1 Monday, 21 November 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. General, if I could remind you of

7 the affirmation you made at the beginning of your evidence, which still

8 applies.

9 WITNESS: IMRA AGOTIC [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Agha.

12 MR. AGHA: Yes, Your Honours, last time when we closed, there was

13 the question of whether the evacuation agreement should be admitted as an

14 exhibit, and my learned friend Mr. Vasic had some objections to that. The

15 Prosecution has since been speaking to the Defence on this point, and

16 Mr. Vasic has kindly agreed to contact General Raseta to actually find out

17 from him whether or not he signed the document. And then once that is

18 known, we propose the matter can be taken from there.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that. We will hold things as they

20 are for the moment.

21 MR. AGHA: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Examined by Mr. Agha: [Continued]

23 Q. General, last time you were giving your evidence we had just

24 looked at the evacuation agreement and the question of signatures. We

25 would now like to move to another document which we would like you to

1 comment upon.

2 MR. AGHA: If I could kindly ask the court clerk to call up

3 document bearing 65 ter 209, ERN ZA004342, and that is only an English

4 translation. There is not a B/C/S translation.

5 Q. General, do you have a copy of this document?

6 A. [Microphone not activated].

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I see the document.

9 MR. AGHA:

10 Q. Now, this is a document in English which is being read to you in

11 the Croatian language which is essentially an order from General Tus to

12 the commands of the various ZNG units operating in Vinkovci and Osijek,

13 concerning there to be a cease-fire in that region on the 20th November to

14 allow the convoy to go through. Now, are you aware of that document,

15 since it was copied to you?

16 A. I'm aware of this document. This is the usual way to pass orders

17 down to the relevant units on the ground, cease-fire orders specifically.

18 If I may make one observation in this English translation, I think

19 there is a mistake. It says the 11th of November, whereas it should most

20 probably read, actually I'm quite certain, the 20th of November.

21 MR. AGHA: May I ask this document to be exhibited with the

22 permission of the Court.

23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

24 THE REGISTRAR: This will be exhibit number 94, Your Honour.

25 MR. AGHA: Could I ask the court clerk to please call up document

1 bearing 65 ter 210, bearing ERN 00099955. And B/C/S, 03269948.

2 Q. Are you able to see this document, General?

3 A. Yes. I am now.

4 Q. And this is a document which I believe you have sent to General

5 Raseta concerning the evacuation of the hospital on the 20th of November

6 and that the evacuation route should be secured. Is that a correct

7 assessment of this document?

8 A. Correct. This is a proposal I made following a previous oral

9 agreement with General Raseta. You can see that this is not the same

10 route that had been agreed on the 18th of November. This is an

11 alternative route being proposed here, crossing JNA-controlled territory

12 and going on into Bosnia and to the lower or southern river-bank of the

13 Sava.

14 MR. AGHA: May I ask that this document be exhibited, Your Honour?

15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

16 MR. AGHA: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 THE REGISTRAR: This will be exhibit number 95, Your Honours.

18 MR. AGHA:

19 Q. Now, Witness, I'd like to turn to another document which is in

20 fact the reply to your proposal.

21 MR. AGHA: And if I may kindly ask the court clerk to call up

22 document 65 ter 209 bearing ERN ZA004343. Unfortunately, this document is

23 only in English. There is not a B/C/S translation.

24 Q. General, do you have a copy of this document?

25 A. I have it on my screen now.

1 Q. In essence, this document is dated 21st of November, 1991 and it's

2 actually from General Raseta agreeing to your proposal. To your

3 recollection would that be correct?

4 A. Can we please -- yes, yes. That's the one I mean. Yes. This is

5 indeed his reply, as far as I can remember. I saw it and acted

6 accordingly, in accordance with my letter dated the 20th of November 1991.

7 MR. AGHA: May I ask the Court that this document be exhibited?

8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

9 Mr. Lukic.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] On behalf of the Defence teams, I

11 would move that this document be marked for identification for the time

12 being, for the following reasons. On the face of the document we see

13 nothing but the English translation. We have never received a B/C/S copy

14 of this document. And based on all the documents that we have so far

15 seen, the documents based on letters written by Mr. Raseta that we have

16 not objected to, we realise that originals were used. I don't believe

17 this is an original document. If the OTP does indeed have a copy in

18 B/C/S, a signed one needless to say, in that case we would not challenge

19 the document.

20 However, as there appears to be an English translation of the

21 original bearing no signature, we would propose that this document be

22 marked for identification and then we can pursue this subject further with

23 Mr. Raseta and verify the authenticity of this document. We do not

24 believe that this can be considered an authentic document given that this

25 is only an English translation and there appears to be no original, at

1 least none that's been disclosed.

2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be marked for identification.

3 THE REGISTRAR: This will be number 96, Your Honour.

4 MR. AGHA: And, Your Honour, just to clarify on the point of

5 translation, it had been the policy of the OTP that where a document had

6 been submitted in a previous case, as was in this case, Milosevic, and

7 there was no translation, generally as a rule we did not pursue a

8 translation, but now if this is the case we will pursue such a document

9 and produce it for the Court.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. The important issue for admission is the

11 original or a satisfactory best copy available of the original. This

12 clearly is not an original or a copy of it. It's an English translation

13 at best.

14 MR. AGHA: And this is what we are try and sort out, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

16 MR. AGHA:

17 Q. Now, Witness, I'd like to turn to another document now, which was

18 actually written on the 26th of November, 1991, after the evacuation of

19 the hospital?

20 MR. AGHA: If I can ask the court clerk to kindly turn up on the

21 E-Court 65 ter 211, bearing translation in the English -- one moment while

22 I find the ERN. 00269903. And B/C/S, 03269903. I beg your pardon,

23 actually with the English, it's 03269903. The copy was blurred that I was

24 reading from.

25 JUDGE PARKER: We have that number but not in English, Mr. Agha.

1 MR. AGHA: If you would bear with me, the English is ET 03269903.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Same number, both languages.

3 MR. AGHA:

4 Q. General, do you have a copy of this document?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And this is a document by Dr. Mate Granic, written to the

7 honourable ambassador, Ambassador D.J. van Houten, the chief of the ECMM,

8 mentioning about the JNA occupational forces getting even with civilians

9 and prisoners and release of Mr. Bili Vidic.

10 Now, firstly, could you tell the Court who Dr. Mate Granic is?

11 A. Dr. Mate Granic was assistant prime minister in the Croatian

12 government, the government gave him the task of monitoring the

13 negotiations and quite generally relations with the ECMM.

14 Q. And are you aware of this correspondence?

15 A. I don't think I ever received this letter myself, but I do know

16 that Dr. Mate Granic wrote to Ambassador van Houten about this. We were

17 in touch almost permanently at the time. I do believe that this is an

18 authentic signature.

19 MR. AGHA: May I request the Chamber that this document be

20 exhibited?

21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be exhibit number 97, Your Honours.

23 MR. AGHA:

24 Q. Now, General, once again, after the evacuation of the hospital,

25 the question arose as to where some of the patients had gone.

1 So with the court clerk's assistance, I would like to call up

2 document marked 65 ter 212, with English translation 03269880, and B/C/S

3 translation 03269880. And I should make clear the B/C/S is actually the

4 original, and it's the English which is the translation.

5 General, do you have this document on your screen?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And this is a letter from Professor Andrija Hebrang to the

8 European mission concerning the destiny of the wounded from the hospital

9 staff, and it is essentially saying that according to the list only a

10 small number of the hospital staff was received contrary to the agreement

11 and contrary to the Geneva Conventions. So even at this date, 27th

12 November, it is apparent that there are missing patients from the hospital

13 staff. Are you aware that Professor Hebrang wrote such a letter?

14 A. I was aware of the fact that he had written this letter. He

15 interceded on several occasions. This is just one of many letters that

16 were sent to the European mission dealing with this or similar problems.

17 Professor Hebrang, Croatian health minister, was charged with dealing with

18 the hospital evacuation and negotiations.

19 Q. And do you know whether any satisfactory response was ever

20 received about the whereabouts of the patients pursuant to this letter by

21 Dr. Hebrang?

22 A. After we received this letter, the same day or the next day, it

23 was placed on the agenda of our bilateral meeting, the meeting between

24 General Raseta and myself. I remember that his answer at the time was as

25 follows: "You will be receiving a reply in due time. For the time being

1 we can provide no further details other than what you already know."

2 There was a worrying answer about the fate of the prisoners who did not

3 arrive in that convoy that was received in Sremska Mitrovica, and we never

4 received another response from Raseta.

5 MR. AGHA: Can I ask the Court, please, to exhibit this document?

6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

7 THE REGISTRAR: It will be exhibit number 98, Your Honours.

8 MR. AGHA:

9 Q. Now, I'd like to turn to another letter which again is from

10 Professor Hebrang of the same date, 27th of November. This, however,

11 doesn't concern the hospital convoy and its evacuation. Rather, it

12 concerns the difficulties being faced by the Croatian community in Lovas?

13 MR. AGHA: I'd like to ask the court clerk to kindly call up the

14 this document. It's under the same 65 ter number as the last document and

15 has B/C/S number 03269881 and English translation 03269881.

16 Q. Now, do you have this document before you?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And in essence, this document concerns the need to evacuate

19 various people from Lovas. Can you comment on this document?

20 A. Lovas is a village that had been putting up resistance against the

21 aggression for quite a long time. It was surrounded by JNA units and what

22 were most probably paramilitary units too. Once it had been taken, there

23 was immediately information on the situation of these citizens who were

24 inside the half-occupied and surrounded village. I'm not sure how the

25 information reached us, by which route.

1 Professor Hebrang then appealed to the European mission to make a

2 plan for evacuating these people. We can see here that he's proposing

3 several evacuation routes. It was his belief at the time and my proposal

4 that Hungary might be one of the possible routes where the evacuation

5 would be quickest and easiest, and there is a proposal for evacuation by

6 helicopters and an alternative was to use the River Danube.

7 None of these proposed routes were accepted by the JNA. They had

8 the village under control and there was nothing the Croatian side could do

9 about it. We learned later on that the people captured at Lovas had been

10 forced to stray into minefields, as a result of which many were killed and

11 some were again captured.

12 Q. Thank you, General.

13 MR. AGHA: Can I ask that this document be tendered as an exhibit,

14 please.

15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

16 THE REGISTRAR: It will be exhibit number 99, Your Honours.

17 MR. AGHA:

18 Q. Now, General, as you can see from the last document, which we

19 addressed we are now moving away from the evacuation of the hospital and

20 the expulsions of Croatian citizens from other parts of Croatia by the JNA

21 in league with paramilitary forces. So the next document I would like to

22 call up bears 65 ter 213, and has translation of 00310190. And we only

23 have an English copy because actually it's an information that has been

24 received following a meeting with Prime Minister Granic on 15th of

25 January, 1992.

1 Now, you'll see at paragraph 1, this is actually a meeting which

2 you attended. And at paragraph 4, the two Croatian priorities were to

3 halt the process of intimidation of Croatians out of their homes in areas

4 under JNA control, as well as to halt their replacement by Serbian

5 settlers and to secure an early withdrawal from the JNA. You also see on

6 paragraph 5, which if I can ask the court clerk to turn the next page of

7 the document, is that minister Budisa claimed that Serbia was using the

8 truce to achieve its war aims primarily the forcible ejection of Croatians

9 from occupied territory and the systematic settlement of Serbians in their

10 place.

11 Now, you also mention at paragraph 12 that in certain territory,

12 which was 98 per cent Croatian, no excuse could be advanced for the JNA to

13 enter to protect minorities. Now, do you recall this meeting?

14 A. Yes, I do. I remember that we had this meeting at the Hotel I, I

15 believe, Hotel I. That was about a fortnight before Spain took over

16 Presidency of the European mission. It was Ambassador Salgueiro who took

17 over in 1992.

18 I think this was one of the first meetings that were held. This

19 was also 12 days after the Sarajevo truce on the 2nd of January, 1992.

20 The UN occupation troops tried to reinforce and fortify the lines reached

21 that were already under their control. A large number of complaints were

22 received from those areas, caused by the actions of the occupying forces.

23 This faithfully reflects the situation in the occupied areas and the

24 general mood during this particular round of negotiations.

25 MR. AGHA: May I ask the Court that this document kindly be

1 tendered as an exhibit.

2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

3 THE REGISTRAR: This will be exhibit number 100, Your Honour.

4 MR. AGHA:

5 Q. Now, again, General, on the point of Croatian populations being

6 expelled from villages in hand with the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries,

7 I'd like to call up another document, which is 65 ter 214, with English

8 translation, ZA002090, and B/C/S, ZA002091. Now essentially this is a fax

9 which you received about the expulsion of Croatians from a Croatian

10 village of Boksic by Chetniks right under the very noses of the JNA and

11 you requested the urgent sending of the ECMM team to look into the

12 situation. Now, can you tell us who Iljo Kobas is, the person who sent

13 the document?

14 A. I have the document in front of me. As for the gentleman, the

15 teacher who signed this document, Professor, as he signed it, I don't know

16 this person but it's quite obvious that this is the secretary for

17 Zuljpanja [phoen] municipality because that's what the stamp indicates.

18 It is quite obvious that information had reached him on the displaced

19 persons, displaced residents of the village of Boksic, which is obviously

20 again next to the village of Cakovci because that's where he states the

21 Chetniks had entered Boksic from.

22 You can see the handwritten comment at the bottom of the page,

23 this is something that I wrote, and addressed to Mr. Ramljak, the

24 vice-president of the Croatian government. I wanted this to be shown to

25 the Croatian news agency and the Croatian state TV. I also asked that the

1 ECMM from Belgrade be sent over in order to protect the citizens on their

2 way out.

3 Q. And did the ECMM monitors go there to that village and protect the

4 civilians, so far as you're aware?

5 A. No. I'm not aware of that. An ECMM group that was based in

6 Belgrade eventually went there, and I don't remember what sort of

7 information I received later.

8 Q. Now, you mentioned in your handwritten note that you believe there

9 will be an escalation in the displacement of persons. Did your prophecy

10 prove correct? Did it escalate the displacement of Croatian persons?

11 A. After the truce was established on the 2nd -- or rather, 3rd of

12 January, 1992 the occupation forces started cleansing the remaining parts

13 of the Croatian territory that they had taken. The scale was more massive

14 in some areas and the process was a little slower in other areas. Certain

15 people managed to linger on in the areas for quite a long time. I don't

16 know how they managed. The concern expressed in the last sentence proved

17 to be fully justified at a later stage.

18 Q. Now, General, who do you actually mean by the occupational forces?

19 A. I mean those who were in control of that particular territory.

20 I'm talking about Eastern Slavonia and all the way to the confrontation

21 line. In my submission, the JNA units were responsible. They were

22 supposed to have control or had effective control over all the units that

23 were controlling the area. A popular name for those where I come from

24 used to be Chetnik units, or alternatively TO units that got involved

25 right at the beginning when the whole thing started in the area.

1 MR. AGHA: May I ask the Court that this document be exhibited.

2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

3 THE REGISTRAR: This will be exhibit number 101, Your Honours.

4 MR. AGHA:

5 Q. Now, we have been discussing the expulsion of the Croatian

6 population and I now come to a document dated 28th of March, 1992, which

7 is again on this subject.

8 MR. AGHA: If I could ask the court clerk to call up this

9 document, 65 ter 215, with ERN 00796553, and we only have an English of

10 it. There is no translation.

11 Q. Now, this document is from General Nambiar, the UNPROFOR in

12 Sarajevo, to Goulding of the United Nations in New York, and it concerns a

13 meeting attended by Mr. Ramljak and yourself as well as others, and it's

14 addressing the expulsion of the Croatian population, in particular in the

15 villages of Tovarnik and Nijemci.

16 Now, you also, on page 2 of this document -- and if I can ask the

17 court clerk to move to page 2, in the second paragraph, it says that

18 Mr. Ramljak spoke in strong terms about daily reports of plundering,

19 expulsions, coercions, especially in the three regions mentioned, and that

20 you, Agotic, in the fifth paragraph, stress the importance of the

21 technical coordination under joint auspices of UN and ECMM.

22 Now, do you recall such a meeting?

23 A. I remember that we did have a meeting. I think it was in -- on

24 the -- at the premises of the Croatian assembly and that was perhaps the

25 first meeting with General Satish Nambiar, the European -- the Croatian

1 parliament. It was attended by those people who are mentioned here, and

2 besides the Croatian side, members of the ECMM were also present.

3 Ambassador Salgueiro was mentioned here, the Chairman at the time. That

4 was when we talked about the tasks that needed to be carried out in

5 relation to the territories under occupation. The task was supposed to be

6 carried out by UNPROFOR. I don't know English well enough in order to be

7 able to follow the text and to confirm whether it's reported the way it

8 was. But I know that I was present at that meeting and that I did attend

9 subsequently a series of meetings of similar content.

10 MR. AGHA: May I ask the court that this document be exhibited?

11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

12 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit 102, Your Honour.

13 MR. AGHA:

14 Q. Now, general I know that you're aware of General Anton Tus and

15 some of the activities of the ZNG due to opposition. And I'd like to turn

16 to a document which has already been marked for identification as

17 number 71, and it's 65 ter 184, with English ERN RO320966. And it's a

18 newspaper article entitled "the war was won by blockading the garrisons,"

19 and it's based on a lecture given by General Anton Tus, the chief military

20 adviser to the president of Croatia.

21 Now, in essence, General, in this document, General Tus, amongst

22 other matters, points out that one of the tactics of the ZNG was to

23 blockade the JNA barracks with a view to acquiring weapons because the

24 Croatian armed forces had hardly any weapons, having been disarmed. Would

25 that be a correct policy?

1 A. I know General Tus well. We worked together, and up until the end

2 of 1992, he was the chief of the Main Staff of the Croatian army. Then he

3 became military adviser to the president of the republic. I cannot really

4 guarantee because I don't know English well enough in order to be able to

5 read the document, so I don't know what its contents are exactly, but I

6 know that in his lectures he would always give an assessment such as this

7 one and that I actually agree with that. Whether he assessed the

8 development with the barracks situation in such a way that it was

9 necessary to obtain weapons for the ZNG or to be able to take weapons from

10 the JNA for the paramilitary, perhaps that was something that could have

11 been discussed, but this was true.

12 Q. Now, also during the same lecture and in the same document,

13 General Tus mentioned that the aggressor gave up on the occupation of all

14 of Croatia and attempted to at least achieve the goals set forth in the

15 memorandum and to capture parts of Croatia to the

16 Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line and that is why the large battle was for

17 Eastern Slavonia and its cities, Vinkovci, Osijek and Vukovar.

18 Now, does General Tus's assessment in his lecture fall in line

19 with your evidence that there were three plans: Plan A, the taking over

20 of the whole of Croatia; Plan B, up to the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica

21 line; and then finally the truncated Plan C which was largely the cities

22 in Eastern Slavonia?

23 A. That is correct. But Plan B was to reach the

24 Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line and to capture the Croatia area there,

25 including Bosnia, all the way or all the areas that were east of that

1 line. When they realised that it was not realistically possible achieve

2 this plan, then they embarked on the implementation of the so-called Plan

3 C, achieving control over 30 per cent of the territory of the Republic of

4 Croatia, which was actually realised by the end of 1992, and it was

5 sanctioned with the cease-fire in Sarajevo on the 2nd of January, 1992.

6 MR. AGHA: May I ask the Chamber that this document previously

7 marked as number 71 be exhibited?

8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

9 MR. AGHA:

10 Q. Now, General, as we have been running through various documents,

11 we've touched upon numerous areas and towns and cities in Croatia. And I

12 think it would be of assistance to the Chamber if perhaps we could look at

13 the location of some of these towns and cities on a map so that it's

14 easier for the Chamber to familiarise itself. So I'd ask the court clerk

15 to kindly call up map 4, which is 04626620.

16 Can you indicate when the map is appearing, General?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And if I might ask the Court for assistance in providing the

19 general with a marker, because, General, I'd like you to mark or circle

20 various of the locations which you've mentioned.

21 A. I can see the map now. We can continue.

22 Q. Before I ask the general to proceed with the marking, may I submit

23 to the Chamber that we exhibit this map as a blank document and then

24 thereafter give a new exhibit number to the document which he marks?

25 JUDGE PARKER: That will be done.

1 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit 103, Your Honours.

2 MR. AGHA:

3 Q. Now, general, this is a map which shows a part of Croatia and has

4 many of the towns and villages which you've mentioned in your evidence.

5 So could you kindly circle on the map Vukovar.

6 A. [Marks].

7 Q. Ilok.

8 A. [Marks].

9 Q. Lovas.

10 A. I'll find it in a minute. You can't really see all that well.

11 [Marks].

12 Q. Tovarnik.

13 A. [Marks].

14 Q. Nijemci.

15 A. [Marks].

16 Q. Roughly where the Bruska village is?

17 A. Bruska.

18 Q. Bruska.

19 A. Bruska, the village of Bruska is near Benkovac. It's on another

20 part of the map. It's in western Croatia, near the Adriatic coast, near

21 Ravni Kotari.

22 Q. We will look at a second map in a moment and perhaps we can do

23 those markings on those maps.

24 Now, in your evidence, you mentioned the

25 Virovitica-Karlobag-Karlovac line, the so-called Plan B line. Could you

1 kindly draw for us where that line is on this map, if it's possible?

2 A. It's not possible on this map. It's -- it shows only the eastern

3 part of the country, while this line is more to the west from -- in

4 relation to this part. All I can mark here is the eastern sector, which

5 was occupied. I can mark that line.

6 Q. Yes. If you could mark the eastern sector line, please, and then

7 we'll mark the other line on another map.

8 A. [Marks]. East of this line was the occupied territory of the

9 Republic of Croatia, later named sector east, once the UNPROFOR forces

10 arrived.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you, General.

12 MR. AGHA: May I kindly ask that this map be exhibited, saved as,

13 with the markings?

14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

15 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit 104, Your Honours.

16 MR. AGHA: Now, can I ask the court clerk to kindly call up

17 another map? And this is map number 3, bearing ERN 04626619.

18 Q. And you'll see, General, when this map appears that it is more of

19 a global map showing the whole of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia.

20 So hopefully we can mark the few remaining lines. If you can let me know

21 when you have the map.

22 A. I see it.

23 MR. AGHA: May I ask the Court again that this blank map be

24 tendered as an exhibit?

25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

1 THE REGISTRAR: This will be exhibit number 105, Your Honour.

2 MR. AGHA:

3 Q. Now, General, as I've mentioned, this is more of a global map, so

4 once again, if I can ask you to mark on it so the Chamber can see the

5 global areas, the city of Vukovar.

6 A. [Marks].

7 Q. Ilok.

8 A. [Marks].

9 Q. Lovas.

10 A. [Marks].

11 Q. Nadin.

12 A. [Marks].

13 Q. Tovarnik.

14 A. [Marks].

15 Q. Nijemci.

16 A. [Marks].

17 Q. Skabrnja.

18 A. [Marks].

19 Q. Bruska village.

20 A. [Marks].

21 Q. Benkovac.

22 A. [Marks].

23 Q. Dubrovnik.

24 A. [Marks].

25 Q. Ratkovici.

1 A. Rakovica.

2 Q. Rakovica.

3 A. [Marks]. Not in Bosnia but on the Croatian side of the border.

4 It's more to the west on the territory of Croatia.

5 Q. Okay. And are you able to make a marking?

6 A. Yes, yes. This point is on the area -- in the area of Bosnia.

7 It's on the crossroads from Bihac towards Zagreb towards western Lika.

8 Q. And finally, Saborsko.

9 A. [Marks]. It's here, this last dot.

10 Q. Actually it's my fault, General, but I think perhaps for better

11 identification, it would be easier if, as I called out each village again,

12 you would put the relevant number 1, 2, 3 or 4 there.

13 So if we start with Vukovar, if you could put 1?

14 A. [Marks].

15 Q. Ilok, 2.

16 A. [Marks].

17 Q. Lovas, 3.

18 A. [Marks].

19 Q. Nadin, 4.

20 A. [Marks].

21 Q. Tovarnik, 5.

22 A. [Marks].

23 Q. Nijemci, 6.

24 A. [Marks].

25 Q. Skabrnja, 7.

1 A. [Marks].

2 Q. Bruska village, 8.

3 A. [Marks].

4 Q. Benkovac, 9.

5 A. [Marks].

6 Q. Dubrovnik, 10.

7 A. [Marks].

8 Q. Rakovica, 11.

9 A. [Marks].

10 Q. Boksic, 12.

11 A. [Marks].

12 Q. And Saborsko, 13.

13 A. [Marks].

14 Q. Now, General, you mentioned before on the other map it was

15 difficult for you to mark the line of Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line.

16 Could you kindly mark it on this map, if it's possible?

17 A. Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag. [Marks].

18 Q. And could you mark that 1A.

19 A. [Marks].

20 Q. And if you could also kindly just draw a line showing sector east

21 again.

22 A. [Marks].

23 Q. And mark that portion 1B.

24 A. [Marks].

25 Q. So looking at the map, General, according to your evidence, the

1 plan of the JNA was firstly Plan A to take over the whole of Croatia?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Plan B, according to map would have been to take over areas marked

4 A and B?

5 A. Plan B was to take the areas up to the

6 Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag line. So that's 1A, everything to the east.

7 Q. That would also include the area marked 1B?

8 A. That is correct. What was actually implemented was Plan C, which

9 includes the 1B line and three more sectors in the area of Croatia which

10 are not marked here but they can be marked.

11 Q. Okay. Well, since we are primarily interested in Eastern

12 Slavonia, which is the area 1B, we will leave it at that.

13 MR. AGHA: And if I may ask the Court if this map could kindly be

14 exhibited?

15 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

16 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Exhibit 106, Your Honour.

17 MR. AGHA: So, that is all the exhibits which the Prosecution

18 would like to put through this witness, and has indeed been done. But it

19 may be helpful to the Court by way of clarification if the Prosecution was

20 able just to ask the general one particular question concerning his

21 knowledge of the security administration.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.

23 MR. AGHA:

24 Q. Now, General, you were a member of the security services for about

25 20 years, and you've explained in your evidence in the Milosevic case,

1 which has also been admitted into evidence in this case how the chains of

2 command of the security organs and other ordinary reporting lines were in

3 the JNA.

4 So my question to you is: If a commander of a unit gave a

5 security officer a particular order, for example, the evacuation of a

6 hospital, would the security officer need to report on the progress of the

7 implementation of that order to the commander who gave him that order?

8 A. Correct, yes. He would have to do so. Each order by the

9 commander had to be carried out by any member of the unit. If the

10 security organ received an order from the commander, then he was obliged

11 to inform his line of management of the service, along -- according to his

12 competency, and then they would have to begin implementing it. Then all

13 the tasks that were implemented had to be reported on. If he received the

14 order from his commander, he would report to the commander, as well as to

15 his line of command of the service.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 MR. AGHA: That completes the 92 bis (B) procedure for this

18 witness.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Agha.

20 Mr. Vasic?

21 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Cross-examined by Mr. Vasic:

23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General. I would like to

24 introduce myself first. I am Mr. Vasic, and I am Defence counsel for Mr.

25 Mrksic. Because we both understand and we speak the same language, I

1 would like to ask you to pause after my questions so that the interpreters

2 would be able to interpret our dialogue into English so that others who

3 don't speak our language would know what we are saying. Hopefully there

4 won't be any problems because you have already testified before at this

5 Tribunal.

6 For a moment I would like to go back to your military career so

7 that we would know what jobs you performed at certain time periods, which

8 would be relevant to the questions that I will be asking you.

9 Your career in the JNA began in 1966 in Pula, and then in 1968 you

10 already became the commander of the reconnaissance centre of an air force

11 unit; is that correct?

12 A. No. My military career started after I completed the military

13 academy on the 27th of September, 1965. The -- I became a commander of a

14 radar station or unit in Bihac in the course of 1968 or in early 1969.

15 Q. Three years after this, you became chief of security of the 117th

16 Combat Fighter Regiment?

17 A. Yes. It was a combat air force fighter regiment, and I have been

18 a chief of security or the chief of security since 1974.

19 Q. General, and when do you -- when did you become the deputy chief

20 of the military security department of the 5th Air Force Corps in Zagreb?

21 A. I became deputy -- it wasn't an official title, but I was the

22 assistant of the chief in 1974. This was in June of 1974.

23 Q. The 5th Corps was subordinated to the air force command in Zemun,

24 was it not?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. After you completed the war college in 1986 you became chief of

2 security of the 5th Air Force Corps?

3 A. That's correct. Several months after I graduated, I became chief

4 of the security services of the 5th Air Force Corps.

5 Q. You remained in that position until March 1991, when you were

6 removed from your post by your superior, Slobodan Rakocevic; is that

7 correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. My apologies. In July 1991, you requested and received approval

10 to quit the military service?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. As early as at the beginning of August, you became Chief of Staff

13 of the National Guards Corps?

14 A. Yes, that's true.

15 Q. When the Main Staff of the Croatian army was established in

16 September 1991, you became commander of the air force and anti-aircraft

17 defence?

18 A. Commander of the air force and anti-air force defence, I became

19 commander of the air force and anti-air force defence in early September

20 1991 -- in early December 1991.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

22 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. In 1996, did you receive a promotion to the rank of Lieutenant

24 Colonel and were you appointed deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of

25 the Croatian army?

1 A. That's not true. In 1996, I was awarded the rank of Colonel

2 General, but I was named assistant Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the

3 Croatian army for the air force and anti-aircraft defence.

4 Q. Thank you very much. It was in December 2002 that you retired and

5 your rank at the time was staff general, which would have been equivalent

6 to the rank of army general in the former JNA, would it not?

7 A. Yes. That's true. My rank was staff general. That is equivalent

8 to a four-star general. But there was another general level rank in

9 wartime in the Croatian army. It would be very difficult to translate

10 into a different system but it would have been the equivalent of an army

11 general in the JNA.

12 Q. Was that the top-most rank that could be achieved in your army?

13 A. Yes. That would have been the highest rank with the exception of

14 those who were in the position of chief of the Main Staff.

15 Q. After your retirement you became adviser to the president of the

16 republic, first for defence and military-related matters, and following

17 that, adviser for national security?

18 A. I became adviser to the president of the Republic of Croatia even

19 before I retired, when the Croatian president, Stipe Mesic, began his

20 first term of office. After I retired, I became adviser for national

21 security and remained in that position until the end of his first term of

22 office.

23 Q. Thank you. When I look at your impressive military career, we

24 must agree that for over 20 years you were involved in security-related

25 tasks and matters. When you were a JNA officer, you were in a security

1 unit of the air force that covered the whole territory of the former JNA.

2 Isn't that a fact?

3 A. Yes, precisely. There is one thing that is debatable, whether it

4 covered the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. From a

5 professional point of view, that can be debated but I believe more

6 questions will follow about that later, so let's not waste time on it now.

7 Q. In addition to all the military schools that you completed, in

8 addition to your practical experience in the army, you also obtained an MA

9 degree from Zagreb's political sciences faculty?

10 A. Yes, that was back in 1985.

11 Q. While you were an active officer, the air force structure broke

12 down into corps, did it not?

13 A. Yes. That was after the last reorganising scheme, and up to that

14 point, it had been different, and many different systems prevailed

15 throughout my career.

16 Q. After this new corps level organisation, the first was in Nis, the

17 third was in Zagreb, and the 5th was in Zagreb, and you were chief at the

18 time; right? In each and every one of these, there were security

19 departments that were subordinated to the chief of the war air force in

20 Zemun; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And chief of security of the air force was subordinated to the

23 chief of the security administration of the secretariat for All People's

24 Defence; is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Which territory was covered by the 5th Corps of the -- 5th Air

2 Force Corps which you were part of at the time?

3 A. The 5th Air Force Corps covered the area to the east of the

4 following line: Virovitica-Banja Luka-Split, or rather to the west of the

5 line that I just described.

6 Q. So we can conclude that they covered the entire territory of

7 Slovenia and southwest Croatia?

8 A. The north, the northwest, and the west of Croatia.

9 Q. Thank you. You were talking about your tasks in your statement,

10 and in your testimony that has been tendered into evidence here, the

11 transcript, about the tasks that the security administration of the

12 federal secretariat for All People's Defence handed out to their

13 subordinated security organs. These tasks subdivided into roughly three

14 groups, neutralising the actions of foreign intelligence services,

15 neutralising the activities of extremists from the immigration circles,

16 and countering the domestic or internal enemy?

17 A. Yes, globally speaking. But another thing was protection of

18 confidentiality which was also essential to what we did.

19 Q. At the relevant period of time, just before the events of 1991,

20 unlike the air force, the land forces were subdivided into three military

21 districts; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you tell us which three those were and which territories they

24 covered?

25 A. The 1st Military District in Belgrade, the 3rd Military District

1 in Nis, and the 5th Military District in Zagreb. As for their respective

2 territories, I can't say with certainty, but they did not overlap with the

3 territory covered by the air force, although to a very high extent they

4 did.

5 Q. Thank you, General. What about the 5th Military District based in

6 Zagreb? Was it not made up of 5th -- five corps?

7 A. I think there were five corps. I've listed them all in my

8 statement in a previous trial.

9 Q. Rijeka, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Maribor and Varazdin?

10 A. Yes, that's right.

11 Q. Each military district of the land forces had security departments

12 headed by chiefs, as well as counter-intelligence groups, did it not?

13 A. I think we had security sections not departments - it's a slightly

14 higher level - and counter-intelligence groups, yes.

15 Q. What was in the course in the air force was at the military

16 district level in the land forces; is that right?

17 A. No. In the air force, at the air force command level, there was

18 the central or rather counter-intelligence group which had three

19 detachments in the respective corps headquarters. But these were not

20 subordinated to the corps. They were subordinated directly to the central

21 intelligence group of the air force command.

22 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

23 JUDGE PARKER: Is this a convenient time, Mr. Vasic?

24 We will have the first break now and resume at five minutes

25 past 4.00.

1 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Vasic.

4 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. General, during the break the interpreters asked me to slow down a

6 little and to pause between our questions and answers.

7 On the 29th and 30th of May and until the 1st of July 2002, did

8 you give a statement to the OTP? Do you remember that?

9 A. Yes. I gave a statement but I don't remember the exact dates.

10 That must be indicated on the statement, I believe.

11 Q. When you spoke about the different units of the air force, and

12 specifically those of the 5th Air Force Corps, you said that the 5th Corps

13 had several air force bases and that each had a security organ?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. You also said that each of the bases had a military police unit

16 subordinated to the security department?

17 A. Yes. But that was as far as professional matters were concerned.

18 Q. And the same applied to the land forces?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 Q. In your statement you described two parallel chains of command

21 that applied to security bodies. For military matters, the chain went all

22 the way up to the commander of the air force, and in the land forces, the

23 commander of the military district. The other chain, as far as

24 professional matters were concerned, went to the chief of security

25 administration of All People's Defence, and this applied to both the air

1 force and the land forces?

2 A. Yes, roughly speaking that's true, except that this part went up

3 only as far as the corps. Whichever command had a security body, this

4 security body was subordinated to the commander, first and foremost, as

5 far as military matters were concerned. As far as purely professional

6 matters were concerned, technical matters, we didn't call it a chain of

7 command. We called it a chain of control.

8 Q. What about the activities of security bodies? Was not most of

9 their work about technical aspects?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The -- these technical aspects mostly depended on the chief of the

12 security organ. Can you explain that, please?

13 A. The more the security organ dealt with technical and security

14 issues, the more successful it was because their superior for technical

15 issues always insisted that they deal, as much as possible, with technical

16 aspects, which did not imply that they would not have followed the orders

17 of their commanders where military matters were concerned. There had to

18 be some sort of a balance, however, between the two.

19 Q. What about the importance of security organs or bodies in the JNA?

20 It was great, wasn't it, in relation to those officers who were not part

21 of the security chain, as it were? Were security bodies consulted when

22 officers were appointed to command positions?

23 A. Yes, they were.

24 Q. If their opinion was negative, could it have resulted in someone

25 not being appointed?

1 A. Yes. There were cases like that, but there were cases where the

2 security organs opposed somebody's appointment and this person was still

3 appointed. Then there would be appeals to the superior command structure

4 at a higher level. These appeals sometimes failed. But in most cases,

5 where the security organ had some authority, in their work with the

6 commander, they would normally be successful in imposing their position

7 and their opinion.

8 Q. Let us now consider the period of late 1990 and early 1991. What

9 about the activities of the security administration in this period? You

10 said that it became a command structure and that security channels were

11 used to pass on the most important orders in the JNA in this period of

12 time. Would that be correct?

13 A. It's very difficult to say, to define the time line from when

14 until when, but yes it's important that -- it's true that important

15 information was passed down that chain, and most of the instructions that

16 were received from positions higher up were based on information collected

17 by the service, not necessarily all but the best part.

18 Q. In your statement to the investigators of the OTP, did you not say

19 that the federal secretary, Kadijevic himself, at the time, believed the

20 security channel to be the most reliable and the fastest way at the time

21 to pass information and orders up and down the command chain in the JNA?

22 A. Yes. That's true. But that statement was in reference to the

23 beginning of the war in Croatia. I'm not sure about Slovenia. That was

24 in reference to that time. I wasn't talking about 1990 and 1991 in their

25 entirety.

1 Q. So this would be in reference to the second half of 1991, if I

2 understand you correctly?

3 A. Yes. I think that would be an accurate way of putting it.

4 Q. When you testified in a different case before this Tribunal, did

5 you not say about this that the then-chief of the security administration,

6 Aca Vasiljevic, could have passed information down the security channel

7 without informing the relevant commanders?

8 A. Yes, that's true. Whether he informed anyone about that or not is

9 not for me to say. Whether he informed his own superior, the federal

10 secretary for All People's Defence. However, within the service,

11 information was being passed on that I think the superiors in the chain of

12 command were not necessarily familiar with.

13 Q. What about the independence enjoyed by security officers when

14 dealing with technical issues pursuant to orders from their own superior

15 security officer and in relation to their own unit?

16 A. Where technical matters were concerned, they would have been

17 entirely independent. However, from the rank of army commander or

18 military district commander later on, and higher up the chain, those

19 officers would have known everything that their security organ was doing.

20 Down the chain there was selective information being passed around, such

21 information as concerned technical issues.

22 Q. Does that mean that the security organ would have been in a

23 position to use certain activities concerning these technical aspects

24 without informing their commander?

25 A. Yes, that's precisely what it means.

1 Q. Does this position of the security organ indicate the existence of

2 a separate chain or special chain of command in relation to orders and in

3 relation to higher or superior organs of structure?

4 A. Yes, it does indicate that.

5 Q. At the time that we are speaking about, was a security officer

6 authorised to hand over a JNA member or a civilian suspected of committing

7 a crime in relation to the JNA?

8 A. I think that security officer did not have that right. The only

9 right that he had was in an emergency situation was to detain a person if

10 there were grounds to suspect that person, and they could hold the person

11 until the investigative organs arrived on the scene.

12 Q. We talked about activities of the security administration and the

13 security organs in neutralising certain factors or certain destabilisation

14 factors of the social order. The third of those activities was to

15 neutralise internal enemies. At a certain period in time, did this third

16 activity become a priority activity, as far as the security organs were

17 concerned?

18 A. Yes, that is correct. It did become a priority.

19 Q. Countering the activities of internal enemies, did that refer to

20 internal enemies of all the nations and nationalities that lived in the

21 SFRY at the time?

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. After 1976 [as interpreted], this segment of activity of the

24 security organs was given a special form in uncovering members of the

25 so-called irredentist movement. These were internal enemies of Albanian

1 ethnicity?

2 A. Well, I wouldn't say that it was from 1986. I would say that it

3 was from an even earlier time period.

4 Q. Was the culmination -- an event that occurred in a barracks of the

5 JNA at the time, did that event draw special attention of the organs of

6 security to this problem, if you know what I'm talking about?

7 A. Yes. That is correct. If you have the transcript, that is where

8 I already explained this.

9 Q. Considering all of these circumstances, was there a justified

10 concern because of this organising tendency by the irredentist forces?

11 A. Yes. There was a concern in that respect but I think that certain

12 individuals exaggerated it and occasionally abused it.

13 Q. You said that it was exaggerated and abused by certain

14 individuals. Could you please tell us who you mean when you say these

15 individuals?

16 A. If we are talking about Albanian nationalism specifically and the

17 irredentist movement as we refer to it officially within the security

18 services at the time, some individuals that were heading the service

19 insisted that irredentist organisation had to be found in any unit of the

20 JNA. For example, if there were any three Albanians in any given unit,

21 they were an organised threesome. So there was a certain number of

22 individuals within the security service who managed to impose this view on

23 the service. So that is what I mean when I say that there was an abuse of

24 this occurrence in a way.

25 Q. Thank you. One of the people who created such an approach

1 regarding the irredentist movement was Mr. Aca Vasiljevic. Would you say

2 that was true?

3 A. I explained that and I think that at the time, he and his team

4 were one of those individuals in the 7th Military District. Excuse me, in

5 the 7th Army.

6 Q. And did this method of work spread throughout the service when

7 Mr. Vasiljevic became the chief of the SSNO security administration?

8 A. Yes. It spread throughout a considerable part of the service, and

9 those security organs that had not uncovered any irredentist activities

10 were considered to be unsuccessful in their work.

11 Q. Did you personally have a problem in regard to this matter, in

12 terms of your relations with your superiors from the security organs?

13 A. Yes, to a certain extent, I did. I managed to resist that. And

14 in the 5th Corps, there was not a large number of cases of irredentist,

15 nationalist organising. There were individual cases which were considered

16 as indicative, and my superior at the time considered that to be an

17 unsatisfactory assessment and -- a reflection of unsatisfactory work.

18 Q. A colleague of yours from the security service, Mr. Bogdan Vujic,

19 did he come to the -- to your corps in connection with this uncovering of

20 irredentist occurrences in your corps?

21 A. I remember Mr. Vujic from that time. He was a travelling

22 ambassador at the time throughout Yugoslavia. He travelled when these

23 irredentist movement events were topical. He did come to the 5th Corps as

24 well. I personally did not work together with him in his team, even

25 though in that period we did have frequent contacts.

1 Q. He was a specialist in uncovering irredentist cases?

2 A. Yes. He could have been considered a specialist in that area in

3 the service.

4 Q. And did your information lead you to believe that he was an

5 honourable officer?

6 A. He was a person who had quite an imagination, and he put in a lot

7 of effort in his work. He could work for days without a break, conducting

8 interviews and so on. But as far as I know, he was an honourable officer

9 and he did not set up or stage any organisations or cases in this respect

10 in particular.

11 Q. Did you have information as to how he identified irredentist

12 threesomes in the area of the 5th Corps?

13 A. I did say that we had a very insignificant number of such cases,

14 and I did not directly participate in these activities. This is something

15 that my deputy did at the time, Lieutenant Colonel at the time. I don't

16 know exactly what his role was, the role of Colonel Vujic in specific

17 cases, but I do know that he was considered to be a person who provided

18 considerable assistance in these matters.

19 Q. When you were testifying before this Tribunal, did you say that

20 Mr. Bogdan Vujic, in uncovering these irredentist threesomes, requested a

21 list of soldiers of Albanian ethnicity from a unit and would then proceed

22 to declare them as members of the irredentist movement?

23 A. A list of members of the unit would be a starting point in order

24 to make assessments aimed at future activities. So he probably did

25 request such lists. He couldn't begin without that. However, I do know

1 that he, as well as the other individuals who worked on uncovering these

2 threesomes, would make setups on paper of their organisation and then

3 would proceed to acknowledge or would proceed to gain confessions from

4 these individuals, that they were a member of these threesomes without

5 enough elements that would justify such a conclusion.

6 Q. Does that mean that they were practically forcing them to admit

7 that they were members of such cells?

8 A. Yes. As well as by having established some sort of cooperation

9 with them, and enter into certain arrangements. However, when such cases

10 would come to trial, they would not usually be successful.

11 Q. And was this work that was done by him valued within the framework

12 of the security administration?

13 A. I think so, yes. I wasn't at the security administration, but

14 there, at that level, it was a help to the people who were working on

15 these issues.

16 Q. Is it your opinion that Colonel Vujic did this because it was

17 particularly valued in the service or he did it because he had something

18 against soldiers of Albanian ethnicity?

19 A. I don't think that he had anything against any soldier of any

20 nationality, but that was a trend at the time. He agreed with such a

21 policy and such a trend, and he took part in it.

22 Q. And did he cooperate with Mr. Aleksandar Vasiljevic in this trend?

23 A. Well, he probably did report to him but I don't know what their

24 relationship was.

25 Q. Did you say that in this period, after these activities were

1 implemented against internal enemies, members of the irredentist movement,

2 that he actually surrounded himself with his own people who shared his

3 beliefs?

4 A. Yes, who shared his beliefs, but who also blindly followed him and

5 obeyed him. Yes, he did surround himself with such people.

6 Q. Was Bogdan Vujic a member of that team?

7 A. Bogdan Vujic, I think, was about to retire at that time. I don't

8 know whether he had an important post or not in the security

9 administration at the time, but he did enjoy the rank of colonel, the

10 reputation of a senior, experienced person. So this is something that he

11 brought with him. However, I really don't know what his relations were

12 with Aca Vasiljevic, but I assume that they were close.

13 Q. During the 1980s, during this phase of neutralising internal

14 enemies, and at the end of the 1980s, when different political parties

15 were created in the territory of the SFRY, did the focus of the security

16 organs shift from internal enemies so that now the service began to look

17 for associates among the ranks of these new political parties?

18 A. Yes, that is correct. This changed.

19 Q. The Communist Party or the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was

20 the ideological basis within the JNA, were there any attempts at the time

21 in order to create a new such basis through the League of Communists

22 Movement for Yugoslavia, and if such a thing did occur, who was the

23 architect of such an idea and such a policy?

24 A. Yes. That is correct. There were attempts to create the League

25 of Communists Movement for Yugoslavia. As far as I know, initiators were

1 certain retired generals and admirals of the JNA, specifically Mamula,

2 Mirkovic. They were generals. And they included in those activities

3 persons from other republican centres.

4 Q. Was this in fact an attempt to preserve cohesion in the army and

5 to prevent the break-up of the country?

6 A. Yes. I think that's what they believed. I think that was the

7 intention that mattered, since they eventually opted for this platform.

8 Objectively speaking, even now, and it has been 14 or 15 years since, we

9 see that their attempt or their effort was groundless. Personally, I did

10 not agree with their platform and I wished no part in it. That was one of

11 the reasons I clashed with my superiors in the service.

12 Q. Were Mr. Vasiljevic and Mr. Rakocevic, whom we mentioned today,

13 part of this endeavour?

14 A. Mr. Vasiljevic and Mr. Rakocevic were -- it's difficult to be

15 specific about the time, but I think it was back in 1988 and 1989, they

16 were a priori in favour of preserving Yugoslavia, and I can say that I was

17 too. It was in this sense that they opposed every form of nationalism.

18 As time went by, and the multi-party system was allowed and subsequently

19 introduced, they looked for a party throughout Yugoslavia that was strong

20 enough and powerful enough to be able to implement their ideas. They

21 found a candidate in the Socialist Party of Serbia, more specifically in

22 the person of their party president. It was at this point in time that

23 they left behind Serb nationalism, which, like any other nationalism,

24 would eventually have destroyed Yugoslavia.

25 Q. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, did we not have a situation

1 where certain high-ranking JNA officers were being monitored by the

2 security forces as suspected of being Serb nationalists?

3 A. Yes, that was the case. But, like I said, that was up until 1989,

4 perhaps even 1990. But back in 1988 or 1989, I'm convinced, because I

5 myself attended a number of such meetings and lectures, where the two of

6 them, on behalf of the security administration, branded or condemned all

7 forms of nationalism.

8 Q. After the multi-party elections that we briefly touched on, and

9 following the victories of national parties in some of the republics, did

10 the military leadership not at that point believe that there was a real

11 danger that the leaderships of Croatia and Slovenia would use force in

12 order to cause the breakdown of the SFRY?

13 A. Yes. Assessments like that were voiced among the JNA leaders at

14 the time.

15 Q. What about the result of these assessments and decisions that were

16 made by the chief of the General Staff? I mean his decision to disarm the

17 Territorial Defence units of all the republics and autonomous regions? I

18 mean his decision to place all the weapons thus requisitioned under the

19 control of the JNA?

20 A. From where he was standing, this assessment was real, and the

21 result of this fact was the decision that he gave. This was not only an

22 act of usurpation on his part but he was also usurping other people's

23 property because the TO's equipment was the property of the republics.

24 Without thinking twice, he requisitioned all of this and placed it under

25 his own control.

1 Q. But the decision was only about placing the weapons under control.

2 These weapons were not taken away from the republics and autonomous

3 regions. The weapons were still, technically speaking, property of these

4 republics?

5 A. That was on paper. In reality, it boiled down to who was in

6 possession of these weapons and who had access to them. It no longer

7 mattered who the weapons technically belonged to. The physical reality

8 was altogether different.

9 Q. Let's go back to Aleksandar Vasiljevic's appointment as chief of

10 the security administration. What is your opinion of Mr. Vasiljevic as

11 chief? What exactly was the extent of his power in that position?

12 A. I think Mr. Aleksandar Vasiljevic was a very able officer, very

13 intelligent, very versatile. He was very good at making assessments. He

14 was very good at following through with his assessments, and he was able

15 to impose himself on other people. I think he was very good at selecting

16 his associates and he was very good at organising the service in order to

17 carry out the tasks that he believed were crucial at the time, at least as

18 far as his aspect of activity was concerned.

19 Had he been successful, or rather had the JNA leadership managed

20 to remain neutral in what happened in the territory of the former

21 Yugoslavia, there would have been a monument built to honour them all

22 now. But they took sides, the leadership of the JNA took sides, and we

23 all know what happened as a result of that.

24 Q. Let's leave this topic for a moment.

25 In relation to your last answer, according to the constitution,

1 did the JNA not have a duty to protect the territorial integrity and

2 sovereignty of the entire SFRY?

3 A. Yes. That's true. That was one of its duties. However, what was

4 necessary at the time was to recognise the political realities. Once the

5 multi-party system had been allowed, there was no longer any way we could

6 influence which party would be victorious in the elections, which is

7 something that the JNA tried to do.

8 Q. So what's your conclusion? Was it a problem that the JNA didn't

9 act according to the constitution or because the system was not adapted to

10 the new realities that the country was facing after the multi-party

11 elections?

12 A. The constitutional system was not modified to fit the new

13 realities. For that, you needed to have a new consensus by the

14 leaderships of all the individual republics and not for the JNA to make

15 independent decisions as a political agent.

16 Q. Let us now, please, go back to the security chief. When you spoke

17 about Mr. Vasiljevic to the investigators of the OTP, did you say that his

18 associates in the security administration respected him and feared him in

19 equal measure?

20 A. That was the feeling I had. I had the impression that he was a

21 very authoritarian person in the way he treated those who were around him.

22 Q. Does that mean that they carried out his ideas and designs?

23 A. Yes. I believe that to have been the case.

24 Q. Was he at the time influential even with the federal secretary,

25 who made decisions based on Mr. Vasiljevic's opinions?

1 A. I think he was very influential. I can't be more specific, but I

2 know that I personally in 1989 and 1990 and in early 1991 repeatedly wrote

3 to the federal secretary in order to inform him about the situation as it

4 was at the time in Croatia and Slovenia. Some of the information that

5 came from that general direction was quite contrary or different from my

6 own assessments and information that I had obtained in the area.

7 Q. Did you suffer any consequences in your work on account of that,

8 on account of these erroneous assessments?

9 A. Yes. I suffered some consequences, and this climaxed on the

10 2nd of March, 1991. I was removed from my post because my assessments

11 were different from those of my superior.

12 Q. In relation to this topic, did you state to the investigators of

13 the OTP that the decisions of Admiral Brovet who was assistant federal

14 secretary and of Aleksandar Vasiljevic became in actual fact orders?

15 A. Yes. I said that based on certain decisions, I had that feeling.

16 The same applies to the information/order of the chief of the Main Staff

17 which we discussed yesterday, dated the 12th of October, 1991.

18 Q. Does that mean that any decision by Mr. Vasiljevic would have the

19 same effect with his subordinates as if it had been made by the military

20 leadership itself?

21 A. No. I don't think it carried quite the same clout, because it

22 would not have had the same consequences in case of failure to comply as

23 would have been the case if orders had been disobeyed by the Chief of the

24 Main Staff. However, his attitude caused a lot of respect and fear with

25 his inferiors or his subordinates. Not with all of them, mind you, but

1 that is certainly what most of them appear to have felt.

2 Q. Particularly, if we bear in mind the influence that Mr. Vasiljevic

3 had with the federal secretary?

4 A. Yes, of course.

5 Q. Does that mean that, at the time, Mr. Vasiljevic held under

6 control the entire security structure of the then-JNA? And that no action

7 or operation of any consequence within the security and

8 counter-intelligence sector could have been carried out without his

9 knowledge and explicit approval?

10 A. First of all, can you please be more specific about the time?

11 Q. 1990 and 1991.

12 A. All right. 1990 and 1991. From March onwards, I can't say. In

13 1991, up until March, I know that he enjoyed no absolute authority with

14 me. I was independent in making assessments, and I would act based on my

15 own assessments. There were other individuals, later on, who were anxious

16 about holding down their positions and thought the best idea was to obey

17 him, although they sometimes disagreed. Specifically, I know some

18 examples from the land forces at the time. From the air force, too, for

19 that matter, but as time went by, in 1991, his authority and his influence

20 grew and continued to grow.

21 Q. Following the arrival of Mr. Vasiljevic at the head of the

22 security administration, did the scope of activities of the security

23 organs start to include the civilian sector, which up to then had not been

24 within their remit?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. Were three new groups not created at the time in order to monitor

2 society outside the JNA?

3 A. If we are talking about the air force, that is correct. Three new

4 detachments were set up, one in Zagreb, one in Sarajevo, and one in Nis.

5 These detachments were supposed, as of sometime around 1988 or 1989, to

6 deal with the society, which up until then had not been the case and had

7 even been forbidden by the rules of service.

8 Q. What about the Zagreb-based detachment? Were they given the task

9 to deal with the Croatian political leadership and members of the MUP and

10 to set up a network of associates in those structures?

11 A. Yes. That's true.

12 Q. Did this happen after the multi-party elections in Croatia also?

13 A. It grew in intensity after the multi-party elections but also on

14 the eve of the elections, when the first political parties were created in

15 late 1989. That's when they set about doing this.

16 Q. What about this network of associates? Did they not try to

17 recruit people among the very leaders of Croatia's political life?

18 A. It's in the nature of the service to get as close to the top as

19 possible, to have the top-most source possible, as it were.

20 Q. Was there a plan for this network of associates to continue to

21 exist once the JNA left Croatian territory?

22 A. If you're talking about the 2nd Detachment, then I would say

23 that's true. That was the objective. That was the task. Leave

24 strongholds behind in the territory even once the JNA had withdrawn from

25 the territory.

1 Q. The next step was to expand this network of associates to the

2 media; is that correct?

3 A. Yes. I think that was the first step. That was the step that was

4 taken first. And then the move was made to the party political leadership

5 because at the time, and we all were witnesses of that, the media had a

6 very important role in creating public opinion.

7 Q. This operation that we are talking about conducted by the

8 2nd Detachment did it remain secret until the end of the war?

9 A. It remained secret until the barracks was captured where they had

10 their headquarters. Then the Croatian security services analysed the

11 seized materials quite soon after that, but I can't tell you exactly

12 how -- after how much time they analysed these materials. But this

13 operation did not remain a secret right until the end of the war.

14 Q. You talked about going into the barracks where these materials

15 were seized. When was this?

16 A. This was in 1991, in the Maksimirska barracks, where they had

17 their headquarters.

18 Q. For the transcript, the date actually was the 15th of September,

19 1991.

20 A. Yes, that is correct.

21 Q. We will come back to this a bit later. In the conversations you

22 mentioned here that you had with General Raseta, did the JNA make an offer

23 for Vukovar to be an open city, without access allowed to any army?

24 A. I don't recall Raseta ever offering such an option. There is a

25 very objective record of what Raseta offered and also what my response was

1 in the minutes made by the ECMM observers. I think that that is the most

2 objective record of what was offered, who offered what, and what the

3 response was.

4 Q. I'm asking you this because you said that you spent every day

5 sitting at the table and conducted negotiations conducive to resolving

6 problem situations.

7 A. Every day, from the 8th of October, almost until the end of 1991,

8 yes, that is true.

9 Q. Do you know that until November 1991 the road between Vukovar and

10 Vinkovci, via Luci [phoen], Bogdanovci, Marinci, Nustar, was open?

11 A. No. I don't know that it was open until that time. Specifically,

12 it was my task to visit Vukovar on the 30th of September, 1991, and I was

13 not able to enter. I came to Bogdanovci, to the defence command. I was

14 in contact with the commander of the Vukovar defence. And it was not

15 possible for me to get into Vukovar because it was besieged entirely, and

16 this access road from Bogdanovci was under the control of the JNA or the

17 TO. In any case, the first convoy that we organised to bring out the

18 wounded was at that time because already at that time it was not possible

19 freely to enter Vukovar. So that was that period, between the 8th and the

20 12th of October.

21 Q. When you mentioned the convoy, didn't the convoy actually enter in

22 that way to Vukovar, under the escort of the ZNG, and it happened without

23 the knowledge and escort of the JNA?

24 A. No. That was not the case at all. It arrived escorted by doctors

25 from Doctors Without Borders. The vehicles used were civilian vehicles

1 that went there. At no time did the ZNG members move beyond the line of

2 separation between the Croatian forces and the other side. It is true

3 that members of the ZNG were able to enter Vukovar at the time. Had that

4 been possible, then the wounded would have been brought out in a day or

5 two. A convoy is a complicated thing and you need four or five days in

6 order to do that. I have it written down somewhere. It was stopped, it

7 was searched by members of the JNA. Specifically I remember a Lieutenant

8 Colonel Milenkovic, this has stuck to my mind, who kept searching over and

9 over, each of the vehicles, the ambulances. He made threats and so on. I

10 remember that surname of that specific JNA member.

11 Q. You don't recall that this convoy went through the corn fields

12 under the escort of the ZNG members from Bogdanovci and that's how it

13 reached the Vukovar hospital? It did not actually follow the agreed-upon

14 route and what you are describing actually happened only on the way back.

15 A. Had these been members of the ZNG, it would not have gone to the

16 Vukovar barracks because once it entered the area of Vukovar, it spent the

17 first night at the Vukovar barracks, which was under the control of the

18 JNA. So it's not logical that ZNG members would have brought the convoy

19 to the Vukovar barracks where the JNA were.

20 Q. Then we are not talking about the same convoy. I realise that now

21 that you mention the Vukovar barracks.

22 However, when we are talking about this convoy that you are

23 talking about now that reached the Vukovar barracks, do you know the

24 reason why it didn't continue to the Vukovar Hospital? Was that because

25 the Vukovar defence command did not want to let the convoy through in

1 order not to disrupt the defence lines?

2 A. That is partially true, because specifically Branko Borkovic got

3 angry because this route was agreed upon, because it would have allegedly

4 disrupted their lines of defence. However, in the Vukovar events, that

5 was not the only reason, because the other parts were controlled by one

6 side or by the other side. It was very important to the Croatian side to

7 bring out the convoy with the wounded because the Croatian public was

8 convinced that these large number of wounded were in danger. So the

9 Vukovar defence was ordered to act even at its own harm in order to pull

10 out the wounded. So that's what was done. I cannot, however, tell you

11 how the JNA acted because I was not able to see that from the place where

12 I was. However, it did take the convoy five days to go and come back.

13 Q. A little bit earlier, I talked about a different convoy, the

14 convoy of the 18th of October, 1991, which was organised under the

15 auspices of Medecins Sans Frontieres and which was brought to the Vukovar

16 Hospital with the escort of members of the ZNG and on which occasion 111

17 sick and wounded persons -- 112 sick and wounded persons were evacuated.

18 This is the convoy that I was talking about. Perhaps it was a

19 misunderstanding.

20 A. No. That is the same convoy. The Medecins Sans Frontieres

21 organised only one convoy, and that was the first convoy to bring out the

22 sick and wounded from the Vukovar Hospital. I don't know when the second

23 convoy took place. It's written down somewhere. But that convoy, which

24 came out on the 18th of October, was actually that first convoy that we

25 are talking about, based on an agreement with the JNA on the 8th of

1 October. So it was immediately embarked on to organise this convoy.

2 Q. There is testimony about this convoy by people from the Doctors

3 Without Borders or who were with them. So I won't ask you any more about

4 that because it doesn't seem that you know so much about these two

5 convoys.

6 A. These people who wanted to do that at the time, I think had they

7 been able to do that, they really deserve to be decorated, but I really

8 believe that at that time they were not able to do that.

9 Q. Do you know how long the road between Vukovar and Vinkovci was

10 open? How long did the traffic proceed normally?

11 A. The traffic did not proceed in a normal manner for a long time.

12 As far as I can remember, and according to the information that I have,

13 all exits and entrance points to Vukovar were closed on the 1st of October

14 up to Marinci. This corresponds to what I have, because on the 30th of

15 September, I spent all night in the defence command at Bogdanovci

16 attempting to get in. There was a lot of shelling. Marinci fell the next

17 day. And that's when all the access points to Vukovar were closed. At

18 least this applied to the Croat side. We were at Marinci and that's how

19 it was.

20 Q. I think that in responding to my question, you took out some kind

21 of note or document. Could you please tell us what that is?

22 A. On the sad occasion of the fall of Vukovar, on the 18th of October

23 [as interpreted], the Vecernji List, Croatian Daily, published an overview

24 of the events at Vukovar and that's where they described the day when

25 Marinci fell. I had forgotten that. So that is why I used this document

1 in order to see exactly the date whether Marinci fell.

2 Q. And when was this newspaper published?

3 A. It was published this year. It was published several years --

4 several days ago, just prior to the anniversary of the fall of Vukovar.

5 Q. Just one intervention for the transcript. In the transcript it

6 states that you said that Vukovar fell on the 18th of October, but you

7 actually meant the 18th of November?

8 A. Yes, yes. I meant the 18th of November.

9 Q. During the time shortly before the fall of Vukovar, were

10 negotiations conducted with the JNA for an exchange of prisoners and were

11 the prisoners from Vukovar mentioned on that occasion?

12 A. There were negotiations with the JNA about prisoner exchange, and

13 that -- those negotiations were conducted by Mr. Ivan Milas on the

14 Croatian side, by Andrija Raseta from the JNA. I don't remember whether

15 anybody was assisting him or not, but I think there were two colonels from

16 the security administration who were with him all the time and they were

17 assisting him. That agreement, as far as I can recall, was signed on the

18 6th of November, 1991 under the principle all-for-all.

19 Q. In the implementation of that agreement, was a group of KOG

20 members exchanged for Dr. Bosanac and Dr. Njavro, the ones who had been

21 arrested in Zagreb for creating the Labrador association, network?

22 A. That group was exchanged with a number of important detainees, in

23 the sense that the public was aware of them. I don't know whether

24 Drs. Bosanac and Njavro were a part of that group. I wasn't really

25 following the events.

1 Q. You told us that these were people who were important, as far as

2 Croatia was concerned. Was this decision then made at the highest

3 political level, to exchange these people?

4 A. Yes. It probably was.

5 Q. What about these persons who belonged to the Labrador group? Were

6 they important too?

7 A. No. Not to Croatia. Not even their names were known, unlike the

8 other group. However, obviously the negotiators had agreed on this being

9 a fair deal and that's why the agreement was eventually reached.

10 Q. Do you know what crimes these members of the Labrador group were

11 accused of?

12 A. Illegal enemy activity, something like that, but I don't remember

13 specifically, terrorism, sabotage, because certain specific particular

14 acts were attributed to them in the Croatian territory.

15 Q. What about Mr. Aleksandar Vasiljevic? Was he involved with this

16 exchange?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. After the arrest of the Labrador members, was the entire network

19 in the police and general political environment in the Republic of Croatia

20 uncovered?

21 A. I was not a member of the security services of the Republic of

22 Croatia at the time. When I became adviser for national security, I

23 didn't ask any questions about this case. It was no longer interesting.

24 However, I did read the Belgrade newspaper, Duga, and I realised that some

25 individuals had been tried in Belgrade. It transpired that documents had

1 been left behind about a network of associates throughout the former

2 Yugoslavia. These documents were being held by that detachment.

3 Q. We are talking about the network of associates that we discussed a

4 while ago. They were the reason that the 2nd Detachment was given the

5 task of contacting members of the Croatian MUP and some members of the

6 Croatian media; is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did this group have anything to do with the incident at the Jewish

9 cemetery in Zagreb?

10 A. The conviction prevails in Croatia, among the people, this has not

11 been proved at trial. I know that proceedings were at one point underway,

12 that it was this body that carried out the act of sabotage at the Jewish

13 cemetery, by laying explosives to a monument in the Jewish cemetery as

14 well as the Jewish community building in Palmoticeva Street in Zagreb.

15 Q. As a former security officer, can you tell us this: How important

16 is it for a security operation to keep its network of associates unknown?

17 A. It is absolutely material. Each and every member of the service

18 has a sacrosanct duty to keep it secret.

19 Q. Were a network to be blown, it would be very difficult to very

20 quickly organise another network in the same area, would it not?

21 A. Trust is lost, confidence is lost in the service, and these are

22 some of the guidelines here in their work.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Is this a convenient time, then, Mr. Vasic?

24 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume at 10 minutes to 6.00.

1 --- Recess taken at 5.25 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 5.54 p.m.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Vasic.

4 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. General, did you know that during the talks between the Croatian

6 leaders and the representatives of the European Community regarding the

7 recognition of Croatia, there was talk of the crime committed by the

8 Croatian forces in Gospic back in 1991?

9 A. Which talks do you have in mind? Where and when were these talks

10 held?

11 Q. What I meant was is this a problem in a very general sense? Are

12 you familiar with the crimes committed in Gospic?

13 A. I'm not sure if that point was raised. I was never party to any

14 of these talks. Although from time to time, in our talks, Raseta

15 mentioned the fact that there had been harassment and even murder.

16 However, I was not myself specifically aware of any such incidents at the

17 time. I knew nothing about Gospic at the time.

18 Q. What about now?

19 A. I know because the Croatian General Mirko Norac was tried and

20 Tihomir Oreskovic was tried. I know that crimes were committed in the

21 area and they were duly sentenced.

22 Q. Do you know anything about an organised group named Opera?

23 A. I learned about this group later on. I learned from the media,

24 from the printed media, and especially from articles published in the

25 Belgrade newspaper Duga. This was serialised.

1 Q. What was the objective of that group?

2 A. I believe I learned this from one of Vasiljevic's interviews. I

3 don't remember it all too clearly, though. However, based on my

4 understanding, what my understanding was at the time, as I was learning

5 about it, because I was familiar with certain people who were involved, I

6 understood the objective was to collect funds, and these funds were later

7 manipulated, which is what they were accused of. Supposedly they had been

8 collecting funds in order to pay for psychological warfare throughout the

9 different wars in the former Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Do you know if they issued announcements or leaked information and

11 thereby participated in psychological warfare in Croatia?

12 A. There was psychological warfare at work in Croatia at the time and

13 propaganda, up until the end of the war in 1995. It is still at work, as

14 a matter of fact. Who was involved and who payrolled the entire thing is

15 not something that I can say. I was not involved on the Croatian side and

16 certainly not on the other side.

17 Q. Let's go back now to an earlier period, when you first joined the

18 National Guards Corps and became Chief of Staff. Do you know anything

19 about the activities of Mr. Tomislav Mercep with regard to the setting up

20 of the National Guards Corps?

21 A. I'm aware of some of Tomislav Mercep's activities but nothing to

22 do with the setting up of the National Guards Corps. He was not involved

23 in that. The corps is a different organisation. Its leadership was in

24 Zagreb. As far as I know, and I think I'm right on this one, Tomislav

25 Mercep was not involved. Tomislav Mercep was Defence secretary for

1 Vukovar municipality and he was involved in organising Vukovar's defence

2 system and in the general area too.

3 Q. What about Vukovar's defence units organised by Mr. Mercep, as you

4 say? Were those a part of the ZNG too?

5 A. No. They were not part of the ZNG. At the time, before the fall

6 of Vukovar, ZNG had set up four brigades. Those were not fully manned,

7 nor did they have sufficient weapons. As for Vukovar's defence, on the

8 inside, there was a relatively small number of people involved who were

9 formally speaking members of the ZNG. All the other people that he

10 organised were volunteers bringing their own weapons which they obtained

11 in some way or purchased but they were not formally speaking members of

12 the ZNG, except for a very small number of them.

13 Q. So these units organised by Mr. Mercep were paramilitary units, if

14 I understand you correctly, made up of volunteers who just obtained

15 weapons in one way or another?

16 A. Formally speaking, I can't agree that these were paramilitary

17 units. Those were units, individuals, or groups, organised in part along

18 military and police lines, along territorial lines. They prepared to

19 defend Vukovar and they eventually defended Vukovar. The secretary for

20 All People's Defence was Tomislav Mercep. How he went about doing this is

21 a different matter altogether, but what I'm telling you is how it was in a

22 formal sense.

23 Q. Formally speaking, I don't think that the setting up of any such

24 units had any basis in the existing laws of the SFRY or Croatia for that

25 matter, or the constitution. I hope we can agree on this.

1 A. To a certain extent I can agree that, formally speaking, this was

2 the case. However, the situation on the ground showed a different

3 reality. Early in 1991, the Serbian League was established. In April

4 1991, the Serbian League or Serbian Association proclaimed its annexation

5 to Serbia. What was the All People's Defence secretary on the ground

6 doing? He was preventing things like these from happening. He was

7 helping to prevent some of these illegal activities.

8 Q. Do you know that Mr. Mercep organised units comprising more than

9 1.000 men? Do you know that he reviewed these units in March 1991 in

10 Bogdanovci?

11 A. I don't believe that over 1.000 people were involved. It would

12 have been a very good thing for the defence once there was combat, once

13 there was fighting. I know that he hailed from Bogdanovci and that his

14 popularity was the greatest in Bogdanovci. He had a lot of his own men

15 there. If he reviewed any units or not is not something that I can say.

16 I simply don't know.

17 Q. You refer to the Serb National Council, a league, and its

18 decisions. Do you know that following the first multi-party elections in

19 Croatia, where the HDZ won, on the 22nd of December, 1991 the Croatian

20 constitution was changed and the Serbian people, who had up to that point

21 been a constituent people in the Republic of Croatia became a national

22 minority?

23 A. I know that the constitution was passed at that time. I know that

24 the Serbian people used to be a constituent people but were then reduced

25 to a lesser status. The republican leaders, however, were entitled to

1 pass a new constitution and this was an assessment that they made at the

2 time. Serb delegates who were ethnic Serbs, although many of them were

3 not elected as members of Serb parties but, rather, other parties, had the

4 duty to fight in the parliament to keep these changes from coming into

5 effect.

6 Q. Do you perhaps know that the Cyrillic script ceased to be used for

7 official documents in the Republic of Croatia and the Cyrillic script, as

8 we know, is used by most Serbs?

9 A. I don't know if there was an official ban, but I do know that in

10 the Republic of Croatia, among the Serbs residing in the Republic of

11 Croatia up to 1990, the Cyrillic script was not used very much. I knew

12 the script, although it's not one that I use in my mother tongue. Even

13 the Serbs in Belgrade didn't use it all that much. I have relatives

14 there, so I should know.

15 Q. We were both taught both these scripts, and we are familiar with

16 both. But if you look at the political aspect of this problem, well,

17 that's a different thing. If you introduce a ban on a script that a

18 certain group is using, justifying this with the fact that only a minority

19 appear to be using that script, well, that's a different thing, isn't it?

20 A. I agree that there should be no bans at all and everybody should

21 be allowed to use whatever script they prefer. However, if an official

22 decision was made and adopted by official bodies of the Croatian

23 government, I would consider that to be uncivilised.

24 Q. In this situation, on the eve of the multi-party elections, did

25 representatives of the Serbian people had a national party such as the HDZ

1 was for the Croats? Do you know that?

2 A. I believe they did have a party, because there were literally

3 dozens of parties in Croatia at the time. The HDZ was the most popular,

4 and it won. I do know, however, that there were a lot of Serb

5 representatives who were elected who were members of the SKH. I think

6 that was the name, the party for democratic change.

7 Q. This party was headed by Ivica Racan an ethnic Croat, wasn't it?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And this party continued to work along a communist line, modified

10 for the purposes of this new period in history, but it had its roots in

11 the communist era, didn't it?

12 A. I'm a soldier and I wouldn't go too far into these matters.

13 Q. Thank you. You said a while ago that you knew some things about

14 the activities of Tomislav Mercep. Do you know about his activities in

15 Vukovar itself in June or July 1991, August, all the way up until

16 September 1991?

17 A. I became the Chief of Staff of the ZNG on the 10th of August 1991,

18 and that's when I began to inform myself about the situation and the state

19 of the defence in the territory of Croatia. Vukovar was already topical

20 at that time. There were problems relating to the organisation. Many

21 delegates, quote/unquote, and many people from Vukovar originally who

22 actually lived in Zagreb would come to see me, asking for help. They also

23 suggested solutions. They asked for help in equipment or in

24 organisational matters.

25 On those occasions, I found out that Tomislav Mercep, somebody I

1 had only heard about at the time, whom I didn't know very well, was at the

2 head of the organisation as the secretary of defence and that essentially

3 is his duty to organise the defence. I heard that he was incompetent,

4 that he had made some quite intactful moves, that he was alienating and

5 picking fights amongst the people, not only amongst the Serbs but also

6 amongst his associates, and there were requests that he be replaced. This

7 is not something that I had only heard about. This had reached the top

8 leadership as well because he was one of the leading people within the

9 ruling party.

10 Sometime in late August, perhaps around the 20th of August, or

11 perhaps a bit later than that, he was replaced from that post by the

12 president of the republic, and after some time he was brought to Zagreb in

13 order to shed light on his activities in the area of Vukovar. There was

14 an investigation by the ministry for internal affairs, and this is

15 documented. At the time, I didn't actually have time for that. Later, I

16 wasn't really interested in finding out exactly what it was that he did

17 and what did the records indicate, what were his failings, what were his

18 good and bad qualities.

19 Q. You said that you received information about bad defence

20 organisation. Did any information about crimes committed by members of

21 Mercep's forces in the area of Vukovar reach you committed around July

22 1991?

23 A. I didn't know about reports that such-and-such a person was

24 abused, expelled and so on, but I did learn about him detaining certain

25 people. However, this did not refer only to Serbs, although it did refer

1 mostly to Serbs. It was mostly about those who did not share his views.

2 Exactly who these people were, I believe that there are records of that in

3 documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia. I don't know if

4 there are records about it also in the security services of the Croatian

5 army because at the time I was not there at the head of the service.

6 Q. You said that when you were the head of the security service of

7 the ZNG, you said at the time that the ZNG had four brigades. This number

8 of brigades, part of which was -- which was part of the Croatian army, did

9 it grow to 21 in due course?

10 A. The ZNG had four brigades. Later, as years went by, the 7th and

11 the 9th were still formed. So two more. So the ZNG thus had six

12 brigades. However, brigades were formed as part of the Croatian army.

13 Because of tradition they continued to be known as the ZNG Brigades, the

14 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th, and then after that the 5th, 7th and the 9th.

15 Excuse me, there were actually seven, in fact. They bore that name. But

16 the rest which was mobilised by the army went to the -- to form brigades

17 of the Croatian army. I don't know exactly what the numbers are. That's

18 perhaps not so important. By the end of the war, or by the end of 1991,

19 about 60 such brigades were formed. I don't know whether it was 21 until

20 October. I'm not sure about that.

21 Q. In your statement, as well as in your evidence in another case

22 before this Tribunal, you said that 24 brigades were formed until the

23 1st of October 1991, half were armed and by the end there were 63 in all

24 and that they were all armed with weapons returned by the JNA.

25 A. Yes, that is correct.

1 Q. Could you please tell us which units of the Croatian army operated

2 in the area of Vinkovci, Vukovar, in 1991?

3 A. There was the defence of Vukovar within Vukovar, which did not

4 have any numerical insignia and it did not have any kind of military

5 status, in terms of being a platoon, a company, a battalion, brigade and

6 so on. This was later regulated through orders, and there are still

7 disputes about exactly which brigade it was and whether it was a brigade

8 at all.

9 So the defence of Vukovar formed one entity. On the eastern

10 front, there were units which had an effect on the defence of Vukovar or

11 were preventing the advances of the JNA from the eastern front, and these

12 were the 106th Brigade, 107th Brigade, then there was the 3rd ZNG Brigade,

13 the 105th Brigade was there, a part of the 108th Brigade, and the

14 123rd Brigade. I might have left one out, and if I have, then I don't

15 think it's all that important.

16 Q. Can you please tell me whether the units that you mentioned also

17 include the units that were in the area between Vukovar and Osijek? Are

18 those units included?

19 A. The area between Vukovar and Osijek had relatively few units. For

20 example, the 101st Brigade was there from Vukovar to Osijek, somewhere on

21 the Vuka River or in the village of Vuka. The 122nd Djakovo Brigade was

22 there. Specifically, the Djakovo Brigade. Osijek, Vukovar, was an area

23 that had been occupied a while back, and there was only this line that

24 remained which I drew, which went south of Vukovar, encircled some

25 villages and then there were these brigades that I mentioned.

1 Q. Could you please tell us approximately what the strength of all of

2 these brigades was? You don't have to give us a specific number.

3 A. The brigades were mobilised, equipped, if the equipment was

4 available, and were sent to the front. That was the situation. So in the

5 beginning, in October, in September, there were relatively few units

6 there. After the 10th, as the mobilisation proceeded, there were more.

7 When Vukovar was occupied and when the front stabilised in that area, I

8 believe that there were not more than 30.000 soldiers on the Croatian

9 side, but this is hard for me to say specifically. This is just an

10 estimate. A brigade numbered 2.000 soldiers.

11 Q. Excuse me, for the transcript, earlier you said in October. In

12 the transcript it states the 10th. So when you say -- said the 10th,

13 actually, did you mean the day the 10th, as a date, or did you mean the

14 tenth month, October?

15 Earlier we already spoke about the decision of the chief of the

16 General Staff, about the withdrawal of weapons belonging to the republics

17 and the autonomous provinces. Do you know how the ZNG armed itself? And

18 what was the time period in which the arms arrived? What did you know

19 about this when you were a JNA officer and then later when you joined the

20 ZNG?

21 A. Well, the ZNG was formed on the 28th of May, 1991. There was a

22 well-known review on the football grounds of the Zagreb football club.

23 That's where the units were reviewed. From 1991, it armed itself with

24 weapons obtained previously by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of

25 Croatia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

1 And as far as I know, this is something that was written and talked about

2 in the JNA, throughout Yugoslavia and in Croatia. These were Kalashnikovs

3 which were purchased from what I know -- the numbers we are talking about

4 are approximately 40.000 Kalashnikovs and some pistols. These are all the

5 weapons that the ZNG were able to use or had at their disposal at the time

6 they were formed, not all of these 40.000 pieces, because units of the MUP

7 also received a certain quantity and a certain quantity had already been

8 distributed. So when the ZNG was formed, they were -- there was the

9 option to arm with the Kalashnikovs about 8.000 members.

10 Q. Does that mean that the priority in using these weapons was given

11 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and then what was left over was given

12 to the ZNG?

13 A. Yes. That is correct. But the ZNG was also part of the Ministry

14 of Internal Affairs. All members of the ZNG signed their contracts with

15 the minister of the internal affairs and carried out their duties within

16 the ZNG as part of the MUP, because MUP was permitted to organise an armed

17 unit, whereas the Ministry of Defence was not authorised to do something

18 like that.

19 Q. Are you asserting that members of the ZNG were actually members of

20 regular police forces?

21 A. Members of the ZNG were essentially formed out of the so-called

22 reserve forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

23 Q. This quantity of weapons that you mentioned, these 40.000

24 Kalashnikovs, long-barrelled weapons, is that the quantity of weapons

25 obtained by General Spegelj? This is something that was made public in

1 the former Yugoslavia, I think, in January 1991.

2 A. Yes. I think that that is probably the shipment of arms obtained

3 by General Spegelj. I don't know whether anyone else obtained these arms,

4 but this refers to that famous footage of the arms shipment organised

5 through General Spegelj.

6 Q. Was blocking the barracks also another source of weapons for the

7 ZNG?

8 A. Yes. That is correct. That was an additional source to obtain

9 weapons for the ZNG, which actually turned into the main source, and that

10 source made it possible to end the war in Croatia in the way that it

11 ended. Because on the 1st of September 1991, the international community

12 declared an embargo on arms shipments for the entire territory of the

13 former Yugoslavia. Croatia had no other sources. It was under threat.

14 And it had to organise itself and obtain weapons.

15 Q. Were 230 tanks taken in this way from the Varazdin barracks?

16 A. I think that it was not actually that number. I think it's about

17 130 tanks but you probably have the record with the numbers from the JNA.

18 But I believe that it's about 100-odd armoured vehicles, tanks, armed

19 personnel carriers and so on.

20 Q. One of the strongest armoured corps was located in Varazdin?

21 A. Well, we didn't call it an armoured corps. These were just corps

22 of the infantry corps, but they did have a lot of armoured equipment at

23 their disposal.

24 Q. And how many of these armoured vehicles were forwarded on to the

25 Vukovar front after they were taken from the Varazdin barracks?

1 A. I cannot tell you exactly what number, but a number was sent to

2 the Vukovar front, meaning the line of separation between the Croatian

3 army and the JNA, and it does not mean the area of -- the city of Vukovar

4 itself, because we did not have such equipment or type of weapons within

5 the city of Vukovar itself.

6 Q. General, are you familiar with the crimes that occurred in some of

7 the barracks after the blockade was lifted and the ZNG attacked some of

8 the barracks, such as the one in Bjelovar?

9 A. I know that when some of the barracks were taken, there was

10 resistance by the JNA. I also know that when the Bjelovar barracks was

11 taken, there was a powerful explosion in the warehouse, killing a major

12 and some privates or non-commissioned officers. A number of people were

13 killed. I know that when the barracks was taken, some individuals who

14 defended the barracks were also killed. I don't know how many, and I'm

15 not sure we can call it a crime. That's a different issue. They opened

16 fire on Bjelovar, causing damage to a number of buildings and killing

17 civilians, and that was days before the barracks was taken.

18 Q. Could we perhaps call it a crime we know that the barracks

19 commander was killed, once the ZNG had taken the barracks? Is this

20 something you're familiar with?

21 A. Once the barracks was taken, I know that the commander was a

22 colonel named Kovacic, if I remember correctly, and he was killed. How he

23 was killed, whether it was while the barracks were still in the process of

24 being taken or whether it was afterwards is not something that I can say.

25 Q. Were there other casualties like this one in other barracks in

1 Croatia?

2 A. I know about the Gospic barracks. When it was taken, a

3 high-ranking JNA officer was captured. Others were probably captured too,

4 but there was this one Macedonian, I believe, a high-ranking JNA officer.

5 I can't remember his name.

6 Some other barracks that were taken -- I can't remember right now

7 anything specific about any casualties. I know that when the one in

8 Delnice was taken, two days later planes bombed the warehouse there and a

9 lot of the weapons and ammunition were destroyed. Some civilians who were

10 nearby were killed too, but I'm not familiar with any details.

11 Q. Were there casualties when the ZNG entered the Samobor barracks?

12 A. I can't say. I do know that on that occasion -- well, one reason

13 I remember Samobor is because it was then that we found a document

14 containing a JNA directive for action in Croatia. That's the one reason I

15 remember Samobor. That's why I mentioned it.

16 As for casualties, there were probably casualties on both sides,

17 but it's hard for me now to specify.

18 Q. Do you know that during the war there was a camp at the Zagreb

19 fair, the grounds of the Zagreb fair, where people of Serb ethnicity were

20 being held?

21 A. I didn't know about it at the time, but I know that things were

22 being said in the media after the war, that there were individuals who had

23 their own private warehouses where they kept weapons and ammunition and

24 where they even kept certain people detained. Who those people were is

25 not something that I can say, but it was part of the Pakracka Poljana

1 case, which was a much-discussed trial -- case in Croatia, but I can't

2 specify who the people were on either of these sides.

3 Q. And who were the people who had those private warehouses who were

4 keeping those other people there? Is this perhaps something that you can

5 tell us a little about?

6 A. I think those people belonged to the Croatian Defence Ministry

7 because they dealt with our logistics, obtaining weapons, storing weapons

8 and equipment. If those were indeed warehouses or storage areas, then

9 those people must have been members of the defence ministry.

10 Q. Do you know anything about the activities of armed units set up by

11 the Croatian Party of Right, Mr. Paraga more specifically?

12 A. Mr. Paraga and the Croatian Party of Right set up a unit known as

13 H-O-S, HOS, sometime in mid-October. Croatia's liberation forces. I know

14 that in some areas there were incidents involving disobedience, or

15 insubordination to use the mildest possible term, by some of the members

16 of that unit as well as some other units. News of this spread quickly

17 through Croatia. Order had to be re-established, which it was by order of

18 the president, the Supreme Commander. Those units were disbanded. There

19 were no longer any HOS units. They were integrated into the Croatian army

20 and they had to abide by all the rules of discipline that applied. So

21 they existed for a brief while, but I do know that at one point in time

22 they did exist as a separate unit.

23 Q. Were they neo-Nazi? Were they not in fact a continuation of the

24 Ustasha tradition?

25 A. I'm sure there were people who saw themselves that way, who

1 thought it was their mission to do that. However, the general orientation

2 of the young men I knew who were HOS members was nothing like Ustasha and

3 nothing like neo-Nazi. I'm sure there were people like that, though, both

4 in terms of insignia that some people were wearing, both in terms of the

5 songs they sang, both in terms of their salute and other things, but it

6 was certainly not an official policy that was promoted by the Croatian

7 leadership or the Croatian government.

8 Q. You said that early in August - I think it was the 10th, you

9 said - you became Chief of Staff of the National Guards Corps. Did you

10 know that on the 1st of August, President Tudjman called on the Croatian

11 population to prepare themselves for an all-out war?

12 A. I'm not sure about that particular call, but there were calls

13 before this time and after, similar ones.

14 I'm not sure if this is the right time or place to say it, but I

15 think it was on or about the 20th of August that I reported to him

16 personally on the situation that prevailed in the ZNG, having been invited

17 by him to share my opinion. I complained about the lack of weapons and

18 ammunition, especially as the war was ablaze throughout Croatia. And he

19 said, "Don't be in a hurry, don't worry about ammunition, don't worry

20 about weapons. There will be no war." I was simply stunned by this

21 because I realised what the situation was. Areas, certain areas, were

22 sealed off, which amounted to more than 30 per cent, perhaps more, of the

23 Croatian territory, and he said there won't be a war, we'll reach an

24 agreement. And yet there was war already and everybody could see that.

25 So he did call on the Croatian people, probably then, maybe later, but in

1 a private conversation he told me what I'm telling you now. He said that

2 I shouldn't press ahead with weapons or ammunition.

3 Q. Given your position at the time, could you understand where he got

4 the conclusion from? Was it based on talks that he had had with President

5 Milosevic or something else?

6 A. That is what I believed to be the provenance of this position.

7 Another source might have been his contacts with the international

8 community, who assured him that they would place pressure on the JNA to

9 not start a war.

10 Q. Can we agree that early in December, rather on the 1st of

11 December, 1991 Croatia had its own representatives in the federal organs

12 or bodies of the SFRY, that at the time Stjepan Mesic was president of the

13 SFRY Presidency, that the SFRY prime minister was another Croat, Ante

14 Markovic that the foreign minister was Budimir Loncar, that the federal

15 secretary for All People's Defence was another person of Croatian origin,

16 Veljko Kadijevic, with the former three gentlemen being Croatian

17 nationalists. Can we agree on that?

18 A. Can you just repeat the date for me, please?

19 Q. Up until early December 1991. That's what I'm talking about. Let

20 me remind you, it was on the 5th of December, 1991 that Stjepan Mesic

21 stated in front of the parliament, "I have completed my task. There is no

22 more Yugoslavia."

23 A. I think that assertion is correct. But your assertion that up

24 until early December, those persons held the highest posts or positions in

25 those federal bodies, well, I can't say that it's entirely inaccurate,

1 because formally speaking, perhaps they were still there whether people

2 were filling out forms and one of the forms said, president of the

3 Presidency, and then next to that was the name of Stjepan Mesic.

4 But I know for a fact that this president of the Presidency, as

5 you call him, sometime in October or November, I'm sure there is a record

6 of this somewhere, namely that he wrote an order to the federal secretary

7 for All People's Defence for all units to withdraw to their barracks. Not

8 a letter of that order was complied with, if we consider the problem, the

9 situation with the barracks. So what does it mean, formally speaking

10 somebody is the president but the most important element, the army, is

11 disobeying him?

12 Secondly, if I may, the prime minister, as of the 7th of October,

13 1991 can no longer go to Belgrade. There was an assassination attempt in

14 Serbia. So what sort of leaders are these? What sort of presidents, if

15 the army, the JNA, is clearly trying to kill them?

16 Q. General, what would you say if I told you that Mr. Herbert Okun,

17 who was adviser to the personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General, stated

18 that on the 18th of November he met Mr. Ante Markovic in Belgrade.

19 Therefore, there seemed to be no danger? Quite the contrary, in fact. He

20 seems to have been meeting high representatives from all over the world

21 and Europe at the time.

22 A. The last time I saw Mr. Ante Markovic was on the 7th of October,

23 1991 after he left Banski Dvori, the presidential palace in Zagreb, which

24 had just been targeted by the JNA air force. In the building at the time

25 were president of the Presidency, Stjepan Mesic, Prime Minister Ante

1 Markovic and president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. I know

2 that after that he left for Graz. I'm not sure if he returned to

3 Belgrade. I can't say. But I am fully convinced that he had no role to

4 play any longer, no matter where his office was. Might as well have been

5 in Washington. Neither of these two had any role to play.

6 Q. You agree, however, that if he'd had no role to play, I don't

7 think Mr. Cyrus Vance would have seen him and talked to him in trying to

8 reach a solution to the Yugoslav crisis?

9 A. I think his only role was in trying to reach some sort of a

10 solution for the Yugoslav crisis. But the only influence he had was on

11 the Croatian side. The Slovenes were long gone but he was still

12 influential with the Croatian side. He hails from Croatia and he talked

13 to them. As for the Yugoslav side, the Serb side, his influence was zero.

14 It's as simple as that. It's as if he had no longer held that post at the

15 time.

16 Q. Be that as it may, we agree that until December, Croatia had not

17 formally withdrawn their representatives from the federal bodies. They

18 were still, formally speaking, there on Croatia's behalf?

19 A. I don't think that's true strictly speaking, but I can't guarantee

20 that, not being in expert in that area. What I'm saying is that on the

21 8th of October, 1991 Croatia adopted a decision to disregard federal laws,

22 regulations, and the constitution as far as secession from the SFRY was

23 concerned. So if it was still sending representatives to Belgrade, well,

24 then, they were lying to themselves, which I don't believe was the case.

25 MR. AGHA: Your Honours? If I may interrupt my learned friend and

1 object, if I may, to this line of questioning which seems to be very

2 political in nature and calls for a great deal of speculation on the part

3 of the witness and that perhaps the questions could be more focused on

4 military matters, which the witness is in a better position to deal. I

5 haven't mentioned this before, but it does seem that my learned friend is

6 going very broadly into areas of which the witness does not have

7 particular expertise.

8 JUDGE PARKER: There was one question in which that became an

9 issue. Until then, I think the questioning generally has been directed at

10 military matters, though unquestionably with a political flavour.

11 I would not think there is any basis at the moment for disturbing

12 Mr. Vasic's cross-examination.

13 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Just a

14 minute, please. There is a problem with my headset. It's fine now, thank

15 you.

16 JUDGE PARKER: I think I was the problem, Mr. Vasic. My -- there

17 are ear phones near my microphone and I'm causing a feedback.

18 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Well, that's taken care of now, Your

19 Honour.

20 Q. You talked about negotiations with the JNA today. In your

21 testimony before this Tribunal, did you mention that during the combat

22 operations, you kept a personal diary?

23 A. Yes. I wrote down as much as I managed to jot down but not

24 everything. However, it would be very useful to me now.

25 Q. Do you still have that diary?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Did my learned friends from the Prosecution ask to look at that

3 diary in order to check your assertions and to refresh your memory?

4 A. They didn't specifically ask for my diary or for copies of

5 excerpts from the diary. I did, however, give them some documents that I

6 had from the negotiations phase with the JNA.

7 Q. Can you please tell us the period during which you kept your

8 diary?

9 A. I kept the diary from the time I became the chief of the Main

10 Staff of the ZNG. I do, however, also have a lot of notes or entries from

11 1986 onwards.

12 Q. Are you still keeping a diary?

13 A. No. Not anymore. Retired persons don't really keep diaries.

14 However, when I was active at all my posts, I jotted down as much as I

15 could. Unfortunately, I did not jot down everything. I'm saying that

16 again.

17 Q. You told my learned friend from the Prosecution today in response

18 to a question about the signing of the agreement on the 21st of October on

19 the change of the convoy route and that agreement was signed on the basis

20 of a prior oral agreement. Can you please tell us, under whose orders did

21 the ZNG members fire at the column of vehicles which was going in the

22 direction of Nustar on the 21st? Do you know that?

23 A. No. I don't know. But I know that Nustar's defence held up

24 throughout the whole period of the war. They did very well. I don't know

25 what they felt at the moment when the convoy passed by and came to that

1 side. I don't know that.

2 Q. Thank you very much, General.

3 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further

4 questions for this witness.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Vasic.

6 Mr. Borovic, the time would suggest you could have seven minutes.

7 Do you think you would be more efficiently organised if we started at 2.15

8 tomorrow or would you like the seven minutes now?

9 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I think

10 that it would be better to start tomorrow, and I'm not going to need so

11 much time tomorrow. So these seven minutes now might not be the best

12 possible option that I'm being offered.

13 Thank you.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Very well.

15 We will adjourn now and we will resume at 2.15 tomorrow.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.54 p.m., to

17 be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day of November,

18 2005, at 2.15 p.m.

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