1 Tuesday, 28 November 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. It is hoped that Judge Van den

7 Wyngaert will be able to sit after the next break. We will, for the time

8 being, continue two of us sitting under the Rule.

9 Now, Mr. Moore, are you ready? Thank you.

10 MR. MOORE: Yes.

11 JUDGE PARKER: I would just remind the witness that the

12 affirmation you made at the beginning of your evidence still applies.

13 Thank you

14 WITNESS: BORCE KARANFILOV [Resumed]

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Moore: [Continued].

18 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Karanfilov.

19 A. Good afternoon.

20 Q. I have one or two questions to ask you. General Vasiljevic, he

21 came to Vukovar, I believe, on the 19th; is that correct or not?

22 A. Yes, that's when I saw him.

23 Q. What position did General Vasiljevic hold at that time?

24 A. General Vasiljevic was the chief of the security administration of

25 the Yugoslav People's Army at the time.

1 Q. And I think it's right to say that he came and he was discussing

2 various matters with individuals who were there; is that right?

3 A. He was in our premises, yes.

4 Q. Are you aware of a document that arrived, I believe from memory,

5 it was the 18th of November, that came to Major Sljivancanin. We have

6 heard about it here that it came from General Vasiljevic indicating that

7 every effort should be made for Croatian soldiers to be detained to

8 facilitate exchange with JNA soldiers. Were you aware of that policy or

9 document?

10 A. No.

11 Q. So not aware of the document. What about the policy of: Let's

12 see if we can get as many Croatian soldiers so that we can exchange them

13 for some of ours who have been detained, just prisoner for prisoner. Do

14 you follow?

15 A. No, I don't recall having been aware of that.

16 Q. So you wouldn't be aware of Sljivancanin speaking to Vukasinovic

17 about that topic; would be that be correct?

18 A. No.

19 Q. I presume that means that you weren't aware. Can you explain to

20 me, then, the following phrase, that when -- I think you were at the

21 barracks on the -- it might have been Negoslavci, on the 19th of November,

22 that you remember a Colonel Tumanov being present?

23 A. The presence of Colonel Tumanov sticks in my memory because of

24 this thing he did when he withdrew his hands because this was a rather

25 ridiculous situation. He extended his hand to treat Marin Vidic Bili and

1 then he withdrew his hand. And that's why I remember the scene, the

2 arrival of Colonel Tumanov.

3 Q. So you do remember him being there, it's as simple as that; is

4 that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can you explain to me how Major Sljivancanin was having a heated

7 conversation with the very head of his department? The phrase you were --

8 that you told us yesterday was that you heard "a fairly heated

9 conversation between Sljivancanin and Vasiljevic." I'm just curious how

10 it is a major can have a heated conversation with his boss. Do you

11 follow?

12 A. As far as I can remember, the conversation took place in the

13 hallway outside of our office.

14 Q. In Negoslavci?

15 A. In our office in Negoslavci, yes. So it was in the hallway right

16 out of the office. It was a loud conversation. And the topic of the

17 conversation is not known to me.

18 Q. But what I'm curious about - I didn't know about the location so

19 we'll deal with that - "fairly heated," that, I would suggest, tends to

20 indicate that there were raised voices, voices that were angry. Would

21 that be a fair way of assessing it?

22 A. Yes, you could put it that way. It was an angry conversation.

23 Q. An angry conversation between a general and a major; that's

24 correct, isn't it, in a public place?

25 A. In the office or rather in the hallway outside of the office, my

1 impression was that they were angry.

2 Q. Yes, but sometimes when one has disagreements, one tries to have

3 those disagreements in offices. This angry exchange was in a hallway

4 between a general and a major. That's right, isn't it?

5 A. I wouldn't go into guessing why it was in the hallway, it was in

6 the hallway and that's more or less the only thing I know. I don't know

7 anything apart from what I've already told you.

8 Q. It wouldn't have been, perhaps, Major Sljivancanin indicating that

9 he was not happy with General Vasiljevic's position of trying to take J --

10 Croatian prisoners in exchange for JNA prisoners, was it, and expressing

11 his dissatisfaction with that policy? Are you able to help us?

12 A. I can't because I don't know what they were talking about.

13 Q. When was it that Vasiljevic gave you the task of collecting the

14 items and taking those items to Belgrade?

15 A. I was given the task by Mr. Sljivancanin and I remember that he

16 had told me that it was General Vasiljevic who had ordered that.

17 Q. Let's move to the 20th. I've already dealt with this topic in

18 very general terms but I'll deal with it now more particularly. At what

19 time did you get to the barracks, approximately, on the morning of the

20 20th?

21 A. Sometime between 10.00 and 9.00 I went to the hospital, I stayed

22 there a couple of minutes, and went back to the barracks. That's the

23 period that I'm talking about.

24 Q. So when you went to the hospital -- you say you were there a

25 couple of minutes -- so if people say that they saw you, you would agree

1 that you were at the hospital, but you say just a couple of minutes; is

2 that right?

3 A. I was there for just a couple of minutes, yes.

4 Q. Did you go into the hospital grounds?

5 A. No.

6 Q. So if you weren't in the hospital grounds, presumably you weren't

7 in the hospital, were you?

8 A. If you mean the grounds, I was there at the entrance, at the gate.

9 I was not in the building itself.

10 Q. Well, who did you speak to at the gate?

11 A. I don't know. When we asked where the forensic technicians were,

12 some commanding officers present there said that they had headed towards

13 the barracks. I don't know who it was.

14 Q. Well, when you went to the hospital, did you see the buses lined

15 up outside?

16 A. I don't remember.

17 Q. Do you remember seeing Mr. Sljivancanin at that time?

18 A. I think I saw him, but he is far away from me. I think I saw him.

19 I'm not sure.

20 Q. Did you see Mr. Vukasinovic?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Did you see Mr. Karan?

23 A. No.

24 Q. And I suppose it's pointless to ask whether you saw Mr. Radic.

25 Did you see Mr. Radic?

1 A. No, I don't remember. No.

2 Q. It's not a case of them not being there, it's a case of you not

3 seeing these people because you were there for such a short time; is that

4 right?

5 A. I stayed there for just a couple of minutes.

6 Q. When you went to the hospital, where did you travel from,

7 Negoslavci?

8 A. Yes. Yes.

9 Q. In what vehicle did you travel?

10 A. In a police Puch.

11 Q. How was it that you were able to get to the hospital at a

12 time when other people were not able to get there, by the way over

13 the bridge?

14 A. I don't understand your question.

15 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Bulatovic.

17 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like

18 Mr. Moore to confront the witness, to tell him who claimed that it was

19 impossible to get to the hospital at that time and what route we're

20 talking about. I think that would be fair to the witness in light of what

21 the witness has testified about his arrival at the hospital.

22 JUDGE PARKER: I don't see a basis at the moment, for interfering,

23 Mr. Bulatovic. We'll watch it.

24 Yes, Mr. Moore.

25 MR. MOORE:

1 Q. Could you answer the question, please.

2 A. I had no problems getting there. There were no problems there at

3 the hospital, if that's what you mean. If you mean that the road had been

4 destroyed. I really don't know what you want to say.

5 Q. Well, you know Vukovar or you knew Vukovar in 1991. It's right to

6 say that you know and did know at that time that there were two principal

7 bridges across the River Vuka; that's right, isn't it?

8 A. There were bridges there, yes.

9 Q. And we have heard evidence from a number of people, monitors, et

10 cetera, where they say that they were in a long queue and we have seen

11 video evidence of it that they could not get across the bridge until 10.00

12 or thereabouts. What I want to know is how you managed to get across to

13 the hospital at a time when they were told it wasn't possible. Do you

14 understand?

15 A. Yes, but as I already said, I don't know the time, the actual

16 hour, I just said that we got there with Momcilovic and then that we

17 didn't have any problems.

18 Q. No, but you do know the time and I asked you about that and you

19 went 10.00, 9.00, and you were there approximately two minutes and we have

20 got evidence that suggests that that bridge wasn't open until after that.

21 So I would like to know how you got there.

22 A. First of all, 9.00, 10.00, I don't see why that should be a

23 problem to have it plus or minus half an hour, it could be half an hour

24 more than I said. We didn't have any problems getting there. There was

25 some gunfire, we could hear it, but we had no problems as we travelled

1 there.

2 Q. No, I'm not talking about gunfire, I'm talking about a long line

3 of traffic with ECMM vehicles, Red Cross vehicles, other vehicles that

4 couldn't get across one of the bridges and I want to know how you were

5 able to get across into the hospital. Do you understand? So can you give

6 us an answer on that?

7 A. No, I can't. I really can't.

8 Q. Was it the case that there was a checkpoint on the bridge to stop

9 any traffic?

10 A. It's possible, but I don't remember.

11 Q. In any event, when you go back, you say that you go to the

12 barracks and you then notice incidents occurring at the barracks

13 themselves; is that right?

14 A. Yes. I saw an unusual situation.

15 Q. Well, just describe the unusual situation. A number of people in

16 and around the buses; is that correct?

17 A. Yes. There were buses there in the barracks. The police were

18 there around them and then some 10 to 15 metres away from the buses, there

19 was a group of people, maybe 40 to 50 people, most of them men. The

20 situation was unusual in that there were curses, verbal abuse hurled and

21 so on.

22 Q. Well, it was much worse than that, wasn't it?

23 A. That was my impression.

24 Q. But it was a situation that caused you concern, wasn't it?

25 A. No, not concern. This was not a situation that would cause

1 concern but some degree of unease, yes.

2 Q. Well, can I just read to you -- MR. MOORE: I think perhaps in

3 fairness to everybody, that I should just pass out some of the transcripts

4 that we have, with the Court's leave, I'd ask to do that. It's marked up

5 in a way that I would hope would help for B/C/S and English.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

7 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much. Could that be done now, please.

8 The Defence can have them if they wish; I have no problems with

9 that. Will that help? Of course. It's exactly the same format as we

10 have used on previous occasions. There is a chronological index. Items

11 one and two are the 12th of November, 1998. Three and four, 1st of

12 October, 2001. Three is English and one is English.

13 Then number five is an English and B/C/S translation by an OTP

14 investigator Nigel Stewart. Six and seven, the 5th of November, 2003.

15 Six is English, seven, B/C/S.

16 Eight and nine, transcripts from the main hearing, 23rd of

17 November at Belgrade. Ten and eleven, an audio recording, 11th of

18 November. English is ten. And then finally, you may remember, perhaps

19 not, number twelve where you and I had a chat in Belgrade on the 19th of

20 September. I hope you remember that. Good.

21 Q. Let's us then deal, if we may, with tab 8, please, and for you, it

22 is B/C/S, which is 9. So in English it is tab 8, page 7, bottom

23 right-hand corner; for the B/C/S equivalent, it is page 0367-9153.

24 Mr. Karanfilov, we tend to have our numbers on the top right-hand

25 corner in the B/C/S, so yours should be 0367-9153. Have you got that

1 page?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I'm just going to read, it's on the top of the page, I think, the

4 B/C/S. "Inside the barracks compound," and this is you speaking with the

5 judge asking the question. "Inside the barracks compound, and what we

6 found, so to say, the most striking and unacceptable at the same time, was

7 that there was a lot of civilians surrounding the buses who were

8 expressing rather fierce anger."

9 Have you got that passage?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Well, what do you mean by "rather fierce anger"? That's not the

12 way you have described it here at all, is it?

13 A. Well, fierce anger, that's what I meant, actually very bad curses

14 hurled at those people involving members of their family and so on.

15 Q. Well, let's move on in that page, it's the English page, page 8,

16 it's half of the way down the page. The Presiding Judge asks the

17 question: "When you were questioned by the investigating judge of the

18 military court, did you actually say, 'as far as I could gather, their

19 intention was to take over the securing of the buses'?

20 "Karanfilov: Yes.

21 "Question: Is that what you were saying?

22 "Yes, it was literally like that. They almost scuffled with the

23 police," that's military police, "but this did not happen, although that's

24 how it looked like. I'm not saying that that I am right, this is my

25 personal opinion."

1 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour?

2 JUDGE PARKER: I think we'll wait for the question, Mr. Bulatovic.

3 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] We have a problem with

4 interpretation or translation.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Well, we'll have the question and answer and then

6 you can put that. Thank you.

7 MR. MOORE:

8 Q. So have you got that?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Go to page 0367-9153. Top right-hand corner. Have you got that

11 page number?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. It should be 9153, I would say it is halfway down the page. It's

14 a question -- I can lead it in a little earlier. Let's see if we can find

15 that. Deputy prosecutor: "In what way did they express their desire to

16 take over these people from the buses, what specifically, apart from what

17 he's already told us? Were there any other manifestations like that?"

18 Witness Borco Karanfilov: Well, I believe aside for the insults

19 but I don't know what you mean precisely."

20 Have you got that now?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "Nothing but insults, only insults and swearing; is that right?

23 "Yes, yes, yes."

24 When you were questioned by the investigating judge of the

25 military court, did you actually say: "As far as I could gather, their

1 intention was to take over the securing of the buses?"

2 "Yes.

3 "Is that what you are saying.

4 "Yes, it was literally like that. They almost scuffled with the

5 police but this did not happen, although that's how it looked like. I am

6 not saying that I am right. This is my personal opinion."

7 Now, you see that. Does that now refresh your memory on what you

8 saw on the morning of the 20th?

9 A. Let me say it once again. This is what it actually says here. It

10 was all at the verbal level and my observation was that this was on the

11 verbal level and this creates an unpleasant picture. When you see a group

12 of people verbally insulting other people, hurling abuse, insults, that's

13 not a pleasant picture, but that's all there was.

14 Q. There is a difference, I'd suggest; for example, if I am verbally

15 insulted, well, one can live with that. But this is a situation where you

16 have a group of people who are in a bus or buses who allegedly have been

17 responsible for criminal acts. And the people who are outside are

18 suggesting that many of these criminal acts were committed against them or

19 their family. That is right, isn't it? Such things as murder; isn't that

20 right?

21 A. It is true or at least I assume that there were people on the

22 buses who may or may not have committed criminal offences. The locals

23 probably had reason enough to abuse them and curse them. Many of them had

24 lost their nearest and dearest so probably that was reason enough for them

25 to abuse those people and jeer at them. If that's what you mean.

1 Q. It's not quite what I mean at all. There may be a reason for

2 jeering and abusing, but one also has to put into the context what those

3 people believe they have suffered and what they are also capable of

4 inflicting. And those people, I'd suggest, some of them had weapons.

5 That is right, isn't it?

6 A. Yes, there were armed people there, but that is very much a

7 hypothetical question. What would have been the case if something else

8 had gone on to happen differently. I have already given you all my

9 observations and all my conclusions regarding this situation. I can't

10 address what might have been.

11 Q. Well, in actual fact, you can address what might have been because

12 what might have been actually did become. Those people were murdered.

13 That is correct, isn't it?

14 A. Please, I don't know about that. I entered the barracks on a

15 mission. I was there for several minutes. My impression and observation

16 is a near snapshot and that's what I'm telling you. My impression was

17 that the situation was under control and that the commander was keeping

18 the entire situation under control and there was no reason to believe

19 anything else, nothing to lead me to believe otherwise, nor was I required

20 to do anything about that or linger there. So this is a snapshot

21 impression that I garnered in the brief time that I spent there.

22 Q. Firstly, I would suggest to you that what you say is an attempt to

23 minimise what was going on because you, in actual fact, were so concerned,

24 you mentioned it to Lukic who was in charge of security at the barracks;

25 isn't that correct?

1 A. Mr. Lukic was standing at a distance of about 25 or 30 metres. He

2 was aware of what was going on. I talked to him much along the lines of

3 asking him what was going down.

4 Q. So you did speak to Lukic.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you used the phrase "we informed Lukic," in that interview

7 that I've referred to. Who's "we"?

8 A. All right. We informed him, that's probably about the brief

9 conversation that we had. When I say "we," I mean Zoran Momcilovic and I,

10 since we happened to be there together.

11 Q. But you don't need to, to inform him of anything, do you, if he's

12 just standing there and can see; isn't that correct?

13 A. I do agree. That's precisely why I think the word "to inform" has

14 two potential meanings in this context. There was an exchange saying

15 things like: "What is going on? What was this about?" It's not like I

16 was informing the commander. The commander was there, he was monitoring

17 the situation and he was commanding his unit.

18 Q. And I would suggest it's of more than that, that you informed

19 Sljivancanin about the problems; isn't that right?

20 A. First of all, I didn't see that as a problem. I did inform

21 Sljivancanin. I had the impression that he had already found out earlier

22 on.

23 Q. And where did you get the impression that he had found out earlier

24 on?

25 A. As far as I remember, it was based on him saying that everything

1 was all right. I think his answer was "Everything is all right."

2 Q. Well, "everything is all right" can mean many things. I'm asking

3 you why do you say you formed the impression that he already knew?

4 A. Precisely because he asked no additional questions. I assume that

5 had he had any other questions or had he not known about the situation, he

6 would have asked further questions.

7 Q. You earlier on, about three or four minutes ago said that it was

8 not your duty to do anything, along those lines; isn't that right?

9 A. I don't think that what I actually did was doing anything about

10 it, informing someone or, rather, talking to Mr. Sljivancanin, is not for

11 me tantamount to me doing anything particular about the situation at the

12 barracks. What I was required to do was to observe and to convey my

13 observations to the chief, so this is a mere observation on my part.

14 Q. Please go again to, in your case, tab 9, English tab 8, page 7.

15 The B/C/S equivalent 0367-9153. It's the same page that I was referring

16 to earlier. So English it's tab 8, page 7, bottom of the page. And for

17 the B/C/S, it is at the top of page 0367-9153.

18 I've already mentioned this to you but I want to read now extra

19 parts. At the top of the page of the B/C/S, "And what we found, so to

20 say, the most striking and unacceptable at the same time, was that there

21 was a lot of civilians surrounding the buses who were expressing rather

22 fierce anger. Later, since the police were around the buses, after that,

23 which means while we were taking over Bili we informed Lukic who had just

24 been appointed commander of the barracks, and I think that upon our return

25 to Negoslavci, we informed Sljivancanin as well that local residents were

1 gathering around some buses in the barracks. I guess that this is what

2 the gentleman was referring to."

3 So there you have that you in -- you see an incident, you mention

4 it to Lukic, and then you mention it to Sljivancanin back in Negoslavci.

5 That's right, isn't it?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. MOORE: I -- there seems to be a problem.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Vasic, Mr. Bulatovic is waiting. You're next.

9 I see that Mr. Bulatovic's problem is resolved.

10 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Moore read out the relevant

11 part.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Waiting for the subject matter to reach the end and

13 then we'll come to the concerns. So if you'd wait, Mr. Vasic.

14 We wait on you, Mr. Moore.

15 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry, I thought Mr. Vasic wanted something.

16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, he's waiting for you. At my invitation, I

17 might say.

18 MR. MOORE: Can I politely inquire what he's waiting for?

19 JUDGE PARKER: Here you are, Mr. Vasic, jump in quickly.

20 MR. VASIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I'm waiting

21 for the interpretation. My learned friend, when he quoted the portion

22 from that page -- I'm not sure if the witness had informed Sljivancanin

23 upon returning to Negoslavci with Bili. I think that's one thing that

24 didn't make it into the transcript, page 15, lines 23 through 25, as well

25 as page 16, line 1.

1 MR. MOORE: Well, I just read the part that I have on the B/C/S

2 translation. The witness agrees with that.

3 Q. Could I also deal with tab 3, please. It's tab 4 for you, Mr.

4 Karanfilov. For the English, this is a record compiled on the 1st of

5 October before the military court. And the part I want to deal with is

6 English page 5. For the B/C/S, it is tab 4, page number 0218-8552. Now

7 that should, in the B/C/S, start: "The only thing I remember if that's

8 dates tally was that at the time, I received an order to take charge of an

9 guard Marin Vidic, always known as Bili. Then there's Vesna Bosanac too.

10 We guarded her in the hospital in Negoslavci, completely secretly because

11 we feared reprisals."

12 Have you got that part? Then we go to page 5 in the English.

13 Have you found that part, Mr. Karanfilov?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. It's the next part that I wanted to deal with. "I think when I

16 took charge of Marin Vidic from the barracks that day, I noticed a large

17 crowd at the barracks around some parked buses because I then saw a group

18 of territorials arguing with our army members around the buses that had

19 people inside. From what I could make out, they wanted to take charge of

20 security of the buses. I cannot now state definitely what this

21 altercation was over. When I returned to the command in Negoslavci, I

22 think I informed Sljivancanin about it but I do not know what action he

23 then took."

24 So you have, on previous occasions, informed courts in 2001 and

25 later on, I think it's 2004, that you told Sljivancanin when you returned

1 to Negoslavci. That's right, isn't it, that's what you said?

2 A. Yes, that's what it says.

3 Q. Of course, your account here is different, isn't it? Your account

4 here is that you spoke to Sljivancanin when he was in Vukovar. Isn't that

5 right?

6 A. All right. I mentioned this to Mr. Sljivancanin upon leaving the

7 shelter when we were off with those documents that we had taken. We met

8 him somewhere near the exhibit in the vicinity of the shelter. Why am I

9 saying that? I'm saying that because as we were coming out and we met,

10 Sljivancanin asked if we had observed a vehicle, a car with foreign

11 licence plates near the shelter. We had, in fact, observed one and the

12 idea was to go back and take the licence plates off because they were

13 foreign licence plates. That's why I remember Sljivancanin as being

14 there, because we had to go back and get the foreign licence plates off

15 that vehicle there.

16 Q. So the answer to my question is: Now I'm saying that I saw

17 Sljivancanin in Vukovar. Is that the answer to my question, not

18 Negoslavci?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Because we have heard evidence that Mr. Sljivancanin didn't get

21 back to Negoslavci until around about 6.00ish in the evening. He was

22 going back to the command briefing and that he was seen by Major

23 Vukasinovic that evening and then saw him afterwards in Negoslavci. So if

24 that's the case, and these accounts that you gave earlier on are true, it

25 means quite simply that you weren't making a trip to Belgrade from

1 Vukovar, you were seeing Sljivancanin in Negoslavci; isn't that right,

2 later in the evening.

3 A. I don't understand at all the permutation of events. I'm telling

4 you, it's been a long time, it's been 15 years. Even now, I could hardly

5 claim that I saw that car, had I not seen that recording with that

6 armoured car. And this car sticks with me because of its foreign licence

7 plates. I'm not sure with a other information you may or may not have.

8 Q. Am I right that in actual fact on the account that you have given

9 to courts previously, you would be seeing Sljivancanin not in Vukovar, but

10 in Negoslavci in the area of the command post. That's what you believed

11 when you gave this evidence; that is right, isn't it?

12 A. That's what it says.

13 Q. And that would mean that you were wrong about travelling back to

14 Belgrade on the 20th because, quite simply, you would be travelling at

15 night and wouldn't get back for some considerable time; that is also

16 right, isn't it? Isn't it, Mr. Karanfilov?

17 A. That changes nothing at all about the fact I could have gone on to

18 Belgrade. I don't see why not. Actually, I have no idea what you're

19 trying to tell me.

20 Q. I think you know perfectly well what I'm trying to suggest and

21 indeed I am suggesting that if this account that you gave to the judges is

22 correct, that you were in and around the command post when Sljivancanin

23 was there, and you were therefore not in Belgrade, and that in actual fact

24 you were the officer who went to Ovcara and released the military police;

25 isn't that right, Mr. Karanfilov?

1 A. Come on, sir. Please. First of all, this piece of information

2 that suggests that I went to Ovcara and conveyed this, that is just not

3 true. Out of the question. I'm not an officer. I am no part of the

4 chain of command. I was not an officer in the chain of command in a

5 position to impart orders to anyone. The gentleman you're talking about

6 is a military police officer. He takes his orders down the chain of

7 command. One of his commanders, his superiors, had given him a task, to

8 set up a group, to take up a position and securing the hangar. These are

9 military tasks and they are very specific.

10 In a chain of command, an order can be withdrawn by an officer of

11 the same rank or his superior. Members of any counter-intelligence group

12 have no authority to impart any orders or withdraw any orders. Therefore,

13 your theory is erroneous, to put it mildly.

14 Q. It's not my theory. There are three witnesses who say you were at

15 Ovcara on the 20th. There are the following: There is Vezmarovic who

16 said that you were there. There is 022 who says that you were there. And

17 001 says that you were there. So you have three separate independent

18 people who say that you were at Ovcara on the 20th. Let's deal with the

19 generalities and come to the specifics.

20 It's right, on your account that you have given this court, that

21 you were never at Ovcara on the 20th; that is right, isn't it?

22 A. No. I was never at Ovcara.

23 Q. So dealing with the generalities, you were not at Ovcara on the

24 20th. That is correct, yes?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So these three people, all independent people, all giving evidence

2 here, said they saw you there. Do you understand that? Have you been

3 told that by Mr. Lukic, or in your case, Mr. Bulatovic? Have you been

4 told that?

5 A. All right. I was told about the security commander. Please,

6 again, I'm telling you, the last name that I referred to in relation to

7 the fact that I introduced myself on the day of the Mitnica Battalion

8 surrender, I still believe that to have been an honourable thing to do.

9 There is that last name that was dropped in relation to the security

10 commander. I'm telling you, this is an insinuation and a fabrication and

11 the whole story was staged, as it were, at a later stage just because

12 people knew my name. This whole story is a fabrication and there is not

13 the blindest bit of truth to it. The security commander must take his

14 orders from somebody in the chain of command.

15 Q. Let's set aside the chain of command. Don't bother looking at

16 Mr. Lukic, Mr. Bulatovic, they're not going to help you.

17 A. I apologise. My apologies, again, but again, you're way off the

18 mark. Somebody was springing to their feet, and that's the actual reason

19 I turned around.

20 Q. There are three people who saw you there. One of them saw you on

21 the 18th in daylight. He saw you again for over an hour on the 19th -

22 this is on your evidence - and he gave evidence that you recognised you

23 and knew who you were the following day when you told him to withdraw the

24 military police and indeed introduced him to a TO leader who was going to

25 take over. So you're saying, therefore, the identification is wrong; is

1 that right?

2 A. No, I'm saying the whole thing is a lie. That's what I'm saying.

3 Q. Well, you keep saying your name is well-known. Mr. Sljivancanin,

4 we have heard he was being picked out because his name was well-known.

5 How is your name known? You were only a minor officer. You've told us

6 that already.

7 A. Please, I didn't say my family name was a well-known one. I said

8 it was a rather peculiar sounding one because it doesn't end in the usual

9 "ic," which is common in B/C/S. I said my last name was peculiar and

10 therefore easy to remember, because it somewhat deviates from the norm in

11 the B/C/S. Those are the very words I used. Don't twist it.

12 Q. But I want to know why on earth you, Borco Karanfilov, should have

13 the finger pointed by three separate people as being responsible for the

14 pulling out of the military police, thereby guaranteeing the slaughter of

15 over 200 people. What is it that you have done to people to deserve this?

16 A. Again, I think the simple reason is my family name was the only

17 one they knew because it is a peculiar sounding one. But I can't rule out

18 the possibility that they're trying to shift the blame to someone else

19 because of everything.

20 Q. Well, let's look at it again. You were not at Ovcara -- on the

21 20th, therefore you were not with Vukasinovic on the 20th, clearly, at

22 Ovcara; that is right, it's just logical.

23 A. I was in Belgrade on the 20th.

24 Q. And you were not with Vukasinovic on the 18th either, were you, at

25 Ovcara, because we have heard your evidence on that.

1 A. No.

2 Q. And in actual fact, these witnesses refer to you being with

3 Vukasinovic.

4 A. Again, I don't know who said what. One thing I am certain about

5 is it's a blatant lie. The more I like at it, the more I see people are

6 trying to shift the blame to someone else in order to exonerate

7 themselves.

8 Q. Well, the one thing that is absolutely certain is you were not

9 with Vukasinovic on the 18th, that is right, when you were at Ovcara?

10 A. On the 18th, no.

11 Q. Let's move on to another topic: Velepromet.

12 You and I had a chat with Velepromet and I seem to remember you

13 had some difficulty remembering that location. Do you remember that

14 conversation?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And just to assist the Court, my learned friends have got the

17 B/C/S equivalent but it's at divider 12. It is page 5 of 13, so English

18 page 5 of 13, divider 12 of the English translation.

19 Now, I asked you one-fifth of the way down the page the following

20 question -- I'm MM and you're BK, surprisingly: "Who was that? Who was

21 that someone?

22 "Okay.

23 "Let's deal with Velepromet. Do you know the Velepromet

24 facility?"

25 The answer that you gave: "It's a bit foggy."

1 I then asked the question: "You don't remember Velepromet, the

2 main area for the evacuation."

3 "I remember it was opposite the barracks or something like that,"

4 was the answer.

5 Then you go on to say quite simply about the road dividing them.

6 Now what I want to ask you is this, you were security organ and

7 Borisavljevic was a security organ and we have seen documentation here

8 indicate that go Borisavljevic had, and I will use a neutral word,

9 responsibility for the Velepromet collection facility. You were aware of

10 that fact, obviously. Yes?

11 A. Yes, I was aware of the fact that in the early days in Negoslavci,

12 Borisavljevic went to the barracks and he spent all of his time there. I

13 wasn't aware of his specific responsibilities.

14 Q. Well, I suggest that cannot be right because there were security

15 organ briefings by Sljivancanin to which Borisavljevic attended; that is

16 correct, isn't it?

17 A. Not all. Again, where meetings were held very much depended on

18 how much time people had and the overall situation. Briefings and

19 informing the chief about the situation, well that's a different matter.

20 The security organ discussed only what was material to their work. We

21 didn't necessarily familiarise ourselves with what everybody else

22 throughout the security organ was doing.

23 Q. All right. We'll cut it down to fine bones. You knew that

24 Borisavljevic was at Velepromet; is that right?

25 A. I did know that he was in the barracks.

1 Q. No, I'm not talking about the barracks, as you're well aware. I'm

2 talking about Velepromet. Or do you see them as being a similar ...

3 A. No, I don't see as being similar. You are asking me if I was

4 aware of that. The only thing I was aware of was his office at the

5 barracks. I didn't know about Velepromet and him there. He was billeted

6 at the barracks.

7 Q. But you were asked about Velepromet in other court sessions don't

8 you remember that occurring? I think it was in Belgrade.

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Well, I'd like you to go to 5E, please, of the divider and I hope

11 it is page 14. So 5E. And it is line at 19, 20. This is the 2003

12 interview.

13 You are asked a question about Velepromet and at 19, you say "I

14 have a vague picture of Velepromet." In your case, it would be line 16,

15 line 24.

16 Have you got it?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Well --

19 A. Tab 5E.

20 Q. It should be orange. So go to line 19 and 20, page 14 of 17. It

21 is concurrently a translation. Have you now got that, Mr. Karanfilov?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. The translation that we have got is "I have a vague picture of

24 Velepromet ..." Have you got? "But at that time, nobody really dared to

25 walk around Velepromet.

1 "Why was that, fear?"

2 Line 28: "It was war."

3 Well, now, Velepromet was within the zone of responsibility for OG

4 South; isn't that right?

5 A. I said last time that I don't know about Operations Group. I did

6 not know about south, east, and so on but as for Velepromet, it was near

7 the barracks.

8 Q. Well, can we just work on a slight inference that if it's near the

9 barracks and near Vukovar, that it might be under the control of Mr.

10 Mrksic and his troops. Can we work on that basis?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Well, can you just explain to me then please the phrase "But at

13 that time, nobody really dared to walk around Velepromet." Could you

14 explain to me why people couldn't walk around Velepromet, why you've given

15 that answer, and it was war?

16 A. Please, the answer I gave was: "I don't know," full stop. "I

17 don't know," full stop. "Let me tell you, I have this foggy picture,

18 approximately, of that part of Velepromet, but at that time, nobody dared

19 to walk around or to walk and walk around."

20 This is not -- I'm not talking about walking around Velepromet;

21 no, walking around in general.

22 The first question was related to Velepromet, and my answer was

23 that I have a vague picture of Velepromet. And the second part of my

24 answer pertains to the whole area. After dark, nobody dared to walk

25 around at all, not just around Velepromet.

1 Q. So this answer refers to the area generally, not the Velepromet

2 facility that was where the TO were based as we have heard; is that right?

3 Or the suggestion of lawlessness?

4 A. I didn't quite understand you.

5 Q. Well, let me try and put it to you. I would suggest people didn't

6 walk around Velepromet because the Velepromet facility was used for

7 filtering individuals who were brought in, that the TO were actively

8 involved there, and that it was an extremely dangerous place for people to

9 go. That's all I'm suggesting.

10 A. Please, please, I don't agree with your allegation. "I don't

11 know. I don't know. Let me tell you, I have this foggy picture." This

12 is the sentence that I actually stated recently now. "I have this foggy

13 vague picture of Velepromet,"; the second part of the sentence is, "and --

14 but at that time, nobody dared to walk, to walk around."

15 This pertains to the whole war zone in general when, after

16 nightfall, nobody walked around unless one really need today.

17 Q. Well, let's put it to the test. Would you read out the exact

18 words, please, of line 16 in B/C/S, and the interpreters can interpret.

19 Would you do that? Starting, "Neznam. Neznam."

20 A. "I don't know. I don't know. At that time let me tell you, I

21 have this foggy picture approximately of this part of Velepromet, but at

22 that time, nobody dared to walk or to walk around."

23 Q. So you say, then, it relates to the area generally, not just the

24 Velepromet facility?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Thank you. I'd like to deal with two other topics before I

2 finish. When were you at the military academy?

3 A. 1981 until 1985.

4 Q. And did you meet any of these defendants when you were there?

5 A. The Defence counsel?

6 Q. Well, I can't speak for the Defence counsel, but I was only going

7 to ask about the defendants. I won't ask about the Defence counsel. Just

8 the three defendants: Mr. Mrksic, we'll leave out Mr. Bulatovic,

9 Mr. Radic --

10 THE INTERPRETER: It was interpreter's error.

11 MR. MOORE: It's all right.

12 Q. Mr. Mrksic, Mr. Radic or Mr. Sljivancanin.

13 A. Mr. Radic, yes.

14 Q. And how long was Mr. Radic at the academy with you for?

15 A. Four years.

16 Q. Would it be fair to say that you would consider yourself a friend

17 of Mr. Radic?

18 A. We're friends.

19 Q. Thank you very much. And I think it's also right to say that you

20 have told a previous court that he would come a number of times to the

21 post at Negoslavci; is that right? Mr. Radic, that is.

22 A. I don't think I said many times. I think I said several times.

23 He did come there a couple of times, a few times.

24 Q. And can I just put the following sentence to you. It's at line

25 5020 -- actually, page 5020, line 3. It was in respect of the following

1 question: "Do you know Captain -- did you know captain Karanfilov before

2 the 20th of November?

3 "Yes. He came with Major Sljivancanin to the headquarters of my

4 company in Nova Ulica," and he then went on to describe you. Is that

5 right? Did you go to Nova Ulica with Major Sljivancanin?

6 A. No, I did not enter Vukovar at all during the fighting.

7 Q. So if in actual fact your friend, Captain Radic, was there, are

8 you saying you didn't keep contact with him or to go to see if he was

9 there?

10 A. I didn't go there because that was not my task. I didn't visit

11 any of the units except for the rear units in Berak.

12 Q. Well, I would suggest you did go and see him there. Can I finish,

13 then, in the following way. You told us that you got documents and you

14 went off to Belgrade with those documents; isn't that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Those documents themselves were burnt documents; isn't that

17 right?

18 A. Not all of them. It was obvious that somebody had tried to set

19 fire to them on purpose. Some papers had burned down and some were still

20 intact.

21 Q. What I would like to know is this: You had a perfectly good

22 warrant officer; isn't that right at that time?

23 A. I don't know. I don't know what you mean "a good warrant

24 officer."

25 Q. Well, you know perfectly well what I mean. That in actual fact,

1 you had another person in the security organ who was a lesser rank to

2 yourself. Isn't that right?

3 A. Sir, I did not have a warrant officer in the security organ. He

4 was a member, just as myself, and apart from the chief and the two

5 deputies, all the other members of the security organ are at the same

6 level, regardless of the actual rank they have.

7 Q. All right. I'm using British ranking system. What I want to know

8 quite simply is this: Why is it necessary for two members of the security

9 organ to have to go all the way to Belgrade when in actual fact it is an

10 extremely busy time for the security organ to be there? Why waste two

11 people rather than just one?

12 A. I'm not going to question Major Sljivancanin's order. I am not

13 competent to judge why he did issue that order. It is a fact that we did

14 not know what we would find there and how much material there would be.

15 And you will agree with me that it would be difficult for one person -- it

16 would be risky for one person to go there, to collect all that material

17 and then to go with all that material to Belgrade because it was war. The

18 war was going on at the time.

19 Q. You see, what I would suggest to you is that in actual fact, when

20 you have been spoken to at earlier dates about when you went to Belgrade,

21 what you actually said was as follows: "I cannot say for sure exactly

22 when I left Vukovar because I cannot -- or I really cannot remember."

23 Do you remember saying that? Just -- actually in fairness: "But

24 I am certain that I returned three to five days before the unit did."

25 So there you are saying: I cannot say for sure exactly when I

1 left Vukovar.

2 A. I keep saying in all my statements I am talking about the events.

3 I remember events, I don't remember the dates, and that is why I said even

4 in that statement that I cannot be sure about the actual dates?

5 Q. But I'm going to ask you to look at this. It's the English tab 3,

6 B/C/S tab 4. English tab 3, it is page 8, paragraph 11. The B/C/S,

7 0218-8553. So I want to go to -- it would be approximately three-fifths

8 of the way down the B/C/S page. Paragraph 11. "I do not remember any

9 kind of written order being sent to us from the command regarding the

10 treatment of prisoners in the final phase of the operation, and nor do I

11 remember whether any kind of verbal order was issued in that regard. I

12 cannot say for sure exactly when I left Vukovar because I really cannot

13 remember, but I am certain that I returned three to five days before the

14 unit did."

15 I am suggesting to you, you indicated earlier on you are not sure

16 when it was you went back to Belgrade, if you did. You are saying three

17 to five, so it could be three, could be four, could be five days, couldn't

18 it?

19 A. Yes, and so what? As far as I'm concerned, it's okay. As I said

20 so many times before, I don't know about the dates.

21 Q. The "so what" quite simply is this: That you were the officer

22 told to go along and release those military police. And I would suggest

23 that in actual fact, that you, when you did that, knew perfectly well what

24 you were doing and what the consequences would be, namely the murder of

25 these people in Ovcara. What do you say to that?

1 A. Please. I'm saying that this allegation is completely wrong on

2 your part. Completely.

3 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Moore.

5 MR. MOORE: I have no further questions.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Bulatovic -- I think we'd better -- there are

7 ten minutes, Mr. Bulatovic. Would you like a break or would you like to

8 press on?

9 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we take our break now and then

10 I can continue after the break.

11 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume at 4.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 3.35 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Bulatovic.

15 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Good afternoon to everyone.

17 Re-examination by Mr. Bulatovic:

18 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Karanfilov.

19 A. Good afternoon.

20 Q. After the cross-examination by the Prosecution, I will ask you a

21 couple of questions in an effort to clarify a few things that are of great

22 importance to us.

23 Mr. Karanfilov, you remember that you talked to my learned

24 colleague from the Prosecution about the fact that that day in the

25 barracks, you had seen the buses and how long you had stayed there and

1 that after this event, you had gone back to the shelter and you said that

2 you had notified Mr. Sljivancanin. You were told that in some of your

3 statements you had said that this had been in negotiations; now you said

4 that it was at the shelter. Let us clarify now this: Where did you meet

5 Sljivancanin?

6 A. I met Mr. Sljivancanin near the shelter. I don't know the exact

7 location, but it was close. The reason why I say it was close, because

8 there was a possibility and there was, in fact the need for us to go back

9 to pick up the foreign licence plates on the car that was there at the

10 shelter. In the conversation with Mr. Sljivancanin, as far as I can

11 remember, it was stressed that this foreign vehicle was there and

12 according to some estimates, this vehicle cost about 3 to 400.000 German

13 marks and this is why it was very important for us to be in possession of

14 those licence plates.

15 Q. Mr. Karanfilov, I just wanted to know where the conversation took

16 place.

17 A. It was near the shelter.

18 Q. And then you went on to Belgrade; is that correct?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. From that time on, did you see Mr. Sljivancanin again at all?

21 A. No, not until his return to Belgrade.

22 Q. You spoke about your conversation with Marin Vidic and the fact

23 that General Tumanov appeared there. What I want to know is where this

24 conversation with Marin Vidic took place.

25 A. This interview with Mr. Bili was conducted in our office, in the

1 office where we were, in Negoslavci.

2 Q. Did you at any point conduct any interview with Marin Vidic in the

3 Vukovar barracks?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Regarding the questions by the Prosecutor that had to do with

6 Velepromet, you explained what you had said. Can you please give us the

7 reason why people avoided walking around Vukovar at night? What were the

8 reasons?

9 A. It was not just in Vukovar, in all war zones, when night falls,

10 for safety reasons, this is why you don't do that.

11 Q. Do you know if there was curfew in force?

12 A. I can't remember.

13 Q. The Prosecutor told you what Captain Vezmarovic had said regarding

14 your encounter, so you were told what Mr. Vezmarovic had said in 2001 and

15 every time you made a statement; is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Since 1991, after seeing Vezmarovic twice in that time, have you

18 ever seen Captain Dragan Vezmarovic again?

19 A. No, I have never seen him again. That was the only encounter, in

20 fact, the couple of minutes on those two occasions.

21 Q. And did you ever have the occasion to see him during those trials

22 to perhaps talk to him face-to-face to discuss some things?

23 A. No, never.

24 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we go into

25 private session now, please.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Private.

2 [Private session]

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 [Open session]

11 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.

12 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. You were given those tasks that are related to the hospital, the

14 departure towards the shelter and then on to Belgrade. Was warrant

15 officer Momcilovic with you at all times during that day?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I asked you, and I just realised the OTP asked you the same thing

18 while showing you something. In the briefest possible terms, can you

19 reproduce for us the exact sequence of events of your own activity from

20 the time the Mitnica Battalion surrendered to the time you left for

21 Belgrade? In the briefest possible terms, please.

22 A. Preparing the security for Mr. Pavkovic, our departure for the

23 area where the Mitnica Battalion were surrendering, first the preparations

24 then the negotiations then the actual surrender, followed by

25 suggestions --

1 Q. Slow down, please. I just want to know about the specific steps

2 that you took.

3 A. Conveying the --

4 MR. MOORE: I object to the objection in this form because it's

5 merely a rehearsal in evidence in chief. If there's a specific topic that

6 had been cross-examined on, my learned friend can certainly do that but a

7 rehearsal is certainly inappropriate.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Technically, Mr. Bulatovic, that is a valid

9 objection. You really, on your question, just asked a witness to

10 summarise what he's already told us.

11 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll accept that,

12 although I do think that Mr. Moore asked a lot of questions about the 20th

13 and tried to mention something, but okay. I'll try to tackle this in a

14 different way.

15 Q. Mr. Karanfilov, your departure for Belgrade, what do you associate

16 that with, any particular events?

17 A. I was going to the hospital, I was going back to the barracks, the

18 buses, the shelter, Belgrade.

19 Q. When answering the questions of Mr. Moore, and once you'd been

20 shown the evidence of witnesses who claimed to have seen you on the 20th,

21 you said these people were whitewashing or shifting their own blame to

22 someone else. Who do you mean?

23 A. All the people who claimed to have seen me there, those specified

24 by the OTP, whoever claimed to have seen me there.

25 Q. Why do you think Vezmarovic would possibly have a reason for doing

1 that?

2 A. First of all, Vezmarovic had to have been ordered by his own

3 superior --

4 MR. MOORE: I object. That just calls for speculation.

5 JUDGE PARKER: It's very close to one of your questions, Mr.

6 Moore.

7 MR. MOORE: I asked the question on the basis that people had

8 nominated or indicated that he was there and I asked whether, in actual

9 fact, he could think any reason why it is that they should be saying that.

10 The witness, for example, therefore must have an opportunity of saying,

11 let's us say, I had a fight with Vezmarovic over money and he owes me

12 money and it's a way of getting back. A witness must have an opportunity

13 of being able to clarify that point.

14 In re-examination, I would submit that that's a different issue.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Well, Mr. Moore, I don't think a distinction can be

16 drawn.

17 Mr. Bulatovic, the concern, though, is the question was put, as

18 I've indicated, very directly by Mr. Moore and the witness has answered

19 it. Are you just going over the same ground again?

20 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is not my

21 intention to waste any time, but my learned friend Mr. Moore asked about

22 the reason and the witness said those people were shifting the blame. I

23 just wanted that clarified, what exactly he meant by that, which might be

24 pure speculation on my part, so I'd be happy to give this particular

25 question up.

1 JUDGE PARKER: One thing, whether they may be trying to shift the

2 blame. A different issue is why they might do that and that's where

3 you're getting into speculation with the "why." Unless the witness knows

4 something and he has already told us he doesn't.

5 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation].

6 Q. Mr. Karanfilov, let's move on to something else. You saw an

7 officer on the afternoon of the 18th and on the morning of the 19th. Do

8 you know which unit he belonged to?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Did you know which unit was in the area where that building was

11 where they were put up?

12 A. Not at my level. I just knew that he was not one of my own unit.

13 Q. A military police company, what would be its numerical strength,

14 roughly speaking?

15 A. About 100.

16 Q. Is that --

17 A. Well, that depends.

18 Q. Would that be sufficient men to set up a security system for this

19 many people?

20 A. Quite.

21 Q. What about reservists? Or assume those people were reservists,

22 would that change things?

23 A. There are no reservists in time of war. Those people are

24 reservists in peacetime. The unit commander who was a police officer is a

25 reserve officer in peacetime conditions but as soon as he's mobilised, he

1 becomes an officer, not a reserve officer. A reserve officer is a

2 peacetime term.

3 Q. Does the same term apply to soldiers themselves?

4 A. Yes, all soldiers are members of the armed forces.

5 Q. In addition to your assignment about the shelter, did you have any

6 other assignments or tasks on the 20th?

7 A. No, none.

8 Q. You say that there were a number of people in the security organ.

9 You told us about their chain of command. What I want to know is, in the

10 JNA, was this chain of command complied with or respected?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You say that Radic came several times to where you were; right?

13 A. Not our office, our building.

14 Q. Can you tell me why?

15 A. Believe me, I don't know. All I can remember is the phone. I

16 assume that was the reason. That was the only line to Belgrade so maybe

17 officers came to our building to use the phone.

18 Q. The Prosecutor asked you about your relations with Radic. What

19 about your relations with Veselin Sljivancanin?

20 A. He was my chief for several months, not more. That's before the

21 actual combat operations and after as well. I was transferred after that

22 and our relations were of a purely professional nature.

23 Q. Did you have any other kind of relations with Mr. Sljivancanin

24 aside from your professional relations?

25 A. No, none.

1 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

2 I have no further questions for this witness.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Karanfilov, you will be pleased to know that

4 that ends the questions that are to be asked of you so you are now free to

5 leave. The Chamber would thank you for your attendance and for the

6 assistance you've given us and the court officer will show you out.

7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.

8 [The witness withdrew]

9 JUDGE PARKER: The next witness, Mr. Lukic.

10 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, can I just mention one matter to assist

11 my learned friends. With regard to Witness 002, we did, Your Honour,

12 suggest to see whether we could bring that witness in early next Monday

13 and I believe that may well be possible.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that, Mr. Moore. That will be

15 helpful. Could I also mention that it has proved convenient to the

16 listings for our proceedings this Friday to be moved to the morning, 9.00

17 to 1.45 instead of the afternoon. I had received indications that that

18 would be convenient to a number of people so we have been able to secure

19 that position. So Friday morning will be 9.00 to 1.45 instead of the

20 afternoon.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters could not hear Mr. Lukic on

23 account of the atrocious amount of background noise.

24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I thank my colleagues. My predictions

25 for this testimony were that it would take longer. Mr. Moore was talking

1 about five hours for Mr. Karanfilov in cross-examination. I was hardly

2 able to secure Mr. Karan's arrival.

3 [The witness entered court].

4 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. Would you please read aloud the

5 affirmation on the card.

6 WITNESS: MLADEN KARAN

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

9 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic has some questions for you.

13 Examination by Mr. Lukic:

14 Q. Good afternoon, sir, would you please state your name?

15 A. Mladen Karan.

16 Q. Where and when were you born?

17 A. The 16th of September, 1956, in Vojnic, Vojnic municipality,

18 Republic of Croatia.

19 Q. Mr. Karan, please bear in mind what I told you about during your

20 proofing, we have to pause after our questions and answers to ensure an

21 accurate record.

22 I will now go through your CV. Please confirm all of my

23 information for me, if you can.

24 You completed the military gymnasium or high school in 1975 in

25 Belgrade, as far as I know; right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It was in Belgrade that you attended the military academy for the

3 land forces, which you completed in 1979; is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Your first professional commitment began that same year. You

6 worked as a commander in a signals platoon for the army's command post in

7 the Bijeljina garrison; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. In 1986, you were off to work with the security bodies. You had

10 been a company commander with that signals unit previously but between

11 1986 and 1988, you were chief of security of the security branch of the

12 signals regiment in Sarajevo; right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Ever since you worked with the security bodies, between 1988 and

15 1989, you were the deputy chief of the counter-intelligence group of the

16 17th JNA Corps based in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In 1989, you start working with the security administration in

19 Belgrade and you work in the 1st Intelligence Department of the security

20 administration until the autumn of 1991; right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That's the period we'll be looking at. In the autumn of 1991, you

23 were captain first class; right?

24 A. Yes, 1991.

25 Q. Yes, that's right. From October 1991 to the summer of the

1 following year, roughly speaking, you were assistant chief of security for

2 counter-intelligence in the Guards Motorised Brigade, weren't you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Your next post is in the cabinet of the Federal Secretariat for

5 National Defence where you worked as a security desk officer within the

6 security department of the cabinet. You remained in that post until the

7 15th of October, 1993?

8 A. Quite right.

9 Q. Between 1993 and 1995, you were chief of security in the 21st

10 Kordun Corps of the Serbian Krajina army; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. BULATOVIC: [Interpretation] It's the Kordun corps, the

13 translation on page 44, line 6, K-o-r-d-u-n.

14 Q. This is the republic of the Serbian Krajina; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Following operation storm in the summer of 1995, you were back in

17 Belgrade for a couple of days. After this, you take up the post of chief

18 of security of the 11th Slavonia and Baranja Corps of the Serbian Krajina

19 Army in the town of Vukovar; right?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. You were there for about 20 days and then you were expelled, as

22 you told the OTP in your interview. You go back to Belgrade. Between

23 1995 and 2005, you occupied several different posts, but always with the

24 security department of the Ministry of Defence and the JNA, that is the

25 army of Serbia and Montenegro, which was the successor state at one point;

1 right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Finally, on the 1st of May, 2005, you retired with the rank of

4 colonel?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

6 Q. We can now move on to your actual evidence. There's just another

7 thing that strikes me as noteworthy and will probably make for the ease of

8 handling for everybody in these proceedings. You never provided any sort

9 of statement, any sort of official statement to anyone so far. And when I

10 say "official," I mean any official bodies in relation to Vukovar, of

11 course?

12 A. If you disregard yesterday, yes, that holds true.

13 Q. That's right. That's right. Yesterday was your first interview

14 to the OTP in their office; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. No paperwork for us.

17 Mr. Karan, which precise duties did you have in the security

18 administration in the autumn of 1991? Can you describe that for the

19 benefit of the Trial Chamber.

20 A. I can. I worked in the first operative department of the security

21 administration. My job was the monitoring of any activities by what we

22 called at the time the hostile emigration, which primarily concerned the

23 Albanians living abroad.

24 Q. Slow down slightly and speak up, please.

25 A. I was also charged with monitoring the activity of the legion

1 etrangere, or rather the members of that organisation.

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's correction, the foreign

3 legion.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As the Yugoslav crisis evolved, I

5 was tasked with monitoring what was going on in Slovenia, Croatia, and

6 Bosnia, as well as Montenegro and Macedonia. All the former republics

7 with the exception of Serbia.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation].

9 Q. This first section or department within the security

10 administration, why is it important? What particular importance does it

11 have?

12 A. That is the main section or the main department. It's called

13 operative. That means it deals with counter-intelligence work throughout

14 the former SFRY, specifically in JNA units and Territorial Defence staffs.

15 I mean their security organs, of course. It provides technical guidance

16 and is superior to everyone in this technical sense.

17 Q. In relation to your age and the rank you held at the time, what

18 was your position within that unit in relation to everyone else?

19 A. I was captain first class at the time and most of the other people

20 were lieutenant-colonels or colonels. However, as a result of the

21 circumstances that prevailed, I was the most junior officer that was

22 available, and that was it.

23 Q. Mr. Karan, I know that I may interfere with your concentration

24 when I say this, but please slow down when you give your evidence.

25 In the fall -- and perhaps you can be more specific about the time

1 frame -- were you given any new tasks? Were you dispatched to any

2 location, and who gave you this task?

3 A. Yes. In early October, I can't recall the exact date, I was

4 called by General Vasiljevic and General Tumanov, and the chief of the

5 first department, Colonel Gligorevic was also present so I was called to

6 come to Gligorevic's office and there, I learned that I was to get ready

7 and to depart for Vukovar the next day and to take the post of the

8 counter-intelligence section chief.

9 Q. In what unit?

10 A. In the Guards Motorised Brigade.

11 Q. Do you remember --

12 A. I did not have a lot of time to prepare, maybe 20, 30 minutes.

13 They told me that I know what I had to do and that I should authorise my

14 wife to collect my salary if I had not done that before, because otherwise

15 she would not have any means to support herself.

16 Q. Were you told what the objective was for your being sent there at

17 the time?

18 A. Yes. They told me that since I had experience in

19 counter-intelligence work, that I should improve the operation of the

20 counter-intelligence section in the Motorised Guards Brigade and my

21 perspective would be of use to this unit.

22 Q. Were you given any written decision or order for your

23 appointment?

24 A. No. They told me that the written order would follow and I didn't

25 really need it at all; the oral order sufficed, as far as I was concerned.

1 Q. And when did you receive this written appointment and who gave it

2 to you?

3 A. When we got back. In fact, during our activities in Vukovar, or

4 rather in Negoslavci at the command, that was the rear command post where

5 the personnel officers were located, I was asked when would I take up the

6 post officially and I said upon my return so this formal appointment to

7 the post of the deputy security chief, I received it once we got back. It

8 was in December 1991. Of course, I was given this written approval by the

9 brigade commander.

10 Q. Who, then, signed this written approval?

11 A. The security administration wrote the order but every time a

12 person is transferred, one needs the written approval of the commander of

13 the unit to which one is being posted.

14 Q. And what was the name of that person?

15 A. It was Colonel Mile Mrksic.

16 Q. Yes, of course, but we have to be precise.

17 Mr. Karan, do you remember what happened next? Did you go to

18 Vukovar? When? Where? How did you get there?

19 A. The next day, around 5.00 or 6.00 a.m., I left the Guards Brigade

20 compound at Topcider by truck and headed towards Vukovar. I arrived there

21 at around 11.00, first to the rear command post in the village of Berak

22 where the assistant to the commander for logistics received me. There

23 were also some other officers there. I told them the reason for my

24 arrival. And soon after that, I was taken in a military vehicle to

25 Negoslavci. That was the same day.

1 Q. And what was your final destination? Where did you go to in

2 Negoslavci and who did you find there?

3 A. My final destination was the house, the premises where the

4 security organ was located in the village of Negoslavci. And I have to

5 say that I waited there several hours to be received, two or three hours.

6 The police officer there would not allow me to get into the offices, first

7 because I didn't have the pass to get into the combat zone, and secondly,

8 I did not have any orders indicating that I was to take up my post.

9 This complicated the matters a little bit, as far as I was

10 concerned, because they wouldn't let me in, but when the chief appeared, I

11 mean Sljivancanin -- in fact I'm not quite clear about the sequence.

12 That's not really important, but perhaps I was allowed to get in a little

13 bit earlier before he arrived, but at any rate, we got introduced to one

14 another.

15 Q. You said that you introduced yourself to him and he to you, can I

16 then deduce that you did not know him from before?

17 A. No, I didn't know any of the officers in the Guards Brigade before

18 my arrival there.

19 Q. Can you give me the names of the people from the security organ

20 that you met and I can ask you just to be very slow when you give their

21 names and to give me also their tasks.

22 A. Major Sljivancanin was the chief of security in the brigade. I

23 met him there. Major Vukasinovic, his first name was Ljubisa, assistant

24 for staff security affairs. Captain Borce Karanfilov, desk officer. And

25 staff sergeant Zoran Momcilovic. He was the clerk. He was the assistant

1 to the desk officer. That's actually -- that was his title.

2 I think that when I got there, I actually did not meet

3 Captain Srecko Borisavljevic. I met him -- later on and I was told also

4 that there were some members of the security organ located in Belgrade,

5 Captain Petar Kovacevic and a warrant officer Grocic. Grocic did not come

6 because he had injured his leg and his leg was in a cast.

7 Q. Can you tell us in general terms very briefly as an assistant to

8 the chief of security for counter-intelligence work, can you tell us what

9 was your job description? What you were your tasks?

10 A. My task for as the assistant for counter-intelligence work is to

11 cooperate with my colleagues on identifying any signs that would indicate

12 the operation of any intelligence services, sabotage activities, command

13 activities, and other activities that may pose a threat to the unit and

14 its personnel.

15 To be more specific, it was my task to detect any threats to us,

16 the forms of those threats, who actually was behind those threats, and

17 what means are used to actually carry out those activities that posed a

18 threat. At the same time - let me finish, please - we were then supposed

19 to do something about it once we learned all that. And what do we do?

20 How do we counter those activities? What methods and means are we to use?

21 Who should be carrying out those activities within our team, in general,

22 and who has to do each specific stage of each task?

23 So that would be in brief what the counter-intelligence organ or

24 the security organ in the unit does.

25 Q. Now let us move on from the theoretical plain to the practical

1 one. Let us have some practical examples.

2 In your operative work, did you have any instances of any enemy

3 activities within Negoslavci that were of interest to you and that you

4 dealt with?

5 A. Of course. My colleagues told me about the problems that they

6 faced and their biggest problem was the radio station that was used to

7 guide the enemy fire against our positions and in particular, when some

8 persons -- this would happen when the helicopter would land on the helipad

9 to evacuate the wounded. So we took measures and quite soon we eliminated

10 this threat; in other words, we located the radio station.

11 Q. Were there any instances of defeatism, any instances of desertion

12 in the unit and was it important for you? Was it something that you

13 analysed and something that you had to respond to as a security organ?

14 A. Of course low morale, defeatism, and all the other forms of

15 anti-social behaviour were something that was of interest to us because

16 those kind of behaviour affected the combat readiness of the unit and, in

17 the final analysis, the successful execution of the missions.

18 Q. We will use documents to illustrate specific examples but let us

19 now move on. In your security department, did you have briefings, when

20 these briefings were held, how were they organised in the security organ

21 then?

22 A. Of course we had such briefings; they were called the daily

23 briefings. But it didn't mean that those briefings had to be held every

24 day. They usually took place in the evenings but sometimes they could

25 take place at other times of day, later or earlier, and sometimes there

1 were days when those briefings were not held at all.

2 Q. You had been in other units before your posting here as we saw

3 from your CV. When you joined this unit, can you please tell us, did you

4 notice any specific features, any peculiarities in the Guards Brigade that

5 differentiated from the other units, in particular when it comes to the

6 security organ and other parts of that unit?

7 A. Every former member of the JNA new that Guards Brigade was a

8 special kind of unit and that it had the kind of units that usually

9 belonged to the corps, that usually you would kind in a corps. It had two

10 platoons of the military police. That was not usual. You would not

11 usually find that in a brigade.

12 Q. I will not go into the relationship between the military police

13 and the security organ because this had been discussed before, but can you

14 tell me: You, as the security organ, the security section in the Guards

15 Brigade, who were you subordinate to? What organ?

16 A. In terms of our work, we were subordinate to the security

17 department of the federal-- cabinet of the Federal Secretariat of National

18 Defence.

19 Q. Did you have daily correspondence with them? Did you draft

20 reports and send them to them? Who drafted those reports in your section,

21 and what was the purpose of those reports?

22 A. The very purpose of the security service lies in reporting on the

23 security situation in the units within its purview to the superior unit

24 and we did this regularly, every day. There were also some reports,

25 urgent reports, and I was actually in charge of drafting those reports.

1 Q. And how did you actually do that? How did you draft those reports

2 and how did you send them?

3 A. At first, it was a bit difficult. I had to write them by hand

4 because my colleagues had not brought the typewriter with them. But as

5 far as I was able to see, these -- our superior command did not mind and

6 only later did we receive the typewriter and then we were able to draft

7 our official documents properly because these were official documents

8 and they had to comply with certain standards, both in formatting and

9 contents.

10 Q. Do you know what happened with your report? Who actually read

11 those reports?

12 A. Of course. Our reports were used when our superior officer in the

13 cabinet of the Federal Secretariat of the National Defence reported to his

14 superior. The security administration used our reports to exercise

15 command and control in the depth of the armies and other units and

16 formations.

17 Q. Can we have the first page of Exhibit 819 placed on the -- brought

18 to the screen?

19 Mr. Karan --

20 A. I can't see anything.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the usher to switch on the

22 screen in front of the witness, please.

23 We can see just one portion of it but I think that's what we

24 actually want to see.

25 Q. Mr. Karan, first of all, do you recognise the handwriting?

1 A. It's my handwriting.

2 Q. Please explain, what is this document about?

3 A. This is a daily operations report covering our activities. It's a

4 report we sent on the 12th of October, 1991 to our superiors in the

5 security department of the cabinet of the Federal Secretary of National

6 Defence.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the last page of

8 the B/C/S for a moment. It's page 10, I believe.

9 Q. Whose signature is that?

10 A. Mine. The initials too. It means I wrote it. This is a common

11 procedure with our documents. If this document had been typed up, it

12 would have contained the initials of whoever did so.

13 Q. What about the other reports, the following reports, in terms of

14 substance. Who produced those, if I may put it that way?

15 A. I myself produced over 9 out of 10 of those.

16 Q. And who signed them later on?

17 A. This is just a matter of circumstance. I mean the fact that this

18 particular one was not signed by the chief himself. Otherwise, it would

19 have been mandatory for the chief to sign a document being sent on to a

20 superior command. Major Sljivancanin was not physically present and the

21 matter was urgent and the document needed dispatching as soon as possible,

22 which is the reason I signed it, but normally he would sign these.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have Exhibit 820.

24 Q. First of all, in very general terms, what is it that we're looking

25 at?

1 A. What we're looking at is a written document from the security

2 department of the cabinet of the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

3 In duplicate, this is sent in duplicate to the aforementioned office.

4 This is in reference to intelligence about security in units, specifically

5 the units of the Guards Motorised Brigade.

6 Q. In terms of its substance, we covered this ground during our

7 proofing, does this document reflect what you had submitted to them in a

8 handwritten form?

9 A. Yes, it's an accurate reflection. There may be a word or two was

10 rephrased but the substance remains the same.

11 Q. Page 3, please. The B/C/S, halfway down the page. While we're

12 waiting for it to show up, Mr. Karan, in your work as an intelligence

13 officer, did you ever come across any situations involving arms dealing?

14 Was this something that you investigated, and who was involved in that

15 sort of activity?

16 A. Needless to say, we had such incidents in our area of

17 responsibility. Much to our surprise, these things were done by people

18 who, for professional and other reasons, were not supposed to be doing

19 things like that. We discovered that the Minister of the Interior of the

20 autonomous region was dealing in arms and another two or three of his

21 flunkies from Negoslavci. This was a serious problem not only in an area

22 of combat operations, but also further afield. If you have military

23 equipment and weapons being distributed commercially like that, it can be

24 used to place at risk people who were not affected by the actual

25 fighting. So this was one of our priorities.

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have the next page on

2 our screens now, please.

3 Q. Mr. Karan, let me ask you this: Muharem Besic, does that ring a

4 bell? If it does, please tell us something about that person.

5 A. I can't see anything on the screen yet.

6 Q. It's about to show up.

7 A. Yes, indeed. Muharem Besic, I'm familiar with this person. He

8 had the same rank as I at the time and we had been schoolmates and

9 classmates at the military academy in Belgrade. We established that

10 before my unit arrived in the Vukovar area, they had already left. And he

11 had unlawfully distributed some certificates to persons who weren't

12 authorised security officers. These certificates allowed them to, to all

13 practical intents, become security officers.

14 Of course, once we investigated this, we discovered that there had

15 been such a person in possession of such a certificate, and this person

16 had done things to his own design and not in keeping with the actual

17 rules and regulations. This was important for us so that's why we

18 informed our superior security officer. They informed the administration

19 and the administration did what they were supposed to do in a situation

20 like this.

21 Q. This report is based on another one previously produced by

22 yourself. There is reference here to a messenger of the Croatian armed

23 forces being killed by one of those persons in Vukovar; right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you remember when you produced this report, what status did

1 this person enjoy? Was this person captured, killed? What did your

2 information indicate about the status of this person at the time you found

3 out that the person had been killed?

4 A. This person was never a POW. But deep down inside, we knew what

5 had happened. But we just were told at one point that this had been

6 done.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We will no longer be requiring this

8 document.

9 Q. It seems by now to be an undisputed fact that some of the military

10 police units were involved in combat operations. Were you familiar with

11 Mr. Sljivancanin's position on the use of the military police in combat?

12 Did you know anything about that?

13 A. Yes. At our meetings, we had discussions about that, about the

14 fact that military police units were not being used for special purposes

15 in the fighting. So this is what Sljivancanin believed and our team

16 shared his position.

17 Q. Is not one of the tasks of every security organ to provide

18 technical assessments regarding the use of military police units?

19 A. Needless to say, the commander and the assistant commander must

20 advise on the possible use of the military police. They provide technical

21 advice, which is not necessarily accepted by the commander if the

22 commander himself believes that it is necessary to act otherwise.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please go into

24 private session for a moment, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Private.

1 [Private session]

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 [Open session]

18 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation].

20 Q. Tell us what you know about that, please.

21 A. As operations evolved, the situation in that unit became ever more

22 complex. At one point in time, there was a threat of the situation

23 degenerating into an open refusal to carry out orders, insubordination.

24 There was defeatism, morale was low. This was one of the forms that this

25 unsoldierly behaviour and conduct took on.

1 On the other hand, there was the unsoldierly appearance of

2 soldiers in that unit and such like.

3 Q. Did you react in any way to that?

4 A. Of course. We submitted reports on the situation daily in that

5 unit and we recommended that this situation be dealt with as soon as

6 possible. As for that particular task, Major Sljivancanin was

7 particularly involved more than anybody else, personally involved, since

8 he had a very good relationship, an excellent relationship, as far as to

9 say, with that particular commander; however other persons were involved.

10 MR. MOORE: I would wish my learned friend, if he would be kind

11 enough to just directly to the passages in the proofing notes that I've

12 received, because I cannot find anything at all in relation to this topic.

13 We have two proofing notes part one and two, they are both extensive.

14 If you could just show them to me, I would be very grateful. My

15 apologies.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I'm really glad to have my proofing

17 notes called comprehensive. We did our best, in the case of this

18 particular witness, who never provided any statements to anyone, to

19 practically put together a statement. Just a minute, please.

20 This is a fact that I forgot to mention in my proofing notes and

21 I'll just drop it. I don't think it's that crucial for the OTP to know

22 about this, since we've had a number of written documents about this. But

23 if the Chamber rules that I should not be asking any further questions,

24 I'll just drop this line of questioning. I was going to ask this witness

25 since he's the one who actually produced the documents.

1 Your Honours, the one thing I bore in mind was your guidance to

2 ask the most essential questions. The proofing notes contain over five

3 pages, very comprehensive material, and it may be an omission on my part.

4 If you believe that this is something that I should have stated, in that

5 case, I will just press on with a different line of questions.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE PARKER: Press on, Mr. Lukic.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. We weren't about to hear anything particularly new anyway.

10 Can you just finish telling us about Mr. Sljivancanin's action in

11 relation to this particular problem, Mr. Karan?

12 A. He took a lot of action, I'd say, in terms of convincing people

13 about things, in terms of seeing people, in terms of advising people.

14 That's as far as his personal involvement was concerned. Needless to say,

15 for our own part, we did some reporting and this became more important, as

16 a consequence. Our superior commands realised that this was a serious

17 situation in that particular unit. I would even go as far as to say, and

18 I know for a fact that the command itself, the brigade command, I mean,

19 was busy with this, was busy trying to overcome this problem.

20 So towards the end of the fighting, the situation sort of died

21 down.

22 Q. Fair enough. Thank you. In terms of the security organ, was

23 there a problem concerning the dismissal of reservists from the front

24 line, reservists being sent away before the remaining forces, and is this

25 a problem for a security organ to consider?

1 A. First and foremost, this poses a problem to those planning the

2 actual combat, and, of course, for us too, as a result, since there were

3 several hundreds of reservists who were ours, tried and true, so to speak,

4 these people leave the unit and there's a vacuum that's created and no one

5 to fill it.

6 Q. We looked at the war log. We looked at the entry where

7 Sljivancanin made some adjustments to artillery fire. Do you remember

8 anything specific about this adjustment? You, specifically, the work of

9 the security organ and this in particular.

10 A. Of course while I worked at the security administration, I told

11 you that I also covered Bosnia and Herzegovina. We received word at the

12 time that there were acts of sabotage in progress. Shells were being

13 produced in Travnik and in other factories across the country. By the

14 same token, we realised that there was a production line, at the time

15 shells being produced with the specific purpose of being used in Vukovar,

16 in fighting around Vukovar. This was a special signal both for us and for

17 our superiors. This could possibly have been defective ammunition.

18 Q. I'll ask you another question and then it might be time for our

19 second break. During your daily activities, where were you and where was

20 Mr. Sljivancanin, generally speaking, for as long as you were there? I'm

21 not sure if that makes sense. What was your daily schedule about --

22 A. I understand. I understand your question, all right. We agreed

23 at the outset that he, in his capacity as chief, would be at the command,

24 and would, of course, be spending time with us whenever joint activities

25 were being agreed, organised, or specified, whereas the rest of us were at

1 the security organ which was in a separate building.

2 Q. Throughout the month and a half that you were there, even less,

3 perhaps, in the Vukovar theatre of war, did you ever leave Negoslavci, so

4 to speak?

5 A. No, that was one of the things agreed initially. When I arrived

6 at the brigade, I faced an uphill struggle simply because I didn't know

7 anyone there. It was only natural and certainly more effective for

8 Major Sljivancanin to do the rounds of the units to try to see for

9 himself, as one should say, what the security situation was, as well as

10 any information relevant for our own assessments, for our analyses and for

11 our reports.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would now suggest that

14 we take our break. This session was a little bit unusual but I think it's

15 okay for us to take it now.

16 JUDGE PARKER: We resume at ten minutes to 6.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic.

20 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Karan, I will now move on to another topic

22 which is of interest to me and I think that you will be able to provide me

23 with some information. Let us move on now to the topic of the

24 relationship between the security organ in the Guards Brigade and other

25 security organs both in the vertical and in the horizontal axes. You

1 told me that your the security organ that was superior to you was in

2 fact the cabinet of the Federal Secretary for National Defence or rather

3 the assistant to the secretary of national defence for security, am I

4 right?

5 A. Yes, that was so both in technical terms and in terms of command

6 and control.

7 Q. So all the correspondence sent from you to that organ and sent

8 from other organs, the superior organs, and by that I mean primarily the

9 security administration, did it all go through the security organ of the

10 Federal Secretariat of National Defence, the SSNO?

11 A. There was no other channel for our documents apart from the

12 security section of the SSNO cabinet.

13 Q. During your tour of duty in Vukovar, did you ever have any

14 correspondence that you either sent or received from the security organ of

15 the 1st Military District in Belgrade or from their forward command post

16 in Sid?

17 A. No, we did not get or send any correspondence to them.

18 Q. While you were in Negoslavci performing this task, do you remember

19 whether the officers of the security organ from the 1st Military District

20 visited you? We know that they arrived on the 19th, in the evening of the

21 19th, but that's another story. But in the period until the fall of

22 Vukovar, until the 18th, do you recall anyone visiting you from there?

23 A. No. Or in fact sometime in mid-October -- in fact, no,

24 mid-November, the advance unit from the corps arrived. I think that they

25 belonged to the 1st Military District, if that's what you mean.

1 Q. We'll get to that later. Do you know if anyone from the security

2 organ from your section ever went to Sid or Belgrade to receive any

3 instructions or to report to the security organ of the 1st Military

4 District?

5 A. No.

6 Q. They didn't go or you don't know?

7 A. I'm sure that they didn't go.

8 Q. In the Operations Group South, were there other security organs

9 apart from the security section of the Guards Motorised Brigade?

10 A. Yes, there were.

11 Q. Can you now describe to us the relationship between your security

12 section and the security organs in the other units that were part of the

13 Operations Group South?

14 A. Yes, I can do that. The security organ of the Guards Motorised

15 Brigade was the security organ just for the Guards Motorised Brigade. All

16 the other units that were part of the OG South had their own security

17 organs. There was no chain of command from the chief of security in the

18 Guards Brigade leading down to the security organs in those other units.

19 In other words, the chief of security in the Guards Motorised Brigade was

20 not the superior officer for any security organ that was part of

21 Operations Group South.

22 Q. In order for your section and for your chief to become superior to

23 the other security organs, who can decide that? Who can make decisions

24 changing the structure and the chain of command in technical terms in the

25 security organ?

1 A. For the security organ in the Guards Motorised Brigade to become

2 the superior security organ for the entire Operations Group South, it

3 would first have to change its name from section to department and only

4 the Federal Secretary of National Defence or a person authorised by him,

5 that would be the chief of the security administration, could make such a

6 decision. That would have to be done in writing defining the structure of

7 the new security organ, its tasks, and the channels through which reports

8 would be sent.

9 Q. In your correspondence with the security department in the SSNO,

10 and the security administration through this department, did anyone ever

11 address your organ as the security organ of the OG South?

12 A. No, never, because we were never such an organ.

13 Q. In the reports and documents that you yourself sent to those

14 institutions, did you at any point state that you represented the security

15 organ of the OG South?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Do you remember if at some point during your tour of duty, whether

18 the 80th Motorised Brigade became part of the OG South, I mean the 80th

19 Motorised Brigade from Kragujevac and did you have any contact with its

20 security organ?

21 A. Yes, I think that some 10 days before the 80th Kragujevac Brigade

22 was to be deployed in Vukovar, we, at the section, were visited by two

23 representatives of their superior command, two security officers from

24 their superior command or rather that was the Kragujevac corps, I remember

25 clearly that this was Lieutenant-Colonel Zika Petrovic who had worked with

1 me in Bijeljina. He was the security officer there before I got there.

2 We then informed them of the situation in the field. In other words, we

3 presented to them the overall counter-intelligence situation that their

4 unit would face once it was deployed in the combat zone.

5 Q. Does the name Vukosavljevic Dragi mean anything to you?

6 A. Yes, I met him a few days after their unit was deployed in the

7 combat zone. He actually reported to us. In fact, he came to see us in

8 the security section.

9 Q. What was the purpose of his visit, if you remember, and what

10 happened then? Was there any conversation? Can you describe the

11 situation?

12 A. Well, he had come to the combat zone and quite naturally, security

13 officers should visit their opposite numbers in the other unit and we did

14 not present the situation for his unit in the field because he had already

15 been briefed by his superior command or, rather, by the security organ of

16 the Kragujevac Corps. So we had a brief exchange and we agreed that if

17 there were any problems, we would meet or talk, get in touch. Something

18 along those lines.

19 Q. During your stay in Negoslavci, did Dragi Vukosavljevic or,

20 indeed, any other security officer from the 80th Brigade or any other unit

21 give you any written or oral reports?

22 A. No, there were no oral or written reports.

23 Q. Did he or any other officer from that unit or similar units ever

24 get from you any task whatsoever? I mean technical instructions from the

25 security organ, so to speak?

1 A. No, we could not issue any tasks to them.

2 Q. Did he or any other security officer or organ from any other unit

3 that was part of OG South at any point attend any briefings of your

4 section?

5 A. No, never.

6 Q. What was the relationship between your security section and the

7 security administration? What was the chain of command there?

8 A. Do you mean in terms of reporting? In terms of reporting, we

9 first reported to the security department of the cabinet of the Federal

10 Secretariat of the National Defence and then they reported to the security

11 administration. According to our rules and regulations, we were not

12 supposed to send any reports or indeed to address the security

13 administration directly at any time.

14 Q. Thank you. Let me now touch upon a different topic briefly. Mr.

15 Karan, in the period while you were there, did you know if there were any

16 civilian authorities in Negoslavci and, if yes, which authorities were

17 there?

18 A. Yes. Throughout this period, we're talking about the period from

19 my arrival until the end of fighting or, rather, our pull-out back to

20 Belgrade, the local police station was operational and it had all the

21 necessary aspects of a police station. They had their police commander,

22 the duty roster, vehicle, communications equipment.

23 Q. And do you know which authority actually controlled its work,

24 under whose jurisdiction was it?

25 A. They were under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior,

1 and I guess that's who they reported to, but I didn't really get involved

2 in all that.

3 Q. Was that Boro Bogunovic, the Minister of the Interior that you

4 referred to?

5 A. Yes, yes, of course.

6 Q. As far as you know, what was the relationship between the military

7 authorities that you were part of, the military structure, and the police

8 station? Was it a relationship in which there was subordination? Was

9 that the nature of your relationship?

10 A. No, there was no subordination. They could not -- there could not

11 be subordination. They were the police and they carried out their own

12 tasks within their own purview.

13 Q. Do you know who was the police commander in this station?

14 A. There were two of them, one of them got killed. I can't recall

15 his name, but I do know that the other person's name was Kovacevic. Ilija

16 Kovacevic, that was his full name. He was a professional police officer.

17 He had graduated from the police school.

18 Q. We heard evidence here about the regime governing the movement of

19 all people in the zone of combat and in Negoslavci. Do you know whether

20 this police station was subjected to the same regime? Was there any

21 coordination here or not?

22 A. Let me be specific. The roots should, in a way, be under the

23 jurisdiction of the local police, but the situation in the combat zone in

24 Vukovar was such that they had to agree to a different regime because it

25 suited them in light of their -- the equipment that they had, for -- to

1 let our military police perform those tasks. I think that was a little

2 infringement of the actual jurisdiction of the local authorities.

3 Q. Were you able to cooperate well with them? Were you able to

4 communicate well with them, in general terms?

5 A. Well, we knew them and we changed information and so on, but we

6 didn't really interfere with their work.

7 Q. Thank you. Mr. Karan, what did you know about the Vukovar

8 Hospital during the actual fighting prior to the 18th of November? You,

9 as a security officer, did you have any information that you believed to

10 be important?

11 A. Of course. We had our own information that we retrieved in our

12 capacity as security officers. However, we also received guidance and

13 documents containing guidance from our superiors and from the security

14 organ of the cabinet of the federal secretary, things about the hospital

15 and about what happened in and around the hospital.

16 Q. What was the gist of these reports?

17 A. To put it in the simplest possible terms, the gist was that the

18 hospital was not only a hospital. Rather, reports suggested that it was

19 occasionally used as a place or a position from which fire was opened on

20 our forces.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have Exhibit 824 brought

22 up on our screens for the witness's benefit. Briefly, this is a covering

23 letter. Let's not dwell any more time than necessary on this. Can we

24 please go to page 2 of this exhibit. Halfway down the page, and the upper

25 half as well. Thank you.

1 Q. Mr. Karan, can you please comment on the second paragraph, the one

2 we are looking at? Does that bring to mind specific information of what

3 we are talking about now?

4 A. What I'm looking at is a document containing guidance or

5 instructions from the security organ to -- of the security administration

6 to the security organ of the Guards Brigade through the security section

7 or department of the cabinet of the Federal Minister for National Defence.

8 On the face of this document, you can see that they are informing us about

9 one of the defence centres of the MUP forces as being inside the Vukovar

10 Hospital and as holding certain ZNG members, while other members of the

11 MUP were still at the police station.

12 Q. When you received something like this, what does it tell you? How

13 do you use it for your intelligence work?

14 A. Well, first of all, this at any report is first of all brought to

15 the attention of your command and then all the units along that particular

16 axis down the chain of command. What do we use it for? We use it as a

17 foundation for any further assessments, for any of our

18 counter-intelligence assessments regarding the situation prevailing in the

19 area.

20 Q. Mr. Karan, the 18th of November, 1991, what does that tell you?

21 What is the first thing that springs to mind?

22 A. The first thing that springs to mind is Vukovar actually fell that

23 day, which means our units took the town.

24 Q. Let me ask you briefly: Is there any personal recollection that

25 you associate with that date, something you did on that date? We talked

1 and we didn't find out much, but do you remember yourself doing anything

2 in particular on that day?

3 A. The 18th, you say?

4 Q. Let me try to be a little more specific. Did you do anything

5 about the surrender of the Mitnica Battalion?

6 A. No, I was in no way involved in that. No.

7 Q. I'll move on to the following day. During your actual proofing, I

8 was not able to obtain from you anything that was helpful at all in terms

9 of this testimony. It was different with the 18th. But can you tell us

10 whether on the 19th, you went to the Vukovar Hospital? When? Can you

11 tell us what you remember about that?

12 A. I did go there, yes. I went to the Vukovar Hospital because I was

13 told by Major Sljivancanin to go there. I think I arrived sometime after

14 lunchtime, at about 2.00 or 3.00 p.m. It has been 15 years, after all,

15 and I haven't exactly been rehashing this since the events at the time and

16 it's very difficult to be very specific about the time line.

17 Q. When you got to the hospital, who did you find there? Who did you

18 see, describe the scene? How did you get there?

19 A. I got there from Negoslavci. I took the road to Vukovar. A

20 driver who knew the way took me there. When I came there, I found men

21 from our own unit. More specifically, members of the police. Inside, I

22 met Captain Simic and I knew that he was the commander of the unit that

23 was in and around the hospital.

24 Q. Was there an exchange between the two of you? What happened?

25 A. It was a brief exchange between us and one thing that struck me as

1 noteworthy is he pointed out a passerby and said: This is Dr. Njavro,

2 just for you to know.

3 Q. Why did that strike you as noteworthy, him mentioning that name or

4 that person? Why do you think he did that?

5 A. Because over the previous days and weeks, we had been talking

6 about the Vukovar Hospital doctors and about the way the hospital was

7 organised, who was in charge, who were the doctors, that sort of thing.

8 And Njavro was a familiar name had that had cropped up many times before

9 but I didn't know what this man actually looked like.

10 Q. What happened next?

11 A. I parted ways with Simic soon after. I stopped Dr. Njavro to

12 inquire about a schoolmate of mine who was also working as a doctor at the

13 Vukovar Hospital.

14 Q. Can you share his name with us? I mean your schoolmate that you

15 asked Njavro about?

16 A. Radomir Dejanovic.

17 Q. Can you repeat that name for us?

18 A. Radomir Dejanovic.

19 Q. Why did you want to know about that person in particular?

20 A. We were schoolmates for four years in high school. I know he was

21 a resident of Bobota. I had been at his wedding and I knew that he was

22 now an employee of the Vukovar Hospital. I was curious to know what had

23 become of him.

24 Q. What did Njavro tell you, do you remember that?

25 A. He said he had left for Borovo Selo.

1 Q. What happened next?

2 A. Major Sljivancanin called me and asked me to go to a specific room

3 in the hospital grounds, it's a small room right next to the hospital

4 entrance.

5 Q. Who did you see there, tell us about it?

6 A. I saw Dr. Bosanac, Vesna Bosanac, who was a familiar name and

7 face. I had seen her face on TV previously so I recognised her

8 immediately. Mr. Sljivancanin told me that I should stay with them in

9 that room, since there were a number of other people there, and to watch

10 them, to put it in the simplest possible terms.

11 Q. And then?

12 A. I approached this driver who was also a military police officer.

13 I told him to stand at the door, to watch the door so that nobody would

14 disturb us inside. The atmosphere was such that it was impossible to

15 avoid such a conversation, so Dr. Bosanac started introducing all these

16 people to me which was the first time I ever set eyes on this person that

17 she said was Marin Vidic, Bili. I had imagined him quite differently.

18 His hair was unkempt, he was unshaven, he was thin as a rake and blond.

19 The other person he named was Anton Avric who was a paramedic who had

20 arrived from Zagreb to help out. She introduced Njavro, she hadn't

21 realised that I had met him before.

22 We stayed in that room for about an hour. It's difficult to be

23 specific. I know, because at one point, I allowed Dr. Bosanac to use the

24 phone, but only over the interphone so that I, too, was able to monitor

25 the conversation. There is one thing that I'm forgetting. That sticks

1 with me. I became angry immediately, even before the whole thing began.

2 There was a foreigner there, a tall man, long, blond hair from the Red

3 Cross with a white coat. I learned later that this was the ICRC

4 representative there, Borsinger.

5 Another thing that struck me at the time. In my presence,

6 Dr. Bosanac gave the ICRC man some documents. I became quite angry and

7 informed Sljivancanin immediately that she had provided this man with a

8 list of some kind. We didn't know what this list was about. It looked

9 like a list of names. And then Sljivancanin said: Here, I have one too

10 that I got from her. She told me this was the same list as the one she'd

11 handed to the ICRC man previously. She said that the two lists were

12 consistent.

13 Needless to say, I was none too happy about this. I said I didn't

14 think it was a good thing that we didn't know what she had actually given

15 him but as far as I remember, Sljivancanin said well that's all right. I

16 just leave it like that. We're not taking it away from them now. I

17 assume that he believed that the list given to the ICRC man was the same

18 list that she had given to us. I had a look and I realised that it was

19 nothing at all like the list that had been given to the ICRC man. It

20 struck me more as a more minor list containing names of persons. Names

21 were crossed out on it, names were added to it, and copied. It seemed

22 like somebody was playing a random game using a telephone directory.

23 That's what it looked like. It was of little, if any, use to us.

24 Sljivancanin left and I stayed with them. We started talking. In

25 the meantime, Dr. Bosanac had picked up the phone twice. Calls from

1 Vinkovci, I assume, from the Vinkovci operations zone. I think there was

2 a call from Zagreb, too. It was Hebrang's secretary.

3 While I was with them in that room, Dr. Bosanac surprised me by

4 doing something in particular, something that under the circumstances was

5 not appropriate. She asked me about my name. I said, "Mladen." "Where

6 are you from," she said. "Petrova Gora," I replied. She thought that I

7 was from the Petrova Gora in Vukovar, I assume. Since she believed me to

8 be a Croat from Vukovar, she said: "Help. Help us," without explaining

9 what exactly what she meant.

10 During those conversations, I interrupted her conversation with

11 Zagreb, the secretary wanted to know who was on the line and I was angry

12 about her inquiring. She even order offered to me a rank in the Croatian

13 army, major general, the rank of major general, as some sort of a bribe,

14 this secretary, which really riled me. She didn't really provide any

15 details of what I would be expected to do or how I was expected to help.

16 She just said, "Help us."

17 On the other hand -- there were four of them, right. They often

18 looked up to the ceiling, there were some books or documents apparently on

19 top of a shelf. There was a huge black bag which looked a bit like a bin

20 liner to me. It was quite big and quite black. I looked in the same

21 direction and my take was there was something there that was concealed.

22 The first thought that struck me, it might be something that was likely to

23 put me at risk. I said: "What is it?" They failed to answer. At my own

24 risk, I climbed a chair and pulled the bag down. I opened the bag and

25 realised that there was a large number of bank notes inside, money. I

1 immediately informed Major Sljivancanin about this. He replied: "What

2 shall we do about that?" And I said, based on my previous experience, as

3 soon -- as it's money, the best thing is to be rid of it as soon as

4 possible because people start talking in no time at all.

5 I suggested for this money to be handed over to some sort of a

6 commission to be counted. I suggested that a report be drafted and that

7 we wait for further instructions from our superior security organ.

8 Q. Before you continue, did you ask Bosanac and the other people

9 where that money was from?

10 A. Yes, of course. I asked her who this money belonged to and she

11 said that this was the money from the -- of the Crisis Staff, and I

12 immediately got this idea that I should really check whether the Serb

13 doctors had received their salaries too, because she said that these were

14 -- this was the money for the salaries of the Crisis Staff. And then I

15 went to the room where the Serb medical staff from the hospital was, where

16 they gathered, and I asked female doctor whether they had been receiving

17 salaries in the previous period and she said, "No, we haven't."

18 Then I complied with -- after Major Sljivancanin said that he

19 agreed with my suggestion, telling me to immediately go to Negoslavci to

20 set-up the commission that would count the money and then report to the

21 superior security organ and that's what I did.

22 Q. Can you please tell us, this room where the Serb medical staff

23 was, where was that room in relation to the room where you were with

24 Dr. Bosanac and the others?

25 A. You had a line of vision from one room to the other. Let me

1 explain this. This was a quadrangular hallway and, if you walked into the

2 hospital, the room where with Dr. Bosanac was to the right and this other

3 room was a small room to the left on the ground floor in the lobby, in

4 fact, as far as I can remember.

5 Q. Apart from these two rooms that you said you visited, did you go

6 to any other places in the Vukovar Hospital on that date?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Can you tell us, when did you leave the hospital, not the exact

9 time, but whether it was after nightfall, dusk, daytime?

10 A. It was in the late afternoon. I think dusk, 5.00, 4.00, 6.00

11 p.m., I can't really remember.

12 Q. Fine. We're not asking you to. During that evening and night,

13 did you go to the Vukovar Hospital?

14 A. No, I did not.

15 Q. Thank you. Does the name -- Dr. Stanojevic and Dr. Ivankovic, do

16 these names mean anything to you?

17 A. Yes, these are the doctors that worked in the hospital.

18 Q. Do you know their ethnic background?

19 A. They were Serb doctors. They were ethnic Serbs.

20 Q. Thank you. Does the name Bogdan Kuzmic mean anything to you?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Nikola Dukic?

23 A. No.

24 Q. During your stay in the hospital on that day when you got in and

25 got out and in the area where you actually were, were you able to see any

1 other members of the Serb forces, the Territorial Defence, the volunteers,

2 apart from the JNA?

3 A. No. Apart from Major Simic's unit, I didn't see anyone else. In

4 fact, I assumed that the personnel there were members of his unit and

5 there were no other units there.

6 Q. What did you upon your return to Negoslavci?

7 A. I set up this commission. He we did what we were tasked to do.

8 We drafted the report for the security organ of the cabinet of the Federal

9 Secretary of National Defence and we waited for the chief to come in order

10 to report to him on our daily activities. This was the regular briefing

11 that we did almost every day, because he needed to be briefed on what the

12 other security organs had been doing.

13 Q. So did you see Sljivancanin that evening?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you receive your tasks for the next day then, if you can

16 recall what were you talking about and who was given which task?

17 A. Yes, I remember that our task for the next day -- I mean our

18 counter-intelligence activities was related to the evacuation of the

19 wounded and the sick from the hospital. Now, if your question was what my

20 task was, then I can tell you that Sljivancanin told me that the two of us

21 would go to the hospital in the morning and that persons or rather

22 security officers from the security administration would go with us to

23 assist us. In other words, he informed me that some people from the

24 security administration would come and that a group of doctors from Novi

25 Sad would also take part in this task, seven or eight doctors.

1 Q. Did he tell you at that time what tasks would have to be done in

2 the hospital, what lay ahead for you?

3 A. When he issued the tasks, he told me that I would be there to make

4 sure that the doctors would be able to perform a selection of the wounded

5 and so on. We knew - we had received information that in the previous

6 days, and in fact even after the 18th, after the surrender of the Mitnica

7 Battalion - those who did not want to surrender had withdrawn to the

8 hospital and that they were dressing up as medical staff or that they were

9 pretending that they were injured.

10 Q. You, as a security officer, as a counter-intelligence operative,

11 you have this kind of information. What does this information mean to you

12 in terms of organising the evacuation of the wounded and the sick, and the

13 circumstances in which this evacuation would take place?

14 A. This means that there is a high level of risk because we did not

15 know anything about the intentions of those people, why they had come to

16 the hospital, and we had previous intelligence that they were armed and we

17 knew that these were the most extreme elements because they had refused to

18 surrender. This was a high-risk situation that required us to address

19 this task in a very serious manner and I think that the very presence of

20 the doctors, the presence of the security officers from the superior

21 command really showed how important this was.

22 Q. At that meeting with Mr. Sljivancanin, was there any discussion as

23 to what would be done with the persons who were hiding among the medical

24 staff or the wounded?

25 A. Mr. Vukasinovic, Ljubisa Vukasinovic. The task was to transfer

1 those persons to the barracks and then from the barracks to transfer them

2 immediately to Sremska Mitrovica. And I have to note here that I did not

3 perform the triage. This was not my task. It was my task to make sure

4 that the doctors doing the job would do that in such a way, in a safe

5 environment, in other words, that nothing would happen to those doctors.

6 Q. Do you remember what tasks were issued to your other colleagues

7 for the next day? Did they have any tasks pertaining to this evacuation

8 or what?

9 A. As far as I can remember, Captain Karanfilov was supposed to go to

10 the shelter that had been used by the commander of the defence of Vukovar

11 and to gather the documents there and to inventory the things that could

12 be found there in those premises.

13 Q. Mr. Karan, at that time, did you hear about the Zagreb Agreement,

14 as we call it? Did you hear that there had been negotiations going on

15 about the evacuation of the wounded and the sick from the hospital between

16 the ministry -- the health ministry in Zagreb and the JNA?

17 A. No, I don't know anything about that.

18 Q. In those days, were you told that negotiations had been going on

19 in Negoslavci between some JNA officers on the one side and the ICRC and

20 the ECMM regarding this very same issue?

21 A. No. I did not really analyse any events that were in the public

22 domain, so to speak. I don't know much about that, because I had other

23 tasks.

24 Q. Did you, perhaps, see Vesna Bosanac that evening? Do you know

25 what happened to her?

1 A. No. When I left the hospital, I didn't see her.

2 Q. Do you know if anyone else had talked to her?

3 A. Yes, I know that Major Sljivancanin talked to her because he told

4 us that later, sometime after the briefing that we had, that was the very

5 short briefing. I assumed that from there, went to the command -- he

6 didn't tell us where he was going, at any rate.

7 Q. At any rate, you did not see her?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Did you see anyone else who was brought to the building where your

10 section was?

11 A. Yes. Marin Vidic, Bili, was brought there.

12 Q. Can we now hear from you about this event. When was that? What

13 happened?

14 A. Well, I can't really remember because of the time that has

15 elapsed, at what time it happened. I am sure that this was before

16 midnight, maybe an hour or two hours before midnight. I know that because

17 I know at what time we had briefing. It was maybe an hour or two hours

18 after the briefing.

19 He was brought there to the offices of the security organ in

20 Negoslavci. And since I knew him from before, I had already talked to

21 him. He was offered a seat. And he is the kind of man that adapts fairly

22 quickly to a new environment. And he was able to create a relaxed

23 atmosphere if you compare it to the atmosphere would be able to create,

24 especially in circumstances where that person would be arrested.

25 He asked for something to drink, some refreshments, and it was

1 interesting for me to note that he had his guitar with him. We allowed

2 him to keep it. We didn't really mind. And the fact that had he brought

3 his guitar with him and the fact that he was so relaxed in his

4 communication with us -- we knew that he was the government commissioner,

5 but what really surprised me was that spoke against his erstwhile fellow

6 thinkers in political terms. He criticised the official policy of his

7 government. He spoke against Tudjman, and I felt that this could be put

8 to some use in propaganda terms, and I immediately called the forensic

9 technicians asking hem them to record that and he agreed to being

10 recorded. I thought that if such a tape could be provided to the Belgrade

11 TV in Serbia, that some effects could be achieved, some positive effects.

12 So, as all this equipment was being set up, I asked him: If you

13 can play the guitar, I'm sure you can sing too. And I have no doubt that

14 he's a top-notch singer in his own right, I can say that much.

15 Q. Who was with you there throughout this time?

16 A. Captain Karanfilov, in and out of the room, but he was with us

17 most of the time. I was there, the forensic technician who was supposed

18 to do the recording, I think his name was Cekic, and later on, Major

19 Sljivancanin joined us soon after Marin Vidic had been brought in. We had

20 hardly started this little activity that I had come up with. Sljivancanin

21 talked to him briefly between the songs that he sang for us.

22 In the meantime, as all of this was going on, General Tumanov and

23 General Vasiljevic arrived. I hadn't realised that they were actually in

24 the combat zone or there. One thing that was striking is that one of them

25 refused to exchange greetings with him.

1 We stayed there for a while talking. It was more about the

2 political situation in Croatia and the decision of the Croatian

3 authorities to declare the JNA an occupation army. We tried to explain

4 that there was no way we could be an occupation army in our own country,

5 that we were not the enemy of the Croatian people. Needless to say, he

6 agreed with us at this time.

7 That's where our conversation was headed. We knew that he was a

8 political figure, someone appointed by the Zagreb-based government, that

9 sort of thing.

10 Q. Was he at one point taken away from there or did he stay with you

11 throughout?

12 A. No. We dropped this idea of mine. I think Vasiljevic was the one

13 who didn't want that or someone. Anyway, the idea was dropped. They said

14 there was no need to do anything like that where it might even be a

15 damaging thing for our public image, somebody said. So we decided to do

16 something more earnest, more serious. We decided for him to give a

17 statement to the police which would carry some weight later on.

18 Q. Just to explain something. The forensic technicians, that

19 particular department, which unit did they belong to?

20 A. The Guards Brigade military police.

21 Q. Another one and a half questions and we'll be wrapping up for the

22 day.

23 Mr. Karan, where was Mr. Sljivancanin sleeping throughout his time

24 in Negoslavci?

25 A. We were all in the same room, crowded, all of the security

1 officers. This was a room adjacent to the room in which we worked. We

2 worked out that this was the most practical thing for us to do and we were

3 all there with the exception of his driver, who was in a different room in

4 the same building.

5 Q. That evening, once Sljivancanin had arrived, which you say

6 occurred soon after Marin Vidic had been brought in, did he leave the

7 building again that evening, Mr. Sljivancanin?

8 A. No, he didn't. We all slept there and the next morning, we all

9 woke up. Actually, I was the one who woke everybody else, since I am an

10 early riser myself, and we were off to Vukovar.

11 Q. Thank you very much.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think this is a

13 perfect moment for us to call it a day.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

15 We adjourn now to resume tomorrow at 2.15.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 29th day of

18 November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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