130117IT

Page 6901

1 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Rose, I'd like to remind you that you're still

5 bound by the solemn declaration you've given yesterday at the beginning

6 of your testimony, and Mr. Lukic will now continue his cross-examination.

7 WITNESS: MICHAEL ROSE [Resumed]

8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]

12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

13 A. Good morning.

14 Q. I take it you do have a hard copy of your statement before you?

15 [In English] Okay.

16 [Interpretation] Please turn to paragraph 63. There you say:

17 "On 19 March 1994 I sent two letters of protest to Dr. Karadzic.

18 The first related to BSA harassment of a UN convoy."

19 The question is this: In your view, what did this harassment

20 amount to?

21 A. I don't remember the specific incident, but normally harassment

22 meant stopping the convoy unnecessarily or turning it back.

23 Q. Could we agree that the Serbs had the right, according to the

24 protocols that had been signed, to inspect convoys?

25 A. I think the original agreement was made at a time when I was not

Page 6902

1 in Bosnia was that there was full and free movement of all convoys and

2 that the right of inspection was only given subsequent to that. And it

3 was not necessarily part of the original agreement.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have

5 65 ter number 9643 in e-court.

6 Q. General, we are about to see a document of the

7 9th of February, 1994, which is approximately at the beginning of your

8 tour in Bosnia. We're interested in the last paragraph of the document,

9 so the very bottom of the document; the last paragraph on this B/C/S page

10 and the last paragraph on the next page in English. There you see as

11 part of this order by the Main Staff of the VRS that it is ordered as

12 follows:

13 "All planned and authorised convoys should be allowed to cross

14 Republika Srpska territory after inspection."

15 Does it mean and was it the case in practice that there were

16 unscheduled or unplanned convoys which moved without having been

17 announced? Do you know anything about that?

18 A. No. The system of convoy runs was very carefully co-ordinated

19 with all the warring parties.

20 Q. Do you know of any cases where in such conveys there were goods

21 that had not been announced or stated as present?

22 A. No, I do not.

23 Q. Can you exclude the possibility that something like that

24 happened?

25 A. Well, certainly mistakes could have been made in manifesting

Page 6903

1 convoys, but there was certainly no deliberate desire to misstate the

2 goods that were being carried.

3 Q. Would you agree with me if I said the following: In cases that

4 the goods that were being transported are not in accordance with the

5 cargo manifest, that in that case blame could not be placed on the side

6 of Republika Srpska if it decided to keep such cargo or turn it back?

7 A. Such an approach would have been an example of the undue

8 bureaucratic approach taken by the Bosnian Serb side in order to harass,

9 prevent, and stop the free running of convoys, which had been the

10 original intention. The fact there may have been a baked bean tin too

11 many on a convoy was no reason for starving the people for whom that

12 convoy was designed. And I should remind the Court that there were some

13 600.000 Serbs daily dependent on the receipt of those convoys.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, would you refrain from showing material

15 to anyone in this courtroom. No, you were showing a book which you are

16 not supposed to do. I'll consider with my colleagues what the

17 consequences are.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE ORIE: Any further violation, whatever slight, will have

20 consequences. And this is another example on the record.

21 You may proceed, Mr. Lukic.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. General, I was interested in your view - and I believe it was

24 UNPROFOR view as well - that you blamed the Serb side for UNPROFOR

25 mistakes as well; in other words, if UNPROFOR failed to meet its

Page 6904

1 obligations in terms of properly filling in the paperwork, you found it

2 to be a Serb mistake if such convoys were not let through. Isn't that

3 correct?

4 A. I disagree with that interpretation. There was no need in the

5 original agreement for a system and inspection of manifests and the

6 matching of those manifests with the cargos. The practice had been

7 extended as a result of a courtesy given before my time to the Serb side

8 to allow them to look at the cargos that were being carried. I would not

9 have allowed that to have happened had it not have already occurred

10 because it was beyond what had originally been agreed with the warring

11 parties, which was the free running of all convoys, aid convoys,

12 throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 Q. It is a fact that at the moment of inspection or control --

14 actually, inspection, the Serb side had the right to do that,

15 irrespective of what was in the original document. When you were in

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb side had the right to inspect convoys; isn't

17 that correct?

18 A. It was a courtesy that had been extended to the Serb side; it was

19 not a right, in my view.

20 Q. Thank you. Can we move to paragraph 69 next, please. There --

21 well, it's a short paragraph to start with:

22 I met with General Delic that evening and he was not interested

23 in a cease-fire at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.

24 Such position of the Muslim side remained in place until the very

25 end of the war, did it not?

Page 6905

1 A. I think it did.

2 Q. At that time the Muslims had already been promised that they were

3 to be given a much larger territory than they had held until then. Since

4 already by the end of 1993 a plan had already been in existence that

5 Serbs were to be left with only 49 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina

6 territory out of over 70 per cent, which is the size of territory that

7 they had under their control at the time. Were you aware of that?

8 A. I was certainly aware that there was the discussion about whether

9 the Serb side should have 51 per cent, which I think was their demand, or

10 whether they should have 49 per cent, but the situation was much more

11 complicated than that because of course the Serb side wanted contiguous

12 territory and they also wanted a number of high-value areas, which was

13 not agreed by either the Bosnian government side or the international

14 community.

15 Q. As you have said yourself, on one side there were Muslims and

16 Western powers, and on the other side the Serbs, when it comes to the

17 percentage negotiations?

18 A. I guess that was probably the situation.

19 Q. Thank you. Let us move to paragraph 70, please. It reads --

20 well, you quote -- actually, you seem to have been shown a document of

21 the 7th of April, 1994:

22 "... signed by Major-General Manojlo Milovanovic and sent it to

23 the commands of Herzegovina Corps, Drina Corps, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

24 and Tactical Group Visegrad."

25 In the order General Milovanovic states that we should abstain

Page 6906

1 from using any further the assets that we have in the urban part of

2 Gorazde without any artillery destruction of the town and no

3 ill-treatment of the civil population especially with no ill-treatment of

4 foreigners. It is 65 ter 9326. What I have just read out is on page 2.

5 Perhaps we could see that in e-court. We can see from that, since you've

6 already seen the document, that the Serb forces refrained from opening

7 fire on the town of Gorazde. My question is this -- well, we need page 2

8 for that.

9 Did you know at the time that the Muslim forces from the

10 protected area of Gorazde carried out offensive operations against both

11 VRS positions as well as against Serb civilians. Following such

12 operations, they always went back to the protected area of Gorazde.

13 A. I had no reports from either the UNMOs of that occurrence or,

14 indeed, when the JCOs arrived did they report such activity.

15 Q. I will try to jog your memory.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We need 1D549 in e-court.

17 Q. It is the 6th of October, 2010, transcript of your testimony.

18 The page we are looking for is transcript page from the Karadzic trial,

19 the number being 7375. It is page 56 in e-court, lines 10 through 13.

20 Perhaps my question was not sufficiently clear and I was not specific

21 time-wise, but in this testimony you were asked the following question:

22 [In English] "You were aware of the fact that the Muslim Army had

23 expelled Serbs, and killed quite a few, at that, and they burned their

24 houses in and around Gorazde. You saw the houses, didn't you?

25 "A. I did."

Page 6907

1 A. I think you're confusing two time-periods.

2 Q. That's why I apologised at the beginning of this question, so --

3 A. During my time there, I did not have reports, specific reports,

4 of those activities that you mentioned, although indeed they could have

5 been happening and it would have been typical, given what was happening

6 around Srebrenica, for that sort of activity to have occurred. But I had

7 no specific knowledge because we had -- the UNMOs did not report it and

8 we had not deployed the JCOs at that time into Gorazde, who would have

9 reported it.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 When did you send eight of your members to Gorazde? They were

12 also members of the SAS, were they not?

13 A. They were JCOs. Where their original units had been, I don't

14 know. They were JCOs.

15 Q. They had been trained to plot targets and guide planes to such

16 targets; correct?

17 A. It's possible. I don't know. If I could just explain to the

18 Court that I was there as a United Nations officer. I was not directly

19 commanding any units from the troop-contributing nations. And therefore,

20 what the skills and capabilities of those troops that had been deployed

21 in Bosnia were, I had no specific knowledge. They were there to help the

22 United Nations Protection Force to deliver humanitarian aid; they were

23 not there in a war-fighting role.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Rose, in order to have a transcript which is

25 understood by outsiders as well, could you tell us what JCOs are in full

Page 6908

1 and not just use the acronym?

2 THE WITNESS: The joint commission officers --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

4 THE WITNESS: -- were deployed by the troop-contributing nations

5 as a request -- as a result of a request by me, because I did not have

6 confidence in the quality of the -- or timeliness of the reporting from

7 the United Nations Military Observers that were a separate force to the

8 UNPROFOR force deployed in Bosnia. I needed accurate assessments by

9 military people as to what was happening on the ground; this was not

10 being provided reliably by the United Nations Military Observers. The

11 background and capabilities of the people who were deployed as

12 joint commission officers was a matter for the troop-contributing

13 nations, not for me.

14 JUDGE ORIE: You're explaining it. You went beyond what I ask

15 you because I think we find that in your statement, but for the public

16 who's listening, they now know that it's joint commission officers.

17 Please proceed.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 Q. When a target was attacked, as was the case in 1993 around

20 Gorazde, how were such targets chosen? Was it supposed to be someone in

21 the field to determine such targets?

22 A. I was not there in 1993 and I have no knowledge of any such

23 activity.

24 Q. But in 1994 --

25 A. But in 1994 the joint commission officers reported to the

Page 6909

1 headquarters in Sarajevo the details of the attack that was being

2 launched on that time from the Serb side, and as a result of those

3 attacks and the identification from where those attacks were coming, NATO

4 air-strikes were called.

5 Q. I understand. Thank you. But in order for NATO aircraft to know

6 what they're targeting, someone on the ground has to tell them that;

7 right? Somebody on the ground has to guide them to this target? And was

8 that one of those eight persons that you sent out there?

9 A. It would have been.

10 Q. The decision to attack Serb positions around Gorazde was your

11 own; right?

12 A. It was certainly me that called for the air-strikes, but of

13 course I was part of a long chain of command which went back to the

14 United Nations in New York.

15 Q. Thank you. At that time a major got killed, a British major; is

16 that correct?

17 A. He was a corporal.

18 Q. [In English] Corporal. [Interpretation] Do you know how that

19 happened?

20 A. He was caught between -- in cross-fire between the Serb side and

21 the Bosnian government side.

22 Q. Is it actually correct that he was killed by the Muslims?

23 A. Difficult to say in the circumstances, but they had stayed too

24 long reporting contact between the two sides. And as they were

25 withdrawing and rounding the bend of a road, the vehicle was hit and he

Page 6910

1 was killed. The report from the people on the ground believed that it

2 was from the Serb side, but it was not deliberate firing, they said, from

3 either side that killed him.

4 Q. So you did not have any information to the effect that they were

5 attacked by Muslims at Jabucko Sedlo, near the cemetery, near the Senokos

6 facility?

7 A. No.

8 Q. At the moment when a NATO airplane is attacking Serb positions,

9 do Serbs, in your view, have the right to respond, to fire back?

10 A. The right -- Serbs had no right in the first place to be in that

11 situation.

12 Q. I do apologise, General. I like to say the following: If I ask

13 you what day it is today and you say, "Five past 10.00," that is the

14 correct time but it's not an answer to my question. So could you please

15 tell me if a NATO airplane targets --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I have to interrupt you here because

17 you're criticising the witness for giving the answer he gave. You are

18 supposed to ask about facts and not about theoretical abstract matters --

19 MR. LUKIC: This is not theoretical, Your Honour --

20 JUDGE ORIE: The question was:

21 "When a NATO airplane is attacking Serb positions, do Serbs, in

22 your view, have the right to respond?"

23 That is an abstract, theoretical question.

24 MR. LUKIC: Okay. I will --

25 JUDGE ORIE: And if you want to focus it on the event which was

Page 6911

1 at the beginning of your testimony [sic], then you should be specific.

2 And then of course the answer given by Mr. Rose is certainly relevant for

3 your question. So since you criticise Mr. Rose for not answering your

4 question, I'm inviting you to put questions about facts rather than about

5 abstract matters and law. Please proceed.

6 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. [Interpretation] General, at a moment when a NATO airplane near

8 Gorazde fires at a Serb target, does the Army of Republika Srpska have

9 the right to fire back at this NATO aircraft?

10 JUDGE ORIE: This is still not a concrete question. Are you --

11 the only thing you changed is that you said "at Gorazde," but still it is

12 not focused on a matter of fact. The reason, Mr. Lukic, why I'm

13 intervening is the following: In the answer the witness gave, he

14 expressed clearly that circumstances, specific circumstances, of the

15 individual case may be relevant for what is a right and what is not a

16 right. So apart from whether we should ask the witness about the legal

17 situation -- but even if you do so, the answer clearly indicates that the

18 witness considers it impossible or very difficult to answer such a

19 question without taking into consideration the specific circumstances of

20 the case. And he's right that that is relevant. Therefore, you should

21 put not a hypothetical case to the witness, but you can ask him about an

22 event that, in your view, happened.

23 Please proceed.

24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Under the circumstances in which you asked for the Serb positions

Page 6912

1 to be targeted around Gorazde, NATO is sending aircraft. The Serbs who

2 are on the ground and who are being targeted by NATO aircraft, should

3 they just be there as sitting ducks or can they respond by firing back,

4 bearing in mind all the circumstances that you are aware of and in which

5 this NATO attack took place.

6 A. There was an alternative action that could have been taken by the

7 Serbs, and that was to stop firing on the town of Gorazde and withdraw

8 their troops from immediate contact. That would have avoided NATO

9 dropping bombs or firing missiles at the Serb positions that were engaged

10 in breaching 824 and 836, the United Nations Security Council

11 Resolutions, which I was bound to use all means possible to deter attacks

12 against those safe areas. NATO was responding in -- to a situation that

13 had been created by the Serb side.

14 Q. We'll get to that, what NATO was responding to and what they did

15 not wish to respond to. But I'll try once again to get an answer to this

16 question. At the moment when this aircraft is flying over Serb

17 positions --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you've got an answer to the question. If

19 you want to put a follow-up question, that's fine, but you've got an

20 answer to your question. I do not accept that you are criticising this

21 witness for not answering your questions where he did, but follow-up

22 questions on the matter, fine, but then perhaps without the introduction

23 outside to get an answer to my question. Please proceed.

24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. So this is the follow-up question, General - sorry if I'm being

Page 6913

1 difficult: At the moment when the aircraft is already above the Serb

2 positions, this is no longer a situation in which the Serbs can stop the

3 attack; right --

4 JUDGE ORIE: No consultations. Write a note, Mr. Mladic. No

5 consultations; they should take place during the break.

6 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic. Sorry to interrupt you in your

7 question.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. I don't seem to have any luck with this question. At the moment

10 when the aircraft is above Serb positions, it had set out to hit its

11 target. Would you agree with me that at that point in time there is no

12 time left for the Serbs to stop the attack and to have the airplane

13 return?

14 A. The situation was very different [Realtime transcript read in

15 error "difficult"] from the one you described. The NATO aircraft flew

16 several times over the predicted targets and fired warning chaff delta,

17 dropping chaff delta or making sonic booms to inform the Serb side that

18 they were under threat of use of lethal force. The Serbs ignored these

19 warnings. In the end, NATO was obliged to carry out a live attack. I

20 don't think at that point the Serbs had the right to fire at the NATO

21 aircraft, given the warnings they had received, but they were determined

22 to continue with their combat operations, and that was not a right that

23 they should have been accorded.

24 Q. Thank you, General. We shall move on.

25 The person guiding the plane is a member of UNPROFOR. Would you

Page 6914

1 agree with me that he, together with the pilot, makes up the team that is

2 attacking a Serb target?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. Sir, on the translation here, it should be:

6 "A. The situation was very different from the one you

7 described."

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for looking at the transcript as well.

9 It's usually reviewed after the session.

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Before you ordered NATO air-strikes on the 10th of April, 1994,

13 you did not know what the boundaries were of that safe area; right?

14 A. The exact delineation of the safe area was never all together

15 clear.

16 Q. Did you know how many Serb civilians were detained in Gorazde?

17 A. I visited the installation and I believe there were 3- to 500

18 people there.

19 Q. You took part in the negotiations in which the Serbs asked for

20 their dead; is that correct?

21 A. I don't recall that particular request.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could I seek clarification. The question

23 was: Did you know how many Serb civilians were detained in Gorazde?

24 Your answer was:

25 "I visited the installation and I believe there were 3- to 500

Page 6915

1 people there."

2 Did you intend or not intend to say that you do not know whether

3 they are civilians or was it a confirmation of the 3- to 500 people being

4 civilians detained there?

5 THE WITNESS: Sir, it was confirmation of the fact that I did not

6 know whether they would have been civilians or former military.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

8 Former military or military at present.

9 THE WITNESS: Military people.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

11 Please proceed.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 Q. The Muslims often tried to involve UNPROFOR in the conflict to

14 have them on their side; that's what they did in this case too; is that

15 correct?

16 A. I have no idea what the intentions or indeed the capabilities of

17 the Bosnian government forces were.

18 Q. Now I would like to go back to your statement, to paragraph 74.

19 You say the United Nations, that is somewhere towards the end of this

20 paragraph.

21 "During the cease-fire, the United Nations hoped a political

22 settlement would be reached."

23 The political settlement pertained to the percentage of territory

24 that was supposed to be given to the two sides. Who was the first one to

25 come up with the 51/49 percentage proposal?

Page 6916

1 A. I have no specific knowledge as to where that figure came from.

2 Q. Thank you. In Gorazde the Muslim units were in town itself; are

3 you aware of that?

4 A. I was aware of that.

5 Q. What was the position of UNPROFOR?

6 A. Are you referring to the period before the Serb offensive into

7 Gorazde or after it?

8 Q. [In English] Before.

9 A. Well, we had UNMOs there. That was all.

10 Q. [Interpretation] What did the UNMOs, or military observers,

11 report? Were there any soldiers of the Bosnian Muslims in Gorazde,

12 regardless of the lack of confidence you had in them? Or what about the

13 JCOs? What did they report once they arrived in Gorazde? Were there any

14 forces of the Bosnian Muslims there in town?

15 A. There were definitely Bosnian government forces in Gorazde.

16 Q. According to UNPROFOR, in Gorazde as a safe area, was it

17 permissible to have forces of either side in town?

18 A. In principle, the safe areas were areas where there was to be

19 no -- by agreement of all parties, there were to be no military forces

20 or, indeed, combat. And this was a way of preserving the lives of the

21 civilians who lived there. I guess all sides cheated on that agreement.

22 Q. There weren't any safe areas where Serbs lived, so I don't see

23 how Serbs could have cheated.

24 A. That's why I added the word "combat," because of course the Serb

25 side attacked into these areas when they were not supposed to. Indeed,

Page 6917

1 they had agreed not to do so.

2 Q. Was it the position of UNPROFOR that the Serb forces should not

3 allow Muslim -- should not attack Muslim forces that are within safe

4 areas?

5 A. That's where the system broke down. There was a failure by the

6 warring parties to stick to the agreement that had been made.

7 Q. Just a moment, please. In Gorazde there was a division of the

8 Muslim army - are you aware of that - the 82nd Division of the

9 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10 A. I already explained I had no specific knowledge of any

11 deployments or capabilities, but the description of a "division" sounds a

12 little bit extreme to me, knowing what a normal division would look like,

13 a theoretical observation.

14 Q. Would you accept that if this is stated in Muslim documentation,

15 namely, that the 82nd Division was stationed within Gorazde?

16 A. Whatever that means.

17 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us what UNPROFOR did during

18 your time to demilitarise the area of Gorazde and whether anything was

19 done at all?

20 A. Once the battalion had deployed to Gorazde, which took place

21 after the events of the first two weeks of April, certainly the unit

22 there would have persuaded the Bosnian government forces not to take

23 active part in any further military operations. Disarmament was not part

24 of our programme.

25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 08145;

Page 6918

1 that's the 65 ter number. Could we please have that document in e-court.

2 JUDGE ORIE: When we're waiting for it, Mr. Lukic, I wondered

3 whether I understood your line of questioning and what you would like to

4 know, and therefore would you please comment if I would formulate the

5 following question before Mr. Rose answers it. Because if it's a

6 question you're not interested in, then we'll let it go.

7 Mr. Rose, the continued presence of Bosnian government military

8 in Gorazde, did that not create a situation in which it would be

9 difficult to blame the Serbs for acting against this presence by military

10 means, where they were not supposed to be within Gorazde? Is that a

11 question which focuses very much on what you'd like to know?

12 Could you please answer that question.

13 THE WITNESS: It made it very difficult to be critical of the

14 Bosnian Serb side --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

16 THE WITNESS: -- when they were responding to attacks against

17 them from within the safe areas.

18 JUDGE ORIE: You say "responding to attacks," but I do understand

19 from you that their mere presence was already in violation of the rules

20 that applied for this safe area. So could you also answer the question

21 more specifically on how I put it to you, that is, not in response to

22 military action, but in response to even the mere presence, a continued

23 presence.

24 THE WITNESS: I think the view at the time of the United Nations

25 was that the Bosnian government forces had the right to maintain infantry

Page 6919

1 units or their own military units wherever they chose on their sovereign

2 territory, that as long as the units were not active and merely

3 maintained themselves as a response to -- for attacks if ever that

4 occurred, that would be the status quo acceptable to the UN. It was when

5 these units attacked out from within the safe areas that it made it

6 impossible to sustain the concept of the safe areas which was dependent

7 on agreements by all parties and not to use those safe areas for combat.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I notice that there is a slight - I wouldn't say

9 contradiction - but inconsistency between one of your previous answers,

10 where you said they were supposed not to be there and not take any

11 military action, which suggests that the mere presence was already a

12 violation. But I now understand that just being there and remaining

13 silent, to say so, and not to move was considered not to be in violation

14 of the concept of the safe area of Gorazde.

15 THE WITNESS: It was a -- it was certainly a violation, sir, but

16 it was one that was accepted, I think, tacitly by the United Nations.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you would say the violation was so innocent,

18 more or less, that it would not justify any action taken against it, but

19 this is an interpretation then of what are acceptable and not acceptable

20 violations.

21 THE WITNESS: It was certainly the status quo that I inherited

22 when I arrived.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may have a follow-up question on that

25 question.

Page 6920

1 Mr. Rose, what was the responsibility of UNPROFOR in a situation

2 where within a declared safe area one of the parties was present in

3 violation of the rules of the game as established for the safe area?

4 THE WITNESS: As I tried to explain, sir, the United Nations were

5 not in a position to forcibly disarm anybody. Pressure could be brought

6 to bear politically through the media on elements who kept their weapons

7 within the safe area, that is, the Bosnian government; and certainly the

8 subject was raised a number of times by the United Nations with the

9 Bosnian government. But each time the Bosnian government would reply, we

10 have the right to maintain military forces where we choose to, say the

11 next level of argument was: Well, they must not be active in that case

12 and must only be there for -- in the form of ultimate self-defence. And

13 that became the accepted status quo that I inherited.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: I -- my question didn't deal with the right to

15 disarm any of the parties. I'm just asking the question: If, according

16 to the establishment of a safe area, it is a violation to be merely

17 present as a military force inside of the safe area. I'm saying what did

18 that kind of presence evoke by way of responsibility on the part of the

19 United Nations?

20 THE WITNESS: Only political pressure.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: And if --

22 THE WITNESS: To disarm.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: To disarm or to get the army out of the area?

24 THE WITNESS: Just to hand in their weapons.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: It doesn't seem to me as if that was addressing

Page 6921

1 what would have been the agreement regarding the establishment of a safe

2 area. If I understand you -- unless I am missing something, if I

3 understand you well, you are saying no military presence is allowed

4 within a safe area. Is that a starting point?

5 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, the military on the Bosnian side were

6 often civilians or militia who merely were issued with weapons;

7 therefore, it was difficult to say who was formed military units and who

8 were not. In most cases, they were not formed military units; they were

9 civilians who had got weapons and had formed themselves into military

10 units. The wish of the United Nations when the discussions took place

11 establishing the safe areas was that with the agreements of all parties

12 they would disarm, not move the militias or people out of the safe areas,

13 but disarm, hand their weapons in, and that would then guarantee the

14 sanctity of that safe area. Unfortunately, the Bosnian government side

15 failed to do that.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you now say these were civilians who were

17 armed --

18 THE WITNESS: Many of them were.

19 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- the debate gets extended and I will end it at

20 that point because we'll never stop now. Thank you so much.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock. It's time for

22 a break. We've deprived you of some time for your questions. We'll take

23 a break after the witness has left the courtroom and we'll resume at five

24 minutes to 11.00.

25 [The witness stands down]

Page 6922

1 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

2 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. General Rose, you were familiar with the various agreements that

8 had been concluded concerning Srebrenica and Zepa which expressly

9 contained provisions stating that the forces of the Muslim or Bosnian

10 army had to either leave Zepa or hand over all of their weapons to

11 UNPROFOR; isn't that correct?

12 A. I was not there at the time the agreement was made, but that was

13 my understanding.

14 Q. You told us you inherited the situation on the ground, which is

15 that UNPROFOR tolerated the existence of armed elements of the Muslim

16 army within the protected areas. It pertained to both Srebrenica and

17 Zepa, as well as Gorazde and Sarajevo and Tuzla and Bihac; correct?

18 A. That's so.

19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please help us to understand your answer. It's

20 only recorded "that's."

21 THE WITNESS: That is so.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Contrary to such practice, the purpose of such protected areas

25 was to protect civilians and not soldiers controlled by

Page 6923

1 Alija Izetbegovic; isn't that correct?

2 A. That was the reason for establishing the safe areas.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] While we're on the topic of Gorazde,

5 could we please have in e-court 65 ter number 1845.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 8145.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. We see in item 3 that Mr. Karadzic assured you that the intention

9 of the Serb side was not to take Gorazde, and in your testimony yesterday

10 you told us that it was how you saw things too; is that correct?

11 A. That is so.

12 Q. Later in the document, in item 7 which is on the next page in

13 this version, Mr. Karadzic told you that he could not take a decision in

14 that regard on his own but that he had to consult the Security Council,

15 as translated, or rather he specified the names of Koljevic, Krajisnik,

16 Plavsic, and the defence minister, as well as that of the interior. In

17 this chain, or rather, body which was supposed to make that decision,

18 Mr. Karadzic did not include General Mladic. Were you familiar with the

19 way of how decisions were made regarding Gorazde and who participated in

20 that decision-making process?

21 A. No, I was not.

22 Q. Thank you. In item 8 of the same document we see that

23 Mr. Karadzic insisted on at least four months -- actually, that his side

24 insisted on a permanent cessation of hostilities which would be at least

25 of six months' duration. That was in item 1 or (i). So this too tallies

Page 6924

1 with what you told us yesterday, which is that the Serb side constantly

2 favoured a permanent cessation of hostilities; correct?

3 A. It certainly is correct.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Next I would kindly ask for document

6 1D550 in e-court. We need page 2.

7 Q. General, it is your testimony of the 7th of October, 2010. We're

8 interested in lines 2 to 4. On that occasion you stated that it had been

9 discussed previously and that the status was different for the Bosnian

10 government side than it was for the Bosnian Serb side.

11 Yesterday you explained that the UN recognised only

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state and that at the time Republika Srpska

13 was not recognised as such an entity. My question is this: Is it then

14 correct that with regards to same obligations there was a difference in

15 treatment between the two warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

16 Muslim and the Serb side? Or rather, is it correct that when

17 implementing undertaken obligations, the two sides were treated

18 differently?

19 A. I don't think the two things are logically connected. The UN

20 mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to act impartially in respect of its

21 treatment of all three sides and that we were delivering humanitarian aid

22 to those three sides. When it came to trying to negotiate or broker a

23 peace, we equally treated the three sides equally as one would have to do

24 as an impartial mediator. Whether we were neutral in the long-term as to

25 what the outcome would have been is another matter all together, but it

Page 6925

1 did not enter into the calculation at the time.

2 Q. Thank you. At the time did you know, although I'm aware of the

3 fact that you are not a lawyer - as you have pointed out - and you

4 actually said at page 7405 on the 6th of October, 2010, in the trial of

5 President Karadzic:

6 [In English] "I'm no expert on international law."

7 [Interpretation] Still, I am inclined to ask the following: Did

8 you at the time know what it meant that the three peoples in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina were all constituent?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Did you know that the Muslims actually usurped the power in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, portraying themselves as the only legitimate

13 representatives on behalf of the entire state?

14 A. I had no such knowledge.

15 Q. Did you know that at the time in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

16 matter of fact it was the Christian population that made up the majority

17 of the population, that is to say Serbs and Croats?

18 A. I think I was aware of that.

19 Q. Thank you. I will briefly turn to Bihac next. In e-court we

20 need 1D551 which is your testimony in the Karadzic case of the

21 8th October 2010. We need page 39 in e-court, lines 5 through 8.

22 Perhaps the page is not correct. We need page 7539, which is five pages

23 back, lines 5 through 8. You were asked about an offensive of the Muslim

24 army from Bihac and a counter-offensive undertaken by the Serb army:

25 [In English] "Thank you, General. But they could fully envisage

Page 6926

1 what would happen if we would launch a counter-offensive. You would

2 attack them with sharp words and us with sharp bombs; right?"

3 And your answer was:

4 "I suppose you could put it like that."

5 [Interpretation] The thrust of my questions was in this vein when

6 I asked you whether there was a different treatment according to the

7 sides. There was a drastic difference, as a matter of fact, General, and

8 we'll get to that. You could ask that NATO undertake action against the

9 Muslim side, but you were openly told that NATO would not act against the

10 Muslim element in Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that correct?

11 A. I was told on one occasion that the -- when the Bosnian Serb army

12 breached the ultimatum regarding the total exclusion zone on Mount Igman

13 and I discussed with the air commander in Italy the prospects of calling

14 in air-strikes against those elements because they were engaging with the

15 French forces on the ground that this would not be accepted by NATO.

16 That was the only occasion I can remember discussing specifically

17 air-strikes against the Muslim Bosnian side.

18 Q. So you are trying to tell us that on other occasions you did not

19 ask that NATO bomb Muslim forces because of operations they were carrying

20 out?

21 A. It was not in our remit to do so unless they were in breach of a

22 particular ultimatum, and that was the only occasion I remember them

23 being in breach of a NATO ultimatum.

24 Q. So if they violated the agreements they had signed with UNPROFOR,

25 such as the agreement on demilitarisation of Srebrenica or Zepa or

Page 6927

1 Gorazde, the Muslims were in no danger that action would be taken against

2 them; is that correct?

3 A. That is so. I think certain explanation may be required to that

4 answer, and that is that the United Nations were not deployed to enforce

5 any peace or to prevent combat between the warring parties by the use of

6 military force; they were there purely in a peacekeeping role. And that,

7 I think, puts in context the position I've just described of the

8 United Nations with regards to attacks by one party or another.

9 Q. We keep going back to the topic of the humanitarian part of

10 UNPROFOR mandate, but, as it seems, UNPROFOR also asked NATO to bomb the

11 Serb side, save for the one occasion we have discussed. And if one

12 applies common sense to that, one realises that it is no humanitarian

13 issue but a military one; correct?

14 A. Incorrect. The UN only required -- requested air-strikes when

15 convoys were being held up or when attacks were being made into the safe

16 areas or when weapons were taken from weapon-collecting points. In each

17 occasion these acts were carried out by the Serbs.

18 Q. You never asked that Muslim attacks be sanctioned, the attacks

19 they carried out from inside the protected areas, thus provoking

20 counter-attacks by the Serb side; isn't that correct?

21 A. I don't know what you mean by "sanctioned."

22 Q. You never asked NATO aircraft support, you never asked them to

23 bomb Muslim positions?

24 A. We did not.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 6928

1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I step in here for one additional question in

2 that respect.

3 Sir, you told us earlier that there was one occasion when

4 air-strikes asked against Bosnian Muslim forces and you said that this

5 would not be accepted by NATO. Do you know the reason for this denial by

6 NATO?

7 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, sir. We didn't officially ask for

8 air-strikes. I discussed it with the air commander who was based in

9 Italy, and he said that they would never accept air-strikes against the

10 Muslim forces.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: But you don't know the reason?

12 THE WITNESS: I was not given a reason, sir, although I had my

13 suspicions because by then NATO had quite clearly taken sides in this

14 war, which the United Nations had not done.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And just before my question Mr. Lukic asked you:

16 "You never asked NATO aircraft support, you never asked them to

17 bomb Muslim positions."

18 And you said:

19 "We did not."

20 Why not?

21 THE WITNESS: Because the -- apart from the one incident that I

22 described on Mount Igman when the Bosnian government forces were in

23 breach of a NATO ultimatum, not to have military forces within that total

24 exclusion zone, there was no other occasion which would have justified

25 it. Our job was not to try and stop the combat by force of arms from

Page 6929

1 either side.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, is it correct that armed Muslim forces by attacking Serb

5 positions and withdrawing to a town which was inside the protected areas

6 actually placed civilians in danger?

7 A. Evidently so.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Next I would kindly ask for

10 65 ter 9033 to be placed in e-court.

11 Q. General, it is a document of the Main Staff of the

12 Army of Republika Srpska of the 18th of April, 1994. We see there that

13 there were NATO aircraft attacks underway which had bombed and fired at

14 Bosnian Serb positions in the area of Gorazde. Simultaneously, we see

15 Muslim forces attacking the Nisici plateau. We'll take a look at another

16 document about this. What knowledge did you have about the co-ordination

17 of NATO air-strikes and the attacks of Muslim forces from the protected

18 areas?

19 A. There was no such co-ordination. Each NATO attack was mounted in

20 response to a Serb attack on the safe area. We did not co-ordinate in

21 any way a response. And of course NATO air-strikes were only delivered

22 after due warning.

23 Q. Such warnings obviously reached the Muslim forces as well. Did

24 you inform them about that? Were they aware when you warned the Serb

25 side?

Page 6930

1 A. I have no knowledge as to whether they were intercepting our

2 messages to the Serb side, but there is no reason why we should have

3 warned them.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 65 ter 8966 in

5 e-court.

6 Q. It has to do with paragraph 87 of your statement. That's not the

7 right number. It's not what we need. Perhaps we can use the ERN number

8 to locate the right document. 04394709. It is the B/C/S version. The

9 English version has the same number.

10 General, at the top of the page we see the following:

11 "NATO air raids on the positions of the Herzegovina Corps have

12 provided direct support to the Muslim forces, allowing them to mount a

13 counterattack along all axes."

14 Were you receiving reports that the Muslim armed elements used

15 NATO air-strikes to carry out attacks on Serb sides?

16 A. Well, it's a completely incorrect assessment by Colonel Masal who

17 wrote this signal. NATO did not co-ordinate in any way its activities

18 with the Bosnian government forces. If the government -- Bosnian

19 government forces chose to use an air-strike to carry out military

20 activity, that was their concern, not ours.

21 Q. What is the source of your knowledge that NATO did not

22 co-ordinate its actions with the Muslim forces?

23 A. Because it was I that was calling the NATO air-strikes and in no

24 way was I co-ordinating those air-strikes, timing them, or any other form

25 of co-ordination with the Bosnian government forces. They were being

Page 6931

1 called down in direct response to actions by the Serbs.

2 Q. I don't know whether my question was phrased properly or

3 interpreted properly. I'm not trying to say that you took part in that.

4 What I'm saying is the following: What is your source of information to

5 the effect that, or rather, did NATO co-ordinate its activity with the

6 Muslim side?

7 A. Well, since NATO only carried out air-strikes as a result of a

8 request by me, that could not have been the case because I was not

9 co-ordinating the air-strikes to conform to any activity by the Bosnian

10 government forces. That is quite clear.

11 Q. Thank you. At paragraph 85 you explained that at that point in

12 time Serb tanks had left the area and went in the direction of Visegrad.

13 Now that we're discussing the attack against Gorazde that continued. So

14 after that it was only the infantry that was involved in these attacks.

15 Is that what we can infer on the basis of your statement?

16 A. No. Tanks can turn around and come back and artillery can fire

17 and mortars can fire.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, just for the record you initially called

20 for 8966, where apparently in view of the ERN number you then used you

21 intended to call for 65 ter 8996, which by the way is P731.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Now paragraph 89 of your statement. You say the following:

24 "On the 12th of April, 1994, Gorazde was relatively quiet until

25 the Bosnian Government army," the BH Army, "began to fire mortars and

Page 6932

1 mounted infantry attacks at the Bosnian Serb army from within the safe

2 area," of Gorazde.

3 I assume that yet again you did not ask for NATO to bomb Muslim

4 positions because of this action?

5 A. Definitely not. It was not within our mandate so to do.

6 Q. My next question would precisely be as follows: What was -- what

7 was it that the Muslims were supposed to do for you to ask to have their

8 side bombed too?

9 A. I've given you the one example where they breached a NATO

10 ultimatum and I called for air-strikes; that's the only occasion I can

11 remember. If they chose to attack out from within a safe area, that did

12 not, in our view, justify using air-strikes against them even if NATO

13 would have responded, which they - as I now know - would not have done.

14 We would have of course not left that unremarked. We would have raised

15 that incident with President Izetbegovic, pointed out to him that he was

16 hazarding the safety and the lives of his own people in Gorazde, and we

17 would have used all possible pressures, other than military force, use of

18 military force, to stop that kind of incident reoccurring.

19 Q. So once again it would be the way Dr. Karadzic had put it, you

20 would only target them with sharp words; isn't that right?

21 A. If that's what he -- how he likes to describe it.

22 Q. In Tuzla, that's where the command and the units of the 2nd Corps

23 of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were; in Sarajevo, of the 1st Corps of

24 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Gorazde, units of the 82nd Division of

25 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; in Srebrenica, the command and units of

Page 6933

1 the 28th Division of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and in Zepa, the

2 command of the units of the Zepa Brigade; in Bihac, the command of the

3 units of the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina: All the

4 mentioned locations had been declared safe areas. From all of these

5 places active combat was launched against Serb positions; isn't that

6 right? Is that your knowledge?

7 A. It certainly happened on a number of occasions from some of those

8 safe areas. I can't confirm whether it happened from all safe areas. I

9 don't, for example, remember anything happening from Zepa.

10 Q. During your mandate, did you ever propose a review of the

11 position involved, namely, that these were safe areas?

12 A. The topic of safe areas was under constant discussion within the

13 United Nations because there was a, as you pointed out, some

14 contradiction here. On the one hand the state, the recognised state of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina had every right to station its forces, such as they

16 were, wherever it chose; on the other hand, it had agreed to demilitarise

17 these safe areas. The fact that it had chosen not to do so and had, as

18 you pointed out, launched out a number of actions from these safe areas

19 was a matter of deep regret to the United Nations. We took up the matter

20 frequently with President Izetbegovic and the vice-president, Mr. Ganic,

21 and we tried to point out that all they were doing was hazarding the

22 lives of their civilians living in those areas and making it difficult to

23 bring about peace. But as I equally pointed out, by then the Bosnian

24 government side had determined that they would be more likely to regain

25 their lost territories by war means than by the peace process. And so

Page 6934

1 they were being unhelpful at that point to the United Nations peace

2 effort.

3 Q. Thank you, General.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have document

5 65 ter 08714 in e-court. It should be in this document, but I seem to be

6 unable to find it.

7 Q. It has to do with paragraph 95 of your statement. However, the

8 document was shown to you but you didn't really comment upon it.

9 However, we can see from this document that the report says that it was

10 Muslims that fired at NATO aircraft. Did you ever receive such

11 information, namely, that Muslims had opened fire at NATO aircraft?

12 A. If you're talking about the Gorazde incident, I received no such

13 reports.

14 Q. This mainly has to do with the shelling of the town of Doboj in

15 northern Bosnia that was shelled by the Muslim forces every day

16 throughout the war.

17 A. I didn't have any knowledge of any firing on NATO aircraft in

18 that location.

19 Q. Please give me a moment. We'll have to move on. I cannot find

20 it now so we'll have to go back.

21 As for humanitarian aid - and you say that that is what UNPROFOR

22 was primarily in charge of - is it correct that anywhere in the world it

23 is soldiers who first receive humanitarian aid and it is only afterwards

24 that all others do? Was that the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well?

25 A. Well, there was no specific evidence --

Page 6935

1 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] -- could we first -- these

2 are -- a question starts with a general observation. I think it would be

3 fair that we first ask whether you do agree with this general observation

4 that humanitarian aid is always everywhere in the world received first by

5 the military and only then by those for whom it is intended. Do you

6 agree with that statement?

7 THE WITNESS: I certainly do so.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Then the second question, whether this happened here

9 as well, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 THE WITNESS: I don't recall any specific incidents where we

11 discovered United Nations' supplies in the front line, but I think it was

12 certainly happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina on all sides.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Do I understand you then that all the humanitarian

16 aid that came in was first given to the military?

17 THE WITNESS: No, sir. The way the system worked is we would

18 hand it over at a distribution point to local representatives from the

19 community, who very often would then subsequently hand it on to the

20 military.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand. To that extent, the

22 humanitarian aid was supporting the fitness of the military primarily; is

23 that -- that is the consequence of your --

24 THE WITNESS: I think that's an inevitable consequence of a

25 humanitarian aid programme, but the alternative is worse in the view of

Page 6936

1 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could I perhaps ask one follow-up question. Were

5 you referring to situations of armed conflict or were you talking in

6 general about humanitarian aid?

7 THE WITNESS: Situations of armed conflict, sir.

8 JUDGE ORIE: In armed conflict. Thank you.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to ask for

10 65 ter number 8714. Could we please have that in e-court. We need the

11 bottom of the page in B/C/S, the beginning. The very bottom of the page.

12 I do apologise. And page 2 in English. It's quite illegible.

13 Q. That question of mine is based on this document. It says at 1640

14 hours an area -- in the area of Gorazde --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find this

16 reference and it's being read out too fast.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could you try to find for us what you're

18 reading from.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] 8189 is the 65 ter number that I

20 actually need. We see it at the bottom of the page of this document and

21 it's on page 2 of the English version.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, can you tell us is this document 8714

23 or 8189?

24 MR. LUKIC: 8189, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: This is what this document is?

Page 6937

1 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. And to what part of the page must we look

3 in the English?

4 JUDGE ORIE: I think it's just below the -- if you are referring

5 to the paragraph which mentions 1640 hours, it would be the paragraph

6 just below the middle of the page "in the area of responsibility" --

7 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, do you see this report where it says that an aircraft

11 had been hit in the area of Gorazde and that it was fired at from

12 Muslim-held territory and it crashed on Mount Jahorina? Do you see that

13 it's in the document? Do you believe that Serbs would be gloating if

14 they had downed the aircraft? Do you think that that's what they would

15 be doing rather than saying it's the other side that downed it?

16 A. All I can say without commenting on the Serbs or the Muslim

17 position is that the pilot who I had spoken to and NATO were quite sure

18 that the aircraft was -- if it's the Harrier aircraft we're referring

19 to - was shot down by Serb ground-to-air missiles. They are having taken

20 that view because they saw previous missiles fired at them but missing;

21 on this occasion, it hit. So I think that report is completely

22 inaccurate.

23 Q. Is that the only aircraft that had been shot down in the area of

24 Gorazde?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 6938

1 Q. Thank you. In this report in paragraph 4 - so we need the next

2 page in English now and in B/C/S - we probably have to go further ahead

3 in English, one page up. Let's see number 4 --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm also looking at the clock. It's

5 approximately time. So perhaps you reorganise your sources and then we

6 can more efficiently proceed. But before we take a break, I'd like to

7 ask one additional question on a matter which is still puzzling me, that

8 is, the military receiving or benefitting first from humanitarian aid.

9 You said this is considered -- the other option would even consider to be

10 worse. Now, I've been thinking about what the other option would be,

11 that would be that you would not provide humanitarian aid at all. And do

12 I then understand that the risk that there are even not any leftovers for

13 the civilian population would be the worst situation. Is that how I have

14 to understand it or ... ?

15 THE WITNESS: I mean, the quantity of aid being delivered was

16 sufficient for 2.7 million refugees who were dependent on that aid in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. An element of that aid certainly would have gone to

18 the soldiers on the front line, many of whom of course were civilians

19 anyway but merely taking up their position on rotation in the front line.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, then --

21 THE WITNESS: It was impossible therefore to say that no aid went

22 to the front line, and typically in an environment like that the soldiers

23 would be fed first and then the remainder of the aid would go to the

24 civilian population. And I think that was probably the case in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But not to have delivered aid would have been

Page 6939

1 unacceptable to the international community.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, now I better understand the worse alternative

3 as you called it.

4 We take a break and we resume at a quarter past 12.00, but first

5 could the witness leave the courtroom.

6 [The witness stands down]

7 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.19 p.m.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

10 [The witness takes the stand]

11 JUDGE ORIE: I use the time meanwhile, Mr. Lukic, but I'm also

12 addressing you -- I'm also addressing the Prosecution, Ms. Bibles. I

13 rephrased or at least I phrased a question, Mr. Lukic, in a way because I

14 thought that that is the question you'd like to seek an answer to. Now,

15 at the same time in that question - and I followed you there, rightly or

16 not - there was a suggestion that the permanent presence of military in

17 the safe area of Gorazde was prohibited. Now, the Chamber is a bit

18 confused now and then about what is the legal instrument by which some

19 behaviour or activity is prohibited. For example, do the

20 Security Council Resolutions - you might think of 824 and 836 - do they

21 impose an obligation to withdraw troops, of whatever kind, from all

22 places near the safe areas? Or is it on the basis of an agreement

23 between the parties? And whenever you ask questions like: Why didn't

24 you respond with force, air-strikes? Then of course the question arises:

25 What were the limits of the use of force? What were the conditions?

Page 6940

1 Et cetera, et cetera. And in order to avoid any confusion in that

2 respect, the Chamber would very much like to receive from the parties the

3 texts which are determining the -- the -- at the various moments in

4 time were determining conditions, definition of safe areas, et cetera, so

5 that we are better able to understand the testimony and sometimes the

6 questions that are put to witnesses.

7 Mr. Rose, I addressed the parties when you came in. We'll now

8 proceed --

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

10 JUDGE ORIE: -- with your cross-examination.

11 Mr. Lukic.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. You see in item 4 - and that's where we left off, General - it is

14 the Main Staff of the VRS document of the 16th of April, 1994. In item 4

15 we have a description of the situation with regards to the air-space. It

16 reads:

17 "The enemy continued with reconnaissance activities, the training

18 of plane crews and exercising power in Republika Srpska air-space. The

19 focal point of the NATO Air Force runs was in the areas of

20 Sarajevo - Gorazde, Kupres - Bugojno, Tuzla - Brcko - Doboj,

21 Banja Luka - Gradiska and occasionally Mostar - Konjic and

22 Petrovac - Bihac. A total of 108 enemy formations have been detected and

23 observed, out of which five were in the territory of Croatia."

24 It is obvious that at that point in time Serbs considered NATO

25 airplanes enemy airplanes, as we can see from this document. Perhaps you

Page 6941

1 can answer that.

2 A. I'm not sure what the question is.

3 Q. Can we see from the document that Serbs considered NATO airplanes

4 enemy airplanes?

5 A. Well, I can't comment on the Serbs' attitude towards NATO, but I

6 could understand if that was the case.

7 Q. Thank you. The sorties of such planes, as we can see here there

8 were 108 enemy formations. Well, what was the goal of those flights?

9 Were they of humanitarian nature? Military nature? Reconnaissance? If

10 you know.

11 A. Well, I disagree with the use of the word "enemy." NATO were

12 there to enforce the no-fly zone. They were there to provide close-air

13 defence for the United Nations peacekeepers on the ground. And they were

14 there to enforce the passage of convoys, to deter attacks against safe

15 areas, which I think is the reading of 824, et cetera. It was not there

16 to wage war against any side.

17 Q. Whether they were waging war or not, NATO airplanes had already

18 bombed Serb positions and only Serb positions, were they not?

19 A. We've already identified that fact.

20 Q. Was it justified in your view from a military standpoint?

21 A. I would not have called in air-strikes if I hadn't felt they were

22 justified.

23 Q. Was it justified from a military standpoint that the Serbs were

24 preparing themselves to be targeted by NATO airplanes again?

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you are referring to "from a military

Page 6942

1 standpoint." I think if we understand the testimony of this witness

2 well, the use of force, military force, was ruled by - and this comes

3 back to the issue I raised before the witness came in after the

4 break - was ruled by the mandate of those who were tasked with

5 supervising and by the United Nations Security Council to perform their

6 jobs; and to the extent allowed by that, to call for support by those who

7 had airplanes available. And now -- and then to put "from a military

8 point of view," which very much sounds as if it was just an ordinary

9 combat situation. So I would like you to clearly take into consideration

10 the testimony of the witness on the situation which existed and then to

11 explore what you would like to know about what was justified and what was

12 not justified on the basis of the mandate, on the basis of who decided on

13 it, who then called for it. And then as a part of that, perhaps also if

14 you want to include that matters like: Was it an air-strike against an

15 individual soldier somewhere? That is then the last portion of a whole

16 and a complex series of events and considerations and you cannot just

17 simplify the situation and say: From a military point of view was it

18 justified? You need to address all the various aspects of that question

19 because otherwise it wouldn't assist the Chamber.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will try to abide by

21 your instructions, although I am of the opinion that the area I have been

22 exploring is not as broad. I'm simply trying to establish the fact that

23 the Serbs considered that NATO was the enemy at the time. I wanted to

24 establish that their view was justified and what the consequences were as

25 regards the movement of convoys.

Page 6943

1 JUDGE ORIE: If you just justify it or not requires to look at it

2 in such detail and what the attitude of the Serbs was, the witness has

3 several times said "I do not know." What you can ask him is under what

4 legal or military regime the actions were taken as they were taken and

5 then to explore them in such a way that it enables the Chamber to form

6 its judgement on what was justified or what was not justified.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] With all due respect, I do not

8 believe that a Serb soldier in the field was interested in the legal

9 standpoint --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I didn't invite you -- I mean, I gave you

11 my guidance. Then you re-opened more or less a debate. Then I gave you

12 again my guidance. And now to do it for a third time, there's no need to

13 do that. Just proceed and elicit the evidence from the witness which you

14 consider to be relevant with my guidance.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. We see here that the plane flights occurred at the time not only

17 in the crisis areas, such as Gorazde, Sarajevo, we see that they also

18 flew over Kupres, Bugojno, Tuzla, Brcko, Doboj, Banja Luka, Gradiska. In

19 those areas, if you know, why were there NATO flights there?

20 A. You would have to ask NATO that question. NATO was embarked, as

21 I've already stated, on a -- enforcing a no-fly zone and it was in

22 support of that mission or in support of the United Nations peacekeepers

23 on the ground that they were in the air at all. So it would have been

24 one or the other.

25 Q. In any case, these NATO planes were not there for humanitarian

Page 6944

1 reasons, were they? They were not delivering humanitarian aid? That was

2 the thrust of my question.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the question has been answered. The

4 witness has said what it was and that had got nothing to do with

5 humanitarian aid. It was to ensure the no-fly zone or to give the

6 necessary report to what happened on the ground, I take it, with the

7 agreement and the approval of all relevant authorities.

8 THE WITNESS: And I could add one more thing, sir, and that is

9 that I think early in the spring of 1994 there was still a programme of

10 air-dropping humanitarian aid to a number of the enclaves, such as

11 Maglaj, although that was terminated because we were able to deliver aid

12 by land after that. So there was some active air-dropping of

13 humanitarian aid by NATO in the early part of that year.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. So in mid-April 1994 there were air-drops of humanitarian aid

17 still in place?

18 A. I think they had terminated possibly by mid -- that year. I

19 don't know the exact date. But you should also remember that a lot of

20 the air landed aid to Sarajevo airport came through NATO as well.

21 Q. Thank you. Could we please have in e-court P732, which is a

22 document you have commented upon yesterday during your

23 examination-in-chief. It is related to paragraph 96 of your statement.

24 We see that it is a document of the Main Staff of the

25 Army of Republika Srpska --

Page 6945

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic.

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Where it is stated that pursuant to an oral order of the

4 president of Republika Srpska the following is being ordered. In the

5 last paragraph which you commented upon it is stated as follows:

6 "Immediately take measures to intensify security and control over

7 the members of UNPROFOR and international humanitarian organisations. In

8 case of massive air attack against units and facilities of the RS, the

9 said must be immediately disarmed, arrested, and the weaponry and combat

10 equipment confiscated and used for anti-aircraft combat."

11 Your interpretation yesterday at transcript page 6857 in this

12 trial, lines 3 through 15, was that you understood it to mean that the

13 manpower should be used for anti-aircraft combat by exposing them to NATO

14 bombardment. In B/C/S and in the English version as far as I can see, if

15 we look at the translation and the semantics, one would not conclude that

16 because it says the weaponry and combat equipment should be confiscated

17 and used for anti-aircraft combat. Would you agree that based on this

18 document one cannot conclude anything other than what we can read in it?

19 A. Well, I stand corrected in that case.

20 Q. Thank you. I would like to move to paragraph 97 of your

21 statement. We also need document 8734. It is a 65 ter document. On

22 page 2 -- well, we can see that it is a document of the Main Staff of the

23 Army of Republika Srpska dated the 20th of April, 1994. On page 2 in the

24 B/C/S, which is also page 2 in the English, the part describing the

25 situation in the corps begins. We are interested in sub-item (c), we

Page 6946

1 find it on page 3 in the English, whereas in the B/C/S it's still on the

2 same page. We see again -- well, it reads as follows:

3 "The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps: The 1st rpbr, as part of the

4 'Zvijezda 94' operation, is engaged in active operations in the direction

5 of Orahovica and Datelj. The other units of the Corps are at full-scale

6 combat-readiness in order to prevent any surprises by Muslims and

7 UNPROFOR."

8 We see again that the Serb side saw Muslims and UNPROFOR as one

9 side to the conflict. I wanted to ask you this: At the time, were the

10 humanitarian aid convoys stopped? Was there a cessation of their

11 movement at the time?

12 A. Yes, there was.

13 Q. Did you expect such a cessation in the movement of convoys

14 following your order for NATO to carry out air-strikes on Serb positions?

15 A. Yes, we did.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, would you allow me to go back to one of

17 your previous questions, that was about the interpretation of the

18 document whether it said that the weaponry and the combat equipment

19 confiscated from UNPROFOR members and international humanitarian

20 organisations to be used for anti-aircraft combat, was the weaponry and

21 the equipment of UNPROFOR which you could confiscate, would that be --

22 could that be militarily -- properly be used in anti-aircraft combat?

23 THE WITNESS: I'm -- not really. So I know it was small arms we

24 carried and the chances of hitting a fast-moving jet were minute. When I

25 read that statement the first time, I was referring to the fact that on a

Page 6947

1 number of occasions UN personnel were definitely placed by potential NATO

2 targets in order to protect them. And I was assuming that both weapons

3 and personnel were being referred to by that last bit of the statement,

4 but I'm much relieved to hear that it was only the weapons that they

5 thought were going to be useful.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let me read it then again the line to you.

7 Perhaps we could have it on the screen again. This was ...

8 MR. LUKIC: P732.

9 JUDGE ORIE: P732, paragraph 4, page 1 in English. And I slowly

10 read it again, "In case there is a massive" -- I beg your pardon, it's

11 not on the screen yet. Yes, it's at the bottom of this page. I start

12 halfway:

13 "In case there is a massive air attack on units and facilities of

14 the RS, the said must be immediately disarmed," and that's a reference to

15 UNPROFOR, members of UNPROFOR, international humanitarian organisations,

16 "arrested and the weaponry and combat equipment confiscated and used for

17 the anti-aircraft combat."

18 Now, apparently we are at this moment interpreting a text. I'm

19 not a native English-speaking person, but I wondered whether the word

20 "used" here where there's no specific reference to any of the previous

21 portions of what had to be done, that is, persons to be disarmed and

22 arrested, weaponry and equipment to be confiscated and used, whether

23 there's any -- in terms of language, whether there's any ambiguity in

24 what "used" would refer to.

25 THE WITNESS: I think there is, sir. I think you could read that

Page 6948

1 statement as the UN must be immediately disarmed, arrested, and

2 weaponry -- it's disappeared.

3 JUDGE ORIE: It should be still there.

4 THE WITNESS: It's come back.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 THE WITNESS: The UN must be immediately disarmed, arrested, and

7 the weaponry and combat equipment confiscated and used could refer to

8 both the weaponry and the personnel if you wanted to read it that way.

9 JUDGE ORIE: If you say it's not unambiguous in the English

10 version?

11 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] No. So that's why I in my

12 first statement yesterday assumed that they were also referring to the UN

13 personnel being used as well as the equipment.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 THE WITNESS: But I'm relieved to be corrected by counsel for the

16 Defence.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Whether you're corrected or whether the ambiguity is

18 there and not resolved, we might have to go back to the original language

19 because that's the language the author used and perhaps ask whether a

20 similar ambiguity does exist in the B/C/S version of this document. That

21 would be the best way to proceed.

22 Mr. Lukic, perhaps we could find a way to see whether a similar

23 ambiguity is found in the original text.

24 MR. LUKIC: I'm not a translator, but according to me --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, let's --

Page 6949

1 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --

2 JUDGE ORIE: I said let's ask for --

3 MR. LUKIC: And there is -- according to me there is not any

4 ambiguity.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Could be. Then we should seek a better translation

6 so as not to be confused.

7 Could -- it's a document you presented, Ms. Bibles. Could you

8 perhaps briefly seek from the CLSS a short memo on whether the ambiguity

9 which is by a native-speaking person but apparently also by me has been

10 noted, whether a similar ambiguity exists in the original language.

11 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour, we will do that immediately.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

13 Please proceed.

14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Irrespective of any linguistic problems, although I believe there

16 are none, I wanted to go back to these combat assets. The weapons and

17 combat equipment were to be seized and used for anti-aircraft combat.

18 Combat equipment in this case would also include communications equipment

19 that some of the UNPROFOR members had with them in order to guide planes;

20 is it not correct? Did some UNPROFOR members have such combat equipment

21 used to communicate with NATO airplanes?

22 A. Yes, they did.

23 Q. Could that be used in, for instance, alarming the troops or

24 guiding them to a wrong target?

25 A. No, it could not.

Page 6950

1 Q. Please explain why not.

2 A. Because the pilots of the aircraft would have detected

3 immediately that they were being improperly used by other parties. They

4 would not have had the codes and they wouldn't have had the language to

5 be able to direct aircraft wrongly, even if the Serbs had tried so to do.

6 Q. By seizing such equipment, would precise guidance and targeting

7 have been prevented?

8 A. It certainly would have been.

9 Q. Very well. Thank you. I will leave this topic now. Where was I

10 before I went back to this topic?

11 JUDGE ORIE: You were with a different document. That's what I

12 remember, Mr. Lukic. I caused the disturbance.

13 MR. LUKIC: Yes, that's fine.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Paragraph 99 of your statement, General. There

15 you discuss the 23rd of April, 1994. You say that an agreement was

16 reached following the NATO ultimatum and UN Resolution 913:

17 "The agreement included an immediate cease-fire in and around

18 Gorazde and the creation of a 3-kilometre exclusion zone from which the

19 Bosnian Serb sources would withdraw, as well as the creation of a

20 20-kilometre heavy weapons exclusion zone, medical evacuation for the

21 wounded, and freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and humanitarian

22 organisations."

23 By virtue of this agreement, were any obligations placed upon the

24 Muslim side, if you recall?

25 A. No, I don't think there were other than they should desist from

Page 6951

1 using the safe areas - which was a general point we continually made to

2 them - for military operations.

3 Q. So they did not have to disarm; right?

4 A. That was not part of the agreement, as far as I can remember it.

5 Q. In the next paragraph, 100, which is a continuation, if you will,

6 but in general terms you say:

7 "From my experiences and observations of the events surrounding

8 the BSA's attempted take-over of Gorazde in April 1994, I am of the view

9 that had the take-over succeeded, the Bosnian Serbs would have placed

10 further pressure on the Bosnian government to accept a global cessation

11 of hostilities and thereby cement the territorial gains of the

12 Bosnian Serb army."

13 Can we say that the activities of UNPROFOR and NATO prevented

14 precisely this from happening?

15 A. That was my belief.

16 Q. In addition to the fact that they had been bombed, the Serbs,

17 both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Yugoslavia, had sanctions imposed

18 upon them; is that correct?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. Muslims constantly provoked conflicts from within the safe areas;

21 is that correct?

22 A. They were certainly in the habit of doing so.

23 Q. Western media at the time were partial and they reported only to

24 the advantage of the Muslim side, and in that way they turned the Western

25 public opinion against the Serbs; is that correct?

Page 6952

1 A. I think that probably is in -- largely the case, although there

2 were a number of honest, hard-working reporters who tried to give a

3 balanced point of view; but the general impression internationally was as

4 you described.

5 Q. The leaders of NATO and the politicians from these states were

6 also on the side of the Bosnian Muslims; is that correct?

7 A. Well, there was no evidence to say that was the case, but my

8 belief certainly in retrospect is that sometime during 1994 the NATO led

9 by the Americans decided to breach their own United Nations

10 Security Council Resolutions regarding the arms embargo and started to

11 train and equip the Muslims and the Croats. And that, therefore,

12 inevitably placed NATO on one side and the Serbs on the other, leaving

13 the United Nations trying to hold the two sides from the middle. It

14 certainly made the peacekeeping mission almost impossible to proceed

15 with.

16 Q. Is it also correct that peace plans were always formulated so as

17 to go against the interest of the Serbs and also to improve the position

18 of the Muslims in the field?

19 A. I think that was the case. I think every effort, honest effort

20 was made by the peace-brokers such as Dr. Owen, Mr. Stoltenberg,

21 Mr. Vance, to try and reach a fair but enduring peace. And certainly the

22 figure as I have described oscillated between 51 per cent for the Serbs

23 and 49 per cents for the Serbs.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just a second. Sorry, Mr. Rose. You did say 51

25 per cent for the Serbs and 49 per cent for the Serbs. Would you like to

Page 6953

1 correct one of those?

2 THE WITNESS: It would be 49 per cent for the Bosnian state in

3 some iterations of the agreement, whereas the Serbs were looking for

4 51 per cent for themselves. So from their negotiating point of view they

5 wished to have 51 per cent plus a number of important areas. But the

6 offer was never rarely more than 49 per cent for them by the

7 international community.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Perhaps I did not phrase the question properly, but this is what

11 I wanted to ask. The peace plans that were offered always offered less

12 to the Serbs compared to what they held in the field then in terms of the

13 percentage of the territory they had in their hands. And then on the

14 other hand they always offered more to the Muslims that they had actually

15 held in their hands at the time?

16 A. That was always the case.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D548 in

19 e-court.

20 Q. General, this is your testimony from the Karadzic case on the

21 5th of October, 2010. I'm going to read out a section first and then I'm

22 going to put a question to you. We need page 9 in e-court and it should

23 be 7249 of the transcript, lines 8 through 15. Could we see that,

24 please. You are talking about a turning point here in 1994 when the

25 balance of power shifted, and this is the question:

Page 6954

1 "Did this transformation, or the culminating point, as you have

2 described it, have any relationship to the positions taken at

3 international peace negotiations?

4 "A. It most certainly did, because, of course, the Bosnian

5 federation became more encouraged in their strategy of not signing up to

6 any peace accord which they felt was unjust and rewarded the aggressor,

7 and, of course, they had the support of NATO, and the Americans in

8 particular, in that position."

9 This is precisely in keeping with what you said to us a moment

10 ago at this trial; right?

11 A. That is correct. That is my view and remains my view.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Could I -- could I -- still in relation to this, the

13 matter of the percentages and the negotiations about that have been dealt

14 with earlier today, Mr. Lukic, and I made a note with one of your

15 questions. The witness - I'm talking about page 7, line 7 and

16 following - testified that he was aware that there was a discussion about

17 49/51 per cent, but he explained that the situation was far more

18 complicated because of the specific wishes in relation to that. Your

19 next question then was:

20 "As you have said yourself, on one side there were the Muslims

21 and Western powers, and on the other side the Serbs, when it comes to the

22 percentage negotiations."

23 That was your question. And the answer was:

24 "I guess that that was probably the situation."

25 Now, I wondered when you put that question what exactly it meant

Page 6955

1 and what it meant what the witness told us. Did you mean to say that

2 they were siding with the Muslims as a general observation, which of

3 course would have its effect as well during these negotiations? Or was

4 it that the international community shared the Muslim views that the Serb

5 proposals in terms of 49/51 per cent were unreasonable, and therefore at

6 that point not in general about division of territory but specifically in

7 relation to what was finally the discussion, which side of the

8 50 per cent, that they shared the views of the Muslims there? So I'm --

9 it was presented more or less as on the one side the Muslims and the

10 international community, the other side the Serbs, whether that was the

11 overall situation when it came to division of territory or whether it was

12 specifically on the 49/51 per cent that the international community sided

13 with the Muslims?

14 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm guessing here, sir, because obviously I

15 was not party to these various discussions and negotiations. The

16 Contact Group, for example, excluded the UN for that -- from their

17 discussions, but my general view is that the international community

18 wished to bring about an enduring and a just peace, which meant going

19 along roughly the lines of 49 per cent for the Serbs and 51 per cent for

20 the Bosnian government. I'm sure the Bosnian government wished to have a

21 great deal more than that, but that was the general international view

22 that that was the fair and enduring settlement.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, siding with the Muslims in acceptance of what

24 the international community considered here to be a reasonable --

25 THE WITNESS: Correct.

Page 6956

1 JUDGE ORIE: -- proposal and not going any further .

2 THE WITNESS: Correct.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because your answer was:

4 "I guess that was probably the situation ..."

5 It needs -- we needed to fully understand what the situation was

6 which was depicted in the question.

7 THE WITNESS: But I guess so because I use the word "I guess,"

8 because of course I wasn't party to those discussions.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

10 Please proceed.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 Q. Now we're going to move on to more specific matters after having

13 dealt with these general matters. And now let us look at paragraph 102

14 of your statement. You say:

15 "The Bosnian Serbs had indeed launched a significant attack on

16 Gorazde in which civilians were killed and injured and had been

17 unconcerned about the plight of civilians caught up in the fighting.

18 They had undoubtedly directed artillery fire and tank fire at the Bosnian

19 army in the town ..."

20 General, you said earlier on that you knew that in Gorazde there

21 were quite a few combatants but they were hardly discernible from

22 civilians. There were people in civilian clothing who carried a rifle

23 nevertheless or were for a while members of a particular unit and then

24 they would be at home. So this is my question: Would you agree with me

25 that it was extremely difficult in that fighting to distinguish between

Page 6957

1 civilians and soldiers in the area of Gorazde among the Muslim

2 population, that is?

3 A. Difficult to be specific because if the Bosnian government forces

4 were fighting outside of the town, as they were, across the bridge on the

5 other side of the river, then it would have been easy to identify them as

6 soldiers. If they were fighting in and around the edges of the town,

7 then it may have been less easy to distinguish them. But of course if

8 someone is carrying a rifle or firing it or some other weapon then you

9 can identify them anyway as soldiers.

10 Q. Is it correct that fighting in Gorazde took place from one house

11 to the other, that the fighting had actually spilled over into the town

12 itself, although on the edges?

13 A. I don't think it crossed over the bridge into the main part of

14 the town. The villages --

15 Q. Thank you --

16 A. -- on the other side of the town were being --

17 Q. Villages, yes.

18 THE WITNESS: Sorry, can I make a plea to terminate at this

19 point. I think I probably drunk too much coffee during the lunch break,

20 the previous break.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll take an early break. We'll resume

22 then at 1.30 and we'll then continue until quarter past 2.00.

23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could you first follow the usher.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

Page 6958

1 [The witness stands down]

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you're on your feet.

3 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. I had intended to raise this at a

4 time when there was free court time, but given your question at the

5 beginning of the session I think it's relevant to bring it up now. The

6 Prosecution was going to seek an exception to the guidance and request

7 permission to file a bar table motion with relevant UN documents. We

8 thought that it would be beneficial for the Chamber to have those at this

9 stage of the trial rather than to wait until the end of the case, and we

10 are in the process of preparing such a bar table motion. But I may ask

11 for the Chamber to consider whether we would be allowed to file such --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, of course the Chamber asked this morning for

13 at least some documents. What I would suggest is that if you make such a

14 filing, that you would make it a combined filing and that the Defence

15 adds to the series of documents you consider to be relevant those they

16 consider to be relevant, perhaps including some agreements between the

17 parties as well. So this kind of, if I could say, legal stuff.

18 Mr. Lukic, would you be willing to consider that together with

19 Mr. Groome?

20 MR. LUKIC: Of course, Your Honour. You know we co-operate well

21 with --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, no doubt about that. I confidently ask you.

23 We -- so, Mr. Groome shall therefore proceed, perhaps

24 co-operating with Mr. Lukic, and we now take the break, resuming at 1.30.

25 --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m.

Page 6959

1 --- On resuming at 1.31 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

3 [The witness takes the stand]

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. General, are you all right? Can we go on now?

7 Now I would briefly like to deal with paragraphs 105 and 106 from

8 your statement, that is, and in connection with that I would kindly ask

9 for 65 ter 8146 in e-court. We see the document. It's a fax. It has to

10 do with the agreement on Gorazde, and the fax is dated the

11 21st of May, 1994. On the second page of this document, which we need to

12 see on the screen now, we see the agreement on demilitarisation --

13 actually, the agreement on the demilitarisation of the 3 kilometre total

14 exclusion zone east of the Drina River. We see when it will enter into

15 force. We see that in paragraph 1. We see when the cease-fire will

16 start. And then in paragraph, 3 it says:

17 "The BiH commander commits himself to not undertake any offensive

18 action. The only armed personnel in the shaded area on the attached map

19 will be those of UNPROFOR."

20 On page 4 of this document that we need to see in e-court now we

21 can see this map, so that the General can remember what all of this is

22 actually about. The shaded area is actually Gorazde on the right bank of

23 the Drina River; is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Did that, or rather, do you remember whether members of UNPROFOR

Page 6960

1 entered that zone?

2 A. I don't remember. And if you're referring to the shaded zone,

3 that is.

4 Q. [In English] Yes.

5 [Interpretation] Did the parties abide by this agreement? Do you

6 remember that?

7 A. Generally speaking, they did.

8 Q. Now I would like to move to paragraph 112 of your statement --

9 actually, this is an explanation of document 65 ter 8148, so could that

10 please be displayed in e-court. You are familiar with the form of

11 document that we see here, General?

12 A. Yes, I am.

13 Q. We see here that Mr. Akashi is writing to Mr. Annan at the UN on

14 the 4th of June, 1994. We will need page 2 in both languages.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm still seeking some clarification

16 of -- we don't have to move back in documents to the earlier one. Your

17 question was whether the parties abided to this agreement which was

18 signed by General Milovanovic and General Rose. In 106 we see that the

19 witness gives us evidence that Ganic refused to sign any agreement. Your

20 next questions were about whether the parties -- now, that's ambiguous

21 language again, parties, parties to the conflict? And abide to an

22 agreement, where we learn from the evidence that the Bosnians apparently

23 did not want to sign that. So was there any agreement? Were there any

24 parties to an agreement? Or were there just the warring parties? I'm a

25 bit confused.

Page 6961

1 MR. LUKIC: I was asking about Gorazde, and in 106 --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. LUKIC: -- it's telling about sniping in Sarajevo

4 [overlapping speakers]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, let me see. 106, yes anti-sniping agreement --

6 yes. Now, I may have been confused because I didn't see the signature of

7 the Bosnian government. I think I saw two signatures on the copy you

8 showed to us, therefore I not sufficiently carefully read 106 dealing

9 with a totally different matter. Yes, Judge Moloto points at that 106

10 says "any agreement," whether that's limited to anti-sniping agreements

11 or to other agreements and whether it was just a refusal to sign or also

12 to refuse to commit yourself to it, which is not exactly the same, you

13 can orally agree with something and then nevertheless refuse to sign.

14 It's unclear. Could you please --

15 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: -- seek clarification.

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, sorry, from the copy that we have I cannot even tell

19 whether it had been signed or not. So can we please have -- just a

20 moment, please. 8146 on our screens again.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Page 2 of this document.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have both pages 2 and

23 3 because they were signed both in English and in B/C/S.

24 Q. I see the same blot, if you will, by General Delic's name both in

25 English and in Serbian, but perhaps it was signed using some pencil or

Page 6962

1 pen that faded in the meantime.

2 A. I think he did sign it at that time, Delic, that is.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you considered UNPROFOR to be a witness to

4 this --

5 THE WITNESS: Agreement.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- agreement between the parties?

7 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Yes, please proceed. Yes, it's not

9 visible. I do agree that if you --

10 MR. LUKIC: You can see that the next page [overlapping speakers]

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, page 3 is better --

12 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers]

13 JUDGE ORIE: And, yes, please proceed.

14 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

15 Q. [Interpretation] So now we're dealing with document 8148, the fax

16 that was sent by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan. And in this document we need

17 page 2 since we need paragraphs 6 and 7. We see here that paragraphs 6

18 and 7 speak of armed civilians who are refusing to withdraw from the

19 right bank of the Drina River, roughly that shaded area that we saw a

20 moment ago. In paragraph 7 Mr. Akashi says that Dr. Karadzic stated that

21 these are remaining elements of demobilised soldiers who were not under

22 control and that some of them were not following General Mladic's orders.

23 As Mr. Akashi says, he, however, telephoned his people in Pale and issued

24 orders for the immediate withdrawal of these elements.

25 General, did you know that in part of the territory of

Page 6963

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina that was under the control of the

2 Army of Republika Srpska there were armed elements that were not under

3 General Mladic's command and control? Had you heard of -- have you heard

4 of that?

5 A. No, I had not. Our view was quite specific that these soldiers

6 hadn't moved out as ordered. Whether that was a game play on the part of

7 the Bosnian Serbs or not we don't know. And when we challenged them, you

8 can see an account of the reply we had from Mr. Karadzic. But the

9 situation was finally resolved and all elements, whether they were

10 so-called policemen, armed civilians, or whoever, were finally moved from

11 that 3-kilometre zone.

12 Q. Concerning paragraph 125 of your statement, with regards to that

13 paragraph we also need document 8149. We need paragraph 2. It's a fax

14 message. It concerns a meeting with General Mladic on the

15 21st of July, 1994. In item 2 it is stated that you, General Rose,

16 protested since in air-space near Sarajevo airport in the previous

17 24 hours, including two that morning, fire was opened at UN planes. You

18 asked that an immediate investigation be made and action taken as

19 appropriate. We see in brackets that you were informed ten minutes later

20 by General Galic that the shooting came from a particular building on the

21 Bosnian Muslim side of the confrontation line in Sarajevo. This

22 information is still unconfirmed.

23 General, was it finally established who opened fire at the planes

24 on those three occasions, if you recall?

25 A. No, it was never established clearly.

Page 6964

1 Q. Would you agree with me that it was standard practice to lay the

2 blame on the Serbs first and then it was up to them to disprove that?

3 A. I don't think that was the case at all. We merely -- I tried to

4 identify in difficult circumstances where the fire had come from and

5 would then go to that respective party to discuss it.

6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Let me ask you something about

7 paragraph 127 of your statement. There you discuss the tunnel.

8 Obviously UNPROFOR was aware of it as was also testified to by some other

9 UNPROFOR members. You say there the following:

10 "All the supplies that were going through the tunnel under the

11 airfield came down through Mount Igman - this route was important to the

12 UN aid convoys, as well as to the racketeering being conducted by the

13 warring factions."

14 During your stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina did anyone acquaint

15 you with the initial document by virtue of which the Serbs handed over

16 the control of the airport to UNPROFOR?

17 A. I don't think I did see the original agreement.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we have P334 in e-court.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic kindly speak into the

20 microphone, please. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the interpreters invite you to speak into

22 the microphone.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Apologies.

24 Q. General, on the screen we have the agreement on the re-opening of

25 Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes. We see immediately that it

Page 6965

1 is 1992. We're interested in paragraphs 4 and 6 which is on the next

2 page. General, in item 4 we see that UNPROFOR took upon itself to

3 control all incoming personnel, aid, cargo, and other items entering the

4 airport, so as to ensure that no war time materials are imported and that

5 the airport's opening is not otherwise abused in any way. Of course the

6 issue of the tunnel somewhat complicates matters. But let me ask you

7 this: The French soldiers who were at the airport, did they inform you

8 about the existence of the tunnel? And did they tell you that they were

9 aware of its existence? Did they inform you that they actually took part

10 in expanding the tunnel?

11 A. I don't think I ever discussed the existence of the tunnel with

12 the French.

13 Q. On that score, let me ask you the following: The system of

14 reporting within UNPROFOR, did it go towards the governments and

15 intelligence services of the respective countries first and did various

16 elements of UNPROFOR have an opportunity or an option not to inform other

17 elements of UNPROFOR?

18 A. Well, with regards to the latter part of your statement, of

19 course that was the case. There was always a national position taken and

20 any instructions given by UNPROFOR to the troop-contributing nations

21 would always have to be ratified by their governments.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I do not know whether I fully understand the link

23 between question and answer. Was it your question, Mr. Lukic, whether

24 before reporting to the UNPROFOR superiors that the information was first

25 submitted to the national governments of the relevant UNPROFOR person or

Page 6966

1 unit resulting perhaps in information not reaching the UNPROFOR higher

2 level by being stuck through the local -- through the national

3 governments of the UNPROFOR units? Is that --

4 MR. LUKIC: Yes, that was exactly my point, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I don't think that the -- I don't know

6 whether the answer really responds to that. Could you expand on that.

7 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, I would agree that each of the

8 troop-contributing nations had their own national policy with regards to

9 the mission and they had their own reporting chains back to their

10 governments. Now, what went up and down those reporting chains, I of

11 course have got no knowledge of. I do believe that with regards to the

12 French they gave me all the necessary information I needed to be able to

13 administer the mission.

14 JUDGE ORIE: It may have been filtered to the sense that some

15 information which was stopped by the French government never reached you?

16 THE WITNESS: That could well have been the case and that would

17 have been so of all the troop-contributing nations.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

19 Please proceed.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Q. Concerning the airport you do not recall the agreement. Can you

22 tell us what governed your actions concerning the airport? Were you

23 simply briefed and continued with what you had inherited?

24 A. The importance of the airport was to be -- enable humanitarian

25 aid to be flown in and people, casevac cases, et cetera, to be flown out.

Page 6967

1 What was happening on the perimeters or underneath were signs that I may

2 have been -- heard of in terms of rumour, but certainly never had

3 confirmed during my time there. And you should also understand that it

4 was, I guess, suited everybody that supplies and aid should be coming in

5 to Sarajevo by -- no matter by what means.

6 Q. In paragraph 128 of your statement you say that you learned that

7 Dr. Karadzic, save for being stubborn, he also stated that there was

8 smuggling of weapons into Sarajevo as part of the commercial traffic and

9 that the failure of Bosnians to sign up to the anti-sniping agreement and

10 prison exchange programme was the situation in place. You conclude by

11 saying that finally the cease-fire agreement was sabotaging the

12 cease-fire agreement signed in Geneva. A reference is made to a document

13 and it reads that for security reasons you felt compelled to close down

14 the airport.

15 In your previous answer you said that it was in everybody's

16 interest to see goods coming into Sarajevo through the tunnel. Let me

17 ask you this: Do you allow for the possibility that through the tunnel,

18 especially at night, weapons were being brought in, military equipment,

19 and troops into Sarajevo as well as troops leaving Sarajevo?

20 A. Of course that was a possibility.

21 Q. Thank you. In this paragraph we have a reference to 60.000

22 civilians coming into or leaving Sarajevo. It all took place as of the

23 opening of the airport routes in March 1994. It is stated that 60.000

24 civilians left. How do you know -- actually, if you know, how was the

25 entry and exit of civilians and/or soldiers in Sarajevo controlled? And

Page 6968

1 do you know whether any such control existed in the first place?

2 A. All the convoys going in and out of Sarajevo were administered by

3 the UNHCR, United Nations Commission for Refugees. That figure would

4 have come from them.

5 Q. You believed that the civilians coming into or leaving Sarajevo

6 were onboard UNPROFOR trucks or did they leave on foot? It is unclear to

7 me. These 7.000 trucks, did they transport goods only - because

8 obviously we're discussing delivery of humanitarian aid - or the passage

9 of people? Do you have any such information?

10 A. Yes, certainly there were buses running in and out of Sarajevo

11 for many of those months we're talking about.

12 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 129, the last sentence:

13 "The Bosnian Serbs realised they were being seen as aggressors,

14 and thought BH command was taking sides."

15 Did UNPROFOR see the Serbs as aggressors; and if so, please tell

16 us what the definition of "aggressor" was under UNPROFOR terms. What is

17 an aggression?

18 A. The UN were acting impartially as mediators and had no position

19 to take on that issue.

20 Q. In your view, who was it then that viewed the Serbs as

21 aggressors? Because obviously the Serbs realised they were being seen as

22 aggressors. Who believed them to be the aggressor?

23 A. Obviously the Bosnian government referred to them almost

24 universally as the aggressors, and that was often reflected in the

25 propaganda put out by the media who sided with the Bosnian government.

Page 6969

1 Q. Thank you. When you say that in the fall of 1994 the Serbs

2 blocked the airport, you mention a number of reasons: One was that the

3 pressure be brought upon the Muslim side so as to force them to accept

4 the peace conditions; under two, that the Muslims be forced into signing

5 an anti-sniping agreement; three, that Sarajevo be demilitarised.

6 Although it is partially self-explanatory, I still need to ask you the

7 following: The Muslims obviously didn't want any of the three

8 conditions - correct? - they wouldn't accept any peace conditions; they

9 wouldn't sign an anti-sniping agreement; and they did not consent to

10 Sarajevo being demilitarised?

11 A. On the 14th of August they signed an anti-sniping agreement.

12 Q. Was the agreement implemented following its signing?

13 A. It was implemented and it held good for a number of weeks, but it

14 in the end declined on both sides.

15 Q. Can we have 1D548 in e-court. It is your testimony of the

16 5th of October, 2010, General. First we'd like to see page 16 in

17 e-court. The very bottom of page 16. We need page 7256 which is page 16

18 in e-court. Reference is made to the same paragraphs we have mentioned

19 today in your statement:

20 [In English] " ... in your written evidence, at paragraphs 127

21 to 129, you referred to an event somewhat earlier than that, the closure

22 of the airport to commercial convoys using the road down Mount Igman ..."

23 [Interpretation] On the next page starting with line 2 there is a

24 question:

25 [In English] "Are you able to put this in context for us, this

Page 6970

1 event?"

2 And then your answer follows:

3 "I think this was happening for two reasons: 1, that the

4 pressure, again, not only strategically, needed to be brought to bear on

5 the Bosnian government side to adopt their peace terms; but also to try

6 and get them to sign up to the anti-sniper agreement; they also had a

7 desire to have Sarajevo demilitarised. And I think they were" --

8 JUDGE ORIE: One second, Mr. -- you were reading and that takes

9 more time to translate.

10 MR. LUKIC: I apologise.

11 Q. "And I think they were the three areas which caused them to shut

12 down the routes, because they could see that people now in Sarajevo on

13 the Bosnian Muslim side were living far better than the people on the

14 Bosnian Serb side ..."

15 [Interpretation] General, can we conclude on the basis of that

16 that humanitarian aid improved the situation in the Muslim part of

17 Sarajevo to the extent that people in that part of Sarajevo lived much

18 better than the people in the Serb-held part of Sarajevo?

19 A. I think it was a consequence of the opening of the routes rather

20 than the delivery of humanitarian aid at that point, but certainly the

21 end result was that the Serbs living in Golubovica [phoen] were not as

22 well off as many of the people living in the rest of the city.

23 Q. Despite that, the Western powers and NATO kept insisting upon

24 improving the living conditions of only the Muslim population in Bosnia,

25 and Sarajevo in particular; is that true or not?

Page 6971

1 A. That's not true at all. The United Nations were impartial in

2 their view as to what aid was required to the people of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed it was the World Health Organisation that

4 made assessments for the tonnages to be delivered to each of the three

5 populations living there.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm --

7 MR. LUKIC: Just one second --

8 JUDGE ORIE: If there's one question, please put it to the

9 witness.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, I apologise, I wasn't asking about UNPROFOR. I was

12 inquiring about the insistence of NATO and Western powers to improve the

13 living conditions of only the Muslim part of the population. I exclude

14 UNPROFOR from that. The Western powers insist on improving the living

15 conditions of only the Muslim part of population in Bosnia?

16 A. Well, I completely disagree with that judgement and assessment.

17 Q. [In English] Thank you.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, before we adjourn for the day, could you

19 give us an indication as where we stand in terms of time?

20 MR. LUKIC: I promise to finish tomorrow in the first session.

21 JUDGE ORIE: First session.

22 MR. LUKIC: I have more but I will have to condense my questions.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then, Mr. Rose, I would like to instruct you

24 again that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way with

25 whomever about your testimony, whether already given or still to be