of

15                           October, 2012, at 9.30 a.m.