130826IT

Page 15612

1 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic will now continue his cross-examination.

3 Mr. Lukic.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Doctor.

6 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.

7 Q. I'm indebted to the Chamber to discuss the letter that Judge Orie

8 asked me whether I had it, and my source was a transcript. So in view of

9 that, I have distributed copies of the transcript both to the booths and

10 to the panel of Judges. I don't know if you need it to have it in front

11 of you and perhaps I can request some assistance in that respect.

12 In the lower part, as you can see, this is a Mladic transcript,

13 pages 15568, and I asked you something from line 21, about your openly

14 expressing your conviction that Slobodan Milosevic was guilty of what he

15 had been charged with, and you said, probably I don't have a specific

16 recollection of saying those words, but I would not be surprised if I

17 had. And then on the next page, 15569, lines 1 through 5, in answer to

18 my question that -- about 50 something persons signed the letter, you

19 said that you remember signing the letter, but I don't specifically

20 recall the contents of the letter. And that this letter including a

21 conclusion that Slobodan Milosevic was guilty.

22 In the upper part of the page, I have pasted part of the

23 transcript from the Perisic case, page 1771 --

24 JUDGE ORIE: You said, "And that this letter including a

25 conclusion that Slobodan Milosevic was guilty." Where does it say so?

Page 15613

1 MR. LUKIC: In our transcript, page 15569.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we should, if you are referring to the last

3 two and a half lines, it reads:

4 "I don't -- I don't specifically recall the contents of that

5 letter as including the conclusion that Slobodan Milosevic was guilty."

6 Which I understand, my knowledge of the English language, but I'm

7 ready to be corrected, that the witness doesn't know whether that letter

8 said that Mr. Milosevic was guilty or not.

9 MR. LUKIC: That's how I thought I was translating it. I agree

10 with you 100 per cent.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me see. Yes, because the language is

12 slightly -- yes, perhaps the problem is that in the transcript, the line

13 where it says, "I don't specifically recall the contents of the letter,"

14 and then it gives a full stop, and that this letter including a

15 conclusion, is perhaps even more ambiguous as the transcript is so

16 therefore we have a shared understanding of what the transcript says and

17 what it means, that is that the witness does not remember whether it

18 includes or not a conclusion that Mr. Milosevic was guilty.

19 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed. I'm sorry if we --

21 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry, I should have read it in English so we

22 wouldn't have any mistake in translations. But I will correct myself and

23 now I will quote from page 1771 from Perisic trial.

24 Q. It's from line 20, it says:

25 "Q. With regard to your views on, for example,

Page 15614

1 Slobodan Milosevic, you have a definite view with regard to his criminal

2 responsibility, do you not?

3 "A. Yes, I do.

4 "Q. You believe that he's guilty of the crimes for which he was

5 charged, don't you?"

6 Answer, on the next page, line 1:

7 "Yes.

8 "Q. That is a view that you have, as a matter of fact,

9 articulated on more than one occasion?

10 "A. Yes.

11 "Q. That is a view that you have as a matter of fact and we may

12 discuss it later, you have actually sent at least one letter concerning

13 your position about the judgement that was rendered by the

14 International Court of Justice as being a political decision because they

15 didn't use certain information.

16 "A. I don't believe I sent a letter.

17 "Q. You signed a letter that was sent by 54 -- you and 54 of

18 your colleagues; do you recall that?

19 "A. Yes.

20 "Q. And in that letter you made it very clear that in your

21 estimation, Milosevic was guilty.

22 "A. Yes.

23 "Q. And you also made it very clear that as far as you were

24 concerned, the judgement finding -- the finding of that Court was a

25 political decision that, as a matter of fact, avoided what you believed

Page 15615

1 to be compelling evidence that should have brought them to a different

2 position.

3 "A. Yes."

4 [Interpretation] Doctor, has this refreshed your recollection as

5 to the effect that you had signed the letter in which it is unambiguously

6 stated and an estimation was made that Slobodan Milosevic was guilty as

7 stated in both the questions and answers in lines 14 to 16 on page 1772

8 of the Perisic case transcript?

9 A. [In English] I still don't have a copy of the letter before me,

10 and I certainly acknowledge that here I concurred that he had been --

11 I stated that he had been guilty of the crimes for which he was charged

12 in our estimation, that is the estimation of the letter writers. But

13 I don't see the letter, I'm sorry.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, have you dealt with this matter?

16 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I have.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Because what confuses me is to link the guilt of

18 Mr. Milosevic to a decision of the International Court of Justice, where

19 it is, I think, clear to everyone that the International Court of Justice

20 does not express itself on the individual criminal responsibility of

21 persons but on the responsibility of states, and therefore I'm slightly

22 confused by the issue being linked or at least mingled or I don't know

23 exactly; that's the reason why perhaps reading the letter might be

24 relevant for everyone.

25 MR. LUKIC: Do you want to finalise your concern with the witness

Page 15616

1 or I should?

2 JUDGE ORIE: Well of course having expressed this, if you want

3 to -- I could ask the witness how he views the issue I raised, but if you

4 have any specific questions on the matter, Mr. Lukic, I will gladly leave

5 it in your hands.

6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Q. Doctor, this statement of yours or expression of views on the

8 guilt of Mr. Milosevic, since it is said that he was guilty, and you have

9 confirmed this, that you and the other people who signed this letter with

10 you, was maintained as a position, can you tell us to whom was this

11 letter addressed?

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, I get concerned when your questions

13 tend to embellish the evidence of the witness. The witness said in their

14 estimation and now when you say that you have confirmed this, since it is

15 said that he was guilty and you have confirmed this, I thought the

16 witness clearly stated that that's their estimation. Quite apart from

17 what Judge Orie has said about what the ICJ's mandate is. Thank you.

18 MR. LUKIC: I thought, Your Honour, that the witness confirmed

19 today that he remembers signing the letter.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Confirming the letter is one thing. Confirming

21 Mladic's guilt is another.

22 MR. LUKIC: Milosevic's.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: I beg your pardon. I'm sorry, Mr. Mladic.

24 Confirming Milosevic's guilt is quite another. This is what you are

25 saying in the question that you are putting to the witness.

Page 15617

1 MR. LUKIC: I'll start from the beginning.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Doctor, first of all, to whom did you send the letter in

5 question? Do you remember?

6 A. No, I don't recall.

7 Q. When writing this letter, and whilst you were discussing

8 Mr. Milosevic's guilt, what did you have in mind? Did you have in mind

9 the indictment issued by this Tribunal or was it something else?

10 A. Well, first of all, let me be clear. I had no role in drafting

11 the letter. I endorse it on a web page after it had been drafted and

12 signed by several other people. The subject of the letter was the

13 International Court of Justice's decision not to subpoena the full

14 Supreme Defence Council minutes for its consideration of the case before

15 it. It didn't really have any -- as I recall, it didn't have any

16 specific reference to the work of this Tribunal. But I -- again, without

17 looking at it, it's been a good number of years since I have seen it, and

18 would certainly want to have it in front of me before I speculate any

19 further about what it said.

20 Q. Did you sign this letter before or after you testified in the

21 Milosevic case, do you recall?

22 A. I believe it was -- I'm not certain. No, I don't know.

23 Q. Very well. I'd like now to go through to what you said in

24 examination-in-chief. On Thursday, 22nd of August, you said the

25 following and I'm going to read in order to avoid any mistakes. We need

Page 15618

1 page --

2 JUDGE ORIE: If you could -- could the parties agree on that the

3 decision by the ICJ was delivered far after Mr. Milosevic had died and

4 therefore that the letter could not have been signed before giving

5 testimony in the Milosevic case. I'm just trying to reconstruct recent

6 history. Would the parties agree on that so that we have --

7 MS. BIBLES: Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic?

9 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So therefore it was a matter easily to be

11 agreed upon. Does this refresh your recollection by any way, Mr. Donia?

12 THE WITNESS: That was what I recalled but wasn't certain, so

13 I didn't want to speculate.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Let's proceed.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. When we were discussing about P2003 which is your report, there

17 is mention of six strategic goals. We saw that a long time before the

18 publication in the Official Gazette of these goals, they had been

19 discussed at an assembly session. Do you know why it took almost a year

20 and a half for what has been laid down as the strategic goals to publish

21 them in the Official Gazette?

22 A. Immediately after the discussion in the assembly session, within

23 the next day or two, there was a further discussion in which the key

24 leaders of the SDS actually disagreed about whether they should be

25 published. Krajisnik, Mr. Krajisnik, favoured publishing them. And

Page 15619

1 Karadzic and others were opposed. I think that they felt this was not

2 something - that is Karadzic and his supporters on this - felt this was

3 not something they wanted publicly known at this time, but there was of

4 course the other side of that, which was that it clearly articulated

5 their ambitions and aims and was useful for that purpose in the peace

6 process. So it's my understanding that they shared the goals with a few

7 of the key negotiators in the peace process but refrained from publishing

8 them publicly.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Lukic, one correction for the transcript.

10 You said, "P2003 which is your report," but that is not the report of the

11 witness. P2003 is the Official Gazette where the strategic goals were

12 published.

13 MR. LUKIC: Sorry, and thank you for the correction.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Being unpublished the public was not aware of

15 it, the broader public, or did you know that the broader public had been

16 aware of it?

17 A. I don't know how much the word of these goals crept into general

18 public awareness. It was certainly not uncommon in that time for

19 substantial time to lag between the adoption of a decision or resolution

20 and its publication in the Official Gazette, particularly for the

21 Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb side. This was an unusually long

22 period of time, and I think it's hard to believe that there was not some

23 growth in public awareness of it over that year and a half, but the

24 ultimate answer is: I don't know how much it became known in public.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask, Mr. Donia, during the

Page 15620

1 discussion in the assembly, did the assembly resolve to keep it quiet and

2 keep it just known by members of the assembly? Or when they discussed in

3 the next two or three days, whether or not to publish it, was this

4 information also passed on to the members of the assembly?

5 THE WITNESS: And the -- to my knowledge there was no discussion

6 of that decision in the assembly. There was discussion among the top SDS

7 leaders, Krajisnik, Koljevic and Karadzic, but not in -- it doesn't

8 appear in the transcript of that session. So the discussion was a very

9 closed one and a sort of small, small group of people who considered it.

10 They -- obviously you had 50, 60 people at least who knew what the goals

11 were and some of them were reflected very quickly in other meetings or

12 discussions, so there clearly was some dissemination to other leaders of

13 the Bosnian Serb movement, of the contents of the goals, and one can tell

14 that because in some case they were articulated somewhat differently than

15 they were in the actual session.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: So shall we then understand you to say, to be

17 referring to about 60 people when you talked at page 12, line 13,

18 "Immediately after the discussion in the assembly session," by referring

19 to the assembly session you're referring to those 50 or 60 people?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thursday, 22nd of August, our trial, page 1504, line 1 through

24 16, this is what you say:

25 [In English] "However, it is important, I think to look at the

Page 15621

1 context in which a particular proposal was made and adopted and the way

2 that people understood it."

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you repeat the page number?

4 MR. LUKIC: 1504 is what I have.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This page number is wrong because the transcript

6 of that day starts with page 15486.

7 MS. BIBLES: Your Honours, that would be transcript reference

8 15504 and that appears to begin at line 14, if that helps.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour, and I thank my colleague for

11 helping.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Could I meanwhile ask an additional question in

13 relation to the public character of the six strategic goals, the matter

14 was discussed during the 16th session of the -- of the assembly session.

15 Was that a public session?

16 THE WITNESS: No, it was not.

17 JUDGE ORIE: It was not. Thank you. And the transcript or the

18 records of that session were not public either?

19 THE WITNESS: No. They were not made public at that time, no.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. So we've corrected the page reference and you said that the

23 context was important. This is my question: Would you agree that in

24 this report of yours about the assembly sessions, the sessions of the

25 Republika Srpska, it is precisely context that is missing and it cannot

Page 15622

1 be seen what events led to a particular discussion. Excerpts were taken

2 from the debate itself at the sessions of the assembly of

3 Republika Srpska. Would you agree with me on that?

4 A. I -- that's a couple of different questions. I would agree that

5 my excerpts were taken from the debates themselves at the session. In

6 answer to your question, Is it precisely context that is missing, I would

7 say that's not completely the case. I attempted in the introduction to

8 each section to provide some modest amount of context for the section

9 that followed. And within the excerpts themselves there is a great deal

10 of other information about the context, about the events that were taking

11 place, about the specific vocabulary choices being made within the SDS

12 and about the, I would say, flow of discussion within the time. So

13 I wouldn't agree completely that this is without context completely.

14 There is some there. I would have to say, looking at it today, I wish I

15 had added more. The problem with that is, if you start introducing

16 context into every session and explain the external circumstances, this

17 gets to be a very long report and I really -- the idea behind this report

18 was to let the Bosnian Serb leaders speak for themselves in their own

19 words and then have the reader pursue further details, including what

20 came before it and after it, and the specific event, context, separately.

21 Q. Thank you. Now I hope I have the right page finally, 15498,

22 Thursday, the 22nd of August, line 6 to 10. This is the discussion you

23 had with the Prosecutor. I'm going to read this out in English:

24 [In English] "Q. And what consideration -- did you give

25 additional consideration to the role of the accused in this particular

Page 15623

1 case?

2 "A. Yes. This report, which is similar to one that I prepared

3 for earlier cases, was designed specifically to be tailored to the role

4 and perceptions, as he expressed them, of the accused in this case."

5 [Interpretation] It is precisely this report that is being

6 referred to from the assembly of Republika Srpska. However, will you

7 agree with me that in this report, it is not the words of General Mladic

8 that were singled out but, rather, an enormous part of the report are not

9 the words of General Mladic but of other persons, rather; is that

10 correct?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles?

12 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, I would object

13 to the phrasing of this question. The transcript reference from which

14 this is drawn refer to the Sarajevo report. It may be a fine

15 distinction, but --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, are you willing to rephrase your question

17 keeping in mind what Ms. Bibles said?

18 MR. LUKIC: I might come back. I see that this paper which is

19 very short is -- I don't know how it turned up to be a real mess. I will

20 leave this to be checked during the break. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I think that we've come to page 35 in B/C/S or in English it is

24 37, page 37 of your report, about Sarajevo, P1999. I asked you because

25 you say in the heading, itself, the simultaneous pursuit of Bosnian

Page 15624

1 independence and Serb separatism. I asked you and I don't think I got an

2 answer, when you say Bosnia, independence, Bosnian independence, is it

3 true that this is actually the aspiration of two peoples from

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina for independence, the Muslim and the Croat people,

5 excluding the Serbs?

6 A. No, I think that's not a good characterisation of it. I would

7 say that the principal nationalist political formations of the

8 Bosnian Muslims and the Croats and individuals from those groups and from

9 others, including Yugoslavs and Serbs, favoured independence or were

10 sympathetic to it, were prepared to support it politically. The leading

11 formation claiming to represent the Serb people, which is the SDS, was

12 staunchly opposed to it.

13 Q. According to your research, how many Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 were in favour of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Can you give us a

15 percentage? Except for Mirko Pejanovic.

16 A. No, I can't give you a number or percentage. I don't know that

17 that is available, that there was any kind of public opinion survey that

18 we would consider reliable that goes to that issue.

19 Q. Would you agree, although you don't know the number and you don't

20 know the percentage, that this was a negligible number of Serbs who would

21 be in favour of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time?

22 A. Well, I would not agree in the sense that it's very difficult to

23 determine how many at that point were feeling that way, based on the

24 evidence that I know of.

25 Q. My colleague is helping me and he's saying what is your source,

Page 15625

1 in terms of the Serbs voting in favour of independence, if we know that

2 the vote was secret?

3 A. The -- that's a good question. I have to say I don't -- I don't

4 recall seeing an official report of the electoral commission, for

5 example, that gave that number. We certainly know that the political

6 formations took the positions that they did, and the SDS urged Serbs to

7 stay home. But what the percentages are, in terms of official reports,

8 I can't recall seeing any official reports. There were many reports in

9 the press about this at the time and some very precise numbers which were

10 announced by the government, but I don't really know what the count, how

11 the determination was made, if it was made at all.

12 Q. Thank you. Somebody is cooking something good. I don't know if

13 you can feel the smell of food here in the courtroom as well.

14 JUDGE ORIE: And it's still some time before we go for lunch,

15 Mr. Lukic, but the sooner you want to go for lunch, the more efficient

16 your cross-examination would have to be.

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Do you know that even before the war, at the time when this

19 coalition government was in place, SDA/HDZ/SDS, the minister of

20 foreign affairs of that joint government travelled in the east and asked

21 that Bosnia-Herzegovina be admitted into the Islamic conference, the

22 community of Islamic states?

23 A. Yes, I think that's widely acknowledged to be the case by people

24 who looked at that.

25 Q. Military preparations in BH, 91-92, is the next heading. You're

Page 15626

1 talking about the JNA in May 1992. This is page 39, and then on page 44,

2 third paragraph in the English version, P1999, so could we please have

3 this in e-court? Page 44 of this document in e-court, paragraph 3, in

4 the B/C/S version, page 42, paragraph 2.

5 You said: Confronted with a lack of manpower, the JNA tried to

6 mobilise Bosnian Serbs for service in Croatia and ...

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find this

8 portion.

9 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters have difficulties in finding the

10 portion. Could you --

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It is the last paragraph on that page, beginning

12 with the words, "Faced with manpower."

13 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you.

14 MR. LUKIC: Paragraph 3 in English version, page 44, and

15 paragraph 2 in B/C/S version on page 42.

16 Q. [Interpretation] In your research, did you find that the JNA at

17 the time, like before that, had an obligation according to the law to

18 keep their units manned? That was in accordance with the constitution

19 and the law and the internal regulations of the JNA as well?

20 A. Well, I'm not familiar enough with those internal regulations to

21 know at what level that obligation existed. I would not think it was a

22 constitutional obligation but, again, I don't -- I really don't know.

23 It's clear that they were, that is the JNA senior officers, and for that

24 matter Milosevic, were very determined to keep it manned and engaged in

25 various strategies to try to keep it that way and to bring additional

Page 15627

1 troops into the force in the fall of 1991.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask for a clarification. You said

3 "additional troops," in addition to what?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that would be in addition to the

5 active serving troops. They mobilised reservists and found recruits from

6 local Serb organisations in order to complete the -- continue the

7 staffing. I mention in this report somewhere that in the fall of 1991,

8 the -- I believe it was the Presidency endorsed the strategy of accepting

9 volunteers into the JNA in addition to these other mobilisations of

10 reservists that the senior command engaged in.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Just before we take the break, the units were not manned at a

13 level that was normal before that, before the Muslims and Croats left.

14 The Serbs did not manage to have the units manned as they were before the

15 departure of the Muslims and Croats. Would you agree with that?

16 A. Well, the -- I'm a little bit confused about the question. The

17 people who were trying to have the units manned as close to capacity as

18 possible were not the Serbs particularly but JNA officers and, as I say,

19 the senior political leadership of Yugoslavia at that time. So I'm not

20 sure what your question pertains to.

21 Q. My question is: The level of manning of the units, was it

22 normal, was it below the manning level, or above the manning level? Do

23 you know? What we are suggesting is that it was below the prescribed

24 level of manning.

25 A. For those units that I've had an opportunity to see numbers for,

Page 15628

1 you would be right. They were below the maximum, below the authorised

2 level in the cases that I've seen, and I rather think that's probably

3 true of the army as it existed in its Croatian units anyway.

4 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Doctor. It's time for our break.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we will take a break of 20 minutes.

6 Ms. Bibles.

7 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I wonder if it might be helpful in the

8 examination for Dr. Donia to have a hard copy of his two reports.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, there seems to be no problem looking at the

10 body language of Mr. Lukic.

11 MR. LUKIC: Do you have it, if you don't mind?

12 MS. BIBLES: I could print a clean copy with no highlights.

13 MR. LUKIC: My copies have highlights too.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Okay, clean copies will be provided to

15 the witness. Mr. Donia, you may follow the usher. We would like to see

16 you back in 20 minutes.

17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 [The witness stands down]

19 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and we resume at five minutes

20 to 11.00.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

24 [The witness takes the stand]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

Page 15629

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 Q. Have you received a hard copy of your report about Sarajevo?

3 A. Yes, I have.

4 Q. It will be easier for you. If we now move to page 43,

5 paragraph 3 of your Sarajevo report. Now we are facing the same problem

6 with regard to e-court. In e-court it should be 41, paragraph 3, and

7 page 42 in B/C/S in e-court, paragraph 2. Are we on page 44 in English

8 in e-court? Look at this portion where you speak about

9 28 September 1991, where you say that the JNA ordered reservists in BiH

10 to active duty on 27th of September, 1991, and many Serb reservists and

11 volunteers responded to the call and joined either the Croatian or BH.

12 But the very next day, the Presidency of BH denounced the JNA's

13 mobilisation order as illegal and thereby discouraging Muslims and Croats

14 from joining the pro-Serbian JNA.

15 Have you seen this Presidency's decision, ever?

16 A. The decision of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is that

17 what you mean?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. Yes, I have. It's been a long time since I actually looked at it

20 but it was published at the time and was very brief decision.

21 Q. At the time, Serb representatives were in the Presidency as well;

22 is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In the decision that you saw, did you see that Serb

25 representatives voted against such a decision of the Presidency?

Page 15630

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So you would agree that that was a time when even though there

3 were joint organs such as the Presidency, all the decisions were taken by

4 outvoting representatives of the Serb nation and against the interests of

5 the Serbian people?

6 A. I can't agree with either proposition that you make here. First

7 of all, I don't think that all decisions were -- all decisions were taken

8 by majority rule within the Presidency. But not all of them were a

9 five-to-two vote at that time. There were a few decisions as I recall

10 that people agreed on, and I don't -- you know, against the interests of

11 the Serb people, I would say against the interests as interpreted by the

12 SDS leaders and Serb representatives on the Presidency at that time.

13 Q. In order to demonstrate whether that was solely the interests of

14 SDS representatives but also the Serbian people as a whole, a plebiscite

15 was called - is that right - and in this plebiscite the Serbs voted, if

16 not 100 per cent, but nearly 100 per cent, against the succession of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia; is that correct?

18 A. No. Neither part of your proposition here is correct. First of

19 all, the referendum, or, I'm sorry, the plebiscite was not called in

20 response to this decision. It was called in response to the developments

21 after the 15th of October, when the SDS leadership had begun taking

22 these -- the steps toward a separate Serb state. And the proposition

23 that was voted upon was not -- did not pertain, did not say anything

24 about the Serb, as I recall, it didn't say anything about the

25 independence. It simply said that if you voted yes, you wanted to remain

Page 15631

1 in Yugoslavia.

2 Q. Well, it's one and the same thing.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, it is the way in which you phrase it.

4 I wondered over the last few questions, you put your questions in such a

5 way that it elicits contradiction by the expert whereas to the substance,

6 I think you could even have agreed on the matter, that is that at the

7 time collegial decisions were sometimes or perhaps even often that it was

8 an opportunity to outvote a minority. I think the Prosecution most

9 likely would not disagree with that. Second, that the Serb leaders voted

10 in what they thought to be in the best interests of Serbs, might not have

11 found any opposition either. Now, here for the same, that there was a

12 referendum in which Serbs could express themselves on whether they wanted

13 to stay within Yugoslavia, yes or no, there may be no dispute about that

14 either. It is the way in which the questions are phrased by you enter

15 into a debate whereas from what I understand on the basic matters,

16 I would not expect the Prosecution to disagree, but I am also looking at

17 Ms. Bibles whether my assumption is a fair one.

18 MS. BIBLES: That's correct, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: So why not focus on what basically is what you want

20 to draw our attention to? That outvoting was -- happened, and that the

21 decisions may not have been agreed by the Serb leaders because they

22 thought them not to be in the best interests of Serbian citizens? That's

23 what you want to establish, isn't it?

24 MR. LUKIC: But it's pretty differently explained in this report

25 so that's why I have to ask.

Page 15632

1 JUDGE ORIE: The report doesn't say anything about it. The

2 report here underlines we are looking at at this moment just gives facts,

3 the very next day, no dispute about whether it was the next day or any

4 other time, the Presidency of the BiH, and you want to tell us that that

5 is not necessarily unanimous. I think there is no -- might be no

6 disagreement, denounced the JNA's mobilisation order as illegal, there

7 may be no dispute about that either, thereby discouraging Muslim and

8 Croats reservists in BiH from joining the Serb-leaning JNA. There is

9 nothing in it there which suggested that it was unanimous, that it was

10 suggested that it was in the best interests of Serbs. Not in any way.

11 So you're fighting against something which isn't there. And you want to

12 draw our attention to specific aspects, not necessarily unanimous,

13 perhaps outvoted and therefore perhaps not having considered sufficiently

14 the interests of the Serbs, that is, I would say, not very difficult most

15 likely to agree upon, and the way in which you phrased the questions

16 elicits minor disputes about the language rather than on the substance.

17 But I'm also looking at you at this moment, Mr. Donia, whether you would

18 agree with my analysis that on the basic matters, you agree with

19 Mr. Lukic but it's mainly the way in which he phrases the questions that

20 causes you to contradict.

21 THE WITNESS: I would agree, Your Honour, yes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So it's very inefficient. It doesn't bring

23 you where you want to be, Mr. Lukic, and it's easily good to get there in

24 approximately 20, 25, 30 per cent of the time you're using. Please

25 proceed.

Page 15633

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Dr. Donia, is it true that in your report, what you're trying to

3 say is that it was the Serbs who were actively involved and that it was

4 the Serbs who were striving for the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

5 A. Well, I think I stated that previously that this was -- there

6 were two tracks that were being simultaneously pursued, one by the SDS

7 Serb side moving towards separatism and the other moving toward

8 independence on the part of the Croat and Muslim leadership. So I think

9 your statement is correct but that's only part of what I'm trying to

10 point out. These two things were happening. They were interactive and

11 they were proceeding along very different paths but at about the same

12 time and pace.

13 Q. I must say that it's difficult for me to understand, therefore I

14 am a bit perplexed by the comment of Judge Orie. At the time when

15 Yugoslavia was in existence, and when the Serbs wanted the existing state

16 of Yugoslavia to remain there, for them to be qualified and described as

17 separatists, I can't understand that. How is it possible for someone who

18 wants to remain living in the existing state can be described as a

19 separatist?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Before you answer the question, Mr. Donia, could

21 I ask the following question, and perhaps you'll answer the two of them

22 together: Is it true that the strife for separating Bosnia-Herzegovina

23 from Yugoslavia caused the Serbs who had been in favour of staying within

24 Yugoslavia even more to separate themselves from the Croat and Bosnians

25 in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Page 15634

1 THE WITNESS: I think it intensified their desire to do that,

2 yes. There was some desire to do so before the events of the

3 15th of October, but it certainly intensified their wish to move forward

4 with these separatist activities.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Then, as far as Mr. Lukic's question is concerned,

6 do I understand that you disagree with him that the Serbs wanted to stay

7 together with the Croats and the Muslims in Yugoslavia?

8 THE WITNESS: That would have been their first preference, yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: It would have been their first preference, together,

10 to stay with them?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: All of them within Yugoslavia?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes. And, in fact, they worked to that end

14 substantially prior to the events of mid-October.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Where you say "I think it intensified their desire

16 to do that," that was their wish to remain or their wish to separate from

17 the Croats and the Muslims?

18 THE WITNESS: They wished to separate from Bosnia.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Already before the mid-October events?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes. Now, I think as I say, that was not -- that

21 was not their first preference at that point. They had kind of a primary

22 objective and a backup objective. Primary objective was to keep Bosnia,

23 all of it and everyone in it, in Yugoslavia. That's what they first and

24 foremost sought. Their secondary -- their fall back position was to

25 separate.

Page 15635

1 JUDGE ORIE: And that was intensified after the 15th of October.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was, and my argument would be that the

3 events of the 15th basically ended any realistic hope of the primary

4 objective being achieved.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you have any follow-up questions

6 please put them to the witness.

7 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 Q. [Interpretation] Doctor, I'm sorry for this short pause because I

9 had to consult with my colleague.

10 Is it, in fact, true that the Bosnian Serbs did not want

11 secession but, rather they said this: We want the whole of Bosnia to

12 remain within Yugoslavia, but if the Croat and Muslim peoples do not want

13 that, then we, ourselves, would wish to remain in Yugoslavia and we are

14 willing to let them go away? Was that actually the position of the

15 Serbian leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. That was indeed the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership, and

17 in fact follows almost word for word the description that I've given of

18 General Kadijevic's view within the JNA, which I think starts on page --

19 this quote that starts on page 41. That was the position. At the same

20 time that they took the position that they wanted no change in the status

21 quo, only to remain in Yugoslavia, they intensified their separatist

22 activities citing as the justification the referendum, the plebiscite

23 that was held. In other words, they used the statement of just simply,

24 "I want to stay" to justify things beyond which, beyond what that

25 proposition actually stated. So I think both are correct. That was

Page 15636

1 their position. That was their official position. And they stood by it

2 firmly and at the same time began organising separatist activities.

3 I mentioned this interesting exchange from an assembly session yesterday

4 in which one of the delegates stood up and said, Wait a minute, I thought

5 we were for staying in Yugoslavia. And if that's true, we shouldn't need

6 to do anything. We are already in Yugoslavia. And the leadership of

7 course responded that that's not enough. We have to pursue these

8 separatist activities in order to break away from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 Q. Is it true that at the time, a declaration was issued, adopted by

10 Serb representatives, and that everything contained therein was

11 conditional? Nothing was defined definitely. If the other side does

12 this we shall do that? If the other side does that, we shall do this?

13 Up until that time, we are not going to make any moves. Is that actually

14 the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership?

15 A. That was their official position, yes.

16 Q. On page 43 of your report, which is 45 in e-court, last

17 paragraph, 43 in e-court in B/C/S, they -- since --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could we just be given a

19 second to find the paragraph? Thank you.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the interpreters are asking for a moment

21 to find the relevant portion.

22 MR. LUKIC: M'hm.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps if you slowly proceed now. And indicate

24 from where you're reading.

25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I know it's the last paragraph in

Page 15637

1 English and -- it's this separate paragraph, which reads:

2 "When it proved fruitless for the JNA to orient the Muslim part

3 of Bosnia's leadership towards a new Yugoslav state made of those

4 Yugoslav nations who still wanted it, we had to orient ourselves towards

5 concrete co-operation with the representatives of the Serb nation and

6 with the Serb people as a whole, never closing the door on co-operation

7 with others, individuals who supported a new Yugoslavia."

8 Q. What do you know about these negotiations that were going on

9 about -- and about the offers made by the JNA to all the peoples, i.e.,

10 Muslims, Croats and others in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 A. I -- I don't know what you're referring to.

12 Q. Are you aware of the negotiations that you are making reference

13 to? What was the source of what you're citing here, what kind of

14 negotiations were in question, and what offers were made by the JNA? Do

15 you know anything at all?

16 A. I'm quoting here General Kadijevic, and quoting him for the

17 purpose of explaining the motivation and procedures that were part of

18 this reorientation of the JNA to -- reorientation to the Serb people and

19 what he viewed as Serb interests. I don't see any reference to

20 negotiations in the quote anywhere.

21 Q. Shall we read the first sentence again which reads:

22 "When it proved fruitless for the JNA to orient the Muslim part

23 of Bosnia's leadership toward a new Yugoslav state made of those Yugoslav

24 nations who really wanted it."

25 But it's all right if you're unable to talk about this, then I'm

Page 15638

1 going to ask you something about a broader context. At the time, were

2 you aware that Alija Izetbegovic was offered to be the first

3 prime minister of the Yugoslavia that would include Bosnia-Herzegovina,

4 Serbia and Montenegro? I even believe that Macedonia featured in these

5 talks as well.

6 A. Well, I'm aware of a meeting that Adil Zulfikarpasic had with

7 Milosevic which was I think in June or July in which he made an almost

8 implausibly generous offer to restructure Yugoslavia and its succession

9 process in such a way that the SDA could select the first president or

10 Bosnia could select the first president of the federal Presidency, and

11 also agreed to name a number of Muslim JNA officers to key positions in

12 the army. That's -- I think, as I recall, that was in June, maybe early

13 July. But that's not quite the same thing that you're talking about and

14 I don't frankly know of any negotiations in the period we are talking

15 about here, which I take to be the time of the failed mobilisations or

16 the bifurcation of the mobilisations which is in September.

17 JUDGE ORIE: When you're referring to June, July, you're talking

18 about 1991?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am, yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Then we saw that mobilisation was announced and that a decision

23 on the Presidency was adopted by outvoting, that Muslims and Croats

24 failed to respond to the call-up. Then we come, as you say, to

25 mid-October when Serbs indicated their efforts to separate themselves

Page 15639

1 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'm going to say to you that the Defence

2 case was that the Serbs only wanted to remain in the same state with

3 everybody else, if possible, and if that was not plausible, then to

4 remain with those who wanted to stay and let the others go. I asked you

5 about the plebiscite and now my colleague has provided some information

6 about that. I'm asking you do you know that the plebiscite of the

7 Serbian people took place on the 9th and 10th November 1991 when

8 1.350.000 citizens or 96.4 per cent of citizens voted for an independent

9 state that could either be an independent one or part of Yugoslavia?

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, before the witness answers, you

11 referred to 96 per cent of the citizens, citizens of what state?

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Everybody was invited to vote in the

13 plebiscite. However, this plebiscite organised by the SDS almost only

14 Serbs turned out, the number of Muslims and Croats who turned up was

15 negligible. The referendum held on the 29th February 1992 and

16 1st March 1992 was held by -- with participation of the majority of

17 Muslims and Croats and the negligible number of Serbs.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm coming to assist my colleague. 96.4

19 per cent of citizens. You were asked for an explanation. May I take it

20 that you wanted to say 96.4 per cent of the citizens that participated in

21 the vote voted for?

22 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: That's the simple answer. You come with a long

24 explanation on matters not asked for. But apparently my suggestion for

25 the answer seems to satisfy my colleague.

Page 15640

1 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry for being vague and not precise enough.

2 That's the concise answer.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's very important to be concise when you ask

4 questions, Mr. Lukic, and when we ask for clarification it's also equally

5 important to listen to the question and answer my question.

6 MR. LUKIC: May I continue?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. On page 46 of your report, in the English version, in e-court,

10 that is, or rather page 44 of your report itself, in the second

11 paragraph, on page 44, paragraph 1 of the B/C/S version, you say, in an

12 article that was published, let us just wait for a moment.

13 There is a reference to the 22nd of November, 1991. So it's easy

14 to find. In an article published on the 22nd of November, 1991, in the

15 Sarajevo magazine "Slobodan Bosna" a journalist claimed to have documents

16 showing that the SDS had formed a war staff and made detailed plans to

17 besiege and attack Sarajevo in the event of a war.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the text of the report reads,

19 "Journalists claimed" not a journalist claimed.

20 MR. LUKIC: I have translation on B/C/S. I cut it out. If it's

21 in English I would accept English version of course, but in B/C/S it's

22 "jedan novinar je tvrdiu," [Interpretation] "a journalist claimed."

23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. In English it says "journalists." In English

24 it's then a translation error. Please proceed.

25 MR. LUKIC: Doesn't affect my question anyway. Thank you.

Page 15641

1 Q. [Interpretation] You used "Slobodna Bosna," a newspaper, here as

2 a source for your report, and in footnote 118 that you refer to here, as

3 a source, we see that the title of that text is, "Sarajevo as a Chetnik

4 target." Would you agree at the time Chetnik was a pejorative name for

5 Serbs that was used in the Muslim press?

6 A. It was used in not only the Muslim -- I would say -- it's a

7 pro-Muslim publications but Croat and other publications and it

8 definitely was a pejorative. Not clear sometimes whether it was

9 referring just to armed Serbs or all Serbs but it was certainly widely

10 used.

11 Q. Let us be specific. Widely used by who? By the Muslims and

12 Croats; right?

13 A. Yes. Your Honour, could I, in response to the earlier exchange,

14 there was a question that was asked of me which I didn't get to answer,

15 as you addressed some remarks to Mr. Lukic. And it pertained to the

16 content of the plebiscite of the 9th and 10th of November, and I believe

17 the representation was, Mr. Lukic, that the plebiscite gave voters a

18 choice of whether to stay in Yugoslavia or become part of a separate

19 state. That is not my recollection of the content of the wording of the

20 resolution on which voters voted. My recollection is that it only asked

21 if voters wanted to remain in Yugoslavia and had no further reference to

22 independence or even a separate Serb state. It simply pertained to

23 independence and perhaps some of the regional associations that were

24 being formed.

25 Q. Thank you. This document that we discussed and that footnote 118

Page 15642

1 of your paper refers to, that is mentioned in "Slobodna Bosna," did you

2 see that? Did you see that document that they say exists, namely that a

3 war staff was established and there is a plan for a war siege of

4 Sarajevo? I'm not referring to the article itself. I'm referring to the

5 document that the article refers to.

6 A. I have not seen that document, no.

7 Q. "Slobodna Bosna," we will agree, won't we, is a paper that

8 exclusively represented the views and positions of the representatives of

9 the Muslim people; isn't that right? At that time and even today?

10 A. No, I wouldn't agree that that's quite right. I think it was

11 founded as a -- first of all, as a weekly. It wasn't really a newspaper,

12 and it specialised in muckraking, aggressive investigative journalism.

13 It was certainly oriented in that time principally to the needs or

14 interests of the Muslim leadership, but also at times became very

15 critical of developments within the SDA and published some of those items

16 too, but its principal orientation I would agree was, as you said.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, if you would have avoided the word

18 "exclusively" in your question and if you would have phrased the question

19 that whether it principally reflected that, then you would have had

20 exactly the same answer in approximately a split of the time you used

21 now.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Yes, but then that would be my

23 position and my position that they exclusively, exclusively, wrote by

24 conveying the positions of the Muslim leadership. They would criticise

25 even a politician who would be in a different faction, again only

Page 15643

1 representing the interests of the politicians who represented the Muslim

2 people. So that is my position. If Dr. Donia corrects me, I accept

3 that.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I accept that if you think it's exclusively,

5 how unlikely that might be, if that's your position, then you should ask

6 for that rather than to move immediately to it being mainly reflecting

7 the interests, then of course you're free to do so. Next question,

8 please.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10 Q. Now I would like to go to page 48 in e-court, in the English

11 version, we need paragraph 4. In B/C/S it's page 46, and that is the

12 46th version of your paper in the English language.

13 A. I'm sorry, what was the page number in the English paper copy?

14 Q. [In English] 46.

15 A. 46.

16 Q. Paragraph 4. It starts, "Although he successfully kept most ..."

17 it's paragraph 4.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is page 44 in the English version of the

19 report itself.

20 MR. LUKIC: It moved. It was two pages different, but thank you

21 very much.

22 Q. [Interpretation] So the text is as follows:

23 "Although he successfully kept most JNA resources from Croat and

24 Bosnian government forces Kukanjac was unable to arrange the JNA's

25 peaceful withdrawal from its urban barracks. Some JNA facilities had

Page 15644

1 been under either surveillance or actual blockade by government forces

2 since early 1992."

3 When you say government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at that time,

4 there were still Serbs in that government; right? January, February

5 1992?

6 A. In that period, there were, yes.

7 Q. Would you agree actually that the forces that besieged the

8 facilities of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were not loyal to the

9 government of the BH but actually loyal to the SDA, the party of

10 Alija Izetbegovic?

11 A. At this time, it's kind of difficult to tell exactly who was

12 doing what. I think as a general statement, you can say they were loyal

13 to the SDA or its programme, and that's why they were participating in

14 the besieging or surrounding of the barracks.

15 Q. You would agree that you did not mean that they were loyal to

16 Biljana Plavsic or Nikola Koljevic who at the time were the Serb

17 representatives in the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that

18 correct?

19 A. No, they had really no personal loyalty to either of those

20 persons.

21 Q. Now, this same paragraph, you say:

22 "Most problematic were huge barracks in Tuzla and north-eastern

23 Bosnia, the sprawling Marsal Tito barracks on the near west side of

24 Sarajevo and the century-old headquarters of the second military group on

25 the south side of the Miljacka river in Sarajevo. Of those three

Page 15645

1 facilities, only the Tito barracks were evacuated peacefully. And that

2 only a month after Kukanjac left his command. In the other two cases

3 locally negotiated agreements broke down and the withdrawing JNA columns

4 were attacked by forces of or loyal to the Bosnian government."

5 At this time, the BH government had no Serb representatives any

6 longer when the barracks were attacked; isn't that right?

7 A. I would say -- I believe that's correct. I think those seats,

8 those seats were vacant, the two seats on the Presidency, as of the

9 6th of April and were not filled again until, I believe, sometime in

10 early June. So you're correct.

11 Q. But when you say "manned," you mean co-opting Mirko Pejanovic and

12 that is what Alija Izetbegovic did, it's not that new elections were held

13 in which the Serb people would elect their new representatives into the

14 government?

15 A. I know that's your position and your firm conviction but the --

16 there actually were two members put in -- appointed to the position to

17 represent Serbs in Bosnia. One was Pejanovic and the other was.

18 Q. Kecmanovic?

19 A. Kecmanovic. Who subsequently did not stay in Sarajevo, but for a

20 period of time the two of them as the, I believe, next two vote getters

21 from the 1990 elections were put in those positions by the Presidency

22 appointing them.

23 Q. Pejanovic was a representative of the Communist Party; isn't that

24 right? And he won 15 per cent of the vote. So maybe Croats and Muslims

25 and Serbs voted for him. It's not that he was a representative of a Serb

Page 15646

1 national party; isn't that right?

2 A. No. That's not the case. He, first of all, was the candidate of

3 the reformed Socialist Alliance, not the League of Communists, and that

4 party in its new name, I believe, was the Democratic Socialist Party.

5 And he was, as I say, third or fourth among Serb vote getters in this

6 very complex arrangement which didn't even send the top seven people to

7 the Presidency. It sent the top two vote getters in each of the three

8 national categories and then one in the category of others. So it wasn't

9 the practice, it's very unlikely that anyone other than Serbs voted for

10 him, not because of the way that the thing was structured but because the

11 parties all urged people only to vote for members of their own ethnic

12 group.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to ask you the following: When you

14 refer to government or loyal to government forces, did you intend to say

15 loyal to all the individual members of the government or forces loyal to

16 all the individual members of that government?

17 THE WITNESS: No. I meant to -- loyal to the majority, to the

18 body itself --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 THE WITNESS: -- of the Presidency.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, all your questions are focused on reading

22 in the report something which isn't there and then to challenge that. If

23 it says "government," the Chamber understands this as what the government

24 by majority and any other way had decided to do or not to do. Again, you

25 are challenging things which seems not to be in the document, and are

Page 15647

1 suggesting a meaning of the report which is not there, if I understand

2 Mr. Donia well. And that's a rather useless exercise.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Now that you say that it's not in the report, and --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I think Mr. Mladic is seeking your

7 attention or he's thinking about the break. I think we would have a

8 break in five minutes from now. Please proceed.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. The report says that these reports were loyal to the government

11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In your view, then, the government of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it issue orders to these forces that surrounded

13 the barracks and facilities of the JNA from the beginning of the year?

14 A. I have not seen them, looked at them. I'm confident it did. The

15 Presidency issued orders to military leaders who at that time would have

16 been the TO. You're dating this from the beginning of the year. The

17 actual siege of the barracks surrounding and cutting them off really

18 didn't happen, wasn't completed, until May, particularly starting about

19 May 2nd of 1992.

20 Q. Do you know, then, whether the representatives of the Serb people

21 in that government were informed of such orders, or were these orders

22 issued behind their backs?

23 A. No, I don't know.

24 Q. You say here in this last passage that we read out that in the

25 other two cases, local agreements were not observed and withdrawing JNA

Page 15648

1 columns were attacked by forces who were loyal to the Bosnian government.

2 Who was it that did not observe locally negotiated agreements, the JNA

3 that was withdrawing or forces loyal to the BH at the time, those who

4 were attacking the columns?

5 A. Well, each side claimed that the other was not respecting the

6 agreement. For example, in Tuzla, the Tuzla city government accused the

7 JNA of withdrawing its weapons and ammunition with the column, in

8 violation of the agreement that they had reached. In that same

9 situation, the JNA accused the Tuzla local forces of attacking the column

10 unprovoked.

11 Q. In the course of your work, did you learn that the JNA did not

12 respect something that had been agreed or is this a shameless lie that

13 was just used to justify attacks against a column that did not offer any

14 resistance whatsoever?

15 A. There certainly is evidence that the -- in the case of the Tuzla

16 column, that the JNA was withdrawing substantial weapons and ammunition.

17 One of the trucks that was attacked clearly was carrying ammunition

18 because it exploded during the fire-fight and burned for a couple of

19 hours, throwing flames several hundred feet in the air. So it seems to

20 me there is some evidence that the JNA was indeed withdrawing weapons and

21 ammunition, in that case at least.

22 Q. Is it your testimony then, that in your research you came across

23 information to the effect that the JNA soldiers were supposed to withdraw

24 unarmed or did the agreement precisely provide for them withdrawing with

25 their weapons?

Page 15649

1 A. I -- I don't believe -- there was, I think part of the agreement

2 in the case of the Sarajevo withdrawal from the 2nd Army headquarters,

3 was that the withdrawing troops could have --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just stop you for a moment? We were in

5 Tuzla, weren't we, Mr. Lukic? The answer now moves to Sarajevo. Could

6 we first check whether you have any knowledge about what exactly was

7 agreed upon, if we are talking about local agreement, in Tuzla, as far as

8 taking your arms with you when withdrawing? Do you know?

9 THE WITNESS: I've actually looked at that pretty closely and

10 I don't see any -- I don't know of any provision in the agreement as it

11 was finally reached for them to withdraw with their arms.

12 JUDGE ORIE: But also not to withdraw without their arms?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes. That that was, as I understand it, that was

14 the final agreement. Now, it was only a verbal agreement.

15 JUDGE ORIE: One second. You say as you understand it, that is

16 your understanding is then that they would withdraw unarmed or without

17 their arms, which is not exactly the same, but --

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, without their weapons.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Without their weapons.

20 THE WITNESS: That was my understanding of the second --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Of an oral agreement.

22 THE WITNESS: There were two agreements and one fell apart

23 immediately and the other actually was what allowed the column to begin

24 its exit and then the fire-fight broke out at that point. And it was the

25 second verbal agreement that in speaking to the people who were party to

Page 15650

1 it, they said that there was no stipulation that they could take their

2 weapons with them.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Now, but that's -- was there any stipulation that

4 they could not take their weapons with them? Were they prohibited from

5 doing that?

6 THE WITNESS: That's my understanding, that they were prohibited

7 from doing that, yes.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Explicitly or implicit by not having a stipulation

9 that they could take their weapons.

10 THE WITNESS: I frankly don't know enough because it was a verbal

11 agreement and people I talked to couldn't recall exactly what the

12 substance of it was.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Having dealt with Tuzla, I don't know,

14 Mr. Lukic, whether you want to proceed anything further in relation to

15 Sarajevo but perhaps --

16 MR. LUKIC: One minute with Tuzla and then we can go to --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. You say a conflict broke out. In that conflict, how many

20 casualties were there on the other side, that is to say not the JNA, on

21 this other side that attacked the column, there weren't any casualties;

22 right? There was no conflict there. This was an attack against children

23 sitting on trucks and that were killed and burned, would you agree with

24 that?

25 A. No. I don't know of attacks against children in this -- in this

Page 15651

1 process. It --

2 Q. They were 19 or 18 years old; isn't that correct?

3 A. In uniform, I think that's, you know, not -- not the definition

4 of a child here. Look, there was -- again, this has been litigated

5 actually in a Belgrade court for a long time, without, in my view,

6 reaching any conclusion about who began this action, and exactly, you

7 know, what -- what caused the outbreak of violence, and --

8 Q. Just a moment, please. Could you please tell us before the

9 break, these soldiers from the column, how many people did they kill on

10 the Muslim side? How many Muslims were killed then?

11 A. Well, I don't know. I could tell you the number of casualties

12 that were counted in the column. The Bosnian side counted 34. Milosevic

13 in his -- one of his testimonies submitted the number 47. I think that's

14 a range within which the number of people killed in the column could be

15 placed.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you one additional question, then? Do

17 you not know the number of casualties among the Muslims, or do you say,

18 I never heard about any casualties among the Muslims during this

19 violence?

20 THE WITNESS: I would say the latter. I have not heard, do not

21 know of any casualties, on the Tuzla government side of the thing.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic? That's it?

23 MR. LUKIC: It's time for our break.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then could the witness be escorted out of the

25 courtroom?

Page 15652

1 [The witness stands down]

2 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and we resume at 20 minutes

3 past 12.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

7 There was one issue remaining from this morning. I think

8 I instructed the Registry to attach the translation to P1987. I do

9 understand that it was MFI'd for the lack of a translation. Hereby, the

10 Chamber decides that P1987 is admitted into evidence. Apart from that,

11 the Chamber was informed that the Registry had followed up on all the

12 instructions that the Chamber issued this morning.

13 [The witness takes the stand]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you may proceed.

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 Q. Doctor, now I would focus on your report which is called,

17 "Siege." It's page 54 in e-court, it should be 50 in your report. And

18 in B/C/S it should be page 51.

19 In one of the previous parts of your report, you said that there

20 was a reorganisation of Sarajevo by encouraging the Serbs to leave the

21 Sarajevo.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please repeat slowly the rest

23 of the sentence.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please repeat slowly the rest of the

25 sentence.

Page 15653

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. "And to eliminate the presence of the majority of Serbs from the

3 territory under their control."

4 That was a quotation.

5 Is it true that people left Bosnia-Herzegovina in fear; that they

6 left the territory under the control of the other side for that reason?

7 A. I'm sorry, I don't know -- I don't see where I wrote this

8 statement or made this statement, to eliminate the presence of a majority

9 of Serbs.

10 Q. Well, you say that this was the Serbian strategy.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, where do we find it? That's the first

12 question.

13 MR. LUKIC: I'm trying to speed up but it's English page 52 in

14 e-court. And it's B/C/S --

15 JUDGE ORIE: It should be 48 in the hard copy.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is indeed, just under the heading,

17 "Establishing the siege," that first paragraph.

18 MR. LUKIC: And 49 in B/C/S.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. The title is, "Establishing the siege," and you say that a

22 democrat -- demographic reordering of Sarajevo by urging Serbs to leave

23 Sarajevo and eliminating the presence of most non-Serbs on territory they

24 controlled.

25 Yesterday, you told us that the Serbs who wanted to leave

Page 15654

1 Sarajevo after the 2nd of May were no longer able to do that. And my

2 question was, is it true that all the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina were

3 leaving the territory controlled by the other side for the reasons of

4 fear?

5 A. Well, you've again summarised something I said yesterday and

6 I didn't say that. I didn't say that Serbs who wanted to leave Sarajevo

7 after the 2nd of May were no longer able to do that. I said that there

8 were some barriers imposed to their departure but that it appeared to me

9 that no one who wanted to get out was not able to get out. So to turn to

10 your question --

11 Q. Just a moment, please. Let us continue from here. According to

12 your knowledge, who of the Serbs managed to leave the Sarajevo? How many

13 of them and under what circumstances?

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Lukic, we suggest that you look at that

15 paragraph in this "Establishing the siege" carefully because I'm not

16 quite sure that your question is in line with the statement that is made

17 there. Eliminating the presence of most non-Serbs is what the statement

18 says, not Serbs, if you look at the report itself.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] But it says that the Serbs were

20 encouraged to leave Sarajevo.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure, in order to eliminate non-Serbs. Or ask the

22 author. Here he is.

23 MR. LUKIC: But the witness returned to previous answer from

24 yesterday telling that I quoted him wrongly and I just wanted

25 clarification from the witness now to give us examples, numbers, sources,

Page 15655

1 how he learned who from the Serb people left Sarajevo. I will come back

2 to that second part of elimination, and that was my question, wasn't that

3 true that every nation in Bosnia left the territory that is not under

4 control of its own army. And I haven't got the response yet. I will

5 come back to that.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: You will come back to it but you're mixing it with

7 what is already here and I don't think -- but, look, carry on.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Can you tell us any examples, any numbers of how many Serbs

10 managed to leave Sarajevo and under what circumstances?

11 A. Well, the number of Serbs in Sarajevo, according to the 1991

12 census, was something around 150.000. And I think some of those, there

13 was an initial wave of departures just in the beginning weeks of the

14 armed conflict, but most actually stayed at that time, and then a good

15 number of those actually departed in the course of the spring and summer

16 of 1992, and subsequently in the war. So that the estimates of numbers

17 of Serbs who remained in Sarajevo at the time the siege ended, which was

18 in February of 1996, ranges from a high of maybe 60.000 to as little as

19 20.000. Now, those are not census figures but they are estimates by

20 various people who -- mainly estimates by Serbs who stayed in Sarajevo

21 during the war. So it's clear that those people who wanted to get out

22 were able to get out, although, as I say, often not without some

23 difficulty.

24 Q. And you believe that when we question Sarajevo Serbs, that they

25 are going to corroborate the statement that you have just made that

Page 15656

1 anyone who wanted to leave was free to go?

2 A. Again, you've mischaracterised my testimony. I said that they

3 were able to get out but not without in some cases substantial

4 difficulty. And I do expect, if you talk to a representative number of

5 people, to be borne out on that point.

6 Q. Therefore, you wouldn't agree with the Defence case that Serbs

7 were unable to get out of Sarajevo because they were held there not only

8 as a human shield but they were also used for digging trenches, that

9 money was being extorted from them and that they were summarily executed

10 without any guilt? Would you agree that this is the characterisation of

11 Sarajevo situation in the 1990s?

12 A. Well, I think it's a caricature, propagandistic caricature of the

13 situation in Sarajevo, not an accurate characterisation of the situation.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek clarification. Is it your position,

15 Mr. Lukic, that all of the Serbs were either held as a human shield, used

16 for digging trenches or that those instances occurred? Because we are

17 talking about the Serbs, the Serbs not being able to leave, the Serbs.

18 Is it your position that all of the Serbs.

19 MR. LUKIC: Majority.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Majority.

21 MR. LUKIC: Not all, of course it's very hard to say all. We

22 have Mirko Pejanovic who was enjoying that period of time living in

23 Sarajevo of course, and a few like him.

24 JUDGE ORIE: And is it your position that none of the Serbs

25 managed to get out and do you have any numbers so because I'm troubled by

Page 15657

1 the Serbs, Serbs, majorities. Do we have -- what is the position of the

2 Defence on that?

3 MR. LUKIC: Only few Serbs were able to leave Sarajevo, only they

4 were loaded with money, if they were able to pay a lot of money for their

5 departure.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's -- the position is clear now. Could

7 you comment then on these statements, that --

8 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think that's not the case. Many of those

9 Serbs who stayed were, in fact, people who stayed because they had jobs,

10 their roots were in the community. One prominent Serb who stayed,

11 Dane Olbina, wrote in his diary that we will share the destiny of this

12 city. That was his reason for staying. And I think people had various

13 reasons for staying, as well as various reasons for living -- or for

14 leaving, those who did, but I disagree with this characterised

15 description of everyone being persecuted and unable to leave. That's

16 simply not the case. The vast majority of Serbs who lived in Sarajevo as

17 of the first day of siege left, something like 60, 70 per cent of them

18 left the city.

19 JUDGE ORIE: But could you express that in numbers more or less?

20 THE WITNESS: Well, as I say, 150.000, sometimes Serb SDS and

21 Serb leaders wanted to include Yugoslavs in that number and get it up to

22 200.000 but I would accept the census number, from something around

23 150.000 down to something between, let's say 20- and 60.000 at the end of

24 the war.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Which means 100.000 left approximately?

Page 15658

1 THE WITNESS: Yes.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Such instances, digging trenches, being

3 held as -- did such instances happen?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, they did, and they happened principally in the

5 first several months of the war, and they were principally done by these

6 paramilitaries or gangs before they were really brought under control by

7 the government but they certainly did take place. There were also

8 others, non-Serbs, who were forced to dig trenches, so it's not

9 specifically, not solely a matter of ethnicity but, yes, there were such

10 cases, to be sure.

11 JUDGE ORIE: And could you quantify those instances? If even

12 only approximately?

13 THE WITNESS: I just -- very difficult to do. Maybe, I don't

14 know, 20-, 30.000 may have been involved, let's say of all citizens of

15 Sarajevo may have been involved in some form of forced labour, whether

16 short or longer period of time, in the course of the siege.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Which is still a considerable number?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 Q. 150.000 Serbs, that involves the whole Sarajevo including the

22 parts under the Serb control, or was someone not included in that number?

23 A. Well, that number which was used by Karadzic and General Mladic

24 for that matter was derived from the 1991 census which included all ten

25 municipalities of Sarajevo that were as it existed from 1977 on.

Page 15659

1 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you whether you can quantify those Serbs

2 who lived in an area where they didn't have to move in order to be or

3 rather to remain under Serb control? Would that be, for example, people

4 in Pale wouldn't have to move, isn't it?

5 THE WITNESS: Right. That was certainly true in a couple of

6 these municipalities, very -- not so in the western part of the city

7 where really there was a Serb takeover that was in many cases violent.

8 It's hard to quantify. I would guess that if you take -- I mean, Pale,

9 some of these areas were not that heavily populated generally so perhaps,

10 I don't know, I'd say 40- to 50.000 maybe Serbs lived in 1991 in areas

11 that were controlled by Serb forces after, let's say, May 2, 1992.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Which therefore reduces the number of 150.000 to

13 100.

14 THE WITNESS: Roughly.

15 JUDGE ORIE: And those that had left to roughly 50- to 60.000?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, that would be --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, which is a different number from the one you

18 gave me a minute ago.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm trying to reconcile the 1991 census figure

20 with what we really saw at the end of the conflict in February of 1996.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. The post war situation was supposedly better than the one during

24 the war. Do you have any information how many Serbs are living in

25 Sarajevo nowadays expressed either percentage wise or in numbers? And

Page 15660

1 I'm talking about the part which is within the Federation today.

2 A. I -- I really have no idea. That's far beyond the scope of what

3 I've attempted to address here and don't know what it is.

4 Q. Would you agree that only a handful of Serbs and Croats are

5 living in Sarajevo nowadays?

6 A. I just -- no. I don't -- I don't think it's just a handful. I

7 don't know how many you mean by a handful but we -- I don't think --

8 simply don't know that. There was a kind of enumeration from 2002 that

9 was made in Sarajevo only, I believe, and I just don't have those numbers

10 at hand. I would not agree with your statement that it was necessarily

11 better after the war. I think it probably -- certainly the number

12 declined in areas within the Federation. But, remember, there was a

13 large shift of boundaries in 1996 to correspond to the lines that were

14 drawn in the Dayton Agreement.

15 Q. As far as Sarajevo is concerned, the part that was given to the

16 Federation was bigger than the one that was under the BH Army control

17 during the war?

18 A. It was -- yes, it was as I mentioned I believe in the report,

19 something like 59 per cent of the pre-war ten municipalities and during

20 the war the area was considerably constricted from the --

21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic is invited to remain seated and even

22 instructed to do so.

23 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Please keep the volume down. Please keep the volume

25 down.

Page 15661

1 Mr. Lukic, please proceed.

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. At the time, is it true that the SDA had started taking over

4 departments of the Ministry of the Interior in Sarajevo and thus they

5 acquired full control under public security stations of Stari Grad,

6 Centar, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, which was, in fact, something that

7 constitutes the major part of Sarajevo downtown?

8 A. When you say at the time, what time are you referring to?

9 Q. The time that you included in the title outline of the siege.

10 That is to say when things started developing before the outbreak of the

11 conflict.

12 A. Yes. There were SDA-backed efforts to -- successful efforts, to

13 take control of public security stations that were often in conflict with

14 those being engaged in by the SDS. So it was kind of a two-party

15 process, in some cases even three-party process in which both the SDA and

16 the government on the one hand and the SDS on the other tried to seize

17 police stations and order the obedience of policemen within each of the

18 stations.

19 Q. On page 56 in e-court, third paragraph, and 53, third paragraph,

20 in B/C/S, and 56 in English, probably 49 in your report, you say that

21 General Mladic, the appointed commander of the VRS.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please read slowly.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, first of all, page 56 in e-court would

24 correspond with page 52 in the English hard copy. I think there is a --

25 usually a difference of four pages, already for a long time, and could

Page 15662

1 you please slowly read what you want to refer to. And I take it you are

2 reading from the middle of the page:

3 "General Mladic, the newly designated commander of the VRS urged

4 that heavy weapons be placed strategically around the city."

5 That's where you started reading?

6 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please continue whatever you want to read further.

8 MR. LUKIC: I didn't mean to read further. If you want I can

9 read further.

10 JUDGE ORIE: No, I don't. I just started reading where you --

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. At the time, there existed in the city of Sarajevo numerous

13 units, as you call them, loyal to the Presidency of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you find out from the sources the number of heavy weaponry in

17 the city of Sarajevo that later became the position -- possession of the

18 1st Corps of the BH Army?

19 A. No.

20 Q. In your work, did you find out how many offensives were launched

21 from the city of Sarajevo against the Serbian positions during the war?

22 A. I have described several of them in the course of the report,

23 which, as you know --

24 Q. Do you know the total number of offensives?

25 A. I don't -- didn't count the total number of offensives just like

Page 15663

1 I didn't count the total number of gun barrels on both sides.

2 Q. [In English] Okay. Fair enough. [Interpretation] Do you know

3 that the Muslim politicians and military commanders refused to accept

4 demilitarisation of the city that had been offered by the Serbian side?

5 A. I'm not sure specifically what you're referring to. I don't --

6 don't know, sitting here, that -- of situations in which they discussed

7 but then rejected that. I just don't know.

8 Q. In your research, did you acquire information that the Serbian

9 side constantly proposed a permanent cease of hostilities that were

10 rejected by the Muslim side and that they only agreed to intermittent

11 cease of hostilities? Did you study any UN documents on that topic?

12 A. Well, as you can see in the report, I've made some study of UN

13 documents over the course of the war pertaining to negotiations.

14 I wouldn't accept that -- agree with that characterisation of the

15 negotiations as a whole. I think there was much more give and take, back

16 and forth than that, than you've described here. I think that it's fair

17 to say that there was more readiness on the Serb side to declare a

18 cessation of hostilities once they had completed their conquest of about

19 70 per cent of Bosnia and in fact they declared an end to the war in

20 December of 1992.

21 Q. Very well. You speak about controlling a compact and interlinked

22 territory in your report. It's page 60 in e-court, paragraph 2. B/C/S

23 version 56, paragraph 2. I suppose this is also 56th page of your

24 report. You are --

25 JUDGE ORIE: It is.

Page 15664

1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

2 Q. [Interpretation] You are talking about meeting in Graz, when

3 Mr. Karadzic on 6 May 1992 met with Mate Boban, and you say Croatian

4 nationalist leader. Later on, the European Community did not accept

5 these agreements. This is on 61 page in e-court. Next page, paragraph

6 second, page 56 of the B/C/S, once they learned that the Muslim side did

7 not participate in these negotiations and did not express their views.

8 Would you agree that the European Community did not react in the equal

9 manner when a referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was

10 held? In other words, they were not interested in what the third side,

11 that is to say the Serbs, had to say about it?

12 A. No. I don't agree at all. You've kind of mixed two time periods

13 which were very different in character, but if you go back to the earlier

14 time period that you're speaking about, in fact --

15 Q. I'm talking about the beginning of March and beginning of May, so

16 there is a two month difference; right?

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, before we continue on this matter, is it

18 your intention to put on an equal level an agreement agreed upon or not

19 agreed upon by certain parties to the outcome of an election or a

20 referendum? Is that what you intend to do, to say, Well, since you did

21 not recognise the vote of the Serbs, therefore that's inequal treatment

22 where you do not accept an agreement binding a party which never took

23 part in the negotiations or the agreement? Is that what you want to

24 compare? If that's the case, please tell us.

25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I want to show the double standards

Page 15665

1 that the European community had, and the representatives of the Serb

2 people and representatives of Serb parties were aware of that.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I do understand that you want to show the

4 double standards. My question was, however, a different one is whether

5 not being a party and not having agreed upon something, is that the same

6 as having lost an election or is that comparable? That was my question,

7 whether you intended to compare the two as equal. Apart from what you

8 then wanted to establish.

9 MR. LUKIC: You're talking about referendum now, when you say

10 lost the election. Referendum was illegally conducted and results of the

11 referendum are illegal and unconstitutional since you have to have

12 three-quarters of votes to change the constitution. And that --

13 JUDGE ORIE: So you really wanted to compare the outcome as

14 being --

15 MR. LUKIC: Yes, yes.

16 JUDGE ORIE: -- of an equal --

17 MR. LUKIC: It's not the election, the referendum without the

18 Serbian people according to the constitution would not be legal and it

19 was illegal but the EU at that time did not want to look at that.

20 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear to me you want to compare the two as

21 being equal for analytical purposes. Would you please, then, answer the

22 question? I think I interrupted you, Mr. Lukic.

23 MR. LUKIC: I just wanted to ask Dr. Donia.

24 Q. Dr. Donia, do you think that there were double standards in the

25 EU, and the EU was on the side that wanted to destroy Yugoslavia openly?

Page 15666

1 A. No. And specifically, the Badinter Commission of the

2 European Community in its decision regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina in

3 January of 1992 specifically took note of the Serb plebiscite, and

4 treated that as an expression of the Serb people of Bosnia-Herzegovina

5 that they were opposed to independence, and it was then on that basis

6 that the EC invited Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct a referendum on the

7 basis -- without regard to differentiation by ethnicity on the question

8 of independence, and short of that being done, the EC was not prepared to

9 move forward to recognise the independence of Bosnia.

10 Q. [Interpretation] The outcome was known, wasn't it? It was known

11 that there would be a majority vote, that the Serbs would be outvoted, as

12 they were in the Presidency, as they were in the assembly, and that is

13 why we had an instrument called constituent peoples whereby it was

14 prohibited to have one particular people outvoted. Although you're not

15 an expert in constitutional law, you knew that at the time there was this

16 principle of constituent peoples which prohibited one constituent people

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina being outvoted by the other two. Were you aware of

18 that?

19 A. Let me try to unsort this. First the question was the outcome

20 known? I think there were some in the EC who assumed that they knew what

21 the result would be. But the fact is that in relatively last minute, the

22 HDZ wavered in its support for independence, and objected to the specific

23 language of the referendum, and only after some consideration decided to

24 go ahead and actually support a vote in favour of independence. So I

25 have to question whether they really knew or even thought, had great

Page 15667

1 conviction, of the outcome. They were, after all, in the process of

2 trying to impose some order on this whole business of parts of Yugoslavia

3 and the Soviet Union becoming independent. That was their orientation.

4 That was the task of the Badinter Commission. So was the result

5 foreknown? I really don't think so. And even if it was, they wanted to

6 establish the principle of majority vote. They had no interest in the --

7 they really did not recognise this principle of constituent nations,

8 which was, after all, rooted in a Stalinist time in understanding of

9 nationality polity in the Soviet Union. In addition, the principle of

10 constituent nations really didn't apply in the Presidency, was clearly

11 established, I believe, in the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it did

12 not apply in any code that I know of to the Presidency.

13 Q. The Presidency does not pass laws and cannot change the

14 constitution. They pass decrees and that is why it didn't pertain to

15 them. However, we are going to move from this subject of constituency.

16 We are going to elaborate on that with someone else. Thank you for your

17 effort to try to help us.

18 Reading UN documents, did you come across any traces to the

19 effect that Muslim politicians were preventing supplies from reaching the

20 city, the repair of electricity, gas, water, in order to portray the

21 situation in town worse than it actually was?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. You also knew of the existence of the airport -- or, rather, a

24 tunnel underneath the airport. We see that from the paper. When we now

25 discussed the possibility for Serbs to leave town, I should ask you the

Page 15668

1 following. Actually, you knew and you mentioned that also, that through

2 this tunnel, units were being brought in and taken out of Sarajevo

3 through this tunnel. Did you ever come across information to the effect

4 that anyone who was of Serb ethnicity could leave through that tunnel?

5 A. I don't think the tunnel was open to anyone of any ethnicity just

6 to freely leave. It was primarily built for military purposes, the

7 passage of food and humanitarian aid, and military personnel, rather than

8 civilians.

9 Q. You saw through your work that Muslim authorities actually did

10 give permits for entering and leaving through that tunnel; right?

11 A. I have not seen any of those. Certainly wouldn't doubt that they

12 were issued.

13 Q. Did you know of armed clashes within Sarajevo between different

14 Muslim formations, in 1993 and 1994?

15 A. There were such, yes. There were a few.

16 Q. What was the attitude of the HVO towards the Army of BH in

17 Sarajevo? What was the attitude of the HVO headquarters in Kiseljak?

18 Did they help or not help the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did they

19 contribute to them or not?

20 A. That's several questions. I think the answer depends on what

21 time period you're speaking of. At the beginning of the conflict, the

22 HVO in general was allied with the ARBiH. There was considerable tension

23 between them, as there was politically between the political leaderships,

24 but there were plenty of HVO units in Sarajevo co-operating with the

25 ARBiH in the defence of the city. That certainly changed after the

Page 15669

1 outbreak of war in Central Bosnia between the HVO and the ARBiH, which

2 really started in let's say in October of 1992 but became much more

3 widespread in spring of 1993. And at that point, most of those units

4 left Sarajevo or at least focused their activities only on the area of

5 Stup and a couple of other Croat-inhabited areas and of course eventually

6 the co-operation between them broke down completely. And I think the --

7 I can't really address specifically what the headquarters in Kiseljak

8 did. I certainly know that the HVO entered into broad co-operative

9 arrangements with the VRS and traded a lot of materiel over that line,

10 but it also co-operated at times with the ARBiH even in the circumstances

11 of war.

12 Q. Would you agree that the HVO contributed through most of the war

13 to the blockade of the Muslim forces within Sarajevo?

14 A. I would say part of the war, and, again, that's a kind of

15 question that calls for breaking down specific time periods. Probably

16 more than the other two sides the HVO was in a position to play an

17 opportunistic role and so at times did, indeed, enforce the blockade; at

18 other times, did not.

19 Q. As for elevations surrounding Sarajevo, very often it is stated

20 that it was Serbs who held these elevations around Sarajevo and that

21 Muslims did not have access to them. In your research, did you actually

22 come across information to the effect that many of the elevations around

23 Sarajevo were actually held by Muslims?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, many, little, et cetera, that doesn't

25 assist the Chamber. If you say 70 per cent, fine, or if you mention

Page 15670

1 specific ones, but --

2 MR. LUKIC: I can mention specific ones.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you mention them and then see if the witness

4 knows anything about it.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you know where Colina Kapa is, and do you know that it was in

7 the hands of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and from there there is a

8 view of almost all of Sarajevo?

9 A. I know where it is. I've not specifically taken in the view. I

10 have written at some length in the report about the key elevations, and

11 which side they were on and how they changed hands in the course of the

12 war. I haven't certainly treated them all or this report would be 500

13 pages long, but I think that the general tenor, the direction of things,

14 is pretty well captured in the paper as it reads.

15 Q. I'm just going to ask you briefly about Grdonja and Hum. From

16 Grdonja you can see Ilidza and Vogosca that were held by Serbs, and from

17 Hum you can see Grbavica and all of Sarajevo including Ilidza; is that

18 correct? And did you know that these two elevations were held by the

19 Muslim forces?

20 A. Yes. Of course, Hum was taken by the ARBiH in May of 1992, and I

21 don't know about the other part that you mentioned, but of course it was

22 a key strategic goal of the ARBiH to take this, say, mid-level high

23 ground both because they wanted it for their own purposes but also to

24 deny it to those who were assaulting the city with infantry or with

25 artillery and tank attacks.

Page 15671

1 Q. From these elevations the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not only

2 prevent the other side from firing at town but they actually fired at

3 civilian parts of Sarajevo that were held by the Serb forces; isn't that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes. It certainly is true.

6 Q. I'm just going to speed up a bit. The Cutileiro Plan, you say

7 that it failed. You didn't say why it failed. Why did the Cutileiro

8 Plan fail? It was before the conflict, wasn't it?

9 A. Well, as I've indicated in the report, Cutileiro actually

10 submitted a number of plans, proposals, in the course of the first six

11 months of 1992. The first one that was significant in that it won --

12 looked like it had the possibility of being accepted, was floated in

13 February and parties backed away from it, largely because of the -- some

14 interference on the part of the -- well, the EU objected to the Serb

15 decision to pronounce or declare a constitution of their own. The

16 Cutileiro Plan that most people think about is the one that we've already

17 discussed of 18 March 1992, which I've characterised as an agreement in

18 principle, and the specifics of that plan are actually fully available in

19 the 11th session that was held on that day when there is a very accurate

20 report to the Bosnian Serb Assembly by Karadzic. The -- all three sides

21 eventually backed away from the plan, before subsequent negotiations

22 could be held to move from an agreement in principle to the, let's say,

23 more specifics. The -- I think some -- the -- many people in the EU

24 believed that it was the Muslim or the SDA side that initiated this, and,

25 indeed, they may have been first but eventually all three parties backed

Page 15672

1 away from the Cutileiro Plan.

2 Q. Did it work for the other two sides to remain faithful to the

3 plan if the third one wouldn't? You will agree that it didn't make any

4 sense to negotiate any further when the Muslim side did not want to

5 negotiate about that anymore that way?

6 A. Well, I would turn to the words of Karadzic at that 11th session,

7 in which he said, We are not going to agree to anything that we didn't

8 sign. So I think it was the position of all three sides that until that

9 final agreement was reached, it was not a valid agreement.

10 MR. LUKIC: Is it the break time?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but before we take the break, could I ask one

12 clarification? You asked for many high grounds in the hands of the

13 Army of BiH. You mentioned three. Do I have to understand that this is

14 the position of the Defence, that the significant high grounds were

15 Colina Kapa, Hum hill and Grdonj. Is that how I have to understand it or

16 was it just examples.

17 MR. LUKIC: Examples since this gentleman obviously is not

18 capable of knowing all of them or the names. He didn't even recognise

19 Grdonj.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but he did recognise the tow other ones.

21 MR. LUKIC: I have Balino Brdo, Brijesce Brdo, Mojmilo, Igman.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's the position of the Defence as

23 significant high grounds.

24 MR. LUKIC: Well, I didn't confirm. I just wanted to see if this

25 gentleman took it into account. This was confirmed by the UN witnesses

Page 15673

1 here. There is also Zuc elevation. It's in the evidence in this case.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I just wanted to know what the position of the

3 Defence was in this respect. But it's more than the three you mentioned.

4 MR. LUKIC: M'hm.

5 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear, but although you do not put further

6 questions to the witness on that. Then we take a break. Could the

7 witness be escorted out of the courtroom.

8 [The witness stands down]

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the Chamber would urge you to see whether

10 you can finish in the next session. We take a break and we'll resume at

11 20 minutes to 2.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 1.19 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 1.42 p.m.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

15 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, I just want to inform you that my

16 estimate is better than my wish. And I estimated 7 hours and I can cut

17 it down but I cannot finish today. Half an hour is not enough. I have

18 to deal now with the second report. It will not be as extensive as the

19 first one but we'll have, I'm afraid, to see Dr. Donia tomorrow, at least

20 for the first session.

21 [The witness takes the stand]

22 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider your request to use all the time in

23 accordance with your estimate. But at this moment, please proceed.

24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

25 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Donia, now I'd like to move on to your

Page 15674

1 report that has to do with the session of the assembly of

2 Republika Srpska, at first the assembly of the Serb people in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, P2001, if I wrote that down correctly. In relation

4 to this, you said in your report that the general first referred on 12

5 May, the 16th session, but yesterday, or actually on Thursday, the

6 question was that on 25 April 1992, the general took over this position.

7 I'm asking you whether you knew that General Mladic came to Bosnia only

8 on the 9th of May, 1992?

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all unnecessary

10 microphones please be switched off. Thank you.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. He came from Croatia?

13 A. Yes, I wasn't certain of the exact date but I was aware that he

14 came within a day of that anyway so I certainly accept that

15 representation.

16 Q. Thank you. Officially he was appointed on the 24th of April but

17 you do know that always a certain period of time elapses before one takes

18 over one's duties. You said that he attended seven assembly sessions

19 until May 1994 and on the 50th session in April, out of a total of 66

20 sessions that were held, so actually in that light, we will be

21 discussing, this is what you say in the English version in e-court, we

22 need 2001, fourth page, end of the second paragraph; page 5 in B/C/S, end

23 of the first paragraph. As you were explaining why General Mladic did

24 not attend sessions you say despite his frequent absence other senior

25 generals of the VRS attended most sessions and some of their remarks are

Page 15675

1 included in the following highlights. This is what I'd like to ask you.

2 Do you know whether these other military representatives were invited

3 through General Mladic or whether they were invited in their personal

4 capacity, personally? Do you have any information about this?

5 A. No, I don't.

6 Q. Thank you. Now I would just briefly like to say a few words

7 about the methodology that you applied in this report. In English it's

8 page 5, the first paragraph, and in B/C/S, it's page 5, the third

9 paragraph there. You say -- the second sentence in this first paragraph:

10 "Excerpting necessarily entails removing a statement from its

11 immediate context but I have sought to retain or explain as much of each

12 statement's context as possible consistent with the principle of

13 reasonable brevity."

14 We do understand and you explained to us that it would have been

15 a huge report if you had taken everything into account. However, the

16 position of our defence is that such a method does not give a full

17 picture regarding the sessions of the assembly or the decisions passed by

18 this assembly, so we are going to show that to you by resorting to a few

19 examples.

20 First example, a conclusion is based on what is said. If one

21 takes only excerpts -- well, we would need page 24 of this paper of

22 yours, the third paragraph in English. It's the 50th session. The

23 15th and 16th of April, page 33, first paragraph in B/C/S. We see here

24 the words of Mr. Aleksa Buha. This is what he says:

25 "First of all as regards territory, the assembly defined the

Page 15676

1 objectives of this struggle..." it's obvious there is a problem with the

2 page number.

3 A. I think you've given the e-court number and I'm --

4 JUDGE ORIE: It's minus 2 in the English version.

5 MR. LUKIC: Then it's 22nd page.

6 THE WITNESS: So it should be page 31.

7 JUDGE ORIE: So page 22.

8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, 22 in English. Then it's B/C/S 31.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so page 22 in English.

10 MR. LUKIC: Twenty-two in English, yes. Twenty-two in English.

11 JUDGE ORIE: And it's item 49, I take it, you're reading from.

12 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

13 THE WITNESS: Okay.

14 MR. LUKIC: It is page 22, item 49.

15 Q. [Interpretation] So I'll start again:

16 "First of all as regards the territory, the assembly defined the

17 objectives of this struggle in the territorial sense at least globally.

18 However, one deputy said yesterday and another one today that we missed

19 the opportunity of taking Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, et cetera. This, my

20 dear friends, was never the programme of the SDS. I think that this

21 question should not be raised for the single reason that we have not set

22 out to fight a war of conquest but we keep saying that this is a

23 defensive, patriotic defensive war, and secondly that we are not intent

24 on destroying other peoples but want to secure the freedom of our own

25 people on the ethnic territories which are ours."

Page 15677

1 This is this portion, and this is the end of quotation. This is

2 the portion of the contribution and debate. You will agree with me that

3 when you discuss the statements of these other two delegates, criticised

4 by Mr. Buha, had you done that, we would have had a different conclusion

5 and a different impression than the one that we gain by reading what

6 Mr. Buha said.

7 A. Well, I don't know what conclusion or impression that you are

8 referring to in terms of gaining it from Mr. Buha's statement. It seems

9 to me pretty clear that he is opposed to these other two claims and says

10 so very clearly and emphasises that the nature of the war would have been

11 different had we followed their suggestions. So it seems to me it

12 supports the -- much consistency with other statements which emphasise

13 that this is not a war to conquer all of Bosnia in the eyes of the SDS

14 but was in fact limited by certain territorial objectives.

15 Q. Thank you. I'm precisely asking you this: Had we been able to

16 read the statement of these two delegates, had you selected them instead

17 of Mr. Buha, the picture would have been completely different. Am I

18 right?

19 A. Well, it might have been the same if I'd select them in addition

20 to Mr. Buha's. I chose this because it seemed to me that he was the

21 authoritative figure speaking for the SDS here and there were from time

22 to time these delegates who favoured a more aggressive position for the

23 conquest or for the VRS. And the SDS leaders, including Buha, simply

24 knocked them down, rejected those viewpoints. That's what I was trying

25 to capture here and seems to me it's -- it does so. It refers to the

Page 15678

1 other two and then points out that they are excessive.

2 Q. Thank you for this eloquent response but I need to ask you again,

3 since you didn't provide an answer: Had you selected and chosen the

4 statements of these two delegates, and we are talking about the

5 selectiveness of your report, had you chosen these two instead of

6 Aleksa Buha, the reader would have gained a completely different

7 impression and would have had a completely different picture.

8 A. Yes, that's true. If I had selected just those two and not the

9 refutation to it, it would have been different, certainly. It would have

10 been much less representative of what was going on.

11 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Please, may I approach my client?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Only for a short consultation, low volume.

13 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Let us now briefly look at our second objection. Our second

16 objection is that in your report, you first start with a question that

17 was posed by a delegate but you failed to provide an answer to that

18 question. So on page 71 in English in e-court, paragraph 2, which should

19 correspond to page 69 of your hard copy report, it's item 168, and we are

20 talking about the 32nd session held on the 19th and 20th May 1993. In

21 B/C/S, it's page 96, fourth paragraph. I'm going to read it. I'm

22 quoting from item 168 and this is a speech by Ljubo Bosiljcic, and I

23 quote:

24 "My third question is for General Mladic, and I would ask him to

25 answer before the parliament, who commands the military police? As much

Page 15679

1 as I know, it is outside any command. Military policemen can kill a man

2 whenever they want. They can break into apartments whenever they want.

3 They can use violence whenever they want. Military policemen should be

4 under a single command. They should be responsible for their good and

5 bad actions just like other citizens, and military, judicial organs

6 should work in the way civil judiciary organises do."

7 In your report, I did not manage to find the response by

8 Mr. Mladic.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Therefore, can we have in e-court

10 65 ter 02378?

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you repeat the number, please?

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] 02378.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] It's a minutes of the meeting that

15 you are referring to. I did this in a hurry; therefore, I failed to find

16 the B/C/S version. I only have the English one and we need page 89.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Both versions are on the screen.

18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, but I don't know which page it is in B/C/S

19 version.

20 Q. [Interpretation] I'm going to read a portion in the second

21 paragraph which begins with, "Gentlemen." This is a response as

22 recorded, the response given by General Mladic. It's a lengthy one and

23 this is his answer posed by Delegate Bosiljcic, and it is being recorded

24 that General Mladic said the following, and I quote:

25 [In English] "Gentlemen, I am not satisfied with the level of

Page 15680

1 discipline in the army either, nor am I satisfied with the efficiency of

2 judicial authorities or the police."

3 There is some more, but on the next page, 90, there is

4 continuation, more concrete, about different things. But under number

5 sixth it says, and it is the sixth paragraph on this page, it says:

6 "Sixth, a sweeping campaign should be launched to prevent the

7 abuse of the army, military police, and MUP uniforms. Believe me, true

8 soldiers, true members of the MUP, do not do things you have talked

9 about. Believe me that. It is those who put on various uniforms and do

10 all of -- all sorts of trouble. Even some of you brought certain

11 individuals from distance -- from -- it does then distance myself from

12 such dishonest behaviour."

13 Obviously cut short. It was a long answer:

14 "So a broad campaign should be launched to prevent the abuse of

15 army, military police and MUP uniforms. And the president, the assembly

16 and the government should support the campaign. We cannot do it on our

17 own. Please let us eradicate such behaviour. Let us not allow water to

18 become turbid at the source, be it the Main Staff, the corps, or a

19 brigade. It must be clear everywhere that we are serving our people and

20 we can serve them only if we have honour" --

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We need the next page in English.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] The last page, yes, page 91,

23 at the beginning.

24 Q. [Interpretation] Doctor, would you agree that only a

25 comprehensive approach can provide a full picture? It's not enough just

Page 15681

1 to quote a question. One needs to see what kind of answer is given to

2 that question.

3 A. Well, I think I would agree that a comprehensive approach can

4 provide a full picture. And I think this is a fair criticism that you're

5 making. One comes up against simply limitations of mass. You know,

6 I would have to say I think that just about every word that

7 General Mladic and Radovan Karadzic said to the assembly in these

8 sessions is meaningful and ideally would be included in a report such as

9 this. I'm limited or constrained only by the considerations of length

10 and I think the ability of a reader to concentrate on a particular issue,

11 I try to limit one excerpt to one particular issue, but that's not a

12 perfect solution. It's very true. I'm glad that you brought this into

13 evidence to show the very spirited response that he gave to this.

14 Q. Thank you. You spoke about the ideals and objectives of the

15 Bosnian Serb nationalists. Let's move to page 7 in e-court of the

16 English version. I suppose it's page 5 of your paper. In B/C/S, it's

17 the second paragraph on page 8. English is page 7 in the e-court,

18 paragraph 1. Should be the third sentence in that paragraph.

19 [Interpretation] It's recorded here that Slobodan Bijelic said the

20 following: [No interpretation]

21 THE INTERPRETER: We don't have the proper page, interpreter's

22 note.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. For a long time now there has been a conspiracy into reducing the

25 Serbian people into a national minority. We are not talking about now

Page 15682

1 the constitutional issues. Would it be the case that being outvoted, the

2 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina would actually be deprived of their

3 status of a constituent people by applying the principle of one

4 person/one vote? Did you read anything about what the Serbs referred to

5 "minorisation" of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina in that period?

6 A. Yes, I interpret that as essentially what he is saying here is

7 the same thing, and that's why it's part of these excerpts. I'm trying

8 to include those statements which are well expressed that clearly state

9 the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership, and then that can be weighed

10 as to whether it's valid or invalid or -- but at least it's explanatory.

11 It helps explain other parts of their position and the attitude that they

12 were taking toward events at that time.

13 Q. We talked about this conditional approach by the Serbian side in

14 their future actions and now let's look at paragraph 3 on page 7, and

15 page 9 in B/C/S. It reads, "If we are outvoted ..." I'm sorry, the date

16 of the session is 21 November 1991. These are Mr. Krajisnik's words. He

17 says:

18 "If we are outvoted in discussion of national interests to the

19 Serbian people, the will of the Serbian people will be expressed through

20 the decisions of the Assembly of the Serbian People of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

22 We see here the conditional approach and the fear of Serbs in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina of losing their status of a constituent people and

24 that they would have no say whatsoever in Bosnia-Herzegovina any longer.

25 In your research, have you noticed this fear among the Serbs? Do you

Page 15683

1 find it justified, in terms that, by simply being outvoted would amount

2 to the Serbs being deprived of their status of a constituent people in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. My own opinion is it's not justified, but this is, I think, a

5 very precise, concise, accurate statement of exactly what that fear was

6 and what the position of the SDS leadership was and the reason for

7 forming the assembly.

8 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask clarification, whether the fear was

9 justified or not, if you are in a minority politically, would fear to be

10 outvoted, if this has happened before, would that in no way be justified?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, I think some variant of it might be. At this

12 point, the -- at the point that he uttered this, the Serbs had just taken

13 the decisive step of creating their own separate assembly and I think

14 they have excessively focused on the question of outvoting or majority

15 rule as the source of fear for them. I don't think that the -- they had

16 reason to fear the overall political situation as strongly as this

17 statement suggests. That's my personal assessment of it. But

18 I certainly want to, you know, give space for them to express exactly

19 what it was that they opposed and feared.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I'll then ask you the following: You think they had

21 reason to fear the overall political situation. What you say is there

22 was more to fear. Does that in any way undermine any justified fear for

23 a smaller question?

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I guess what I'm saying is I think they are

25 unnecessarily riveted on this single question of constituent peoples,

Page 15684

1 which was a constitutional principle that they believed applied to a

2 whole bunch of areas that it didn't seem to me it applied to, and so they

3 focused on that one issue to express their fears about. I believe the

4 overall situation created less reason for them to be fearful. And in

5 fact, if you look at the negotiations that were following the statements

6 of the 15th of October, you see a much more flexible approach to dealing

7 with the other two parties than you see here.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You say they believed that this constitutional

9 principle "applied to a whole bunch of areas that it didn't seem to me it

10 applied to." Every vote in parliament would not be subject to a risk of

11 being outvoted and to be minority?

12 THE WITNESS: What I mean by that is that this is contested.

13 There were so many undecided factors at this point, as I believe

14 Mr. Krajisnik says in the -- one of these entries, I may have taken it

15 out for this, so aptly describes the situation with the council of

16 national equality which had been provided for in the existing

17 constitution including amendments of 1990 but had never actually been

18 operationalised, established, by the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So

19 these discussions hinge on whether a non-existent body should have

20 provided this protection. I can't get to the bottom of that. My

21 constitutional mind has a difficulty with that one.

22 JUDGE ORIE: If I would respond to that, the more reason for

23 fear, if the protective institutions do not function.

24 THE WITNESS: I understand your position.

25 JUDGE ORIE: It's not my position. I'm just putting questions.

Page 15685

1 Not taking any position.

2 THE WITNESS: And I just think that the -- let's put it this way.

3 Some of this certainly was justified. I think they have overstated the

4 threat in this and overestimated the basis for fear in their own

5 positions and responses to this.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just go back to your initial answer. You

7 were asked about:

8 "In your research, have you noticed this fear among the Serbs?

9 Do you find it justified, in terms that, by ... being outvoted ...,"

10 et cetera.

11 Your answer was:

12 "My opinion is it's not justified."

13 As I now understand that some fear may have been justified but

14 perhaps not at the level they expressed it.

15 THE WITNESS: I would -- yes, that's exactly right.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, we will adjourn for the day. But I would

17 first like to instruct you, Mr. Donia, not to communicate, not to speak

18 or in any other way communicate within about your testimony and we would

19 like to see you back tomorrow morning when we will conclude your

20 testimony. You may follow the usher.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the Chamber, having monitored and having

25 followed the way in which the cross-examination was conducted, gives you