130918IT

Page 16945

1 Examination by Mr. Groome: [Continued]

2 Q. Good morning, General. General, before I begin, I am concerned

3 that at the pace we are going that I may not have time to ask all of the

4 questions in the allotted time that I have.

5 Can I ask you in particular with these next series of questions

6 related to meetings and reports received by the Main Staff to give brief

7 answers. At the end of those questions I'll give you an opportunity to

8 add anything else that you think is relevant for the Chamber to know.

9 Now, yesterday we were talking about the regular daily meeting

10 and there was some confusion about who were the regular attendees at the

11 regular daily meeting. Can I ask you to take the pointer that you were

12 using yesterday. I've asked that the diagram be placed on the easel once

13 again, and can I ask you to point to the people that attended the regular

14 daily meeting?

15 JUDGE ORIE: And could it be turned a bit because the witness

16 explained yesterday that he had difficulties in turning his head.

17 MR. GROOME: Just maybe not quite so much so I can see as well.

18 That's good.

19 Q. Can you please do that now?

20 A. Yes, I can. There were those early morning meetings which were

21 attended by the commander of the Main Staff. All the chiefs of various

22 sectors. And they could bring an assistant to those early morning

23 meetings, or if the commander so decided, the entire Main Staff could

24 meet and that depended on the agenda that was to be discussed, i.e. on

25 the problems in the various theatres of war.

Page 16946

1 Q. Now, if General Mladic was not present in the Main Staff, if he

2 was in the field or he was out of the country, would this meeting still

3 take place?

4 A. Yes. The meetings would still be held even if General Mladic

5 wasn't there. Then I would be in charge. However, sometimes it happened

6 that neither of us were there, when we attended the meetings of the

7 Supreme Command, it would be the most senior chief of sector who would be

8 in charge of the meeting, who would chair the meeting. In any case,

9 those meetings took place every morning and they started approximately at

10 7.00.

11 Q. And just to be clear, who would chair the meeting when

12 General Mladic was in the Main Staff?

13 A. General Mladic chaired the meeting when he was present in the

14 Main Staff.

15 Q. Now, you said that on some occasions it was held more than once a

16 day. Can I ask you to direct your attention to the period of 1992 and

17 can you tell us with what frequency an evening meeting was also held, an

18 evening daily meeting was held?

19 A. Those daily meetings in the evening were held as necessary. They

20 were not mandatory. They didn't happen every day. But they did take

21 place two or three times a week, and they were scheduled if the situation

22 on the front lines so demanded.

23 Q. If we can think hypothetically, if there was a very quiet day

24 where nothing really happened on any battlefield and there were no issues

25 really to be discussed, would the morning daily meeting still take place?

Page 16947

1 A. Yes. Those meetings were always held in the morning. That's

2 when we analysed the plan of work for the previous day or we would

3 discuss the plan of work for the next day. In any case, those meetings

4 were taking place on a regular basis.

5 Q. Were decisions made during these meetings with respect to what

6 orders would be issued to the troops?

7 A. That also did take place. Those meetings were mostly the place

8 where we analysed the regular combat reports sent by the units for the

9 previous day. Then the commander decided who should be helped, who

10 should be assisted, which of the decisions had to be redrafted. In any

11 case, those meetings were held regularly.

12 Q. My final question on these meetings: Can you give us some sense

13 as to who were the primary speakers at these meetings, if there were

14 primary speakers?

15 A. Well, when he called the meeting to order, the commander actually

16 introduced the issues that were to be discussed. I was the first

17 speaker, as the Chief of Staff. I gave my assessment of the situation.

18 My conclusions, after the assessment of the situation. I also submitted

19 my proposals to the commander as to how to deal with certain issues and

20 then the other assistants to the commander voiced their objections to my

21 assessment or to my proposals. Then they added their own proposals or

22 something of the sort, and when that discussion was over, the commander

23 would make his decision and he would then issue tasks and orders.

24 Q. Now I want to turn your attention now to weekly reporting

25 meetings for the next few minutes. My first question is: When and where

Page 16948

1 were these meetings held?

2 A. Such meetings were held in the operations centre of the Main

3 Staff. That was the biggest room in those prefabricated buildings. It

4 could hold up to 30 people. As for the last part of your question, you

5 lost me. I didn't understand it.

6 Q. When were these meetings typically held? Was there a particular

7 day of the week or --

8 A. It would be at the end of the week, either on Fridays or on

9 Saturdays. What we did, first we lined up the working maps of the corps

10 commands with the map of the Main Staff. I would do that on the eve of

11 the meeting and then I would tell the commander whether there were any

12 discrepancies between the working map that was maintained by the corps

13 command and the map that was maintained by the operations administration

14 of the Main Staff.

15 We often looked at the corps map based on their reports, and they

16 did the same based on the reports of their subordinate units. There are

17 often discrepancies in that exercise. When that is discovered, we then

18 invite the corps commander to the Main Staff in the course of the week so

19 there could be an alignment of the maps, so that all of the maps that we

20 worked with depicted the same situation across the entire theatre of war.

21 Q. These weekly reporting meetings, who regularly attended these

22 meetings?

23 Or, perhaps can I ask the question a little bit differently? Did

24 all of the people who attended the regular daily meeting also attend the

25 weekly reporting meeting?

Page 16949

1 A. We usually called our weekly meetings as briefings, and the same

2 persons attended as the persons who attended the morning meetings, plus

3 the entire operations administration, from the staff sector, as well as

4 the chiefs of the other sectors in the Main Staff, who also decided who

5 they would bring along among their assistants.

6 They had their subsectors and those would usually be the chiefs

7 of the subsector. For example, there was the personnel administration,

8 the mobilisation administration, and the chief of that sector could bring

9 all of his three assistants, who were in charge of the respective

10 subsectors. And as I told you, the operative administration attended

11 those briefings in their complete composition.

12 Q. And was the agenda for this meeting different in any way from the

13 daily meeting, and if so, can you describe the difference?

14 A. The agenda for those weekly meetings or briefings were drafted --

15 was drafted by the commander of the Main Staff and he would convey the

16 agenda to me on the eve of the meeting and then I would communicate the

17 most interesting points to the chiefs of sectors.

18 All of us prepared the reports that had to do with the work of

19 our own sector. When the commander started the briefing, he would invite

20 me first to give the assessment of the situation on the front line, and

21 to give my proposal for the use of the military or parts thereof. And

22 then if each chief of sector reported on his own sector as to what was

23 done in the course of the week, what is supposed to be done during the

24 next week, a discussion follows, and such meetings, such briefings

25 usually lasted for an hour and a half to two hours tops.

Page 16950

1 Q. Were -- at this meeting, were -- or this briefing, as you

2 describe it, were decisions taken and orders issued?

3 A. Yes. At the end of the briefing, the commander usually stood up

4 behind his desk and he would then say, "Tasks," upon the proposal of the

5 Chief of Staff. And then he added something of his own, something that

6 he had already came up with earlier.

7 At the end of the briefing, there would be seven, eight,

8 sometimes ten tasks given by the commander. However, if a plan for a

9 future operation was discussed at the briefing, then in addition to the

10 tasks that the commander gave to the staff, the commander would also

11 issue a decision on the use of the military based on the proposal tabled

12 by his assistants. He would then say, "I decided" and then he would say

13 what he decided. And then he would say whoever is opposed or -- whatever

14 was said during this discussion would then become moot because we would

15 all have to focus on the commander's decision and we would all have to

16 follow through.

17 Q. Now, can I ask you, can you give us a sense of whether Mladic's

18 subordinates would have felt able to have engaged in a significant

19 military operation, absent his decision or his order, with respect to

20 that specific operation?

21 A. No. I was the only one who could do that, if General Mladic was

22 not anywhere in the theatre or if he was not in Republika Srpska at all.

23 Q. Now, if General Mladic was unable to attend either the daily

24 meeting or the weekly briefing because he was away from the Main Staff,

25 would he be briefed at some point about the discussions and the decisions

Page 16951

1 taken by you at those meetings and briefings?

2 A. Yes. Immediately after the two of us met. Even if we had

3 communicated another means of communications, I would inform him about

4 the contents of the briefing, on what I had decided as his deputy. He

5 would then either give it a thought or not, he would accept some of the

6 things, he would reject some of the things. He would comport himself as

7 a true commander. He would usually accept my decisions but he would

8 always have something to add to them.

9 Q. Can I now ask you whether there was a briefing or meeting

10 referred to as a monthly reporting meeting?

11 A. Yes. It would be the last meeting of the week, because it was

12 longer than the others, since the analysis of activities of the military

13 were done for the whole month. It wasn't necessarily scheduled monthly

14 but usually at the end of the week and it amounted to analysing the

15 month's work. It did make part of the overall work plan of the

16 Main Staff, monthly work plan, that is.

17 Q. Who regularly attended these meetings? And again could I ask

18 you, did all of the people who attend the daily meeting, did they also

19 attend this monthly meeting?

20 A. The monthly meetings were usually attended by all those members

21 of the Main Staff who were present, whoever was on the location.

22 Occasionally some of them were in some subordinate units and in different

23 theatres. So there was no classification per se. Whoever was present

24 attended the meeting, including the commander and chiefs of sectors,

25 their assistants, desk officers, everyone save for the stenographers.

Page 16952

1 Q. At this monthly meeting, did corps commanders also attend?

2 A. Not always, but when the Main Staff and the commander of the

3 Main Staff made key decisions on the implementation of an operation,

4 which touched upon one of the six strategic goals, we did so as part of

5 the collegium -- commander's collegium meetings which included all of his

6 assistants, that is to say all chiefs of sectors. And we regularly

7 scheduled extended collegium meetings and it was the corps commanders who

8 were supposed to attend such meetings to be present when the commander

9 made decisions. That type of meetings was referred to as the commander's

10 collegium.

11 Q. I just want to make sure that I understand your evidence. There

12 were two additional meetings that were held on an ad hoc basis and these

13 were called the collegium of the commander of the Main Staff, and there

14 was also an extended version of this which had additional people attend?

15 Did I understand you correctly?

16 A. Yes. Yet there was another type of meeting, which was the

17 personnel council session. In addition to the commanders' assistants, we

18 could also summon the subordinate corps commanders.

19 Q. And what was the typical agenda at this council of commanders,

20 I think is what you've termed this. What was the typical agenda at this

21 meeting?

22 A. At such personnel council meetings, personnel policy was

23 discussed most frequently, such as the appointment of commanders, the

24 appointment of certain assistants of the commander, if there were any

25 changes in the Main Staff. Then promotion or awarding ranks to officers,

Page 16953

1 implementation of stimulative measures, so to say, such as commendations,

2 awards and so on. And anything that had to do with individual officers

3 in the VRS. The corps commanders forwarded their proposals on promotion

4 or measures of discipline, and such matters were always discussed at

5 personnel council meetings of the Main Staff commander.

6 Q. So, do I understand you correctly that this would have been a

7 venue in which disciplinary matters would have been discussed?

8 A. No. It was the kind of forum where personnel matters were

9 discussed. Personnel policy was implemented through this council as

10 envisaged by the commander of the Main Staff.

11 Q. If there had been an allegation that an officer had engaged in

12 some improper conduct, was there a venue in which that matter would be

13 discussed?

14 A. I did not see that during the war because disciplinary procedures

15 were in the hands of commanders of units. They were supposed to be in

16 charge of disciplining their ranks. Breaches of discipline can be

17 forwarded by subordinate commanders to the competent military courts of

18 their region, and it could so happen that the military court would return

19 the file to the commander, as their estimate is that no procedure ought

20 to be initiated. In that case, the commander in question can discipline

21 a soldier up to the level of a short prison sentence, since the state

22 of -- since the state of war was never declared, we still worked under

23 peacetime regulations.

24 Q. Now, if I can return to the collegium of the commander --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, if would you allow me to ask

Page 16954

1 clarification of part of one of your previous answers. You said the

2 corps commanders forwarded their proposals on promotion or measures of

3 discipline and such matters were always discussed at personnel council

4 meetings of the Main Staff commander.

5 On the following questions you said, more or less, that this was

6 -- discipline was not discussed. Could you give examples of the measures

7 of discipline you said were always discussed at the personnel council

8 meetings?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think I misspoke

10 when I said measures of discipline. The Main Staff commander did not

11 decide on how to discipline a subordinate, because there were regulations

12 in place for that. It was well known. A company commander may

13 discipline a soldier or a subordinate officer, and could apply certain

14 measures. The battalion commander could give seven days prison sentence

15 and then the prison sentence went up the higher the level was. So I

16 believe I misspoke when I mentioned disciplinary measures.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And did you intend to refer to something else?

18 Or was it just that you said promotion and then discipline was a total

19 mistake? Or did you intend to refer to something else?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I wanted to mention, and

21 perhaps this is what I meant when I said disciplinary measures. For

22 example, the commander's collegium decided on removals of individual

23 commanders, upon proposals of the subordinate commands. For example, a

24 corps commander requested or asked that a brigade commander from his

25 corps be removed. It is still a kind of disciplinary measure because

Page 16955

1 it's a forceful removal. Someone was not doing their job properly and

2 the brigade commander wanted that person removed. So it is a kind of

3 punishment. That's what I had in mind. But I did misspeak when I said

4 disciplinary measures.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

6 MR. GROOME:

7 Q. I have a very brief question with respect to the collegium of the

8 commander, both the normal and extended version of these meetings.

9 During these meetings, would General Mladic take decisions about how

10 operations were to proceed and to give orders?

11 A. The commander's collegium had a very strict purpose. The

12 commander or the Main Staff through mutual daily or weekly consultations

13 and briefings, reached certain conclusions. For example, an operation

14 had to be carried out in order to improve the position of the armed

15 forces in Republika Srpska.

16 For example, in Operation Lukavac 93 the goal was to connect

17 Herzegovina with the rest of Republika Srpska. The commander and

18 I always had a thorough discussion in the woods nearby and then we would

19 conclude that the collegium had to meet and at such collegium meetings

20 the commander would state his goal that he wanted to achieve by summoning

21 the people there. We always, or occasionally, called the corps

22 commanders as well in the extended version.

23 Since Lukavac 93 was to be carried out in the area of the

24 Herzegovina, Sarajevo and Drina Corps, we also invited the other corps

25 commanders so that the commander would put his idea to them, his general

Page 16956

1 concept of the operation. As well as what he needs for that. And the

2 other corps commanders not participating in the operation were there to

3 listen. In this operation specifically it was so decided that the 1st

4 Corps would lend two brigades, the 2nd Corps would lend one brigade and

5 in the Drina Corps, a separate so-called combined Drina Brigade was

6 supposed to be set up.

7 So we would put the corps commanders in a position to participate

8 in the process of decision making. The Main Staff can think up anything,

9 but if General Grubac, the commander of the Drina Corps, says, I can't do

10 that, it boils down to nothing. Then of course he had to explain why he

11 couldn't do it. That was the goal of the extended collegium meetings.

12 Every collegium meeting had a particular topic on its agenda, a

13 theme. It wasn't like we -- that we discussed just about anything that

14 was discussed at daily meetings but we dealt only with very specific

15 topics, assisting the commander in reaching the best decision.

16 Q. Now, after this rather detailed discussion that was held at these

17 collegiums, would, in fact, General Mladic then take his decision and

18 issue orders along the lines of the decision?

19 A. There were two possibilities. First, General Mladic could do it

20 immediately, at the meeting of the collegium. Thus concluding the

21 meeting. But General Mladic was no robot. He would usually take time.

22 He would say, "We now conclude this meeting, I will make my final

23 decision tomorrow. This part of the meeting is finished. And a decision

24 is to follow" at this and that time. So he needed time to analyse the

25 proposals of all subordinates including the corps commanders, in order to

Page 16957

1 come up with a vision of his own.

2 Usually, all decisions pertaining to collegium meetings were made

3 the day later because it were -- they were serious matters and

4 comprehensive operations which required time. In the meantime he would

5 even consult, perhaps, one of the assistants or corps commanders before

6 reaching his decision. It could happen that a decision was made

7 immediately but usually it was prolonged until he made a final decision

8 when he would take the time necessary.

9 Q. Now, General, you've spoken about these several different

10 meetings. My last question with respect to these meetings is the

11 following. Can I ask you to explain to the Chamber your understanding of

12 how these meetings contributed to good command and control over the VRS

13 army?

14 A. First of all, the commander would be given an opportunity to hear

15 who thought what at such meetings, and then he would reach a conclusion

16 of his own as to who was wrong or who was right. He would also take into

17 account the different traits of his subordinates. He also took into

18 account - he actually had to take into account - our positions, our

19 thoughts.

20 Commanders are usually abrupt, and Mladic, for himself, would

21 usually say that he's easily jump started. But it was important that

22 such meetings are not concluded with people being dissatisfied. Those

23 whose proposals were not accepted were usually given an explanation why,

24 either it collided with the situation in the field or in collision with

25 the proposals of other commanders and so on and so forth.

Page 16958

1 We had some radical proposals of individual corps commanders,

2 which could simply not be accepted, and it would then be explained to

3 them why it could not be accepted.

4 Q. Now, General, I want to now move to the topic of reports and

5 I want to deal with written reports separately from oral reports. Now,

6 yesterday, you said that on the 12th of May, you began to receive combat

7 reports. So my first question to you in this regard is: Can you explain

8 what a daily combat report is?

9 A. Daily, or actually regular daily combat reports had to be sent by

10 every subordinate command before 8.00 p.m. That is to say, between 6 and

11 8.00 p.m. Such reports had to be forwarded to the Main Staff for the

12 last day in written form.

13 The contents of such reports were prescribed by regulation.

14 First, it contained enemy information, in other words what the enemy did

15 that day, did it attack, defend, make incursions. So overall enemy

16 activities during the day.

17 Item number 2: What he or his corps did that day. Attacked,

18 defended. So the same thing as the enemy.

19 Item 3, which we added later on, included information on adjacent

20 units, our neighbouring units. But that is how we controlled the corps

21 commands in terms of their ability to monitor the situation in the

22 theatre. If the commander of the Herzegovina Corps reported that the

23 enemy attacked the Vis feature in Srecko Polje, for example, the staff

24 sector would refer to the East Bosnia Corps commander's report to see

25 whether that piece of information would be found there, about the attack

Page 16959

1 on Vis, because it was on the border between the Drina and the East

2 Bosnia Corps. If in the East Bosnia Corps commander's report it is found

3 to be missing, it means that one of the corps commanders is not following

4 the situation. Or that General Simic, commander of the East Bosnia

5 Corps, was unaware of the attack on the Drina Corps. Or the Drina Corps

6 commander blew things out of proportion. And then the next day, teams

7 would be set up at the Main Staff to go to the location to see who was

8 right. So we made the corps commanders responsible for monitoring not

9 only their activities but those of their neighbouring units.

10 The next item, item 4, was the corps commander's decision for the

11 next day, that is to say what was to be done the next day.

12 Then we have an item on logistics supply, and first we would

13 always have the losses, the killed and wounded during the day, the sick.

14 That item was usually the most comprehensive one because it included

15 commanders' requests for materiel for the corps.

16 Then if there was anything in terms of morale and policy to be

17 discussed, and the item following that, it could be skipped if there were

18 no problems during the day.

19 The next item was security issues, say something was stolen,

20 there was a fight between soldiers, there were deserters and so on and so

21 forth.

22 Lastly, command and communications. Usually the commander would

23 say, the corps commander would say: The command post, unchanged. Or a

24 forward command post was established at this and that location. I can

25 add by saying that the corps commanders could not relocate their command

Page 16960

1 posts without an approval from the Main Staff commander. Forward command

2 posts, on the other hand, could be designated by themselves alone in

3 order to assist their units, but they had had to keep the Main Staff

4 informed.

5 So such were reports of subordinate units to the Main Staff.

6 However, this doesn't conclude the story of daily reporting.

7 Since in the armed forces, there is a separate term which

8 specifies that reports have to be sent as from 6.00 p.m., meaning by

9 6.00 p.m. they should have received reports from their subordinates,

10 brigade commanders.

11 Brigade commanders had to assemble their information based on

12 their battalion commanders' reports received previously. Battalion

13 commanders had to tour the positions of their company commanders.

14 So to cut things short, the process of reporting on the situation

15 at the front lines began early in the afternoon and then from the

16 battalion to the brigade, from the brigade to the corps, from the corps

17 to the Main Staff. It would all take about three hours. We were

18 supposed to receive reports before 8.00 p.m.

19 From 3.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. we have five hours during which the

20 commanders were duty-bound to report to their commander and to the Main

21 Staff by phone, by protected line, that I mentioned yesterday. They

22 would have to report that there were no significant changes in the

23 meantime or that there were changes, and they had to be specific.

24 However, they usually declined to speak openly on telephone lines and

25 they would say, it is included in the report.

Page 16961

1 So in terms of the meeting, the next morning, at 7.00 a.m., by

2 that time we would have the reports of all subordinate commands. So this

3 concludes the story of the subordinates' report.

4 The Main Staff had an obligation, by midnight, to forward a

5 regular combat report to the Supreme Command. A person was designated in

6 the operations administration who was in charge of it. At first, it was

7 the position of the Supreme Command to have such reports signed by the

8 commander, but it proved to be too much of a burden because otherwise he

9 wouldn't be able to go to bed before 11.00 or midnight on any day. Thus,

10 that obligation was delegated to the Chief of Staff. And that is how we

11 were approached by our subordinate units as well.

12 So Karadzic would receive our regular combat report by midnight

13 at the latest.

14 Now as for the procedure of the Supreme Command and who studied

15 those reports and received them, it was their own business. The Supreme

16 Commander would probably receive information from that report the next

17 day. And if he had a request for clarification, or an order of his own,

18 he would announce it by phone to the commander of the Main Staff or to

19 me, if General Mladic was absent, and then further measures were taken.

20 So those are the two basic ways of reporting.

21 I'd rather not discuss interim reports because I have included

22 such possibilities in the description.

23 There was another way commanders could report. It was in the

24 morning before our meeting, before -- between 6.00 and 7.00 a.m. By

25 phone they could report whether there were any changes during the night

Page 16962

1 in their sector of the front or not.

2 Since no one of the three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina engaged in

3 frequent night-time operations, usually there weren't such problems.

4 There were of course incursions by sabotage groups occasionally but that

5 could happen on any given side.

6 Q. General, thank you for that detailed explanation. We have two

7 minutes before the break. I'd like to ask you some very specific

8 questions and if possible could you answer in a "yes" or "no" answer.

9 You gave a description of the format of the report, the corps report to

10 the Main Staff. So my question now is: Did the reports from battalion

11 to brigade and brigade to corps, did they also follow the same format?

12 Did they have similar information that you've described?

13 A. Exactly the same. It's just that their contents were smaller in

14 terms of text size.

15 Q. What time of day would a battalion be responsible for having sent

16 the report to the brigade? Can you just give us the time of day?

17 A. Sometime in the afternoon, between 4.00 and 5.00 p.m.

18 Q. What time of day did the brigade have the responsibility to send

19 its report to its -- their superiors in the corps?

20 A. An hour later, so between 5.00 and 6.00 p.m.

21 Q. And finally the corps to the Main Staff?

22 A. I said that it was between 6.00 and 7.00.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Between 6.00 and

24 8.00 p.m.

25 MR. GROOME: Thank you. Your Honour, would that be a convenient

Page 16963

1 place to break?

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but I would have one additional question before

3 we take that break.

4 You explained to us the reporting at the end of the day to the

5 Supreme Command. And you said, I read from your testimony:

6 "At first it was the position of the Supreme Command to have such

7 reports signed by the commander but it proved to be too much of a burden

8 because otherwise he wouldn't be able to go to bed before 11.00 or

9 midnight on any day."

10 First of all, I understood your reference to signed by the

11 commander to be signed by Mr. Mladic. Is that correctly understood?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That's how things were, to

13 begin with.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Now, even if General Mladic did not sign that report

15 to the Supreme Command on every day, would he still be aware of the

16 content of what was reported to the Supreme Command?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. As I've already told you

18 once, whenever there were any changes or whenever there were developments

19 in the military, I would report to him on the -- and them as soon as

20 I met him. Those reports that I sent to the Supreme Command would end up

21 on his desk, as well as the reports by the subordinate commands, if it

22 was my assessment that he should be put in the picture. I didn't send

23 him all of the reports because he would have ended up with piles of

24 paper. I made a selection and I only sent him those things that

25 I thought that he should be aware of.

Page 16964

1 JUDGE ORIE: But anything that was reported to the Supreme

2 Command, the events on which -- the developments on which reports were

3 based, were known to General Mladic on the basis of the meetings,

4 discussions, communications, whatever, on the day preceding the sending

5 of the late-evening report to the Supreme Command; is that how it went?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not necessarily. It wasn't always

7 so. For example if General Mladic was not in the Main Staff, if he was

8 not in his command post, the staff would continue to function as if he

9 had been there. However, I could not wait for General Mladic to return

10 for him to look at the report, to sign it, and to send it to the Supreme

11 Command. It had to be there by midnight. If General Mladic turned up in

12 the morning, during the regular meeting, he and the entire staff would be

13 informed about the reports that had arrived from the units and what the

14 Supreme Command received as our report. If in the meantime, after the

15 morning meeting and before the ad hoc evening meeting, there were some

16 discrepancies or changes, we would discuss things either in my office or

17 in his office. So he was kept abreast of all the developments.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer.

19 We will take a break. Could the witness be escorted out of the

20 courtroom.

21 [The witness stands down]

22 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at five minutes to 11.00.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

25 JUDGE ORIE: The witness will be escorted into the courtroom.

Page 16965

1 Could I meanwhile seek from the Defence further information about

2 whether they identified the famous 11 lines in relation to the 14th

3 Rule 92 bis motion?

4 MR. LUKIC: You said that you seek information from us? But it's

5 the Prosecution motion to include those 11 lines.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 MR. LUKIC: I think yesterday I said we do not object.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Then I have missed that. I apologise for that.

9 Then we add those -- those 11 lines can be added to the selected portion

10 of the material submitted. I don't know whether that's already uploaded

11 in its new version.

12 MR. GROOME: I'll verify that, Your Honour, and perhaps at the

13 next break we can report on it.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so the court officer can include it. The court

15 officer is instructed to do so so that the portions become part of the

16 exhibit and I think a number still has to be assigned to it as well.

17 [The witness takes the stand]

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, if you're ready to continue, you may

19 proceed.

20 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. General, I have a few very specific questions about the reports.

22 My first question is: Did the commanders of VRS battalions, brigades and

23 corps have the discretion to not file a daily report if, let's say,

24 nothing happened on a particular day?

25 A. No. They didn't have that discretion. They had to submit a

Page 16966

1 report. Even if all they had to say in it was, "No changes," which was

2 very often the case.

3 Q. Now, if I can draw you to what you refer to as item 4, can I ask

4 you to explain, in a little more detail, what was item 4 in a daily

5 combat report that the corps sent to the Main Staff?

6 A. That was the corps commander's decision on future activities and

7 actions. Usually that item stated that the corps would proceed pursuant

8 to a previous decision. If there was a new decision, then its contents

9 would be forwarded. For example, I decided that tomorrow I would launch

10 an attack on location A, and I gave that order to my units.

11 So this is where the corps commander actually drafts his idea,

12 his plan. And those of us from the staff sector who studied those

13 reports would first assess whether the decision was correct, whether it

14 was doable. And before the morning meeting, or if there was something

15 urgent in that report, I would do it immediately, i.e. by -- either by

16 telephone or I would go to him. I would inform had him that the corps

17 commander decided on something, but his decision was wrong because he was

18 supposed to change either the target or the procedure or the composition

19 of the units that would be engaged, and then the commander would usually

20 respond by saying this: "Tell him, in your telephone communication after

21 2000 hours, that his decision was accepted," or "rejected," if it was

22 rejected. But a sentence would follow after that: "In the course of the

23 night you would receive our decision," the decision of the Main Staff,

24 that is. And then in the course of that night, that had to be done, an

25 excerpt from a combat order or a combat command had to be issued to

Page 16967

1 change that decision and that would be communicated in a written form to

2 the corps commander that issued the wrong decision in the first place.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask to you slow down a bit? Because I feel

4 that the interpreters had difficulties in following your speed of speech.

5 Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

6 MR. GROOME:

7 Q. General, I want to clarify something you've just said. You --

8 the record records you as saying that the commander would usually respond

9 by saying this: "Tell him in your telephone communication after

10 2000 hours that his decision was accepted or rejected." My simple

11 question for you is, when you say "the commander," are you referring to

12 General Mladic?

13 A. Yes, because the commander was the only person who was authorised

14 to alter the decisions previously made by his subordinates.

15 Q. Now, if I can now move to the oral reports. So earlier today you

16 gave evidence that there would be a telephone communication, I believe

17 you said around 20 -- around 8.00 in the evening and also at 6.00 to 7.00

18 in the morning and the primary purpose of this was to update the main

19 command on whether there had been any change in the situation. Did I

20 understand you correctly?

21 A. Yes. That's more or less correct. And I was talking about any

22 changes that may have occurred during the night, for example whether he

23 came under attack or he attacked, which was rare. We're mostly talking

24 about the activities that happened during the night and concern the

25 infiltration of terrorist and sabotage units from the other side.

Page 16968

1 Q. Now, when you said that Mladic would instruct that the corps

2 commander's decision in item 4 be affirmed or amended, in a telephone

3 call, would that happen typically in this 8.00 p.m. phone call that -- or

4 this oral report?

5 A. Sir, first of all, let me tell you this: When you start

6 speaking, the sound is so loud at first that I get confused at first.

7 Later on, the loudness is reduced but when you first start speaking it's

8 too loud. And as far as your question is concerned, that would usually

9 be communicated in that telephone conversation that we had after

10 2000 hours and that would usually be communicated by the commander, if he

11 was at the Main Staff.

12 In the conversation in the morning, before the meeting started,

13 if there had been any alterations to the corps commander's decision he

14 would usually tell us this: I received your written decision and I am

15 proceeding pursuant to this. And in the evening, in the written report,

16 he would be duty-bound to include that amendment or alteration in his

17 report. Or if there had been any changes on the front line during the

18 night, irrespective of the fact that he communicated those changes to us

19 over the phone, he had to include those changes in his daily combat

20 report for that day. Had he not done that, that would not have -- those

21 changes would not have been recorded. Again --

22 Q. Regarding the level of my voice, I'm standing back from the

23 microphone now. If you still experience that loud noise, please let us

24 know and we'll try to adjust the equipment, okay?

25 This process that you're describing now, is this the way that the

Page 16969

1 Main Staff was able to verify whether its instructions were given --

2 whether the instructions that were given were indeed followed by the

3 corps?

4 A. The first measure of checking whether the corps commander took

5 those changes into account would be his regular combat report that he

6 submitted in the evening, because he was duty-bound to tell us how he

7 proceeded pursuant to the alterations introduced by the commander of the

8 Main Staff.

9 Q. Who would typically answer the phone and receive these oral

10 updates in the evening and in the morning?

11 A. In the morning, it would be corps commanders, who called the

12 commander of the Main Staff. If the commander of the Main Staff wasn't

13 there, they would call me. And the same was true of the evening calls.

14 However, if I was the one who answered, if General Mladic was not at the

15 Main Staff and they learned that, I don't know how they learned that, it

16 would be the chiefs of staff who would call me.

17 In any case, what concerned me most was for anybody from the

18 corps command to report to me because the commander himself could be

19 absent, so whoever contacted me, be it the chief or the duty operations

20 officer, who was privy to the situation in the corps, it was all okay, as

21 long as somebody called me.

22 Q. My final question with respect to these reports is the following:

23 You've told us in some detail the types of information that was

24 communicated through these reports; I'm asking you now, was one of the

25 pieces of information in these reports the amount of munitions that were

Page 16970

1 used by a corps, the amount of bullets, the amount of artillery shells?

2 Was that information that was reported to the Main Staff in these daily

3 combat reports?

4 A. When it comes to the daily combat reports, they were not

5 duty-bound to do that because our subordinate commanders of various corps

6 would submit to us an analysis of the operation once the operation was

7 completed, and there they included the consumption of ammunition, fuel

8 and so on and so forth.

9 However, what they were supposed to do was to ask for assistance

10 in materiel and equipment, and they had to specify what kind of bullets,

11 shells, and other ammunition they needed. They also specified the

12 quantity of fuel. They never skipped that. And if they said that they

13 needed 1 million rounds, 7.62, then we would conclude that it was about

14 one half of that quantity that he probably used in the course of the

15 previous day.

16 Q. Would the Main Staff have been aware of the quantity of artillery

17 shells that were being used by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

18 A. Not always. From time to time, we did seek reports or when they

19 submitted their monthly analytical reports, they would also specify that.

20 They would give us the quantities. And your officers saw schematic of

21 the ammunition that was available in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that was

22 stitched to the working map. However, when it comes to the ammunition,

23 the available quantities and the consumption of the ammunition was

24 something that the technical service from the logistics sector dealt

25 with. So whenever the commander had to know the available quantities or

Page 16971

1 the consumed quantities over a period of time, he would receive that via

2 General Djukic who was the chief of the logistics sector.

3 Q. Now, my final question before we move on from this topic: Can

4 you say a few sentences about how this regime of meetings plus this

5 regime of reports, supported command and control over the VRS troops?

6 A. Yesterday I spoke about the command function in the VRS and

7 I told you that it is based on several principles. The first principle

8 was continuity which means that the command was a continuous exercise.

9 The second principle was centralisation, which means from the top to the

10 bottom, from the Supreme Command across the Main Staff to the corps

11 commands.

12 And the following principle was the so-called command

13 relationship between the superior and the subordinate, or a senior and

14 the junior. The most prevalent principle was the relationship between

15 the superior and the subordinate. For example, General Talic was a

16 Lieutenant-Colonel, and I was his junior. However, according to the

17 principle of the military subordination Talic was not allowed to give me

18 orders or to decide not to carry out my orders if the commander of the

19 Main Staff was not there.

20 In that command relationship, there was a formal relationship and

21 a personal relationship. The formal relationship is what we saw on the

22 schematic that was before us just a while ago, and that was about the

23 chain of subordination or the chain of command, and the personal

24 relationship or the personnel relationship is a relationship within an

25 institution, within a command, within a staff. It is a personal

Page 16972

1 relationship between General Mladic and myself, General Mladic and the

2 other individual chiefs of sectors. The relationship between

3 General Mladic and each of the corps commanders. This would be the

4 personal relationship which reflects how much we respect each other, how

5 much we value each other, and to what extent we adopt the following

6 principle, and that is the principle of military subordination.

7 Let me go back to the part of the sentence where I said that

8 everything goes from the top to the bottom when it comes to command.

9 When it comes to reporting, it's just the other way around, from the

10 bottom to the top of the chain.

11 Q. General, during the existence of the VRS, from the 12th of May

12 until the end of the war, was there any period of time which, in your

13 view, the command and control structure, that you've described for us

14 over the last two days, did not function as intended?

15 A. There was a period during the final operations undertaken by the

16 VRS, i.e. during the Croatian Operation Storm in the western front. The

17 Supreme Command, i.e. the Supreme Commander, was giving me direct orders

18 in Drvar, either by sending me telegrams or by calling me. All the

19 orders that I received from him were forwarded by myself to

20 General Mladic. And I waited for his position because General Mladic was

21 my immediate superior. I warned Karadzic several times that what he was

22 doing, that that way of issuing orders, was a waste of time because every

23 time I received an order, I had to forward it to Mladic and then

24 General Mladic would respond. Usually he would say "execute" but I would

25 never proceed without General Mladic's opinion. And sometimes it took

Page 16973

1 24 hours for an order to be executed. I told you that I had warned the

2 Supreme Commander about the waste of time that that constituted and that

3 that was also a violation of military subordination. Sometimes he would

4 justify his acts by saying that General Mladic was too busy and that he

5 wanted to do it in his own way, to make a shortcut.

6 General Mladic and I did what we thought we should do. I.e.,

7 I always sought General Mladic's approval before I proceeded. If not his

8 approval, I at least wanted to make sure that General Mladic was abreast

9 of the situation. As far as the relationship in the VRS, from the

10 commander of the Main Staff to the commander of a squad in a corps, that

11 system of military subordination, or the system of issuing and receiving

12 orders, was never changed.

13 Q. Now, General, I want to change topics and I want to show you two

14 directives, military directives. Before I do that, can I ask you to tell

15 us, in theoretical terms, what is the purpose -- what is a military

16 directive and what is its purpose?

17 A. You started your question really good. What is a military

18 doctrine, you said. A directive is --

19 JUDGE ORIE: You are translated to have said, what is a military

20 doctrine. I didn't hear that to be part of your question. It was

21 military directive, which Mr. Groome was referring to. I don't know

22 where the possible translation problem is but --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether there was a

24 translation problem. However, Mr. Groome started by saying, doctrine but

25 then he changed his mind. Instead of finishing by saying doctrine he

Page 16974

1 changed his mind and said a directive. However, I think I understood his

2 question.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please answer it.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A doctrine -- or rather a directive

5 in wartime, is the highest form of doctrinally ordering or directing the

6 activities of any military including ours. Directives mean that there is

7 a turning point in the way war is run. Either in one part of the theatre

8 of war or the whole theatre of war. In principle, a directive is issued

9 by the political board -- body that conducts a war. This means that

10 something is changed in the warfare policy, in the warfare objectives, or

11 something is changed in terms of temporal determinants.

12 I told you it was customary for the Supreme Command as a

13 political authority to issue such directives. However, during my

14 proofing I also told you that our Supreme Command, i.e. the

15 Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska, did not have enough personnel

16 and it didn't have personnel who was educated to draft such documents.

17 So more often than not, that would be the task of the Main Staff. The

18 staff sector had to do that more often than not.

19 The first version would be then sent to the Supreme Command for

20 their opinion and alterations. Such an altered version would be returned

21 to the Main Staff for the final processing. When it was finally

22 processed, it would be sent to the Supreme Commander for his approval and

23 signature. Sometimes the Supreme Commander could, if a directive such as

24 was directive number 4 -- constituted a military turning point in the

25 system of conducting a war, then he could --

Page 16975

1 Q. General, if I can interrupt you there, I think it looks like

2 you're beginning to tell us about directive 4 so I'm going to call that

3 to the screen so everyone can see that document.

4 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that 65 ter 709 be brought to the

5 screens before us. It is entitled, "Directive for further operations of

6 the Army of Republika Srpska" dated 19 November 1992, drafted by

7 Major General Manojlo Milovanovic. I note for the Chamber's reference

8 that a teleprinter version of this document is already in evidence as

9 P1968.

10 Q. General, once you can see this, the first page of this document

11 on the screen, can I ask you, is this the document that you've just

12 referred to?

13 A. Yes. This is the document that I had in mind but I did not

14 intend to analyse it. I just wanted to offer it by way of example. As

15 to when it was the commander of the Main Staff who could actually sign a

16 directive. This directive was drafted over a space of several days. The

17 staff method was used. On the 10th of November, I told the

18 Supreme Commander that we were working on that directive. We discussed

19 some other army issues, and I told him that he would soon receive the

20 directive number 4, and I asked him to look at it urgently. I wanted the

21 Supreme Command to analyse it and sign it. He received the directive a

22 few days later, a few days after the 10th of November. We even met on

23 the 11th of November and he ordered me to wait for him in Han Pijesak.

24 He was en route to somewhere in the north. And then we travelled in his

25 car to Vlasenica and we discussed some military matters including this

Page 16976

1 particular directive. The directive was indeed sent to him. However,

2 one or two days later, the vice-president, Koljevic called us and told us

3 that the Supreme Command adopted a directive, but since the directive

4 contained very precise military matters, that the directive should also

5 be signed by the commander of the Main Staff, and that's what was done.

6 I told you that it was a political authority that issued the directive.

7 In our case it was the Supreme Command. There were such -- there were

8 exceptions, such was this directive, that were -- were also signed by the

9 commander of the Main Staff. That was my intention when I mentioned this

10 directive number 4.

11 Q. Okay. You're talking about the document being signed.

12 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that we go to the last page in both

13 versions and take a look at the signature.

14 Q. And when you are able to see the signature, can you tell us, do

15 you recognise it? And it's the signature below General Mladic's name.

16 A. I can see it. It is my signature.

17 Q. Can you explain to the Chamber the circumstances under which you

18 signed in place of General Mladic?

19 A. I tried to tell you before I was interrupted. It is my

20 signature. However, on the directive that we worked on, which was sent

21 by teleprinter, there is General Mladic's signature. I don't know how it

22 came to be that my signature was on this copy, because it is illogical.

23 First of all, on the 19th, General Mladic was in the field and I

24 can sign documents only when he was away outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 So being in the theatre was not sufficient. You ran some checks and it

Page 16977

1 turns out that General Mladic had negotiations with General Morillon at

2 Pale around noon that day.

3 Another thing which bothers me concerning the signature is this:

4 You showed me the original of this document which has a purple stamp. It

5 is well known that the archives -- that there is no archives of the Main

6 Staff. Now, how could then this original come from the Main Staff

7 archives? There is a possibility that, following the teleprinter

8 processing of the directive and its sending to the units, the teleprinted

9 part was typed -- retyped so as to remain in the archives of the

10 Main Staff, because the teleprinter documents usually did not make their

11 way into the archives. And then I signed it simply to have the document

12 stored or archived. Still, what remains unknown is how the Tribunal has

13 this original when there are no Main Staff archives.

14 Q. Should the Chamber ever be interested in that information it's

15 something the Prosecution can provide.

16 General, you've mentioned that you had an opportunity to see the

17 original. After having looked at the original, do you believe the

18 document to be authentic or not?

19 A. The document is completely authentic. I drafted it. Actually,

20 I compiled it. It was drafted by all of the commanders' assistants. I

21 have no objection to that.

22 Q. And, General, having looked at the original of the document, was

23 there some text above your signature which you were able to see in the

24 original that is quite difficult to see on the digital version of the

25 document?

Page 16978

1 A. I don't understand. Is it item C or D?

2 Q. Let me ask the question in a different way. Did you have a

3 practice, if you were signing a document for General Mladic, did you have

4 a practice which you engaged in to indicate that was the fact, that you

5 were signing for him?

6 A. There is this word "for," but as far as I could see on the

7 original, although I don't see it here, this "for" is in the Cyrillic

8 script, whereas I sign my last name in the Latin script. And in the

9 original, I could definitely see the letter Z whereas the A is covered by

10 the stamp but one could infer that it is actually "for." If I had truly

11 signed this document in its original, it would have said "deputy

12 commander, Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic." So the word "for"

13 indicated to me that Mladic was in the theatre. Now, why my signature is

14 there, whether I did so upon his approval or not, that's something I

15 don't know.

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could the B/C/S version be zoomed in on the

17 signature block?

18 MR. GROOME: If Your Honours want to see the original, we could

19 produce that in about 15, 20 minutes.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.

21 MR. GROOME:

22 Q. Now, General, you were aware from other times that you have

23 testified, that the interpretation of one particular passage in this

24 document is of some contention.

25 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we go to e-court page 6 in the

Page 16979

1 original and 5 in the translation and for us to look at that passage.

2 Q. The passage is from section 5 of the document, a section

3 entitled, "The tasks of the unit." If we look at the passage beginning

4 at the letter D, you see:

5 "The Drina Corps. From its presents positions, its main forces

6 shall defend with utmost persistence Visegrad, the dam, Zvornik, and the

7 corridor, while the rest of its forces in the general Podrinje region

8 shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on them and

9 force them to leave with the Muslim population, the Birac, Zepa and

10 Gorazde areas."

11 General, since you are identified as one of the authors of this

12 document, it seems only fair that I give you an opportunity to tell us

13 what you intended by this particular passage.

14 A. This passage, from the directive, was used during my testimony in

15 the Srebrenica group trial, between the 29th of May and the

16 1st of June, 2007. The discussion of this passage was initiated by the

17 prosecutor, Mr. McCloskey, when we had an interview in Banja Luka on the

18 18th of October, 2005. Mr. McCloskey showed me the document, where this

19 sentence, beginning with "the rest of the forces" was smudged by the

20 toner used in its printing. So it was illegible. I asked for a clean

21 document, and he said, yes, indeed, it is smudged, but he did not have

22 another document. He could only produce its English version. He asked

23 me if I would agree to his reading out the English version, and to have

24 the interpreter, a girl from Tuzla, Danisa, I believe, translate it.

25 I consented out of curiosity.

Page 16980

1 The interpreter said something I couldn't agree with. I don't

2 have the transcript of the interview now with me but she said something

3 to the effect that the main forces should be used to defend this and

4 that, and then that the enemy and the Muslim population should be

5 exhausted. And then the word "exhausted" somehow ended up being as --

6 interpreted as "expelled" or "pushed out," and the whole sentence was

7 then viewed as my intention to have them forced out of the area.

8 Q. General, unless you think it would be unfair to answer my

9 question specifically, and perhaps skip this mistranslation of the past,

10 the text now you have before you, the original text, my question simply

11 is: What did you intend by that phrase, by that passage?

12 A. This is what I wanted to say. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, during

13 the war, wherever there was shooting, all of the population in the

14 perimeter of 20 kilometres would start to move. Muslims would move

15 towards majority-Muslim areas. The Serbs would cross the Drina into

16 Serbia or to some other areas with a Serb majority, for security reasons.

17 I don't know how Croats behaved in such circumstances but it is

18 irrelevant in terms of this situation.

19 We knew that there would always be population movement. The idea

20 was once there was movement by the Muslim population, they would usually

21 go to Srebrenica or Zepa, in that area, was to also have their armed

22 forces forced out, together with the population. The intention was not,

23 as you believe, to have the population expelled. The intention was to

24 have the Muslim forces pushed out because they had committed horrific

25 crimes before that time in Podrinje.

Page 16981

1 Q. Now, can you describe where the Podrinje region is with respect

2 to Srebrenica?

3 A. Srebrenica is in the centre of middle Podrinje. There is upper

4 Podrinje from Foca to Visegrad; the middle Podrinje from Visegrad to

5 Zvornik; and the lower Podrinje from Zvornik, Bijeljina, the estuary of

6 the Drina and the place where it joins with the Sava.

7 Q. Now, General, am I correct that this directive assigns tasks not

8 only to the Drina Corps but to the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, the

9 East Bosnia Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the

10 Herzegovina Corps? Is that correct?

11 A. Yes. This directive was a result of the Drina Corps being

12 formed, and by virtue of this directive it was introduced into the system

13 of defence of Republika Srpska. It came into being on November 1, 1992.

14 We wanted to find a place for it in the RS defence system.

15 Q. General, sorry, I'm just conscious of the time, so you've

16 answered my question. My next question to you is: Each of these corps

17 was also responsible for a geographical region in which there was some

18 conflict; is that correct?

19 A. Yes. Each of the corps had their own areas of responsibility,

20 which was -- which had its precise locations.

21 Q. Is it correct to say that this phrase regarding forcing the

22 Muslim population to leave is not used in describing the tasks to be

23 carried out by these other corps, only the Drina Corps?

24 A. In this directive, the tasks which had already been assigned to

25 the other corps are merely repeated so that the Drina Corps commander

Page 16982

1 would be aware of what the other corps were doing.

2 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, at this time the Prosecution tenders

3 65 ter 709 as the next public exhibit.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

5 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00709 receives number P2217,

6 Your Honours.

7 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

8 MR. GROOME: Can I now ask that P2007 be brought to our screens.

9 It is a document dated 22 December 1992, entitled: "Raising the combat

10 readiness of units of the VRS, additions to directive 4," signed by the

11 witness.

12 Q. General, while that's being brought up to our screens, is it

13 correct that there were two additions made to directive 4?

14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you repeat the number, please?

15 MR. GROOME: The number of the exhibit, P2007.

16 MR. LUKIC: If I may, I would like to get clarification because

17 I noticed before that the Prosecution is using documents that are not on

18 the list to be used with this witness. If I can -- I can be corrected if

19 I'm wrong.

20 MR. GROOME: No, Mr. Lukic is correct, and I apologise. This was

21 a document that the witness brought to my attention just the day before

22 he testified. And in fairness to Mr. Lukic, I will not deal with the

23 document now. It's already in evidence and the Chamber can read it.

24 MR. LUKIC: No, no. I just wanted to check. I would like to be

25 noticed if there would be more documents. You can proceed. I don't

Page 16983

1 object.

2 MR. GROOME: I don't believe there are any. I apologise for

3 that.

4 JUDGE ORIE: It's the only one, yes.

5 MR. GROOME:

6 Q. General, the document that's on the screen, is this a document

7 which you brought to my attention just before you testified?

8 A. Yes. You said that it was an addition to the directive.

9 Actually, it's an amendment of directive 4, the first of several. It

10 came into being because there was a need to raise the level of combat

11 readiness of VRS to a higher level.

12 Q. General, the Chamber will be able to read the substance. What

13 I'm most interested with this document is can you explain its

14 relationship to directive 4? Did it void directive 4 or did it

15 supplement directive 4?

16 A. I believe I said that at the beginning. This document was used

17 to amend or supplement directive 4, because there was a fourth enemy to

18 the VRS. You can see that it refers to the meeting of commanders of the

19 NATO alliance and of the European Union. On the night between the 16 and

20 17 December 1992, they planned air strikes and a NATO intervention

21 against Republika Srpska. They even worked on some details. When we

22 learned of it in the Main Staff, and General Mladic was not present at

23 that moment, we made this addition to the directive because

24 Republika Srpska had just acquired its fourth enemy, the NATO alliance.

25 Q. Now, General --

Page 16984

1 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that we look at 65 ter 9807? It's a

2 combat order signed by General Milovanovic and dated 15 February 1993.

3 Q. General, when you can see this document, could I ask you to --

4 whether you've had an opportunity to review the document prior to coming

5 to court?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. GROOME: Can we take a look at the last page in both

8 versions?

9 Q. And when you can see this, my question to you is: Did you sign

10 the document as deputy commander?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And finally, can you tell us, this particular order, does it also

13 supplement directive 4 that we looked at earlier?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, at this time the Prosecution would

16 tender 65 ter 9807 as a public exhibit.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

18 THE REGISTRAR: Document 09807 receives number P2218,

19 Your Honours.

20 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.

21 MR. GROOME:

22 Q. General, before I move -- I want to now move to Directive 7.

23 Before do I that, is there anything else of importance that -- regarding

24 directive 4 that you would want to bring to the Chamber's attention?

25 A. Perhaps I should complete my previous answer but maybe there is

Page 16985

1 no need. During the testimony between the 29th of May and the 1st of

2 June, the Prosecutor handed me again this directive number 4, with some

3 stress being placed on the disputed part of text. However, in that copy

4 of the directive, in terms of the words "the remaining forces," there was

5 nothing there. There was a blank space. There was no more smudging.

6 However, there was some shade that could be seen. I used all of my

7 glasses and table lamps, even the light in the toilet place -- while

8 placing it on the mirror. I managed to decipher the text, and Judge Kwon

9 asked me how I knew that the Muslim population would move, and

10 I explained it to the Chamber by what I told you, that the people in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina tended to move. I think the Chinese are the first who

12 follow their army in movement, the French are number two, and the Serbs

13 are number three in the world. And in this war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

14 the Muslims learned it from us. Thus, they moved with their army too.

15 That is my explanation, in terms of why there is this part of the text

16 which says, "with the civilian population."

17 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, I'm about to move to Directive 7.

18 Would this be a convenient time to break.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I think it's the perfect time for the break. We

20 take a break of 20 minutes.

21 Mr. Milovanovic, could you please follow the usher.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and resume at quarter past

24 12.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.

Page 16986

1 --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.

2 MR. GROOME: Your Honours.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Groome.

4 MR. GROOME: Earlier today the Chamber inquired about the status

5 of 65 ter 29048. This was in reference to the 11 pages. I can inform --

6 JUDGE ORIE: 11 lines.

7 MR. GROOME: 11 lines, sorry, and I can inform the Chamber that

8 that now is fully uploaded into e-court.

9 JUDGE ORIE: And now the new version with the 11 lines may

10 replace the earlier uploaded version and it is the --

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ORIE: A final decision apart from the 11-lines issue will

13 follow.

14 [The witness takes the stand]

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, just for the parties to know that the request

16 this morning for -- the request this morning for the four remaining

17 Rule 92 bis motions to be filed not later than the 4th of October, that

18 request is granted.

19 MR. GROOME: The Prosecution appreciates that.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

21 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that Exhibit 1469 be brought to our

22 screens? It is an urgent memo signed by Lieutenant General Milovanovic

23 on 8 March 1995 forwarding directive 7.

24 Q. Now, General Milovanovic, before I ask you questions on this

25 document, the Chamber is very familiar with this document and it is

Page 16987

1 already an exhibit in the case.

2 Can I ask that we look at the first page in the original and the

3 translation?

4 Now, we can see what appears to be a transmittal letter dated

5 17 March 1995 sending a document attached to the command of the

6 1st Krajina Corps. It purports to bear the signature of

7 Lieutenant General Manojlo Milovanovic. My first question to you is

8 whether the signature we see is in fact yours?

9 A. Yes. But the date is not the 8th of March, as you stated. It is

10 actually the 17th of March.

11 Q. That is correct. At the top of the document, just under the

12 date, we can see the phrase, "Very urgent." Can you tell us what this

13 phrase indicates?

14 A. This means that the document was to be sent or carried

15 immediately.

16 Q. The transmittal letter is brief and it says:

17 "Enclosed with this document, we are sending you the directive

18 for further operations. Op number 7. Confirm receipt of the

19 above-mentioned directive by returning a copy of this document."

20 Can we now go to the second page in both versions? And my

21 question is: Is the attached document the one that you were

22 transmitting?

23 MR. LUKIC: Just it's page 3 in B/C/S.

24 MR. GROOME: Thank you.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The previous document was a cover

Page 16988

1 page, or, rather, an order issued to the courier, to take this directive,

2 which was in an envelope, to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps. What

3 puzzles you is the phrase very urgent, if the directive was issued on the

4 8th of March and from the Main Staff it was dispatched only on the

5 17th of March, you're probably confused about the difference or the gap,

6 if I'm not mistaken.

7 JUDGE ORIE: If you just listen to the question, the question is:

8 Is the attached document the one that you were transmitting? There is

9 nothing about time or, et cetera, it's just is this cover letter about

10 this document? That's the simple question. If the answer is yes, please

11 say yes. If there is any other answer, tell us.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

13 MR. GROOME:

14 Q. You anticipated my question. The document is dated the

15 8th of March and once again marked "very urgent." My question is: Would

16 it be typical for a directive marked "very urgent" to take nine days to

17 be transmitted to subordinate commanders?

18 A. "Very urgent" is on the cover letter, and on the directive, you

19 can see "very urgent", and you're right, how come there is a difference

20 of nine days between the two dates? In the original of the directive, it

21 says:

22 "To the command of the 1st and 2nd Corps," and all the other

23 corps which are enumerated here. I suppose that in the first cycle of

24 dispatching the directive, the 1st Corps did not receive it, the person

25 who actually put the document in the envelopes did not see number 1. He

Page 16989

1 only saw number 2. I suppose that the 1st Corps intervened or the

2 operative in the staff discovered that mistake had been made because he

3 was left with one extra copy. And that's why this phrase, "Very urgent"

4 was repeated, meaning that it should indeed be dispatched very urgently

5 to the command of the 1st Corps which had not received it yet by then.

6 Q. Could I ask that we now go to the last page in both versions?

7 I want to draw your attention to the signature of Radovan Karadzic. And

8 my question to you is: Can you tell us, do you recognise the stamp

9 that's authenticating his signature?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. What stamp is that?

12 A. The stamp of the Main Staff of the VRS, not of the

13 Supreme Command.

14 Q. Now the Chamber is able to read the contents of this document but

15 I do want to seek your comment on a particular passage.

16 MR. GROOME: Can we go to the section for the setting out the

17 tasks for the Drina Corps? It can be found on e-court, page 17 in the

18 original, and 10 in the translation.

19 Q. Can I draw your attention to the sentence with respect to the

20 Drina Corps where it says, "By planned and well-thought-out combat

21 operations"? And can you indicate when you have found that passage?

22 A. Can you direct me? Can you tell me where I could find it in the

23 middle or at the bottom or at the top of the page?

24 Q. I'm sorry, I'm a bit --

25 JUDGE ORIE: I think you'll find it in the lower part of the

Page 16990

1 first paragraph under the Drina Corps. Yes. It ends with "Srebrenica

2 and Zepa." That's the first paragraph and the few lines before that.

3 MR. GROOME:

4 Q. Let me read it to you but again I would want to you follow in the

5 original text so perhaps I will wait.

6 JUDGE ORIE: It is the last sentence of the first paragraph under

7 the heading, "Drina Corps."

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. Would it assist you to have a hard copy of the document?

10 A. No. The most efficient way to proceed would be for somebody to

11 approach my desk and show me where to look.

12 JUDGE ORIE: On the ninth line under Drina Corps, the first

13 linear ends. It is the last sentence before that.

14 MR. GROOME:

15 Q. General, I'll read the passage and maybe by me reading it and

16 having it translated you'll be able to find it. The passage I want to

17 read is: "By a planned and well --"

18 A. No.

19 MR. GROOME: Does counsel have any objection to me providing a

20 hard copy with a mark in the side? Can I ask the usher.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Could the usher assist?

22 MR. GROOME:

23 Q. I just handed you a hard copy with an arrow indicating the

24 approximate location of the passage.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Now the B/C/S has disappeared from our screens.

Page 16991

1 I take it that it will be back in a second.

2 MR. GROOME:

3 Q. "By a planned and well-thought-out combat operations --"

4 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please. There seems to be a technical

5 problem. Nevertheless, the witness has a hard copy. The line has been

6 read over and over again. If you would slowly read it, Mr. Groome.

7 MR. GROOME:

8 Q. "By a planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an

9 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

10 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

11 Now, my question to you is: Would you agree that a plain reading

12 of this sentence would lead the reader to conclude that the civilian

13 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa were intended to be the focus of

14 well-thought-out combat operations?

15 A. A target is a military term, and it indicates a target that has

16 to be shot at. The word here is similar to target but it's not a target.

17 This means that the activity is aimed at worsening the conditions of life

18 for the population of Zepa and Srebrenica and as a result of such adverse

19 conditions of life, they would be forced to leave Srebrenica and Zepa.

20 However, with your leave, I would like to proffer a comment on this

21 combat order issued by the Drina Corps.

22 Q. This is a directive now. This is not a combat order. This is in

23 the directive itself.

24 A. Okay. I understand.

25 Q. So my next question to you is: Based on your military training

Page 16992

1 and experience as a senior commander, do you have a view whether this

2 particular passage in this directive is a lawful military objective?

3 A. According to the Geneva Conventions, the civilian population is

4 not a legitimate military target or objective.

5 Q. And again if you can apply the Geneva Conventions to this

6 particular phrase, is it your opinion that this is a lawful or an

7 unlawful order?

8 A. Unlawful, if it is an order, but this is a political decision.

9 Q. So can you explain how this directive -- I'm sorry, let me

10 rephrase my question. So you are saying that the text as we read it

11 here, you would consider it unlawful if formulated into an order? Do

12 I understand you correctly?

13 A. Yes. If it is formulated into a combat order.

14 Q. Now, can you explain what is different or how is it different if

15 this same phrase appears in a directive issued by the Supreme Commander?

16 A. This is a political decision, because it was issued by the

17 Supreme Commander. It cannot be applied to military documents.

18 Q. Why can it not be applied to military documents?

19 A. Because, as I've already told you, the civilian population is an

20 unlawful military target or objective.

21 Q. Can I now ask that we see --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, could I seek on two points,

23 clarification? First, you said "it cannot be applied to military

24 documents." What cannot be applied?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This phrase that we have just

Page 16993

1 discussed cannot be used in military documents.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Clear answer. Then earlier you said you'd like to

3 proffer a comment on this combat order issued by the Drina Corps, and

4 then Mr. Groome said this is a directive now, it's not a combat order.

5 And then you said, okay, I understand.

6 Nevertheless, irrespective of the characterisation of the

7 document, would you still like to proffer a comment on this document? If

8 so, please do. And then specifically focusing on these lines.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, this document, and

10 I'm repeating this for the umpteenth time, was issued by the

11 Supreme Command. It was signed by the Supreme Commander. This directive

12 should not have left the Supreme Command to go to the corps commands. It

13 should reach -- it should have reached only General Mladic, the commander

14 of the Main Staff. Based on this directive, General Mladic was to issue

15 his orders, and I can see that he did issue directive 7/1 which was a

16 legitimate thing to do. However, during the proofing, I --

17 JUDGE ORIE: We'll come to that in a minute. I take it,

18 Mr. Groome, that you will pay attention further to directive 1. I was

19 just interested in your proffered comment on this document, and now

20 you're putting it in a different context which most likely will been

21 dealt with by Mr. Groome. Please proceed.

22 MR. GROOME:

23 Q. General, you ever mentioned directive 7/1.

24 MR. GROOME: I would ask that that be brought to our screens. It

25 is Exhibit P1470. It's entitled, "Directive for further operations,

Page 16994

1 operative number 7/1" dated 31 March 1995 and signed by

2 General Ratko Mladic.

3 Q. Now, General, could I ask you to take a look at this document?

4 Did you have an opportunity to review this document prior to testifying

5 yesterday?

6 A. Would you kindly repeat the second part of your question?

7 Q. My question was simply, for now, and I'll be asking you several

8 questions about this: Did you have an opportunity to review this

9 document prior to taking the witness stand yesterday?

10 A. Yes. During the proofing, before I arrived in the courtroom, and

11 I also had an opportunity to read it between the 29th of May and

12 1st of June, 2007, when I testified in a prior case.

13 Q. Can we go to the last page? Can I draw your attention to the

14 signature? And my question is: Do you recognise the signature which

15 purports to be that of General Mladic?

16 A. Yes. This is General Mladic's signature.

17 Q. Now, we can see that has been drafted by Colonel Radivoje Miletic

18 of the -- is he a member of the Main Staff?

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, would you please refrain from already

20 nodding what the answer to a question might be? Would you refrain from

21 any gestures? And would you also refrain from communications with the

22 public gallery? Focus on what happens in court. Please proceed.

23 MR. GROOME:

24 Q. Is Colonel Radivoje Miletic a member of the Main Staff?

25 A. Yes. Colonel Miletic was the chief of the operations

Page 16995

1 administration. As we could see on -- when looking at the schematic of

2 the composition of the Main Staff earlier this morning.

3 Q. Is that the same Colonel Miletic who drafted directive 7 which

4 was signed by Karadzic?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, before I ask you to tell us your understanding of this

7 directive, can I ask you to tell me what is the operational relationship

8 between directive 7 and directive 7/1? In other words, it would appear

9 that there are two possible relationships. The first, that 7/1 would

10 supplement directive 7 which would remain in effect, or, two, that

11 directive 7/1 would make -- would replace directive 7 and would make

12 directive 7 void. Can you tell us what is the relationship between the

13 two documents?

14 A. Directive 7/1 was a directive issued by the commander of the

15 Main Staff, General Mladic, which originated from directive number 7

16 which was signed by the Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic.

17 Q. And what is the relationship between the two? Does 7/1

18 supplement 7 or does it replace 7?

19 A. One does not replace the other. Actually, this means that the

20 elements of directive 7 were now being used by lower units. Unit

21 commanders could not take any measures based on anything that they

22 received from Karadzic, and I said that it was a mistake on the part of

23 the Supreme Command, when they sent the directive to all the corps

24 commands. They should have sent it only to General Mladic. This was an

25 instance of duality, or double lines, in the chain of command.

Page 16996

1 Q. General, when you say they should have sent it only to

2 General Mladic in the last document, wasn't it you that sent it on?

3 Wasn't it your signature on the transmittal letter?

4 A. Yes. My signature on the cover letter was only an instruction to

5 the courier to take it where he was supposed to, but I was not even

6 supposed to be aware of the contents of the envelope. I'm not accusing

7 Karadzic's administration. Corps commanders should not have reacted to

8 Karadzic's directive before receiving Mladic's orders as a result of the

9 directive. I believe that only one corps commander did that. That was

10 the Drina Corps commander, who did not wait for Mladic's directive that

11 was issued and I don't know how much later, how many days later -- based

12 on Karadzic's directive issued his order for defence or some such order,

13 I don't know what it was. So when he received Mladic's directive, he

14 could no longer react, and insofar as I studied both documents, in his

15 directive, General Mladic omitted the sentence that we just discussed,

16 where it says that the life for the civilian population of Zepa and

17 Srebrenica should be rendered unbearable or something like that, whereas

18 General Zivanovic literally copied that sentence from Karadzic's

19 directive. When that directive was discussed, one of the lawyers put a

20 question to me as to how General Mladic dared omit that sentence from his

21 own directive and I answered him that General Mladic assumed

22 responsibility when he decided not to put pressure on the population and

23 not to adopt every single element from Karadzic's directive. He assumed

24 that responsibility. He took it upon himself not to do that.

25 Q. General --

Page 16997

1 JUDGE ORIE: The simple question was whether it was your

2 signature. You answered that by one word, yes. We are not here in a

3 debating club where you present positions. You are here to answer

4 questions. I, by the way, have one question for you in this respect.

5 Who ordered you to send the transmittal letter? On whose instructions

6 did you send it?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was standard practice in the

8 regulations. All transmittal letters accompanying mail to the

9 subordinate units are signed by the most senior general in the Main Staff

10 at that moment. That was my task because I happened to be there.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Now, you earlier told us that if you received any

12 instruction from the Supreme Command, that you would never do anything

13 until you would have consulted with Mr. Mladic whether he agreed with

14 that, "yes" or "no". Now, here apparently, something arrives which is to

15 be distributed, you sign a distribution letter, you tell us that this was

16 not how it should have been because the Supreme Command should not give

17 any direct instructions to the lower level. Could you explain why, on

18 whose authority, you did send that distribution letter, that cover

19 letter, with the directive attached?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The signing of the accompanying

21 letter was not an order from the Supreme Command. I guess

22 Colonel Miletic brought the sealed envelope, as well as the cover letter

23 for me to sign so that the courier could lawfully go to the 1st Corps

24 command. It had nothing to do with the Supreme Command or with

25 General Mladic. It was Main Staff mail sent to a subordinate command.

Page 16998

1 JUDGE ORIE: So whatever Miletic would give you to be

2 distributed, you would just send it and say, this is mail? Is that your

3 position? Sealed envelopes, whatever the content would be, just send it

4 down the line without even bothering about content?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not quite. On the envelope, it

6 said directive number 7, the addressee was the 1st Krajina Corps.

7 Miletic explained to me that this particular corps had not received it,

8 whereas the others had, and that it was an extraordinary situation to

9 deal with.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Now, you explained to us that directives were issued

11 by the political body, by the Supreme Command. Have you verified whether

12 General Mladic agreed with this distribution, as you earlier told us you

13 would always do?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't recall whether

15 General Mladic was in the Main Staff or whether I asked him anything.

16 It's a long time ago.

17 JUDGE ORIE: You earlier explained that it would only cause

18 delays if you would receive something directly from the Supreme Command

19 because you would not take action unless and up till the moment that you

20 had the approval of General Mladic. That's what you told us quite

21 extensively. Could you explain what happened here?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not an order of the

23 Supreme Command, this transmittal letter. It was produced in the office

24 from which the directives were supposed to be sent to the different

25 corps. They skipped the 1st Corps and I don't know on whose request.

Page 16999

1 Miletic did find a copy of that directive, put it in an envelope, sealed

2 it, gave me the transmittal letter to sign, and then dispatched a

3 courier.

4 JUDGE ORIE: And you didn't know what was in it, apart from that

5 there was a directive?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I knew it was directive number 7 by

7 the Supreme Command because it said so on the envelope and Miletic told

8 me what it was. He said that a copy was omitted in the first round and

9 that it was to be sent to that particular corps. I don't know whether

10 the 1st Corps command intervened and requested it or if it happened on

11 someone else's request, though.

12 JUDGE ORIE: And content of the directive was known to you?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wasn't familiar with the content

14 of the directive. I wasn't familiar with it being produced. I didn't

15 even know people were working on it, because between the 6th and the

16 12th of March, I was on the western front between Krupa and Drvar. When

17 I came back, the directive had already been signed and put in envelopes.

18 Even if I had been aware of the contents of that directive, there is

19 nothing I could have changed in it because Karadzic had signed it.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

21 MR. GROOME:

22 Q. General, I want to take you back to something you said a few

23 minutes ago. You said that General Mladic -- when comparing the

24 difference between directive 7 and 7/1, you said General Mladic omitted

25 not to put this phrase which you have characterised as unlawful, and you

Page 17000

1 said, "He took it upon himself not to do that," in reference to removing

2 that from the directive 7.

3 My question to you is: Is it your evidence that Mladic's failure

4 to include that particular phrase was an intentional act by him not to

5 advance that particular part of directive 7?

6 A. It is my assessment, or conclusion, that General Mladic took over

7 responsibility for not implementing that part of the Supreme Commander's

8 directive, since he deemed it was unlawful.

9 Q. Is there anything in 7/1 which explicitly rescinds that part of

10 directive 7?

11 A. I don't think so. That sentence was simply omitted from Mladic's

12 directive to his subordinate commanders.

13 Q. Now, after directive 7/1 was issued, was the complete physical

14 separation of Srebrenica from Zepa still a military objective?

15 A. The physical separation of Srebrenica and Zepa at Mount Susica,

16 had been our military goal ever since the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa

17 have been established -- had been established because the Muslim soldiers

18 and civilians kept going through the Drina canyon to the east of

19 Mount Susica between Srebrenica and Zepa.

20 Q. General, I'm not so much interested in the reasons why that was a

21 military objective. But directive 7 says the following:

22 "Complete physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be

23 carried out as soon as possible."

24 I'm going to ask over the break that you take a look at

25 directive 7/1 and see is there any where in 7/1 that Mladic mentions

Page 17001

1 that? And I would suggest to you that upon reading it you'll see that

2 that's also omitted from 7/1. If after reading that, you verify what

3 I've just suggested to you, can I ask you: How would a subordinate

4 commander have been able to tell that the order to physically separate

5 Srebrenica and Zepa had not been rescinded but the order to target

6 civilians had?

7 A. I'm afraid I do not understand the question. That first

8 sentence, about exerting pressure on the civilians, that's fine. It's

9 not to be found in Mladic's directive. I have to go back again to the

10 Drina Corps commander's order. We find it in his order which means he

11 copies Karadzic's directive.

12 As regards the separation of Srebrenica and Zepa, it was a

13 standing idea ever since the enclaves were formed, and perhaps

14 General Mladic found it unnecessary to reiterate because we constantly

15 had this problem of troops moving between Srebrenica and Zepa and

16 according to the demilitarisation agreement pertaining to the two

17 settlements they were not supposed to have been in contact. It was

18 supposed to be overseen by UNPROFOR and not the VRS. However, since

19 UNPROFOR did not do that throughout the war, the VRS took upon itself to

20 do so.

21 Q. General, I'm going to ask you over the break to reread 7/1 and I

22 will come back to this at that time. I want to move on to a different

23 topic, the topic of --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Could I meanwhile ask another question? You have

25 explained to us that 7/1 contains a -- if I understood you well -- an

Page 17002

1 instruction or directive, whatever you call it, which was, as you

2 explained, was obviously illegal. Now, if you have --

3 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry to interrupt but I believe he was

4 referring to directive 7 not directive 7/1 as you just mentioned.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I made a mistake there. Directive 7 contains a

6 clearly -- lines which are clearly illegal, as you said, from a military

7 point of view, that is, making the civilian population an object rather

8 than a -- it not being a military target. Now, you told us that in 7/1,

9 this was left out on purpose because General Mladic did not want to take

10 responsibility for such a line.

11 Now, the awareness that directive 7 had been distributed to the

12 lower levels, should not a strong protest or a strong line saying,

13 "Whatever you read in 7, which was illegal, such as this and this and

14 this, ignore that because it is against the laws of warfare," rather than

15 to silently leave it as it is and that everyone should understand that

16 whatever they received earlier would not apply any further because it was

17 not repeated? Do you have any comment on those observations?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said already that General Mladic

19 took upon himself, at his own responsibility, to omit the unlawful

20 sentence. He was not under an obligation to direct his subordinates'

21 attention to the unlawful nature of it because based on Karadzic's

22 directive he issued his own simply omitting that. The subordinates are

23 duty-bound to implement Mladic's directive, not Karadzic's. That is why

24 I said at the beginning that it was Karadzic's administration mistake to

25 have sent it to all of the corps.

Page 17003

1 JUDGE ORIE: But you also told us that 7 was not replaced by 7/1.

2 It was still in existence. You knew, or at least it was known, that it

3 had been distributed to the lower levels, and then you say, well, it's

4 enough to omit it. And you say you assumed that -- you concluded that it

5 was omitted for that purpose whereas you now say again that you said

6 already that he took it upon himself to omit the unlawful sentence,

7 whereas earlier you said that you concluded without giving a basis for

8 your -- the knowledge on which you base such a conclusion. Any further

9 comments on those points?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, I repeat that it is only my

11 conclusion, my presumption, that that was Mladic's reasoning. I can't

12 say that he did so because of that. It is my conclusion that he took

13 over responsibility not to implement or not to carry further that part of

14 Karadzic's directive.

15 JUDGE ORIE: He never told you, you never discussed it with him?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome. Judge --

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I put a follow-up question? Did you discuss

19 this question with Colonel Miletic, who was your deputy?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I saw this directive for the

21 first time in the Tribunal building sometime around the 29th of May.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you saying that the communication between the

23 drafter of directive 7/1, Colonel Miletic, and the commander,

24 Ratko Mladic, took place without involving you in any way?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It was done completely

Page 17004

1 without me.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

4 MR. GROOME:

5 Q. General, so that the Chamber understands -- I think it's

6 important for the Chamber to understand where you were at this time. I'd

7 ask you not to go into a detailed explanation of what you were doing or

8 where -- why you were where you were but simply tell the Chamber: Was

9 there a period of time that you were not physically present in the

10 Main Staff at Crna Rijeka?

11 A. From the 29th of October, 1994, until, I think, the

12 15th of October 1995, I was in charge of the western theatre, and I was

13 in the area of Bihac, Petrovac, Drvar, Glamoc, Banja Luka. I omitted

14 Mrkonjic Grad. Occasionally I came to the Main Staff for meetings or

15 when summoned personally by General Mladic, such as when we saw

16 General Zivanovic off or when we had analyses of combat readiness of the

17 VRS. I think it was on the 29th of January, if I'm not mistaken.

18 I was also there in late March and early April, before

19 Operation Flash on the Croatian side began, and then I went to Gradiska

20 where I was until 12 May. When I returned to the Main Staff, I found a

21 telegram which was a request of the 2nd Krajina Corps, General Tomanic's

22 message telling me that I should go to the western theatre because the

23 so-called Carter's truce was violated. I hesitated but a decision was

24 made and I left on 29 May where I remained until the end of the war.

25 Q. I want to switch to the topic of Sarajevo. Was there a period of

Page 17005

1 time that General Mladic was primarily stationed in Sarajevo in an effort

2 to establish the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

3 A. Yes. It was immediately following the decision on the

4 establishment of armed forces. General Mladic and Colonel Tolimir spent

5 a month or a month and a half in Sarajevo at Lukavica where they worked

6 on the issue of establishing the SRK. That is to say the translation of

7 the command of the 4th JNA Army into the SRK command. We communicated by

8 phone or by courier.

9 Q. General, would this mean that General Mladic was physically

10 present in the Sarajevo area from about mid-May of 1992 to mid-June 1992

11 and perhaps the end of June 1992?

12 A. Yes.

13 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that 65 ter 14730 be brought to our

14 screens? It is an order issued on 7 February 1994 and signed by

15 General Milovanovic.

16 Q. General, the copy of this order that is going to be brought

17 before you is a teleprinter copy, it does not bear your signature. After

18 you have familiarised yourself with the document, can I ask you whether

19 you indeed did issue this order?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, this order is addressed to all of the corps including the

22 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to order number 2. It reads,

25 "Rule out any possibility of uncontrolled shelling. Impose the most

Page 17006

1 severe penalty immediately for uncontrolled behaviour or offences."

2 Now, this order was issued by you within a few days of two

3 notorious shelling incidents charged in this indictment as schedule

4 G.7 and G.8. G.7 was an event in which three mortar shells landed in

5 Dobrinja and G.8 is the first time a shell landed on Markale market.

6 This order was issued two days after the Markale market shelling. My

7 question is whether or not you issued this order in response to one or

8 both of those shellings.

9 A. Neither. I issued this order based on the order of the Supreme

10 Commander, number 01278 and so on and so forth dated the 7th of February.

11 By the time I received it in the Main Staff, I had it translated into my

12 own order and sent it to these corps commands, to the Sarajevo command

13 for implementation and other corps commands for information.

14 Q. Now, your order threatens to impose the most severe penalties for

15 uncontrolled shelling. My question is: Can you recall any incident of

16 uncontrolled shelling after which such most severe penalties were imposed

17 on those VRS soldiers responsible?

18 A. I can't recall any. It was not in my department. It was within

19 General Gvero's purview, who was the assistant commander for morale and

20 religious affairs. I did not receive information from the corps in terms

21 of whether someone was disciplined, tried or anything of the sort. I did

22 not receive such feedback.

23 Q. What was your assessment of the level of uncontrolled shelling,

24 that is shelling not pursuant to an order, by Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

25 members around Sarajevo?

Page 17007

1 A. The term "uncontrolled", I would prefer to use the term

2 "unselectively" meaning targeting areas and settlements without a

3 stipulated military target or trying to engage a military target by

4 shelling areas where civilians suffer. This order precisely requests

5 that fire can be opened only on detected military targets or military

6 assets possessed by the enemy engaging our forces.

7 There is also a ratio, a shell for a shell, meaning that if one

8 mortar shell came from the yard around the Kosevo hospital, they cannot

9 respond with more than one.

10 Q. Can I take from your answer that there were instances where areas

11 were targeted and settlements were targeted without a particular military

12 target? That that was one of the problems you were seeking to address

13 with this order?

14 A. I did not see any such case. I stress again that this order came

15 as a result of the Supreme Commander's order. I don't know whether he

16 had any further insight.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, I'm looking at the clock.

18 MR. GROOME: That would be a convenient place to break, Your

19 Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but again before we take the break I would have

21 one very short question, please a short answer as well. When you signed

22 the cover letter by which the directive 7 was contributed, where were

23 you?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my office. Miletic brought it

25 for me to sign, since the courier was supposed to leave for Banja Luka.

Page 17008

1 JUDGE ORIE: So you were at the Main Staff headquarters?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

4 MR. GROOME: Before we break can I simply tender 65 ter 14730 as

5 the next exhibit, public?

6 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 14730 receives number P2219, Your

8 Honours.

9 JUDGE ORIE: P2219 is admitted into evidence.

10 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have a clean copy of directive 7/1 in

11 the original language if it's acceptable for the witness to have access

12 to this during the break.

13 JUDGE ORIE: So he can read it over the break.

14 MR. GROOME: Yes.

15 JUDGE ORIE: You're invited to read the directive over the break.

16 Could the usher assist in --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I also need directive number 7

18 so as to compare.

19 MR. GROOME: Directive 7 I believe is sitting on the desk next to

20 him if he be allowed to take that from the courtroom as well.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I take it that there is no need to

24 inspect?

25 MR. LUKIC: Of course, no objections.

Page 17009

1 JUDGE ORIE: Could it be given to the witness. You may follow

2 the usher.

3 [The witness stands down]

4 JUDGE ORIE: We will take a break and resume at 20 minutes to

5 2.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 1.17 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 1.41 p.m.

8 JUDGE ORIE: The witness is escorted into the courtroom.

9 Mr. Lukic, I've been a bit unfair to you today where you said I

10 cannot immediately respond on the deadlines, 4th of October, and then

11 I gave a ruling that it was granted. That is unfair. If there is any

12 reason to revisit those time limits, you have an opportunity to do so and

13 we will then consider whether the decision should stand.

14 MR. LUKIC: Time limits are never of our concern. We never

15 object to any extension of time.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, if you would have said this this morning.

17 MR. LUKIC: I didn't know what else to look into. I didn't know

18 that --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Then the matter stands as it is, Mr. Groome.

20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the witness's last answer, about

21 P2219, he made reference to an order by Radovan Karadzic. I just want to

22 bring to the Chamber's attention that is 65 ter 14456 and it's the

23 subject of the bar table motion for Sarajevo documents.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for giving us this guidance. At the end

25 of this session I would need a couple of minutes to read a short

Page 17010

1 decision.

2 [The witness takes the stand]

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Milovanovic, Judge Fluegge has one follow-up

4 question from before the break.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, indeed. Mr. Milovanovic, you said this is

6 to be found on page 65, line 8, you said, "The term 'uncontrolled'

7 I would prefer to use the term 'unselectively,' meaning targeting areas

8 and settlements without a stipulated military target."

9 Why are you now using the term "unselectively" instead of

10 "uncontrolled"? Uncontrolled, we saw in the document which was signed by

11 you. Why are you now preferring another term?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reason is simple. Uncontrolled

13 means opening fire without a prior order or being held accountable for

14 opening that fire. Unselectively means that there is an order but the

15 fire does not focus on a military target but, rather, it is dispersed

16 across an area. Non-selectively means to open fire, it is a military

17 term, but that fire is not selectively targeted.

18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is well understood. But in the document you

19 used the term "uncontrolled."

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I suppose that I copied that from

21 Karadzic's order, or, rather the operative who was working on the text,

22 his initials are MDj, I don't know who that may have been, it could have

23 been Mico Djapa [phoen]. We had two men with those initials, one was

24 Milos Djurdjic but at the time this was drafted Mr. Djurdjic was not a

25 member of the Main Staff so it was probably Lieutenant-Colonel Mico Djapa

Page 17011

1 who drafted that. When we discussed that document in the prosecutor's

2 office, my objection was that I would not have used the term the

3 strictest laws. This is not even a military term. A law, an act, cannot

4 be strict or stricter or the strictest. An act is an act. This person

5 who drafted this document must have had in his mind to emphasise that

6 whoever breaks this rule would suffer the severest of penalties.

7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you saying --

8 MR. LUKIC: I might help with the translation issue here and

9 that's why there is confusion, too.

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, that would be helpful.

11 MR. LUKIC: If we can have that document on the screen that would

12 help both you and the witness, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It should be --

14 MR. LUKIC: 14730.

15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Which is now P2219.

16 MR. LUKIC: Yes. I think you are referring to number 2, rule out

17 any possibility of uncontrolled shelling.

18 In B/C/S, I will read so you get proper translation. I quote:

19 [Interpretation] "Rule out any possibility of shelling beyond control."

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much. Still I would like to know

21 from the witness if he signed this document without thinking about using

22 this or the other term, because it was prepared by somebody else. Is

23 that what you are saying?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely so. I focused on this

25 ratio one for one, one shell here, one shell there. This said a lot to

Page 17012

1 me. I'm afraid I did not pay much attention to the linguistics of the

2 document. The most important thing for me was for the document not to

3 lose its meaning, its contents.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. That's all from my side.

5 MR. GROOME:

6 Q. General, I'm going to ask you to look at a video now, and then

7 I'll ask you some questions after it. This is 65 ter 22344.

8 [Video-clip played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] The 21st Sabotage Detachment has

10 realised and demonstrated in practice the use of artillery for sabotage

11 purposes. The 21st Sabotage Detachment was the first to use a mobile

12 rocket launcher in combat.

13 Go.

14 The strength of the detachment's fire power is shown by the

15 possibility to launch 18, 250 kilogram bombs in one fifth second burst of

16 fire as well as 152, 57 millimetre rockets."

17 MR. GROOME:

18 Q. General, can you tell us what munition we just observed being

19 assembled and fired in 22344?

20 A. I don't have anything on the screen. Can I start answering your

21 question?

22 Q. If you heard my question. Did you hear my question - whether you

23 could tell us what munition that was and if you would like us to try to

24 put that up again?

25 A. No need to show it again. I saw this video-clip when it was

Page 17013

1 shown to me by you during the proofing. And that was the first time

2 I saw it. I know that aerial bombs were being launched and what the

3 speaker, the commentator, is saying about 57 millimetre rockets,

4 I haven't a clue what he's talking about.

5 I know that there were some anti-aircraft howitzers that were

6 57 millimetre so I don't know. I don't think that this belongs to the

7 Army of Republika Srpska but to the 21st Sabotage Detachment of the

8 Serbian Army of Krajina, i.e. of the 21st Detachment of the Serbian Army

9 of Krajina. Some operation group. It's mentioned here. I don't know

10 anything about that operation. I can only assume that those were aerial

11 bombs that we could see in action and that their weight is 250 kilos. In

12 our military, I never saw any such thing. There were no such assets in

13 our army.

14 Q. So the munition that we saw on the screen here, you're saying

15 that there was no such munition in the VRS?

16 A. We did not have any such assets or a launcher that could launch

17 four aerial bombs at the same time. We didn't have such a system, and I

18 don't believe, when the commentator says that in the space of five

19 seconds, it could launch 18 such bombs, those bombs weigh 250 kilograms,

20 you know what power and what weight we are talking about? I think it's a

21 bit of an exaggeration, in the space of five seconds you can hardly

22 launch one such projectiles let alone 18.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you first to focus on the question? It

24 is what you saw. What the comments was is a different matter. And the

25 simple question is: Do I understand that you -- the munition you saw did

Page 17014

1 not exist in the VRS?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The munition that we saw existed in

3 the VRS. Those were lethal assets that belonged to the anti-aircraft

4 defence and the air force. These are lethal assets that are usually

5 carried by an aircraft.

6 JUDGE ORIE: So that's the simple question -- the simple answer

7 now is one quite different from the answer you gave, which is --

8 Mr. Groome, please proceed.

9 MR. GROOME:

10 Q. Are you familiar with the phrase "skalamerija"? That's

11 s-k-a-l-a-m-e-r-i-j-a.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you explain what that phrase referred to when used in the

14 VRS?

15 A. It's a makeshift device to transport aerial bombs from the firing

16 position to a target. So instead of using an aircraft to launch it, they

17 are launched from the ground.

18 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we now take a look at 65 ter 1986.

19 It's a letter addressed to the chief of the Yugoslav Army from

20 Ratko Mladic dated 31 May 1995.

21 Q. General, my simple question to you now when it first comes on the

22 screen is whether you recognise the document and whether you've had a

23 chance to review this document in the week or the few days before you

24 testified.

25 A. Yes.

Page 17015

1 Q. When you saw this document, did it remind you of a conversation

2 that you had with General Momcilo Perisic, the commander of the

3 General Staff of the Yugoslav Army?

4 A. Yes. With the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of

5 Yugoslavia and that conversation took place on the 6th of January, 1994.

6 Q. Can I ask you to summarise that conversation for us.

7 A. That was our first conversation after the New Year's holiday.

8 First we talked about a unit that the Army of Yugoslavia or, to be more

9 precise, General Mrksic had brought to the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija

10 Corps. Perisic told me that he heard that I had decided that that unit

11 should go back home. It was not my decision. It was General Mladic's

12 order after I reported to him about the appearance of that unit. We

13 continued talking and he told me, I didn't call you about that, but

14 during the holidays, Ratko and myself - and he meant General Mladic -

15 socialised and we discussed the aerial bombs that we could use. What do

16 you think about those? That was the first time I heard the term, and

17 I told him, Listen, I'm not interested in the way you Herzegovinian

18 think. If anybody is to tell me anything about them, it will be

19 General Mladic, not you. And that's how we left it off.

20 Q. Now, the record records you saying reference to "discussed the

21 aerial bombs that we could use." Can I ask you for a bit of more detail,

22 if there is any, about how they might use aerial bombs?

23 A. First of all, I don't know whether they were actually aerial

24 bombs. I'm not familiar with the term. Those were air fuel bombs. When

25 I was at school, I learned about those bombs being able to change the

Page 17016

1 climatic conditions. For example, in Vietnam, they could stop the rain

2 or -- I don't know. So he used the term fuel air-bombs. I don't -- I

3 didn't know what he was talking about. So that's why I told him what

4 I did.

5 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that we now look at 65 ter 1985? Again a

6 letter addressed from Ratko Mladic to the chief of the Yugoslav Army and

7 it bears the same date, so it has the same date.

8 Q. Once you can see this document on the screen, it's in reference

9 to a request with respect to Colonel Ivan Djokic. Can I ask you if you

10 know him and, if you do, describe briefly who he was?

11 A. Before I answer, I should tell you that the previous document and

12 this document were both issued on the 31st of May, 1995, when I was in

13 Ostrelj, near Drvar. As for Ivan Djokic, I know him.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, we are not asking you where you were on

15 that date. Mr. Groome puts a question to you. Would you please answer

16 that question.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I knew Ivan Djokic.

18 MR. GROOME:

19 Q. And what was his expertise or who was he in the --

20 A. He was an officer in the command of the air force and

21 anti-aircraft defence of the Army of Yugoslavia. He was an expert for

22 rocket anti-aircraft assets.

23 Q. He helped develop the modified air-bomb, skalamerija?

24 A. I used to see him in the theatre of war, and I believe that he

25 helped Colonel Rajko Balac in crafting a prototype of that skalamerija

Page 17017

1 contraption.

2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, at this time Prosecution tenders

3 65 ter 1985 and 1986 as public exhibits.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar?

5 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1986 receives number P2220. And

6 document 1985 receives number 2221, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE ORIE: P2220 and P2221 are admitted.

8 MR. GROOME:

9 Q. General, are you able to tell us whether these skalamerija, these

10 modified air-bombs, were able to target precise locations or general

11 areas?

12 A. I did not see that asset in action. Nor did I see it after it

13 was manufactured and assembled. I only saw a model of that asset. It

14 could not be precise, and it could not target a precise -- precisely.

15 Like a bomb launched from an aircraft, it could target an area.

16 Q. Was the placement and use of air-bombs supervised at the level of

17 the Main Staff?

18 A. This was supervised by the chief of artillery of the Main Staff,

19 Colonel Rajko Balac.

20 Q. And can you remind us, if we were to look at that organisational

21 chart, in what sector would we find this person?

22 A. He was in the staff sector, in the group of military branches or

23 combat arms.

24 Q. General, my last series of questions is with respect to a chart.

25 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that 65 ter 26001A be brought to our

Page 17018

1 screen. This is a chart summarising General Milovanovic's observations

2 regarding seven documents he was asked to review prior to giving evidence

3 in this trial.

4 Q. General, while that's being called up, prior to giving evidence,

5 were you asked to review seven documents related to humanitarian convoys

6 and record any observations you had with respect to their authenticity

7 and substance on a chart?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is this the chart that we see before us now?

10 A. Yes. This is only the first document.

11 MR. GROOME: Can we go to e-court page 4 in both languages.

12 Q. And when you can see that, can you tell us whether you recognise

13 the signature?

14 A. Yes. This is my signature.

15 Q. General, having completed this chart several days ago, is there

16 anything else you would like to add to your comments before I tender this

17 document?

18 A. No.

19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the Prosecution now tenders 26001A into

20 evidence. It's the chart as well as the seven documents aggregated into

21 the same exhibit.

22 MR. LUKIC: We always object to documents of this nature.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

24 MR. LUKIC: If I wasn't clear, we object this time as well.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No, that's clear. I'm not seeking -- you say

Page 17019

1 always of this nature. You mean charts or underlying documents or what

2 is it exactly?

3 MR. LUKIC: Is this -- I mean this should then be 92 ter

4 statement. Is it -- what kind of evidence is this? This is written

5 statement about something. This witness is a viva voce witness,

6 specifically for him.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Would that exclude the possibility of -- you can

8 cross-examine the witness on it. I mean, it is a written statement to

9 some extent, yes, but perhaps then Mr. Groome -- if Mr. Groome would ask

10 the witness whether he gave his comments to the best of his knowledge

11 and -- I mean, is a viva voce witness per se excluded from any written

12 statement given for very practical reasons? I mean, that's my question,

13 procedural question.

14 MR. LUKIC: For us, yes. If you rule differently, then it might

15 affect our Defence case as well. And we would object --

16 JUDGE ORIE: In what respect?

17 MR. LUKIC: That we might have viva voce witnesses with written

18 statements.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, written statements, it is limited to -- but

20 you'd say: We would never use a chart with any of our witnesses if we

21 call them viva voce? Is that your position?

22 MR. LUKIC: I never did it before, no. I never used these charts

23 with any of my witnesses before, nor I saw it in any other trial.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 17020

1 JUDGE ORIE: The chart and the underlying documents will be MFI'd

2 for the time being.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE ORIE: You tendered only the chart, Mr. Groome?

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, to simplify matters, we aggregated the

6 seven documents and the chart into a single exhibit. The original

7 exhibit had the same 65 ter number with all of those documents but

8 without the suffix.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, this document will be MFI'd under

10 what number?

11 THE REGISTRAR: Document 26001A receives number P2222,

12 Your Honours.

13 JUDGE ORIE: P2222 is admitted -- is marked for identification.

14 Mr. Groome?

15 MR. GROOME:

16 Q. General, the last question I have, I wanted to return to the

17 topic of Directive 7 and 7/1 and give you an additional opportunity to

18 say anything that you might want to say about them now that you've had an

19 opportunity to look at them. So let me put essentially my question to

20 you again. Is it your evidence that you have concluded that the absence

21 of that offensive phrase from 7/1 that we found in Directive 7 is an

22 indication of General Mladic's intentional withdrawal of that part of the

23 order?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And do you have factual knowledge that this is true or this is a