130207ED

Page 8197

1 out to you. May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Good morning. I solemnly

3 declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

4 truth.

5 WITNESS: ANTHONY BANBURY

6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Banbury. Please be seated.

7 Mr. Banbury, you'll first be examined by Ms. Bibles. Ms. Bibles

8 is counsel for the Prosecution and you'll find her to your right.

9 Ms. Bibles, you may proceed.

10 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour and good morning.

11 Examination by Ms. Bibles:

12 Q. Would you please state your full name for the record.

13 A. Anthony Nathan Banbury.

14 Q. Mr. Banbury, what were the dates you were stationed in

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina while working with the United Nations?

16 A. From April 9th, 1994, until May 1st, 1995 in Bosnia. And then

17 later in Zagreb, Croatia, from May 1st, 1995, until November 1995.

18 Q. Mr. Banbury, is it true that you have provided evidence to the

19 Office of the Prosecutor and have testified before this Tribunal in the

20 Karadzic case with respect to evidence relating to that work?

21 A. Yes, that's true.

22 Q. Have you provided such evidence in part in the form of a written

23 statement?

24 A. Yes, I have.

25 Q. You first prepared a statement in 1997?

Page 8198

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And again in 2009?

3 A. Yes.

4 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could I ask to display 65 ter 28667 on

5 our screens.

6 Q. Mr. Banbury, once the document is on the screen I ask that you

7 view this first page, and in particular to look at a signature on that

8 page and indicate whether you recognise it.

9 A. Yes, that's my signature.

10 Q. I'll now ask that we go to page 53 in e-court of the English

11 version, and I will again ask if you recognise the signature?

12 A. Yes, that's also my signature.

13 Q. Have you had an opportunity to read and review your 2009

14 statement in preparation for your appearance here today?

15 A. Yes, I have.

16 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph 14, which is in e-court on

17 English page 4 and 5 in the B/C/S version, could you review this

18 paragraph and indicate whether there are any corrections that you would

19 like to make to this paragraph.

20 A. Yes. Thank you. I would like to point out that in paragraph 14

21 where it's on the second line where it says "or about 23 April 1993,"

22 that should, in fact, say "or about 23 April 1994."

23 Q. Thank you. With that correction in mind, if the Chamber was to

24 consider your statement will they have an accurate record of your

25 evidence?

Page 8199

1 A. Yes, they would.

2 Q. If I were today to ask you questions similar to those you were

3 asked in the taking of this statement, would you give the same answers?

4 A. Yes, the same or substantively the same, yes.

5 Q. Now that you've taken the solemn declaration, do you affirm the

6 truthfulness and accuracy of this statement?

7 A. Yes, I absolutely do.

8 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, having established the foundational

9 requirements necessary, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 28667.

10 JUDGE ORIE: I hear that there are no objections.

11 Madam Registrar.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Document 28667 receives number P874,

13 Your Honours.

14 JUDGE ORIE: P874 is admitted into evidence.

15 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, may I read a brief public summary of

16 the witness statement? We have provided copies to the booths and I have

17 explained to the witness the purpose of this statement.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

19 MS. BIBLES: Anthony Banbury served with the United Nations in

20 the former Yugoslavia from April 1994 until the end of the conflict. He

21 was first a civil affairs officer in UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo

22 until 1 May 1995. He then worked as an assistant to the special

23 representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi. In both roles,

24 Mr. Banbury attended meetings with leaders of the warring factions and

25 drafted reports, cables, letters, and other correspondence on behalf of

Page 8200

1 his superiors.

2 Mr. Banbury states that the population in Sarajevo suffered

3 because of a constant campaign of shelling and sniping that was directed

4 at civilians. In the course of Mr. Banbury's frequent attendance at

5 meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership, Mr. Banbury observed that they

6 were able to modulate the conditions in Sarajevo by controlling the

7 supply of utilities, the freedom of movement, and the level of shelling

8 or sniping, among other things.

9 Your Honours, that concludes my summary.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Bibles.

11 MS. BIBLES:

12 Q. Mr. Banbury, I would ask that we both remember to take pauses

13 between question and answer to allow the translation to catch up.

14 Mr. Banbury, looking at your statement, specifically paragraphs 2

15 through 4, they summarise your professional biography. I would like to

16 ask just a couple of additional questions. First, was your work with

17 UNPROFOR your first with the United Nations?

18 A. No, I had been employed in a few different capacities by the

19 United Nations before I arrived in UNPROFOR. My first position with the

20 United Nations was working as a human rights protection officer on the

21 Thai/Cambodian border in the camps for displaced Cambodians. I spent two

22 years doing that from 1988 to 1990. After that, I worked in the UN

23 peacekeeping operation in Cambodia for about a year and a half as a human

24 rights officer and then briefly in the joint UN organisation of

25 American States OAS mission in Haiti. That mission was expelled from the

Page 8201

1 country until my employment there, and then I moved from there to Bosnia

2 in April 1994.

3 Q. And then could you summarise for the Chamber your professional

4 activities since 2009 when you signed this statement?

5 A. Shortly after signing this statement I moved from the position I

6 had at the time which was the regional director for Asia of the UN

7 World Food Programme based in Bangkok Thailand where I oversaw operations

8 for that humanitarian organisation throughout Asia. Then in June 2009 I

9 took up my current position as the assistant Secretary-General for field

10 support based at UN headquarters in New York. In that capacity, I -- the

11 deputy in the department of field support where I among -- or, the

12 essential aspect of that work is to provide all kinds of operational

13 support to our peacekeeping and political missions around the world.

14 Q. Now, returning to your time in the former Yugoslavia, could you

15 briefly describe the nature of your two positions while you were there.

16 A. In the first position, the title was civil affairs officer, but

17 my role was not the role of a traditional civil affairs officer.

18 UNPROFOR had civil affairs officers deployed throughout Bosnia and

19 throughout its area of operations in Croatia, et cetera, doing what I

20 would call traditional civil affairs work, working with local

21 communities, et cetera. I was, essentially, a political affairs officer

22 working for the delegate of the Special Representative of the

23 Secretary-General, the DSRSG, Mr. Viktor Andreev initially, later

24 Mr. Enrique Aguilar. In that capacity I went along with him to meetings

25 on an almost daily basis, meetings of all kinds with warring factions,

Page 8202

1 with diplomatic community, with other UN entities, internal meetings of

2 UNPROFOR with, say, his military counterpart, initially General Rose,

3 later General Smith. And then depending on the nature of the meeting,

4 certainly if it was a meeting with an external party, I would then write

5 a report to normally UNPROFOR headquarters in which I sought to summarise

6 what had actually happened in the meeting, a factual accounting of what

7 transpired. And then normally at the end of the document include some

8 kind of analysis of the significance of the conversation, the next steps

9 that perhaps we needed to take, the issues at stake, trying to help our

10 superiors in Zagreb understand the significance of the meeting.

11 Q. And in the meetings if you were part of a meeting and you were

12 working with or meeting with individuals from the Bosnian government

13 side, who from that side was typically also attending the meetings?

14 A. The officials on the Bosnian government side with whom I had the

15 most contact were President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Salajdzic,

16 Vice-President Ganic, and Minister Muratovic.

17 Q. Then when you attended meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership,

18 could you describe who attended those meetings from the Bosnian Serb

19 leadership?

20 A. The officials on the Bosnian Serb side with whom I had the most

21 contact were Dr. Karadzic, Professor Koljevic, General Mladic,

22 General Gvero, General Tolimir, and Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Krajisnik. At

23 times Mr. Zametica.

24 Q. Then when you moved to your second position based out of Zagreb,

25 who did you meet with predominantly in the meetings after that time?

Page 8203

1 A. I took up my new position as a special assistant to the SRSG on

2 May 1 1995, based in Zagreb. I had very similar duties and

3 responsibilities, but in that case for the SRSG as opposed to for his

4 delegate in Bosnia. And there, of course, given the nature of my

5 superior's responsibilities, instead of focusing just on Bosnia we also

6 worked a lot with authorities in Zagreb, in Croatia, and in Serbia, in

7 Belgrade. And there the main officials were President Tudjman and

8 President Milosevic, also Mr. Sarinic on the Croatian side, sometimes

9 General Perisic on the Serbian side.

10 Q. In addition to these meetings, what other sources of information

11 did you rely upon in preparing your reports and assessments?

12 A. I, for the most part, wrote two kinds of reports. One were --

13 one set was on the meetings that I attended, and there was just what

14 happened in those meetings plus the analysis at the end. I also, though,

15 routinely wrote a weekly report that sought to summarise -- when I was in

16 Bosnia, when I was in Bosnia -- that sought to summarise the events of

17 the week, what had happened in the week, and the meaning of it. And that

18 was a report that I would prepare but Mr. Andreev would sign. It would

19 come from him to our headquarters in Zagreb. And there, myself, or other

20 colleagues when they wrote it, sought to draw on whatever information

21 sources we could find. It was a wide range. We had regular contacts

22 with the diplomatic community, with humanitarian community. We rely

23 quite heavily on the local press from all sides, the Bosniak, Croat, Serb

24 side. We had some very good national staff who monitored the press very

25 closely, the radio, TV, newspaper, and would provide us with an analysis

Page 8204

1 of the key developments in the press or key reports in the press. And we

2 would often use those. So we were able to, I think, develop a fairly

3 good picture -- oh, we also relied very heavily from UNPROFOR reports

4 from the field, our civil affairs officers, our UN military observers,

5 military contingents deployed in the field, they were deployed throughout

6 Bosnia, and we -- they all submitted weekly reports. And that

7 combination of UNPROFOR reporting, formal and informal engagement with

8 the diplomatic community, meetings with the parties themselves, local

9 press reporting, that combination gave us a pretty good picture, I think,

10 of what was happening, and we sought to -- or, I sought to distill that

11 in my weekly reports to the most important developments.

12 Q. During your time in the former Yugoslavia, did you have a sense

13 as to the gravity of the events that you were witnessing in these

14 meetings in negotiations?

15 A. It was a coincidence, but it nonetheless had a big impact on me.

16 I was deployed to Bosnia on April 9th, 1994, right at the peak or almost

17 peak of the Gorazde crisis. And I got off the plane and went to my new

18 headquarters and there was all this talk about use of NATO air power,

19 blue sword as they called it, and generals running around. And the day

20 after was the first use of NATO air power in the history of the

21 organisation. So from literally the first hours I was in the country, I

22 had the sense that these were important things that were happening. Of

23 course I read the press and was familiar with the war from an outside

24 perspective, but upon arriving and, really, every day that I was there I

25 felt like we all were living history for better or worse. And I had that

Page 8205

1 sense really in two important ways. One was the humanitarian or human

2 impact of what was happening, just seeing how people's lives were

3 affected; you saw that every day. And the -- it couldn't help but have a

4 huge impact on how you saw people living on any side of any line. You

5 could tell that real human beings were suffering terribly. Societies

6 were being riven apart, families riven apart, communities destroyed.

7 The other -- the other main way that I really felt history was

8 being made was because decisions that were being taken by people I was

9 working with on a daily basis, either people in the United Nations or

10 officials of the different parties, those decisions were history in the

11 making. Those decisions, you know, have -- used NATO air power, not use

12 NATO air power, let UN flights land or not let UN flights, let a convoy

13 go to Gorazde or not let a convoy go to Gorazde, these things had a huge,

14 huge, huge impact on people's lives, and sometimes they were

15 life-and-death questions. They were peace-and-war questions. And you --

16 certainly myself working in Bosnia-Herzegovina command headquarters had

17 the sense every day that history was being made.

18 Q. How did that awareness impact your efforts to observe and

19 preserve the events as they happened?

20 A. I felt like I had a very important and in some ways privileged

21 responsibility because of the assignment that was given to me. Normally

22 when a civil affairs officer was first deployed to Bosnia, a newcomer

23 like myself, he or she would be sent out to one of the regional offices,

24 spend a year out in a place like Gorazde or Gornji Vakuf or somewhere

25 like that. But for whatever reason, Mr. Andreev from the day I arrived

Page 8206

1 kind of attached me to his personal office, and so I was privileged in

2 that sense but also privileged to be watching this history and a witness

3 to the history in the making and that created a -- I think, a very big

4 responsibility on me and the position I was given to try and be a

5 faithful recorder of it. And as a result, I tried very hard to

6 transcribe the events as they were happening. In the notes I took I

7 tried very hard to reflect accurately what he said, what she said, what

8 he said. And then, you know, try and provide that information to our

9 superiors.

10 Q. Did you observe and note the negotiating practices and strategies

11 of the various parties?

12 A. I sat in dozens and dozens and dozen of meetings with officials

13 and often the most senior officials of the different sides. And as a

14 result, I was able to observe, yes, their negotiating approaches to

15 important issues, yes.

16 Q. Could you describe for us the negotiating style of Ratko Mladic?

17 A. I think General Mladic was or is a very intelligent, strategic

18 thinker. I was always very impressed by General Mladic, his grasp of the

19 issues, his strategic approach to the issues. I thought he was one of

20 the more intelligent and strategically minded actors of the ones that I

21 was exposed to on any of the sides, including the UN. He was very

22 effective in meetings, using a combination of, I would, say charm and

23 almost bullying, where you had the choice of either kind of going along

24 with the charm offensive and his points and his sides and that would, you

25 know, be very easy and comfortable and a much more pleasant experience,

Page 8207

1 or resisting it and opposing him, and that would lead to a less enjoyable

2 experience. And he was, I would say, a very negotiator.

3 Q. Were you able to discern any particular techniques and strategies

4 employed by Mladic, particularly with respect to the United Nations?

5 A. The main strategy that I discerned on the Bosnian Serb side, and

6 it was apparent early for me even in the Gorazde crisis but became more

7 pronounced over time, was on the critical issue of the use of force by

8 the UN and NATO. And I think it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs did not

9 want to have the UN or NATO use force against them. They didn't want

10 another combatant warring against them. And the way I believe

11 General Mladic sought to achieve his objective of keeping us at bay was

12 to -- whenever the UN was inclined to use force or did use force,

13 particularly NATO air power, he would ensure through process of

14 escalation that the Bosnian Serbs at the end of that crisis were in a

15 superior position to the United Nations and that we were in a much worse

16 position than when we started. And this pattern was repeated across a

17 number of occasions when we used NATO air power. And the way they

18 ensured that was by doing things like shutting down the airport which was

19 critical to us, blocking our movement so we could not resupply our troops

20 in the enclaves, blocking humanitarian convoys, taking hostages at times,

21 refusing to negotiate. So in each use of our -- each time we used force

22 we ended up in a worse position and that had both a big operational

23 impact on the United Nations but it also had a big, I think,

24 psychological impact on certain UN officials in UNPROFOR but also in UN

25 government officials well beyond the former Yugoslavia.

Page 8208

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, I noticed that you at various occasions

2 by your faces, by the way in which you seek communication with other

3 persons in this courtroom, including me, that you in some way react and

4 respond to what the witness says. And you are hereby instructed not to

5 do it any further because you know what the consequences are if you

6 continue to express any feeling or thoughts even without words about the

7 testimony of a witness.

8 Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.

9 MS. BIBLES:

10 Q. You testified that your first day was the beginning of the first

11 NATO air strikes in Gorazde. And in your statement just roughly

12 paragraphs 10 through 22 you describe both the circumstances on the

13 ground and also the negotiating position of the Bosnian Serb leadership.

14 Focusing on that time-period in April and May of 1994, how did the

15 Bosnian Serb actions with respect to Gorazde influence peace

16 negotiations?

17 A. Gorazde was a very serious political, humanitarian, and military

18 crisis for UNPROFOR and the people of Gorazde, and the use by NATO of air

19 power for the first time, the shooting down of a British aircraft by the

20 Bosnian Serbs, the killing of some British soldiers in Gorazde, this

21 created not only a major crisis for the United Nations and -- it forced

22 us to reflect very seriously on our role in the former Yugoslavia, in

23 Bosnia, in -- on our relationship with the Bosnian Serbs. And I think

24 the Bosnian Serb leadership, including very much General Mladic, saw the

25 weakness -- weaknesses of the UN, understood clearly our

Page 8209

1 vulnerabilities - in this, by "vulnerabilities" I'm talking about the

2 political will to pursue more forceful course of action - and were very

3 smart in exploiting the UN's weaknesses and vulnerabilities. They did it

4 through a combination of use of force and measures that I think speak for

5 themselves in terms of what they did to the United Nations, but also in

6 the meetings and discussions that we had, they realised they had a

7 superior position. They staked out very hard-line positions and demands

8 in the negotiations, very inflexible, and were able to quite effectively

9 use -- well, first develop leverage over us and then use that leverage to

10 achieve their -- or at least advance their objectives in the Gorazde area

11 but also very much in terms of the strategic relationship between the

12 Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR.

13 Q. I'd like to direct your attention now to paragraph 19 which in

14 e-court the English version would be page 6 and in B/C/S, page 7. In

15 paragraph 19 you state that:

16 "By attaching unreasonable conditions to their offer of peace,

17 they were perpetuating the war."

18 Could you describe for us what those conditions were that the

19 Bosnian Serb leadership was asking?

20 A. In this particular context they were referring to a per cent of

21 land that would be allocated to the Bosnian Serbs in a potential peace

22 agreement. They were referring to the width of a corridor in northern

23 Bosnia linking western and eastern Bosnia, the Posavina corridor around

24 Brcko. They were referring to access to the sea. And while it's normal

25 in negotiations to perhaps stake out a position that you're willing to,

Page 8210

1 you know, make compromises from, I don't believe that was the case here,

2 in part because this was a very common tactic that the Bosnian Serb

3 leadership used throughout the war, the civilian and military leadership

4 where they would say one thing, whether it's they wanted peace or they

5 wanted to have a POW exchange or they wanted to have utilities flowing in

6 Sarajevo, but their actions made clear that they in fact were pursuing a

7 very different objective. And we -- we saw that -- I saw that time and

8 time again, where they staked out entirely unreasonable positions and

9 then placed the burden on the UN to get their counterparts, the Bosniaks,

10 the Croats, to make the concessions necessary to achieve these very

11 unattainable positions and it left the UN in a very difficult position.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, well if not for the full hundred

13 per cent then at least for 90 per cent this is perfectly clear from the

14 statement. Of course you ask now the witness to again state about the

15 corridor or the 50 per cent of land. This is a 92 ter witness with a

16 lengthy statement. Would you please try to avoid repetitious evidence

17 and put such questions that really add something to what we have already

18 in the statement. Please proceed.

19 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour.

20 Q. Pulling back to the big picture, from April to September of 1994

21 could you describe politically and in terms of military terms what effect

22 those developing patterns had on the Bosnian Serb leadership?

23 A. The -- in the wake of the Gorazde crisis, there was a strong

24 diplomatic push by external actors leading to the so-called

25 Geneva Agreement from I think it was June, and that led to an improvement

Page 8211

1 in the climate in Bosnia, but as was often the case when there was some

2 kind of political agreement it didn't last very long. The political

3 agreement was more a result of external pressures rather than any of the

4 parties involved fundamentally reassessing and changing their war aims

5 and their fundamental interests. And while things improved in June and

6 July, by August they were deteriorating and the political process was

7 more or less in shambles and the military developments were getting --

8 were becoming more predominant.

9 Q. In terms of the international or even within the former

10 Yugoslavia, in terms of the support that the Bosnian Serb leadership had

11 in their relationship with these other entities, by September of 1994

12 were those relationships stronger or had they started to dissolve?

13 A. Sorry, the relationship with which entities?

14 Q. With the leadership in Pale and other entities in both the former

15 Yugoslavia and internationally.

16 A. I think there was a gradual move towards isolation of the

17 Bosnian Serbs. They were over time losing support of key actors who

18 weren't necessarily their allies but were reliable supporters and that

19 support was weakening. And whether it was in Moscow or in Belgrade or,

20 to some extent, Paris and London, we saw I think more and more external

21 actors perceive the Bosnian Serb position to be an unreasonable one and

22 didn't want to be associated with it and wanted them to move toward a

23 more reasonable one that could produce a peace agreement or a cease-fire

24 or a calming of the situation. And there was a perception that the

25 Bosnian Serbs were making that goal very difficult to achieve.

Page 8212

1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, may I invite you to read with me your

2 last question. You were talking about "the support that the Bosnian Serb

3 leadership had in their relationship with these and other entities," and

4 then you were asked "relationship with which entities?" And then you

5 said "with the leadership in Pale and other entities." So you are asking

6 a question about the relationship between the Bosnian Serb leadership had

7 with the leadership in Pale. It is really confusing me quite a bit and I

8 would prefer that you are clear in your questions and perhaps asking this

9 witness of facts -- primarily his knowledge of facts because you are at

10 this moment eliciting political analysis, assessment of situations, not

11 to say that it is not relevant and that we wouldn't like to hear it, but

12 if it becomes that vague that you are asking about the relationship the

13 Pale leadership had with itself then it's time to think about it. Please

14 proceed.

15 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour, and I'll attempt to be more

16 articulate as to the parties I'm referring to.

17 Q. Mr. Banbury, moving to the fall of 1994, were there areas in

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina which were particularly reliant on the aid

19 convoys?

20 A. Yes. There was of course a large number of people throughout

21 Bosnia on all sides dependent on humanitarian assistance, but the ones

22 most dependent were the ones in the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia and to an

23 extent in Bihac.

24 Q. What was your understanding as to the United Nations -- as to

25 whether the United Nations was to be permitted freedom of movement with

Page 8213

1 respect to these areas?

2 A. The Security Council made very clear in its resolutions that the

3 United Nations was to be given full freedom of movement to carry out its

4 responsibilities. Initially those responsibilities were very heavily

5 focused on humanitarian assistance, Resolution 776 and others; that

6 evolved over time to include other things. But it was clear that one of

7 the very fundamental roles of UNPROFOR was to support the delivery of

8 humanitarian assistance to civilians in need and that we were to be

9 accorded freedom of movement by all parties to achieve that objective.

10 Q. Just briefly, could you describe whether there was actual freedom

11 of movement to these areas in the fall of 1994?

12 A. The United Nations never had what I would -- or UNPROFOR never

13 had what I would call freedom of movement in Bosnia. We were constantly

14 impeded in our movements, whether it was for delivery of humanitarian

15 assistance or other activities.

16 Q. You've described some of these specifics in your statement but

17 could you tell us whether you were able to determine whether these

18 restrictions were based on local action or whether it was coming from a

19 higher place in the Bosnian Serb leadership?

20 A. The subject of freedom of movement was very often discussed by

21 the leadership of UNPROFOR with their interlocutors on the Bosnian Serb

22 side, with Dr. Karadzic and his colleagues on the civilian side; with

23 General Mladic and his colleagues on the military side. We discussed it

24 again and again and again. They were acutely aware of their

25 responsibilities under the Security Council mandate. They were acutely

Page 8214

1 aware of the fact that they were failing to fulfil these

2 responsibilities. And despite the repeated requests from Mr. Akashi on

3 down, they refused to accord us the freedom of movement we needed and had

4 the right to.

5 Q. In drafting letters to the various players in the former

6 Yugoslavia with respect to these restrictions, were you cognisant of the

7 particular tenor or tone that those letters would take with respect to

8 the events which they were describing?

9 A. Yes. UNPROFOR always sought to be very respectful to all parties

10 and accord the leadership of the parties the respect that we felt was due

11 to them, but we also put a higher priority on implementation of our

12 mandate and our responsibilities toward the people, all the peoples of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And we had to try and strike a difficult balance,

14 whether it was in letters or in meetings, between on the one hand

15 maintaining cordial, respectful relations, and on the other really

16 focusing on getting our job done.

17 Q. In paragraph 78 you described drafting a letter from Mr. Andreev

18 to Mr. Karadzic --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, could I ask you, in drafting a letter

20 you would say that the drafter could be not cognisant of the tone which

21 is adopted in that letter? Is that -- because that's what -- was your

22 question, isn't it?

23 MS. BIBLES: I was eliciting an explanation as to the recognition

24 of the different types of -- or the elevation in tone and tenor with

25 respect to certain incidents to put the next document in context,

Page 8215

1 Your Honour, perhaps not artfully.

2 JUDGE ORIE: What you were asking is whether as a drafter the

3 witness was cognisant of the tone in which certain events were described

4 in the text he drafted. Now, I have some difficulties in understanding

5 if you draft a document that you would not know about the tone you are

6 using. I mean, that's the privilege of the drafter I would say.

7 Therefore, could you please come to relevant, concrete points as quickly

8 as possible.

9 MS. BIBLES: If we could bring 65 ter 10586 to the screen,

10 please, specifically the second page in both versions.

11 Q. Could you describe for us the -- in diplomatic terms the tenor

12 that was used in this particular letter, that you used in this particular

13 letter?

14 A. This was a letter in which we, I guess, used very direct,

15 explicit language. Mr. Andreev was someone who I think generally sought

16 to understand the perspectives of all parties to the conflict. As a

17 Russian I think he had a particular ability to understand the perspective

18 of the Serbs and establish generally positive relationships with the

19 Bosnian Serb authorities, which was a good thing. So he had a particular

20 role and could play a role different than some other UN officials could.

21 Given how serious the situation was in Bosnia at the time of the writing

22 of this letter, in part following the Bihac crisis in late November 1994,

23 I thought it was critical or at least appropriate for Mr. Andreev to use

24 extremely direct, frank language with Dr. Karadzic so there could be no

25 misunderstanding at all about how grave the situation was, about the

Page 8216

1 responsibilities the Bosnian Serb leadership had for its part -- they

2 weren't the only ones responsible, but they had a responsibility for

3 getting the situation to where it was, and the implications of their

4 behaviour and what might follow if they -- if they did not change it so

5 there could be no misunderstanding later on if -- if things happened a

6 certain way as to them not having been put on notice of what was -- what

7 was happening.

8 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 10586.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Document 10586 receives number P875,

11 Your Honours.

12 JUDGE ORIE: P875 is admitted.

13 Please proceed, Ms. Bibles.

14 MS. BIBLES:

15 Q. In paragraph 75, your statement describes a meeting between

16 General Rose and others regarding NATO's position in Bosnia. I note that

17 this is an example where General Mladic is not actually present in the

18 meeting. Was it your experience in these negotiations that an agreement

19 could have been reached without General Mladic's authorisation?

20 A. In my experience, any significant decision or agreement --

21 decision by the Bosnian Serbs that had military implications or agreement

22 with the Bosnian Serbs that had military implications could only be

23 reached with the consent of General Mladic. There were many

24 conversations, discussions, negotiations that took place without him

25 present, and that meant one of two things: Either the issues being

Page 8217

1 discussed were of -- not of a level that required his engagement or that

2 the decision or agreement wasn't going to be reached in that room and

3 needed to be referred to him or he had already given his consent to a

4 certain position. And I think that was -- that was pretty clear to me

5 over time.

6 Q. Moving to the end of 1994, could you describe for us briefly

7 whether you were involved in the negotiations for the 31st December 1994

8 cessation of hostilities agreement?

9 A. Yes, I was assigned by the SRSG to President Carter as the

10 UNPROFOR political advisor notetaker for his negotiations. So I was the

11 only UN person attached to President Carter's delegation and was present

12 with him for all his meetings with the different parties.

13 Q. Could you describe for us whether Mladic was actively involved in

14 these negotiations.

15 A. General -- for President Carter's negotiations with the

16 Bosnian Serbs, General Mladic was normally present, but I would not say

17 he was actively involved in the formal meetings. I, of course, don't

18 know what role, if any, he played behind the scenes, but in terms of the

19 discussions with President Carter, those were generally led by

20 Dr. Karadzic.

21 Q. Moving on now to the spring of 1995, starting in -- around

22 paragraph 92 you indicate that this agreement started to break down.

23 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, could we see 65 ter 10592 on our

24 screens. And for reference, this is referred to in paragraphs 93 and 94.

25 And if we could go to e-court page 3 in English and 6 in the B/C/S

Page 8218

1 version.

2 Q. I'd like you -- to direct your attention to paragraph 7, where it

3 reads:

4 "The increasingly clear intention of the BSA appears to be to

5 permit delivery of supplies to the enclaves necessary for our survival,

6 but not those needed in order for us to function."

7 Was this level of control of freedom of movement a new point in

8 terms of negotiations, which you've described as negotiations, with the

9 Bosnian Serbs?

10 A. I wouldn't say it was a new point. It was used across the

11 time-span of the conflict as a very powerful source of leverage over the

12 UN. What was perhaps a little bit new or evolving around this time was

13 what I assessed to be the Bosnian Serbs' decision to really find a way to

14 neutralise the UN and neutralise our ability to act in Eastern Bosnia by

15 drastically limiting our ability to supply our personnel and deliver

16 humanitarian assistance. And I think there were two main objectives

17 there. There was the operational one by limiting the delivery of, say,

18 food and fuel to our troops. Our troops sometimes had to sleep in

19 unheated accommodation, they had to patrol on mules, they had to do foot

20 patrols, they couldn't run generators, so that limited our operational

21 ability to work. But there was also a very important psychological

22 impact, I think, on the UNPROFOR -- on some UNPROFOR leaders, both in

23 Eastern Bosnia and in Sarajevo as well as in Zagreb, where we became

24 dependent upon the Serbs to function, for us to function for us to live.

25 And very often the Bosnian Serb leadership, General Mladic and others,

Page 8219

1 would say: If -- we're doing this because the Bosnian government is, you

2 know, using an enclave for military purposes or one thing or another, so

3 you need to go get the Bosnian government to change its behaviour. And

4 if you do that, then we'll give you the ability to resupply yourselves.

5 So we got into the position of supplicant to the Pale leadership,

6 kind of beseeching them, please let us have food and fuel, and some folks

7 got -- ended up blaming the Bosnian government for our plight in the

8 enclaves. I think this was particularly true of some of the leaders in

9 the enclaves or some of the enclaves, and it was -- it was a very

10 intelligent, well-crafted strategy on the part of the Bosnian Serbs

11 because it totally reversed the situation where we wanted to get -- we

12 wanted to make the Bosnian Serbs happy and make them like us and we were

13 very angry - by "we" I mean some of the UN officials - angry at the

14 Bosnian government because of all these restrictions placed on UNPROFOR

15 by the Bosnian Serbs.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, I'm looking at the clock. It's time for

17 a break. We already can allow the witness to leave the courtroom. We'd

18 like to see you back in 20 minutes.

19 Ms. Bibles, apart from that, are you on track as far as time is

20 concerned?

21 MS. BIBLES: Very much, Your Honour. A little ahead of schedule

22 actually.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

24 [The witness stands down]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Which would mean that you would need how much time

Page 8226

1 Bosnian Serb army on the civilians, whether it was civilian deaths caused

2 by sniping or mortar fire or the humanitarian impact on people by

3 blocking delivery of humanitarian supplies. We did the same thing with

4 the other sides when their actions created a negative impact on the

5 civilians.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you recall the reaction of General Mladic

7 during such meetings when this issue was raised?

8 THE WITNESS: It was raised so many times, but normally there was

9 some combination of either blaming the other side for whatever the action

10 was or in linking, as in the recent example just cited, Bosnian Serb

11 action to something unrelated; so sniping civilians in Sarajevo because

12 of Serb casualties on a front line somewhere else. So there was some

13 effort to justify the behaviour or there was a denial of it or an

14 expression of not being aware of it and a pledge to investigate, which I

15 never found very credible, or to minimise the particular incident that

16 was being raised. So it was normally some combination of those,

17 justifying, denying or pledging to investigation.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the

20 witness?

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: You'll now be questioned by Mr. Stojanovic.

23 Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, sir. I assume that you have your

Page 8227

1 statement before you.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I'll try and go through certain parts of your statement. If I

4 have understood you correctly, you arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina one

5 day after your 30th birthday; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. Would you agree that you were a fairly young man who had an

8 extremely difficult job to do and a lot of responsibilities?

9 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

10 Q. Had you been trained in any way with regard to what you were to

11 expect in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1994? Had you been briefed?

12 Had you learned anything about the situation?

13 A. I had, I think, very relevant and significant experience with the

14 United Nations in conflict and post conflict zones before my arrival in

15 Bosnia that enabled me to carry out my job. In terms of my briefing on

16 the actual conflict in Bosnia, I had the normal induction briefing of UN

17 personnel when I arrived in Zagreb a few days before I arrived in Bosnia.

18 Q. And P874, if we could have it on the screen, please, paragraph 5,

19 and also in the course of the examination-in-chief today you mentioned

20 the manner in which you understood the task you had to carry out. What I

21 would like you to explain to us today is the following, it concerns

22 paragraph 5 in the English version, Your Honours -- in the English

23 version, Your Honours, it will be on the following page.

24 You said, amongst other things, that your mission was also to

25 interpret UNPROFOR's mandate for colleagues who held official, or rather,

Page 8228

1 military posts, especially this was for the benefit of the commander

2 Michael Rose, the commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and commander

3 Rupert Smith.

4 Would you tell the Court in what way you carried out this mandate

5 of -- or in what way you carried out this task of interpreting UNPROFOR's

6 mandate?

7 A. It started with a serious study of resolutions that had been

8 adopted by the UN Security Council with respect to UNPROFOR's mandate;

9 and then based on that study - I have a degree in international law which

10 helped me in my analysis of those resolutions - then trying to explain to

11 my superiors on the civilian side but also the senior military officers

12 what the meaning of that or the resolutions were in a given context.

13 Very often the interpretation was contextual following -- you know, in

14 the Gorazde crisis, what was our responsibility? What were we obligated

15 to do? What were we authorised to do? But it was up to the leaders to

16 decide what to do because they were not necessarily obligated to do

17 something; they perhaps only had the authorisation to. So it was mainly

18 in that way that I sought to help them understand either their

19 responsibilities or at least the authorities they had if they chose to

20 use them.

21 Q. But would we agree that there were various ways in which

22 UNPROFOR's mandate was interpreted or viewed and members of UNPROFOR

23 themselves viewed it in different ways; is that correct?

24 A. Yes, that is absolutely correct. Unfortunately, for various

25 reasons, the Security Council Resolutions had a degree of ambiguity in

Page 8229

1 them that left them open to interpretation and different interpretations.

2 And so it was sometimes a challenging task because the military wanted

3 something very clear and definitive and we were not always able to give

4 them a clear, definitive answer to their questions.

5 Q. With regard to these various interpretations of UNPROFOR's

6 mandate in various crisis situations that you were involved in, these

7 interpretations kept reoccurring in the field; isn't that the case?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you. Let's now have a look at paragraph 11 in your

10 statement. P874. And could we see the document in e-court,

11 65 ter document 10641. Sir, in paragraph 11 you refer to this document,

12 in fact, and in response to a question put to you by the Prosecution you

13 comment on it. I would like to clarify certain issues in that paragraph

14 now. If I have understood this correctly, this telegram or this document

15 was drafted by three authors; am I correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Dejan Mihov, David Harland, and yourself?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. I'm asking you about this because I would like to focus on

20 paragraph 4 in this document, paragraph 4 in the B/C/S version, and in

21 the English version it's on the next page, Your Honours. This was

22 mentioned in paragraph 11 of the witness's statement. So the first thing

23 I would like to ask you about is whether you can remember of the three of

24 you, who, in fact, drafted this report or message dated the

25 18th of April, 1994?

Page 8230

1 A. I believe that all three of us had a role in drafting the

2 document, which probably meant some of us wrote some paragraphs, some

3 wrote the other, but in the end we all reviewed it and had a chance to

4 make comments on the entire document.

5 Q. So that would also be your point of view in relation to what it

6 says in paragraph 4, that is the text that should be provided?

7 A. Well, it's likely that one of the three of us wrote paragraph 4

8 but that all three of us in reviewing the entire document had a chance to

9 review that paragraph.

10 Q. And it states, among other things, that in the event of people

11 leaving Gorazde en masse in Sarajevo, other areas under the control of

12 the government of the ABiH, the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

13 would become more radical and the conflict would probably continue. You

14 said what you thought about that, and in the light of what you said in

15 paragraph 11 of your statement my question is as follows: On the basis

16 of what experience did you draw the conclusion that this would be one of

17 the main obstacles to peace? And this is what you stated in paragraph 4.

18 A. I think it's unlikely that I was the drafter of paragraph 4. I

19 think it was more likely one of other two colleagues.

20 Q. If I told you that Mr. Harland drafted it, would that be correct?

21 A. I don't know which of the three of us drafted it. I'm sorry, I

22 don't recall. My guess is it was more likely to be Mr. Mihov, but if you

23 told me that Mr. Harland did it I could certainly believe that's a

24 possibility, yes.

25 Q. Very well. I'm not making that claim, but I'm asking you about

Page 8231

1 this because I want to know whether they would allow you to comment in

2 paragraph 11 on something that someone else wrote, not yourself, one of

3 the three of you but not yourself?

4 A. I'm sorry, sir, I don't understand the question.

5 Q. I'll rephrase it. I apologise. You are commenting on what

6 paragraph 4 was supposed to mean. In paragraph 11 of your statement, I

7 just want you to confirm something, in fact, that you are commenting on

8 the text drafted by someone else. And this is, in fact, the way in which

9 you interpret something that someone else drafted. Am I correct in

10 saying that?

11 A. Yes, you're correct.

12 Q. And given that this is your interpretation, what is the opinion

13 of the three of you in paragraph 4 when you say that this situation, the

14 influence of the military units of the ABiH is composed of displaced

15 persons from Eastern Bosnia would be one of the main obstacles to peace?

16 A. I can only speak for myself and not the colleagues at the time,

17 but it is my understanding that our -- we assess that where there was

18 serious displacement of population, where there was so-called ethnic

19 cleansing, violent displacement of people, burning of homes perhaps,

20 terrible crimes committed against women, that this would -- on any side,

21 this would quite naturally make the survivors, the families, you know,

22 very hostile to the party that carried out these acts and deeply opposed

23 to any kind of reconciliation with them, perhaps seeking, you know, if

24 not revenge at least victory over the other side and less inclined to

25 compromise. And so for in this particular case the people in the

Page 8232

1 communities and units made up of people who were displaced through

2 violence from Eastern Bosnia, those people would be less inclined to

3 compromise with the party that they assigned responsibility to for these

4 acts than, say, people who had not been so directly a victim of violence.

5 Q. Well, that's exactly why I asked you this. Now, based on your

6 experience during your stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina, would you say that

7 both sides ...

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] May I continue, Your Honours?

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, could you just restart your question. You

11 said, "Based on your experience during your stay in Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina would you say ..." and then continue your question from there

13 on.

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Would you say then that this pattern of taking revenge because of

16 something that someone had gone through would have been something that

17 would affect both warring parties?

18 A. As a general matter, I think it is human nature and it's -- in

19 the case of Bosnia it's all three parties, I think, human nature if you

20 see something terrible or horrible done to a family member, your

21 neighbour, that you are then angry, upset, want revenge or victory over

22 the people. You want justice against the people who have carried that

23 out. And I think this is a human reaction that applied to civilians,

24 people, or military, for that matter, in all parties in the conflict in

25 Bosnia, yes.

Page 8233

1 Q. Now let's take a look at paragraph 6 of this message, this

2 document, that we have before us which reads:

3 "The situation -- the unstable situation persists. Bosnian

4 infantry, released from Sarajevo by the TEZ, is destabilising the main

5 western confrontation line and the Nisici plateau ..."

6 Now, my question is this: Could you explain to the Trial Chamber

7 what you meant by the words "Bosnian infantry released from Sarajevo"?

8 A. Well, again, it's not necessarily the case that I drafted that

9 paragraph, but I think the meaning of it is that because of the agreement

10 or the requirement by the Security Council and the UN on the total

11 exclusion zone around Sarajevo, that led to a lessening of conflict in

12 that area; and as a result the parties were able to redirect military

13 assets that they had previously concentrated in the Sarajevo area to

14 other locations.

15 Q. Thank you. Now let's take a look at paragraph 10 of this

16 document where it says:

17 "The Council must clarify the concept of the Safe Areas as soon

18 as possible ..."

19 And then you go on to explain what that implies. So my question

20 for you is this: Could you tell the Trial Chamber whether at any point

21 in time the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina received an

22 official explanation from the council describing the exact meaning of the

23 concept of safe areas or whether this issue and the various perception of

24 what the term "safe area" implies remained open throughout your stay in

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, unresolved in other words?

Page 8234

1 A. The only explanation or guidance that UNPROFOR received from the

2 Security Council on the safe areas was in the form of its official

3 documents, resolutions, presidential statements, and in particularly --

4 in particular Resolutions 824 and 836. So we did not get guidance beyond

5 that from the Security Council and UNPROFOR was left to interpret the

6 resolutions and its responsibilities largely on its own.

7 Q. Now I'll put a very specific question to you: Would I be correct

8 if I said that such different approaches to the concept of safe areas did

9 not have an answer to the question of whether UNPROFOR, and I quote,

10 "should tolerate the fact that the Bosnian army used them, took advantage

11 of them, for military purpose"?

12 A. The two primary Security Council Resolutions dealing with safe

13 areas did not create an obligation on the Bosnian government forces to

14 withdraw from the safe areas. And in fact in 836 there was an explicit

15 requirement of the Bosnian Serb forces and related militia to withdraw

16 from the safe areas -- to a safe distance from the safe areas. And by

17 specifically creating that obligation on the Bosnian Serb forces while

18 remaining silent on the Bosnian government forces, it was the

19 interpretation of myself and, I think, several others that there was thus

20 no requirement for the Bosnian government forces to withdraw their

21 military from the safe areas.

22 Q. But would you agree with me that there were different

23 interpretations about the Bosnian army in the safe areas, the enclaves,

24 that, in fact, should be disarmed and that that was, after all, the

25 mandate that UNPROFOR had?

Page 8235

1 A. There were different views within UNPROFOR and beyond about

2 the -- what should be the role of the Bosnian military, if any, whether

3 there should be a presence or not in the safe areas. For the most part

4 those difference of views were not based on different interpretations of

5 Security Council Resolutions and obligations imposed by those

6 resolutions; rather, the difference of views was a result of an

7 assessment that the continued -- an assessment by some that the continued

8 presence of Bosnian government forces in the safe areas was a

9 destabilising factor and creating problems and it would be better if the

10 Bosnian government forces either were not there or were not active in the

11 safe areas. But that was more on an operational assessment as opposed to

12 an interpretation of a legal obligation.

13 Q. If we accepted the interpretation according to which the BH army

14 would not have the duty to demilitarise within the safe areas and that it

15 may remain as an organised and armed force and launch attacks out of the

16 safe areas, would that mean, according to you as you've just explained,

17 that the VRS, the Army of the Bosnian Serbs, would not have the right to

18 counter such attacks because of its obligation under Resolution 876 of

19 the Security Council?

20 A. It is clear, I think, from Resolution 824 and 836 that there was

21 a clear, unambiguous obligation on the Bosnian Serb army and any other

22 force not to attack the six safe areas. There was no provision that

23 allowed them to attack.

24 Q. And can you agree with me then that such a difference in

25 positions caused continuous problems in all the talks with the

Page 8236

1 Army of Republika Srpska?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Now let's just briefly take a look at paragraph 11 of

4 this document and then we will be done with it.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, paragraph 11,

6 that's on the next page in both the B/C/S and English versions. It's the

7 last paragraph.

8 Q. And it reads:

9 "UNPROFOR's mandate has pushed it into low-level conflict with

10 the Serbs ..."

11 And you say:

12 "Our mandate must either be one within which we are able to have

13 a co-operative relationship with the Serbs, or it must be one in which we

14 have the force to impose our will. It cannot be - as it is

15 now - somewhere in between."

16 You talked about this in paragraph 12 of your statement, and we

17 have that statement before us so I won't repeat myself. But let me ask

18 you just this: At any point in time while you were in

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina - and I'm not referring to you personally,

20 sir - were you ever given a different interpretation of the UNPROFOR

21 mandate as opposed to the time when this -- when this telegram was

22 drafted?

23 A. No, not fundamentally. There were some additional capabilities

24 assigned to UNPROFOR, but the fundamental mandate was never changed so

25 that ambiguity remained.

Page 8237

1 Q. And we can agree that this was a constant cause, as you stated

2 here, of a low-level intensity -- low-level conflict with the Serbs;

3 correct?

4 A. I don't believe that UNPROFOR was engaged in a constant conflict

5 with the Bosnian Serbs, at least -- certainly not militarily. That came

6 and went for very brief periods, but for the most part we were not

7 engaged in any kind of military conflict with the Serbs except in those

8 short periods. The -- it did create political tensions between the

9 Bosnian Serbs and UNPROFOR, though, throughout that period, yes.

10 Q. Thank you. Then just one final question which I hear from what

11 you've said. You said that some points in time UNPROFOR was in conflict

12 with the Serbs. Can we agree that in some periods that conflict was a

13 high-intensity conflict, where it was necessary to use very strong

14 resources of the NATO Pact?

15 A. Yes, with the slight qualification that very strong resources of

16 NATO were used. Whether it was necessary or not I think is a matter of

17 opinion.

18 Q. You mention in your statement and I will talk about this a little

19 later, but did you see this conflict as a situation where UNPROFOR, in

20 fact, was a warring party and that its opponent was the

21 Army of Republika Srpska?

22 A. No, absolutely not.

23 Q. Very well. Thank you.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, Your Honours, I would like

25 to tender this document into evidence. It is on our -- actually, it's on

Page 8238

1 the OTP 65 ter list.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Document 10641 receives number D186,

4 Your Honours.

5 JUDGE ORIE: D186 is admitted.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. I will return to paragraphs 17 and 18 of your statement, but for

8 now let's take a look at para 24 where you were shown a document.

9 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honour, could we pull

10 up this document in e-court? That's 09738, 65 ter document.

11 Q. Sir, you discuss this document in paragraph 24 of your statement

12 and I would just like to remind you that you also discussed this document

13 in the Karadzic case. Now having reminded you of that --

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could we now see

15 1D00708 in e-court. 1D00708.

16 Q. Sir, I believe that you had occasion to see this document. You

17 were shown it in the Karadzic case. And if you need some time to go

18 through it, please let us know, but I will just have a few questions

19 about this and the interpretation of the document that we saw a little

20 earlier. This is a document sent from a forward command post, an IKM,

21 from the VKRS. And in paragraph 1 it says:

22 "On the 27th of April, 1994 ..."

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps, Your Honour, we should

24 just see who the author of this document is and then we can go back to

25 this page. With your leave, could we see the last page first because

Page 8239

1 that will give us the full context.

2 Q. So we see the document was signed by Major-General Milan Gvero.

3 Thank you. And now could we go back to page 1, please. It says here,

4 sir, that on the 27th of April, 1994, at a joint meeting of

5 representatives of the VKRS - and in a moment I'll ask you to assist us

6 with interpreting this VKRS - and the UN representative, Mr. De Mello,

7 and General Soubirou, it was stated that the Gorazde cease-fire agreement

8 was reached, the agreement between Mr. Akashi and President Karadzic had

9 been implemented in its entirety in accordance with the agreed -- what

10 had been agreed and the resolution. Then in paragraph 3 it says:

11 "It was agreed that VRS soldiers in the stated sectors," in other

12 words in a 3-kilometre-wide zone, "will put on civilian clothes with the

13 explanation that these are villagers that do not have any other clothes

14 since their village was burned down by the Muslims. It was also agreed

15 that some local police officers will put on civilian clothes and that all

16 the problems with UNPROFOR should be resolved through negotiations."

17 So my question is this: Have you had occasion to see this

18 document before?

19 A. Yes, I believe I have.

20 Q. Am I right that VKRS is, in fact -- stands for Supreme Command of

21 the Army of Republika Srpska?

22 A. That is my understanding, yes.

23 Q. And that Major-General Milan Gvero who signed this document sent

24 this document, in fact, on behalf of the Supreme Command, informing

25 thereby the units that are mentioned here as the addressees; correct?

Page 8240

1 A. I'm not an expert on Bosnian Serb military communications.

2 That's why understanding. That's my understanding of the document, but I

3 can't attest to that, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. But the key issue here is this: Did you at any point

5 in time receive information that at a meeting between Mr. De Mello and

6 General Soubirou, Mr. Akashi and Karadzic, there was an agreement reached

7 that VRS soldiers in the stated sectors should change into civilian

8 clothes as stated here in this document?

9 A. I accompanied Mr. De Mello from Sarajevo to Gorazde after the

10 agreement was reached between Mr. Akashi and Dr. Karadzic. I was --

11 Mr. De Mello was the head of civil affairs for UNPROFOR based in Zagreb

12 but sent by Mr. Akashi to help resolve the Gorazde crisis. Mr. De Mello

13 was a senior official and led the first convoy of UNPROFOR from Sarajevo

14 to Gorazde following the agreement. And so I was present there at the

15 time and this issue of Serb forces remaining within the 3-kilometre total

16 exclusion zone was a source of disagreement between UNPROFOR and the

17 Bosnian Serb authorities, and what was agreed from the UNPROFOR side,

18 what we had understood and agreed to, was that as per the agreement

19 between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Akashi, all Serb forces were required to

20 depart the 3-kilometre total exclusion zone. If there were individuals

21 who were from within that region, primarily on the right bank of the

22 Drina, Serb individuals who had served in the military or had served in

23 the police, and they wished to stay behind as civilians, then they were

24 free to do so as long as they did not wear their military or police

25 uniform and did not carry their weapon. They were not allowed to stay

Page 8241

1 behind as members of formed military police unit just changing their

2 clothes. And I think there was a disagreement between UNPROFOR and the

3 Bosnian Serbs on that.

4 Q. Can we agree, knowing the structure of the

5 Army of Republika Srpska, that those soldiers were, in fact, from the

6 areas near Gorazde?

7 A. I cannot attest to that one way or the other. I don't have

8 knowledge of that. I'm sorry. I think it's quite likely some were --

9 almost certainly some were. Whether all were or not, I cannot attest.

10 JUDGE ORIE: I see you are looking at the clock, Mr. Stojanovic.

11 Is this to introduce your last question, or whether you thought it was

12 the right time for the break?

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, Your Honour, I

14 do have one additional document. I'll be very brief. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 1D00717.

17 717.

18 Q. We can see this document before us now. I don't know if you've

19 seen it before, sir. The date is the 16th of April, 1994, in other words

20 at the time of the Gorazde crisis. It was issued by the Main Staff of

21 the Army of Republika Srpska signed by General-Colonel Ratko Mladic and

22 entitled: Treatment of civil and prisoners -- civilians and prisoners of

23 war in Gorazde. And it says:

24 "I strictly forbid the mistreatment and physical liquidation of

25 prisoners of war, civilians, and members of international organisations."

Page 8242

1 Under 2:

2 "All commands and members of the VRS are duty-bound to isolate

3 and protect the civilian population in Gorazde by transferring them to

4 more adequate locations."

5 And under 5:

6 "Destruction of movable and immovable property on the liberated

7 territory by torching or destroying is prohibited."

8 So I'm asking you this: According to what you knew, was this

9 order issued by General Mladic implemented? Was it complied with in view

10 of the events in and around Gorazde in those days? And as far as you can

11 remember, were there any actions that ran counter to this order?

12 A. If I can just have a minute to review the text, please, because

13 I've not seen this document before. According to my recollection I have

14 not seen it.

15 It is my experience that this order was not fully implemented by

16 Bosnian Serb military units in and around Gorazde at that time.

17 Q. Then after the break I will ask you how that portion of this

18 order not being complied with actually expressed itself in the field.

19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to

20 tender this document.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar -- we had one on the screen before,

22 Mr. Stojanovic. We did not even have time to look at it because you

23 had -- you had already changed it for another one. Would you consider

24 during the break with the precise 65 ter numbers which other ones you

25 would also wish to tender. But for this one at this moment,

Page 8243

1 Madam Registrar ... ?

2 Let's first finish this one.

3 Madam Registrar.

4 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Microphone, Madam Registrar.

6 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise. Document 1D717 receives number

7 D187, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE ORIE: D187 is admitted into evidence. I'd like to take

9 the break now. Mr. Stojanovic, if you would put down on a little piece

10 of paper which of the others you want to tender, then we can deal with it

11 far more quickly after the break. The witness may follow the usher.

12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

13 [The witness stands down]

14 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we'll resume at 20 minutes past

15 12.00.

16 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

17 --- On resuming at 12.22 p.m.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if I can just inform the Chamber -- I

20 know that we had some discussions earlier in the week about possible need

21 to sit extra time in order to complete the witnesses. I've spoken to

22 Mr. Stojanovic. It appears that there will be no need for any extra

23 time. He's confident that he can complete his examination in the regular

24 hearing time. Thank you, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, I am looking at how we finished

Page 8244

1 yesterday, the Chamber already thought that there would be no need,

2 although it was not confirmed, it was mainly introduced through the

3 previous witness who I think concluded his testimony well in time.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you may proceed.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have to suggest

7 that the document dated the 27th of April, 1994, be tendered -- be

8 admitted into evidence. I commented on it and discussed it with the

9 witness. 1D708 is the number of the document.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D708 receives number D188,

12 Your Honours.

13 JUDGE ORIE: D188 is admitted.

14 Any other document, Mr. Stojanovic?

15 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. No, Your Honour.

16 There will be other ones, though.

17 JUDGE ORIE: There's also nothing about 65 ter 09738? You don't

18 want to tender that one?

19 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that won't be necessary.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.

21 Then please proceed.

22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. Sir, if you remember we -- you were saying that before the break

24 that as far as you know General Mladic's order dated the

25 16th of April, 1994, wasn't fully respected. Do you remember in what

Page 8245

1 respect the order was not fully respected? Who failed to abide by the

2 order and where?

3 JUDGE ORIE: Could we have it on our screen again so that we can

4 follow the comments of the witness.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. 65 ter 1D717.

6 JUDGE ORIE: It's on the screen already.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] D187 is the number now.

8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. The timing there of the -- this order

9 of 16 April 1994 was right in the middle of the crisis, so of course

10 things that happened before the 16th of April cannot have fallen under

11 this order but -- and there were many problems before the 16th.

12 Nonetheless, even afterward there was, for instance, I believe

13 significant destruction of property. For instance, when I accompanied

14 that first convoy led by Mr. De Mello, UNPROFOR convoy, from Sarajevo to

15 Gorazde, as we approached Gorazde very late at night, around midnight, I

16 saw many homes burning still -- on fire at the time, other homes

17 destroyed, though it's possible that some of those destroyed homes could

18 have been destroyed before April 16th, but certainly the ones that were

19 on fire were contemporaneously destroyed. A number of dead animal

20 carcasses. So I think there was destruction of property in and around

21 Gorazde following 16 April. There was also an UNPROFOR soldier killed in

22 the Gorazde area. There -- excuse me one second. The treatment of

23 civilians at -- following April 16th -- and there certainly was not

24 adequate humanitarian assistance brought in to them by the United Nations

25 because of impediments imposed by the Bosnian Serb military. So I think

Page 8246

1 both in the letter and in the spirit of this order there were some

2 significant violations following April 16th by the Bosnian Serb forces in

3 and around Gorazde.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could we briefly go through a few of them. The

5 first one is the prohibition of cruel treatment, as well as the abuse and

6 physical destruction of the civilian population. Did you see any

7 violation of that order or was that included in the previous part of your

8 answer?

9 THE WITNESS: Well, that first part, Your Honour, involved a

10 number of different concepts. Cruel treatment, abuse and physical

11 destruction of civilian population, prisoners of war, and members of

12 international organisations, but trying to interpret it as literally as

13 possible the way it's written, the -- physical destruction of civilian

14 population, no, I don't believe I could say I personally -- other than

15 the fact that the population of Gorazde was -- was imprisoned as a whole

16 and given very limited access to -- to humanitarian assistance. There

17 was a military assault on the enclave which involved or included

18 destruction of or shelling of the area that led to civilian deaths. I

19 guess that may fall within that, but that's only thing that I could say

20 on the first part.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Second category, that is, isolation and protection

22 of the civil population by transferring them to more adequate localities.

23 Was that done and do you have any understanding of what the basis of this

24 order was?

25 THE WITNESS: Well, the civilian population was not isolated,

Page 8247

1 although I don't think the Bosnian Serb authorities or military could

2 have isolated the civilian population in Gorazde from the military

3 population. It was a small enclave; things were intermixed. But there

4 were not transfers of the population that -- that I'm aware of at that

5 time. And I don't know what exactly the intention of that part of the

6 order in paragraph 2 refers to. It could refer to different things.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, abuse of prisoners of war, and, 3, any

8 knowledge about that whether that was --

9 THE WITNESS: No, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: 4:

11 "All members of the international organisations to be sheltered

12 on the territory of the Republika Srpska and to be accommodated and

13 secure treatment in accordance with their mandate."

14 THE WITNESS: On this two comments, Your Honour. One, there was

15 the killing of the UNPROFOR soldier. Putting aside the shooting down of

16 the NATO jet, but the killing of the UNPROFOR soldier is one specific

17 example where that part of the order was not respected. But more broadly

18 the last part of that paragraph, "secure treatment in accordance with

19 their mandate," certainly we were not accorded the treatment we needed in

20 accordance with our mandate, i.e., freedom of movement, ability to

21 operate to move freely in and around -- to Gorazde and then within the

22 Gorazde area. We could not freely move our personnel there from, say,

23 Sarajevo. Once there, we could not move freely about and we could not

24 deliver the humanitarian assistance that was required. So I believe that

25 part was clearly not followed.

Page 8248

1 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if I follow you, the -- perhaps the order was

2 followed but was -- to the extent that -- but that it was not in

3 accordance with your mandate?

4 THE WITNESS: Correct, yes, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

6 THE WITNESS: That's what I meant to refer to at the last part of

7 that paragraph.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Any comment on the destruction of movable and

9 immovable property?

10 THE WITNESS: Not in addition to my previous answer, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Anything about confiscated MTS, materiel

12 technical resources?

13 THE WITNESS: No, I don't have any personal knowledge of that.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

15 Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for your assistance.

17 Q. I'd like to ask you the following: As far as you know, was that

18 Sea Harrier plane destroyed before this order was issued by

19 General Mladic, and was this something that occurred subsequent to this

20 document?

21 A. I don't know exactly. It was right around that time. It may

22 have been before but it was right around that time. I don't know. I'm

23 sorry.

24 JUDGE ORIE: You may sit down, Mr. Mladic. If there's any need

25 to consult -- Mr. Stojanovic, for urgent consultation 30 seconds at a low

Page 8249

1 voice is allowed; otherwise, you would have to wait until the next break.

2 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

4 Please be seated, Mr. Mladic.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Q. Sir, I just have a few other questions that relate to this crisis

7 in Gorazde to put to you. Would you agree that in this conflict in

8 Gorazde -- or rather, this conflict in Gorazde was preceded by numerous

9 incidents from the Gorazde safe haven incidents that were launched

10 against Serbian villages, surrounding Serbian places, or rather,

11 provocations that were launched against these places?

12 A. As I mentioned previously, I only arrived on April 9th when

13 perhaps those incidents to the extent they occurred had already occurred.

14 So I do not have personal knowledge of that. I did hear reports or

15 complaints from the Bosnian Serb authorities of such incidents, but I

16 have no direct personal knowledge. And the UNPROFOR reporting on such

17 incidents to a large extent took place before my arrival; and in

18 addition, our ability to report on such incidents was limited because of

19 the restrictions on our freedom of movement.

20 Q. Did you have the opportunity of personally learning about the

21 contents of the warehouse of the former JNA warehouse in the suburb of

22 Gorazde, Kopaci, this was under ground. What sort of logistics, what

23 sort of equipment, what sort of resources were kept there? Did you find

24 anything out about that?

25 A. No, I did not.

Page 8250

1 Q. And is it correct that the pilot of the downed plane was an

2 English pilot?

3 A. Yes, that is certainly my understanding. It was a British

4 aircraft piloted by a British pilot.

5 Q. And the UNPROFOR member who was killed, was he part of an

6 UNPROFOR mission or was he, in fact, guiding NATO planes?

7 A. If I recall correctly, there were two British officers killed or

8 British personnel killed in Gorazde, both of whom were UNPROFOR

9 personnel.

10 Q. And was their mission to guide the aircraft?

11 A. Not that I'm aware of. I should say, however, if that was their

12 mission it's quite likely that I would not be aware of that because of

13 the nature of those kinds of military operations. I just don't know.

14 Q. Thank you. Because that is a question that we also put to

15 generals who have already appeared here. Would you agree with me that

16 the bullet that killed these UNPROFOR members is -- or the bullet fired

17 by the UNPROFOR members is in dispute. There is no agreement as to who

18 fired that bullet that killed the UNPROFOR members?

19 A. It is my understanding that UNPROFOR had concluded that the shot

20 was fired from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's now have a look at a

22 document. It's a 65 ter document, 18775. We'll have a look at it in the

23 e-court. Unfortunately we only have it in English, Your Honours. And

24 we'll focus on paragraph 3 in this document. It's a telegram of the

25 25th of April, 1994, sent by Mr. de Lapresle to Mr. Annan. In

Page 8251

1 paragraph 3 it states the following:

2 "The situation on the ground in Gorazde is much improved. The

3 Army of Republika Srpska has withdrawn 3 kilometres from the line agreed

4 on by Karadzic and Akashi."

5 And it further states that the BiH is of no assistance because

6 snipers, their snipers, opened fire on the Serbs who were withdrawing

7 from those lines, at least 13 BSA casualties resulted in the direction of

8 Ustipraca. Do you remember this document? Have you already seen it?

9 A. I do not remember it and it's very unlikely that I would have

10 seen it at the time as this code cable was generated in Zagreb and I was

11 at the time based in Sarajevo and I think on that day I was already in

12 Gorazde. So we would not have had access to these code cables in

13 Gorazde.

14 Q. Were you informed of such a situation at any point in time? Were

15 you provided with such information according to which ABiH members at the

16 time of the withdrawal of the Republika Srpska army, according to the

17 Karadzic-Akashi agreement, opened fire on members of the Republika Srpska

18 army and opened fire from sniper rifles?

19 A. I would have been informed of most significant military or

20 operational developments in respect to the Gorazde crisis, including such

21 an incident as this which I would have and we would have characterised as

22 very serious. Although I do not recollect at this time the specific

23 incident, that just simply may be due to the passage of time and I don't

24 dispute it.

25 Q. And this, in fact, happened, would that have meant that the ABiH

Page 8252

1 had violated the Karadzic-Akashi agreement?

2 A. I would have to review the specific terms of the agreement and

3 also need to have more information about this specific incident, but

4 it's -- that's certainly a possibility.

5 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that according to the information you

6 had and on the basis of your experience, according to the information you

7 had while present in the field, the ABiH was operating in the Gorazde

8 safe haven and that army was armed and functioned like a standard

9 military unit in 1994?

10 A. It was certainly my understanding that there were elements of the

11 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina present in Gorazde and they were trying to

12 function as a military force. I don't know that they were operating as a

13 standard military force because of the unique situation in -- present in

14 Gorazde. Basically they were isolated, surrounded by their opposing

15 force, their enemy, and as a result they had to operate in a quite

16 different way. And I think their -- the resources available to them,

17 their logistics, for instance, were a significant problem. But certainly

18 I agree that there were elements of the Bosnian government military

19 forces in Gorazde acting in a military way.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one additional question in relation to

21 this. Were there any international legal instruments,

22 Security Council Resolutions, other agreements which were valid

23 agreements that would prevent them from having their presence in Gorazde

24 and to act as a military force?

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, according to my understanding and

Page 8253

1 recollection, there were no legal requirements created by the

2 Security Council or agreements entered into by the parties that would

3 have required the Bosnian military to withdraw from the safe areas,

4 including Gorazde, or to limit their activities in the Gorazde safe area

5 to the point where they -- they did not act as a military force according

6 to my understanding.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

8 Please proceed.

9 It seems that Mr. Mladic would like to hand out a note. Please

10 proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And I'll go back to the issue we were dealing with, that concerns

13 the safe havens. According to your understanding and according to your

14 understanding of the safe havens, would it be legitimate if there was an

15 attack launched by the ABiH? If there were certain formations in the

16 safe haven, would it be legitimate in the case of such attack for the

17 Republika Srpska army to respond to the attack launched?

18 A. This was an issue of constant -- that created constant

19 difficulties for UNPROFOR and relates to the previous discussion on

20 clarification of the safe area concept. Because according to my

21 understanding, the legal obligations created by UN

22 Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836 were -- imposed very significant

23 constraints on the Bosnian Serb -- constraints and obligations on the

24 Bosnian Serb army in terms of not attacking the safe areas and

25 withdrawing to a safe distance from the safe areas. But those

Page 8254

1 resolutions did not make similar or associated demands or create

2 obligations on the Bosnian government forces so that from a legal

3 perspective the Bosnian government forces could launch attacks from the

4 safe areas. And if they did so, the Bosnian Serb army was prohibited

5 from responding. As a legal matter, according to

6 Security Council Resolutions and hence the UNPROFOR mandate, whether that

7 was fair or just or wise --

8 JUDGE ORIE: It is exceptionally that -- first the witness cannot

9 be interrupted in answering a question so you should -- Mr. Mladic,

10 Mr. Mladic, Mr. Mladic, no loud speaking. Is there a problem with the

11 audio?

12 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I think he has a problem with

13 receiving the interpretation again. That is my understanding of the

14 issue.

15 JUDGE ORIE: It will be resolved then. We'll wait until it has

16 been resolved. I'll speak a few words and see whether Mr. Mladic

17 receives interpretation. Do you now receive interpretation? One second.

18 Usually on channel 6. We will wait until the technicians have resolved

19 the problem.

20 That is, Mr. Mladic, there is no need to speak about it. It will

21 be resolved and we will stop until it has been resolved. Is it a

22 technical problem or is it a choice of the channel?

23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could I check at this moment whether Mr. Mladic now

25 hears what I say in a language he understands?

Page 8255

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am receiving the interpretation

2 now, but I would like everything that I did not hear to be interpreted

3 for my benefit again.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, for the next break, I don't know for

5 how long it was, we could ask Madam Registrar to make a print-out of,

6 well let's say the last two pages from before Mr. Mladic told us that he

7 had problems and then you have an opportunity to go through that with the

8 assistance of whomever because we have only the English transcript at

9 this moment. But you'll find a solution for that I take it. Meanwhile,

10 you may proceed.

11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Sir, I'll put another question to you that concerns Gorazde

13 now --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we first allow the witness to complete his

15 answer to the previous question.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I thought he had completed his

17 answer. He repeated what his position was, the one that he expressed in

18 the course of the previous session.

19 Q. Am I correct?

20 A. I was just about to conclude my answer, but I think the

21 substantive point had been made. Thank you, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Then time for the next question, Mr. Stojanovic.

23 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 Q. As instructed by General Mladic, I would like to ask you whether

25 you knew that within the Gorazde safe area there was a special purposes

Page 8256

1 factory for producing military ammunition and the name was Pobide [phoen]

2 Gorazde and there was also a chemical industry plant, a Zotare [phoen]?

3 A. I had heard reports of the Bosnian forces in Gorazde making

4 somehow their own munitions. I have no direct knowledge of such a

5 factory. I haven't, for instance, seen it with my eyes, but I did hear

6 reports. I don't know the name of that factory. I had not heard of a

7 factory manufacturing chemicals in Gorazde or the name of that factory

8 either.

9 Q. If what you heard was correct, given your understanding - and I'm

10 referring to your understanding - of the term "safe area," would this

11 have represented a violation of the concept of a state -- of a safe area

12 in accordance with international law. Would that have been the case if

13 ammunition was being produced in such an area?

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, if you're referring to the concept

15 of a safe area in international law, you are hereby invited to tell us

16 exactly what you're referring to. Is this an agreed safe area between

17 the parties with -- or is it a concept which was used, for example, in

18 Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836. We should clearly distinguish

19 what we are dealing with at this moment.

20 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, preparing for this

21 I read both resolutions of the Security Council a number of times because

22 for years I have been dealing with the Srebrenica story. The resolution

23 itself is open to interpretation and that is the problem that the witness

24 today has spoken about --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Now, the only thing I'm inviting you to do is are

Page 8257

1 you asking whether it was in violation of the safe areas as defined in

2 the Security Council Resolutions or by any other definition. Then the

3 witness has a clear point of reference for his answer.

4 If there would be present such factories, would that violate the

5 safe area as outlined in the Security Council Resolutions 824 and 836?

6 That is now the question.

7 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, such a presence of a munitions factory

8 in the safe area would not, according to my understanding, violate either

9 Resolutions 824, 836, or other Security Council Resolutions related to

10 the Bosnian conflict.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

12 Please proceed, Mr. Stojanovic.

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. That's precisely

14 what I was hoping to elicit, the interpretation of this witness. Now,

15 Your Honour, I would like to tender 65 ter 18775.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Document 18775 receives number D189,

18 Your Honours.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, you would agree, I take it, that it

20 would be MFI'd until you have provided the B/C/S translation?

21 MR. STOJANOVIC: [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE ORIE: We did not receive interpretation of your words.

23 Could you please repeat what you just said, Mr. Stojanovic.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct. This would be

25 my proposal. I would like to tender this document with an MFI

Page 8258

1 identification pending the B/C/S translation.

2 JUDGE ORIE: D189 is marked for identification. Please proceed.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 Q. Now briefly let's focus on paragraph 27 of your statement. Let

5 me say that that's P874, document P874, and in this paragraph you talk

6 about a crisis situation dealing with the release of an UNPROFOR

7 official. If you recall, a number of documents are mentioned here and

8 briefly I will tell you, or rather, I'd like to show you paragraph 27,

9 the portion specifically which says that Mr. Andreev had met with

10 Mr. Karadzic on the 31st of May, 1994, and that Karadzic indicated on

11 that occasion that the said gentleman would be released once the Serbs

12 had received written confirmation of his status as an UNPROFOR staff

13 member and assurances that his mistake would not be repeated.

14 Very briefly, could you agree with me that this incident occurred

15 when it was established that there were individuals in the vehicle of

16 this UNPROFOR member who were not properly accredited and who had on them

17 over 300.000 Deutschemarks, were taking the money into Sarajevo?

18 A. I am familiar with the incident. I do not recall the amount of

19 money that was supposedly found in the vehicle, though I have no reason

20 to question the amount you cited. What is important about this incident

21 and an issue embedded in your question about whether the people were

22 properly accredited, and here there was a fundamental difference of

23 opinion between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb authorities on our rights

24 to transport people, to move our own people, transport other people,

25 transport goods for our operation. And all too often the Bosnian Serb

Page 8259

1 authorities, the military authorities at check-points, would stop

2 UNPROFOR, take people out of our vehicles and imprison them, take goods,

3 confiscate goods, from us. And this was a serious violation of the

4 obligations of the Bosnian Serb authorities as created by

5 Security Council Resolutions to give us unimpeded freedom of movement.

6 And it was a source of constant impediment to the conduct of our

7 operations. And this is just one such incident.

8 Q. In this particular incident it was established that one of the

9 people who were in the vehicle of an UNPROFOR member asked the UNPROFOR

10 member to get in his vehicle and go through the check-point and bring

11 300.000 Deutschemarks into Sarajevo. So this fact, this particular fact

12 and this particular case, is this fact correct?

13 A. I don't know if it's correct. If it is correct then that

14 UNPROFOR staff member made a mistake or did something wrong that he

15 should not have done. However, the response to that -- and I know this

16 from my experience then and my current position, the response to that is

17 for the authority concerned - in this case the Bosnian Serb

18 authority - to bring that issue to the attention of the proper UNPROFOR

19 authorities and for us to take action. It does not give the

20 Bosnian Serbs any right whatsoever to stop a UN vehicle, take people out

21 of a UN vehicle, to search a UN vehicle, to take goods out of a UN

22 vehicle. And in this case and in many others, I believe the Bosnian Serb

23 military were in flagrant violation of UN privileges and immunities and

24 their responsibilities to us under international law and

25 Security Council Resolutions.

Page 8260

1 Q. Was this UNPROFOR member released the following day?

2 A. He was soon thereafter released. It's quite likely the following

3 day, but I can't say for certain it was that day. But yes, he was very

4 soon released.

5 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to

6 tender this 65 ter document, 10650, or rather, a set of documents as

7 placed on the 65 ter list by the OTP. The entire batch of documents

8 deals with this particular incident and the entire batch is numbered

9 10650.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber is quite interested to

11 learn what these documents are. The only thing we know until now is that

12 they are on the Prosecution's list. We haven't seen them. You want us

13 to admit into evidence material which we have even no idea about what

14 they are. If you could briefly describe, for example, what it is that

15 would certainly already assists.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. It's a

17 document that was drafted by the witness, the present witness, on the

18 8th of June, 1994, describing the entire incident. Then there is a

19 letter sent by Mr. Viktor Andreev to Mr. Radovan Karadzic, mentioning --

20 or rather, this letter was mentioned in the statement, this witness's

21 statement, and the letter deals with the same incident. Then there is a

22 document drafted by the present witness on the 6th of June, 1994,

23 referring to the letter sent by Mr. Viktor Andreev to Professor Koljevic

24 in conjunction with this incident --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Is that all to be found in 65 ter 10650 or are you

Page 8261

1 referring to other 65 ter numbers as well? Because there I only see a

2 fax sent.

3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, from what I got

4 from the OTP all of these actually comprise a document numbered 10650, a

5 summary of all of these events --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] -- that is dealt with in the

8 witness statement.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles.

10 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, perhaps it would be helpful to pull up

11 10650. The front fax sheet describes that on the 8th of June a series of

12 documents are being faxed. And so the entire -- it's a fax document and

13 the fax itself that explains it is a series of documents relating to this

14 incident that's described in paragraph 27 of the witness statement.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now at least we know what we are supposed to

16 admit into evidence, Mr. Stojanovic. There is no objection. I take it

17 you want to tender it from the bar table because you have not shown it to

18 the witness, but it relates to a matter about which he has testified and

19 therefore bar tabling this document at this moment would not meet any

20 objection certainly where the Prosecution does not object. We have it on

21 our screen anyhow. We could make it even a real exhibit.

22 Mr. Banbury, do you see the document on your screen at this

23 moment and do you remember that you have drafted it?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes to both questions, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

Page 8262

1 Then, Madam Registrar, the number ... ?

2 THE REGISTRAR: Document 10650 receives number D190,

3 Your Honours.

4 JUDGE ORIE: D190 is admitted into evidence.

5 Please proceed.

6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. Let us now take a look at paragraph 35 of your statement, which

8 statement is now P874. And could we have in e-court 65 ter 09467. Sir,

9 this is a report sent by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan. It is dated the

10 14th of July, 1994, and it relates to a meeting between foreign ministers

11 of Great Britain and France, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe, with the

12 warring parties. And I would just like to ask you a few things here.

13 Could we focus on paragraph 3 of this document, summarising the talks

14 between Minister Douglas Hurd with the leading men of the

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. I assume that you drafted this document

16 as it is stated here; is that correct, sir?

17 A. Yes, though I should clarify that the covering code cable, the

18 document that was shown or the page shown just before this, is a cover

19 sheet or covering code cable that UNPROFOR headquarters attached to the

20 report and sent to UN headquarters in New York. So I did not draft that

21 first page that was there; however, that page just attaches the report

22 that I did draft.

23 Q. My question related to paragraph 3 of this document. That is

24 your text; correct?

25 A. Yes, the whole report, I believe, is my text except the covering

Page 8263

1 code cable, including paragraph 3.

2 Q. Thank you. Could you just briefly hear this: Minister Hurd in

3 his conversation with Federation representatives, or more specifically

4 Mr. Izetbegovic, asked whether it was possible for Serbs in Bosnia to

5 enter into confederation with the FRY as has already been done with

6 Croatia? And the second question, whether he saw a possibility where the

7 eastern enclaves would be exchanged for other territory and Izetbegovic

8 gave a negative question to both questions and pointed out one thing and

9 that's what I want to ask you about. The only possibility for any

10 special ties to be established between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia,

11 according to him, would be if the same ties were established between the

12 Bosnian government and the Muslims in Sandzak. In response to the second

13 question, Izetbegovic stated that he did not believe in exchange of

14 territory. So my question is this: Where is Sandzak, that area that is

15 mentioned here in your -- in this summary of yours?

16 A. It's in the Federal Republic of -- at the time the

17 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

18 Q. Was that position of Mr. Izetbegovic's pointed out for the first

19 time to you or was it something that you were aware of from some of his

20 earlier speeches or talks or discussion?

21 A. I'm sorry, I do not recall.

22 Q. You don't recall that he said anything of that sort or you don't

23 recall that he had said something like that before this meeting with

24 Mr. Hurd?

25 A. I don't recall whether I had heard him state that position either

Page 8264

1 personally or through the press before this particular meeting.

2 Q. Thank you. Now in paragraph 5 of this summary that you drafted

3 and the same talks -- could we move on to the next page in both versions,

4 both B/C/S and English for paragraph 5. It says here that Mr. Hurd had

5 said to Mr. Izetbegovic that it was necessary to recognise the realities,

6 including the fact that it was impossible for Bosnian Serbs to sever all

7 ties with Serbia because such ties would inescapably still exist. And

8 then Hurd said that although he would not inform Serbs of this, it was

9 necessary for Bosnians to understand that NATO would not wage their war.

10 Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber what this is a reference

11 to? First of all, why was it his view that he should not or why did he

12 say that he wouldn't inform the Serbs of this request put forth by

13 Izetbegovic or his position? And second, why did he warn Bosnians that

14 NATO would not wage their war?

15 A. The role of NATO in the Bosnian conflict, particularly from, I

16 would say, February 1994 with some decisions of the

17 North Atlantic Council and going forward was a source of great

18 contention, in capitals, around the world and certainly in Bosnia. And

19 there was a -- I think a hope -- a strong hope on the part of the Bosnian

20 government that NATO would become an ally of theirs in their war, in

21 their conflict with the Bosnian Serbs. They wanted that for, I believe,

22 political as well as military reasons. And they, I think, sought to

23 achieve that objective or convince politicians to have NATO fight on

24 their side. On the other hand, I think the Bosnian Serbs were very

25 fearful of NATO entering the war against them. So here the foreign

Page 8265

1 secretary of one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and a

2 NATO member is conveying at least his position or the position of the

3 United Kingdom on what the role of NATO was.

4 Now, the reason -- I'm speculating here, I don't know if you want

5 me to do that, but to answer your question about why he would have said

6 to President Izetbegovic that -- what Mr. Hurd would have said to

7 President Izetbegovic that he would not tell the Bosnian Serbs this is

8 because he thought the threat of NATO military action was a source of

9 powerful leverage in negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. And if that

10 threat were either diminished or removed, then the leverage that the

11 international community had over the Bosnian Serbs, trying to get them to

12 agree to peace or whatever, would be correspondingly diminished.

13 Q. Thank you. Doesn't it seem, sir, that whenever discussions

14 dealing with certain proposals for a peace agreement were being in the

15 phase of being concluded, the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina would

16 always come up with new demands from the other warring parties including,

17 in this case, where the Contact Group was being discussed when they came

18 up with this request to have special ties with a portion of another -- or

19 the population of another part of the former Yugoslavia, the part of the

20 territory which is part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

21 JUDGE ORIE: That's approximately 17 questions in one,

22 Mr. Stojanovic. I would not mind if you would focus on certain aspects

23 of your question.

24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, let me simplify that.

25 Q. Was it your experience that whenever there were negotiations

Page 8266

1 between the warring parties while you were in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

2 there were always new demands being put forward, demands on the other

3 warring party that would then delay the signing of a peace agreement?

4 A. Both sides routinely tried to - as is absolutely normal and

5 expected - to maximise their position in negotiations and get

6 international support for their position. I do think there was a regular

7 pattern where once negotiations had concluded or the international

8 community in the form of a Contact Group proposal or other peace plans,

9 once the international community had put a proposal on the table, the

10 Bosnian government would kind of complain and push and try and maximise

11 their position up to the point where the proposal was put on the table or

12 finalised. But then they would -- because there were certain fundamental

13 principles always embedded in those proposals, the Bosnian government

14 would try and lock in those positions. I don't think they tried to

15 change the -- their demands at that time. What they tried to do, I

16 think, was lock in the elements of the proposal that they found

17 absolutely critical, like territorial integrity, and that put the

18 Bosnian Serbs in a very difficult position because those international

19 proposals invariably contained elements that the Bosnian Serbs were not

20 willing to accept, thus the demands that were -- thus it was much more

21 often the case that it was the Bosnian Serbs putting additional demands

22 on the table at that stage in a negotiation than it was the Bosnian

23 government.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, I'm looking at the clock. I think

25 we should take a break. The witness may follow the usher. We take a

Page 8267

1 break of 20 minutes.

2 [The witness stands down]

3 JUDGE ORIE: We'll resume at a quarter to 2.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 1.23 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

7 Meanwhile, I put the following on the record. At the end of the session

8 of last Friday, the 1st of February, the Chamber admitted into evidence

9 Rule 65 ter number 22565E as Exhibit P841 through Martin Bell as a

10 witness. It should be clarified that like the other video-clips tendered

11 by the Prosecution through this witness, Exhibit P841 should have been

12 MFI'd pending verification of the accuracy of the transcript by CLSS; and

13 therefore, the status of P841 is now that it is MFI'd.

14 [The witness takes the stand]

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Can we continue, sir?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you. If you remember we were looking at a document that

20 you drafted after the meeting of the Ministers Hurd and Juppe with the

21 warring parties. And I would just like to deal with item 5 where you

22 commented on the words used by Mr. Hurd. He said that it was important

23 for the Bosnians to understand that NATO wouldn't be waging war on their

24 behalf. In the course of your stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did you

25 have the opportunity of seeing or learning about the basis on which the

Page 8268

1 Bosnia and Herzegovinian leadership drew the conclusion that NATO might

2 wage their war, so to speak, wage a war for them?

3 A. I, on many occasions, heard different members of the Bosnian

4 government leadership talk about what they thought the role of NATO ought

5 to be. I assessed it to be more of an aspiration of what NATO should do

6 than a conclusion that it is what NATO would do. I think they always

7 felt that they were deeply wronged as a victim of the conflict and that

8 the UN and NATO and the world should do more to assist them. And they

9 very much wanted, aspired, to have NATO enter the conflict on their side.

10 Whether they concluded NATO would do that, I don't know.

11 Q. Thank you. I'll conclude with this document now by putting a

12 question to you that relates to paragraph 8. After the meeting with the

13 leaders of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two ministers left

14 for Pale. They spoke with -- the two ministers went to Pale, spoke to

15 Mr. Karadzic. And if I have understood you correctly in paragraph 8 --

16 thank you, I think that's the right passage. In that passage you stated

17 that on that occasion Karadzic told the two ministers that it was

18 essential for Republika Srpska to have some form of international

19 identity, international legal identity. In the course of such

20 conversations with these very important leaders, very important countries

21 that were part of the Contact Group, was there a platform of any kind

22 that was expressed in July of 1994 about the sort of international

23 entity, legal international entity, that would be found satisfactory by

24 the Serbian side?

25 A. I'm sorry, could you please repeat the question. I'm not sure I

Page 8269

1 understood it precisely. I'm sorry.

2 Q. I'll be briefer. On that occasion, did the leadership of the

3 Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina mention the sort of legal personality

4 that Republika Srpska should have, the sort of international legal

5 personality that the Republika Srpska should have in order for them to be

6 satisfied?

7 A. I -- I don't know or I do not recall to what detail they went

8 into in that meeting, but it is my general recollection that in this

9 meeting as well as in other contexts in terms of legal personality for

10 the Republika Srpska, the leaders sought to have two main -- they had two

11 main objectives, one - and it's reflected in this paragraph - that they

12 did not want to be legally part of the same entity or state as the

13 Bosnian government or the Bosniak authorities; and two, they wanted the

14 ability to make independent decisions such as confederation with Serbia

15 that they could make on their own without any reference to other

16 authorities such as Sarajevo. Those were -- my -- that was my

17 understanding of their two main objectives certainly in this context.

18 Q. Would this correspond to what was accepted towards the end of

19 1995 in the Dayton Agreement? Would it correspond to what was granted to

20 Republika Srpska at that time?

21 A. I think there are important differences.

22 Q. With regard to these differences, did Republika Srpska receive

23 more concessions pursuant to the Dayton Agreement than had been asked for

24 by Mr. Karadzic or did they in fact receive fewer concessions than in

25 that agreement?

Page 8270

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stojanovic, it gives the Chamber the impression

2 that you are trying to, first of all, make the focus of this case all

3 kinds of negotiations, not to say that they're entirely irrelevant, but

4 they're certainly not the core of this case, and even less whether

5 finally at the very end the parties got what they wished or did not get

6 what they wished, which in itself, of course - and I take it that that is

7 your suggestion, it is about how reasonable it was or not - that would

8 require an analysis which goes far beyond what is relevant in this case.

9 Would you please keep this in mind when continuing.

10 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I will, Your Honour.

11 Q. If you could answer that question; if not, we will move on.

12 A. The arrangements contained in the Dayton Accord provided the

13 Republika Srpska with less than what Dr. Karadzic stated was their

14 objective in the meeting with two foreign ministers. In respect of legal

15 personality, that's all we're talking about here, of the

16 Republika Srpska.

17 Q. Thank you. And I'll now conclude with this document. Could you

18 please have a look at paragraph 11. It's in the same document. It says

19 at the press conference following the meeting, the comments made by the

20 Serbs and by Karadzic in particular were of a calmer kind and did not

21 convey the substance of the discussions that had just taken place.

22 Do you have an explanation, a brief explanation for which the

23 substance of these discussions was not conveyed at the press conference?

24 A. It was very often the case that discussions inside a private

25 meeting were very complex and involved a wide range of related matters

Page 8271

1 that were hard for people to understand and very hard to convey in a

2 simple manner to journalists. So it's quite natural, I think, in talking

3 to the press that what is said there is much, much, much less than what's

4 said in the meeting. Additionally, positions that are staked out

5 privately in a meeting, there are many good reasons why an official may

6 not want to reflect those publicly to the press, either for the

7 consumption of their public and stakeholders and for the parties on the

8 other side. So I think this was a fairly routine tactic used by many

9 officials on all sides.

10 Q. Thank you. Let's now have a look at 65 ter document 08149 in

11 e-court. And, sir, I would like to ask you to focus on --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Was it your intention to tender this document which

13 we just looked at?

14 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I don't think

15 that's necessary. We would only be encumbering the file.

16 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, Mr. Stojanovic, often a reference

17 was made to what was found in a certain paragraph which was not read out

18 in its entirety, so therefore I would suggest that you do tender it. I

19 mean, a reference was made in this paragraph; how do you interpret this?

20 Then of course the Chamber should have the whole of the paragraph in

21 evidence to evaluate the evidence. So you tender it.

22 Madam Registrar.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Document 09467 receives number D191,

24 Your Honours.

25 JUDGE ORIE: D191 is admitted into evidence.

Page 8272

1 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you, sir. The document you mention in paragraphs 41 and 42

3 of your statement is something I would like us to comment on. Because

4 here you also speak about the presence of General Mladic. Can we clear

5 up something. When was this meeting, in fact, held? Because in your

6 statement in paragraph 41 it says on the 21st of July, 1994. And if I

7 read through your report it seems it's the 21st of June, sent on the

8 22nd of June. What is, in fact, correct?

9 A. I read the date of the document as 22 July, the subject

10 indicating the meeting took place on the 21st of July. And in the

11 opening sentence it says, "I," meaning Viktor Andreev, "met yesterday in

12 Jahorina ..." et cetera, thus referring to -- since the date of the

13 document is the 22nd of July, referring to the 21st of July. So it's my

14 understanding this meeting occurred on the 21st of July, 1994.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I see the point -- I see the point --

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 JUDGE ORIE: -- in the translation it reads 22nd of 6th of 1994.

18 So there is apparently -- there is a translation error. The original is

19 clear on the matter; therefore, the translation should be corrected.

20 Could the Prosecution take care -- it's a Prosecution exhibit --

21 not an exhibit yet, but 65 ter - that you provide a verified translation

22 with the correct date.

23 MS. BIBLES: We will, Your Honour. And actually, I think this

24 has been admitted as P764, but we will --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Nevertheless, need to have the accurate date on it.

Page 8273

1 Now, Mr. Stojanovic, if you ask these kind of questions, I would

2 have a look at the original as well, isn't it? Someone will be able to

3 read it and then we can avoid that we have to unnecessary spend time on

4 it. Then you give a call to the Prosecution and inform them that the

5 translation is wrong and we don't have to spend time on it. That's the

6 appropriate way of dealing with these kind of matters. Please proceed.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

8 Q. Sir, in paragraph 2 of this summary, this message that was sent,

9 I assume that you are the author of this message as it says here. In

10 paragraph 2 it says that General Rose lodged a protest because fire was

11 opened on three UN planes in the previous 24 hours. As far as you

12 remember General Galic informed them that fire had been opened from a

13 building located on the Muslim side. And this information hadn't been

14 verified. My question is after this meeting and having drafted this

15 report, was this piece of information, in fact, confirmed or not?

16 A. I'm sorry, I do not recall.

17 Q. Very well. In that case I would ask you to have a look at 3(c)

18 in which prisoners of war are referred to. The words spoken by

19 General Mladic are mentioned. In inverted commas he said that:

20 "'... the Serbs cannot forgive international organisations for

21 not honouring the agreement to get the prisoners released.'"

22 That's a quote.

23 What sort of prisoner of war is General Mladic speaking about,

24 could you tell us for the benefit of the Chamber, and what sort of

25 agreement on releasing of prisoners is concerned in this paragraph?

Page 8274

1 A. There were on a consistent basis prisoners of war held by each

2 side and prisoners of war refer to military personnel captured by one

3 side, military personnel of the other side, and not to civilians who by

4 definition are prisoners of war. The agreement that is referred to here

5 was, if I recall correctly, an agreement between the Bosnian Serb

6 authorities and the Bosnian government authorities containing provisions

7 for release by both sides of different prisoners of war. There may have

8 been some requirement on release of -- or provision of information on

9 missing personnel, which was often a contentious issue. What is, I

10 think, significant about this phrase that you've read in this paragraph

11 is that there was an expectation by General Mladic that there was an

12 obligation by UNPROFOR to fulfil the obligations entered into by the

13 Bosnian government. And this was often the case where General Mladic and

14 others would blame UNPROFOR for the actions or lack of actions by the

15 Bosnian government side. And of course it was not -- there was not a

16 legal obligation on UNPROFOR in these agreements to, for instance,

17 release Bosnian prisoners held by the Bosnian government authorities. We

18 were a facilitator. We tried to help. We tried to conclude

19 negotiations. But we did not take on these kinds of obligations. These

20 were obligations by the parties.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, where -- and that's how we find it in the

22 transcript, that's how I heard it, where you said "not to civilians who

23 by definition are prisoners of war," I take it that you misspoke and you

24 would say that they are by definition not prisoners of war.

25 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I thought I said by

Page 8275

1 definition are not prisoners of war. If I misspoke, I apologise, but

2 certainly that is what I meant to say.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we now have it on the record.

4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And another clarification in line 19, page 78,

7 you said:

8 "There was not a legal obligation on UNPROFOR in these agreements

9 to, for instance, release Bosnian prisoners held by the Bosnian

10 government authorities."

11 I take it that you meant Bosnian Serb prisoners?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes. Again, if I misspoke, I apologise and that is

13 what I meant to say.

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17 Q. Now, General Mladic here specifically made a reference to Gorazde

18 and Tarcin prisoners or detainees. Did you have -- or any information

19 about prisoners still being held in Gorazde at the time?

20 A. No, not really, just of a general nature. I was aware that the

21 Bosnian government was holding prisoners, but other than that nothing

22 specific.

23 Q. You mention that General Mladic had also mentioned Tarcin in this

24 part of the text. Could you tell us where Tarcin is, if you know, and do

25 you know how many prisoners and detainees, civilians, were held there

Page 8276

1 under the control of the BH Army?

2 A. I am not very familiar with the Tarcin problem. If I recall

3 correctly, this was an issue that predated my arrival in Bosnia but was

4 one that frequently was brought up by the Bosnian Serbs and it's one

5 where very little, if any, progress was achieved over a long time. So

6 I'm just very generally aware that it was an issue, it was there, but I

7 never became quite familiar with the details of the Tarcin issue and

8 prisoners.

9 Q. Did you ever hear about the silo camp in Tarcin where Serb

10 civilians were held, "silos" in B/C/S?

11 A. Yes, I heard reports or talk of it. I never personally witnessed

12 or visited it.

13 Q. I'd like to refer you to subparagraph (d), 3(d), where you again

14 quote General Mladic as saying that the Serbs were very worried over the

15 rearmament that the Federation armies were undertaking with the

16 co-operation of foreign countries. Was this statement of his according

17 to your information correct?

18 A. If the question is -- I'm sorry, are you asking me if I

19 understood the Federation was being rearmed? Is that the question?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the question is not clear because the quote

21 given contains a few statements. First, is it true that the Serbs are

22 very worried about the rearmament?

23 THE WITNESS: That is my understanding that, yes, indeed, they

24 were concerned about that.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Second, was the Federation acting in

Page 8277

1 co-operation with foreign countries in the context of rearming?

2 THE WITNESS: According to my understanding, based largely on

3 press reports, yes, that is the case.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

5 Mr. Stojanovic, I'm also looking at the clock. It's quarter past

6 2.00.

7 Mr. Banbury, we'll adjourn for the day. We'll ask Mr. Stojanovic

8 in a second to tell us whether he's still on schedule and whether he

9 expects -- when he expects to conclude his cross-examination, which might

10 be interesting for you to know as well.

11 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I believe

12 that is the case and that we will complete our cross-examination within

13 the regular hours tomorrow.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but then of course there might be a need for

15 re-examination. How much time do you think you would still need? I

16 mean, if you say, I need tomorrow's session minus 45 minutes, then I

17 think there would be no problem in concluding the evidence.

18 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: So it's your expectation that we'll conclude -- that

20 the examination will be concluded in such time that there will be

21 sufficient time left for -- if there's any need for re-examination and

22 questions by the Judges. That is understood which opens a good

23 perspective, Mr. Banbury, to be released tomorrow at the end of

24 tomorrow's session.

25 I would like to instruct you not to speak or communicate in any