1 Wednesday, 16 January 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Before we start hearing the evidence, Judge Fluegge is, for a
12 mixed urgent personal and authorised Tribunal business, is unable to sit
13 this day, therefore is of short duration. And Judge Moloto and myself
14 are satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to continue today.
15 So therefore we're sitting as it's colloquially called Rule 15 bis.
16 I was informed that there were no preliminaries, therefore the
17 witness could be escorted into the courtroom. I, meanwhile, use the time
18 for the following: On the 28th of December of last year, the Prosecution
19 filed their confidential 92 ter motion concerning Witness RM157. The
20 Defence has requested on the 11th of January of this year an extension of
21 seven days to respond to the motion which was particularly voluminous,
22 215 pages. And the witness is scheduled to testify in the week of the
23 28th of January, 2012 [sic], and the request is granted.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mrs. Selmanovic. Can you hear me in a
1 language you understand?
2 I'll speak a few words so that the system can be tested.
3 THE USHER: I hear it perfectly well.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's -- Mrs. Selmanovic, can you hear me in
5 a language you understand?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Selmanovic, I'd like to remind you that the
8 solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony is
9 still binding upon you.
10 WITNESS: MUNIRA SELMANOVIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE ORIE: We'll continue where we were, but I think,
13 Mr. Traldi, the last thing we discussed was the addition of 65 ter 28614
14 to the 65 ter exhibit list. I think we had dealt with 28613.
15 And, Mr. Stojanovic, you would consider your position again,
16 whether you'd still oppose this list of names to be added to the 65 ter
18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We will not object because we'll
19 be using that document, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 Then let me just try to -- you wanted to have it added to the
22 65 ter list and you wanted to tender it, Mr. Traldi, isn't it?
23 MR. TRALDI: Yes, Your Honour, I'd renew my application to have
24 it admitted at this time.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, 65 ter 28614.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit P726, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
3 Mr. Traldi, you may proceed.
4 Examination by Mr. Traldi: [Continued]
5 Q. Good morning, ma'am. Do you recall when we left off on Monday --
6 A. Good morning.
7 Q. Do you recall when we left off on Monday that we were discussing
8 a list of names that you and your friend Muniba Colic had put together.
9 A. Yes, I recall it.
10 Q. I just have one further question about that list for the clarity
11 of the record. Did the two of you draft the list together before you met
12 with the Office of the Prosecutor or afterwards?
13 A. Yes, that was before.
14 MR. TRALDI: And, Your Honours, I'd ask that the court officer
15 please call up 65 ter 19610. This is a document which identifies itself
16 as emanating from the cantonal court in Sarajevo and is dated
17 September 2000.
18 Q. And, ma'am, before we discuss this document, in paragraph 23 of
19 P717 at page 7 of both the English and the B/C/S, you talk about the
20 exhumation of a grave-site at Ivan Polje. Were you present for that
22 A. Yes, I was present over three days. For two days they kept
23 attempting to find something but nothing happened, but on the third day
24 toward the end of their work they started finding remains. They were --
25 we were on the surface and once they had completed with their work, the
1 people from the commission, they asked us to come up closer and they
2 asked me, Now, first of all, Madam, can you tell me what your child wore?
3 And my child had worn on that day a T-shirt which was striped red and
4 white. And then he had also jeans and a chain around his neck and then
5 they said, Oh, all right then. So then they took a body-bag. They
6 opened it. They said, Don't anyone touch anything with their hands. We
7 will show you everything. And then they showed me the clothes and I
8 recognised them and then they kept searching for something, and then I
9 asked them, Well, why is this bullet there? And they said, Well, Madam,
10 you see this bullet here next to the T-shirt, you can see that it's torn
11 in the back so -- and then they told me, You know, your son was shot in
12 the head and in the chest and such-like. And I really can't say much
13 more. And I state here with full responsibility that that's how it was.
14 Q. And, ma'am, at the bottom of page 2 in the English, this report
15 describes the scene at that grave-site. I'm going to read to you three
16 brief excerpts. I'd ask if they accurately describe what you were able
17 to observe that day. The report says:
18 "Garbage is strewn everywhere."
19 It says:
20 "Part of the elongated round shape of a minaret can be seen among
21 the bodies."
22 And they conclude that:
23 "The remains of a destroyed mosque are located there."
24 And that's at Ivan Polje. Does that accurately describe the
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could we enlarge the portion you are referring to?
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, we can't see it; that's why.
3 JUDGE ORIE: It's too small. And it looks as if not the same
4 text is there in B/C/S.
5 MR. TRALDI: And, Your Honour, the text in the B/C/S starts at
6 the bottom of page 2 but continues at the top of page 3.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. TRALDI:
9 Q. And, ma'am, again for the record, does that accurately describe
10 what you saw that day?
11 A. Yes, yes. It's accurate. There was some kind of meadow and that
12 was used as a garbage dump. And they found parts of the mosque, some
13 debris, and a lot of time had passed. We didn't know anything about what
14 had happened to them, but because my husband and son and the others were
15 there we reported to the commission that was searching for the people and
16 they tried to do their work. And whenever we went to Sokolac we always
17 visited this site; it wasn't too far from the main road. Yes, it's the
18 truth. That's how it was.
19 Q. And, ma'am, I have three more very specific questions for you
20 about this exhumation. First, were the names of people in this
21 exhumation report read to you in preparation for your testimony?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And did you recognise them as people you last saw on
24 22 September 1992?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And the report refers to someone named Osman Sestic. Do you
2 believe that person's name to be Osman Sestic as in your statement and in
3 the list you provided to us?
4 A. There is Osman Sejtic [phoen] and there is also Osman Selmanovic,
5 so please go ahead, just ask.
6 Q. Thank you, ma'am, I think that answers the question.
7 MR. TRALDI: Your Honours, I tender 65 ter 19610 for admission as
8 the next Prosecution public exhibit.
9 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
10 Mr. Registrar.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P727, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: P727 is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. TRALDI:
14 Q. And finally, ma'am, I want to go back to what happened on
15 Metaljka on 22 September 1992. On Monday you mentioned a soldier named
16 Milenko Koprivica. Did any of the people from Novoseoci who were there
17 know him or his family?
18 A. Milan you said but I didn't get the last name. What did you say
19 it was.
20 Q. Milenko Koprivica, ma'am. I'm sorry if I'm pronouncing it
22 A. Milenko Koprivica -- Nikola Koprivica.
23 Q. And did any of the people from Novoseoci know him or his family?
24 A. No, we didn't know his family, but I knew him by site because I
25 went with my neighbour Namira Ocuz, and his son and this Namira woman's
1 son, they went to school together. So, she asked him, Please, my child
2 is 15 years old, please go and get him. And she mentioned Milenko
3 Koprivica then. She shook hands with him and that's how she asked him to
4 do this favour for her.
5 Q. Her child was 15, is that Damir, who's mentioned in your
7 A. Yes, Damir.
8 Q. And how old was your son at the time?
9 A. My son was 18.
10 Q. And did you also ask to have him stay with you?
11 A. I begged. It didn't work.
12 Q. Can you describe what happened for the Chamber in your own words?
13 A. We were all there at Metaljka and we were supposed to be sent to
14 Sarajevo by bus. They ordered and said that they would come and get us,
15 and I went to my child to get him with me. But they said, No, Madam, you
16 have to go to Sarajevo, and your husband and your children and the
17 others, they will have to stay here for a work drive.
18 Q. And then, Mrs. Selmanovic, you describe in paragraph 20 of P717
19 how after you got on the bus it took you to Hresa and then you walked to
20 Sarajevo. Now, your father was on the bus too. Was he capable of
21 walking to Sarajevo himself?
22 A. No.
23 Q. And how did he arrive in Sarajevo?
24 A. No, he couldn't walk because he had been beaten and he could not
25 move. So when we got off the bus, we took him off the bus. We carried
1 him. A woman and I carried him together but then we couldn't get very
2 far. And then a neighbour of mine, she had a blanket or something. She
3 gave it to us. And there were some soldiers who escorted us. They also
4 brought some floor carpeting and we put him on that. And then we tried
5 to move on from Hresa, but they kept telling us, You can't leave this
6 here. You have to carry it with you. Now they said to us, Don't you
7 leave this here and you will reach barricades. We didn't know anything
8 about this, but there was something that was placed across the road. We
9 crossed that, some kind of barrier. And then there was shooting but we
10 didn't -- we just fled everywhere, you know, all the way we knew how.
11 And there was shooting. I was in the middle of the road. There was a
12 neighbour who said, Why don't you -- I won't leave him, don't worry.
13 I'll stay here with you, although there was shooting all around. And
14 then two soldiers came by. I stayed there with my father for quite a
15 while. Then two other soldiers came and then they helped us and brought
16 us -- carried us into a house.
17 Now, when they carried my father into the house, I saw that there
18 were some women, our women, there, with small children --
19 Q. Ma'am --
20 A. And then from there we took my father in a car because they came
21 with a car there.
22 Q. Thank you, ma'am. I have one very last specific question for
23 you, Mrs. Selmanovic. Did your father continue to live in Sarajevo for
24 the rest of the war?
25 A. My father died on the 12th day when I arrived there in 1992, in
2 MR. TRALDI: Your Honours, this completes my examination.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Traldi.
4 Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
5 Ms. Selmanovic, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Stojanovic.
6 Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:
9 Q. [Interpretation] Mrs. Selmanovic, I only have a few questions for
10 you, but before I start I would like just to say on behalf of the entire
11 Defence team that we're deeply sorry for everything that you had gone
12 through and for your loss. I would ask you to look at the document we
13 saw a moment ago together; that is, document P726 now. And you will see
14 before you, Mrs. Selmanovic, a list that was discussed a little earlier.
15 Could you tell us how long after the exhumation in 2002 was this
16 list compiled. Or, let me put it this way: When did you compile this
17 list together with your friend?
18 A. Well, I did it now, but I think I had it from -- I had another
19 one from before. I couldn't remember all the names. There was
20 Pasic, Celo; and Colic, Hasib; Adem Catic; Hodzic, Ismet Hodzic. Those
21 four I could not remember right away.
22 Q. But would you agree with me that after the exhumation on one
23 occasion you sent to the Prosecutor another list that did not include all
24 of these names; is that correct?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. And this list -- you drafted this list before you came to
2 The Hague for this case; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. The reason I ask this is so that you can help us. Could you tell
5 us who from this list was not from your village?
6 A. Well, that was Amir Selmanovic, the son of Memis. There are two
7 Selmanovics here, but I'm referring to the one who is the son of Memis.
8 Q. Perhaps we did not understand each other well. Which of the
9 people on this list were not from Novoseoci before the war?
10 A. Of all the people here, they were all people who lived in
11 Novoseoci. The Selmanovics, the Ocuz, the Karic, the Sestics, and the
12 Kabas. The Pasic family, these are in-laws, sons-in-laws or
13 brothers-in-laws, our husbands' relatives, also Vatres, Bajro, who lived
14 with his sister. They were all ...
15 Q. Ismet Hodzic?
16 A. Ismet Hodzic.
17 Q. Was he with his family?
18 A. Yes -- well, he was staying with the Karic family together with
19 his Colics.
20 Q. Where did they live before 1992?
21 A. They lived in Kovalj, where Nezim Colic was. These were his
22 uncles and his relatives.
23 Q. How far away is that village from Novoseoci?
24 A. Well, perhaps some 8 to 10 kilometres. I couldn't really tell
25 you exactly. And this is in the direction of Rogatica, Kovani [phoen].
1 Q. Would you tell the Trial Chamber a little more about the
2 exhumation site at Ivan Polje.
3 A. Well, it's on Ivan Polje. If you go from our village, it's to
4 the left towards Hrabro, and it's not far from the road, perhaps a
5 hundred metres or so at most.
6 Q. How far is that site from Metaljka, the place where you parted
7 from your dear ones?
8 A. About a kilometre or so.
9 Q. In addition to the body of your late husband, was there anyone
10 else from this list who had not been found in that mass grave?
11 A. Well, my husband's remains were found, but on the other side of
12 this grave, and it was only last year. But, yes, one more thing I want
13 to say: Amir Selmanovic is the only one who is missing.
14 Q. And his body has not been recovered to this day?
15 A. Yes, that's correct, not to this day.
16 Q. You don't know when those people were killed?
17 A. We don't know when they were killed.
18 Q. Nor do you know who killed them?
19 A. No, it is not known.
20 Q. The people who arrived in your village, whom you named to the
21 best of your recollection as having been there that day, were they
22 members of the police, of the reserve police, or the army?
23 A. I saw soldiers. As for the police, I'm not sure.
24 Q. How do you tell such people apart? How do you know someone was
25 from the army?
1 A. It's not as if I belong to the army. I saw the army there that
3 Q. What did you base your conclusion on, to say that they were
5 A. Because they had olive-drab and camouflage uniforms.
6 Q. Who is Momcilo Pajic and had you known him before the war?
7 A. I had.
8 Q. Who is he?
9 A. He was a surveyor in Sokolac before the war, land surveyor.
10 Q. Did he leave his job at some point in time and left to Sokolac?
11 A. When he gathered all of us together at the meadow near Metaljka,
12 that's when he went to Sokolac.
13 Q. How long did he stay there?
14 A. Between 20 and 30 minutes.
15 Q. What I'm trying to ask you is this: The 20 to 30 minutes during
16 which -- is that the time during which you went to fetch your father?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. When you returned with him, had the man you just mentioned
19 returned from Sokolac?
20 A. Yes, he had. He ordered that all women, children, and those
21 physically unfit were to go to Sarajevo, whereas all able-bodied men were
22 to remain behind for work.
23 Q. After you received that information, how much later did the buses
24 arrive which took you to Hresa?
25 A. After some 20 to 30 minutes, that's when the buses arrived.
1 Q. How long did you have to walk from the place you were at Metaljka
2 to the place where the buses were?
3 A. We didn't -- well, we walked for less than 15 minutes. It was
4 close, but I had to support my father and another woman helped me. Later
5 on my husband helped me to put him in a wheelbarrow to carry him.
6 [No interpretation]
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could there please be
8 pauses between questions and answers.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, the interpreters asked for a pause
10 between question and answer.
11 And, Ms. Selmanovic, would you also wait for a second after
12 Mr. Stojanovic has finished his question before you answer it. Could you
13 please repeat the last part of your answer. What we read in the
14 transcript is:
15 "Later on my husband helped me to put him in a wheelbarrow to
16 carry him."
17 What did you say after that?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I brought my father to the bus --
19 we did, actually, and then he helped me put my father on the bus.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. Who told your husband that he wasn't allowed on the
22 bus with you?
23 A. One of the soldiers, although I don't know him. He had an
24 olive-drab uniform.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness kindly sit closer to the
1 microphones, please.
2 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Were those buses civilian --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Selmanovic, could you come a bit closer to the
5 microphone, please.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. May we continue, Ms. Selmanovic?
9 My question was this: To the best of your recollection, were
10 those buses civilian?
11 A. I don't remember whose buses they were. I didn't presume they
12 were civilian. I was in a state of shock. We were just told to go on
13 and that the women and children should board, and we put my father on the
14 floor of the bus. I sat in one of the seats and my father was beside me.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P720 in
17 Q. While we are waiting for the document, let me ask you this,
18 Ms. Selmanovic: Did your husband remain on the road once you set off or
19 was he taken away before the buses moved away?
20 A. My husband stayed on the road. He was kicked out of the bus and
21 that's the last I saw of him.
22 Q. Before you is a death certificate which you handed over a short
23 while ago to the Prosecution. I wanted to ask you this only: In 1999,
24 what was the basis for this death certificate to be issued to you
25 concerning your husband?
1 A. My husband used to work and I was entitled to his pension. I was
2 trying to exercise that right.
3 Q. Do you remember whether there was an administrative procedure or
4 proceedings before a court in order to declare him dead because at that
5 time there were still no such documents in existence?
6 A. Yes. There were proceedings. We had to go back to the death
7 register office, and only after we have obtained all the papers then I
8 could conclude the procedure concerning his pension.
9 Q. In this document we have the date, month, and year, as well as
10 hour of death, the 22nd of September, 1992. Do you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Who provided that information to the court as the date of his
14 A. I did, alongside some witnesses.
15 Q. At the time you didn't know if he was killed that day. You
16 provided that piece of information based on the fact that you saw him on
17 that day for the last time?
18 A. Yes.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Stojanovic, on the English version of the
20 certificate, I do not see the time. Can you please guide us to where the
21 time is on that document?
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] In the B/C/S version,
23 Your Honour, it reads on the left-hand side:
24 "Date of death, day, month, year, and hour."
25 So we have "hour" in English instead of time. However, the rest
1 of that line does not specify the precise time. We only have the date.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure, and I do see the word "hour," but I don't
3 see what hour it was when he died. But the question to the witness was:
4 How do you -- you gave the hour of death to the authorities. I'm saying
5 what hour is this that she gave? Do you have it in the B/C/S? Is the
6 hour mentioned in the B/C/S?
7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, neither in the
8 B/C/S nor in the English version --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continues]...
10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] It is only in the left-hand side
11 column that I read out to you.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay, but you can't follow that question up
13 because, in any case, the hour is not given -- the hour of death is not
14 given. Thank you.
15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely, Your Honour. Thank
16 you for your assistance and clarification.
17 Q. I asked you, Ms. Selmanovic, whether you provided that piece of
18 information based on the fact that you saw him then for the last time?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So many years after those tragic events, you still don't know
21 when he was killed precisely; is that correct?
22 A. It is.
23 Q. You also don't know or you have no information about whether he
24 was taken to work somewhere and then killed?
25 A. I have no such information, whether he was taken to any kind of
1 labour. It's just that I saw him in 1992 for the last time, full stop.
2 Q. Ms. Selmanovic, the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily
3 the prosecutor's office, did they summon you to provide a statement in
4 the proceedings conducted against certain persons with relation to this
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you mentioned the people you saw on the
8 22nd of September, 1992, in your village to them?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Let us look at one other document.
11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P718,
12 Your Honours. Could we have the second page in both versions, the last
13 paragraph of the document.
14 Q. It is a document from the 2nd Romanija Brigade Command of the
15 22nd of August, 1992. Mrs. Selmanovic, you were asked about it during
16 proofing. In this report sent to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command by
17 the 2nd Romanija Brigade, it reads:
18 "Within this territory in the villages of Micivode, Raktitnica,
19 Kramer Selo and Novoseoci, there is a certain number of extremists who
20 are peaceful for now. They are not causing problems to the Serbian
21 population but we are keeping them under control."
22 Let me ask you this first: In the proximity of your village --
23 A. No.
24 Q. Are the villages of Micivode, Raktitnica, and Kramer Selo close
25 to your village?
1 A. No, Micivode is towards Han Pijesak. Raktitnica is towards
2 Rogatica. They are not close to our area. The closest villages to ours
3 are Jelosaljevici [phoen], Pavacici [phoen] and other Serb villages.
4 Q. Were you familiar with the type of guard that was held in the
5 village in 1992?
6 A. I am familiar with it because my husband and others informed
7 them. They would come and see my father and tell him that there were no
8 problems and that they could continue living and working there. That's
9 all I know.
10 Q. Who organised the village guards, as far as you know?
11 A. The village guards, I don't know if anyone stood guard. They
12 just came and spoke to our people, telling them that there was no need to
13 go and to live there. As for any guards, I'm not clear on that.
14 Q. Was there any point in time when the authorities in Rogatica
15 asked that the military -- the men fit for military service be enlisted
16 into the army?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Your late husband, did he receive a draft call in 1992 at any
19 point of time?
20 A. No, he didn't.
21 Q. Let us look at document - it's a 65 ter document - number 06862.
22 MR. TRALDI: Your Honours, I'd just put on the record at this
23 time that we haven't gotten a list of documents from the Defence to use
24 with this witness. This was initially on our list so I won't object to
25 this one being used, but in the future it would be good if we got some
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. In any case,
4 Your Honour, if the omission was on our part, we accept that. According
5 to the information I am receiving, we informed the Prosecution that we
6 will only be using such documents that are on their list. Not a single
7 document that we wanted to rely on was uploaded into e-court by us. This
8 document, too, is on the Prosecution list. That's what we included in
9 our e-mail sent to them, I believe. If I am wrong, I stand to be
10 corrected of course.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, if documents are on your list, the
12 purpose of notifying the Prosecution about the use of certain documents
13 seems to fall away.
14 MR. TRALDI: I agree, Your Honour, and that's why I hadn't
15 objected to this one.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. TRALDI: I didn't received the communication Mr. Stojanovic
18 mentions, but I'm sure it's a one-time occurrence.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And apart from that, apparently the Defence
20 does not intend to use any document that is not on your list. Please
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Precisely, Your Honour.
23 Q. Before us is a document of the SRK command dated the
24 27th of July, 1992. Let us look at the second paragraph where, among
25 other things, we read:
1 "In the village of Novoseoci to the south of Sokolac by some 5 to
2 6 kilometres (Glasinacko Polje) there was a hand-over of arms and lethal
3 assets by the Muslim population to representatives of the
4 2nd Romanija Brigade. The hand-over was conducted as previously agreed
5 and it is believed that not all of the weapons had been handed over."
6 Ms. Selmanovic, do you know anything about the existence of
7 weapons in your village?
8 A. Yes, I do. I know that they came and gathered all of the people.
9 They discussed who had what weapons to hand over. People had some
10 hunting rifles and that's what was handed over. That's what my husband
11 told me. The weapons were handed over. I have nothing else to say.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I seek to tender
14 this document as a Defence exhibit. It's 65 ter 06862.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, any objections?
16 MR. TRALDI: No objection, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D130, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: D130 is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Ms. Selmanovic, I will end this with one additional question.
22 After the war and the implementation of the new laws, your house was
23 returned to you?
24 A. Yes, it was, but it's in no shape of any sort.
25 Q. Well, do you own that house?
1 A. Yes, and my children and I own it.
2 Q. Did people return to Novoseoci?
3 A. Well, the people of Novoseoci are asking for donations. I don't
4 know if they're doing this through the Sokolac municipality, but if you
5 ask me whether anyone has returned to live there, reside there, no, they
6 didn't. They are just looking after their property there.
7 Q. Mrs. Selmanovic, thank you. And I apologise if my questions
8 caused you any sorrow.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stojanovic.
10 Mr. Traldi, is there any need to -- for questions -- further
11 questions to the witness?
12 MR. TRALDI: Just very briefly, Your Honour, and I'll be done in
13 just a couple of minutes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
15 Re-examination by Mr. Traldi:
16 Q. Ma'am, at temporary transcript page 20 today's transcript
17 Mr. Stojanovic asked you about weapons in Novoseoci. I have just one
18 very simple question for you about this. Did you know of any weapons
19 which were kept in your village after the surrender of weapons in
20 July 1992?
21 A. No, I don't know anything about that.
22 Q. At temporary transcript page 18, Mr. Stojanovic asked you about
23 guards and you responded discussing people who had come to your village
24 and said everything would be okay and people didn't have to leave. When
25 you answered, were you discussing Serb guards or Bosniak guards?
1 A. I meant Serb guards, Serbs came, but I didn't say anything about
2 guards or patrols. I knew nothing of that. I didn't know that there
3 were any patrols. I didn't know anything about that nor did I hear it
4 from my husband nor anyone else.
5 Q. And at temporary transcript page 11, Mr. Stojanovic asked you if
6 you knew when the men from Novoseoci had been killed or by whom. Can you
7 simply tell us, when you last saw your husband and son alive, were they
8 free or were they under someone else's control?
9 A. To that I can only say this: All of us, all the other villagers,
10 me and my child and my husband, we were all on a meadow together. And
11 from there my child remained but my husband, his -- he helped my father,
12 but as for them, I know nothing of their fate after that.
13 Q. When you last saw them, could they go freely wherever they chose
14 or was there someone restricting them?
15 A. Their movement was up until some time in May when people still
16 worked. Later on, we, the women, would go to Sokolac from time to time
17 but there were no obstacles. Others would come and say --
18 Q. I apologise for interrupting, ma'am, but I'm asking specifically
19 about when you last saw your husband and son on September 22nd. And at
20 that time, were they free or were they under someone else's control?
21 A. When I last saw my husband at Metaljka, this meadow, when he was
22 left there, how could I know whether he was free or not when there was --
23 there were troops all around him?
24 MR. TRALDI: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Traldi.
1 Ms. Selmanovic, since the Chamber has no further questions for
2 you and as I understand there's no request for further questions by the
3 Defence, this concludes your testimony in this court. I'd like to thank
4 you very much for coming and having answered questions about past events
5 which may have been difficult for you to think back of. And I wish you a
6 safe return home again. You may follow the usher.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break.
9 Is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness after the
11 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break and we'll resume at ten minutes
13 to 11.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness?
17 MS. BIBLES: Good morning, Your Honours. Yes, we are ready to
18 call the next witness.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted into the
21 Ms. Bibles, have you explained Rule 15 bis to the witness or not?
22 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so the witness is aware that tomorrow there'll
24 be three Judges again?
25 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I apologise, I was thinking of another
1 Rule. No, I did not advise him of that.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You did not? Then I'll briefly explain to him the
4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, while the witness is being brought in,
5 I will take up a quick matter, and that is we do intend to tender a
6 reduced number of associated exhibits. We would propose that it would be
7 beneficial to defer that application until the conclusion of the
8 witness's testimony if --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll deal with it at the end just as about the
10 admission of the 92 ter statement.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Rose.
13 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Before you give evidence, the Rules require that you
15 make a solemn declaration, the text of which is now handed out to you.
16 May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.
17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
18 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 WITNESS: MICHAEL ROSE
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Rose. Please be seated. Mr. Rose,
21 if I address you as "Mr. Rose," that is because that is what the Chamber
22 does with all witnesses, that is, without titles, without ranks. It is
23 not out of disrespect for the titles and the ranks you may hold.
24 Ms. Bibles, if you're ready, please start your examination of the
1 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Examination by Ms. Bibles:
3 Q. Good morning. Could you tell us your full name, please.
4 A. Hugh Michael Rose.
5 Q. And, General, you served as commander of the UNPROFOR forces in
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 5th of January, 1994, until the
7 23rd of January, 1995?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Based on your work in that time-period, have you previously
10 presented evidence regarding your observations and experiences here at
11 ICTY and at the International Court of Criminal Justice?
12 A. On three separate occasions I have done so.
13 Q. You have also authored a book about your experiences which is
14 titled: "Fighting for Peace"?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review a statement dated
17 26 March 2009 as well as certain associated exhibits which consolidates
18 the elements of your evidence into one statement?
19 A. I have.
20 Q. And since we're both native English speakers, I will attempt
21 myself to pause between question and answer and slow down and would ask
22 you to follow.
23 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I'd ask that page 1 of the English
24 version of 65 ter 28619 be brought to our screens.
25 Q. General, once the document is on the screen before you, I would
1 ask that you view the signature at the bottom of the page and indicate
2 whether you recognise that signature.
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. And whose signature is that?
5 A. That is mine.
6 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I would ask that we now go to page 53
7 of the English document.
8 Q. And likewise, do you recognise the signature on this page?
9 A. I do.
10 Q. And whose is that?
11 A. That is mine.
12 Q. As you reviewed the document, did you also note initials on every
13 page of this statement?
14 A. I did indeed.
15 Q. And whose initials are those?
16 A. They are mine.
17 Q. In reviewing the statement, did you note any changes or
18 corrections to the document?
19 A. I did not.
20 MS. BIBLES: And I would bring your attention, Your Honours, to
21 paragraphs 150, 151, and 167.
22 Q. Did you note that there were paragraphs which had a date of 1992?
23 A. Yeah, I didn't notice that at the time but obviously it should
24 read "1994."
25 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours, I would simply note those
1 corrections on those three paragraphs. They appear to be typographical
3 Q. With these corrections in mind, if you were asked about these
4 matters, would you today give the same answers that are contained in the
6 A. I would indeed.
7 Q. Having taken the solemn oath, do you affirm that the information
8 in this document is accurate and truthful?
9 A. To the best of my knowledge, it is.
10 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, having established the foundational
11 requirements necessary, we do tender 28619 into evidence at this time.
12 JUDGE ORIE: A number will be assigned to it. In view of the
13 objections raised by the Defence the Chamber will decide at the end of
14 the testimony about admission.
15 Mr. Registrar, the number to be assigned to the witness statement
16 would be ... ?
17 THE REGISTRAR: P728, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: P728 is marked for identification.
19 Please proceed.
20 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, may I read a brief public summary of
21 the witness's written testimony?
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so, Ms. Bibles.
23 MS. BIBLES: General Sir Michael Rose was the commander of the
24 United Nations protection forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from
25 January 1994 through January of 1995.
1 General Rose arrived in Sarajevo on the 23rd of January 1994 with
2 a mission to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to attempt
3 to bring a peaceful resolution of the war. He found in Sarajevo a city
4 that had no lights, water, or electricity. He was briefed on the sniping
5 and indiscriminate shelling by the Bosnian Serbs of civilians in the city
6 centre, including the very recent deaths of children who had been out
7 tobogganing in the snow. During his tenure, General Rose met frequently
8 with General Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and others in the Bosnian Serb
9 leadership. General Rose regularly raised issuing of sniping in Sarajevo
10 as well as issues of freedom of movement and access for humanitarian
11 convoys in these meetings. General Rose observed that the Bosnian Serbs
12 blocked humanitarian aid or utilities as a means of achieving political
13 ends and/or in response to Bosnian or NATO actions elsewhere.
14 After the 5 February 1994 shelling of Markale Market in Sarajevo,
15 General Rose acted quickly to implement a cease-fire by setting a
16 20-kilometre Total Exclusion Zone for heavy weapons. The cease-fire was
17 largely effective and held for most of the year. Sniping continued but
18 in August of 1994 the factions agreed to an anti-sniping agreement which
19 was followed by a decrease in sniping for the following weeks. As autumn
20 1994 came to an end, the situation in Bosnia deteriorated with an
21 increase in shelling and sniping incidents in Sarajevo and restrictions
22 on utilities and the flow of humanitarian aid until a cessation of
23 hostilities agreement was signed by the parties on the
24 31st of December 1994.
25 General Rose maintained a relationship with the Bosnian Serb army
1 and General Mladic during which he observed that the decision-making in
2 the Bosnian Serb army was done at the highest levels and that
3 General Mladic and Karadzic were at the peak of the pyramid --
4 JUDGE ORIE: It's only now that the French translation finished.
5 Would you please slow down.
6 MS. BIBLES: I will, Your Honour.
7 Were at the peak of the pyramid of control of the Bosnian Serb
8 forces. General Rose notes that General Mladic had the ability to
9 control the shelling and sniping in Sarajevo and that the siege was used
10 by Bosnian Serb leaders to exert pressure on the United Nations, the
11 international community, and the Bosnian Muslims. General Rose
12 recognised that nothing happened militarily without General Mladic's
13 knowledge or authorisation.
14 Your Honours, this concludes the summary. May I proceed with
16 JUDGE ORIE: You may, Ms. Bibles.
17 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I will note that we estimated two
18 hours for direct; we will be substantially less than that.
19 Q. General, let's first turn our attention to your meetings and
20 negotiations with the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership.
21 Could you please describe for us whether there were consistent topics
22 discussed throughout 1994 in these meetings.
23 A. There were consistently the following subjects discussed: The
24 demilitarisation of Sarajevo, following the withdrawal of heavy weapons;
25 the running of humanitarian aid convoys to the various enclaves,
1 including Sarajevo; and the maintaining of the utilities to the various
2 enclaves as well; and of course the ultimate aim was to bring about a
3 cessation of hostilities long-term which would bring about a peace.
4 Q. As a result of your meetings and interactions on these topics,
5 did you develop an overview of the political/military situation as it
6 existed in the beginning of 1994?
7 A. I did indeed. At that time the Serbs controlled approximately
8 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including territory
9 which ran up to within 75 metres of the Bosnian government Presidency in
10 Sarajevo. They were the dominant military force in that country
11 throughout 1994, and therefore they were in a position to control most of
12 the convoy runs to the 2.7 million people who were dependent on
13 humanitarian aid throughout that year.
14 Q. During 1994, did the political and military situation change?
15 A. The political and military situation changed dramatically in
16 1994, with the bringing about of an agreement known as the
17 Washington Accord between the Croatian warring party and the Bosnian
18 government warring party, say two out of the three warring parties had
19 now formed Federations, and that tilted the strategic balance, both
20 militarily and politically against the Bosnian Serbs. And from that
21 moment on, it was evident to the United Nations - and indeed to the
22 Bosnian Serbs - that they were in a declining political and military
23 situation, deteriorating possibly I should say.
24 Q. Given your experience in the meetings and negotiations during
25 this shift, did you develop an understanding of the ultimate territorial
1 objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership?
2 A. I did indeed, and the conclusion we came to that they wished to
3 have contiguous territory as part of the Republika Srpska; and secondly,
4 that that should include parts of Sarajevo and that the total proportion
5 would be 51 per cent in favour of the Serbs, 49 per cent in favour of the
7 Q. Did you determine whether there were areas in and around Sarajevo
8 that the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to remain wholly Serb?
9 A. In particular, Globuvica [phoen].
10 Q. Likewise, were there areas of Bosnia that you determined the
11 Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to be wholly Serb?
12 A. They were determined to retain possession of Srebrenica, Zepa,
14 Q. You have described --
15 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours, this would be paragraph 20 of the
17 Q. -- that the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid was
18 a mission of UNPROFOR. Did you observe whether it was in the
19 Bosnian Serb interests to facilitate these convoys in 1994?
20 A. Well, the Bosnian Serbs clearly regarded the running of
21 humanitarian aid convoys to the enclaves as contrary to their strategic
22 aims of bringing political pressure to bear on the Bosnian government to
23 sign up to peace on Serb terms rather than on their terms, the Bosnian
24 government terms, so they were using the flow of aid very much as an
25 instrument with which to bring pressure to bear on the Bosnian government
1 to sign up to peace.
2 Q. Did you observe what tactics were employed in this process?
3 A. Well, there were many tactics employed which ranged from the
4 physical blocking of convoys on the road to bureaucratic measures which
5 required the listing of the manifest down to the minutest detail. And,
6 of course, inevitably, if they discovered that, for example, there was
7 one more tin of baked beans had been delivered than required - and this
8 is an illustrative example - then the convoy would be turned back. It
9 was impossible basically to comply with all the requests that had been
10 laid upon the UN.
11 Q. Did --
12 A. Am I speaking too fast?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you are close to that, and if you have some
14 compassion with transcribers and interpreters, I would invite you to slow
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
17 MS. BIBLES:
18 Q. Did you raise your concerns about these tactics in your meetings?
19 A. Frequently.
20 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, if we could bring up 65 ter 08162, and
21 this would initially be page 1 of both versions.
22 JUDGE ORIE: To the extent possible, could you also indicate in
23 relation to what part of the --
24 MS. BIBLES: Statement --
25 JUDGE ORIE: -- statement.
1 MS. BIBLES: Paragraph 182, Your Honours, I'm sorry.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
3 MS. BIBLES:
4 Q. Could you please look at this page and let us know if you
5 recognise this document.
6 A. I do recognise it.
7 Q. I would specifically ask you to look at paragraph 3 before we
8 pull up the next page.
9 A. Okay, I've read that.
10 Q. With respect, and I believe it's on - thank you - page 2 of the
11 B/C/S version. With respect to subsection (b), does this accurately
12 depict your statements as you recall?
13 A. It does.
14 Q. Could we now look at page 2 of the English version. And again,
15 specifically directing your attention to the remainder of paragraph 3.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all extra
17 microphones be switched off, please. Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: Okay, I've read that.
19 MS. BIBLES:
20 Q. Does this document accurately describe the discussion as you
21 recall it on the 12th of December?
22 A. It does indeed.
23 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 08162.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Whom should I look at to know whether there are any
25 objections? Mr. Lukic.
1 MR. LUKIC: No objection, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P729, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE ORIE: P729 is admitted.
5 MS. BIBLES: We can remove the document from the screen at this
6 time. Thank you.
7 Q. Given the situation that you describe with the convoys in this
8 meeting towards the end of 1994, were you aware of what impact that was
9 having on the people who lived in the enclaves, in the eastern enclaves?
10 A. It was having a very negative impact. They were daily dependent
11 on not only food but also medical supplies for their survival,
12 particularly during the winter months, and the halting of the convoys are
13 meant that they suffered almost immediately.
14 Q. I'd like now to shift your attention to Sarajevo. In
15 paragraph 201 of your statement, in the context of the shelling of
16 Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs you state:
17 "The usual response from the Bosnian Serb leadership to protest
18 of shelling was that they were responding to attacks by the
19 Bosnian Muslim army."
20 You acknowledge that the Bosnian forces were firing out from
21 within Sarajevo. Then you state:
22 "The disproportionality of the Bosnian Serb response, however,
23 undermines the credibility of this justification."
24 General, could you please articulate why you considered the
25 Bosnian Serb response to be disproportionate?
1 A. One only had to look at a suburb like Dobrinja which had been
2 totally destroyed. People were living in the cellars in order to
3 survive. If even a cat walked across the street, it was engaged by
4 artillery. The response was demonstrably disproportionate.
5 Q. Could you describe --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, may I take it that disproportionately
7 should be disproportionality?
8 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: That's then -- please proceed.
10 MS. BIBLES:
11 Q. Could you describe for the Court how effective the February 1994
12 cease-fire was in reducing the shelling in Sarajevo for the remainder of
14 A. The bringing about of the withdrawal of heavy weapons from
15 Sarajevo transformed the lives of the people of Sarajevo and gave them
16 some hope that there would be a return to long-term peace, a hope which
17 was sadly disappointed at the end of 1994. But during the summer of
18 1994, electricity was restored. Water was restored. The trams started
19 to run again. Major convoys came over land from Europe into Sarajevo to
20 replenish the warehouses and stocks of food. Life seemed to be returning
21 to normal for the people of Sarajevo as a result of that cessation or
22 withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.
23 Q. When negotiating either for this cease-fire, the February
24 cease-fire, or later the anti-sniping agreement, were you aware of what
25 level within the Bosnian Serb army made the decisions?
1 A. All decisions were made at the top in Pale by both the civil and
2 the military side, one represented by Mr. Karadzic and the other by
3 General Mladic.
4 Q. General, given what you've described, that the negotiations or
5 the negotiating was at the highest level, did this allow you to form a
6 judgement about the ability of the senior levels of the Bosnian Serb army
7 command to control the level of sniping in Sarajevo?
8 A. In our view, there was absolute control of every single sniper
9 and he would not have been allowed to open fire unless he'd been duly
10 authorised and the reverse was equally true.
11 Q. In your statement, to go back to the cease-fire, in paragraph 44,
12 you describe reaching the agreement on the cease-fire. You further
13 describe in the following paragraph, 45, that you tested the cease-fire
14 and that your observation was that the shelling stopped. Can you,
15 however, briefly describe for us your degree of certainty both at the
16 time and with -- your perspective now, the degree of certainty in the
17 UN's ability to determine whether the heavy weapons were actually moved
18 out of the 20-kilometre area?
19 A. Of course at the time the UN were under no illusion that both
20 sides had fully withdrawn heavy weapons out of the 20-kilometre circle
21 around Sarajevo or in the case of the Bosnian government forces taken
22 them out of use. But the fact that they were not using them is what
23 mattered. And of course, on the Bosnian Serb side, they merely handed in
24 the out-of-date weapons which they had ceased to require to the weapon
25 collecting points. It was certain, and we had evidence by discovering at
1 least one T55 tank hidden, that they had concealed most of their heavy
2 weapons for future use.
3 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could we please bring 65 ter exhibit
4 19674 to the screen. And this would be page 1 in both versions.
5 JUDGE ORIE: In relation to ... ?
6 MS. BIBLES: This is one of the non-associated exhibits that we
7 indicated we would be using.
8 Q. In reviewing the first page of this document, it proposes methods
9 of appearing to comply with the cease-fire and yet maintain heavy weapons
10 within the zone. Are the terms of this proposal consistent with your
11 experiences that you've just described regarding the detection of
12 Bosnian Serb heavy weapons?
13 A. That very much reflects our view.
14 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours, I'll ask that we go to -- I
15 believe it's page -- well, that is the page. Your Honours, I -- the
16 Prosecution tenders 19674.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P730, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: P730 is admitted into evidence.
20 MS. BIBLES:
21 Q. Directing your attention now to the time-period of August 1994,
22 after the anti-sniping agreement was signed, was there an improvement in
23 sniping in Sarajevo?
24 A. There was a distinct and immediate improvement, although in the
25 end that agreement was not adhered to by either side and the situation
1 deteriorated. But at least for a month there was a perceptible
3 Q. Shifting your attention now to the enclaves, in your
4 statement - and this would be paragraphs 65 through 101 - you describe
5 the Bosnian Serb offensive on Gorazde. Could you describe for us where
6 the negotiations for a global peace in the country were when this
7 offensive began?
8 A. The UN at that time were engaged with both the warring parties
9 about bringing about a long-term cessation of hostilities, and the
10 argument between the two parties was whether to make Gorazde and what was
11 happening there part of the global cease-fire plan or whether Gorazde
12 should be resolved first and then the global plan addressed. The Bosnian
13 government side wanted Gorazde to be resolved before embarking on
14 long-term discussions about a permanent cease-fire. The Serb side wanted
15 the opposite, and it was almost impossible to get any agreement. And it
16 was at this point that presumably to put pressure on the Bosnian
17 government side that the Bosnian Serbs launched a [indiscernible]
18 offensive into the enclave of Gorazde.
19 Q. Did you have opportunities to communicate with General Mladic
20 during the Gorazde operation?
21 A. On a number of occasions we spoke by telephone.
22 Q. Could you explain for us a little bit more - I believe it's in
23 paragraph 86 - how your calls to the Bosnian Serb leadership resulted in
24 your being on the phone with General Mladic?
25 A. I think a little explanation may be required. The Bosnian Serb,
1 and indeed all Soviet Warsaw Pact countries tended to lay telephone wires
2 as well as use radio communications. And therefore all messages that we
3 passed to General Mladic tended to go down the telephone communications
4 and they laid wires to their front line. And we discovered that whatever
5 telephone number we dialled in Pale, somehow we always ended up talking
6 directly to General Mladic and they had merely switched their exchange,
7 telephone exchange to enable that to happen.
8 Q. Could you describe for us in these conversations with
9 General Mladic if you could ascertain where he was physically located?
10 A. Not really, but it was evident from TV coverage that he was
11 located around Gorazde itself leading the attack.
12 Q. In your statement you've set out examples of General Mladic's
13 control of events on the ground and specifically I direct attention to
14 paragraph 85. Did you have any examples indicating that General Mladic
15 had anything less than total control of the Bosnian Serb forces during
16 the Gorazde offensive?
17 A. Absolutely not. He was in total control, as one would have
19 Q. Were you aware of whether or not General Mladic was in the
20 battle-field arena on the 10th of April of 1994?
21 A. He certainly would have been.
22 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could we please bring 65 ter 08996 to
23 our screens. This is a one-page document.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Branko.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you know there should be no consultations
1 during the hearing. If you would approach Mr. Mladic and find out what
2 causes him to ask for a time-out without further discussions, which
3 should take place during the break.
4 [Defence counsel and accused confer]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, would you please report to the Chamber
6 the situation.
7 Yes, we'll continue. Mr. Lukic --
8 MR. LUKIC: Just I was briefly instructed by my client --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
10 MR. LUKIC: -- how to follow the testimony of General Rose.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you know that --
12 MR. LUKIC: I know.
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- it should not be done during the hearing but
14 during the breaks.
15 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: This may be clear to Mr. Mladic now. May I remind
17 him of the rules which apply in this courtroom.
18 Ms. Bibles, you may proceed.
19 MS. BIBLES:
20 Q. Drawing your attention to General Mladic's statements in
21 paragraph 7 of this document, specifically where he describes his --
22 '"The Turks must disappear from these areas.'" Is this position stated
23 in this document consistent with General Mladic in his stated intentions
24 to you with respect to the offensive?
25 A. General Mladic at the time was telling us that he was recovering
1 the lost territory which had previously been occupied by the Serbs and
2 1993, I think, had been driven from their homes, that that was the limit
3 of his aim. And at the time we tended to believe that they only wanted
4 to advance as far as the old Serb areas, not going into the Muslim parts
5 of Gorazde.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, could I seek clarification of one of the
7 previous answers just before there was a short interruption.
8 Mr. Rose, you were asked whether you were aware of whether or not
9 General Mladic was in the battle-field arena on the 10th of
10 April of 1994. Your answer was:
11 "He certainly would have been," which -- what makes you believe
12 or conclude that he was?
13 THE WITNESS: The UN of course had no intelligence-gathering
14 capability and it was -- we were not being passed any intelligence either
15 by NATO. Therefore, we had to assume a number of things, and it would be
16 characteristic of General Mladic to have personally led the attacks
17 himself and not to have absented himself when a major offensive was
18 taking place.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it was an assessment on the basis of you gained
20 experience with the way in which General Mladic exercised command and
21 control; is that --
22 THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: He preferred to lead from the front.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.
1 MS. BIBLES: Thank you.
2 Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 08996.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P731, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
6 MS. BIBLES:
7 Q. General, your statement sets out through several paragraphs,
8 calling for NATO air-strikes in response to the Bosnian Serb offensive in
9 Gorazde. Did your working relationship with General Mladic change as a
10 result of those air-strikes?
11 A. It changed dramatically for the following six weeks or maybe two
12 months. Even during the discussions in Geneva where the Serb party was
13 involved he refused to speak directly to any UNPROFOR personnel and
14 channelled all his questions through Colonel Tolimir, who was his aid,
15 military aide. Also, I think, they began to take the view that the UN
16 were now engaging in a war against Serbia, although we tried to persuade
17 them that we were merely enforcing passages of convoys, maintaining the
18 integrity of the withdrawal of heavy weapons agreement or the agreement
19 to demilitarise the zone on Mount Igman. We were not waging war. I
20 suspect that they began to see we, the international community, were
21 beginning to take sides at that point.
22 Q. Could you tell us generally whether the Bosnian Serb forces took
23 action against UN employees and humanitarian workers as a result of the
25 A. Immediately following air-strikes, the Bosnian Serbs would halt
1 all convoys, seize convoys that were on their territory at the time, and
2 take hostages. That was the normal practice following an air-strike.
3 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, I would ask that 65 ter 14676 be
4 brought to our screens. And, Your Honours, 14676 pertains to
5 paragraph 96 of the statement.
6 Q. Could you please review this document with particular attention
7 to paragraph 4.
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. With respect to General Mladic's reference to the use of UNPROFOR
10 and humanitarian organisations for anti-aircraft combat, what do you
11 understand that to mean?
12 A. Well, I guess that they by placing hostages around their
13 positions, military positions, they would hope to deter NATO air-strikes
14 against those positions.
15 MS. BIBLES: And, Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 14676.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I'm trying to find a date on the document.
17 MS. BIBLES: It appears to be undated, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P732, Your Honours.
20 THE WITNESS: Can I set that document a little bit in context?
21 The UN never had any intention of carrying out massive air-strikes. We
22 merely used minimum force to enforce the passage of a convoy, et cetera.
23 The intelligence that the Bosnian Serb side therefore had that NATO was
24 going to launch massive strikes was faulty.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that explanation.
1 MS. BIBLES: We can remove this document from the screen,
2 although, Your Honours, I will note that paragraph 1 of the order list
3 the 19th of April of 1994.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Whether the document is of that date is
5 different, but at least some context in terms of time is given here.
6 Mr. Registrar, the number would be ... ? Oh, yes, no, you've
7 given the number already. It's P732 and is admitted into evidence.
8 Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.
9 MS. BIBLES:
10 Q. Based on your experiences and observations, were you able to draw
11 conclusions as to General Mladic's ability to control the events on the
13 A. Well certainly he would be central to the battle plan and
14 therefore in total control of what advance or retreat may be determined
15 on their side.
16 Q. During your time, 1994, did you have an opportunity to observe
17 how General Mladic interacted with his military subordinates?
18 A. We had many opportunities to see how he dealt with his
19 subordinates. During our many meetings we had with him he was often
20 accompanied by his subordinates, and they showed complete respect and
21 clearly under total command of General Mladic.
22 Q. Were you ever aware of a situation in which anyone within the
23 Bosnian Serb army acted contrary or in opposition to General Mladic?
24 A. Never.
25 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, that concludes my examination.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Bibles.
2 We have another ten minutes left before the break, Mr. Lukic, but
3 before I give you an opportunity to start your examination.
4 Mr. Rose, you may be surprised to see only two Judges. One of
5 the Judges, Judge Fluegge, is for urgent reasons unable to sit today. He
6 will be with us tomorrow again and he has access to the full transcript
7 and, if need be, even the audio and video of this hearing.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you're ready.
10 Mr. Rose, you'll be cross-examined now by Mr. Lukic. Mr. Lukic
11 is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
14 A. Good morning.
15 Q. You have a hard copy of your statement before you, do you not?
16 A. I do indeed.
17 Q. It's just that I need to find one for myself. Let us go to
18 paragraph 22. That's where we will start. There you say -- well, you
19 discuss Dobrinja, saying that the area of Dobrinja was virtually
20 surrounded. As a matter of fact, there was an exit across Mojmilo hill,
21 whereby one could move between Dobrinja and the rest of Sarajevo; is that
23 A. It could possibly be so.
24 Q. Dobrinja also had access to other parts of territory under Muslim
25 control and that is proven by the fact that one side of the tunnel which
1 went under the airport runway actually ended in Dobrinja. Did you know
3 A. The UN had no knowledge of the tunnel, official knowledge, at the
4 time. Went to examine which areas were sounded and which areas were not,
5 we would have to have a map in front of us. So I cannot make a valid
6 comment on how much Dobrinja was surrounded or how much it was not
8 Q. You say you had no personal knowledge, official knowledge, of the
9 existence of the tunnel. But, as a matter of fact, you were aware of its
10 existence, were you not? No one could have been ignorant of its
11 existence as long as they were in Sarajevo?
12 A. There was certainly rumours to the effect that a tunnel existed,
13 but the Bosnian government side kept the knowledge of its whereabouts to
15 Q. Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Rose, may I ask you one clarification. Your
17 answer was:
18 "There certainly were rumours to the effect that the tunnel
19 existed, but the Bosnian government side kept the knowledge of its
20 whereabouts to themselves."
21 These are two items, first the existence of a tunnel wherever --
22 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- second, where it was.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Now, did -- could I ask you to explain on both
1 whether the Bosnian government also was silent on the existence.
2 THE WITNESS: It was silent on the existence of the tunnel.
3 JUDGE ORIE: And therefore --
4 THE WITNESS: And therefore would not reveal its whereabouts.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. In your reports -- actually, in the reports you received from
8 your subordinates and the reports you authored, did you mention the
9 existence of the tunnel under the runway?
10 A. Not to my knowledge.
11 Q. In paragraph 23 of your statement you say:
12 "The general view at this time, as I was briefed, was that there
13 was indiscriminate shelling of civilians within the city centre by the
14 Bosnian Serbs. A number of incidents which occurred immediately prior to
15 my arrival and shortly afterwards supported that view. For example..."
16 Actually, you go on to say that:
17 "It is also the case that of course shelling was going the other
18 way from time to time against the Bosnian Serbs," et cetera. "Sniping
19 was also prevalent during this period, by both sides."
20 UNPROFOR was unaware of the strength and structure or disposition
21 of units, facilities, buildings, and commands of the
22 1st Corps of the BH Army in Sarajevo; is that correct?
23 A. That is correct.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, sorry to interrupt again but I'd like to
25 seek clarification of the first line of paragraph 23. It starts:
1 "The general view at this time, as I was briefed ..."
2 Now, I'm not a native English-speaking person, but should I
3 understand this "the general view at this time," the time when I was
4 briefed or the general view at this time according to how I was briefed?
5 Which of the two? And it may be that it's a wrong reading anyhow, that
6 there's no ambiguity at all in the language, but could you please assist
8 THE WITNESS: Absolutely, sir. As I arrived in Sarajevo in
9 January 1994, I received, prior to arrival and after my arrival, many
10 briefings. And the basis of those briefings were and the evidence were -
11 anyway, was all around to see - that Sarajevo had been for two years
12 under heavy shell fire.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so you're --
14 THE WITNESS: And continued to be under shell fire.
15 JUDGE ORIE: So you're both referring here to the content of the
16 briefing and on what you observed at the time, although general view is
17 difficult to observe?
18 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. [Interpretation] General, would you agree that if UNPROFOR was
22 unaware of the disposition of units, facilities, buildings, and commands
23 of the 1st Corps of the BH Army, it also could not have known what it was
24 that the Serbs were targeting in Sarajevo, i.e., whether the shelling was
25 random or not; is that correct?
1 A. Again, putting that question in context, the United Nations'
2 presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to facilitate the delivery of
3 humanitarian aid. They were there by agreement with initially three
4 warring parties. They were not there in a military capacity, therefore
5 they did not have intelligence-gathering capabilities. They were working
6 with, albeit recalcitrant parties to try and deliver humanitarian aid and
7 to bring about peace. They were not in a position to have detailed
8 military knowledge of the strength, deployments, intentions of any of the
9 warring parties.
10 Q. Thank you. Since in this paragraph there is a brief mention of
11 snipers, on the 6th of October, 2010 -- well, could we please have 1D549
12 in e-court first. It is the transcript from the Karadzic case. We need
13 page 17 in e-court. We need page 7336, lines 13 through 17.
14 General, you see Judge Kwon's question there. He asked:
15 [In English] "General, you can confirm what is stated in this
16 information sheet; i.e., that you believe Ganic organised his secret
17 police to snipe trams?"
18 And your answer was:
19 "That was certainly our belief at that time, sir, yes."
20 [Interpretation] My question is this: Do you still stand by this
21 part of your testimony?
22 A. I certainly do.
23 Q. Thank you. At the time, as you say, there were three warring
24 parties. During any of the briefings you received did anyone tell you
25 that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina made up one-third of the population
1 and that before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina they also enjoyed the right
2 to one-third of all positions within the authorities?
3 A. That did form part of my briefing, yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, looking at the clock. I do not know ...
5 MR. LUKIC: We can break now, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: We can break now.
7 We'll take a break and we'll resume at quarter past 12.00 after
8 the witness has left the courtroom.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 --- Recess taken at 11.52 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 12.16 p.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you're ready, you may continue.
15 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. [Interpretation] May we continue, General?
17 A. Indeed.
18 Q. Now, why did I ask you about the percentage of Serbs and their
19 participation in power? Is it correct that UNPROFOR treated only the
20 Bosnian or Muslim side as the official representative of Bosnia and
22 A. I think that was the case.
23 Q. Serbs were at the time treated as rebels; is that correct?
24 A. The United Nations had recognised the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 in 1992. They'd never recognised the existence of the Republika Srpska.
1 Q. [In English] At that time?
2 A. At that time.
3 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Is it true - and you refer to that
4 at page 7322 on the 6th of October, 2012, when you testified in the
5 Karadzic case - that the Western powers did not understand the nature of
6 conflict as it developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. I'd have to see that on the screen in context before I reply.
8 Q. Could we please have in e-court 1D549. It should be page 41 in
9 e-court. We need page 7322 -- actually, 73 --
10 JUDGE ORIE: It is -- the page you're mentioning is on e-court
11 page 3.
12 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, obviously I stand corrected. Yes.
13 We need the last row of this page -- actually, we need rows 16 to 19, I
15 Q. You'll see, General, on the screen it's saying:
16 "Is that what I said, that that was an observation of yours, that
17 there was a lack of understanding among Western governments, in terms of
18 the nature of the conflict?"
19 And your answer was:
20 "That is true."
21 Would you agree with this today as well, General?
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I just ask Mr. Lukic to understand what is --
23 what the witness is being asked to answer to. This question says -- is
24 asking the witness whether is that what I said. And does the answer
25 "that's true" answer to the fact yes that's what you said, or does it
1 answer to the fact that there was a lack of understanding among Western
2 governments? I'm not quite sure what he's being -- what the answer is
3 responding to here.
4 MR. LUKIC:
5 Q. So, General, can you explain this issue to Your Honours -- to
6 His Honour?
7 A. My understanding today of that statement is that there were
8 people in the West, NATO being America, who wished to use more force in
9 resolving the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina than the United Nations felt was
10 appropriate to a peacekeeping mission and that there was this
11 misunderstanding about what a peacekeeping mission could do and what it
12 could not do with regards to the use of force. And I think that's what I
13 was referring to.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: So --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could I -- reading it, it seems that you are -- that
17 the parties were putting a part of your book to you in which certain
18 language is used and that you're invited to confirm that that is what
19 you -- your feelings or your thoughts were.
20 Now, Mr. Lukic, for the Chamber to fully understand such an
21 isolated item of the testimony, of course we would like to see also what
22 the relevant pages in the book say so that we have the context. It's, I
23 do understand, page 3 of the book which in the very beginning, so it
24 might be an introductory observation. For the Chamber to fully
25 understand this part of the testimony and the confirmation Mr. Rose has
1 given today, the Chamber would like to have access to the previous pages,
2 this was the third page of that day's session, perhaps the tow previous
3 pages, and also the relevant portion of the book on which the witness
4 then commented.
5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, for us this is enough what General said
6 today because we are --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but as I said --
8 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers]
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- we would like to have the context. We need to
10 fully understand. If it's enough for you it doesn't mean that it's
11 enough for us. Could you please prepare that we receive in evidence the
12 previous two pages as well and that we -- I don't know to what extent we
13 still need 92 ter confirmations for that or attestations, but to take
14 care that the Chamber has the full context available of this portion of
15 the testimony including relevant pages of the book.
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, we will do so.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. Please proceed meanwhile.
18 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. [Interpretation] General, let us focus on paragraph 28 of your
20 statement. There reference is made to humanitarian aid being distributed
21 and brought in in different ways, primarily by airplane to Tuzla. There
22 was a plan to open up the airport there so as to enable an easier
23 delivery of humanitarian aid. You said that the airport was not opened
24 even a year later, which is when you left Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. When you say towards the end of this paragraph -- well, you say:
3 "...President Izetbegovic was later to state that he was prepared
4 to see 10.000 Bosnians die of starvation rather than accept a single Serb
5 on Bosnian territory)."
6 Is it correct that one of the main reasons for not re-opening the
7 airport was that the Muslim side -- that there should be Serb controllers
8 at the airport who would control the goings-on at the airport and what
9 was being distributed from it?
10 A. No, that's not precisely what the discussion was about. The Serb
11 side wished to have inspectors, not controllers, to examine the air
12 cargos being brought in to ensure there were no weapons being brought in
13 to the Muslim side. So there were inspectors not controllers, and that's
14 the objection that the Bosnian government had, they would not allow
15 inspectors from the Serb side.
16 Q. What is the difference, if you may, between a controller and an
18 A. Well, I controller would be controlling the entire flow of aid
19 coming in to Tuzla. An inspector merely inspects what is happening.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the last two and a half minutes it was
22 pure repetition of what is found already in paragraph 28, apart from
23 additional confusion that was created by the difference between
24 "controller" and "inspector." There's nothing new. Cross-examination is
25 there to test the evidence and to bring new evidence which is relevant
1 for your case, not to emphasise what you consider important or to repeat
2 what is there already.
3 You may proceed.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 Q. Did you believe the position of Alija Izetbegovic, as we've just
6 heard, when he discussed a multi-ethnic Sarajevo which was a thesis put
7 forth by the Muslim side at the time?
8 A. I'm not sure which statement by President Izetbegovic you're
9 referring to.
10 Q. We have just read in your statement that he was prepared to
11 sacrifice 10.000 Bosniaks to see them die of starvation rather than
12 accepting a single Serb in Bosnian territory. And now I'm narrowing it
13 down to Sarajevo. Is it true that the Muslim government in Sarajevo was
14 basically not in favour of a multi-ethnic society? That is my question.
15 A. There was never evidence to that effect. The issue over the
16 inspector at Tuzla was, I think, one of sovereignty.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could I try to keep focused Mr. Lukic? I think I
18 understand what you'd like to ask the witness. The last part is:
19 "... President Izetbegovic was later to state that he was
20 prepared to see 10.000 Bosnians die of starvation rather than accept a
21 single Serb on Bosnian territory )."
22 I think what Mr. Lukic would like to know whether you believed
23 President Izetbegovic to be serious in such a strong denial of any
24 multi-ethnicity in Sarajevo.
25 THE WITNESS: President Izetbegovic I think when he made that
1 statement was -- should have added "in this instance" on Serb
2 territory -- on Bosnian territory. What he was saying: I would not
3 accept any Serb inspector at Tuzla on Bosnian territory there. He was
4 not making a wider statement regarding his views on multi-ethnicity in
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, is that what the question you would like
7 to --
8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- you were seeking an answer to?
10 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
13 Q. [Interpretation] General, sir, did you come by information that
14 Serbs and Croats wanted to leave the part of Sarajevo that was under the
15 control of Muslim forces?
16 A. We never had any evidence presented to us that either the Serbs
17 or Croats wanted to leave, although I think maybe some Croats did leave
18 without our knowledge. Because once the Federation was created, they
19 were free to come and go; the Serbs of course were not.
20 Q. Could we now please take a look at paragraph 30 of your
21 statement, the last portion or, in fact, the last sentence where it
23 "My concept of demilitarisation was that subsequent to a
24 cease-fire, weapons would be withdrawn beyond a certain agreed point by
25 both sides. President Izetbegovic was generally not in favour of
2 A. That is true.
3 Q. What about Ganic, Salajdzic? In other words, the other top
4 leadership within the Muslim lines, were they in favour of
5 demilitarisation in Sarajevo?
6 A. None of them were. Their view was that they were a sovereign
7 nation recognised by the United Nations and they had every right to
8 position soldiers where they wanted on their own territory and they would
9 not accept demilitarisation. Of course they were also worried that
10 demilitarisation would result in the freezing of the conflict line and
11 become de facto an international border.
12 Q. We will get to that and spend some more time on that issue, but
13 at this point I'd just like to ask you this: Is it correct that the
14 Muslim party was, in fact, interested in extending war operations and the
16 A. Sometime during 1994 I think that the Bosnian government side
17 abandoned the peace process because they were being armed by the
18 Americans and others and trained and were given hope of recovering their
19 lost territory by force of arms. This was particularly advanced by the
20 forming of the Federation, which tilted the strategic military balance
21 against the Bosnian Serb side. So it was in their interest, as they saw
22 it, to return to war. In my view, of course, that was a wholly mistaken
23 view, that it would take decades before they were able to create
24 sufficient military strength to recover their lost territory by force of
25 arms. And we pointed that out repeatedly to President Izetbegovic and
1 Vice-President Ganic.
2 Q. I just want you to know that it's not that I'm not satisfied with
3 your answer. I'm just waiting for the interpretation to end. Just this
4 is to explain why I pause before I put the next question.
5 And now paragraph 31, please. You state here:
6 "The Bosnian Serbs were in favour of general demilitarisation
7 that would begin with the general demilitarisation of Sarajevo."
9 "They suggested that UNPROFOR place monitors on the heavy weapons
10 on their side as a confidence-building measure and that this would be a
11 start to working towards a cease-fire?"
12 You've just explained a moment ago why the Muslims were against
13 the cease-fire and the demilitarisation of Sarajevo, but at that time,
14 did you have any specific information about what Mr. Warren Zimmermann
15 had promised Alija Izetbegovic? Did UNPROFOR have any information about
16 the type of agreement reached between the Americans and the Muslim
17 government in Sarajevo?
18 A. We were never so informed.
19 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the Croats, too, were in fact in
20 favour of a cessation of hostilities and an end to the war at the time
21 while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
22 A. Following the Washington Accord, I had very little dealings with
23 the Croatian side and I have no knowledge of what their position was.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know, because you said that you were aware of
25 the fact that the Americans were arming the Muslim side, were you privy
1 to any information or did you have any information where these weapons
2 were coming from? Did you know whether the weapons were coming from
3 Iran, the United States? So did you have any information about the
4 source of these weapons?
5 A. None at all. And I should probably modify the word "aware." We
6 were aware of the rumours that this was happening and there was some
7 circumstantial evidence, for example, the Bosnian soldiers started to
8 appear in modern American-style uniforms, but how this equipment was
9 getting to -- into Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had no knowledge at all.
10 Because of course NATO controlled the air-space and they were not passing
11 any information pertaining to that to us.
12 Q. You did not have -- you did not control the land roads either so
13 you didn't know whether the weapons came in by road; correct?
14 A. That is correct. We were an organisation that was facilitating
15 the delivery of humanitarian aid. We were not a military occupying
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have in e-court document
18 65 ter 8137.
19 Q. General, you know this type of document; correct? You recognise
20 the format?
21 A. I do indeed.
22 Q. Who sent this fax? Who sent this fax message and to whom? Can
23 you tell from this? It says the 31st of January, 1994.
24 A. It looks as though it's a signal passing between Zagreb and
25 Belgrade and I'm not, as far as I can see, on the distribution list.
1 Q. Yes, that was a surprise to me too, but I just wanted to show you
2 that you did not get this information either. You hadn't received that
3 fax, although it deals with a meeting between you, Dr. Radovan Karadzic,
4 and General Mladic; correct?
5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2 for the benefit
6 of the General, to show that he, too, was a member of this -- in this
8 Q. If we look at paragraphs 3 and 4 we see that this is in fact a
9 reference to you; correct?
10 A. That is correct and that I was certainly at that meeting.
11 Q. In paragraph 4 we see that it reads -- well, it says that you
12 were the one who proposed that ways and means be provided to disengage
13 and separate forces and that Dr. Karadzic was enthusiastic about this but
14 doubted that the Muslim side would agree, as this ran counter to their
15 international propaganda strategy of portraying Sarajevo as the martyr
16 town. And it goes on that General Mladic's reaction was also positive,
17 but he was more cautious and recommended a step-by-step approach. This
18 is another instance where you proposed a cessation of hostilities in
19 Sarajevo. Can you recall what the reaction of the representative of --
20 representatives of the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo was?
21 A. I can't recall. It was nearly 20 years ago, but the -- my view
22 now would be that they were -- would have been resistant to any such
23 suggestion because that was characteristic of their position of the
25 Q. Thank you. Towards the bottom of the page we can see that --
1 THE INTERPRETER: [Previous translation continues]...
2 interpretation, thank you.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. -- the airport in Tuzla is mentioned. And reference is made to
5 legitimate Serb's concerns and that they have to be taken into account,
6 and these concerns were that without inspectors the airport could be used
7 for funneling in weapons but also because the Serbs were concerned that
8 the Muslim side could down a UN plane and then blame that on them. As
9 you sit here, can you recall what the outcome of these negotiations on
10 the Tuzla airport was?
11 A. The end result, as you have already described, was negative. We
12 never made any progress with opening Tuzla airport during the year that I
13 was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. In paragraph 8 Dr. Karadzic proposes not just the re-opening of
15 the Tuzla but also of the Banja Luka airport; in other words, an airport,
16 too, that was under the control of the Serb forces. Was the Banja Luka
17 airport ever open while you were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. No, it was not.
19 Q. Let us move on to February 1994 and paragraph 35 of your
21 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, Mr. Lukic, I saw in the 92 ter
22 statement that one page is missing of this report.
23 What efforts were made - and I'm addressing you, Ms. Bibles - to
24 get a complete picture of this meeting? I mean, just to say, Well, we
25 have a -- we have the minutes but not all of it is not very satisfactory.
1 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, the short answer is that we don't know
2 where the missing pages are. It -- the document itself reflects that it
3 would be paragraphs 1 and 2 of the minutes that are missing. The witness
4 in his statement verifies that what is present in this document is
5 consistent with his recollection of the meeting itself.
6 JUDGE ORIE: My question was: What efforts were made to get the
7 complete version? If you can't answer that question right away, we'd
8 like to be informed as soon as possible.
9 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour. I will do that.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.
11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Q. In paragraph 35 you talk about the shelling of Dobrinja, a suburb
13 of Sarajevo, and you say that you went to the site after the attack and
14 that you ordered a crater analysis to be carried out and the results
15 showed conclusively that the rounds had been fired by Bosnian Serb
16 forces. Many ballistics experts will testify on this. And we have
17 discussed at length the findings here, but let me ask you, first of all:
18 Do you know that the -- that the findings have never been finalised, the
19 conclusion as to what had happened had never actually been finalised?
20 A. It's particularly difficult to identify a precise firing point by
21 crater analysis. When you have five mortar bombs in a particular line,
22 you can certainly tell the direction. The distance may not be so easy to
23 define. The more bombs, you have crater bombs, the easier it becomes.
24 And certainly our view at the time was that it had come from the Serb
25 side. Balance -- it was, as you say, a balance of judgement.
1 Q. Do you personally know what the results of this analysis were?
2 Do you know where these people obtained their information from and that
3 they started this investigation 28 days after the incident? Are you
4 aware of that?
5 A. There were usually two levels of investigation. First of all, an
6 immediate one carried out by the French army engineers who had a certain
7 experience in this area; and then, secondly, there would be a more
8 detailed investigation from a team from Zagreb. I cannot remember at
9 this length of time when the team from Zagreb made an analysis or,
10 indeed, whether it ever did so.
11 Q. Thank you. Let us now pull up 1D548 in e-court. That is your
12 evidence of -- from October 2010 and could we have page 69, please, in
13 e-court. That should be 7309, the transcript page, from the Karadzic
14 trial. We have the right page. Let's take a look at lines 4 to 7 and
15 then 11 through 18. Have you read what your evidence was? And I will
16 have a brief question about this once you've read it, and that is the
17 following: UNPROFOR did not have good or modern up-to-date equipment and
18 it wasn't easy to conclude where the fire had come from; is that correct?
19 A. We're talking about two periods of time, the time of the Markale
20 bombing and the Dobrinja mortar bomb. There was no mortar-locating radar
21 deployed. By the autumn the UN had deployed mortar-locating radars which
22 of course gave a great deal of precision in identifying the firing point.
23 At this time it was an imprecise art, as I described.
24 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 36, General, of your statement you say,
25 speaking of Dobrinja, in the penultimate sentence:
1 "The Serbs had it completely surrounded and were firing directly
2 down into the suburb such that residents were forced to live in their
4 General, is it true that Dobrinja was at the same time a very
5 strong stronghold of the Muslim forces, almost a bunker?
6 A. Not as far as I know.
7 Q. Is it correct that Dobrinja was surrounded on three sides and
8 that there was no way the Serbs could capture that part of the
9 settlement? Half of Dobrinja was under Muslim control and the other half
10 by -- under Serb control. Would it have been possible had it not been so
11 strongly fortified that the Serbs would not have been able to capture it?
12 A. As I've explained, the UN was not in a position to make detailed,
13 strategic, or even tactical-level analysis as to the correlation of
14 forces on the ground. As you already pointed out, the word "completely
15 surrounded" may have been a little extreme because there was a route, a
16 hidden route, through Dobrinja from the airport into the main part of
17 Sarajevo but it was a very narrow route indeed. And effectively,
18 Dobrinja was surrounded.
19 Q. Dobrinja was close to Mojmilo hill or adjacent to it which was
20 under Muslim control, and in fact Sarajevo was linked with Igman and the
21 roads that went across Igman via Dobrinja - is that correct? - through
22 the tunnel that ran across Dobrinja and then under the airport runway to
23 the part that was under the control of Muslim forces, Bosnian Muslim
25 A. As I've said, we had no precise knowledge as to the hidden routes
1 into Sarajevo at the time. And what you're saying could well have been
2 the case, but of course there were other negotiations and deals where
3 stuff came across the line without the knowledge of the UN and this would
4 have been an example of one of them.
5 Q. You were aware of the Igman routes that were also used by
6 UNPROFOR; correct?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Did you know that those routes were used by Muslim forces to
9 supply their armed formations in the city of Sarajevo?
10 A. Not to our knowledge.
11 Q. Thank you. Let's go to paragraph 37. There you say:
12 "On the following day, the 5th of February, 1994 ... there was a
13 massacre in Sarajevo ... a single mortar shell had been fired onto the
14 Markale market-place not far from the Presidency."
15 Markale and the single shell will be the subject of many
16 investigation expert testimony in this case by eye-witnesses and
17 ballistics experts. I would rather not go into ballistics issues with
18 you but I would make a connection between this paragraph and the next
19 paragraph in your statement, paragraph 38, where you also stress that:
20 "General Milovanovic sent a fax message offering to form a mixed
21 commission of military experts to determine the provenance of the
23 The question is this: Such a commission was never established;
24 is that correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Was it considered to establish a joint commission comprising
2 representatives of the Serb-Muslim side and UNPROFOR? Was it considered
3 at all, if you recall?
4 A. I don't really recall, but if it had been suggested to the
5 Bosnian government side they would certainly have refused to accept Serb
6 analysts on their territory.
7 Q. There were two commissions established in this regard. One
8 attended the scene straight away and the other arrived subsequently from
9 Zagreb; is that correct?
10 A. That is so.
11 Q. During the first investigation there were representatives of the
12 Muslim authorities and they gathered evidence for the most part; is that
14 A. I think that is true.
15 Q. Thus, the second commission arriving from Zagreb relied on the
16 evidence gathered, or rather, immediately following the incident; is that
18 A. Again, that would have been the case.
19 Q. Do you know and did you object to the fact that parts of evidence
20 went missing or were removed immediately following the initial, the
21 first, investigation?
22 A. I certainly remember discussing with the French engineers that
23 they had not been able to get hold of all the material because the
24 Bosnian government side had removed a number of items from the site
25 before they arrived. Whether they subsequently got access to these
1 items, I don't know.
2 Q. Thank you. Next you say in paragraph 40 of your statement, in
3 the last sentence:
4 "I suggested that we should take advantage of the situation and
5 look towards introducing a 20-kilometre total exclusion zone (TEZ) for
6 heavy weapons."
7 It had to do with seizing the opportunity created by this event
8 at Markale; is that correct?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. After that -- actually, let me ask you something about something
11 before the total exclusion zone was introduced. Before that and
12 afterwards, the balance in terms of number of personnel was in favour of
13 the Muslim side. I don't know whether you were familiar with that piece
14 of information. If you are not, please say so.
15 A. I'm not.
16 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
17 actually was supposed to encompass the withdrawal of all armed
18 individuals as well from Sarajevo in order for Sarajevo to become an
19 unarmed city, and is it also correct that the Muslim side would not
20 accept that?
21 A. I think you're conflating two issues. The first issue was the
22 removal of heavy weapons which was agreed but not adhered to by both
23 sides; the second issue was the demilitarisation, which we have already
24 discussed, was resisted by the Bosnian Muslim side.
25 Q. When you say that this agreement on collecting weapons was not
1 implemented, are you saying that it was not implemented at all or that
2 some parts of it were not implemented, i.e., that some pieces were not
3 handed over at collection points?
4 A. It was certainly not implemented hundred per cent by either side.
5 Both sides cheated on the agreement and hid heavy weapons within that
7 Q. We'll get to that issue later on in more detail, but while we're
8 on this topic let me ask you the following: Serbs took, or rather, used
9 the weapons from collection points when attacked by the Muslim forces;
11 A. That was the claim made by the Bosnian Serbs when they came to
12 seize weapons back from the collecting points.
13 Q. It was their assertion that they had no other weapons and
14 therefore had to use the ones that were there; correct?
15 A. That was the assertion. Of course it was more of a political
16 act, I think, than a military one, particularly as we suspected they had
17 hidden the affected weapons and could have used those.
18 Q. Was it not dangerous for the Serbs to use those weapons that were
19 under the control of the UN? Did they not expose themselves to the
20 danger of air-strikes by the NATO Alliance?
21 A. They did indeed.
22 Q. Thank you. Let us discuss the demilitarisation of Sarajevo
23 briefly, so we will leave the area of collecting heavy weapons. In
24 paragraph 42, you say:
25 "President Izetbegovic said he would never agree to the
1 withdrawal of his infantry from Sarajevo ..."
2 I'm trying to understand the following, and I would kindly ask
3 for your explanation: Did UNPROFOR accept that position by
4 President Izetbegovic and what were further actions by UNPROFOR? Was
5 there any effort made towards demilitarisation or was it given up on?
6 A. We had to accept his position as it stood at that time, but we
7 didn't relent on our efforts to try and demilitarise the situation which
8 was a part of bringing about permanent peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 Q. Did you ever threaten President Izetbegovic with air-strikes
10 against his forces?
11 A. I did.
12 Q. We'll get to that later on, when I will ask you whether you could
13 bring that about in fact or not, but I'm afraid we are at the end of this
14 part of our session and we need to have a break.
15 MR. LUKIC: It's quarter past 12.00.
16 JUDGE ORIE: It is a suitable moment for you. It is
17 approximately the time one hour after we restarted. We'll take a break
18 and resume at 25 minutes to 2.00 but only after the witness has left the
20 [The witness stands down]
21 --- Recess taken at 1.13 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would appreciate if you would stop your
24 loud conversations when the Chamber enters the courtroom, Mr. Mladic.
25 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
1 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, could I take advantage of this time to
2 inform the Chamber of two things? I spoke with Mr. Lukic about RM009.
3 Mr. Lukic's estimate is four hours for that witness and the Prosecution
4 will reduce its examination by 15 minutes, so that's four hours and 15 --
5 4 hours, 45 minutes for the witness. We'll wait for the Chamber to
6 direct us as how we might take care of the schedule.
7 And, Your Honour, with respect to P723, it's a public exhibit
8 from yesterday, the first page of that exhibit indicates where the
9 videolink was from and the Prosecution is requesting, since it has no
10 evidential value to the case, that the Chamber order the court officer to
11 remove that first page. Thank you.
12 [The witness takes the stand]
13 JUDGE ORIE: The Registry is hereby instructed to replace P723 by
14 the same document without the first page.
15 Mr. Lukic, are you ready to proceed?
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
18 MR. LUKIC: Thanks.
19 Q. [Interpretation] General, may we continue?
20 A. Please do.
21 Q. Thank you. Please focus on paragraph 43 of your statement.
22 There you say you met with General Divjak, deputy commander of the
23 BH Army. That is at the end of the paragraph, you continue:
24 "... to discuss the cease-fire. Surprisingly, he also agreed to
25 observe the cease-fire."
1 Could we please have 1D549 in e-court. It is your testimony,
2 General, of the 6th October 2010 in the Karadzic case in order to refresh
3 your recollection. We need page 20 towards the bottom starting with
4 line 14. We also need page 21, the first four lines just following this
5 page. Please, can we go back to the previous page. My apologies. Let
6 us go to page 20 so that the General would have sufficient time to read
8 We see here, General, that you said that General "...'Divjak was
9 reluctant to sign up to a cease-fire, once again on the grounds that the
10 UN proposal was not linked to any long-term political settlement.'" And
11 then we see that you --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it looks at first sight to be a quote.
13 So this is part of a question and not -- perhaps we come to that, but you
14 introduced it as "you said," but apparently it is "you wrote," as quoted
15 by the accused in that case. Is that --
16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. My apologies.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
18 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
19 Q. [Interpretation] General, following this introductory part you
20 provided on the 6th October 2010, you discuss further that you told
21 Divjak that the shell which hit Markale, the one that exploded on the
22 5th of February, 1994, came from the Muslim positions and that you were
23 able to establish that. Automatically, he had a change of heart and
24 signed up to the agreement. What was your impression? Did he know that
25 indeed the shell had arrived from the Muslim positions? Or did he have
1 doubts regarding that?
2 A. Well, clearly he thought that if that information went public it
3 would be very damaging to the Bosnia-Herzegovina side. As I said
4 previously, the initial investigation was incomplete, but that was the
5 first view of the French analysts, that it could have well come from the
6 Bosnian government side, i.e., been dropped off the building physically.
7 But that view was later rescinded. It was useful in that time in the
8 end, it proved that pressure was such on Divjak that he signed up to the
9 idea that they should have a cease-fire.
10 Q. Thank you. We said we won't go into the technical details of
11 this matter. General --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could I try to verify this and to be very precise.
13 What is quoted as what you've written in the book is that the
14 first investigation would reveal that it was fired from the Muslim side,
15 whereas your testimony today is the initial investigation was incomplete
16 and the first view of the French analysts was that it could have well
17 come from the Bosnian government side. These two are not the same, at
18 least the one is it comes from the Muslim side, the other one is it may
19 have come from the Muslim side. Now, which is the accurate presentation?
20 That the French analysts said it came from or that it may have come from?
21 THE WITNESS: Well, my memory is certainly hazy on the subject,
22 but I guess if I wrote in the book that they were definite initially
23 about where it had come from, then that would have been the view I had at
24 that time.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: Subsequently it is no doubt it became far less
2 certain where the bomb had been fired from.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, something came to my mind - addressing the
4 parties - dealing with what the report would have stated, I take it that
5 sooner or later we'll have all of that in evidence. The same is with the
6 Dobrinja shelling on the 4th of February, to the extent not portions are
7 already in evidence but forgive me for not having on my mind every single
8 piece of evidence where there are so many reports.
9 MS. BIBLES: The Chamber can look forward to additional evidence
10 with respect to these reports, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. [Interpretation] General, please look at paragraph 46 next, where
15 you discuss the 12th of February, 1994:
16 "General Milovanovic sent a fax protesting the Bosnian government
17 breaches of the cease-fire ..."
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D552 in e-court.
19 We need --
20 Q. You see -- well, you can see it in English. It is a document of
21 the SRK command. It's a regular combat report for the 9th
22 of April, 1994, that is to say a few days -- well, in April. In
23 the B/C/S we need page 2, whereas in the English version we need page 4.
24 General, at the time did you have information that UN convoys
25 were transporting weapons and ammunition for the Muslim forces?
1 A. The allegation was often made, but to my knowledge the UN never
2 moved weapons or ammunition for the Bosnian government forces.
3 Q. Here we see in this document that at around 8.30 p.m. on the
4 8th of April, 1994, a humanitarian aid convoy for the city of Sarajevo
5 was searched, seven trucks and one jeep, during which a large quantity of
6 ammunition for Brownings and medical material were found that were not on
7 the list of goods to be transported.
8 At the time were you informed of this incident or allegation by
9 the SRK command?
10 A. To my knowledge, I was never made aware of this supposed
11 incident, and I'm sure I would have been made aware and I would have
12 remembered it now.
13 Q. Please bear with me. Would you agree with me that the situation
14 of the Muslim forces in 1994 improved drastically, not only due to the
15 Washington Agreement but also because those forces were constantly
16 receiving ever-larger amounts of weapons?
17 A. We certainly detected that the Bosnian government forces were
18 improving their capability, but how they were doing that and where their
19 ammunition or equipment was coming from, as I say, we had no direct
20 knowledge. Our role there was purely to facilitate humanitarian aid, not
21 to act as a guarantor of the arms embargo which of course was a
22 responsibility of NATO, not ourselves.
23 Q. Thank you. I'd like to move to March 1994. Kindly look at
24 paragraph 55 of your statement. On the 1st of March, 1994, a framework
25 Washington Agreement was signed creating the Federation of
1 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Nowhere in the documents was I able
2 to find whether there was any contribution of yours to the signing of the
3 Washington Agreement of the 18th of March, 1994.
4 A. I was the person that chaired the meeting near Zagreb where the
5 two parties were brought together, and it was my wording that stood for
6 that agreement, but of course it was a politically done deal. I merely
7 had to administer the cease-fire, the signing of the cease-fire, and then
8 the separation of forces, et cetera, which follows any end of
10 Q. The territory controlled by Fikret Abdic, did it make part of the
12 A. No, it did not.
13 Q. In that Federation there was no clear delineation of which part
14 of the territory belonged to which side, or am I mistaken?
15 A. There was no clear delineation.
16 Q. The signing of this agreement followed shortly a period of
17 fighting between Muslims and Croats; is that correct?
18 A. I don't recall whether it did. They certainly had been fighting
19 during the time that I had been in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was one
20 month roughly, maybe two.
21 Q. The fighting between Muslims and Croats for the most part took
22 place in 1993 when you were not in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is probably
23 why you're not aware of any details and we will gladly accept that. In
24 paragraph 56, you say:
25 "On the 3rd of March, 1994, I attended a meeting at
1 Lukavica Barracks with General Mladic. At the meeting he proposed that
2 there should be a meeting with the Bosnian government over the
3 establishment of a global peace agreement."
4 My question is: Is it true, is it correct, that it was neither
5 the first nor the last time that such proposals arrived from
6 General Mladic and the VRS?
7 A. That is true.
8 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 59 you discuss the 7th of March and the
9 opening of the bridge over the -- at Grbavica. You said you "met with
10 Dr. Ganic, Mr. Muratovic, General Delic, and Brigadier-General Karavelic
11 at the Presidency. Agreement was reached over opening the Grbavica
12 bridge ... as far as I know," the bridge, had been closed ever since the
13 beginning of the war. Were there any problems on the Serb side with the
14 opening of the bridge?
15 A. No, the objections came from Mr. Ganic.
16 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 61 next, please.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Can I meanwhile ask a question, Mr. Lukic?
18 You said that General Mladic had at very occasions proposed a --
19 or at least Bosnian Serb side had proposed a global peace agreement. Was
20 that an open proposal: Let's agree on peace? Or was it related to the
21 status quo? Or could you explain a bit more about how open that proposal
22 was, if you remember.
23 THE WITNESS: It was a very open proposal. It was a general
24 proposal that was always on the table whenever we met with the Serb side.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and without any conditions --
1 THE WITNESS: Without any --
2 JUDGE ORIE: -- or suggestions about the content?
3 THE WITNESS: Correct.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
5 Please proceed.
6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. I will just add on to what Judge Orie just said to ask you this:
8 Irrespective of the reasons, was it your impression that the Serb side
9 was honest in its proposals to end the war, it was sincere?
10 A. I'm sure they wished to end the war when they were at the most
11 advantageous military and political position. And after 1994 I think
12 they passed what Clausewitz would call the culminating point and that
13 position was bound to deteriorate so therefore it was in their interest
14 to seek and secure a peace at that time, in 1994. And of course events
15 subsequently proved that assessment to be correct.
16 Q. Now I would like to explore a bit more the issue that Judge Orie
17 has initiated. You said this was an open proposal. Does that mean that
18 there were no preconditions?
19 A. Depending on when you're talking about. At the time of the
20 attack into Gorazde and its aftermath, then of course the Serb side
21 wished the incident and the withdrawal of troops, et cetera, from around
22 Gorazde to be part of the global agreement, whereas the Bosnian Serbs say
23 that was a condition. But on the Bosnian government side, then they
24 wished to be separate and be dealt with first before they moved on to any
25 more long-term agreement.
1 Q. Could you agree with me that at the time while you were in Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina, almost all, if not all of, the offensive operations came
3 from the Bosnian side and that this was the reason why the war continued?
4 A. I think that would be too extreme a view. I think that there was
5 attacks going on that we were possibly unaware of and elsewhere in
6 Bosnia, not in the areas where we were deployed so I couldn't really make
7 a substantive comment, but generally speaking the interests of the
8 Bosnian Serbs was to secure peace and the interests of the Bosnian
9 government side was to continue with the war.
10 Q. Thank you, General.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, also Mr. Rose, I'm re-reading page 77,
12 line 2 and following, especially on line 3 where it says that after "the
13 attack into Gorazde, then of course the Serb side wished the incident and
14 the withdrawal of troops, et cetera, from around Gorazde to be part of
15 the global agreement, whereas the Bosnian Serbs say that was a
17 The "whereas" is confusing me.
18 THE WITNESS: The Bosnian government side wished to treat the
19 Gorazde incident separately and deal with that before they moved on to
20 discussion about a global agreement, whereas I think I'm correct in
21 saying the Bosnian Serb side wished to just have a global agreement of
22 which Gorazde would form a part.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 THE WITNESS: So it was sequential in the case of the Bosnian
25 government side but included within in part of the Bosnian Serb side and
1 that was always the sticking point.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that explanation.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, could we now please move on to paragraph 61 of your
5 statement, that's another area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bihac namely. You
6 state, and this is on the 12th of March, 1994:
7 "The French Battalion in Bihac asked for an immediate air-strike
8 against the Serb T55 tank that was firing at the headquarters of the
9 Bosnian Army 5th Corps in the centre of town."
10 Was there a request from NATO aviation to act as a result of
12 A. The request to bring in air-strikes always came from the
13 United Nations troops on the ground, never initiated by NATO. The only
14 area in which NATO could fire a weapon without the authority of the
15 United Nations was that of self-defence.
16 Q. Did an air attack follow?
17 A. On this occasion, not. A tank was moving in and out of cover and
18 NATO were unable to identify that tank and engage it. So the mission was
19 finally called off.
20 Q. According to you, was the headquarters of the 5th Corps a
21 legitimate target, military target?
22 A. I guess in any war situation it would have been.
23 Q. So could NATO air-strikes against Serb positions be called for or
24 requested even when the Serb positions targeted legitimate targets?
25 A. Certainly, because they were firing into a built-up area and the
1 enclaves were determined to be areas where fighting should not take
2 place. The fact that the headquarters was located there didn't
3 necessitate -- mean that they were necessarily fighting themselves, this
4 is the Bosnian government side, in that area, in the built-up area.
5 Q. This came immediately after a Muslim attack against Serb
6 positions and then in a counter-attack the Serbs pushed back the Muslim
7 forces, and as part of that counter-attack they opened fire on the
8 headquarters. Am I correct?
9 A. I don't think I can comment on that. All I remember is that a
10 tank would come out of some cover, fire, and it seemed to be an isolated
11 incident to us at the time.
12 Q. If the Muslim forces were to open fire from a built-up area at
13 Serb positions would the Serbs be justified in that event to open fire at
14 that particular point, even if it was in a built-up area? What was the
15 UNPROFOR position?
16 A. The UNPROFOR position of course was that no one should fire from
17 a built-up area and engage -- and end up engaging the civilian population
18 in combat, which is of course what happened far too many times in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I guess, as I say, in any war you have the right
20 of return of fire and self-defence. But the response has to be
22 Q. Talking about proportionality, we saw that, for instance, in the
23 Afghanistan war, we saw British aircraft opening fire at a soldier
24 carrying a Kalashnikov, opening fire with a 500-kilogramme bomb. Would
25 that -- could that be called proportionate? And who is it that
1 determines what proportionality actually entails? What military rules
2 guide the decision as to what proportionality is?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you are giving an example from a
4 different armed conflict, and you're asking, I think, the witness to
5 write a thesis on many matters. Could you please focus the question, and
6 I don't know whether you especially selected a British aircraft to fire
7 on a soldier or not, but we are more interested in what happened in
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.
9 I see Mr. Mladic is seeking contact with counsel. The rules are
10 clear about consultations, but if there's any specific matter we'll
11 adjourn anyhow in four minutes. This could have been written down.
12 Mr. Lukic, please proceed.
13 MR. LUKIC: I think that the last part of my question was
14 actually what I wanted to ask: Where was that described what was
15 proportionate? If the General can help us.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the proportionality principle, that's what you
17 are referring to, Mr. Lukic, where you find the sources for that and
18 the -- I take it also the considerations on what is proportionate and
19 what is not proportionate.
20 We have only three minutes left, Mr. Rose.
21 THE WITNESS: Well, obviously each specific set of circumstances
22 you have to make a judgement. But, for example, to call down an
23 artillery barrage in Sarajevo against one mortar that had fired out at
24 you would be disproportionate because you're inevitably going to cause
25 unnecessary civilian casualty. If, for example, a mortar bomb was put on
1 top of a hospital building and you called down fire and destroyed the
2 hospital, that would be disproportionate.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I just get clarity, Mr. Rose. You're talking
4 of a bomb on a hospital. It looks like you're including in this concept
5 some kind of collateral damage. And I'm not quite sure whether you're
6 talking about collateral damage or whether you're talking about
7 proportionality. The example given of the British 500-tonne [sic] bomb
8 was against a soldier with a Kalashnikov without any collateral damage
9 around him. That would be a classic example, for me, of proportionality,
10 of a discussion of proportionality. But once you put in there hospitals
11 or protected people, you seem to introduce the concept of collateral
12 damage and I'm not quite sure I understand you.
13 THE WITNESS: I'm merely talking about collateral damage, sir --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah --
15 THE WITNESS: I mean, the decision to waste a 500-pound bomb on
16 an individual soldier, the end result is the same but that is
17 disproportionate use from the tax payer's point of view. But if you're
18 talking about law, the law of war, and you're talking about moral issues
19 then you're talking about collateral damage. And the example I gave,
20 again illustrative, if somebody put a single mortal tube on top of a
21 hospital and fired one mortar bomb and you replied with an artillery
22 barrage which caused a lot of civilian casualties, that would be
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I said we had three minutes left; they
1 are gone now.
2 Mr. Lukic, I am -- I think you have used approximately -- you've
3 left a little bit over four hours of the time you claimed which was six
4 hours, as far as I remember.
5 MR. LUKIC: [Microphone not activated]
6 JUDGE ORIE: I beg your pardon?
7 MR. LUKIC: I asked for seven, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: You asked for seven. Which means we would not
9 conclude the cross-examination tomorrow as matters stand now, but
10 certainly in the first session of the day after that then I take it?
11 MR. LUKIC: Most probably, yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We'll adjourn for the day, Mr. Rose. We'd like to
13 see you back tomorrow morning at 9.30 in the same courtroom, III. And I
14 hope that you are prepared to stay for at least a part of another day
15 with us, the day after that.
16 THE WITNESS: As long as it takes, sir, I shall be here.
17 JUDGE ORIE: That's highly appreciated. Could -- I would like to
18 instruct you that you should not speak with anyone or communicate in
19 whatever way about your testimony, irrespective of whether that is
20 testimony you have given today or testimony still to be given the
21 following days.
22 THE WITNESS: Fully understood, sir.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then please follow the usher.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then we adjourn for the day and we will resume
1 tomorrow, Thursday, the 17th of January, at 9.30 in the morning in this
2 same courtroom, III.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.15 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of
5 January, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.