1 Thursday, 22 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

6 Mr. Moore.

7 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, may I just deal with two preliminary

8 matters; it will take no time at all.

9 We move on to Major-General Pringle. And I just would like some

10 clarification from the Court in relation to dealings with experts. In my

11 jurisdiction, counsel can speak to experts in the middle of their

12 testimony. I believe it may well be the practice here that that is not

13 the case. And so really all I wish to have is clarification obviously for

14 Prosecution and Defence that if experts are being called they either are

15 or are not able to speak to the lawyers during their testimony.

16 JUDGE PARKER: The position with which I am familiar in this

17 Tribunal and elsewhere is as you understood, that they may not be spoken

18 to. So that if something unusual arises, which you think requires such,

19 it would require an application to the Chamber.

20 MR. MOORE: Yes, I'm quite happy with that. It just helps both

21 parties.

22 The second relates to Witness, I think it is 002, is the last

23 civilian witness who gave evidence, and there was reference to a notebook

24 which we have, despite many searches, not have any copies of. Apparently

25 that witness contacted the investigation department last night and has

1 said that he has located the document. I have arranged for the following

2 to occur. For it to be taken to the field office in the city in which he

3 lives, for it to be photocopied there and for the original to be sent here

4 to The Hague and obviously my learned friends to have photocopies of that

5 document and translations to be made of it.

6 If that sounds wonderful, I hope, but there is a difficulty, and

7 it is quite simply this: Your Honour may remember we had Mr. Kypr who had

8 also a notebook, we tried to interpret it, and sometimes people use their

9 own techniques of recording notes. My understanding is that that might

10 well be the same problem for this witness. So I am going to see whether

11 in actual fact it is possible for a translation to be done in the city

12 where he is with an authorised interpreter, but nevertheless for copies to

13 be forwarded up to this Court and the lawyers as soon as possible. So

14 that is the modus operandi that I was going to deal with in relation to

15 this witness.

16 JUDGE PARKER: I must say that sounds very encouraging, Mr. Moore.

17 MR. MOORE: Very well. Thank you very much. May I call then,

18 please, Major-General Pringle.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

20 [The witness entered court]

21 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

22 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Would you be so kind as to take the affirmation

24 which is printed on the card handed to you.

25 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

1 whole truth and nothing but the truth.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 WITNESS: ANDREW PRINGLE

5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Moore.

6 [Prosecution counsel confer]

7 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, before we commence, there are copies of

8 the report for the Chamber. They have been slightly modified. My learned

9 friends have seen those amendments. And perhaps if those hard copies can

10 be forwarded. They're being brought down and will be here in a moment.

11 But may I just deal with the introduction with regard to Major-General

12 Pringle.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Do we not have them already?

14 [Prosecution counsel confer]

15 MR. MOORE: Your Honour may remember that there was objection

16 taken to references to one or two witnesses. What we have done, my

17 understanding is, and what I've been informed is, is that the copies that

18 you have are the originals. And the modified copy is going to be in

19 colour in certain parts. If I just assist the Court --

20 JUDGE PARKER: That's enough. You can carry on. I thought, not

21 having opened it, that this document was the modified copy.

22 MR. MOORE: Well, it may well be. Can I just clarify to see? It

23 may well be that parties have been more efficient than has otherwise been

24 the case. If one goes to page 13 where it is the topic -- it

25 says "Command climate."

1 JUDGE PARKER: I have trouble finding a page called 13. Oh,

2 it's --

3 MR. MOORE: It's bottom right-hand corner.

4 JUDGE PARKER: We have an interruption in the pagination. And

5 then it continues. Command climate, yes.

6 MR. MOORE: If one looks down at the footnotes, one can see, for

7 example, on footnote 56, that there is a reference to a man called Topola

8 appears in other witness statements.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.

10 MR. MOORE: Brutalising prisoners of war. That is underlined in

11 red. The red --

12 JUDGE PARKER: Not yet.

13 MR. MOORE: That's what I thought.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Okay.

15 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much. May we then deal with the

16 curriculum vitae of Major-General Pringle.

17 Examination by Mr. Moore:

18 Q. Could I have your full name please?

19 A. Andrew Robert Douglas Pringle.

20 Q. And I think it's correct to say that you had the good fortune to

21 serve in the British army; is that correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. That you are currently a retired major-general from the army,

24 having served there for 37 years?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. That you are currently employed as a defence consultant with I

2 perhaps can describe as a wide-ranging portfolio; for example, providing

3 assistance on two occasions to NATO command and control studies?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Can we deal then, please, with the -- your professional

6 background. Is it right that you entered the Royal Military Academy at

7 Sandhurst as an officer cadet in 1964; that you graduated in two years

8 from Sandhurst; and you were commissioned in the Royal Green Jackets, one

9 of the principal and most famous of the infantry regiments which has three

10 battalions, I believe. Is that right?

11 A. That's correct and kind of you to put it like that, Mr. Moore.

12 Q. My pleasure. Can we deal then, please, that you served as platoon

13 commander with the battalion in Cyprus?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. In Cyprus, given the nature of the work that you had to do, there

16 was considerable tension at that time between the two ethnicities or

17 nations, both Turkish and Greek, which in its own way created its own

18 tension; is that right?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. You then attended a three-year degree course in applied science in

21 the Royal Military College in Shrivenham, and you subsequently rejoined

22 your infantry battalion in 1971?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. In 1971, if I deal with it in this way, you then commenced a

25 number of tours, as it's called, of Northern Ireland, when the troubles,

1 as they are called again, were at their peak, that involved disputes

2 between the IRA and loyalist paramilitary -- paramilitaries, and your

3 tours were through 1971, 1972, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1983; is

4 that right?

5 A. That's correct Your Honours, but I could describe it as a

6 counter-terrorism campaign rather than disputes.

7 Q. I'm trying to be as neutral perhaps as I can.

8 May I then deal please with your position through Northern

9 Ireland. You were appointed, as I say, platoon commander, you then became

10 adjutant company second in command, company commander, concluding as an

11 operational staff officer at headquarters in Northern Ireland; is that

12 right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Moving on, you attended junior staff college, it was called the

15 junior command and staff course, 1975, and you then were selected to go to

16 what some would describe as the prestigious command and staff course at

17 Army Staff College, I believe based in Sandhurst, is that right, 1976 to

18 1977.

19 A. At Camberley, that's correct.

20 Q. Thank you. The selection process involved there 30 per cent of

21 the officers only were selected for staff training. And that was a result

22 of a competitive examination and obviously receiving the appropriate and

23 proper recommendations on their annual appraisal reports, and you

24 subsequently returned to that college as a member of the directing staff

25 between 1983 and 1985 inclusive. Is that correct?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Again, you then in relation to the Army Staff College, if I deal

3 with it in this way, you attended the Royal Military College of Science at

4 Shrivenham, that was a one-year course, because I believe you have an

5 honour's degree in applied science. Is that right?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. The second year you concentrated on command and staff

8 responsibilities and tactics up to divisional level, which is -- well, up

9 to divisional level, that the course itself could be described as

10 wide-ranging in content and there were studies in command including

11 presentations and various other discussions with -- with persons who had

12 first-hand knowledge. Would that be correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Dealing with the staff college exercise, is it right to say that

15 there were exercises themselves which included various aspects of military

16 observations, or I should say operations at that time?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. You then returned to command your infantry battalion, that's the

19 3rd Battalion of Royal Green Jackets, that was from 1985 until 1988, that

20 was in Germany and the U.K. And it was on that occasion that you had what

21 could be described as close contact with the German army, and you

22 subsequently and consequently were exposed to doctrine and operating

23 procedures. And you then went on a tour of duty to the Ministry of

24 Defence as a colonel in the military operations branch operating at

25 strategic level, responsible for general staff policy which was worldwide.

1 Is that right?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Following that you then attended the Royal College of Defence

4 Studies, otherwise known as the war college, for one year. Perhaps I

5 won't go into the detail of that, but it would be -- would it be right to

6 say that half the members of the war college were British, drawn from

7 military police, other government departments, and the other half were

8 drawn from around the world and it was predominantly from the military?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Moving on in time, I think it's right to say that you had, as has

11 been described, a tour in the cabinet office between 1992 until 1994.

12 There you led a branch in the assessment staff working for the joint

13 intelligence committee. In 1994, you moved to Germany where you took

14 command of the 20th Armoured Brigade. There you were subsequently

15 deployed with your headquarters and a number of units to

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. On that occasion, you were commander of the

17 UN sector southwest based in Gornji Vakuf; is that right?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Dealing with your operational tour, unfortunately, I think it

20 coincided with what could be described as the total break-down of the

21 cease-fire, and from April 1995 you describe the conflict between the

22 different ethnic groups as having extreme intensity until it was finally

23 brought to an end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement; is that right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Would it be correct to say that you have described this tour, was

1 a lesson for a commander to operate in the context of what you have

2 described as strategic muddle and lack of clarity?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. What do you mean by that, if I may just abbreviate my questions

5 for a moment.

6 A. We were operating in a climate of nuclear objectives. We were

7 sitting in the middle of a war that was raging all round us as the

8 United Nations with very restrictive rules of engagement. We were taking

9 directions both from the United Nations and nationally. There was an

10 international state of disagreement as to what should or should not be

11 done. And for the commanders on the ground their best guidance was simply

12 to do what they thought was right.

13 Q. Thank you very much. I think it's right then that after a tour

14 you were as director of land warfare in 1996 until 1997, you became

15 responsible for the army concepts and doctrine, and you then returned to

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the NATO commander, multi-national division

17 southwest, again based in Banja Luka; that was from 1997 until 1998. And

18 I think it was here that you described yourself as having considerable

19 high-level contact with Bosnian Serb military police and civilian

20 authorities; also contacts with a wide range of international humanitarian

21 agencies. And then finally your final posting was Chief of Staff/director

22 of operations at the permanent joint headquarters at Northwood in the

23 United Kingdom, there is a slight misprint in the report, I see, 1998

24 until 2001. And it was there that the United Kingdom directed, deployed

25 and sustained forces in respect of numerous operations around the world,

1 and there you had dealings at operational interface with deployed

2 commanders in forward theatres of operations. Is that right?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. As I have already said, you retired from the army, I believe, in

5 2001?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. The reports are here. In conclusion therefore, is it right to say

8 that you have commanded troops and been involved in the chain of command

9 in relation to countries other than the U.K., those countries and troops

10 coming from Spain, Turkey, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States of

11 America, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and Malaysia, and that you have

12 cooperated closely with headquarters and troops from Australia, France,

13 Germany, Sweden, Norway and Finland. Is that right?

14 A. That's correct. The only thing I would add is I have had the good

15 fortune to command at every level from platoon to division.

16 Q. Thank you very much.

17 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, would you forgive me one moment, please.

18 [Prosecution counsel confer]

19 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, may I just pass these forward, please.

20 This is for the Bench.

21 Your Honour, may I now deal with one or two matters. If Your

22 Honour looks at page 13 again, and I will provide, I hope in the near

23 future, coloured copies. The copies that you have will not be coloured,

24 but the reason will become obvious in a minute. But the report is

25 unchanged, the lining is there, but the colouring will help. We also wish

1 to insert the exhibit number because a number of these documents have been

2 exhibited.

3 But if we look, for example, at page 13, footnote 56, the one I've

4 already referred to, I hope that there is a line underneath the

5 phrase: "Topola appears in other witness statements." As I say, what I

6 intend to do when the printing process is up and running is for the Court

7 to have that underlined in colour. That will be in red and will denote

8 that it's something that we do not seek to rely upon.

9 If one then moves to page 29 by way of example --

10 JUDGE PARKER: Judge Thelin has the benefit of colour.

11 MR. MOORE: Judge Thelin is a very lucky Judge, I think.

12 JUDGE THELIN: So far.

13 MR. MOORE: So far. Could well be true. But in any event, we

14 will try and ensure that Your Honour and Your Honour's colleague will have

15 the coloured copies as well.

16 But if I move to page 29 and we look take, for example,

17 footnote 124, we have got there: "See for example Witness P-202," that

18 witness was not called. It will be underlined in red, and therefore we do

19 not rely on that.

20 However, if you looks across, you will see then, and it will be in

21 blue in Judge Thelin's document, or aquamarine, Witness P-022, then it

22 should show T and a reference, 4959, 4960. That stands T for transcript.

23 So what we have attempted to do is to extract from transcripts evidence

24 that is comparable to the witness statement, and we have attempted to do

25 it that way. As I say, I will get the additional copies. But that is the

1 way that the report has been structured.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Before you close that page, I notice in the text,

3 in the paragraph numbered 84 there is underlining.

4 MR. MOORE: Yes.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Is that indicating that that is not relied on?

6 MR. MOORE: It is.

7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

8 MR. MOORE: If one looks at, for example, footnote 126, at the

9 very bottom, there is underlining, Judge Thelin will see it, it is in red,

10 that relates to an officer called Tesic, who the Prosecution most

11 certainly will not seek to rely upon. It is replaced by Witness P-030,

12 the transcript is there. Then just below it at 127, Ibid relates to the

13 reference from Tesic. And so consequently that was something that he had

14 originally stated but it will be replaced by the note -- footnote 126.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

16 MR. MOORE: So I hope that that is clear.

17 May I then also pass forward to the Court two bundles of hard

18 copy. These are documents ...

19 [Prosecution counsel confer]

20 MR. MOORE: I hope Your Honour has already got those two bundles.

21 JUDGE PARKER: Two heavy black folders, if that's what you mean by

22 bundles.

23 MR. MOORE: Yes, two heavy black bundles. Can I just deal please

24 with the explanation for these bundles of documents.

25 Your Honour will see that there is reference to footnote 1 and it

1 flows through and should link to every footnote in the -- Major-General

2 Pringle's report. I have stuck with footnotes at this time. Many of

3 those documents are now exhibits, and really for completeness it is

4 better -- is there one or two? For completeness, it is better if we stick

5 to footnotes because that's actually on the report. I will subsequently

6 serve on the Court a further amended report from General Pringle where the

7 footnotes will be replaced with exhibits. So when the report is available

8 for you to consider it, you will have not only the footnote, but the

9 exhibit which have been principally exhibited in Theunens's document, so

10 that is the way it will be done.

11 To assist the Court again, because it's not quite as

12 straightforward as one would think, when we have "Ibid" referred to in the

13 footnotes, often it will be, for example -- if we go to footnote 6. So

14 it's the largest bundle. If one goes to footnote 6, one will find that

15 there is nothing there.

16 JUDGE PARKER: I'm glad of that.

17 MR. MOORE: It's not an omission, it's unusually deliberate, and

18 therefore we have got on the page footnote 6 is in the range of

19 footnote 2. So what we have tried to do is go back to the original source

20 document. So if, for example, the Court find that there's something

21 missing, it, I hope, will show that in actual fact there is a reference

22 specifically back to footnote 2.

23 On occasion, one will find a reference going back three or four

24 times. I'm afraid there is no way out of it, because of the way the

25 report has been written, and that's not a criticism in any way. I hope

1 that that is clear.

2 May I then deal, please, with the first topics.

3 Q. General, do you have your report in front of you, and you have got

4 the documents in the two files; is that right?

5 A. I have. Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Thank you very much. May we deal, please, with the first topic.

7 It is quite simply this: Is there a document where you have found an

8 apparent definition of what "command" means?

9 And I'm going to ask the Court to look at footnote 1, please.

10 A. Yes, there is. Command refers to the authority vested in an

11 individual for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.

12 This has a legal and constitutional status --

13 Q. Just before we proceed, may we make sure everybody gets that page.

14 Unfortunately matters move rather slowly.

15 So it's footnote 1. It relates to the Law on All People's

16 Defence. And I would like to refer you, if I may, please, to Article 112.

17 And the registry have got an index prepared for them to assist them on

18 putting it on e-court. Thank you very much.

19 So, General, would you be kind enough please to refer us to -- or

20 read for us, please, Article 112 where you have referred to footnote 1 on

21 your report?

22 A. Yes. This represents the legal and constitutional basis, and

23 Article 112 on the Law on All People's Defence states that: "Command in

24 the armed forces shall be founded on the principles of unity of command

25 with respect to the use of forces and resources, unity of authority and

1 the obligation to implement decisions, commands and orders of a superior

2 officer."

3 Q. And as far as you are aware, is that comparable to "command" in

4 the -- I will call the western armies, or perhaps NATO forces, as you know

5 it?

6 A. Yes, it is.

7 Q. Thank you. May we move on to the second point, which is

8 footnote 2, because I'd like to ask you: Are you aware - indeed I think

9 it's right it say, there's no dispute - that you have consulted the

10 Federal Secretariat for National Defence command and control document; is

11 that right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. We note it as Exhibit 394. Could we please go to section 5, or

14 should I say page 27 in the hard copy. I hope everyone has now got that.

15 You should have before you: "Principles of command and control." Is that

16 right?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Can we deal then, please, with section 5, as I say, dealing with

19 single authority, going across to page 28. I want to specifically refer

20 to that. So page 28 at the bottom of footnote 2. What are the principles

21 that apply there, please, in respect of single authority?

22 A. Well, this doctrine states that: "The principle of single

23 authority in command and control implies an inalienable right of a

24 commander to command and control a subordinate command and unit in keeping

25 with the powers deriving from the competence ascribed to a specific level

1 of command and control. This principle ensures that in the process of

2 command and control there is only one superior who issues commands and to

3 whom the others report about the execution of tasks."

4 Do you wish me to continue?

5 Q. Yes, please.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the translation. Thank

7 you.

8 THE WITNESS: It continues: "The commander's authority is

9 stipulated by regulations. It is his right to make decisions for which he

10 is therefore solely responsible. In his work, a commander relies on his

11 aides, the staff, and other command organs. The rights and obligations of

12 these organs are stipulated by regulations, and they are responsible for

13 their scope of work. A commander may delegate some of his duties and

14 obligations on the Chief of Staff, his aides, a staff organ and

15 subordinated commands, but he cannot delegate the responsibility for the

16 situation in the unit and its use."

17 Q. May I deal with that last sentence, please. "But he did not

18 delegate the responsibility for the situation in the unit and its use."

19 What exactly does that mean in layman's language?

20 A. That means that the commander is ultimately responsible for

21 everything that happens in his command and the acts and actions of those

22 under his command.

23 Q. May we deal then, please, with the issue of subordination. It is

24 the following page. The subheading is on page 28, but the part that I

25 would like to deal with in English is on page 29, and it is four lines

1 from the top, commencing "subordination within." Would you be kind enough

2 to read that, please, and then I will ask some questions in respect of it.

3 A. This extract reads: "Subordination within a military organisation

4 introduces a chain of command from top to bottom - from the SFRJ

5 Presidency to a squad. Underlying the chain of command are the duty,

6 right and responsibility of superiors to make decisions and assign tasks,

7 whereas subordinates have the duty, right and responsibility to carry them

8 out accurately and in time."

9 Q. May I just deal with the issue of subordination here. We have the

10 commander who has the ultimate responsibility. To what extent must he be

11 informed of the task of which he has assigned to a subordinate?

12 A. He must be fully informed, because he is accountable, and

13 therefore he requires information to flow up and down the chain of

14 command, such that he has a full, if you like, situational awareness of

15 everything that is going on in his command.

16 Q. Does that mean that the subordinate therefore has no

17 responsibility for the task assigned to him?

18 A. Absolutely not. The subordinate has absolute authority --

19 absolute responsibility to carry out the order assigned to him in the

20 manner ascribed by his commander.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

23 MR. MOORE:

24 Q. May I refer to your report, please, paragraph 16. That comes

25 under the subheading of command and control. Six lines in the English

1 version it starts "in relation to accountability involves liability and

2 obligation to answer to a superior."

3 You refer here clearly to accountability and control. What do you

4 mean by this?

5 A. Accountability, as I say in my report, involves a liability and

6 obligation to answer to a superior for the proper use of delegated

7 responsibility, authority and resources. At every level of a command

8 chain those receiving orders are accountable to their superior officer for

9 the way in which those orders are carried out.

10 Control -- do you want me to go on?

11 Q. Yes, I do, please.

12 A. Control is the process through which a commander is assisted by

13 his staff to organise and direct and coordinate the plethora of activities

14 that the forces under his command are carrying out. Command and control

15 are thus inextricably linked.

16 Q. Thank you very much. I want to move on a little, if I may. You

17 have had the opportunity of reading the report by Major-General Zorc dated

18 the 1st of February, 2004. And that will be found at footnote 4, for the

19 Court's assistance, and I will refer to it in a moment. There he refers

20 to command and control and other related issues for the JNA.

21 The question I wish to ask is as follows: Are you able to comment

22 or observe within your professional capacity on the similarities between

23 the command and control system in respect of the JNA and other developed

24 armies of which you are aware?

25 A. Yes, Your Honour. In his report, Major-General Zorc states that

1 the commander control system in the armed forces of the former Yugoslavia

2 was very similar to the system of other European armies, having developed,

3 in the course of time, within what he describes as the continental

4 military tradition.

5 Now, I would agree with that. I have read many extracts and tomes

6 from JNA doctrine, and I've been extremely impressed by its thoroughness

7 and its similarity to the sort of doctrine that I have grown up with and

8 an awareness of doctrines of other continental armies. We referred to the

9 German army whilst you were running through my CV. There is an absolute

10 similarity between the doctrine laid down by the JNA and what

11 Major-General Zorc describes as European armies.

12 Q. Thank you very much. To assist the Court, may I refer, please, to

13 footnote 4, top right-hand corner, page 3. And there is the reference,

14 the first four lines in respect of the similarity of the European armies.

15 And again, merely to assist the Court.

16 Could I ask you then, please, General, to move to page 6 of the

17 Zorc report. I will be referring to page 6 and page 10 in due course.

18 Page 6, it is subheading "Forming an operational group/OG and its

19 command and control level." When one looks at an operational group and

20 its formation, do you see any similarity in relation to an operational

21 group formation and/or its function?

22 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Moore, I don't quite understand your question.

23 Q. You have reference to "c), Forming an operational group."

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And its command and control level?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. An operational group, if we suggest that it is created on an

3 ad hoc basis?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The question that I want to ask is: With something like an

6 operational group creation on an ad hoc basis, what is its function?

7 A. An operational group would be formed from a number of different

8 formations brought temporarily together under a single commander for a

9 specific operation, usually for a defined time. So its composition would

10 be in accordance with the task and size of the area of responsibility it

11 was allocated.

12 Q. And how would one deal with command and control with regard to an

13 ad hoc creation like an operational group?

14 A. Well, the ad hoc part poses extra problems for the operational

15 group commander. It's all very well commanding your own formation which

16 you have trained and which you live with on a day-to-day basis and where

17 you know all the personalities involved. When you start to add to that

18 formation with different formations that you may not have experienced

19 before, you may not have trained, and you may not even know, and when you

20 compound that with the fact that they may be a mixture of regular forces,

21 territorial forces, volunteer forces, the commander has a problem. And he

22 would be aware of that. And so he would have to deal with those under his

23 command in accordance with their level of professionalism, expertise and

24 knowledge. And in particular, he would have to pay very careful attention

25 to the less well-trained element, which I would define here as the

1 territorial element and the volunteer element, which he would not expect

2 to act in the same way as his well-trained regular forces.

3 Q. Thank you. I would like -- I would like to turn to page 9, top

4 right-hand corner, please. But I want to go to g) again of Zorc's report.

5 I want to deal with it very briefly. So it should be top right-hand

6 corner. It should be the heading of "Monitoring conditions and the

7 situation at higher and lower levels of command and control." Do you have

8 that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. If you forgive me, General, I just want to check that the

11 documents that have arrived are in colour. Thank you very much.

12 You have, to a large extent, dealt with this. But in relation to

13 the regulations themselves, is it right it say that there is actually

14 categories indicating the -- monitoring the conditions, situation at

15 higher and lower levels of command and control. I would like to deal with

16 the second paragraph, commencing "in immediate combat all commanders."

17 Would you be kind enough to read that out, please, and then we'll deal

18 with the content.

19 A. Yes. Major-General Zorc's reports states that: "In immediate

20 combat all commanders should be informed of the situation two levels above

21 (first level above in detail, second level above - approximately) and two

22 levels below. A corps commander then makes a plan of combat activities,

23 respecting the decisions made by the commanders of the first subordinate

24 levels - at battalion level - on engaging their units."

25 Q. What the importance of the doctrine of two up/two down?

1 A. Two up/two down will be familiar to European armies or certainly

2 NATO armies. And it's interesting that Major-General Zorc says the same

3 thing is applying in the JNA.

4 By thinking two up and two down, a commander at any level puts --

5 is able to interpret his orders in the context two up of the much bigger

6 picture, and therefore he understands why he is being ordered to do what

7 he -- what he has been ordered to do. And a commander thinking two levels

8 down ensures that a commander gives proper cognizance when allocating

9 tasks to the resources required to carry out those tasks.

10 Q. Thank you. Would you be kind enough, please, then to turn to

11 page 10, top right-hand corner. It is i), subheading i). The title

12 is "What must a commanding officer do to ensure that his orders are being

13 carried out." Do you have that particular reference?

14 A. I do, Your Honour.

15 Q. The word I wish to focus on is "ensure," "what must a commanding

16 officers do to ensure." Now may we deal, please -- obviously I rely on

17 the whole of the document, but I wish to focus six lines down, sentence

18 commencing "the commanding officer himself." Do you have that reference?

19 A. I do.

20 Q. Would you be kind enough to read out that sentence and then I will

21 deal with it.

22 A. The sentence reads: "The commanding officer himself or his

23 command staff must supervise the execution of his orders and help if and

24 when necessary (this activity is called 'control and help')."

25 Q. And finally to read one other part. If one looks at the

1 penultimate paragraph, the second-last paragraph, it is three lines from

2 the bottom of that paragraph, commencing "in cases when officers under

3 their command." Do you see that reference?

4 A. Yes, I do.

5 Q. Would you be kind enough to read that out, please.

6 A. Yes. Before I do that, I'll just add on the sentence to the

7 transcript I've just read out that I omitted, because I consider it to be

8 highly pertinent. After "this activity is called control and help" it

9 goes on to say: "For orders of utmost importance, the commanding officer

10 should be involved himself."

11 Turning now to the transcript, the second one, it reads: "In

12 cases where officers under their command are not experienced enough or if

13 there are reserve units insufficiently trained in the task, commanding

14 officers tend to become personally involved in controlling and helping

15 those officers under their command."

16 Q. The question that I have, although in actual fact you have pretty

17 much dealt with it, is why is it necessary for a commanding officer to

18 become personally involved when there are matters of -- to use the

19 words, "utmost importance."

20 A. Because as we have mentioned already, the commanding officer is

21 responsible for everything that happens in his command and is accountable

22 for everything that happens in his command. Therefore, if some elements

23 of his command are less well-trained than others, he has a responsibility

24 to ensure, nevertheless, that they understand his orders, understand how

25 they are to be carried out, and supervises that they are being carried out

1 in that way and were they or not to take the necessary action.

2 Q. Thank you very much.

3 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, may I please tender this document, Zorc's

4 report, as an exhibit. It is 65 ter number 961. But it's subsumed within

5 the bundle that we have already provided.

6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be --

7 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] [No interpretation].

8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Vasic.

9 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] My apologies. Thank you.

10 I think the situation here is similar to the one encountered

11 yesterday with Professor Adinovic's [phoen] report that was used in the

12 Kunarac case. Yesterday the Defence made a similar objection to

13 Mr. Adinovic's report in the Kunarac case. We don't have a ruling on that

14 yet.

15 I'm afraid my learned friend cannot now be tendering the report of

16 a witness who has not been heard in this case and who once testified in

17 another case. It's all right to ask Mr. Pringle what he thinks about

18 particular subjects from this report, but another thing is that we are not

19 given a chance to cross-examine the author of this report in this trial.

20 JUDGE PARKER: The question of the admission of the document will

21 be dealt with at the same time as the issue raised yesterday, Mr. Vasic.

22 MR. MOORE: Will the -- will I be permitted to submit in relation

23 to the admissibility of this document?

24 JUDGE PARKER: You will, Mr. Moore.

25 MR. MOORE: Thank you.

1 JUDGE PARKER: You could even do it now, if you wish, but --

2 MR. MOORE: I don't want to use the time, but I will --

3 JUDGE PARKER: That's what I had in mind.

4 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

5 JUDGE PARKER: If you run entirely out of time, written

6 submissions within a day or two next week.

7 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Because the decision will be coming next week.

9 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE PARKER: And in the meantime, it will be marked for

11 identification.

12 THE REGISTRAR: With the reference number 599, Your Honours.

13 MR. MOORE:

14 Q. May I, General, please, refer to paragraph 18 of your report.

15 With regard to this paragraph your report returns to really footnote 2,

16 the text-book in respect of command and control. Dealing with it briefly,

17 there is reference in your report to the various principles, I think there

18 are eight principles or criteria, to ensure successful command and

19 control. I just read them out: "Objectives, authority, responsibility,

20 trust, discipline, morale, regulations, and time."

21 Are these principles equally encapsulated in developed armies

22 within your professional experience?

23 A. In different words, they are very similar, and are stressed in --

24 in certainly British doctrine and other European armies' doctrine, I

25 believe.

1 Q. And how important are they for the establishment of command and

2 control?

3 A. Well, they're plainly important. And if I quote from my own

4 report and pick out one or two -- take authority, for example. Under

5 authority, the JNA doctrine discusses reputation and personal authority

6 and goes on to lay out a number of important character traits required for

7 effective command. These include honesty, truthfulness, expertise, and

8 familiarity with the job.

9 It goes on to say: "A responsible officer must be knowledgeable

10 about military regulations and must adhere to them." It talks about moral

11 responsibility as being the most prominent form of responsibility assumed

12 by senior military officers. It describes discipline in readily

13 recognisable terms as permeating all interpersonal relations and spreading

14 across the entire organisation, and it stresses the importance of

15 self-discipline. So all of this is readily recognisable in European

16 doctrines.

17 Q. Thank you very much. Again, moving on to paragraph 19 of your

18 report. If I summarise it, it deals with the command at brigade level,

19 and the discussion is in the JNA 1984 brigade rules.

20 Could I ask the Court, please, to turn to footnote 12 and 13 as I

21 want to deal with two topics there. 11 really is just the frontispiece.

22 May I deal with footnote 12. It should have "Introduction." Do

23 you have that before you?

24 A. I do.

25 Q. Thank you very much. Could we go to the bottom of the page, it is

1 ostensibly the third paragraph from the end. It commences: "The aim of

2 the rules." Have you got that?

3 A. I have.

4 Q. Thank you. Would you kind enough, please, to read that and then I

5 will deal with other matters?

6 A. The paragraph reads: "The aim of the rules is to ensure that each

7 separate brigade, according to its purpose and capabilities, adopt and

8 apply unified views, attitudes and tactical moves in the preparation,

9 organisation and execution of combat operations in an All People's Defence

10 war."

11 It goes on: "It is a duty of all senior staff and commands to

12 study the provision of these rules in detail and to test and evaluate them

13 during training for all types of brigades and for the conditions in which

14 they operate."

15 Q. Perhaps an overly simplistic question, but how important is it for

16 officers or commanders to familiarise themselves with the rules in respect

17 of command and control?

18 A. It's very important. And it's not really a question of rules,

19 it's a question of doctrine and training. Officers --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down for the

21 benefit of the record. Thank you.

22 THE WITNESS: Officers are taught and brought up to apply the

23 doctrine applicable in order that when orders are given there is a clear

24 understanding of what they mean and the sort of actions that they imply,

25 and the sort of way that those orders would be carried out.

1 MR. MOORE:

2 Q. Thank you. And may we deal with footnote 13, please. There

3 should be reference to chapter IV, the heading of "Command and joint

4 provisions." Do you have that before you?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Thank you. I really want to deal or focus on one section, which

7 is paragraph 107. Do you have that before you?

8 A. I do.

9 Q. Would you be kind enough, please, to read that out?

10 A. Paragraph 107 reads: "Command of the brigade is part of an

11 integrated system of command and control, which is based on adopted

12 principles of command. Command implies the best ways of using human

13 skills and the capabilities of equipment for the brigade to achieve the

14 best possible results in performing a given task. To this end, command

15 must be integrated, continuous, secure, flexible, effective and

16 operational."

17 Q. Do you agree with that particular analysis of command?

18 A. Yes, that is readily recognisable.

19 Q. And is it recognisable within other armies within your experience?

20 A. Yes. In my own army, for example, that is readily

21 understandable.

22 Q. I would like to move to paragraph 20, if I may, please, of the

23 report. You have already dealt with it, and perhaps if I can abbreviate

24 it in the following way: That you came to the conclusion that this

25 document was a comprehensive, sound and well-written command and control

1 doctrine which lay down the principles and fundamentals with which all

2 officers are required to be familiar. Is that right?

3 A. Yes, that was the opinion I came to.

4 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to move to a new topic, if I

5 may, please, which really relates to the application of command and

6 control principles vis-a-vis Operation Group South. May I refer you,

7 please, to your paragraph 21. In the report itself, there is actually

8 highlighted a question which I will read into the record, and then deal

9 with it in a moment. Question based on the 1st Military District and

10 OG South documents that you were shown by the Prosecution, describe how

11 these principles of command and control were applied by the commander of

12 the JNA OG South during the Vukovar operations. So we deal with the

13 application, as I have already indicated.

14 May I just deal with it in this way: We know that OG South had

15 both regular JNA units as well as reserve and paramilitary/volunteer

16 units. From the documentation that you have seen but more particularly

17 from the experience that you have gained over your period in the military,

18 are you able to conclude if there was proper application of JNA principles

19 regarding command and control in respect of these subordinated units?

20 A. Yes. From the documents I have read, starting with the doctrine

21 and then going on to Operations Group South orders and reports and other

22 documents such as war journals and diaries, it's clear to me that there

23 was a functioning command and control system with information and orders

24 flowing down the chain of command and information flowing up the chain of

25 command, and that's exactly what I would expect. It's what the doctrine

1 lays down, and it's what -- and it's how a well-trained unit like the

2 Guards Motorised Brigade would be expected to perform.

3 Q. May I deal with paragraph 24, but perhaps for completeness sake

4 the conclusion that you have given, I think it's right to say for

5 brevity's sake you have referred to paragraphs 22, or there is reference

6 in paragraph 22 and 23 of some of the documentation that you have perused

7 when evaluating this particular topic; is that right?

8 A. That is correct. And I think I've footnoted them as 15, 16, 17,

9 18, to 20 on that page.

10 Q. Yes. I'm not going to use time in relation to those documents.

11 They're available to you, and if cross-examination is required, they are

12 available.

13 May we deal then, please, with paragraph 24 of your report. Here

14 there is reference to what is called an assault detachment. Again, for

15 the assistance of all parties, what is an assault detachment, as far as

16 you're aware?

17 A. Yeah. Your Honour, I understand an assault detachment to be

18 temporary combat units made up of a variety of troops; infantry, armour,

19 engineers, military police, pioneers, whatever is required to achieve the

20 task. All those troops would be under the command of a single overall

21 commander, that is the assault detachment commander. And an assault

22 detachment could be divided into a number of smaller groups which are

23 termed in JNA doctrine "assault groups."

24 Now, those mixed or what we would describe as all-arms groupings

25 are very akin to what in NATO armies are described as battle groups, which

1 are formations made up of a number of different arms, and by arms, I mean

2 infantry, armour, engineers, et cetera.

3 Q. Thank you very much. On the material available to you, are you

4 able to say if the -- the TO and volunteer units were integrated into the

5 assault detachments of OG South?

6 A. Yes. I have seen a number of orders in which the distribution

7 lists include TO and volunteer units and orders given to assault

8 detachments whose composition includes TO and volunteer units.

9 Q. Thank you very much. Again, dealing with the application of the

10 command and control principles, to what extent does a commander have to be

11 aware of the - my words - possible variability of disciplinary levels in

12 units subordinated to him?

13 A. Well, we've touched on this already, and it comes back to a

14 commander's accountability and responsibility for everything that happens

15 in his command and by those whom he commands. Therefore, the implication

16 of that is that a commander must have a good feel for the capabilities of

17 those he commands which, as the groupings become more varied, such as

18 assault detachments and assault groups, becomes even more important. If

19 those groupings include other than well-trained regular troops, less

20 well-trained TO troops and volunteers whose training may not be apparent

21 to the commander at all, then he has an absolute responsibility to ensure

22 that, (a), he has -- he understands what their capabilities are, what

23 their level of discipline is, how they operate in order to be able to,

24 (a), control them, and (b), give them appropriate - and I stress the

25 word "appropriate" - tasks.

1 Q. Thank you. Does that principle apply to commanders at all levels?

2 A. Absolutely. That principle would apply at an assault group level,

3 at an assault detachment level, or OG South level for that matter, where

4 the groupings are made up of different sorts of troops with different

5 capabilities.

6 Q. Thank you very much. I'd like to move on to paragraph 27 of your

7 report. Here you deal specifically with the competence and perhaps

8 requirements for the suitability of the position of commander of OG South.

9 My first question would be this: On your own experience or from

10 your own experience, what level of competence was required to be appointed

11 commander of a guards, or the guards brigade?

12 A. Well, I read the Guards Motorised Brigade as the elite formation

13 of the JNA. It was better equipped, better organised, had higher

14 standards, better training, than the more run-of-the-mill units of the

15 JNA. To command that organisation would have required, in my professional

16 opinion, an extremely high-grade officer, specifically selected for the

17 job.

18 Q. Thank you. May I deal with a topic that's often called

19 situational awareness. From the documents that you have seen, are you

20 able to indicate the level of situational awareness existing within the

21 command structure of OG South?

22 A. Yes. Referring to the orders and reports that I have read and the

23 war journal and operational diaries, it's clear that there was a

24 well-tried and exercised system for passing information up and down the

25 chain of command, using a variety of methods from routine reporting, radio

1 reporting, liaison officers, visits, all of which would be normal, and all

2 of which would end up with the commander having a proper and full

3 situational awareness, both from his own actions and from the process of

4 information being passed to him by his staff.

5 Q. Why is situational awareness important in a command structure?

6 A. Well, situational awareness is important, per se, because unless

7 the commander is fully aware of what's happening around him, both from the

8 enemy forces and own forces situation, he will not be able to make the

9 correct decisions or take the correct actions required for his

10 responsibilities and accountabilities.

11 Q. And how does a commander achieve situational awareness, within

12 your experience?

13 A. Well, as I've touched on, there's obviously the normal reporting

14 regime, where he is assist -- where reports are coming into his

15 headquarters, both over the radio and through liaison visits and -- and

16 officers reporting in. But also a responsible commander would not just

17 sit in his headquarters and rely on information to be fed to him. He

18 would be actively pursuing the sort of information he wanted. He would be

19 visiting those commanders subordinated to him, looking them in the eye,

20 judging what they're saying, seeing what their sense of morale is,

21 assessing for himself whether there are any problems that may not have

22 come to the attention of the staff that need addressing. All of that will

23 result in the commander having a full, as you describe it, situational

24 awareness.

25 Q. Thank you very much.

1 MR. MOORE: Would Your Honour give me one moment, please.

2 [Prosecution counsel confer]

3 MR. MOORE:

4 Q. Can I deal with a very small topic. It's quite simply this: What

5 is the function of a duty officer?

6 A. Well, a duty officer, as his name implies, is on duty to carry out

7 a specific function. It would normally -- for example, in a brigade

8 headquarters, duty officers would be manning the operations desks or the

9 desks for the other functions of command, receiving information, assessing

10 it, taking actions where he -- on his own initiative where he was

11 empowered to do so, or where appropriate, and, in particular, making sure

12 that the commander and/or the Chief of Staff were fully appraised of

13 anything that he thought they should be appraised of immediately, if it

14 was urgent, or routinely through situational updates, et cetera, if it

15 wasn't urgent.

16 Q. To what extent -- or perhaps how important is it for a record, a

17 documentary record to be kept in relation to important material, given

18 either to a duty officer or indeed to a command itself?

19 A. Well, that's important. You will recall that one of the

20 principles of command was continuity. Now, this implies that whoever

21 is -- amongst other things, whoever is on duty there must be a continuous

22 actioning and responsibility for what is happening. And therefore, the

23 way that that is done, because duty officers cannot be on duty forever,

24 and there would be a shift system, important information is recorded, and

25 when one duty officer hands over to another, they will go over the

1 important aspects and those aspects that need following up in the new duty

2 officer's watch. It's also important so that there is a note or a record

3 of information that needs to be passed to the Chief of Staff or the

4 commander or that they can simply call for the log and skim through it,

5 read through it themselves.

6 Q. Thank you. I want to try and merge, if I may, the topic of

7 commander and record, in relation to an issue of subordination and

8 resubordination. As a commander, to what extent or perhaps again how

9 important is it for a record to be kept of the resubordination of a unit

10 that had been previously subordinated to you as a commander?

11 A. Well, that's important for a number of reasons. If a unit is

12 resubordinated, that could carry with it command and control implications,

13 it could carry with it logistic implications. It might mean that logistic

14 resources or resupply of, for example, ammunition, food, water, fuel,

15 needs to be switched in another direction. So it's clear, must be clear

16 that certainly all the staff and particularly the supporting commanders,

17 by which I mean the logistic commanders, the artillery commanders, the

18 engineer commanders know who is subordinated at a certain time or

19 resubordinated at a certain time so that they can control and organise the

20 support that they are providing appropriately.

21 Q. If this is not done, what are the possible consequences in

22 relation to command and control?

23 A. If it's not done, the consequences are confusion. You may get the

24 wrong orders or inappropriate orders going down the chain of command on

25 the assumption that it is going to an organisation comprising of a certain

1 organisation, when, in fact, it's not because some of that organisation

2 has been taken out and put somewhere else. So it -- it's important in

3 that respect. But it's also important in terms of logistic resupply. If

4 it's not clear, as I said, to the supporting commanders who is where in

5 the organisation, they cannot plan their logistic support appropriately.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, I'm going to move on to a new topic. I

8 would, if Your Honour wouldn't mind, wish to take a break at this time.

9 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the 20-minute break now, Mr. Moore,

10 and then resume.

11 --- Recess taken at 10.55 a.m.

12 --- On resuming at 11.20 a.m.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Moore.

14 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, I'm told that Mr. Lukic may have an

15 application.

16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic.

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's not an application,

18 but you know the position that my team is in; we're last when it comes to

19 cross-examination. So what I would like to know is the exact rules of the

20 game as far as the cross-examination of this witness is concerned, or the

21 examination, we would like to know how long the in-chief would last and

22 how long the three teams are going to have. So could you please provide

23 clear guide-lines for us, because, if possible, it would be helpful for us

24 to know all of this now. It's up to the Chamber, of course. And I don't

25 know, perhaps it would be possible also if the witness is available, and

1 if the Trial Chamber is willing, that we perhaps continue to work for part

2 of the afternoon tomorrow.

3 JUDGE PARKER: The answer is that you will have two hours, each

4 Defence team. And the Prosecution has a slight more flexibility. It will

5 run over two hours in-chief, but only a little. But you will each have

6 two hours, so a total of six hours between the three of you, okay? And it

7 will all conclude by 1345 tomorrow.

8 Mr. Moore.

9 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Did you understand your batting order there?

11 MR. MOORE: I'm trying to work out the -- the timetable, but I

12 anticipate --

13 JUDGE PARKER: You will finish at about midday.

14 MR. MOORE: Yes.

15 JUDGE PARKER: But as I've indicated, you can stretch over,

16 because if you stretch over, you're merely diminishing your own

17 re-examination time.

18 MR. MOORE: Thank you for that.

19 JUDGE PARKER: So we're being very generous to you.

20 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

21 Q. Without hesitation, if I may move on then, please, to the issue of

22 notice. You deal with it in paragraph 32 of your report. You have

23 already informed us about situations in which you have been involved

24 where, to use your phrase, there was terrorism, namely Northern Ireland,

25 military conflict, perhaps within the Balkans. Now, when one has a

1 situation where you have irregularity within the combat, if there is such

2 a thing, does that create difficulties over and above what I will call

3 normal combat tensions?

4 A. Define irregularities.

5 Q. Defining irregularities to this extent: If one looks at a war

6 between two disciplined armies, one I would suggest probably expects a

7 level of consistency in relation to tensions that may exist between those

8 two conflicting parties.

9 If one moves to scenario two, here you may have, as was in

10 Northern Ireland, conflict between paramilitaries of Protestant, Catholic;

11 in the Balkans you had irregular forces as well on either side. What I

12 would like to know is if one deals with what I will call localised combat,

13 does that create any additional difficulties over and above that which one

14 would normally expect?

15 A. Well, the situation is plainly more complex, but the laws of armed

16 conflict would apply in exactly the same way.

17 Q. To what extent should a commander of whatever level be aware of

18 the dangers of unlawful acts to units subordinated to him?

19 A. Well, he's got to be -- he's got to be absolutely aware because he

20 is accountable. And that goes back to my previous answers about knowing

21 the capabilities or shortcomings of those under his command.

22 Q. What could or should a commander do to avoid such problems or

23 eliminate such possible dangers?

24 A. Well, the sort of actions he could take would be to ensure that

25 less well-trained troops, such as TO or irregulars or volunteers, are

1 placed firmly within the chain of command with a responsible commander who

2 is given clear direction to ensure that these less well-trained troops are

3 tasked appropriately and behave appropriately and to report back if there

4 are any problems in that respect.

5 So that's one thing he can do. He can also take a very personal

6 view himself and ensure by visits that that is happening and be aware

7 of -- of the dangers in which he himself will find -- in which he will

8 find himself, as he is accountable for their actions as they are under his

9 command. He can take a very personal interest in these particular sorts

10 of troops, how they're tasked, how they're involved, and how they're

11 performing.

12 Q. Thank you. I would like to, please, at footnote 39 bis. It is

13 also Exhibit 415. It's a document of the 18th of November. It is a

14 document that has been signed by Lieutenant-General Zivota Panic. It

15 should be under footnote 39 bis. Have you got that document, General?

16 A. I have.

17 Q. Thank you very much. I want to deal with it in a moment, if I

18 may, please.

19 Let us look at this document. I'll deal with it initially in a

20 fairly brief way. We have got the date, top left-hand corner, 18th of

21 November, 1991. We have got just below that the phrase, "Very urgent."

22 Below that, "Deliver immediately." And we can see to whom it is sent, and

23 we can see on the second line of the recipients, OG South.

24 Now, I want to deal with various parts of this document, please.

25 If we look at the bottom of the page, it is page 1 in the middle. We can

1 see the penultimate paragraph commencing, "However, the war." Do you see

2 that?

3 A. I do.

4 Q. I will read that and then I will move on to another part of the

5 document.

6 "However, the war did not end with the fall of Vukovar and an even

7 more fierce and brutal war against Ustasha forces is now ahead of us."

8 Can we then turn over the page, please? And I want to deal with

9 again two parts of this page. First it relates to order. One is OG

10 South. Moving to the very bottom of that page: "While carrying out these

11 assignments," it clearly relates to OG South and North, "and in other

12 operations in the area in which first VO units are engaged on smashing

13 Ustasha forces, observe all aspects of the Geneva Convention on prisoners

14 of war."

15 Now, I'd like to turn over, please, to the final page of that

16 document. And it is number 8. Would you be kind enough, please, to read

17 out that particular paragraph?

18 A. Paragraph 8 of this order reads: "Every unit must fully control

19 the situation on the territory of its area of responsibility. Commanders

20 at all levels will be responsible for this. Wartime laws have not entered

21 into force, and therefore, as always, nobody has the right to retribution

22 and other kinds of revenge which some local TO Territorial Defence units

23 carried out. In future, arrest those who commit any such acts and

24 undertake appropriate legal measures."

25 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to the following questions --

1 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Vasic.

3 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] My apologies for interrupting my

4 learned friend, but this reference cited in his question, I'm afraid I am

5 unable to find it in this order that we are talking about. Perhaps my

6 learned friend can tell me where it states that it is ordered -- just one

7 moment. "[Previous translation continues] ... [In English] ... situation

8 on the territory of its area of responsibility [Interpretation] in

9 relations to Operations Group South, and that the applications of the

10 Geneva Conventions is mentioned.

11 MR. MOORE: Well, I obviously work from the English translation,

12 and I think that -- well, it has already been an exhibit. I have it

13 clearly on page 1 who the recipients are. Order is in relation to page 2,

14 and clearly the recipient is OG South. The reference to "observe all

15 aspects of the Geneva Convention on the prisoners of war" is my page 2,

16 the bottom of the English. There is a reference, actually, to "prevent

17 any disobedience of unsoldierly appearance of behaviour" on page 3. And

18 I've got, as indeed the General has read out, paragraph 8, and I only want

19 to move on to Zivota Panic. Has my learned friend now located that?

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

21 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, Mr. Moore.

23 MR. MOORE:

24 Q. General, and clearly we see the signatory is Lieutenant-General

25 Zivota Panic.

1 The questions that I have in relation to this and the topic of

2 notice are as follows: Does such a document properly reflect the concerns

3 of a commander in a way that is appropriate for the circumstances existing

4 after the conclusion of hostilities?

5 A. Absolutely. This is -- this is an order from General Panic to his

6 subordinate commanders, including Colonel Mrksic, commander Operations

7 Group South, which will be like a flashing beacon to the recipients,

8 because it will be quite clear from the tone and the content that their

9 superior commander is extremely concerned that, given the situation,

10 atrocities, shall I put it like that, or acts in contravention of the

11 Geneva Conventions on the prisoners of war could occur, and he is saying

12 to his subordinate commanders, I want you to pay particular personal

13 attention to this issue and ensure that it does not. And he goes on to

14 say that it has already happened with some local TO Territorial Defence

15 units. So a recipient receiving this order would take this extremely

16 seriously.

17 Q. Thank you very much. May I just move on to the next question. If

18 you received such an order from your superior commander, what steps and/or

19 measures would you take to carry out the directions of your commander as a

20 result of the receipt of this document?

21 A. I would immediately translate this into an order of my own,

22 reflecting my commander's concerns, adding whatever flavour of my own I

23 wished to. I would draw particular attention to the close supervision

24 required of TO units and volunteers in my command, and I would probably go

25 visiting forward to look commanders in the eye and impress them of the

1 urgency of this order and what I expected them to do to carry it out.

2 Q. And why would you do such a thing, or why would you implement

3 orders in that way?

4 A. Well, I would implement them in the first -- in the first instance

5 because my commander is plainly concerned and has brought it to my

6 attention, and therefore it is my responsibility to act; and secondly, I

7 would do it because I would realise that I am accountable for my actions.

8 And if there are such actions, if such acts occur in my area of

9 responsibility, it will be my responsibility.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 A. Not the least of which, it is against, and I would realise it, it

12 is against the international laws of war, to which we have subscribed.

13 Q. Have you seen any document, documents or orders that is consistent

14 with the urgency of this order from Zivota Panic passing on these

15 concerns?

16 A. In the documents that I have been provided with, I have not

17 noticed the sort of actions logged as I have described. I have noted, I

18 think it's in the war journal, the receipt of this document. But

19 interestingly, if I remember rightly, in the actions column there's no

20 comment. There's no comment to the effect that commander impressed this

21 on all subordinates, or orders group called to impress on all subordinates

22 Geneva Conventions, or even commander visited forward to impress this

23 order on subordinate. There's not -- I've come across no "action on"

24 comments. All I've seen is that that order was noted as received.

25 Q. I would like to deal with an issue that I will call verbal notice.

1 If a commander of whatever level receives information that illegal acts

2 are occurring or are about to occur, does he have a duty to act?

3 A. He has an absolute duty to act. And it is laid down, inter alia,

4 in the JNA doctrine on compliance with the International Laws of War.

5 Q. If that officer fails to act immediately, does that diminish the

6 duty that he has in relation to that notice given?

7 A. Well, he would be well advised to act immediately. Because he

8 would realise that he is accountable.

9 Q. That deals with the subject if acts are occurring or about to

10 occur. Let us move on to a slight variation of that. If a commander, at

11 whatever level, receives information that illegal acts have already

12 occurred, does he have a duty to act?

13 A. Yes, he does. As, for example, General Panic has acted in putting

14 out his own order.

15 Q. And what should that commander do, in your professional opinion?

16 A. He should -- first of all, if it is -- if it is clearly who has

17 carried out these acts, they should be arrested immediately. If it is not

18 clear who has carried out these acts, he should institute an immediate

19 investigation.

20 Q. Thank you very much. I wish to deal now with the topic of

21 evacuation. I hope it is paragraphs 68 to 76. Again, I will read into

22 the record the formal question that you were asked. "Evacuation

23 operations. Drawing from your knowledge of (international) regulations

24 and your military experience, explain, by ways of a generic example, how a

25 commander should plan, organise, and carry out the evacuation of prisoners

1 from a protected facility (for example a hospital) through hostile

2 territory, that was agreed upon at a higher level."

3 Now, I want to deal with that topic, if I may. In your report you

4 state that given the existing circumstances at that time, such an

5 evacuation, in this case of the hospital, would constitute a very

6 high-profile event. I think that's correct, isn't it?

7 A. That's what I've said.

8 Q. Why did you and do you consider it was a high-profile event?

9 A. Well, I consider this evacuation to be a high-profile event for a

10 number of reasons. Starting with the fact that it emanated from something

11 that I understand was called the Zagreb agreement, which was agreed at

12 very high level between the two states concerned. And secondly, it's

13 going to be a high-profile event because that agreement involved the close

14 monitoring of this operation by international agencies such as the

15 Red Cross. And thirdly, given the events that have just occurred, a very

16 hard-fought battle for Vukovar, a lot of loss of life, lots of wounded, a

17 confused situation, the existence in my command of TO and volunteer units

18 who I have already been warned of their activities elsewhere, and the

19 implications on my part to ensure that the Geneva Conventions are strictly

20 adhered to by my superior commander, I would be under absolutely no

21 delusion at all that this was an operation in which I would have to take a

22 very, very personal interest.

23 Q. Thank you. The following questions in relation to this topic:

24 Firstly, would you expect a commander to be aware of or indeed possibly

25 involved in such an evacuation?

1 A. Well, the commander could not possibly be unaware of the

2 evacuation, because it is a major operation occurring in his area of

3 responsibility. So it is inconceivable that he would be unaware of it.

4 Being aware of it, for the reasons I have just said, I would expect the

5 commander to, with his staff, plan and issue the orders for what is, in

6 effect, a very complex operation.

7 Q. Thank you. By delegating or by delegation of the organisational

8 role for that evacuation, does this diminish the commander's obligation to

9 ensure its successful completion?

10 A. Absolutely not. The commander is fully responsible for everything

11 that happens under his command, by those under his command, in his area of

12 responsibility.

13 Q. Thank you. If a superior officer/commander delegates the task of

14 the evacuation operation to a subordinate officer, to what extent does

15 such delegation diminish the duties of that subordinated officer in the

16 performance of his tasks?

17 A. The officer to whom the task has been subordinated will be

18 responsible for the proper conduct of the task and accountable to his

19 commander for the proper conduct of the task. The commander will remain

20 responsible as the commander for the way in which that task is carried

21 out.

22 Q. If I use the word "command," simpliciter, what does it mean in the

23 military context, what, in your judgement would be the hallmarks of

24 command?

25 A. As I said in paragraph 16 of my report, command and control,

1 command really involves leadership and decision-making, and therefore

2 involves planning and giving orders with the expectation that subordinates

3 will carry them out.

4 Q. Thank you. Given your professional experience and the complexity

5 of the evacuation operation, would you expect a written order to be

6 issued?

7 A. I certainly would. Because this operation is going to involve a

8 whole host of different units under my command. There are going to be

9 logistic implications. There's going to be transport required. There's

10 going to be guarding required. There's going to be security organ

11 activities in terms of sorting out who's who. There's going to be route

12 clearance. It's a highly complex operation. There's not to mention the

13 fact that it's going to be observed by international organisations which

14 will need liaison and monitoring in their own right. And therefore, that,

15 in the normal course of events, would be the subject of an operation order

16 declaring how that operation is going to be carried out, who's in command,

17 and issuing tasks to the subordinate units.

18 Q. Thank you. In the carrying out of such an evacuation operation,

19 to what extent should the commanding officer take appropriate steps to

20 ensure the safety of the evacuees?

21 A. Well, the whole -- that is the responsibility of the whole of the

22 chain of command, and in -- in this instance, from the commander of

23 OG South downwards, the commander of OG South would be impressing on

24 whoever he has delegated responsibility for the evacuation, his

25 responsibilities towards the safety of the evacuees, and the officer and

1 everybody involved in the evacuation would also be responsible for

2 ensuring the safety of the evacuees. But in particular, the commanding

3 officer of the evacuation operation itself would have an absolute

4 responsibility to ensure that all the forces he is commanding, conducting

5 the operation, are briefed properly in this respect.

6 Q. Thank you. If a commander of whatever level has information that

7 atrocities either have or may occur, how would that affect the planning of

8 the evacuation operation and, above all, the successful completion?

9 A. Well, if a commander, or the commander, is aware that troops under

10 his command have already carried out that sort of act, then he would be

11 alert to that fact and would ensure that those troops were not in any way

12 involved in such a delicate operation. If that had not occurred, but

13 knowing that TO units and volunteer units were in the area, even if not

14 involved in the operation directly, but maybe they were, or could be, then

15 he would be impressing down the chain of command the -- what he expected

16 from his subordinate commanders in that -- in that respect in exactly the

17 same way as General Panic has done to him.

18 Q. Thank you very much. I would like to deal with a topic that I

19 will label "zone of responsibility." Do you agree with the following

20 hypothesis: That a commander cannot delegate command responsibility?

21 A. If you mean by that does the responsibility of a higher commander

22 cease to exist when he has delegated tasks to a subordinate commander, the

23 answer to that is no. The responsibility remains with commanders at all

24 levels, and the higher commander remains responsible for all actions

25 carried out to delegate its subordinates within their own areas of

1 responsibility.

2 Q. I want to try and deal with a topic, for the assistance of all

3 parties, and deal with it as neutrally as I possibly can.

4 We have a situation evidentially in this case that on the 20th of

5 November, 1991 Ovcara was located in the zone of responsibility of the

6 commander of the 80th Motorised Brigade; that's Lieutenant-Colonel

7 Vojnovic. The 80th Motorised Brigade is and was subordinated to OG South.

8 There is evidence that a Major Vukasinovic, a security organ within the

9 command of OG South, entered the zone of responsibility of the

10 80th Motorised Brigade. Thirdly, we have evidence that incidents

11 apparently were occurring at that time at Ovcara.

12 Now, Vojnovic was asked why he did not deal with the problem

13 immediately in what I will call a military sense, and he stated as

14 follows, and I summarise it, that a member of the superior command had

15 entered his zone of responsibility without notifying him. And he stated

16 that he subsequently went to Mrksic to inform him.

17 Now, what is the responsibility of Mrksic for -- or shall I not

18 personalise it. What is the -- what is the responsibility of the superior

19 commander for events that have occurred within the zone of responsibility

20 of his subordinate unit?

21 A. Well, it would be clear to the superior commander that there was a

22 command and control muddle here. You will recall the principle of unity

23 of command. Here we have an officer responsible for a zone of

24 responsibility, or an area of responsibility, who has found another

25 organisation carrying out an operation in his area without, apparently,

1 his knowledge or without, apparently, him being involved in the planning

2 or the orders for that operation. Moreover, this operation being carried

3 out in his area of -- in his area of responsibility appears to be being

4 carried out by officers from the brigade staff.

5 So, in my view, what he did was absolutely correct. He went to

6 his commander and said, There is an absolute muddle going on here, what is

7 your direction, commander, to sort it out.

8 Does that answer your question?

9 Q. It does. Thank you very much. I am almost out of time.

10 On the material that you have had available to you, are you able

11 to indicate to the Court whether Colonel Mrksic or his conduct achieved

12 the level one would expect from an officer in his position?

13 A. Well, from the material that has been made available to me, I

14 conclude that the commander of OG South failed to take the sort of actions

15 that I would have expected from a commander of his standing and

16 experience, and which, in my opinion, that failure has contributed to the

17 events that occurred.

18 Q. To assist the Court, one really refers to paragraph 81 of the

19 report.

20 May I deal with paragraph 82, when you move on to Major

21 Sljivancanin. I want to read out the second sentence. There's reference

22 to personal involvement. And then following this -- following that, I

23 should say: "Furthermore, he, Sljivancanin, appears to have played a

24 greater command role in organising and conducting the evacuation of the

25 hospital than might be expected from an officer of his appointment."

1 Why do you come to that conclusion?

2 A. Well, I came to that conclusion from reading the documents which I

3 was provided with, which indicated to me that Major Sljivancanin was very

4 personally involved in the evacuation of the hospital; in particular,

5 giving orders and directing and being seen around at all times, and for --

6 to all extent and purposes, giving the appearance that, from what I read,

7 that he was in command and able to direct subordinate units to act in

8 accordance with what he was saying.

9 Q. Could I direct your attention, please, to the following page,

10 page 29. It is the final -- final sentence of that paragraph,

11 paragraph 83, commencing: "His failure to take effective appropriate

12 action before, during or after the events, which are the subject of the

13 indictment, to ensure proper conduct all indicates to me that Major

14 Sljivancanin failed to act in accordance with JNA doctrine and failed in

15 his duty as an officer and as a senior advisor to Colonel Mile Mrksic, his

16 commander."

17 Why do you come to that conclusion? What is that conclusion based

18 upon?

19 A. That's based on the documentation that I have read. And to give

20 you an example, it would appear to me that Major Sljivancanin was in

21 charge of the evacuation operation. It would appear to me that he was

22 fully aware of the everything that was happening and that happened. He

23 was fully aware that there were TO and volunteer forces involved. He was

24 fully aware of their conduct. And all of that is -- and the conduct of

25 that operation was as far from compliance with JNA doctrine that I can

1 imagine.

2 Q. May we deal, please, with Captain Miroslav Radic. It's

3 paragraphs 84 to 86. Again, I will attempt to abbreviate.

4 Paragraph 86: "Captain Miroslav Radic's failure to take it effective

5 appropriate action before, during or after the events, which are the

6 subject of the indictment, to ensure proper conduct in the evacuation

7 operation, or to instigate appropriate disciplinary investigations after

8 becoming aware of the massacre of the prisoners of war by TO and volunteer

9 troops then under his command, in my opinion indicates that Captain

10 Miroslav Radic failed to act in accordance with JNA doctrine and failed in

11 his duty as an officer and a commander."

12 What do you base that summation upon?

13 A. Again, I base that on the documents with which I was provided,

14 which would indicate to me that whilst Captain Radic does not appear to

15 have been present at Ovcara he became fully aware of what had happened at

16 Ovcara, I think the next day, when he was involved, I believe, with

17 conversations with various TO and volunteer elements. And I concluded

18 from that that even if he had not been there he was aware or became aware

19 of what had happened, and therefore in accordance with JNA doctrine, he

20 had a duty to act. He had a duty, immediately, to report that up the

21 chain of command and to investigate and, if necessary, arrest those that

22 he had become aware were suspected of carrying out such actions.

23 Q. Thank you. Dealing with Captain Radic, if Captain Radic had been

24 made aware of such incidents at the time that they were occurring, does

25 that strengthen or weaken your conclusion in relation to him?

1 A. If he had been made aware that such incidents were occurring at

2 the time they were occurring, it puts even more onus on immediate

3 action, (a), to alert the chain of command, and (b), to take action to

4 stop it. And then subsequently to deal with those perpetrating it.

5 MR. MOORE: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.

6 But I would seek to put the report in as an exhibit.

7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 600, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE PARKER: And is that in the coloured, final form? Or the

10 original, or what, Mr. Moore?

11 MR. MOORE: It is in the coloured form, but with the Court's leave

12 and the agreement, as I'm sure will be the case, of my learned friends,

13 what I intend to do will be to tender the report in an upgraded form --

14 JUDGE PARKER: You've mentioned that. My interest is that there

15 is the original report and now a coloured modification of it. Are you

16 wanting both or just one?

17 MR. MOORE: Well, can I explain, I hope simply and fairly, and

18 that is the original report was created in August. Clearly there were

19 witnesses we did not seek to call, and we have supplemented it -- or the

20 General has supplemented it with reference to other documents. Perhaps it

21 would be prudent to put in both reports and that way it avoids any doubt

22 or problem.

23 JUDGE PARKER: That would accord with the Chamber's view of the

24 practical situation.

25 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

1 JUDGE PARKER: We will receive the report in both forms.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The report in the original form will be

3 Exhibit 601.

4 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Vasic.

7 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 I'm going to cross-examine the witness anyway, but I would just

9 like to clarify something in relation to this exhibit tendered just now.

10 It's not clear to me if both of them are accepted, both the expert

11 reports, and one is not underlined, then I don't know what the point would

12 be of this other one being underlined. Are we accepting the first one to

13 see what the original report was, and then those parts that were red-lined

14 will then not be taken into consideration. This is how my learned friend,

15 Mr. Moore, explained it, but I just wanted to clarify it so it's clear to

16 everyone.

17 JUDGE PARKER: I thought we had laboured over that to the point of

18 complete clarity, Mr. Vasic.

19 The original report is the original report and it is received as

20 such. Clearly to the extent at least that it is now underlined in the

21 second version, it's acknowledged by the Prosecution that it has not

22 substantiated parts of the report. The underlined, coloured version, is a

23 practical means of everybody, including the Chamber, being aware and not

24 unconsciously falling into the trap of relying on passages that have not

25 been proved. Is that enough? And the original is received on that basis

1 and with that caveat.

2 Your time starts 10 past midday.

3 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Vasic:

5 Q. Good afternoon to everyone. Mr. Pringle, good afternoon. I'm

6 Miroslav Vasic, and I represent Mr. Mrksic.

7 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry for interrupting. I just received a note.

8 We have not received any lists of exhibits to be used by my

9 learned friends in cross-examination. There may be an error, but if such,

10 I wonder if there is such a list we could have a copy of it, please. For

11 all three defendants.

12 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

13 I'm going to make up for what time Mr. Moore has taken up. Some

14 of the documents tendered here as exhibits, I'm going to use them. That

15 is not going to be a problem. My opinion is that this expert expressed

16 his opinion in response to questions by the Prosecutor, so in the same way

17 I'm going to conduct my cross-examination, at least as far as I'm

18 concerned.

19 Thank you.

20 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sure that Mr. Lukic and Mr. Borovic, if they're

21 going to rely upon documents, will ensure that Mr. Moore has a list over

22 the break. Thank you.

23 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Pringle, you said in your report that you approached your task

25 when the Prosecution asked you for assistance in the Vukovar case by

1 providing your assessment of the evolution of the military and

2 professional aspect of this case. Is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Thank you. Were you then provided with the complete documentation

5 in the possession of the Prosecution, and were you in the position to pick

6 from those documents those documents that you mentioned in Annex A,

7 attached to your report, or were you presented only with the documents

8 that you note in the annex?

9 A. I was presented with the documents noted in the annex.

10 Q. Thank you. I also have a question about the annex. In the annex

11 you list 60 witness names whose statements you received from my learned

12 friends from the Prosecution. What I would like to know is whether you

13 also received transcripts of the testimony of those witnesses who

14 testified in this case and who are on the list, and -- or you only

15 received the transcripts provided to you by my learned friend which he

16 believed to be relevant for your expert testimony?

17 A. I received the transcripts of the list of witnesses at the annex.

18 Q. Thank you. Did my friend from the Prosecution draw your attention

19 to the differences in the statements of certain witnesses and what they

20 testified before the Trial Chamber, or did you actually go through the

21 transcripts and find the differences yourself?

22 A. I went through the transcripts myself in the process of compiling

23 my report, and indeed the statements in my report and the conclusions

24 drawn were as a result of reading the documents annexed in my report.

25 Q. Thank you. And now I would like to ask you that now that you are

1 aware of the differences in the statements, in the transcript, and from

2 the witness statements, did you completely disregard those differences in

3 your findings, or are there still some parts in your findings other than

4 what was underlined by my learned friend that he did not seek to rely

5 upon?

6 A. I'm not sure I understand you where you say that you are aware of

7 the differences in the statements in the transcript, and from the witness

8 statements. The witness -- I read the transcripts of the witness

9 statements in the annex.

10 I'm sorry, Mr. Vasic, I'm not sure I understand your question.

11 [Defence counsel confer]

12 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I'm going to clarify my question; it wasn't entirely clear.

14 When I say "transcript," that is the transcript of the live

15 testimony of a witness in this courtroom before this Trial Chamber. So in

16 cases you found that the transcript of a certain witness was different in

17 comparison to the statement that he gave to the Prosecution investigators,

18 for example, did you then leave such a statement out of your findings?

19 That's my question. I think I've been a bit clearer now.

20 A. I think I can see where you're getting at. My report was written

21 based on the witness statements as they were in the annex when I received

22 them. I believe subsequent to that various witnesses did give testimony.

23 I was provided with some testimony. For example, I was provided with -- I

24 think it's Major Trifunovic, his testimony which I read. I'm not aware

25 which of these witnesses in totality have given evidence and which

1 haven't, but I have -- I have read some testimonies.

2 Q. Mr. Pringle, I would like to ask you to make the effort now and to

3 recall other than the transcript of Mr. Trifunovic, do you recall the

4 names of any other witnesses whose testimony transcript you've read while

5 drafting your report?

6 A. Yes. I have read -- remind me of the name of the commander of

7 80 MBTR? Vojnovic?

8 Q. Vojnovic.

9 A. Vojnovic, I have read that. I've read his testimony. Yeah, in

10 court.

11 I've read, I think, Vucic, number 72. I'm trying to recall the

12 difference between testimony and original witness statement. But I have

13 read some, yeah.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. I see that in Annex A there are 60 names

15 whose statements you received. As far as I was able to analyse, in

16 drafting your report you used about 20 per cent of these statements; the

17 rest you did not use.

18 Could you please tell us what criteria you used to decide to use

19 these 20 per cent and not to use the 80 per cent? Was that your own

20 criteria, or was it done in that way for some other reason?

21 A. No, it was my own criteria, and you will see in my report it's

22 broken up into a number of questions highlighted in bold print. And I was

23 looking for statements and evidence, if that's the right word, that would

24 help me answer those questions. And not all of it was relevant to those

25 questions.

1 Q. It's as if you guessed, actually, what I am interested in, whether

2 your research of the material was limited by the questions that were put

3 to you. You didn't go beyond the strict confines of these questions; is

4 that correct?

5 A. That's partly correct and partly incorrect. My research of the

6 material was not limited by the questions. My answering of the questions

7 was drawn from the material that I read, not all of which was relevant to

8 answering the specific question.

9 Q. I understand, thank you. According to you, all the relevant

10 materials that you read are included in your report, which you considered

11 to be relevant.

12 A. All the relevant materials were included in my research. I then

13 drew on that research to answer the questions in the report.

14 Q. Thank you. The relevant parts that you found while reviewing the

15 documents before drafting the report are all included in the report. None

16 of them were excluded or left out from the report. This is what I want to

17 know.

18 A. Well, I've drawn on what I have read and footnoted, where

19 appropriate, quoted in some cases, where appropriate. And anything that I

20 have footnoted or quoted has been drawn from the documentation which I was

21 provided with.

22 Q. Thank you. I assume that your view or your conclusion which is

23 based -- which is actually evident from your report, is a collection of

24 premises arising from a limited number of documents that you had access to

25 and witness statements shown to you by my learned friends from the

1 Prosecution. So I assume that you would, because of that, agree with me

2 that if you had perhaps had some other documents or other testimonies or

3 statements which would be opposite to the ones you had now, your view or

4 opinion would be subject to change, would it not?

5 A. Can I refer you to paragraph 3 of my introduction? And I'll read

6 it out for ease. And what I've said is: "I've been asked to consider a

7 number of specific questions which I have addressed below, and if deemed

8 appropriate on the materials supplied to me, to come to a conclusion based

9 on my own experience regarding the military participation and conduct of

10 the three defendants on the subject matter of this indictment."

11 So my report and my conclusions are based on the material I have

12 read. Hypothetically, if I had read something else, I might have come to

13 a different conclusion. You are correct.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. I would now like to clear up some

15 terminology issues which I think are not quite clear in your findings.

16 In the command and control section you cited, this is

17 paragraph 15, page 4, you say that there was a legal and constitutional

18 basis codified in the SFRY doctrine. My question is: What would the SFRY

19 doctrine be, what would it constitute, since that category actually did

20 not exist in our -- in the time that we are talking about, neither as a

21 concept or a document. This is on page 4 of the English version,

22 paragraph 15.

23 A. Are you saying, Mr. Vasic, that the 1982 Law on All People's

24 Defence did not exist in 1991?

25 Q. No, Mr. Pringle. I'm confused by the term or a concept you use

1 here, and that is the doctrine of the SFRY. I am not familiar with that

2 term or a document. So this is why I would like you to explain what SFRY

3 doctrine means.

4 A. Okay. Doctrine. Doctrine at its simplest is what is taught.

5 Doctrine is what is used to describe the base documents on which conduct

6 and procedures, for example, in the military, are carried out. So

7 doctrine in this respect is my terminology. I have described it as JNA

8 doctrine in exactly the same way as I would describe similar documents

9 from other armies as German doctrine, British doctrine, American doctrine,

10 et cetera.

11 Q. Does that mean that there was a kind of slip or a lapse here? So

12 it's not a doctrine of the JNA, but a doctrine of the SFRY. Now from your

13 answer I assume that what you meant was the doctrine of the Yugoslav

14 People's Army, actually, here, even though it doesn't say that.

15 A. Well, the documents I read were from a large number of sources. I

16 mean, if you take the -- for example, the Law on All People's Defence,

17 that is -- what would you call that, as SFRY doctrine. I would call

18 command and control doctrine that we've talked about into these various

19 pamphlets as JNA doctrine. The word "doctrine" meaning -- being a generic

20 description of what is laid down.

21 Q. Yes, Mr. Pringle, there is no problem in understanding the word

22 "doctrine," but in your findings you link the term "doctrine" with the

23 state, and this term was not familiar. Is this -- what I meant was,

24 actually, the doctrine of the JNA. Do you differentiate between the

25 doctrinal documents, and the normative framework of normative documents

1 when you talk about the system of All People's Defence?

2 A. I regard the documentation that I have read as completely relevant

3 to the conduct of operations by the JNA.

4 Q. Would you agree with me that in 1991 the JNA doctrine did not

5 exist. What did exist was the doctrine of All People's Defence and social

6 self-protection as a common doctrine of the country's defence system?

7 A. What I would agree is that in 1991 the state of the former

8 Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, and therefore the doctrine

9 applied by the JNA would have been drawn on or would have been in

10 compliance with whatever doctrine they had been previously complying with.

11 Q. And my last question before the break is: When you were drafting

12 your expert report, and when you discussed doctrine, did you acquaint

13 yourself with two doctrine documents, the doctrine of All People's Defence

14 and social self-protection, that is the strategy of All People's Defence

15 and social self-protection, and the strategy of armed conflict. Is that

16 something that you incorporated in your expert findings?

17 A. I don't believe I have seen either of those documents, unless you

18 can help me, Mr. Vasic. If they're referenced in any one of 100 and

19 something or other footnotes, please draw my attention to them. If

20 they're not there, then I probably haven't seen them.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. They are not there. These are doctrinal

22 documents, and I think that in your findings you dealt more with normative

23 documents.

24 Thank you for your answers. I think that it is time now for the

25 break.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Vasic.

2 As I indicated yesterday, it will be necessary for me to spend a

3 longer time than usual during this break. And we will resume at 2.15.

4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 2.15 p.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Moore.

7 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

8 Your Honour, I'm sorry to deal with a matter as I'm going to have

9 to, but there has always been a very clear understanding, rulings from the

10 Bench repeatedly, that we should have notice on documents that are to be

11 served. I mentioned this morning that we had received nothing from the

12 Defence again. As a direct consequence, we get documentation coming

13 through. It's for the Court to decide whether it's been done

14 deliberately. It means we can't speak to the witness about the documents

15 and, I'm sorry, it is not acceptable to just give it to us in, I'm afraid,

16 what can only be said flagrant disregard of what the Court has ordered.

17 It disadvantages the Prosecution, it disadvantages the witness, and as I

18 say, the Court's order was quite specific.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Do I take it that what you are saying is that you

20 have just received documents that are of factual relevance and of which

21 neither you nor the witness have any advance notice?

22 MR. MOORE: I certainly have no advance notice of them. They may

23 be exhibits; I don't know. They just -- they come in, we don't have a

24 chance to even see them. And what happens is quite simply -- my learned

25 friends can roll their eyes all they want. They know perfectly well that

1 this issue has been going on for weeks. Can we please have the document

2 in advance so at least the witness can see exactly what they may or may

3 not be. This is not being done. And I'm not in the position to say

4 exactly what the issues relate to. As far as we are aware, they may well

5 be exhibits. I think there may be a new document. But, as I say, we are

6 supposed to get notice whether in actual fact they're exhibits or not.

7 And it has not been done again. So may I just make my protest --

8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Moore.

9 MR. MOORE: -- and that is all.

10 JUDGE PARKER: We will see if there is any affect of that by the

11 time of your re-examination tomorrow. Even if you have to lose some

12 sleep.

13 Mr. Vasic.

14 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Mr. Pringle, let us continue. In your expertise when you spoke

16 about command and control, you talked about the basic principles of

17 command and control, but I think that you did not encompass the system as

18 a whole, its organisation and system of functioning. What I would like to

19 ask you is if you know whether the system of command and control continues

20 at three levels, the strategic, operational, and tactical levels?

21 A. Command and control would encompass all those levels, yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me that if I say that your

23 assessment of the work of the OG South command's work would be valid only

24 if all the war documents of the command were available to you, including

25 the operations diary, the brigade's book of reporting, which records all

1 the events during regular briefings, and only then you would know which

2 orders arrived from the superior commands and which were then transferred

3 into OG South commands to their subordinate units?

4 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that. I stated at the beginning that my

5 report was based on the documents I have seen and I have read, and my

6 assessment is based on that.

7 Q. Yes, Mr. Pringle, but we here had the occasion to hear the

8 operations officer, Mr. Trifunovic, who told us that there was an

9 operations and a reporting diary in the brigade, and that orders that

10 arrived were also recorded in them as well as orders that were passed on

11 further, as well as the reports received by OG South from its subordinate

12 units. Are you aware of that?

13 A. I am.

14 Q. Thank you. In your expertise you dealt also with the evacuation

15 of the Vukovar Hospital, and you also dealt with the Zagreb agreement,

16 which you described, I assume at the highest level. The materials that

17 you received from my learned friends from the Prosecution for you to

18 analyse, did you find a single assertion or a single document that the

19 OG South command knew about the contents of this agreement or that it had

20 an order from the 1st Military District, its superior command, to act in

21 accordance with this agreement?

22 A. You will find in the -- one of these files the Zagreb agreement.

23 That was an agreement pertaining to the evacuation of prisoners of war in

24 the OG South zone of operations. It is inconceivable to me that the

25 commander of OG South and his headquarters would not have been alerted to

1 that agreement and to the requirement to evacuate the personnel in

2 accordance with the Zagreb agreement, as indeed the evacuation was carried

3 out.

4 Q. Mr. Pringle, that is your conclusion, your opinion. All I asked

5 was if you had seen a single document or a single reference that would

6 refer to the command of the 1st Military District sending such an order to

7 the command of OG South regarding the Zagreb agreement. Would you agree

8 with me there are no such references in the material that you reviewed?

9 A. I believe that is correct. I don't think I have seen a

10 1st Military District order to OG South in the material I have. That does

11 not mean that that does or doesn't exist.

12 Q. All right. Thank you very much. Would you agree with me if I

13 were to say that in the formation of operations groups whose formation is

14 regulated by the rules of the corps it is established that an operations

15 group can be formed at the level or by the command of the 1st Military

16 District and that is actually a formation comprising one corps,

17 strengthened by several brigades, or a formation comprising two or three

18 corpses from the same military district, or that it's a formation which

19 can be formed from a number of corps by the General Staff and then that

20 would be an operations group of the General Staff. Would you agree with

21 me that that would be the definition? Other than it being an ad hoc

22 formation?

23 A. As far as my understanding goes, an operations group is a

24 formation that is brought together to carry out a specific task in a

25 specific area of responsibility for a specific time, made up of a number

1 of organisations from the level of brigade up. But I wouldn't be too

2 specific on that, because I think operations groups would take the form of

3 several different forms of organisation, depending on the task required.

4 Q. Thank you. Today you talked about the findings and the opinions

5 of your colleague, Mr. Zorc, and I think that this is how he defined the

6 operations group organisation, in the way that I have just presented to

7 you. Do you remember that? Do you recall that?

8 A. Yes, I do. And he talks about the corps level, but -- and when I

9 read that, I sort of put a question mark against that, because that

10 doctrine is really pertaining to, if you like, nation-on-nation

11 war-fighting, I think, and that is not the situation that was going on.

12 Here we had a state of conflict at a lower level, and therefore it was

13 quite conceivable to me that operations groups would be formed as ad hoc

14 groupings made up of a number of different formations at a lower level.

15 Q. Would you agree with me that a brigade is a formation at the

16 tactical level? Is that correct? At the tactical level of the command?

17 A. Here again, I think the terms tactical, operational and strategic

18 are potentially misleading in these sorts of operations. The operational

19 level is designed to coordinate and carry out tactical actions in a way

20 that achieves the strategic objective. Put simplistically, a brigade

21 would be carrying out tactical operations. But many of the operations

22 that a brigade will be carrying out in this form of conflict have

23 operational and strategic significance and implications. And therefore, a

24 strict definition of operational or tactical, operational and strategic, I

25 personally find unhelpful.

1 Q. Mr. Pringle, I just have to say in regard to your conclusion, and

2 it is your conclusion that this division arises from the system of the way

3 the command and control system functions, and it is inconceivable that a

4 brigade command can successfully command a unit comprising a number of

5 brigades because it simply does not have any functional capacities in

6 order to be able to successfully command at the operational level. It

7 does not have the sufficient number of officers, it doesn't have the

8 sufficient capacities. Would you agree with me on that?

9 A. Not necessarily. The Guards Motorised Brigade was an elite

10 formation with a strong organisation, a strong commander, well-trained

11 officers, and a well-functioning headquarters. That organisation would,

12 in my opinion, have been well able to take on other formations under

13 command in exactly the same way as, for example, in NATO doctrine, a

14 battle group could be -- could be -- could consist of much more than one

15 battalion, but it would be the battalion commander or the armoured

16 regiment commander that will be -- that would be in command of the

17 grouping. So, no, I do not agree with your assertion.

18 Q. Would you agree with my assertion that when forming ad hoc units

19 such as operations and tactical groups, there is a rule that if a command

20 of one unit becomes the command of such an ad hoc formation, it has to be

21 strengthened in order to have the required quality to be able to command

22 at the operational level?

23 A. That may be so, but that would be the decision of the superior

24 commander; in this case 1st Military District, General Panic. He, I take

25 it, did not consider that that was necessary. He obviously took the view

1 that the Guards Motorised Brigade was well capable of turning itself into

2 an operational group command at the same time.

3 Q. You are probably aware that before the command of the guards

4 brigade turned into the command of OG South, the then existing OG South

5 had a completely independent command headed by Commander Bajo Bojat?

6 A. I'm aware that the Guards Motorised Brigade took over the duties

7 of Operational Group South from a previous commander called Bajo Bojat

8 because I think in the war diary there is a reference to Bojat taking his

9 leave and staying farewell and wishing them good luck. What sort of

10 headquarters he had, I do not know.

11 Q. Very well. I am asking you all of this in view of the assignments

12 that OG South had after the combat operations ended in Vukovar, and I

13 assume that you know that during those two or three days more -- or

14 several thousand civilians wounded and the sick were evacuated from

15 Vukovar in several batches, and I assume that you know that the Croatian

16 side did not wish to receive these convoys of the Croatian people who were

17 going there, which, at least in my opinion, created considerable

18 difficulties for the command of OG South in the implementation of their

19 other assignments. Are you -- would you share my opinion?

20 A. I am aware of the generalities of events after -- was it the 18th?

21 When Vukovar was declared to have fallen. And I am aware that there were

22 a number of evacuations taking place, and I am generally aware of the sort

23 of situation that OG South would have found itself in.

24 Q. Do you think that turning back the convoy to the area of

25 responsibility of OG South, taking care of them and then sending them to

1 new destinations considered -- was considered to be quite a burden for

2 OG South when it was making its daily plan of assignments and keeping in

3 mind all the assignments that it was supposed to carry out.

4 A. No, I think that is well within the capability and capacity of

5 OG South. You must remember that there is a subtle difference between the

6 sort of operations that were being conducted now in Vukovar which were

7 predominantly static.

8 Had OG South been conducting serious manoeuvre operations over

9 large -- over large areas and covering many, many kilometres, the

10 commander of OG South would have had a very, very different problem. As

11 it was, in this operation, the commander of OG South was static, the

12 headquarters was static. There were not -- these were not manoeuvre

13 operations that he was conducting. These might have been complex

14 operations, and there may have been many different sorts of operations.

15 But that was well within the capacity, in my opinion, of Colonel Mrksic

16 and the Guards Motorised Brigade.

17 Q. Thank you. You are most probably aware that all that had to do

18 with the convoys that we talked about here, the procedure as far as the

19 civilian population was concerned, and the procedure as far as the

20 prisoners of war from Mitnica were concerned, proceeded in the best

21 possible way and that they arrived at their destination not through

22 Croatia because the Croats did not want to receive them, but through

23 Bosnia and Serbia.

24 A. Is that a question, Mr. Vasic?

25 Q. Yes. It's a -- it's a question whether you are aware that the

1 units engaged on these assignments completely implemented the assignment

2 the way they were supposed to and that assistance was provided to all of

3 those people in the necessary manner.

4 A. Yes, I am aware that other evacuation operations had been carried

5 out in the zone of responsibility of Operations Group South.

6 Q. Thank you. You talked about the commander of OG South and his

7 duty to take appropriate steps in relation to all the aspects of the

8 Geneva Conventions, to prevent any occurrences of indiscipline and to

9 inform the -- failure to act in accordance within the guide-lines from

10 General Zivota Panic.

11 I would first like to look at the order, if we can. This is

12 Exhibit 415. My colleague, Mr. Moore, dealt with that today, and you also

13 read parts of it today. If you can now look at the last page of that

14 order. Page 3, please.

15 A. Sorry, Mr. Vasic, are you going to put the English version up on

16 my screen, or are you wanting me to find it?

17 Q. Yes, of course. Perhaps we can look at the English version, since

18 the witness cannot read B/C/S.

19 A. Are you going to put it on the -- ah, thank you.

20 Q. Can we look at page 3? That would be paragraph 8. In the English

21 version I assume that that is on page 2. Yes, that would be paragraph 8.

22 Thank you.

23 Mr. Pringle, in paragraph 8 -- have you found it, do you see it?

24 A. I have it on the screen.

25 Q. The first sentence in paragraph 8 concerning the warnings or the

1 caution to prevent retribution, that part -- does not the first sentence

2 of that paragraph state: "Every unit must fully control the situation on

3 the territory of its area of responsibility for which the commanders at

4 all levels will be responsible."

5 And then after that the text that you read out for my learned

6 friend Mr. Moore follows.

7 Do you agree with -- that what I have just read out is what is

8 stated in the paragraph?

9 A. Yes, I believe you will find that I read out the whole of

10 paragraph 8. "Every unit must fully control the situation on the

11 territory of its area of responsibility. Commanders at all levels will be

12 responsible for their ..."

13 And then it goes on. That's what it says, I agree.

14 Q. Does that mean that the implementation of the assignment means

15 that each of the commanders in their area of responsibility were made

16 responsible for that, according to the instruction from the 1st Military

17 District?

18 A. Here we fall directly into the chain of command. Each commander

19 at each level is responsible for carrying out his duties as described, and

20 each superior commander is equally responsible for the sum of the

21 responsibilities carried out by his subordinates.

22 Q. Thank you. What I'm interested in now is the following: You

23 spoke about this order, and you talked about your conclusion about the

24 conduct of the commander of OG South. You told us that you read

25 Mr. Trifunovic's transcript of his testimony here before this Trial

1 Chamber. If I were to tell you that in his transcript on page 8237, and

2 this is a reference for my learned friends and for the Tribunal, line 1

3 to 12, if he said that Colonel Mrksic, as commander of OG South, based on

4 orders received from his superior command, drafted these orders into

5 appropriate orders to his subordinate units, would you then allow for the

6 possibility that an order of this kind was conveyed to the units

7 comprising OG South? Are you familiar with this particular piece of

8 testimony by Mr. Trifunovic?

9 A. Well, I think Mr. Trifunovic testified over something like four

10 days, and there were a lot of pages of testimony. But if that's what --

11 if that's what he said, fine.

12 Q. [No interpretation].

13 A. It doesn't -- I should qualify that by saying -- I mean, he's

14 saying that based on orders received from his superior command. He would

15 have received a lot of different orders from his superior command. He

16 drafted these orders into appropriate orders to his subordinate units. Is

17 that a particular statement or is that a general statement, I don't know.

18 Q. The reference was that he meant all important orders arriving from

19 the 1st Military District command, the -- and I did give the page and line

20 reference.

21 Now that we're talking about the material that you looked at, and

22 we mentioned this statement, could you please tell me, the Annex A of your

23 findings, I didn't see that any documents from the command of the

24 80th Motorised Brigade was given to you for your consideration. All I see

25 are orders from the 1st Military District and the command of OG South.

1 Did you perhaps receive such orders and you didn't include them or not?

2 A. At the time I drafted this report I don't believe I'd seen --

3 well, I'd seen -- well, witness -- I had witness statement from

4 Witness 70 -- I think we're talking about Milorad Vojnovic, aren't we?

5 So I'd seen a witness statement. Subsequent to that, after I believe he

6 testified here some days ago, I received his testimony, and I did read

7 that.

8 Q. What about orders of the command of the 80th Brigade, did you

9 receive a single order? I was asking about the orders issued by the

10 commander of the 80th Brigade in the critical time period. Those are the

11 documents that I'm talking about.

12 A. I don't believe so, unless they're referenced in my report.

13 Q. Mr. Pringle, the commander of Operations Group South, with his

14 strictly confidential order 349-1 dated the 9th of November, 1991, and

15 this is Exhibit 374, formed location or local commands in accordance with

16 orders of the corps command. Are you aware of this, Mr. Pringle?

17 A. Yes, I believe I've seen that order, and it's an order to assault

18 detachments 1 to 5, if my memory serves me correctly.

19 Q. It's an order that, amongst other things, relates to the assault

20 detachments or the local commands in areas of Vukovar, but also refers to

21 the local command in Negoslavci as well as those in the Ovcara, Jakubovac

22 and Grabovo sectors.

23 A. Thank you.

24 Q. Are you aware that sometime later, after the 17th of November,

25 1991, the order was augmented in the way that instead of Slobodan Misovic,

1 the commander of Ovcara, Jakubovac and Grabovo, Miodrag Vojnovic was

2 actually appointed instead of Slobodan Misovic?

3 A. I can't say whether I've seen that particular order or not. But

4 if you'd like to put it on the screen I could comment on it.

5 Q. No, this does not arise from the order, but the order is mentioned

6 in a command -- in a combat report of OG South sent to the command of the

7 1st Military District. All I was asking was whether you knew this. But I

8 think that this is not in dispute that the commander Miodrag Vojnovic was

9 also the commander of the Ovcara sector.

10 Actually, I'm interested in something else that we talked about.

11 Are you aware that the order appointing the local commanders also says

12 that the local commanders, in implementing their tasks, should stick to

13 the rules of the garrison and barracks service from the rules of service

14 of the armed forces, that they need to comply with these rules?

15 A. If you'd like to show me that document, I could comment on it.

16 Q. Very well, thank you. Can we please have Exhibit 374, the

17 English, please.

18 We'll have it on other monitors in a minute, I hope. Oh, there it

19 is. Thank you.

20 Mr. Pringle -- can we just zoom in a little so that Mr. Pringle

21 can read. This is the order appointing the local commands on the 9th of

22 November, 1991. You can see that now, sir, can't you?

23 A. Yes, I've got -- I hereby order, paragraph 1, and the top of

24 paragraph 2 on the screen.

25 Q. I'm asking you, because we shall have to go to page 2, item 5,

1 which is the relevant portion that I was asking you about, believing that

2 you were familiar with it. Item 5, please, page 2.

3 Mr. Pringle, can you see item 5?

4 A. I can.

5 Q. Does it not say: "Organise authorities in these areas in line

6 with the OS service regulations and the relevant regulations on service in

7 garrisons and barracks and undertake all measures in order to prevent

8 attacks by sabotage and terrorist groups and the execution of terrorist

9 actions."

10 A. It does.

11 Q. In continuation, thank you. "Compiling instructions for work and

12 securing normal conditions for the life and work of the population."

13 A. It does.

14 Q. And finally: "Prevent any ill-treatment to the population and

15 local inhabitants and unauthorised entry and searches or apartments and

16 houses."

17 A. It does say that about the population and local inhabitants, yes.

18 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pringle. What I want it know is -- I

19 will.

20 Do you know that pursuant to the rules governing service in the

21 barracks and garrisons a local commander has the duty to ensure

22 discipline, order and proper service in the area covered by his local

23 command. He's also duty-bound to inform all officers passing through his

24 area of responsibility about all these provisions. This is a provision

25 from the rules of service of the armed forces. Is this a provision that

1 you are familiar with, sir?

2 A. In general terms, I'm familiar with that. And what you say as an

3 instruction in rules appears quite reasonable.

4 Q. The local commander lays down the rules in terms of order and

5 discipline in any provisional detention units in his territory, in the

6 area covered by his command. Is this also something you are familiar

7 with, sir?

8 A. Well, if there were detention units, the local commander would be

9 responsible for it, as would his superior commander, and his superior

10 commander up to the top of the chain of command.

11 Q. Yes, by all means. The order we just read out sees the local

12 commander prohibiting in the strictest possible terms any mistreatment of

13 the local population. Are you familiar with another order along the same

14 lines passed on the 20th of November by the local command? The strictly

15 confidential number is 439-1, and the exhibit number is 419. In this

16 order they refer to strictly confidential 349-1, underlining again the

17 need to prevent any mistreatment of the local population. Are you

18 familiar with this, sir?

19 A. Could you put it on the screen, please.

20 Q. Certainly.

21 Can we please have Exhibit 419, the English, please.

22 There is one thing that I need to say about the transcript,

23 page 67, line 20. The order, the number of the order -- it's fine. It's

24 fine. My apologies.

25 Mr. Pringle, have we got that now?

1 A. Yes, I am familiar with that order, and I've referred to it in my

2 report at footnote 45.

3 Q. Thank you. Have you ever seen the operations log of the

4 80th Motorised Brigade?

5 A. I've seen various operations logs. I think the operations log

6 I've seen is OG South. I'm not sure about 80th Motorised Brigade, unless

7 I've referenced it in here. But again if you'd like me to comment on it,

8 please put it on the screen.

9 Q. Mr. Pringle, you would greatly surprise us if you claimed to have

10 seen the OG South operations log. The Defence certainly have not seen it.

11 Nor has Mr. Theunens, apparently. However, could we please have

12 Exhibit 375. I would like to show you a particular entry made to the log

13 of the operation -- of the guards brigade on the 19th of November at 1800

14 hours. My learned friends are familiar with this particular entry. My

15 apologies, this is the war log.

16 Mr. Pringle -- we need the entry marked as 19th of November, 1800

17 hours. This is page 10, it should be page 10 in the English.

18 Sir, you see what it says: "During the morning the imprisoned

19 Ustasha were taken to the Sremska Mitrovica prison. There is fighting in

20 the hospital area where the remains of the ZNG and MUP, about 200 of them,

21 are expected to surrender. There was an order to be at the ready in order

22 to organise the guarding of prisoners."

23 My question, sir: Were you familiar with this particular war log

24 entry of the 80th Brigade at the time when you wrote your report?

25 A. I've just referred to the annex to my report, and the war diary I

1 record in the annex is the Guards Motorised Brigade. So I'm not aware of

2 this at the time I wrote my report.

3 But could you just go back to paragraph 11 -- or what you have

4 just read out, because I'm not sure it's exactly the same as what

5 you've -- what appears on the transcript.

6 Yes, that. Thank you. "And so it was arranged to be prepared

7 about the organising security of the prisoners."

8 Q. No, Mr. Pringle. Let me spare you the effort. We have discussed

9 this before the Trial Chamber. During another witness's appearance, we

10 were looking at the B/C/S, and we were able to ascertain that the actual

11 word used there was, "It was ordered" or, "There was an order" instead of

12 the word "arranged." I think that might be what is confusing you. If the

13 word was, "There was an order," if that was the expression used, would

14 that not mean that the commander of the 80th Brigade was ordered to be at

15 the ready in order to organise the guarding of over 200 prisoners from the

16 ZNG and the MUP from the hospital? Would that not appear to be the

17 inference?

18 A. Whether the word is "arranged" or "ordered" this appears to be

19 what I would describe as a warning order to 80th Motorised Brigade to be

20 prepared for the organising security of the prisoners. In other words,

21 the inference there is start using your initiative to get ready for the

22 task, orders to follow.

23 Q. In your opinion, would this order be sufficient to influence any

24 further actions taken by the commander of the 80th Motorised Brigade?

25 A. I have already commented on the complexity of that operation, the

1 widely differing sorts of formation and units that will become involved,

2 and therefore as -- therefore, I consider the commander of the

3 80th Motorised Brigade would be awaiting detailed orders from the

4 commander of OG South as to who was to be involved, who was to be in

5 charge, how was it to be conducted, et cetera. This is not an order.

6 This is a warning order; this is be ready for.

7 Q. Indeed, Mr. Pringle, but I'm not sure if you have understood me

8 correctly. I meant as a directive, is this a sufficient directive for him

9 to go on, in a manner of speaking, for him to be ready for a -- an

10 assignment coming his way. Would this not determine his behaviour or his

11 actions in any future assignment?

12 A. This would alert him to the possibility that he is going to be

13 required to take part in some shape or form in an evacuation-of-prisoners

14 type operation. It is far short of the detail he requires to be able to

15 properly plan that, but it is sufficient for him to get his thinking cap

16 on and start anticipating in a sensible way using his own experience and

17 initiative and thinking about what might be involved, but this is not

18 sufficient to carry out the task. Doesn't even begin to approach that.

19 Q. What if I told you, Mr. Pringle, that Vojnovic, as the commander

20 of the 80th Brigade, had already carried out this particular task on

21 the 18th and the 19th at Ovcara, where his unit was guarding the captured

22 ZNG and MUP units from Mitnica? Is this something you are aware of?

23 Would that not shed new light on this directive that was sent to him on --

24 at 1800 hours on the 19th of November?

25 A. Yes, I am generally aware of that, and I'm generally aware that

1 that operation was conducted in good order. So he would be generally

2 aware of the sort of operation that he was being invited to think about,

3 but he wouldn't have any of the details; who, where, how, where to, are

4 international organisations involved, et cetera, et cetera.

5 Q. I assume you are aware of the fact that on the 20th of November

6 another entry was made at 1800 hours to the operations log of the

7 motorised brigade. This is Exhibit 371. The commander requested that

8 guard shifts be set up in order to secure the captured ZNG and MUP

9 members. For this purpose, people from the brigade and from the military

10 police company were assigned from the 80th Motorised Brigade?

11 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, I don't quite understand the question, if

12 indeed it is a question. And also, from what I remember, the context of

13 the evidence was that that entry was a consequence of what Vojnovic found

14 at Ovcara, not of what he had been informed of.

15 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this comment made by my

16 learned friend is utterly disrespectful. It is also leading the witness

17 on what he is expected to say. I don't think that is fair. My question

18 was crystal clear. I was asking the witness whether he was aware of this

19 particular entry. That was all.

20 THE WITNESS: My --

21 JUDGE PARKER: I'm sorry, Mr. Vasic, I'm not going to get into the

22 game of keeping ring between you two. But the way you put the question

23 did not fairly represent the evidence, and that clearly has led Mr. Moore

24 to making the comment that he did. What you intended to put may be

25 exactly as you have said, but what actually was said is not a fair

1 representation, and Mr. Moore has corrected it.

2 So we'll carry on now. I gather that the General has been trying

3 to answer you for a few moments. So perhaps he should proceed. But

4 understand, unless you are correct, you can't expect Mr. Moore to sit

5 quiet.

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Could you put Exhibit 371 on the screen, please.

8 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Of course, I was just about to. This is the entry, the date is

10 the 20th of November, and the time is 1800 hours.

11 A. Could I have it blown up a bit, please?

12 Q. I'm afraid we don't have the right entry here. 1600 hours.

13 There, Mr. Pringle, can you see that now?

14 A. I see an entry, 1600 hours: "The brigade commander requests that

15 shifts of officers be assigned for guarding the captured ZNG and MUP

16 members and brigade command officers were engaged for this."

17 Q. Based on this entry in the war log of the 80th Brigade, do you

18 believe that their assignment was to guard the captured ZNG and MUP

19 members on the 20th of November at 1600 hours at Ovcara?

20 A. Well, it says nothing about Ovcara. I think it is an entry for,

21 you said, the 20th of November at 1600 hours. My instant reaction to that

22 would be that this is a bit late for an operation that started that

23 morning.

24 Q. Mr. Pringle, I'm asking you a simple question. If you look at the

25 entry, what do you think? Do you not believe that their assignment was to

1 guard the ZNG prisoners? Yes or no.

2 A. Yes. It says: "Assigned for guarding the captured ZNG and MUP

3 members." It doesn't say where.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. But can you please look at the next

5 entry, 2235. What about that entry? Does it not seem to indicate that

6 the location is Ovcara?

7 A. This says: "The security for the camp for captured ZNG members

8 was withdrawn from the Ovcara sector and this duty was taken over by

9 Vukovar territorials. The" -- not quite sure whether -- is that military

10 police? "... and duty organs from the brigade command returned to the KM

11 in Negoslavci village." That's what it says.

12 Q. Can we now agree that this should lead one to conclude that the

13 place where all of this is happening is Ovcara, of all places?

14 A. Well, the entry for 2235 hours does mention the word "Ovcara," I

15 agree with that.

16 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pringle. Speaking of this entry, the

17 2235 entry, in your opinion, sir, the officer in charge of securing these

18 prisoners, did this officer act in keeping with the rules of service, if

19 sometime at night he withdrew his unit regardless of the fact whether he

20 had previously received an order or not? But bearing in mind the fact

21 that he knew of aggressive behaviour by certain TO members against the

22 prisoners being held at Ovcara? Would this have been in keeping with the

23 rules of service, the actions taken by this officer? What do you think?

24 A. Well, I have to answer that question in the context of my wider

25 reading. And if I remember rightly, the commander of 80 Motorised

1 Brigade, when he found that brigade staff officers and convoys of buses

2 and prisoners were arriving at Ovcara without his knowledge or previous

3 involvement, went to the Operations Group South command post for the

4 evening orders group at which, if I remember rightly, he arrived late

5 because he had been trying to prevent -- I'm recalling his testimony. He

6 had been trying to prevent what was happening at Ovcara and appeared at

7 OG South where he says to the commander -- or he informs the commander of

8 what is going on at Ovcara. And according to his testimony, he is waved

9 away and dismissed by the commander, which he took to be -- in fact, I

10 think he was asked what are you doing there, according to his testimony -

11 and I'm trying to recall all this - and he took it that the commander's

12 answer and attitude was such that he had no place to be there.

13 And I have to say, in reading that testimony, if you accept that

14 testimony as given, any reasonable commander being alerted to that sort of

15 muddle in command and control that was going on at Ovcara would have taken

16 positive action one way or the other to clear it up, and that doesn't seem

17 to have happened.

18 Q. Mr. Pringle, are you saying this based on Mr. Vojnovic's

19 statement, based on his statement that -- based on his inference that he

20 was not supposed to be there, not that he had received any orders or

21 anything, based on his inference that he was entitled to withdraw his

22 unit, having previously witnessed aggressive behaviour displayed by the

23 local TO members against the prisoners there? Is that what you're saying,

24 sir?

25 A. I'm saying that I'm recalling, as best I can, Mr. Vojnovic's

1 testimony in which he drew his superior commander's attention to what was

2 going on at Ovcara and the fact that he found himself in the middle of a

3 command and control muddle. And he -- he testifies to the fact that he

4 got the clear impression that the commander dismissed his concerns; indeed

5 queried what was doing there.

6 What was actually happening was that although Ovcara, I think, was

7 in 80 Motorised Brigade's zone of responsibility, the principle of unity

8 of command had been transgressed in that there was a completely separate

9 operation going on in his area of operations in which he had not been

10 involved and in which he had taken no part in the planning.

11 So he was absolutely right to seek guidance from his commander and

12 having received, in his view -- having received, in his view, from the

13 commander either a dismissal or a why are you involved, took that to mean

14 that he should not be there. And I assume - and it is only an

15 assumption - that that resulted in him withdrawing his troops from Ovcara

16 farm.

17 Q. Mr. Pringle, you have recounted for us the evidence of

18 Mr. Vojnovic. You are a high-ranking officer of the British army. Based

19 on your familiarity with the rules of service, an officer, a brigade

20 commander, the local commander of Jakubovac, Ovcara and Grabovo whose zone

21 of responsibility this happens to be, based just on his own assumption, is

22 he entitled to withdraw his own troops from their assignment of guarding

23 prisoners in the face of the fact that he had previously witnessed an

24 attack by the local TO on these prisoners inside the hangar that night?

25 There had been no orders to this effect, he had received nothing at all.

1 Even if he had received an order along these lines, would he not have had

2 to refuse this order to withdraw his troops? Would that have been in

3 keeping with the rules of service? Would not the same thing apply in the

4 British army, sir?

5 A. My impression is that very little that is happening here is in

6 accordance with the rules of service. What is happening at Ovcara farm is

7 certainly not in accordance with the rules of service. The fact in a

8 commander 80 Motorised Brigade went to his commander to seek guidance and

9 clarification and plainly did not receive it in the way he should have

10 done is a very surprising omission from a commander of Colonel Mrksic's

11 standing and reputation about which one can only surmise, and what you end

12 up with is a complete command and control muddle.

13 So whilst you say, you know, in principle, is this in accordance

14 with regulations, that and everything else that is happening is not in

15 accordance with regulations.

16 The commander of 80 Motorised Brigade, just to finish off, I think

17 must have found himself in a very, very difficult position. And it was

18 his superior commander's responsibility to sort that out.

19 Q. Mr. Pringle, my question was very simple. It was about the rules

20 of service. I reminded you that Lieutenant-Colonel Vojnovic was the local

21 commander at Ovcara, and we know about his duties as local commander.

22 Would it not be in accordance with the rules of service, would an officer

23 not be duty-bound, an officer unhappy with an order received from his

24 superior, even if there had been an order, an order that might lead to a

25 criminal offence, or even a war crime? Would that officer not have to

1 refuse to carry out this order and go back to his superior officer,

2 ultimately in this case the commander of the 1st Military District? Would

3 that not have been mandated by the rules, or do you see the entire

4 situation in a different light?

5 A. No, the situation I see is one of complete confusion. It's very

6 easy to quote rules. It's extremely difficult in situations like this

7 where an officer finds himself in a state of command and control confusion

8 apparently deliberately unsupported by his superior commander, for him to

9 take the necessary actions. In theory, I suppose Colonel Vojnovic could

10 have mustered the whole of his brigade, gone to Ovcara farm, marched out

11 the TO and volunteers at the point of a gun, and declared operation over.

12 In theory. But it obviously wasn't that easy.

13 Q. Mr. Pringle, I'm not sure if this is something you've heard from

14 my learned friends. Lieutenant-Colonel Vojnovic was the local commander

15 at Ovcara, and between the 15th and the 20th the commander of OG South had

16 resubordinated to him a tactical group of the 125 Brigade, a detachment of

17 the Stara Pazova TO, an armoured battalion belonging to the 544 Motorised

18 Brigade, and this tactical group -- and all of this to set up a security

19 regime in Jakubovac, Ovcara and Grabovo. This unit comprised more than a

20 thousand men. How can you then say that he did not have the right

21 conditions in place to carry out this order issued to him by his own

22 command on the 19th of November at 1800 hours, to go there to take those

23 POWs and to simply guard them? As far as I can see, there is no confusion

24 at all here within the command and control system.

25 A. Well, then, your understanding, Mr. Vasic of command and control

1 is completely different than mine.

2 What a commander 80 Motorised Brigade finds himself in the middle

3 of is the fact that he's been overtaken by events. Had he been given a

4 clear order to conduct the evacuation operation and guard all the

5 prisoners at Ovcara and be responsible for the forces used, he might have

6 been able to decide on his own initiative that the presence of, for

7 example, TO and volunteers was absolutely not in keeping with that sort of

8 operation. But that's not what happened. He was presented with an

9 operation in the course of execution which he then brought to the

10 attention of his commander, and his commander apparently did nothing to

11 sort that out.

12 Now, you can say simplistically, yes, he could then muster his

13 1.000 men and attack his own side, but if his commander had done nothing

14 to sort it out, that leaves him in a somewhat difficult position.

15 You are trying to shift the responsibility to the commander of

16 80 Motorised Brigade who has taken the correct action so far and off the

17 commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade and OG South who has taken none

18 of the necessary actions required, in my opinion.

19 Q. I have two questions for you, Mr. Pringle. What you're telling us

20 now, what do you base that on? Where is your opinion founded, in what?

21 Is this all you have to say?

22 A. My opinion, as I have stated, is based on the documentation I have

23 read. Now, I am fully aware that there has been -- that this Court has

24 been sitting for many, many months and I have not seen all the

25 documentation, but based on the documentation I have read, that is my

1 opinion. And it will be for the Court to decide whether my opinion has

2 any veracity or not, Your Honour.

3 Q. By all means, Mr. Pringle. I will ask you one thing though.

4 Which are the relevant documents that you went through that led you to

5 this inference, with the exception of Mr. Vojnovic's evidence, of course?

6 A. Well, I think the key documents are Mr. Vojnovic's evidence, and I

7 think is it -- is it Vasiljevic; is that his name? His testimony -- it's

8 not in my annex because it came in later, but I think his testimony is

9 relevant as well. And the documents I've referenced in my report.

10 Q. Yes, you didn't have a single document from the 80th Brigade, as

11 far as I can tell, based on your report.

12 One thing I'd like to ask you, since you've studied Mr. Vojnovic's

13 statement, since you've based your opinion on that, are you familiar with

14 the fact that Vojnovic claims that after this event at Ovcara on the 21st,

15 once he had found out about these events, he informed no one from his

16 superior command. All he did was held a meeting with his subordinate

17 officer to keep this sort of thing from happening again. That is all he

18 did?

19 A. Well, he had already informed his superior command on, I believe,

20 the 20th.

21 Q. About what, Mr. Pringle?

22 A. About the events going on at Ovcara farm.

23 Q. Which events, Mr. Pringle?

24 A. The events that he describes in his testimony.

25 Q. Please be so kind, your report is based on that testimony. Can

1 you please describe those events for us?

2 A. No, my report was written before I saw his testimony. I only saw

3 his testimony last week or over the last two weeks.

4 Okay, I will recall, I will dredge my memory again. As I recall

5 it, he -- he recalls buses of prisoners arriving at Ovcara farm, he

6 recalls them being made to run the gauntlet, he recalls them being abused,

7 he recalls, if I remember rightly, Major Sljivancanin's presence, he

8 records the presence of TO and volunteers. He describes the placing of a

9 rope in the farm buildings to keep the TO and volunteers who were being

10 extremely threatening to the prisoners apart from the prisoners. He

11 records the presence of brigade staff.

12 Do you want me to go on? He's describing the events at Ovcara

13 farm, which were all most irregular, and which he then, according to his

14 testimony, brought to the attention of his commander.

15 Q. As you have just told us, he informed his commander about what he

16 considered to be relevant. I asked you about that bit of information

17 which indicated that people had been killed at Ovcara on the 21st. He did

18 not inform anyone else, those are his own words, with the exception of his

19 directly subordinate officer. Are you familiar with that particular

20 portion of his evidence?

21 A. I can't -- I can't comment on that.

22 Q. Just another question before -- I'm not sure if it's time for our

23 break.

24 Sir, do you believe that Lieutenant-Colonel Vojnovic, as a -- as

25 the local commander of Ovcara, would have been duty-bound to inform any

1 officer or any institution in his territory about the rules that he had

2 laid down in relation to his own area? Would he not have been duty-bound

3 in keeping with the order from OG South to make sure that those -- that

4 there was no mistreatment of the local population in the area under his

5 command?

6 A. I agree that commander 80 Motorised Brigade, in carrying out his

7 duties as the -- the local commander would be impressing those -- or

8 should be impressing those sorts of responsibilities under -- to those

9 under his command. What surprises me is that this operation at Ovcara

10 farm was conducted in his area of operations without his knowledge until

11 he came across it and all the events that happened thereafter. So we're

12 addressing two slightly different things here.

13 Q. Mr. Pringle, are you --

14 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, to interrupt for one moment.

15 It's the previous question. Is my learned friend, in relation to

16 the composition of the question, at 89:22, is he referring to the order

17 that came in from Zivota Panic where there is a clear indication that the

18 matter should be passed on to subordinate units? Because as far as I'm

19 aware, there is no evidence, as such, apart from speculation, that

20 subsequent -- or subordinate officers were ever informed of that document.

21 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] There is testimony to show that, as

22 far as I know. I'll try to find the right references. However, this was

23 certainly --

24 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ... wish to break

25 now and allow you time to do that? And we will have a 20-minute break and

1 you then have 20 further minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 3.33 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 3.56 p.m.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Vasic.

5 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 First thing I would like to deal with it what I think I still owe

7 Mr. Moore. The reference in the transcript is 0 -- 9044, lines 16

8 through 23. Thank you very much.

9 Q. Mr. Pringle --

10 Can we please have Exhibit 425 put on our screens. This is a

11 regular combat report, OG South command, the 22nd of November,

12 1991.

13 Mr. Pringle, I'm not sure if you're familiar with this, but maybe

14 we're all better off having it on our screens. There is an English

15 translation. Thank you very much.

16 Mr. Pringle, this is a regular combat report dated the 22nd of

17 November. Can we please scroll down to the very end of this report?

18 We'll need to turn the page, please. The last two paragraphs, if we can

19 please blow that up.

20 Mr. Pringle, does it not read: "During the day all measures have

21 been taken related to the 80th Motorised Brigade taking over the

22 organisational and commanding functions in the area of responsibility of

23 Operations Group South."

24 The next passage: "Command of the 80th Motorised Brigade received

25 instructions and documents regarding the organisation of command and

1 control in the area of responsibility of Operations Group South."

2 A. Yes, Mr. Vasic, that's what it says. On an order dated the 22nd

3 of November.

4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pringle. Based on your experience as a

5 high-ranking military officer, will you agree with me if I say that the

6 conveying of documents and instructions for the organising command and

7 control is the last act in a hand-over between two units?

8 A. This is a -- sorry. I think this is not an order, it's a report,

9 isn't it. It is a report stating that all measures have been undertaken

10 effectively to prepare for 80 Motorised Brigade's takeover, and the final

11 paragraph where it says: "Command of 80 Motorised Brigade received the

12 instructions and documents regarding the organisation of command and

13 control in the area of responsibility of Operations Group South" would

14 indicate to me that we are in the final throes of a hand-over from the

15 guards -- well, from the current Operations Group South, i.e., Guards

16 Motorised Brigade, to 80 Motorised Brigade.

17 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. When you were preparing your

18 report, did my learned friend show you any combat reports from the

19 1st Military District such as those sent to the operations centre of the

20 General Staff on the 20th and 21st of November, 1991. This was in

21 reference to what was going on in the area, including the evacuation?

22 Have you ever seen any of these? The numbers are, if that helps,

23 1614-177, the date is the 20th of November, and the other is 1614-178.

24 The 21st of December is the date the document bears.

25 A. I'm quickly scanning the annex of my report where the documents I

1 received are tabulated. I'm not sure whether they're there or not, to be

2 honest with you. But you'll know.

3 Q. I was just asking whether you were shown these. But my principal

4 question is: Did you ever see anything to indicate that the command of

5 the 1st Military District set up a special team comprising command

6 officers to monitor the evacuation of Vukovar Hospital, the separation of

7 the ZNG and MUP members who were hiding, passing themselves off as

8 patients in the hospital, and sending them to previously determined

9 locations, as well as the general situation. They were supposed to inform

10 the command of the 1st Military District about all these, weren't they?

11 A. That sounds familiar. In the mass of reading I did, I seem to

12 recall something along those lines, yes.

13 Q. Do you perhaps remember whether this team, in their role as

14 monitors, ever established that on the 20th and the 21st the prisoners who

15 were subjected to vetting and triage were sent to certain places and that,

16 in fact, the Geneva Conventions were being complied with, at least as far

17 as they concerned the treatment of POWs? Is this something that you're

18 familiar with, sir?

19 A. No, that's not what I recall. I recall reading quite a lot of

20 witness statements and et cetera to the effect that the prisoners of war

21 being cleared from the hospital were absolutely not being treated in the

22 way that would have been required by the Geneva Conventions.

23 Q. Yes, you base that on the witness statements you read, I suppose.

24 But you don't remember a report like this from the 1st Military District

25 team, just to be clear about this? That's why I'm asking.

1 A. I do recall, and again this is from memory, a report going upwards

2 to 1st Military District from OG South, I think dated the 20th of

3 November, to the effect that the prisoners of war had been evacuated in

4 strict compliance with the Geneva Conventions, which, as we all know, is

5 not what happened.

6 Q. Mr. Pringle, I asked you one thing; you answered a different

7 thing. I'm asking you about this team set up by the command of the

8 1st Military District to monitor the situation during the evacuation.

9 Do you know whether they stated unequivocally that the Geneva

10 Conventions had been complied with? If yes, please say so. If no, that's

11 no problem at all.

12 A. I don't recall that, no.

13 Q. While you were preparing your report, did you ever come across a

14 conclusion by the command of the 1st Military District dated the 21st of

15 November mentioning the fact that certain groups took steps of their own

16 accord, steps that were not in keeping with decisions made by their local

17 commands, and that it was therefore decided that the commands should take

18 appropriate measures to protect the local population from random acts

19 committed by certain groups within their zone of responsibility? Did you

20 ever perhaps come across a reference like this in that conclusion dated

21 the 21st of November in relation to what happened at Ovcara?

22 A. I don't recall that, but if you would like to put it on the screen

23 I could comment on it.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pringle. I was just asking whether you ever came

25 across anything like that, a document like that. Thank you.

1 Do you know that on the 19th of November, 1991 a group of officers

2 arrived in Negoslavci, officers from the security administration whose

3 assignment was to select prisoners on the 18th -- on the 19th and 20th of

4 November in Vukovar? Is something that you heard about?

5 A. Yes, I have a general recollection that a group of security organ

6 officers were arriving in the area, I assume, to carry out security

7 organ-type functions, which would include screening of prisoners of war.

8 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pringle. Do you know that there was

9 another team from the security section of the 1st Military District that

10 arrived in the area with that same assignment, and they went about their

11 work likewise on the 19th and 20th of November, 1991?

12 A. Yes, I don't recall that, but it wouldn't surprise me because what

13 was happening in Vukovar was a mass of prisoners of war, combatants, local

14 forces, that had been engaged in operations, and therefore there would

15 have been a heavy task to sort out combatants from civilians, et cetera.

16 So it doesn't surprise me that these security organs are descending on the

17 sector.

18 Q. Do you know that at this time, the 18th and 19th, the 20th,

19 the 21st, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, chief of the security

20 administration, happened to be in the Vukovar area, came there several

21 times, in fact?

22 A. I wasn't aware of that.

23 Q. Mr. Pringle, do you know that the Chief of Staff of the

24 1st Military District, General Vlado Stojanovic, issued an order that no

25 POW exchanges were to be conducted without his prior consent?

1 A. I don't recall seeing that.

2 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me if you know that the negotiations on

3 the surrender of the Mitnica group and the negotiations on the evacuation

4 of the hospital were conducted by Colonel Pavkovic, deputy Chef de Cabinet

5 of the Federal Secretary for National Defence at that time?

6 A. I don't recall that in detail, but are you talking here about the

7 higher-level negotiations that were either the outcome or resulted in the

8 Zagreb agreement?

9 Q. No, Mr. Pringle. Those negotiations were conducted by General

10 Raseta. I'm talking about the negotiations conducted in Vukovar on

11 the 18th and 19th of November, 1991, and the 20th.

12 A. I'm not familiar with the detail of those negotiations.

13 Q. Thank you. Do you know, Mr. Pringle, that after the European

14 monitors' team and the representatives of the Red Cross, after they came

15 to the Vukovar Hospital and entered the Vukovar Hospital, were informed

16 that a group of persons was taken away and that they had -- they did

17 nothing to find out where those people were taken to and what happened to

18 them?

19 A. I'm aware that the Zagreb agreement laid down the involvement of,

20 amongst others, the International Red Cross, ECMM monitors, Medecins sans

21 Frontieres, and perhaps others. I am also aware that they were held and

22 delayed at a bridge approaching Vukovar, and I am aware that when they

23 arrived at the hospital a certain element of the evacuation had already

24 taken place. I'm aware of that.

25 Q. And you don't know about what I asked you about? Is that correct?

1 A. If you're asking me, did I know that they did nothing to find out

2 where those people were taken to and what happened to them, I don't know

3 that, no.

4 Q. I asked you whether they were told of the fact that people were

5 taken away that same day. This is what I asked you.

6 A. Did I know that they were informed that a group of persons was

7 taken away. I'm not sure, but I think I recall that they were told that,

8 and it probably would have been obvious to them, because they arrived in

9 the middle, if I recall correctly, the evacuation operation. But I don't

10 suppose they knew who had been taken away or how many or where to, because

11 they, during, if I recall correctly, that time, were being delayed at the

12 bridge trying to get into Vukovar.

13 Q. Mr. Pringle, although the term "command climate" that you speak

14 about in your report did not exist as a term in the doctrine and

15 regulations of the JNA in the way you presented, other than in the

16 segments that you quoted, I must ask you whether you really believe that

17 what happened at Ovcara was as a consequence of the command climate

18 prevalent at the OG South command post, and in circumstances when we heard

19 here that in Vukovar on site there were representatives of the strategic

20 levels of command and control from the Ministry of Defence and the 1st

21 Military District, with the task of coordinating and monitoring the

22 situation and even participating in the negotiations, as we heard. Does

23 this fact change your conclusions to a certain extent in relation to the

24 command climate and do not all levels of command, from the strategic

25 through the operational to the tactical level have an influence on the

1 command climate, and not just an individual?

2 A. Yes, I addressed the subject of command climate in my report at

3 some length between pages 13 and 18. And I acknowledge that the term

4 command climate is not used in JNA doctrine, but what I'm talking about as

5 command climate is readily recognised by JNA doctrine, and I reference a

6 number of quotations to illustrate that.

7 The command climate set by a commander at any level reflects his

8 every act, his every action, his every utterance, his conduct, his

9 behaviour, his views, his interpersonal relationships, the whole style of

10 his command reflects the command climate. What you're, I think, trying to

11 ask me, does the fact -- "I must ask you that whether you really believe

12 that what happened at Ovcara was as a consequence of the command climate

13 prevalent at the OG South command post." I can't comment on the command

14 climate prevalent at the OG command -- OG South command post, because I

15 was never there and I never saw it in action. But the way Colonel Mrksic

16 commanded his forces, and the way he conducted himself, and the way he

17 dealt with information flowing up and down the chain of command, in

18 particular up the chain of command, and here I refer again to the report

19 by Colonel -- his name's gone. 80 Motorised Brigade, concerning the

20 events at Ovcara, the way he dealt with that sort of report does reflect

21 the command climate that he is exuding about him.

22 If you're asking me specifically, is what happened at Ovcara a

23 direct result of the command climate, I can't answer that question. It's

24 certainly a direct result of the actions taken or not taken by the chain

25 of command.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Vasic. You are now five minutes

2 over.

3 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but the

4 witness did not answer the question that I put to him. I asked him about

5 the present strategic -- actually, members of the strategic command and

6 what an effect that would have in the view of the witness, on the command

7 climate in Vukovar in the time of the events at Ovcara, and he told us

8 about everything else other than answering exactly what I asked him.

9 JUDGE PARKER: General, did you hear that?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Could you give an answer?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes. In that respect command climate is a permanent

13 result of the way a commander acts. It is the tone and style he sets, it

14 is what those subordinate to him believe is acceptable and non-acceptable

15 to the commander, and in that respect the arrival of exterior organs into

16 his area is not going to change the command climate he's already set, one

17 way or the other.

18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

19 Thank you, Mr. Vasic.

20 Mr. Borovic.

21 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

22 Cross-examination by Mr. Borovic:

23 Q. I'm Borivoje Borovic, and I represent Miroslav Radic. General,

24 sir, were you present when the military expert, Mr. Theunens, testified in

25 this case? Were you present from the courtroom?

1 A. Yes, I was. I was sitting at the back over there, Your Honour.

2 Q. Thank you. Before you drafted your report you had a list of

3 witnesses from the Prosecution. My question is, since you said today that

4 you read transcripts of three witnesses who testified here before the

5 Trial Chamber, you also mentioned the names of the witnesses. Did you

6 read any other transcripts, and would you be able to remember any names or

7 you did not read any other transcripts other than those three?

8 A. I received at least two boxes of papers, and I concentrated on the

9 three that I mentioned. There were others that I didn't have time to get

10 through.

11 Q. Thank you. Does that mean, General, that you did not read what

12 witnesses P-002, P-022 stated in this trial? I'm thinking of the

13 transcript and not of the statements provided to you by the Prosecutor. I

14 am also thinking of the transcript of the testimony of Witness Vezmarovic,

15 the testimony of Witness P-014. Does that mean that you did not read

16 those transcripts of their testimony in this case, in this trial before

17 you completed your report? I don't want to confuse you. The statements

18 provided to you by the Prosecution and cited in your footnotes, yes, it's

19 obvious that you read that. But I'm now talking about their testimony

20 before this Trial Chamber. So could you please tell us that -- if you

21 read that or not?

22 A. I find these questions very difficult, because I have read so

23 much, and what I have been reading was really to see whether there was

24 anything in the statements I was reading that led me to amend or change

25 the opinions that I put in my report. I have to say that I didn't come

1 across anything that led me to change my opinions in my report, but

2 whether I read P-002, P-014 or a whole host of others, I'm sorry, I cannot

3 recall unless I actually saw them and it would trigger my memory. That

4 may not be very helpful, but it's true.

5 Q. I think that you were quite clear when you said that you didn't

6 have time, that you read the transcript of the testimonies of all -- only

7 those three witnesses that you considered as relevant.

8 A. Well, I certainly read those three, and I dabbled in others, but

9 what I was not necessarily taking into account who it was, but rather more

10 what they were saying to see whether it should amend my view that I put in

11 my statement.

12 Q. Thank you. Did you read the transcript of the testimony of the

13 witness who was the commander of the military police company of the 80th

14 Kragujevac Brigade?

15 A. Can you give me his name?

16 Q. Vezmarovic.

17 A. I don't recall that.

18 Q. Thank you. And just to finish with this question, did you read

19 any kind of statement at any stage of drafting of your report by Witness

20 Radoje Paunovic, the commander of the military police battalion?

21 A. I'm just looking to see whether his name appears in the list of

22 witness statements that I have got, and I don't think it does, unless he

23 is hiding under a P number. Does he have a P number?

24 Q. General, he is on that list; there is no number that is used in

25 relation to him. Do you recall this name, the first and last name, and

1 did you come across that name? Did you also read the statement by

2 Dr. Njavro?

3 A. I'm sorry, I do not have a Radoje Paunovic in the list of witness

4 statements that I was given.

5 Q. Very well. Very well. Do you recall reading that statement?

6 A. As I say, it's not in the list of witness statements I was given,

7 and therefore I will not have read it.

8 Q. Very well. Thank you. And I still need to hear the answer in

9 relation to Dr. Juraj Njavro, did you read his statement. He was employed

10 at the Vukovar Hospital.

11 A. Oh, yes. He is Witness 43 in the list of witness statements.

12 Whether I have footnoted him or not, I'm not sure, but I will have read --

13 I would have read his witness statement.

14 Q. Thank you. And you would remember what he said if I were to ask

15 you?

16 A. That's a dangerous assumption, but you can try me.

17 Q. Thank you. Well, I'm going to do that now, even though I wasn't

18 planning to do that. This is a good challenge.

19 Do you know if he mentioned Captain Radic and, if he did, in what

20 context, because you say that you recollect the challenge -- actually, the

21 statement. If it's not a problem.

22 A. Well, I do remember that Captain Radic was mentioned in a number

23 of statements as being present at the hospital. I have got --

24 Q. General, I'm talking about Njavro. Just Njavro. And then we will

25 move on.

1 A. Well, I don't know whether it was in Njavro's statement or not, to

2 be honest with you. But it was certainly in Witness P-030's statement,

3 whoever P-030 is.

4 Q. So even though I did try, you did not recall what he said about

5 Captain Radic; is that correct?

6 A. Let me just refer to what I've said about Captain Radic.

7 Q. Well, I don't want to confuse you, but it's true that you do not

8 mention him anywhere in his footnote -- in your footnote, so I wouldn't

9 have put this question to you had you not said, You can try me. You do

10 not quote Dr. Njavro anywhere in your footnote, so I just wanted to be

11 fair. I mean, if you remember anything that, all right; if not, then we

12 will move on.

13 A. I think you've answered your own question then.

14 Q. Go ahead, continue.

15 A. I have nothing further to say.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to ask

18 the interpreters to use a method that we used earlier, when we talked

19 about -- or when we used any military terms that relate in particular to

20 my client, meaning that -- because we have a problem with the English

21 language in relation to military terminology. Specifically I would like

22 to ask the interpreters when I ask a question about komandir, to use the

23 word komandir; when I'm talking about komandant, then I would like them

24 to use the term komandant.

25 Q. General, sir, could you please also follow the text on the screen.

1 And this is why I actually mention this. Do you know the difference

2 between a komandant and a komandir?

3 A. I'm not really familiar with that, although I do recall it was

4 being talked about -- you were asking the military expert, Mr. Theunens,

5 the same question. I think they're different levels, but I'm -- the

6 proper answer is -- is no. Just remind me.

7 Q. Thank you, General. Officer commanding a company, would he be

8 called a komandir, and would an officer commanding a battalion or a

9 higher-level unit be called komandant on the basis of the regulations that

10 you studied?

11 A. I believe that's the case, but if you wanted an absolutely certain

12 answer, I would wish to go back to the regulation, for you to refer me to

13 the proper text, and for me to say yes, there is it is in writing. But I

14 believe that's what you were discussing with Mr. Theunens the day before

15 yesterday.

16 Q. Very well. Thank you. This time I want to be absolutely proper

17 in my conduct in relation to my learned friends from the Prosecution, and

18 we disclosed documents last Friday, rules of service of company and

19 platoon, and since obviously they did not have time to study that, today I

20 am not going to discuss those documents. I am going to tender them

21 through my own expert when the time comes, if the Trial Chamber permits.

22 So I'm going to skip some of my questions precisely because I think that I

23 questioned Mr. Theunens about that in detail, and before that Colonel

24 Trifunovic gave precise, definite answers in interpreting these rules.

25 Mr. Pringle, do you know at what level a staff is formed?

1 A. Before I answer that question, I should say that I'm not here as

2 an expert on JNA doctrine. That's not to say I have not read quite a lot

3 of JNA doctrine, and I have not used it to draw conclusions on -- in my

4 report on the generalities of command and control and behaviour. So I

5 would just like to make that point. The expert in JNA doctrine you

6 interviewed in the case of Mr. Theunens. In fact, I think you asked him

7 exactly that question.

8 Now, let me go back to your question. At what level -- I think it

9 was at what level does a staff -- do staff happen. Well, you don't have a

10 staff at a company level. You have a staff at battalion level, it's not

11 very big, but you do have one. You have a much bigger staff at brigade

12 level, and you have an even bigger staff at divisional or, in JNA terms,

13 corps level.

14 Q. Thank you. I think that you defined that. Based on the documents

15 tendered here, and I think Mr. Theunens, to a large part reviewed most of

16 those documents, if I were to tell you that the company commander, through

17 orders and decisions of the battalion commander would be given the axis of

18 attack and that higher-level units would be assigned areas of

19 responsibility or areas of operation, would I be right as an amateur

20 expert, when I say this?

21 A. I believe battalion level or assault detachments were also given

22 axes, because I think I've read a number of orders from OG South saying

23 that.

24 Q. Thank you. Today we talked a little bit more about the climate

25 command, and these are paragraphs 37 to 48 of your report. And mostly you

1 link that term or concept with the komandant or the komandir; is that

2 correct?

3 A. No. The -- a command climate is a concept that you can apply to

4 any level of command from the lowest, non-commissioned officer to the

5 highest commissioned officer. It reflects the way they act, the way they

6 conduct themselves, and the conclusions that those who they are in command

7 of draw from their actions.

8 Q. Thank you. I absolutely agree with this conclusion of yours. In

9 your report in paragraph 39, amongst others, you talk about the need for a

10 personal authority, honesty, sincerity, discipline, good conduct, and

11 other personal characteristics that you mention, courage and so on and so

12 forth, moral responsibility as a particular characteristic. Am I right

13 that these are some of the characteristics that an officer would need to

14 have in order for the climate command to be at the desirable level?

15 A. Yes, the point I'm making here, and what you've quoted, is

16 footnote 58, drawn directly from JNA brigade rules, where, in effect, it's

17 saying in different words, I mean let me read it: "Through his personal

18 conduct where involvement in the interpretation of the SKJ policies

19 ethical standing, courage, ability, fairness, cool-headedness,

20 consistency, and respect for the personality and opinion of subordinates,

21 the commander vitally influences the entire condition of the brigade,"

22 because this is brigade rules, "... of the brigade, especially the morale

23 of units and command."

24 But exactly those character traits would apply at all levels.

25 Q. Thank you. General, sir, witnesses P-022, P-002, Witness

1 Trifunovic and most witnesses I have questioned about the circumstances in

2 relation to Captain Radic, and the reference for P-022 is page 5083-15,

3 and for P-002, this is 10555-5. In relation to Captain Radic, they all

4 emphasise the following features: Brave, courageous officer, he was with

5 his soldiers at the front, he was honest, he was disciplined. An example

6 was given that was discussed here at trial of 40 volunteers who had

7 violated the rules of discipline. Radic had them disarmed and forced them

8 to leave the front. He marched them away from the front line. Are you

9 familiar with this information? Are you familiar with any of these

10 statements that were previously given, not taking into the account the

11 transcripts from this trial?

12 A. I'm not familiar with the statements you've quoted there, no. I

13 have no reason to disbelieve them.

14 Q. Thank you. I don't have much time, and I don't think it will be a

15 good idea for me to go into everything that was actually said. We

16 tendered into evidence a number of newspaper pieces. They all emphasise

17 Radic's bravery and so on and so forth. If you take this to be true, if

18 you take to be true what a number of witnesses stated, and it is on the

19 record, would that not mean that at company level, which is where Captain

20 Radic's was, there simply had to be the sort of command climate that you

21 describe as necessary and desirable, given these assumptions, of course.

22 A. No, I wouldn't necessarily agree that. I have no reason not to

23 believe that Captain Radic was an extremely brave officer and had

24 performed in such a manner. But that, in itself, is not sufficient to

25 create the totality of the command climate that I'm referring to.

1 And let me give you two examples. If I recall correctly, Captain

2 Radic's headquarters was close by, if not co-located with the local TO and

3 volunteer forces headquarters and so he was intimately knowledgeable of

4 how they behaved, and yet when he was informed that -- of the events at

5 Ovcara --

6 Q. My apologies, sir. May I interrupt for a second? You are talking

7 about things that we are about to get to, but at a later stage. Just to

8 be fair, can you keep -- can you please keep this until later. You can

9 perhaps draw these conclusions when we get to that stage.

10 If I am hearing you correctly, you keep using the term Captain

11 Radic's headquarters. I'm not sure if the interpretation is correct. Are

12 you perhaps referring to his command post, although that, strictly

13 speaking, would not be accurate either?

14 A. Now, I think you would call it an observation post, which to me is

15 something completely different.

16 Yes, okay. Let me strict -- stay strictly within the confines of

17 your question. Is the fact that Captain Radic has a reputation as an

18 extremely brave officer, does that mean that he has all the attributes for

19 a correct command climate as I've described it. Answer, no.

20 Q. That was not my question. Bravery is just one feature that was

21 required, but I've enumerated all the others. Honesty, discipline, I've

22 given you that example about him sending those people packing, because

23 they had breached discipline, rules of discipline. I talked about all the

24 protected witnesses at this trial, OTP witnesses who could not but admit

25 that he was the most honourable and bravest officer there, that he treated

1 people well. These are different questions that I asked a wide range of

2 witnesses. Bearing in mind precisely the qualities that you list in your

3 report as being desirable or necessary for an officer, whether this was a

4 command post or indeed whether Captain Radic had effective control, or

5 actual control, is something that we will be getting to.

6 My question is: In your interpretation of the principles of

7 command and control, which is what you do in your report, after all, you

8 did not specify the command and control relationship at komandir level and

9 komandant level. And in terms of the doctrine that was applied, these

10 were by no means identical. However, if this distinction between komandir

11 and komandant is a problem for you, and if you believe that this was

12 covered by Mr. Theunens before you, please by no means consider yourself

13 compelled to answer my question.

14 A. I have no difficulty distinguishing between the roles and

15 responsibilities of komandir and komandant, if one is loosely put at

16 company level and the other is loosely put at battalion or assault

17 detachment level. That does not, in any way, reflect different

18 requirements in terms of setting a proper command climate. Exactly the

19 same criteria would be required as indeed it would be to the komandir's

20 subordinates in their own right. Does that answer your question?

21 Q. Thank you. Let's leave it at that. My next question: In your

22 report, you say that on the 19th or 20th of November Captain Radic was at

23 the hospital as a private individual. Is that right, sir? This is in

24 your report, paragraph 84.

25 A. That is in my --

1 Q. That indeed what it says, that's my first question.

2 A. You're asking me to refer to a bit in my report that has been

3 underlined, because it was drawn from a witness statement by Borivoje

4 Tesic, under which I understand there is a problem. But if you'd like me

5 to read that out, I will do.

6 Q. The footnote is underlined.

7 A. The footnote, 126 and 7 are underlined. What I said in my

8 report: "As it is apparent that Captain Miroslav Radic was present at the

9 hospital during the evacuation on 19th and 20th November without any

10 apparent orders and apparently not in command of his own assault

11 detachment troops, he appears to be have been present in an individual

12 capacity."

13 Now, that was a conclusion I drew from what I had read. It did

14 not appear that he was there in command of his own company. But he was

15 there.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you only base this on the statement that is

17 underlined in red, which probably means that we can't use it, or is there

18 another piece of evidence that leads you to that same conclusion; namely,

19 that Radic was there in his own private capacity?

20 A. That Radic was there appears in a statement by Witness P-030.

21 Q. But being there in a private capacity is not something that we can

22 really derive from your report, is it?

23 A. Yes, no, the statement "in a private capacity" is the conclusion I

24 drew, because I did not gain the impression in the reports and statements

25 that I was reading that Captain Radic was there commanding his own troops.

1 He had just happened to be there, apparently, working with Major

2 Sljivancanin, and he was, as I say in my report, therefore witness to

3 ill-treatment of evacuees by TO and volunteers. That's -- that's the

4 point I was making.

5 Q. Thank you. Let us assume for a moment that he was there in a

6 private capacity, and let us assume for a moment that the commander of the

7 1st Motorised Battalion, Borivoje Tesic was there too, at the same time as

8 Radic, on the 19th of November. Could he, in the presence of his superior

9 officer, possibly ever be there in purely private capacity?

10 A. I can't comment on that, because I -- it is not apparent to me why

11 he was there.

12 Q. Under the rules, when an officer of a lower rank happens to be in

13 the same place as his superior officer, who also happens to hold a higher

14 rank, how do you imagine the lower-ranking officer could be there in a

15 private capacity under any set of rules known to us, or would one prefer

16 to assume that he was there under the command of his superior officer and

17 for that reason only?

18 A. Well, I think when I say "private capacity," I'm really referring

19 to the fact that as far as I could make out from what I read he was not in

20 command of his own troops there. Now, that does not mean that he could

21 not have been there in a reconnaissance capacity, a liaison capacity, or

22 any other capacity. But the fact is, I simply don't know why he was

23 there.

24 Q. Thank you. On the 19th and 20th of November, 1991, do you know

25 what a JNA officer's uniform looked like and could you describe it for us,

1 please?

2 A. Not really. But sort of spider camouflage, I believe. Side hat

3 or steel helmet. The answer is I cannot give you the detail of that.

4 Q. Thank you. While studying this case, have you ever come across

5 the fact that anyone at all in the infantry companies was wearing blue or

6 green berets? What I'm putting to you is that this was not standard issue

7 in the JNA at the time.

8 A. I don't believe I've read anything that has stated that.

9 Q. Thank you. General, sir, on the 20th of November do you know who

10 was providing security at the Vukovar Hospital on the 20th of November?

11 Which specific unit?

12 A. I believe, and here again I'm recalling from memory, that it was

13 elements of a motorised battalion of -- and I'm not sure whether it was

14 Guards Motorised Brigade or 80th Motorised Brigade, but I also believe

15 from the many statements that I read that on the 20th of November the

16 person in charge or taking charge of the operation at the hospital

17 appeared to be Major Sljivancanin.

18 Q. My question was if you knew who was physically securing the

19 hospital. You studied a great deal of documents. Which military unit

20 could that have been? Who could have been in charge of providing that

21 sort of security for that particular sort of facility?

22 A. That is a duty that could fall naturally to elements of a

23 motorised battalion or, equally well, to elements of a military police

24 battalion.

25 Q. Do you know who is authorised to frisk people, members of just

1 which unit? Do you know who was doing the frisking, who was sending the

2 people to the buses that were there following the frisking? Have you come

3 across this sort of information, sir?

4 A. I did read statements about what was going on at the hospital.

5 Who was actually doing the frisking I'm not sure I can recall, but that is

6 a duty that would fall naturally to military police and/or security

7 organs. If by "frisking" you mean searching and sorting out and screening

8 of prisoners.

9 Q. The commander of the 3rd Company, Miroslav Radic, even if he had

10 been there, could he possibly have exercised command, or indeed issued any

11 orders to the military police company that was there or indeed any

12 military police officers who may have happened to be there?

13 A. Well, it depends under what circumstances he was there. If he had

14 been authorised to be there in some capacity, official capacity, shall we

15 say hypothetically as the assistant to Major Sljivancanin, for example,

16 then he may well have been authorised to give orders on Major

17 Sljivancanin's behalf if Major Sljivancanin himself had been authorised to

18 take control of the operation. It's a hypothetical answer to a

19 hypothetical question.

20 Q. My last question. If he was there in a private capacity, as you

21 say, all the more then he would certainly have not been in a position to

22 issue any orders, would he?

23 A. I say again, when I talk about private capacity, I was meaning

24 that it was not apparent to me that his own company troops were there

25 under his command. Whether he would have been in a position to issue any

1 orders would have resulted directly from the reason and -- and

2 authorisation which resulted in his being there in the first place.

3 Q. You don't know the reasons, do you?

4 A. I have said many times I have not -- I am not aware of the reason

5 why Radic was there when his troops were not. But it is -- it is plain

6 that he was there.

7 Q. I apologise. It is not plain that he was there. However, we are

8 now ready to call it a day, I believe. Thank you.

9 A. In the statements that I have read, it is incontrovertible that he

10 was there.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Borovic. And --

12 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] I think we can challenge that very

13 efficiently tomorrow.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Borovic, that's for another day, not for today.

15 We resume tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning, finish by 1.45 in the

16 day.

17 So thank you very much. We now adjourn.

18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.02 p.m.,

19 to be reconvened on Friday, the 23rd day of June,

20 2006, at 9.00 a.m.

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