Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31945

 1                           Thursday, 19 February 2015

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.37 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             There were a few preliminary matters -- yes, Mr. Registrar, would

 8     you please call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  And good morning, Your Honours.

10             This is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             It was announced that the Prosecution had some preliminary

13     matters to be raised.  And before I give you an opportunity to do that,

14     Ms. Hasan, I'd like to inform the parties about the fate of the marked

15     map yesterday.  The map was marked by the witness, it has been scanned,

16     but the marking with the red pen did not result in a legible scanned

17     version of it, and therefore the parties are invited, together with

18     Mr. Registrar, to use one of the breaks in which the witness would again

19     mark exactly on that same map but now in black, make exactly the same

20     markings over the red markings so that it then can be scanned and that we

21     have an electronic copy that could be admitted into evidence.

22             That was my announcement.  So at least one break is already lost.

23             Ms. Hasan.

24             MS. HASAN:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning, everyone.

25             The first matter is in relation to an exhibit that was shown


Page 31946

 1     yesterday, P02100.  The Prosecution has received a revised translation of

 2     that.  You may recall that's the one where the English says "to the

 3     Main Staff" when it should say "to the Drina Corps."  The revised

 4     translation has been uploaded in e-court under document ID

 5     0426-9441-A-ET, and we'd request that we have permission -- or the

 6     Court Officer can replace the revision with the existing translation.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Court Officer is instructed to replace the

 8     present translation by the newly uploaded one.

 9             MS. HASAN:  The same issue arises with respect to Exhibit P01661.

10     We have found an error in the English translation; specifically, the

11     frequency in that intercept is recorded incorrectly as 254.950 when it

12     should provide 245.950, and the revised translation has been uploaded

13     under doc ID 0080-4430-A-ET.

14             And if the Defence doesn't object, we'll request again that the

15     Court Officer replace it with the existing translation.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  The Court Officer is hereby instructed to replace

17     the English translation of P01661 by the newly uploaded one as mentioned

18     by Ms. Hasan a second ago.

19             Ms. Hasan, have the translations been entirely revised or was it

20     just that you just asked for a revision of those points?

21             MS. HASAN:  No.  Well, we sent them for revision noting that we

22     have seen that this particular issue arises, so I presume CLSS looks at

23     the entire --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then that's --

25             MS. HASAN:  Entire document.  That's -- no.


Page 31947

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That's not what has been done?

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MS. HASAN:  Ms. Stewart advises that it was only those particular

 4     matters I raised that were revised.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm asking this because it now and then happens that

 6     there's not only one mistake but there are more.  Therefore, the Defence

 7     is urged to look at the whole of the document, and at least the error we

 8     discovered has been corrected now, but if there's anything more, of

 9     course, the Defence could address the matter again.  Usually we do that

10     within 48 hours, Mr. Ivetic.  And I'm addressing you because the

11     documents were related to the testimony of the present witness.

12             Then we move in -- there was one more, I do understand, in

13     private session?

14             MS. HASAN:  That's correct.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we move into private session.

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17                           [Open session]

18             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

20             Ms. Hasan, I did not consult the Rules directly so I have to

21     verify that as well, whether I made any mistakes, because we always

22     learned our students:  Don't say a word without having looked at the

23     rules, and I violated that general basic rule but I've seen them in the

24     past.

25             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.


Page 31952

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Jevdjevic.  Before we continue,

 5     I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration

 6     you've given yesterday at the beginning of your testimony.

 7             I also would like to inform you that you'll be invited during one

 8     of the breaks to do the same markings on that map as you did yesterday

 9     because since a red pencil was used, scanning in order to have a

10     electronic copy was not very successful, so under the supervision of the

11     Registrar and the parties you will be invited to make the same markings

12     but now in black so that it can be scanned again.

13             Mr. Ivetic will now continue his examination.

14             You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

16                           WITNESS:  MILENKO JEVDJEVIC [Resumed]

17                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

18                           Examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

19        Q.   First of all, good morning, sir.

20             Now, in relation to the geographic positioning of the two ABiH

21     listening posts, which yesterday we agreed we'd refer to only as the

22     northern and the southern locations without mentioning their names, what

23     comment, if any, do you have as to their possibility of intercepting

24     radio relay routes of the Drina Corps?

25        A.   It's a very broad topic.  Essentially both locations are very


Page 31953

 1     remote from radio relay hubs and points where the radio relay devices of

 2     the Drina Corps were located.  It's one factor that restricts ability to

 3     intercept radio relay communications.

 4             Another factor is that these locations were in sites where they

 5     cannot find themselves directly inside beams of the electromagnetic

 6     waves.  They are to the side or in other words on the flanks.

 7             And, third in the azimuths of their receiver antennas at

 8     intercepting stations were turned in the right direction, then there is a

 9     possibility for that to happen.  However, during proofing for this

10     testimony and my earlier appearances, I had the occasion to see many

11     intercepts from the two locations we are discussing now.  And I noticed

12     that in their reports, at the beginning of every report, the azimuth of

13     the receiver antenna is indicated.  And I wish to stress I always

14     remarked that their receiver antenna was turned to face towns and places

15     where our commands were located, not in the direction of our radio relay

16     communications.

17        Q.   Now, in terms of the operation of radio relay devices by the

18     Drina Corps, what was the standard practice as to the power level that

19     they would be operated under?

20        A.   The interpreter used the term "voltage" or "feed."  I suppose you

21     don't mean the power supply, but I suppose that you actually mean the

22     power of the equipment.

23        Q.   If I could use the B/C/S term, I believe I'm talking about

24     "snaga."

25             JUDGE ORIE:  It may be clear but I'm seeking the common


Page 31954

 1     understanding of the parties that the voltage under which you'd operate

 2     something doesn't say anything about the power you use in the application

 3     of that equipment.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Definitely, I would agree.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  I mean, 220 volts would help both for your hairdryer

 6     and other machines, which doesn't say anything about the -- I would say

 7     the watts, the power used in operating the device which is fed with a 220

 8     volt, if it is 220 volt, not necessarily perhaps, but do the parties

 9     agree on that?

10             MR. IVETIC:  I do, definitely.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan.

12             MS. HASAN:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  So then that's -- unless the witness would say that

14     I missed the point, we'll just go on.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. IVETIC:

17        Q.   So, sir, perhaps I can phrase the question this way:  What was

18     the standard practice in the Drina Corps as to what operating power

19     levels the units functioned according to?

20        A.   The entire standard procedure and the rules that operators had to

21     adhere to before the war and during the war was that if radio relay

22     devices were operating at a shorter distance, they would use less power.

23     Specifically, the radio relay devices we discussed yesterday have the

24     possibility of operating at full power and at lower power.  There is a

25     switch that you can turn to full power and decreased power.  So at


Page 31955

 1     shorter distance, we used less power.

 2        Q.   And what would be the result in terms of the transmission of the

 3     electromagnetic signal from that radio relay device operating at

 4     decreased power?

 5        A.   In practice that would mean that the reach, the range of these

 6     electric magnetic waves would be smaller because you're using reduced

 7     power, and that is a compulsory measure for protecting information, for

 8     protecting the radio relay route from interception.

 9        Q.   If I can ask you in relation to your last answer to clarify for

10     us:  Did you quantify how much smaller the range of the waves would be

11     when operating on the reduced power setting?

12        A.   Full power of the radio relay devices we discussed yesterday

13     RRU-800 and FM-200 is 10 watts and reduced power is 5 watts.  If the

14     distance between radio relay stations is smaller, then we always operated

15     at reduced power, i.e., 5 watts, to prevent that the electric magnetic

16     waves would reach larger distances and to prevent interception.

17        Q.   Okay.  Now I'd like to turn to the Krivaja 95 operation.  And

18     first of all, sir, what was your specific tasking in relation to that

19     operation?

20        A.   In that operation, I was an officer whose job it was to implement

21     the plan of communications for the execution of that operation.

22        Q.   What role -- what role did the Main Staff play in the

23     establishment of the plan of communications for the operation Krivaja 95?

24        A.   The Main Staff had no role.  The operation was executed by the

25     Drina Corps, and the plan of communications for that operation was made


Page 31956

 1     by the chief of communications of the Drina Corps.

 2        Q.   Were there any encryption devices in use during the Krivaja 95

 3     operation?  And now I'm going to first focus on radio devices.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   What type of encryption devices were used during that operation

 6     for radio devices?

 7        A.   For radio device that operated in the radio network towards

 8     subordinated units, we had an encryption device for the scrambling of

 9     speech which is called KZU-63.

10        Q.   Could you please describe for us how this unit, the KZU-63, would

11     be attached to a radio device to enable encryption?

12        A.   It's a small portable device.  Using a special cable, you connect

13     it to a radio device, and it's adjusted so that by inserting a particular

14     key or a code into it, the device encrypts speech and sends it, transmits

15     it on the air as encrypted speech.  All the other devices that have the

16     same encryption device attached to it with the same key, the same code,

17     are able and only they are able to hear and understand that message.

18        Q.   Was it possible for a participant of an encrypted radio

19     conversation to inadvertently switch off the KZU-63 device and still

20     participate in the communications with other participants still using

21     encryption, either to send or to receive communication from them?

22        A.   Absolutely impossible.

23        Q.   Could a participant in the encrypted radio network switch off the

24     KZU-63 encryption device and have it not be noticed by the other

25     participants in the communication?


Page 31957

 1        A.   If he turned off his device, he would have practically plugged

 2     out of that radio network and he would no longer be able to hear anyone

 3     else or be heard by anyone.

 4        Q.   And would there be anything else that would alert the other

 5     participants to the radio network that something has happened to that

 6     participant whose device has switched off?

 7        A.   Perhaps the mere fact that they would call him on that network

 8     and nobody would answer.  They would know that there is a problem with

 9     the device because they would not hear him.  That was the first indicator

10     for us.  So if he's not answering, that means he's not hearing us and

11     we're not hearing him.

12        Q.   And in the event that something like that happened, where a

13     participant dropped out of an encrypted radio conversation, what would be

14     the standard procedure?

15        A.   The standard procedure would be wherever that participant was,

16     for the encryption man to go there, taking a device which is called key

17     charger, and enable that participant to participate in the encrypted

18     radio network again.

19        Q.   Do you recall any such occurrence during the Krivaja 95 operation

20     where that happened?

21        A.   I don't remember that such a thing happened.  But if it had

22     happened, that would have been our routine procedure and it's a problem

23     very easily dealt with.

24        Q.   Now, I want to focus on --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic --


Page 31958

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  -- earlier you asked about the planning of this

 3     operation and the communications plan which was drafted for that purpose,

 4     and the witness told us that it was for the Drina Corps it was drafted.

 5             Now, yesterday we looked at -- at two plans, one of 1993, one of

 6     1994.  We also looked at the reconstruction of the communications as made

 7     by the ABiH after the war.  Do we have -- is that plan for the

 8     Drina Corps, is that in evidence at this moment?

 9             MR. IVETIC:  It's about to be.  It's one of the items I'd on my

10     list, Your Honours.  I believe it's 06261.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll --

12             Ms. Hasan.

13             MS. HASAN:  Sorry to intervene but, Your Honour, you raised the

14     issue of the two plans from yesterday and the dates of them, you

15     mentioned the dates.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             MS. HASAN:  The kremen plan is from January 1994.  The Drina plan

18     is part of a VRS, VJ, SRK operation known as Drina, which is dated

19     November/December 1993, and the Drina communication network we saw

20     yesterday is part of that operation but at the subordinate level of the

21     Drina Corps.  And that's dated January 1994.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But, of course, the gist of my request was

23     whether we have -- what we saw yesterday was not summer 1995 but was

24     plans, that's at least how it was explained, plans for communication at

25     earlier periods.  And we saw one reconstruction which deals with the


Page 31959

 1     summer of 1995 but which was, first of all, a reconstruction, and second

 2     was made only after the war.  That's how it was introduced.

 3             My question is do we have that plan the witness just talked about

 4     for Krivaja -- it was -- planned in 1995 for Krivaja within the

 5     Drina Corps?  That's -- do we have that?

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Well, I believe we have what the witness is talking

 7     about.  I'm not sure it is exactly what you'd expect it to be.  I can ask

 8     the witness to discuss that if we --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  It's just for me to be able to follow and not

10     to -- you'll understand that my recollection is not always good enough to

11     know exactly whether a document is among the approximately 10.000

12     documents which are now in evidence.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  Then --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Perhaps then if I actually skip ahead, I can call

16     that up.  The number 06261.

17        Q.   And, sir, when this comes up, if you could please take a look at

18     and identify the same for us.

19        A.   That is the communications plan that was elaborated by the chief

20     of communications of the Drina Corps for the Krivaja 95 operation.

21     According to that plan and in terms of equipment for speech protection

22     that I spoke of a moment ago, well, all of that has to do with this plan.

23        Q.   Okay.  And now looking at this plan, there are some reserve

24     participants listed, two -- two of them.  First of all, were those

25     actually used during the Krivaja 95 operation?


Page 31960

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   There is also a -- there's also an entry for the MUP just above

 3     the reserve participants.  What position did the MUP or other civilian

 4     police have in the communications system for the Krivaja 95 operation?

 5        A.   In this plan, one of the participants in this encrypted radio

 6     network was the MUP as well.  However, in reality in the field while this

 7     operation was being carried out, they never appeared and never

 8     participated in this operation and did not have a proper device.  So they

 9     were not part of the network that I headed.

10        Q.   Okay.  And would you explain for us there are a -- there are

11     several frequencies, I believe 22 in total that are listed in this

12     document.  Can you explain for us how and when these frequencies would be

13     used, paying particular focus to how one would change between

14     frequencies?

15        A.   Now we are talking about radio devices.  The communications that

16     we carried out according to this plan were carried out with RU-2/2K.  And

17     their frequency range is from 30 to 60 megahertz.  In case we operated on

18     a particular frequency and if there was some jamming or something like

19     that, we had the following possibility:  The person who was handling the

20     network would use a certain table of signals issuing an order to move to

21     one of the reserve frequencies.  So in this work-plan, the envisaged

22     frequency number one is the one we see here, and the planner of this

23     activity planned for 21 reserve frequencies as well.  Where it says

24     remark here, the way in which a reserve frequency would be used has been

25     explained.


Page 31961

 1        Q.   And just to be clear, you've identified the radio device in

 2     question as a RU-2/2K.  First of all, is that the correct denomination?

 3        A.   Yes, that is the correct denomination of that device.  Otherwise,

 4     that is a device that is fully compatible with the RUP-12.  However --

 5     yes, and they also work in the same frequency.  They're absolutely the

 6     same.  However, this is a more modern version, if you will, because a

 7     protection device could be plugged into this, so a modified RUP-12 was

 8     called RU-2/2K.

 9        Q.   And the RUP-12 and the RU-2/2K variant of the same, could you

10     identify for us if those were simplex or duplex modes of radio

11     communication?

12        A.   These radio devices work in simplex only; that is to say, using

13     one frequency.  For as long as anyone is speaking on this network,

14     everybody else has to listen because in that case he takes over.  It is

15     only when he let's go of the button he used to turn on, then it is only

16     then that the other participants in the conversation can say anything.

17        Q.   Okay.  And now I want to move --

18             MR. IVETIC:  First of all, I want to tender the document as the

19     next Defence exhibit number.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I hear of no objections.

21             MS. HASAN:  No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  But before we do so, Witness, I do understand that

23     this is something entirely different from what we looked at yesterday?

24     Yesterday we were looking at the radio relay structures, whereas this is

25     just radio communication.


Page 31962

 1             Then before we admit the document, I see that there's

 2     transcription -- I wouldn't call it a translation error.  In the second

 3     row of the frequencies, it starts with 12, 13, then again 13, where in

 4     the original it reads "14."

 5             Now, we could send that back for -- but perhaps it's far more

 6     practical to put on the record that it's common understanding between the

 7     parties that where it reads 13,272, that it indeed reads 14,272.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  I think that's practical and I don't see this

 9     becoming an issue of --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I don't think that this will be the decisive

11     issue.

12             Mr. Registrar.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D910, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Is admitted into evidence.

15             And one of the reasons, if it would be just text it's easy to

16     change it, but this seems to be a very special format which may take far

17     more time to get it right.

18             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

20        Q.   Now I want to focus on radio relay devices used during the

21     Krivaja 95 operation.  Were there any encryption devices in use on radio

22     relay devices during that operation?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Could you briefly describe for us what encryption capabilities

25     were used and at which devices.


Page 31963

 1        A.   For carrying out the Krivaja 95 operation, from the forward

 2     command post of the Drina Corps in Pribicevac, we established

 3     communication with our command of the Drina Corps through RRU-1.  Through

 4     this device, we had the possibility of sending encoded, encrypted written

 5     information, and we also had a KZU-61, and in that way we encoded speech

 6     as well.  I need to point out that with KZU-61 we could encrypt only

 7     speech communication with other participants who had the same device.

 8        Q.   And for which of the radio relay routes of the Drina Corps that

 9     we discussed yesterday did that encryption apply; that is to say, who

10     else -- who were the other participants that had the same capability?

11        A.   As for radio relay routes, the ones we discussed yesterday, we

12     had encrypted communication from the corps command in Vlasenica and the

13     Main Staff.  The device for the Main Staff was at Veliki Zep; that is to

14     say, along that line we had this device for encrypting speech.

15        Q.   Okay.  Now, did you have occasion to come into contact with any

16     UNPROFOR members during the course of this operation?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Can you please tell us what happened.

19        A.   In one of the stages of the implementation of this operation when

20     our forces from the direction of Zeleni Jadar were advancing towards

21     Srebrenica, at that moment, according to our information, there was an

22     incident between the members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

23     Srebrenica and UNPROFOR.  There was an exchange of gun-fire.  And on that

24     occasion a member of UNPROFOR was killed.  He was located at a

25     check-point in the broader area of Zeleni Jadar.  Through communications


Page 31964

 1     equipment at the forward command post we received information to the

 2     effect that the members of UNPROFOR who were at that check-point used

 3     four APCs to move to our side because of this unpleasant situation that

 4     they found themselves in.  Literally, they withdrew towards our side,

 5     towards Zeleni Jadar, and then General Krstic personally - from the

 6     forward command post, he was the one who commanded that operation - he

 7     sent me to Zeleni Jadar as an active-duty officer so that I take in these

 8     UNPROFOR members and bring them to a secure position.  I did that.  I

 9     went in the direction of Zeleni Jadar, and I encountered these four APCs

10     as they were moving towards the broader area of Pribicevac.  I turned my

11     vehicle around and brought them to the broader area of the forward

12     command post.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I still have a question which I seek

14     clarification of.

15             You talked about KZU-61.  That is different from KZU-63.  Is that

16     well understood?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You understood that well, yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  You said:

19             "I need to point out that KZU-61, we could encrypt only speech

20     communication with other participants who had the same device."

21             In what respect is that different from the KZU-63?  Because I do

22     understand that for encryption you always use at both ends of the

23     communication devices which are able to, on the one hand side, to

24     encrypt, and on the other side to decrypt.  In what respect is the KZU-61

25     then different from the KZU-63, or is it the same?


Page 31965

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KZU-63 are devices that are plugged

 2     into radio transmitters that soldiers carry on their backs.  The

 3     dimensions are those of a regular back-pack, and these are portable

 4     devices, portable radio devices.  As for KZU-61, that is a fixed piece of

 5     equipment that we would plug into an RRU-1, and it encoded speech that

 6     goes through radio relay equipment between Pribicevac and Veliki Zep on

 7     that radio relay route.  In order to have this kind of encoded

 8     communication with a participant on the other side, that other party

 9     needed to have that kind of device too.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I understand that.  You also said that this

11     allowed you for encrypted communication.  In relation to the KZU-63, you

12     were asked whether you could switch that off.  You said no, it couldn't.

13     Is that the same for KZU-61 or is that different?  Because you said:

14             "We had the possibility of sending encoded, encrypted written

15     information, and we also had a KZU-61, and in that way we encoded speech

16     as well."

17             Could you also not switch that off, the KZU-61?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KZU-61 is a device that technically

19     can be switched off and one can speak openly through an RRU-1.  That is

20     the way it was conceived.  You can have an open conversation as well.

21     However, when the encoder is turned on, then this speech goes through

22     there protective encoder and then it is encrypted.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I understand that.

24             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

25             MR. IVETIC:  If we could return to the --


Page 31966

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  At the same time, I'm looking at the clock.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Oh.  I guess we'll have our first break.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll take a break.  Can you tell us how much

 4     time you would still need after the break, Mr. Ivetic?

 5             MR. IVETIC:  I think 15, 20 minutes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  15, 20 minutes.

 7             Mr. Jevdjevic, we'll take a break.  We'd like to see you back in

 8     20 minutes.  You may follow the usher.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10             And the parties and Mr. Registrar will use the break for the new

11     markings.

12             Mr. McCloskey, you were on your feet, but not anymore.

13             We'll take a break and resume at ten minutes to 11.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  We briefly turn into private session but the witness

17     can be escorted in the courtroom already, although I will deal with one

18     matter before he enters the courtroom.

19                           [Private session]

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 31967

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 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

10

11  Pages 31967-31969 redacted.  Private session.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25


Page 31970

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, before we continue, Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber

23     just gave a ruling that to the extent protective measures for this

24     witness which were granted in the Krstic case would still continue to

25     exist after a decision on the 12th of November, 2008, by the Popovic


Page 31971

 1     Chamber that, to the extent that may have been the case, that they're

 2     hereby rescinded by retroactive effect, which means that the parties can

 3     refer to the evidence given by this witness in the Krstic case not only

 4     in terms of substance but also in terms of this testimony be given in the

 5     Krstic case.

 6             Finally, it is the prerogative of the Presiding Judge of a

 7     Chamber to seize any mobile phones that are ringing.  I gave authority to

 8     my colleagues to seize my mobile phone if mine rings.

 9             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11        Q.   Sir, if we could just finish up with the UNPROFOR members that

12     you encountered, could you please tell us if you recall what date it was

13     that you had that encounter with the UNPROFOR members withdrawing towards

14     VRS lines.

15        A.   It was on the day when one of them got killed.  And I think it

16     could have been the 10th of July, in the middle of the day.

17        Q.   And under what conditions were these UNPROFOR members kept once

18     at the VRS side?

19                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Following me, they arrived in the

21     broader area of the forward command post Pribicevac.  They parked their

22     vehicles in a field, and nobody kept them anywhere.  Nobody restricted or

23     controlled them.  They were all treated as soldiers who had found

24     themselves in trouble an hour earlier, and they were not kept or

25     mistreated in any way.


Page 31972

 1        Q.   Okay.  And now I'd like to focus on the forward command post for

 2     communications at Pribicevac for Krivaja 95.  How long did you stay there

 3     before completing your duties at that location for that operation?

 4        A.   I remained until 11 July.

 5        Q.   And where did you go then upon completing your duties at the

 6     Pribicevac communications command -- forward command post?

 7        A.   An hour or two hours before night-fall on the 11th July, I think

 8     it could have been 7.00 p.m., I packed up the communications centre at

 9     the forward command post.  And with all my troops, I set out after what

10     we call elements of the combat disposition who were far in advance of us

11     ahead of the command post, so I passed Srebrenica and Potocari, arriving

12     at the command of the Bratunac Brigade in Bratunac.

13        Q.   Did you report to anyone at that time?

14        A.   At the command of the Bratunac Brigade, I found my own

15     signalsman, who was carrying the portable radio device for encryption,

16     and he was together with General Krstic in a vehicle.  I asked him where

17     General Krstic was, and he answered that Krstic had also come to the

18     Bratunac Brigade Command, so I located General Krstic and then a meeting

19     followed at the command shortly after.

20        Q.   Could you tell us who were the participants in this meeting.

21        A.   There was the commander of the Main Staff, General Mladic; the

22     commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic; then the Chief of Staff

23     of the Drina Corps, General Krstic; the commander of the

24     Zvornik Brigade - I think he was a lieutenant-colonel then - Pandurevic;

25     and to the best of my recollection, all the brigade commanders of the


Page 31973

 1     Drina Corps who took part in that operation.

 2        Q.   And what was the timing of that meeting?  What day and what hour

 3     are we talking about?

 4        A.   The meeting was held on 11 July at the Command of the Bratunac

 5     Brigade, and if I remember well, it was from 2200 to 2300 hours.

 6        Q.   What topics were the subject matter discussed at that meeting?

 7        A.   A brief analysis of the combat actions of that day was presented

 8     at the meeting headed by General Mladic.  And after that analysis, he

 9     briefed us about the main concept; namely, that on the following day, the

10     12th July, all the units that participated in Krivaja 95 should regroup

11     and set out to execute the next operation, Stupcanica 95.

12        Q.   And Stupcanica 95, what region or geographic area did that

13     operation involve?

14        A.   The broader area of Zepa.

15        Q.   Okay.  Was anything else of significance discussed at that

16     meeting that you recall or that you had your attention drawn to?

17        A.   To the best of my recollection, after General Mladic presented

18     the main concept, that on 12 July all the units should regroup towards

19     Zepa, Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, commander of the Zvornik Brigade,

20     asked to speak, and he presented his opinion that the situation in part

21     of the front line facing Srebrenica was still unclear; meaning, the bulk

22     of the forces of the 28th Division which, according to our intelligence,

23     intended to try to break through, to break out of Srebrenica, and a

24     smaller part of their forces wanted to go towards Zepa.

25     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic suggested that his forces should wait a


Page 31974

 1     little for the situation in Srebrenica to become clearer concerning these

 2     forces of the 28th Division who intended to move towards Zepa.  And

 3     regardless of this thinking of Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, I remember

 4     very well that General Mladic said no, no, no, tomorrow everybody goes to

 5     Zepa.  And he pointed at me and said, "And you, boy, you set up tonight

 6     already a forward command post at Krivace between Srebrenica and Zepa."

 7        Q.   Okay.  And did you immediately go to establish a forward command

 8     post at Krivace between Srebrenica and Zepa?

 9        A.   Shortly after the official meeting ended and bearing in mind the

10     orders of General Mladic, I stood up immediately and was among the first

11     to leave that room.  I gathered my soldiers and picked up my

12     communications centre, which was on a big vehicle, and immediately headed

13     to Vlasenica where the command of the Drina Corps was.  Vlasenica itself

14     is further down the road from Srebrenica to Zepa.

15        Q.   And then what else did you do that evening?

16        A.   When I got to the command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica, it was

17     past midnight, and I was reasoning that I wasn't familiar with the

18     location of Krivace where General Mladic had ordered me to set up the

19     communications centre, and it was not easy to do it so late.  So I went

20     to the operations centre and used my own common sense because I, as a

21     signalsman, need much less time to get to that location than the brigades

22     who had involved -- who had been involved in the operation around

23     Srebrenica, needed time to assemble and get to Zepa.

24             So either I asked for somebody's permission or decided myself to

25     spend the night in Vlasenica and then replenish my unit with batteries


Page 31975

 1     and other things, and then proceed to execute the order on the 12 July.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And after establishing the communications centre at the --

 3     at the forward command post at Krivace, did at any point in time some new

 4     information come to light which changed the situation of the forces

 5     available for that operation in relation to Zepa?

 6        A.   I didn't have such information.

 7        Q.   Did all the forces that were envisioned for the Zepa operation

 8     stay in that region and complete the mission as to the Zepa?

 9        A.   The operation in Zepa began on 14 July in the morning hours.  And

10     I remember from the plan of that operation after one day of fighting, one

11     part of the Zvornik Brigade was pulled out, and this part was commanded

12     by Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic himself, and was ordered to go back to

13     the area of that brigade because of the problems that their units had in

14     fighting the 28th Division that was trying to break out of encirclement

15     and link up with their own forces, the forces of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla.

16        Q.   And what was your knowledge and understanding of the threat posed

17     by the problems that the Zvornik units had in fighting with the

18     28th Division that was trying to break out of encirclement?

19        A.   I remember that Major Dragan Obrenovic, Chief of Staff of the

20     Zvornik Brigade, called me on the phone personally, since we have been

21     good friends from childhood and we finished all the military schools

22     together.  He sounded panicked.  He was calling me at my forward command

23     post knowing that I was close to General Krstic, and he asked me to try

24     to convince General Krstic, to get through to him the urgency of the

25     situation he was facing in fighting the 28th Division, because the


Page 31976

 1     Zvornik Brigade had deployed all its available forces to hold the front

 2     line facing Tuzla and its elite unit and its reserve unit that it had was

 3     already on the front line towards Zepa, so he had literally taken out one

 4     platoon to confront the whole division.  He said that he had already

 5     contacted many other people but they had shown little understanding for

 6     the seriousness of his position, so he asked me to reason and convince

 7     General Krstic that it was absolutely necessary to bring back

 8     Vinko Pandurevic and his units to help him in his fight.

 9        Q.   And in terms of where this fighting was going on, did you have an

10     appreciation from the information that you received of where precisely

11     this fighting was going on between the 28th Division and the platoon that

12     had been mustered up by Major Obrenovic?

13        A.   From my estimate and my knowledge about that battle, the fighting

14     was taking place along the transversal where even earlier the sabotage

15     groups had contact with the units in Tuzla.  It's across Pobudje, the

16     broader area of Konjevic Polje, Cerska, Udrc, towards Tuzla.  So

17     somewhere in the area of Crni Vrh in the direction of Zvornik.

18        Q.   Sir, I thank you for answering my questions both on behalf of

19     myself, General Mladic, and the team.

20             MR. IVETIC:  I have no further questions in direct examination.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

22             Mr. Jevdjevic, you'll now be cross-examined by Ms. Hasan.  You

23     find Ms. Hasan to your right.  Ms. Hasan is counsel for the Prosecution.

24             You may proceed, Ms. Hasan.

25             MS. HASAN:  Thank you, Your Honour.


Page 31977

 1                           Cross-examination by Ms. Hasan:

 2        Q.   Good morning, Witness.

 3        A.   Good day.

 4        Q.   Just to start, can you tell us what -- what -- what's your

 5     nickname?

 6        A.   Jevdjo.

 7        Q.   And was that what people would call you during the war time as

 8     well?

 9        A.   That is how they addressed me, those who were in closer

10     communication with me.

11        Q.   Are there any other Jevdjos that you know of in the Drina Corps

12     Command?

13        A.   In the Drina Corps, no.  In the protection corps -- regiment

14     there was my brother.  Everybody called him Jevdjo too.  And there was

15     this other man in the Visegrad Brigade.

16        Q.   Let's go to your testimony in relation to Zeleni Jadar.  Now, you

17     testified yesterday, do I understand you correctly, that you were only

18     involved in the operation to the extent of setting up the communications;

19     is that correct?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And you made a brief reference to a document that suggested that

22     you had been in a leadership role; do you recall, recall that?

23        A.   The interpretation I received was "leadership"?  In our country,

24     only the commander and the Chief of Staff can be leaders.

25        Q.   Okay.


Page 31978

 1             MS. HASAN:  Let's turn to 65 ter 19555, please.

 2        Q.   Perhaps this document will help refresh your recollection on what

 3     role you had.  So what this is, it's an order from the Drina Corps

 4     Command.  It's dated the 29th of May, 1995.  We see that it's marked

 5     urgent.  And it relates to the order for the taking over of Zeleni Jadar,

 6     of the Zeleni Jadar sector.

 7             And among others, it's addressed to the command of the

 8     Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac Brigade, and the Skelani separate battalion.

 9     It provides at the beginning:

10             "Following UNPROFOR departure from the Zeleni Jadar check-point,

11     Muslim forces will probably try to place Zeleni Jadar under their

12     control."

13             "In order to prevent the incursion of enemy forces into

14     Zeleni Jadar and place the Zeleni Jadar factory complex and the

15     Skelani-Podravanje road under our control, I hereby order the

16     following ..."

17             And this is an order from General Zivanovic.

18             If we look at item 3 --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please slow down.

20             MS. HASAN:  Yes.

21        Q.   If we look at item 3, it provides, the order, again, of

22     General Zivanovic:

23             "Engage the following officers from the Drina Corps command to

24     command the attacking forces in the Zeleni Jadar sector."

25             And we see three names:  Colonel Obrad Vicic, Colonel Stojan


Page 31979

 1     Veletic, and Major Milenko Jevdjevic.  And these are persons you made

 2     reference to yesterday during your testimony.

 3             So according to this order from General Zivanovic, you were

 4     supposed to be a leader of this attack.  In fact, this was an order that

 5     you were to lead this attack.  Does that help you remember about what

 6     role you had?

 7        A.   If you just go on reading, that is to say read the next sentence,

 8     just where you stopped, you will see that it says here:

 9             "I will personally command the forces from the forward command

10     post of the Drina Corps at Pribicevac."

11             Major-General Zivanovic says that this attribute of command and

12     control only belongs to him.

13        Q.   So you're denying what it says very clearly in this order, that

14     he was engaging you to command the attacking forces?

15        A.   I don't know.  Probably this is a misinterpretation or a

16     mistranslation.  It says here that Zivanovic is telling himself that he

17     will personally command the forces from the forward command post.

18     Everybody else assists him in particular areas.  I was the man in charge

19     of the field of communications, and that is unequivocal and I never

20     denied that.

21        Q.   Well, I think the order is clear.

22             MS. HASAN:  I'd offer 65 ter 19555 into evidence.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's comment, Ms. Hasan, that the order is

24     clear.  But I do understand you tender it.

25             Mr. Registrar.


Page 31980

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7130, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  P7130 is admitted.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MS. HASAN:

 5        Q.   And you testified yesterday in relation to this -- in relation to

 6     this attack that it was carried out without a single bullet being fired;

 7     is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, it always assists us if you would have a

10     page reference.  If not, then of course it's no drama, but...

11             MS. HASAN:  I actually don't have one for this one but I

12     certainly can look it up and bring it to your attention as soon as I find

13     that.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll find it anyhow.  But if you have it there, then

15     I can immediately follow what you're referring to.  That's the issue.

16     But I'll search for "bullet" and then ...

17             MS. HASAN:  Could we have P01153, please.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  By the way, it is 31878.

19             Please proceed.

20             MS. HASAN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21        Q.   Witness, this is an order from General Zivanovic.  It's dated the

22     2nd of June, 1995, regarding the restoration of the control over the

23     facilities and the Zeleni Jadar asphalt road.

24             And we see it's issued to the command of the Bratunac Brigade and

25     the commander of the Drina Corps Manoeuvre Battalion.  And it states that


Page 31981

 1     the conditions were right to "launch the final stage of liberating

 2     Zeleni Jadar in its entirety."

 3             Are you familiar with this order?

 4        A.   During proofing, I did have an opportunity to see it.

 5        Q.   Now, to sum it up, it outlines the steps of how to remove a UN

 6     observation post at Zeleni Jadar, and if we look at --

 7             MS. HASAN:  On page 1 at the end, and this is at the end of the

 8     page in the B/C/S, and the third bullet point, I believe, from the top of

 9     the English.  It's on the second page of the English, I apologise.  Okay.

10        Q.   And there it says -- in outlining how to take over this OP, it

11     says:

12             "If they fail," and this is a reference to UNPROFOR, "to follow

13     the order," of surrender, which is previously discussed, "one should fire

14     a Zolja hand-held rocket-launcher into a power generator, with readiness

15     to neutralise a personnel carrier, while taking care to avoid physically

16     injuring any UNPROFOR personnel."

17             Do you see that there?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MS. HASAN:  Now, if we look down in the English on page 2, and

21     it's about the fourth bullet point in the English, and I think we have to

22     turn now to page 2 of the B/C/S.

23        Q.   It provides:

24             "If the UNPROFOR continue threatening to use weapons towards

25     Legenda, use a Zolja to neutralise a personnel carrier."


Page 31982

 1             Do you see that?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And you'd agree that the Legenda referenced here is Milan Jolovic

 4     from the Drina Wolves; is that right?

 5        A.   Yes.  That unit was called the Podrinje Detachment of special

 6     forces battalion of the brigade.

 7        Q.   And as far as you remember, did that unit also take part in this

 8     attack?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             MS. HASAN:  Now if we scroll down in the B/C/S, and in the

11     English we have to turn the page to the signature page --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, it was put to you that the name

13     was the Drina Wolves.  Is that confirmed by you as well, that that was

14     the name used to refer to that unit?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Its official name in our

16     establishment was not the Drina Wolves but they themselves called

17     themselves that, so others called them that too.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, thank you.

19             Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.

20             MS. HASAN:

21        Q.   Now if we look at the handwritten note there at the bottom, it

22     reads:  "For Skelani SPB (Jevdo should convey) self-propelled guns to be

23     included at 0500."  That would be you, a message that you were to convey;

24     correct?

25        A.   No.


Page 31983

 1        Q.   Now, this order to remove UNPROFOR from their observation point,

 2     which details calls to surrender and then to -- to use weapons to

 3     disengage them, that was carried out, wasn't it?

 4        A.   Firstly, this telegram was received at the command of the

 5     Bratunac Brigade, and someone from the command of the Bratunac Brigade

 6     probably in his own hand for some reason stated, probably thinking of the

 7     communications plan, that Jevdjo would convey or transmit the plan of

 8     communications.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm stopping you there.  Could you please answer the

10     question.  The question was whether the order, and the details were given

11     by Ms. Hasan, was carried out or not.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ms. Hasan said -- well, this speaks

13     only about the plan if members of UNPROFOR do this, if they do that, so

14     these are assumptions.  This entire order is based on assumptions.  Or,

15     rather, on a sequence of steps.  If somebody does this, then this should

16     be applied.

17             So this is not an order for attack for combat activities because

18     otherwise what would have been written in the letterhead would have been

19     order to attack.  It is only an order for the territory held by the

20     Drina Corps that positions should be moved from one line to another; that

21     is to say, within that framework that is under its control, of course,

22     everything outside the protected area and outside the Muslim positions.

23             So this was just relocation, and that is also what the title

24     says, relocating one's own lines to a better territory so that our

25     territory would be in our rear, behind us.  And also include


Page 31984

 1     self-propelled weapons.  That is not what I am supposed to convey.  With

 2     the best of intentions and to interpret this as a soldier who took part

 3     in this, maybe this means that the Bratunac Brigade has, just in case,

 4     artillery prepared somewhere, include self-propelled guns.  That is not

 5     what is stated here that I should convey that.  These are two different

 6     statements.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, did you intend to take the witness back

 8     again to the stamp or did you just wanted an answer to your question?

 9             MS. HASAN:  No, absolutely, I just wanted him to answer my

10     question.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

12             Witness, apparently it's of some concern to you what is written

13     at the bottom here, but that is not what you were asked about.  I think

14     you explained that in this order various scenarios are described and

15     therefore you say it's not an order.  At the same time, if at the end of

16     the order it says Legenda and Petrovic shall take control of the UNPROFOR

17     check-point and make detailed arrangement before continuing along the

18     asphalt road crossing Jadar, I mean, that's clearly an order, isn't it,

19     although some possible scenarios, what would have happened in between,

20     are described.  But if you say it's not an order, this last paragraph

21     certainly at least very much resembles what an order is, isn't it?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The entire document, the entire

23     operation, was not conceived as an order to attack.  Only to relocate --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  No one talked about an order to attack.  It was just

25     referred to whether this order was put in place, yes or no.


Page 31985

 1             You told us already that some of the portions were written in a

 2     way as if this happens, then do that; if this happens, then do that.

 3     That's clear.

 4             Ms. Hasan will now put further questions to you, and I would urge

 5     you to carefully listen to what she wants to know rather than what you

 6     consider relevant to tell her.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MS. HASAN:

 9        Q.   So, Witness, and please try to just answer the question, was this

10     order of General Zivanovic carried out?  Simple: Yes or no?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, that's not an appropriate question.

12             The witness has rightly explained that the order contains various

13     possibilities.  Now, if you want to know whether it was carried out, you

14     can, as I did, either refer to the last part, where there's no such

15     conditions, or you should put to the witness did they point weapons, was

16     this said or not, because all the same -- you have to be specific there.

17     You can't ask a yes or no on the basis of this order.

18             Please proceed.

19             MS. HASAN:  I'll move on.

20        Q.   Witness, it -- would you agree with me that -- and you having

21     reviewed this -- this document, that it was essentially, leaving aside

22     whether you claim it happened or not, an order to terrorise or scare

23     UNPROFOR and get them in -- to leave the OP.  Would you agree with that?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Okay.


Page 31986

 1             MS. HASAN:  Could we please have 65 ter 32038.

 2        Q.   Witness, this is the -- what's going to appear is your testimony

 3     from the Popovic case.

 4             MS. HASAN:  And if we could e-court page 54.

 5        Q.   And you're asked at line 17, and I'll read this out slowly so you

 6     can follow along:

 7             "Q. And I understand how important that was.  And, basically,

 8     this is an order to scare the daylights out of UNPROFOR and get them to

 9     leave that OP; correct? "

10             And your answer was:

11             "Well, more or less, yes."

12             Do you stand by that testimony.

13        A.   I stand by that part of my testimony, but this is probably,

14     again, a case of taking things out of context.  If UNPROFOR were to put

15     up resistance, that is how the entire order is treated.  If UNPROFOR were

16     not to resist with using weapons in any way, the order says very nicely

17     that our forces would just pass through and put their positions within

18     their own area of responsibility.  In case they resist, then there is an

19     envisaged scenario; namely, that in a way it be made known to UNPROFOR by

20     firing a gun into the air, et cetera, that quite simply they should not

21     interfere in that part of the situation.

22        Q.   And since you have provided us with your interpretation today

23     saying parts of it wasn't followed and parts it was and it was

24     conditional, well, let's look at what you said in Popovic at line 7:

25             "Q. So we can conclude that this order was followed, can't we?


Page 31987

 1             "A. Well, the person who issued the order would probably know

 2     that best if he were to carry out an analysis.  Last week, I spoke in

 3     detail about the events I remember from that period of time.

 4             "Q. Well, was it carried out or not?"

 5             And your answer was:

 6             "It was, but later on some people were dissatisfied with this

 7     because was it enough to secure those factories, because the Muslim side

 8     could control the Zeleni Jadar area with fire-power.  But I remember that

 9     the Zeleni Jadar-Jasenova road could be used after this, and that was

10     very important for our units on the ground there."

11             So, do you stand by that testimony you gave in the Popovic --

12     before the Popovic Trial Chamber?

13        A.   Of course.

14             MS. HASAN:  Your Honour, I note the time.  Is this an appropriate

15     time for the break?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll take a break now.

17             Witness, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.  You may follow

18     the usher.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We resume at quarter past 12.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.

23                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24                           [The witness takes the stand]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.


Page 31988

 1             MS. HASAN:  May we see Exhibit P02100.

 2        Q.   Witness, this is the regular combat report from the 3rd of June,

 3     1995, which we looked at yesterday.  And it's in relation to this

 4     document that you had testified at transcript page 31878, lines 22 to 25:

 5             "That whoever it was who wrote this probably wanted to exaggerate

 6     his own contribution to these events."

 7             Now, you may recall that this document set out that the

 8     population, the civilians in that area, left in panic.  So according to

 9     you, sir, that would have been something impressive to tell your

10     superiors, or to tell a superior?

11        A.   When I said that somebody tried to exaggerate, I meant the entire

12     document.  Quite simply, one of the hundreds of sentences in this

13     document; namely, that the population had fled in panic.  And my

14     testimony was that there was no population living there, and therefore

15     they could not have fled there panic.  So this flight of civilians would

16     not be impressive for any officer.  But my testimony was there was nobody

17     living there in the first place, and therefore they could not flee in

18     panic.

19             MS. HASAN:  Well, let's look at page 2 in the English and page 2

20     in the B/C/S -- oh, sorry, I apologise.  The English - keep it - it

21     starts on page 1.

22        Q.   And it says:

23             "In a very precise and professional operation, they forced the

24     strong and courageous UNPROFOR check-point in Zeleni Jadar to withdraw in

25     panic to Srebrenica."


Page 31989

 1             Do you see that there?

 2             MS. HASAN:  It looks like it's also page 2 in the -- sorry, page

 3     1 in the B/C/S, item 2.

 4        Q.   Just at the beginning there.  I'll give you an opportunity to

 5     read that.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps it can be enlarged a bit further.

 7             MS. HASAN:  Okay.  And if we turn to item 3.  That's the next

 8     page in both versions.

 9        Q.   It says:

10             "We have -- we have had no casualties.  We expended small amounts

11     of ammunition and three Zoljas, hand-held rockets."

12             Now, that's consistent with General Zivanovic's order of the 2nd

13     of June, isn't it?

14        A.   What do you mean it's consist with the order?  What is it that

15     you are specifically citing and then saying that it is in keeping with

16     General Zivanovic's order?

17        Q.   Well, for one thing, that ammunition, including Zoljas, were

18     used.

19        A.   I've already told you and I said in all my previous testimonies

20     that to the best of my knowledge this action was carried out without a

21     single bullet fired.  It was completed by 9.00 in the morning.  We

22     transferred our forces from one area to another, and not a single bullet

23     was fired let alone three Zoljas.  My knowledge from that period does not

24     tally with what this report says.

25        Q.   Well, let's look at what DutchBat officer Major Franken says.


Page 31990

 1             MS. HASAN:  And that's P1417.  Your Honours, that's his admitted

 2     statement in this case.  If we could see page 10 in the English and page

 3     17 in the B/C/S version.

 4        Q.   And he describes the VRS attack on OP Echo in paragraph 38, and

 5     he says:

 6             "On 3 June 1995 the VRS attacked OP Echo.  We got report through

 7     Bravo Company, the company responsible for that area, that there was some

 8     movement in front of OP Echo.  The movement proved to be Serb infantry.

 9     Then the Serb infantry used the loud-speaker to tell the OP that they had

10     to go, they had to withdraw because the Serbs wanted to come in.

11     B Company asked me permission to do that which I denied.  Then they came

12     under attack and in the end the Serbs took OP Echo over and the crew

13     withdrew in the very last moment with my authorisation.  The attack was

14     conducted by about 40 infantry supported by a tank, (T55), a main battle

15     tank, and a gun on the edge, ridge at Zeleni Jadar.  The observation

16     tower was hit by the firing main battle tank and the area was fired at by

17     the anti-aircraft gun standing up there used to support the Serb attack."

18             So, Mr. Jevdjevic, do still maintain that no force was used in

19     this attack?

20        A.   To the best of my knowledge because we were listening with our

21     own ears to hear what would happen, and we were expecting gun-fire at any

22     moment.  But then in the early morning hours, we received reports that

23     our forces had just crossed over to the line they wished to reach.  So

24     that event remained in my memory as the only planned combat activity

25     where we accomplished the mission without combat, and I stand by the


Page 31991

 1     evidence I gave yesterday and earlier today.

 2        Q.   And would you agree with me, then, that the report that is --

 3     that bears your name that we just previously looked at, that -- that

 4     would have meant that you were operating outside of your regular

 5     communications duties; is that correct?

 6        A.   Absolutely not.

 7        Q.   So you could have authored that report, despite the fact that you

 8     were -- you claim you were just -- just engaged in communications?

 9        A.   The interpreter just told me that you claim I could have authored

10     that report.  I never said that.

11        Q.   What I'm asking is, that report bears your name.  Now you claim

12     that that is -- that couldn't have been you, okay?  But it would mean,

13     right, the fact that it bears your name, that you were acting outside

14     your regular communications duties.

15        A.   Either I am getting a very strange interpretation or I failed to

16     understand your logic.  I maintained --

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll phrase the question again.

18             If you would have been the author of that document, which you say

19     you're not, would that mean that such activity, writing such a report and

20     being involved it as described, that that would have been beyond, outside

21     what your real functions were; that is, being engaged in communications.

22     Would you agree with that.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, I take it that this resolves the matter.

25             MS. HASAN:  Yes.


Page 31992

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 2             MS. HASAN:

 3        Q.   Now, Witness, you told us - I'm going to move on to a different

 4     topic - that you were at the Pribicevac forward command post during the

 5     Krivaja 95 operation.  Could you tell us when it was that General Mladic

 6     arrived at the IKM on 10 July?

 7        A.   To the best of my recollection, around 10.00.

 8        Q.   And is that 10.00 in the morning or 10.00 in the evening?

 9        A.   10.00 a.m.

10        Q.   And do you recall how long he stayed on the 10th of July at the

11     forward command post?

12        A.   At the very location of the forward command post, he spent very

13     little time.  He was going further on towards the forward lines where the

14     observation posts were, and it was not within my field of vision.  But he

15     stayed in the broader area of the forward command post perhaps until

16     later afternoon.  He was at the observation posts near the forward

17     command post.

18        Q.   How far were these observation posts from the command post --

19     forward command post?

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mladic, no communications, as you -- turn,

21     please.

22             Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Several hundred metres.

24             MS. HASAN:

25        Q.   Now, if someone was trying to reach General Mladic from the


Page 31993

 1     Main Staff or from Vlasenica, they could reach him, couldn't they?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And General Mladic was also at the Pribicevac forward command

 4     post on the 11th of July; isn't that right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And could you share with us when he arrived and when he left.

 7        A.   I think he arrived before noon; and he left the forward command

 8     post in the early afternoon, around 3.00, 4.00 p.m.

 9        Q.   And as you were at the forward command post, do you agree that

10     the chain of command remained intact throughout that Krivaja 95

11     operation?

12             MR. IVETIC:  Object to the question as being unclear.  Which

13     chain of command?

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, you perhaps be a bit more precise.  I

15     think I understand your question but to avoid any confusion.

16             MS. HASAN:

17        Q.   Well, I'm referring to the VRS chain of command and the command

18     over this Krivaja 95 operation.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Well, then I would ask that she split up the two

20     questions.  Those are two different chains of command.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, then the witness can answer the question.  And

22     if there's any need to follow up, then we'll find that from his answer.

23             Witness, could you please answer the question.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operation was commanded by the

25     Drina Corps, and that chain of command remained unchanged throughout the


Page 31994

 1     operation.

 2             MS. HASAN:

 3        Q.   Now, Witness, I'm going to move on --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we ask the witness also, was there anything --

 5     you said within the Drina Corps the chain of command functioned normally.

 6     Of course, the Drina Corps was under the command of the Main Staff of the

 7     VRS, the main command.  Was there anything there which you think was

 8     interrupted in any way, chain of command from the Drina Corps up and down

 9     from the Main Staff and command to the extent you know?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything functioned normally.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Both at the level of the Drina Corps and at the

12     level above the Drina Corps, as far as you are aware of?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't understand what you're

14     asking me.  Everything functioned normally.  The Drina Corps was carrying

15     out the operation.  It established the forward command post.  The forward

16     command post was commanded by someone from the Drina Corps.  In this

17     case, General Krstic.  In Vlasenica, where the command of the Drina Corps

18     is based, it continued to function according to the previous plan.  And

19     the Main Staff and their command, in their location, continued to

20     function according to their plan.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

22             MS. HASAN:

23        Q.   So, Witness, I'm going to move on to the evidence you just gave

24     towards the end of your testimony today about this meeting that you claim

25     took place on the night of 11 July.  And this is, in fact, an account


Page 31995

 1     that you have been given -- that you gave in the Krstic case, and this is

 2     when General Krstic tried as well to put that meeting on the 11th of

 3     July.  You were aware of that; right?

 4        A.   What are you claiming should have been clear to me?

 5        Q.   Well, that General Krstic was also claiming that the meeting you

 6     were referring to took place on the 11th July and not the 12th of July.

 7        A.   I don't know what General Krstic claimed, but I know that the

 8     meeting that I, too, attended was held on 11 July.

 9        Q.   Now, we happen to have the contemporaneous diary that was taken

10     by Mirko Trivic who is the commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade.

11             MS. HASAN:  And if we could take a look at those; it's

12     Exhibit P01467.  And if we could turn to page 28.

13        Q.   And you see there, it says:

14             "Order: Remain at the line reached.  The brigade commanders are

15     to come to the Drina Corps IKM in Bratunac by 2100 hours via Srebrenica

16     and Potocari (the Bratunac Brigade KM)," command.

17             Now, in fact, you attended the meeting that took place at 2100

18     hours with all the brigade commanders; correct?

19        A.   Yes, except that I said that, to the best of my recollection,

20     that meeting began around 2200 hours.

21        Q.   And you did travel through -- from -- from the forward command

22     post at Pribicevac through Srebrenica and Potocari; isn't that the case?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And Mirko Trivic goes on to record that General Mladic arrived at

25     2200 hours.  That also accords with when you've told us this meeting took


Page 31996

 1     place; is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.  Although this thing that resembles a diary is something I

 3     see for the first time.

 4        Q.   Now, he then notes after congratulations and greetings, and in

 5     brackets:

 6             [As read] "(Despite the fact that Vinko Pandurevic and I warned

 7     him [sic] that the soldiers should rest) he ordered ..."

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The English reads:  "I told him," not "I warned

 9     him."

10             MS. HASAN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

12             MS. HASAN:

13        Q.   Now, does that -- is that consistent with your recollection of

14     what happened at that meeting?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And what about the next point he notes down:

17             "By 0800 hours tomorrow, General Krstic must prepare a decision

18     for the liberation of Zepa!"

19             Does that accord with your recollection of what took place at

20     that meeting?

21        A.   That fact is in keeping with what I already testified to; namely,

22     that General Mladic ordered that everyone should move the next day to the

23     operation in Zepa.  Now whether he ordered Krstic to prepare a decision

24     or not, I don't remember such details, but I remember our destination was

25     Zepa.


Page 31997

 1        Q.   Do you recall that General Mladic addressed the soldiers who were

 2     to take part in the Zepa operation in Vijogor village before they left?

 3     You were aware of that; right?

 4        A.   Absolutely not.

 5             MS. HASAN:  Now, if we turn back to page 25 in the English and

 6     the B/C/S.  And we can go through this page by page to where we were.

 7        Q.   But you will see here that Mirko Trivic recorded this meeting as

 8     having taken place on the 12th of July, not on the 11th July as you

 9     claim.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Ms. Hasan, you are saying "this meeting."

11             I read here 0900 hours.  I don't know if that -- I think it

12     refers to 9.00 a.m., but we are talking about a meeting late in the

13     evening.

14             MS. HASAN:  That's correct.  So it will help, then, to just turn

15     to the next page so there's -- we have 0900 hours, 12 July 1995.  His

16     notes continue.  And we can go to the following page.  And we can

17     continue to the next page.  We come to the page we were just looking at.

18     And when we turn to the page after that, the notes continue.  And he

19     reports on events at 2300 hours.  And if we follow along to the next

20     page, we see the next diary entry, Wednesday, 13 July, 1000 hours.

21             And, Your Honours, I can find the reference to the testimony on

22     this diary, if that would be useful.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Judge Fluegge raised the issue, so I leave it in his

24     hands to --

25             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we went through several pages and we saw


Page 31998

 1     an entry, 11th July, 12th July, and then here a reference to a 13th July.

 2     Thank you.  Please proceed.

 3             MS. HASAN:

 4        Q.   Now, Witness, I suppose, then, you are claiming that Trivic's

 5     diary is incorrect?

 6        A.   I only maintain that I'm absolutely certain the meeting was held

 7     at around 2200 hours on 11 July.  There are some events that I remember

 8     less well, some others I remember better, but I maintain with absolute

 9     certainty that that meeting was held around 2200 hours on 11 July.

10        Q.   So this document is wrong, this diary is wrong?

11        A.   I don't go into what Colonel Trivic wrote or whether he was

12     mistaken about the date.  But out of all the events from that period, my

13     clearest memory, an unmistakable memory is that that meeting was held on

14     11 July and began around 2200 hours.

15        Q.   Now before you left this meeting, did anyone, including

16     General Krstic, give you any precise orders about the communications that

17     were to be set up for this Zepa operation?

18        A.   No, because there was no need.

19        Q.   Now, how was it that you knew which units precisely were to be

20     involved in that operation?

21        A.   Because General Mladic ordered that evening that all the units

22     that had taken part in the operation in Srebrenica, all be transferred to

23     the operation in Zepa.  That's how I knew.

24        Q.   And did you ever receive orders on the set-up of the

25     communications for this operation?


Page 31999

 1        A.   Well, General Mladic ordered me.  That was perfectly enough.

 2        Q.   So you did not receive any other orders?

 3        A.   No.

 4             MS. HASAN:  Can we look at Exhibit D00290, please.

 5        Q.   And in the -- in the meantime, sir, were you aware you were -- I

 6     take it, then, that you were not aware that Krstic issued Zepa attack

 7     order on the 13th of July and that in that attack order he provides

 8     orders for the set-up of communications at the Drina Corps forward

 9     command post.  And this is the order appears on our screen right now.

10             MS. HASAN:  And if we turn to page 4 in the English and 3 in the

11     B/C/S.

12        Q.   We see here that on the 13th of July at -- under item 10:

13     "Command and communications."  And the Chief of Staff orders:

14             "The Drina Corps forward command post in Krivace shall start

15     working at 1800 hours on 13 July 1995.

16             "Communications shall be ready for the attack at 0600 hours on 14

17     July 1995."

18             Do you see that there?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And Krivace, that's where the forward command post for the

21     operation was established; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And you're claiming that you did not act pursuant to these

24     orders?

25        A.   This order was written two days after the decision was made and


Page 32000

 1     the basic concept of the commander was generated for the operation in

 2     Zepa.  All these decisions have to be formalised in writing, and thus in

 3     every order there is a paragraph that determines where the forward

 4     command post would be, when it would start operating, what the

 5     communications system would be like.  It all has to be written in the

 6     order because the army is such an institution.

 7             All the points in the order have to be specified in a particular

 8     sequence.  When this order was written, I had been in the forward command

 9     post already one day and a half.  I was setting up the communications

10     system and I was waiting for the other units to arrive in the area -- in

11     the sector of Zepa.

12        Q.   Now, we can go back a page, but the order includes a lot of

13     details of where the various units involved in this operation, what axis

14     they were going to be at, details of which you would accept are important

15     for you as a communications officer to be aware of; isn't that correct?

16        A.   That's true.  However, we communicated with those units using

17     radios with whip antennas, and these antennas beam in all directions

18     equally.  So wherever those units were located and regardless of their

19     deployment, with that type of communication, I can more easily

20     communicate with them.

21             It is true that even for that type of communication it's

22     important for me to know these units' axis of attack, whether they are on

23     a clearing or a hilly or mountainous area so that I should know how the

24     signals would spread.  However, with all my prior experience, all these

25     details were not crucial for the execution of that operation.  The main


Page 32001

 1     thing for me to know was which units would be participating.

 2        Q.   And it's clear that you hadn't informed your superior command

 3     that you had already set up communications at the Krivace forward command

 4     post; isn't that right?

 5        A.   Which superior command do you mean now?  When you say "my

 6     superior command"?

 7        Q.   Yes, your superior command.  So General Krstic, the Chief of

 8     Staff, was not informed that you had already set up the communications at

 9     the forward command post.

10        A.   Well, I've told you --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.

12             Mr. Ivetic.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Can I ask where that is in the document?  Because I

14     don't see it.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me see.  Did you refer to a document?

16             MS. HASAN:  No.

17             MR. IVETIC:  Then I'd ask for the reference from the question at

18     line 24 for "it's clear that."  "It's clear that" implies that it's in

19     the document.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, not necessarily.

21             The witness may answer the question.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My Chief of Staff, General Krstic,

23     at the joint meeting on the 11th of July, clearly heard where the forward

24     command post of the Drina Corps would be for the Zepa operation, and he

25     clearly heard when I was ordered to go there and set up a communications


Page 32002

 1     centre.  For us soldiers, that is, quite simply, the beginning and the

 2     end of it all.  It doesn't cross anybody's mind to go into any kind of

 3     unnecessary formality at moments like that.

 4             MS. HASAN:

 5        Q.   Trivic recorded in his diary that at that meeting that you claim

 6     you attended on the night of the 11th, he had ordered -- Mladic --

 7     General Mladic had ordered Krstic to produce "this attack order

 8     tomorrow," and I put it to you that that could only have occurred on the

 9     12th of July which is why General Krstic issued this order, the attack

10     order, on the 13th of July?

11        A.   You are absolutely not right.  I remember that this order was

12     written by Colonel Vicic, operations officer in the Drina Corps, and for

13     the entire day, the previous day, he was writing this order and he was

14     waiting for General Krstic to sign it.  Because I was waiting for all of

15     them up there for two days since I was at the IKM already on the 12th and

16     the units were relocated from the area of Srebrenica during the night

17     between the 13th and the 14th.

18        Q.   Let's move on.  On the night of the 11th when you claim you

19     travelled to this meeting, you moved with all of your communications

20     personnel in a large military communications truck; isn't that right?

21        A.   Yes, except for one soldier who was with General Krstic.

22        Q.   And what was his name?

23        A.   Plakalovic.

24        Q.   And according to you, you left Pribicevac for Bratunac via

25     Potocari; isn't that right?


Page 32003

 1        A.   Absolutely.

 2        Q.   You passed through Potocari without an escort.

 3        A.   Absolutely.

 4        Q.   Well, I put it to you that there's no way you would have

 5     travelled through Potocari on the night of the 11th in a VRS military

 6     truck.  I put it to you that the offensive was still going on and that

 7     Potocari had not yet been taken by the VRS, and therefore you could not

 8     have possibly driven through there that night.

 9        A.   First of all, I should like to correct you.  When I testified

10     previously, I said that as soon as night fell, I passed through

11     Srebrenica and Potocari; that is to say, it wasn't night-time.  It was

12     just as night was falling.  That is when the day turns into the night.

13     So I know that our units had orders not to enter Potocari, or quite

14     simply as they were going after the 28th Division, that should not be the

15     point where they should focus.  However, from communications, I had

16     knowledge that the road from Srebrenica via Potocari to Bratunac was

17     accessible because that is the main road and definitely the shortest road

18     to Bratunac, and I set out through Potocari because I had an officer 's

19     idea that this unit -- this area had been left by the units of the

20     28th Division.

21        Q.   Now, when you passed through Potocari, you saw crowds of

22     civilians, you saw UN DutchBat officers, and you saw members of the VRS;

23     is that correct?

24        A.   Correct.  I stated that during some of my previous testimony,

25     that I saw lots of people, and this left a particular impression on me, a


Page 32004

 1     strange impression, as to all the things that war can produce.  However

 2     they were they were intermingled, the population and UNPROFOR, so I can

 3     just tell you about what I saw along the main road that I was going down.

 4     I didn't stop but I saw lots of people.  I saw members of UNPROFOR, they

 5     were all mixed, and in my assessment I saw a few members of the Army of

 6     Republika Srpska.

 7             Now, I don't know from which unit they were, but it remained in

 8     my mind that they were talking to the people there, so then I thought

 9     that they may have been soldiers from the surrounding villages who

10     perhaps knew someone and therefore talked to them, so they were holding

11     their rifles on their shoulders.  A few of them.  I saw a few of them as

12     I was passing there, and I said that during every one of my previous

13     testimonies.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask one clarifying question.  You said in

15     the area of Potocari, the units of the 28th Division had left already.

16     Was that true for the whole of the route you took?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  So no units of the 28th Division nearby the road you

19     used.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

22             MS. HASAN:  Let's have a look at P02117.

23        Q.   What we'll see here is the RS MUP special police brigade report.

24     And it's from the deputy command, Deputy Commander Ljubisa Borovcanin.

25     And he's writing to the Pale police staff sector and others, reporting on


Page 32005

 1     the activities of the RS MUP combat unit on 12 July 1995.  You see the

 2     report, it's dated 13 July 1995.  And he reports here that:

 3             "During the course of 12 July, MUP units were engaged in

 4     offensive actions from the direction of Zuti Most towards Potocari.  At

 5     0530 hours, we sealed off the check-point at Zuti Most and then proceeded

 6     along the road toward Potocari.  There was no strong armed resistance

 7     from the Muslims, so we took control of Potocari by 1300 hours, and with

 8     a right hand flank we took control of the Budak and Milacevici features."

 9             Sir, you wouldn't have passed through Potocari when combat was

10     still going on, would you?

11        A.   According to the information I had and on the basis of which I

12     made this assessment in terms of whether I could take that road or not,

13     spoke in favour of that.  Namely, that the 28th Division left its own

14     civilians in Potocari and that they started their breakthrough towards

15     Tuzla and that they were grouping in the part of the enclave towards

16     Konjevic Polje.  It is absolutely illogical that any one of them had the

17     intention to stay that close to that road after I passed that way.  And

18     to this day I believe that was quite a risk on my part.  So sometimes

19     we'd talk to colleagues, officers, and, for example, I even received

20     information stating that Vinko Pandurevic, commander of the

21     Zvornik Brigade, as he went to that meeting he passed through Potocari.

22     But when he saw what he saw, he went back taking a different route via

23     Sas when going to Zeleni Jadar.  But I really don't see what this

24     document specifically says refuting what I have been saying so far.  I

25     can guarantee and I assert that --


Page 32006

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  You don't have to bother about to what extent it

 2     supports or not.  If you just answer the questions and tell us about what

 3     you know or what you -- what you considered at that time, you don't have

 4     to enter into a comparison of your own thoughts and what is written down

 5     here unless specifically asked.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MS. HASAN:

 8        Q.   Witness, you don't contest then, as I understand it, that

 9     Potocari had not been taken at the time, sorry, that you claim to have

10     passed through it?

11        A.   When I passed through Potocari, there were no members of the

12     28th Division in Potocari.  There were only civilians there, mixed with

13     UNPROFOR, and a few members of the Army of Republika Srpska.  Not a

14     single member of the 28th Division was in Potocari at that point in time

15     because then they were far to the west as they were regrouping for their

16     breakthrough towards Tuzla.

17        Q.   What information did you have that informed you that it was safe

18     for you to pass through Potocari?

19        A.   Already in the afternoon, sometime when NATO air force struck, at

20     the forward command post, we had a radio intercepting group of the

21     Drina Corps that monitored the communications of the 28th Division.

22     Already then in the afternoon of the 11th of July, we had information

23     that their main plan was that civilians should go to the UNPROFOR base in

24     Potocari and that they should group in the western part of the enclave,

25     the 28th Division, that is, and that they should get ready for a


Page 32007

 1     breakthrough to join their main force in Tuzla and their auxiliary forces

 2     towards Zepa.  So they had the entire afternoon to carry out this

 3     regrouping.

 4             So I absolutely had that information, and that was my assessment,

 5     that the 28th Division was no longer there on that road that I had

 6     intended to take.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, I'm looking at the clock.  Would it be

 8     time for a break?

 9             MS. HASAN:  Yes, that's appropriate.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, you may follow the usher.  We'd like to see

11     you back in 20 minutes from now.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  We resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15                           --- Recess taken at 1.15 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I was a bit embarrassed that before the

18     break I'd forgotten that you'd asked for a matter to be raised in private

19     session.  Should that be with or without the witness?

20             MR. IVETIC:  Without.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Without the witness.  Then we briefly move into

22     private session.

23                           [Private session]

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 32008

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21                           [Open session]

22             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

25                           [The witness takes the stand]


Page 32009

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan, if you're ready you may continue once the

 2     witness has put on his earphones again.

 3             MS. HASAN:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4        Q.   When you travelled -- when you left Pribicevac and travelled down

 5     to Srebrenica to pass through Potocari to get to Bratunac, did you pass

 6     any check-points?

 7        A.   I passed through an area that is called Tucak, I think where

 8     there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point.

 9        Q.   Did you pass through a check-point at Zuti Most?

10        A.   Yes, I did pass the check-point at Zuti Most, and over there

11     there were a few soldiers, I think from the Bratunac Brigade, or

12     policemen and so on.  Somebody was there at that check-point.  Before

13     that operation was carried out, they had been there.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I seek clarification of the previous answer.

15             You said you "passed through an area that is called Tucak, I

16     think where there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point."

17             The question was whether you passed any check-points.  Did you

18     pass at Tucak any check-point; and, if so, manned by whom?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the Prosecutor asked

20     about the check-point in Zuti Most that was held by members of the

21     Army of Republika Srpska.  Am I right?

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, that was her last question.  The previous

23     question was when you travelled -- when you left through Pribicevac and

24     travelled down to Srebrenica to pass through Potocari to get to Bratunac,

25     did you pass any check-points.  That was the question.  And then you told


Page 32010

 1     us that there was a place where there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point,

 2     but you did not answer the question whether there was a check-point at

 3     the time when you passed, and I was seeking clarification of that.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that moment, it was not manned.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 6             Please proceed.

 7             MS. HASAN:

 8        Q.   So, Witness, then let's first deal with the Zuti Most

 9     check-point.

10             MS. HASAN:  Let's look at P00724.  Could we go to page 3 in the

11     B/C/S and page 2 in the English.

12        Q.   And under the heading "12 July," if we scroll down a little bit

13     in the English, I'm -- it reads in the second-to-last paragraph,

14     second-to-lasts line:

15             "The first task" -- and I don't know if can you see that in the

16     B/C/S.  Let me double-check for you.  Yes.

17             "The first task - to take control of the UN check-point on

18     Zuti Most - was completed successfully without any incidents.  The Dutch

19     UN members did not react."

20             Now this is a MUP report on the combat engagement of the special

21     police brigade and other police in Srebrenica 1995, and it's a report

22     Ljubomir Borovcanin dated -- he wrote about the events between 11 and 21

23     July 1995 and the report itself is dated 5 September 1995.  So according

24     to him, the UN were manning the check-point at Zuti Most and it was only

25     on 12 July that they successfully took over control of that check-point.


Page 32011

 1     Do you contest that?

 2        A.   Could you, please, in the Serbian version -- I haven't got the

 3     12th.  I just have the 13th.  So could you please tell me which

 4     paragraph that is under that date so that I could read it?

 5        Q.   Yes.  If you look at the top of the Serbian version, you see it

 6     begins -- should begin "between 0500 and 0630 hours," and look -- and I

 7     don't read Cyrillic, but towards the end of that paragraph.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  It's a bit unclear whether that's a new paragraph or

 9     the end of the first paragraph.  There is a bit of --

10             Sir, the two lines following the first paragraph which consists

11     of some eight lines, and then we have two paragraphs.  That was the

12     paragraph Ms. Hasan was reading from.  And that details with the

13     12th of July.

14             Have you found it?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, no.

16             MS. HASAN:

17        Q.   Witness --

18        A.   What you are reading out is not written here.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, Witness --

20             MS. HASAN:

21        Q.   You can see in the brackets --

22             MS. HASAN:  I'm sorry, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

24             Witness, look at the two lines following the first full

25     paragraph.  The first full paragraph starts with 05 to 6.30, that takes


Page 32012

 1     approximately -- not only approximately but exactly eight lines, and then

 2     the two following lines.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see that.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 5             MS. HASAN:

 6        Q.   So, sir, you just testified and told this Chamber that you passed

 7     the check-point at Zuti Most where there were members of the

 8     Bratunac Brigade or other VRS members, and Borovcanin is reporting here

 9     that that check-point hadn't been taken control of until the 12th of

10     July.  So is Borovcanin providing false information in his report?

11        A.   I remember that on that road I just came across members of the

12     Army of Republika Srpska who were on the road towards Potocari and

13     Srebrenica from Bratunac and that I passed by them.  The entire road had

14     not been blocked by any kind of fortification obstacles.  It was free,

15     this road, and I just passed there.  I didn't stop.  And to tell you the

16     truth, I don't remember having seen members of UNPROFOR on that road.

17        Q.   Well, let's move, then, to see what members of DutchBat say about

18     who was on that road on the night of the 11th.  And I'll read you an

19     excerpt from DutchBat officer Lieutenant-Colonel Alko Koster testimony in

20     the Krstic case.

21             MS. HASAN:  Oh, sorry.  I stand corrected.  It's

22     Lieutenant Koster, not Lieutenant-Colonel Koster.  And I'll read that

23     excerpt.  He is asked about Potocari on the 11th of July.  If we could

24     have a look at 65 ter 32024.

25        Q.   And I will read this to you so you can follow along:


Page 32013

 1             "Q. And what hours were you on duty in the [sic] area on the

 2     afternoon/evening of 11 July [sic]."

 3             This is line 3.

 4             "A. Eleventh.  From the 11th, the afternoon, sir, I was on duty

 5     until approximately 8.00 p.m. and then I went up to the compound for

 6     approximately two hours, and then returned to my position, where I stayed

 7     the whole night, the morning, the afternoon of the 12th of July, and also

 8     the evening of the 12th of July."

 9             And I'll just skip a few lines to line 13.  And, sir, I

10     understand you speak English, if you wish you can also follow the

11     transcript.

12             "Q. Now, while you were gone from the area briefly on the evening

13     of the 11th, did you have a deputy that was in command while you were

14     gone?

15             "A. Yes, sir, he was.

16             "Q. And to your knowledge, on the afternoon or evening hours of

17     July 11th, was there any vehicular traffic from the VRS military along

18     that road?

19             "A. No, sir.  I have not seen any vehicle movement, VRS vehicle

20     movement on that road, and neither I was reported to by my deputy on the

21     11th of July.

22             "Q. Was there some kind of roadblock or check-point there?

23             "A. Yes.  We installed sort of a roadblock to guide and to guard

24     the refugees, so a vehicle couldn't get through without being reported to

25     me, without being seen by me."


Page 32014

 1             MS. HASAN:  And if we turn to the page.

 2        Q.   "Q. Would this have been a significant event if a VRS vehicle had

 3     come through this area on July 11th?

 4             "A. Yes, sir.

 5             "Q. Did you notice any VRS soldiers in this area around where the

 6     people are, or anywhere around this compound, around this road, on the

 7     afternoon or evening of July 11th?

 8             "A. Not on the [sic] -- not on July 11th, sir.

 9             "Q. Would that have been a significant event if VRS soldiers had

10     been amongst the [sic] people or in this area?

11             "A. Yes, sir.  I would have seen them, I would have been

12     reported, and also I guess the refugees would have panicked.  So it's not

13     been reported and I have not seen them.

14             "Q. Can you be sure that no VRS vehicle came through this area

15     and no VRS soldiers were in this area" --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan.

17             MS. HASAN:  I'm sorry.

18        Q.   "And no" --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Hasan.

20             MS. HASAN:  I'll start that question again.

21        Q.   "Q. Can you be sure that no VRS vehicle came through this area

22     and no VRS soldiers were in this area on the evening or afternoon of

23     July 11th?

24             "A. Yes, I'm sure about it, on the 11th; yes, sir."

25             So, Witness, do you also claim that Lieutenant Koster is wrong


Page 32015

 1     about that?

 2        A.   He is not right because at the time when I passed there -- well,

 3     he himself says in that statement of his that you read out that he had

 4     left that point at 8.00 and that he stayed for two hours.

 5             I said in my statement that I passed there around 2100 hours,

 6     whereas he left around 2000 hours and he was away for two hours so he

 7     could not have seen me.  Even had he been there.  So I'm absolutely

 8     certain that I did pass that way, and he himself says in his statement

 9     that at the time when I passed there he was absent from that point.

10             There's something else I wish to add here.  Maybe for them it

11     would be illogical to expect a military vehicle of the Army of

12     Republika Srpska to pass along that road from the direction of

13     Srebrenica.  It would have been of interest to them that if vehicles from

14     Bratunac were passing in the other direction towards Srebrenica.  At any

15     rate, when I passed there, he was not there, and he could not have seen

16     me.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, he is wrong, we do understand your answer.

18     You're explaining why he is wrong.  And then you select part of that

19     statement.  Now, if you wish to do that, that's fine.  But he talked

20     about being replaced and a deputy there, et cetera.  So you're not here

21     to argue and to tell him why he is wrong and what may have been on their

22     mind.  You just say he is making a mistake.  And that's -- because if you

23     start explaining, then, of course, if you already do that and you're not

24     invited to do that, but then take all of the information in the statement

25     into consideration and not just the part you selected.  This is not


Page 32016

 1     argument.  This is testimony.

 2             Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.

 3             MS. HASAN:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Let's move on a little.  The communications centre that you set

 5     up at the forward command post for the Krivaja 95 operation, now that

 6     communication centre was basically mounted on a truck; that's right?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And within that vehicle, you had the means to establish

 9     communications between -- sorry.  You had the means to establish

10     communications with subordinate units of the Drina Corps?

11        A.   Both subordinate and superiors.

12        Q.   And in that vehicle, you had an RRU-1 device; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Now, the members of your unit that were with you at this

15     communications centre, that included Oliver Sekulic; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Momir Bakmaz.

18        A.   Bakmaz, yes.

19        Q.   I apologise for my pronunciation.  Veljko Vukosavljevic?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Mirko Plakalovic.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Do you recall anyone else?

24        A.   There were two or three more soldiers who were with me from the

25     operation in Srebrenica, but I don't remember their names.


Page 32017

 1        Q.   Now, you left Pribicevac at approximately 1900 hours, is that

 2     correct, on the 11th of July?  That's what you claim?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And you go --

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And you continue -- you continue to Bratunac and sometime after

 7     midnight you arrive in Vlasenica; right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Now, you didn't return to Pribicevac after that to set up

10     communications again, did you?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   And, in fact, all the components of the communications centre

13     that you had which had been installed for the Krivaja 95 operation moved

14     with you.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   What time on the 12th of July were communications -- was the

17     communications centre at Krivace operational?

18        A.   In the early afternoon.

19        Q.   And when you moved with your vehicle, am I correct that the

20     communications equipment in your vehicle was not functioning.  It was

21     disengaged?

22        A.   No, it was not working.

23        Q.   So then from around 1900 hours on the 11th of July, which is when

24     you claim you left Pribicevac, to the time you arrive in Vlasenica, until

25     you set up communications the next day in Krivace, your communication


Page 32018

 1     centre, the Drina Corps IKM was out of operation.

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   It was not possible during that time to communicate through a

 4     teleprinter, was it?

 5        A.   It was not possible to communicate through that teleprinter that

 6     was used at the IKM.

 7             MS. HASAN:  If we could have a look at 65 ter 4399, please.

 8        Q.   And what you see here is an 11 July Drina Corps order to block

 9     the linking up of the forces of the 28th enemy division with the forces

10     in the enclaves.  And it is addressed to a number of commands, including

11     the Drina Corps IKM.  You see that there?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And it is marked "very urgent."  Now, this is an order from --

14             MS. HASAN:  If we turn to the last page.

15        Q.   Signed for General Zivanovic.  And we see here a received stamp,

16     and it's dated 11 July, 2230 hours, processed 11 July, 2250 hours.  And

17     am I correct that this means the cryptographer received this document at

18     2230 hours, he processes it at 2250 hours, and then it gets sent; is that

19     correct?

20        A.   He encrypted it up to 2250.  Out of that entire telegram, he made

21     an encrypted tape ready for transmission.

22             MS. HASAN:  I'd offer 65 ter 4399 into evidence.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P7131, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.


Page 32019

 1             MS. HASAN:  Could we have a look at now D00289, please.

 2        Q.   And we see here this is a very urgent 11 July order to block the

 3     linking up of the forces of the 28th enemy division with the forces in

 4     the enclaves, the same order we saw before.  And it's a teletyped

 5     version.

 6             MS. HASAN:  And if we turn to the next page, we see that in

 7     handwriting it says "received, 11 July 1995 at 2350."  It has a number

 8     and it bears a signature.  Do you recognise that signature.

 9        A.   Yes.

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We turn into private session.

15                           [Private session]

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 32020

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

18             MS. HASAN:

19        Q.   So according to this document, which is addressed to the

20     Drina Corps IKM, it was received on 11 July at 2350 hours when you claim

21     the communications centre of the forward command post was completely

22     disengaged.

23             Now, I first want to ask you a question about this handwriting.

24     Was it normal at the IKM to -- to write it this way as opposed to the

25     previous document where we saw a stamp.  Was that the typical way you


Page 32021

 1     noted that a telegram had been received?

 2        A.   Yes.  Because at the IKM, sometimes we didn't have the usual

 3     stamp.

 4        Q.   And at the Pribicevac -- when the IKM was at Pribicevac, sir, you

 5     did not have that stamp, did you?

 6        A.   I don't remember that detail because only the encryptor does such

 7     things, but I think we didn't have that stamp.

 8        Q.   And I take it that you take the position that this document which

 9     is dated 11th July, 2350, was not received at the Drina Corps IKM as is

10     indicated here?

11        A.   Correct.  That's my position.

12        Q.   And the reason you claim that you dismantled the communications

13     centre at the forward command post is because, in your assessment, the

14     combat was over, you had precise knowledge, information, about where the

15     28th Division was moving, and, therefore, you decided to pick up and go.

16     Did you receive any orders to move the IKM?

17        A.   I made my own assessment.  Considering that the combat

18     disposition had gone forward and my commander, the commander who was

19     commanding that operation, was very busy with that operation, I decided I

20     would be more useful to him if I followed.  Because when the combat lines

21     move forward, the communications centre has to move forward too.  And the

22     IKM has to move.  I supposed that the commander had forgotten to order me

23     to move the forward command post, and I decided to follow him and follow

24     the combat lines.  That's the reason I packed up my equipment and headed

25     forward.


Page 32022

 1        Q.   The intelligence that you had, you said you received from a radio

 2     reconnaissance platoon.  Now, the 4th Reconnaissance Platoon was located

 3     just about 100 or so metres from the forward command post.  Am I right?

 4        A.   One group of intercepters from that platoon.

 5        Q.   And it was on the basis of information that they had gathered

 6     that you understood -- well, that they knew where the 28th Division was

 7     and, on that basis, you decided to move.  That's correct?

 8        A.   Not only based on that information.

 9        Q.   Well, what other information did you have; and from whom?

10        A.   We had information from the units that were in contact with the

11     enemy.  That means the units who were in direct fire contact from the

12     enemy.  From them, we knew where the enemy was exactly.  And the other

13     information we gathered from intercepts.

14             MS. HASAN:  So let's take a look at 65 ter 04147.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Should we do that today or should we do that after

16     today?

17             MS. HASAN:  I would prefer to do it today, but I'll leave it your

18     hands, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, how much time would that take?  I can imagine

20     that sometimes there's a good reason to just conclude a certain portion

21     of the evidence.

22             MS. HASAN:  It's just a question of pulling up the document, I'll

23     briefly explain what it is, and have the witness comment on.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  We have only a couple of minutes.  That would be

25     sufficient?


Page 32023

 1             MS. HASAN:  I think it's manageable.  I hope so.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I would agree.  And with the assistance of all

 3     those in the booth, you may proceed for those few minutes.

 4             MS. HASAN:  So 65 ter 04147.

 5        Q.   This is an interim report from the 4th Radio Reconnaissance

 6     Platoon.  It's dated the 12th July, and it is passing on information

 7     intelligence department, Drina Corps intelligence section -- department.

 8     And it's addressed to the Drina Corps Pribicevac forward command post.

 9     This is processed by teleprinter; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And you'd agree that that's the signature of (redacted) on

12     that document?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And in handwriting, it says "received 12 July at 0740 hours."

15     And it provides:

16             "Commanders and signalsmen, by monitoring this network, we

17     reached the conclusion that they were all present ..."

18             And I'll pause there, "they" being in the previous paragraph it

19     explains Naser's men.  And it continues:

20             "That they were heading in a direction unknown to us yet together

21     with the people ... and their groups."

22             You see that there?  So how is it possible, sir, that the

23     intelligence being received by the 4th Reconnaissance Platoon was

24     indicating to the Drina Corps Command intelligence department that

25     they -- there was no information about where the 28th Division was?  And


Page 32024

 1     so I put it to you that, in fact, there was no information to the

 2     knowledge of the Drina Corps at that moment about the whereabouts of the

 3     28th Division?

 4        A.   This is information from only one group of interceptors.  The

 5     radio reconnaissance platoon of the Drina Corps had several intercepting

 6     groups in its area of responsibility, and during the execution of the

 7     Srebrenica operation, it sent one intercepting group to the centre at

 8     Pribicevac.  I received information - and not only I - from that group.

 9     This report contains information collected by a different intercepting

10     group in a totally different part of the Drina Corps area of

11     responsibility, and you see that reference is made here to Naser's

12     people.  Naser, at that time, was in Tuzla, not with the 28th Division.

13     This is information from a different intercepting group, not the one at

14     Pribicevac.

15             And I sincerely hope that somebody will ask me how it is possible

16     that this telegram was received on 12 July at Pribicevac where I maintain

17     there was no communications centre.

18             MS. HASAN:  Your Honour, I will leave it at that.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you tendering this document?

20             MS. HASAN:  Yes, I will do that now then.  Thank you,

21     Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P7132, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

25             P7132 is admitted, under seal; and P7131 is to be put under seal


Page 32025

 1     as well.

 2             We adjourn for the day.

 3             Witness, I'd like to instruct you that you should not speak with

 4     anyone or communicate in any way with whomever about your testimony.  We

 5     have no court hearing tomorrow, so therefore we'd like to see you back on

 6     Monday morning at 9.30 again.

 7             And I take it, Ms. Hasan, then we'll easily conclude the

 8     testimony by that day.  I'm also looking at Mr. Ivetic.

 9             We'd like to see you back then.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             MS. HASAN:  Your Honour, I'm not sure that it's necessary --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we move into private session, because you were

13     uncertain about whether it has to be under seal.  Is that the issue?

14             MS. HASAN:  Yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then we move into private session very

16     briefly.

17                           [Private session]

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 32026

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12                           [Open session]

13             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume on Monday,

15     the 23rd of February, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.

16                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.24 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of

18                           February, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.

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